Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-01-28
THE PLAN OF OPERATIONS OF THF
BURNSIDE EXPEDITION.


pondent says:
Considerable dissatisfaction is expressed
among prominent military men with the risks
TO which il is alleged the Burnside expedition
is and will be subjected. These prognosti-
cations Of danger are based in part upon the
incompleteness Of the equipment and mobile
facilities Of the 5000 troops concerned, but
principally on the exposed points of debark-
alton and attack selected for their Operations
An officer Of high rank and Connections has
this morning expressed to me his anxiety on
this subjsct. he says land this, owing 10 the
lateness OF the present date, without any vio-
lstion Of official reticencel that the orders
under which the Burnside expedition left Fort
Tess Monroe embrace the following commando
the hrst peremptory, the second depending on
the judgment Of the leader:
The entire feet was to pass through one
OF the lnlets below Cape Hattsras, rendezvous
in Pamlieo Sound, sail up the Neuse river, and
stack ana possess the city Of Newbern, on the
North Carolina coast
2. II matters should progress fayorably, and
. dash inland seem feasible, General Burnside
was TO make forced march with his army TO
Golds0oro-sixty miles from NeWbern (Golds-
boro is at the junction of the Wilmington and
Weldon Railroad with the road from Raleigh,
ana mus main point on the great through
line from Richmond to Charleston, Savannah,
and the Gulf. Its occupation would not, how
eTer, completely sever the rebel railway con-
nectlons, inssmuch as they have a round about
track from Ridgeway to Raleigh, and the
North Carolina Railroad.'') But if the
march to the interior should seem too peril
Gus, the leaders of the expedition were author
lied to re-embark their forces, make q two
days sail for Cape Fear river, and occupy the
lnportsnt and strongly-defended seaport town
Of Wilmington.
The latter city is also a main point on the
grand route from Richmond to Charleston.
But new, as have said, that we have fairly
shlPped or the gallant Burnside and his brave
little army on this business, 50 vital to the
success of General McClellan's extensive plans:
now that ships, men, and leader have been
gone ten days, and we have yet no distinct
tidings of their fortures-noW we beyin TO
realise the grave nature Of the enterprise, It's
possible successes and reverses, and to listen
esgeriy for every breath Of intelligence as to
the actual result. It Is believed that Burnside
after NeIbern should be taken, weuld suffer
the dangers attendant upon an inland march
70 weigh very lightly upon his determined
nature, and would dash forward as rapidly as
the roads, the enemy, and his means Of trsns.
Portstion would permit.
Now, although We sincerely believe the east
ern portion Of North Carolina to be largely
loyal at heart, this expedition has not been
Planned In any reliance upon such sentiment
1t Is felt, therefore, that fifteen or sixteen
thousand men are, sfser all, q very small force
TO isolate in an enemy's country, sixty miles
from the coast, and TO attack point where the
enemy's railroads interseet and afford him
every means Of concentrating large bodies of
troops at the shortest notice
Let me, however, sdd that much Of the anx-
fety in question is aiisyed by the confident
aVoWal IN high quarters0f The rebels inability
10 spare any force for the defence OF Colds
borough and other North Carolina towns.
General Mcclellan says thay sannat aa "a siih
out badly exposing Norfolk, Richmond, and
Charleston, one or all. In fact, between dread
Of our position at Beaufort, panic over Schoeff7s
success at Mill Spring, solioitude for the safety
Of Norfolk, and necessity for maintaining the
entire present force at Manassas, they can
hardly fnd heart or hands to T, sist Burnside's
most exposed movements.