Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-07-07
McCLELLAN's
CHANGE OF BASE OF OPERATIONS.
"A SERIES OF BLOODY BATTLES.
TIE SITUATION NOW.

Gu III " Ills anu n biuHo u dnlCS AlhCl.
All eyes in the loyal States have been turned
upon Richmond for months, where Gen. McCLEL-
Ian, with an insufficient force, has been moving
upon and menacing the rebel capital. Since the
battles of May 3lst and June LIST, when he beat
back the massive columns hurled upon him, it
has been evident to every rejecting mind that
his situation was a very critical one, and that he
must be heavily reinforced to make success pos
sible. The dashing demonstration in his rear,
towards White House, disclosed the fact too that
his base of supplies could be reached by the ene-
my, and with his force he could not advance his
long line of investment. or even hold it without
extreme danger. In short it was demonstrated
that he could be hanked, but whether the move
ment to the James River was forced upon him
prematurely or not by the advance of the enemy,
army in his old line on the Chickahomipy is
clearly stated by the correspondent of the Gin
ciunati Commercial:
THE SITUATION.
You remember that the army was pressing
hard upon Richmond. Every communication to
the press assured you that it was not strong
enough to execute the task. For weeks the
symptoms of insufficiency of power manifestly
increased. But the army pressed so closely upon
Richmond it could not be withdrawn without
great peril. Gen. Mcclellan was mmitt to
''do all he could" with what he had, while he
hoped for aid. If the enemy did not reinforce,
he might accomplish his aim. So the work was
pressed, while the people clamored that it was
slow. The right wing, consisting of McCalPs,
Morel's, and Sykes's divisions, less than % 1000
strong, was well posted on the left bank of the
ChickahOminy, from. Beaver Dam creek to a
point below New Bridge. Several military
bridges formed the avenues of communication
between the two portions of the army separated
by the river. The center, consisting of Smiths,
Sedgwick's, and Richardson's divisions, stretched
in line of battle from Golding's, on the banks of
the river 70 a point south of the Yorktown rail
road. The left wing, consisting of Hooker's,
Kearney's, and COUGHS divisions. stretched fron
Richardson's left to a point considerably south OF
the Williamsburg stage road, on the borders of
White Oak Swamp. The whole line was pro-
tected by strong breastworks and redoubts. The
necessary extent of the line left but few troops
for supporters. Casey's, now Peck's. sadly re-
duced division, now guarded Bottom Bridge. the
railway bridge, and were assigned to other SINH
lar duty. Our line of battle on the right bank
of the ChickahomiDy, as | have informed you,
pressed so close to the rebel lines that neither
could advance a regiment outside of their re-
spective breastworks without provoking battle.
On Wednesday, June 25, General Mcclellan
made the first distinctly offensive movement, by
directing Gen. Hooker &c take up an advanced
position on Fair Oaks Farm, near the Williams
burg road. 1t provoked IA sharp resistance, which
we overcame, and accomplished our object. 1t
is necessary to note this fact particularly. because
it bears strongly upon the question whether Gen.
MpCNallan had then diSfiuot1y coptapapl.taI
changing his base of operations to james river
a perllous thing to attempt before; more so now
that we were still nearer the enemy. 1t was pro-
nounced an important achievement by Gen.
Mcclellan himself, because it gave him adyan-
tages over the rebel position which he had not
enjoyed before. Sometime during the night,
however, tidings were received of a movement of
Stonewall jackson on our right wing. 1t was
deemed hazardous to maintain the advantage Of
the previous day, and the line was ordered to re-
sumo its old position. Thursday afternoon the
anticipated attack upon our right wing was made
and handsomely repulsed; but it was discovered
that it had not been made by Jackson's com
mand. Information was received that Jackson
was sweeping down the Pamunkey, probably to
capture military stores at the White House, to
cut off our communications with our water base,
and menace our rear. Orders were given at once
to destroy all public property at the White House
1 anu aOAA tiitt HOties ~ ~
sumo a critical appearance, and danger cnlmi-
mated in the disaster of Friday. 1t was then July
determined to "change the base of operations to
James river" 1t seems TO me this was cOmpul-
sorry. The enemy had turned our right, evidently
outnumbered us in great disproportion, was too
strong in front for us to break through, and was
in position to crush us i'll front and Jear-and,
perhaps, intended to strike on our left flank. Ap-
parently his army was numerous enough for that
n.,.l .,-lt,n., 1In r,a,f rn,r 10 .nnra
ment was really begun last Friday evening, by
the transfer of headquarters from Trent's Bluff
to Savage Station, but the grand exodus did not
until Saturday, and did not swell into
full proportions till nighttall of that day.
The reader being supposed 10 be familiar with
the war map, will now follow the course pursued
by the army. In order to preserve the morale of
the army as far as possible, and obtain supplies OF
ammunition and subsistence, it was determined
to carry through all the wagons loaded, and the
ambulance train-making a mighty caravan
vastly increased by artillery trains. There was
but one narrow road to pursue. 1t struck almost
due south from the Williamsburg road, through
White Oak Swamp to the Charles City road, into
which it debouched about eight miles from Tur-
kew Bend in James river. The course then lay
up the latter road towards Richmond, where it
struck a little southwest by the Quaker road,
which terminated in New Market road, leading
lrOm RlcnnODu. ne TlNti WAS Dut IL SHUT us
lance south, and Malvern Hill, a beautiful, lofty
bluff overlooking the river and commanding the
surrounding country, being our goal. Although
there was but a single road-with slight excep-
tion-it hid the advantage of coursing through
White Oak Swamp, upon which we might rely in
some degree for protection of our TANKS. There
was greater danger that the enemy might cut us
off by moving columns down the Charles City,
Central, or New Market roads, or all three, but
these chances were necessarily accepted. Gen.
Mcclellan acted upon the supposition that the
enemy would not guess his determination until
he was able to defeat their movements. AT all
events, it was the only hopeful course, because
the enemy was watching for him on the left bank
Of the Chickahominy. The road was a narrow
funnel for such a mighty torrent Of trains and
men, but fortunately it was smooth and dry. In
order ~ make the movement successfully, it was
necessary to fight at the outset, because it was
was morally certain that our line of battle could
not be withdrawn from the front without sucking
The enemy alter them-so that due preparations
were made.
Surprising the situation as given above to be
correct, and it is by all odds the clea est we have
yet seen, the advance made on the right bank or
from the center was to cover the movement con-
templated. The ground gained was not held aud
on Thursday, the Goth, the enemy in strong force
attacked the right wing posted on the left bank
of the Chickahominy. This 6gh. is called the
BATTLE OF MEcHANIcsyILLE.
TIL extreme right wing consisted of McCalfs
Pennsylvania reserves with four batteries of ar
tillery. Gen. Porter's corps, consisting OF Nor.
rill's division and Sykes's regulars, 5000 strong,
with Duryea's. Zouaves, we're at New Bridge
within supporting distance. General Stoneman
with one regiment of cavalry and two of infantry
ma cfaftonat a. N otn nc ch-arvatton N eiQpk
the hanking movement of the enemy and if prac-
| ficahla To decnu him 10 the PamnIkv river