New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-11-22

Rebel army-more or less Of it-wes on tb'
other siae of Of the Blue Ridge, and Of course
in position TO act upon the flank Of McClel
lan's advance if opportunity offered. 1t is
worth while perhaps 10 explain once more The
MIXTURE of this country, fer its general features
ore so simple that the slightest consideration
will indicate the character of the campaign
which depended upon them.
4 The Blue Ridge is chain Of mountains
running south-westerly from IIarper's Ferry.
West Of it are the Shenandoah River and Valley.
where the Rebel army lay. Through the country
east OF il our array advanced. The mountains
formed barrier sufficiently protecting its flank,
except at the Gaps, the possession OF which
therefore was necessary TO the safe progress OF
the army. The frequent. skirmishes reported
during the fortnight Of movement were simply
the contests, in no case serious, for the posses
sion Of these passes. So long as Jackson re-
NAMED in tho Shenandoah our armies must have
held Smokers, Ashbys, Manassas, and Chester
Gaps, TO protect its right flank. When it
changed its direction Of advance and turned
of to Fredericksburg, il wa still necessary to
to hold these gaps for the defense of the Upper
Potomac and Washington.
From Warrenton the proposed advance was
by way OF Culpepper Court-House to Gordons-
vile, where tlc strength OF Lees army was
supposed to be, a plan involving constant eX-
posure 70 flank movements, the extension of
/ the line OF communication, and formidable
necessity for transportation, which was In
secure exactly in proportion to its length
Gen. Burnside determined TO reconstruct the
whole plan of campaign, abandon the Kappa
hammock line, cover Washington by dispo-
sition Of forces which would reduce the number
required to maintain nn unbroken front, and
at the same time put bis own columns Of at
tack in the way of any possible advance in
force against the Capital. The movement, Ike
all movements on our side, was premeturely
disclosed. but has progressed without serl-
Gus interruption, and promises TO bring on the
crisis OF the Rebellion and the decisive battle
of the war at much earlier dsy than a fort
NIGHT stree was deemed to be possible. The
arduous and responsible duty OF maintaining
I the lines in front Of Washington is entrusted to
Gen. Sccl. If a. is reported, Jackson is stu
lurking in the Shenandoah Valley, watching for
chance 70 fall upon faux or rear Of the
Uaion forces, We may rejoice that General,
who is his equal IN strategy, caution celebrity
OF movement, and tircless energy, is d.taied
20 oppose BIN.
Against This fredericksburg aiyence what
can Lee do II NAY be taken Tor granted
Tat he has finally abandoned all plans Of North
crn invasion By Withdrawing BIS army to Cor
doua,iar. Jackson might penetrate from the
Shenandoah ty Cumberland, tu, hii movement
could have 40 decisive effect on the fortunes Of
The tNo capiflis aud the two armies. direct
assault upon Washington while Sisel maintains
hls lines b. impossible. An -lort to move uDon
nulnsidcs line OF communication between
Fredericksburg ana bic advancing army must
prove iruitcss. for tie simple reason ,hat Lee
must march as far 10 reach that Inc O. Burn.
slGc has 10 arrive at Richmond. an the cAper-
intni would be more hazardous to him than 10
hls enemy. lIis obvious, AID perhaps therefore
most unlikely course. Is TO transport BIS army
on the Virginia CoAirs! Railway from Gordons-
Vile - the junction Of that road vilh the
R.cLmonl and Frederick. burg line, ;al there
utcrposo h's forces between Burnside and
Richmond. Il il believed 20 be yof.blc, OF
ilt other hand. that Lee viii wholly avoid
battle, leave Richmond 10 be taken, nnd either
withdraa BIS army into the interior or attempt
a blow IN another direction.
In ibis Is. theory We have no belief Public
opinion is 4 powerful influence even in military
affairs, and tie opinion Of the South il iniiexi-
BY opposed 70 an abandonment Of their CAPT
ta-uulc,s, indeed. as was once determined,
Richmond should be lett to its fate in order to
transfer the Rebel sea. 0i Government to
Washington. Lee must hcht somewhere.
Neither Lc nor Burnside is sufficiently mi Ter
Of the situation 10 decide for himself The field
Of battle; but il is NOT easy 70 see low IL
place or IL, time can b. llr removed. Burn.
side cannot be diverted from Lis straight lgc
If advance 90 Richmond Lee cannot threaten
Warrington, cannot sever BurnsIdes conmu-
mentions, cannet defend. Richmond without
battle. lie cannot Gght wifhou, rlak.ng hs
army, hrs capital and be Pause, for he has nj
lost 10 do with d General whom drawn battles
Vii no. satisfy and WHO VIII esteem no battle
victory unless be can profit b. his success (
Ne believe therefore, that The plan of Gen.
Burnside, which is said 70 have been his own,
subm.tTed 70 Gen. llailcch for bis sanction and
approved by him, while it adopts tie only
method OF attack which has not already been
t-n.I nrh i..InL i. nlsn IT, n1n ,.A..n . nrnat