, 1862-12-27

ullHtf3 0O 5UH =uPtU1G tu D1l UllE
side on the day Of the battle?
4. Under fire, do son mean?
G. Yes, sir.
O. Do you mean to include tie reserves
4. I mean to include all under tire.
should think there was hardly men under
fire; when say that were all that were
under fire, 1 would sly that do not consider
the reserves beyond musketry fire as being
exactly troops under fire.
@. What was the whole number Of our
a. should suppose there must have been
II, and the difference between that number
and the number under actual. fire WAS held
Us a reserve.
Q. From the best light you have, what do
yon estimate the force of tho enemy:
L. I thought our forces were about equal
A. At what do you estimate our loss to be
in killed, wounded and missing.
L. I think 10,0o0 would cover our whole
loss. It has been stated over that number,
but these things are always exaggerated.
Q. At what do you establish tie loss Of the
A. 4 great deal less than our own, from
the fact that they we're covered by their
works.
@. In your Judgment as military man,
were there any faults Or mistakes in bringing |
on or conducting that attack?
4: think NOT. The General commanding |
conferred great deal with me about it. If be !
made mistake, I made one too; for Ger |
tainly approved the steps, one by one, that he !!
took. As regards the responsibility for order
ing the attack, I do not know what orders the |
general commanding may have received from
Washington. He, however, told me that lie
had received a telegram from the President
that lie did not wish the army sacrificed.
think myself would have made but q single
attack instead Of making two attacks. I
would have made but one, mass1ng everything
upon one point That is 4 point upon which
military men may differ.
G. By Mr. Gooch: DID the commanders Of
the grand division concur in all Of them, SO
far msas IS y0u Know in the movement that Was
4. do not know, but suppose they did.
@. By the Chairman: What is your opin-
ion Of the general condition and efficiency Of
| the army since the battle?
| 4, consider that within q few days, with
sufficient esertion, this army will be in excel
| lent order again.
TESTIMONY OF GENERAL FRANKLIN.
Major General William B. Franklin sworn
and examined by the chairman:
| @. You have seen the resolution Of the Sen-
| ate under which this committee are now act
| inge VIII you 60 on and state in your OWL
| way what you deem it necessary to state?
a. do not recoliect the precise time, but
it Was just before VIC moved from Washing
ton, Gen. Halieck and Gen Meigs came
down there and had a conference with Gen.
Burnside. the result Of that conference, rs
understand it, Wis that Gen. Burnside was to
move this army from Warrcnt0n and that Vi
| einity to Fredericksburg, and not across the
river here as an important part Of that move
1aent. I understand from Gen. Burnside that
when the advance Of his army arrived in
front Of Fredericksburg, pontoon train,
enough to build Two bridges, was to meet
him there. know thcadvance Of the army did
arrive at Fredericksburg at the proper time,
but there was no pontoon train to meet it there,
and in consequence Of that the army could
; / not cross at the time we expected to cross.
We were, therefore, delayed several days in
consequence Of the delay in the arrival Of the
pontoon train After arriving here we accu-
; mu1ated provisions tor twelve days. Then
Gen. Burnside called a council, in which it
was the unanimous opinion, think, of Ill the
Generals present, that if this river could be
crossed, it ought to be crossed, no matter
what might happen afterwards. The point
Of crossing was not then definitely determined
uron, but thought Mt the time we we're to
. ,:ross several miles further down. Afterwards
. Gen, Burnside called us together again, and
Informed us that he had determined 10 cross
at the two points at which We finally did
J cross. had no objection 10 that, but thought
| they were as good as the point further down.
know nothing at all, iii fact, about the de-
fl fcnscs on the other side 1t was not my busi-
, ness to know anything about them.
; think. the arrangements for tho crossing
were all well made, At the same time doubt
: ed our power to cross, and do not believe
we could have crossed bad the enemy chosen
j. to prevent 1t, and know from what ! have
II Elu&C eIGA anu HuAt l. AClUiE Eu6lCNLGNS tull
r they could have prevented our crossing at
o these two points il they had chosen.
II However, as tie committee Knows that tht
e the crossing WAS successfully made undel
IS cover Of . fog; and as far rs my wing was
/ concerned, we got into position safely Will
te the loss Of 4 very few NEIL Still VIC were il
,s such u position that if the enemy had at AMI
10 moment opened upon us with the guns the,
" had bearing upon us, I think that in the cours
re- Of an hour our men would have been so scat
= ENJI1T hnr fanr1 1f1y11 1EcSf> Il
ut to rally them. For some unaccountlbl
Is reason they did not open their batteries
n On the morning Of the 18th inst. I mad
d. an attack according to the order Of Genera
it proper and prudent to put IN, I fought Ii
III whole strength Of my command as far as
or could, and 1t the same time keep my com,n1
er nication with the river open. The reason tls
er We failed vas that we had not troops enougg
"a to carry the points where the attack We
o. made. Under the orders that were glye1
n- after we were pressed back directed that
r. position should be held as far in advance {
Id twas possible to hold it, and I brought 1t u
at held that position until was ordered to r
he cross the river, and from what know of OF
to want Of SUCCESS on the right and the denora
IN. ICED condition Of the troops on the right N
,sf center, as represented to me BY their co,
rs uanders, I must confess that believe the g
cir der to yecEoss was avery proper one. We +
+rd crossed on the night Of the 18th, without Il
iii loss Of a man, and with no tronble at Ill o.
-: - q: By Mr.. Gooch: Had the pontoons be'
of here at the time Of the arrival of the arm
I've what would have probably been the result 2
to A. The probable result would have be
cd that the army, as much of it as Gen Burnsi
It'll It'll crossed the river, driving away the enen
len here, perhaps 500 OF ], ,0oo men, and th
yer would hare occupied these very nights
ms attack, and the crossing would have been p
and manent and successful
re- re- @: Do yon know 8h whom rests the respt
did sibiGty ii the delay in the arrival Of the po
haf toons?
;t,,s ;n1 A. do not, officially.
onc a. Do understand you to say that y
fhe concurred in the movement to cross
d. stTeanls
TX 4. It was not my opinion that VIC CO,
rat cross at any Of the points indicated.
Far @. Will you state whether or not it is *
or opinion that ifthe movement Of the army fr
; ~ toons had arrived here the army could b
m then come here, and with those pontoa
yere lave made crossing here and occupied
nn lights before the enemy could have reacl
+,,nt | here in sufficient force to have prevented
It 4. Yes, sir; that is my opinion.
f;s @. Then it is your opinion that if it
he been aseertaiAed that the pontoons could
tic possibly be here at the time Gen. Bnrn.
tbc been notified Of the time when they coult
,gan here, 80 that he might make The moyemt
iers Of his as1ny correspond with the time Y
iffar | tho pontoons could be here:
; thr A. That is my opinion
ocos @. What is the condition Of the army
rfhc as to its efficiency. Is its efficiency
red paired other than by the loss Of so n
else men, Or is it dcmoralized by the regent
nrci asters?
~ = A. think it is not dcmoralizcd at all,
Gene is, so far as my own wing is concerned, Il
I'd in it is not
to to re- e. Q. After the crossing had been made,
could it possible, In your opinion, for our tr0ol
,sfino have carried the Nights. or to have hello
heci3 position upon the other side, so rs to
hnnoe derived any advantage from it,
;ewed Alt is my opinion that If, fnste.
title making two real attacks, our whole force
raf;,re been Concentrated on our left, that is,
;bnrr: available forces, and the real attack had
onfy made there, and merely feint made upo
on;n. right, We might have carried the hight
heftar think We could have carried them. VIII
,c3 ~ the army would hnve achieved a succes
,dad T. | that, / cannot say. I do not mean to say
do 50 the mere carrying Of the nights would
ger or t.I ~ ,,er,, 1 W n9t en1M "
enemy had there. know that wherevs
MN, appeared we found great many more
t08 than we had. / Wou1d like to impress as
upon the committee as it is firmly impr
% upon my mind, the fact that this Who'll
ter ri aster has resulted from the delay in the a
nc or Of the pontoon bridges. Whoever is re
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