The Weekly Perrysburg journal. [volume] (Perrysburg, O. [Ohio]) 1861-1???, 1862-05-28
why Gen. Mcclellan Delayed His March
50 inl


A correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial,
writing to that paper, says at this period there
matter susceptible of being WORKED up into an in
teresting letter. The enemy is before US, and tho
commander is disposing lis forces to attack them.
suppose that readers are momentarily looking for
news of the great battle, but the chances seem to
favor considerable delay before the shock of con-
airt dsturbs the appar'nt quiOt of tho hour. Tho
sndden evacuation Of Yorktown, the swift pursuit,
the bloody collision at Williamsburg the diversion
at West Point, anil the concentration of all the
cnamy's forces behind the Chiclhominv, rendered
delay on our part necessary 70 prepare for deci-
svc battle Indeed, there were developments at
the battle OF Williamsburg, which rendered par
tial reorganization of army corps necessary 10 D-
success hereafter AID II required time to bring
forward stores and ordnance for the army. and 10
recOnnniteT the rebel force and position. MANY Off
GERS were impatient at delay. but have no doubt
Cen Mcclellan is pursiuing the only safe and wise
policy
II may be well enough to continue the con 10
Richmond cry, but the heavy loss nt Williams-
burg a serious a6monitiOn that il is best tD be
deliberate, II is folly 70 presume that the enemy
| is domoralized. We have M reason to Justify this
assumptinn They fought fercely ot Williams
| burg. Being more desperate now. and having ac-
cumulated an enormous nrce behind Formidable
dpfences, II i pTIdent tn anticipate Il trrmn /
resistance. In my humble IN gmant Gen. Mc('lol-
Ian will create grave fault hv rsking battle before
| Banks and Mcdowell arrived to his assistance II
is, doubt true that thr enemy is prepared 70 Nv
II they discover that their position un'enoblr but
it is apparent to them, il is 20 US thatthCv car
/ not withdraw their entire army from Virginia. We
re justified in the belief Tint thrv win fight wit
| utter desperation. Thay certainly out number u,
NJ least one third. and they have The advnraCe OF
chosen fortified position. Tie advantages IN ON
! favor are splenddF equipped and we'll dscipn
| ed army flushed with victory.
NUMBERS OF TIE RNFMY.
! II is true that the numbers Of the enemy hereto
/ fore have been greatly over estimated. But it Il
reasonable now to assume that we do not exagger
ate their strength, We know that they have con
| centratPd everything OF the Chickahominy Con
/ trabands who arrive in camp daily report that IN
army occupies the whole territory from Richm0n,
to the Chiokahominy, packed into that space a
thick as trees in the pine forests. They have
drilled and disciplined force probably as large al
our army, and vast numbers Of conscrpt recruits
! While the latter would be EMBARRASSING in an opei
field Of battle, they behind lntrenchmcuts, an,
| as good as regulars. Thus you will understan,
that tremendous responsibility rests upon th,
Commander chief of this army, and that reli
ance for victory depends upon the desperate cour
age and persistence Of our troops and tie skill 0
our generals. The two armies are now separated