Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1862-03-25
StratagY Of the Rebels.

New Madrid on the Mississippi leads US to be-
lieye that the abandonment Of Columbus was o
part OF their strategy Of defense Of the passage
Of the river. We had heard 50 much Of the
prcgnablllty Of Columbus that when it was
evacuated we at first cjoiced At it, as though IT
opened at once the way for our gunboats to
New Orleans. The rebels, however, evidently
had their own notions about the defense Of the
river, and possibly in their Judgment the island
was regarded asabctter position than Columbus.
They had opportunity 10 remove all their guns
from the latter place to the Island, and concen-
trato all their force there The successes Of
Federal troops have, no doubt, taught them
that when they have any purpose OF resisting
the advance OF our army or navy, it will not
answer to attempt it with any inconslderable
fragment OF her force. One rebel ratification
on the Mississippi, well and strongly defended,
is better than the same strength divided between
two positions, and having determined to tortiiy
Island No. 10, at all, it was their wisest policy
to abandon Columbus, and concentrate all thelr
strength at the Island And it is not imposs-
BILE, that Beauregard, in his recent visit to Co
lumbus. and the rebel delences Of the Missis-
slppi, may have determined upon the Island as
the best point for stand in that vicinity, and
at the same time concluded to abandon Column
bus.
The boast, for SO long time INDUCED in by the
rebels, that one q" Chvalric Southerner y was a
match for five " Northern mudsls, has not
recently been paraded in Southern papers, or
uttered by Southern orators The rebels have
found to their cost, and by the convincing logic
Of experience, that Yankees will fight. and they
have no stomach for fight unless in their stron-
gest positions and with their best material OF war.
This knowledge will lead them to fight at as few
places as possible on the Mississippi, but to bring
into action, wherever they do make a stand, all
their available strength in that vicinity. If
their force and their guns had been divided be-
tween Columbus and Island No. 10, both places,
OF course, would have been weakened by the
division and could have made a much less for
midable resistance to Com Foote'S fleet, and
would more quickly, and with less loss Of lie
to us, have fallen into our hands. 1t was only
by uniting their strength, that they could have
any hope of success.
And ever since the battle Of Fort DoneIson,
this policy Of falling hack, contracting their
lines of defense, and bringing their forces nearer
together to be mutual supports against the over
wheming Union armies that are maj ching South
ward, has apparently been adopted by the lead
ers Of the rebellion, 1t was this that led them
to abandon Bowling Green and Nashville. They
understood that the struggle was to be for the
valley of the Mississippi, and stand at Nash
vile would have aided, in defense of Memphis
or New Orleans, but little. even if there had
been IN it one desperate chance of victory. Gen.
Buell's army at Nashville does appear to be
any part Of the expedition to New Orleans, our
land force in that expedition having gone up the
Tennessee, and not the Cumberland river. But
it is not at all probable that Memphis. and its
approaches along the river, are to be surrendered
without blow What the rebel strength is
there we do not know, but the preparations for
resistance a, Island No. 10, warrant the suppo-
stion that the defense of the river nearer to the
city has not been neglected, and that if there is
much fight left in the rebels some OF it will
come out soon. Indeed, we have had specimen
already at Island No. TO-
And the recent movements in Virginia indi-
cate the same rebel policy Of narrowing their
line of defense 1t has been extended, until re-
Gently, from Sewcs Point to llarper's Ferry,
with its centre at Manassas. But it is now
falling back from the Potomac, along ITS whole
circuit, toward Richmond, and putting the
points along the line in easy communication
! with each other 1t may be no part of the
rebel plan to make stand in Virginia, and
risk great and decisive battle there, While
! Wv WV III 'htiA Io'NcnciNhs 'hNl NAil
fight or retreat @they please, as the Federal
advance will be necessarily slow and clutious
But whether for the purpose of fighting, or for
slowly retreating, there is more safety in the
united than in theseparate action of their forces
1t hardly seems possible that jeff. Davis will
abandon Richmond to the " Northern mudsills,
without battle, yet it would be better for hin
to give it up and save his army and armamen
than 10 lose great battle, and Richmond will
1t. There would be much gained to the Fedora
cause by the ocupation OF Virginia by GU
troops, but the achevement would kill the -
bellion if the rebel army could be defeated, cap
tured, or scattered in the process of this occupa
ton. But if the rebels are too brisk to b.
oyertaken, the next beet thing to do is to nd
vance as fast as they retreat and tins we sup
pose is beng done