, 1862-07-12
The PenIDsQlaf Campaign.

For civilians to criticise military plans, in
advance, or direct them, would be presump-
tuous; and to do SO while they are being |
worked out. would DC damagsng to the cause.
Bu Iwhen they have been carried ont to dISas-
trous result, it will warrant the expression Of
opinions all the while entertained of them.
To the public it was iDexplicable that the
route by The Yorktown Peninsula should be
Potomac to Richmoud; and they hare
looked to events to disclose military ad-
yantages in that route which uuInilitary per-
sors could not perceive. The event hns JUS
titled their apprehensions, and has demonstra- [
ted that to be the most difficult way which
could have been chosen.
The great strategic triumph which Was
c1aimed on occount Of being driven from this |
line, when journalists two Or three days aGo, !
were humiliating themselves, destroying ali |
the national character by their puerile labor to |
turn disaster into trategic victory, iu5tities |
this opinion Of the route. We lad al estab- |
1iBhed ard fortified base Of operations Oh the
Potomac, where other corps in the Valley OF
Virginia and in the Mountain Department
could have co, operated, and where the advance
on Richmond would have cleared all Virginia
as If vent, making its line Of Supplies secure,
while an advance il the Mountain Department
would have cut the confederate coinmunica-
tions with the Southwest.
system OF rss.Aroads would hare hesn
opened 70 us o. we vent, and the Potomac
would have furnished 4 na7igahle line to
Aqua Creek, and the Rappahan1ock to Fred
erleE5jUrg- Our march would have secured
to Us he Shenandoah Valley, whose wheat
| tlan the possession Of Richmond. From
Fredericksburg it is sixty miles to Richmond,
q railroad which could be rebuilt as our army
marched. There are feT now who will pre-
tend that the srny Of the Potomac 7Tas not
| strcng enough to have made this march
| promptly ard successfully, had there been
! military leadership With genius to under
| take it,
What was gained by abandoning the base Of
[ operations and transporting our army By water
| to Yorktown What military commander
would interposc naval transit in his march,
| with its great delay and Immense cost, to clrry
| his army farther away from the point aimed at,
| when the direct way was open for him bf land?
| We do n!t undertake to state the time exactly,
| but nearly four months have elapsed siuee
| movement Of the Army OF the Potomac be-
| gap. Nearly month was wasted in counter
marching about Manassas. The transit con-
sumed 9 mouth. Fortress Monroe aad New
port News had been standing menace to tae
eontedcrates for year, Of an adyanee by that
| route, and it WILLS therefore well fortified
4 month was consumed in the siege Of
Yorktown. Then, after 1a1ting pursuit Of
the enemy, and land march Of eighty miles,
attended BY all the hardships that can arise
from storms and want Of permanent roads, in
| IIotAGt u4out4 0cl. 4flC|4e14tAl 4eALuCu ti4G
Chickahominy to find it an insurmouatable
obstacle. He could not cross it without losing
his communications; and it is doubtful If
even another LOO, 600 men could have relieved
him from this dilemma. His position was es.
| scntlaly that Of making flank march in front
| If the enemy, an operation regarded as mad
m:eslb1e by military men.
To STE tli5 We have bnt to LOOK at the Chicka-
hominy. Six miles north Of Richmond, it
runs through rolling country and tine firms,
E31F 4f1+
ordinary stages it is forlable, and is easily
! hTi1rei This district was all occupied bY
tie febels, ard from rs vicinity to Richmond
AID the cooperation Of the Inhabitants, was
From Ills district @ the ChickahominF runs in .
, beuoiug cou5sc rencral]r southeast. into q
sEampT countrr, where It has treacherou;
, | bottom, urfordable. and difficult to ind q
fn1l5;d: :tion for bridges
, On the Gust Of Richmond. where the York
, River railrosd-McClell Inc Of supplies
: crosses It, thr Ch:ckahouiny Is about twelve
, | miles fro1n RichInond. The confsderate5
) holdlre the river above, in such close prox
. | in.ity 10 Richmond, were on the tlank of hI:
1itt. nf sun1,]i+s and con1d 1,rertnifata \ forcf
! uaon it at any roint between the Chicka
r | bouiny ard York Rivers. Twentr miIt; q
! railroad Wou1l have to be protected ayains
thesr stacks in force, While sier. onar1tion
Ter, ot,;nv IN in Trnnt. IN ,,r.tfcct ihis rna*
) Afc(.cll.n stretched his 7ine fifteen miles u,
, +hI. Chictohnutinr and then = In oavalr
> VIDA - Tnernnt ~ II 1nd ]estrorod lar
, am,.nnt ~ sI,Inl;as ''7
Uad hc crossed his r;,,ht ,sinsr his communi
G CATIONS would have bten in fhe hands If RI
t,e,nv' In nuehinp fnrrard bis 1sft w;fhon
H." s,}n,,ort IF tht. min hoJy # W 'ots,rSe
; ara r.,.nlsad n hnI1;nn Ills r;rht 1s;1.- ~
! fLe nrIheast siir to rrotIrt his Gnmn,n,ii,,
) tio1,s> it VA eynased ia atact hy ovrrwhel1 -
;1su fnrcts II las hcen tI,onr-hf stronpe tl,,
y tht cnnf.dcratrs All not rrSjst hjs e3vanc
:: oyer he CI,irEafominv. when ita nasnr,1 oI
s,ar1es x:rrc 50 croaf. It eJn nov he SOC
# fhat II was a greater adyautare IN thern r
; have the Chickahominy BETWEEN 1dcCi=Sila
IF eu:s his communications. The only possibil
l. ty of success was by bold push for gard t
l. Richmord. If Mcclellan could have beate
C the rebel army there, tpat wcul l have mad
e his rear communication safe. But it was fc
n linn 10 Judge whether he had sufficient for1
IS to attempt ills.
al McClejIan's position could result only i
l. the sacrifice of his army The retreat upo
= James River was the orly alternative. VIII
is RI sponsible for the military blunder th5
d. chose the route to Richmond by way OF Yorl
st town ard the ChicIahominy. We do not pr
It tend to know That vas the military incOu
Of potency that has cost the country this disa
ter It is enough to sacrifice any man
reputation, whether military or aduInistr
tive. There are collateral military nlist .kc
which can Only be- alluded to il this articl
The three months 1elsurly march bV wat
be and land to Richmond gave abundant time
,r | the colicderates to concentrate th:ir torc
- frnnl tie whole South to resist it which Ge
ag IIallcck's cautious siege approaches in IL
SIS West old little to prevent; and which the d
~ captured, demoral!zed and destroyed B -aur
~ CARDS army, had I tendency to prevent o.
ke guarding against By similar concentration
u SGme correspondents insaneIy talk as
u. ue McClellar. or inc contr.r5, hc b is had
LQ ! 1,-, lea 81 In