The Manchester journal. [volume] (Manchester, Vt.) 1861-current, 1862-03-11
Gen. fremont Again


Gen. Frrmsni l,as asslrvsstd lensih,
dorpmeui - ~ Congressional coa,rnisle,
81 tie ooadpei Of The war, ~ whicl 4,
gi'es slssailed aeccaut.og his Western
r@nraign.
lie weni West ibe latter part n Jolly
q which daie no place n O. eraiioas hai
bren received upcn BY the administration
ard sseryti'ins wa, leA 10 his conirol.-
lie foand he troops ia his division mostly
( sIilsoui ar'ns aud everything in hopeless,
disorirr, While tie enemy we're nsasinq
Missouri and threatening to advance upon
81. Louis. Gen. Fremsn,s attempts 10
I procure arins from headquarters we're sew
e'al timrs Ihwaried by Tie diversion Of
tie arms promi,ed him 10 The army of The
Potomac. His three months troops we're
also refusing 70 re-enlisl because they had
not been paid. In this emergency be- sent
10 New York TO purchase such arms Is
could he tad, 10 be forwarded By express.
and be compelled the sub treasurer al ST..
Louis 10 pay over TO ham 100000 loi
III payment If his troops. Both acts b.
defends By lie necessities Of bis position.
and states that lie communicated Lis ar.
ton 70 tie President, WHO expressed 10
dissplrobalion IN regard 10 he disaster
u Springfield, in which Gen. Lyon lost
bis life, Gen. Fremont brings ryidcnae 10
show that it was not at that lime ii his
power TO reinforce Gen. Lyon. lie also
defends the erection Of Notifications around
81. Louis, ms essential TO rs defense by a
small force while he should conduct the
campaign southwark, and the works. be-
says, we're thoroughly built at cost Of
less than 100000. Some other less inn
portant chag es against his Management
are noticed by Gen. Fremont, and he clio.
ses with the following statement Of tie
condition and prospects Of his department
at the time of bis removsl:-
AT the end Of October, when | had
succeeded in organizing and eqnippiug al
army, and was beginning 10 handle il IN
lie field, We We're everywhere and uni /
iurmly along the whole extent of our lines
successful against the enemy. AT Spring |
field one Of the most brilliant actions. and
At Fredericktown one OF the most almira-
bly, conducted battles OF the war had been
fought, Isolated railroads bad been con. /
neeled with ST. Louis, and we're in full
aid continuous operation over their whole
extent. Additional cars had been provid.
ed, and at twenty -four hours notice TO-
900 men could be moved upon them from
my one point 10 the opposite side of the
State. All our posts, so far as the rail
road went, had been fortified and connect
ID by telegraphs, which were everywhere
N full operation, and the daily mails were
running 10 Springfield, from which place.
Al officer, alone and in uniform, could ride
Trough with safety TO 81. Louis. Quiet
nd comparative peace had been restored
o the State, and the enemy were III fun
'etrcat before US to lis southern boundary.
4 compact had been entered into with
lin, under which the authority OF the
State and federal courts was acknow!
dyed; liberty Of opinion and security Of
'rr,on were guaranteed to both sides all
,uerilla parties suppressed. AID the war
iricty confined TO responsible officers and |
he armies in The field.
The State was, in reality, reclaimed, !
nd in condition TO leave The army free ,
Or the especial object Of descending the
iissis.ippi. The rebels already acknowl-
dyed The inutilty Of resistance to the fed
raj authority the doubtful came 10 the
ide OF power, and the loyal, who had borne
he brunl of war-when TO stand by the
lnion involved danger and. losses-were :
vcrywhere encouraged TO new elforts.and =
,warded for their past aid. The fall rains o.
ere over, the fine weather of the Indian a
,mmer had come, the hay was gathered
nd corn hardening and we were about 10
lrry out the grea; object Of our campaign J
nder the most favorable auspices, with y
-wer haldshlps from exposure aud imped- 70
nents from transportation than at any u
her season. The spirit Of tie army was IN
gh. II Was mainly composed Of West &C
II men, whose interests is well as hose m
lirioiism was involved in the opening Of
e Mississippi river, for the PREPARATION
which they had contributed every pos p,
bic effort. and we had every reason 10 tr
'lieve that The campaign would open
th signal victory in the defeat or dis
rsion OF the rebel army, with move on pl
emphis as the immediate result. These 50
lie the circumstances under which. with +
I reason assigned, was relieved Of my
III
-. A.