Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-11-19
THE Removal or MCCLELLAN.

| the crowd
THE REMOVAL oT MCCLELLAN.
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4 Prom the Washington Star Of Monday
The reader is referred to the Star elsewhere to
day for the particulars of, aud circumstances at
! tending the removal of General Mcclellan from
the command of the Army of the Potomac I
was clearly the right of the President to tako
the step, it. in his judgment, the public interest
] required such action, and nons who know him
| will doubt that such was his sincere conviction
| Il is clear, from the prompt publication Of the
| correspondence between GeneTAlin- Chief Hal
! leck, QuArtermssterG General Meigs, and the
| War Department, upon tho subject of General
McClellsn's complaints against alleged want OF
supplies for his troops, that the specific charge
under which he was displaced waS,a deeleusiou
or bis part TO make the campaign ss it Kas
/ carved out for him here. No sensible man will
accept ths Washington Republicans theory that
| he was removed because the drit of the recent
elections called for it; the recent elections hav-
| ing gone overwhelmingly against those who
1 for a year past have been his bitter enemies in
season and out Of season, and for those whe
! tTu { for the speedy success of our arms in him
and almost in him only
Nor viii the country any more readily sccepi
the theory eDUrc ciaisd yesterday by the Wash
inglon Chronicle that be was removed on account
Of astounding developments resulting from re
| cent Investigations eic which, if meaning auv-
thing dsrogsiory TO General Mcclellan, appa
renfly casts aspersions upos his loyalty; which
that journal, we are happy to perceive, promptly
retrscts.
While it is very true that there hes been
nearly ever since he was called to the command
of the scattered, broken and dispirited forces OF
Pope an issue between Gen Mcclellan and the
military authorities here, with reference to the
suthciency of bis supplies Especially of horses
it for cavalry aud artillery seTvice), are sat-
ish that the true reason for his delay in obey
ing the order to fight the battle which Is prob
| ably to decide the result of tho war, when and
where he was ordered so to do by Gen. Hsleck
is a very different ore. That order directed
him to fight it in the Valley, while, as he evi-
IDENTIFY believed. he would be deprived of the
assistance Of perhaps fifty thousspd Of his troops
regarded by him as necessary to be kept on the
Maryland aide, at the fords, to save his rear and
Maryland and Pennsylvania from the disastrous
consequences of another raid of Stuart cavalry,
which would almost surely bring about his de-
| feat when the enemy accepted battle in the Val
| ley, if by that time Stuart had succeeded in
cutting off bis communication with Washington
and Baltimore, and destroying his supplies nee
essarily accumusted and left on this side Of the
river. He must also have been influenced by
the fact that, If permitted to follow his oTn plan
of campaign, be could OBJ tain the assistance f
from thirty to fifty thouscnd troops who could
not be spared from guarding the Rasionsl capital
| 80 long IS Lees army was between his own and
Washington, as it would continue to be- had be
essayed to march directly from Harper's Ferry
upon Lee in the Valley.
His subsequent movements clearly demon
stTste the fact, that however bis preverbal To-
ticence may have induced him to keep the secret
| Of bis plans ia his own heart (for fear that il
any one here knew them they might possibly
como to the knowledge of tho enemy) and thus
plead embarrassment from want of supplies
which may not have seriously existed, his de-
clension to move when ordered so to do was re-
eally occasioned by his conviction that if he
waited until the rise of the river mAds him 50 =
600 stronger for the movezent frsm his imnedi-
ate command, and 10000 stronger from this vi
cinity, be could fight, not only with the assn
rance of victory, but st lodere uictorv lcoRld Be
likely to sad the tOaT IN faDOr Of the Uaion
Had he essayed the battle in the valley with
cut these additional 80 600 troops, he must have
fought when and where Lee chose Had he
simply been more or less less OF men and ma
| teral on both sides, as at Antietam, with
many other subsequent battles as they fell
back, at mountain passes, in all Of which
the rebels would have had choice of posi-
ton. He evidently preferred to wait until
| the elements permitted him TO move in
! greatest force. In his progress to the point
| wlers he proposed to fight the enemy-where
/ he knew well the enemy must fight or soon sur
i !
every gap through which Jackson (whO re-
mains in the valley with from 5000 TO 20 900
| treop,) might possibly threaten his rear, sufh
| ciant guard to hold it qlite long enough to Sc
| cure his Communications with his base of oper.
atoms and supplies, and he steadily pushed his
| army on for the field Of his ogn choice We
| refer 70 the banks Of the R4Didan the threat oi
| Richmond, because it is the defense of G0rdons-
! vile, through which ths rebel capital receives
three -fourths its supplies Of every description
| He knew IS well that L2e must fight there t.
the sacrifice If his last man in It's defense, as
! that, if victorious thsre, Richmond would
| speedily be as muck at bis mercy, as Washing
ton would be at Lees with the Potomac si
closely blocksaed as James river IS, its commu
nication with Frederick by turnpike as seriously
| threatened g sPetersburg now is from SaTolk
and with Annapolis Junction in the hands of q
victorious enemy.
Were such the situation of Washington, the
time thAt it could hold out could be counted by
hours; and it is evident to us that General Nc
Clsllan's plan Of campaign contemplated get
| ting Richmond into that situation within weeE
from to-day ct furtbest Bat it has been deter
mined by his superiors in command that Ii,
cause of the country will be ssferin other hands
and with his advances within thirty-two miles Q
the point where the battle must take place tina
will probably decide thefats Of the war, he i
prompt to obey the order directing him to repaii
TO Trenton, New Jersey, and there await furthe
orders.
Though we have not yet seen bis farewell ad
dress to his army, we learn by telegraph that il
it be does his best to nerve it to a proper dis
charge Of its duty in the rnomentous stTuggl
which he says, is on the eve Of coming eff
doubtless, as We explain above
To those who, like oursef, have plsced on
trust in him as the great UAion captain Of th
age, through good and evil report we have 4
point to his patriotic conduct in the present cr,si
as furnishing tho example it s their duty to fol
low. He takes no thought Of self at this time
his heart and mind being wrapped up in tn
cause OF his country as involved in the momeu
tous crisis to which his almost completed move
ment had brought that cause. His friend
should, as one man, acee9t the action of his 50
! psriors in command here as thing accom-
plished to be made the best of 10 secure, wIt
the command Of the army in other hands, th