The New York herald., 1862-11-14
PRINCE De JOMVHLE ON TIE WAR
DEfIcUL TIES OF ATTACKING RICHMOND.
The Superseding OF Mcclellan as
C0mmander-in-Chief.
Unaccountable Weakening of
His Command.
EMBARKATION FOR FORTRESS MONROE.
THE MERRIMAC AND MONITOR DUEL
PerilOuS Position of Our Transports at
Hampton Roads.
How the Merrilnac Affected
Federal Operations.
~--,~o-->~~~~~~~~>~~---~
The Peninsula Route the Only
Practicable One,
60. &c.. Do.
EMBARKATION FOR FORTRESS MONROE,
THE MERRIMAC AND MONITOR DUE.
How the Merrilnac Affected
Federal Operations.
The Peninsula Route the Only
Practicable One,

N<a &C., %.
The following continues Prince de Joinviles narrative
OF the campaign Of the Potomac, translation Of
il having closed with the evacuation OF Manassas the
robei army
DIFFICULTIES on CAMPAIGN.
But while were thus moving grave events were
occurring u the uppe- part the Army OF the Potomac
There IN the American n the English army,
ander nchie who exercises above all other generals,
supreme authority. He regulates the disposition Of
troops and directs military operations These functions
greatly reduced since the Cr!mean IN the British
army, are still fully exercised America. From old
General Scott who discharged them ith honor long
time, they have passed TO General Mcclellan We
learned on arriving at Fairfax that they had
been taken from him. 1t is easy to compre
hend the humiliation and ANNOYANCE which this
ing OF the campaign, must have caused the Gene-an-
Chief THIS IS, however, only portion of the evil The
opening OF the mpaign in itself nopporunely iu-
posed uioa ham, Mcclellan knew for long time aad better
than other person. an the facts concerning the forces
which occupied Manassas and tentreviie He was per
fecty well those WOODEN guns the batteries OF
the enemys works, aud which it has been often pre-
tended frightened him Tor some six months. NoE1bere
was even stoveppe resembling cannon which he
had heard spoken Of but which the curiosity hunters
IND But ne also Knew ihat up TO- Aprn the
roads Of Virginia would be in such a
dition that he could not move his and wagons
except by building sort Of wooden road very usual in
this country-a tedious work and during which the
enemy, ing railroads his disposal might either
tire as he had just dsne might attack other points
rapidly. In any s0nt, whether the enemy had evaou.
ated Centrevile defended and lost the position pur
suit implss bic victory barron The BRIDGES cut
away would enable the conquered escape all the cks
OF the conqueroran lnesmabe advantage of railroads
for defensive war ana one which does not exist on the
part OF the pursui army Per contra, II is true that,
the the railroad beng broken, that
orbids any offensive etogrde movement the par; Of
the army which has destroyed II.
N'tLlILA,s's PLANS.
We believe, therefore, that may state that General
Mcclellan had Of going 10 Centrevie His idea
resolved on Tor long Time was 10 secure Washington
from sudden attack, by mea1s q a large garrison
strongly established in The works o. which have
spoken and after that provide by the large navigabe
waters sand the immensy OF the naval resources Of The
North for the trans ,orttlon Of the army rapidly by
water 70 a poin. close TO Richmond For weeks. even
for months the execution Of this project had been very
secretly preparing seciesy, II was understood, Us well
rompttue here The principal condition
That this thing should n0sed abroad
ssry cynde IL oly TO small number OF persons. Hence
pe haps one of the causes of jealousy again, the Com
mander in Chief However that might be, the day Of
action approaching those who suspected the idea
the Genera, and who annoyed at not beng let
it, those whose envy had been excited by his promotion
70 the supreme command-his political eneines-(and
who in the dnited States has not them)-everybody
nDe him and under him, wished hun III and appear
ca 70 nave taEea up Tue cry OF siowness. "Aacuon'
and "lnacvity," and used it against him with great vo
lenoe.
MS PLAN. rmwARrEp
General Mcclellan, with a patliotic courage which
have always admired disdaed these accusations aud
Hid not pCid 10 them fio cpnteDted himself with
luety ana laborously pre- airing his operations. The
moment at length came when, spite Of the loyal sup
port which the resident hin, he could no longer
stand against the storm lfeci itated upon his head
council Of war Of all the gepcras OF division was held
a paa ol the campaign, which that Of
Comman der in thief, proposed and discussed Gen
Mcclellan haa then 10 plain his projects and the next
day they were known TO the enemy-informcd with .ut
doubt by those thousands Of female agents who
did the work o. espionage or hin even in the most ia
mate Places The Chief OF the fcbel army evacuated Ma
nassas Ills name siilniL Unable to
the deie neaced with attack either al Centrev
where his defence would nothmg, at Eieh-
moDd, the loss OF which would be great check auls
besides 70 cover both q these positions az once he could
d. ncthing better than fall sack with al bis forces
Richmond. Foo the Army OF the Potomac this
tion unfortunate. Its movenent unnlaskod be
fore It ready the trans Collected
part Of them still icebound IN the Hudson.
In that situation, should he perseyere IA executing
pdly as possible the movement BY water towards the
Virginia peninsula Or should he rather march by land
TO llIchmundy Such the ave decision which the
young General Army OF tue Potomac, laid up sick,
in misc Die chamber oi deserted no in Fairfax,
had 70 maze within twenty-toUr hours.
MCCLELLAN SUPER EfED As COMMANDER IS-eHrEE.
IL under these circumstances that news reached
hm Of his beng deprived Of the command chief That
operation OF the other armies oi the Union with his. aud
that the troops Collected under bis orders were TO
ohefs, all nominated the ground OF SENIORITY,
70 cause some generals OF division
who had his personal confidence TO sink iuto
subaltegn condition. 1t VIII easily be conceived that
there enough in this render careful the most
rssoutc mind Still his resolution was not the less
promptly taken.
mrffcrrTiEs or LAND OPERATIONS
To pursue the Confederate army by land, and to pur
sue 1t up TO Ricnnond was, this Of the ye ri
terial imposs bity That fact being experienced
at the same moment light column, commanded By
General ST neman bad been thrown in pursuit of the
enemy. That column found enemy in retreat upon
the Rappaannock and aong the Gordonsvils Railroad,
and had two unimportant engagements with him But
the rains came, all the bridges were carried away,
the fords BECAME imrassabe, the water could
not be crossed even by swimming, SO long and
torrentcus had they become the column had got out OF
provisions and its situation extremely critical To
make It's condition known General Stnncman had 10 get
two aids camp u the General n.Chcf who had
panied him, the river the trunks OF trees
bound together by Such was the country IN which
the army would have 10 be engaged That was In March,
and the would continue TIL the 18th of June. More
over the enemy had burned and destroyed all the ra
road bridges. But with the necessities OF the American
soldier the unusual Of his raons, with the
necessity Of carrying everything in country where
nothing was 70 be found ant where the least storm
renders the road impractcable, the army could not
subsis, unless II supported or its march either
by nayigabe streams OF railroads Our military
administration has a rule tina, the wagon system
n EUROPE canno; provision that army at more than
three days ch from It's base Of operations. Here in
The desert, without roads, believe that this limit should
be reduced TO one day An American army cannot there
FORE 60 than days journey from the railroad
The water which supply IT, and IL the road is
Intercepted by tie destruction Of bridges must wait
their repair at the risk OF going forward without NUM-
lions and without food Bat yet there were on the rail-
roads leading TO Richmond visducts which would require
six weeks 10 rebuild. The march by land therefore
abandoned and they fell back the movement by water
THE PESissuLAR ARMY
But the operation had changed s aspect and was no
longer the General Mcclellan had conceived IL
the revelation OF his plan being made to the enemy
had permitted the latter take his precautions against
the danger which had menaced him The evacuation of
Manassas had preceded Instead Of following the opening
d tho campaign OF the federal army, and the
against Richmond had ceased 10 be surprise Unoru.
1atey also IL was lose the advantage OF prompt exc
sutton Already days bad been permitted 10 eaTse
says employed the useless pursuit oi the enemy
Tairfax Court House and TO Manassas. still II only
certain extent unfortuna as the transports had not
get assembled As as they began 10 appear an or
der given 10 the army To embark al Aexandfa
rhcre again a disappointment awaited the seneral-
u-Chief. They had promised him means for trans.
porting al 80 900 The vessels assembled on
the Potomac could hardly receive bali that mum.
ber. Instead Of carrying at once, AZ had been ex
pccted, the whole army, with lis artillery and mdterfd
iLwss necessary make the federal hotila so many
ferry boas. II was the nth Of March when the move
mont Of the whole army began Its enectual strength
was composed 0f eleven divisions OF infantry, 0 from
eight tan thousaDs mep each than thousand
regular infantry sno cavalry and about three hundred
sad nfy psoes y uelo st.sry-.ne whole amounting 70