Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-06-26


mistakes at Bull Run were almost redeemed by
the perfect candor and truth of his report Of that
battle, and the foTbearance with which he has
ever trested those whose blunders, if nothing
verse, had contributed to his defeat by putting
part of one army against all the rebel forces on
the Potomac lie may never win battle, but
We feel sure that he will never lose one and then
say he fought it against his own judgment, in
obedience to newspaper clamOr. Nay, more;
had he been lieutenant general last July, we
should not have fought an important battle with
more than halt the Union soldiers within fifty
miles of the battle field, placed where they were
unable to fire shot or contribute in any way to
tho triumph of our arms. IL needs the prestige
of a great name to cover such dispositions with
the mantle of strategy.
MCCLELLAN
The New York Herald replies in like manner
to criticism on Mcclellan, which appeared in
the Boston Transcript The object OF the Tran-
script is to explain the course Of the failure of
McClellan's campaign, and to show that the
government is blameless in the matter, and that
the blame is all McClellan's The Herald says
that the transcripts article must have come
"from the War Department or military commit
tee of the Senate;' and in reply it cudgels Fre-
mozt Banks, Shields, Mcdowell, the War De-
partment, and the Influences generally, that con
troll at Washington. The following is portion
of its article:
The plans may have been all right, and may
have failed only from tie blundering in the exc
culion by incompetent generals. That terrible
blunders have been I. ade and that somebody is
responsible for them Is beyond all doubt.
The writsr in the Transcript states that when
Secretary Stanton came into Office che found
Gen Mcclellan virtually directing the whole
war, and fixed in his determination that no sd-
vance should be made until April;" aud that Gin
this determination he fortified himself by vote
of eight of his generals against four"
This is perfectly true as far as it goes, but let
the whole truth come out. Why was it that
Gen. Mcclellan was fixed in this determination
not to advance till April, in despite of the clam
ors of the Tribune and other abolition journals,
which daily assailed his ears Because large
portion of the army of the Potomac were with
out improved small arms and some Of the troops
without any kind of weapon, while part Of the
cannon, SO essential to success, had yet to be
made; and, lastly, the roads would not be in
order for the movement of artillery and military
stores till April while every days delay weak
ened he enemy, who had the start in prepara-
ton, but whose twelve months men to the nun
Der of $4,000 would probably retire to their
homes, if not p'emsturely attacked; whereas
the preparation, the organization and discipline
of the Union army would be rendered more
complete by gaining little time, which would,
in the end, have the effect of really fastening
the campaign to its consummatiOn. The army
of the West, too, before the arrival of Gen. Hal
leck, was in a miserable condition Nor were
the gunboais ready to play their part in the pro-
gramme. 1t was essential to the plan Of Gen.
Scott, adopted by Gen. Mcclellan, that the
movements in the Southwest, in Virginia, and
on the Atlantic coast and in ths gulf should be
simultaneous. But through the influence and
intrigues of the Abolitionists ia the Cabinet
the army of the Southwest was forced to al
vance prematurey. The plan of the campaign
was thus disclosed too-soon, and the rebels at
Manassas, taking the alarm retreated; whereas,
had not the time fixed by Mcclellan for a stimuli
taneous movement at all points been auticipat-
ed by a rash precipitancy, the rebels q! Bowling
Green and at Manassas would have been Gagged
together, the rebellion would have been finished
at a blow, and the war would have been now at
an end The excuse for the necessity of an i'm
mediate advance was the fear of foreign inter
vention, which was a grOuRdless fear, for if
Mcclellan had not been interfered with he
would have been successful before any foreign
power could have intdrvened.
Instead Of moving in April, Gen. McClelan's
army of the Southwest had moved even in Feb
ruary. Owing to the fact that Hslleck had the
control aid direction of the whole army Of the
Southwest he was eminently successful, but
would have been much more so had his advance
been delayed, while he would essentially have
contributed to the capture or destruction of the
whole rebel army in Virginia. On the one hand
Mcclellan had his army split by abolition in
trigue, and only fragment Of it asst gned to his
| command 1t was divided into four armies, one
of which was given to Fremont to operate in the
mountains of Virginia, another to Banks to
operate in the Valley ct the Shenandoah, q third
| to Mcdowell to operate on the Rappshannock,
and the fourth to Mcclellan to operate on the
Peninsula between the James and York rivers.
The object of this arrangement was to enabl2
| Med DWELL, who held the central position, to slip
| into Richmond while Mcclellan was laying
| siege to Yorktown, which it was necessary for
! him to reduce before he could make any further
advance. Mcclellan was thus to be deprived
! Of all the fruits of his exertions-the eelat of
capturing the rebel capital. But, by some fatal
! bluudering, the plan was frustrated. The Path
finder lost his path in the mountains. Banks
ran away to Maryland, distance of sixty
miles in two days, Shields, brilliant general,
with a portion of Banks army, was nowhere,
while Mcdowell was fitting backward and for
ward between the Rappahannoek and Washing
ton, doing nothing. The panic was equal to
that of Ball Run, and was greatly enhanced by
the alarming dispatches from the War Depart
ment about the danger Of Washington.
1t is scarcely necessary to say that these evsnts
were not very well calculated to avert foreign
| interventions Meantime, Mcclellan, who was
certainly not responsible for the disaster OF the
Shenandoah, did all the fighting, but was left
| to fight his battles alone against superior odds
Yet amidst these difficulties he has advanced to
the very suburbs of Richmond. Where are the
other three Union armies which were to co-ope
rate with him In consequence of his losses
from sickness and from battle he wants rein
forcements, and unless he speedily receives
them there may be serious difficulty. Owing tc
the original interference with the general plsr
of the campaign, he win now probably have t
fight considerable portion of Beauregard'' Z
army as well as Johnstor's. The very Journals
who most strongly urged his premature advance
and said his troops numbered two or three t.
one of the foe, now unite in the most disma
strains, and sound the note Of alarm.
TIE New York Times says there is an " omi
nous pause +" in the advance Of Mcclellan Il
Richmond, and the reason is that be finds ther
far greater force than his Own-a force of sOm'
100000 men. The HOJld says he ought to b