Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-05


Here, directly in front Of this army, is the
heart Of the rebellion. It is here that all
our resources should be collected to strike
the blow which will determine the fate Of
this nation. All points Of secondary i'm
portance elsewhere should b. abandoned
and every available man brought here
A decided victory here and the military
strength Of the rebellion is crushed. 1t
matters not what partial reverses we may
meet with elsewhere; here is the true de-
fence Of Washington; it is here on the
banks Of the James river, that the fate of
the Union should be decided
Clear in my conviction Of right, strong
y the consciousness that have ever been
and still am actuated solely by love Of my
country, knowing that no ambitious or
selfish motives have Influenced me from the
commencement Of this war, 1 do now, what
Inever did in my life before, entreat that
this order may be rescinded. If my coun-
sci does not prevail, will with sad heart
obey your order TO the utmost Of my pow
er, devoting to the movement, one of the
utmost deiieacy and difficulty, whatever
skill I may possess, whatever the result
may be, and may God grantthat if am mis-
taken in my forebodings, shall at least
have the internal satisfaction that I have
written and spoken frankly, and heye
sought to do the best in my power to avert
disaster from my country.
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen.
GENERAL HALLEcK's REPLY.
wAsHIxorox, Aug G. 1862.
AojoT- General Geo. B. nc CIeIlan, OoEmqRd-
ing, ETC., Berkeley, Va.
| GENERAL: Your telegram Of yesterday
was received this morning, and immedi-
ately telegraphed brief reply, promising
to write you more fully by mail. You,
General, certainly could not have been more
panied at receiving my order than 1 was at
/ The necessity Of issuing it. / was advised
| by high officers, in whose judgment l had
| great confidence, to make the order imme-
diately on my arrival here, but deter
mined not to do so until could learn your
wishes from a personal interview; and
even after that interview l tried every
means in my power to avoid Withdrawing
your army, and delayed my decision as
long as l dared to delay it. assure you,
General, it was not hasty and inconsid-
crate act, but one that cost me more anx-
ious thought than any other Of my life But
after full and mature consideration of all
the pros and cons, was reluctantly forced
to the conclusion that the order must be
issued. There was to my mind no other
alternative.
Allow me to allude to a few Of the facts
Of the case. You and your officers, at our
| interview, estimated the enemy's forces iu
and around Richmond at 100000 men.
Since then you and others report that they
have received and are receiving large re-
/ Inducements from the South. General
Pope's Army, now covering Washington, is
! only 10000. Your effective force is only
about 10000. You are 80 miles from Rich
mond, and General Pope 80 or 80. With
the enemy directly between you, ready to
fall with his superior numbers upon one or
the other, ss he-may elect neither can re-
inforce the other in case Of such an attack.
If General Pope's army be diminished
to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland
and PennsylVania would be left uncovered
and exposed. If your forces be reduced
to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak
to even bold the position you occupy,
should the enemy turn round and attack
you in full force. In other words, the old
army Of the Potomac is split into two
parts, with the entire force Of the enemy
directly between them. They cannot be
united by land without exposing both to
destruction, and yet they must be united.
To send Pope's forces by water 70 the pc
ninsula is, under present circumstances, a
military impossibility. The only alterna-
tive is to send the forces on thepeninsula to
some point by water, say Fredericksburg,
where the two armies can be united. Let
me now alude to some Of the objec-
tiOns which you have urged.
You say that -to-Esiskdsaz1- fran the
present position will cause the certain de-
moralization Of the army, which is now
in excellent discipline and condition.
cannot understand why a simple change
of position to a new and by no means dis
can't base will demorslize an army in eX-
cellent discipline, unless the officers them
selves assist in the decentralization, which
am satisfied they will not. Your change of
front from your extreme right at Hanover
Court House to your present position was
over thirty miles, but have not heard
that it demoralized your troops, notwith-
standing the severe losses they sustained
in efeoting it.
A new base on the Rappahannock, at
fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles from Richmond, and secures
you a reinforcemento of forty or fifty thous-
and fresh and disciplined troops. The
change, with such advantages, will, 1
think, if properly represented to your
army, encourage rather than demoralize
your troops. Moreover, you, yourself,
suggested that q junction might be effected
at Yorktown, but thats flank march across
the peninsula would be more hazardous
than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will
remember that Yorktown is two or three
miles further from Richmond than Fred
ericksburg is. Besides, the latter is be-
tween Richmond and Washington, and
covers Washington from any attack by the
enemy.
The political effect Of the withdrawal
may at first look unfaYorable, but think
the public are beginning TO understand its
necessity, and that they will have much
more confidence in q united army than in
it's separate fragments. But you will reply, !
Why not reinforce me here, 80 that can |
strike Richmond from my present posi-
ton To de this, you said at our inter- |
view that you required $4,000 additional |
troops. told you that 1t was impossible |
TO give you 80 many. You finally thought 1
you would have "some c5Ence" Of success |
with 10000, but you afterwards telegraph
ed to ne that Yon would require 81, 900, as !
the enemy was being largely reinforced.
If your estimate Of the eRemy's strength |
was correct, your requisitiop was perfectly |
but it was utterly impossible TO |
fill it until new troops could be enlisted |
and organized, which would require sew
eral weeks. To keep your army in its
present position until it could be rein
forced would almost destroy it in that cli-
mate. The months Of August and Sep
tember are Utmost fatal to whites who live /
on that part Of James River and even af- |
- ~. IL Ii. a.-.a-..-L- ..I-..l = !