Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-03-05

The following extract we take from q leading
editorial ia a late number of HaTpey's Weekly,
on the military policy and plans of Gen. No
CLELLAN in his conduct of the present war. It
is especially suggestive in view Of the events Of
the last thirty days:
These operations afford the key TO Gen MClel-
lan's plan. 1t is " slow and sure Itisnot swift
enough to satisfy the idle gOssips who indulge in
tes-tsble strategy But 1t is very sure, and it
takes no step backward We have no idea that
the future win differ from the past in regard TO
the movements of the campaign. Events viii
doubtless seem 10 succeed each other with pain
full slovNsss. But every week viii witness some
substantial progress, and no day viii be marked
by defeat or retreat Whatever is done viii be
thoroughly done. Wherever the rebels are met,
they viii be met by a superior force TO theirs,
armed with superior weapons. Wherever a bat
lie takes place the odds viii be enormously in
our favor, as at Mil Spring. As soon as the
reads enable our armies to move, they viii be set
in motion; but they will not move precipItately,
and nothing viii be left TO chance. Careful and
thorough Reconnaissance viii precedee every OPP
Grafton, and young soldiers viii be Disguised az
the want Of dash displayed by our commanders.
Why should it be otherwise 1t Is possible TO
render the triumph of the government mathe-
m-atcslly certain; why risk anything! Why
90 and knock our heads against Columbus, If a
few strategic movements can compel the garrison
TO cspitulate without firing a shot Why dis
turb the rebels at Manassas, If Burnside and
Thomas can catch them there as in 8 trap, and
force them 20 scatter or sue for terms Of sUrreu-
/ derl If we were fighting for glory # ON
generals, like some chiefs renowned IN history,
hadno higher aim than their own personal fame
as soldiers, then We might offer to meet the reb-
els IN some fair field, with equal or nearly equal
force, and fight it out. But glory is tie last
thing that can be won in civil war and as TO
General Mcclellan. he is too good q citizen to
wish 70 see bloody and doubtful battle fields
when his purposes can be accomplished without
them.
We have in this brief extract the whole theory
upon which the Northern people base then
Utopian scheme Of Southern conquest They
expect to concentrate in overwhelming numbers,
and overpower our scattered forces in detail
We are never, if the Federal leaders can avoid
It, to be offered battle, where their triumph is
not rendered "mathematcally certain"
We dig traps and bitches, as at Bowling Green
and Columbus, fortiy them, and patiently await
the euemy's approach, only to witness "%strat-
egc movements - on either flank, for the Pur-
rose of forcing capituladon without the firing Of
a gun. We are to have no brilliant battles
where all is riskei to gain . t~riumph-none OF
that dash which characterized the warfare OF
NAPoLEoN, ALEXANDER the Great, OF ScIPIo.
But m]uldtudinous hordes8ke those Of NERxEs,
are to move upon US, attempt the capture Of our
intrenched armies l~eisurely in detail, and thus
crush us out surely and slowly"
The Federal troops, indeed. are adapted to no
other sort Of wariaTe. The Lincoln government,
like the Persian empire, arvs from the force
of 4 despot an involuntary and reluctant species
Of attraction very different from q cohesion
arising from a spirit of patriotism. The Lincoln
Iarny, ike the armies Of AEREEs and DARIUS.
immense in its numbers, is Ike the heavy and
iusnimate limbs OF ysstand m-organized body.
Its parts yield a sluggish obedience to the will
of the head, but the whole is incapable OF any
spirited and vigorous exertion Hence the wis
! dom-we may say, the absolute necessity-ot
this slow and tagiy process OF o~yeriunning the
South, fcr the purpose Of conquest and suBju-
gsdon.
There is but one remedy toE the disasters en-
tailed upon US by this Persian policy It Is for
Ms to abandon all further efforts, as suggested by
the President in bis inaugural, to protect unim-
portant positions along cur Goa and frontier
] and going still further. even concentrate our
| forces in large columns and give the enemy bat
tie when and where we choose. We need often
siye operations. We must leave bitches and
earthworks. except where they are essential for
the protection Of ws-ss courses and large cities,
and attack, pursue and haTrass The invaders On
every side, cut off tkeir supplies as PRICE is now
doing snd weary them down where we are too
weak to w1,E -ham Dashing and daring e7-
PLOTS, if history De .sken as evidence viii
Illustrate and disorgauize this ere and slow ="
policy. where the srandstil system of defensive
operations w0uld fail