, 1862-12-05
q full hundred Thousand men :,.l;nst t
linn and make the attempt to storm The

linn AID make the attempt to storm the
rebel capital!
Gen. Mcclellan has never been counted
a rash, desperate, fool-hardy commander,
striking before he is ready, and attacking
greatly superior numbers, even IN the open
field. Yet history does not record a
more insane project than that which
Gen. Mcclellan proposed to himself aud
the Army OF the Potomac, Of rushing with
1o5,000 mcn upon the Richmond breast
works, held by $4,000 Of the enemy. Ac-
core1ins to his showing, Gen. Johnston,
Then in command Of the rebel forces, would
have met Geu. McClellan in the open field
with equal numbers, and held the enor-
NOUS reserve Of 100000 in tue foriit1ca-
TORS to withstand any possible success Of
our army OF to hurl them upon us at
decisive moment. What must have been
the result Of such a conflict? There has
been no engagement East or West which
gives warrant for the belief that the Fed
eral troops could resist odds of nearly two
to one in any kind offght, unless our forces
were posted behind well manned fortitica-
tions. Such would not have been the case
in front Of Richmond. The foru1cations
were On the other side.
If Gen. McClellan was lot crazy when
he made this proposition, re are bound to
conclude that he did Aot believe lis oxn
story concerning the numbers Of the
enemy. We are forced to believe that
he invented his estimate of the
enormous superiority of the rebels to
excuse his own discontinue and retreat,
and that when it became q question of
Withdrawing the army from the Peninsula
and abandoning the darling Ciickahominy
marshes, the 100000 rebels shrunk in his
estimation to about The proportions Of his
own army How else could he propose
to advance? Hehad just had experience
Of the proves Of his adyersaries in pro
tracted engagement or series Of engage
mcn's, which had oceasioned great re-
jcicirg in the rebel States, and cores
ponding depression in tie North.
To account for his rctrograde move.
ment, he had alleged the enormous su-
pe1ior'ty Of the enemy, and yet he imme-
diately proposed to assume the offensive
with the same relative disparity Of forces!
Was this reasonable2 Is it susceptible Of
any other explanation than the one We
have given, namely, that of the 100000
soldiers IN the enemy's ranks, 100000 at
least were men in buckrAm, and tha. Gen.
Mcclellan knew it?
We will not discuss the other points pre-
scuted in this remarkable correspondence
further thai: to remark upon the conse-
qucnces which would have fol-
lowed the adoption Of General lIc-
Cleilan's suggestions concerning the
transfer Of the Western troops to the line
Of the Chickahominy. In order>to have
reinforced Gen. Mcclellan, casufine the
enemy'sstrength IS lie measured it, 100000
men would have been required to be moved
from the armies Of Generals Buell., Grant
and Curtis. This would have taken nearly
all their available strength at that time.
What would have been the result? Bragg,
Beauregard and Van Dorm would have
rushed forward and taken Louisville, Gin
cinnsti, St. Louis, Cairo, Indianapolis,
and Springfield before an adequate force
could have been enlisted and armed to op-
pose them. They would have threatened
Chicago about the time we should have
begun to threaten Richmond, and 1t IS not
unlikely that Gen. Mcclellan would then
have discovered q full half million Of rebels
between himself and tie goal Of lis Gu
deayors, aud have cried out more Justify
thau ever for rcinforcen1cnts.
Such is the Democratic candidate for the
next Presidency. We pray he may be put
on the track as speedily as possible, and
run on his military merits before On intclli-
gent and discriminating people.