The Placer herald. [volume] (Auburn, Placer County, Calif.) 1855-1991, 1862-12-13

anced by the coreative right on the part of
the Federal Government against an inferior
State or States, to re establish by force, if
necessary, its continuity of Territory" (For
this he cites Paley's Moral and Political
Philosophy, last chapter. 1t may be there,
but | have been unable to find t) Whilst
it is Difficult, to ascertain his precise mean.
ing in this passage, he renders what he did
not mean quite clear in his supplementary
"views." In these be says: ut will be seen
that The views only apply to case of seces-
sion that that makes a gap in the present
Union. The falling off, say of Texas, or OF
all the Atlantic States from the Potomac
south, (the very case which has occurred, J
was not thin the scope of Gen. Scott s
provisional remedies" that is to say, to
establish by force, if necessary, the continui.
ty of our territory. In bis views" he also
states as follows: ''But break this glorious
Union by whatever line or lines that po. It'll
cal madness may contrive and there would
be no hope of re uniting the fragments ex.
cept by the laceration and despotism of the
sword. To effect such a result the intestine
wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in
comparison to ours, sink into mere chld's
play" In the Generals opinion, "a smaller
evil (than these intestine wars) would be to
allow the fragments of the great republic to
form themselves into new Confederacies,
probably fodr" He then points out what
ought to be the boundaries between the new
Unions; and at the end of ea..h goes so far
as even to indicate the cities which ought to
be the capitals of the three first on this side
of the R'cky Mountains-to wit: "Colum,
bia, South Carolina" 'AIton or Quincy,
Illinois," and Albany, Nrw York." excluding
Washington city altogether. This indica'
ton of capitals contained in the original
now in my possession is curously omitted in
the version published in the National Intel
Hgencer. He designates no capital for the
fourth Union on The Pacific The reader
will Judge what encouragement these views
proceeding from so distinguished a source,
must have afforded to the secessonists of
the cotton States.
trust have said enough, and more than
enough to convince every mind why did
not, with force Of five companies, attempt
to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on
the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile;
Forts Pickens and McRae, in Pensacola har.
OOIS rOIt uIdokI, UclOW Odtduudt, FOIIb
Moultrie and Sumpter, in Charleston harbor,
and Fortress Monroe, in Virginia.
CENsuRE OF GEN. SCOTT.
These ''views" both original and supple
mentary were published by Gen. Scott in
the National Intelligencer of January ls,
1861, at the most important and critical
period Of the Administration. Their publ
bat IL l. l.
good, and might do much harm. To have
published them without the Presidents
knowledge and consent, was as much in vio'
lation of the sacred confidence which ought
to prevail between the commanding general
of the army and the commander in chief, as
it would have been for the Secretary of War
to publish the same documents without his
authority. What is of more importance,
their publication was calculated injurousy
to effect the compromise measures then
pending before Congress and the country,
and to encourage the secessonists in their
mad and wicked attempt to shatter the
Union into fragments. From the great
respect which | then entertained for the
General passed it over in silence.
1t is worthy of remark that soon after the
Presidential election, representations Of what
those "yiews" contained, Of more or less
correctness, were unfortunately circulated
especially throughout the South. The edi'
tors Of the National InteUigencer, in assign.
ing reason for their publication, state that
both in.public prints and in public speeches
illusions had been made to them, and some
misapprehensions of their character had got
abroad
THE FORT SUMTER QUESTION.
II. and III. Gen. Scott states that he
arrived in Washington on the 18th, and
accompanied by the Secretary of War, held
a conversation with the President on the
18th December. Whilst | have no recol,
lection whatever of this conversation, be
doubtless states correctly that did refuse to
send 800 men to reinforce Major Anderson
at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed
TO Fort Sumter. The reason Of this refusal
is manifest to all who recolect the time.
But twelve days before, in the annual mes
sage of the Sd December, had urged upon
Congress the adoption of amendments to
the Constitution of the same character with
those subsequently proposed by Mr.. Cri'ten
den, called the "Crittenden Compromise"
At that time high hopes we're entertained
throughout the country that these would be
adopted. Besides, believed, and this cor
recly, as the event proved, that Major
Anderson was then in no danger Of attack.
Indeed, he and his command were then
treated with marked kindness by the author
tiles and people Of Charleston. Under these
circumstances, to have sent such a force
there wond have been only to impair the
hope Of compromise, to provoke collision
and disappoiot the country. q.
There are some details Of this converse.
tion in regard to which the Generals mem
ory must be defective. At present shall
specify only one. l could not have stated
that on future occasion | would telegraph
"Major Anderson of Fort Moultrie TO hold
the forts (Moullrie and Sumter) against