Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1862-12-05

lpabann0Ck, i must remark that large
number OF your highest officers, indeed
most of those whose opinions have been
reported to me, are decidedly in favor OF
the movement. Several Of ttoss who orig
inAlly advocated the line Of the Peninsula
now advise its abandonment. have not
inquired, and do not need to know, by
whose advice, or for what reasons, the Ar
my of the Potomac was separated into two
parts, with the enemy between them.
must take things as find them. ! fnd
the forces divided, and wish to unite
them. Only one feasible plan has been
presented for doing this. If yon or any
one else had presented better one, Ger.
tAinly should have adopted it but all Of
your plans require reinforcements, which
it is impossible to give you. It is very
easy to ask for reinforcement, but 1t Is not
easy to- give them when you have no dispose
tion noftroOpsatyourc command. have writ
ten very plainly, as understand the case,
and hope you will given me credit for haV.
ing considered the matter, although I'have
arrived at different conclusions from your
own.
Very respectfully your ob't serV't,
CSiguedl 81. W. HALLEcK,
GeneraI-in- Chief.
Halleck states that about this time he
received news of a heavy rebel force pre-
pairing to attack Pope, and menace the Cap
ital. BE thereupon sent urgent messages
TO Mcclellan, but still the evacuation OF
HRrrison's Landing was not commenced till
eleven days after it was ordered. Ia this
emergency CoK's troops were ordered for
ward 10 great haste from Western Virginia.
Halleck then recites the history of POpe's
campaign, and brings out letter from Pope
in which that officer pronounces Sigel
wholly unreliable. he commends Pope's
earlier dispositions for isoIating Jackson's
forces as well planned. The delays of some
OF AcClellan's troops in marching to POpe's
relief, were neither ereditAble nor expusa-
ble. He says no full Official report Of the
campaign has yet been received from Pope.
he concludes this subject by saying that
it McClellan's troops had arrived little
earlier, the rebel army would have been
easily defeated, aud perhaps destroyed.
HAlleck's report sketches the history of
the Maryland campaign, denounees the suF-
render of Harper's Ferry, and emphatically
censures Mcclellan for it. He then COM
plains of McClellau's long inactivity in the
face of defeated enemy, aud says he was
utterly ignorant Of what his plan of the
campaign Was, as toward the close McClel-
Ian sent no report to him, but only 70 the
President direct. Halleck next sketches
mission is ordered to investigate it, it
would be obviously improper for him TO
express his opinion now. he says an iu-
VestigRtion has been ordered of Morgau's
strange abandonment of Cumbeland Gap.
Grants and Roseerans' operations are
sketched without comment. Curtis with
draWRl to Missouri is termed unfortunate.
aud is said to have prevented the carrying
out of intended movements in Arkansas.-
He says it is quite possible that the Indian
hostilities may be renewed in the spring,
and preparations will be made according
ly. The forces in South aud North Caro-
lima are pronounced too small to accom-
plisb much. ----..- %
General Halleck calls attention TO the
fact that our victories have not been fol-
lowed up, and says that in Maryland, Yir-
ginia, Kentucky and Middle Tennessee the
rebel armies have exhibited much more
mobility and action than our own. He says
this is partly owing to our enormous bag
gage and immense transportation trains,
aud says that our troops, especially in the
East, have been little accustomed TO march,
at least snch as is required by active
operations. Absenteeism, struggling and
desertiOn are spoken ofas crying evils, and
military laws on this and other subjects are
said 10 need revision. i 1 Tnur n
The whole report, OF which the above is
condensation, is one thousand words
longer than the Presidents message. 3I =