Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-03-08
GEN. a. ;. JOHNSTON.

sonally acquainted with him; that am not, in
fact on terms Of intimacy with any Of our
generals, and, consequently do not speak "by
authority or by the book" l wish, never
theless, to have a little talk with you and your
readers about Gen j. and his operations.
When Gen. Johnston assumed the command
/ OF the army Of the West, the enemy had control,
by means Of bis gunboats, of the Tennessee
river up to Fort Henry, and of the Cumberland
/ up 10 Fort Donelson. These forts had been
| located by the army Of Tennessee under Gen.
/ Pillow Fort Henry 60 Tar as putting such a
work on such a ste) was In plain violation, or
rather disregard, of what may be termed an
axiom j military engineering. Fort DOnelsOu
was well enough chosen to resist an attacS from
! the river, but seems t. have been badly placed
/ TO resist a land attack, according to Gen. Pill
/ lows recent report. Gen. Johnston evidently
saw that Fort Henry would not do, for he
/ ordered Fort Heiman TO be constructed on tAe
Tennessee river. This is SAID to be proper site.
/ Now it Is not very easy thing to evacuate one
/ fort and transfer its armament t0 another, Ia the
/ face Of an enemy's gunbOats Bsauregard, Il Is
true, has recently done it; but be was differently
situated. Columbus had Just been occupied when
/ Gen. Johnston assumed command, and it was aD-
sOlutely necessary that every gun should be Sent
TO that point as the control of the Mississippi
/ of vital Importance 10 Us. No guns could be
4 spared for Fort Heiman, even if IL had been pre-
! pared to receive them, and those of;Fort Henry,
! In Gen. JohnsOns opinion, (it is to be pTeSumed)
/ and he had the best means of Judging, could
! not be safely transferred. The same may be
said As 10 the plan Of fobstructing the navigation
{ Of these rivers below the forts. The present
/ flends of the writer know that he was perhaps
the first 70 urge that boats loaded with stones
I should be sunk in the channels, and that he &C
! tually took the trouble TO ascertain what num-
! Der Of old coal and salt boats could be had for
/ this purpose on the Tennessee river but Gen.
| Johnston WIS the best judge Of its practicable
/ ty, controlled as the river was by the enemy's
I gunb0ats The writer thought it could be done,
aud believed then as he believes now, that with
proper caution, aud if necessary, battery of two
/ heavy guns aud battaGOa of infantry, the
WORK could have been protected against such
/ gunboats as the enemy then had; but neither
! he.nor any one else hasa right TO 's.7rmine the
/ practcability Of such an operation without be
| ing in person on the proposed field OF opera
I tions, and IN possession of such information as
! Gen. Johnston alone could have.
So far then as the part Of his line, which was
SELECTED for him, and which be was forced to
adopt, is concerned, it is very clear that i
was not strengthened simply because he dJa not
haUC the guns 20 spare and could not get them. /
repeat that / DO nOE speak by authority, / am
not indeed attached to the army) but from
general knowledge OF the resources of our
ordnance department The point selected by
Gen Johnston himself, or rather for which he is
responsible was Bowling Green. It was in
tended to cover Nashville, or for advance
his first step was to call upon the Governors Of
several States for additional troops. BE com
menced terrifying his position, and it was gen
orally understood that it was impregna5le and
that he mad an army varying from 10000 70
10000 men. The writer believed ali this, and
when he saw, or rather heard, Of two or three
movements of the enemy which be, a SOFT of
military man, thought Gen. J. ought vita such
a force, to have interrupted, be began very Sc
riOusy TO doubt Gen. Jchust1n's ability as a
general, and it was not until the present hue
and cry was raised against MIN, that he disc0v-
cred his eryor, and began to understand and ap
preciate the man 1t revealed TO him the fact
that no such force bad ever been at Bowling
Green, and that Gen. Johnston had exhibited
the very finest generalship Ia making him and
all others believe (his own army and the enemy
besides), every one ia fact, except the adJutanl
general and the heads Of the army, that he was
strong, W en- in fact he was wesk, and had
thus with a small force prevented the advance
of the enemy. Il is useless to talk about it
any man who, by a simple disposition of his
troops, can produce such an effect, is certainly /
general Of the very frst order. Now for the
recent movements: Il Is clear 10 the writer that
Gen. Johnston knew fdat be could not save /
Nashville cIceDt Jg has Od0H skill. lie certainly /
did not have an army large enough 10 do it, aud /
he kneJo H. Il was not his place, however, TO /
say so to even Governors or Legislatures; by Z
his skill alone, he had saved Nashville for over |
two months he had called for men and they !
had not been funished.' At length, fortunately |
for the COntedeTaCy, the civilians at Washing 1
ton interfered and ordered an advance. Had /
they waited until Butler and others were pre-
pared to move, we would have been reused from /
our supineness with vengeance. As it is, the /
people OF the South are now awakened to a full |
sense Of their danger and have time TO meet II. !
All we have to do is for the press TO keep silent
about military movements publish no sDecUia- /
tiOns as 60 our own or the enemy's plans, except
from the papers Of the enemy, and rally around /
the gallant and able BeauTegard with every 1
available weapon (pikes properly made being |
quite as good q weapon as the flint lock tHusket I
But to return to Johnston. he penetrated The /
designs Of ias enemy, and he bg6sd them as com
pletelu as ann general 50 situated c9Uid possibly
hare done What was the main object Of the /
enemy The possession Of Nashville By no I
means Il 55as the aHaihjigti0H Of Johnston I
lok8lc aTrny! The combined movements of the 1
armies of Buell. and Grant and the glnboats was 1
to attack Fort Henry and open tue Ionuessee-
to attack Fort Donelson and open the Cunb=T
laud-if successful, the possession Of Clarksvila,
the rolling mills, and the railways from Ken
tuckv to the Tennessee river, followed, of course.
Had Johnston fingered a single day at Bowling
Green, Grant would have reached Nashville
before him, and, placed betweeu the two armies
Of Grant and Buell., cut of from resnt0rcements
and supplies, his whole army would nave been
lost Had be moved sooner aud turned towards
Fort Douelson, in three days Buell. would have
been at Nashville, and he would have been
between two armies and two rivers
both in possession Of the enemy. His rapid
retreat from Bowling Green was not to escape
from Buell., but to get TO Nashville and across
the Cumberland before Grant reached there
Had be stopped e. Nashville, Grant would have
advanced immediately, convinced that he was
covering important military stores, and hoping
70 force him into g battle on unequal terms As
il vas, the failure Of Grant and Buell. to advance
was simply 2 wei conceived act Of what may ,
be termed military iE5oeuce 70 Johnston, per
f5.,lv ipstifab.s, + IS true, by waich they hoped
ts uFg-oks Johnston into returning 70 Nashville, D
OF make him undergo the modification Of
seeming to fee panic struck when no enemy ,
was in pursuit lie was not io Dc caught.
4 general Of less ability would hay5 lo65 his ,
must be ALWAYS borne IN mind that Gen Grant [
corld. at auv time, have been at Nashville with a /
much larger force than Johnston then had under
him, in a few hours. lie could, in fact, have /
marched there as soon as Johnston dld i he had /
been very alert Some justification Of tie Gov @
aruor and Legislature can be found in this fact.
Gen. Johnston, 1t is presumed would have
risked battle to save his brave division al Fort q
Douelson, had they rersated or cut their way @
throurh. but uos 10 save Nashville, which, al d
though Il Is Of some military yaiee 20 he enemy, b
s of but comparatively little 10 Us. 4be pHIel (
has some reason TO believe that Johnston, know
ng MS weakness designed a counteFsIoEe when
.be enenF advanced, which might have saved
Nashville foy a rno.li4s or two, but he was pre- f
vented by some want Of preparation in another !
department la bringing THIS article 10 q close,
lei Ee simply say that Johnston is now IN po- f.,
sltion to be reinforced 20 any extent and II con
iiton 70 protect points Sf much greater military
uporta 20 CO than Nashville lie aas kest vel :
m ADVANCE Of the enemy, nd by 50 doing has I
1ad time 70 make bis arrangements. This be
,ould no. as--4 done after battle with a supe- 7
-ior arrDv pressing closely upon him. Now, If !
ave fsirly Judged General Johnston-lf he =
zne,s, his own weakness, and, # knowing 1t, he
lid not suffer bs0 great an accumulation u YaI-
Iable military stores st bsshyille and it does /
oot appear that ne did he hes certainly proved +
himself to be q general Of decided ability and is !
,tii sztitled, fliy entitled, to the confidence OF