North Branch democrat. [volume] (Tunkhannock, Pa.) 1854-1867, 1862-11-26
LETTER FROMEX-PRES-
IDENT BUCHANAN.
IN REPLY TO GENERAL SCOTT.

| Ut iHtetLtgenCef, containing Oen. SCOTS ad-
dress to the public. This is throughout an
undisguised cenSure of my conduct during the
last months of the administration, in regard to
the seven Cotton States now in rebellion.
From our past relations was greatly surpris-
ed ct the appearance of such a paper. In one
aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It
has Justified me, nay, it has rendered it ab-
solutely necessary, that should no longer re-
main silent in respect to charges which have
been long vaguely circulating, but are now
endorsed by the responsible name of Gen.
Scott.
l. The first and most prominant among
| these charges is my refusal Immediately to
garrison nine enumerated fortiffcations, seat
tered over six Of the Southern States, accord
ing to the recommendation Of Gen. Scott in
his views" addressed to the WarDepar tment
on the 29th and Both of October, 1860. And
it has even been alleged that if this had been
done it might have prevented the civil war
| The refusal is attributed, without the least
cause, to the influence Of Governor Floyd
| was the President myself, responsible for all
acts of the administration and certain it is
| that during the last six months previous to
the 28th December, 1860, the day on which
he resigned his Office, after my request, he ex
ercised less influence On the administration
| than any other member of the Cabinet. Mr..
| Holt was Immediately thereafter transferred
| from the Post Office Department to that of
War; so that, from this time until the 4th of
March, 1861. which was by far tho most I'M
p1rtant period of the administration, he per-
formed the duties of Secretary Of War 20 my
entire satisfaction.
But why did not Immediately garrison
these nine fortifcatons, in such manner, to
use the language Of Gen. Scott " as to attempt
to take any one of them by surprise or coup
de-main ridiculous % There is ore answer
both easy and conclusive, even if other valid
reasons did not exist. There were no avail
able troops within reach which could be sent
to these fortifcations. To have attempted
military operation on a scale so extensive by
any means within the Presidents power
would have been 81 IMPLY absurd. OF this
Gen. Scott himself seems to have been con-
vnced, for on the day after the date Of his
first " views he addressed (on the Both Oc-
tober) supplemental views to the War De
partment, in which he states There is one
(reguLar) company in Boston, one here, (at
the NQrrOws.) one at Putsburg, one ut AW-
gusta. (Ga.,) one at Baton Rouge"-in all
fpe companies only Cithin reach to garrison
or reinforce The forts mentioned IN the "rleloS'
Five companies-four hundred men-to oc-'
cupy and reinforce nine fortifcations in six
highly excited Southern States The force
" within reach" was so entirely inadequate |
that nothing more need be said on the sub |
iect. To have attempted such a military op- |
Grafton with so feeble force, and the PreSi- |
Dental election impending, would have been |
an invitation to collision and secession. In |
deed, if the whole American army consist
ing then of only sixteen thousand men, had |
been within reach" they would have been
scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was
our want of troops that although Gen Scott,
believing, in opposition to the opinion OF the
committee raised in the House of Represen-
tatives, that the Inauguration Of Mr.. Lincoln
might be interrupted by military force, was
only able to assemble at Washington, so late
as the 4th March, six hundred and fifty three
men, rank and file of the army. And, TO
make up this number, even the sappers and
miners were brought fir ON West Point.
But why was there no greater force Within
reach This question could be better answer
ed by Gen. Scott himself than by any other
person. Our small regular army, with the
exception of a few hundred men, were
out of reach on our remote frontiers, where it
had been continuously stationed for years,
to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants
on their way thither against the attacks OF
hostile Indians. All were insufficient and
both Gen. Scott and myself had endeavored
in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise sew
eral additional regiments for this purpose.
In recommending this augmentation OF the ar
my, the General states in his report to the
War Department of November, 1857, that /" it
would not more than furnish the reinforce
ments now greatly needed in Florida, Texas,
New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington
(T } Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving
not company for Utah." And again, in his
report of November, 1858, he says:
"This want of troops to give reasonable
security to our citizens in distant settlements,
including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely |
be too strongly stated but will only add,
that as often as we have been obliged to
withdraw troops from one frontier,in order to
reinforce another, the weakened points have |
been instantly attacked or threatened with |
formidable INVASION"
These views" of General Scott exhibit
the crude notions then prevailing even among |
in ntellicent and patriotic men on this subject of