The Hillsdale standard. [volume] (Hillsdale, Mich.) 1851-1909, 1862-08-05

/ "The immense superiority Of the enemy at Win
chester in men and guns well as In position, wa
| we'll known. The information was obtained fro
deserters and from various sources, all agreeing OF
an average Of forty thousand men and over sixt,
guns" r. ~
Colonel Price says: @ M
HE General Patterson) got positive information
at Bunker Hill that Johnston had forty-two thous
and men at Winchester, and, think, sixty-thrc
pieces of artillery" /.
Colouel Biddle says:
Everybody represented the force Of Gen. John
ston at from thirty TO forty thousand"
That 10 the testimony Of Patterson and his
staff The facts were that Johnston had re.
ceived no reiuforcsments except OF undisci.
pined, uncrganized militia FROM the surround.
Jog country, and held an effective force less
than that Of Patterson. ~
Nathaniel F. Palmer, (pris,ner at Win.
chester J says: - 'nsaa2 o,eF
I'VE concluded that by the 18th (July) there was
but very little over thirteen thousand men there
DR.. Ira Trip, (prisoner at Wincbester,) J
says that there were abont twelve thousand
mer of The enemy at Winchester on the 18th
of July. $50
Alfred Spates, president Of the Cbesa.
peake and Ohio canal,) says:
The general impression in that vicinity was that
Johnston's army was between eight and ten thous-
aud men. ! never heard any man put it higher than
ten thousand men,"
A. r. Stoke, general superintendent of
the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, says:
al know that it was the impression throughout
the community, and in the army, that there were
not more than ten thousand men under Johnston;
and there is this additional fact ascertained since
from perfectly reliable gentlemen. that there
was at any time in Winchester as many as fourteen
thousand men, and of those there perhaps four
or five thousand militia, badly armed and equip
ped"
Colonel David B. Bi,ney. Twenty third
Pennsy l,ania volunteers,) says:
II thought, from information that got from the
people there in the county, that he General John
ston.) had from fifteen to twenty thousand men,"
General Sanford says, in reference to the
story that Johnston had been reinforced:
"They had all got this story. which was without
the slightest shadow of foundation, for there had
not single man arrived at the camp since we had
got full information that their whole fofce consisted
of twenty thousand men. of whom eighteen hundred
were sick with the measles. The story was, how
ton of this reinforcement. Where they got their in
formation do not know. None such reached me-
and picked up deserters and other rebels TO get
all the information I could. And we since have
learned, as matter of certainty, that Johnston's
force never mid exceed twenty thousand men,"
Upon this melancholy statement Of facts l
will neither comment nor dwell.
2, The second crusc Of this disaster was
the failure to attack on Friday before the ar
rival OF the enomy's rcinforceInents, instead
OF ou Sunday, after they had arrivel Why
was not this douel 1t is averred l,t tie
fault was in the quarternaster's department,
in not furnishing transportation at the proper
time and place.
General Heintaelnlan says;
"The delay ut Centrcvile, I suppose was prin.
cpally waiting for provisions, and for the infor-
nation of the position Of the enemy.
The day after we left Alexan lria the pr, v sion
train was to start. The wagons had not yet been
collected, as / understood, and the consequence
was that they did not start the next day, but the
day after.
General franklin states, iu relation 10 the
delay of the army a; Centerville from Thurs,
day to SUNDAY:
"My impression is that it was on account Of the
nonarrival ofthe supplies for the army until some
tiuic oh oaturuhy'
General Mcdowell states that he Vas for ed
to leave to those in The city tho duty Of for
wardiDg provisions TO him, but lhcro vas
delay in doing So.
8. The delay VI the whole army for three
hours O., Sunday moraing in consequence tf
tie delay OF Kcyos brigade in Tyler's divis
i1n, 10 getting into the assigned position. ] he
IL L.
for the timely arrival Of n portion Of Johnson
force, their rout wou have been complete
The three hous lost in ,ha early morning
could not be regained Te men wer. ia.
igued and overworkcd in the heat, and the
precious moment for n crushing blow passed.
Gen. Mcdowell says on this point:
"Tyler was TO move at halfpast two o'clock A. NJ.
md Hunter was to move half an hour earlier so that
lie might close up on Tylers division. Heintzel-
nan to move at halfpast two, A. NJ, 50 as to |
all in the rear of Hunters division. Tyler ex-
,ectedto get over the ground between the encamp-
nent of his advanced Brigade and where the road
nrned off to the right ut the blacksmith's shop, in
ime to offer distractions to the road TO be used
n common by all the divisions.
Il was sick during the night and morning. and
lid not leave my quarters little over mile per-
laps mile and quarter east OF Centerville-until
uOuBnJ I'LL the ulNlsiOnS were Iully IN mOtlOn so
Is to give my self as much rest as possible. When I
had got beyond and sitting down on the wayside |
Upon asking why they did not move forward, the
eply came to ire that the road was blocked up.
Jaw some men coming from the left of the road
through cornfeld into the road. When asked |
o what regiment they belonged, they said the Sec
md New York, which formed part of Schecnks
brigade, (Tyler's division / went forward, urging
he troops to move on, until got to the blacksmith
hop, where the road turned off to Sudley's Springs.
was making every effort, personally and 6v my
ids to have the roads cleared in order tina. Hunters
md Heintzeiman's divisions might take up their
march TO the right. by way Of Sudey's Springs, to
larry out the plan Of battle
Ia reply TO the question, "Whosc division
blocked up the road 7" Gen. Mcdowell says:
@'The first division: General Tyler's DIVISION
Aajor-now General-Barnard. who was the chief
If engineers my staff, in his report to me, dated
July %, 1861, says as follows:
"You are aware of the unexpected delay. The
wo leading Brigades Of Tyler's did not clear the
road for Hunter TO this point, BLACKSMITH shop,)
where the road turned TO the right, until half past
i've.
That was three hours after the time fixed to start
Colonel Heintzelman--now General Heintzelman
in his report TO Of July 81. states follows:
At Centerville we found the road filled with the
troops and were detained three hours 10 allow the
divisions Of Generals Tyler and Hunter TO pass
followed them with my division, Immediately in