Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1862-09-03
Rapidity of Movement iii War
Suggestions of Count GuroWski

Rapidity of Movement III War
Suggestions of Count Gurowski.
Throughout the thirty centuries Of Zee.
oI'lS of mans history imbiued with wan
carried on in the Old World from Indus
/ Ia The Atlantic shores. reSounds one car
dinai, absolute rule OF warfare. and this
rule X comprised in two words-raDi,Gty
lg' nlotsmeEErapidity of movement in
marching or getting al the enemy. and
rapIdity Of mannuvres on the field of bat
tie. Were it not that it Is for the destruc-
ton OF man. it is undoubtedly the golden
rule of warfare
1t su ms itscii from the DIM epoch
when nan '"f ght oHly perhaps with clubs.
in.,l sticks, then with arrows.
49, d. q. ~ to-day, when the most fearful
arms OF destruction are in use The rule
has ITS roots in reason and in logic, and
that Is why it is absolute. To il all the
great captains owe their victories and con-
quests. recorded in history. From Cyrus
dow To Stonewal! jackson rapiditv of
movement and It's results. surprise Of the
eye. quickneSS IN uIpIeciIt.ng exigencies
on gwen field of battle rsipidity to profit
byth eventual faults Of the enemy. in
sight into the cncmy'S aims. and. finally.
the inspiration of the mOmcnt-thiS high
est gilt and attribute of a military genius:
all are corOliorie> to the above named
9"'deA Tft. Always all-poWeriul. ii re-
named the same with various tactics Ii
WIS decisive for the Macedonian phalanx.
for the Roman leginnS, and for our mod
ern regiments, brIgadcs and divisions.
10 hIs lightning-lIke rapidity OF move
nIents Alexander the Great was indebted.
not only for his victories on the Granicus
and ON the plains of Arbela, but also those
conquests from the Nile TO Bactria and
Indus. Hannibal surprised the Romans
by the rapidity of his march iIom Spain
10 Italy, and 10y that other with which he
pounced upon them on the Ticino. at
Irasimenc. ut Canne. Any one familiar
with Ca'Sgr annals admires the almost
msurpaes,dra rapldity with which lac moved
hIs legIons IN balllt-a country then with
out roads-and afterwards i'll all parts oi
tie world or the Roman Empire.
. Gustavus, of Sweden, with II force or
about 10000 men, moved in all directions
of Germany, between the. Rhine and the
Elbe, dealing blow after bl"w at his panic
stricken enemies.
Charles XII for years owed his success
to his reckless military nobility. Fred
erick the Great, a sovereign of about four
millions OF subjects, had at one time on
his hands France, Austria, Russia, and
SaXony, with an aggregate of about 65.- /
UUO,UUU OF inhabitants. With his little /
army lie moved shuttle-like from Bran |
denburg to Silesia, Bohemia and Saxony, J
beading and whipping his numerous enc I
mics.
Napoleon terrified the old world by /
the turrent-like .rapidity with which he
rushed from the Alps, flying, rather than I
from the frontiers of France To I
those of lstria and IyrUl. Ills campaigns /
OF Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena, /
are one uninterrupted conservation oil the /
golden rule. When Napoleons rapid .
We're crowned 10y taking Mack .
and his army prisoners at Ulm, the French .
soldiers taunted their leader by say ing
that hitherto he won battles with their
arms, but now he won them with their
legs. Our only successes are won 10y the
rapid movements Of Pope, Sigel, Mitchell,
and Morgan, in Tennessee, and our disls-
ters are inflicted by the ubiquitous Stone
san Jackson.
Military history teaches that the great
Inr rapidly moving commanders seldom.
f ever, have the choice of Il field of battle
prepared, selected for weeks, nay, even
lays before; nor do they mature their
plan; during weeks and weeks for Il bat
lie, to be fought when they reach the
.nemy. Reason shows that suclriarreach
ng routine is impossible. Those who at
ack an enemy do it rather on a field Sc
ected and prepared 10y the enemy, this
,eing the logical consequence OF their
apid. bold, truly military tactics. Ma ,
IOleon scarcely ever had the choice of .
ield of battle; certainly not in the plains /
Inder the Pyramids; not in the great
,lains of MarengO. when he rather by an
ccident came i'll contact with the Aus {
RAN army nearly twice as numerous as
lis, and above all Outnumbering him by !
numerous and excellent cavalry, of which
le (Napoleon) had scarcely a handful.
Napoleon selected not the immortal field
# battle of AusterlitZ. Gen. WeihrOter,
he military adviser ofAleXanderof Russia
Sfr0ttsy. Australitz was Sc .
ected by the allied Austrian and Russians I
5 the most favorable S'TatCgical point, and {
" strategy Napoleon and his army were :
o be annihilated. Napoleon, won de- I
pissed strategy, overthrew at Austerlitz >
he allied armies, and the Austrian En-
ire to boot. Napoleon had not the ,
hoice of the fields of Jena or Eylau. but :
lund at Jena the Prussians- at Eylau the !
won and Overthrew :
russia. Napoleon had not the choice OF +
Vagram. where his army was cut in two :
" the Danube, then extraordinarily :
Tollen. But he won that day. and for :
he second time Austria lay at his feet.
Ie selected not SmolenS9< or Borodino.
Any student of OSapoleOnic cam :,
signs will find that eten he handled !,
18th greater case smaller than larger .
umbers. So in his first Italian cam :
agn; so at Marengo; So at Austerlitz. =
eason and logic establish that it must =
e so, as the longer the line. the larger =
ie numbers, the more difficult to make \
lem move as one man, the more numer- :
Is the physical and intellectual impedi- \
ents.
These historicrl truths. aS po~itiyc rs (
ly mathematical law. | submit TO the "
rious consideration of the American
eople. GUR0WSKI. !,