The Corinth war eagle. [volume] (Corinth, Miss.) 1862-186?, 1862-08-07
From the New York Express.
General Mcclellan.

He declines to speak for himself. He bears
and forbcars. and if never tempted to place
bis name Before the country, even when most
grossly assGiled in high and low places. He
remains with his army, assured Of their
love, confidence and respect. Now and then
he enforces respect from open traducers and
halfway defehdets as in the TIMES to-day;
when it says:
In the great work of ofgsnizing an army
he has proved his possession of the highest
ability; his siege of Yorktown (whether it
might have been avoided or not) was
masterpiece of successful soldiership; his
preparations for an advance Upon Richmond
were complete and perfect; he has the rare
duality of inspiring confidence and thorough
respect amdng his troops, and his conduct of
the retreat to the James River was most
mastery execution of one Of the most diff
6cult and dangerous movements which an
afrhy is ever compelled to make"
Sometimes it is asked why he did not go
up the James River, Instead Of the York and
Patnunkey. The answer is that "had the
Navy Department destroyed the Merrimacin in
time, the Jatnes Rivef would have been Sc
lected. He was bey6hd Yorktown before
the Mefrimac was destroyed, and his supplies
had been sent up the York River to the Pa
1nunkey. Had Jackson been engaged in the
valley by Fremont, or had Mcdowell, on the
Rappahahnock, co-operatei vigorously and
prevented the rapid flank and rear movement
of Jackson upon Mcclellan, or had sufficient
Feinfofosnen3s been sent 70 Mcclellan to pro-
tevt ii.a i,illO - ol4,.or's .f.oEl his base II
White House to his advance position at Fair
Oaks and MechanicsYille-a distance of
twenty t1iiles-there would have been no
necessity for changing his base but had he
not done so, and done so skillfully, his whole
army would have been captured.
Another question is answered as follows
by the "Herald .
The query is put sorietinIes, why Mcclellan
did not make Washington his base of opera
tions, and proceed overland, by way of Gem
treville and Manassas, to Richmond.
Those who ask this question ars either
entirely ignorant of the att of war, or they
maliciously ihdulge in clap trap to tickle the
ears Of the multitude. In the first place, in
a march from Washington to Richmond,
Mcclellan could have no natural protection
of sea or great FLYER for either of his fanks;
and the lite Of opetatiOns is SO extremely
long, being one bundled and seventeen miles
as bird would fly; tha. it would have re-
quired $n army of double his number to
protect his communications with his base.
His army would have had to be supplied en-
tifely by wagons; and he would have needed
about seven thousand Of their; and they
would have been liable to be cut off con-
tinually by an enterprisiug enemy like that
led by Jackson.
Then along that route Notifications were
erected and batteries established which would
have rendered it impracticable, unless to a
much larger army than was placed at the
disposal of Mcclellan. His force would
have had to be spread over a great width Of
country, from the Potomac to the mOuntainsi
in order to prevent his fanks being turred
or his lines penetrated !. SO that while he was
marching on Richmond, he might have dis
covered, when too late to prevent It, that y ,e
enemy was on his way TO- Washington and
that it must inevitably fall into his bar .ds.
General Mcclellan had the concur encc Of
eight of twelve Of his Generals in the route
taken towards Richmond, and we believe
also that he had the advice ar anproval oi
General Scott. Of course, ,;storv will dc
this man justice and so viii his loyal
Onion-iovlng csuntryms i, notwithstanding
the assertion of the TiU les that the public
taste IN has ability o lead an army in the
field to- victory has, ,een greatly shaken"
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