Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1862-12-23
OFFICIAL REPORT OF GEN. BURN.
SIDE.
The following has been received at head
quarters; a-. .0a. 4F Hsaa.. ...
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac,
December 10, 1892.
Gen. II. W. HALLEcK,


+ HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac,
December 10, 1852.
Gen. II. W. HALLEcK,
- G,neral-in- OAiS, o. s. A.,
GENERAL; have the honor TO offer tho fol-
lowing reasons for moving the Army of the
Potomac across the Rappahannock sooner than
was anticipated by the President, Secretary, or
yourself, and for crossing At a point different
from the one indicated by you at our last meet
ing at the Presidents,
During my preparations for crossing at the
place had at first selected, discovered that
the enemy had thrown a large portion of his
force down the river and elsewhere, thus weak
ening his defence In front; and also thought
discovered that he did not anticipate the cross
ing Of our whole force nj Fredericksburg, and
hoped, by rapidly throwing the whole command
over at that place, to separate, by a vigorous
attack, the forces of the enemy on the river be-
low from the forces behind and on the crest In
rear of the town, In which case we could fight
him with a great advantage In our favor. =.
To do this We had to gain height on the ex-
treme right OF the crest, which height COM
manded a new road lately made by the enemy
for purposes Of moe rapid communication
along his lines which point gained, his posi-
ton along the crest would have been scarcely
tenable, and he could have been driven from
thence easily by an attack on his front In con-
nection with movement In rear of the crest.
How near we came TO accomplishing our OBJ
ject, future reports will show. ~
But for the Fog and unexpected and unavold-
able delay in building the bridges, which gave
the enemy twenty -four hours more to concen-
trate his force In his strong positions, we would
almost certainly have succeeded, In which case
the battle would have been lin my opinion, far
more decisive than II We had crossed at the
place first selected. Il. ...r .....--.
As 1t was, we came very near success. Fall
Ing In accomplishing the main object, we re.
mained In order of battle two days, long enough
to decide that the enemy would not come out
Of his strongholds or fight us with his infantry.
After which we crossed to this side of the
river unmolested and without the loss Of men
or property. .... . b.. ~.
As the day broke, and long lines of troops
were seen marching 10 their different positions
as IL getting on parade, not the least demorali-
| Zatlon or disorganization existed.
To the brave officers and soldiers who ac.
complished the feat Of thus rccrossing In the
face of the enemy, owe everything for the
failure In the attack am responsible, as the
extreme gallantry, courage, and endurance
shown by them were never exceeded, and
would have carried the point had II been posi-
BILE. ... a % HHI' H.s "r.
To the families and friends of the dead car
only offer my heartfelt sympathles but for thu
wounded can offer my heartfelt prayers fol
their comfort and final recovery. h ..
The fact that l decided TO move from War.
renton on 10 this line, rather against the oplnior
of the President, Secretary and yourself, ant
that you have left the whole movement In my
hands without giving me orders, makes me th'
more responsible. -tta Hg7- yifHAE srt
l will write you very soon, and give you NOR
definite information and, finally, will sent
you my detailed report, In which special nc
acknowledgement will be made of the service o
the different grand divisions corps, and N.