The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-06-10

The country saw tbs great Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road mos only aoanaonsd 70 the enemy out " ,S n
him 70 whom ts value was immense. The response
bty for this loss We 40 not impure 10 General AcCs
Ian. The road remained in tbs snemy's possession.
Still patient, but In deep humiliation the country saw
blockade OF the Potomac quietly allowed which cost
this country mil ions Of d0llas, by reducing i'm
mense transportation railroad sing track
and which placed before the world Is be-
sieged in its own capital We know whereof affirm
when we say that i've months age Navy Esnart.
ment begged TO be allowed to that blockade.
They demonstrated its removal 10 be simple certainty
and an eminent general was anxious u aid by landing
troops confident that he could capture the batteries
the men who manned them Their repeated re luests
peremptory refused by the Commander
The plan OF the Hattsras expedition contemplated
nothing more than the destruction Of the forts and
sinking distractions in tho channel and the occupation
OF the forts was wise transcendpg Of instructions. In
this General Mcclellan may, perhaps have had
sponsbility Bat the instructions for the burnside
Burnside was limited to perfectng the blockade and
prevented from striking at vital points and cutting inn
portant lines Of railroad. Over all this the country
wondered, believed and waited.
We know that beginning more than 1--WE months ago,
General Wool and the Navy Department. joined in urgent
and repeated applications 10 be allowed to take Norfolk,
which they demonstrated be = military and naval
certainty. Besides its immense Importance otherwise,
the Merrimac would have been taken while building the
Cnmber and and the Congress- would have been saved
and the James well the York river would have been
open for General McCieilan's march upon Richmond
Their requests were persmptorly refused by the COM
We know that while Gen. Mcclellan was stfll Com
zen. SHERMAN T0port0u NC was
prepared and anxious be allow to take Savannah
that il was military certainty, and that IT could be
done with little loss of ile This, TOO was forbid
den by the Commander nchief.
We have given these great selected facts, derived
from centre and authoritative sources to indicate the
whole circle which the people supposed bore relation
some sufficient and entirely justying plan in the mind
Of the COMMANDMENT chief. We will add, without
Stunning pass judgment that. while in great European
the spy system has often boon such tap the
very centre OF military COUNSEL while there
war Offering better opportunity for such system than
and a0trnn hacy
session Of nearly all plans soon as made We have
lamentably failed in detecting his
We will not stop to conjecture what Gen. NcCellsns
plan was and we have no right TO state such facts bear
ing upon II as are within knowledge Nobody ques
toned his loyalty and his faculty for organization aud
we Shall now show that 1t becomes entirely unnecessary
TO discuss his PLAN for the plan itself becomes unim-
portant in the light Of the facts shall state
some Of which already partially before country.
Mr. Stanton came into power when foreign interview
tion seemed mmnont. with no one great military ad
vantage yet followed up aud with capital distressing
the national finances which all depended With the
breadth and vision Of statesman and with the terrible
earnestness and force OF will or Cromwelian, he
brought into the national coupses, for the FIRST time
since the war began comprshensvensss decisiveness
and thorough realization OF the value of time to this
baton For the rst time The national will found ex-
precision Some minor Mistakes like his letter to the
New York Tribune, sprung naturally from his bcing
thoroughly in earnest or great mistakes he made
He found General Mcclellan virtually directing the whole
war, responsible that had been done and
in his deter minaton that no advance should be made
until April In this determination General Mcclellan
still further fortified himself by vote OF eight OF his
generals against four.
Mr. stanton saw at once that no advance until April
involved national dependency, tax levied upon
people for an immense debt which had borne fruit in
victories hot weather and fall campaign dstrust
babe foreign Intervention. Then through him
issued the Presidents order No. l. Gen. McClelan's
head and AGAINST his protest psgsmptofily commanding
Mcclellan placed at the head Of the Army Of the Poo
mac, and ceased to be Commander Chief Mr.. Stanton
simply became real Secretary Cf War taking into his
capable hands the rens which Mr. Cameron had either
necessarily given to others misussd himself. The
zach and ereataT for the oth er anu
The movements in the West under Commodore Foote,
which sent joy and hope through the nation made
without regard TO General AicCeans plan and srang
directly from Commodore Footes communications and
quests TO the Navy Department and its orders to him
and without further enumeration only
say that the series Of brilliant during Fsbrn
AIRY and March which threw now life into the nation,
which gave us Fort Henry Bowling Greer, Columbus,
national stocks to par, and which forced respect for
abroad II it did not prevent Intervention, and in direct
conravenon OF the plan of the Commander in Chief, and
aganst his protest What that plan proper
to discuss it, becomes of little consequence when
know that no advance be mado under IL until
April, and when it found that the Commander in
Chief had communicated mono TO the other MAJOR gem
erals.
Mcclellan AS the commander Of army-all the more
because as civilians. we are ssntely incompetent to
form " his military acts since he placed
at the head Of the Army of the Potomacwe free to
say, and think all candid will agree with us
that in the light ofthe Trustworthy have
ii the nest fortunate event in me history this
when Edwin d. stanton became Secretary Of War,
and General Mcclellan was placed where nothing
than purely military ability was wanting.
We have u believe that nobody regretted
than Mr Stanton tina, the New York tribune attacked
General Mcclellan 1t is almost the only newspaper on
our whole seabca which has attacked him. and since
lie has left for Yorktown the TouneS mplants
have mainly ceased. No trace TO Mr.. Stanton
complaints against General Mcclellan tho head Of
army, and IL is simply cruel to him with the
random and ilconsdered criticism OF others. What
lis opinions may be, ne too wise sEd
complain Of general as long he is kept 1t the bead
OF great army in the face Of his enemy.
And now what are the facts a. to the charges of diver
sion of troops from General Mcclellan which have
contradictory and absurd shlpes, which have had tho
support Of some letters written by few honest officers
in the Held with only special and limited knowledge,
well those OF omniscient newspaper correspondents
newspapers which have mered supp rsssion for early
treason and persistent ess and even of few
republican ucwspapsrs like the DaIv 4d,,yrsrr which
instead Of ing 10 the proper sources for u know ledge,
have been ~ dogmatic as they have bosn ignorant In
the first placs le, IL not Be forgotten tina, e Prcd nj and
Cbind haze at thev side special mih.ary adviser, Gen.
Hitchcock ioho has been called the Cesar Of army aud
ichose skill rrgia and whose p,sceys Of conabndn
are commensurate TON the highest mtiaary authority ui
his general culture chi comprehensipess And he is not
the only general eminent by nature, culture and sxps
rience who 10 called into consultation. The idea that
Mr. Stanton alone intsrfcros with or changes military
plans Is simply absurd.
No agreement was made by the President or the
War Department with General Mcclellan TO send TO the
peninsula the whole Of Mcnowes corps. For
no doubt sufficient TO his mind with reference to his
would have left not national soldier betweop ths forts
the Potomac and Richmond by way OF Fredercks
burg. large part Of McDowell's command was how
ever sent TO him. which much OF agree
msnt and when the correspondence Of the War Depart
mcnt that subject sees the light 1t win be found that
the President hnss ntsrlered 70 prevent the 23 900
LETT 70 General Mcdowell from being further in
excess Of original agreement But for the President
wisely insisting that both for the safety OF Washington
and that General Mcclellan might be aided by flank
movement under General MCDOWELL these 20, 600 men
should make part OF sufficient force all OF General
/ McIOWellH army would hav0 10 the peninsula,
And yet Mr.. Stanton has been charged with divsrng
troops from General Mcclellan in violation Of original
agreement and with his having prevented this very flank
movement upon Richmond, which was long delayed be-
men had been sent 10 Gen. Mcclellan than he
entitled to by agreement. The simple truth IL, that
the reduction Of General McDewelps command By
ing large portion OF II 70 General Mcclellan beyond
agreement, II not In full compliance with his wishes
caused the very arrangements VI original plans which
has boon wickedly charged upon Mr. Stanton Until
General McDowors force increased and the eposi
ton OF troops changed these facts could not be publicly
atAtAd