Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-08-28
rHE RECENr moEEnENTs az vER-

ter not TO be communicated, and consequently
/ they, too, are silent, except the mere announce
msnt that Mcclellan has gone somewhere
Ia the meantime the world is left to conjecture
In this eon to Richmond" movement it is evil
dent that the enemy has discovered they have
made 8 second grave error. Their detached
armies, making up the Virgins Anseonda to
crush cut Richmond, have been cut up oy de-
tail, until the fallacy Of the plan is made aPpA-
rent TO themselves. Hence they concentrate,
hoping to accomplish their purpose by one great
blow. A great army, gigantic in its numbers
is to punish the Confederate capital Forces
! from every point-rom the West, the seaboard,
and every garrisOned position are massed and
certainly there can be no reasonable doubt OF
the intention.
A letter from Washington to tbs st. Lsuis
Republican, after admitting that "the evacuation
Of the Peninsula was a necessity, - that III was
impossible to advance successfully with the
i force MCCLELLAN had says that HALLECK's
new plan of the campaign would not admit OF
large reinforceneuts at present" They had
but two altsrnatives-to remain inactive Rhi
the new levies were drilled, or 60 to POPE's aid,
who was too weak to act otherwise than on the
defensive. They have undoubtedly done the
latter. Waiting for rsinfOrcements, with the eI-
cepdon of filing up the old regiments, was, says
the writer. mo part Of the plan of HALLEcK.
With the old regiments filed up, and the
armies Of Virginia thus recruited to something
near their former strength, he appears deter
mined to push them forward once more against
the rebel cspitali while the new forces are to
take the places of old soldiers on the fcrtifea-
tons, and in holding and occupying the con
ouered territory. AL immediate campaign has
Certainly been decided on, snd McCLELLAN's
transfer to the Rappahannock in conjunction
with PoPE's advance on the Rapidsn, is the
beginning Of heavy operations, which must re-
suit in grand events in & few weeks" And he
adds;
With this radical change of the plan Of opera
lions by General Halleck, the new campaign
assumes strategic and Typographical features
| different from those Of any prosecuted heretofore
IN Virginia. The Rsppahannock becomes our
| base of operations, from which two heavy
| columns-eaeh numbering near one hundred
thousand men-will advance toward Richmond
| Mcclellan having msssed his army at Frsder-
! icksburg. will push down the Richmond Boto-
| mac and Fredericksburg railroad, while Pope
/ will cross the Rapidsn, and, after dislodging the
! enemy from Gordonsville, will sweep down the
| line of the Virginia Central. The latter railroad
is the line upon which the enemy have evidently
decided to make a stand, as their forces now
occupy the following prominent points: Sections
A---a--Ewa wnTlaa north nj KEEnm0nU-
which mGy be properly called their night Wlng
a Doint on The Virginia Central, about hsteen
miles east of Louisa Court House, where = com
| uonroad from SPOTS, lv&nis Court House crosses
the railroad. as their center; and GoTdonsvlle,
I sixty-fve miles from lhsir capital, where jackson
/ commands their left. This line may appear a
weak one tor DE d-fsuse Of Richmond, as Ihat
cty j, 81 one end OF It Instead Of beng TIE cen
uadat; but the tIurh Is, Il Is the osss that
caui be chosen for to- purpose, aud possesses
I srerars,iyat ~Bjvantages ot S Superior chafac er-
/ The Maaa1ouy ard Pamonky rivers, tog ther
/ sikh tie tggampy character Of the p~enlnsulss OF
5hese streams sgd the R-appahannock, are q
sacufe guard against fank movement against
Redmond from the northeast, and our army
/ Advancing fron Fredericksburg must march
due sauth. and WHIP the enemy at or nesr Sex
TOMS junction bes-uss il is impossible by any
: algY % ua tlst position From LOUISA
E.ut II us- they can f~elotoTcs theT armies az
Sections Juueton OF GOrdOnsyIile, As occasion
may demand, and, though a strong Federal
iorcs viii pgobably operate against this central
/ position. they possess such great advantages by
having railroad communication along their en-
IRE line thst il is fair 70 presume they viii meet
our army 1t al points IN strong numbers, ana
7 make the issue one Of hard fighting and god
generalship On more thsn one field OF battle.
We are. therefore, on the eve of great events.
The Federal commander viii, if possible, delay
his movements until bis regiments are filed
Batitis so obviously our policy to give battle al
once, wherever an enemy can be found, that we
cannot believe our generals viii hesitate. oul
facilities Ter massing an army referred to by
the correspondent quoted, are sufficient. Yet i
cannot be disguised that we have cause Of ap
prehension-that danger threatens very strong
We cannot, however, doubt the strength Of GU
army IS to numbers and equipments-we can
not doubt its bravery, for that has been sstostet
!. on many hard fought felds-neither can the
ability of cur generals be questioned. The de
feets in tie eneuy's plans viii be taken sdvan-
tsge of, and we are promised sctive movement
Of an offensive character. Give Us action then a
an early day, and the gallant in the field VII
accomplish the rest. And until We have these
the country. viii be aDxiOus and full Of misgiv
logs and fears, for which it must be gdmitte'
there is sufficient ground in the present situation
"TuE STRUGGLE TO CONF"
Tho Mobile Adgsrtiser has some timely course
under this head, which we copy and adopt feel
ing that 1t cannot be impressed too strongly o.
tie minds OF eur people. Il says:
Tie pubic mind has become SO sccustone'
to large 6sure5 Of men and money that 1t