Delaware State journal and statesman., 1862-12-23
- -lr--s--an-
From the Philadelphia American
FIUH EIe THHaueTpnIA AmefIfnI.
The Battle of Fredericksburg

FROM lne fhhauelphth American
The Battle Of fredericksburg.
few days ago we remarked that the first
accounts If battles differ in the most remarkable
manner from those which fiually obtain place
in history, being exaggerated, distorted and in
accurate. AT the time We wrote we had no idea
that this would so soon be exempliied in the
accounts of one Of the most fearful battles on
record, Que in the contemplation of which the
heart nickens, and the imagination grows weary
Of the vain attempts to embrace tie details of the
horrible slaughter The revelations Of this week
have scared place in the memory of the present
generation, the like Of which may not, aud, we
trust, will not occur again. A struggle SO tre-
mendu0us in the size Of the armies engaged NO
fearful in its cOncomitants, So appalling in its
results, and so brief in its duration, deserves to
be memorable in our annals for all time to come
and yet the first accounts treated il as IA mere
Reconnaissance or skirmish.
Some of our contemporaries are yexine their
brains to find the means of behttling this pro-
dlgous slaughter li they were uot in 90 great
II hurry to judge of every event in the very in
staut that the FIRST telegram arrives--if thev
were not so big with council aud nortentous with
their threats--if, in short, they had but little
Of Tint cool bravery which is the pre-eminent
quality of an officer in battle, aud should he pos.
sessed by all who undertake TO counsel generals
they would wait patiently until they were
furnished with accurate details, and then Judge
calmly and philosOphically There is no need
for ony one to apologize for this great battle, or
to attempt to belittle it into II Reconnaissance in
force, or to ccusure the generals who undertook
it, or 70 explain it away into whnt it WAS not
II wds II prodigl0us attempt to achieve a great
result, aud il was II prodigious failure When
such things do fail at ALL they always fail in This
way. No partial failure Is, in the nature of
things, possible. II the event proves n victory,
| au off a "a -
tactical victory; il becomes Il mOmentous tri-
umph memorable through all succeeding time.
burnside was unsuccessful in his ATTEMPT. hut
Napoleon WAS equally unsuccessful at Aspern
aud EssIing, and his faure at Waterloo was
awful Burnside has made no blunder Ills
plan was worthy of the best general in Europe
tie had used 1t before with skill and success at
Roanoke Island aud Newbern, and although he
failed in the present case, TINT does not prove
that the plan itself was defective The main
feature of his military system seems to be TO
attack tue enomy's centre in force, and to attack
always iu column. some OF the very wise men.
who thiuk the President and Cabinet ought TO
resign, urge that both these ideas were wrong
and that the progress of the age has exploded
them We do not believe word of this, and we
will sny why.
We have already stated that, both ut Roauoke
Island at Newborn, these two Napoleono ideas
were used by Burnside, and were the LEADING
features of his operations. lie paid no attention
to outposts, to flanking efforts, etc In this he
was right. Baron Jomini expressly says, in his
summary Of the Art Of War, that these fauking
operations imperil an army by making its line
600 thin and weak, so that an attack by the
enemy may easily break it; and if the ilankipg
party is separated, and sent by detour to make
a rear diversion, it is very apt to fail through a
mistake of roads, or delays of various kinds. and
if encountered by the enemy in force, is sure to
be annihilated. In the desperate battle of
Springfield, Sigel's flank attack was disastrous
failure, and his whole division was cut up, des-
pte the great skill of the General and his iried
abilities on many hard-fought field
ln war the most obvious and ordinary of all
effort by generals, OF every grade OF talent is to
J outank the enemy. Napoleon achieved the great
est and most wonderful Of oil his successes by
avoiding this haekneyed mode Of operations and
riskng his whole force on a single desperate Mt
tack of the centre. Perhaps it will be said that
every general is not Napoleon, and therefore
I such risks ought to be avoided. To this we repy
that in every battle where these fearful attacks
OF the centre proved successful he was on the
very brink Of destruction. In his fist signal
victory at Marengo the battle was actually lost
his army was thoroughly beaten and flying in all
directions, when Dessaix arrived. lie, too.
thought the field lost, but Napoleon renewed the
contest with the fresh troops, and won the day
by his attack on the centre. Wagram was a
memorable instance Of this terrific risk, and the
terrible slaughter of MacdOn9ld's column ia the
decisive charge still causes the reader of history
to thrill ms he ponders on it.
Our soldiers at fredericksburg were not n whit
, worse than those of Napoleon His troops re.
, coied in many battle before tho awful lire of
? the opposing army, and tho best troops in the
, world sometimes fail in charge. The British
storming party failed at the Redan before Sebas.
, topool They fled like sheep at Bunker Hill and
New Orleans. Napoeon's veterans from hun
dted battle. fields were scattered TO the winds at
! Waterloo. Ii is idlo to expect that men with
reasoning faculties will not recoil before such
horrors as our troops encountered at Fredericks-
burg IL may bo said that il this is true the
, charge in column and on the centre must be an
. error. But here is just the point where modern
} military science shows itself most triumphantly
] Napoleon knew that the risk Of such a charge
1 was awful, and that as in great war il ,ntst
always be increased by the fact that mo st of the
troops in the field arc new leyies, and, therefore.
to II certain extent unreliable means must he
r found To guard against the possibility of their
being able TO take to flight. TO do this he made
his charging columns always very heavy. that
however great the slaughter might be ia front
no one could turn and flee, as the vnst multitude
. pressing forward in the rear prevented it, Mac
/ dOuald's charging column at Wagram started out
I some eighteen thousand strong, and when il
reached the Austrian lines had only eighteen
hundred left. But it broke the enemy's lines
) and gained the victory.
4 Something Of these tactics was resorted to bv
} Burnside in the late battle. When Meades uiyi.
zion, after its successful charge broke before
the fearful fire of the enemy. Birney's division
was Immediately pushed forward, and drove back
the enemy, and took several hundred prisoners
This method Of attack is now the accepted one
in all the European armies The Russians used
it at lnkermann, and deSpit the dreadful slaugh-
ter, they would undoubtedly have succeeded but
for the timely arrival of the French. Napoleon
Ill used it ut Magenta and Solierino aod the
carnage was so great that for months after these
conflicts the EmperOr's nerves was completely
unsettled, and his mind filled with morbid