The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1862-12-03

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tory. s1 ss 3aF aaa .ss-a r-,-.sf
| Tia Prines De ysiuxilis, whe wss usm
lbss Of Gen. McCisIlan's stsf during thl
Reorganization OF the Army OF the Potoms,
and the Peninsular campaign, has Published
q careful and elaborate sketch Of the cam
palgn which began with the evacuation o
Manassas by the rebel army and ended will
the retreat OF Mcclellan from before Rich
mond. The review has been carefully pre-
pared by one WHIT is versed in the highes
military science and diplomacy OF the age
and whose sfatement Of fdcts will not bt
called in question. No one can read the
comments Of Prince De Joinville without
being convinced that Gen. Mcclellan in that
memorable campaign was the victim alike o.
jealousy and weak and irresolute Cabinet
II he had been sustained as be should have
been, by the representatives Of the Govern.
ment, the rebellion would have recsived q
severe blow, and the condition Of public
affsirs would have presented far different
aspect from what they now do. Mcclellan
was stricken down when it was in the pow
or Of the Administra tion to have given the
rebellion check from which il could not
have recovered, and cow again, when he was
on tho eve Of q decisive battle, he is agaih
removed f. hom his command. Who, then, is
to blame for the indefinite prelongation Of
the war? The conspirators who twice have
done all in their power to produce tho dis
ssters which our arms have suffered and who
have thus given vitality and power to the re.
bellien, will be held to . fearful account. We
5aye only space for few extracts from the
paper of the Prince, but enough TO show the
eDbarrassments of Mcclellan in the cam
paign of the Peninsula, which should have
been, il he had been properly sustained, q
| triumphant success instead OF o reverse to
our arms. With respect to the deposition
of Mcclellan from the chief command, the
Prince denounces il as "a restriction of force
and dmunition Of usefulness and regards
it as "a blow in the rear at the very outset
of the campaign" lie adds: ... sI
"Yst this was but part Of the mishief
done by him. Mcclellan had long known
better than any body else, the real strength
of the rebels at Manassas and Centerylle.--I
lie was perfectly familiar with the existence
Of "wooden cannon" by which it has been
pretended that he was kept in awe Tor six
months. But he also knew that till the
month Of April the roads Of Virginia are in
such state that wagons and artillery can
only be moved oven them by constructing
plank-roads, tedious operation, during
which the enemy, holding the railways,
could either retreat, as he was than actually
dong, or move for blow upon some other
point. In any event, had Mcclellan attack
ed and carried Centerville, pursuit was i'm
possible, and victory would have been barren
ol results A single bridge burned would
have saved Johns ston's whole army. Such
are the vast advantages OF railway for q
retreatlng army-advantages which do not
exist for the army which pursues it.
"We have the right, we think. to say that
Mcclellan never intended to march upon
CenterviIle. mis- long determined pdrpose
was to make Washington sale by means OF a
strong garrison, and then to use the good
nsyigable waters and immense naval resour
ces Of the North to transport the army by
sea to point pesr Richmond. For weeks,
perhaps for months, this plan had been SO
cretly maturing. Secrecy, ss we'll as prompt
ness, aud hence had arisen the long ilieeling
toward the uncommunicative General.
"Be this as it may, as the day Of action
drew near, those who suspected the Gener-
ais project and were angry at not being in.
formed OF it; those whom his prom otion had
excited to envy; his political enemies; (who
is without them in AmericaO in short all
thoss beneath or beside him who wished him
i'll, broke out into chorus of accusation OF
slowness, inaction, incapacity. Mcclellan,
with patriotic courage which have always
admired, disdaiAed these accusations and
made no reply. He satisfied himself with
pursuing his preparations in laborious ST.
lence. But the moment came In which, not
withstanding the loyal support gwen him by
the President, that (unctionary could no lon
ger resist the tempest. A council of war Of
all Division Generals was held; o plan of
campaign not that of Mcclellan was propo
sed and discussed. Mcclellan was then
forced to explain bis projects and the next
day they we're known to the enemy. In
formed, no doubt, by one Of those female
spies who keep up his communications into
the domestic circles OF the Federal enemy,
Johnston evacuated Manassas at once. This
was q skilfull maneuver. Incapable OF assum-
ing the offensive; threatened with attack
either at Cen;erville, where defence would
be usele IS il successful, or at Richmond, the
loss of which would be q grave check, and
unable to cover both positions at once, John
ston threw his whole force before the latter
of the two" .!s5aa ID
The consequence resulting from this un
fortunate pressure Of the radicals, sand the
prompt resolution Of General Mcclellan to
attempt the capture OF Richmond from the
Peninsula are then described. -
An attack on the rebels in their position
on the Rappahannock and at Gordcnsville is
shown to be military absurdity. The
Prince then describes the embarrassments Of
Mcclellan in consequences Of his diminished
ranks precluding HIM from concentrating the
whole land and sea forces OF the Republic ups
on this single point. OF the subsequent de-
lays which greatly retarded the success OF
thee xpepition and the withdrawal OF portions
Of his command, we fini the following &C
count: n... ..l ,s.....
"A few days had been half lost in . use.
less pursuit of the enemy, while tho trans
ports were assembling at Alexandria. At
last they were assembled, and the order
came to embark, but here new uisuuder.
standing awaited the General, He had been
promised transports which could convey SO.
600 men at time. Ho iound vessels hard.
ly equal to the conveyance Of half that mum
Der. Instead OF moving at once, ~ McClel.
Ian had intended, whole armr, with it's
equipage, . number Of trips had to be made.
The smbarcation commenced March, IT,
The force consisted OF eleven divisions OF in.
iantry, 5000 to 10000 strong; one division
of Regulars linfantry and cavalry) 5000
strong, and $50 peices Of artillery. ~
"The total effective force may have bssn
10000 men. A. tho moment Of departure
whole division was detached TO form, We
know mot why, an independents command
under General Fremont. in The mountains OF
Virginia. We shall see the Potomac Army
81. S1~.n <,tla. nat lsan inasnl;eahla Aixntrss-