Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1862-03-08
Gc..Psi,,y,s Report.

:, The genei al anxiety among the people to learn
the particulars of The Eight ut Fort Boneson, has
led Gen Pillow to publish in advance of his Official
report lengthy account of this battle. Ne regret
that its length and the crowded state of our. col
umns prevent its publication Most Of the particu-
lars, however, have already been given to the pub
lie The following portion of bis statement, low
ever, will be highly interesting to all History does
not, perhaps, furnish an instance Of more deter
mined couras e and,severe lighting than took place
on Saturday, the day before its surrender:
"a The operations Of the day had forced the entire
command of the enemy around to our rlgnt wing,
and in front of Gan. Euckner's position in the m
trenchments, and wien his command reached ms
position he found the enemy rapidly advancing TO
take possession Of this portion Of his work. lie
had stubborn conflict lasting one and half hours to
regain it, and the enemy actually got possession OF
the extreme right Of his position, and held 1t SO
firmly that he could not dislodge bin. The position
thus gained by the enemy ost commanding
one, being Immediately in the rear OF our river bat
terry and field work for its protection. From 1t he
could readily turn the intrenched work occupied by
General Buckner, and attack him in reverse or ad-
vance under cover of intervening ridge directly
upon our battery and field work. While he held
| this position it manifest could not hold the
main work or battery. Such the condition OF
the armies at night fall after nine hours of conflict
the 18th inst, in which our loss severe, and
leaving not less than 5U00 of the enemy dead and
wounded on the field. We left upon the eldnearly
all his wounded, because conld not remove Them
We left his dead unburied because we could not
bury them, Such conflict ana carnage has perhaps
never before occurred upon this continent. We
| took about 800 prisoners and large number OF
arms We had fought this battle to open the way
| tor our army and relieve us from an investment,
which would necessarily reduce and the position
| by famine. We had occupied the whole day to &C.
| complsh object and before could prepare to
leave, after taking up the wounded and the dead,
! the enemy had thrown around us again in the night
an immense force Of fresh troops, and re-occuped
his original position in the line of investment, Thus
| again cutting off our retreat We had only about
| IL, 900 troops all told. OF these large proportion
we had lost in the three battles. The command had
been IT. the trenches night and day for five days,
exposed to the snow, seet mud and Ice water with
| out shelter, and without adequate covering and
| without sleep.
In this condition the general officers held con.
| sutation to determine what we should do. Gen.
| Buckner gave it as his opinion that he could not
hold his position one half an hour against assault
of the enemy, and said the enemy would attack him
next morning at daylight. The proposition then
made by the undersigned to again fight through
| the enemy line and cut way out. General
Buckner said his command was so worn out and cut
to pieces and Gemorazed, that he could not make
another fight; that it would cost the command
three quarters Of it's present numbers, to cut its
way through and it was wrong to sacrifice three
quarters of command to save one-quarter; that
no officer had right to cause such a sacrifice
Gen. Floyd and Maj. Gin,er understood to concur
in this opinion.
then expressed the opinion that we could hold
out another day, and in that time could get
steamboats, and set the command over the river, and
probably save large portion of it. To this Gen.
Buckner replied, that the enemy would certainly
attack him at daylight, and that he could not hold
his position half an hour. The alternative of the
proposition was surrender of their position and
command. Gen. Floyd said that he would neither
surrender the command, would he surrender
himself prisoner. had taken the same position.
Gen. Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else
could be DONE and that, therefore, he would sur.
! render, if placed in command Gen. Floyd said
| that ne would turn over the command to him if he
could he allowed to withdraw his command; to this
Gen. Buckner consented. Thereupon, Gen. Floyd
turned the command over to me- | passing it in
Stantly to Gen. Buckner, saying | would neither
surrender the command nor myself prisoner.
directed Col. Forest to cut his way out. Under
these circumstances Gen. Buckner accepted the
con IN nd and sent flag Of truce to the enemy fol
an armistce Of six hours TO negotiate for terms o
capituation Before this flag and communication
was delivered retired from the garrison"