Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1862-12-09

from Harrison's LaDdDg against Gen. McClsl-
lan's earnest remoDAtrances is reason which
reflects the highest diecredt on the admin stra-
ton. By the showing Of Gen. Hailsck him
sell, the controlling reason why Gen. McC ie'l.n
was Withdrawn wss that the administration
could not furnish him the reinforcements he re-
qured Tor che execution OF his own plans II
Gen. Mcclellan would have advanced against
Richmond with q reinforcement of twenty
thousand, his Wi'bes would have been Occeded
t.; but as he would not u deftuk ke the ,ptute
Of that city from III arrisoD's lnding without
fifty thousand, Or a. least thirty five thVu aud,
his judgment was OvcIruled eud bis army wi h.
Dr. wa. CAL Of our plans," wrote Gen. Hal
lck 70 him, rec quire reinfoIcemeps, when it
Is Impossible 70 give you IL 10 very eisy 10
ask Tor reiuforcemsuts, but IL 10 not so easy 10
give them when you have no diepOsabIe forces
at your command'' The confederation on
which the army WAS withdraw was me- ely a
qiestion OF Is 900 men: the President off ,rlng
20 600 men, and General McCItl il N r,qulr Dg
35 000 ss the miOimum with Whicn he vas will,
lug to undertake the capture ol r ch moDd -
Nov uhose fault oas IL that lhese Is 000 troops
could nos Dc ADDED 70 an army in ttrOng posi-
ton within tWenly-fy mies Of the rebel capi-
tsl-nearer than any Union army seems likely
to be again for agfeat while to come. How did
Il happen that 30 petty O matter as difference
Of l5,OOO men was the controlling reason which
broke up the we'll -considered plan of Gen. Nc
ClellaD, and substituted another IN which he
had no confidence, and Wnic, proved 10 iscI TO
disastrous that full employment is now found,
not for Is, 900 more men, but for foItg limes
10 .000-that Deing the amount Of the Two new
levIes2 Who 10 responsible for the inability to
furnish the reiniorcements which would have
rendered McClellsn's campaign against Rich
mond success2 Not Gen McCe Ian himself,
most certainly, who has never underrated the
enemy's power of resistance, and who, at be
very outset OF his campaign, eatiy in be spring,
was deprived CT portion oil he men be thought
necessary 10 ouccess. About this time total
stop was put TO enlistments, on the ground that
our army was large enough. Nobody has ever
claimed that this blind aud fatal step Was taken
at the instsnce of Gen. Mcclellan; il was the
act OF those who Withheld from him the corps
oil Mcdowell, which he thought essential TO
the success OF his plan in the peninsula; IL was
tho act of those who continued to deny bis re-
quests for reinforcement from that day till the
date OF the order Tor bis withdrawal from Har-
rison's Landiug IL 10 the height Of absurdiy
for the administration to txcuse i,self from
furnishing coDtessedy needed reinforcement T.
on the ground that they bad not the men 10
give, when the lack was owing 10 nothing but
their own folly in stopping eulIs!mente; an act
of which they afterward were 90 ashamed that
tbey durst not encounter The public derso on they
we're conscious Of deserving IN osllibg Tor vast
armies so toln sftei ward, aud resoted to the
trick OF getting the SAFE Governors 10 Gduise
them TO make the csll.
Gen. HAleck thinks the Pope campaign was
the next best thing to a complete success, iDas-
m Ich as the enemy did not &C ualls capture The
q ilionai capital! His precise language is:-
''Athough this short aud active campaign w4r,
from csuses slresdy referred to, lese successful
| than we had reason to expect. it had Scc0m-
pils bed The great aud important object OF cover
ing the capital till troops couo be colleceJ
its defense' Bus was IL not owing 20 Tbs
"shott and active campaign" that the capital
was ever in any danger at ALL The merit of
the rescue b,longs wholly to Gen Nc jl,lIsn;
' : bu"deriuP campaign which caused the peril
, n.s uod ,rsak en- against his advice aud In disre-
gard Ot his remonstrances
Lee s n1my pentursd into nti9hborhood of
WARRINGTON only uh.n Merielldn's army uoas
II y,infoy cements had been sent 10 fhe James TueT
no hO,ps Doufd haue been needed about Washing.
ton ezetpt gar,isons for its fO,ts.
| The oDly serious charge ag iiast Gen. McClel-
Ian in this report is that he vas dlatory in
obeyiug the orders of the p eel eni, e tst 10
| Withdrawing his command from HArrison's
Laudpg, and again in marching against Gen.
Lee in Virginia, after the battle OF Antietam.
There is uDfairness and sophistry in General
Haileck's way of urgiog both these complaints.
| He says that II was eleven days after McC;el
Ian received The order TO evacuate Harrisoa's
Landing before his army began TO move. Bat
the fIai order, In reply to McClellan's remun-
ctr ance, was written on the of August, and
as 1t was not sent by telegraph could not have
been received by Gen. Mcclellan before the lib
or 8 b, and his army was moved on the l4,b.-
We mention this as a specimen of the uufiir-
ness aud over. statement whioh run through the
report What justice is there i'll contrasting
Barnside's promp,ness in moving from Newport
News to Acquia Creek with the timo cJns umed
by Mcclellan in SithdrawiDg from Hsrr,sOns 9
l. .nding2 Had Burnside an army Of $4,000
men2 Was it necessary for him to make thai
most delicate and perii0us OF all military muve-
ments, q retreat ia the face Of superior force
Ought Mcclellan to have retired without the
rea souabe precautions and ripe preparation
which incurred the safety Of his army7 IL ls a
signal proof Of his military prudence and ca.
pacity that he brought his army away without
the s,crifce of a man, or OF any portion OF hs
valuable stores and munitions of war. For his
delay after the battle OF AnIietam he gave as
reason tnat the WRbL3 OF MS army were nIl
sessonably supplied by the auth rites at Wash
ington. The attempt TO show that this clm
plant was not we'll founded will make no i'm.
preston on the public at THE late day, wher
Gen Burnside, in c)mmsnd of the came army,
has been notorously delayed from the same
oiuse Till his campaign 10 likely TO prove q
failure. The same men remain q charge u
the came departments; II they wers 8, en- Ii ly
) Efficient in Forwarding supplies t. Gen NC D.
Ian, how does it happen that they all Of sud
den become such incompetent aud imbeclle do
no,hings. u supplying Gen. Burnside ..
Gen d .lleck q report is an unsuccessful at
tempt to defend the indetersibe Pope campaign
Gen. Haleck feels for that grea,est blunder oil
the war (Which he planned himseli something
of the doing affection of father for his de
formed aud missbapen offspring. But all hit
| military knowledge, sided By all his ability as
4 lawyer, cannot go far make the worse sppeal
Q the better reason as to convince the countr!
' that IL WAS q merit to attraci to the very gate
Of w ashiDgton victorious army which nigh
/ have been beaten 10 defense OF it's own capital
When she country reads Gen. Halleck's com
Iplaint that Mcclellan did not more speedil!
drive Lee back from the Potomac, is will 10
auire, Who 10 responsible for Lees getting q
the Potomac7 Who but the organizer OF th
8 aoortive and disastrous camp.igu whioh relieve
D the rebel lJarmy OF employment nearer home7-