The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1862-12-13
The II mobilize Of our Armies.

Major General HALLEcK, in the con-
Guiding portion Of bis report % Che Secre-
tary Of War, makes some pertinacious
remarks in relation to the immobility OF
our armies, md their failure to reap the
full fruit os victoriec achieved ~ +.
II is seen from this brief summary OF
military operations during the last three
or four months, that while our soldiers
have generally fought with bravery, and
gained many important battles, these
victories have not produced the usual i'm
portant results. In many instances the
defeated foe was not followed from the
battlefield, and even where a pursuit
was attempted, it almost invariably fall
ed TO effect the capture or destruction Of
any part Of the retreating army.
This is a matter which requires serious
and careful consideration. A victorious
army Is supposed TO be in condition 10
pursue its defeated foe with advantage,
and during such pursuit TO do him seri-
Gus, il not fatal injury. This result has
usually been attained in other countries.
Is there any reason why IL should not be
expected in this ?
II is easily understood that in country
like that between Yorktown and Rich
mond, or the thickly wooded swamps of
Mississippi and Louisiana, retreating
force, by telling trees across the roads and
destroying bridges over deep and marshy
streams, can eiIectually prevent any rap
id pursuit. The one in few minutes
blocks up or destroys roads which the
other cannot clear or repair for hours or
even days. The pursuer has very little
hope of overtaking his flying foe. But
this reasoning isnot applicable to Mary
land, and the greater part of Virginia,
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee. It
must be admitted that in these theatres OF
war the Rebel armies have exhibited
much more mobility and activity than our
own. Not only do they outmarch us,
both in advance and retreat but on two
memorable occasions their cavalry have
made with imppnity the entire circuit Of
the army of the Potomac. If II is true
that the success of an army depends
upon its "arms and its legs" ours has
shown itself deficient in the latter Of
these essential requisites. This defect
has been attributed to our enormous bag
gage and supply trains, and to a want OF
training in making marches.
There is no doubt that the baggage
trains of our armies have been excessive
ly large. Every possible effort has been
made within the last few weeks to re-
duce them, but this is no easy task.
Once accustomed to certain amount OF
transportation, an army is unwilling to
do without the luxuries which it supplies
in the field.
Blythe recentincrease of the army ration,
which was previously larger than in any
other country, considerable amount OF
transportation is employed in moving
provisions and supplies which are not
necessary for the subsistence of the SOL
diers. An examination of the returns of
the Quartermaster- General, few days
since developed the fact that the Army
of the Potomac, including the troops
around Washington (most of which are
without field.trains), had fifty-four thou
sand animals, and that nine thousand of
these were employed in transporting am
balances and hospital stores. In addi-
ton TO all this, the roads, streets, and
wharves, are encountered with private
vehicles, used for the transportation of
suffers stores. No matter how large the
main body of an army may be, it can
never move rapidly with such a mass Of
impediments. And yet speculative pro-
jecls are almost daily urged on the War
Department., to increase the immobility
of our army in the field. Again, our
troops especially those in the East, have
been very little accustomed.to marching,
at least, TO that kind of marching usually
required by active operations in the field.
Absenteeism is one of the most serious
evils in all our armies. Hundreds of Of
ficers and thousands of men are almost
continually away from their commands.
Many of these are really stragglers and
deserters. In regard to officers, the evil
is being abated by summary dismissals,
and if the law could be stringently en-
forced against the men, it would soon put
an end 70 assertions. But struggling on
the march and in battle, can be prevent
Cd only by severe and summary punish
ment inflicted.on the spot.
In this and many other important par
ticulars, our military laws require revi-
sion and amendment. They were mostly
enacted for a small army and for times
of peace, AID are unsuited to the govern
ment of the army we now have, and the
war 10 which we are now engaged.
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. w. HALLECK. 81
Commander-in- Chief