The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-06-04
Heavy SIIirmishing Along the Lines Of
the Hostile Forces.
The Assault on the Rebel
Intrenchments.
EXPLOSION OF THE ENEMY'S MAGAZINES
Flight Of the Rebels and Occupation OF the
Town by the Union Forces,
&C., &C., &c.
Our Special Army correspondence.


CoRISTH Miss, May so, 1862.
The great event for which we have so long been wait
ing and in whose anticipation the country has FOR weeks
etood in breathess anxiety, has at last TRANSFERRED
After spending six weeks in making an advance or
twenty miles and lying, day after day, within sight Of
the rebel camp fires Corinth, army has entered
the nrenchments lately he'd by the enemy and hoist
ed the Union flag another triumph of the Union arms.
The army Of the rebels which stood facs- to
face with its retreat from Shiloh en- the It'll
Of April and made repeated boasts of our annihiation
should attack its chosen lines is fleeing before
our triumphant soldiers all the dependency of defeat
and disgrace. Its commanding general, whose vaunt
ins the capture Of Sumter have but lately ceased
is heading the retreatng array, with fixed deermua
ton quench the thirst OF his equine quadrUped IN some
head stream Of the waters that flow into Mobile
Bay Coriuth is ours and the confederacy has to
grief.
ENEMY PREPARING RETREAT.
For some days before the final grand movement OF
The Army OF the Mississippi it apparent TO many
careful observers that the enemy making prepare
for falling back either to the south west 1t
was ascertained that Columbus. small unimportant
town situated the Tonbigbee river, the eastern
boundary of Mississippi, had been contemplated by
General Beauregard proper place Of retirement in
Of defeat Columbus Is at the head Of navi
CATION the and accessible by steamboats,
through large portion OF the year. railroad, about
Ateen miles in length, extends TO from point the
Mobile and Ohio Railroad. hundred miles south Of
Corinth, and about two hundred miles north Of Mobile
General Beauregard fail the importance OF
. which furnished both river and rail
zion with the larger remaining portion Of the con
fsderacy. Aberdeen, still higher up the
Tombigbee had been selected by General Bragg;
but his choice speedily overruled by the
Major Genera. in Chief Small bodies Of troops had
cupied Columbus and the erection of works
Of defence nearly weeks previous to the evacuation
Of Cornth. 0kolona, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad
about half way from Corinth to Columbus, consid-
cred place easily capable Of defence and Notifications
cd there but few days before the final
exodus.
Il has been known for time throughout the North
that Grand Junction. thirty i've miles Of Corinth
at the point Of intersection Of the Memphis and
Charleston and the Mississippi Railroads rapidly
being put in condition to hold against enemy. The
Mobile and Ohio road to the south OF Cornth and the
Memphis and Charleston road, west OF that point, o.
fered the rebels lines Of retreat; and 1t difficult
20 determine which they would prefer. The former
would carry them down into Dixie, where they
would DO cut of from Western Tennessee and
Arkansas, their principal sources Of supply, and
whore they would be too far removed from
Memphis to AFFORD 1t any assistance when
ever might be threatened by the Union forces from
above. On the other hand they would be thrown
10 Charleston and Mobile and in easier communication
with Richmond it desired TO transfer troops
from to tho other Of the two great armies Of the
federacy. Besides they would be in position draw
supplies directly from and within the cotton States
which hitherto had not been occupied either by in
vading or defending army At the time they would
Be drawing the unacclimated Northern troops into
region where yellow fever and other epidemic diseases
Of the South would speedily thin their ranks render
their position untsnabIe If they reiterated to Grand
Junction they would still hold all the railway
lions TO the South the Mobile and Ohio, and would
be in position to protect Memphis and render the APP
proach Of General Curtis from Arkansas exceedingly
hazardous movement. vicksburg could not be perma
nently occupied so long an immense rcbo force held
Grand Junction and its vicinity. With that point in his
control General Beauregard could still draw upon
and Western Tennessee for supplies OF and
pork for the OF his great army That such contin
gcncy long since forcseen h made evident by the
embargo laid in December last upon the shipment Of
either the above great staples any point south OF Mem
phis Tennessee. Quantities OF and pork still
main N Northern Arkansas that long since would have
found their way the hatcher Orleans markets.
With Memphis in rebel hands this supply would still be
drawn upon even though . portion Of II might
tall into tho hands OF the Union army in
me extreme Southwest. Arkansas and Tennessee tn
tive ood-producinG States of,ths Mississippi valley por
sson Of the confedsracy would DO lost by the
occupation Of Grand Junction. In either
would hem the rebels into narrower limits, while II
would draw the federal army further from its base or
operations. "Undsr which Ring, Bszonians" was the
great question with the Corinth council Of during
che nnal weeks Of May
Arrnrr BAo rHR oAMR.
General Hallsck had been for Q long time almost
within sight Of the ensmy's lines before II was dis.
covered that retreat intended. His generals we're
mode Of operations against the large army their front
Some favored the policy Of immediate advance upon
the snemy's works, ard felt certain that they
should not faA Of success. When tho army
was nrss set down before Corinth II was gen
orally beevedth the rebel desences were very slight
but vAdd become stronger 40 days and weeks rolled
away. General Halleck confidently stated that Il vas
mis- Intention 70 take Corinth without and with II
capture ca uregards entire army only desiring time 10
accomplish this undertaking. Tho cutting Of IN. Mem.
phs and Charleston Railroad by General Mitchell was
looked upon a. one step toward this object, as was aao
the destruction Of several bridges and m,,e os
track on the Mobile and Ohio road north OF Corinth
How 10 get at their railroads TO tho wo,,
and south was the most puzzine question: and on. -
which all were anxously awaiting . sosstion Thu
starving out policy in reference the army was no,
considered feasible as long as the rebels the fertile
portions Of Tennessee and Arkansas opon 10 their d.
rnands. Some wise shook their heads and mani.
Tested many fears that should not be able 70 CAPTURE
in too gigantic army, cutting II OF from its lines Of
reinforcement and retreat, without q battle
in which both parties would sustain severe loss.
Others believed that We should speedily com.
piete Gordon around the insurgent stronghold
and when once completed our triumph was certain.
SLOW ADVANCE.
From the time when the arst advance wss ordersa.
svcr the confusion subsequent the battle Of the 9Th
and Jth or April had passed away, our movements
werS very slow. We FIRST marched out for two or
three ilcs on the road TO tue west. then drew mn in
strong d, Nensivs line and halted for two davs Thor
we slowly Shed forward and held az our front Tho ,o,
~ nor,ar.r Now nearly tan m p~a ~ -. --