Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1862-12-06
COWARD TO RICHMOND -

n
As our military srticle of Monday has excl
ted 8 good deal Of curiosity, and as the demand
for the National Republican containing 1t has
vsstly exceeded the supply, we reproduce it for
the benefit Of those who failed to notice
It In our former issue, and to silence
certain class Of critics, who are better qualified
10 nisrepresent than to Judge, and whose high
est military authority is the vicious and AFRO.
giant New York press
SHALL THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
ADVANCE.
This Is the great question before the country,
II, indeed, that can be called question, which,
80 far as Its advocates are concerned, has no
negative. There was time when we should
have had no hesitation In taking the popular
side Of this question; but that time has passed,
and the circumstances which would have in
nuenced our decision no longer exist.
While II is probable that such a movement.
under the right military auspices. might be
crowned with success, still, we are satisfied
that, under the circumstances, II is not q safe
and, therefore, not a wise one. This may be
easily determined bya military principle of
universal application. II will be found In the
collection of maxims Of Napoleon, republshed
in this country under the auspices of Lieut..
Gen. Scott, and Is from MontecucHlle, one of the
greatest military authorities. 1t Is TO this effect,
THAT the circumstaces under which O battle
is to be avoided, or declined, are, when there is
greater danger to be apprehended from defeat
than advantages TO be derived from victory"
Now, let US test the wisdom of this proposed
advance by this maxim. IL was admitted that
at least hfty-fve thousand men were necessary
for the defence Of Washington when the last
advance was made upon Richmond by the way
of the Peninsula. This force was evidently
considered adequate only to meet the force
likely TO be sent against US with our army
menacing Richmond; for II II was deemed suffi.
cient, with the fortihcations, to defend this
city, under any circumstances, the raid Of Jack
son and Lee into Maryland, with the whole
army of the Potomac and Of Virginia in the
immediate vicinity, demonstrates the fsllacy
Of such an idea.
This invasion of the rebels shows that three
times that number oftroops is required for the de-
fence Of Washington, If sssailed by the whole
rebel army.
The question, it appears TO US, which now
presents itself is this Can we spare from the
army Of the Potomac a sufficient force for the
defence Of Washington, and still have a sutfi
cient force 10 advance upon Richmond
II the Government and the Union generals
can answer this question in the affirmative,
then they may safely offer battle 10 the rebel
army between this city and Richmond, without
violating the cardinal principle of war, quoted
above. If they entertain the least doubt upon
NLt lntu tneN move dt peril, LOT
while their triumph over the rebels would 90
ouI little way towards crushing the rebellion,
their defeat would inevitably involve the fall OF
washington, and the consequent triumph of
the revolution. The victorious rebel army
would surely follow back our routed and demOr-
slised legions, overwhelm the army Of the de-
fence Of Washington, capture II, and with the
supplies and munitions which they would get
here, and the prsstiqs they would thus acquire,
push on to the banks of the Susquehanna and
even TO the Hudson.
But 1t may be suggested, If this reasoning be
correct, that the army of the Potomac will
never be able 10 move, as the rebels will only
have TO increase their force between this and
Richmond, 10 perpetually hold US in check. AL
this may be true, and still the army of the Po-
tomsc play an important, and even a de-
cisive part in the contest. The army Of the
POTOMAC is properly an army Of observation
and defence, combined that is TO say, an army
70 defend Washington and menace Richmond
whenever the rebels reduce their force sufficient
ly 70 enable US, consistently with the cardinal
military maxim 10 which we have referred, to
DO So AS long as II compels the rebels TO Keep
up their force, and protects Washington, II does
AL that it ought TO do, under present circum-
stances.
It IL the left wing and the vulnerable CEN
ire Of this gigantic military position of tine reb-
States which ought TO be asssiled and carried.
The remaining wing mayhem be simultaneous
ly sssailed on both sides and in the front must
hnslly succumb.
Let rs illustrate by arranging the combatants
upon absttle-feld precisely IS they are now ar
ranged by their geographical location. Let
US suppose that the Federal LEFT rested upon
tortifcstions which, while it, the left, acted
strictly upon the defensive, rendered It not only
impregnsble, but supplied rallying point for
the discounted centre and right wing, but that
the moment IL assumed the offensive became
useless; would any military man in Europe or
america advise that our left wing, thus-posted,
should attack before the enemy's centre and left
should have been carried
We think mot. Yet, this appears TO us 10 be
the exact policy of an advance of the Army OF
the Potomac under existing circumstances.
Possibly the fortunes Of war might favor us in
such movement. Still, we know that three
times already II has declared against us on
this disastrous battlefield.
We shall have more to say upon his import
snt'topic hereafter.