New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-12-24

Tho FIGHT WAC continued on the le''.,, ont was 70
ren,ote f'om that that cannot give any DESCRIPTION
of /, M all. The General Commanding directed me
70 establish my head quarters at the lacy House. SO
that could suDe intend the operations OF both my
corps.
~ss there while the General commanding was
at the Philips House during the action; during an
action there is constant running for orders Io re-
endorsements, artillery, troops ut different points,
ammunition, &c. l..
consider the crossing of the river under the cir
cumstances very credable thing and also con-
,ider tie retreat under she circumstances, ns very
creditable; there VISA not gun or ahy'hln8 CHS
lost. r
would like to add here because it was almost the
only occasion when the General commanding ana
myself have differed in regard to any point, .nat
dill not wish to rehuquish fredericksburg ithouSn'
we could have held II with fin3e diVisioh w PoSS
| ing our batteries right. ,,.
| IL would not have been giving up an expedition
but rlmply change Of tactics. That Is the way In
which viewed il; that We would jus. DO drawing
back little in order to try 1t again was, tnere-
fore, strongly in favor Of holding Fredericksburg
| Others were not.
Perhaps was the only general officer OF rank
who was Of that opinion; thought 1t would pre-
sent better and different appearance II we coz,
| timed TO hold the town; we could have commanded
| il sny time with our artillery, and we eau do 30
NOW. i 40 not tunh tucIo Nic "nohs'
Gully in holding it, but may have been mistsken.
@. Do you know any reason why the PARTON
bridges did not arrive earlier
| A. do not.
Q. You know nothing on that subject
A. do not. expected, ia matter OF courfe, 70
find them here when came, or very soon aiterward
O. If you had found them hero as You expected,
what would in your opinion, have been the reau
| A. should have taken the crest IN rear OF the
town Oh that night or the following cay. Not con-
sderrg Frederics,burg GO beng OF any consequence
excent AS being on tho road 10 Richmond, should
have passed through the o"b anu lahon Possessioh
of the crest.
O. Are .here any fords above here which might
A. There sAe several small fords on this river, aud
in the Summer time two or three Of them would TO
practicable, perhaps.
/ O. I mean, wers there cry practicable foris at
the time You did cross, and II So who're were they
A. There Ia O rough cavalry ford down by the
upper bridge at Falmouth where horsemsn some
But That ford depends upon the tide which rises
above the town. Tho tide was in when arriS ed
here. which was in the afternoon. Tho tide was
then regedlng, and a citizen told me II would not
30 possible 10 get anything over the ford until AFTER
dark.
That ford il represented to ne as being deep
ford, deep holes in IL; men can Exp rom rock To
rock; few men at u time, but there are occasion
ally deep holes from ak 10 eight feet deep; such
ford would never be considered practicable for
marching troops over.
] O. VIVA, reasons do you assign for not crossing
either above or below where tue enemy have for
cited So
! A.-Ths reason was this: We did not attempt TO
,nrn their Ieft flank because shorr i, then slack
water navigation taken out Of The RIVER soaie two
miles above here aud brought with tue basin at the
upper end Of the town, that runs alo al consider
abic distsnco from the R,ppGhannock.
/ In making tie movement 10 turn the enemy 5
fsnk ii force bad been sent up between the river
and canal the canal would have TO 90 crossed, and
to DO 60 it would be necessary to bridge II. -,
| In, only way - have made tba, movement would
have been 20 have Q entirely the left Of that
car al and that would have exposed the iroOps ell
tie way Up 70 hfe uron the halk from tie batter
les winch had erected all along ap there With
Ont our beng able to return their tire q. ali.
| q. In regard TO the condition OF the army since
the bAlIle, Il Il deBOrnlzed any more than by tue
/ .uss oi Is.l number VI L.cnl
! a. think i.
! q. To wba, extent anc In wha, way'
/ A. IL !. difficult 10 describe il III aLy other ray
than by saying mere Is sress deal TOO much cTosk
| ina; tuo.e Is DO. eali u oOuilrLce.
! q. WHAT numrer Of men, or about what number,
DO you ,appoe, were engaged on our eide On Tie
day 81 The battle
| A.-Uader Ere, do you meant
| Q.-lch, cir.
| A.-Do you resn TO include the roseryes1
| Q.--I mean to Iucladc all under fire.
! Al should taiuk there was hardly - under
/ FIRE. Wien l say hat - nen were all that were
| under ire | would .ay that DO Lot oontiGcr Tie
icserves leyoud muskeiry h'c as being exactly
troop, under Ire.
q. Whnt was tho whole number o! our forces
over The uyegi
! a. eAonld euppose there must have been
and the difference between that number and the
number actually onder lire was held a. u reserve.
Q From tie beet hgAi You haye, what 90 you
Estimate the force Of the enemy
| Al thought our forces wee about equal.
! Q.--At what DO y0n estimate our o.s 10 be in
| Kidd, wounded, and missing.
4. lhmk 10000 would cover our whole loss Ii
has been stated over that ncube, but these things
are a,wsys exa -gerfei.
q. At what 90 you estimate the los. Of the onemyl
4. = great le-l Ices tl4n our oven, i.on The .act
that they were covered by TIER works.
q. IL your jgdgmoai, "a q military man, were
there any euils mistakes ia bringing Oh or con-
duciing thsl attack
4. think not The General commanding con-
farrcd great deal with me about IT, II he ua13 a
I uiisfake, made one TOO for ! certainly approved
NC s.elr, one BY one that be took.
As regards tue Iesiola.5il,y .os ordering tho at
TACK. do DO; know whli oIderI tie General COM
minding may rave received from WAsliurt,n.
/ Ihu % al zee had Tcceirel GieH on forms cent
10 press.
! rssT-rs----- TIT --r
Mcdowell Court "a Inquiry.
WismsGro~. Tuelisy, Dec %. ilc9