The Portland daily press., 1862-10-25
The Union Army--"Masteriy Inactivity"

The Union Army--ssMasterly Inactivity"
With the largest, best appointed, and best
disciplined army known to modern times, why
is it that our commanders still hug the lines OF
the Potomac, and no advance is made into the
enemy's country? Why this "masterly mac
tivity?" Are the loyal people satisfied to see
month after month wasted in procrastination,
now that the season has so tar advanced that
Northern men may no longer fear the malaria
of Southern climate?
1t is no part of our purpose to single out
objects Of attack, or to dictate policy for the
government or the army to pursue; but we
do insist that the people have right to be I'M
patient at the long delay, and to complain that
their reasonable hopes and expectations are
not setter realized. Since the 4th of July al
most nothing has been done to encourage the
hope of a speedy termination of the war, but
much has occurred TO discourage such hope
The Peninsua cahpaign-a failure-was aban-
doned, for wnat reason does not exactly ap-
pear, though it does appear to the minds OF the
uninitiated, that the reasons urged in support
of that great retreat, if valid, should have pre-
Ncuttu tut chtci liicO mum oSihS Wy
on in the first place. 1t does seem, too, as
though the generalship which conducted that
mastery yretreat-conessedlyo one of the great
est military movements of the age - might
have avoided the necessity for such a back
ward movement.
The great battles of Maryland were fought
prior to Sept. 20th, and from that time the
lie
ing. Those battles were accepted by the
American people as wonderful victories, and
yet what vas actually gained! Did the Fed
eral army gain possession OF single inch of
rebel territory? Did they do more than de-
fend the loyal State of Maryland against in
vasion, and to drive the invaders to their own
side OF the Potomac? And how long will it
take to subdue the rebellion if we only defend
the loyal States against rebel attacks?
A brief retrospective view will injure no one
The first Bull Run battle was on the 2lst OF
july 1861. The disastrous rout of our army,
and its great decentralization as the result OF
that affair, are well known. The people, how
ever, were quieted with the explanation that
the troops were raw, undisciplined, and mex
perienced. They were willing cheerfully to
wait for our raw recruits to be drilled in the
arts of war, and to be converted into veterans.
The cry OF "On to Richmond" was no longer
heard, until it was conceded that our men
were actually spelling for fight
impatient, and demanding a forward move
ment. And when our splendid army did move
after long and tedious delays--it was only
to find Manassas evacuated, and the enemy
flown! Why they were not followed up, aud
Richmond assaulted at that time, and from
that direction, has never, to our knowledge,
been explained to the people.
The "base of operations" was changed. The
Peninsula campaign was entered upon. York
town was not tassaulted-stormed,a Us some of
the best military minds insisted it should have
been, and could have beeny with a loss not ex-
ceeding five thousand placed hors du tombat,
but the more tedious process of seige was re-
sorted to, which resulted in finding the place
wholly evacuated, and the rebels safely of, af
ter not less than ten thousand of our brave
fellows had either died, or, by climate and cas-
ualty been rendered unfit for service!
Of the proftless campaign entered upon the
Peninsula we need not further speak, than to
say that forty thousand OF our best troops were
exhausted, with no result except few drawn
battles, a few splendid artillery duels, lew
gallant charges, and matchless exhibition of
military genius and SKILL all expended upon
retreat-upon getting out OF a bad scrape!
Meantime Pope was-sacrifced, some say
l.c.. .i..., l.. IL d. D.,
2; the Shenandoah Valley was overrun by
Stonewall jackson, and the heart almost sick
ems at the remembrance ofthe long catalogue
of retreats, evacuations, surrenders, etc, which
marked the entire period from the discomiit-
ure before Richmond, up TO the time when the
public were startled with the intelligence that
the rebels had crossed the Potomac, that Lee
had issued his proclamation to the people OF
Maryland, and that Baltimore and Washing
ton were both in actual danger of capture by
the rebel army!
The explanation given in certain quarters
for the disasters referred to was the division
Of Virginia into several departments, each act
ing independently of the others, thus dividing
our strength rs well as our councils, and max
ing our scattered forces an easy prey for the
active, daring, dashing rebel chiettains. But
this excuse can no longer be pleaded, to ex-
plain either delay or disaster.
Gen. Mcclellan led one of the finest armies
on this continent against Lees invading forces,
and the battles of South Mountain and Antie-
tam followed; and what was the result? That
Is the question in which the people are deeply
interested. The result was about all summed
up in the despatch over the wires, maryland
Is safer Why was she allowed 10 be in dam
ger? Why was Lee allowed to invade her?
And when he was forced to retreat aohy acas
he not fottoced upS Why were not Gen. Por-
ter's 10000 fresh troops, held as u reserve, and
not allowed to go to the relief of Burnside
even when all seemed to tremble upon his
questionable ability to hold his position,- why
were they not put on the track OF the retreat
ing rebels, to harrass and follow them up, and
ifpossible prevent their re-crossage OF the Po-
tomac, or to capture them even if they did re-
cross? The fact of the 4OO00-of their fresh
ness-of their being reserve-of their being
held In reserve even at the most critical iunct-
ure, has not, that we are aware of, been de-
MED; but who has explained why they were
not brought into action before the enemy had
made a successful retreat, and regained his old
position on the Virginia side OF the Potomac
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