Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1862-03-31

reverence for men in authority outliyed
even Gardiner ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS me
into vacant corner at Willard's Hotel,
and, with az air of mingled horror and
sadness, said ia a whtsper-"Isn't this
rather free-talkiugtown!" Twas oblig-
ed to confess that, next to Discomfort,
scandal was Washington weakness. sly
friend was shocked, as we'll as puzzled, by
the way that congressman, cabinet minis
tiers, men in authority and men out, have
been smashing Mcclellan with the rough
sides of their tongues for the last ten days.
Not men aloue-the women-wiVes of CT.
villains aud army ofices-daughters of the
cabiuet-the bellies of public and private
drawing-roOms, join in the eager fray, with
tongues sharpened by original serPeutine
association, and fired With the love aud
jealousy that are the monster passions To
the Crinoline MUD. Is Mcclellan great
er than Napoleon, or a monster humbug {?
Is he plotting for u compromise and the
Presidency, or has he scheme of rebel
lion determination SO deep and great that
no other mind can imagine or comprehend
it? The visitor at Washington can take
his choice, and find plenty of conclusive
arguments for either Judgment. But you
must believe him either fool or demi-
god. The war of friends and enemies has
reached the point where no compromise is
permitted. Those of US who don't believe
him either must hide our diminished heads
and wait til! the storm is over.
Indeed it Is very difficult for an earnest,
candid seeker for the truth to reach cor
rect judgment as to Gen. McClellau's man.
Ogement of the campaign; and his relations
to its successes and failures. There is no
| doubt of great abatement of confidence
in him on the part of the Cabinet and Con-
gress. The President, too, measures what
he before gave him without stint. 1t is
not easy to see. why, with nearly a quarter
of million of the oldest aud best troops
OF the Union at his command, Gen McClel-
Ian permitted the rebels to press their lines
in upon him at ull points, and 10 hold the
Potomac, both above and below Washing
ton, all winter-why he refused to seize
fine opportunities to cut off large detach.
ments of their armies-why he denied the
Navy Department the corporation it has
for months asked TO take Norfolk and seize
the Merrimac before she could execute the
mischief that has since startled the
country; or why he could not Join the ra-
val forces in clearing the Potomac of the
rebel batteries, for which they were long
ago rea0y-why, in the only "stirring
up" that he gave the enemy, the prepare
tons for an advance and retreat were SO
feOble as to result in the Balls Bluff TRACE
dy,-Why he kept Halleck in check for
weeks after that officer was ready to move
forward -Thy he opposed Gen. Buffers
southern expedition until overruled by the
War Department,-whyh he kept promising
to move onward, aud never did until the
President had repeated twice or thrice
positive orders to do so,-and why, when
he did so, he permitted himself to repeat
the farce of the king of France in march
ing mp the hill and then marching down
again2 That all these and many more sim
liar things are true of his course as Com
mander-in-C Chief, have the most abundant
reason to believe. Thathe has almost sinnei
away, by pOs:pOnement aud inaction, his
day of grace with President aud cabinet,
those most cognizant of the opinions of
the latter sufficiently know. The new
Secretary of War, Mr.. Stanton, has been
growing in impatience with and estrsnge-
ment from him, ever since he assumed
that office; and but for the Presidents
cautious policy, it is quite likely General
Mcclellan would before to-day have been
dethroned' even from the leadership of the
army of the Potomac. There was a tire,
mcudous pressure from the Senate and a
portion of the Cabinet for a change, but
the President was firm, and said that
though he had relieved him from the gen.
GFal command, in part because he was not
satisfied with his course, he had confidence
that now he had taken the field at the
head OF his special division of the army
he would push forward the campaign as
rapidly as possible, ndiproVe worthy of
the position. TO-
Only two theories can l imagine be urged
in explanation of Gen. McCleIlan's adminis.
tratiOn; aud neither of these justify some of
the many damaging things declared
against him on the highest authority
One of these is, that he was possessed of
the idea that time and the demonstration
OF a.large force are the most important
elements in crushing out the REBELLION
This ignores the necessity of proving to
the Southern people that the Northerners
are. not towards, but can and will eight
bravely aud we'll; and it also forgets that
the financial interests of the country can.
not stand the present enormous cost of the
war till such time as the South is morally
convinced of the failure Of their expert
ment, The other and more creditaSle cx-
pianatton is that his policy twas, by the
presence of large and threatening force
around Washington, to hold the main ar
my OF the South in Virginia, while with
our other divisions We penetrated the
Southern territory at various remote
points, aud substantially turned their fIsnk
from both, sides. Neither of thtse, how
ever, do hear more than suggested by his
friends, who seem to content themselves
with swearing him through" without a
why or wherefore.
How far Gen. Mcclellan is the author of
the general plan of the camraigu-how far
he may be credited with what has been
done at the South and West,-is another
matter of hot dispute. Some deny him
any right Of authorship-others giant the