Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1862-09-06

If the following statements are true, the
disastrous result of the battle on Saturday
last week, was caused by something much
more open to criticism than the delay of
Franklin's division at Alexandria. We take
it from a Washington letter in the New York
Tribune? Can it be true? Whether strictly
true or partly exaggerated, there is probably
enough reality in it to furnish another proof
of the fact that our troops need nothing so
much as competent leaders.
Sits needless now to explain the constantly
changing disposition of forces during the days
which followed the defeat of Saturday. Three
corps at least remained at Centreville on Mon
day, and were scattered over the broad slopes
of the hill on either side of the road in unmil-
itary disorder. They have never been in or
der-no more had the rest of the army since
the retreat. There was no head to put them
in order. There was NO order to any depart
ment of the service. There was not ammu-
milton in the batteries or i'll the cartridge box
es Of the infantry enough for another battle,
yet no one knew where the ammunition trains
were to betOund. There were able officers, but
no control was in their hands-no means of
doing their duty Orderlies had Just been sent
in all directions in search of the wagons-and
it was already ten o'clock, and a battle hourly
expected since daylight.
The camps were ineXtrcably entangled--
not my eye'or Judgment only, though have
seen enough to know something about it, but
| heard a general commanding a corps d
armee say he did not know, and could not as
certain, the relative position of other corps
Another general, a regular officer of engin-
GERS, and famous for typographical clearness
and skill, said to me that one glance at the
hillside was enough to show that there was no
general at the head Of the army encamped
there.
at was no better with the supplies of food.
The troops were half fed or fed irregularly.
Regimental wagons were unloaded, and or
dered to Alexandria for food and forage.
Then the order was countermanded, and they
were reloaded and ordered to the rear. Brig
AIDES without supplies were sent out on the
Hanks and in front, and left there without
wagons to shift for themselves suppose to
subsist on the country; and from the country
they might have gathered scanty grass and. if
in the woods, leaves for their horses-for the
men, nothing But if a general on the eve
of battle cannot supply his troops with pow
der, it is useless to expect they shall be fed
i need not multiply instances. There was
mismanagement everywhere, because at head
quarters there was incompetence, confusion.
no settled plans, no head.
'The army was not so much disheartened as
enraged-willing to fight, but not willing to
be sacrifed-denouncing with unanimity
that had no exception, the incapacity which
had caused their defeat. No one believed
that the combined force Of the rebels were in
front; and as for the battle on Saturday, the
men, the officers, the generals who fought it,
confess with shame and anger that they were
beaten by half their number. The army was
not defeated, its commander was out-general-
ed. He neither knew where his enemy was,
nor would suffer himself to be informed. lie
was warned that the enemy was massing on
bis left--every soldier knew it, but he dis