Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1862-09-02

performance in front of Washington. The hints
that Mcclellan is to occupy hls old quarters in
the neighbol hood Of Alexandria, that earth
works are to be thrown up along the line OF the
kappahaunock, and that not the slightest un-
easlness is now ielt in official quarters or the
safety OF Washington. sound like omlnous pre-
monltions OF new delays and OF hopes still fur
ther 10 be deferred They bring VI unpleasant
"reminiscences Of long Winter IN front OF Man
assas,-of long weeks spent IN approaching
Yorktown,-ot the protracted and disastrous
occu patton OF the swamps OF the Chckahomlny,
-oi wasted chances and opportunities thrown
away, through an exaggerated estimate OF the
rebel strength, and lpable distrust OF our own.
/ 1t is always easy 10 be wise after the event.
! We can see now halt-a.d dozen Occasions which,
it seIzed with pIompt and dashlng courage,
would have given us 4 crownng and decisive
victory. Time is was ed in deplOrng the weak
ness tina; allowed them To slip. But we should
only repea, our folly if we were to neglect The
practical lessons which they lnculcate,
I Everybody knows now tu4t if Mcdowell had
fought the battle OF Bull Run one day sooner
than he did, he would have woni il. Everybody
knows that il Mcclellan had pushed upon
Yorktown Is soon as he reached the Peninsula,
the re- els with his whole force after Williams
burgh, he could have routed them that he
could have taken Richmond alter Fair Oaks, and
that be could have routed the enemy at Gaines
NJ Ill. II he had thrown bB fresh troops upon
them, instead OF Withdrawing to the James
River IL may be ot no use now To ensure
these repeated TAI ures But It is OF use To take
notice that they are all due u one defect-lack
OF courage and sell-confdence, lack OF reliance
upon our own troops and au undue estimate Of
the proves and strength OF the enemy. And
1t is important that we should not continue to
commit this mistake. IL has cost us enough
already. But for this lack Of pluck, which in
niBe times out ol ten 10 the highest prudence,
the war would have been ended long ago. 1t
has cost US hundred thousand lives, five hun
dred million dollars, the respect and confidence
OF Europe, and worst oi all the prospective aid
OF powerful Union party, temporarily over
borne IN the Southern States. II we could have
crushed the rebel army ii year ago, We should
have had by this time the popular vote OF half
the rebel States lor return to the Union. When
we shall have it now--who can tell
W { must not make these mistakes hereafter.
We must disc rd the aesltatlng, dlstrusttul
timidity out Of which they have sprung We
have an army in the field worthy OF our conf
denee and we must put confidence IN it, W.
must nut shrink trom hurting IL apon the enem.
,csJ il should be det..iej-such an apprehension
, goes lar toward securing It's own tuitillment
The rebels owe ali the successes they hav
achic.el 70 Their audactY. They have never
hesItlted 10 attack, ,-and they have done IL II
every case ~ II they expected 90 win aud ;hi
very confidence, by giving them increased
strength. and by hall parlly yIziag as has gone
Jar juw rus soaring them the victory. We
have been imposed upon By their boldness. They
have always Impressed us with an exaggerated
idea ol their strength, by the dashlng ygof with
whlcu they have used it against u. II ID nme
we caught something OF their spirit.
Oar armies are now massel in lrCnt OF Rich
mond-upon that side Of OF it least threatened
hitherto and therefore up 10 the present time
least defended II We wait until everything
and everybody is ready for an advance, the
rebels will make Richmond as strong on the
north as 1t was on the south. 1t We wait un;ll
our recruits are all in the field we give the
rebe's a chance to get theirs also. We have
always lost by the waiting game. Anattacking
army always does. The sooner the attack Is
made, the more formidable 1t IL. Everything
depends on the temper and spirits OF our army
and the time always gives an army which Is
waiting to be attacked, coolness and steady
courage An Individual attacked suddenly,
before he has had time to make preparation for
defence or count the cost of resistance, is al
ways taken at disadvantage but you give
HIM time 10 think about 1t, you give him com
nand OF all hls faculties Precisely so it is
with an army A surprise is itself hall de
feat, an. the less time you give the enemy To
prepare Tor resistance, The less chance do you
give hm OF resisting successfully.
The whole country await with eager anxiety
the advance of our combined armies on Rich
IN Jnd. They will hear with impatience and
incredibly, excuses and apologies for delay
We outnumbered the enemy largely, and there
can be no valid reason for falling back before
them, or for standing still in their presence
The burning of the bridges across the Kappa
hammock if intended to do anything more thar
provide against momentary emergency, s'
bad symptom. We would much rather see new
bridges built aud preparations made to throw
our armies in overwhelming force across tina
stream.