The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1862-10-01

on the left. The distance was too great |
TO distinguish the sound oE his artillery |
from Porters left There WAS no imme-
diate prospect Of more fighting on the /
right, and / left the field which all day /
long had seen the most obstinate contest /
of the war, and rode over 10 McClellan's |
headquarters. The different battle fields |
were shut out from each Others view, |
but all partially visible from the central |
hill which General Mcclellan had Occu- !
pied during the day. But was more
than ever impressed on returning, with |
the completely dcceillul appearance of |
the ground the rebels had chosen when !
yi9Wcd FRAN the front
s'dJokers and summers struggle nad
Fbeen carried on over an uneven and
wooded surface, their own line Of battle
extending in a semi circle not less than
a mile and a half Perhaps n better no.
ton of their position can he got by con-
sidering their right, centre, and left as
forming three sides Of square. SO long,
therefore, as either wing was driven back
the centre became exposed 70 q very dam
gerous enlilading fire, and the further
the centre was advanced the worse off il
was, unless the lines on its side aud rear
were firmly held This formation re-
suited originally from the efforts of the
enemy 70 turn both Hanks. Hooker, at
the very outset, threw his column so far
into the centre Of the rebel lines that
they were compelled 10 threaten him on
the flank to secure their own centre.
Nothing of all this was pcrceptiblc
from the hills in front. Some directions
IF ths, vnI,1 1t,,.g L., a. 1.
the smoke Of their guns, but the whole
interior formation of the country beyond
| the hills was completely concealed.
| When Mcclellan arranged his order of
battle, il must have been upon informa-
| ton, or have been left to his corps and
! division commanders to discover for them
! selves.
Up TO . o'clock Burnside had made
! little progress. His attacl, on the bridge
/ had been successful, but the delay had
| been so great that TO the observer il ap-
pearcd as if McClcllan's plans must have
| been seriously lisarrangcd. lts impos-
! sibe not TO suppose that the attacks on the
! right and left were meant in measure To
| correspond, for otherwise, the enemy had
only to rcpel Hooker ON the one hand,
then transfer his troops and push them
against Burnside.
Here was the difference between Sum-
ner and Burnside. The former did his
work al once and lost all his men
At once-that is, all whom he lost
at all Burnside seems to have acted
cautiously, in order TO save his men,
and sending successfully insufficient
forces against position of strength,
distributed his loss over greater pc
Rod Of time, but yet lost none the less in
the end.
Finally at O'Clock, Mcclellan sent
simultaneous orders 10 Burnside and
Franklin; TO the former TO advance and
carry the batteries in his front az all
hazards and at any cost; 10 the latter
TO carry the woods next in front of him
TO the left which the rebels still held.
The order TO Franklin, however, was
practically countermanded, in cOnse-
quence of a message from Gen. Sumner,
that if Franklin went on and was repuls-
ed, his own corps was not sufficiently re-
organized to be depended on as reserve.
Franklin, thereupon, was ordered TO
run no risk Of losing his present position,
and instead OF sending his infantry into
the woods, contentcd himself with adj
yancing his batteries over the breadth in
front supporting them with heavy coll
umnslof infantry, and attacking with
energy the rebel batteries Immediately
opposed to him. His movement was a
success so lar as il went, the batteries
maintaining their new ground, and sem
sibly affecting the sicadincss Of the Rrb-
: ell fire. That being once accomplished,
and all hazard Of the right being again
, forced back having been dispeled, the
, movement OF Burnside became at once
the turning point of success and the fate
of the day depended on him.
How extraordinary the situation was
, may be Judged from \ moments consid-
Grafton Of the facts. II is understood
that from the outset burnside's attack
; was expected TO be decisive, as il GER
q tainly must have been If things went well
p elsewhere, and if he succeeded in cstab-
fishing himself on the Sharpsburg road
- in the rebel rear.
/ Generals Hooker, Sumner and Frank
q lin, and Mansfield, were all sent 10 the
e right, three miles away, while Porter
4 seems 10 have done double duty with his
4. single corps in front, both supporting
n the batteries and holding himself in re-.
4 serve. With all this immense force or
the right, but 10000 men were given &,
h Burnside for the decisive movement o
J the day.
r. Still more unfortunate i'm ils results
q was the total failure Of these seperat
"a attacks on the right and left 10 sustain
8 or in any manner cooperate with eacl
v other Burnside hcsilated for hours II
Y front of the bridge which should hay,
2 been carried az once by a coup de main
v Meantime, Hooker had to be fighting TO
hours with various fortune, but final sue
d cess. Summer had come up too late 4
Join in the decisive attack which al
10 earlier arrival would probably hay
Ia counted into a complete success; an
O. Franklin reached the scene only whe
Il Summer lhad been repulsed. Probabl
IA before his arrival the Rebels had trans
Up irrred a consderable'number of troops
rs their right 10 meet the attack of Burn
ne side, the direction of which was the
he suspected or developed
n Attacking first with one regiment. the
he with two, aud delaying both for artillcr.
in burnside was not over the bridge btlUr
70 two perhaps not tin three. L
in advanced slowly up the slopes in h
r. front his batteries ian the rear GOVERN
,d 10 some extent, the movements of the in
e. iantry A desperate fight was going q
lis in deep rayine ON his right, the rcb
rd batteries were in full play and apparent
AT ly very annoying and destructive, viii
,s. heavy columns of rebel troops wei
id plainly visible, adyanoingas il carele
ra ] Ui TUUrpalUlanf aI.p9 do ryaH and .p
b, the hills iu che direction ct Burnside