Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-07-09

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VOL. XVI.
-aI cannottell. None have been sent
only know that shah live and die viii
! the army Of chs Poiomac
The retrogressive movement had no
then begun, but disaster vas looming uI
: in dreary proportions. AT Malvern Hill
/, as Ut Savage Station, white Oak Swamp
T and on the march, his usually cheerful
countenanoe was scared with deep lines Of
care and anxiety. Those nearest him Wnrc
grave and sorrowful. But why sketch the
! gloomy picture. Evidences 10 fortify the
facts already apparent 10 the people, could
be multiplied almost indefinitely. Every
hour Of Tuesday which wore away without
calamity was so much gained-sO much
hope, 50 much prospect Of relief, and as it
! Verged upon darkness, without the grand
movement Of the enemy which had been
anticipated with a shudder all day long,
the heavy load upon our hearts seemed a
little lighter. 1t is true that supplies were
sent, but The troops did not suffer 50 much
from want Of food as from general physi-
cal prostration. One nights undisturbed
rest would have changed the conditions al
together. That was impossible. Those
who did not stand 10 line Of battle were
required to dredge in the trenches, 50 that
there was no respite for any. Soldiers in
the trenches dropped from sheer weari-
ness. You can put no finer point upon the
situation. God be thanked for his mercy,
the battle Of Monday, and the stupidity or
I inability Of the enemy on Tuesday-as it
now seems-proved rainbow Of promise
to those who had fought so long for human
! rights.
THE POSITION.
With limited time I endeavored to con-
vey to readers q clear idea Of the position.
I Il may perhaps be wise 10 restate it. With
our backs to the James river, facing the
enemy, who pursued from Fair Oaks, our
left rested on Malvern Hill, which looks
down into Turkey Island, in Turkey Bend.
Our left wing as we faced was posted on
the crest Of the hill, about opposite the
head Of the island, a mile from the river.
A narrow valley lay between the hill and
riYer-eoVered both by the army and gun
boats. In front Of the left wing up the
river, there is a wide cultivated bottom,
with an intervening swamp and heavy for
est. The center bowed out toward the
southeast corner Of Richmond, and swept
around nOrthwardly in irregular horse
shoe course toward White Oak swamp
And the right curved back again towards
Harrison's L.nding. Malvern Hill as you
now understand, is lofty bluff, unap-
prOaehable, almost impregnable, on the
river side, and on the deelivity looking
down upon the swamp have described
The north 'front.' however, is much less
abrupt, but the hill ITSELF perhaps O mile
square (mny be more) in area, could, with
fresh troops, be made very powerful fort
within thirty-six hours. The exterior po- I
sitions we're simply woodlands and planta- !
tions alternately, with some considerable |
undnlations on Turkey Creek. Below |
Malvern Hill, the plateau terminates in
bluff aud sWamp-materially contributing
10 the defensibleness Of the position. In I
short the site is admirable for defence
with the proviso that the army has time to /
fortify it. II is strong in any light, and |
its sanitary merits are conspicuous. 1t IS I
about seventeen miles below Richmond |
via, the river, and some forty miles above /
the mouth Of the ChickahOminy. Fort 1
Darling is on the opposite side Of the river, I
some ten miles, think, above. The main 4
thorOughfares-the Charles City, Central |
and New Market-roads, and one obscure
road, passable in dry weather by infantry /
and artillery, lead 10 it from Richmond,
and several roads are open towards it from
theChiekahOminy, SO that the enemy could 1
launch columns upon it from the front and
both TANKS. The gunbOats, however, pro-
teet the tanks directly, and the river and 1
Turkey Island protects the rear.
STRENGTH OF rHE ARMY.
or the exhaustion Of the army you have
read enough TO distress you. It would not
be prudent to attempt to state definitely
how much it has been reduced numerically
But there can be no imprOpriety in stating
that Gen. Mcclellan was never able to car
~ over so, 900 electives into battle When
he landed at Fortress Monroe his muster
rolls exhibited l15,000 men Of all arms
A considerable proportion Of these, say
5000, were cavalry, Of which 1000 were
seryiceable. The remainder would have
served their country better behind their
plows at home Others were necessarily
dstsiied to keep open our communications
and protect our danks-leaVing about
100000 10 be disposed Of A very large
per centage Of sick was then to be sub
tracted. It is not very extrayagant TO say
that wounds and deaths at Yorktown cost
vs. 1000 men; Williamsburg cost US 3,OOOi
West Point 250; Hanover Court House
500; Fair Oaks, SO say official bulletins,
5, zoo. / wish / could believe that were
ALL skirmishes and affairs in front Of
Richmond, 1000 at least; Mechanicsville,
800 at least; Gaines Hills, 1900; Savage
Station, 1000; White Oak Swamp and
Turkey Creek-0h, how many Where
are the stragglers To be sure the enemy
/ have lost full as many, but they could af-
/ ford il. without attempting to estimate
/ the average number Of sick l Will give one
exceptional fact which may cause you TO
shudder. When General Casey's Division
/ landed at Fortress Monroe it numbered
/ 1900 men. When his Division was rout-
/ ed at Seven Pines it numbered less than
| 6,000. All the rest were dead and in hos
I pitals. But no other Division suffered as
/ much. After Seven Pines it was no Divis-
ion at all. Many Of these losses were
compensated by reinforcements-seven reg
iments, Say 5000 men, from Fortress Mon
roe, and McCall's Division Of 10000 efRec-
lives from the Rappahannock. But even
with all these reductions, the army could
sustain itself against attack if it had re-
guisite rest and supplies. l state these
4 facts because the crisis seems 10 have
passed. Reinforcements and supplies have
been forwarded.
i A BRIaADIER IRON NELsOS.-Our cor
respondent G.. P. S. tells US that Col Tut