Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1862-09-18
REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL fS9E.
HEADQUARTERS AR.iY OF E,RnlNiA,(
SenteTnber Z lSri2

HEADQUARTERS AR.fY or VIRGINIA.
September 3, lSG2.
t;skEHAL-l have the honor To submit the
following brief sketch Of the operations OF
This army since the 9Th Of August:
moved from Sperryville, Llttle Washing
ton and Warrcnton with the CORPS of BanBa
and Sigcl and division OF McUoweli'Y
corps, numbering III all thirty-twn thousand
Men, tn meet tho enemy, whp had crossed the
Rapidan, and was advancing on Uulp.pcr.--
The movement towards Gordonsville had
completely succeeded in drawing of large
my of the Potomac from much of the danger
" hich threatened it's withdrawal from the
Peninsula.
The action Of August 9, at Cedar Noun
tain, with the t9rccs under Jackson. which
compelled his retreat across the -Rapidsi,
made necessary still further reinforccmcnts
of the enemy from Richmond aad by this
time, it being apparent that t!re army of tho
Potomac waa evacuating tho Peninsula, the
whole farce Of the enemy concentrated
around Richmond was prshed Inraard with
great rapidlty to crush the army Of Virginia
before the forces eyacuating the Peninsula
could be united with it. [ remained at Cedar
Mountain, and still Threatened to cross the
Rapidan, until the Eth Of August, By which
time General Robert Lee mad assembled in
my front, and within eight miles, nearly
the whole rebel army. AS soon as ! asccr-
Gained this fact and knew that the army of
the Potomac was no longer in danger, drew
back my whole force across the Rappahan-
mock, OH the night of the eth and day of
the 18th, without loss Of any kind, and ono
day IN advance Of Lees proposed movement
against me. The enemy Immediately appear
ed in my front at Rappahaunock Station, and
attempted to pass the river at that bridge, and
the numerous furdS aoovc and below, but
without success.
The line Of the upper I.appahannock, which
| had been ordered TO hold, that the enemy
might be delayed long enough In his ndv.rce
upon Washington to enable the forces from
the Peninsula to land and effect junction
with me, was Very weak, as it could be crossed
ut almost any point above the Railroad bridge
by good fords.
BY constant vigilance and activity, and
much severe fighting for three days, the enemy
was gradually forced around from the railroad
crossing to Waterloo Bridge, west Of Warren
ton. Meantime my frrce had been much d.
tigue and eyposure-So thai, although bad
been joined by detachment under Gen. Reno
and the other division Of McDoweli's corps,
my force barely numbered forty thousand
inen.
On the - II heavy rain fell, which rem
dered The tords impossible for twenty.four
hours. Assoon as discovered this, Tc0nren-
trateL my forces, and marched rapidly upon
Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge 10 drive
bark the forces Of the enemy, which had sue
ceedcd in crossing ut these points. This wss
successfully done and the bridges DESTROYED.
passed one day-or rather part Of one
at Warrenton and bsyond,-rhe enemy still
coulinued To move slowly around alons the
river, masking every ford With artillery snd
heavy forces Of infantry, SO that it was in
pussible for me TO attack him, ereu with the
greatly inferior forces under my command,
without passing the river over iords strongly
guarded, iI tbs face o. Superior uUrbers.
The movement of Jackson toward Write
Plains and in tho direction OF Thoroughiare
Gap, wlilo the main body Of the enemy con-
ironted me at Sulphur Springs SID Water loo
Bridge, wGs well known To- Inc, Iut | relied
confidently upon the forces which l mad been
assured would be sent from Alexandria, md
one stray division OF which had order, 10
take post on the works at Manassas juno
tion. | was entirely under the belief nh$t
these would be there, and it was not until
found my communication intercepted that
was undeceived. knew that this movement
was no aid, and that it was made by not
less than twenty-five thousand men, under
Jackson. BY this time the army corps Of
If 81 L.x
reached Wsrrenton junction; one division Of
1t, think, on the very day Of the raid; but
they calne without artillery, with only fOrty
rounds OF ammunition TO the man, without
wagons, and even the field and general ohi-
GERS without horses. FltZ John Porter also
arrived at Brlstow Station, near Rappahan-
mock, with ono OF his divisions, 4,5UU strong,
whilst his other division was still ut Harnrtt's
and Kelly Ford. directed that corps, abnat
eight Thousand five hundred strong, To con-
centrate Immediately at Warrenton Junction.
where Heintzelman already was. This was
accomplished on the evening OF the -rh.-
As soon as it became knnwn 10 me that
Jackson was on the railroad, It became appar
ent that the upper Rappahannock was no
longer tenablc. l could not detach sufti-
cient force to meet jackson, and at the samo
time to confront the main body Of the enemy.
accordingly at once evacuated Warrcn'"n
and Warrenton Junction, directing McDo well,
with his own corps and Sigel's, and the dlvi-
sion of Beynolds, to march rapidly by The
turnpike upon Gainesville, 80 IA To inter-
cept any reintorcements coming 10 Jackson
through Thoroughfarc Gap, aud instructlng
Reno, with his command. and kearDey, with
one of The divisions nf Heintzelman's, to
march On Greenwich, so rs TO support Nc
Doweli il case of necessity. moved back
along the railroad upon Manassas junction.
Near Kettle Run, Hooker came upon the ad-
vance Of Ewell's 9 division on the afternoon OF
the 9th. A. severe action took place, which
terminated at dark, Ewel being driven from
the field, with tho loss of his camp and 3UU
killed and wounded. The unfortunate over
sight of not bringing more than 4O rounds OF
ammunition becaIue III once alarming. At
nightfall Hooker had but about i've rounds
to the man left. AS soon as | learned this,
[ sent back orders to Fltz John Porter TO
march with his corps at o'clock that night,
80 az to be with Hooker at daylight in the
morning. The distance was only nine miles,
and he received the dispatch at " o'clock.
but did not reach the ground until after IL
o'clock the next morning. lie can probably
explain better than 1 can the reason of tais
delay.
Fortunately Hooker had handled the army
so severely the evening before, and the move
ment of Mcdowell had begun TO be so appa-
rent, that the enemy, fearful Of being sur
rounded, had retreaeed prrcipitately frnm Mn
nassas junction, directing his retreat through
Cenreyille, as Mcdowell, Reno and kenrney
had made the road through Gainesville i'm
practicable. Immediately pushed forward
TO Manassas, and thence to Centreville, which
was occupied by kearnry that night only a
lew hours after tha enemy had left II. Reno
had reached Manassas junction, and Fltz John
Porter vas Immediately ordered up from