Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-11-17

The Peninsular Campaign.
The PHIScE De JoIsvILLE, who was a member
of Gen. McCLELLAx's staff during the organize
ton of the Army of the Potomac aud the PENN
sular campaign. has published careful and elab-
crate sketch OF the campaign which began with
the evacuation of Manassas by the rebel army
and ended with the retreat of MCCLELLAN from
before Richmond. The review has been care
fully prepared by one who is yersed in the high
est military science and diplomacy Of the age,
and whose statement of facts will not be called in
question. No one can read the comments of
Prince DE- JoISyHLE without being convinced
that Gen MCCLELLAN in that memorable cam
paign was the victim alike OF jealousy and weak
and irresolute Cabinet. 1T he had been sustained.
as he should have been. by the Representatives of
the Government. the rebellion would have re-
ceived severe blow and the condition of public
affairs souId have presented far different as
pcct from what they now do. MCCLELLAN was
stricken down when it was in the power of the
Administration TO have given the rebellion check
from which it could not have recovered and now
again when he was on the eve of decisive battle.
he Is again removed from command. Who,
then. is to blame for the indefinite prolougation
of the war; The consprators who twice have
done all in their power to produce the disasters
which our arms have suffered and who nave thus
given vitality and power to the rebellion will be
held to a fearful account. We have only space
Tor a few extracts from the paper of the Prince.
but enough to show the embarrassments of Nc
CLELLAS in the campaign of the Peninsula.
which should have been, il he had been properly
sustained, triumphant success instead of a re-
verse to our arms. With respect to the deposit
ton Of MCCLELLAN from the chief command. the
Prince denounces it "a restriction of force and
deminution of usefulness" and regards it as "a
blow in the rear at the very outset of the cam
pagn." He adds:
Yet this was but part Of the mischief done
him. Mcclellan had long known, better than
anybody else, the real strength of the rebels at
Manassas and Centrevie He was perfectly ia
miliar with the existence of wooden cannon" by
which il has been pretended that he was kept in
awe for six months But he also knew that till
the month OF April the roads of Virginia are in
such state that wagons and artillery can only
be moved over them 10y constructing plank roads.
a tedious operation, during which the enemy
holding the railways, could either retreat as he
was then actually doing, or move for blow up
on sumo other point. In any event. had McClel.
Ian attacked and carried Centrevile pursuit was
impossible and victory would have been barren oil
results. single bridge burned would have
saved Joheston's whole army Such are the vast
advantages OF railway for a retreating army
advantages which do not exist for the army
which pursues IT,
We have the right, we think 10 saw that Nc
Clellan never intended To march upon Centre
vile. His long determined purpose was To make
Washington safe BY means of strong garrison.
and then To use the good nav gable waters aud
immense naval resources of the North to trans
port the army 10y sea tO a point near Richmond
For weeks. perhaps Tor months, this plan had
been secretly maturing. Secrecy, as we'll as
prOmptneSs, II will be understood, was indispensa
bic here 10 success To keep the secret il had
been necessary To confide il TO few persons, and
hence had arisen the long i'll feeling toward the
uncommunicative General.
BE tins as il may. the day of action drew
near, those who suspected the Generals project
aud were angry At not being informed of it: those
whom has promotion had excited Ia envy: his po-
litIcal enemies who is without them in Amefi-
cal) in short all those beneath or beside him who
wished him III. broke into a chorus OF accu-
sation of siowness, naction. incapacirv. Nc
Cleilan. with patriotic courage which | have
always admired dsdaned these accusations and
made no reply. he satisfied himself with 2ursu-
ing his preparations i'm laborious silence But
the moment came Ia which, Notwithstanding the
loyal support given him by the President that
functionary could no longer resist the tempest
n council OF war Of all the divisional Generals
was held: plan OF campaign not that of Nc
Clelan was proposed and discussed. Mcclellan
was then forced 10 explain his projects, and the
next day they were known 10 the enemy In
formed. no doubt, by one of those female spies
who keep up his communications into the domes
tic circles of the Federal enemy Johnston evacu
ated Manassas at once. This a skillful ma
neuver. Incapable OF assuming the offensive:
threatened with attack either NJ Centreville
where defense would be useless if successful or
At Richmond. the loss of which would be grave
check, and unable 10 cover both positions AZ
once, Johnston threw his whole force before the
latter OF the two.
The consequences resulting from this uniortu-
nate pressure of the radicals, and the prompt re
solution of Gen. MCCLELLAN 10 attempt the cap
ture of Richmond from the Peninsula are then
described.
An attack oa the rebels in their position on the
Rappzhsnnock and At Gordonsville Is shown 10
be military absurdity- The Prince then de
scribes the embarraSsments of MCCLELLAN in
consequence of his diminished ranks precluciug
him from concentrating the whole land and sea
forces of the Republic upon this single point
OF the subsequent delays which greatly retarded
the success of the expedition and the withdrawal
of portions of his command, We find the follow
ing account:
A fe~ DAYS had been half lost in an useless
pursuit of the enemy. while the transports we're
assembling at Alexandra Al last they we're
assembled, aud the order came 10 embark But
here new misunderstanding awaited the Gene
raj. lie had been promised transports which
could convey 81. 900 men a time he found
vessels hardly equal 10 the conveyance of half
that number Instead Of moving AZ once as Nc
clellan had intended. whole army with Is
eqaipage. number Of trips had - be mhde
The embarkation began March IL. The force
Consisted OIL
ii divisions Of infantry. 5000 TO 10000 strong
division OF regulars (infantry and cavalry.
5000 strong