Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1862-02-20

The MAIN sraegical object of the Burnside eXpedl-
ton is to obtain control of the great through route at
Weldon as once there the interior we'll the coast
line of roads would be cut off.
Suppose, aud it is not only supposable, but almost
certain that this movement should fail, have no
doubt it will fail, then attempt might might
not be made Norfolk. That might possibly succeed,
but it would be at cost most difficult to calculate and
such cost we very much doubt the disposition Of
the enemy to pay.
Failing to reach the Weldon junction. now the great
strategic point aimed at, other point might be
struck for and this point in the interior would be Colds
bore via Newbern because of Goldsboro's being the
nearest point on the lower line from which the upper
could be aimed at For all these purposes light gun
boats would not only the purpose but they alone
would answer it. We trust that that attempt too,
could and would be frustrated.
Where is the mortar feet and the Butler expedition
bound for 1t is asserted by the Northern papers that
the mortar feet is destined for an attack on strong
fortfcation. If not to cooperate in front attack
Norfolk with rear ettack by Burnside, for what
point is this feet designed ?? 1t appears hardly proba-
bic that it is for the gulf The first stone fort South Of
Norfolk, is Fort Macon at Beaufort Harbor in orth
Carolina, but that is comparatively unmportant while
attack upon NeWbern any other point higher up
on the railroad remains undsposed Of Is it for our
Forts The strategic value of Wilmington is unques-
tonably known with the peculiar character of
ter approaches by of which works that might be
out of ordinary range might not be safe from thirteen
inch mortarS Possibly the forts in Charleston Harbor
may be aimed at. These and new and still unfinished
work at Fernapdina are about eli on the Atlantic
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of Savannah already tremhl6s III the balance.
Again and again, We must be permitted to urge the
necessity of having larger number of guns case
mated or otherwise protected having island orti6
cations without OF retreat aud above ALL due
that we DO not fail when success is within the grasp
forces for want of ammunition and that Of the right
kind. Rihed. ammunition must be just so. Without
enough OF the very thing the oldest smooth bores we
are informed is preferable if there shot shell
that can be placed more conveniently than they are if
there are magazines that can be made more available
if there are then be developed now is the
very time for bringing all these things to bear Who
knows what a day or an hour may produce Who says
that this or that expedition may be destined for
We are very much at war. Let us not for moment
forget that fact and be ready sell what of ours tie
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oH that the cost will be we'll counted and long remem-
bered.
We say all this in no complaining or faut-fnding
spSit We are not used to look only at the dark side
of the picture to think that everything is not right
when it does not to be to Wehave no doubt
and for doubt of the devotion and care with
which General Anderson attends to the duties of his
position, of the zeal of the authorities still the CO.
operation of all, the mutual confidence and the mutual
understanding of ALL desirable and right and proper
For THE DISASTER at Roanoke Island deep respon.
sbihty exists somewhere and it would be as useless to
attempt to deny disguise this fact as it would be
wrosg to do it even were il eompishment possible.
The defences of the posfeon clearly bore no pro.
portion to the force likely to be brought against them
were they at all commensurate with the real import
ance of the post the advantages which its maintain
ance would have secured.
There was no hurry-there was no surprise. The
authorities had full warning. The post had not been
recently occupied. The mighty force brought against
it had been delayed apparently by the direct nterpcs
tion of Providence as if to give every chance for pre-
paraton and excuse for the want of it, and yet the
post was no stronger when attacked than it had been
menths before, if as strong No guns were mount
ed. No attempt made to put additional gunboats in
the Sounds to throw more men the island to have
any light artillery; nay, even the few gunboats we had