Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-01-08
THE EVENING STAR.
90. roM.NasSASI,

VhANASSAs''
By this time many Of our citizens have be-
come better acquainted with the difficulties Of
war than they were when the cry of "0n to
Richmond 10 was so loudly repeated. Many,
however, have given bnt little thought 20 the
subject Of wars snbJeet which has Justly been
said to be = enc of the most complicated that
man can study.h They count the months
Stree the battle Of Manassas, and sum up the
number Of men that must be by this time
gathered around Washington" and they draw
the conclusion that there are men enough, and
that the men have now been well enough
trained, and therefore they want something
done. In short, they want Manassas stormed
and taken vfhey believe that it can be done
any day, If the brave men, now eager for. the
hght, arc led out to the undertaking. ~ -
Let us look for a moment at the other side
OF the question. The rebels have many men
on their side who have been crying out, "On
20 Washingtonr and who now grumble terri
bly, because the vast army at Manassas is not
Ted forward 10 snatch the coveted prize They
think IL only needs for them to move In order
70; take the city? Why do they not move?
Those who CRY, son to Manassas =" have no
idea that the rebels can take Washington.
Why notf Because it is too strongly fortified.
Ibey know that il is no child's play to face
those Publications with which General McClel-
Ian has girdled it. They cannot be leaped
over as Remus leaped over the early walls of
men, and all those thousands brave men too.
But are the fOrtificatiOns at Centreville and
at Manassas less formidable than those about
Washington These at Manassas have ceri
tainly been longer In preparation. At any
, rate, who has examined them and compared
them with those at Washington with a prac-
tised military eye! For aught we know, they
may be quite as formidable as those which We
believe 70 be real safeguard to Washington,
fmpreguable by any force that the rebels can
bring against them. 1t certainly is contrary
20 at the dictates Of military prudence to I'M
-derTslue either the enemy or the obstacles he
may place IN our way. $50
What Qualifications are, and how vast the
preparatiOnSne necessary to attack those success
fully, SevastOpOl has taught them who traced
the progress Of that memorable siege step by
step. The Allies had but faint idea of the
vastness Of tho work before them when they
sat down before the place. 1t was virtually
an assault oil temporary field fortifentions
and they expected to make an erd of the task
IN single day. Their assault by sea was a
total failure, and NE may let that pass out of
sight. They opened FIRE on the 18th day of
October, 1851, with siege batteries of one hun
dred anu tTenty-six guns, and that 6rst bonn
bardment Of twenty days amounted to nothing.
1t was not until the 9Th of September 1855,
that they made themselves masters of the place.
And when, at the close Of what was to have
been brief days work, they came to review
their work, they found that they had been
compelled to BRING upon the field two thousand
iye hundred and eighty-seven guns Of all ca
I0ers, two millions three hundred and eighty
one thousand and fOTty-two shot and shells
and eleven millions four hundred and eighty
four thousand eight hundred and four pounds
OF powder. They had also, before the siege
closed, sent FOR ak hundred msrtars, of which
only part arrived in season. All this was
independent of millions of musket and rife
cartridges. To keep these vast batteries sup
piled with ammunition was OF itself gigantic
task. making railroad and steam trapsporta-
ton OF them from the ports Indispensable
Our object in presenting this view of the case
Is simply 70 suggest TO those who are so eager
Tor an advance to Manassas some problems
winch they possibly have not maturely con-
sIdered We msy rest assured &C this that
Gen. Mcclellan has not overlooked them. He
experience in Mexico, followed by his careful
study OF ali the details Of the Crimean cam
palgn, have not been without their practical
uses to him in his present work. With a true
soldiers eye he has scanned all the details of
the present war ard be tells US that ID cannot
be a long, but il viii probably be desperate
struggle.
If the necessities Of the campaign demand
II, no doubt he will move on to Manassas, even
II IL be to renew there the fierce and costly
struggle OF SeysstopOl. But if the ends of the
campaign can be secured without it-and we
think 1t will be proved that they can-then,
for the sake Of our brothers sons and friends
We hope he viii attack Manassas at some point
far distant from tie longest range of its heavy
batteries. At least, let it be left to him to
decide when, and wEoTe, and how to strike.
we shail be reloiced as the most jubilant when
the Generai-in-Chief feels himself entirely
ready to cry I" forward" and sound ire
oharge.-Phtla. Inquirer.
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