The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-07-18
An Intelligent English View.
WHAT THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE
LONDON SPECTATOR SAYS OF
THE WAR.

OF most valuable and intelligent letters to
that journal in the last few months, and
who has travelled through the loyal states,
writes the following from
BOSTON, Sd June.
As 1 was leaving the West tie news
reached US of Banks defeat. Travelling
thence eastwards it was the talk of the dsy
at the towns through which passed.
4 4 As far as anybody understands
McClellan's strategy bis original idea seems
to have been to march the army of the Pos
tomac in three converging lines on Rich
mond. McDowell's division according to
this plan, would have been the centre Of the
attack, his own corps G'Grmie the left and
Banks division the right. If you connect
Washington, Yorktown and Richmond on
map by three straight lines, you will find
that you have formed very nearly a right.
angled triangle; the right angle being at
Yorktown, and the side between Richmond
and Yorktown being about third of the
length between that place and Washington.
McClellan's own army, therefore, formed
the main attack, and from its proximity to
the enemy occupied the post of danger
By the time the federal army was estab.
lished on the Peninsula of YORKTOWN, on
the way to Richmond, Mcclellan believed
or was led to believe, that the enemy had
resolved to contract bis line of defence, and
instead of resisting the advance of the
three armies separately, was determined to
concentrate the whole of his forces in de-
fence of Richmond against the advance of
the main army.
M'CLELLAN's PLANS.
In consequence, Mcclellan changed his
strategy, and issued orders for McDcwell's
division, which was then marching towards
Richmond by Manassas, to come and rev
infcrce him on the peninsula. These orders
were, understand, objected to by the War
Office On the following grounds II the en-
envy was to be crushed by mere weight and
force of numbers, the army already at Nc
Clellan's disposal was amply sufficient DIS he
had already some sixty thousand men end
some fifty pieces of artillery more than Ma.
pcleon had under his command at Sc!ferino.
In the second place, in the possible, though
improbable, event of defeat on the PENN
sula, the army had no available means of
retreat, and any extension of its unwieldly
size would only increase the possibility of a
disastrous rout. In the third place, WASH
irgton would be left exposed to an advance
OF the enemy, in case the Confederates
should be able to detach force of any size
from the army of Richmond.
Of these considerations, which we're laid
before the Precedent, the last was the one
which weighed most with him; and, On his
own authority this l know to be the easel,
be interfered with the execution Of McClel.
Ians orders. A compromise, as usual was
arranged between the War Office and the
General. General Franklin's division, form
ing part of McDowellis army, was sent to
Yorktown, but Mcdowell himself was re-
tanned in front of Washington, and was
reinforced by troops drawn from Banks's
army. Like most compromises in war, this
arrangement proved blunder, and each of
its authors considers the other was to blame
for its subsequent failare. McClelans
strategy was thwarted, McDowells advance
was stopped, aud Banks's force was left
isolated and weakened in the far away
valley Of the Shenandoah. As the Presi-
dent is reported to have said to Wendell
Phillips, " General McClellan's main fault
is, that be thinks tomorrow is always better
than today"
Whether wisely or not, the design of TAXI
ing Richmond by coup de main was aban-
dOned; the enemy became aware that they
had no cause to fear an immediate advance,
and Jackson's division was detached las it
is presumed) from the main army to fall up,
on Banks force, which consisted of little
more than four thousand men. Happily
McDowell's division was too strong to be
surprised, and so Washington was saved
from any danger of capture. However,
when the news reached Washington a very
natural panic ensued. The weak point in
General McClellan's present plan of cam.
paign is obviously that, if the Confederate
army chose to abandon Richmond, they
could reach Washington many days before
any large portion of the Yorktown army
could overtake them. 1t is true that such
Q step would require craftsmanship and a
generalship the South has not yet given
token of, and that in all probability. Gen.
Mcclellan has absolute reason to know that
this is step which will not be taken. Still
it is, or rather was then, possible and an
obvious move on the military chesboard;
and the possibility OF its being adopted
caused panic at Washington.
PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
Altogether the episode of Banks defeat
and its attendant panic is not intrinsicaily
creditable, either to the generalship or the
craftsmanship of the North, but yet the
whole incident has convinced me more fully
of the power and ultimate triumph of the
northern cause than anything l have yet
seen. The North has now been so used to
the idea of victory, so welded to tie convic.
ton that the end Of the rebellion was close
at hand, that the intelligence of an Union
army being disastrously defeated fell like
thunderbolt among them. Still from no
party or no paper or no person that met
with have 1 heard anything but the one
expression of opinion that the war must be
pushed on with redoubled energy.
Within week hundred thousand vol
unteers have been raised, and the services OF
probably a hundred thousand more have
been already declined. To judge of the
importance of this fact you must remember
who these new volunteers are. The scum
and rif4raff of the towns has been long ago