Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1862-12-17
Your eiFeclive.force IS only aboul nIne-


ninety, with the enemy directly between
you, ready to fall with lis superior nuns
bers upon one or the other, ms he may Sc
lcct. Neither can reinforce the other in
case Of such an attack.
II General Pope's army be diminished
to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania would be. left uncovered
and exposed. II your force be rec uced to
strengthen Pope you would be too weak
to even hold the position you now occupy.
should the enemy turn round and attack
you in full force. In other words, the
old Army Of the Potomac is split into two
parts, with the entire force of the enemy
directly between them. They cannot be
united by land without exposing both to
destruction and yet they must be united
To send Pope's forces by water to the Pc
ninsula is, under present circumstances, a
military impossibiIity, The only aIlerna'
tive is TO send the force on the Peninsula
to some point by water, say FrederiCks-
burg where the two armies can be united.
Let me now allude TO some Of the obs
jections which you have urged Tou say
that to withdraw from the present posi-
'i".: will cause the certain demoralization
Of The army, (Which is nov in excellent
discipline and condition" cannot unN
derstand why a simple change Of position
to a new and by no means distant basis
will demoralize an army in excellent IIsr
cipline, unless the officers themselves as
sist in tn: Generalization, which ! am
satisfied they Will not. Your change Of
front from your extreme right at Hanover
Court House TO your present position was
over thirty miles, but haYe not heard
that it demorali2ed your troops, notwth-
standing the severe losses they sustained
in eflecling it.
A new base on the Rappabannock, at
Fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles Of Richmond, and secures a
reinforcement Of forty or fifty thousand
fresh and disciplined troops. The change
with such advantages will, ! think, II
properly represented to our army, ,cncour>
age rather than dPmoTalize YOUR troops -
Moreover, yourself suggested tha. juno
ton might be effected at Yorktown, but
that a flank march across the Peninsula
would be more hazardous than to retire
TO Fortress Monroe. You will remember
that Yorktow is two or thIee miles fur
therlrom Richmond than Frederick burg
|
ard Washington, and covers Washington
from any attack by the enemy. The po-
litical effect Of the Withdrawal may at first
bo unfavorable; but | think the public
are beginning TO understand its necessity,
and that they will have much more con-
; liiencc in a united army than in its sepa'
rate fragments
But You will reply, why not reinforce
. me here, so that can strike Richmond
from my present position?
To CO this, you said at our interview
that you required fifty thousand addition
. al troops. told you it was impossible tc
give yon so many. You finally thought
; you would have some chance of success
1 with twenty thousand. But you after.
wards teetraphed to me that you would
=, reuuire thirty five thousand ms the enemy
; was being largely reinforced. If your es
innate of the cnemy's strength was cor
rect, requisilion was perfectly reason
able tut il was utterly impossible to I'll IT.
; until new troOps coulG be enlisted and or
/ ganized, which would require several
, weeks. To keep your army in its present
, position until j. could he 50 reinforced
would almost destroy it in that climate
The months of August and September are
almost fatal TO whites who live on thai
art Of James river, and even after yon
got the nforcemeuts asked Tor, you adj
mittcd that YOU must reduce Fort Dar'
ling and the river batteries, before yoC
could advance on Richmond.
: Ii is by no means certain that the re
/ duction of these Notifications would no
y requ re considerable time, perhaps al
much as those at Yorktown. This delay
might not only be fatal to the health o
, your army, but in the mean time gencr
4 al Pope's forces would be exposed tC
c the heavy blows Of the enemy without th'
u Slightest hopo Of assistance from you. II
regard to the demoralzing effect Of {
withdrawal from the Peninsula to th'
Rappahannock, must remark that larg'
- number of your highest officers, indeed
majority of those whose opinions have
been reported "a me, are decidedly IN ia
vor Of the movement. Even several o
, those who originally advocated the line o
= the Peninsula now advise its abandon
: ment. | have not inquired, and do no
= desire to know, by whose advice or 70
' what reasons, the Army Of the Potoma
was separated into two parts, with the en-
. envy between tnel. must lhke IuluS
u as find them. | find the force divided
: and wish to rcunite them. Only on
{ feasible plan has been presented for doint
{ this fyou or any one else had presented
. : better one, | certainly should have a
= dopled it; but all your plans require re
: Inducements, which it is impossible t.
:, give you. 1t is very easy to ask for rein
= forcements but it is not so easy to Civ
J them, when you have no dsposable troop
! at your command.
y have written very plainly, as | under
q stand the case, and hope you will Civ
I me credit for having considered the mat
g ter, although may have arrived st DIT
ferent conclusions from your own, Yer
u respectfully, your obedient serv't.
's II. W. HALLEcK, General in-Chiet
. Official copy:
. J. c. KELToN, Assistant Adjutant General
n Public applause is even jealous OF ii
u own verdict, and thus the men who hsy
l. been the most abused have been general
q thaEa " ho hava hapn most OraIspl