The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1862-11-12
Letter from Ex-PresIdeut Bu-
chnuan--IIis Reply 10 General
SeOtt-The Beginning of the
Rebellion -

Seott-The Beginning OF The
Rebellion. - 81
.WAsHINGTcE, November /.
The Inlelligencsr OF to-day contains the
! following letter from ex President buchanan
in relation to his conduct during the last
months OF lis ttiicial term: q.
! 10 DE Editors Of hs National HtellgeHcer;
| On "Wednesday last | received the ma
to1al lntelligencer," containing Gen. Scotts
address to the public. This is throughout
/ an undisguiSed cenSure OF my conduct for the
last months OF the Administrator, in regard
to the seven Cotton States now in rebellion.
From our past relations, / was-greatly sur
prised at the appearance Of such paper. In
one aspect, however, il was highly crafty
ling. II has justified me, nay, it has ren
dered it absolutely necessary that should
no longer remain silent in respect to the
charges which have been long vaguely cir
cuatine. but are now endorsed by the re.
spoHsible name Of Gen. Scott.
|. The first and most prominent amorg
these charges IS my refusal immedi stely 10
garrison nine enumerated notifications scat
tered over six Of the Southern States, accor
ding TO the recommendation Of Gen. Scott,
in his "vlews" addressed TO the War Depart.
And it has even been alleged that il this had
been done it might have prevented the civil
war.
This refusal is attributed, without the
least cause, to the influence Of Governor
Floyd. All my cabinet must bear me witt
ness that was the President myself respon>
sible for all the acts OF the Administrator;
ard certain it is that during the last six
months previous to the 2Slh of December,
1860, the day on which he resigned his ofA
flee, after my request, he exercised less IN
tuence on the Administration than any oth-
er member Of the Cabinet. Mr.. Holt va as
Immediately transferred from the Post Of
flee Department to that OF War; so that,
from this time until the 4th Of March, 1861
which was by lar the most important period
OF the Administration, he per 'ormed the do
ties of Secretary OF War 10 my entire sat-
isfaction.
But | did not Immediately garrison these
iortiGcations, in such a manner, to use the
language of General Scott, "as to make any
one Of them by surprise or coup de main ri
diculous?" There is one answer both easy
and conclusive. even if other valid reasons
dld exist There were no available troops
within reach witch could be sent to these
for,ificatons. 20 have attempted mill ary
operation on scale so extensive by any
means within the Presidents power wohld
have been simply absurd, OF this General
Scott himself seems to have been convinced
for on the day alter the Date OF his first
: "vfews' he addressed Con the 30th Of Octo.
ber) supplemental views1o the War Depart
ment in which he states: There is one
(rcgular) company in Boston, one here (ai
The Narrows) one at Piushurg, one at Au'
gusta [Ga.) one at Baton Rouge" IN all five
companies only within reach to garrison OF
: reinforce the forts mentioned in the "vieWs.'
Five companies-iour hundred men-to
occupy and reinlor,e nine Notifications il
; six highly excited Southern States! The
force "within reach" was so entirely made
quate that nothing more need be said on The
| subject. 70 have attempted such military
= movement with SO feeble a force, and tbt
Presidential election impending, would have
, been an invitation to collision and secession
Indeed il the whole American army, consis
= ting then Of only sixteen thousand men, hat
been within reach, " they would have beef
r scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Sucl
was our want Of troops, that, although Gen
Scott, believing in opposition to the oplnior
c OF the committee raised in the iolSe c
Representatives, that the Inauguration Q
MIR. Lincoln III ieht he interrupted By militia
G ~ force, was only able to assemble at Wash
/, ,ngton, so late as he 4.h oil March, six hun
: dred and fifty three men, rank and file ofth
e army. And, to make up this number, eve
Il the sappers and miners were brought fror
West Point. "
d But why was there no greater force With
: reach? This question could be better on
swered by Gen. Scott himself than by an
&c other person Onr small regular army, wit
l. the exception OF few hundred men, wer
out Of reach, on our remote frontiers, wher
. it had been continuously stationed for year,
IS to protect the inhabitants and the emgran.
=, on their way thither, against the attacks {
. hostile Indians. All we're insufficient, an
it both Gen. Scott and myself endeavored
h vain to prevail upon Congress to raise sewers
additional regiments for this purpose.
recommending this augmentation OF II
!, General States, in his report to the w;
~ Department, Of November, 1857, that
t, would not more than furnish the reinIorct
Of ments now greatly needed in Florida Texa
w New Mexico, California, Oregon Washing
OF ton, (F.,) Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesot
,e leaving not company for Utah" Ar
again, in his report Of November, 1853,
IL says:
eS This want of troops to give reasonable =,
p. curity 10 our citizens in distant settlements, il
is cludiDg emigrunts Oh the plains, can scarcel
be too strongly stated; but vii oniy add til
i" as often as we have been Obliged TO wilhdra
nj troops from one trontier in order to ruiuiort
another, the weakened points have been instan
as ly attacked or threatened with Formidable il
, tvasion." a5a- e
ai These "yiews'' OF General Scott exht
IL the crude notions then prevailing even amor
a intelligent and patriotic men on this suhje
:" Of secession. In the first sentence the Ge
ne whilst stating that "to save time the risl
k o OF accession may be conceded 'yet inimed
ately SAYS "tbis is instantly balanced by u
III correatiye right On the part of the FEEDER
Ie Government against an INTERIOR State y
States to re establish by force, II necessar
ct its former continuity Of territory" (F
MS this he cites, "Paley's Moral and Politic
Philosophy last chapter" It'may be ther
he but have been unable to find il.) Will
at i. is difficult to ascertain his precise m msanil
:. in this passage, he renders what he did NJ
~ mean quite in his supplementary views
In these he says: "lt will be seen that Il
views" only apply to a case oftecession tn
lg makesa GAP in The present Union. Il
i'd falling off say of Texas, or Of all tho Alta
tic States from the Potomac South, (t
nc very thing which has occurred,) was n
ge within Tie scope OF General Scotrs "rrov
20 ional remedies;" that is to say, to establi
W. by force, il necessary, the continuity OF 0
on territory. In his views he also states
he follows: "But break this glorious Union
whatever line or lines that political madne
ne may contrive, and there would be no ho
NJ OF recruiting The fragments except by !
laceration and despotism OF the sword.
ne effect such result the intestine wars Of 0
be Mexican Delghbors would, in comparison
: ours, sink into mere chid's play" 1n I
~ Generals opinion, "a smaller evil Chan
l.. - L. l.. II e