Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1862-01-23
THE CAMPAIGN.

So often has the patient public been deluded
with promises of a vigorous advance upon the
enemy that the very word is now greeted with
incredulous smiles, and is consigned by general
consent, along with certain other phrases, such
as "the grand plan," "the oath of allegiance"
"nobody hurt" &C., to that limbo of ridiculous
verbiagc known as reporters slang. Never
theloss, we venture TO believe that our armies
are upon the eve of an advance in force, and
with, we hope, more determined purpose than
our generals have vet shown, and more decisive
results than they have hitherto achieved
The details of the movements which are pro-
jccted or the plans which the Gencral-in-G Chief
has laid out for his campaign, the public. of
course, will only know when these are carried
into effect. But an attentive study of good
military map, showing the places of the rebel
forces their chief lines of communication, and
the bearing of our own armies upon these,
may reveal to the student glimpses of the
great result towards which a wise general
would be likely to work.
1t has been remarked by recent military
writers, that the tendency of all modern wars
is to concen rate the efforts of the opposing
forces upon some one or two principal points,
where :he battle may be fairly fought out with
out that general ravage and destruction of
great regions which formed the unfailing ac-
Thus the war between Russia and the Allies
was fought out at and near Sebastopol. If we
are not mistaken, it is General Mcclellan who
remarks that, had the fall of Sebastopol failed
to bring the Russian Emperor to terms, the
Allies would then have attacked Cronstadt, for
which purpose, indeed, England and France
had prepared themselves with ships and forces.
But in so vast a field of war as a continent,
which is so thinly settled withal, it is difficult
to concentrate-to crystalize operations, so to
speak. There are no great fortresses, like Sc
bastopo or Cronstadt, to beleaguer and reduce I;
there are no great capitals like London or Paris
TO captures for New York is the capital of
North America, and the rebels have no means
even to threaten it. They rest, therefore, on
the defensive, trusting to time to be their best
ally. Meantime we might chip away at the
edge of the rebellion for a century and effect
nothing; what is needed is a blow which shall
pierce and divide its spinal cord. 1t is not
bloody battles, but decisive results, which the
great general works for A hundred thousand
men might faithfully cut each others throats,
and yet-men being plenty on each side-ehect
nothing Our armies might capture Richmond
and if they took only the city, or if they
took only the state of Virginia, they would
have gained but small advantage after all,
and the most sanguine might well despair of
thus capturing half continent in detail and by
main strength.
1t is evident, therefore, that commander of
genius adequate to the end would not waste
men and means by scattered blows, which,
singly, can effect but little. rather he would
endeavor to work out slowly carefully studied
plan by which he could bring all the means at
his command to bear upon some decisive point,
which he could hope to overwhem the enemy
| nd not Orl,, k,,t
itself.
Richmond and Manassas have two great lines
Of communication, and two only. The Virginia
and East Tennessee railroad connects Rich
mond with the great Southwest, from which
Beauregard draws nearly all his supplies. The
railroad system which is concentrated at We'll
don, or at Raleigh, in North Carolina, connects
Richmond with the Atlantic slave states, from
which Beauregard has drawn most of his men.
If these two lines a.e cut off, the grand army
OF the rebels is ellectually isolated the decisive
point of action is at once declared, and this
point may be threatened from front and rear
at the same time. But to make such blow
tell more decisively, it would be necessary to
operate as well in those states which are cut off
from succor, as against the great army to can
ture which would crush the rebellion.
Let us see how our forces are situated to full
til these conditions. Buell. is in Kentucky with
one hundred thousand men. His advance upon
Nashville will isolate Zollicotfer and Marshall.
who must retreat before Schoepf into Tenncs-
see, and give us command of the Virginia and
Tennessee railroad, and southwestern commu.
nication. If, now, we can imagine Burnside
striking at the seaboard railroad line-sav at
Weldon-wc shall at once have Beauregard s
forces imprisoned in Virginia, for they have
never been able to get means of transportation
together for their great army, and cannot move
off the railroads. Meantime Buell. may turn
his forces eastward, through the loyal districts
Of East Tennessee and Western Virginia, till
ne threatens Richmond from the southwest /;
Burnside may secure himself in the loyal parts
of North Carolina. and threaten Beauregard
from the South Mcclellan and Banks lie upon
the rebel front, ready to assail, the moment
Beauregard turns to defend himself against
Buell. or Burnside. And while the grand ar
my of Davis is thus imprisoned on all sides
Sherman has opportunities to strike in South
Carolina, Dupont may join in the attack or
Charleston or Savannah, or 10th; Butler and
Phelps threaten Jackson, the capital of Mssis-
sippi and Halleck carry his hundred thousand
men to New Orleans.
Napoleon defeated his opponents by piercing
their centre; and by the movements we have
supposed above, Mcclellan would pierce the
centre of the rebellion. He would mass an
overwhelming force upon the decisive point in
Virginia, and meantime would prevent succor
by engaging the weaker portions of the enemy
at various points. And lastly, he ought to be
able to capture, in this way, an army which
might make fresh stand were it merely driven
out of Virginia. Thus, too, the expedition tc
Port Royal will assume its proper importance
and cease to be regarded as a mere raid upor
cotton fields; and the forces at Ship Island
too small for independent conquest, will dc
their work, in threatening the enemy's rear
and embarrassing his movements for defence
N. y EceRing Post.