The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-06-29
INTERESTING FROM SOUTH CAROLINA.
Additional Particulars Of tho Battle
on James Island,
Our Port Royal Correspondence.


Our Port Royal Correspondence.
PoRr RoyAi. june %, 1862
an account Of nc Late Affair." james Island S. O.,
and What Led 10 1t, de-
The attack on Charleston intended TO be . cssp
ain and II the views Of General Bennam could have
been carried il would have been before
this The idea Of sudden concentration of available
troops upon James Island, and then Of rapid dash upon
Fort Johnson aud point commanding Charleston orgi-
by him. adopted after careful consideration by
General Hunter, entirely feasible had been
that ths Stono open and the rebel force
the island very sman. The plans of tho
carried out the Quartermasters department was
Found entirely inefficient and destitute OF the proper
facilities, large part Of tho water transportation Of
the department having been detained and diverted At
New York, and portions Of il breaking down when
most needed. Hence there arose unavoidable delays,
and instead OF the troops being all concentrated on
James Island the Sd of June as was contemplated
ordered and agreed portion only reached there at that
time, the rest not arriving till the sth and 9th
Meantime the rebels had brought in considerable
force, and had commenced the erection of
fort which commanded CAMPS, and threw
its shells even into the river. A reconnaissance in
force was therefore ordered by General Benham the
approval OF General Hunter for the morning Of tho 11h
with the object OF attacking this FORT which was erected
place called Secessionville Tho rebels hav
ing attacked lines however tho afternoon OF the
10th they repused with loss TO them, but
small to us and our troops being represented good
deal exhausted tho reconnaissance postponed and
the effect of erecting battery for the purpose of senc
ing this fort tired with General Hunters approval
On the 18th General Hunter left the Sono leaving Gene
raj Benham in command, and ordering him. with his en-
tire concurrence 'not advance Charleston TO
attack Fort Johnson unless reinforced but to provide
secure intrenehed camp on the river.
This fort not the route to Charleston or Fort
Johnson and the camps, whose positions the river
taken with General Hunters appreciation not
long the guns Of this fort we're allowed TO
command them.
The battery erected by produced effect, and it
therefore became evident to General Benham that he
must return to the original plan of the
which had had General Hunters approval-moving
with additional force, inasmuch the enemy had
had week nearly for strengthening their works
On the 14th we learned from some deserters who
in that the whole number OF the forces the island
was fourteen regiments and two battaions, mostly con-
csntrated the direct route TO Charleston that behind
the fort in question and in SecessonvIe there
two battalons that six guns were mounted and seven
more were on the wharf 1t deemed comparative.
y easy matter to reduce this work. and this reduced to
position the only firm land route TO
Charleston
The reconnaissance was therefore ordered for the
morning Of the 10th, not one of the officers Directing
sen Stevens with six regiments was TO advance at early
dawn, and by rush, If possible seize tbs ter. which
. plain earthwork; while Gen. Wright and Col. Will
left
somehow there was a delay. The supports in Gen
Stevens command did not follow the ASSUMING compa
MES close enough. Only two regimen;s-the Eighth
Michigan and Seventy. New Yosk Hghandefs tn.
ftUO Guh UiYpors Of cd a
snemys works, and they were good dea cut up with
Ealing Ere OF grape and cariser and rifemen.
Of them mounted the parapet and penetrated tho
fort They virtually he'd the place Tor while, and
there period OF half an hour that not shot
hcd from it, but as the other regiments did not come
up they forced to retire The Twenty eighth Mas
failed entirely. Meantime Colonel Williams had been
ordered 10 the support Of General stevens with his
brigade but instead of going round TO tie right was
expected he led his men TO the extreme left and TO the
opposite SIDE OF the fort from which they were sepa
rated by creek and marsh, and where they were ex-
posed fire from field battery the OILS 10
their left The Third New Hampshire and Third Rhode
Island fought here sp.enddy and drove everything be-
fore them but as il was not deemed desirable 70 expose
the by second assault in broad daylight they
recalled and finally all the troops were drawn on in per
feet order bringing away their dead and wounded Our
less in killed proved 10 be about 1907 wounded and
missing about 500. The enemys loss we cannot ascer
tain. contraoand who ran away from them says they
had 800 wounded Their papers claim victory, at
tie time saying they have reason TO exut,
they ost very many Of their most estmabe citizens In
The skirmish or the 10th lest only four killed and
about twelve wounded. The rebe.s lost In Killed
and wounded from 100 to 200. In the reconnos.
Of the 10th lost about one hundred killed and
fve hundred wounded and missing The loss OF the
eneIsy have been in killed and wounded four hun
dred or more.
The fort should have been We failed OF 1t only
by Of those fortutoHs vicssitues that In
Ii would be hard 10 say bam0 should be attached to
any the programme as ordered could have been
closely followed up, success would have been certain
Some OF the regiments certainly not in dr and
Of them certainly not used to that sort Of
thing.
1t has been said that General Bsnham disobcyed the
orders Of General Hunter but that would never have
been said had tho fort been taken He certainly intended
70 carry what he supposed to be General Hunters
wishes and follow his orders % the very letter
General Hunter left the Stone and the c9mnand at a
critical moment when he knew that camps
being sheed by the guns OF the FORT after he had once
approved OF assault on the fort after he had ap
proved the erection OF to attempt 10 silence IL,
and with the entire knowledge Of the necessity Of
ducing in order to hold the positions taken under his
supervision and moreover, with tina direct order
10 General Benham 10 secure the camp, while he not
70 advance Charleston ATTACK Fort johnson.
There was but left 20 General Benham and
That under his responsibilities and as he sup
Yosed, in dHect obedience his orders, he pursued
That did succeed the 18th no fault Of his
although may DO deemed necessary, TO sustain
tam policy that he should be sacrificed