New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-11-28
TIE AIT OF WAR.


hesitation may produce disasters, it were wise
and well that we avail ourselves of all the
lights that history offers.
Just after the brilliant campaigns Of last
Spring in tho months OF May and june and
after JEFF. Davis, in message to bis Congress,
had admitted that they were attempting JIM
possibilities in trying to defend the entire
frontier Of the Southern Confederacy, The four
mails of the South took up tao discussion OF
tho "Cordon System Of warfare Alison,
Theirs, and Napoleon were oil consulted, aud
al gave their verdict against the system. ii
was therefore universally decided that it was
their true plan to "mass their forces and strike
the enemy in detail and in his most sensitive
points" The success of tho seven battles OF
June and the failure Of Pope demonstrate the
wisdom Of this decision.
There was another species Of warfare that
they condemned upon the authority Of the
above.named authorities. "The M,thodIca
system." May we not profit by the example
Waving all mention Of the sufficiently known
success that has INDICATED the course Of the
Confederates in this regard, let US examine
what history teaches VA about the " cordOn'
and the 4" Methodiea" plans. 1t is Of the lat
ter of these systems that We propose chiefly Il
let history speak, as it is tho one in which We
are most interested.
1t will be quite enough to say of the former
that had the Allies given up this Gordon plan
of operation against France and seized TIE
several most inviting occasions to follow ~
their victories, Alson and Theirs both agree
that the French Revolution would have been
undone in its comparative incpency, aud Eu-
rope would have been saved a twenty years OF
war and its consequences. But it is tao Ne
tHodieaI plan which they especially condemn
and which our own short experience in this
Rebellion has already condemned.
Every reader Of French history must have
observed the success winch followed Dumouriez
so long as be struck his blows according to
the occasion, following up big successes regard
less of las plans. And no reader Of that
interesting period can have failed to observe
that he faiied when be failed 70 seize the oc-
casica but yielded 10 his preeonceyod plans.
After the detection of Dgmogriez, aud the
French repulsc at Ncerwinden, reverse after
reverse followed in quick succession. Their
Northern Frontier and their cOnquosts of the
North had all been wrested from the French
by the victorious Allies; but few leagues lay
between the victorious armies and PsTis, unn.
terrupted and uninpeded by even the appear
ance Of an organized force. More than this
more than three-;ourths Of France itsclf was
in revolt ageinst Paris aud the Government;
nothing remained but TO march upon Paris,
and the Revolution was no more. " But" says
Tliers, q" fortunately for the Revolution tie
Allies, adhering to the ms,hodioal plan laid
down at the opening Of the campaign, would
not push forward at any one point. Had
there been any genius or any union among the
Generals Of the coalition. the cause OF The
Revolution would have been undone After
Neerwinden and the detection OF Dumouriez,
they ough. TO have pushed On aud gwen no
rest to that beaten. divided, and betrayed
army. In this Gaze, whether they made IT
prisoner or drove it back into the iortresfes.
our open country would have been at the mercy
of the victorious enemy"
or the same conduct on the part OF the Al
lies, Alison says: "if the conduct Of the
Allies had been purposely intended to develop
the formidable military strength which bad
grown upon the French Republic, they could
not have adopted measures better calculated ~
effect their object than were actually pursued.
-Four months Of success. which might have
been rendered dseisire had been wasted in
tlamable inactivity"
In process of time, when tho revolutionary
energy had been fully aroused, and when, after
the reduction Of reyotcd Lyons, and amid the
alarming danger Of that PERIOD new war-cry
was raised, Theirs tells us, To this period
must be referred the first advances Of the art
Of war. Tie principles of that art had, in
deed, been known and practiced in all ages
by captains combining boldness Of mind with
Doldness OF character. In very recent times,
Frederick had furnished an example Of the
meet admirable strategieal combinations. But
~ soon as the man of Genius disappears aud
gives place to ordinary men. the art Of war
alb back into oireunYsetion and routine.
Generals fight everlastingy for tho defense or
he attack Of line; they acquire 'kill in cal
,ulating the advantages of the ground, in adapt.
ne it to each kind OF arm; but with all there
means, they dispute for whole years the pos
lession Of province which bold captain
would be able to gain by one maneuyer; ana
las prRdeHcc Of n'ediocriiy saoryiees more tIood
han the t;nle.1,y Of genus, for II consumes men
oihOm producing adequate results. Such had
800, Aha noi,r.n I.ur.nod L., IL. IL, llEL %