Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1862-11-19
MoctELLAN's RELIEF FROM COMMAND


morning, the pnblc were startled by the an
| nonncement that General McCLELLAN had
been relieved from the command of the Army
| OF the Potomac. BY this order, which was
handed to him Friday night about eleven
| O'Clock, by General BUCKINGHAM, the COM
mand of the Army of the Potomac immediate
ly devoved upon General BURNSIDE, and Gen.
eral MCCLELLAN s last official act was to issne
brief address to the troops, max ing that fact
known, and taking leave of them.
This event will naturally create a profound
| impression upon the country, and quite as ma
turally excite vast deal of discussion and
this discussion will he bitter and mischievous
| or good tempered and salutary, accordingly
as the disputants governed by common
sense, or impcled by blind passion Unfor-
| tunately, General McCLELLAN's name, without
any necessity in the world, has been mixed up
| in our politics; misfortune that is fairly
! chargeable upon both the unreasonng oppo--
nents and the Incorporate friends of the Ad
ministration. If this we're not so, an mpor-
tant event like his relief from the command
OF his army, which to-day will be topic of
conversation and debate with millions of his
| countrymen would be considered calmly, un-
der the light of what may be its true meaning,
rather than as a subject for angry and sense
| less aliercation. 1t is in the former temper
! that we propose to consider the event, and
| thus discharge the highest duty OF a journal
st by attracting public sentiment into its trne
channels, when it is in danger of being led
astray. f2 s a#tE
We should all remember that the President
has been. TIN ough good report and through evil
report the steadfastest friend of General Nc.
CLELLAN, and we must therefore accept his
order transferring General McCLELLAN's com
mand as an act done in good faith, because Of
controlling reasons of public policy.
What may those reasons be? For in them
is involved the whole question whether the
friends of our young General should take this
matter philosoph,caly, as he does, or wheth-
er, unlike him, they should give wayto rage
and indignation. Let then explore for these
reasons The President is not only the Com I
mander.in- Chief of the Army and Navy, bu.
he isthe Chief Magistrate of the country. He
has TO regard not alone the military but the
political aspect Of affairs. While he scans the
field of warlike operations through the eyes
of General he must observe the far wider
field of diplomacy and politics with the en-
larged vision of Statesman. He must watch
the signs abroad as well as passing events at
home. sc0 Heroa3 sFfTN BIB ei1lg la4
Now with these distinctions laid down let
us proceed a step further. There can be no
doubt OF the existence of strong and almost
universal desire throughout the layal States
for active. sharp, decisive operations against
the Rebellion. This desire is shared by both
the friends and the opponents of General Nc
CLELLAN. Many of his warmes. champions
deplore the circumstances, whatever they may |
be. that have delayed his movements until
they are threatened with interruption by the |
storms OF winter These persons in com on |
with nearly all others, would prefer action
with all its hopes, though it should not be de
cisiye, to the delays which make us all fearful |
of another long year of lingering war. Such |
is unqnestionably the feeling of the people in
the mass, and this is bound to be recognized |
by the Executive.
Again, it would be idle TO attempt conceal
ment of the fact that, as month after month of |
unsurpassed Rebellion rolls on, the danger
of foreign interference in our affairs is advanc-
ing in geometricaI progression. Old hatreds |
in England, irrepressible jealousy and fear of
powerful rival, self-interest in all its forms,
suffering humanity in the manufacturing com
munities of Europe-all these forces, aided by
the most influential exponents and leaders of
political opinion, are working against us. Ev-
erything-but the true hearts of the people,
who, amidst all their miseries, stand by til is
ance now and hereafter. But the people, un-
fortunately for US, have no present power, and
their wishes are, therefore, unlikely to rule
We have nothing to counteract all these ma
lefic influences except an immediate demon
stration of our power to restore the supremacy
of the National Government. We must have
victory; but whether victory or defeat, the
worst possible condition for our affairs abroad
would be long winter OF inaction at home-
This would be to invite interference--to give
the s,Confedsrates''th the very opportunity they
want. Here again is an important phase of
the situation by which the President is cou-
pelled to regulate his conduct. of the war. He
is moved by two powerful political considera-
tions- one at home and the other abroad
which he can not disregard - 20 2 slA e. -'e1
Far different are the surroundings of the
Commanding General Of this army. He OBJ
serves the; military situation alone. He sees
the enemy, considers his force. his position,
his means of attack and defence. These he
compares with his own, and makes up his mil