New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-12-25
-uy py<vprsrCKsRUnG BATTLE
-..e,< Of the Committee ON the Conducf OIL
The War.

--.srrvoSY OF MAy.-GEN. sUMNEE--l Conoluocd.
as however, told me that he mad received a 'e,c-
no. nv" me President THAT be did not wish IN
- sacriiced; | ihink myself would nave H,iu9
-, single attack; instead OF making TWO a''sor
pus lave made but one massug everything upon
one point. -, rDon which military men may
That ID poin' upon "'i
dInsf' no yr. Gooch-Did the commanders Of the
end Diylssns concur, all OF them, so iar az you
~, in tie nov ement tia. was made
do not know, but suppose they dld.
N bv The Chsirrnsn-What is your opinion OF the
General condition and efficiency OF the army since
VIC cop,ld.r tha, witsin few days, with snfl-
;aa, sxer,on this army will be in excellent order
MAJ. GEN. FRANKLIN's TESTIMONY.
1fajor-Gen VIM. b. Franklin sworn and exam
iped.
zion of the Senate under witch this Committee are
now acting. Will YOU 20 ami state IN your own
NAV what you deem IL necessary to state
A. 60 no, recoleet tie precise time, but it was
just before We moved from Washington; Gen. Hal
leck and Gen. Megs came down there, aud had
conference with Gen. Burnside.
lie result Of that conference, o. underetaDd II,
was tina, Gen. Burnside to move this army from
Wauenton aud that vicinity, to Fredericksburg,
and not across the river here, IS an important part
OF that movement.
I understand from Gen. Burnside that when the
advance Of his army arrived In front OF Fredericks
burg poDtoon train. enough TO build two bridges,
was 10 meet him there. i ssow the advance vi the
army did arrive at Fredericksburg at the proper
time but there was ponioou train 70 meet it there
end 10 consequence Of that the army could not croes
Al the tine we expected TO cross.
We were therefore delayed several DAYS In con-
seoueree @. the delay IN the arrival of tue pontoon
train. After arriving here we accumulated pro-
visions for twelve days. Then Gen. Burnside called
\ council, in which il was the unanimous opinion,
mink of al the Generals present. that II this river
could be crossed, i, ought ~ be crossed no matter
what might haVpen afterward.
The point OF crossiDg not then definitely de-
sermined upon, but thought st the time.we were
10 cross several miles further down; afterward Gen.
Barr side called us together agaia, and informed Us
fhKt be bad determined to cross ut the TIVE points at
which we finally did cross.
had no objection 10 that, bat thought they were
n good as the point further dowl. knew nothing
ut all in fact, about the deisnses on the other side
1T was not my business TO know anything about
them.
/ think the arrangement for the crossing all
vel made. At the same time doubted our power
70 Gro e. and do not believe we could haye crossed
had the enemy chosen TO prevent IT. and 1 know
from what have since seen, and what before
suspeced, that they could have prevented our
crossing at those two points il they had chosen.
However as the Committee know that the cross-
ing was necessarily made under cover Of fog and,
as far my wing wns concerned. we got into posi-
Still We were in such position that II the enemy
hsd at any moment opened upon with the gus
they had bearing upou u.s. funk that in the course
of en- hour orr men wonld have been scattered
thai Il would have been impossible to rally them.
For some unsccountatle reason they did not open
their battefies; the morning Of the 18th inst.
made an attack according to the order Of Gen. Burn
side; put IN all the troops that thought il proper
and prndeDt to put in; fought the whole strength
Of my command as far as | could aud At the came
time keen my communication Nth the river Open
TIE reason that we failed WAS that we had not
troops enough 20 carry the poiots where the attack
was made. Under the orders that were given, ate.
NE were pressed back / directed that q position
shcul be held as far in advance as IL was possible
20 hold IT, and brought up ell the troops In reserve
90 hold that position.
held that position until was ordered to recross
the river; and. from what knew OF our want OF
succoss on the right, and the demorazed condition
Of the troops on the right and center represented
70 NE by their commanders, confess that believe
tbe order to recross wac a very proper one
We recross,d the III sht Of the l5tu without tie
los OF a Iaan aud w ith no trouble at all.
o. BY Mr.. Gooch--Had the pontoo,s been here
a, The time Of the arrival of the army, what would
Lsve heeD the result
A, Tie probable result vs. ould have been, tina, the
Army, Us much of it as Gen. Burnsiee supposed
necessary, would have Immediately crossed the
river driving away the enemy here, perhaps go OF
4 600 men, and they would have occupied these very
hisbis which we have since been obliged 10 attack
and that crossing would have been permanent and
saccessfu
o. Do you know on whom rests TIE responsibility
OF the delay IN the arrival Of the pontoOns
A. / do not officially.
o. Whst in your opioion is the number of your
Killed wounded, ard missing!
A. thiDk it viii amount TO ebout 10 600 alto
getber.
Q. Have You suy knowledge Of the loss Of the
enemy
a. i have not, except what saw incidentally in
@ Richmond paperf
Q. DO understand yon 10 say that you ooneurred
10 the movement TO cross the riverf
A. IL was not MY Opinion that we conld cross al
any o: the poiDts indicated
Q. Will YOU state whether or not it is your opn-
ION that ii the movement of the army from Warren
ton had been delayed until the time the pODtooDs
arrived here the army cOuld have then come here
slonz with those rontoons have made crossing
here and occupied the bigbts before the enemy
could have reached here in sufficient force 10 have
prevented II
A. Yes, Sir; chat IL my opinion.
Q. Then II is your opinion that II II had been Of
certained that the pontoous could not rossibly be
here at the time Gen. Burnede expected them 10 be
here he should have been notified OF the time when
they could he here, that hs might make the move
rents OF bic army correspond with tie time when
the poDtoons could be here.
A. bat is nay opinion.
o. What is the condition Of the army now as 10
sis eGiciency1 II its eic ency imraired other than
by The loss Of SO many men, Or Is 1t demorazed by
the recent disasters
A. think Il Is not deinorazed at all; that If, 50
Gar US my own wing is concerned know It is not.
O. After the crossing had been mace, WIS 1t pos
sbls ~ sour opinion, for chr troops 10 have carried
TIE h.gffIs or 10 have held position upon the
Other sice so as to have derived any advantage
from it
A. IL is my opinion that il, instead Of making
tive real attacks our whole force had been concen-
traied on our leit---that is, our available iorces-