Dayton daily empire. [volume] (Dayton [Ohio]) 1850-1865, 1862-11-18
ExposItlon of McCIeIIan,s Plans.

Exposition of fmCClellan's Plans.
The following description Of Gen. McClel-
lan's plans we find in the Washington Star,
and II correct will eonsttute bis best Tindi;
cation from the charges for which he has been
dismissed from his command
While il Is very true that there has beon
nearly ever since he has beeh called 10 the
command OF the scattered, broken and dis
I pirited forces of Pope, an issue between Gen.
eral Mcclellan and the military authorites
here, with reference to the sufficiency Of his
supplies Especially Of horses fit for lcaYalfy
and artillery seryics,) we are satisfied that
the true reason for his delaying the order to
fight, the battle which is probably 10 decide
the result of the war, when and where he was
ordered to do so by Gen Halleck, is a very
different one That order directed him to
fight it in the Valley, while, as he evidently be-
lieved, he would be deprived Of the assistance
OF perhaps illy thousand of his troops, re7
garded by him as necessary TO be kept on the
Maryland side at the fords, to save his rear
and Maryland and Pennsylvania from the dis!
astrous consequences OF another raid Of
Stuart's cavalry, which would almost surely
bring about his defeat when the enemy sccep.
ted battle in the Valley, IL by that time Stuart
had succeeded in cutting Of his eommunica
ton with Washington and Baltimore and de-
stroyed his supplies, necessarily accumulated
and left on this side Of the river. He must
also have been influenced by the fact that If
permitted to follow his own plan Of cam
paign, he could obtain the assistance Of from
thirty to fifty thousand troops who could
not be spared from guarding the National
Capital 80 long as Lees army was between his
own and Washington; as it would continue to
be, had he essayed 10 march directly from
I -
His subsequent movements clearly demon
strated the fact that, however his proverbial
reticence may have induced him 10 keep the
secret of his plans in his own heart (for fear
that if any one here knew them they might
possibly come to the knowledge Of the enc
my, and thus to plead embarrassment from
want of supplies, which may not have serious
ly existed, his declension to move when or
dersd so to do was really occasioned by his
conviction that if he waited until the rise OF
the river made him 10000 stronger for the
movement from his immediate command, and
10000 stronger from this vicinity, he could
fight not only with the assurance Of victory
but just where victory would DO likely to end
the war in favor Of the Union. ,so-,as
Had he essayed the battle in the Valley,
without these additional 10000 troops, he
must have fought when and where Lee chose
Had he been victorious in it, the result would
have simply been more or less loss of men
and material on both sides, as at Antietam
with many other subsequent battles as they
fell back, ut mountain passes, in oil of which
the rebels would have had choice of position
He evidently preferred to wait until the ele.
ments permitted him to move in greatest force
In his progress to the point where he propos.
ed to fight the enemy-where he knew we'll
tho ana H0ht oro ottruandau Rsob
mond without battle-he left at every gap
at which jackson (who remains in the Valley
with from 6,000 to 10000 troops) might posi-
bly, threaten his rear, a sufficient guard to hold
itquite long enough to secure his communica-
tons with his case OF operations and supplies
and he steadily pushed his army on for the
| field of his own choice. We refer to the
banks of the Rapidan, the throat of Rich
mond because it is the defense Of Gordons.
| vile, through which the rebel capital receives
three fourths OF its supplies Of every desctip-
ton He knew very we'll that Lee must fight
there to the sacrifice Of his last man in its de-
fense, as that if victorious there, Richmond
would speedily be as much at his mercy as
Washington would be at Lees with the Potol
mac as closely guarded as James river is, its
communication with Frederick by turnpike
as seriously threatened as Petersburg now is
from Suffolk, and with Annapolis junction in
the hands of victorious enemy t'A'-
We're such the situation Of Washington,
the time for which it could continue to hold
out could easily be counted by hours and it
is evident to us that Gen. McClellan's plan of
campaign contemplated getting Richmond into
that situation within week from to-day at
farlhest But it has been determined by his
superors in command that the cause Of the
country will be saferin other hands : and
with his advance within thiry'two miles Of the
point where the battle must take place that
will probably decide the fate of the war, be is
prompt to obey the order directing him TO re-
pair to Trenton, New Jersey, and there await
further orders. $50 E5di gol yla.314
Monument 10 MIR Rollmeyer.