The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-07-25


Why DID McCIEIIAs Go TO THE Peninsula
This question is frequently asked. That route
was chosen because it presented the shortest
and most secure base Of operations, and every
able military man regards it as the best way to
the rebel capital; and had the Navy Depart
ment done its duty by destroying the Merrimac
in time, the James river would have been Sc
lected as the base instead of the Pamunkey
And this is the answer to those who ask if the
James river was better than the Pamunkey
why did not Mcclellan adopt it at first? He
was beyond Yorktown before the commander of
the Merrimac ordered her destruction to pre-
vent capture; and, his supplies having been
sent up the York river to the Pamunkey, it was
not possible to make the change in the face of
the enemy till he was driven further back.
Had Jackson been sufficiently engaged in the
valley of the Shenandoah by Fremont or had
Mcdowell, on the Rappahannock, co-operated
vigorously and prevented the rapid flank and
rear movement of Jackson upon Mcclellan or
had sufficient reinforcements been sent to Nc
Clellan to protect his line of operations from
his base at White House to his advance position
twenty miles-there would have been no ne
cessity for changing his base; but had he
not done SO, and done so skilfully, his
whole army would have been captured, jack
son having been permitted by the other Union
generals not under the command Of Mcclellan
to turn his right flank aud cut him off from his
base. The rebel troops would have pressed
,bar - tho
river, above the point where the gunboats
could have rendered him assistance, and either
surrender or destruction must have been the
consequence The skill of Mcclellan enabled
him to escape the disgrace planned for him by
the radicals and saved our army to capture
Richmond at future day.
But it has been asked why Mcclellan
did not make Washington his base of
operations, and proceed overland by way
of Centreviile and Manassas to Richmond
Those who ask this question are either
entirely ignorant Of the art of war, or
they maliciously indulge in claptrap to tickle
the ears of the multitude. In the first place, in
march from Washington to Richmond McClel-
Ian could have no natural protection Of a sea
or great river for either of his TANKS, and the
line of operations is SO extremely long, being
one hundred and seventeen miles as bird
would fly, that it would have required an army
Of double his number to protect his communi-
cations with his base. His army would have
had to be supplied entirely by wagons, and he
would haye needed about seven thousand of
them; and they would have been liable to be
cut off continually by an enterprising enemy
like that led by Jackson.
Then along that route Notifications were
erected and batteries established which would
have rendered it impracticable, unless to a
much larger army than was placed at the dis
posal of Mcclellan. His force would have had
to be spread over great width Of country, from
the Potomac to the mountains, in order to pre-
vent his TANKS being turned or his lines pene-
trated; so that while he was marching on Rich
.nond he might have discovered, when it was
too late to prevent It, that the enemy was on
his way to Washington, and that 1t must in
evitably fall into his hands.
These considerations will show the ignorance
or wilful wantonness of the fippant criticisms
which have been written and uttered against
the military operations on the peninsula.