Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1862-05-06
GEN NcCL 81 IAN AND MS POLICY VIVA
THEY sly lRO OF NLA[LN u SHLNG Ton


THEY YLB0 or HiA[N EiSRIIGTON
The editor OF tho Springfield (Massachu-
se.ts) 'Reprblcau." who has been on visit
to Washington, wrtcs to his papcr-"hich,
by the way, has heretofore bccn Mcclellan
paper-as follows:
Boston Bostonian-ot that kind whose
ravereace for men in authority cutlived even
Gardner knQw-N Otbingsu.-drew me into a
vacant corner ct 1Tillacd's Hotel, and, with an
cir nt mingled horror and salncss, said, in a
whisper, isn't thia rather Il frce-taking
town: :" YVES Obliged 10 confess that, next to
discoIa fort, scandal was Il Washington weak
ness. My friend wsi shocked us we'll as pnZ
zled, by the way that congressman, cabinet
ministers, men in authority, and men OUT, have
been smashing Mcclellan with the rough sides
of :hcir l1ngnes for the last ten days.
Nor nlen aionu--w oman-the wives OF civil
isns and army otticers--dnugh Of tho Oabi
nstthe bellies Of public and private drawing
rooms, join the eeser fray, with tongues
shsrpened by original sarpentine association,
snd Tired with tho iOya and isalohay that are
tbs monster passions to the crin0lins mind
$ Mcclellan greater nan than Napoleon,
or monster hurhug? Ia be plotting Tor a
compromise and thu presidency, or has nc d
scheme CT rebellion determination so doep and
great that no other mind can imagine OF COM
prehend III The visitor at Washington can
take bis choice, and fud plenty of Conclusive
arguments Tor either Judgment. But you
must believe him either a fool or demag5gue
The war of friends and enemies has reached the
point where no compromise is permitted
Those Of US who don't believe him either must
hide our diminished heada and wait till the
storm is over.
indeed, il is very difficult for en- earnest,
candid seeker OF the truth to reach correct
Judgment as to General MsClellan's manages
mcnt Of the campaign, and bis relations to its
successes and failures. There is no doubt OF
great abatement Of confidence in him on the
part III inc Cabinat md Congress. The
President, too, measures what hs gave him
before without alint II ia not easy to sec
Thy, with nearly a quarter OF million Of Tho
o!ies, and BEST troops oil the Union a. his
command, General Mcclellan permitted the
rebus 10 press thair lugs in upon him at
all POINTS, and To hold the Potomac, both
above and below Washington, nil the wihter--
| why ha refused to seizo ane opportunities
to cut Of large detachments of. their ar
| the congregations it has Tor months asked to
take Norfolk and seizu Tho Msriiuac before
sho could execute tho mischief that has since
startled the country; OF Why he could not join
| ths naval force in clearing tie Potomac OF tho
rebel batteries, Tor which they were long ago
rcsdy-why, il tho only stirring up" that he
gave tho euemy. tho preparations for an adj
vance and retreat WAS so feeble as to result in
the Balls Bluff tragedy-why hs Kept Gone
raj Hallecli in check for weeks after that Gill :
Ger was ready to move onTard-whJ he oP.
| posed General Buffers Southern expedition
unit! oyarrued by the War DepartneIt-Thy
kept promising to move onward, and never did
until The President had repeated twice or
thrice positive orders to do so--and why,
when he did 40 he permitted himself 10 re.
nca, li,o farce of the King Of France, in
marching up The hill ana then marching down
again
That Sill these and many more similar things
arc true of his course 90 Commander-ln. OhIef
7 tays tho most abundant reason to believe
That be has almost snncl away by postpone
ment and inaction his day OF grace with The
President and Cabinet, those most ccgnizant of
the oninions of tho latter sufficiently know
The new Secretary Of Wsr, Mr. Stanton, has
hscn growing in impstience with, and essrarge-
rlsnt from him ever since he, assumed that
oft;ce ard but for the Presidents cautious
pol:cy, it IS quits likely Gen. McClellsn would
have been ds,nroned from tho leadership Of
the army of tho Potomac.
There was tremendous pTessue from the
Senate and a portion Of the Cabiaot for a
cnanse but the President was rm -, and SAD
command in part because he was not satisfied
with his course, be had confidence that, now
hs had taken the iield at the head of his es--
pecial division Of the army, no would push
forward toe campaign as rapidly as possible
and provo worthy OF the position.
lie hss certainly so far trifDd with his own
opportunities as to put his reputation, and
position at the hazard of an accident. lie
cannot stand up under failure, be that failure
even the result of no fault OF his OVID. and
hare in is his screrest self criticism, for no
man, public or private, has the right to place
himself. or let himself be placed, where he