The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1862-02-26

days sgo, was that they would either beat
Price or drive him out OF Missouri. Per.
haps my colleague never got as far as Spring
field, and be does not know the almost
matchless strategy OF Price. He has ventured
TO appear In force in southwestern Missouri;
but be takes care to be within convenient
reach Of the Boston mountains. where he can
hide in that almost inaccessible locality, and
where It is easier for him TO go than curgen
erals to follow. But it IS utterly unjust TO
General Mcclellan to say that he has re-
strained the eager impetuosity Of the Miss
ouri soldiers. General HalIeck has no or.
ders inconsistent with the most prompt
movement in Missouri. When General Hal
leck took command of the Army in Missouri
he found mountains OF difficulty to overcome
--as Buell. did IN Kentucky, as Mcclellan
did herein the organization and equipment
Of the troops. Central Halleek iound il is
true, a fire paper organization He has la.
bored with statesman's foresight, public
ist's learning, and soldiers skill TO bring
order out Of chaos. He found troops without
concentration, and required arms, transpor.
tatlon, and supplies, which General McClel
Ian has strained every nerve to afford -
There has been no delay by any orders oil
General Mcclellan. His sorders to Halleck,
as to Buell., have been TO bury his move
ments as fast as it was safe and possible.
! state these as the positive facts of the case;
and II gentlemen want the facts, let them go
to the headquarters and they can have them.
Again, my colleague makes the specific
charge that he is informed, on authority
which he is not permitted to'question-an |
suppose to quote--that some ten or fifteen
thousand confederate troops, near Romney
were in the power Of our army Of forty thou.
sand, and the capture 80 easy was not made
because an order came from headquarters
here not to advance! This isa charge as
sweeping as it is Irresponsible and groundless
lido not care who is his authority, I ques.
tionit here, and now My colleague reads
certain telegraphs which have strangely come
into his possession to show that Lander and
Kelly dispatched that they conld take the
rebels, and all that was wanted was an or
der; and presto! here they are. We have
had good many such successes in anticipa-
tion. believe we had one at Piketon. 1t
is said that General Lander teegraphed and
General Kelly sent messenger TO apprize
each other OF the absolute certainty ofsuccess.
General Lander | admire for his caution and
intrepidity; but will state the facts to which
suppose my colleague refers. | state them
correctly. General Lander went to relieve
General Kelly at Romney--Kel being sick.
tie reached Hancock on the 5th Of January.
He found the enemy, under General jackson
on the other side of the river, in considerable
strength--say fifteen or sixteen thousand -
The enemy had driven few Of our troops
across the river. When General Lander
reached his point, the enemy we're shelling,
or about to she'll, Hancock. Gen. jackson
summoned General Lander to surrender
Lander declined. Jackson shelled away at
Hancock without effect. Lander sent for re.
inforcements. General Mcclellan sent one
OF Banks brigades, by forcee marches at
once. While there, General Lander sent
two or three long dispatches, suggesting va
rious movements to cut off jackson. Gen
erat jackson had shorter distsnce 10 return 10
Winchester than General Banks had to MARCH
10 "toT jackson retreat, besides the river,
which it would take forty.eight hours to
cross, as they had no means OF crossing
Generel Mcclellan refused TO trust q com.
mand to cross the river under these circum
stances, with no chance of retreat provided
General Lander then sent another dispatch
to General Banks, critIcizirg the President
General Banks, and others; to which McClel.
Ian replied that General Lander was stoo
suggestive and critical" think here is the
rub: Mcclellan had seen enough Of the Balls
Bluff business that affair which | do not
refer to except to say that no one attaches
the responsibility to General Mcclellan for
that terrible disaster. lie knew what gentle.
man from New York depicted So graphically
that to cross river like the Potomac, in the
face OF an enemy, and with no means of re-
treat, was almost insanity. He did what
prudent general, having his own plans ina
tured, ought to have done; and here dis 4
tinctly say that General Banks, wrote
letter, in which, from his stand point, he en-
tirely commended the action Of General
Mcclellan. And now, and here, we have
our general arraigned by my colleague on
facts not authentic; and when, SO far as we
can see, my colleagues military experience
does not reach SO lar as to tell, by practice,
the rear rank from the 'front.' or the breech
from the muzzle OF musket! qaAr
have replied to these complaints in de-
tail. Now for these general complaints OF
no movement, so glibly rehearsed by the
gentleman. G7Hau
1t is complained that Mcclellan has not
moved, that nothing has been done, and that
nothing is about to be done; that he does not
let curious people know what he is about
/ he is doing nothing, as they allege, he has
no hing 10 dlyu'ge 10 these curious gen ismen.
| he is doing something, the very way to
undo it is to let them know it, for they ara
as leaky IS the present weather, or Oregon,
where it is said to rain fiity-two weeks Of
the year. 1faa g5 ws4 a. e5 s,gI
But has he done notiingf say that he
has done all that no could safely. MeClel
Ian has not merely perfected the detenses of
Washing on and the Potomac; but consider
ing the TACT that the force and spirit OF the
south are concentrated hsre on the Potomac,
and near our capital and considering the un
season, weather and roads, is il moth
ing that he.has, as Richmond paper asserts
held Beansegard and his army as in q vice;
and that too when the enemy have all the
advantage OF an eqnal army, railroad for
concentration in the rear, and a power Of
combination impossible for our general,
But he has delayed too long here; and he Is
taken TO task now because he does rot move
his army TO acertain destruction, by assault i
ting an enemy equal n number to his own,
and that, too, in Their ihlrenchthents e''i
Ny answer 10 this querulous questioning
is, first, that my colleague himself gives q
reason why no movement could have been
made the past three weeks, because he says
that the artillery would 30 underthe mud.
Vsry ,uefl. does ne want thaf dona2 Hal
the roads been on the 2istof July last as
they are w, my colleague would not haye
been able TO escaped the compationship oi
my friend from New York. Second, when
Gen. Mcclellan took command here--I say
il without any desire 10 reflect on General
Scott--he found thiogs disorganized, and no
combinations between different parts OF this
grand army. He had 10 Construct intfenchs
inents, and make the Army effective in ma
nv details. This he has dons. Indefatiga.