The Manitowoc pilot. [volume] (Manitowoc, Wis.) 1859-1932, 1862-09-19

undDiuily tudt Ddu HO tACepti )i, lHt ibCd
pacity which had caused their defeat =
No one believed that the combined force
of the rebels were In front; and as for the
battles of Saturday, the men, the officers,
The Generals who fought it, confess with
shame and anger that they were beaten by
half their number. The army was not de
feated, its commander was out generated
He neither knew where his enemy was nor
would he suffer himself to be informed
He was warned that the enemy was mass.
ing on his left-every soldier knew it, but
he disbelieved and denied it; sent batter
les and troops to the right, to the center,
to the rear-eyery where but where they
were wanted-tlen. in moment, found
himself surrounded, enveloped, crushed,
and defeated
Mcdowell was censured not less severe
ly than Pope. With the latter his advice
was said to have had undue controlling in
tluence. The only order Pope gave was
the order TO retreat. Mcdowell fought a
battle. Pope leaned only on his advice
yielded him command throughout |.
was blunder from the beginning. 1t is
useless, said An officer, 10 fight under Nc
Dowell. | shall do my duty as an officer,
but we shall lose every battle where he
commands. l do not know whether l
have heard treachery or imbecility most
frequently imputed to Mcdowell, Per-
haps oftenest he is given the benefit of the
alternative. | did not hear one suggestion
in his favor-no excuse CT palliation.
No order Of battle was communicated
to Generals of any rank Generals of corps
were not told who supported them who
was on their rigA: or left; what move
ments concerned their own command OF
position; or on wha. plan the battle was
to be fought. | asked question about
the plan. "Sir there was no plan We
knew nothing out what We discovered fol
ourselves. do not know to this hour
who was on my right. asked "Is it not
usual to inform Generals of corps or divis.
ions on such points 90 " Usual. The
General who negIects to do it is an imbe,
cie."
A commanding hill in our possession
was threatened by a hostile movement il
force. Gen. Pope was informed, and wa:
asked to send another battery and bold it
If you do not in fifteen minutes, the enc
my will be iD possession of the hill" III
refused to send it; and in ten minutes the
rebel artillery was playing fom that bill
on our troops.
Generals who fought with the most he
roic courage and the most soldierly ability
whose praises are in every ones mouth
speak of the battles in which they have
just won honest fame, with chagrin anc
remorse. Their own efforts became futile
from the incompetence of ;heir command
ing General.
Said one to me, L" I must ask to be re
|, lieved, unless General Pope is removed.
cannot see my men murdered
met general who LED his division il
the hottest of the fight with heroic cour.
age and veteran skill. lie said, {" l have
lost a thousand men; | dare not go in {
the hospital and look in the faces of those
wounded men who know have shed theil
blood bravely and in vain" 1t was Car
Schurz.
The successful movement Of the rebel:
upon the flank and rear of General Pope
must be traced not to his proper means o
information but to his refusal to regard the
intelligence that was sent him. He wa:
officially informed of it but would not be
| lieve it, would not even take reasonable
precautions againstits possibility. lie act
ually withdrew Sigel's corps from his ex'
posed flank while the enemy were turning
that point. Officers stationed in front or
the Rapahanaock line saw tor three day'
the constant clouds Of dust which announ
ced the moving columns of tie enemy. bu
to the General they gave no sign. IL
persisted in regarding their success at Cat
let's as a mere cavalry dash, and was hard
" convinced by Manassas that the enemy
had gained lis rear in force. From tina
hour his movements have been followed
with nothing but disaster.