Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-05
AN nrpoRrANT poCu1ENr.

AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT.
OneiaI Report Of General HalIeek---The
withdrawal from the PeninsuIa---Cor-
respoudsnee with McCIelIau---The Loss
OF Hurper's Ferry---ImBOrtant History
Of the War.
The report Of General Halleck to the
Secretary Of War, an abstract of which
was given by telegraph, is full of import
an information as to the history Of the
war, and is, therefore, Of absorbing inter-
est. The General-in-Chief recOunts the
Peninsula campaign, the withdrawal of
McClellan's army, the protest of that Of
fcer, the disastrous campaign Of Pope and
the causes which made it disastrous, the
surrender Of Harper's Ferry and the res
possibility for that disaster, the subse-
uuent criminal delay Of Mcclellan to obey
orders and thus crush the enemy while
there was opportunity, the question of the
supply of equipments, clothing SC, for the
armies, the inefficient campaign Of Buell.
and the brilliant one Of ROsecrans, and
the history of the war generally since he
took position at the head Of military
movements. All Of this is full of value to
the country, but want Of space forbids the
publication Of the report in full, which
makes five solid columns Of the Tribune
We eondense the most important portions.
Considering that General Hallecks ad-
ministrstion only commenced upon the 28d
Of July last, we may well wonder at the
amount Of important history that has been
made in the brief time since that date
He reports that his attention was first
called TO the condition Of the Army of the
Potomac, which was then at Harrison's
Landing, on the James river. He imme-
distsly visited Mcclellan at his headquar-
ters, the object Of the visit being to ascer-
tain if there was a possibility of an ad-
vance upon Richmond from that Landing,
and if not, to devise some means for uniting
the armies Of Mcclellan and Pope on some
other line. Mcclellan said he could ad-
vance with $4,000 additional troops. Gen
sral HaIleck could not promise him more
than 10000, and did not see how even that
number could well be spared from other
places. Mcclellan took a night to consider
the matter, and then said the 10000 would
do. with this understanding Halleck re-
turned to Washington, but Immediately
received a dispatch from Mcclellan that
he must have $4,000. As this number
could net be sent him without leaving
Washington and Baltimore nearly defense
less, It was determined to withdraw the
army from the Peninsula to some position
where it could unite with General Pope
and cover Washington, while it operated
against the enemy. Accordingly, on the
sOth Of July the order was sent to Nc
Clellan, to send away his sick. On the Sd
Of August the Withdrawal Of the entire
army was ordered by telegraph. To IA
eilitate transportation, General Mcclellan
was authorized to assume control Of all
ths vast fleet which was then on the james
and the Potomac. On the 9th Of August,
the following protest was received from
General Mcclellan:
'BEnKEIET, Va, Aug. .4-l2 II.
k@or General HaEsek, ConmaHdsr-iH-
Your telegram Of last evening is re-
eeiyed. must confess 1t has caused me
the greatest pain ever experienced, for
I am convinced that the order to withdraw
this army to Aoquia Greek will prove dis
astrous in the extreme TO our cause. I
fear il will be fatal blow. Several days
are necessary to complete the prepsra-
tions for so important movement as this,
and while they are in progress, beg that
careful consideration may be given to my
statement. This army is now in excel
lent discipline and condition. We hold a
debouche on both banks Of the James River,
90 that we are free to act in any direction,
and with the assistance Of the gunboats,
I consider our communication secure.
We are twenty-five miles from Rich
mond, and are not likely to meet the enc
ny in force sufficient TO fight battle un-
Hl We have reached fifteen or eighteen
milea, which brings Us practically within
ten miles Of Richmond. Our largest line
of transportation would be from this point
tWenty-hve miles, but with the aid Of the
gunbOsts we can supply the army by wa
Ter, during its advance, certainly to with
in twelve miles of Richmond. At Acquia
Greek we would be seventy-fve miles from
Richmond, with land transportation all
the way. From here to Fortress Monroe
Is march Of about seventy miles, for
regard It as impraeticable to withdraw this
army and its material, except by land. The
result Of the movement would thus be TO
march one hundred and forty-fye miles to
reach point now only twenty-five miles
distant, and 10 deprive ourselves entirely
of the powerful aids Of the gVnboats and
water transportation. Add to this the GER
tain Generalization of this army, which
would ensue, the terrible depressing ef-
feet upon the people Of the North, and the
strong probability that it would influence
foreign powers to recognize our adverse
ries; and these appear 10 me sufficient rea-
sons to make it my imperative duty to urge
N the strongest terms Afforded by our Ian
guage, that this order may be rescinded,
and that far from recalling this army, it
may be promptly reinforced to enable it to
resume the offensive.
IL may be said that there are no rein
forcements available. point to General
Burnside's forces, to that Of General Pope,
not necessary to maintain 8 strict defence
IN front Of Washington and Harper's Fer
~; 70 those portions Of the Army Of the
West not required for strict defence there. ]