Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-01-09
THE EEENENG STAR.
o. O. roM.NassASI =,

~ nANAsSAss'
By this time many Of our citizens have be-
Gene better acquainted with the difficulties Of
war than they were when the cry Of "0n to
Richmond ~ was so loudly repeated. Many,
however, have given bnt little thought TO the
subjected wars snbJeet which has Justly been
said to be = one of the most complicated that
man can study" They count the months
stree the battle Of Manassas, and sum up the
number Of men that " must be by this time
gathered around VI Washington" and they draw
the conclusion that there are men enough, and
that the men have now been well enough
trained, and therefore they want something
done. In short, they want Manassas stormed
and taken vfhey believe that it can be done
any day, ii the brave men, now eager for. the
light, arc led out to the undertaking. 800 ~ =.
Let us look for moment at the other side
OF the question. The rebels have many men
on their side who have been crying out, "On
20 Washington. and who now grumble terri
bly, because the vast army at Manassas is not
led forward 10 snatch the coveted prize. They
think IL only needs for them to move in order
70 take the city? Why do they not move?
Those who cry, son to Manassas :" have no
idea that the rebels can take Washington
Why mott Because it is too strongly fortified.
Ibey know that il is no childs play to face
those Publications with which General McClel-
Ian has girdled it. They cannot be leaped
over as Remus leaped over the early walls Of
AsOfue, not even Two 0unQreQ IQOuSdQQ
men, and all those thousands brave men too.
But are the Notifications at Centreville and
at Manassas less formidable than those about
Washington These at Manassas have ceri
tainly been longer In preparation. At any
rata, who has examined them and compared
them with those at Washington with a prac-
tised military eye? For aught We know, they
may be quite as formidable as those which We
believe to be a real safeguard to Washington,
fmpreguable by any force that the rebels can
bring against them. Ii certainly is contrary
TO at the dictates Of military prudence to un-
-derTslue either the enemy or the obstacles he
may place in our way. $50 l- -.
What Qualifications are, and how vast the
preparatlOns necessar to attack those success-
fully, SeyastoPol has taught them who traced
the progress Of that memorable siege step by
step. The Allies had but faint idea Of the
vastness of tho work before them when they
sat down before the place. 1t was virtually
an assault oil temporary field Notifications,
and they expected to make an erd of the, task
in single day. Their assault by sea was
total failure, and We may let that pass out of
sight. They opened FIRE on the 18th day of
October, 1854, with siege batteries of one hun
dred anu tWenty-six guns, and that first bonn
bardment of twenty days amounted to nothing
Ii was not until the 8th of September, 1855,
that they made themselves masters of the place.
And when, at the close of what was to have
their work, they found that they had been
compelled to BRING upon the field two thousand
i've hundred and eighty-seven guns Of all ca
hoers, two millions three hundred and eighty
one thousand and forty-two shot and shells
and eleven millions four hundred and eighty
four thousand eight hundred and four pounds
OF powder. They had also, before the siege
closed, sent Tor ak hundred msrtars, of which
only part arrived in season. All this was
independent of millions of musket and rife
cartridges. To keep these vast batteries sup
Piled with ammunition was OF itself gigantic
task. making railroad and steam transporta-
ton Of them from the ports indispensable.
Our object In presenting this view of the case
Is simply 10 suggest to those who are so eager
for an advance to Manassas some problems
which they possibly have not msturely con-
sIdered. We msy rest assured &C this that
Gen. Mcclellan has not overlooked them. HIS
experience in Mexico, followed by his careful
study Of all the details of tho Crimean cam
palgn, have not been without their practical
uses to him in his present work. With a true
soldiers eye he has scanned all the details of
the present war, ard be tells US that il cannot
be long, but it viii probably be a desperate
struggle.
II the necessities Of the campaign demand
II, no doubt he will move on to Manassas even
II II be to renew there the fierce and costly
struggle Of SevsstopOl. But if the ends of the
campaign can be secured without it-and we
think 1t will be proved that they can-then,
for the sake of our brothers, sons and friends
We hope he viii attack Manassas at some point
far distant from the longest range of its heavy
hsteries. At least, let it be left to him to
decide when, and whore, and how to strike.
We shall be rejOiced as the most jubilant when
the Generai-in-Chief feels himself entirely
ready to cry Z" forward" and sound the
oharge.-PhtIa. Inquirer.
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