New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-01-22

an ntronched position 60 long as there numerous
routes there still are by which the enemy may be
taken in the Of his Notifications and all reasona
bic risk of disaster and all extrayagant aud needless
waste of blood may be avoided.
After the battle of Bull Run, devoted my poor
efforts TO induce our authorities to land ample force
on the Southern bank Of the Potomac, between the
mouths of the Occoqusn and the Acquia creeks--on
the right flank and somewhat in the rear Of the ene'
uly's position between Bull Run and Broad Run, and
continued those efforts until after the enemy were
allowed to seize aud fortfy every commanding point
there, and close the Potomac by his batteries, when'
and not until then, desisted.
have 10 claim on you, Sir, and my opinions, past
or present are certainly of little consequence 70 Inc
public. Yet, it may not, perhaps, be asking 100
much to request You to give place to tins eXpaha-
ton. and a, the same time to my editorial letter to
contemporary newspaper-wben assure you that L
still deem it very hazardous and altogether impru-
de mt TO attack the enemys batteries at Centrevlle
aud at Manassas Junction, while it is still practical
ble-though certainly more difficult than it would
have been in July even in October-to turn those
fortified positions.
Very respectfully yours.
Wa,liagton, J,n. is, 1862 CHARLES ELLET, IT,
A communication offered for the editorial columns
of a Ncw.York journal, July q, 1861, but not then
published. BY Charles Eet, jr., Civil Engineer.
SHOULD THE ENEMY's POSITION AT MANASSAS
JUNCTION BE ATTACKED
As late as Saturday night it the general ex-
pectation both in military and civil circles in wash
ingtoD that Sunday morning would witness the
openinq Of the greatest conflict III arms which has
led h.
entire front of the Rebel forces at Manassas Junction
where t is already maintained that many batteries
have been planted, and where further observations
will doubtless show that these batteries are merely
auxiliary defenees thrown forward 10 cover or placed
tween TO strengthen, the intervals between closed
redoubts or Fashioned fortt has been supposed the
attack Of impatient troops would commence
simultaneously.
f. war, Therefore with sense Of some relief that
we heard on Sunday morning that the excited ears
Of our anxious friend, in the National Capital were
unable TO detect, in the stiffness OF early daylight,
the i2htest Ieyerberation OF distant artillery
which, 1t supposed might be distinctly percept-
IDLE at that hour, If the anticipated conflict were
really in progress. And this of relief gained
material strength from the further information, that
ut early GAVIN, an inflated balloon was conveyed
through the streets in tie direction OF the Liitle
Falls Bidgc--eadiDg 10 the conclusion that II WAS
the intention still further 10 extend the reconnois-
rance OF the cnemys position, before hurting orr
bis forr idable breastworks.
We 90 not profess that solictude for delay is
altogether the consequence Of apprehension oil the
inability Of our brave fellow-countrymen and loyal
soldiers TO carry any works which the rebels may
have raised for the protection OF treason. On The
contrary we are confident that 10 position can be
found or can lie made by art, in the broad territory
of this unbroken country 70 strong that s patriotic
sodlery cannot and will not enter it by force, aud
drag rebellion forth TO the light and eXtirpate the
heresy by their swords.
Our desire for come delay of our army, now con-
fronting the enemy at Manassas, ia sincere, and
based at once upon the wish for the moot ample pre-
limipary reconnoIssances Of their position, and the
relative bearings Of their defensive works; and
upon strong conviction that the rebel army may,
with little patient DELAY, be forced TO evacuaie it's
position by means Of skiliiul and boodess strategy
alone. 49,,
We are 20 strongly impressed with the correctness
of this opinion that, even at the rsk OF iatgng our
readers By what may seem to be a useess repetition,
we will again submit the isets ana arguments upon
which IL restt.
At an early period Of the military history Of this
contest we undertook to show that the enemys front
WAS so widely extended that, with his imperfect
means Of communication, he could not maintain bic
extreme posionsand that one Of the first results OF
lis rtrategica error would be the necessary eyacua-
ton II Harper's Ferry.
But the retreat from Harpers Ferry has only
brought temporary and Imperfect relief ,othe army
retiring from that position, by permitting 1t TO occupy
another from which its ultimate retreat cannot so
easily hc entirely cut of.
This Harpers Ferry division, under the command
Of Gen Johnston--a most formidable force probably
thirty thousand strong-is now at Winchester, and
there confronted by our national column, OF about
equal force, but, presume altogether superior IN
organization and discipline under Gen. Patterson.
The distance between these two hostile divisions Is
probably about one day march.
Now, west Of Winchester, in the mountains OF
Nirgnia-and, when last heard from, still beyond
the Allegheny mountains-is the strong, self-reant
and yictolious command of Gen. Mcclellan, the dis-
possible portion Of which, it is reasonable to pre-
sumo, is vending lite way across the mountains by
steady marches, into the valley OF Virginia-which
il will doubtless soon enter at some point south OF
Winchester and in the Of Johrstons present po
silion, possibly at Strasburgh or Woodstock.
We cannot, then, resist the conclusion that the
inevitable result OF McClellans advance toward the
valley in Johnston's rearor even on his left flank,
by the Winchester Road, while Patterson closes
upon him in front, will compel his prompt retreat
unless indeed, nature has bestowed on that officer,
what gliitering epaulettes never yet impaired TO
soldier, those Napoleonic qualities which would
enable him TO find Patterson sleeping, and annihate
hi. army before he wakes-and then turn and meas
ure swords with Mcclellan, whom the country
begins to hope is something more than fancy
General and not so likely to be caught mapping.
Surprising, however, that our commanders are all
ND and awake, we conclude that tue advance of
Mcclellan toward the Valley of Virginia will
necessarily compel the retrest of johnson, or as an
alternative, the destruction aud capture OF his army.
And this result, the inevitable consequence of the
present position Of the respective armies and the
assumed advance Of Mcclellan must insist, will
render the intrenched position of Beauregard-with
a superior force on his front, and two formidable
armies lowering on his flank and threatening his
rear-whoy untenable. II will compel him either
to come out and give Mcdowell battle In the open