The New York herald., 1862-12-24

and think IN not 10 exceed hfteen minutes
they drove all the the other SIDE from
ther guns, and they ran on and ieI' 'oor
guns in the iod. Ny orders 10 advance and mold
Falmouth 10 cross but the temptation was 30 sro"s
10 60 AndAke these guns the my had left tnas
one time actually gave the order TO cross the iofd
at all events ami the guns and occupy the cy ou'
on reflection concluded was rather TOO old SOLDIER
to dsobey direct order and there another reason'
too had little too much experience the peninsula
OF tho consequence Of getting astadc Of river to wish
here For these reasons revoked my order that nign
The same night sent note TO General gdrnside, VINO
| was some eight ten miles distant, asking him
" could take Fredericksburg in the morning. should
be able to find q practicable ford, which, by
tho way, knew when wrote the note that could find
fne General replied through his Chief Of STAFF that he did
nos think II advisable TO occupy Fredericksburg until ms
communication were established and reflection
myself thought he right that II was prudent and
proper to have the bridges ready before We occupied
Fredericksburg. think could havo taken that city and
heights the other side Of II any time within three
days after arrival here the pcnoons had been here
Tor do not think there much force Of the enemy
be.e up TO that time. With regard to tho
delay in making the attack, I DO not think
that the could have been made sooner than IL
was made. II win be recollected that no pre9aratits ts
had been made at Aqua creek When we came across
here there were no means Aqua creek for landing
thing there All those things had to be prepared after
wards. Ihe railroad had to be completed before we
could get up supplies for this great army Il takes an
of transportation to supply an army OF
hundred thousand men, and DO net think, the
General could have made his preparations he could have
done all that necessary do than he did after
the arrival here Of the pontoons. The first propo
siiion TO cross the river was to cross Mt shickers
Neck. II seemed 10 that You could scarcely cross
river in the face Of enemy OF equal or superior force,
except by surprise Therefore, after the preparations
were made Snickcrs Neck, after large num-
Der Of wagons had hen sent by the General down there
in order to deceive the enemy, decidedly fayor
Of throwing the bridges over here and carrying the
town. we did carry by surprise rs the enemy were
/ masspg their troops down below expecting We
going below there Twas ia favor Of crossing
the Rappahanock because neither our government nor
our pedpe would be satisfied to have our army
retire from this position 90 into winter quarters until
we force that the other side Of the rivcr
and the only could have done so was by going over
there and feeling Of them. think il necessary 10
have made the that dsy-on Saturday andi It
was necessary therefore, 20 attack their strong works,
and The reruise what frequently happens in cam
10 be- knew IL was hazardous movement, but | did
believe we could carry the cnemys works The attack
failed owing TO the enemy's fotihcations being much
more formidable than We supposed them 10 be-
| Question. n.-will you describe those ortfcaiioDsp
| Answer.-l cannot describe them any farther than
ihs-lhey tier upon tier for two or three tiers.
II had carried the rt tier uld mol have held IT,
for their tier much more Formidable row OF
iotiications only milo distant, aud on higher posi-.
still; and doubt large masses Of infantry were
crest we would have been compelled to contend with
ma seq Of fresh. troops whom their own batteries
could fire. was ordered by the General commanding to
select the CORPS the attack selected the
OF General French and General Hancock two the most
neither Of them ever turned their backs to the emo
| N.Y. They made repeated assaults, but were driven
made ny these officers The principal obstacle that thcy
found long stone wall, which was the outwors OF
s m sns as 10 and had
and strengthened The enemy had artillery that emilia
or ,roops arrived al certain point whom they and
ponrcd perfect voliey ovor this was then ARTILLERY en-
stand Sch dro as that. do not think it repronch to
those two divisions that they did not carry that position
They did AL na men eoua ao nsd sn o strons
| diyison Of General Wilcox's corrs, the Ninth
oorls, General Barnsides old CORPS detached 70
That division not UNDER hro during the day. Some ol
tho oher OF the Ninth corps were more or ess
~ she town and one Of his corps under General II m
phrcy was engaged They made agallant attack, out
weTc driven back. The Aght continued on the lett,
bn, was SO remote from that that cannot give any 40,
scr ption Of ALL The General Commandnr d,rs.se1
establish ."S my ss M p nn
corls was there while the General Commanding was
at The rhlps House during the .en During an action
artillery, troops at different poin,s ammunition. &C. l
consider the crossing of The river. under the CIR.
cSsspessh the crsdseG ans ss%
Ssg else os The There en,o Me' ar%y 1@; vnoa,
acctrcnt. l should like to add here, because -.
a'nost the only occasion when the General Cummana,
and myself have differed in regard to any point that
could have held il with single division by posting our
batteries right Il would not have been giving up ex
pedion but simply change tactics That the way in
which viewed It; that would just be drawing back
little in order 10 try II agan. therefore strongly
Perhaps was he only general oces OF nK who sels was Of
that opinion thought Il would present better and
could have commander any M n'd sne a' 'STn with
no, think there vas any danger or difficulty in holding IT,
oucssion-po you know any reason why the pontoon
oFidsss sa.s.r did H 1sI A. arrive ri, eariisrS
oueston.-You know nothing that subjectS
wer.-I do not. expected as a matter OF 10
Qucston-n you had found them here yon expected,
what woald, in your opinion. have been the result
AnswcrI should have taken the crest In the tho
town on that night on the following day. Not con-
sderng fredericksburg as being OF any consequence
ccpt as being on the road 10 Richmond, should have
passed through the town aud taken possession Of the
| crest ts
QUESTIONABLE there any fords here which nigh, have
Answsr-There are several fords on the river. and in
The sunmsr time two or three OF them would be prac
were there any practicable fords a,
the time You did cross I'D if so, where werc thcy'
Answer.-There IL a rough caysry ford down by The
upper bridge. al Falmouth, where herscuen sometimes
90 over; but that ford depends upou lne tide, which
rises above tho The tide was 10 when arrived
here which was In the afternoon. The tide was then
rsceding asd citizen told that would pot be Ios
sbe TO get anything the ford until after dsrk That
ford II represented TO me as being deep ford.
holes in Il; skep from ro,k 20 rock fcw mon
al time but there OCCASIONALLY deep holes from six
10 eight feet deep. Sch ford would never be cons
dcred practicable for marching troops over
Question what reasons do you assign for not coss-
i,g either above or below WHARF the onsny havofort
hcdf
Answer This reison was this:-wc did not attempt 10
tgrn their left faux because thorc Is then slack ater
navigation taken out Of tho river some two miles above
here aud brought with tho baslu at the upper end Of tho
town. that along al considerable distance from the
Rappahannock In making the movement TO turn the enc
mv's left flank II force had been sent up between tho
river and canal the canal weuld have 10 be crossed and
10 do so II would be necessary 70 bridge 10. The only
way TO have made that movement would have boon 10
have gone entirely the left Of that canal, and that