The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1862-12-26
BEDFORD, Pa, FRIDAY MORNING. DECEMBER as, 1862.

II would not only De WnOny imperative III tuc
object sought, but would directly weaken US in
the border States, but significantly added that
it might increase our strength in the North. l
pause here to inquire where the additional
strength in the North was to be obtai ned ! not
certainly from the Democratic element in the
North. If additional vigor was infused into
the service, it must come from some other quar-
ter which until then had not heartily sustained
the policy Of the Administration. need n OF
particuarize what class of individuals were to
be thus induced to lend their support-the coun-
| try well knows the baleful influences of this
class, and the ends they seek to accomplish.
But this is not all. The record of the mill
tary operations shows to-day almost conclusive
ly what the country had for some considerable
time suspected: that success, in military point
Of view, was not so much the object sought
as the bringing about condition of things when
proclamation of this sort could be urged as
the only means Of securing to us success.
Some of the reasons are now before the pub
lie why Mcclellan did not capture Richmond.
| At the last session of Congress commented on
| the fact that the armies on the Potomac, instead
of being mas.ed, were divided in four or five
corps, and each corps under an Independent
commander; no two Of them cooperating to-
gether; thus enabling a mass corps of rebels
under Jackson to defeat three Of them, and to
i unite before Richmond in repulsing Mcclellan.
will not now repeat what then said re-
! fer to the fact as link in the chain of evidence
which shall to-day adduce.
There were during the whole time Mcclellan
was at the head of the Army, continual demands
that he should advance upon Richmond. The
/ class of persons who raised the outcry were the
persons who favored emancipation. This clam
or forced from Mcclellan plan of campaign,
as we are told by the Prince de Joinyillc, which
the rebels learned in few days after it was
known in Washington. OF course they prepa-
red to meet it. Mcclellan moved forward from
, Fortress Monroe with one hundred thousand
men. He approached the nosition of the reb
7 els under Magruder, expecting Mcdowell % 90
by another route i.c cut off the retreat, when
/ they were driven back; Mcdowell never reach
ed or started for the position he was to occupy.
The rebels were defeated and driven back; in
stead of their retreat being cut off, the road to
/ Richmond was open to them. If this had been
assailed by Mcdowell on their retreat, their
capture or destruction was certain, and the
march of our army to Richmond would have
been unobstructsd, and IFS capture beyond all
doubt The rebellion could not have continued
sixty days. This opportunity was lost. And
| why and by whoms Not by Mcclellan.
The Prince de Joinvie tells us that Mcclellan
is reinforced by Franklins division while on
the Peninsula, and that was all of McDowelrs
forces that ever came to him. The valor and
endurance of our troops overcome all obstacles,
and drove back the enemy TO the ontrench-
ments around his Capital. Mcclellan has no
! &c, f-nr, U,s IN tho f,osi-
sition of the various troops around Washington,
doing nothing, protecting nothing; but from
rumors--camp rumors-learns that Mellow
ellis forces are at Fredericksburg, and to the
front. Porters corps, from the right wing of
the army, is seen to open communication with
Mcdowell, if possible. Porter drives the enc
my from Mechan;csvilIe, and learns that Nc
/ Dowell's advance is only fifteen miles distant.
The news of the fact gives great joy to the ar
my. Forty thousand additional troops are to
aid in the capture of Richmond. Its fall is
certain An order comes from Washington,
and Mcdowell withdrsws his forces, blowing
the bridges up as he retres. Mcclellan is o.
overwhelmed by superior numbers, and forced
to retire, fighting as no retreating army ever
fought before.
Thu, we see, that twice tho rebel capital is
saved from falling into our hands, not by any
skill or courage of its defenders, but by some
unexplained acts of our own rulers. repeat
that the fall of Richmond--thc defeat of the
rebellion.
The reasons for the movement of the army
under Mcclellan from the James river, 60 as to
unite il with the one near Washington, is before
the country, and needs no comments from me.
The correspondence between General Halleck
~, ~ :. AZ. y la,
the other.
When Pope's arn,y retires to Washington be-
fore the army Of lee, let loose from their pris-
on in Richmond by the removal of McClellan's
from the James river; when the capital is
threatened, Maryland invaded, and Pennsylva-
mensced, Mcclellan is again called TO assume
command and drive the insolent foe across the
Potomac. He reorganizes the disordered bat
taions, brings order out Of confusion, marches
large army over one hundred miles, and in
less than tw'cnty dsys fights two battles, wins
them both and drives the rebels across the Po-
toraac; relieves the capital and gives courage
to our army. Things being in this position, on
the 22d of September the President issues his
proclamation to free the negro, ard follows it
up by the one of the Path, to make slaves Of
white men. Mcclellan refused or failed to en-
dorsc either Of them IN his order to the army, |
and then his removal was decided upon. His
competency to command had noth:ngt to dowitli |
his removal. He had vindicated that. Thei-
dea of these people seems to be that proclama-
tions are ell that 10 necessary to make war sue
cessful. They issue proclatnations 10 free the
negro and call that o vigorous prosecution Of
the war.
The charge that Mcclellan failed to relieve
Harper's Ferry is a mere pretext, got up to or
der by commission Of ineal descendants of
Justice Shallow, and they, like their ancestors,