, 1862-09-27
GENERAL PoPE,s CAMPAIGNS.
4 Statement OF Facts by ono Of His
Aids,

Vmm the st. P4al Pres. ] = =,
The following letter was written lately BY
Col smith, to gentleman In Chicago. We
deem i proper to publish 1t, ~ q complete |
1etutetton of certain Misrepresentation which |
have been circulated respecting General Pope,
1t Corinth md in Virgtnia:
ST. PAUL Sept. II. 1861. |
MT DEAR SR:-m our briet interview at
Chicago, while expressing your confluence In
General Pope, you said two things had per-
jure hin before the public. The official d.
patch attributed to him stating that he had
captured IL, 900 prisoners and deserters from
the enemy while, ,he WAS pursuing them after
the evacuation OF Corinth; and 1atelr letter
In the New York Tribune, copied By the press
the si9y oi VDia VI st ae9
irg back from Bull Run, and showing the ut
ter want Of management in the head Of that
army as there exhibited
have found here the letter to which pre-
sume gon refer. It Is not surprising thit Its
information, purportine to be derived from
public mind. an able Of my own kuowl-
edge had at the time Of these trans actions, to
readily dispose of the specific charges made
BY this writer, which are as follows:
Three corps at least remained At Centrerine On
of lie Eli On etther side ii the rosd ID in % nnmiia
disorder. They had never been In order-no more
had the rest Of the army glnce the retreat There
was no head to Put them l. order. There was no
order In any department Of the service. There
was not ammunition in the batteries or In the c.r-
t1iegeboses Of the infantry, enough for another
trains we're to be'fonnd: In the first five minutes
met three ordnance oficers In search Of these
They sbe see 5aI no
troll was IN their handstno means Of doing their
dnty. ordezl!cs had Just been eent In ali diree-
ten O'Clock. and battle hourly expected sinca
The camps were ine1plicit1y entangled-not to
enough to know something about it. but heard q
general commanding corps Tdrnes say he did
not and could not ascertain. the relative position
and IT esf
psss and tkiA sad 70 me It one glance at the
troops were haif led, md led it4esulsriy. 1- 80
The first charge Ii that the troops were in
"unmilitazY confusion" The second, that
there was no order in any department.. Tie
being In regard to ammunition and rations.
The sufficient answer to this first charge Is,
that on the morning after falling back to
Centreyille (sunday morn1ng) General Pope
sent for all the coMmmanders of army corps
and designated the position each was TO ocef1-
pr. It is hardly Necessary to say that any
pnmili'a1y confusion exhibited in suy parttc-
ular corps after the lapse of day, argued
& 90 ~ ~ III ~ ~ tet ~ ~
~ 49, "s % ~. ~. 10 - @1s staao ano - ~ a.
mss r. fht;r' 4ronns T., Tr5ner ~ a. ~ N tha
| P1,ronn5 das;r,stsS N0 t4"eeA 0A0o' va 'AAo
s6s IN snudas ofternoo ho rno,o +ha c,rcn7t =,
the camps and ascertained, in person, that
| cannot thsrtfore nnaeratana hoV f. cnn,5
| hsce nccnrrs5 that IN Monday fhere was nv
commani1er Of corps tTurn,ec who a did moi
| know the relative POSITION Of other corns u a,
| how anY ageneIa1, or regular officer, and ia
| nous for toDopraphical clearness and akili. j
conId pneteEd eyen to suppose that the pcn
ern1s Commanding cnrns hai1 not heen IN
1tructed durinr the iottryai Of mora than :
| day as to their proper positions and cou1i
thus charge The reepons36iliry Of tba want O
order in particular corps, divisions, brjgades
OF reeiments. On the general commaadinr th,
army..
A regards the ammunition, the case /
equally clear. On Sunday morning fat So
q M ! an order was issued b, GeueIal Pope
to the geuerals commanding CORPS. ins1rucr
to secure tho dfstribution OF ammunftioj
| fn his command and tn This end-
first fo send men tn o1fda wapnns Il
:. 1he troops to be suoplied: second. I.
rennrt Inc amonnt and Kinds of arnmu
n;4ion rennir4a rr th;ri ~ - cn1iect and san
| hA1hHnRYfATA emmy
order was that morning delivered tn four G
the commanders nf c6rns IN 1,erson' viii
| thcr Eerf, at heof7on,rfpna and sent r., other
by o1der1iee. and the rceeints dn1v receiTei
Il was rot complicd with by single corr
commander md with txo 1r rhr9t. evcr5
fione. mi ever na,tially comnlcd viii, nr r.
snnnaed tn hv INV oiticer ii interior rou
nenr5 Tic i11fernnca 1unn1d natnro1iv har
hrcn that I;t,l ;f INV anmnnif7on vs. Tpe3-,
Int lest 1his shouid not h. tht. fact ia ali tt
, rnrrs. IN Wontav norntnr a c;1cn1or xas ses ~
tnryrrv cnn1nanflsr of : corns sta,,n~ II,
a 1erou .rnn1r ~ mnnftfon fa7 IN w7,on
i had srr;van that at the n,r1hwor. imn'rd
ate1v IN rearo IF C.ntrari11e' m oif;,.er wn,,l
. he fonnd charred with its d;strihntion. an
: that re ,m,n6n;t;on 1rnn,d hr E,.nr IL r. r.
, ~annna in ,rh;eh r. csm. 50 as 70 ~ sant 1T &,
r -oEd n tha tronns ~ h. snnn3;pd ,nnmed; IT.
: when Teou;rrd, This .cirtu]ar WA sem aronn
a. snnr;te Tn - noon n1t ~ s;rnia da,nar
fnra1nmun;+isn fo- enom arn,s ..,s n,ade. an
: h,'+ ~ q s;nn1s b,ttar1 M 1 can,a - ~ he aTnn,t..
Whose Iapits thtn> VAS it. tnat. when rii:. a
/: had hcen pproffered than far nr.1lr txo i ~
) ot 1enn1h Thrrotened asao,,tt nf9;csrs end =
c 1eriics ~ere riding herc nnii fhere. as +his 20
r 1vtnondsnt restitfss. searchiur for ammun
tion nnif MT knowirr that m abundant: su
nir train vas narks, In the midst of Il
armv9
The ofr;ccrs In c.,,ryo had ,n,da 1;s4s sboz
in;1 The cal;h1, and ne amonnt of ,srevv W +,
cfs s ammunition mn ia ia every yer % Waron ia ia the trai Il
With the name Of fhe teamster driTinr t,
wapon1 The trams and th.ir divers 1ese ;.
s hai5d and ready to move. There vas noth5r
e uceded hut a rcDort Of The amount mi KIM
). wanted, and the wagons could be Immedistc
dispatched to The troops to b. snnu1i.d. ~
10 there any want Of system or efiicicncy at T1ea
!, quarters where this corTespondence n3,css Il
n I speak With the mort. confidencn in this Ina
tern + Eas myat1f fhe M; ,rr y3acrd IN char
D wrote the orders. and saw to their leltTer
s and remained at nv most till I was reliev,
z Monday afternoon.
!. As regards fond and forage. it is before Il
- country how and why these failed to come
u the relief Of the army Of Virginia, Every e
l. lew could be controlled were distributed wi
~ all the care the circumstance allowed.
al - From The degree 1 Of accuracy s % in the sta,
:, uents made to this CORES oondent In rega
le to matters that lay open to the observall
r and knowledge Of every officer of the arm
you may Judge Of the value Of the inform ati
u be received Of the management Of camplf
Is or battle, furnished him by men who neitt
H. knew, nor were supposed to know the pls
~ Quoting the campaign acted. What spi
60 actuatEd officers who could manufacture thf
false and unsoldierly runors to unsett1e t
l.; | confidence nf froons In their general. in I
th fare nj the eneniv-fnr xhot enff fhev wnrl;
u ~finc and their future history w;1l rrv
a. more n11in1v fhnn anr worfls nj m,nr cn1
I'd ~ ;t anWm
~ II II due TO ourselves and 70 Tie cause
era; whnsa h;storv ID hern oce of aci-ne
q 1aaTu1 nnd nGsn;.--n 81 succass anJ
ic - ia so1n-a..,o,. p,,S ~ sa~tia ~ ~
of ~ n-aa,ss5 ,.iionne ahnnid ~ 10 iSrh,I1 ~.
ur ea.,tSa;nns1r 1hro w swsc - 10 ~ IN th7s ~