Daily Democrat and news. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1859-1864, 1862-11-20
IMPORTANT FACTS REVEALED.
The Varlous 1nterfe veBces With Bic
Plans and Command.
HIS PLANS REVEALED TO T0E
ENEMY TIL TROUGH WASHlNG-
TON AUTHORITIES.
How He ras Hampered and Held by
the Federal Government while
the Enemy wds actually
1ideel in Concen rat
ing against HIM.


Etc, ETC's EAN'
We have already alluded TO the re-
markable and important publication IN
the Revue DIES Deur Mondes Of histo.
~ OF McCiellan's campaign sgalnst
Richmond BY the Prince de Joinville
and bis two nephews who occupied
high and confidential positions upon his
staff. That portion which relates to the
orr an ization Of the army with which
Mcclellan moved, and contains the views
of the French princes On the American
soldier, ETC., has already been given.
We now proceed to select the material
portions Of the history Of events up to
the retreat on Harrison's Landings
history which is rendered doubly inter.
esting by the martyroom of Mcclellan
at the hands Of malignant, political
and jealous military csbal working
through Abraham Lincoln, the occupant
of the Presidential chair:
PLANS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
The army once improvised, it became
ne cesar, to settle upon plan Of the
campaign. The general plan was sim
pie. The idea could not be entertained
OF csnquering and occupying territory
so vast as ,ha, OF the Confederate
States; but for the purpose of escaping
the dangers born or to be bonn from
such a formidable instruction, It WAS
necessary TO attain three results LIST,
to blockade efficiently the insnreent
coast; I'd, 10 be master of the Mlssis-
sippi river and Of the entire system Of
western waters Sd, TO drive the rebel
government out Of Richmond, its capl-
tai.
M'cIELLAN's PART-wHY THE cAMPA1GN
WAS DELAYED TILL LAST SPRING.
The latter Of these three operations
being reserved for the army under Gen.
M'Cellan's immediate orders,the follow
ing question naturally enough arose ::
Should this attack be ventrred on as
soon as the means supposed to be suffi-
cient were provided, without awaiting
the results OF the blockade and of the
Mississippi campaign On that ques-
ton opinions were divided. Some said
Eyes," arguing thus that an insurrec.
ton should never be given the time to
establish itself that the Federal army,
with its defective organization, would
be no better in March than in Noyem-
Der that a splendid success on the part
Of the North, following close upon Bull
Run, might finish the war in one blow,
by permitting great effort at concilia-
ton before either side became too embit>
tered. Others said emo" According
to them the great work of reducing the
instruction should be performed on the
coast on the Mississippi. The Rich.
mond campaign, undertaken in the
Spring, with the army Of the Potomac
hardened Ivy Winter passed 10 tents,
and recovered from the fatal impres-
sions of BuiI Run, would be the coup de
grace to secession. The latter course
was chosen, either as the result Of real
elaboration or OF necessity from not
having decided in time TO act in the 6ue
days Of autumn of 1862.
THE FIRST FATAL 1SrERFERENCE--M'-
CLELLAN DEPRIVED OF THE CuIEE
COMMANDO elbow IN
THE REAR"
While we were riding forward grave
events were occurring in the highest re-
g'ous OF the army. There exists 10 the
American army, as in the English, a
commander-in chief who exercises over
the head of all the generals supreme
authority, regulates the distribution of
the troops, and directs military opera
tions. These functions, which have
been greatly curtailed in the Brit sh
army since the Crimean war, were still
exercised in all their vigor in America.
From the aged Gen. Scott, v no had long
hcnorably discharged tn IL, they had
passed to General Mcclellan. We
learned, on reaching Fairtac, that they
had been taken array from him. 1t Is
easy to understand the diminution OF
force and the restriction upon his use
ful"ess thus inflicted upon the General
in Chief by Jio,c IN the rear at the
Gerry outset Of his command.
Tue WOODEN GUNS" AT MANASSAS.
Yet this was but part of the mis-
chief done him. Mcclellan had long
known, better than anybody else, the
real strength Of the rebels at Manassas
and Cen.erv,Ie. He was perfectly ia.
mliar will, the existence OF the "wood.
en- cannou' by which it has been pre-
tended that he was kept in awe for six
months. Bnt he also knew that till the
month of April the roads of Virginia are
in such state that wagons and ar,iIe-
~ can only be moved over them BY con.
structing plank roads, tedious opera.
ton. during which the enemy, holding
the railways, could either retreat, as be
was then actually doing, or move for a
blow upon some other point. In any
event, had Mcclellan attacked and car.
ried Centcrvile, pursuit was impossible
and victory would have been barren oil
results. A single bridge burned would
have saved Jonuson's whole army. Such
are the vast advantages Of railway fer
retreatipg srmy-advantagcs which
do not exist for the army which pursues
it.
| MCCLELLAN NEVER INTENDED TO ADVANCE
ON OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES HIS
PLAN WAS.
We have the right, we think, to say