, 1862-11-27

we nave yet learned the true cause but all the
tacts thus far known to US we place before the
reader.
The commission appointed to inquire into the
circumstances attending the surrender of Har.
per's Ferry have made q report and the report
has been published. Concerning Mcclellan,
says dispatch in reference to this subject, the
evidence adduced in the report and the opinion
expressed BY the Commission are most direct
and damaging The General.in.C Chief tcstiiies
that Mcclellan, after receiving orders to drive
the enemy from Maryland, marched on an arer-
age only sir miLsS a day in PurSuit, and that in
his opinion be (McClelan) both could and should
have relieved and protected Hprper's Ferry. In
this opinion the Commission fully concur.
This march Of sir miles a day. in pursuit Of
disOrgahized hostile army, we can readily believe,
for his management fiOm beginning to end has
shown that il is Characteristic Of him to exhibit
theleast energy when the most momentOus re.
suits were pending He cannot excuse himself
with the plea that his troops were exhausted
Tor candid review Of the whole ground shows
eOnclusivelY that the enemy had undergone a
much greater amount Of fatigue, with scant sup
plies Of food and inferior equipments; and to
set up this plea is to credit the rebels with vastly
superior powers Of endurance, which we cannot
eOneede them. The rebels had made long and
hasty march into Maryland, in hopes Of recruit.
ing their forces and replenishing their commits.
sariat; with disappointed hopes they turned to
retrace their steps, despOndeney the ruling feel.
ing with the mass, officers and men alike. This
vas the time 10 strike the decisive blow, when,
demOTalized, dishsartened, and flying in confu.
sion for their lives, the enemy would have fallen
an easy prey to an energetic commanding officer.
II Mcclellan had been true TO the trust reposed
in him, We believe ho might have crushed out
the rebellion there and then, by snnihilating or
capturing the rebel army. He had the game all
IN bis own hands, but ho either did not know
how 70 use the advantage which circumstances
placed in his hands Of, knowing how, did not see
6t to use Il. These are the facts, and bis most
devoted friends and defenders cannot 70 behind
or gainAy them. t.. a. ss.s-
But this i not all A dispatch dated Wash.
ingtcn, Nov 10Th, says letter has just been
published, written BY General HaIleek, on the
2sth Of Oetober, 70 the Secretary Of War, from
which We make The following extract:
On The drst Of October, finding Mcclellan
PuTposod operating from Hafpers Ferry, I urged
him 70 cross the river At once, and give the enemy
battle pointing out 70 him The disadvantages Of
delaying until The Autumn rains had swollen the
Potomac, and impaired roads. On The Sth Of
yc ooer he was peremptorily ordered 70 cross
ne Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or
drive them south. Il viii beobscrved that three
weeks have elapsed since that order was given.
y ny opinion, there has been no such want Of
supplies 10 The army under Mcclellan as to pre-
vent bis compliance with my orders 10 advance
upon ne enemy. Had be removed his army to
ne south side q he Potomac, he could have re-
e..tca supplies almost y speedily ns BY remain
So 4 would seem that flallecl deemed bis
force suilciontly strong % cope with The enemy,
bat biz peromploEy orders Allied TO arouse Nc.
Clellan from biz lelhargic Inaction. We canno,
bsAsvs that Hallodk would rscklessly leopard
he niuy of he Federal nrny; and when.
ihereioru, Be issued the orders above alluded 70.
be islt that Meclallah bad ample means to fnIHI
them.
Such being The evidence and TIE iacis, We are
relucianily brcsd 70 ne conclusion ia, Ne
Clellana removal has not taken bluco day TOO
SON. He has been tried and found wanting.
With Ne ltsouroa of he nation almost without
limit at BIS diaposal-viih whole swelvemonsh
n which % perissi and execute bic pluns--sn-
ioying o the fullest extent meanwhile. ,he conH.
d1nco Of fhr nation and 10 nrmv-ho h.a A..