The Cecil Whig. [volume] (Elkton, Md.) 1841-current, 1862-09-27

greatly exhausted, and their General
away from the field. MansGeld's were
no better. Summers command had lost
heavily, but two of his divisions were
still compare lively fresh. AR illery was
yet playing vigo rousiy in front, though
the ammunition Of many of the batteries
was entirely exhausted, and they had
been compelled TO retire.
Doubleday held thc right inacxib,y.
Summers headquarters were now in the
narrow field where, the night before,
Hooker had begun the fgh. All that
had been gained in front had been lost
The enemy's batteries, which if advanced
and served vigorously might have made
sad work with the closely, massed troops
were fortunately either partially disa,
bled or short of ammunl ion Sumner
was confident that he could hold his
own; but ano. her advance was out of
the question. The enemy on the other
hand, seemed to be much exhausted to
attack.
At his crisis Franklin came up with
fresh troops and formed on the left. -
Siocum, commanding one division of the
corps, was sent toward along the slopes
lying under the first ranges of Rebel
hills, while Smith, commanding the
other division, was ordered to retake the
corn-lields and woods which all day had
been so hotly contested. 1t was done
in the handsomest style. His Maine
and Vermont regiments and the rest
went forward on he run, and, cheering
as they went, swept like an avalanche
through the corn-feld-, fell upon the
woods, cleared them in ten minutes, and
held them. They were not again re-
taken.
The field and its CHASTITY harvest
which The reaper had gathered in those
fatal hours remained finally with U.S.
four times it had been lost and won.-
The dead are s rewn SO thickly that as
you ride over it you canno, guide your
horses steps too carefully. Pale and
bloody faces are everywhere npturncd.
They are sad and !errible, but there is
nothing which makes ones heart beat so
quickly as the imploring look of sorcly
wounded men who bcckon wearily for
help 1chich you canno. stay to give.
Gen. Smith attack was so sudden that
his success was accomplished with no great
loss. lie had gained a point, however,
which compelled HIM to expect every mo-
mcnt an attack. and to hold which, if the
enemy again brought up reserves, would
take his best energies and best troops -
But the long strife, the heavy losses. inces-
90
~ lost and won inch by inch. and more
than ali, perhaps, the fear Of Burnside on
the left and Porter in tront, held the enemy
IN check. For two or three hours there
was Il lu!l even in the canTonadc on the
right which Iii herto had been inceSSant. -
Mcclellan had been over on the, field aft cr
Sumner repulGe, but had speedily returned
to his headquarters. Summer again sent
word that he was able to hold his position,
but could not advance with his own corps.
Meantime where was Burnside, and
what was he doing? On the right where
| had spent the day until two o'clock,
little was known of the general fortunes
of the field. We had heard Portcr's
guns in the center, but nothing from
Burnside on the left The distance was
too erca to distinguish the sound of his
artillery from Por er's left. There was
no Immediate prospect of more lighting
on the right, and | left the field which
all day hong had seen the mos obstinate
contest of the war, and rode over to
McClellan's headquarters. The different
battle-helds were shut out from each
hers view, but all partially visi bic
from the central hill which Gen NcClcl-
lam had occnnios 1ur,nr tho d,v ~.
''' ~ N"J'
WAS more lhah ever impressed on
re urnlng with the completely deceitful
appearance Of the ground the Rebels had
chosen when viewed from the cront
n IL! ; anu GUNNER struggle haa hcen
Carried carr GU over an uIeIen ana WOODED sur
race, 'heir own me OF battle extending IN a
Ie'"l' c'Fcle nov 'esS tl"h iit'le ana Il nan.
e'n"PS " pe''er np''oh oi thel! pos'uoh
can pe SoI ny considering lhelf rlght, cen
Ter ana ieit as forming three siaes or a
square: 30 !ong therefore as either wing
was driven pacN' 'he center became exposed
10 Il very dangerous ehhladinG hre, and the
infthcf the centre was advanced the worse
OH IL was; unless the lihes on us Slae and
rear were nrhiy heId Inns formation
resulted orlglnaliy from the efforts OF the
enemy to turn ooth ranks; Hooker, at the
very outset tnre" ms column so lar into
the center OF tne rebel lines that they were
compelled to threaten HIM on the flank to
secure their own center.
Notnlhs OF al TINS was Ecrceptlble FROM
INC mis- III 'front.' some directions OF the
/ &