The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-11-22

reePecuvely Inc PERIODS OF Prepor4tl0n, o.
Campaigns, and Of Politics. The first si,
months, from March to August, 1861, wor,
employed in extricating the Government itsel
from the entanglements in which 1t had beer
purpossly left: in organizing the army; inpre-
paring navy; and in providing the enormous
stores Of every kind required for land and sea
service. In no other six months of American
history did the surprising resources and capa-
city Of the nation appear SO honorably. With
insignificant exceptions, there was an undivid-
ed and enthusiastic patriotism in all the loyal
States. A few sordid men had grown to their
selfish Southerninterestsl like sponges to rock
and could not be detached few were SO
dead to moral feeling that even the wild and
fiery enthusiasm Of patriotic fervor shot no
heat into their sepulchrsl souls. But such
served as contrasts, revealing the strength,
unanimity, and terrible earnestness Of the pop
ular will. All classes in society, rich and
time, fused by one intense common feeling into
one mass. A common zeal for laws and liberty
made them homogeneous.
. It will be the task of the philosophic histo-
rian to show why the rebellion was not sup-
pressed in that period. But the same fatal in
fuence that, like q morbid nerve, has run thro'
the WHOLE eighteen months, diffused, then,
through the Administration, inordinate hope
coupled with extraordinary feebleness.
The second period Of the Great Conflict ex-
tends from the appointment to the superces-
sion of General McCiellan. a* 7a o.
1t constitutes remarkable period. While,
IN SO vast theater, there must of necessity
have been great variations Of affairs, fuctua-
tons even into antitheses and contradictions
yet this period has been, substantially, phil.
osophic unity. 1t had its central principles.
Its policy in the main was the logical result of
it's own philosophy. The agents and leaders,
their plans and movements, are all naturally
related to the central spirit of the epoch. It
may be styled the Period Of Armed Delay.
One short convulsive campaign in the South.
west was attended with great results But
these were frittered away, and mostly relin-
quished. ffea @
The same fatal influence 1T the centre para
lyzed the Cabinet, tied up the President and
laid spell upon the Army. What that influ-
ence was, ana by whom welded, it will be the
business Of the future to search out. Another
chapter is to be added to the history of renown.
ed folly and ilustrious weakness
Then, it may be, some Macaulay will leave to
US such portrait as this: "Chief in latent
influence was man of Ideas which had no ply
sical consequences. optimist NOT without
sagacity in merely intellectual problems, but
foolish in affairs. He had the very Conceit of
Hope So certain was he Of the favorable ten.
denotes of great natural causes, that he scarcely
deemed it needful to exert special volitions un-
der them. He was wise in ideas and foolish
in things. Whatever could be settled by think
ing he managed skillfuliy. But it was his in>
fatuation to suppose that all things could be
managed by thinking. He was an Idealist-rich
in the top of his brain !; lean and feeble in the
bottom. So, all matters that lay upon the
earth he treated as if they were shadows, that
came and went, without human volition, by the
movements of the sun. His realities began
where common mems ended, in the realm of
mere ideas. He was utterly devoid of the in
stincts of Physical Forces. He could hate, but
could not fight. Without wisdom in direction
of practical affairs, he had such acuteness in
gennity, and mind-foIce, that his criticisms and
judgments weighed much in the shaping Of other
mems practical politics. His inordnate hope
fulness lit up the future with perpetual bright.
ness, and led him to frequent prophesies. And,
like all uninspired prophets, the failure of lis
provision, and he still covered old disappoint-
xealot and the coward of the Administration"
By the side of such mind, was placed man
remarkable in not few respects. Genial, kind
to fault but, above all. with strong instincts of
justice, with strong but homely seuse, and with
reasoning faculty unusual in it's methods, slow
and odd, yet at length reaching broad results,
and generally sound ones. Well versed in local
politics, butt unframed in national adninistra-
ton, he becsme the President of the United
States divided, at q time that required the ut
most human sagacity joined to frmness and de-
cision He was both firm and facile, obstinate
yet chaDgeabie. Resisting persuasion and rea-
sonings w.thssingular constancy, he was liable,
in certain moods, to accept sudden and unripe
advice, and to precipitate rash action. Mistakes
arising from these causes, served not so much,
through experience, to produce sagacity, as to
render him fearful of other mistakes, and 60, of
following any counsel. Upon such mind, the
confident counsels of an Optimist, whose future
was all bright, who was insensibie to physical
reality, who found little difficulty in the admin.
istration of mere Ideas, could not fail to be
great. When, in perilous times, President is
slow from conscientious timidity, his worst coun.
selor is one who; from excess of hope, tells him
that there is no need of action, and that waiting
is wisdom! While Caution and Couceit we're
maintaining feebleness at the center, there might
have yet been much progress had the armies OF
the Union been led by enterprising generals.
1t is one of the extraordinary events Of the
times, that two generals, to who're hands chiefly
the campaign year was committed, were by ma
ture and sympathy fitted to command under an
Administration where irresolute honesty took
counsel of indolent hopefulness. ~ ssl ..''
Cen Mcclellan has secured for himself place
in history. But it will be by his accidental as
sociaton With great events, rather shan by any
important influence which he has had in pro.
ducing them. He is man of large perception
and moderate intellect. He ia without genius
or even moderate intuition. He digs out his
conclusions as laboriously as ore is dug from
mines. He received q thorough military edvca-
ton. And whatever could be accomplished by
studiousness and untiring industry no man could
better accomplish than he. But he sees nothing
and knows nothing, till it is reduced to the level
of his practical reason. Especially, he lacked
sense and intuition of Human forces. The wise
use of physical matter makes an Engineer. The
wise use Of men makes the General. Mcclellan
is only an Engineer.
But, such man was competent to great re-
suits had right dispositions and sagaclous poiis-
ical faith come to his help. But he was posses
sed by an imperative Caution that worked some,
time towards irresolution and sometimes toward
obstinacy, but never toward daring enterprise:
4 ~Ale II