The New York herald., 1862-12-05

McClellan's army, which enabled him to escape
to the strongly fortified position on the southern
bank Of the Potomac at Washington.
Had Halleck permitted Mcclellan to carry
out bis own plan, Lee would not have dared
to quit Richmond, leaving behind. as he did,
five thousand men. Mcclellan, in position
which was impregnable, would have held Lee
at Richmond or in its vicinity, till, with sufi-
cient Peinforcements and the gunboats, Rich
m0nd would have been taken three months ago.
or the whole rebel force defending it would
have been captured or destroyed Jaclson's
force, too, would have been lost; for, already
inferior to Pope's, and afraid to press on
against him, he waited for the reinforcements
from Lee. Instead Of Lee, Mcclellan would
soon have been upon him. and, hemmed in be-
tween the two Union armies, he could not have
escaped But upon Halleck's plan q series OF
disasters happened. Richmond being relieved
OF McClellans army, which was within one
days march of it, Lee moved rapidly to the
capture Of Washington, and, after defeating
Pope's army in severe battle at Bull run, and
compelling 1t 70 take shelter in the Notifications
of Arlington Heights, crossed the Upper Poto-
mac with view to capture Washington on the
northern side, which was of comparatively easy
access. The capture Of Baltimore would have
followed as a matter Of course.
Thus, not only was Halleck's military judg-
ment completely at fault but General McClel-
lan's fully justified. And HaIleck admitted
this to be the case. When the government in
despair, recalled Mcclellan to the command,
Halleck confessed that he thought it world not
be possible to save the capital-a fact which
has not yet seen the light; and no doubt in
this Halleck would have been right, aud Wash
ington would have been captured, had Pope
remained in command, or had any of the other
generals been placed at the head Of an army SO
discomfitted and disheartened. But with Nc,
Clellan leading it against the foe the case -
different. His reply to Halleck was that if <
worth struggle, and he would try what could
be done. Again, the military Judgment of
Mcclellan was clear and that of Haleck was
bewildered. Glorious success crowned the
brief and brilliant campaign Of Mcclellan in
Maryland, after the greatest battle of the war.
And what Is the most curious feature connected
with this campaign, which drove the enemy out
Of Maryland and beyond the Rappahannock?
Mcclellan fought it without orders, and acted
solely on his own responsibility. So frightened
were the Cabinet and the military authorities at
Washington that not one Of them could be found
when he was about to start for the field. The
result was that, untrammelled by blundering
orders, his success was complete. His reward
to lin hic
General Halleck says he did not rapidly follow
up the victory of Antictam. What did General
Haiieck do at Corinth, with magnificent fresh
army Of nearly one hundred and fifty thousand
men, which had not fired shot for about two
montbss He let Beauregard slip through his
fingers to swell tne army at Richmond to such
figure as to force McCiellan's retreat ail
cause the seven days. disaster, from which
sprung all the other disasters that befel the
army Of Pope.
The rebel generals have obtained great credit
for generalship; but had they been equal to
tteir reputation, had they sighted the army
of General Pope, and pressed on rapidly, in
stead of waiting to fight it, through the valley
of the Shenandoah, and crossed the Potomac,
they would have been in Baltimore and Wash
ington before aid could have reached thoee
cities from either of the Union armies; and, the
capital once captured, the junction between the
two Union armies by way Of Alexandria would
have been prevented, aud the rebel cause would
have been triumphant. Washington and the
Union were saved by the failure of tho re bel
generals, by Providence, and the mastery skill
of General Mcclellan, alter being az good as
lost by the War Department, Halleck and Pope
In his report The General-in-Chief shifts from
bis own shoulders the responsibility Of origi-
nally dividing the Army of the Potomac,
and permitting the enemy in full strength
to occupy position between them. But he
cannot relieve himself from the bundcr Of
sending SO large an army as forty thousand
men so far from its base Of operations. and SO
near to Richmond that it fell into
trap, while it was not in the power of
Mcclellan to save il. Had Halleck with
drawn Pope's army, numbering 10000
men, behind the fortifcations at Washington
and sent them thence by water to Mcclellan.
leaving the 10000 already around the capital
to defend it, and, If necessary, calling even
100000 militia to reinforce them, Richmond
might have been captured in two or three days,
and the General-in-Chief and the War Depart
ment would have been enabled to tell vcrv
different story to-day from that which they
have laid before Congress and the country.
Now the question comes up, what has Hal
leck done since he arrived from the Southw estg--
a general who complains Of the slow opera
tions of others. He assumed the chief COM
mand on the 26th Of July, and he directed the
base Of operations in the beginning of August
to be changed from James river, at Harrison's
Landing, twenty-five miles from Richmond to
Aqua creek, on the Potomac, which is seven
ty-6ve miles from the rebel capital. This is
the 9Th of December, and the army is not yet
advanced beyond Falmouth. So that il takes