Sunbury American. [volume] (Sunbury, Pa.) 1848-1879, 1862-11-22
Some OF General NcCIcllan's Nis-
tmlScs and YEiscnIcmLnliOms.

Administration except in its aid against our
enemies, more determined to-day than we
were II year ago last April to join in crush
ing rebellion and its reasonable though
insidious abcttors, we speak to-day for our
country in her peril and not for party III
its disappointmcnts. In showing the rcla
tions of responsibility between the President
and Gen. Mcclellan, we shall rigidly keep
ourselves far within the line of the facts,
because, while we state but little which Is
not currently though irrcsponsibly circua-
ted, there is much which we have only the
right to indicate In either case we state
what zee kho5r.
Turning back from the Notifications of
Manassas, on none of which was a carriage
strong enough to hold a siege gun, in the
face Of advice and opposition, General Nc
Clclan determined to divide the grandcst
army of modern time, with artillery and
equipment such as the world had never seen,
and transported the larger portion to the
Peninsula, instead of moving upon Rich
mond by way of GordOnsville or FredcriCks-
burgh, in which movement his advancing
army itself would have availcd us a cover
ing force for Washington
Neither he nor the Government had the
ordinary prescicnce to provide for reserves,
and just before starting he proposed Il re-
duction Of 10000 from what time has shown
to be our entirely inefficient cavalry force
! The whole defence of Gen. Mcclellan, semi
officially written for the New York World
| by DR.. Wistar, of Philadelphia his friend
from boyhood, who was with him during
/ the last battles before Richmond, all rests
on an absolutely false assumption which had
before gone vaguely to the country, and
| which has remained uncontradictcd authori-
| tatively to this hour, because the Govern
mcnt could not, in defending itself attack
! its own General. We mean the charge that
! troops agreed to he part of Gen. McClcl-
! lan's Pcninsular force were detained from
| him after he had embarked
We hH01o that this was utterly false and
! we will briefly give the truth. With refer
( encc to the expedition to the Peninsula, the
/ President, wisely and of his own motion, by
| formal written order, prescribed that Wash
ington should be left absolutely secure
and that Gen. Mcclellan and the four Gene
rails Of army corps should decide what such
force should be- BY elaborate written re
| port they decided that $4,000 men were
necessary for the immediate defence of
! Washington, Of whom 30, 600 were to occupy
! the dclcnccs on the north, and fully man
those on the south side of the Potomac. and
! $4,000 were to operate as covering force
| Immediately in front of the latter Before
| leaving, the General placed Cen Banks with
! $4,000 on the line of Winchester and Stras-
! burgh.
In the same way, and with equally posi-
! tive knowledge, we stated in June last some
of the reasons why Gen. Mcclellan ceased to
be General-in-Chief 1t is not necessary to
reiterate that deliberate and guarded state
ment. We left it to be determined whether
/ he had ~ - ability to be more successful as
! tn grand offensive army than he
haC. Dc Ieneral-in-Ch While at the
head OF 10000 men he wished to divide
his army and transport one portion of it to
the Peninsula, leaving his enemy irtrcnchcd
at Manassas This plan abandoned, the
movement in flank upon Manassas failed
/ because engineers Of his own selection. under
his personal superintendent, and mean
/ while recommended by him for promotion.
! collected boats for the passage Of troops,
which, when the force was assembled for
| m0remcW tcerG al ,t3pa2 too hrge TO pass
! hrough the locb Of tie caaal opcaing into the
PUtOmdC The movement thus announced
! to the enemy, was necessarily abandoned,
/ and every rebel escaped from Manassas, of
! whose evacuation the General was utterly
| incrcdulous in the face Of cumulative and
! true testimony.
! llC CiliDdIhtt LOT tllc IGnlnSulG Win
/ l23,OOO men, and their armament and sup
| plies, in the most magnificent fleet of trans
| ports the world ever saw. From on ship
! board he made the unexpected and aston
/ ishing request for the whole of McDOwcIl's
covering force Of 10000 then outlying, as
| agreed, the forts opposite Washington, and
for eight regiments in addition. The only
suggestion he could make of Il force TO sup
I ply their places was some four regiments of
undisciplined troops in PENNSYLVANIA. The
1 President asked those in command of the
/ dctenccs OF Washington for detailed report
/ of the number of troops for the defence
! BY that report it was demonstrated that
with the exception Of McDowclls covering
/ force there were only $4,000 men, nearly all
diSorganized regiments rejected by Gen.
/ Mcclellan, and without a single battery of
I field artillery that, if his request were COM
. piled with, not all even of these IS. 600 men.
instead of the agreed s., 900, would be left
To hold the deicnccs Of Washington, with
: out man as a covering force between them
and Richmond, by way OF GordOnSville and
! Frcdcrcksburgh, and that, therefore, Gen.
Mcclellan had, therefore, started with 1000
moro men than he was entitled to by written
agreement
The President then referred the whole
, CNIb'HCC W TWO StucId!S, TO ueCluc NnCtncf,
If Gen. McClcllun's request were complied
1 with, Washington would be left defended
/ within the terms of the order and agree
ment and they of course decided adversely
10 the request
From this force of $4,000 men the Prcsi-
/ dent, even then, Withdrew and sent Gen.
/ Mcclellan Gen. Frankliu's 10000, leaving
$4,000, instead of $4,000, men for the de
fence Of Washington. Such are the au-
/ thoritatiye facts, and such is the ovcrwhelm-
ing answer 10 the loose and repeated mis-
/ statements, charges and talsehoods of the
. last six months, which a President lenicnt
I To weakness, and kind only to be cruel, has
/ left unanswered, rather than remove u Gen
F cral of whose incompetcncy his own mind
had cumulative, concurrent and convincing
proof
- IHE MANUFACTURE OF MoLAssEs.-
p \ gentleman in Lancaster has raised, on Il
quarter of an acre of ground, sufficient cane