Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1862-11-12
Ex.President Ruchanan,s RepJv IN
General Scott


!nteth9enetr containing General Scott's ad
dress to the public. This Ia throughout an nm
oisgnised censuro of my conduct during IN,
last months Of the Administration In regard I,
the seven cotton States nov In rebellion, From
our pact relations l was greatly surprised
!ne appearance OF such paper. In one aspect
however, 1t was highly gratifying. II has iusti
he'd me, nay, it has rendered It absolutely ne
cessary, that should no longer remain ei,en
in respect to charges which have been Ion,
vaguely circulating, but are now indorsed b
the responsible name Of General Scott
| l. lhe hrot and most prominent among thes,
charges is my refusal Immediately to garrison
nine enumerated Notifications, scattered oveI
elk OF the Southern States, according to th.
recommendation of Gen. Scott, in his "yiews'
addressed to the War Department on the 99tt
ana 3olh OF October, 1860. And It has ever
peen aiieged that II this had been done IL might
have prevented the civil war.
This refusal ia attributed, without the leas,
cause, to the influence OF Governor FIoyd, All
my Cabinet must bear me witness that vas
the President myself, responsible for all the
acts OF the Administration; and certain Il i
that, during the last six months previous to The
18TH December, 1860, the day on which he re-
signed bis Cftice, after my request, he exercised
less influence on the Administration than any
other member Of the Cabinet. Mr., Holt was
Immediately thereafter transferred from tht
fostomoe Department to that of War: 40 thai
from this time until the 4th March, 1861
which was by far the most important period
OF the Administration, he performed the du
ties OF Secretary of War to my entire satisfac
ton.
But why did not Immediately garrison these
nine Notifications, in such q manner, to use
the language OF General Scott, "as to make any
attempt to take any one of them by surprise OF
coup-de.main ridiculous7" There is one an.
sWer both easy and conclusive, even if other
valid reasons did not exist. There were n6
available troops within reach which could be
sent to these Notifications. To have ATTEMPT.
ca military operation on acale 90 extensive
oy any means within the Presidents power
would have been simply absurd. or this Gen
e.ai scout himself seems to have been convinc-
ed, for on the day after the date of his first
"views" he addressed (on the 3Oth OctoberI
supplemental views to the War Department. IN
which he states: "Theye 10 one (requIay) com.
pany IN Boston, one here lat the NayTo,os). ons al
Pata6uyg, one at Au9usta (Georgia), one al
Baton Rogue"-in all .tfue companies onlv ,oith.
In reach TO garrison or reinforce The forts men
TONED in the "uietrs."
rive companies-four hundred men--to occu.
py and reinforce nine Notifications in six highly
excited Southern States! The force "within
reach was 90 entirely inadequate that nothing
more need be said on the subject. To have at.
tempted such military operation With SO feeble
force, and the Presidential election imnendn1.
Wonld have been an invitation to collision and
secession. Indeed, if the whole American
army, consistipg then of only sixteen thousand
men, had been within reach" they would
have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose,
Such was our want OF troops that, although
Gen. Scott, believing, in opposition to the opin-
ION OF the committee raised in the House of
Representatives, that the Inauguration of Mr..
Lincoln mignt De interrupted by military force,
was only able to assemble at Washington, so
late as the 4'h March, six hundred and ffty-
three men, rank and Hle Of the army. And. to
make up this number, even the sapuers and
miners were brought from West Point,
But why was there no greater force within
resohY This question could be better answered
by Gen. Scott himself than BY any other person.
Our small regular army, with the exception of
q few hundred men, were out of reach, on our
remote frontiers, where it had beea continuously
stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants
and the emigrants on their way thiter against
the attacks Of hostile Indians. ALI were insult
hcient, and both Gen. Scott and myself had
endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to
raise several additional regiments for this pur-
pose. In recommending this augmentation of
the army, the General states In his report TO the
War Department of NoVember 1857. that ait
would not more than furnish the reinforcements
now greatly needed in Florids, Texas, New
Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington, IT.
Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a
company for Utah" And again, In his report
Of November, 1858, he says:
This want Of troops TO give reasonable security to our
cith; in distant settlements including emgrants on
the plains scarcely be too strongly stated but will
only add, that often we have been Obliged to with
draw troops from frontier in order 10 renforoe an
other the weakened points have been instantly attacked
or threatened with formidable invasion.
These "visws" of General Scott exhibit the
crude notions then prevailing even among in
telligont and patriotic men on this subject of
secession. In the FIRST sentence the General,
whilst stating that ito save time the right Of
secession may be conceded" yet Immediately
says "this is instantly balanced by the correla-
tive right on the part of the Federal Govern
ment against an interior State or States to re-.
establish by force, II necessary, its former con-
hnuity OF territory" (For this he cites "Psley
Moral and Political Philosophy, last chapter. /"
IL may be there, but have been unable to find It, J
ing In this passage, ho rcnders what he did
not mean quite clear in his supplementary
"views." In these he says: "It will be seen
that the views only apply to case of seces-
sion that makes a gap in the present Union."-
The falling of, say, of Texas, or of all the At
lantic States, from the Potomac south 1.-THE
very case which has occurred), was no. within
the scope of Gen. S. .'s provisional remedies: -
that is to say, to establish by force, If necessa
~, the continuity of our territory. In his
views" he also states as follows: "But break
this glorious Union by whatever line or lines
that political madness may contriye, and there
would be no hope Of recruiting the fragments
except by the laceration and despotism of the
sword. To effect such result the intestine war;
of our Mexican neighbors would, In comparison
with ours, sink into mere ohild's play" In the
Generals opinion, "a smaller evil (than these
intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments
of the great Republic to form themselves into
new Confederacies, probably four" He then
points out what ought to be the boundaries be.
tween the new Unions, and at the end Of each
goes 80 far as even to indicate the cities which
ought to be the capitals of the three frat on
this side Of the Rocky Mountains, to wit: "Co.
lumbia, South CsroiIna," "Alton, or Quincy
Illinois," and ALBANY, New York" excluding
Washington city altogether. This indication 81
capitals contained in the original now In my DO !
session, Is Curiously omitted in the version pub
lished in the National InteliSencer. He desip.
mates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pa.
ciic. The reader will judge what encourage.
mert these views, proceeding from 30 distln-
guished source, must have afforded to the Se-
cessionists Of the Cotton States. ~. 5l
l trust have said enough, and more than
enough, to convince every mind why did mob,