Cedar Falls gazette. [volume] (Cedar Falls, Iowa) 1860-1895, 1862-11-21
WHAT McCLELLAN.S PLAN OF THE
CAMPAIGN WAS.

"
| CAMIAllsN WAS.
| In defense Of General McClellau's course
while in command of the Army Of the Poto-
mac, the editor Of the Washington Star
sheds some light upon the probable plan Of
the campaign in Virginia. He says:
THAT ord r (the peremptory command OF
HailCck to msve on the 9th Of Octobcr) d.
rectcd him to fight in the valley, when NJ he
evidently believed he would be deprived of
the assistance of fifty thousand Of his trssps,
regarded 10y him as necessary to he kept ON
the Maryland side. ut the fords, to save his
rear and Mary land and Pennsylvania from
the disastrous consequences Of another RAID
Of Huart's cavalry which would almost
surely bring about his defeat when the enc
my accepted battle in the valley, il by
that time Stuart had succeeded in cutting of
his coNssaancaton with Washington and
Baltiu",er and destroying his supplies, nec
z sarily accumulated and left on this side Of
the p,ver. He must also have been ,ntiuenc
ed bV the fact that ii permitted to follow his
own plan vi campaign he should obtain the
assistance Of ,hir,y or fifty thousand troops,
who could not be spared from guarding the
national capital so long as Lees army was
between his own and Washington, as It wo'd
continue to be, and he essayed to march d.
rectly from Harper's Ferry upon Lee in the
valley.
HIS subsequent movements clearly demon.
strate the fact that, however his pr0verbial
reticence may have induced him to keep the
secrets of his plans in his own brain, and
thus to plead embarrassment from want OF
supplies which may not have seriously exist.
ed, his dcclenslsn to move when ordered SO
to do was really occasloned by the convic.
ton that il he waited until the rise of the
river made him fifty thousand stronger for
the movement OF his immediate command
aud forty thousand stronger from this vcni-
ty, he could fight not only with the assu,-
ance Of victory, but just where victory VIZ d
bs likely to end the war in favor Of the Un-
ION. .#.s.H @H
Had he essayei the battle in the Valley
without these additional 10000 troops, he
must have fought when and where Lee chose.
Had he been victorious in it, the result wo'd
simply have been more or iess loss Ut NEIL
and material on both sides, as at Antietam
with many other subsequent battles as they
fell back, at mountain passes, in all Of which
the rebels would have had choice OF position.
He evidently preferred to wait until the ele-
ments permitted him to move in greater
force. In his progress to the point where he
proposed to fight the enemy-where he knew
well the enemy must fight or soon surren-
der Richmond without battle-he left at
every gap through which Jackson (who re-
mains in the Valley with from 5000 to TO-
wv troops,) might possibly threaten his
rear, sufficient guard to hold it qa,te long
enough to secure his communications with
his base OF operations and supplies, and he
steadily pushed his army on Tor the field Of
his own choice.
We refer to the banks Of the Rapidan
the throat of Richmond, because it is the de-
Tense Of GOrd0nsville, through which the
rebel capital receives three fourths Of its sup.
plies Of every description. He knew as well
that Lee must fight there to the sacrifice OF
the last man in its defense, rs that, if Veto
rious there, Richmond would speedily be rs
much at his mercy as Washington W uld bs
at Lees with the Potomas as closely block
AIDED as the James river is, its cemmunica-
ton with Frederick by turnpike rs seriously
threatened as Peters6 x now is from Suffolk.
and with Annapolis Junction in the hands of
u victorious enemy.
Were such the situation Of Washington,
the time for which it could continue to hclG
out could easily be counted by hours; and
it is evident to Us that Gen. McClellan's plan
Of campaign contemplated getting Richmond
into that situation within week from 10 day
ut the turthereSt.
Events make it quite poss bic that the
above statement embraces the main points Of
Gen. McCiellan's plan Of campaign.
TO those who, like o1rsef, have placed ouI
trust in him as the great Union Captain Of
the age, through good and evil report, We
have to point to his patriotic conduct in the
present crisis as furnishing the example it is
their duty to follow. lie takes 10 thought
of self at this time, his heart and mind be-
ing wrapped up in the cause Of his couhtr!
as involved in the momentous crisis to
winch his almost completed movement had
brought that cause. His friends should, ar
one man, accept the action Of his superiors
in command, here as a thing accomplished ;
to be N de the best Of to secure, with the
command OF the army in other hands, glori.
Gus decisive victor. for the good cause he
woud surely have achieved within but thirty
or forty miles OF the point at which he had
arrived when ordered t. retire personally
from the field.