The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-10-24
Disclosures Of Rebel Plans.
LETTERS FROM GEN. BEAUREGARD TO
GEMS. COOPER AND BRAGG.
HOW THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN
WAS TO BE CONDUCTED.


Captured by Gen. Buell., which were being
transmitted for file to Brig. Gen. Thomas
Jordan, Assistant Adjutant General of the
rebel army, at Chattanooga, Tennessee.
These papers include confidential letters
from Gen. Beauregard, both to Adjutant
General and Inspector Cooper and to Gen.
Bragg, specifically laying down a plan for
military operations in the West and South
west.
The following is the correspondence in
full:
GEN. BEAUREGARD TO ADJUTANT GENERAL
COOPER.
CONFIDENTIAL MOBILE, Ala, Sept 5, 1862.
GENERAL-Under the supposition that
on the restoration of my health I would
be returned to the command of Depart
ment No. 2, l had prepared, while at Bla-
din, Alabama, plan of operations in Ten
nessee and Kentucky, based on my knowl-
edge of that part of the theatre of war !;
but hearing that my just expectations are
to be disappointed, l have the honor to
communicate it to the war department, in
the hope that it may be of service to our
arms and to our cause. 1t was submitted
by me to Gen. Bragg on the I'd instant
By looking at the map it will be seen
that the forces operating in that section of
country will be separated at first by one
river, (the Tennessee), and afterwards by
two (the Tennessee and Cumberland),
hence they will be unable to support each
other, being unprovided with pontoon
trains; but their operations must be more
or less dependent on or connected with
each other. / will first refer to those in
East Tennessee, and then to those west
of it.
In the first case, our objective points
must be-first, Louisville, and then Gin
clnnatl. How best to reach them from
Chattanooga, with Buell. at Huntsville and
Stevenson, is the question. It is evident
he has the advantage of two bases of ope-
rations, the Cumberland and Tennessee
rivers, and that, if we advance towards our
objective points without getting rid of him,
we would expose our lines of communica-
ton with Chattanooga. We must, then,
give him battle first, or compel him to re-
tire before us.
Should he retire On Nashville Gas the
newspapers say he is now doing), we will
be advancing towards Louisville but
should he venture on Florence or Savan-
nah, to unite his forces with Rosecrans or
Grant, we will have to concentrate enough
of our forces from Middle and East Tennes-
see, to follow him rapidly and defeat him
IN great battle-when we would be able
to resume our march as before indicated.
We must, however, as soon as practicable,
construct strong works to command the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, for
otherwise our communications would be
cut off by the enemy, as soon as these two
rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit
the entrance of their gunboats and trans
ports.
The best position for said works is about
40 miles below Forts DOnelsOn and Henry,
not far from Eddysville, where those two
rivers come within one and a half miles of
each other. | am informed that there is
at that point a commanding elevation,
where a strong field-work could be con-
Structed for garrison of about twenty
hundred or three thousand men, who could
hold out with ample provisions and am
munition) against q large army. Under
the guns of this work and along the banks
of each river, series of batteries, armed
with the heaviest guns eight, nine, ten
inch, and rihed guns) could be construct
ed, bearing directly Oh distractions placed
in each of said rivers.
When Louisville shall have fallen into
our possession, [ would construct work
there for the command of the Ohio and
the canal, and | would destroy the latter
as soon as possible SO completely that
future travellers would hardly know where
it was This | would do as return for
the Yankee vandalism in attempting to
Obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston
and Savannah. A detachment of our ar
my could, | think, take Louisville, while
the main body would be marching to Gin
cinnati but if we could get boats enough
it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in
them. To keep the command of Cincin-
natl would construct strong work, hea-
Willy armed, at Covington
Now for the operations of Western Ten
nessee. The object there should be to
drive the enemy from there and resume
the command of the Mississippi river for
these purposes. ...
would concentrate rapidly at Grand
Junction Prices army and all that could
be spared from Vicksburg Of Van Dorn's
From there would make forced march
to Fort Pillow, which | would take with
probably only a very small loss. It is evil
dent the forces at Memphis and Yazoo
River would then have their line of COM
munication by the river with the North
cut of, and they would have either to sur
render or cross without resources into Ar
kansas, where Gen. Holmes would take
good care of them. From Fort Pillow !
would compel the forces at Corinth and
jackson, Tennessee, to fall back precipi-
lately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their
lines of communication would be cut of
also. We would then pursue them vigor-
ously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus,
or the Ohio at Paducah.
We would thus compel the enemy to
evacuate the State of Mississippi and Wes-
tern Tennessee, with probably the loss on
our part Of a few hundred men. General
D-sa IL %hny, h. IL. Il 1sva<o ,rS