The Weekly Perrysburg journal. [volume] (Perrysburg, O. [Ohio]) 1861-1???, 1862-12-10

De maue ana unless Haue blmultaHeouBiy,
the enemy operating on All inner line, could
mass forces to meet each alternately.
Hooker attacked at daylight, Mansfeld's
corps forming part Of his forces. He con,
tinned a vigorous attack from that time till !
3 o'clock more than four hours without
support, What the style of his fighting |
was is well known. At this time he was
wounded, and Sumner who should have |
been sent at daylight, arrived and took
command. The enemy had constantly
brought mp fresh troops to meet this attack.
This they were permitted to do by the in
activity on the other wing. llookcr's ex-
haustcd troops were relieved by Summers
who attacked with great impetuosity and
was beaten in an hour by fresh forces of
the enemy, and driven back 10 llooker's
first position.
Eight thousand killed and wounded lay
on the field, and our right was exhausted
Not till all this was over was Burnside or
dered to attack on the left. Of course the
enemy could direct all their attention to
him. lie advanced over the bridge towards
the ShepardstOwn road, but was soon
checked. After he was checked, Franklin re-
newed the attack on the right, and recOv..
cred the ground Sumner had lost, but being
without support could do no more.
This was the conduct Of the battle up to
four o'clock. No concentrated attack had
been made, nor any two movements i'll CO.
operation. At four o'clock Mcclellan sent
word to Burnside that this was the battle
of the war, and his the decisive movement
and ordered him to carry the hill in his
front at any cost. At the same time he or
dereI Franklin to carry tho woods on the
right-thc key of tho position at that point.
But this army had already been exhausted
by protracted fighting and successive re-
pulses. Between twelve and fifteen thou
sand from tho two wings were dead and
wounded on the field, The right had been
in battle eleven hours, and in three deter
mined and persevoring attacks had been ter
ribly cut up. Hooker, Mansfield. Sumner
and Franklin had been succcssively sent to
the right and successively encountered by
superior forces Of the enemy, whom this
protractcd manner of conducting the battle
in detail had enabled them TO mass against
our right. In this way not less than 10000
of our troops had been sent to that part of
the field, and successiyely repulsed or ex-
hausted in detail.
Sumner replied that he could not support
Franklin if ho should bc rcpulsed where
upon Franklin was ordered to run no risks.
and no accordingly lay still. Therefore
Burnside advanced to the decisive move
mont Of the battle of the war, with the raus-
nant of 10000 men, entirely without sup
port or cooperation. He went forward
and gallantly carried the hill, bnt was
driven back by Overwhelming rebel forces
which, in full view of the commander. came
over from the enemy's mOccupied left.
Driven down the hill, he sent word to Nc
Clellan that he could not hohl his ground
half az hour unless re.enioreed. Porter 3
troops lay in the hollow fresh and mpa-
ticnt But McClcllans reply to Burnside
was to " hold his ground at any cost, and
the bridge to the last man If the bridge
is lost, all is lost" The reserve were moi
sent into the fight, although all 81 Was 81
nearly lost
Burnside held his ground ill night re-
| lieved him. So also did Summer and
! Franklin. And 80 the battle ended. II
was now known that the force of the enemy
WAS inferior to that of Mcclellan. He haG
10000; they 10000. No fighting could
he moro heroic than that of oM soldiers and
subordinate officers. Was the failure due
to extraordinary generalship in the enemy
They had a good position for lighting, hu
defeat would have resulted in their capture
and i'll the conduct of the battle they haC
only to mass their troops alternately III
their left and right to meet alternate attacks
made At intervals, that gave abundant tim
Tor preparation. The position of the enem,
was "a rash one. II exposed their army t,
annihilation il defeated On their par
there was no opportunity for great general
ship, il is Improbable that he would hav,
taken the risk of battle in that position.
Tho rebel army was in the power of our s
Nothing but our preventive generalshil
saved it. The destruction of Lees arm,
would have been blow tho Confederate
could not havo recovered from. Bctor
that the cheering OF tho soldiers was habi
nal when Mcclellan rode through thei
ranks. 1t is stated that after they la,
seen fifteen thousand of their comrades sat
riicod to no purpose, and the army, whic
yet might have achieved victory, hel
still while the enemy Withdrew and crosse
the river undisturbcd, carrying off all the
material, two entire corps permitted him t
+ pass their ranks in silence. The oppo
tunity of the war was wasted. The bait
9 which should have been Waterloo, cause
y only the slaughter of Waterloo witho,
, any other result to us. After waiting unt
!. the enemy had withdrawn, Mcclellan tel,
r graphed To the General-in.Chiet: I'VE ma
safely claim victory and again: "o'
i victory was complete
n As specimens of the kind of food whiC
fed the public exultat;on over this victor
, and Oh which Mcclellan indicated h
transcendent military genius, and all h
| previous operations, and put doubters
shame, we Vaote the following from the d
y patches of that occasion;
d HARasnURu, September 20.-The accounts
n the battle at Sharpsburg don't give any sastactu