Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1862-11-17
From the Cincinnati Gazette.
THE XERnICT OF EVENTS.


the test Of results. However much II may In
trench itself behind professional mysteries,
above the comprehension Of the masses, II must
eventually submit to the test of results which
the ordinary mind can Judge. The eighteen
months of General McClellan's command Of
the army of the Potomac, during the greater
part of which he controlled the entire military
power Of the Government, have been time
enough 10 Justify the nation in Judging him by
the military result. That II is a failure Ia not
denied by his own most unscrupulous partsans.
They only resort to prctexts TO shin the respon
sibility. He has given to the rebel ConfedcraCy
the prestige Of military success, and has subject
\ ed the national Government, and the section
which stands by it, to the humiliation of an ap-
pearance of military impotence. And the
national destruction, Inevitable from contin-
uance of such military failures, has been ac-
celcrated by the enormous consumption of the
national resources. Ii has burned the candle
at both ends-building up the rebellion into
responsibility, and prostratng the Government
| by the fearful waste of our resources.
The event justifes a review of the general
ship whose consequences threaten the national
existence. General McClellan's campaign in
| Western Virginia was on plan made by Gen.
Morris before Mcclellan took the field He
interposed long delay and greatness of prepa-
ration In striking contrast with the cncmy's
force. He at length brought his army in COM
bined movements to Laurel Hill and Rich
Mountain, surrounding the enemy, but leaving
open the most feasible road for their escape to-
ward the northeast. The attack ON Rich Noun
tain was made by General Rosecrans on u plan
proposed by hmselfto take the enemy in thercar
Mcclellan was TO attack in front. By a difficult
march through by-paths Rosecrans reached the
rear In the afternoon, and attacked and defeated
the enemy's strong rear guard. The sound of
the firing was heard by McClellan's troops, but
he did not move. The next day, at nearly noon,
he arrived on the ground. Garnett had preCi-
| ab ~ lap iolt b,, ha 1nTt
open. Pegram's troops, who had been scattered
by Rosecrans, came In and surrendered.
A subordinate officer in McClellan's place
would have beed cashiered for failure to coop
crate according to the plan of the battle. Gen.
Mcclellan telegraphed that remarkable dis
patch, claiming the victory and eXaggerating
{ it, and asserting that he had liberated Western
, Virginia. Ever since that he has been hostile
to Morris and Rosecrans. The false glitter of
this dispatch, set in the dark background of the
: Bull Run disaster, which involved most of our
leading officers, and the fayoritism of General
Scott, whose infrmity of disposition made him
, hostile to all the prominent officers. made
Mcclellan General-in-Chief. The patriotism
of the volunteers, the unbounded expenditures
of the Government, and the regular drill OF the
, camp built up great army, Of which he was
called the creator. He established himself in
: magnificent state, with staff of forty aids,
, and rode through the streets surrounded by a
cortege more pretentous than an emperor ;
and correspondents wrote that he was con-
stantly in his saddle creating his army. They
4 looked upon the regiments as they swarmed
into Washington from the great patriotic North
> ern hive, and exalted him the creator of
such spirit and power.
The restiveness of the people, under delay,
r was quieted by the constant promise of action,
Z and by the terated announcement that the ar
, my was advancing. Al length II was settled
l for the fall by the Balls Bluff slaughter. in
e which, with McCall's division of twelve thou
e sand men only ten miles off, beside Stones adj
= equate force, he succeeded in having Baker
slaughtered by force of less than six thousand
g of the enemy. Mccall. who was on the Nir-
/. ginia side, in a situation 10 have cut of Lees
h burg, was ordered to the right about, and all
: the forces Withdrawn, in panic, TO the Mary
land side. This was McClellan's first demon
b stration in generalship on his own plan.
The Burnside expedition, 10 take Manassas
in the rear, TO cooperate with an attack 10y Nc
, Clellan in front, was diverted by McClellan's 3
- urgent and persistent appeals 10 the President,
and was sent TO North Carolina. General Burn
side protested; and conscious that no results
could there he accomplished adequate 10 so
n costly an expedition, he was careful, in his re-
:, port, to emphasize the fact that all he had done
- was on the plan Of the Genera-in-C hcI The
y Army Of the Potomac was exposed 10 unncccs-
V sary hardships, in the winter, to deludC public
n expectation by not going into winter quarter.
Three thousand young men went 10 inglorious
graves, on the Potomac, in that winter encamp-
II ment.
. In February, the perempory order Of the
President relieved the Western army from the
deadlock Mcclellan had kept on II, and II went
forward and achieved successes. In March,
the President notified General Mcclellan that 4
/. plan must he evolved implying movement, or a
\ | removal would be made. Coincidently, The
n enemy evacuated Manassas. When that was
/ known, Mcclellan put sixty thousand men in
a motion, leaving their tents on the Potomac
marched them on the vacant Manassas, and
, then left them TO stragglc back hy divisions,
Il suffering great hardship from the want of shell
a ter and of an organization for supplying sub
4, sstenCc on the march. The fact was dcvel-
M Oped that the army had no organization for u
n campaign, and that the head was lacking. The
President then divided 1t into corps, and ap-
pointed the commanders.
y General Mcclellan then interposcd naval
!, transit of an army of 10000 men between
himself and the enemy. After months cX-
= pended in this, ho sat down AT Yorktown for
A small force OF the enemy 10 grow great, and
q incOnsidcrabIe intrcnchmcnts TO be made for
:, midablc. The enemy evacuated at leisure. lie
. telegraphed the War Department thai they
I, were routed aud demoraliZed, and that he
i should "push the enemy to the wall.' His
. advance, under Hooker, pursued and overlook
the enemy, and, following the military maxim
a 10 always attack II retrcating enemy, 1t went
# in, regardless of numbers, knowing that great
g Ndh lOllONlHE. uCucTul MCCLELLAN re-
n fused TO allow Hooker 10 be reinforced, and
, held by his orders, thirty thousand men within
> sound of the battle, by which his advance was
h repulsed and the cnemy's retreat secured.
Il General Mcclellan, the commander of an in
a vading army of hundred and twenty thou
n sand men, marching to the enemys capital
: then telegraphed the GQrernment that he would
. ''try to hold the enemy in check"-an enemy
:, not half his own force, and just before routed
, panc-strlckcn and pushed TO the wall. lie
r. teegraphed an ignorant account of the battle
I doing gross injustice 10 the troops and officers
/ who did the lighting, by giving the chief credit
q to the wrong troops. This he was obliged 10
modify when he had informed himself. As the
enemy continued their retreat, he did not per-
: sist in holding them in check, but followed re-
e spectiuly. With the command of the river,
and division on shipboard, he failed to inter
cept the retreat, or 10 harass it by pursuit Re-
treats, regarded by military authorities as al
most impossible in the face Of an enemy. are
safer from Mcclellan than his own pursuit
y The retreating army went of victorious and
= confident. He followed panic stricken, and
preparing TO hold them in check, if they turn
q ed upon him.
! Time brought this invading army TO the
ChiCkahominy, where il sat down helpless, TO
be destroyed by divisions. The enemy had ii