Rutland weekly herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1859-1877, 1862-12-11
Gen. Halleck,s Report.

Gen. Halleck,s Report.
The report Of Gen. Halleck to the secretary
OF war,-a rough and defective outline of which
was telegraphed- the four months since
he has been general-in-chief and is chiefly oc-
cupied with the campaign in Virginia.
Gen Halleck states that the first thing to
which his attention was called on his arrival
at Washington, was the condition of the army
at Harrson's Landing. He immediately Wis
tied Gen. Mcclellan at his headquarters, to
ascertain if there was possibility of an ad-
vance upon Richmond from Harrison's Land
ing, and if not, to form some plan of uniting the
armies of Gen. Mcclellan and Gen. Pope on
some other line. Gen. Mcclellan thought he
could advance on Richmond if he had $4,000
more men. Gen. Halleck could promise
him only 10000, and the next day Gen. Nc
Clellan said he would advance with the 20, 900,
but afterwards telegraphed that he would re-
quire 35 900, a force which it was impossible
to send him without leaving Washington and
Baltimore almost delenceless. The only alter
native now left was to withdraw the army of
| the Potomac to some position where it could
unite with that of Gen. Pope, and cover Wash
! ingtou at the same time that it operated against
the enemy. Gen. Halieck then determined to
bring Gen. McClellan's army to Acquia Greek
and make the junction of the two armies on
the Rappahannock where Burnside now is.
Gen. Mcclellan was ordered to leave Harri-
sons Landing on the Sd of August. About
this time says Gen. Halleck, received in-
| formation that the enemy was preparing a
| large force to drive back Gen. Pope, and at
tack either Washington or Baltimore. The
information was so direct and trustworthy that
! could not doubt its correctness. This gave
me serious uneasiness for the safety of the
capital and Maryland, and | repeatedly urged
upon Gen. Mcclellan the necessity of prompt
| ly moving his army so as to form a junction
with that of Gen. Pope. The evacuation of
Harrson's Landing, however, was not com
menced till the l4th, eleven days after it was
ordered.
The common rumor that Gen. Mcclellan
opposed the evacuation of Harrison's Landing
is confirmed by the correspondence appended
to Gen. Halleck's report.
Gen. Halleck then proceeds to give an ac-
count of Gen. Popes disastrous campaign, not
| differing materially from those already pub
lished. OF the failure of portions of Gen.
McClellan's army to reinforce Pope promptly,
the following account is given: On the evening
of the 9th, Gen. Pope ordered Gen. Porter to
| be at Brstow's Station by daylight on the
morning of the 2Sth, with Morelfs, and also
directed HIM to communicate to Banks the or
der to move forward to Warrenton junction.
| All trains were ordered this side of Cedar Run,
and to be protected by regiment of infantry
and a section of artillery. For some unex-
planned reason Porter did not comply with this
order, and his corps was not in the battles of
the 2Sth and Goth. The troops from the pc
ninsula were ordered not to wait for transport
alton, but to march Immediately to the field of
battle Some of the corps NOV ID with becom-
ing activity, but the delays of others were
neither creditable nor excusable. Had the
army of the Potomac arrived few days ear
ler, the rebel army could have been easily de-
feated and perhaps destroyed.
| Gen. McClellan's campaign in Maryland ami
the events that followed are tersely reporss ED
Seeing that an attack upon Washington would
now be futile, Lee pushed bis main army across
the Potomac for raid into Maryland and
| Pennsylvania. Gen. Mcclellan was directed
to pursue him with all troops which were not
required for the defence of Washington. Sew
eral corps were Immediately thrown out in OBJ
servaton al Darnstown and Leesboro, and
most of his army was in motion by the 9th of
September. A portion entered Frederick on
| the 18th As the campaign was to be carried
on within the department commanded by Mai.
| Gen. Wool, | directed Gen. Mcclellan to as
sumo control of all troops within mis- reach,
without regard to department lines. The gsr-
rsons of Winchester and Martinsburg had been
withdrawn to Harper's Ferry, and the COM
manding officer of that post had been advised
by my chief of staff to mainly conine his de-
fence, in case he was attacked by superior
forces, to the position Of Maryland Heights,
which could hay been held a long time against
0 erwhelming numbers. To withdraw him
entirely from that position, with the great body
of Lees foIc,s between him and our army,
would not only expose the garrison to capture
but all the artillery and stores collected at that
place must either be destroyed or left to the
enemy. The only feasible plan was fer him
to hold his position until Gen. Mcclellan could
relieve HIM, or open communication so that
hs could evacuate it in safety. These views
were communicated both to Gen. Mcclellan
and TO Col. Niles.
The left Of Gen. McClellan's army pursued
a part Of the enemy's forcn to the South Moun-
tains, where, on the l4th, he made stand.
A severe battle ensued, the enemy being de-
feated and driven from his position with heavy
loss. Lees army then fell back behind Ante
tam Creek, few miles above its mouth, and
took position admirably suited for defence
Our army attacked him ON the 10th, and
|, holly contested battle was fought on that and
the ensuing day, which resulted in the defeat
of the rebel forces. On the nights of the 18th
our troops slept on the field which they had so
bravely won. On the 18th neither party re-
newed the attack, and in the night of the 18th
and 18th Gen. Lee withdrew his army to the
south side of the Potomac. Our loss in the
several battles on South Mountain and at An
tietam was l ,742 killed, S,066 wounded, and
9l3 missing, making a total of l0,72l. Gen.
Mcclellan estimates the enemy's loss at nearly
| thirty thousand; but their own accounts give