Mineral Point weekly tribune. (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1859-1868, 1862-12-31

OF inability to supply the troops after
they should have crossed Gen. Sumner
arrived here with his troops in advance.
He sent to me asking me if he should
cross the river l did not think it adj
visable that he should at that time.
1t was first decided to cross at SINNERS
Neck, about twelve miles below here but
our demonstrations was simply for the
purpose of drawing there as large force
of the enemy as possible. ] then decid-
ed to cross here, because in the first place
felt satisfied that they did not expect us
to cross here.but below. In the next place
felt satisfied that this was the place to
hight the most decisive battle, because. if
we could divide their for es by piercing
their lines at one or two points, separat-
ing their left from their right, then Wig
orous attack with the whole army would
succeed in breaking theirs to pieces.
Two attacks were made and we were
repulsed, still holding a portion of the
ground we had fought upon but not our
extreme advance
That Eight l went over the field on our
right; and N fact | was with the officers
and men till nearly daylight; found the
feeling against an attack
| FASTENED to my headquarters, and
after conversation with Sumner told
him l wanted him to order the ninth
army corps, which | originally command
ed,s 10 form the next morning a column
OF attacks by regiments; it consisted of
some eighteen old regiments and some
new ones, land desired the column to make
direct attack upon the enemvs works
l thought that these regiments by run
nlng quickly up after each other would
be able to carry the stone wall and bat
terles IN front. forcing the enemy on their
next line, and by going in with them they
would not be able to fire upon us to any great
extent.
left Sumner with that understanding and
directed him to give the order the order was
gwen and the order of attack was formed:
the next morning just before the column was
To have started. Sumner came to ME and said:
Il hope you will desist from this attack I
DO not know of any general officer who an
proves of it, and think it will prove disas
trous to the army" Advice of that kind fror,
Sumner, who has always been in favor of our
advance whenever it was possible, caused me
TO hesitate; kept the column of attack form
Cd ana sent over Tor the division and corps
commanders, end consulted with them.
They unanimously voted against the attack
then went over to see the other officers of
the command on the other side and found that
the same opinion pl evIiled among them I
then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the
lett, and he was Of the same opinion. This
caused me to decide that ought not to make
the attack had contemplated and besides
the PRESIDENT had told me not to be in haste
III making TINS attack that he would give me
all the support he could but he did not want
the army of the Potomac DESTROYED
felt that L could not take the responsible
ity OF ordering the attack, notwithstanding
my own belief at the time that the works Of
the enemy could be carried
w bile on his way here, Hooker, on the
morning of the Goth November wrote me a
note, which received on the 21st, in which
he suggested that he would cross his force
over the Rappahannock at the ford nearest
the town, Richards ford, and move rapidly
down to Saxton's Station, and take possession
there. He stated that he had TIN ee days' pro-
visions, and that he could meet any force of
the enemy in front of him.
replied that.I was always very glad to
take the advice OF my general officers, and
should be 10th to move without consulting
them; but | could not approve of the move
he had suggested, because in the first place he
would have to march some thirty-six miles to
Saxton's Station.
1t was raining and he would have to ford
two rivers which might rise and cut him off
from the main body OF the command. and ms
had no means ofcrossing at Fredericksburg
| would be prevented from sending him sun
plies and assistance, and although he might
reach SaXton's Station and not meet any force
OF the enemy at that time, yet it would be
IL very hazardous movement to throw col
una like that beyond the reach of its proper
support.
Gen. Hooker thanked me and said he mad,
it as a suggestion, and the weather as il was
refining rendered it. Of course impossible to
make the movement.
Q-What reason do you assign for the fail
ure of your attack ?
At was found impossible to get the men
up to the works--the enemys fire was too
hot. The whole of the command fought most
CALAMITY. The eremy themselves saw they
never saw our men fight so hard as on that
day.
Q.-Werc the enemv's works very strong >
A.-Their works were not strong works
but they held strong positions. 1t is possible
the points of attack were wrongly ordered
1T such is the case | can only say | did it to
the best of my ability. 1t is also possible
that we would have done better to have cross
ed at SINNERS Neck, but for what s9ppos-
ed to be good casons, l feit we had better
cross here, that we would have "a more decisi
We engagement here, and that if we succeed
Cd IN defeating them we would break up the
whole Of the army here, which, | think now
is the most desirable thing, not even second
to the taking of Richmond. For if this army
was broken up, though they might defend
Rlcaaond Tor wnlie, they could not make |
any protracted defense there
Q.-{By Mr. Gooch )-Do I understand
you to 81, !, that it was your understanding that
Gen. Halleek ana Gen. Meigs, while at your
headquarters in WarrentGn and before you |
commenced the movement of you, army, sent
orders to Washington for the pontoons to re !
Immediately forwadcd to Falmouth
A--This my understanding certainly |
On Your Judgment could the pontoons |
have been forwarded in time for you to cross |
the Rappaiannock when you expected, if all |
possible efforts had been made by those charg- !
e with that duty?
Ayes, if they had received their orders
in time.
Odd not the non-arrival of these pom
toons at the time you expected prevent YOU
crossing when you expected to cross, and in
terfere with the success of your plan?
A.-Yes.