Council Bluffs bugle. [volume] (Council Bluffs, Iowa) 1860-1868, 1862-12-03

To EAs Editor Of the National EaGsLtag<RcsT:
On Wednesday last received the No
tioaaI IntsllissnesT containing Gaasr@l
Seott's address to the pablo. This is
shToaghoHt an zndisgaissd oeHsare Of my
conduct daring the lass months Of the
Administ ration in regard TO the seven
Gotten States now in rebellion. From
our past relations | vas greatly surpris-
ed as the appearance of such . paper
In one aspect, however, it was highly
gratifying Ii has jusaaed me-, nay, it
has rendered it absoIutely y necessary, that
| should no longer remain silent IN re-
gard TO- charges which have kesn long
vaguely circulating, bat ara now endora-
ed By the responsible name of General
Scott. $3.50 3fs.f--
I. Fhe Erst and most prominent among
these charges is my refusal Immediately
to garrison nine enumerated fortffea-
tions, scattered over SIX OF she Southern
States, according 90 the recommendation
Of Gen. Scott, IN has "views" addressed
to the War Department on the 18th and
30thuf October, 1860. And it has even
been alleged that if this had been done it
might have prevented the civil war.
This refusal is attributed, without the
least cause, to the influence of Governor
FLOYD. All nv Cabinet must bear me
witness that vas the President myself,
responsible for all the acts Of the Admin
istration; and certain it is that daring
the last ak months previous to the 18th
Of December, 1860, the day on which be
resigned his Office, after my request, he
exercised less influence on the Admins
tratien than aoy other member OF the
Cabinet. Mr. Holt was Immediately
thereafter transferred freEn the Post
OHhcs Department 70 that of War; so
that, from this time until the 4th March,
1861 which was By far the most import
ant period of this Administration, he
performed the duties Of Secretary of
War to my entire Satisfaction.
But why did not Immediately gsEri-
son these nine fsrtifcatioas, In such a
manner, TO use the language Of Gensral
Scost, ssas to make any attempt to take
any one of them by surprise or coup de
main ridiculous - There Is one answer
both easy and conclusive, even If other
valid reasons did not exist. There were
no available troops within reach which
could be sent to these fortiheationc. 10
have attempted 8 military operation on q
scale 30 extensive by any means within
tbs Presidents power would have been
simply absurd. OF this Gen. Scott him
self seems to have been convinced, for
on the day after the date of his first
s'views'' he addressed ION the Both Octo-
ber) supplemental views 70 the War De-
partmeat, in which be states: "There is
one fregular) company 80 Boston, ons
hsrs, n he NarToIss,) ons at PiitsbaaEg.
one al augusta, Gd-,) one at Batoss
Rossos''-in al ~sHs companies oaty
scithiYs reach TO garrIsoa or veislfor the
| forts mentioned sss the "etez0s."
Five companies--four hundred men
10 occupy and reinforce nine fortihea-
tions 10 six highly excited Southern
States! The force ''wishin reach" waa
30 entirely inadequate thai nothing more
need be said On the subject. To have at
tempted sush . military operation with 80
feeble foEce, and the Presidential eiec'
ton impending, woald have been an invi'
tation 10 collision and secession. kn'
deed. IL The whole American army, con
/ sisting then sfE ouly sixteeu thousand
Il men, had bsen ''within Eeaeh,9 she.
w6ufd have been scarcely sufficient TO
this purpose. Such waa oar want Q
| TROOPS that, although Gen. Scott believ
| ing, in opposition TO the opinion OF I'd
cosnmitte raised in the House OF Repre-
sensatiTes, that the Inauguration OF ME
Lincoln might bs interrupted BY militss
force, Was only able g ASSEMBLE :
Washingteu, 20 fsts ~ the 4th March
lsix hundred and fifty three men, rank an
4 Ale eg shs assay. Aud, to uaks ap III
number even the sappers and miners weE
brought from West Point.
Bnt why was theEs no greater fort
within reach? This question could }
lbetssr answered by General Scott bin
seR than By any other person. Or
small regular army, With the exception
NIL a few hundred men, were out OF reael
on cur rsmote frontiers, where 1t n
been continuously stationed for years,
. usoksss the iahabftaf1ss ard ths szaigran
= On their war Ehishsr against sas assas
of hostile Indians. All wers aasuulsiea
: ana both General Scott and myself b.
q sudeasored in rain 20 prevail upon Go
srsss 70 raise several additional regimen
Y lfog this purpose. In recommending, q
lAs augmentation OF the armys ths Gsaal
II ssstss. ia his rspcrs 10 shs War Dspal
= rmsssk. al MzssazaAag, 1851 thai Ii woz