The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-08-22

The shops, the furnaces, the factories, had
not completed their work; it was simply o
physical impossibility for them to do go by
the 10th, or even by the last, of March. AS
material of different kinds was prepared, it
was assigned where first needed, and the
equipment of the western and southern ex-
peditionary armies took precedence of that
of his own The demands of the whole army
were large; the supply. within a limited
time, wholly inadequate; and neither money,
energy, nor the volleys of abuse from the
Tribune could remedy the matter. Time
alone could supply the deficiencies, and un-
til that time had elapsed, and the supplies
were completed and delivered, the army
could not be ready. An army and all its
material--its instruments and equipments,
not less than it's skill--had to be created.
One merely as good as the rebel army would
not answer. 1t had to be larger and better,
or its first campaign would have been its
last. Thank God, the seven days battles
prove that we have an army.
As to the size, past and present, of that
army, the figures and facts given by Senator
Chandler were given not only to the
country but to the enemy, who now has q
solid base on which to act. His vague idea
of our army of 100000 to 100000 men,
has been of great advantage to US; but that
idea is now corrected, and the Senator's
speech has deprived US of the advantage of
cOncealing our numbers, or the possibility of
misleading or deceiving him. Had any
member Of the Army of the Potomac d.
vulged so much to the enemy as Senator
Chandler has done, he would, on conviction,
have been hung as traitor and spy,
promptly and justly. 1t is lawful and ex.
pedient now, at any rate, to break the full
effect of his indiscretion, by placing the
facts he has presented in their natural order
and connection, so that they may convey
truth instead of falsehood. The consequences
must fall where they belong.
General Mcclellan never moderated the
rebellion, nor the power that must be put
forth to suppress it. He knew well the
strength and resources of the South, and the
desperate character of its able leaders. He
was never deIuded by the foolish theories
about a starved out population, nor by the
rosy but crack. Drained visions of the Irib.
uae, and other negrophiist organs, about an
enthusiastic rising of mean whites and ne.
groes." He did not need to be persuaded
that the army which won the field at MAJ
nassas, doubled in numbers, and perfect in
discipline, would not run away from their
works at the charge of regiment of YAM
kee horse, even if preceded by laundering
speech from an emancipation Senator, dia-
tribe from Wendell Phillips, and first.rate
editorial from Field-Marshal Greeley. He
knew that he was to engage powerful
army of brave men, of the same race and
blood as ourselves, ably commanded, gall
lantly led, and thoroughly and fanatically in
earnest; men who knew they were fighting
for cause-not faction-and that cause
their independence that these men, mis-
taken as they were, would fight as we'll as
men ever fought and that the conflict
would be desperate and bloody, yet that it
might be, could be, and he was determined
should be, short, sharp, and decisive. His
public enunciations were all to this effect,
and his preparations were made accord.
ingly.
We do not propose here to discuss other
plans which General Mcclellan may have
submitted, or their fate. We simply take
MIR. Chambers statement that when the
march to Manassas was executed, which, as
the senator truly says, was not opposed by
Mcclellan and his generals, and which
turned out to be rather an absurdity, the
general returned to Alexandria, and after
some delay necessary, among other things,
to complete the equipment OF his army
embarked for Fortress Monroe But here
the senator gets into mass of confusion.
He tells US that the Army of the Potomac
on the 10th of March numbered 100000
men; that it was decided that 45 900 should
be left for the defense of Washington; that
the general "divided his army" and was
then permitted" to embark with 100000.
Then the senator produces the sworn testi.
mony of General Wadsworth that be had
under his command for the defense of Wash
ington less than 10000 men. All this is
extraordinary arithmetic.
The Army of the Potomac is 100000
strong. General Mcclellan takes 10000
with him, and there are less than 10000 left,
although it had been decided to retain 49,
600. Now the difference between 100000
and 100000 is 10000; what had become
of all these? 1t simply needs to state all
the facts, which Mr.. Chandler everywhere
fails to do. His success, in every impor.
tant statement, in always concealing an es-
sential fact, is extraordinary. General Nc.
Clellan's comprehension of his task was
clear, as we have said. His intent was to
move when be got quite ready, and to be,
before moving, so thoroughly prepared that,
once in motion, there should be 10 delay
from any contingency whatever, against
which labor and fOrethOught could provide.
Having determined on his plan be resolved
to execute it, and reap surely and swiftly
its results, without giving his enemy time
to guard against them. What plan he pre-.
ferred, it is useless to state now. Events
may yet take such turn as to make silence
even now prudent.
The advance by way of the peninsula
was determined on. The plan was thorough
ly digested and arranged, subject only to
such minor variations as circumstances
might render necessary The execution of
the plan was based on the employment of
force Of 100000 men, leaving 10000 for
the defense of Washington. A portion of
these was ordered from the Shenandoah to
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