, 1862-04-23

The fact is forcing itself on the conyic-
ton Of all, that notwithstanding the brag
and brayado Of the rebels-thc Dragging
air with which they have mouthcd their
superior valor. and the swelling and def
ant tone in Which they have dared the !
Tnicn men to the fglt-so far as
their mettle and stcadincss have been
tested III battle, they are no match
fer CUT men. It is plain that when
cyer the opposing forces are equal
in plumbers and strength we are sure to
gain tic Gay; that when the odds are
against Us the victory is as often on our
side as theirs; and when Our forces are
greater than theirs, they are uniformly
beaten and routed In fact it would seem
That the rebcl commanders are themselves
aware Of our superiority. and not daring to
meet US in fair fght in the open field, keep
always persisten1Iy within their entrench-
mcnts; and never hazard a conflict beyond
their fortifications. unless BY some surprise,
or separation Of our forces they can have
the advantage Of making an attack With
two CT tArce men to our one.
TEis last advantage Bcaurcgard sup
posed he had secured for himself in the
conflict at Shiloh; but the result proved
that even with Two ucn or mure to our one,
lie could not drive us from our positioa :;
and so soon as the arrival Of fresh troops
gave Us a number almost, though not fully
equal 10 his, Ee attacked, routed and
pursued him, as he FASTENED to the cover
Of his int1enchments at Corinth, leaving
dead and wounded on the field, and de-
stroy1ng the bridges to prevent his entire
overthrow. If our army was taken by
surprise, that fact is supposed to be an i'm
mense advantage to the attacking force
and although he had all the benefit of ou1
being taken unawares, and outnunbcred
us near two to one, yet the result was his
Tepulse and defeat, It is difficult to sup
pose that he will eTer again have SO many
circumstances working on his side aud
against us; and if with ell the odds in 11is
favor he is SO sure to fail, it cannot bt
doubted that the issue Will be his utter ans
irTcparab1e overthrow, when cur General
choose their own time and place for til
attack.
Another thing 10 be noted is how eas
it was to defeat Beauregord, or at leas
there were two or more instruments, eithe
Of which alone would have successful
done the work The gunboats are said t
have driven him back, OF they could hav
done it, had Buell. not have come I'D i
time. Then again it is claimed, and beyon
a doubt truly, that Buell. would have bee
by himself too strong for the enemy, ha
there not been gunboat on the rive
And further It is stated on the authority
those who we're there, and had the be
opportunity for knowing, that Grant wouI
have held his position had neither Buell. I
The gunboats come to lis help. From s
which it looks very much as though Bea
regard not only was utterly folled 81
failed completely Of his purpose; but tn
be was beaten, or might have been, for '
had the tools, and men with which to do
two or three times orer.
It reminds Us Of Waterloo, In msuy I
spects. Wellington was at q ball Al
slept the night before at Brussells, twe]
miles from the battle field, and is 50
to have been surprised. Wellington b
behind him an almost impenetrable forre
Is Grant had the river, and with eitt
force defeat would perhaps have been ut
ruin. Late in the day, Buell. came
Grants aid. ss Butcher did to that Of "
1ington; and although it Is claimed
Wellington that be would by himself hs
held his position zgalnss the French, &
is said Grant would also have held his O
against the rebels, yet the arrival OF fe
torcements IN both cases made the repu