The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-07-18

ana lrretrleVaOle ruin menace0 us. IL was
believed that the enemy was massing bis
forces that day for final combined move
ment, which but for some unlocked for in.
terposition Of Providence, it was feared
would have swept the army OF the Potomac
into James River. 1t was resolved by that
(then) enfeebled and wasted army to fight
fight Of desperation. But it seemed hope
less. Our numbers had been fearfully re>
duced by sickness, exhaustion and battle.
Those who still stood shoulder to shoulder,
resolved to resist until death, exhibiting
q most touching and sublime devotion to
their country, we're unable to retreat further
had there been an open field behind them.
But they were hemmed about with grim de-
struction They hardly enjoyed justifa.
bic hope of extrication. 1t seemed
that Malvern Hill was to be our Their.
mopyla. Officers of exalted rank so ex.
pressed Enthusiastically, it is true,
that their sentiments might not reach the
hearts of the devoted soldiers, who had
fought so grandly, but it required no keen
perceptive powers to discover the agony
of despair which crushed their brave hearts.
"We will wrap this hill in sheets of fame
before they take it," was heroism and deA
spair in one terrible, graphic sentence. Be-
fore our proud flag would have been hum.
bied, there would have been an awful sacri
flee of human life, but it was sadly believed
the sacrifice would soon be made. At
Trents l had asked our leader what were
his hopes for reinforcements =? With looks
and gesture of indescribable dependence he
replied 81 cannot tell. None have been
sent. l only know that l shall live and die
with the Army of the Potomac" The retro.
gressiye movement had not then begun, but
disaster was looming up in dreary proper
items. At Malvern Hill, as at Savage
Station, White Oak Swamp, and on the
march, his usually cheerful countenance was
scared with deep lines of care and anxiety.
Those nearest him were grave and sorrow
ful. But why sketch the gloomy picture.
Evidences to fortify the facts already appa-
rent to the people, could be multiplied al
most indefinitely.
DARK HOURS PASSED.
From my knowledge CT the situation, l
cherish strong hope-amountipg now to
conviction that the darkest hours have
Tuesday that the enemy was Eassing his
power to close upon US that day or the
next. AS they failed to press upon Us then,
| feel satisfied that they lost their golden
opportunity. left Hardin's Landing
(headquarters) at about 7 O'Clock Tuesday
evening. The army was above that point.
The position en- which our last stand
would be made. when the climax should
arrive, was Malvern Hill. There was some
fighting going on, but not general battle.
We had repuIsed the enemy in the terrible
battle of Monday, but that night our lines
were necessarily contracted. Both tanks
were protected somewhat by gunboats, but
still the greater part Of our position
was assaiiab!e. Had the army been
fresh we could have defed assault.
At about s o'clock our steamer left
Harrison's Landing, several miles below
perhaps 1900 troops, which were return
ing from hospitals, including the two regi
ments which had been sent with General
Stoneman to decoy the enemy to White
House, and the White House garrison,
we're then anchored in the river awaiting
orders. Our transportation trains were ar.
irving from Malvern Hill but the army was
not following. Supplies had not even then
arrived. That night, however, we met
transports With supplies and reinforcements,
and before Wednesday morning the army
had undoubtedly received some relief,
enough, perhaps with the inactivity of the
enemy, to save it. But you know now
that the country was never before in such
awful peril. Do you not thank Almighty
God that be has so mercifully spared US
from awful calamity?
STRENGTH CT THE ARMY.
OF the exhaustion of the army you have
read enough to distress you. 1t would not
be prudent to attempt to state definitely how
much of it has been reduced numerically.
Bat there can be no improperly in stating
that General Mcclellan was never able to
carry ever $4,000 effective men into battle.
When he landed at Fortress Monroe, his
muster rolls exhibited $4,000 men of all
arms. 4 considerable portion of these, say
5000, were cavalry, of which 1000 were
serviceable. The remainder would have
served their country better behind their
pl0ws at home. Others were necessarily de-
tailed to keep open our communications and
protect cur fianks--lsaving about 100000
to be disposed Of. 4 very large per centage
of the sick was then to be substracted. 1t
is not very extravagant to say that wounds
and deaths at Yorktown cost us cne thou
sand men; Williamsburg cost US three
thousand West Point two hundred and
fifty; Hanover Court House FIVE hundred /;
Fair Oaks SO say official bulletins, FIVE thou
sand ard seven hundred. | wish l could
believe that were all. Skirnishes aud af>
fairs in front of Richmond, one thousand at
least; Mechanicsyi!le, three hundred at
least Gaines Hill, seven thousand; Savage
Station 1000; White Oak swamp and Tur~
key creek--ob, how mary! Where are the
stragglers? To be sure the enemy have lost
full as many, but they could afford it. With.
out attempting to estimate the average NUNS
Der of sick, will give one exceptional fact
which may cause you to shudder. When
General Casey's division landed at Fortress
Monroe it numbered 10000 Men. When
his division was routed at Seven Pines it
numbered less than 5000 men. All the
rest were dead and 10 hospital. But no
other division suffered as much. After
Seven Pines it was no division at all.