New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-03-06

looss at Bowling Green. Winchester and Man.
assas.
But how is q resolute aud vigorous oiieasive
IN he inaugurated with soldIery winch hsn''
only when il can impel two full armies Oh P"''
of one "a at Mapassas. or when it can SEQ
that its strength is three to one, as az " ns"n .
crook or ten to one as OF Lexipgtou~ S'er-
linz Price seems to be one OF the cie'o'''.
generals the Rebels have; but the oet'er p'''
of his strategy consists in running wheneve' 10
6ods himself confronted By anything iiho gu
equal force. Lyon had to follow him and ng"'
him on his well'chO'cn ssfound at wilson.
Creek, though the Union force was less than
G, 600 against $4,000; and when, two months
inter. Fremont 90. ready TO go after him, he
ran from Lexington to the Southwest corner
Of the State, as if running were the chiei ena
of Confederate strategy, though his numbers
were at least equal to ours. Again no 'ol'
lowed our retreating army, after Fremonts
removal, nearly to the Missourij and again ne
turned and ran the moment Curtis and Sigel
went after him. lie suffered himself to be
c5ased clear out of his o@n State without
serious contest, and was still ruanlns when we
last heard from him in Arkantas. II would
probably give ofense to suggest to him juat
now the expedieDcy of assuming the offensive.
So with regard TO Kentucky and Tennessee
The Rebels did assume the offensive at Wild.
cat and at Mill Spring, aud pretty business
they made of it. At Bowling Green, they tdIhed
loudly enough Of advancing and taking Louis
vile; but they sneaked of southwardly without
firing a shot or having one fired at them, be-
fore an enemy had come near them. at Fort
Henry, their infantry avoided serious loss by
the happy expedient of running away before
our land forces had come within cnnnon-shot.
At Donelson, being surrounded, they fought;
but. being worstcd, oil ran that could get away,
without waiting for q full encounter. They
were far more strongly posted here than Null gan
was at Lexington; they had artillery, ammuni-
ton and water in abundance; they were Of
least two-ihirds the number of their assailant';
while Muliigan had but one TO ten; yet they
did not bold out so long M he did. Jeif DAVIS
sage!y observes that the loss OF this fort and
army is inoxplicable. We tmidly suggest the
explanation that they were lost for want of O
vigorous offensive. Had they fought their way
out-as Floyd falsely pretended to have done
they must have Inflicted great injury on their
adyersares, and would not have been taken.
III Of ffolu,,.tuo -. norcocfir in
telligibe. After tie disasters on the Tennes.
see and Cumberland, Columbus, though very
strong, was 40 longer tcnable. II might have
been defended for weeks ty n capable General
and well-apponted force of 10000 men; but
the end would have been total loss. IL was
well to ave tho men ond portion of the
guns and munitions. But the flight from
Nashville is stlll unaccOuntablc, save on the
hypothesis Of utter panic and Generalization.
Here wa, the Western capital Of Secessia, in
a deiensible position, with the amplest railroad
communications on every side, with more
munitions and provisions than are this day 10
be found in any city that owns the sway Of
Davis. Here were the best Generals OF the
Confederacy-sidncy John,on, Beauregard,
&c.-whlc Floyd and Pillow had either
already led toward Columbus or might easily
have been made 10 take that direction. To
surrender Nashville was to surrender Tennessee
for the talh of abandoning such n capital to
fight at MurireesborO', or at Chattanooga, is
absurd. Nashyillc lost, rendered Columbus
unienablc, and opened TO the Cnionsts the
way TO Memphis. And they did not wait for
Gen. Bucli's approach, but began to run days
before he threatened them-beloro even a
gunboat approached them. 1t Was clear case
Of unmeasured panic and blind infatuation.
1t certainly seems rather late now for
Confederate offensive, but we trust it may be
undertaken IL las at least this negative
recommended cannot fail more com.
plctely than the opposite policy has done ever
since Mr.. Stanton succeeded TO the control of
tie War Dep ,rtment, and "wait -getready"
ceased to DO the ruling maxim in our counsels.
We commend j. to JEFF as his only remaining
chance, though sorry one. AS Confederate
bonds now 20, aud as the Union forces ad-
vance, even this chance will not long remain TO
him.