The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1862-06-18

from the Boston Transcript, Jun. !,

kfemaome. McOoWelSs Nc.i &C.
from the Boston Transcript, Jun. II
when two Influential nessspspers. Of this city.
in utter ignorance Of the rrt fAefw ndispen-,sble
to correct Judgment, have ss 1T to ss fsr tho re-
mosaiof Mr. Stanton and yten one nf tlsese jour
mails. the Daily Advertiser. hst been for weeks toin
ing with the New York HyakJ and tlae Boston Coz
yier aud with everything bitter factious, and trr-
sonabse, Ia ignorant ah,ise OF that eminent person
II becomes matter OF simple Justice that he should
have the public benefit OF sons Of the great facts
yecofsl IN his favor We propose, by simpfs cx.
hiiitionof authoritative fsrt and in no spirit of
mere partisan attack ahd defence, TO show
that It il TO him, wlo.U the Drly .idrertiser
charges; sI' with , ail which .%s IN r,ssrs ,yS;r a.
~ wisdom in the central esnduet Of this war-to
him whom 40 many yewspsp&rs havs attacked be.
eanse In the intereA Of bts ebnntry and with the
thanks Of all their readers Ire topped their longer
doing the work of spies in conveying information
10 ogr eleInes-to him, whose mobile sefabncga-
tion and stern pafriotisrn lnN riosad his noutI,
from auswefins Eeriss Of fsseSae9iss beefsfSaf
with the charge Of his diverting troops from Gen.
Mcclellan, and ending with the charge of his d.
verting the,a from Gen. Banks, TO gratfy personal
jealousy and alnbiton--at il IN to him, next
tyinly to the President, that this country
to. day than to any other MAN iii it. .-
. TO do this we must go back to the condition Of
affairs when he first took Office In what we have
to say Of General Mcclellan, we shall draw clear
line between his plans and acts as COMMANDMENTS
Chief, and his ability General ut the bead ef
army in the field We believe him to be fully COM
petent where be IL. and shall not to be-
lieve in his eminent fitness and to hope for his tri-
uD,phant success in his present campaign, unless
forced by events and by authoritative military crit
icism to another conclusion.
1t is clear that when the main direction Of this
war was left to a commandment Chief, that more
; than purely military calculations must occupy his
mind that he must see the value Of time in relation
n national finances, "A dpmOcr2tIC form of Gov-
ernment and TO foreign Intervention in short, that
he must have some of the qualities of great states
man, well as all Of the qualities Of great Gene
ral When MIR. Stanton became Secretary of War,
what was the posture of affairs under General Nc
Cieian's plan and direction! The country was uil-
der lasting obligations to his demonstrated faculty
for organization But it becomes necessary to state
how little else had been done why little had been
done and to whom the country is indebted for what
done IN February and March, and to its position
before the world to-day. --,
Whether more could not have been ACCOMPLISHED
in Kentucky, nearly all of whose strategic posts
were occupied by the enemy. we are not competent
to Judge But il is clear to military authorities and
to the country that Eastern Tennessee, whose peo-
pie are the most loyal and the distressed of the
border States. might have been relieved, Knoxville
taken, and the graat northern line of commuuie..-
ton between Virginia and the great sources Of her
supplies broken weeks or months before General
Mcclellan ceased to be Colnmantcr-in-C Chief The
country patiently waited because believed it
bore wise relation to some great military plan.
The country saw the great Baltimore ana Ohio
Railroad not only abandoned to the enemy, but its
rolling stock neither removed nor destroyed, but
given up to him to whom its value immense
The Responsibility for this loss do not nlpnte
General Mcclellan. The road remained in the cne-
mys possession.
Still patient, but in deep humiliation the country
saw a blockade Of the Potomac quietly allowed,
which cost this country millions of dollars by re.
ducing our immense transportation to one railroad,
with a single track, aud which placed our Govern
hate ftIo hoaix Aiy,if
tai. We know whereof we affirm when say
that five months ago our Navy Department begged
to be allowed to remove that blockade Phey de.
monstrated its removal to be simple certainty and
an eminent general was anxious to aid by landing
troops confident that he could capture the batteries
aud the who manned them. Their repeated
requests were peremptorily refused by the Com
maBdcr. ft- Chief
The plan of the Hatteras expedition contempNe ed
nothing than the destruction OF the forts and
sinking ebstructions in the channel aud the
ticn OF the forts was wise transcending OF pstruc
tions. In this Gen. Mcclellan may, perhaps, have
had responsibility. But the instructions for the
Burnside expedition were substantially his, and by
them Gen. Burnside was limited to perfecting the
blockade, and prevented from striking at vital
points and cutting important lines OF railroad Over
all this the country wondered, believed, and waited
We know that beginning more than five months
ago, Gen Wool and the Navy Department Joined il,
take Norfolk, which they demonstrated to be mill
tary and naval certainty. Besides its immense i'm
portance otherwise, the Merrimac would have beeu
taken while building. the Cumberland and the Con
gress would have been saved, and the James Ia well
NJ the York river would have been open for Gen
McCieilans march upon Richmond. Their reques,
was peremptorily refused by the Commander in
Chief.
We know that while Gen Mcclellan was still
Commander in Chief. Gen. sherman reported that
ne was prepared and anxious TO be allowed to take
Savannah that it was q military certainty, and
that could be done with very little loss of life
Chief.
We have given these greatetelected facts derived
from central and authoritative sources, to indicate
the whole circle which the people supposed bore
laton to sufficient aud entirely justifying plar
in ths mind Of the Commander Chief We will
add, without assuming to pass Judgment, that
while III great European wars, the spy system ha'
often been such as to tap the very centre OF miar,
counsel while there never WAS war offering bet
ter opportunity for such system than this anc
while enemy has notoriO,sly been In possession
OF nearly all our plans made we hav,
lamentably failed in detecting his.
We will not stop to conjecture What Gen. Nc
Ce.lan's plan WAS and sve have no tight to state
such facts bearing upon it as within our know
ledge. Nobody questioned his loyalty and his fac
ulty for organization. and we shall now show that i
becalhes entirely unnecessary to discuss his plan
tr the plan itself becomes unimportant in the ligh
OF thu facas we shall now state, Of WHICH arr
already partially before the country.
! Mr.. Stanton into power when foreign iuter
venticn seemed imminent, with gfeat iatar,
advantage yettoiiuwed up, and with capital dis
trusting the national finances, Oh Which all depended
With the breadth and vision of a siateeinan an,
with the terrible earnestness and force OF will of
Cromwelan, he brought into tlls national councils
for the first time since the began, fonlprehsn
siveess, decisiyeness. and thorough realization
the vaus Of time to this nation. For the first tn
the national will found expression. Some miho
! mistakes, like his letter to tho New York Tribune
sprung naturally from his being thoroughly in cav
| nest. uf great mistakes he ma'ie none. He foup,
General Mcclellan virtually directing the who
waI, responsible that no more bad been done, ant
fixed in his dissemination that advance shoul'
be made until April In this determination Genera
Mcclellan still further fortified himself by vote o
| eight of his Generals against four.
| Mr. Stanton saw at once that advance unit
April involved national despondency. tax levies
,pQn q people for au immense debt which had born
no fruit IN victories, hot weather. and fail cam
/ p;gn distrust aud great fall in national stocks
and possible it not probable foreign Intervention
| Then through him, was issued the Presidents Or
| der No. j. over Gen. McClellans head, aud aguils
| his protest, pcrempteriy commanding an aivanc,
III al points on the 23d of February. Gen. MsClel
Ian was placed ut the head Of the Army of the FO
to,,,ac and ceased to be Commander IA Chief Mr.
f, Stanton simply becaule a real Secretary of War
taking into his capable hands the reins which Mr.
/, Cameron had either necessarily given 10 others VI
ms,ised himself The President had. at last, srea
right arm to lean c, aud each was strengthened xat
greater for the ether.
s,rha movements in the West under Commo,lor,
Foose, which sent joy and hope through the nation
were made without regard 10 General Mcclellan,
plan, and spra,,g directly irem Commodore Foe,ei
| communications and requests 70 the Navy DE
partlneht and its orders TO him; and without itr
ther enumeration, it Is only necessary to say tha
the series Or brl,nt successes during Eebrsln,
aud March, which thrssv new lie into the nation
which gsve us Fort Henry, Bowling Greer. Colum
bus Doneson Inland No. 10, and Nashville, ,shirl
brought national stocks to par rifsi which forces
rrspec. for us abroad it did not preventinterveu
tion Ia drert eontrayenticn of The plan Of tn.
! COMMUNICATIVE Chief, and agHind bis protest. Whai
that plan was, wcretpropsr to discuss Il, become,
Of little couveaueuce skhen know that no ad
Vance WIS to be made under il antil April, aut
when il was found that the Conasaanter Chief Had
communicated nonp 70 the other Major Generals.
While expressing. - we have, our faith 10 Gene
ral Nc(Yelian = fhe commander of an armv--al