The dollar weekly bulletin. [volume] (Maysville, Ky.) 1862-1864, 1862-10-09
Important to the People of the North
west.
From the Columbus Ohio Crisis.
CINCINNATI, Sept. 25, 1862.

From the Columbus Ohio Crisis.
CINCINNATI, Sept. 25, 1862.
| AS we have now, if reports be reliable
achieved brilliant and decisive victory i
the bloodiest and hardest fought battles {
the war, it becomes US, as reasonable mel
to determine what use we shall make of il
influence. Shall we use it for the purpos
OF acquiring more recruits for further sau oh
ter; or shall we, as sensible len, as vctors
apply it to the attainment of Just an,
honorable peace? This latter is the obiec
of all just wars. and should never be neglect
ed when opportunities are presented. Their
are many reasons why this subject shoul,
be attentive1y considered. The war has al
ready assumed gigantic proportons-ha
deluged the country with blood, and in it.
continuance threatens the land with desola-
ton. This is not all, but the ostensible OBJ
ject for which the war was originally wagec
has proved an entire failure. Union by wal
is not now within the range OF possibility -
While there was Union sentiment in the
South, there was a probability of its being
lifted up by the assistance of Northern arms
and so made superior to the forces which op
posed it. But now the South is well known
to be unit, and resoluteiy determined on
separation. Under these circumstances, I'm
ion, by war, is an impossibiltv. Conquest
however, which rests in the superiority oi
forces, may still be attainable, but if attain
ed would not be worth the miilionth part OF
the blood and treasure required for lis ac-
qusition.
Union and conquest are very different
things. One exists in assent, the other in
subjugation; one is by agreement, the othe er
by force; one is the relation of equals. the
other ofconquerors and conquered; one CO.'S
through amity, the other through a clash of
arms; and one engenders sociabl:ty, while
the other engenders hate. We do not,
therefore, if we be wise, want conquest, for
it would be alike injurious to the conquarors
and the conquered. What then do we want?
We want the unity of North and South
to swell the proportions of our National
strength, and their relations so conditioned
as to give US the benefits of remunerative
commerce. These two ends attained, it is
hard to see how sensible men can want any
thing else. But madmen may want blood
These ends, we think, may now, under
iudicious managem ent of conditions as they
now exist, be acquired and secured in such
way as to rebound alike to the interests of
both North and South. But they will never
be attained by war. We may destroy the
South, burn her cities, pillage her homes
and murder her people, but in doing so we.
and particularly we of the Northwestern
States, will, of necessity, destroy ourselves.
So intimately are the South and West con-
nected, that the destruction of the one fol-
lows the destruction of the other as newt
able. To elucidate this point, let US refer
to few plain statistical facts. Both sec
tions are agricultural, and depend alike upon
agricultural results. Take, then. the agri-
cultural exports of the nation for any given
year preceding the war, and they will show
in light which the most artful sophistry
cannot bewilder, the absolute dependence of
one section upon the other. Take the year
1859, thu year preceding the year Of our late
Presidential election, which struck down the
amitv of Northern and Southern relations.
In that year the agricultural exports of the
whole nation amounted, in round numbers,
to the sum of S199, ,OOOO 900. Of this sum
SI6l, 100000 alone were cotton, and S2l,-
600 coo tobacco, leaving but SIS 100000 of
all other agricultural productions. All the
cotton was of Southern growth, and very
near all the tobacco. So near was the to-
bacco all Southern, that by giving the cereals
and provisions of the Border Slave States,
and the rice of the Southern to the Northern
States, we may, for calcula alton, assume that
these two great staples are wholly Southern.
These two aggregated, gives us the joint sum
of 1882 100000, and present it as SO much
Southern export, standing against the me eagre
sum of SIS, ,OOO,O 900 of Northern growth
The contrast is overwhelming, and were
there not commercial relation to overcome
this inequality the Southern States would
be exorbtantly rich, and the Northwest be
miserably poor. But we have an interior
commerce not estimated in the exports of
the nation. Of this interior, commerce Gin
cnnati alone, in the year above assumed as
the basis of these calculations, exported the
round sum of SLY, 100000. These figures
show how small sum, $4,000. .OoO, our
whole n orthern exterior agricultural export
is of our Northwestern resources. Pitts
burg, Cleveland, Toledo, Detroit, Chicago,
ST. Louis, and Louisville, are also important
points of shipmen and, in the aggregate, no
doubt, double or treble the exports of Gin
cinnati.
Were we deprived of our inland COM
merce and confined to an export of eighteen
millions year, our fields would grow up in
bramb bles and our cities become the abode of
owls. But the commercial unity of North
and South is our vitality. By our internal
com merce the productions of hese two great
sections are intermipgled, and in their COM
bination become national export.
The Southern planter finds his labor more
remuneratve in the growth of cotton. conse-
quently, he turns his attention exclusively
to its production, and, by so doing, allows
the Northwestern farmer to raise his bread
By this operation our corn. wheat and pro-
visions-which feed the slave while he
labors in the growth of the Southern staple
go into the bale of cotton, and in that form
and character are exported to Europe, from
whence gold is returned in exchange, tt
nourish the Northwestern corn, wheat. oats
hay and barley fields, as well as the cottol
fields Of the South. When the planter re
ceives his money for one crop, he expend
il for Northwestern provisions, with whicl
to feed his negroes while they are raisin
opothar