Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-11-04


That we can honestly attribute recent results
to the fact that our armies have been greatly
outnumbered we have not the least doubt, and
while we lament that such is the case, we do
not feel disposed to allow the excuse to be con
sidered a valid one in behalf Of every command
sr who meets with q reverse, or fails to carry
| out plans upon the execution Of whichthey have
/ almost invariably started after a great flourish
as to the strength of their forces, etc That this
policy has been p~racticed so successfully as to
have deceived our enemy, as well as eur own
people, is true; but, that the effect has been
beneficial TO our cause we deny. We have de-
ceived the enemy, and made him give us credit
for armies twice as large as we could possibly
muster; the effect has bean to cause him to
mass sufficient men to meet us with three or five
to every one Of our actual numbers. We have
deceived our own people thus wehsvenO doubt
prevented thousands from taking up AIMS at the
proper time, simply because, relying upon the
statements that came from camp, they did not
think their services were necessary. If these
were the effects that were intended TO be pro
duoed by eEaggerations, they have been accom-
pliShed; that they have worked US great injury
at various times we know TO be the case, and
50 thinking cannot but condemn the practice,
We observe an articls in the Charleston Asg-
carr. enumerating various occurrences Of the
kind. Previous to the early battle Of Manassas
the county believed We had one hundred thou
sand msR TO make the contest. The ofhcial re-
mort plscsS the number at less than thirty thou
sand. This fight resulted in our favor, And here
snds he success Of this system Of tactics. The
popular suppOsition as to the force under Gene
raj A. S. JOHNSTON was only dispsled after the
abandonment Of Kentucky, Middle Tennessee,
and the capture Of Forts Henry and DSnelSon
and the city of Nashville. Forced to explain
the cause of the disasters, the public then for
the FIRST time became aWars Of the fact that ct
10 time had General JOHNSTON more than
tEenty-eight thousand men. We also believed
that New Orleans was gsrrisoned BY a large
army, yet the morning reports Of the day on
which the city was evacuated, only numbered
two thousand eight hundred. General LIE
left Maryland, and General BRAGG left Ken
lucky, because they found themselves too weak
to hold sither Stats, and General VAN DoRE
lost the battle Of Corinth from the sAms cause,
yet when they msved their force it was thought
to be suhcisnt. But the numbers had been e1-
sggerated, and the result was sgainss Us, as
should have been f~o1eseen; and such viii COR
linus to be the case, while our people remain at
home confident, and while the enemy makes his
preparations upon the most extensive scale, End
prepared to meet our boosted strength instead Of
that which we actually had. We have seen the
effect and eannot but regret it.
As suggested by several of cur exchanges, We
believe our people should be informed Of our
weakness, if We srs weak. We believe the
people are ready TO meet any emergency as soon
as they know one exists. When they are swaTs
of s necessity they viii promptly act. But when.
made confident by Misrepresentation from those
trey rely upon, they will remain careless. True,
tley have learned by dear experience that their
impressions as to our strength have been in eI
cess Of the facts; bat our authorities should also
have learned that results have not followed
bosstings such as the pubic had e right to tx
pct. Thus far the confidence has 81 come
frcm the people and the Yankees, and has served
10 resp She former out Of our " armies, and
70 induce the latter to largely increase theirs.
Should this policy be pursued any furthsri