Bellows Falls times. [volume] (Bellows Falls, Vt.) 1856-1965, 1862-12-26
gen. BurHside's Report OF the Fred
ericksburg Battle.

HE TAKES THE WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY.
HEAp'oRs ARMY OF THE PoroMAc,l
Falmouth, December 10.
Major General II. w. Halleck, general in
chief u. s. A. Washington:
Generals--l hare tue honor TO of; The
following reasons tor moving the army of
The Potomac across the Rappahaanock
sooner than was anticipated by the prrsi-
dent, secretary of war and Yourself, and
for crossing at point different fiom the
one indicated to you at our last meeting at
the presidents. During my preparations to
cross at thu place | had first selected, |
discovered that the enemy had thrown a
| large portion OF his force down the river
and elsewhere, thus weakening ais defenses
in front. and also thorough | discovered
/ that he did not anticipate the crossing of
our whole force at Fredericksburg, and |
hoped by rapidly throwing The whole COM
mand over at that place to separate 10y a
| vigorous attack the forces of the enemy on
the river below from the forces behind and
on the crest in the rear OF the town in which
case we could fight him with great ad-
vantage in our favor. To do this, we had
to gain hight on the extreme right Of the
crest, which hight commanded new road
lately made by the enemy for the purpose
Of more rapid communication along hi. lines.
which points gained, bis position along the
| or, st would have been scarcely tenable, and
he could have been driven from them easily
/ by an attack on his front, in connection
with movement in the rear of the crest.
How near we came TO accomplishing ur
object future reports will show. But for
the tog and unexpected and unavoidable
| delay in building the bridges, which gave
the enemy twenty-tour hours more to con-
centrate his forces in bis strong positions,
we would almost certainly have succeeded.
In which case the battle would have been.
in my opinion, far more decisive than if we
had crossed at the places first selected. AS
It was we came very near success. Failing
IN accomplishing the main object we re-
manned In order of battle two DAYS. lone
enough TO decide that the enemy would not
come out OF bis sirongholds 10 fiaht us with
bis infantry. After which we recrossed to
this side of the river, unmolested. without
the loss ct men or property. As tie day
broke, our long lines of troops were seen
marching TO their different positions as if
I gong on parade. Not the least democrat
izalion or disorganization existed. To the
brave officers and soldiers who accomplished
/ the feat OF thus recrossiug The river in the
face OF the enemy, owe everything. For
the failure in the attack, / am responsible.
as the extreme gallantry, courage and en-
durance shown by them was never exceeded
and would have carried the points had !,
been possible. To the familips and friends
OF The dead can only offer my heartfelt
sympatilies but for the wounded can offer
my earnest prayers for their comfort and
fiaal recovery.
The fact that decided TO move from
Warrenton on to this line. rather against
the opinion OF the pres ident, secretary of
war and yourself, and that you left the
whole movement in my hands, without
giving me orders, makes me responsible.
l will write you very soon and give YOU
more definite information, and finally will
send you my detailed report, in which a
special acknowledgment will be made of
Ire services of the different grand divisions
corps, and by general and staff departments
OF the army OF ihe Potomac, to whom am
so much indepted for their support. and
hearty cooperation. will add here, thar