Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-12-15
From the New York World Dec. l.
General Haileck's Report-A Search.
ing Analysis.

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| ignominious figure in history that the President
forbOre all mention of military matters in his
nual message rather than allude to so mortifying
a topic, and the Secretary of War, equally tender
of coming to particulars in relation to that dis
astrous exhibition Of incompetent Generalship,
deputed TO Gen. Halleck the task of apologizing
for that most discredtable part of the history of
the war.
The whole thing was such palpable and gi-
gantic blunder that any defense of il by nom
military men, like Mr.. Lincoln or Mr.. Stanton,
would have made little impression on the public.
So bad case required good advocate and to
Gen. Halleck was committed the task of defend
ing the Pope campaign. Gen. Mcclellan had
considered that campaign a great military error
from its inception; he had protested against it
with great earnestneSs and argumentatve force;
and so General H4lleck, Ielapsing into the habits
of the San Francisco bar-of which he is a mem
ber-attempts to strengthen his defense of a weak
causeby casting imputatOns on the counsel for
the prosecution.
n careful examination of Gen. Halleck' elab-
crate apology will show that he had better have
initiated the dscrete reticence of President Lin
coin and Secretary Stanton. Passing over the
mass OF subordinate details by which General
Halleck attempts to confuse the perceptions of
his readers, and coming at once to the pith ofthe
subject we shall make it evident that the con-
trolling reason for Withdrawing the army from
HarriSOn's Landing against Gen. McClellan's
earnest remOnstrances, is a reason which reflects
the highest discredit on the Administration.
By the showing of Gen. Halleck himself, the
controlling reason why Gen. Mcclellan was with
drawn that the AdministI alton could not
furnish him the reinforcements he required for
the execution of his own plans. If Gen. Nc
Clellan would have advanced against Richmond
with reinforcement OF twenty thousand, his
wishes would have been acceeded to; but as he
r
Harrison's Landing without fifty thousand, or at
least thirty-tive thousand, his judgment was over
ruled and his army Withdrawn "All of your
plans, wrote Gen. Haleck to him, require
Inducements, whcn il is impossible to give yOu
Ii is very easy to ask for renfOrcements, but it
is not so easy to give them when you have no
diSposable forces at your command" The con-
ditOn on which the army was withdrawn was
merely question of Is 900 men; the President
Offering 81, 900 and Mcclellan requiring 80 900
as the minimum with which he was willing to
undertake the capture of Richmond Now whose
fault was it that these 900 troops could not
be added TO an army in a strong position within
within twenty FIVE miles of the rebel capitol
nearer than any Union army seems likely to be
again for a great while TO Gomez How did il
happen that SO petty matter a difference of
5000 men was the controlling reason which
broke up the well considered plan of Gen. Nc
Clellan, and substituted another IN which he had
no confidence, and which proved in fact so dis
a$trous that full employ ment is now found. not
for 5000 more men, bpt for forty times 900
that being the amount of the two new levies!
Who is responsible for the inability to furnish the
reinforcemehts which would have rendered Nc
Cleans campaign against Richmond a success?
Not Gen Mcclellan himself most certainly who
has never underrated the enemy's power of
sstance, and who, at the very outset of his cam
paign, early in the spring, was deprived of a
portion of the men he thought necessary to
success.
About this time total stop was put to the en-
listments. on the ground that our army was large
enough Nobody bae ever claimed that this
blind and fatal step taken at the Instance of
Gen. Mcclellan Ii was the act of those who
withheld from him the corps of Mcdowell, which
he thought essential to the success of his plan in
the Peninsula; it was the act OF those who con-
timed to denv his requests for reinforcements
from that day till the date of the order for his
withdrawal from Harrison's Landing. 1t is the
height of absurdity for the Administration TO ex-
cuse itself from furnishing confessedly needed
reinlorcements on the ground that they had not
the men to give. when the lack was owing to
nothing but their own folly in stopping enlist
ments; an act of which they afterwards were SO
ashamed Of that they burst not encounter the
public derision they were conscious OF deserving
in calling for vast armies soon afterwards, and
ernors to advise them to make the call
Gen. Halleck thinks the Pope campaign WAS
the next best thing to a complete success, mas
much as the enemy did not actually capture the
National CapitaIl His precise language is:
Although this short and active campaign was.
from causes already referred TO, less successful
than we had reason to expect, it had accom-
plished the great and important OBJECT of cover
ing the Capital till troops could be collected tor
its defense" But was it not owing to this
''short and active campaign" that the Capital was
ever in any danger at all? The merit of the
rescue belongs wholly to Gen. Mcclellan; the
blundering campaign which caused the peril was
undertaken against his advice and in disregard of
his remOnstrances.
Lees army ventured into a neighborhood of
Washington only when McClelan's army was
withdrawn from the neighborhood of Richmond.
1t reinfolcements had been sent to the James
river no troops would have been needed about
Washington except garrisons for its forts
The only serious charge against Gen. McCIel
Ian in this report is, that he dilatory in obey
Ing the orders of the President, first in Withdraw
ing his command from Harrison's Landing. and
again in marching against General Lee in Vir-
ginia, after the battle of Antietam. There is un
fairness and sophistIy in General Halleck's way
of urging both these complaints. He states that
il was eleven davs after Mcclellan received the
order to evacuate Harrison's Landing before his
army began TO move. But the final order, in re-
ply to McClellan's remonstrance, was written on
the 9th of August, and as it was not sent by tele
graph could not have been received by General
Mcclellan before the 7th or eth. and his army
was moved on the 18th We mention this as a
specimen of the unfairness and overstatement
which run through the report. What justice is
there in contrasting Burnside's promptness in
moving from Newport News to Aqua Creek
with the time consumed 10y Mcclellan in with
drawing from HarriSon's Landingl Had Burn
side an army of 90 900 men? Was il necessary
for him to make that most delicate and perlous
of all military movements, a retreat in the face
of superior forcef Ought Mcclellan to have re-
tired without the reasonable precautions and ripe
preparations which insured the safety OF his army!
1t is signal proof of his military prudence and
capacity tha. ne brought his army away without
the sacrifice of a man, or of any portion OF his
valuable stores and munitions Of war. For his
delay after the battle of Antietam he gave as
reason that the wants of his army were not season
ably supplied by the authorities at Washington.
To show that this complaint was not well-founded,
will make no impression the public at this late
day. when General Burnside, in command of the
same army, has been VIGOROUSLY delayed from
the same cause till his campaign is likely to
prove "A failure. The same men remain in charge
of the same departments; if they were so entirely
efficient in forwarding supplies to General McClel-
Ian, how does it happen that they all OF sudden
become such incompetent and imbeclle do
nothings in supplying General Burnsidel
Gen Hallecks report is an unsuccessful at
tempt to defend the indefensble Pope campaign.
Gen. Halleck feels for that greatest blunder OF
the war (which he planned himselD something
of the doting affection of a father for his de
formed and misshapened offspring. But all his
military knowledge, aided by all his ability as a
LAWYER, cannot so far make the worse appear
v., ffo mfr hat