The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1862-05-02
Gen. Halleck's Opinion Of Gen. Mcclellan.


Louis lately, L learned some things that mus
confess were new to me, and as think the ides
will be new to the public generally, and as il
presenting it shall not transcend the rules Iaic
down for the government of the press, will
endeavor to jot it down. The gentleman refer
red to know to be warm personal friend tc
General lalleck, and shares much of that ster-
ling officers favor and confidence Hence a
weight will be attached to what he says, such
asd does not accrue to the sayings of ordinary men,
would like to give his name that the public
might the more readily comprehend the reason
why assign so much paper to the chronicline
OF his ideas. The conversation turned upon the
operations of the army here and elsewhere. |
| asked f.s
''What is General IIalleck's opinion of Gen
eral McClellan?"
| ''oir," said my friend, 81 have heard Gen.
| llalleck say, i'll substance, repeatedly, that he
| considered the military skill, science and penc-
tr;ttion of Gen Mcclellan as second to that of
| no man living; that whatever had been done in
the West and elsewhere was but the carving
out Of NlcClellan's great plan of the war; that
the general idea of each and every of these
movements was the fruit of his foresight and
knowledge of war and its appliances, and that
Mcclellan had rough-hewn the whole work and
only left the finishing touches to the department
and division commanders
This coming so direct from General Hallcck,
led me TO push my inquiries still further. l ask
the mystery that hangs so heavily over the op-
erations of the army on the Potomacl"
lie replied:--sI cannot explain anything;
but l may advance an idea to you that receiv-
ed from Gen. llalleck not a month ago. In con-
versation with him made nearly the same in
terrogatory you. have just propounded to me,
and the Generals answer to me must be yours
1t is this, as near in his own words as can re-
peat thcm:-''Ihis is war in which success
rests upon considerations that do not generally
enter into mems calculations. You are aware
that the revolted States occupy a vastly differ
ent geographical position from the loyal ones.
Health, incident to climate, food, WATER habits.
&c, is as different in the two sections as could
be conceived of that of two distinct nations
Certain hygicnic principles are to be studied in
carrying on campaign as well as the moro ex-
ternal appliances of war, else disaster and de-
feat will follow An army must be soundp phys
ically as well as patriotic. Enervation, pros
tration and climatic maladies must be avoided if
possible. Now the seeded States are eminent
ly unhealthy during certain portion of the year.
The months of August, September and Octo-
ber are those during which the tropical diseases
rage, which so feareully decimate even the ma
tive population, and the more general carrying
off those habtuated to different cline. The
yellow fever RACES through the South periodical
ly every two or three years, and rs that malady
has not appeared during the last two seasons it
may naturally be expected this year. In view
of this state of well established facts, far-scc-
ing general would try to devise means to avoid
the consequences. Ii Northern army should
be marched southwark to the gulf shore during
the sckly months and should there be attacked
by maladiac foe and cut off by a tropical cnnui,
the execrations of q nation would be vented up
ON a general who would thus expose his troops.
Hence it becomes necessary to do what is to be
done in the extreme South carly in the year.
The Southern Atlantic coast, the Gulf States
and the Southwest must be overrrn during q
season Of comparative heathtulness. Rebellion
must be crushed out and rebel troops driven
back to the cooler regions of the mountains of
North Carolina, Western Tennessee and South
ern Virginia during the season when nature is
in favor of, instead of against, an exotic army
then, once hemmed in by an oveIpowering force,
the enemy must fall-it is inevitable. Now,
under these circumstances, it is not hard to see
why a skillful Commander-in-C Chief should ex-
ert himself to retain the bulk Of an enemys ar
my in a position where he can at y proper time
strike a death blow the more surely. If the
flower of the rebel army be coaxed to remain
north of Richmond, so much of its strength is |
etoI tboN Vocta a,,I CntItb hoy IN
the less to contend against and our victories are
the more certain. The Western army clears the
great Valley of the Mississippi of secession; the
Gulf squadron rc-estabishcs the constitution in
the populous cities of the South; the Roanoke |
and Beaufort forces are pushed inward and north
ward; and next autumn, when the sickly sea-
son approaches, all, conformity, are driving the
rebels back to the locality where fresh army
of loyal men are waiting to receive them, in a
country where Southron has no advantage over
Northman. Then comes the great decisive ac-
tion of the campaign. The Union troops, flush |
ed with constant victory, meet those dispirted
by constant rcverses. Who can doubt the re- |,
sult2 On the other hand we will suppose that
the Commanding General and the War Depart
ment yield to the clamor of those who only seek
for carnage regardless of consequences, and or
der an advance upon Richmond. The result
would be simply to drive the rebels away to
some other point, where they would make a sec
ond stand, and a third or a fourth, each time
leading the Federal troops farther and farther a.
'cay .from tie localities Of their acclanaton, and
into more su,e and terrible mortality. No; let
Mcclellan work let him keep the rebels con-
as far North as possible, and so keep
rebel forces from coming farther south, and next
summer or early in the autumn denouement
will come which will justify the present appa-
rent inactivity of the army of the Potomac.-
IF the enemy shall retreat, let Gen. Mcclellan
advance to their positions; if not, let him re-
main in statu quo, until he is ready to make cv-