, 1862-10-17
'Gt6 tGtihuWE,
FRIDAY, OCTOBER II, 1861.
GRuKxAh sooFrs 1ErrER.

FRIDAY. OCTOBER II, 1861.
GENERAL sooTT78 LEEEER.
Wezepint General SCOTS letter to Mr.. |
Seward, daaed March Sd, 1851, fur The pur-
pose OF allowing the theory upon which
the var against the rebellion has been car
1ied on, and for pointing out to the people
Of the Northwest the infinite difficulties
under which the President has labored
since he came into power.
It u clear from what Gen Scott wrote,
that he was OF the opinion thai the South
might possibly be conquered by the NE Of
extraordinary means; but that the con-
quest, when made, would be barren and
worthless -clear, because he says so in !
tc1ms And We think it is equally |
clear. not only that he managed the
army under his command in accord |
ance will, his preconoeived notions Of the !
bopelessness Of the task before him; but
that. when he retired. he selected the mau +
far his successor who Was known to be Ia |
nerfact accord with his views. We are not |
in the councils Of the concessionistst civil |
nr military, hence We can say with no cer-
tainty what hare been the measures that |
grew out Of the theory Of which Gen.
Scott was the author; but the his
toy Of the war. from the beginning
down to the latest event in the |
field. is fresh in our minds; and !
by the use cf this letter, ~ 4 means Of
throwing light upon the past, we can see
clearly into and perfectly understand
thousand things that have, to this moment,
teen wholly ine1plicable We hazard
rothing in saying thst the scventy-fve
thousand men first called for bf General
Scott, were only for the defense Of the
capital, and that there was no intention, by
vigorous onslaught upon the rebels, to
reduce them to subjection. War, in his
view, was the worst possible calamity that
could happen: and that, beng true to his
CONVICTIONS, he was determined to avoid
He would tire the enemy out, envelope
them in the coils of some imaginary
anaconda, conciliate them By lis
moderation, coax them back by the
rcrsuasiyeness Of his entreasies; but
Kill them-no! That would irritate
the survivors, as if ratllesnake III August
could be more yenomous. When Congress
met, more vigorous policy was adopted;
more men were called for, and battle
within sigLt Of the capital was resolved
11pon. We all know how Ball Run result
I'd; We sAaN all knoT, in Heavens good
time, who is responsible for that day's in
famous work We have our opinion now.
Bull Run killed off Scott ia Presidential
estimation, and sent him, with many couT~
locus phrases, to toretiremen1; but he did not
70 until he had named his SUCCESSOR, who
conceded with Scott in his views OF the re-
bellion, and the methods necessary to con-
quer it; and that these vic rs assumed the
form of deeds, who that knows the
shameful inaction Of the army before Wash
iugton, from August, 1861 to April, 1862
an atmy that, in December, while the roads
were yet good, numbered 236,000 effective
men-can doubt. Tic enemy was weak
lut saucy. Hardly fifty thousand in num-
her, they carved Oh all the trees in the yici:
Lily Of Manassas their contempt for tho
policy cur leaders were pursuing. But ths
Lieutenant General had said that the con
1cstwas almost hopeless, and that success
would be worse than failure. And thsr'
can be no question in the mind Of any mat
not a fool or crazy, that his wer
The notions that cur army Wa
carrying out. We sec why we hare SO ia
failed. Our army thus led was not in earn
est AS Key, a member Of Halleck's stan
expressed It, they did not want to beat th
South so badly that an equitable adjust
znent so as to save slavery would be i'm
possible.
Probably this is all changed now. Til
contest has SO increased in magnitude, ant
the blood on each side has become SO heat
cd, that 10 a1bitrament save that Of tn
sword is possible. Gen Scott, even, mus
see lis grieyous error, and must, il helove
ills country with the feryor that is attribr
ted to him. bitterly repent his share in IL
fatal policy that has had such painful n
suits. But what was the President aoin
with all these facts in his possession Z
was doing well. lie was compelled
take the army as lie found it. E
could not have displaced General SEQ
If he had desired to do so. The old ms
was strong in the confidence Of the PC
pie He was almost the only command
left who had rendered conspicuous scrvie
and to hare put him out, would have fu
nisled pretext, which the leaders Of
powerful party were seeking, to divide Il
North aud inaugurate q civil war rig
here at homo. The whole military admi
istratiou of the Government shared Il
Generals notions and seconded his ins
zion. The President was compelled
rely upon the agencies at hand, to on
conc difficulties by patience, to exerci
forbcarance that would have killed
Jess forbearing man, to move with ca
ton, to prove his friends, and to avoid q
starles where he could not override the
We believe that he has succeeded, and th
At VAAt1 uau I'LL lAC 1AcpuUA&L EuAlu LII
done what he has accomplished, witho
convulsioDs that would have shaken dos
the whole governmental fabric. The VI
is at last on d proper basis, and though u
Lincoln secs fit to still further trust the C
ecuto1s Of General SCOTS political al
military will and testament, VIC are Il
without hope that they will shortly pro
That they have arrived at that stage iu II
contest when earnest work, and the use
all available agencies for conqucriug L
enemy and stopping the flow Of blood, 4
demanded at their hands.
-
THE sEChETARK OF WAR.
Energetic, un.iring, outsroken, not ca
ful Of forms OF expression, but faithful
duty, to the Union, and to the holy ca,
Of liberty, the Hon. Edwin II. Stanton
winning lofty positiou amongst the m
honored and trusted Of our public m
Assuming the secretaryship at the time
deepest gloom, when distrust and def
Lad almost broken the spirit Of the co,,Dt