Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-10-31
BY WCLANAHAN & DILL.

Lees Instructions, during the night, wss stil
, IN position. Making the necessary disposition
as rapidly as possible, which could not be prop
eriy done in the darkness Of the preceding night
l advanced in line of battle capturing som
prisoners and q hospital of wounded men.
found that the troops in front were only a smsl
rearguard, portion of whom made their escape
Ny skirmisheTs soon came in contact with thos,
of General jackson, but foTtEnately reeognizins
each other, collision was avoided
Being anxious to pursue these slight successes
by pressing on the reiresting eneay, l desired
{ after the junction with General Jsckson's foreas
to continue nv direct movements 10 the froy,t
- and volunteered with my command to lead in
the pursuit of the enemy. General jackson n.
J Piled that his troops were fieeher than mine.
, and General Lee then directed me to proceed
by the Quaker road and to form on the right of
Jackson.
Having been provided with these guides
soldiers, born in the immediate neiehborbood
who knew thoroughly Ali the roads, put my
troops IN motion, right In front. TO march on the
G1aker Toad, which was nearly parallel to that
on which jackson marched, with q view Of
forming line Of battle TO tue left, and thus oc-
| ccupylng that road, and thus resting my left on
Jacksou's right. General Longstreet having
! expressed some Doubt IS to the road ia question
/ beng The Qgsk0r read 90 eKs mined ths guides
! separately, and was satisfied tat they wore
! night informed nm tHGt # he would give NE
an order TO move by any other road, would
| obey it with pleasure. This ho declined TO DO.
/ therefore marched, 6s originally ordered, about
mile and a half on this road. General Long
street, who had now oysTtEken ne, expressed
again his convictions chat This could n0T bc the
Quaker road, and desired taab I should return to
another road parallel 10 this, bGt nearer e. Jsc3E
sons right. An order 30 the same ,fftct having
been communicated By q staff officer of General 1
Lee about this time, I marched in the new di-
rection. 1t turned out, however, in point OF
fact, that the road 10 aud along which had been
marching, following the guides, was and is the
Qlsker road"-ths only one universally 1
known as snch by tie people ia the country /
(See the sfidavits Of the three guides and that |
of Dir. Bindf5Td, appendix, No !.
General Lee then directed me to place my /
troops on the Tight OF Huge-'s, WAC, in tho |
meantime, had formed Oh the right of Jackson. /
This did as far as The gzouAd would permit, I
placing my thTes divisions an echst0R to the /
right and rear.
had scarcely made these arrangements when /
I received su order from General Longstrest 70 /
support General Armistsad OF bis right Barkss /
dates brigade being already to his right and I
rear, ordaIed Cobbs to his immediate support, y,
preceded by the 18Th Georgia regiment armed /
with Enfield rifles, which be placed still further
to bis night flank, as skirmishers to protect it. (
whilst the infantry of CObb's Legion was posted /
to protect the artillery.
The enemy had for sometime previous opsned |
heavy cannensde on tine positions occupied BY
my troops, from the effects Of which = esisson
exploded, and we were IN danger Of losing our
men. Having proceeded to the front il advance
Of CObb's brigade, ! accommodated the enemy's
position, Ia company with Lieutenant Phillips
and Colonel Elmunds, sent by Genera ArTui-
stead. From two points in the open field the
euemy could be well seen. I found a part Of
General A-mistead's brira1a lying in order CT
battle uuder the brow OF 8 hill covered By wood.
through which q road passed parallel TO the
edge Of the field occupied by the enemy. The
wood through which my troops had to pass 20
reach this road was very dense and the ground
very difficult. ! immediately selected this rosd 4,
as the best position 10 form troops Designed to
operate against the enemy, whilst the bill and
wood Y front afforded strong position fer
permshent LIE Of 5l--.s. IL this recOunaisSznae
l found the enemy - be strongly posted on the
crest Of a hI.l, commanding Gu unduIatiag fal3
between us, which fell Of b our right iul5 a
plain or meadow, portion of the latter border
ing on the 2 l=zer road, from which I had Just
returned.
The enemy. having reschad these hzhts and
7lsced himself ia communication With his gun
beats On the river. 1 Ws5 5atEEsd frUm ,he poz.-
lion Of his lines aud from @ e cheering which
had taken place when his troops weye thus re-
assembled, that toe whole army Of hicClelAn
was n orr front. His batteries or arlil cry were
numerous, aud were collected into two large
bodies, strongly supported By infantry and com
manded perfectly the meadow on Gus right and
tie field in our front except the open raTines
toIReJ by the uaGulAtiOn5 Of the ground Be-
yond the hill to the rear Of that occupied By tbs
enemy, since known as Malvern Hill" firing
had taken plsca IN the morning from battery
posted In that direction, which also commanded
the meadow o. 3 considerable portion Of it.
The field in which the batteries nearest to US
were placed is called " Crews Farm and the
best line Of approach to these batteries saemed
20 be TO the rgnt and font, under TIE cover of
the hills formed by the falling eff Of this fsid
into the meadow
General Armistead having informed me that
General Longssreet would send him two batter
les / deemed such an artillery force inadequate
and soon after ordered Lieuensu.-C Colonel S. D.
Lee, chief of artillery, to bring up from al the
batteries, thirty rife pieces, if possible With
these hoped 20 shatter the euemy's infantry.
Bu', as they did not arrive tbs interval was,
perhaps, too bnef before I was ordered TO make
the attack. Returning rapidly to tic position
occupied by the remainder Of my troops / gave
B Bigadisr-Gsnerol Jones ths necessary orders
for the advance OF his division. comp ased Of Ar
tsrson's and IOom0s's brigades, Uue OF which
,Auderson's) had always occupied tie position
lately held by Cobb Whist this was baipr
done q heavy and crushing IRE was cp-n,d
from the enemy's guus Of great range ana mettI
About sAi5 tino l received an order from Cello
n-l Chiffon, stating that sa order hai been given
10 General ArGisysad, whsa MS artillery Gre
lsd broken the enemy's luss, as Is prob1oly
Hcu do, 10 charge with yell, :" and directing
ne TO do the same. See Appendix. No ]
again gave orders 70 hasten th5 movements OF
he troops, and sUperintended them IN person as ;
81 a. IL was possible. The enemy's fro By this ,
ime became intense.
/ then received an order from General Lee /
through Captain Dickinson, assistant a3jutsnt- !
general, '' 30 advance rapid y, press forward my
whole line, ana follow up A7mistes3's suceesses,
ls the enemy were reported to be eff" General
having Tepulsei, driven bsck, and
nlloHed up heavy b-dV Of the euemy'i sEir-
nishers,) See Appendix, marked No. ] Cap .
ain DlcEIuson Informed me By note ct the same
lme that MahOno's and Rsus1m's bripades, of 4
duger's division, would be ordered up immedi- :
ately. Having completed the necessary arrange
nents for my three divisions and not feeling 4
myself a. liberty te hesitate under the strinpencV
ot ny Instructions, 1 galsoped to the front and :
8t toe request Of General Wright. again recon
nsitered the enemy, in compary with hi.aself
and General ATmistead, from the meadow on :
he right and the hi!l in 'front.' and arranged with .
them simultaneous attack from that portion Of
.he2ne under my commsnd
Soon after Mahone's brigade having arrived, 4
and ise hour growing late, gave the order that
Wright's brigade, supported by Habone's, !,
should advance and attack tbs ensmJ's batter (
les on the right Tina! Jones' division, expected 4,
momentarily, should advances on to the front, /,
and R snsom's brigade should attack on the left !
Ny plan being TO burl about hltean thousand !
men against the enemies batteries, and support !
ing injsntry-to follow up any successes they
might obtain; and if unable to drive the enemy !
from his strong position, TO continue the fight in
front b. pouring in fresh troops aud in case
they were rePulsed, to hold strongly the line of
bastle wbars STOOD. 10 prevent s-r.ons disaster