Fremont journal. [volume] (Fremont, Sandusky County [Ohio]) 1853-1866, 1862-11-28
r1o rrcsIdgnt nngr cen. meoIelIan.

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In the Boston Transcript upon the President
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A"o "-t'- ~
In showing the reiniions q responsibility be-
tween NE President and Senetai Mcclellan,
we shall risidly Keep ourselves within the Inc
Of facts, because while we state but little which
is not currently though irresponslbly circulated,
there is much which we bave only the right 10
indicate. In either case We state what ro k,iole
Turning back from the Notifications Of Man
assas, on none OF which was a carriage strong
enough 70 hold siege gun, in the face Of advice
and opposition, Gen. Mcclellan determined to
divide the grandest army Of modern time, with
artillery aud equipment such AZ the world had
never seen, end transport the larger pofuoa TO
dc Peninsula, instead Of Iaofing upon Rioh-
mond by way Of Gor,onsville or Fredericksburg
IN which movement bis advancing army Itself
would have avsiled as covering force for Wushz
ington. lNff
Neitherhe nor the Government had the ordin-
airy prescienee to provide for reserves and lust
before starting he proposed reduction Of 10000
from what time has shown tn be our entirely in
efficient cavalry force. The whole defense Of
Cen. Mcclellan, semi-officially written for the
New York World, BY DR.. Wistar of Philadel-
pha, his friend from boyhood, who was with
him during the last battles before Richmond,
all rests on anabsolute false assuniption which
had before gone vaguely to the country, and
lively to this hour, because the Government
could not, in defending itself attack lis own
Gencral--we mean the charge that troops agreed
to be part of Gen. McClellan's peninsular force
were detained from him after he had embarked.
We kJiow that this was utterly false, and we
will briefly give the truth With reference to
the expedition to the Peninsula, the President,
wisely and ofhis own motion, by formal written
ORDER prescribed that Washington should be
left absolutely secure" and that Gen. McClel-
lau and the four nerals OF army corps should
decide what such force should be. BY elabor-
ate written report they decided that $4,000 men
were necessary for the immediate defense of
Washington, Of whom 10000 were to occupy the
defences on the north and fully man those on
the south side ofthe Potomac, and 25,000 were
to operate covering force immediately in
front of the latter Before leaving the General
placed Gen. Banks, with $4,000, the line Of
Winchester and Strasburg.
In the same way, and with equally positive
knowledge, we stated in June last some of the
reasons why General Mcclellan ceased to be
lGeneral-in- Chief 1t is not necessary to reiter-
ate that deliberate and guarded statement We
left 1t to be determined whether he had the abil-
ity to be more successful at the head of the
grand offensive army than he had been as Gem
eral- in Chief While at the head OF 100000
men, he wished TO divide his army and trans
port ono portion of it to the Peninsula, leaving
his enemy entrenched at Manassas. This plan
abandoned, the movement in flank upon Man
mass failed, because engineers of his own selec-
tion, under his personal superintendance, and
meanwhile recommended by him for promotion,
collected boats for the passage of troops, which,
when the force was assembled for DsOVoUsIn, aceTe
al found too large TO pass through The lock Of the
cailal opening into the Potomac. The movement
thus announced to the enemy, was necessarily
abandoned, and every rebel escaped from Man
assas, of whose evacuation the general was ut
terly incredulous in the face of cumulative and
true testimony.
he embarked for the Peninsula with 10000
men, and their armament and supplies, in the
most magnificent fleet OF transports the world
ever saw. From on shipboard he made the as
tonishing request for the whole of McDowelPs
covering force of 10000 then outlying, as agreed,
the forts opposite Washington, and for eight