The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-03-22

| II tns1 moment, eieven Iuil-meuneO lnote0O OF
seven partially Unnamed gunboats ready for efH-
cient operations at any point The volunteers
| for the Army to 60 in the gunboats exceed the
] number Of men required; but the arrangement
OF companies and regiments in permitting them
to leave, is the reason assigned for not more
than fifty Of the number having been thus far
transferred to the Aotilla
inclose copy Of my orders to the Com.
manders Of the gunboats, in anticipation Of the
attack on Fort Henry also copy Of orders to
Lieutenant Commanding Phelps, who will have
moro especial charge Of the old gunboats, and
operate in a less exposed condition than the
| armored boats.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
All. FooTE, Flsg Officer,
Cong Naval Forces on the Western Waters
hon. GIDEON WrLLEs.
sec'y of the Navy, Washington. D. c.
P. S.-Several transports with troops have
just arrived. A. H.F.
Iproceed up the Tennessee early in the morn
ing, and will there make the Cincinnati my flag.
ship. A.H.F
On the preceding day he had issued the follow.
| ing order to Lieutenant Phelps:
| Especial Orders, No. 8.
| UNITED STATES GUNBoAa TAYLoR,l
PADUoAH, February Q, 1862.
Lieutenant Commanding Phelps will, as soon
IS the fort shall have surrendered, and upon
signal from the flag ship, proceed with the Con-
estoga, Taylor, and Lexington, up the river to
where the railroad bridge crosses and il the.
army shall not already have got possession, he
will destroy SO much of the track as will entire
ly prevent its use by the rebels.
| He will then proceed as far up the river as the
stage of the water viii admit, and capture the
enemy's gunboats and other vessels which might
prove available to the enemy
A. II. FooTE, Flag Officer,
Comand'g Naval Forces on Western Waters.
| The feet, consisting of the iron-clad boats
Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, and St. Louis,
and the three wooden boats Taylor, Lexington,
and Conestoga proceeded to Fort Henry and re
dueed it in one hour and twenty minutes, Com
modore Foote being, as is his wont, in the fore
front of the battle. It appears from the order
to Lieutenant Phelps, (which that gallant officer
promptly executed,) that Commodore Footc
knew before leaving Paducah that he should
take Fort Henry, no matter what might be the
force or the resistance he should meet there
| He was thoroughly inspired by the great idea of
| victory. The contingency of failure did not en-
| terinto his calculations He, therefore, address.
ed himself to plans for reaping the fruits OF vic
tory, rather than to plans for repairing the con-
sequences of defeat. 1t will be observed from
the foregoing letter to the Secretary of tho Navy
written before the battle of Fort Henry, that
| the efficiency Of the fotia was much impaired
| by the want OF sesmen, or by neglect in some
quarter to have those transferred from the mill.
tary service who had been selected for that pur-
pose.
After reducing Fort Henry and sweeping the
Tennessee river as far up as Florence, in Ala
| bama, Commodore Foote returned to Cairo to
prepare the mortar boats for operations against
Fort Doneson. He was aware of the formida-
BILE character of the rebel works at Donelson,
and he desired delay of few days to complete
| the mortar boats, by which he believed the gar
rison, however extensive, could be shelled out
without much loss OF life on our side. General
Halleck believed an immediate attack to be
military necessity. In this, doubt not, he was
right, and only refer to it to show that the Grip.
pied condition of the feet and the heavy loss of
life on our side not to be attributed to rash
ness or bad management an the part Of the flag
officer. OF the gallant attack on Fort Doneson
| no one need be reminded. Subjected, as our
vessels were, to a long continued and hot FIRE of
three rebel batteries at four hundred yards dis
| tance, they continued the fight for one hour and
thirty minutes, and not until the wheel of one
and the tiller ropes of another of his boats were
shot away, did the wellmanaged guns of the
commodore cease to scatter death and conster-
| nation among the foes of his country. Although
wounded himself, and his gunboats crippled, but
with the glory of the combat on his brow, he in
dulged in no repinings for his personal misfor.
| tunes or laudations of his successes; but, like
true Christian hero, he thought only of his men.
In letter written the morning after the battle
to friend, he said:
"While hope ever to rely on Him who con-
trolls all things, and to say from the heart, Not
unto US, but unto Thee, o Lord, belongs the glo.
ry,' yet feel sadly at the result of our attack
Fort To he knox- oH
men who say they will 60 wherever lead them
fall by my side, makes me feel sad to lead them
to almost certain DEATH"
But he Obeyed what was believed to be the
military necessity of the situation.
The Senator from Massachusetts, nearest me
has this morning kindly furnished me with a let.
ter froma trustworthy friend OF his who has
from the beginning been with the army of the
West, from which l am permitted to read the
following extracts:
when Fort Henry surrendered, the gate was
opened by which the rebellion will be finally and
utterly crushed. In few days CON- Foote will
open the Mississippi, provided he is not hamper
ed, and also provided he is properly supported
by Government. He has done great work for
his country work which, am sorry to say,
has not been properly appreciated. He has i'm.
provsed navy with almost nsurmOuntable OBJ.
stacles against him. see it stated in the papers
that the gunboats did but little service at Don.
elsOn, which is m0nstrous mistake. They 81.
fenced nearly all the enemy's guns, and had not
the wheel of one boat and the tiller ropes Of an.
| other been shot away, in fifteen minutes more
the batteries would have been fanked and the
! entire rebel army exposed to the broadsides of
the feet. He would have moved them down like
grass"
Gas it was, he made the work of the army in
| the fight Of Saturday much easier than it would
otherwise have been. Several of the Mississip.
| pi officers (prisoners) informed me that the
shells Of the gunboats had demoralizing effect
upon their men,. The Memphis Appeal says it
dispirited them" 81 have had
fair opportunity to observe the operations of
both army and navy, and can say with empha-
sis that there are no mors self-denying, patriot.
ic, hard working, faithful men than the dag ofa.
| Ger aud his captains, Stembel, Pennock, Phelps,
and Others" = II make these state.
ments from my own sense of justice and honor,
! and not from any mans prompting or request"
| The next movement of Commodore Foote,
with his Aotilla, was to take possession of Carks.
| vile, where he arrived on the 10th day of Feb
ruary, and issued his proclamation to the inhab-
itants three days before the arrival of the land
forces, though that fact, from some unexplained
cause, nowhere appears in the official reports OF
| the military commander of that department.
| Ou tuc Alst VI rtDruary, 1oOZ, commodore
Foote telegraphed to General Oullum, the chief
of General Halleck's staff, then at Cairo, as fol.
lows:
| PADucAH, February 81, 1862
General CuLLUN. Cairo;
General Grant and myself consider this a
good time to move on Nashville; six mortar
boats and two iron.clad steamers can precede
the troops and shell the forts. We we're about
! moving for this purpose when General Grant. to
my astonishment, received a telegram from Gen.
eral Halleck, mot to let the gunboats 60 higher
than Carhsville;" no telegram sent to me-
The Cumberland is in good stage Of water,
and General Grant and believe that we can
take Nashville. Please ask General Halleck If
we shall doit. We will talk per telegraph
Captain Phelps representing mo in the Office, as
| I am still on crutches.
/ A. q. FOoTE, Flsg Officer.
| It may be that there was some great military
reason why General Grant was directed " not to
les the gunboats go higher than Clarksvlle," "
but up to this time 1t is wholly unapprecable by
/ tho puhlic Had fhnv heov vovuikead a., ~ =.