The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-05-16
GEN. NlcCLELLAN's PLANS.
WHY THEY WERE INTERPRETED WITH.

1t has been charged in the most respec.
table journals of the country that by an I'm.
warrantable interference of the Secretary
of War, McCLELLAN's plans were seriously
embarrassed, and this charge has not been
denied by any papers worthy of credit. We
are glad, however, that the most charitable
construction has been put upon the whole
matter by the New York Times. Mr..
RAYMOND in his correspondence from
Yorktown says:
Gen. McOlellanis numbers have been
strangely overstated in many quarters
and l heard an influential member of Con.
gress who has been vehement in his COM
plants of McC lellan's inactivity, insist, the
other day, that he had over 100000 men
under his command on the Peninsula. Now,
I have the figures for an exact statement of
bis force by corps d'armes, divisions and
brigades, and if it were quite prudent even
yet to state these details of his force, 1
should be very glad to give them by way of
refuting this opinion. can say, however,
without improperly, that bis e6ective force
is just about 0ne.half the number assigned,
"a little more, perhaps, but not much.
His original plan, as have already stated,
was not to send corps d'armee to the rear
of Gloucester,-to reach West Point, Is
miles above Yorktown, and then, by com.
bined attack in rear, in front and on the
flank from our gunboats, to compel sur
render. This plan he was under the neces.
sity of changing when Gen. McDowell's
corps was withdrawn and sent to the Rap.
pahannock because he was then left with.
out force sufficient to warrant the detach.
ment of so large body as this operation
would have required. His only resource,
therefore, was to make the attack in regu-
lar form and by regular siege operation,
running no risks of defeat by undue haste
or inadequate preparation, and making it
absolutely certain that be could hold every
step he might take in advance.
And here let me say one word as to the
reasons of the withdrawal of General Nc.
Dowel from his command. This very re-
markable step has been very frequently as
signed to very unworthy motives on the
part of General Mcdowell, who is charged
with having desired and sought an indie.
pendent command. l believe this to be
grossly unjust and utterly untrue. General
Mcdowell is as honorable and high toned a
gentleman as there is in the army, and
believe him 10 be utterly incapable of any
such unworthy conduct. In point of fact,
moreover, happen to know that General
Mcdowell did not seek or desire separate
command, that he desired above all things
to co operate with Mcclellan in the execu-
ton of the grand scheme assigned to him,
and that be was surprised, chagrined and
bitterly disappointed when he received the
orders which detached him from that army.
The reason for the change, which mas made
by the Secretary Of war with the assent of
the President, was fear for the safety of
Washington. The battle at Winchester
had startled them by revealing a much
stronger rebel force in their front than they
had suppOsed-and upon inquiry they found
that the troops left for the protection of the
capital were less effective than had been as
sumed. 1t was thereupon decided that one
of the two corps remaining, either Mellow.
ellis or Summers should be withheld-and
the choice fell upon the former. This is a
very simple explanation of an affair which
has been invested by rumor with a great
deal Of political Importance, and which has
occasioned good deal of bitterness of feel
ing. But / believe it to be the true one.
Enough on this subject for the present.