Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1862-12-13
HISTORY OF THE WITHDRAWAL FROM IHE PENINSULA
McCIellan's Protest and HalIeck,s Ren,,

H.. IT,
LaNs letter is protest against the order
to withdraw from the Peninsula. Gen,
HALLEoK's reply throws food of light
upon many points heretofore more or less
obscure:
BERKLEY, Aug. 4th, 1922
In cypher to Maj. Gen. Halleck, Com
mander in Chief
Your telegram of last evening is re.
celVed. | must confess that it has caused
me the greatest pain I ever experienced,
Ior am convinced that the order to with
Draw the army to Aqua Greek will prove
disastrous in the extreme to our cause.
fear it will be fatal blow. Several
days are necessary to complete the ar
raEgement for SO important movement
as this, and while they are in progress
beg that careful consideration may be
given to my statement. This army is now
In excellent discipline and condition. We
hold debouche on both banks of the
James River, we arc free to act in anv
direction, and with the assistance of the
gunboats [ consider our communication %
now secure.
We are now twenty FIVE miles from
Richmond, and are not likely to meet the
enemy in force sufficient to fight q battle
until we have reached fifteen or twenty
miles nearer, which brings us practicable
within ten miles of Richmond. Our long
est line Of land transportation would he
from this point twenty five miles, but with
the aid of gunboats we can supDly the
army by water during its advance certain
10 a within tyuaiVo loo o.
At Aqua Creek we would be seventy
five miles from Richmond, with land
transportation all the wav. From here TO
Fort Monroe is march of about seventy
miles, tor regard it as irnpracticable to
Withdraw this army and its material ex-
cept by land, the result of the movement
would be to march 1876 miles to reach a
point now only twenty-five miles distant,
and to deprive ourselves entirely of the
powerful aids of gunbOats and other trans
portation, and to these the certain de-
moralization OF the army, which would
ensue, the terrible depressing effect upon
the people of the North, and the stern
probability that it would influence foreign
powers to recognize our adversaries
There appears to me sufficient reasons to
make 1t my imperative duty to urge in the
strongest terms afforded by our language,
that this order may be revoked, ard that
so far from recalling this army it be
promptly reinforced to enable it to resume
the offensive. 1t may be said there are
no relntorcements available. | point to
Gen. Burnside's forces, to that of Gen.
Pope, not necessary to maintain strict
defense of Washington and Harper's Fer
ry; to those portions of the army Of the
West not required for strict defense
there.
Here, directly in front of the army, is
the heart Of rebellion. 1t is here that all
our resources should be collected 10 strike
the blow which shall determine the fate
OF this nation. All points of secondary
importance elsewhere should be abandon
ed, and every available man brought here
A decided victory here, and the military
strength of the rebellion would be crush
ed. 1t matters not what partial reverses
we may meet with elsewhere, here is the
true defense of Washington. 1t is here
on the bank of the James River that the
fate of the Union should be decided.
Clear In my convictions of right, strong
IN the consciousness that | have ever BEEN
and still am, actuated solely by love of my
country, knO~ltlp bilab NO atnDlJlOnS or sell
fish motives have influenced me from the
commencement of this war, now do what
never did in my life--I entreat that order
may be rescinded.
If my counsel does not prevail | will
with sad heart, obey your orders to the
utmost of my power, devoting to the
movement, one OF the utmost deicacy and
and difficulty, whatever skill may pos
sess, whatever the result may be; and may
God grant that | an mistaken in my fore
holdings. | shall at least have the satisfac
ton that have written and spoken frank
ly, and Lave sought to do the best in my
power TO arrest disaster from my country
(SgneO G. b. MCCLELLAN, Maj Gen.
Official Copy.) Headquarters Army
Washington, D. O., Nov. %, 1862,
To this Halleck returned the following
Washington, Aug. 6, 1862.
Major-General Mcclellan, commanding
&C., Berkeley, Va:
GENERAL: Your telegram of yesterday
was received this morning, and | immedi
ately telegraphed brief reply, promising
to write you more fully by mail. You
General certainly, could not have been
more panied at receiving my order than
was at the necessity of issuing it. | was
advised by high officials in whose iudg-
ment | had great confidence to make the
order Immediately on my arrival here
but determined not to do so until coull
learn your wishes from a personal inter
view. | tried every way TO avoid with
drawing your army, and delayed my de
cision SO long as | dared to delay it.
assure you, General, it was not heartless
and inconsiderate act, but one thai
caused me mere anxious thought than any
other of my life, but after full and mature
consideration OF all the pros and cons,
was reluctantly forced to the conclusion
that the order must be issued. Allow NE
to allude 70 a few facts of the case 1ol
and your officers at our interview estima
ted the enemy's forces in and arount
Richmond at 200, 600 men, since then yo,
and others report that they have receive
and are receiving large reinforcement
from the South. Gen. Pope's army nov
covering Washington is only AZ, 900. You
effective force is only about 10000. Yo1
are only thiEty-five miles from Richmond
and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with tn
enemy directly between you, ready t
fall with his superior Numbers upol
one or the other, as he may eleu t.
Neither can reinforce the other i
case of such an attack. If Pope'sabe deS
tined to reinforce you, Washington, Mary
land and Pennsylvania would be left III
covered and exposed. If your force b
reduced to strengthen Pope, You would b
too weak to ever hold the position 80
now occupy, should the enemy turn aroun
and attack you in full force; III othe