Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1862-05-02

maps, more important sui. Out tpe "SsH"'
suit cannot DO presumed, except by some III
credible consequences, 10 affect tho fortunes
of the war Even il Tennessee were recov.
cred for the Union-whch is not yet done
Tennessee is but single State, and not
one Of tho States originally seeding 1t Is
still uncertain whether the victorious army cl
the Federals may not be met by General
Beauregard with force sufficient to test their
proves over again, and, even if Beauregard
should be beaten, there would be many more
such conquests to follow, and many another
trial to bu made Of the uncertainties oil VAL
Be it remembered that the Northern States
have COZ, 900 and the Southern at least 4UO, eQ0
men in arms, and that the cor tilct between
these enormous hosts is wagsd along frontier
of some thousand miles in extent. VIVA. can
the gain O! single battle or the success Of
single army import to the destinics OF a cause
thus maintained, il its supporters, whether on
one side OF the other, arc resolved TO hold out
to the lasLy 1t happens, Too, in this strange
! contest tim: there is no one position tic
loss of which would BIZ OF decisive impOT-
lance. Tho Uonfcd=rates could probably have
taken Washington after the battle Of Balls
Run; but nobody supp oses that tic capture
even OF the Federal capital itself would have
Terminated The war: Tho NOrtherners would
hove fought on as belnre-psrhaps, indeed,
with greater obsiinacy than cver-and the
Snuthcrnors may tight OH, If they arr 80 re-
solved, alter the capture, not Oh oil Fort
! Dsnelson, bat Of Savannah CT New Orleans
The orl7 question is whether they will DO SO
resolved, or whether the North can row 10.
t.midatc them into submission, or persuade
thern into acceptable terms Of separation
rhe FcderalS beyond doubi, arc gaining
ground-n0t sufficiently To make !Orclnle
| reconstruction Of the Union probable, but
quite sufficiently 10 give them "a advantage
| in negotiating for an amicsblo partition. Tins
was evidently the particular end - the
var which Lord Russell bad II view, aal
| this expectation it wOulh be Very nain!a'
Ii entertain if we could suppose tfa, eithoT or
both Of the be!lserenls Ineai: sn'neT'::l less
than they say.
At this cSnjunc.ure VIC receive tho Address
| of President Davis TO his constituents. y no
have just established paru sHcat,inSlrad d &
provisional Government iur the Confederate
States and elected their chief for six years Of
office. iihis document ii 10 he accepted a.
an rxpfyssnn 1t Southern feeling, i, is CERTAIN,
rs our readers vii At unr: l.SCcci, ,ha, TIC
|
Ct tb, SccrdcIs Tie Confederate ':eGitiGn;
can say !lttl. that is ncw. hut H. reclpitnI.:c'
the grievances Of the South -.ncr iGsufTcc.l1ii
against "ths tyranny Of sc iInS:dlcl iDG-
j0riy-the mast odiois form o! dgSpolislu
their etIn~'S in the struggle. their past F!ctc
rics, an3 heir recent disssters Bat, kt
adds, 'ia tho heart ola people resolved 20 De fcsc
these disasters tend bat to stimulate ~ il
~ -. IL, .
in which recent events nrs accepted by The
South many "thrce months" must pass b.:cr'
pcLco can he ma'!c on any terms ouI tha5r III
compromise. On such cviitions III Sh0ri,
the North cali rsvev sin. RI. can President
Davis count on he support which ne ,hhi he.
spe.ka. Arc his cinsiItuanis all S"cecers =:
he.rt, und resolved 1t all hazard; 10 achieve
their independence? We canIih; confidently
sal; but By the ordinary rules Of political req
soting wo should be led to answer III the
affirmative II is true that The SCu.herners
nre now for the frat time tried By rcr1r5es,
which would have been borne, perhaps, with
greater ortitndc than at tho b ginning OF Tho
wsr. when such trials must have hcen natural.
ly anticipated 1t is true, also, that the pre-.
sercc Of large N:riEcrn lorce Oh the frontier
Of the South may 10 tic means u erakng an
EXPRESSION oil UniGn;s: opinions in III" S: ding
Statcs; and when We observe t;i; extraordinary
confidence which tho invasion of ic3nssec has
produced IL. the Nnrth va should b. justified,
perhaps, IN expecting some corresponding
dep: esson On the part Of the Sorl;h II Che
side attaches such Eexplicsbls importance q
tho capture Of a provincial lot, .uy &c; iha
other II the NcTlhcrner% think this ariIaT
decisive OF tbs war, why may not Sau!'araars
share the belief?
70 ,nesa questions wo reply, that Ec:hir2
hitherto disco, niblo in the proceeding. Al u.
Ooniedurates can lead ns TO suspect them e!ttc;
OF irreso.uton, INCONSISTENCY or p2Iitca; d!s
cord On the Contrary, thsir unan'Tnitr AMI
determination have sl1ays heen remark 'bly
,vircrd We have observed On i1rmrr lcca>
siors that, whereas imputstIons Of treason,
sympa:hy with rob IL" ard Southern "pro-
cliyi;ics," generally were current thrcughHnt
the Federal Ststss, no hint o! Northern feeling
ever reached ,is from tie South. Tue FeG"rais
were not safe from traitors in their own caiu@s;
whers the Con'cduraLcs appeared always II
failed uniloI mly in discovering any "loyalis"
party at any pon. Of Southern soil, and .htn
We reflect upon the exerli6nS which must hayr
been required berre The rino millions OF Cos
icderalas could have confronted rs they has,
,lune the twenty millions Of FrJeras ior .o'
months together; it IL impossible ID doubt Thai
the Soulherners have been really II earnest
As to tho effect Of tie campaign and its events
il years ficrcc end not ingl0TiouS warfare
should have brought T.. S1u'h to desire re-
Cancellation with Tho Eorth he phtnomcHoIl
will BE- most surprising CEe.
Nevertheless, though reason wcr!l ict6d
US 10 expect either the voluntary submission
or violent subjugaton Of the South, yet tie
'terininntion Of The war" by the method o
Compromise, may possibly he "a hand, ,.nd
The recent succcssea Of The Fed5ras m:y IA.
citatn thia conclusou not only By re -eslap-
fishing the military reputation q the North
, bu! bY limiting to moro acceptable proportions
the il nan,ia of the South. II The Government
of Washington could secure the Border States,
it might resolve to let tie Gull Stals go
ralker than rrclong, at p.odigi0us cost, f
!, war which, on tho best of suppositnrs, coIld
only end IN tho rulnous Occupation ~ z
} hUslilc territory. IL requires, Us sc Ennw,
35 900 Federal troops 10 hold the petty
State Of Maryland II would take, We were
told on Federal authority, 300 900 e
savc Kentucky, and il Tennessee, V.r
ginia, and Missouri are 10 be Gartis"nc'
On similar scale, an:; the Gull S;:i=s 10 H. IN
7sdel ard occupied afterwards, how are such
obligations to be supported: Possibly, there
fore, the Federal leaders, in the rlilst OF !hc!r
rej1lcings, a!e thinking OF favorable ne
gotiation. We do not profess TO have dis
covered any such design in the reports wh'c,
reach us. and whicn speak 81 nothing but
unhounded and air.!ast !rrati01a confidence
in continuous victory. But as continuous
victory itself would bring no practical success
excap: by the voluntary return Of lhe South
into the bonds OF Union; as this return, i:ntO
al wc can infer, is utterly improbable, aRl IS
the alternative, tina! Of military occuphti2ii,
can scarcely be said 10 represent possibility,
it is but reasonable to think that s"ne 0t the
wiscst among tie NortherneTs must ha,e Con-
tempated negotiation ard separation as a
| tai i.Ir tale ,,urc,i,l That