Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-04-16
now eENErsAns ARE IADE.

War often works great and sudden uans.or-
nations. 1t lifts up one and it puts down All
other with an almost despotie authority. It rs a
touchst0ne that brings out 60 view the native
character and real capacity Of aspirants for mill
tary command. He in whom there is the stUH
from which great commander is made becomes
manifest. while al the artifcia. glitter that may
have surrounded the incompetent officer IN time
Of peace is stripped away. On one occasion. au
officer I'm the army of the first NAPOLEON solic-
tied the bst0n Of a Marshal Tits not shat
make Marshals," said NAPoLE0H; 'it is yicto-
ries." Capacity for command, proven by the
emergencies, was what he required. He asked
for what he was accustomed to call ' military
head " in him who wished to be the head of mil
itaEy movements.
We often hear sensible persons alleging that
the policy Of the Lincoln government in decapi-
tsting every general who loses battle should be
imitsted by our own authorities But nothing
is more evident than that an army's superior
officers should never be removed or superseded
except for imperative reasons. The period of
transition from the control of one officer 10
the direction OF another is liable to be a season
Of disaster. Aud even if it is not fraught
with positive danger to the army, yet it IS
likely to be a season Of comparative ineti-
cheney. Such changes should only be made for
cOgent military reasons, to be decided upon
by competent military authority. The demands
Of civilians for military changes cannot safely
be allowed great weight. because their opinions
on such subjects are so very liable to the susPi-
cioD OF error. The Judgment Of the civilians Of
the opposition, who RUurished half a century
ago ou the hustings and in the British ParIia-
ment was utterly sverse to the continuance Of the
Pininsular war If It had been allowed to decide,
it would have depossd WELLINGTON from his
command AZ any time between his first landing
at N, ndego Bay and his last conflict at ST.
Sebastian. The result of the campaigns. how
ever, and the final expulsion Of the French from
Spain, fully justified the sagacity of Lord Cas-
TIEREAGH in the selection Of the commanding
officer, and the wisdom Of WELLmGToN in his
plans for the prosecution Of the strife But
when competent military authorities decide,
from evidence presented, that any officer has
not the capacity for general command, We
mus. choose the smaller evil, and be must yield
his place.
It is by success that a general is finally to be
made-success in a large and comprehensive
military view. This is what NAPOLEON meant.
He never r-demanded, as the price OF the mar
shars baton,-a record of advances with no re-
treats, successes with 40 Teverses, gains with no
losses. He well knew that men may lose BAT
ties, YET win campaigns; tbas they may err at
particular points, yet fully compensate flT their
mistakes oy the magnitude Of the grand results
which they achieve. The achieving Of final re-
suits was, in his esteem, victory victories
made the marshal.
TINS war viii test and try men: it win assign
to the incompetent IN council and the feeble in
action their just place, It will on the other
hand, make generals wiz bring out capacity
and energy, and put tleir possessors in the
7 laces which Of right belong to them. Such
men can always bide their time; they may wait
long, like HAvaLoCK, but their day will come;
when dangers press, their names win be called.
and they wiz pass up to the places that await
their coming