Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-11-15

The following description of Gen. McCLEL-
LAS's plans We find in the Washington Star, and
if correct, will constitute bis best yindicaton
from his command
While Il ~ very true that there has been nearly
ever since he has been called to the command of
the scattered, broken and dispirited forces of
Pope, an issue between General Mcclellan and
the military authorities here. with reference to
the suffciency of his supplies, especially of
horses ht for cavalry and artillery service.) we
satisfied that the true reason for his delaying
the ORDER TO hight: the battle which is probably
to decide the result. of the war when and where
he was ordered to do so 10y Gen Halleck is
very different one. That order directed him to
fight il in the Valley while as he evidently be-
heved. he would be deprived of the assistance of
perhaps hity thousand OF his troops regarded by
him rs necessary TO be kept on the Mary land side
at the fords, 10 his and Maryland and
Pennsylvania from the disastrous consequences
OF another raid of Stuart's cavalry, which would
almost surely bring about his defeat when the en-
envy accepted battle in the Valley. if BY that time
Stuart had succeeded in cutting of his communi-
cation with Washington and Baltimore and de
stroyed his supplies, necessarily accumulated and
LEFT on this side of the river He must also have
been influenced by the fact that ii permitted TO
follow his own plan of campaign, he could OBJ
tain the assistance of from thirty "a fifty thou
sand troops who could not be spared from guard
Ing the National Capital 50 long as Lees army
between bis and Washington: as il
would continue TO be, had he essayed 20 march
directly from Harper's Ferry upon Lee in the
Valley
his subsequent movements clearly demon
strated the fact that however his proverbal reti.
cence may have induced him 20 keep the secret of
his plans in his own heart Tor fear that If any
one here knew them they might possibly come 10
the knowledge Of the enemy. and thus TO plead
embarrassment from want of supplies, which may
not have seriously existed his declensiou TO move
when ordered 80 TO do was really occasoned by
bic conviction that If be waited until the rise Of
the river made him 50. 900 stronger for the move
ment from bis immediate command, and AZ 900
stronger from this vicinity, be could fight. not
only with the assurance OF victory, bur Just where
victory would be likely to end the war IN favor of
the Union
Had he esssYed the battle ID the VALLEY, with
out these additional 90 900 troops he must have
fought when Aad where Lee chose Had he been
victorious in IL. the result would have simply
been more or less loss of men and material on
both sides, A. al Antietam, with many other sub
sequent battles as they fell back, II mountain
passes. in all OF which the rebels would have had
choice of position. De evidently preferred TO
wait Until the elements permitted him 10 move IN
greatest force In his progress 10 the point where
he proposed 90 tight the enemy-wheTe he knew
well tie enemy must fght or soon surrender Rich
mond without a basIle-he LETT at every gap at
which jackson Who remains IN the Valley with
ssom 5000 u 10000 troops might possibly
threaten bis rear. sufficient guard to hold tquits