, 1862-12-25

advance whenever II Was po65ID1e, caused me
to hesitate; / kept the column Of attack form
ed and sent over for the division and corps
commanders, and consulted with them.
They unanimously voted against the attack.
then went over to see the other officers Of
the command on the other side, and found that
The sa1ne opinion prevailed among them, I
then sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on the
caused me to decide that ought not to make
the attack had contemplated; and besides,
the President had told me not to be in haste
IN making this attack; that he would give NE
all the support be could, but be did not want
the army Of the Potomac destroyed.
felt that could not take the responsible
ity of ordering the attack, notwithstanding
my own belief at the time that the works Of
the enemy could be carried
While on his way here, Hooker on the
note, which received On the 21st, in which
he suggested that he would Cross his force
over the Rappahannock at the ford nearest
the town, Richards Ford, and move rapidly
down to Saxton's Station, and take possession
there. He stated that he had three days pro
visions, and that he could meet any force Of
the enemy in front of him.
I replied that was always very glad to
take the advice Of my general officers, aud
should be 10th to move without consulting
them; but I could not approve Of the move
be had suggested, because in the first place he
hVu1A AHfN ~ A4dANA 6VaAG lA44 444t4~o "
Ssaxion's Station.
It was raining and he would hare to ford
tHo fiivera wnicn might rise and cut him oil
from the main body Of the command, and as
Lad no means Of crossing at Fredericksburg
would be prevented from sending him sup
plies and assistance, and although he MIGHT
Taa5ii 57t1ss Station aud not meet any force
Of the enemy at that time, yet it would Dc sa; a
very hazardous movemenent to throw q col"
nmn like that beyond the reach Of its proper
support:
Gen. Hooker thanked ME and said he nta1e
j. as suggestion, and the weather, as it Was
raining, rendered it, Of course, impossible to
mike the movement.
Alt was found impossible to get the men
mp to the woTks-the cnemy's fire was too
hot. The whole Of tie command fought most
gal1antly. The enemy themselves say they
never eaw our men fight 50 hard as on that
day.
Q.-Were the enemy's works very strong?
A.-Thcir worEs were not strong
works, but thef held strong posi-
tions. It is possible the points Of attack
were wrongly ordered. If such is the case 1
can only say did it to the best Of my ability.
It is also possible that VIC would have done
for what supposed to be good rcasons, l felt
We had better cross here, that Te would hare
! a more decisive engagement here, and that if
we succeeded in defeating them VIC would
break up the whole Of the army here. which,
think now is the most desirable thing, not
even second to the taking Of Richmond.
For if this army was broken mp, though
they might defend Richmond for q willie, they
could not make any protracted defense there.
Q.-(By Mr., Gooch. do understand you
TO say that it was your understanding that
Gen. Halleck and Gen Meigs, while at your
Ho1 Tr1u i@, %o-. 1rH
comenced the movement Of your army, sent
orders to Washington for the pontoons to DO
Immediately Forwarded to Falmouth?
A.-That was my understanding certainly.
g-1n your Judgment could tile pontoons
have been Forwarded in time for you to cross
the Rappahannock when you expected, if all
possible efforts had been made by thosc
: charged with that duty?
A---fes, if they had received their orders
in time.
Q.-nd the non arrival of these pontoons
at The time you expected prevent your cross
ing when you expected to cross, and interfere
with t4e success Of your plan?
Ayes:
GEE. HOOKER ON TIE STAND.
The following is portion of Gen. Rockers
He did know Why they did not take posses-
sion Of fFreder1cksburg, but the feeling seems
to be that they could take possession Of Fred
erlcksburg at any time.
think It would have been better to have
sufficient force to threaten tic enemy, ard
keep them up to their works at Culpepperand
Gordonsville; but instead of that 1ge with
fhs rSse taS exSsos and even e91nsa no
Te did 50, if Gen: Summers corps had come
down here and left one up there threatening
to advance on that line, it would have led
them to believe we we're going to advance on
both lines. It would have been better, but
The enemy saw at once what We were ut, and
came right On here and they were nearer than
ne were, and this country is such that when
ever you girc them two or three weeks to
fortify 1000 men can make any place i'm
pregnab1e to any other 100, 900 men.
Q.-Would there have been any difficulty
as TO supplles IN your moving down the other
side OF the river, as you proposed?
Al had 3 daye' fations there. I was pre-
pairing to march down through Caroline coun-
ty, where the people had just gathered their
crops, and would have got plenty Of forage
and provisions enough for week or fort
night. At the time of the conversation be-
tween Halleck, Meigs and Burnside, there was
some talk Of forwarding some supplies up the
Rappahannock. I said that at Bowling Green
l could draw supplies from Port R0yal as
easily as could get them.
When was at HARDWOOD T knew that I
%o0AA ldAC QOb4h1UA WILL men E0At
tho whole rebel army could not move me.
Q:-Wou1d that movement have been safe
in view Of the fact that the army had not the
means Of crossing herep
.A--7es,- sir, because I cou1d take the
nights with my command, and then put
tnem IN condition Of defiance; if I had gone
there not man Of the enemy would have
come to fredericksburg, they would have gone
to some other river and fortified there if We had
given them time as efectu&l1y as they have
here. lregard the rebel position on the Rap
Ranannoek ndla M IS strong one. mean the one
they retired to from Manassas. Ther had the
advantage oftwo railroads to bring supplies
from the vest, and the other, Il railroad from
Richmond to bring troops from there. It is
the strongest position they had in Virginia.
The advantages Of this position to hold
against a force wishing. TO attack it. are such
as have never seen before.
WHAT GEN. HALLECK TESTIFIED.
The following is from Gen Halleck's testi-
mony:
Q--Was there or WIS there not an agree
ment or understanding between you and Gen
bnTns'de that pontoons and army strores. or
the authorities here without looking after
them himse1fs
A.-No.
.Q.-I will gay, any, stores necessary for
him to cross the river and move forward for
Fredericksburg
A.-Yes, requested General Mciss and
General Haupt, in charged Of railroads to 20
with me to consult with Burnside, and tell
him everything was ut his disposition, and
he must make his OVID Fequisitions and
give lis own orders, that would not in
tcrfere, except to assist in carving his views
out as much as could, whenever anything
was represented to me as not being done,
that would not render all the assistance
in my power.
Q.-Do you reeollect whether or no there
was any discussion when you were there as
to the point that it was necessary that pom
ICONS and army stores should arrive at Fal-
mouth at the same period Of time, so that the
enemy should not Know the point designated
for the crossing?
Al do not think that was mentioned;
this matter I know WAS mentioned, that the
pontoons should be there as soon a5 thew
could after We had got possession Of the road.
Q.-At any time did Gen. Woodbury. 90 to
you and suggest that 1t would be impos ssible
to get pontoons or stores at Falmouth as soon
as expected, and that was the reason it would
DC advisable that the movement Of the army
Of Burnside should be delayed.
A--Not TO my recollection. Gen. Wood
bury, IN conversation spoke Of the difficulty
IN getting sufficient transportation to 20
down, aud therefore that the train should 20
ey land. The transports were required to set
down provisions, and itwas suggested that as
pontoon trains.
Q.--Sinee Gen. Burnside has been in COM
mand Of the army Of the Potomac, have al
its movements been made according to his
Judgment and discretion, as far as you know9