The Buchanan County guardian. (Independence, Buchanan County, Iowa) 1858-1864, 1862-12-30


cordance aoith my own judgment. In
some cases | have submitted my views,
which have been approved.
Q.-Who did you understand was re-
sponsible for the forwarding of the pom
toons to Falmouth
Al understand that Gen. Halleck
was to give the necessary orders, and
then the officers who should receive the
orders were only responsible for the pom
toons coming here.
| could have carried out that part of
the plan through officers of my own, but
having just taken command of an army
with which | was but slightly acquant-
ed, it was evident that it was as much
as could attend to, with the assistance
of all my officers, TO change its position
from Warrenton to fredericksburg and
| felt, indeed l expected, that all the
parts of the plan which are to be execu-
ted In Washington would be attended to
by the officers at that place under the
direction of the different departments to
which those parts of my plan appertain.
ed.
Odd you or not understand that
you were to be responsible for seeing
that these orders were to be carried
out
Al did not (; / never imagined for
a moment that had to carry out any,
thing that was required to be done at
Washington ; Gen. Meigs told me dis,
'inctly, several days ago, in Washing
ton, that he never saw my plan of opera
I tons until | showed it to them on that
day.
Q.-Do understand you to say in
your statement that you expected Gen.
Franklin to carry the point at the ex-
IRENE left of the ridge, in the rear of the
town, and thereby enable our troops to
storm and carry the notifications
Al did expect him to carry that
point, which being done, would have
placed our forces in the rear of their ex-
treme left, and which | thought at the
time would shake their forces in the
ridge to such an extent that the position
in front could be easily stormed and car
ried.
Q.-To what do you attribute the fail
ure to accomplish that ?
A.-To the great strength of the po-
sition, and the accumulation of the enc
my's forces there. l expected that the
bridges would be built in two or three
hours after they were unloaded, which
was about daylight. Instead of that
those on the right were not built until
three O'Clock in the afternoon, and had
only the means of getting across one d.
vision over the bridge on the right.
Gen. Franklins bridges were built
about noon, and were held by our troops
on the opposite bank. This gave the
enemy time to accumulate their forces,
which were stretched along the river
from Port Royal up to the battle field,
before | was able to order the attack.
There had been a great deal of divis.
ion of opinion among the corps comman-
ders as to the place of crossing. but af-
ter all the discussion upon the subject,
the decision TO cross over here was well
received and understood by all OF them.
Q.-What was the conduct of officers
and men during the attack
A.-With the exception of a single
regiment it was exyellent
@ Have you any knowledge as TO
the force of the enemy?
Alt is estimated all the way from
100, 200 to go, 600 | think it was less
than 100000. | wouli add here that
although at the time we ordered the col
umn OF attack to be formed on the morn.
inc after the battle, l thought the enc.
my's works could be carried and adher-
ed to that opinion during that day. l
afterwards became convinced that that
could not have been done. owing 10 the
great strength of the enemy, the time
given them for reinforcing, and the be-
lief also of our officers that it could not
be done.
accordingly telegraphed to the Pres
ident of the United States, at Washing
ton, that I withdrew our army because l
felt the enemy's position could not be
carried.
1t commenced raining and the river
began to rise did not know how much
it might rise there were no means of
crossing except going up TO the fords,
and it would be impossible to do that,
because of inability to supply the troops
after they should have crossed Gen.
Sumner arrived here with his troops in
advance. He sent to me asking me If
he should cross the river | did not think
it advisable that he should at that time.
1t was first decided to cross at Skin
ner's Neck, about twelve miles below
here, but our demonstration was simply
for the purpose of drawing there as large
force Of the enemy as possible. then
decided to cross here, because in the
first place | felt satisfied that they did
not expect us to cross here but below
In the next place l felt satisfied that this
was the place to fight the most decisive
battle, because if we could divide their
forces by piercing their lines at one OF
two points, separating their left from
their right, then a vigorous attack with
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