The Buchanan County guardian. (Independence, Buchanan County, Iowa) 1858-1864, 1862-07-15

~" 'hS SpoiISS wy SSutiai, VI A'o"
Market roads, or all three, but these
chances were necessarily accepted. Gen
Mcclellan acted upon the suppositor
that the enemy would not guess his de
termination until he was able TO defea
| their movements. At all events, it was
the only hopeful course, because the enc
my was watching for him on the lef
bank of the Chickahominy. The road
was narrow tunnel for such mighty
torrent of trains and men, but fortunate
ly 1t was smooth and dry. In order to
make the movement successfully, it was
necessary to fight at the outset, because
it was morally certain that our line oi
battle could not be Withdrawn from the
front without sucking the enemy after
them-so that due preparations were
made. The events will now be recorded
in their order, with as much Of The spirit
Of the perious enterprise thrown into the
sketch as | have time to engraft. The
affair at Fair Oaks Farm was the real be-
ginning Of the dreary drama.
PREPARATIONS FOR RETREAT.
After describing in detail the battle on
Friday at Gaines HILL the writer pro
ceeds:
But apprehensions about Porter's bat
lie had distressed officers all along |,
seemed apparent that if the enemy de-
leated him, ruin threatened us from the
rear. An attack in front indicated dis
position on the part Of the rebels to force
the issue we now deprecated 1t was a
grateful relief to drive them back in front
so easily. All our supports had been
sent to Porter. We had no more than
men enough to hold the front. 1t would
have been madness 10 have contended
with an equal force of disciplined troops
in front aud rear. There would have
been no alter native but hasty retreat a,
the sacrifice Of most Of our equipage and
the siege train, with the butchery oi
thousan Is Of our troops.
BY this time, sunset, tidings Of q
gloomy character had been received from
Porter. Not much later the extent oil
our misfortunes was partially comprehen
ded by officers Fol The first time We
heard q whisper OF a serious determine
ton on the part Of Gen. Mcclellan to
" change lis base OF operations (?) to
James River" Ii was considered =
most critical movement specially un
der compulsjon. You have alread y
heard some, aud you VI. near many
more explanations Of this calamitous but
necesstous plan, bat l sincerely believe
il never would have been attempted bul
for the attack on our right wing. This
question, however, will bo the subject OF
controversy shall. therefore, withhold
consideration OF it in detail until more
favorable conditions offer.
THE RETREAT.
Even before Porter had been driven
back, | was struck with the singular op
eratlons at general headquarters. dis
covered that they were being removed to
Ssvage's Station, and a competent officer
explained gravely lhat ii was though,
advisable to 60 there, although il was in
the rear of our icf: wing. After dark
there were other omnious symptoms
general officers cou6led to their stats
their fears Of coming disaster, Even
with the best disciplined troops, and un
der favorable auspices, to change plan
Of operations in the face OF an enemy, Is
regarded by military authorities as one
OF the most dangerous enterprises In
our situation it was n case of desperation
With our force, we could not hold our
position against an enemy in front aud
rear longer than supplies on hand would
last. An attempt 10 cut through lines Of
entrenchmenls and powerful redoubls,
defended by a numerous and desperate
enemy, would have been madness We
bad no hope Of rein 'orcements Besides
il was now TOO late for them to form a
junction with us. either by The Kappa
hammock route or by York River, since
they would be cut off inevitably There
was but one extremely perilous allerna
tive. The army must laIl back on James
River. A hope was entertained that the
enemy would be deceived into tic be.
lief that we designed TO iall back TO tie
Whilehouse. Preparations were accor-
d!ngly begun. Porer's command cross
cd The river without opposition. Dur,
ing the night our bridges were blown up
and the crossings were barricaded aud
defended. Keyes' line. which was upon
the extreme lett, resting upon White Oak
Swamp. was prolonged, and our artillery
and transportation trains were ordered 10
prepare to move forward. That night,
Gen Casey was also directed TO destroy
all public property at the Whitehouse
that could NOT be removed, and to trans.
port the sick aud move to a place OF
safety, to retire himself, and rejoin the
army on James River. Friday night was
thns actively and mourniuly passed.
The troops We're ignorant OF The stat as
and II was desirable TO conceal the truth
from them. Ii was feared the enemy
might attack on Saturday, and every
preparation was made TO resist success
fully Our defeated right was disposed
on Trent's Bluffs, where the enemy :
crossing might be successfully opposed
and by daylight our main body Of sup
ports, after severe night. resumed their
original position. The night Of Friday.
June 27th, was gloomy, but il was ielic-
ily itself, compared with those OF Salur-
day, Sunday, Monday and Tuesday.