The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-09-27
BURLINGTON WEEKLY HAWK.EYT

-tw9sd that he Vas able 70 hold his poeItion. s,
coeld not advance nth shi4oxp nespA
u. Meantime, where, was Burnside. and What =,
he doing On the right where l had spent n
day until two O'Clock little was known "a n
general fortunes Of the field. q We had hes,
: 1qfsec'e guns IN the centre, abut nothius fro.
burnside on the left. The distance was ID
from Porters left. There WIS no immedis,
} prospect Of more fighting on the risht and
, left the field which all day long had seen r.
most obstinate contest of the war, and rode ove
q to HcClellans head quartera The different ba1
ne-helds were shut out from each Others Ma
but all partially visible from the central hi
J which General Mcclellan had occupied durin
The day. But was more than ever impresse
on returning with the completely deceitful Az
lpcarsnce Of the ground the Rebels had Fchoee
Y when viewed from the 'front.', Il smf =, ra,s
i Hooker's and Summers struggle had bssn cas
\ Ited on over an uneven and wooded surface
their own line Of battle extending in Z semi
circle not less than . mile andfs half Psrhap
/, . bsttsr notion Of their position can DO got b.
I considering their right centre and left as form
Ing three sides Of . square. So long, therefore
- either wing was driven back, the center b
4 came exposed toa very dangerous enhlsding Gre
and the further the centre Vas advanced tn,
/
/ rear were firmly held. This formation resulted
originally from the efforts Of the enemy to tsrr
both fanks Hooker, At the very outset threw
bio column 90 far into the center Of the Rebel
lineei thet they were compelled to threaten him
on the henk to secure their own centre,
Nothing Of al this was perceptible from the
bills IN 'front.' Some directions Of the Rebel
lines had been disclosed BY the smoke Of their
guns, but the whole interior formation of the
county beyond the hills was completely CON
cealed. When Mcclellan arranged his order Of
battle, 1t must have been upon infosfnstion. OF
have been isft to his corps and division com.
msnder to discover for themsslves ecs.e y,
"a Up to o'clock Burnside had made little pro
gress. His attack On tie bridge had seen sue.
cessfut but the delay bad been so great that To
the observer it appeared ~ if KcCiellan's plans
must have been seriously disarranged. It is i'm.
possible not to suppose that the attacks on right
and left were meant in measure to correspond,
for otherwise the enemy had only ITO repel Hook.
Ier on the one hand, then transfer his troops.
and hurl them against Burnside.
. Here was the difference between Smith and
Burneide. The former did his work at once, and
lost all bic men at once-that il, all whom he
lost at all; Burnside seems to have, attacked
cautiously in order to save his men, and sending
successfully insufficient force against position
of strength, distributed his loss over . Rrester
period of time, but yet lost none the less in the
end. an -sr -, 81 Ia :. -. -.
Finally. at o'clock, Mcclellan sent simulta
neous orders to Burnside and Franklin; to the
former to advance and carry the batteries in his
front at al hazards and any cost to the latter to-
carry the woods next in front Of him to the right
which the Rebels still held. The order to. Frank.
lin, however, was, practically countermanded, in
consequence Of message from General Sumner
that if Franklin went on and was repulssd, his
own corps was not yet sufficiently reorganised
to be depended on as Q reserve. -, s..t .,
Franklin thereupon, was directed to run no
risk Of loeing bis present position, and, inetead
of sending bis infantry into the woods, contented
himself with advancing his batteries over the
breadth of the fields in front, supporting them
with heavy columns of infantry, and attacking
with energy the Rebel batteries Immediately op.
posed to him. His movement WAS success, 90
far as it went, the batteries maintaining their
ne2 ground, and sensibly. affecting the steadi-
plished, and ebel FIRE. That being once accom-
forced back having been dispelIed, the move
ment Of Burnside became at once the turning
point of success, and the fate of the day depend.
ed on him.
; How extraordinary the situation was may be
Judged from a moments consideration Of tho
facts. It is understood that from the outset
Burnside's sttsck was expected to be decisive,
as it certainly must have been, if things went
we'll elsewher and if he succeeded in establish.
ing himself on the Sharpsburg road in the Rebel
rear. 77 ias Cd ga.iasttr ats tteEG OIL
Yet Booker, and Sumner, and Franklin. and
Mansfield were all sent to the right three miles
avay. while Porter seems to have done double
duty with his single corps in front, both sup
porting the batteries and holding himself IN re.
serve. With oil this immense force on the right,
but IL, 900 men we're given to Burnside for the
decisive movement Of the day.
Still more unfortunate In it's results was the
total failure of these separate attacks on the
right and left to sustain, or in any manner CO.
operste with each other. Burnside hesitated for
hours in front Of the bridge which should have
been carried at once BY I coup de main. Mean
time Hooker had been fighting for four hours
With various fortune, but FINAL success. sumner
had come up too late to join in the decisive ~
tack which bis earlier arrival would probably
have converted into . complete success; ana
Franklin reached the scene only when Sumner
| had been repulsed. Probably before bis arrival
the Rebel Ii had transferred . considerable mum
her Of troops to their right to meet the attack OF
Burnside. the direction Of which Was then sue-
pected or developed. a. ~ ., ~,
Attacking first with one regiment, then W.
two, and delaying both for artillery, Burnside
was not over the bridge before o'clock-pef
hans not till 8. He advanced slowly up sne 3opes
in bis front, bis batteries in the rear COVERING
| to some extent, the movements Of the infantry.
A desperate SIGHT was going on in . deep rsvine
on bic right the Rebelbatteries were in full Play
apparently enjoying and ss1 o.
~ visible. advancing as If careless of conceal
ment, along the rosd and over the bills in the
direction Of Burnside's forces. II was At snis
point Of time that Mcclellan sent him the order
above given .rsis8a. l4, o...:..
his troops we'll 10 hand and sending portion q
rsn;dity and the most determined vigcr. stralgh,
M the bill in front, on top Of which the Rebels
had maintained their most dangerous b.,sery !,
The movement was in plain view Of hcCieIlan'
nositiop, and as franklin, on the other s'de sen
bis batteries into the field about the same time
the battle seemed to open in oil directions VIII
greater activity than ever. .
, Tho foht in the rayipe was in full progress