Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-12-03
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.
REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN
CHIEF

hIhy rs tfeneral-In-Chlef has appeared, and
Will doubtless excite no little attention.
After narrating in brief the operations Of OUT
various armies within that time, he goes on to
say:
alt is seen from this brief summary of mill.
tary operations during the last three or four
months, that while our soldiers have generally
lought with bravery. and gained many rn-
Ioftant battles, these victories have not pro-
ouc'd the usual res ults. In many in. tancss the
u-ieated foe WAS not followed from the battle
npla, and even where a pursuit was attempted
Il almost invariably failed TO effect tho capture
army.
This is matter which requires serious and
caIe1uI consideration. A victorious army is
supposed 10 bc In cone nditon to pursue its dc feated
Zoe with advantage, and during such pursuit to
do him serious il not fatal injury. This result
hos usually been attained in other countries.
ls there any reason why ii should not be
expected in this
III is easily und rstood that in a country
Ike that between Yorktown and Richmond. or
the thickly wooded swamps OF Mississippi an d
Louisiana, retreating force by telling trees
across the roads and destroying bridges over
deep and marshy streams, can effectually pre-.
vent any rapid pursuit. The one in a fe w MI
nutes blocks up OF destroys roads which the
other cannot clear or repair for hours or even
days. The pErsuer has very little hope of
oNrrthkine his flying foe. But this reasoning
i not applicable 10 MaTyla and the greater
part of Virginia, Kentucky, and Middle Ten
n"ssee II must be admitted that in these the
alters OF Wal. the rebel armies have exhibited
much NOR" mobility and activity than our own
Not only Go they out-march us, both in ad-
yaHc" and retreat, but on two memoTabi. oc-
Casions their cavalry have made with lnlpuni-
~ the entire circle Of the army of the Potomac
If it te true that the success of an arrny de-
ponds upon its s'arms and its legs ours has
SHOWN itself deficient in the latter OF these es-
kcntial ], quiSit,s. This defect has been attri-
buted 10 cur enormous baggage and supply
trains, ana 10 want Of tI1tining in making
marches.
"Th're is 10 doubt that the baggage train. Of
our *rmHS have been excessively large. Every
possible .Tort la: be. made within the last
i'w weeks 10 reduce them, but this is no easy
ta>h. Once accustomed Ia a certain amount Of
transportation an army is unwilling 10 do
without The iLxurirs which II supplies in the
field.
"Ry the recent increase of the army ration
which was previously larrer than in any other
country, ii Consid rablc amount of transporta-
tiOn Is employed in moving provisions and
supplies which are NOT necessary for the cub
sistencs Of the soldiers. An examination OF
the returns Of the Quartermaster General, a
few days since, developed the fact that the
"lmy OF the Potomac, including the troops
around W washington, (rnost oG which are with
out field trains. had fifty- -four fhonSand ami
mas, and that nine thousand of these Were
employed III trans porting an hulanC-,s and hos
pltil stores. In addition TO all this, tho roads
sir' cts and v harVrS are incumbrred with pri-
Nate yehicl,s, us"d for the trans sporta lion OF
suffers s;ufrs. No matter how large the main
boGy OF an Trny nay b., il can never move
rapidly with such mass Of inlpe diinent. And
Yet speculative projects are almost daily ursed
On thc Var Department 10 increase the iInmo-
tility of our aTrnies in the field. Again, our
troops, especially those in tho East, hase been
very little accustomed ~ marching, AZ least To
hat kind Of marching usually required by ac-
tive operations III Tie field.
cabs, ntccism - one Of the most serious Wis
~ all our armies Hundreds OF officers and
thousands ci men are almost continually away
frCIn their commands. Many OF these are really
StrHg~iprC CeSprtCrs n r,u r3 n off
III" ~ ii II bring ab;itrd b summary dismi>sals,
and IT the law could he stringently enforced
aEamst the men IL would soon iut All ,-nd to
Gt Sertions. Fut strarCiing on the march. and
IN taiil", can be prevented only D. severe and
sunimary punishment inflicted on The spot
"in this and many other important particn-
lars our military laws require revision an
am' ndment. They Were mostly enacted for a
small army and for times of peace, and are un-
suited To tn" gONrrnment OF the army ,ye now
have. and the war in which we are now en-
gaged.'
The most interesting portion Of the report ia
that giving the history of the withdrawal nf the
army from the Peninsula. and of the short
campaign Of Gen. Pope.
The following correspondence in this con-
necton Will b. read with interest:
IEXuIBlT No. I. Copy in cipherl
BERkLEY, Va, August 4, 1862.
Hd ;0r General HQiIecE. Con. n Indrr.iu- Chief.
Your telegram OF last evening is received. 1
must confess that IL has caused me the greatest
pain ever experienced, for L am convinced
that the order TO withdraw this army to Auuia
Creek Will prov" disastrous in the extren. to
our cause. far IL will be a fatal blow Sew
eral days are necessary 10 complete the pren.
arations for 50 impor! movement this,
ana while they are IN progress beg that care,
ful cons liberation may be given TO nv state
rnent. This army lie now in excellent dis scipline
and condition. We hold a debouche on both
banks OF the James river. that we are frp,.
10 act in any direction, and with the assistance
of the gunboats, consider our cornmunica-
tons as now secure. We are twenty five miles
from RiClmOnt', and are not likely TO meet th,.
enemy in force sufficient 10 fight a battle until
we have reached fifteen 10 eighteen miles
which brings US practically within ten miles
of Richmond.
Our largest line of land trans portation would
be from this point twenty-five miles, but with
The aid OF the gunboas we can supply the
army by wafer during lis ad vance, certainly to
within twelve miles OF Richmond. At Aduia
Greek we would be seventy five miles from
Richmond, with Land transportation all the
way. From here 10 Fort Monroe is march Of
about seventy mileF; for l regard it as i1nprac-
ticable TO withdraw this army and its material
except by land The result of the movement
would thus be 10 march one hundred nd for.
ty miles TO reach n point now only twenty-five
miles distant, ard TO deprive ourselves entire
~ of the powerful aids of the gunboats and
water transportation Add 10 this the certain
decentralization OF this army which would en-
sue, the terrible depressing effect upon the
people OF he North, and the strong probability
that il wonid influence foreign Powers to re-
me sufficient reasons 10 make it my imperative
duty TO urge in the strongest terms afforded by
our language that this order may he rescinded.
and that far from recalling this army, il be
promptly reinforced To enable il TO assume the
Offensive. II may be said that there are no re-
inforeements available: I point to General
Burnside's fo-ces-to that of General Pope,
not necessary 10 maintain strict defense in
front OF Washington and Harper's Ferry-to
those portions Of the army OF the West not re.
quired ior & strict defense there. Here direct
ly in front otythis army is the heart Of the re.
bellion. 1t is here that all our resources should
be collected 10 strike the blow which will de-
ttrnine the fate of the nation. All points of
secondary importance elsewhere should be
abandoned and every available man brought
here. A decided victory here, and the military
strength of the rebellion il crushed. IL matters
not what partial reyerses we may meet with
e1sewhere-here is the true defence OF Wash
ipgtOn. ~ .
Its here, on the banks of the James riyeS,
that the fate of the Union should be decidea.
Clear in the convictions of right, strong in the
consciousness that have ever been, and still
am, actnated solely by love of country, know