Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1862-11-17

river, Gen. Mcclellan had business on the gun,
boats, nine miles below, where he awaited the
Issue.
| On the James river, General Mcclellan was
| impotont for attack, and liable to bo cut off
from his supplies by blockade of the river.
| lie wished TO remain, but Halleck's peremptory
order withdrew hint. lie arrived at Alexan-
dria In time TO have saved Gen. Pope by
prompt march, but waited for him TO be sacri-
| feed. Gen. Pope's defeat by McClellan's con-
nivance resulted In restoring him TO the COM
mand. He took circuit around Lee, leaving
the way open for his withdrawal, and delaying
his march until Harper's Ferry, the KEY of the
situation, had fallen into the enemy's hands.
Al Antetam he kept his reserves ont of the
battle and prevented his generals from achicv
ing a victory. lie reported that he was yigors
ously pursuing the enemy, and then waited four
days for them TO cross the river, carrying of
all their material.
| Ha then waited month before advancing
| against the enemy. over whom he had won u
complete victory, as he said. In reply to pc
rcmptory orders TO move he alleged the want of
supplies. This prctcXt is shown TO be false.
When he finally did move, IL was at the rate of
u days march in week In this career he was
cut of.
| These are the chief features of General Me-
Clellan's military performance. We only al
lude to events, leaving the expression Of feel
| lHN 10 lUt reader. ''n lHtNt TtsUUs inc punllC
has right to judge the capacity of the COM
mander.
The dispatches and general orders of COM
mander are corroborative evidence of capacity.
| General McClcllan's addresses to his army sur
pass Chinese military literature In making him
self terrible by words. A foreign reader of his
triumphant and terrible address to his army
after taking the vacant Manassas, must con-
cludc that we arg peculiar people. His dis
patches are remarkable for an inability to tell
| the truth, and for puerle descriptions of what
he is about to do and has done. The remarka;
| bic dispatch from Western Virginia We have
alluded TO. II astonishcd all who knew the
circumstances. And Eastern journals could
only account for its style by the theory that we
really had young Napoleon among lis whose
genius was equal to such pretensions.
From Balls Bluff he telegraphed that the
dispositions were eXcellent-the dispositions
being his own, and the slaughter the result.
From Manassas he dispatched panic-stricken
retreat of the enemy. From yorktown he dis
patched that the enemy was demoralized and
panic-stricken, his victory complete, and he
should push the enemy to the wall. From
Williamsburg he telcgraphed his own demoral-
lied and panic-strickcn condition, and said he
would try to defend himself He has never
been near enough to battle to know how II
was fought, and has, in two well-known in
stances, telegraphed ignorant and erroneous
accounts of battles. At Williamsburg and
Seven Pines he did gross injustice to men and
officers by his ignorant dispatches, which he
was afterwards compelled TO modify, but this
could not retrieve the effect.
lie dispatched TO the Government that the
retreat 10 James river was made with the loss
Of hut one gun and one wagon, which broke
down. The traditional feats Of the longbow
seem Uncomfortable compared with such NapO-
leonic performances. After the battle of An
tieam he telegraphed, Sept 18th, that "ihe
| I. Inc Coz In,
panic,'' and that he was "hurrying everything
forward to press the retreat TO the utmost" :"
And later on the same day that "informaion
at this moment received confirms the rout and
decentralization of the rebel army. We are fol-
lowing as rapidly as the men can move" Yet
four days later no advance had been made, and
he then telegraphed; " Last night the enemy
abandoned his position, leaving his dead and
wounded on the field. We are again in pursuit.
do not know whether he is falling back to an
interior position or crossing the river. We may
safely claim victory"
After his four days vigorous pursuit of the
routed, demoralized, panic-stricken enemy, he
telegraphed that they had withdrawn from the
battlefield In the night, and he knew not where
they had gone, but aS they were gone he might
safely claim victory, which IL seems was
doubtful until the enemy's intentions were
known. On the same day he sent the remark
J able dispatch "Plcasanton is driving the enc.
my across the river. Our victory was com
, plclc. The enemy is driven back into Virginia.
: Maryland and Pennsylvania are now safe -
With unntentional candor he makes his victory
TO hang in the balance until he ascertained the
intentions of the enemy. If they intended TO
) leave, he intended TO advance, and if four days
atIer the battle they retired, his victory was
complete. Are these the dispatches of mill
tary genius which becomes IA young Napoleon
without smelling gunpowderi Are they evil
dences of military or any other ability, unless
IL he with that aboriginal weapon-thc long
! bowi
In this war, commanders have had credit for
latent military capacity on the score Of their
) want of heart in the cause. But the logic of
this will hardly bear statement. That general
Is trcacherous TO the cause he pretends to fight
for, is no evidence that he has either military
capacity or courage These must he establish
ed by some other proof.
II seems incredible that the destinics of this
great country, where, alone, the popular capa-
city has been developed 10 the pitch of self-gov-
crnment, can have been committed to such a
man for year, while, in the sight of the whole
people, II was gliding down the rapids to the
abyss What horrible nightmare has held the
senses of the people and of the authorities !
The responsibility reaches beyond this imbccile
instrument of national ruin, TO those whose in
nncnce and power have retained him. As fail
ure became apparent, the swift eulogies which
hailed his elevation from the supporters of the
IboVcrnmchl, the expression OF their hopes from
him, were replaced by the praise and clamor-
Gus defence of those who desire the failure of
the Government. Every one who charged that
the North was guilty Of the war, that the pur-
pose of the war was to destroy the Constitution,
that the South were in the right, and who de-
sired military failure that ii might result In re-
storing the traitors to power by our submission,
was, and Is, Il defender of Mcclellan.
1t might have excited suspicion when the
enemies of the cause were the ardent support
ers of "a general whose course has been con-
tinual failure. But such was the infatuation
that this was accepted as honest and loyal pub
lie opinion, and ii operated TO fasten this terri
bio imbecility on the country. Even the testi-
mony of the encmy's officers that they regard
ed Mcclellan as our greatest general, and noted
with great interest the attacks of the radicals
on him, was piled up TO sustain him. This
was aided by correspondents Of treacherous
press, sent him into the field with orders to
write him up. BY this means we have had the
stereotypcd announcement in every battle !:
" Mcclellan was in the thckest of the fight,
rallying the soldiers and animating them by
his presence"
Out of this lying correspondents has chiefly
grown the ialsehood of his popularity with the
/ IL in,nnaaihln