The Athens post. [volume] (Athens, Tenn.) 1848-1917, 1862-12-19

tempt to cross the Kentucky river ana
make battle with that river IN MS rear
This apparent movement on frahA'oft
was mere feint, while Buell. was coneen-
trating to Bragg's left wing near feFry- e,
vile. Bragg's left wing rested on eilaP-
Inns fork of Salt river, where wafer was
plenty, and Buell. had no water Tor nine
miles in his rear. Bragg made the at
tack, drove back BuelPs left Tor Two
miles, maintained his position on bueits
right, and held possession of the battle lie
field, and that by fighting only 19'V.V
men; part of Anderson's, part OF DueA-
ner's and Cheatham's commands.
Why did he not fight 10000 or ia;'V0
more men. Let his Generals be calico On
for an ansWe er.
3D. After the battle of Perryviila NY
should Bragg have retreat ted
Dick Robinson, and yTlst dfd flGS ~
centrate and follow Buell.? Bragg held
the water and battlefield with $4,000.
against 10000 opposed to him, and Buell.
did actually retreat after the battle. The
singular facts are now disclosed that both
armies retreated.
4th. What good reason or necessitv can
be urged for the sudden retreat from
Camp Dick Robinson, by which the army
wagons and most of the army stores were
saved by the skin of the teeth, while on
ly 1000 or 5000 cattle on the hoof were
brought out? Camp Robinson is IL an
acute angle formed by the junction of
Kentucky and Dick rivers, with high and
impossible and perpendicular cliffs for
long distances Hp these rivers, except at
few crossings at which very small fore
es could repel twenty times their num-
IL
high and commanding hills. suited for
artillery defences. 1t is notorious to all
of any military science, that it was i'm
pregnable to any other attack than that
of famine, and there was destroyed Or
left to the enemy more picked pork than
would have subsisted the army for
month, besides much corn, wheat and
flour.
Why, then, did not Bragg retain this
position. until his overpowering cavalry
could sweep the country, and drive off,
by private enterprise or cavalry force,
10000 10000, or 10000 fat cattle, or other
commissary and quartermasters stores,
so much needed by our armies?
5th. 1t was admitted by Mr.. Forsyth
that there was great error in not pur
chasing, on army account, and obtaining
by private adventure, the subsistence and
forage in cattle, hogs, mules, bacon, salt,
WOODEN goods, shoes, etc, ETC., from the
first entry of Gen. Smiths army into the
State; but this admission is evidently
made as fling at Gen. Kirby Smith, who
had a small force, and who relied conf
dently on holding the State by the help
of the combined armies of Bragg and
Marshall.
9th. Why did not Gen Nrarshss.,s.ss
uuSEss S&ea4--k~-A1a- h II
sooner than it did? Can any sufficient
reason be given? By this l would not
implicate Gen. Bragg. Why did not Gen.
Marshall, by army aid, and by encour
agement to private adventures, send out
large commissary and quartermaster's
stores by Sandy River and Pound Gap?-
Why did he not aid Col. John II. Nor
gan to capture Gen. George Morgan's ar
my, when it was known to him that j Ohm
Morgan, with 760 cavalry. had arrested
George Morgan's army for five days, and,
with all his force to protect his TANKS,
could have held him in the mountains
five days longer, and, with the help of
1000 of Marshall's infantry, within little
more than days march, could have
captured the entire army of George Nor
gan? 1t is known that courier after cou-
rier was sent to him by John Morgan,
And yet, after all these errors and fail
ures, the whole campaign is excused. and
the retreat justified upon the plea that
Kentlckians violated the promise to rush
$4,000 troops to Bragg's army.
1t must be remembered that General
Bragg's army was in the State but a very
short time, and nearly all the time on the
march; that it occupied at any time but
a small portion of the State; that the
officers and soldiers held out the most
confident promises and assurances OF its
ability to hold Kentucky. 1t is also
known that wherever there was tempo
rary protection by the army, there were
hundreds of organizations commenced,
and being prosecuted by proposed lieu
tenants and captains, majors and colo
nels to raise companies, squadrons and
regiments, and that nearly the whole eff
forts were defeated by Bragg's sudden re-
treat.
1t is confidently stated that a few weeks
time would have perfected very large or
carnations. But the time was too short.
The retreat came like a clap of thunder
in clear day, and confusion and disnay
| was the result.
1t IS known that -.seet,se=S--s-4s-,s-
lucky had, for more than a year, -aesz.l
| overrun by Northern armies, with -safri-
sons in almost every town; had been !i;t euo
| iected to insults. prosecutions, mi!i'ol
exactions, and imprisonments; snuv G
from the public presses except sucp af The
| ly spread abroad theimmense powefo. - -. ~
North and the speedy suejugation o. n,, sne
| South: and that the principal Soulheit n
rights leaders were exiled or imprisoned
| Under these circumstances 1t was natui a.
that the people should be slow in belieV
ino our power to hold the State whllf
nersecutions, military eXactIons ana con
fscations awaited the retreat OF the army
freely admit that our rich men
i Southern affinities loved their estate
roore than their liberties; but there Wer
many, and very many, shining eXeeI
lions. Under all the adverse facts OF III
| case. 1t will be proved that many cohps
MES and regiments will be added 10 0u
army. and that heroic christian Jon
Moroan, has run up his cavalry force no. y
1000 to 2OOO, which is an army OF issei
will conclude these reflections by T,
ferring to single point OF defence mac n
Ihv Mr.. Forsyth, in which it IS stated tn'
in a council of the general officers II W.
: determined, with one dissenting VOICE
evacuata the State, and that Gems. Buc'
e ner and Preston were decidedly IN lav'
t of the honseward movement: veEtuI Ii
f the assertion, and viii stand or 1al1 u |
j the result, that Gems. Buckner ara [Ie
a ton will not prove these facts IN the sen
: SL;oh H. aItthoT yyorlE1 have them U