New-York daily tribune., 1862-11-12
,u.r wA- m rms souTu.wrsT.
,o,,,ausd from Blrs; PAGE.

,,,ioeL Later ia the Afternoon nc ie!i Ot-Ni 10 Z
.t.d-,se 10 orders from Gen. Gilbert some distance
o. tss rear and went INTO biyonac.
Tv,is vginds NJ ny brief sketch az the genoial .
.a.rse Of events during te @cl0n. L have YET 10
nate some additional facts bearing upon II, end
requisite for correct cflncisIa' l
Esn' McCook, in his report while speasing OF
his movements after his arrival upon the field, says
rode forward. examined tho ground, aud saw few o
the enemy .ka.snng % 5 w 70 s Sbsr Ian ,s bis 60.
ntry in limo about four or Eve hunded yards to the rfnI
: Again he says, after describing the dispersion OF
nj. iarcnTe "a T. "a seeing thAt ssssiled by st
least three times my nSres ssps.Gea 6pSsSSns my GEM
ibens of 10 request "a to look TO ny s 20 see tnA'h
y M, di,p.,cbed Can't Horace w. Fisher Of my
s,aa to the commander o! troops for assistance lie
trst met Ger sehoepf marching ct the head Of his DIVISION
desire pp aid stated that he was moving to the
sos' 13 ssS SPS, rSpr S h the coSn Can't FisSeT
ihen reported to Gen Gilbert that ny entire sonmSnd va.
engaged the s In ne and the safety oil
nov rorrs Compounded Gen. Gilbert referred him to Gen.
EaeL 20 whom this officer reported"
Gen. McCook does not give the exsc. reply Of
Gen Gilbert 10 Cant. Fisher, nor state anything as
20 the response in words and acts made by Gen. Bu
ell. can I'll, however, this vacuum in the pu6-
lsh, official record. The former said that he was
very sony 70 learn that Gen. McCook was IN SO
press ed condition; but that he could not send him
re.nforcements without special orders from Gen.
Buell.. Owing to the delay involved in frs hunt
ING up Gen. Gilbert and then Gen. Buel's head
quarters which Were still at toe same point where
(ier. McCook found thcn, the - could not rel ott
the precarious pEgh Of the lst corps TO the Com
nan0eT in Chief until about O'Clock. And how
old he respond, who rad not lett his headquarters
since moTningi lie stepped out of his tent, held
his ear towards the scene Of the action listened for
few moments, aud then turning sharply 10 Capt
Fisher, said: Captain, you must be mistaken;
esnnot bear any sOund OF musketry; there cannot be
any serlons engagement.
Cant. Fisher returned without any Oriers FOR re-
.fc MT shortly
he had eii the fact that ~ nd was blowing 60 as
&c carry the SOUND of battle NoIa him and that there
might tie "seriOus eDgagemer, appearances IL
he contrary Notwithstanding, became impressed
cpon the mind Of the Compander-in-Chief, and
hence he ordered Major Wright of hs staff to the
OF the reported action, 10 ascertain whether
Gen. McCook really wanted assistlnce, and direct
Gen Gilbert to furnish II 10 him. Thus u happened
that reenforcements available before dark TO the
beggary number of 500 men lthe strength OF Good
ng's brigade reached Gen. McCoos only inst at
the elose Of the battle, although still III time 10
ave his right, aud nearly two hours after he had
fret appealed for help 20 Gen. Gilber'.
GrievoUs as tlis portion OF the battle was, IT was
not the worst.
The given extracts from Gen. McCooks report
uake it evident that he relied firmly for the protec-
ton of his extreme right upon Gibed's left. Yet
II was turned, related in the account of The part
taken by Lytle's Brigade Aud how Gen. R0us
seau in his report, says, while speaking OF the sec
oud Rebel effort 20 flank the right:
While near 18th Kentucky saw heavy force Of tn
enemy advancing upon right the that had
Lyies lght hsns 1t moving steadily up in full view
where 9er Gberrs corps bal been during he day TIE e
hsk Of which was not more tbs four hundred yards om It
i have the authority Of Acting -Bngader DAME
McCook brother of the General, who commanded
u The left Of Sherdans division for saying that the
hanking operation Of the enemy in question was
made under his eyes; that it was incIted and rem
dered practicable by the retrograde movement OF
sberdans in the latter part of the afternoon above
referred 20; that he felt al the time this made
that it would compromise the SAFETY of his brother
l.. st.faa all
that Gen. Gilbert had it In his power 10 prevent the
turning Of Lytle's brigade
This was the second sin of omission" during tie
battle. have still 10 mention others.
The losses of Mitcheli's and Sheridan's divisions
In the afternoon prove that the demonstrations
made against them were not OF q formidable char
scter. The former had, exclusive OF the loss Of
Gooding's brigade, experienced while rescuing Nc
Cooks right, but ten killed and wounded, and the
latter not over two hundred. Ii was, indeed the
general opinion Of officers OF these divisions, that
what the enemy venturet against them were merely
feiuts intended 70 cover the main attack McCO0k.
II is also considered certain that the threaten
ing Sheridan between = and o'clock, was the very
one that afierward turned McCook's right.
As previously stated, Sheridan was not seriously
iroabled by the enemy after p. N. Bo.h he and
Mitchell were ready and anxious for forward
movement upon the enemy. There was further the
whole Of Gen. Schoepfrs splendid division Of Old
batIleiried troops, lying directly behind them all
day without firing 9 shot. All the ofiicers Of the
three divisions cnafed under the incomprehengble
management that kept them bivouacking within
phort eannon-raDge Of and IN foil view Of tbe un-
esaai struggle on their LETT. Gen. Sheridan sent
word 10 Gen. Gilbert to beware what he was
doing;" Gen. Schoepf begged and entreatsd Iernus.
sion 10 advance, and when refused, fairly wept IN
the bitterness Of bis disappointment. But all was Of
no avail. The Sd Corps remained idle spectators Of
the desperate straits 20 which their valiant, bleed
ing, partially broken comrades under McCook were
becoming gradually reduced. Aud yet its lOtiton
was such-lhere was not an intelligent officer IN the
corps that did not itthat advance Of its line
for less than mile wonld have brought 1t 10 the
reTy sear OF the enemy at had fallen upon UcCook.
The logic of all of the above tacts allows other
than these legitimate conclusions:
l. The blame for the disastrous results Of the
tst.le is divided between Gems. Buell. and Gilbert.
2 The share Of the former consists in bis failure
20 provide for the contingency Of an attack by the
enemy through the means Of instructions TO Gems.
Gilbert and McCook as 70 how 10 operate in cas- Of
occurrence and frst discreditng instead Of acting
EeC5PeEs ESSP'EIs upon INC 'D' "-''' ''' ''''' u ''H'
g. That of Gen. Gilbert is the largest, and is made
OF, be all of his refusal of prompt assistance 10
Gen. McCook, snd reference Of the subject TO Gen.
Buel, by which over an hours time, full Of peril,
was lost. But for he utiiDching valor # McCOok g
old troops, this delay would have resulted in the
annihilaon Of the whole left wing. Every con-
sideraton of duty imposed 1t on Gen. Gilbert to
spOnd al once 10 the earnest request OF Gen. Nc
Cook. 1t would be hard to find counterpart to
hs conrse in the history OF any war. The second
shor,cOuing chsrgeabe 10 him is his neglect TO i'm
prove his open opportunity Of turning the reverse
Of the day iato victory, bJ lying with % 600 men,
In waiting for attack instead Of undertaking one
liuself, which would have not only relieved Nc
Cook, bat resulted in the capture aud destruction Of
his ASSISTANTS. / know that be acknowledges the
opportunity, but excuses himself for not acting upon
u with want OF orders from Gen. Buell.. That he
did not assume the responsibility Of acting Of his
own accord in that emergency, together with Lis
al e.. l.. q.