Maryland free press., 1862-12-12
. " = y III .T71T - =, y
TWODOLIlARS A YEAR.


en- Pope you would be too weak to even hold
the position you now occupy, should the enc
my turn round and attack you, in full force
In other words, the old army Of the Potomac
is sphtinto two parts, with the entire force of
the ondnny directly between them. They cam
not be united by land without exposing both.
to destruction and yet they must be united.
To send Pope's forces by water, to the pcnin-,
sltla is, under present circumstances, o militia
ry yimpossihilty. The only alternative Us to
send the force on the peninsula to some point
by water, say fredericksburg, where the Two
armies eansbe united, ,3at ,sodc -i.s,.f OIL. ,.-..
/ Let me now allude to soanc Of the objections
which you have urged. You say that t5
withdraw from the present position will cause:
the certain demoralization of the army, (which
is now in excellent discipline and condition"
l-cannot understand why q simple change Of
position to a new and byho means distant base
will demoralize an narmy in excellent discipline,
unless the officers themselves assist i'll that de-
moraiization which am satisfied they will
notir Your change IF front from your extreme
right at Hanover Courthouse to ygtr present
position; was over thirty miles but / have not,
heard that9it denleralzal ey9qri. trop pps, not
iwithstandingt the severe losses they sustained
ineifechng it, bard radio ait Il, 1tl....:~
A neM bascnn the Rqppahannock, at Fred
oricksburgs brings you within about sixty
miles of Richmond, and secures o. reinforce
mentcof fertyyer fifty thousand fresh aud dis
oiplined troops. The change with such adj.
ssntages,will L think, if properly represen-
ted to cur army, encourage, rather than de-
mbralize your troops. Moreover. yourselfs
gesrvd that junction. might. he effected at
Yerktewn, ,sbqt that 3 faux march ryires III,
Peninsula would be more hazardous than to
retirelts Fortress; Monroe. You will remen-
bqr that yorktown is two or three, miles fur
thar from Richmond than III Fredericksburg is;
besides the Latter is between r Richmond and
Washington end s9YeEs 81 y Washington from any
attack by the enemy! l..er 50 f..,.sl,. ...4.
4 The political effect of the Withdrawal may
ali tfrst5be ,unfavorablei but | think the. public
are bcginning te understand its necessity, and
that theylwill have much more mo confidence in Il
unitediarmy ,thaniin its separate fragment.
h..Bat yoawiH replya Why not reinforce j force me
present position p .. s.s--------,, 80
To do this y'od Said, at td6uto Interview, that
you required fifty thousand additional troops
I told you it was impossible toI give you so
many. You finally Thought you would have
asome, chance hss;s II success with twenty thous-
auds But you afterwards telegraphed' to me
that you would require thirty III Thousand,
as the enemy was being largely reinforced @ -
Iflyour estimate of the enemys strength was
correct, your requisition was perfectly reason
able, but it wasiutterly impossible to fill it
Until new troope couldibe enlisted and. organ
lied, which would require several weeks 10
keep your army IN tspresent position unit! it
could be so reinforced would almost destroy
tin that climate The months of August and
September arc almost fatal to whites who live
on that part of James River, and even after
you got the roinforcements asked for, you adj
mitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and
the river batteries before you could advance
on Richmond. q dtis by no means certain that =
the reduction of these fortfcationsiwould not
require considerable time, perhaps as much as
those 1t Yorktown! This ,dchy might mot
only be fatal to the health Of your army, but
in the meantime Gen; Pope's forces would be
exposed to the heavy blows Of the enemy
without the slightest hope Of assistance from
you, In regard to the demoralizing effect of
"a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rap
pahannocls, ] must remark 4 that a large num-
Der of your highest officers, indeed esd 4 majority
of those whose opinions have been reported
to me, are decidedly ain favet of .tthe, move
inent. Even several of. those WHO originally
advocated the line of the Peninsula now adj
wise its abandonment? ?ii"pii4qn daDs ,t.v
1 have not inquired, and do not desire to
know, by whose advice AID toff what reasons,
the army of the Potomac was. separated into
parts, with the enemy, between them. Imust
take things as find them. I find the forces
divided and / wish to oreuniteg them, Only one
feasible plan has been presented for doing this.
If you or any one else had presented a better
one / certainly should Ihaye adopted il but
all your plans requirereinforocments, which it
is impossible to give you. tits very easy to
ask for rqnforoements, but it is not 50 easy to
gire them when you have no disposablc troops
at your command. .srl ,-f.sr ..g,zEys
ja have written very plainly asI understand
the case, and i hopetyou. will siYo me credit
for having considered the matter, although
may have arrived at different conclusions from
your own. Iafa2r r.i'sfi -aF r..
Very respectfully, your obed't servant,
q IL w. HALLEcK, General in Chief.
REPORT DENIED.-The jackson Mississip-
plan denies the report that Gen. Edwin Price,
son off, OldPap" Price, had resigned his COM
mission in tho Confederate service returned to
Missouri and taken tho oath of allegiance to