The national Republican., 1862-07-07
THE PLAN OF CAmrAias.

THE PLAN OF CAmpAiGs.
The time has gone by when the people o,
this country will consent TO give up the use o,
their own judgement in military matters, by
the suggestion that the conduct Of wars is q
mysterious science. comprebeusible only b,
adepts. The country ss.s too clearly the preci.
pice, to the edge Of which II has been dragged
BY that idle sophism.
Alter the evacuation Of Manassas by the enc
my last winter, the way to Richmond wss
straight by land from Washington. II ls idle
TO talk about the expense Of transportation. II
COST us twenty millions Of hard money 10 move
our army aud stores from Washington aud
Alexandra 10 Fortress Monroe. The way was
loug, about one hundred miles, a the crow
hies. What then! 10 the very act oi march
ing to Richmond we cut the enemy's great
strstsgetic line, the Virginia Central Railroad
connecting Richmond with the Valley Of vir.
ginia, and which Is we'll termed the wbiprow,
which enables him 10 keep our whole front,
from Fredericksburg to Msrtlnsburs, 10 alarm,
and which finally enabled him to effect thai
sudden concentration Of bis forces near Rich
mond, which has just proved 60 nearly fatal to
Gen. McClellsn's army.
A force advancing from Washington upon
Richmond would itself be a protection to Wash.
ingtou, whereas upon the plan actually adopted
Of an attack BY the way Of the Peninsula, |,
became necessary 10 leave a considerable force
in front Of the national capital, and serving NO
other purpose than tn protect II. That. TO b.
sure. wss and is an indispensable objsct, nsvs,
to be lost sight Of Bat the protection Of Wash.
iogton does not help us 70 capture Richmond
We are perfectly aware that there Is an EN-
bittersd controversy between the friends Of the
Pres dent and the friends Of Gen. Mcclellan.
growing out Of the failure Of the former to send
to the Peninsula the reinforcsmeuts said 10
have been demanded by the latter. 1t would
be easy 10 judge Of the merits Of that conro.
versy. II the friends Of Gen. Mcclellan would
point out the troop', which they think ought
to have been sent to hioi. Certainly, not n
man more could have besn spared from the
front Of Washington. and we include in that
the Valley Of Virginia.
We know that after the battle of Fair Oaks
such reinf0rcements were sent 10 Gen. jackson
- TO give that euterprising commander not les
than forty thousand men at Orange Court
House and Gordonsvilie, a greater number
than the enemy had last fall aud winter at Ma
nassas, and the presence Of which there kept
our whole army under General Mcclellan mo-
tionlsss 10 its entIencbmsnts for six months
Where General Jackson would have dealt his
blow, II a change Of rebel tactics had not re-
called him 10 Richmond, nobody knows, but
II is prepostsrous 10 suppose that in presence
OF such dangers. the force covering Washington
ought to have been further reduced.
Unless We get new light. We must bsliev,
that Gen McClellaus mode Of operations be
fore Richmond required reintorcemsots, whict
the Pr, sidsnt had not the means Of furnishing
A general, waiting to bs attacked, ought I,
have force at least equal to what the snen,
can muster by any possibility aud at any time
There is no other measure Of safety for . gene
raj who leaves 70 the enemy the choice Of ID,
lime for Sighting He must be ready for 81
the enemy, taking his o,on time, can do. o!
that plan Of tactics, Gen. Mcclellan ought l.
have had at least two hundred thousand men
Four miles Fl ON aa snemys capital, and tbs
capital locus Of railroads from all paris I,
the enemy's territory, is dangerous csmpin,
ground. II Gen. Mcclellan intended To spen,
the summer there, b. ought to have had twic'
his .clual force, but where was II 70 come from