The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-07-18
An Intelligent English View.
WHAT THE CORRESPONDENT OF THE
LONDON SPECTATOR SAYS OF
THE WAR.

London Spectator, who has written series
OF most valuable and intelligent letters to
that journal in the last few months, and
who has travelled through the loyal states,
writes the following from
BOSTON, Sd June.
AS l was leaving the West tie news
reached US of Banks defeat. Travelling
thence eastwards it was the talk of the daY
at the towns through which l passed.
4 X As far as anybody understands
McClellan's strategy bis original idea seems
to have been to march the army of the Pos
t0mac in three converging lines on Rich
mond. McDowell's division according to
this plan, would have been the centre of the
attack, his own corps G'Grmie the left and
Banks division the right. If you connect
Washington, Yorktown and Richmond on
map by three straight lines, you will find
that you have formed very nearly right.
anged triangle; the right angle being at
Yorktown, and the side between Richmond
and Yorktown being about a third of the
length between that place and Washington.
McClellan's own army, therefore, formed
the main attack, and from its proximity to
the enemy occupied the post of danger
By the time the federal army was estab~
lished On the Peninsula of YORKTOWN, on
the way to Richmond, Mcclellan believed,
or was led to believe, that the enemy had
resolved to contract bis line of defence. and
instead of resisting the advance of the
three armies separately, was determined TO
concentrate the whole Of his forces in de-
fence of Richmond against the advance OF
the main army.
M'CLELLAN's PLANS.
In consequence, Mcclellan changed his
strategy, and issued orders fer McDcweIl's
division, which was then marching towards
Richmond by Manassas, to come and re-
intcrce him On the peninsula. These orders
were, understand, objected to by the War
Office On the following grounds /: Il theen
envy was to be crushed by mere weight and
force Of numbers, the army already at Nc
Clelan's disposal was amply sufficient DIS be
had already some sixty thousand men end
some fifty pieces of artillery more than Ma.
pcleon had under his command at So.ferino.
In the second place, in the possible, though
improbable, event Of defeat on the penin-
suia, the army had no available means of
retreat, and any extension of It's unWie!dly
size would only increase the possibility of a
disastrous rout. In the third place, WASH
ington would be left exposed to an advance
OF the enemy, in case the Confederates
should be able to detach force of any size
from the army of Richmond.
Of these considerations, which were laid
before the President, the last was the one
which weighed most with him; and, On his
own authority (th;s l know to be the easel
he interfered with the execution Of McClei-
Ian's orders. 4 compromise. as usual, was
arranged between the War Office and the
General. General Franklin's division. form
ing part OF McDowell's army, was sent TO
Yorktown, but Mcdowell himself was re.
tanned in front of Washington, and was
reinforced by troops drawn from Banks's
army. Like most compromises in war, this
arrangement proved blunder, and each OF
its authors considers the other was to blame
for its subsequent faiIore. McClellan's
strategy was thwarted, McDowelI's advance
was stopped, aud Banks's force was left
isolated and weakened in the far away
valley Of the Shenandoah. As the Presi-
dent is reported to have said to Wendell
Phillips, General McCieilan's main fault
is, that he thinks tomorrow is always better
than today"
Whether wisely or not, the design Of taxi
ing Richmond by coup De mGiaa was adams
doned the enemy became aware that they
lad no cause to fear an immediate advance,
and Jacksons division was detached las i.
is presumeD from the main army to fall up
on Banks force, which consisted Of little
more than four thousand men. Happily
McDowell's division was too strong to be
surprised, and so Washington was saved
from any danger of capture. However,
when the news reached Washington a very
natural panic eusued. The weak point in
General McClellan's present plan OF cams
paign is obviously that, if the Confederate
army chose to abandon Richmond, they
could reach Washington many days before
airy large portion Of the Yorktown army
could ove,take them. It is true that such
step would require statesmanship and a
generalship the South has not YET given
token of. and that in all probability. Gen.
Mcclellan has absolute reason 10 know that
tuIS Is q etop WHICH VIII Eot Ce tahEI. Duh
it is, OR rather was then, possible and az
obvious move on the military chesboard;
and the possibility OF its being adopted
caused panic at Washington.
PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
Altogether the episode of Banks defeat
and its attendant panic is not enthusiastically
creditable, either TO the generalship or the
craftsmanship of the North, but yet the
whole incident has convinced me mere fully
of the power aud ultimate triumph Of the
northern cause than anything have yet
seen. the North has now been SO used to
the idea Of victory, SO welded to tie convic.
ton that the end OF the rebellion was close
at hand, that the intelligence of an Union
army being disastrous!y defeated fell like
thunderoolt among them. Still from 70
party or 10 paper or no person that met
with have l heard anything but the one
expression Of opinion that the war must be
pushed on with redoubled energy.
Within week a hundred thousand vol
unteers have been raised, and the services OF
probably hundred thousand more have
been already declined. To judge of the
importance of this fact you must remember
who these new volunteers are. The scum