Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1862-04-17
ALMOST A DRAWN GAME.

From the accounts of the Two days battle at
Pittsburg Landing it appears that our advanced
division under Gen. Grant, very narrowly es-
capped determination. We were badly beaten
the first day; our batteries had been taken ;
more than 2000 of our troops under Gen.
Prentiss had been captured and we had been
driven back to the river where nothing but the
terrible fire of our two gunboats kept the enemy
at bay. This disaster was brought about by
false sense of security on our part. Gen.
Grant evidently acted upon the belief that the
rebels would, as heretofore. remain in their in
tredchments to be attacked, rather than venture
out in the open field. Accordingly he had not
a force of over 10000 with which to oppose at
least twice that lumber of the enemy. The
rebels fought with confidence under the lead of
their ablest generals, as they evidently knew
the full strength of our force and the sources
of its weakness.
On Monday the tables were turned by the
opportune arrival of the divisions under Gems
Buel and Lew. Wallace, and the advancing
hosts of the enemy, also reinforced, driven
back but the long and bloody contest had so
effectually used up our men that they were un-
able to continue the pursuit to advantage, or
prevent the rebels from retreating in good or
der. We now occupy only the field held by
our forces before the battle, after the loss in
killed wounded and missing of large number
of brave men, variously estimated, in the alb
sence of Official reports, at from 1000 to 5000
The only advantage on our side is that we
retain the field and have diminished the ability
of the rebels to hold their line of defense at
Corinth. The loss of the enemy in killed and
wounded was probably somewhat larger than
our own, owing measurably to the superiority
of our small arms and the enormous and dead
ly projectiles thrown by the gunhoas. The
balance o prisoners is largely in favor of the
rebels. That Beauregard is sadly disappointed
in the result there is reason for believing
He was evidently as well posted as Gen. Hal
leck on the movement Of our troops. That
country is full of rebel spies intimately acquain-
ted with all our movements. 1t is said that
bis attack was arranged for The Friday preced-
ing the battle, and was only DELAYED on account
of the rain. Had it been made then there are
good reasons for believing that it would have
been entirely successful and that the several
divisions of onr army would have been cut up
in detail. As it was the delay proved our sal
walton.
1t is but reasonable to suppose, after this
dearly purchased experience that the command
ers of our troops, will as they advance into the
enemys country, be more circumspect and eau
tous, taking nothing for granted but waiting
for demonstration. In pursuing this course
they need only to follow the glorious example
set them by Commodore Foote, whose campaign
thus far has been so nearly iautless as to defy
criticism. In this instance criticism is almost
disarmed by the obstinate and persistent valor
of our troops in the conflict, and the atonement
made for carelessness in advancing across the
river with so small force by the good general
ship displayed on the field.