The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1862-11-16
SUNDAY MORNING, nov. lG, 1862.


H.a bellion. n|
Why he did not check the Rebellion at the
start t-w w6at he says Of General Scots
letter.
To THE EDITORS OF TnR NATIONAL In
TELLIGENCER:
On Wednesday last l received the Ma
tional Intelligencer containing General
Scotts address TO the public. This is
throughout an undisguised censure of my
conduct during the last months of the
Administration in regard to the seven
Cotton States now in rebellion. From
our past relations was greatly surprised
| at the appearance of such paper. In
one aspect, however, il was highly graft
! flying 1t has justified me, nay, it has
rendered it absolutely necessary, that
| should no longer remain silent in respect
TO charges which have been long vaguely
! circulating, but are now indorsed by the
responsible name of General Scott.
/. The first and most prominent among
these charges is my refusal Immediately
! to garrison nine enumerated Notifications,
scattered over six of the Southern States,
] according TO the recommendation of Gen.
| Scott, in his "views" addressed TO the
! War Department on the Goth and Both
October, 1850 And it has even been
alleged thatif this had been done it might
have prevented the civil war,
This refusal is attributed, without the
least cause, TO the influence of Governor
Floyd All my Cabinet must bear me
witness that was the President myself,
responsible for all the acts of the Ad-
ministration and certain it is that dur
ing the last six months previous TO the
Goth December, 1860, the day on which
he resigned his office, after my request,
lac exercised less influence on the Ad-
ministration than any other member Of
the Cabinet. Mr. Holt was Immediately
thereafter transferred from the Post
Office Departmental TO that Of War 80 that,
from this time until the 4th March, 1861,
which was by far the most important pc
riOd of the Administration, he performed
the duties of Secretary of War TO my
entire satisfaction.
But why did l not Immediately garri-
son these nine fortifications, in such a
manner, TO use the language of General
Scott, Gas to make any attempt to take
one of them by surprise or coup de main
ridiculous" There is one answer both
easy and conclusive, even if other valid
reasons did not exist There were nc
available troops within reach which could
be sent TO these Notifications To have
attempted military operation on a scale
so extensive by any means within tht
Presidents power would have been simp
ly absurd. OF this Gen. Scott himsel
seems 70 have been convinced, for on th,
: day after the date of his first "views' h,
. addressed (on the 30th 0ctober) supple
mental views to the War Department, il
which he states: "There is one (regular
company in Boston, one here Cat the Mar
rows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusts
Ga, one at Baton Rouge" in all five com
panies only within reach to garrison 0
0 reinforce the forts mentioned in tn
Q views .t..
Q Five companies-four hundred men
Q to occupy and reinforce nine fortifica
= tions in six highly excited Souther
% States The force within reach wa
so entirely inadequate that nothing NOR
= need be said on the subject. To hAV
attempted such military operation wit
70 80 feeble a force, and the Presidents
. election impending, would have been a
q invitation to collision and secession
20 Indeed, if the whole American army
y consisting then Of only sixteen thousan
% men, had been "Within reach" the
. would have been scarcely sufficient f.
. this purpose. Such was our want {
70 troops that, although General Scott, be
~ lieVlng, in opposition TO the opinion {
% the committee raised in the House
a. Representatives, that the Inauguration {
9, Mr., Lincoln might be interrupted b
IN military force, was only able TO assemb
at Washington, so late as the 4th {
"a March, six hundred and fifty-three mel
rank and file, of the army. And, to max
III up this number, even the sappers an
miners were brought from West Point
But why was there no greater fore
within reach? This question could l
" better answered by General Scott hin
self than any other person. Our sma
regular army, with the exception of
90 few hundred men, were out OF reach, O
20 our remote frontiers, where ii had bee
w continuously stationed for years, TO pr'
tect the inhabitants and the emigran
''' on their way thither against the atiacl
of hostile Indians. All were insuliicien
and both General Scott and myself h'
he endeavored in vain TO prevail upon Coz
to gross to raise several additional reg
ments for this purpose. In recommen
, ing this augmentation Of the army, I
General states in his report TO the w