Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-12-03
medateiy teieeraphed brief reply, promising
10 Krlte FULLY hx- all


10 write you more fully by msil.
| fou, General, certainly could not have been
more panied at receiving my order than WAS
| al Inc nect seity OF Issuing IL. / was adyised
| by high ohicers, in whose Judgment had
Great confidence, TO ma ke the order i'm mediate
~ on my arriraS here. but determined not to
DO 80 until could lenrn your wishes from a
personel interview, and even after that intrr
view, L tried every means in my power 10
avoid Withdrawing your army, and delayed
my decision as long as dared 70 delay il i
assure you, General, il was not q husty and
intonsid' rate act, but one that caused me more
anxious thought than any other OF my life.
hut AFTER iull and mature consideration Of all
me TT"E and cods, L vas reluctantly forced 10
tie conclusion that the order must be issued.
lh.Ie " as TO my mind no alternative.
Allow me 10 ailude 70 few Of the facts Of
tne case. ou and your Officers st our inter
WE'VE estimated the enemy's force in and around
Richmond at TWO hundred thousand men. Since
then, you and others report that they have re-
celfed and are receiving large reinforcements
| from the South. Gen. Pope's army, now COW
ering Washington, is only forty thousand.
lour effective force is only about ninety thou
sand; you are thirty miles from Richmond, and
Ient raj Pope eighty or niuety, with the ene4ny
naIrcay @ .rlM.rn yon. ready to fall with his su-
may eject. Neither can reinforce the other, in
| case OF such attack.
If Gen. POpe's army be diminished 10 rein
FORCE you, Washington, Maryland and Penn
sYlHanla would De lett uncovered and eN posed
| III your force be reduced TO strengthen Pope,
? you would be too weak 10 even hold the posi-
upon You and attack on in full force. In other
words, tie old army of the Potomac is split into
| TWO parts, with the entire force OF the enemy
orr city between th' IN. They cannot be united
by land, without exposing both TO destru ction:
| and yet they must Lee united To send Pope's
| forces by water 10 The peninsula is under pres
| snt clicunh htances, a military impossibility
he only alternative is 10 send the forces on the
! eninsLla 10 some point by water--say Freder-
/ lchSLurg-wh're the two armies can be united
II me- now allude TO some of the objections
! which YOU have urged You say that TO With
! draw irom the present position will cause the
! ctllaln &c emoTeiIzatIon OF the army. (which is
/ low III exec llent dis cipline and condition" 4
! c8HnGf understand why a simpl, change Il
! position 10 Few and by no means distant base
! "iil d' moraiizr an army in excellent discipline
! unless HE Officers tht mSf Ives assist in that
CcmoI alization which I'm satisfied they will
! net lcnr change OF. Hanover Court House TO
Your present position WAS over thirty miles,
! hut have rot heard that it--drmoralized
, youl troops, rotwiths tanding the severe losses
| thcy sustained in ef.ecting ii.
A nrw base on ihr RarpahanCock at Erpder-
ick burg, brings on within about sixty miles
/ of Richmond, and secures reinforcement of
! loriy or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined
| troops. The change with such advantages
VIII, think, if properly Represented TO your
/ army, encourage rather than demoralize your
troops: Morrov"r. you yourself suggested
that junction ight ne eff; cied AT Yorktown,
but that a flank march across the peninsula
would he more hazardous than TO retire 10 Fort
Monroe You will remember that Yorktown
l. two or three miles further from Richmond
5
tween Richmond and Washington. and covers
,Hashingcn frC any attack by he enemy
The political effect OF the withdrawal, NAV
. at first be- unfa yoTablr; hut think the public
are teeiEnini TO understand its necessity. and
that iL"y VIII have much more confidence in
united army that in its separate fragments
Hnt You viii reply why not reinforce me
mere, so that can Ctrike Richmound from my
PR SCmt positions!
To do this you raid at our interview that YOU
required fifty thousand additional troops. 1
T.. ~
many. You finally thought you would have
''SCIne GRANGE Of success " it'll twenty thou
sand. Eut you afterwards telegraphed
that Nou would r. qIre thirty five Thousand. ~
III" enc my was being largely reinforced. If
your estimate of the cnemy's strength was cor
rect, your requisiiion perfectly reasonable,
hut II rs utterly inrv> >sible fill IT, until new
troops could be enlisted and organized, which
wcuid require several weeks. To keep your
army In rs present position until il could b.
rintorcr6, would almost d, stroy il in that cli-
nais. TIE months OF August and September
are alIn' ~ fatal 70 whites who live on that Dart
of James river, and even after you got the
r'inici' ments asked for, yon admitted that
yon mast T. duce Fort Darling ard the river
Vrttc'irs eefore you could advance on Rich
ipond. it Is by ho means certain tilai the re-
duCu n OF these Qualifications would not require
cons iCerabie time, perhaps much as those at
Yorktown. This delay might not only be fttaI
! TO the n alth OF your army butin the meantime
! General Popcs forces would tie exposed 10 the
heavy blows OF the enemy without thaye lightest
/ hope OF assistance from You. In regard to the
demoralizing effect OF withdrawal from the
lenlns u a TO The Rappahnnpock, must remark
that large nuTnb,f of your highest officers,
indeed majority of those w hose opinions have
6t"a r. ported t" me, are decidedly in favor OF
the moTt ment. Even several OF those who
originally advocated the line of the peninsula
nov advise lis abandonment.
l have not inquired, and do NOT desire TO
know, by ~ hose advice or for what reasons the
army al the Potomac was separated into parts
! with the enemy between them. 1 must take
things as find them. find the ferces divided,
lfp ftplI fauu il.la
! plan has been presented Tor doing this. Ii you
! or any one else had Presented better one, I
| your plans require reinforc ccments which il il
impossible 10 give you. II very easy TO ask
for reinforce ments but il is not SO easy gice
fhfm when you have no disposable troops at
your command.
have written very plainly, rs / understand
the case, and hope you will give me credit for
nav ing considered the matter, although NAV
have arrived At different conclusions from
your own.
Very respectfully, yonr obi servant
h. w. HALLECk. Gencral-in- Chief
HEADoUART&Rs ARMY OF VIRGINIA.
No. 50. August 18th, Q ID. IN.
Major General Railech, Comadnder an Chfef.
The column of the enemy alluded 10 in my dis
patch OF l2y30 p. nl to-day, passed Gaines Cross
Roads, and when last seen near sunset, was
passing to the northeast under the east base CT
Buck Mountain, in the direction of Salem and
Recfortown. L am inclined 10 believe that this
column rs only covering the Hank of the main
body which il moving towards Front ROYAL
and Ihornton,s Gap, though of this amsnot
certain shall push q strong reconnaissance
across the river at Waterloo bridge and Sui
phur Springs early in the morning, TO ascertain
whether the main body or the enemy has really
left, and If SO, 10 push forward on their rear,
There IS certainly no force opposite Pappahans
mock Station. @ --...E . ..|-s
MeDowens is the only corps that is at all re-
liable that have: Sigel, as You know, is per-
fecty unreliable; and / suggest that some
onictr OF superior rank be sent TO command
his army corps. His conduct TO- day has occa-
stoned me great dissatisfaction.
Banks's corps is very weak, not amounting
10 more than five thousand men, and is much
Gemoralized. .'
Kearney's division is the only one that has
yet reao ht me from Alexandria.
! shall, at all events, push McDowelIs corps
and kearney's division upon the enerny's rear,
if fRd my suspicious confirmed in the morn
ing. i shall also put Reno across the river. at
Rappahannock station, and direct him TO move
cautiously upon Culpeper Banks's corps must