Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-24
Burnside's Control Of the Battle at Fred.
erickEburR.

1lEnMlQGn G04LEuA o. L4G nAkEEE II EEl11
erieksburE.
General Burnside having honorably and
frankly assumed the entire responsibility
for the battle at Fredericksburg, the fol-
lowing from the correspondence Of
the New York Times will not be news, but
will make still more clear the evident de-
signs of the Federal commander:
General Burnside will unquestionably
avow the entire responsibility Of that par
| ticular movement. do not mean to say
that he has been supported in the VhoEs
movement upon Fredericksburg from the
time he took command, as he had reason
to expect but that the selection Of his
point Of attack, which proves to have been
50 unfortunate, was exclusively his own
though it was not the one he had originally
contemplated and reported to the War De-
partment.
" His first intention after receiving his
pontoon trains, supplies, &C., was to make
| feint at fredericksburg and cross his
army at Port Royal, twelve miles below
hoping to take the enemy by surprise,
! and turn his right flank He announced
his purpose to the War Department, and
made his arrangements accordingly. Pom
toons were set to Port Royal; supplies lay
in the river protected by gunboats below
that point; a division was pushed forward
and everything made ready for its transit.
But he found that the rebels had antici-
pated that manoeuvre and were ready to
meet it. 1t then occurred to General
Burnside that as the rebels expected him
merely to make feint at Fredericksburg,
he would surprise them by crossing there,
and with that view at the last moment he
resolved to do so. 1 think he confidently
expected to find the heights in the rear
of the town held , -l9V--a'--n7ssoa'-.f fnree,-.
de was delayed In constructing his
bridges by the tenacious and deadly resist
snce Of the rebel skarpshooters, which he
sought to silence by demolishing the houses
which sheltered them. This attempt, how
ever, proved Intellectual, and he succeeded
only by driving them out with the bayonet
But he had lost day, which in executing
g surprise at such close quarters, is as
good as an age, and by the time the assault
took place, the defense had been made too
strong for its success. think in this fact
will be found the explanation of General
Burnside's failure. He was mistaken in
his calculations-a mishap that has over
taken some Of the best Generals in the
world, as well as some Of the worst. All
that any commandeE can do when he gets
thus caught, is to e&ricate himself with as
little loss as possible. This General Burn
side did. If he had attempted, after cross
ing and ascertaining that his movement
had been anticipated, to withdraw
his troops without a fight, he would
have been attacked and driven
into the river. An attack had then become
essential to the salvation of his army. The
vigor with which it was made convinced
General Lee that it would be repeated, and
he therefore awaited its renewal. This
waiting, which was the result of fighting,
enabled General Burnside to save his
army.
"I do not, therefore, believe that the
authorities at Washington can in any just
sense, be held responsible for the result of
that specific action. But am inclined to
think that General Burnside has reason to
complain that the Government did not full
FL the conditions which he had laid down
as absolutely essential to the success of
his movement upon fredericksburg, when
he first proposed that movement the day
after receiving his command, and to which
the President and General Halleck gave
their explicit assent. But my letter is al
ready too long to permit me to state the
facts on which 1 base this opinion