Smyrna times., 1862-12-04
The Career of Gen. Mcclellan.

newspaper, AlIA lOIIneIlJ - ~ uAAlAoCCi W
Central America 1t is written in nSquier's
usual able, independent and slashing mqnner: /:
we publish it that our readers may see the
"pro and con" in the case-having had the
pros for the past sixteen months they will
find the cons in the subjoined editorial criti-
cism:
Gen. Mcclellan has been removed from
the command of the Army of the Potomac.
Not because ofhis demonstrated dicompetance,
which has brought the country TO the verge
Of ruin, but because of insubOrdination ana
wilful disregard of the orders of his superb
ors in authority. 4 letter published from
Gen. Halleck, COmmander-in-C Chief, reveals
the fact that on the lst Of October, Gen.
Mcclellan having delayed for two weeks to
follow up the battle of Antietam, was
"urged to cross the Potomac," and prosecute
the war so as to bring about some decisive
result, but did not do so. On the 9th of
October he traS pEREMrroRILY ORDERED to
cross tie r1,er, gre battle to the enemy, o,ire
him South Your arDy," continued the order.
must more ,rhile the roacLs are good,' Still
Gen. Mcclellan persisted in his traditional
policy of inaction. 1t has been alleged that
he could not move from lack of supplies.
but this allegation is disproved by lhe high
est official evidence, and Gen. McClellans
own confession. There were no greater
obstacles to his movement than are incident
to the operations of any large army what
ever, nor any which competent General
would not have despised and set aside on
the instant. The consequence has been,
the complete waste of the best portion of
the year for operations i'll the field, the adj
vent of winter, and the escape of the rebel
army from the valley of the Shenandoah
involving new operations on distant base
under difficulties hundredfold greater than
Mcclellan was called on to encounter.
For this result, and the consequent pro-
longation of the war, with all its train of
evils at home and dangers from abroad, Gen
Mcclellan is directly responsible. For his
| disregard of the solicitations of the Presi-
dent, urged in person, and for his disobe-
dience to the peremptory orders Of the
Commander-in-Chief (by no means the first
offence of the kind of which he has been
guilty., he has been finally removed from Il
position which he was incompetent to fill,
and in which he has been so long and fatal
ly retained by the weakness of a President
conscious of his incapacity and thoroughly
acquainted with his military derelictions
His long retention in command will be a
puzzle to posterity, for which human inge
nuity will fail to discover an adequate rea
son.
That after the defeat of Bull Run, planeC
by an antediluvian General, who did no
: believe in repressing the rebels by force
the notion should run to the first offiG r VIII,
had acquired some prestige Of success, i
explicable enough. Gen Mcclellan wa
that man. He hal the ecIut Of campaign
, in Western Virginia, very small affair a
best, but successful. And albeit he neve
commanded in a single one of the skirmishc
battles, and was never within hearing of
) single gun fired in anger, in all that cam
paign; and albeit that Rosecrans fought tn
battle of Rich Mountain, and Morris ant
Benham that of Carrick's Ford, Gen. Nc
Clellan received the credit ofthe campaign
and, in consequence, the command of tn
defeated army at Washington.
Great credit has been given him for hay
) ing reorganized that army, and convertc
it from a defeated mob into discipline
force. But the single truth is, it was Il.
lesson OF Bull Run which reorganized tn
army. 1t taught the Government and pee
i pie that the war was no holiday parade, an
: that organization, discipline and discretion
y were indispensable to success. Thesoldier
e appreciated the necessity of all these, an
conformed themselves willingly to the re
quisite conditions. That Gen. McClella
" and his officers gave the technical direction
: in the case, is undOubted; but any Office
t schooled at West Point could have dor
n the same without mistaking himsel for
Napoleon.
n On the 1st Of November, 1861, the d
;, ordered fugitives from Bull Run, whom
d was gross burlesque to call an army, ha
l. been converted into well organized, spler
1t didly equipped, high-spirited army of 200
IL 900 men, eager for action, and impatient
l. wipe out tho disgrace Of July. The tin
d had come, the enemy was in front, Il
Is weather was superb, and there was no col
T. ceiyable condition wanting to make actic
De imperative, and TO insure success. The
y came out the fatal defects in Gen McCle
y lan's character--indecision lack of con
ID dence; hesitation and a moral cowarcl
ID which has ever sought to postpone until t
III morrow the responsibility ofto-day. The
l. became manifest-and all competent obser
r, ers were slowly and painfully compelled
er admit-that Gen. Mcclellan lacked all
the great and most of the essential qualiti
at Of Commander, and that the splend
le army of the Potomac had at its head
re officer whose capacities fitted him for not
,r ing higher than the chief of bureau in Il
of Department of Warl
% We have not the heart to refer to IL
Is waste of the month of November, and
ar the fine month of December, during whi,
ce God stayed back the winter that our arm
be might move. Nor can we refer, exec
/! with sickening sensation, to the blocka
st of the Potomac, and the retention, all Il
weaxy vinte in quarters only DIP fH sql
3 ksae