, 1862-07-04
Campaign in the Peninsula.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE PENINSULA.
The news Of this morning, which brings the
beginning Of the great battle Of the peninsu-
Ia, furnishes proper occasion for some re-
of the country.
The reverse at Bull Run, in July last, By
threatening Washington, caused the northern
forces to be estab1lahed along the line Of the
y defensive attitude, the, gradually acquired
the offensive, and finally the master position
with respect to the whole Of Eastern Virginia
north Of James River. THIS area forms q trl-
ang1e singularly favorable for strategic opera
tione BY an army advancing from the North.
The Illustration Of an open fan Is frequently |
used by military writer's in describing the ma
That which Is situate IL the han
ns Ss ha rado b wSish SasAH e prespes shGfsfe
itself on any part Of the circumference; and /
the enemy. not knowing Ehere the blow viii |
fall, is equally at q loss to concentrate his |
forces. or to keep them divided. # he attempts |
if the latter, each part is helpless against bis
mo;s compact adversary. Thig vas Napo- I
leon,s method. With an inferior army In the |
asggtegate, he 50 maneuVred' 'a6 to divide the
forces OF bis antagonist and to gain the haaldle
Of the fan, when: their destruction IN detail
was made certsin. a glance at the map will
prove to the most unpraetised eye that the |
northern army held this position before Its
transfer to the RentnEula- It rested on an1m- /
preghable base .ot forts In y immediate
telegraphs. In add1tlon;' it held command /
Of tie Potomac and Of the mouth Of James.
Rirer, without weakening the main body.
The confederate forces did not occupy any 4
strength or advantages: natural and artificial,
with!that Of our army. They had no compact
and impregnab1e base and no plan Of bystem-
atized operations, but were scattered. from
yorktown to Leesburg IN q vast semf circle,
with:their principal Divisions in camp st Rich
sacks, over this immense line, anator eight
months after the battle Of Bull Run held at bay
tie n1uch superior army If tue Potomac-Su-
periornot in number only, but in quality Of
men and general equipment. For consider
able part Of: this time their rehe1ilouE dagg
| waved in sight and almost within cannon
| shot Of the presidents house and the halls Of
| congress.
We find the best evidence Of the strategic
| position Of our army on the Potomac in the
| TACT that the enemy moved out OF It's jaws as
soon as the roads became practicable for
| marching after the Tinterrains. Manassas vas
| untepab1e, and for that reason Was evacuated.
| They abandoned to the mtre1T silent force Of
our position more than one half Of the triangle,
retiring On Richmond THY ;tt made ansts no shoW
| bridges and roads, Richmond became their
natural base, for at no intermediates point
could they rest on safe communications n
their rear, by which to receive reinforcements
or supplies, or from which they could retire
without hazarding disadvantageous battle.
Who does not see, therefore, that the gates OF
Richmond were at Man.sses, as Napoleon
found those Of Vienna at Narengo, and those
Of Berlin at Jena? The rebel generals con-
fessed their appreciation Of this fact when they
failed to nse the Rappahhnnock as second
line Of operations. they evidently expected
nothing else than our direct march on Rich
| moud,
We must now call attention to the peculiar
topography Of that part OF Firginia which
. The term peninsula is commonly applied te
the narrow "trip of land on which yorktown
| is situated; bnt the whole region is, in fact
} | a peninsula, from which au army would tlnG
; it difficult to escape if pressed by an enter
, wards Richmond contracts the neck of it, an,
makes its occupation in presence of or threat
ened by superior army fatal fault, involv
! iDg certain destruction. We are, therefore
E at a less to see why the original plan OF cam
: paign should have been abandoned at thi
!, 1uncture, Just when it began to act with it
S inevitable military logic on the enemy. Th
way was opened to Richmond, distant no
81 more than seven days march at fifteen mile
t day; and our army before that place woul
l. give us the absolute command Of the Who'll
S peninsula us completely as we now possess il
d On this reasoning, it stands proved By result
. that the transfer ofthe main body of the arm
II Of the Potomac to YORKTOWN vas an egregiou
, blunder, contrary to all rules Of 1nilitar
strategy. It has cost us more than thre
it months Of delay, immense labor and exhau:
t. ton in digging trenches and parallels tla
!, we're never used, the unnecessary construt
G ton of roads through swamps aud forests, an
C finally, more men BY sickness than were pit
II AoTs du combat Oh the two bloody fields
) Shiloh and Seven Pines together.
a It is hardly worth while to mention the sui
t, ordinate error Of moving an army away tro1
;e close contact with its supplies, or to cous
n has resulted 10 the country from the Wrec
I'd aud waste Of material directly eonseqnel
Id upon this expedition. Neither need We ste
1t to remark that as soon as the army abandon'
is It's prestige on the Potomac, the whole
st Northern Virginia, from Fredericksburg
lie tive raid Of jackson, and even Baltimore 81
es Washington we're Threatened by this enterpri
ne ing rebel chief. That result was ineyltabl
th and when the War Department was alarnlc
n another hundred thousand men *sto save t
OF capital knowing that ne had already in arr
= two to one Of the enemy, better cquippe
no better fed, better disciplined, and lnspir
sia with the better cause-but not knowing t
d. 1uanner they had been used.
t1y We do not know who Was responsible
lis this plan OF the campaign; we do not yet G.
of to inquire; perhaps no individual was, and
)W WIS the result of joint councils; but the
lie feet has been to multiply the difficulties oft
ic- | commanding general and render victf
its | doubtful. II, however, in the fare Of bis c
od barrassments, Mcclellan has achieved
so unph, as our best reports claim, ,:the glory
ted cruing 10 him and bis noble army will be
ON the greater. But If, as some accounts il
mate, he has been compelled to fall back,
cs, has only fonght drawn battle, the want
es. success will be owing to the original plan
ike the campaign, and not to any deficiency in
eir military qualities Of our troops. They b;
BILE done all that men could do in the positi
in | They have endured disease, exposure, fatig
sh. and even death itself, with the spirit OF hero
,ek They have fought as only soldiers Of
uts sternest mettlc can fight, No veterans in
CO. trained armies Of the old world could b
or | manifested more cheerful endurance or q N
ds, incomitable energy. Every American I
ur- have reason, to The end Of his days, to
rho | proud Of bis country en-, and to rejoice
ons he is citizen Of a republic which abounds
gu- men OF this rare stamp.