The Placer herald. [volume] (Auburn, Placer County, Calif.) 1855-1991, 1862-12-13
[From the National Intelligencer.]
Ex-PreSident BuChanan's Defense.
The Early History of the Rebellion.

HIS REPLY 10 Il EN- EhAL SCOTT
The Early History OF the Rebellion.
To the Editors of the National lntellil
gencer.-On Wednesday last received the
National Intelhgencer containing Gen. Scott's
address to the public. This, is throughout,
an undisguised censure of my conduct dur
ing the last months of the Administration,
in regard to the seven cotton States now in
rebellion. From our past relations was
greatly surprised at the appearance of such
paper. In one respect, however, it was
greatly gratifying. 1t has justified me, nay,
it has rendered it absolutely necessary that
should no longer remain silent in respect to
charges which have been long vaguely cir,
cula,ipg, but are now endorsed by the re
sponsibe name Of Gen. Scott.
SON THE SOUTHERN FoRTIFICATIoNs-INI
ADEQUACY OF THE FORCES AT HIS COMMAND.
l. The first and most prominen, among
these charges is my refusal Immediately to
garrison nine enumerated fortifcations
scattered over six of the Southern States,
according to tho recommendation of Gen.
Scott in his views" addressed to the War
Department on the 29th and 3Oth of Octo
Der, 1860. And it has even been alleged
that if this had been done it might have
prevented the civil war.
The refusal is attributed, without the least
cause, to the influence Of Gov. Floyd. All
my Cabinet must bear me witness that
was the President myself, responsible for all
the acts of the Administration; and certain
it is that during the last six months previous
to the 29th December, 1860, the day on
which he resigned his Office after my request,
he exercised less influence on the Admins
traion than any other member of the Cabin
net. Mr.. Holt was Immediately thereafter
TO that Of War; SO that, from this time un
til the 4lh March, 1861, which was by far
the most important period of the Admins
ira,ion, he performed the duties of Secretary
Of War to my entire satisfaction.
But why did not Immediately garrison
these nine Notifications in such manner, to
use the language Of Gen. Scott. "as to make
any attempt to take any one Of them by
surprise or coup de main ridiculous?" There
is one answer both easy and conclusive, even
if other valid reasons did not exist. There
were no available troops within reach which
could be sent to these fortifcatons. To
have attempted a military operation on
scale SO extensive by any means within the
Presidents power would have been simply
absurd Of this Gen. Scott seems to have
been convinced for on the day after the date
of his first views he addressed ION the
30th October) supplemental views TO the
War Department, in which he states: "There
is one (reguar) company in Boston. one
here, lat the Narrows,) one AT Pittsburg, one
at Augusta (Ga,) one at Baton Rouge
in all five companies only within reach to
garrison or reinforce the forts mentioned in
the ">iews."
Five companies-four hundred men-to
occupy aud reinforce nine frtfications in
six highly excited Southern States The
force "within reach" was so utterly made
quate that nothing more need he said on the
subject. To have attempted such mil
iary operation with so feeble force, and
the Presidential election impending, would
have been an invitation to secession. Indeed
if the whole American army, consisting then
of only 10000 men. had been "withn reach"
they would have been scarcel y sufficient for
this purpose. Such was our want of troops
that, although Gen. Scott, believing, in op.
position to the opinion Of the committee
raised in the House Of Representatives, that
the Inauguration of Mr.. Lincoln might be inl
,errupted by military force, was only able to
assemble at Washington, so late as the 4,h
Of March, 653 men, rank and file of the
army. And, to make up this number, even
the sappers and miners were brough! from
West Point
But why was there no greater force within
reach! This question could be better an
swered by Gen. Scott himself than by any
other person. Our small regular army,
with the exception of a few hundred men,
were out of reach on our remote frontiers,
| where it had been continuously stationed
for years, to protect the inhabitants and the
emigrants on their way thither, against the
attacks of hostile Indians. All were insuffi
cient, and both Gen. Scott and myself had
endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress
to raise several additional regiments for this
purpose. In recommending this augmenta
ton of the army the General states in his
report to the War Department of Novem
ber, 1867, that 'it would not more han
furnish the reinforcements now greatly
needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, Cal
ifornia, Oregon, Washington Ter, Kansas,
Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not compa
ny for Utah" And again, in bis report of
November, 1858, he says: ...
"This want of troops, to give reasonable
security to our citizens in distant settlements
including emigranls on the plains, can
scarcely be too strongly stated; but will
only add, that ss often as We have been
obliged to draw troops from one frontier in
order to reinforce another, the weakened
points have been instantly attacked or
lhreated with formidable invasion"
AS TO GEN. sCoTT's "vIEws."
These "yieWs" of Gen. Scott exhibit the