, 1862-10-17
MPoRrAuTlnrERcfprep LETTERS,


ImE ago py 6eU~ 00Skk3 Wlud In PROCESS OF |
t1ansnisalon for lie to Brig. Gen. Taomas
Jordan assistant adtatsnt general In the rsbel
xrmy:;
eEsERl1 BfAuREaARD TO ADsuTAsr GENERAL
: ! - COOPER
[Confaeatial1 NOZZLE, Alabama
September 5. Isoa
GEsKRAL: Under the supposition that on
restoration OF my heslth would be returned
to the command OF Department No. 2, had
prepared, whilst at Bladfn, Alabama, plan of
operations in Tennessee and Kentucky, based
On my knoHl Hledge of that part ct the thsatra
Of var; but hearing that my just expectations
communicate it to the war department, IN the
hope Il at it may be OF service to our arms md
to our cause. t was submitted by me to Gen.
Brsgg on the I'd inst.
!. BY looking Ut the map. It will be seen that
the forces operating in that section Of country
tTennessee,) and Afterwards by two, (the Tan
nessee md Cumberland hence they viii be
unable to support each other, being unpro-
V1ded with poRtoou trains but their opera
tcns mnst be more Or less dependent on OF
connected with each other. will frat refer
west of it.
In The first case, our objective points must
be-fast, Louisville, and then Cincinnsti.
How hest to reach them from Chattanooga,
With Buell. at Huntsville, and Stevenson, ia the
question. 1t is evident he his the advantage
Of two bases Of operations, the Cumberland
opd Tennessee Rivers, and that II wa advance
towards sNr objective points without gettiog
rid OF him, we would expose 0af lines OF COM
nnnicazbn with Chattanooga. We must then
gige him battle first, Or compel him to retire
btfUIe ne
paptrs say be , now -doing,) We will be I'D
yabclDg towards Louisville, but should he ZEN
ture On Florence or Savannah to unite his for
ces with Ro6e Grams CT Grant, We will have to
concentrate enough OF our forces from Middle
and East Tennessee to toilow him rapidly aud
defeat him In great battle-when We Wonld
be able to resume our march rs before inaicar
tee. We must, however, az soon u practieA-
bic, construct strong works to command the
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. for other
wise our communications nould be cut of BY
tic Enemy, Is soon as these two rivers shall
OF their gunboats and transports.
The best positions for said works are about
forty miles below forts Done1son and Henry.
net ia1 from Eddysyille, whtre those two rivers
come wit in one and half miles Of each other,
s4 ilfamed there IL at that point COM
Wx&dnX Elevation, where strong field work
cunld b. constructed for garrison OF about
z, 500 or 1900 men, who contd hold out with
amlle provisions and ammunition) against 4
large amy Uunder the guns Of this work
and along the bank OF each river, a series Of
batteries armed With the heasiess guns eight,
zine, ten-inch and rit1ed guns) could bs con-
s:ructed, bearing directly upon distractions
pIaced in each Of ssi1 rivers.
When Louisville shall haye fallen into our
posi- ession, would counstruct q work there
tor the command of the Ohio and the canal,
a. d would destroy the latter as soon az pos.
hardly kEow where it was. This I would do
Us q return for the Yankee vandalism in at
| tempting to obstruct forever the harbors OF
| Charleston ard sAyanuah. 4 detachment Of
| our army could, I think, take Louisville,
.hilst the main body would be marchiug to
| Cincinnati; but if We could get boats enough,
| i: would be shorter to 60 up the Oaio in them.
| To keep the command Of Cincinnati I would
| construct strong work, heavily armed, at
| Covi1gton.
Nov for the operations in Western Tennes,
see. The object there should be to drive the
enemy from there, and resume the command
Of the Mississippi River for these purposes.
would concentrate rapidly At Grand juno
| tiun Prices army, and all that could be spared
from Vicksbulg Of Van Dorn's. From there
| wculd make 4 forced march to Fort Pillow,
which I would take With probably only smaI
Yazoo River would then have their line o
communication by river with the North c1'
| oil, and they would have either to surren
der cr cross without resources into ar
ksnEas, where Gen. Holmes would take g3oi
care Of them. From Fort PILLOW weul<
Tenn, 10 fall back preclpitatelg to Humboldt
AID Columbus, or their lines o[ commuai:a
tion would be cut eff also. We would thel
pu1 u1sue them vigorously beyond the Mfssis
eippi at Colun bus, or the Ohio at Paducah.
| Ne would titus comPei the enemy to cracn
ate the State Of Mississippi and Western Ten
Lessce, with probably the loss on our part o
few hundred men. General Price could tae1
be tttached into Mis- souri to support LII
friends, where his presence alone would b
worth an army to the co1iederacy.
The armament and ammunition OF tn
works referred to to be- collected as soon a
possible at Mer ridian and Chattanooga.
Such are the operations which I would carr.
| into eiltct, with such modification as cifcuu
starces nigh require, it the president Ia
judged proper to order me back to the coz
; Mahd OF that army which had wish Geners
Bragg's assistance collected together aud o.
gar1zee, and which had only LETT to receive
my khsttcred heath whilst my presence coul
be spzr.d from it, ard until he informed n
that 1t Nas ready to take the offensive.
: Hoping for it's entire SUCCESS, I rema;r
ve7y respectfully, your obedicnt servant,
Il. T. BEAuREGAKD.s
Gen. G. 3. a.
GENERAL BEAUREcARD TO GENERAL BRAY 70
BRAGG.
, CONFIDENTIAL i CCILCN SPRINGS. BLADIN. Ala
July q. 1867
MI DEAR GENERAL: Your letter Of II
: 22d inst. WAS only received last night. Igis
; you With pleasure the following views on yot
proposed operations from Tupe1o, tor wis
you the amy lest SUCCESS, both on yo1r an
, the country account.
You Lave evidently but one Of four thing
! to do: First, to attack Aa!leek at Coriush
!. eecerd, to attack Bull at or about Cdatt:
nocga; third, to attack Grant at or abo1
| Y, "a n$
!. From what you state, the first il evjdeat]
: inadmissble, and the last cannot be entertaine
! for one Eome1t, for action -action-action
! what We require.
:. Now, with regard to the other two propos
b tions, it is evieent that unless yon reiufort
. General E. K. Enith at Chattanooga, he vi
y be oVerpoweral By Buell., and then our cor
y municAlion with the east and our supplies
Atlanta, Augutta, &C., will be cut of; ais
= that partial reinforcement would 30 weaks
- y0u Ut Tupeb as 10 paralyze you for at
= other movements from there, hence you ha
: adopted the wiest course In sending to smi
i all your availaote forces, except just enoul
!. to guard your depots, Sc, to the rear Of yo
4 present position at Tupelo.
). The third proposition woald aavc afford,
;. you some success, but not Is brilliant aud il
porsant In reaults rs the second one; il .
"a newspapers will permit sou to csrry It 81
~ ctsetnl}y into effect; for Ha1leck and Bue
!, occupy ing Il base Of long isoseeles tria
7 gle, 0i which Mobile Is the apex, could 6
Ee to Chattanooga before 3ou, u shey bacoE
i. awsre otyuur movements, and then you Wou
:. taye to contend again With superior iorces
,s a. usual to us. The moment you get to Cl1
- tanocga ycu ought to take the Offensive, kae
a i1g in mild the fcllo sing gra2d principles
u. tie art OF var.
~ 1st. Always bring tie masses Of your arr
~ in consect NTH the fractions Of the cncu
~ I'd. Urt rate as much as possible on his co
: | r,nriratjnTk yr1fEnur aYf3Rsinr Nfsrf