Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1862-11-20


determination of TIE Lincolne government and mill
ary authorities, not to permit their armies to go into
winter quarters but to push forward this winter with
ceasirg seeming to take the view that the longer
the struggle is protraced the greater will be the obsta
eles to Northern success.
We must confess to serious doubts of any extended
operations by land, in a country so large this, and
wh roads so impossible as most Of those in the South
Stats are in the winter season. 1t Burnside, or
Burnsdes successor, aims at advance Richmond,
be either make the effort at once, transfer his
operations to the line Of the James River for the time
is rapidly approaching when active movements from
the Potomac can be attempted by either party. Ne
thor can anything further be pished in the way Of
field operations in Western Virginia. General Loring
was recalled from the Kanawha, and General Echols,
whoever he may be- placed in his stead and he depend
ing upon the report of Yankee spy, representing him
self as deserter skedadded from the Kanawba, and
the Sanes leaving the salt works to the enemy, and
giving up most of the fruits OF a successful summer
campaign. The spy reported enormous bodies of Lin
coin troops advancing by all manner of routes ard
depending exclusively upon this information, Echols left
without sufficient cause, as it turns out.
I The enemys operations in the West must be mainly
confined to the vicinity Of the rivers 1t not only gets
as cold blazes in the interior, not to say the
i famous regions Of Tennessee and Northern Alabama
and Mississippi but rule the roads become wholly
botomless and mpracticabe for artillery baggage
j trains.
Il We may expect the most active movements in North
ern Virginia at once, lot at all this Tier
the effort will probably be to approach Richmond by
the James River from the South side, with tie view o
e taking Drewry's Bluff in the rear Coincident will
his Or possibly before it, attacks will in all likelihood
be made on Weldon, N. g., and Mobile, Alabama
which the most important strategic points Oh
the seahoard Of the Conederacy the being the ke
to the railroad connections between the seat of govern
% ment and the whole Southern Atlantic States Will
the capture of Mobile would lay open the whole regio
of the Alabama, being the very heart of the extrem
70 South
OF course the Mssiss pp Tennessee and other stream
\ will swarm with expeditions, ard the effort to obtai
complete control of the Father of waters :" by tn
- capture of Vcksburg and Port Hudson will be renew
ed with fierce determination, now that colder weathe
permits it to be done with mpuaity, 50 far the #, CT
- of the climate concerned
-, Charleston Savannah and Wilmington, are, next
Mobile, the most important points the Coast, eithe
strategically or from their intrinsic value Cha
lesion and Wilmington interfere with the effectiveness
of the blockade. Savannah does not since the captur
y of Fort ulask. We therefore think that Charlesto
: will probably be attacked before Savannah.
Can we in Wilmington promise ourselves any iinmr
- nifty from attack? The enemy knows well as we
the character and value of rivers and railroads.
He knows and feels also that the possession of Whining
t is alone necessary to give him control of all tt
ID 1avgable waters of the State. Surely, keeping theE
facts in vew it would be folly for atter oursev
OF with the idea that we will not be attacked We Cal
not do that, but may by active preparation, provid
OF against capture and consequent ruin.