Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1862-04-05

YVOCccuS, VIC OcSW W SCC usOSC CsC0sty
the mighty difference between . PEG.
pie complete in whatever can give
strength-education the application
to the creation of wealth Of the best
contrivances of ingenuity, and skin,
aud patient industry, which well knows
that values are always in ratio to cost.
The people most addicted to the arts
of peace, are, when fully reused, the
most terrible in arms, from the skill
aud cunning they acquire in engines
of destruction. A mechanic at the
North, quietly constructing q steam EN-
gine-neither himself nor his work
ever seen-cxcrts q greater influence
over the contest than Southern regi-
ment, with all its Wanting and bravado.
The Port Royal Forts could not have
been taken by any force that the North
could put in the field, marching it all
the way by land. A few ships demol-
ish them, scattering, in a few hours,
their defenders, panic-stricken. Our
skill multiplies the power of our SOL
diers q thousand fold; the moment
they CAT be brought into action, the
disparity between the combatants is at
once seen to be almost infinite.
The elements controlling the contest,
the rebels certainly overlooked. 1t
was impossible that it should be other.
wise. Although for more than gem
Grafton they had administered tie Gov.
eminent ut Washington, oil the mater
ials for its support were drawn from
the Free States. II "a fort was to be
built, or ship costructed, or difficult
undertaking to be executed, the prac-
teal man was always tho Yankee-a
name which has everywhere come to
be the synonym of expedients and
skill. The North fed, clothed and
paid the army and navy: supplied the
ships and the men the means for their
mobilization, and filled tie commissar-
lat. The traitors, who long welded
the Government, had only to command,
and the versatile North was only too
happy to execute order. Utterly ig-
norant of practical affairs, they thought
that the same command, issued upon q
Southern soil, would be followed by
similar obedience that to will would |
be, as formerly, to possess. No argu-
ments could reach them, because they
could not appreciate the ground upon
which these were urged. They conse.
qucntly rushed madly forward in the
work of destruction, little dreaming
that, in scvering themselves from the
North, they forever cut themselves off
from source of their strength and
power.
The social system of the South is
such that the rebels can send a large
number of men into the field. But
this is all. They cannot long feed
them without constant change of place,
in which rapinc supplies the place of
money. The South, at best, can only
act on the defensive 1t cannot make
u forward movement, nor has it really
attempted one, except in Missouri,
which was only dash of mnrauders,
taking advantage Of Gen. Fremont's
inaction, and running, when threat
enea, with much greater CELEBRITY than
it advanced. Prices forces never con.
stitutcd an army, 1t is this incapacity
for any forward movement that is so
fatal alike to the harmony of councils
as we'll as to the military success of the
rebels. When the war broke out, tho
overrunning of the North was supposed
to be very easy matter. The rebel
soldiers were always promised their
Winter quarters in Northern cities, the
wealth and pleasures of which their
imaginations had magnified thousand
fold. The conquest of the North was
foreseen to be the only condition of an
honorable peace. But no forward
movement was made. The fugitives
from Bull Run were not even followed.
Upon the evening Of that disaster, five
thousand troops, properly appointed,
could have captured Washington.-I
The prize was helpless before them,
but the rebels could not even reach out
a hand to grasp it. The forces grouped
around Manassas, did not then, nor do
not to-day constitute an army, in the
true sense Of the term, capable of &C
tive offensive as well as defensive op.
erations. The people South cannot
supply it with what would be necessary
for q movement of City miles in the
face of an enemy. with the immense
train of wagons, horses, materials,
commissariat, and munitions of war.
1t may be difficult for 20 to drive il
from its intrenchments--to overcome
its ris iAer6a-which constitutes its
real strength.
1.-THE South could have put forth
any great military effort. it would have
certainly made some attempt to capture