Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-25
Able Defense of BurnsIde's Plan.

cessful at Aspern and Essling, and his
failure at Waterloo was awful Burnside
made no blnnder. His plan was werthy
of the best General in Europe. He had
used it before with skill and success at
Roanoke Island and Newbern, and al
though he failed in the present case, that
does not prove that the plan itself was de-
fective. The main features ofhis military
system seems to be to attack the enemy's
center in force, and to attack always in
column. Some of the very wise men who
think the President and Cabinet ought to
resign, urge that both these ideas were
wrong, that the progress Of the age has
exploded them. We do not believe q word
of this, and we will say why.
ave have already stated that both at
Roanoke Island and at Newbern, these two
Nspoleonic ideas we're used by Burnside,
and were the leading features Of his opera
tions. He paid no attention to outposts, to.
fanking efforts, etc. In this he was right.
Baron Jomini expressly says, in his Sum
mary Of the Art Of War, that these flank
ing operations imperil an, army by making
its line too thin and weak, SO that an at
tack by the enemy may easily breakit, and
if the hanking party is separated and sent
by det0ur to make a rear diversion, it is
very apt to fail through mistake Of roads,
or delays of various kinds, and if en-
countered by the enemy in force, is sure to
! 4ha-asssiA;1S+~[1--I-.-sa he ssSPoss%ohs af
| Springfield, Sigers flank attack was dis
astrous failure, and his whole division
was cut up, despite the great skill Of the
General, and his tried ability on many q
well fought field.
ain war, the most obvious and ordinary
of all efforts by Generals of every grade
and talent, is to outfsnk the enemy. Ma
poleon achieved the greatest and most won
derful of all his successes by avoiding this
hackneyei mode of operations, and risk
ing his whole force on a single desperate
attack of the center. Perhaps it will be
said that every General is not Napoleon,
and therefore such risks ought to be svoid-
ed. To this we reply that in every battle
where these fearful attacks Of the center
proved successful he was on the very brink
Of destruction In his first signal victory
at Marengo the battle was actually lost;
his army was thoroughly beaten and hy--
ing in all directions, when Dessaix arrived.
He, too, thought the field lost; but Napo-
leon renewed the contest with the fresh
troops, and won the day by his attack on
the center. Wagram was memorable in
stance Of this terrific risk, and the terrible
slaughter of McDonsld's column in the
decisive charge still causes the reader of
history to thrill as he ponders on it.
Our soldiers at fredericksburg we're not
whit worse than those Of Napoleon. His
troops recoiled in many battle before the
awful fire of the opposing army, and the
best troops in the world sometimes fail in
q charge. The British storming party
failed at the Redan before Sevastopol.-
They fed like sheep at Bunker Hill and
New Orleans. Napoleons veterans from
a hundred battle-felds were scattered to
the winds at Waterloo. 1t is idle to expect
that men with reasoning faculties will not
recoil before such horrors as our troops en-
countered at Fredericksburg. 1t may be
said that if this is true, the charge in col
umn and on the center must be an error.
But here is just the point where modern
military science shows itself most trium-
phantly.
Napoleon knew that the risk Of such a
charge was awful, and that as in great
war it must always be increased by the
fact that most Of the troops in the field are
new lexies and -theEafnrn- -ta n nn1.4nir Az
tent untrustworthy, means must be found
to guard against the possibility Of their
being able to take to fight. To do this he
made his charging columns always very
heavy, that however great the slaughter
might be in front, no one could turn and
fee, as the vast multitude pressing for
ward in the rear prevented it. MeDonald's
charging column at Wagram started out
some eighteen thousand strong, and when |
= l.. knd IN
eighteen hundred left But it broke the !
enemy's line and gained the victory.
"Something Of these tactics was re-
sorted to by Burnside in the late battle |
When Meade division, after its successful |
charge, broke before the fearful fire of the |
enemy, Birney's division was Immediately |
pushed forward, and drove back the enc
my and took several hundred prisoners. !
This method of attack is now the accepted |
one in all the European armies. The Rus |
SLAMS used it at Inkerman, and despite the |
dreadful slaughter, they would undoubt-
edly have succeeded but for the timely ar |
rival Of the French. Napoleon III. usedft |
at Magenta and Solferino and the carnage |
was so great that for months after these |
conflicts the Emperors nerves were COM
pletely unsettled, and his mind filled with |
morbid images Santa Anna adopted it |
at Buena Vista, and at one time, nOtwith- |
standing the bravery of our troops, and |
the strength Of our position, he came near
succeeding. But Taylor arrived at the
opportune moment, and renewed the bat
tie with Bragg's army, o'Brien's having
been lost.
"Here is just the perilous point. This
method of attack is never q thing without
risk, and requires q General of great re-
sources and unbounded courage When
the slaughter is greatest he must be able
TO command himself most. This was
where the mighty genius of Napoleon shone
resplendent. Riding amid the thunder
and the horrors Of the battle, he seized |.
upon the moment of fearful peril TO make
his decisive charge with all his force,
lending 10 it all the enthusiasm and cour-
age which his OWH exTnPrs -i-o---
into his men. We are afraid that Burn
side committed an error in not allowing
Sumner to 20 on the field and take com
mand Of his men at the critical moment.
The old hero chafed at being prevented.
BE would be most at home in the midst Of
danger, and had he been allowed to go, he
would have saved the day, and perhaps
have won the battle. Burnside himself
could have done it, or Hooker or Heintz-
Gilman.
awe do not think Burnside deserves
eenGure for his plan of this battle. It was
an attempt not merely to defeat the rebel
army, but to annihilate it. Had he sue
ceeded in his attempt to pierce the center
and seize the railroad in the rear, their
retreat would have been cut of, the whole
rebel army divided into two fragments,
and attacked in front, flank and rear. It
Is worth all the men we have lost to have