Daily Democrat and news. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1859-1864, 1862-11-20

we'll - promptness, Il will be under
stood, was indispensable here to success.
To keep the secret il had been neoessa-
~ to cosfiie it 70 few. persona, and
hence had arisen the long i'll feeling to-
ward tho uncommunicative General.
NC CLELLAN's PLANS EXPOSED AND RE.
vKALRD TO THE ENEMY THROUGH
AGENCY OF THE wAsBISGT0N
CABAL.
Be this a. it may, % the day ef &C.
ton drew near those who suspected the
Generals project, and were angry at
not being informed Of it those whom
his promotion had excited to envy; bic
political enemies; ~ho 10 without
them in America p in short, oil tbose
beneath or beside him Who wished him
i'll. broke out into chorus Of accuse
tions Of slowness, inaction, incapacity.
Mcclellan, with patriotic courage
which have always admired, disdained
these accusations and made no reply.
lie satisfied himself with pursuing HE
preparations in laboIious silence. But
the moment came in which, not
wi.hs,aoding the loyal support given
him by the President, that fuoct'onary
could no longer resist the tempest. A
council of war Of all the divisional Gen
erals was held plan Of campsigo, not
that of Mcclellan, WIS proposed and
discussed. Nc Clellan was Men forced
&c captain his projects, and THE MKT
DAY THEY WERE KNOWN To THE ENEMY.
Informed DO doubt by one Of those fe-
male spies who keep up his con NUM-
cations into the domestic circles Of the
Federal enemy, johnson evacuated Ma.
nassas at once. This was skillful
manoeuvrc. Incapable Of assuming the
offensive; threatcned with attack either
at Centreyile, where defence would
be useless If successful, or at Richmond,
the loss of which would be a gave
check, and unable to cover both posi-
lions at once, johnson threw bis whole
force before the latter Of the two.
EFFECT OF THIS MEDpLIsG AVID TKRACH.
For the Army of the Potomac this
was misfortune. Its movement was
unmarked before it had been made.
Part of its transports were still frozen
uD in the Hudson. Such being the
state OF affairs. was it proper TO exc
cute as rapidly as possible the move
ment upon Richmond by water, or to
march upon Richmond by land Such
was the grave question to be settled by
the young general in a miserable room
of an abandoned house at Fairfax with.
in twenty four hours. And it was at
this m moment that the news OF his remo-
val as General-in chief reached him the
news, that is, that he could no longer
count upon the co operation Of The other
armies Of the Union, and that the troops
under his own orders were 10 be divided
mto four grand corps. under four sepa-
rate chiefs named IN order of rank, q
change uhich mould Mro,c into subal-
tern positions some young generals of
division ,uho hadhis personal con fdence.
Ii is easy to see that here was matter
enough to cast cloud upon the firmest
mind. But the generals resolution was
promptly taken.
WHAT MUST BE DONE-IMPoss1BILITY OF
AN ADVANCE BY LAND.
To follow the confedcratcs by land to
Richmond at this season Of the year
was a material impossbiIity. An Incl
dent had just proved this to be so. Gen.
Stonemap, with flying column, had
been sent in pursuit Of the enemy. This
column came mp with the enemy on the
Rappahannock, along the railway to
and had two engagements
with him of no great Importance. Then
came the rain. The lords were woIlen,
the bridges carried away, the water
courses could no longer be passed by
swimming they we're torrents. Stone
mans column began to safer for want
of provisions, and ITS situation was per.
ilous. 10 order to communicate with
the army Stoneman had to send two Of
McClellau's aides-de-camP, who had &C
companied him, across river, on a raft
of logs tied together with ropes.
Such was the country before the army.
Furthermore, the enemy was burning
aud breaking up oil the bridges. Now
with the wants Of the American soldier
and the usual extravaganza OF his ra-
tions, and with the necessity Of trans.
porting everything through country
where nothing is to be found and where
the least storm makes the roads impas.
sable,no army can live unless supports
its march upon nav,gable water-course
or railway. In Europe our military ad-
ministration assumes that the trauspor-
tation service Of an army of one huu.
dred thousand men can only prov ision
that army for three days march from
its base of operations. 10 America this
limit must be reduced to a single day.
| need only aid that upon the roads to
Richmond there were viaducts which it
would have required six weeks to recon
etruct.
THE WATER MOVEMENT DECIDED UPON
THE ENsMY's ADVANTAGES.
The land march was therefore aban-
doned, and we came back to the move.
ment by water. But THIS operation also
wds no longer ,ohat II had been ,chen
Nc Clelldn had concerned it. The ,eye-
lt'on Of has plans 20 the enemy had al.
to'oed the latter to take has precautions
The evacuation of Manassas had prece.
ded instead Of following the opening Of
the Federal campaign. The movement
by water could no longer be a surprisc.