The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1862-12-17
sssge GFrom the Indianapolis Sentinell ,f
ABOLITION INTRIGUES AGAINST
IA =, GENERAL MCCLELLAN. ~ ~

ABOLITION INTRIGUEs AGAINST
Il, g. GENERAL MCCLELLAN. .P'
5ebnuov tua bsfii- r-78gss ~ abs~6 81
How the Operations against Richmond
. !. were Defeated by Interference with his
- ,g Plans Graphic Description by the
Prince De Joinyille, Member of Gen.
taH-Valuable Contribu-
~ tion to History gsae8 7.otl a5i7
The Prince De Joinville, who was
member Of General Mcclellan staff dur.
ing the Organization Of the Army of the
Potomac and the Peninsnlar campaign, has
published careful and elaborate sketch
of, the campaign which began with the
evacuation of Manassas by the rebel army
and ended with the retreat Of Mcclellan
from before Richmond. The review has
been carefully prepared by one who is
versed in the highest military science and
diplomacy of the age, and whose statement
of facts will not be called in question. No
one can read the comments of Prince De
J Joinyille without being, convinced that
General Mcclellan in that memorable
campaign was the victim alike Of jealousy
and weak and irresolute Cabinet IF he
had been sustained as he should have been, !.
by the representatives, of the Government,
the rebellion would have received a.severe
blow, and the. condition Of public affairs
would have presented far different aspect
from what they now do Mcclellan was
stricken down when it was in the power of
the administration to have given the re-
.bellionIa check from which it could not
have recovered, and now again, when he
was on the eve Of decisive battle, he is
again removed from command. Who,
then, is to blame for the Indefinite prolon-s
cation of the war? The conspirators who
twice have done allin their power to pro-
duce the disasters which our arms, have
suffered and who have thus given vitality
and power to the rebellion, will be held to
d fearful account. We have only space for
"a few extracts from the paper ofthe Prince,
but enough to show the embarrassments
Of Mcclellan in the campaign of the PEN
insula, which should have been, if he had
been properly sustained, triumphant suc-
cess insted Of reverse to our arms
With respect to the deposition of MeClel-
IL Il
denounces it as IA restriction of force and
a dfmihution of usefulness" and regards
II, as "a blow in the rear at the very outset
of the campaign. ~ He adds: % tea >
F@s Y ct this was but part ofthe mischief
done by him. Mcclellan had long known,
better than any body else, thereal strength
Of the rebels at Manassas and Centerville.
He was perfectly familiar with the exist
ence of wooden cannon' by which it has
been pretended that he was kept in awe for
six months. But he also knew that till the
mouth of April the roads OF Virginia ara
in such state that wagons and artillery
can only be moved over them by construct
ing plank roads, tedious operetion, dur
ing which the enemy, holding the railways
could either retreat, as he was then actual
| ly doing, or move for blow upon some
other point. In any event, had Mcclellan
attacked and carried Centerville, pursui
was impossible, and victory would have
been barren of results. A single bridge
I burned would have saved Johnston's whol,
army Such are the vast advantages Of
railway for retreating army-advantage
. which do not exist for the army which
4 pursues IT. q aa 8
s.Ws have the right, we think, to sa,
that Mcclellan never intended to marcl
upon Centerville His long determine
! purpose was to make Washington safe b.
means of a strong garrison, and then t
I use the good naviga BILE waters and immens
naval resources of the North to transpor
4 the army by sea to point near Richmond
For weeks, perhaps for months, this plal
had been secretly maturing. Secrecy, a
!. well as promptness, it will be understood
was indispensable here to success. L
keep the secret it had been necessary t
confide it to few persons, and hence ha
! arisen the long illlfeeling toward the un
communicative General. ja4l e9rerf'a= s
a -tsBe this as it may, as the day of actio
: drew near, those who suspected the Gener
ais project, and were angry at not bein
} Uniformed Of it; those whom his PROMOTE
had excited to envy; his political enemie.
n (who is without them in AmericaO
short all those beneath or beside him VIII
wished him i'll, broke out into chorus I
T laccusation Of slowness, inaction, incapac
1ty,,, Mcclellan, with . patriotic courae
II which I have always admired .disdaine
these accusations ana mace NO rcpfy.'t II
) satisfied himself with pursuing his prepal
8 ations in laborious silence. But the m,
. ment came in which, notwithstanding ii
) loyal support given him by the Presiden
thai functionary could no longer resist Il
!, tempest "A council of war of all Divisio
d Generals was held; plan of campaign NJ
o thatof Mcclellan was proposed and dl
.lcussed Mcclellan was then forced to g.
} fplain his projects, and the next day the
1were. known to the enemy. Informed, I
7 doubt, by one of those female spies wi
It keepsup his communications into the d.
I mestic circles of the Federal enemy, JohI
ston evacuated Manassas at once. Tn
r was askillful manenver. Incapable of a
e lsuming the offensive; threatened with a
! tack either al, CenterYille, where defen'
], would be, useless if successful, or at Ricl
mond, the loss of which would be graz
lcheck, and unable to cover both position
!. at once. Johnston threw his whole for,
: before the latter Of the two."l be 8
The consequence resulting from tn
IS unfortunate pressure ef the radicals, ar