The daily Evansville journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1862-1863, 1862-12-06
EVANSVILLE, IND. SATURDAY MORNING,

personal interview, and even after that
interview | tried every means in my
power to avoid Withdrawing your army
and delayed the decision as long as
dared to delay it. l assure you, Gener-
al, it was not hasty and inconsiderate,
but on the contrary, it caused me more
anxiety than any other act of my life, but
after full and mature consideration of all
the pros and cons, | was reluctantly
forced to the conclusion that the order
must be issued. There was to my mind
no alternative Allow me to allude to a
few of the facts of the case You, and
yonr officers at one of the interviews es-
timated the enemy's forces in and around
Richmond at two hundred thousand men.
Since then you and Diners report that
they have received and are receiving
large re-enforcements from the South.
Gen. Pope army, now covering Wash
ington, is only forty thousand; your eff
fective force is only about ninety thou
sand You are thirty miles from Rich
mond, and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety,
with the enemy directly between you,
ready to fall with his superior numbers
upon one or the other, as he may elect;
neither can reinforce the other in case
of such an attack If Gen Popes army
be demanded to reinforce you, Washing
ton, Maryland, and Pennsylvania would
be left uncovered and exposed If your
force be reduced TO strengthen Pope,
you would be too weak to hold the posi-
tion you now occupy, should the enemy
turn round and attack you in full force.
In other words, the old army of the PotO-
mac is split in pieces, with the entire
force of the enemy directly between
them They cannot be united by land
without exposing both to destruction;
and yet they must be united. To send
Pope's force by water to the Peninsula
is, under present circumstances, mill
tary impossibility. The only alternative
| is to send the forces on the Peninsula to
some point by water, say Fredericksburg,
/ where the two armies can be united.
Let me now alIude to some of the OBJ
| iections which you have urged. You say
to withdraw from the present position
will cause the certain demOralization of
! the army, which is now in excellent con-
dition aud discipline | cannot under
stand why simple change of position to
a new and by no means distant base will
demoralize an army in excellent disci-
! pline, unless the officers themselves as
sist in the decentralization, which | am
satisfied they will not. Your change of
front from your extreme right at Han
over c. II. to your present position was
over thirty miles; but | have not heard
that it demoralized your troops, notwith-
standing the severe losses they sustained
in effecting it.
A new base on the Rappahannock, at
fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a
enforcement of 10000 or $4,000 fresh
and disciplined troops. The change,
with such advantages, will, l think, if
properly represented to your army, en-
courage rather than demoralize your
troops Moreover, you yourself suggest
ed that junction might be effected at
Yorktown; but that flank march across
the Peninsula would be more hazardous
than to retire to Fortress Monroe. You
will remember that Yorktown is two or
three miles further from Richmond than
Fredericksburg is; besides the latter is
between Richmond and Washington, and
covers Washington from any attack by
the enemy. The political effect Of the
. withdrawal may at first be unfavorable;
but | think the public are beginning to
> understand its necessity, and that they
will have much more confidence in a
united army than its separate fragments.
but you will reply, why not re-enforce
here so that ! can strike Richmond from
my present position. To do this you
said at our interview that you required
$4,000 additional troops. l told you
: that it was impossible to give you so
i many. You finally said that you would
have some chance of success with 90,
900, but you afterward telegraphed to
me that you would require 5000, as the
enemy was being largely REINFORCED. II
I your estimate OF the enemy's strength
was correct, your requisition was per
: fectly reasonable; but it was utterly i'm
I possible to Eli it until troops could be
enlisted and organized, which would re
: ouire several weeks To reach your
army in its present position, until it coulC
l. be so re-enforced, would almost destro,
{ it in that climate
{ The months of August and September
t are almost fatal to whites who live OF
Z that part of James river, and even aftel
YOU got the re-enforcements asked fol
y you admitted you must reduce Fort Oar
4 ling and the river batteries before you
c could advance On Richmond. 1t is b.
!, no means certain that the reduction o
u the fortifcations would not require a
much as those at Yorktown This della,
e might not only be fatal to the health o
Il your army, but in the meantime Genera
Popes forces would be exposed to th'
% heavy blows of the enemy without tn,
le slightest hope of assistance from you
y In regard to the demoralzng effect 0
5, withdrawal from the Peninsula to tn,
ID Rappahannock, l must remark that
y large number Of your highest officers, in
n deed most of those whose opinions hav
n been reported to me, are decidedly il
70 favor of the movement Several of thos
Il who originally advocated the line of tn
Peninsula now advise its abandonment
| have not inqnired and do not need t,
know, by whose advice, or for what rea
sons, the Army of the Potomac was sep
arated into two parts, with the enemy be
tween them. | must take things as fin,
them | find the forces divided, and
q ~, III I