Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-12-10
Prom the New FORK World Dec 4
General HafIeck,s Repsrt-A Search
ing Analysis.


pi'itsry ADMINISTERS ion since General Haleck
was called % Washngton-is certain 70 make 60
ienorniuiosss figure ia history that the President
fDrborc al menton Of military matters IN biz an
HnAl message rather than alluje 90 20 morsifying
topic. AID he SecTetaryof wsr. rguaiiv terdser
Of coming 10 particulars in relsiion 70 that dis
astFous exhibition Of ineompeient Generaisn
deyuted 70 Gen. Halleck the tisk OF sp0ioeiziag
for that most discreltable part Of the history Of
the var.
The whole thing VAS such = palpable and gi-
gantic blnnder that any defense OF il by non
military men. like No LiIeoin OF Mr.. Stanton,
would have inside little impression on the pubic
So bad a case required a good advocate. and to
Gen. Hslleck committed the task of defend
ing the POPE campsign. Gen. Mcclellan bad
considered that campaign great military error
from It's inception; he had protested against il
with great earuestness and argumentative force;
and 50 General Halleck. Ielap-ing into The habits
of the San Francisco bar-of which be Is a mem
ber-attemp,s to strengthen his defense OF weak
cause by casting imputatiOns on the counsel for
the prosecution.
A careful examination of Gen HalIeck's eab
crate apology will show that he had better have
initiated the discrete reticence of President Lin
coin and Secretary Stanton Passing over the
mass OF subordinate details by which General
Hslleck attempts to confuse the perceptions of
his readers. and coming ut to the pith of the
subject, We shall make il evident that the con-
trolling reason for Withdrawing the army from
Harisons Landing against Gen. MeCieslaR's
earnest circumstances, Is reason which reflects
the highest discredit on the Administration.
BY the showing OF Gen. HsIIeck himself the
controlling reason why Gen. Mcclellan was with
drawn that the Administration could not
furnish him the reioforcements he required for
the execution Of his own plans. If Gen. Me-
Clellan would have advanced against Richmond
with a reinforcement OF twenty thousand, his
wishes would have been acceeded TO; bat as he
would not undertake the capture of that city from
Harrisons Landing without fifty thousand, or at
least thirty five thousand his judgment was over
ruled aud his army withdrawn 'All of your
plans, wrote Gen. Halleck to him, "require re-
Inducements. when il is impossible 10 give you.
Ii is very easy TO ask for reiuforcemepts, but il
is not so easy TO give them when you have no
dspossble forces AZ your command" The con
dition on which the army was withdrawn was
merely question of Is 900 men: the President
offering $4,000 and Mcclellan requiring 35 900
as the minimum with which he was willing to
undertake the capture of Richmond. Now whose
fault was il that these Is 900 troors could not
be added TO army in strong position within
within twenty FIVE miles of the rebel capitol
nearer than any Union army seems likely 10 be
again for a great while 20 Gomez How did it
happen that so petty matter difference of
ID 900 men was the controlling reason which
broke up the well considered plan OF Gen Nc
Clelan and substituted another IN which he had
no confidence. and which proved in fact so dis
astrOus that full employment is nov fouud not
for Ia, 600 more men, but for forty times ID 900
that being the amount of the two levies2
Who is responsible for the inability to furnish the
reinforcements which would have rendered Nc
Clellan's campaign against Richmond a success?
Not Gen. Mcclellan himself most certainly, who
has never moderated the enemy's power of re
sistance, and who, at the very outset of his cam
paign, early in the spring, was deprived Of a
portion of the men he thought necessary to
success.
About this time a total stop was put to the en-
stments. on the ground that our army was large
enough. Nobody has ever claimed hat this
blind and fatal step was taken at the instance of
Gen. Mcclellan. It was tue act of those who
withheld from him the corps of Mcdowell. which
he thought essential to the success of his plan in
the Peninsula; it the act OF those who con-
tinued to denv his requests for rentorcemenis
from that day till the date of the order for his
withdrawal from Harrisons Landing 1t is the
height of absurdity for the Administration to ex-
cuse itself from furnishing confessedly needed
renforcements on the ground that they had not
the men 10 give, when the lack was owing To
nothing but their own folly in stopping enlist
ments; All act Of which they afterwards were so
ashamed of that they burst not encounter the
public derision they were conscious OF deserving
in calling for vast armies so soon afterwards, and
resorted to the trick of getting the State Gov
errors to advise them to make the call.
Gen. Halleck thinks the Pope campaign was
the next best thing to complete success, mas
much as the enemy did not actually capture the
Natonal Capital His precise language is:
/" Although this short and active campaign was
from causes already referred to. less successful
than we had reason to expect, il had accom-
plished the great and important object of cover
inc the Capital till troops could be collected for
its defense" But it not owing to this
"short and active campaign that the Capital was
ever in any danger at all? The merit of the
rescue belongs wholly TO Gen. Mcclellan: the
laundering campaign which caused the peril was
Undertaken against his advice and in disregard of
his remonstrances
Lees army ventured into a neighborhood of
Washington only when McClellan's army was
withdrawn from the neighborhood of Richmond
Ii reinforcements had been sent the James
river. no troops would have been needed about
Washington except garrisons for its forts.
The only serious charge against Gen. McCiel- |
Ian in this report is, that he was diatory in obey
ing the orders of the President, first in withdraw
ing his command from Harrison's Landing. and
again in marching against General Lee in Vr
ginia after the battle of Antietam. There is IN
FAIRNESS anu soputstiy III Otiefat Iihlech Why
of urging both these complaints. He states that
it eleven days after Mcclellan received the
order 20 evacuate Harrison's Landing before his
army began 10 move But the final ORDER in re-
ply to McCleans remonstrance, was written OH
the 9th OF August, and as il was not sent by tele
graph, could not have been received BY General
Mcclellan before the 9Th Sth. and his army
was moved on the l4th. We mention this as
specimen of the unfairness and overstatement
which run through the report What justice is
there in contrasting Burnside's promptness in
moving from Newport News TO Aqua Creek
with the time consumed by Mcclellan in with !
drawing from Harrison's Landing? Had Burn |
side an army of 90 900 men? Was il necessary
for him to make that most delicate and perilous
of all military movements. a retreat in the face
of superior force? Ought Mcclellan TO have re-
tired without the reasonable precautions and ripe |
preparations which insured the safety OF his army?
Ii is signal proof of his military prudence and
capacity thar he brought his army away without
the sacrifice of a man, or of any portion OF his
valuable stores and munitions OF war. For his !
delay after the battle of Antietam he gave as a |
reason thatthe wants Of his army were not season
ably supplied BY the authorities at Washington.
To show that this complaint was not we'll founded,
will make no impression on the public az this late
day when General Burnside. in command of the
same army, has been VIGOROUSLY delayed from
fia n nj !