Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-06-23

day furnishes the key to the plans of the rebel
leaders, and il is undoubtedly something like this.
II seems that the force which made this attack
came from Richmond around our extreme right,
by way of Hanover. This distance is much
shorter than by way of the Long Bridge and Bal
timore Cross-Rcads, and avoids altogether the
crossing of the wide part of the Chickahominy.
But the fact that they we're able to get TO Tun-
stalls Station from the north, and around our
right, is an ominous circumstance. If they have
done this with a small force, they can also do it
again with a force FIVE times as large, for it has
demonstrated that our army on the Chickahominy
is not large enough TO be so extended as to pre-
vent its being lanked. Tunstal's Station is a
point susceptible of speedy and strong defense.
If the rebels should succeed in getting possession
of it with 10000, or even $4,000 troops, with
suitable artillery, they could, in twenty four
hours, so entrench themselves on the surround
ing hills as to make their dislodgement a work
of serious difficulty. Their tactics would then
be an immediate and furious attack on McClel-
lan's army, at once in front, in the rear, and On
both TANKS. He might be able TO stand such
an attack. But. if he did so successfully, he
would do what no other General, of ancient or
modern times, has ever done.
In making this attack, the enemy made a CON-
plete circuit around McClellan's army, passing
between him and the Pamunkey River. They
ceot y tuCn CuNahuPAnCheo OAhh VI AehNh
mond, crossed the head of the Chicka-
hominy where it is but a mere rivulet. proceeded
eastward To the Pamunkey, at Fingals Point, OF
Garrick's LandiLg (which is near, and south of,
the mouth of Mataduquin Creek burned the
schooners and wagons there. then went south.
ward to Tunstal's Station and Baltimore Cross
Roads, then turned to the southwest and crossed
the Chickahominy at the Long Bridge, and then
proceeded westward, to their encampments south
| of PiohpooDd The vvlolo thinn urao prohahlx
undertaken as much as a reconnaissance as foI
any other purpose. The whole rebel force en-.
gagged in il did not exceed $500 men. The re
suit OF the dash is TO demonstrate that McClel
lan's rear is entirely unprotected, and that he
may be entirely surrounded with the enemy, il
they have troops enough to do it with, and hi:
communications cut off. 1t will be observed
that, although this expedition was composed
mainly of cavalry. yet they had with them alsC
eight pieces artillery. This artillery was draw
over the whole route, which they have thus ascer
tanned to be one over which artillery can bt
brought even after the recent heavy rains.
/ trust that this attack, when viewed in tn,
light in which ! have endeavored to place it, viii
awaken the President, at least, to a sense of th'
absolute necessity of Immediately reinforcing
Mcclellan with at least IS 900 disciplined troops
1t is nc longer a question of taking Richmond
1t is believed that the Secretary of War deter
mlneu, tMO mOHthS dSO, tnat tnhI sHOuiu neNe
be done by Mcclellan. 1t is now a question o
whether or not Mcclellan and his army shall b,
saved, or whether they shall be left to be cut off
for the country may rely upon 1t, they will neve
surrender. 1T these reinforcements are sent U
him promptly, and if they are the right kind o
troops, he may yet be able to take Richmond
But if they are not sent, the Army of the Poto
mac will be in peril. And if any disaster shoulC
befall Mcclellan, the country will not need to b.
-.
he escape the just vengeance of an outraged ma
ton.