The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-12-12
To this General Halleck returned the

OcucIitl, CcIOaluly, COulu 1lOt Lave UCCu
more panied at receiving my order than l
was at the necessity of issuing it, / was
advised by high officials, in whose judg-
ment had great confidence, to make the
order Immediately upon my arrival here,
but 1 determined not to do so until could
learn your wishes from a personal inter-
view, and after that interview tried eve
ry means in my power to avoid withdraw
ing your army, and delayed my decision
so long as l dared to delay it. l assure
you, General, it was not heartless and
inconsiderate act, but one that caused me
more anxious thought than any other of
my life, but after full and mature consid-
Grafton of all the pros and cons, l was re-
luctantly forced to the conclusion that the
order must be issued Allow me to allude
to few of the facts of the case You and
your officers, at our interview, estimated
the enelnys forces in and around Rich
mond at 2O0,00 men. Since then, you
and others report that they have received
and are receiving large reinforcements from
the South. Gen. Pope's army now cover
ing Washington is only 10000. Your
effective force is only about 10000. You
are only thirty-five miles from Richmond,
and Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the
enemy directly between you, ready to fall
with his superior numbers upon one or the
other, as he may elect. Neither can rein
force the other in case of such an attack.
If Pope's be destined to reinforce you,
Washington, Maryland and Pennsylvania
would be left uncovered and exposed. If
your force be reduced to strengthen Pope,
you would be too weak to ever hold the
position you now occupy, should the enemy
turn around and attack you in full force.
In other words, the old Army of the Poto-
mac is split in two parts, with the entire
force Of the enemy directly between them.
They cannot be united by land without ex-
posing both to destruction, and yet they
must be united. To send Pope's forces by
water to the Peninsula is, under present
circumstances, military impossibility.
The only alternative is to send the forces
On the Peninsula to some point by water
say Fredericksburg where the two
armies can be united.
Let me now allude to some Ofthe objec-
tons which you have urged. You say that
to withdraw from the present position will
cause the certain decentralization of the ar
my, which is now in excellent discipline and
condition. | cannot understand why
simple change Of position to new and by
no means distant base will demoralze an
army in excellent discipline, unless officers
themselves assist in the decentralization,
which 1 am satisfied they will not.
Your change of front from the extreme
right, at Hanover Court House, to your
present position, was over thirty miles.
But have not heard that it demoralized
your troops, and Notwithstanding the Sc
we're losses they sustained in etfecting it,
A new base on the Rappahannock, at
Fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles Of Richmond, and secures a
reinforcement of 10000 or $4,000 fresh
and disciplined troops. The change, with
such advantages will, think, if properly
presented to your army, encourage rather
than demoralize your troops. Moreover,
you yourself suggested that junction
might be effected at Yorktown, but that a
flank march across the Peninsula would
be more hazardous than to retire to Fort
ress Monroe.
You will remember that Yorktown is
two or three miles further from Richmond
than Fredericksburg is Besides the lat
ter is between Richmond and Washington
and covers Washington from any attack
by the enemy. The political effect of the
withdrawal may at first be unfavorable but
l think the public are beginning to under
stand its necessity and that they will have
more confidence in a united army than the
separate fragments.
But you will reply, why not reinforce
here, so that can strike Richmond from
my position. To do this, you said at our
interview, that you required 5U,naO addi-
tional troops told Won Il WAS impossi-
bic to give you so many. You finally
thought you would have some chance OF
success with 10000, but you afterwards
telegraphed that you would require $4,000
as the enemy was being largely reinforced
If your estimate of the enemys strength
was correct, your requisition was perfectly
reasonable but it was utterly impossible
to fill it until new troops could be enlisted
and organized, which would require seve-
raj weeks.
To keep your army in its present posi-
ton until it could be reinforced would al
most destroy it. In that climate, the
months of August and September are
almost fatal to whites on that part of
James River, and even after you got the
reinforcements asked for, you admitted
that you must reduce Fort Darling and the
river batteries before you could advance on
Richmond.
1t is by no means certain that the re-
duction of the Notifications would not re-
quire as much as those at Yorktown, this
delay might not only be fatal to the health
of your army, but in the meantime Gen.
Popes forces would be exposed to the
heavy blows of the enemy without the
slightest hope of assistance from you.
In regard to the demoralizing effect of a
withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rap
pahannock, 1 must remark that large
number of your highest officers, indeed
majority ofthose whose opinions have been
reported to me, are decidedly in favor of
the movement. Even several of those who
originally advocated the line of the PENN
cr,1o nOyy o6v;co ;%c o1opIoprport