New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-09-24


ben the latter woke up on Wednesday evening q
icy ioo' "a the three batteries bearing upon them
ON ae north, supported by thousands Of muskels, !
M ell within short range, while dense circle ol
G,utry with dozen pieces Of artillery
planted in sections at different points in-
closed them at the same time from the
south The location of the intrenchments rendering
it utterly impossible for our rools to respond Ell
fectvelv to the fire from the north bank, and fairly
placipp their dense masses-four thousand five hund-
red crowded into space covering hardly three acres
at the mercy of the enemy their comrades, salts
fed that resistance involved their wholesale slaugh-
ter without tie least prospect Of success, deemed II
their duty 10 sepd out flag of truce, and, no other
terms being accepted, surrender uncondtonaiy'
The force surrendered consisted Of the Goth, 6sth,
and S9th Indiana regiments 400 men OF the JUN,
and two companies each Of the 18th and 'lth, one
company of the Ist Wisconsin, company Louisville
Provost Guard 20 recruits for 33d Kentucky infantry
and ith Ohio battery-together shout 41Vo men'
Beside the Fix pieces OF the mentioned oat'ef!' /
four Others, in position, feh into the hands OF the
Rebels.
have obtained and compared the statements OF
several officers and Prisaes that were present ou-
ring the negotiations and made their escape previous
TO the final surrender and am satisfied, from their
and my knowledge Ct the topography of the scene OF
action. that the commanders cannot be blamed for
captivating in the face of the fearful odds appearing
against them on " ednesday morning. On the other
hand It appears they shor of their duty in not
guarding agan, the occupancy OF the north bank by
the Iebels. Daring Monday hight and the whole OF
-. .arf-r.,fr ~ for
tifr,ng position upon it, An abandonment Of the
ius.enchments and retreat IN northerly direction
would also have been practicable during that time.
Fat this means Of saving the troops was moi resorled
70. owing 10 a want of information 20 the real
strength of the enemy. An attempt TO fight way
out through the lines Of the enemy would have
scarcely been successful owing TO the fact that three
fourths of the garrison consisted Of raw leyies en-
tirely unfit for motion requiring the utmost siead.-
+ ness, aud cohesive power OF perfect discipline.
The principal responsibility for the disaster lies
J evidently with Major.Generals Gilbert and Buell..
The intrinsic strategic Importance Of tie position on
Green River should have induced its Strengthening
by all means i'll the power of the forces immediately
upon the appearance of Kirby Smith in Central Ken
lucky. With force of three regiments and proper
? conn lemenis Of artillery, strongly ported on both
sides Of the vor it would have been perfectly safe
y It's utter neglect until within few days of the sur
= render, proves most culpable want Of foresigh
f as to Gen. Buells share Of the blame, strong
military parisans Of hIs here, admit that lis failure
L, prevent Braggs army from establishing itself
e Green River was most discreditabe fault OF all
D lis sins Of omission or commission during Lis OBJ
scure fuess career at the head OF the Army OF tie
Ohio this is certainly the most grieyous, aud should
alone secure his removal from the trust to VII ca LIE
t has proved so absolutely unequal.
a The immediate effect of the surrender WAS tie
9 abandonment OF the whole Of the line Of the Louis
vile and Nashville Railroad between MunfordsviIle
is and Salt River. The news OF the capitulGti0n
It reached Elizalethtown Wednesday afternoon
n This point, 80 miles north Of Green River, formed
our southwest post on the road, the small deaeh
y ments stationed south Of it having been either cap
= tured or withdrawn since the appearance Of the
f enemy al Muniordsvlle. The c0mnandant packed
up in bot haste, and had bis command aboard train
i in an hour after being informed of the surrender
aud the rapid approach Of the enemy. The latter
pant Of his information vas brought to him by some
frightened cavalry rickets who lad Il small
, force Of guerrilas, and 10y no means warranted
basty evacuation, aud tie abandonment Of a large
amount Of military stores 1t involved. But
apprehension prevailed with them the dictates
OF duty, and be not only evacuated in disgaceiul
hurry, but also communicated his unnecessary alarm
by telegraph and couriers to all the posts between
EzaOethtOwn and Lebanon Junction, and tie con-
sequence WIS, that elsewhere the troop abandoned
their positions, after burning tents PROVISIONS for
age, ETC., etc.. as though the enemy was their
very heels. Even tie force at Lebanon junction
uuder the command Of Gen. Dumont, some three
thousand strong, fell back 10 Gait River yesier-
day evening 50 that at this moment there is Rot
Union colder south Of Sbcphcrdsvile. The
i4any bridges and extensive trestle-works
between Lebanon junction and Elizabe'btown
are now at the mercy Of tue Rebes.
Their more than probable destruction viii
prevent the operation Of the road during the next
SIX months. Last Fall, upon Buckuer's dash upon
Bowling Green, it was deemed Of the utmost im-
portance to hold the nights known as MadraugLs
Ill.," covering do they did tie roads to Louisville
and the mentioned valuable railroad structures
Why they were abandoned while 1900 men could
have been in position upon them in "a hours, it il
difficult to say. The retreat to Salt River partook
very much Of the character Of panic and was
neither creditabe the troops nor the military man
ayers here. Not at this hour - bours after it,
has a single Rebel appeared at Elizabothtown.
The all bsorbing question here now is, Where
is Gen. Buell, and what is he about F From two
intelligent persons known TO rs perfectly
trustworthy, that left Bowling Green respectively Oh
Monday and "Wednesday. and came here Oh horse
back via LitcbGed and West Point, have some
positive information az to the movements of Lis
troops. General Rousseaus Division had been at