Charles City Republican intelligencer. [volume] (Charles City, Iowa) 1861-1864, 1862-04-03

VI tue miittafy CouitlaHueI vi tHc Dc
partment.
/ On the 2lst of February, 1862
Com. Foote telegraphed to Gen. Cul
lom, tho chief of Gen. Halleck's staff
then at Cairo, as follows:
PADucAH, Feb 81, 1862
GENERAL CUILuM, Cairo: . E..rE
General Grant and myself consider this a
good time to more on NGshcUe. Six mortar
boats and two iron clad steamers can precedc
the troops and shell the forts. We were about
moving for this purpose when Gen. Grant, to
my astonishment, received q telegram from
Gen. Halleck mot 10 let the guubodts 90 high
er than CidrkspiIe. No telegram was sent to
me. The Cumberland is in good stage of
water, and Gen. Grant and believe that we
can take Nashville. Please ask Gen. Halleck
if we shall do it. We will talk per telegraph
Capt. Phelps representing me in the office,
rs am still on crutches. tSigned)
A. III. FOOTE, Flag Officer.
1t may be that there was some great
military reason why Gen. Grant was
directed "not to let the gunboats 60
higher than Clarksville," but up to
this time it is wholly unappreciable
by the public. Had they been per-
mittcd to go, as was proposed 10y Com.
Foote, Nashville would undoubtedly
have capitulated some days earlier
than it did, and an immense amount
of rebel stores been captured, which
were destroyed or removed before the
army reached there, the value of
which has been estimated at ten mil
lions of dollars.
ought not to omit to mention the
gallant attack, by part of the Wes-
tern hotilla, under Lieut.. Gwin, upon
the enemy at Pittsburgh, on the Ten
ncssee river, where 500 rebel infant
ry and cavalry were completely rout-
cd with loss of thirty killed and one
hundred wounded
The next fact of importance in the
campaign at the West, and indeed the
most important of all, was the cvacu-
alton Of Columbus. Why was this
rebel stronghold, which cost SO much
labor and expense, abandoned without
firing shot? 1t is not for me to nn-
derratc the advantages of position Sc
cured by the valor Of our troops at
| Fort DoHclson, yet undertake to say,
from the knowledge | have been able
| to obtain of the dcfences of Columbus,
that there was nothing in the mere
| fact Of the capture of Donelson, and er-
! daare Of our command of the river,
| which need have caused the evacua-
tion, except after long aud bloody
siege. From the letter Of n cores
pondent writing on the spot, | obtain
the information that the forts at Co.
lumbus were SD located and construc-
! ted as to be almost impregnablo to an
assault by storm. The capture Of one
! by no means involved the capture Of
the balance A fresh assault must be
made in each instance. At the main
| fort and many of the earthworks,
stockadcs crossed the trenches expos
ing the assaulting party to storm of
bullets from riHemcn firing through
loop.holes. Every ravine and ditch
was thoroughly protected, and the va
rious approaches of the river comman-
ded for a long distance in every direc-
ton. 1t is sufficient tc say that all
unusually strong position was seized
upon and SO improved by rare engin-
ecring skill that the equal of the Co.
lumbuS Notifications III extent and
perfection of detail combined can
hardly be found in the United States"
Another correspondent describing
the place after the evacuation, says ::
" The Notifications were strong-pcr-
haps stronger than any others in the
South-but they were injndieiously
constructed on the water side, and
could not have stood an hours bonn
bardment by the gunboats and NOR
tar feet. The water battery stood
out in such relief from the bluff that
a well directed mortar shell would have
buried it under hundred tons Of
earth from above. There were no
classmates to protect the artillery
from the CALLING fire Of the gun
boats, and how long could men un-
sheltered have stood continuous
hail from twenty-Dnc guns throwing
| eight-imch shell 7" 1t is we'll under
stood that Commodore Foote was OPP
posed to giving the rebels an oppor-
'tunity to leave Columbus. He felt
sure of his ability, with his gun and
mortar boats, to shell them into a
speedy surrender, but was compelled
to give way to the counscls Of militia
ry commanders.
When we couple the strategic posi-
tion acquired by our occupation OF the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers,
with the completion of the mortar
boats and the absolute command Of
the river given US by the armored gun
boats, there remains no mystery about
the evacuation OF Columbus. The
two arms of the public service are
Fequally entitled to the credit OF fright
ening the rebels from their strongest
position on the Mississippi river, 1t
not the strongest in their whole mill
tary jurisdiction.
Yesterday the intelligence reached
us that the Western hotlla composed
of ten gunboats and ten mortar boats
had started forward To new scenes of
conflict and to achieve, doubt not,
new and yet greater triumphs. The
country is assured that whatever can
be accomplished by gallantry and
nautical experience will be performed
by Commodore Foote. and the brave
officers and men under his command.
We confidently await the announce
ment of new victories.
have thought it proper, Mr.. Presi-
dent, as Western Senator, in some
degree charged with the examination
Of naval affairs by this body, to bear
this testimony to the worth OF that
branch of public service in the west
ern campaign and TO the noble deeds
of the flag officers in that command.
No one can over estimate their servic-
es to the country and to the North.
west in particular, and in the name OF
that great section, and Of the whole
country, | thank them, one and all,
officers and men.
But l would avail myself of this oc'
casion to accomplish another purpose