, 1862-12-27

1k1&AS1N AFNAIA1HA~NAs
The North Azseaicaa {Philadelphia) is the
only journal, so far IS We have seen, that
saua1ye1y defends Gen. Bnrnside's strategy at
Asthe article is very able,
and as many Vii be curious to see what can
be said on that side, re print it entire, beg
eing every one to bear. IN mind that the views
It expresses are not ours: Here tits: !
- TIE BATTLE, on FREDERICKSBURG.
:, few days age. We remarked that the first
accounts OF batflcB generally differ IN the most
remarkable manner from those which hnally
obtain place in history, being exaggerateo,
6istorted and inaccurate. At the time we
wrote, we had no 1dea that this would so soon
be cxemp1itied in the accounts OF one OF Tue
most fearful battles On record, one IN the con-
temptation Of which the heart sickens, ana
the imagination grows weary Of tic yam A.
teInnt to embrace the details Of the horr1Die |
slaughter. The revelations Of this week nave
seaTtd place in the memory OF Tue prcsenl
generation, the like OF which may not, ann,
NE trust, will not, occur again. 4 struggle |
so tremendous in the size of the armies EN- |
gagged, so fearful in it concomitanLs, 20 appaA- !
ing in its results and so brief in its duration.
deserves to be memorable in our annals for all |
time to come, and ret the first accounts treat
cd it as mere reconnaissance OF sklrm1sh.
Burnside was unsuccessful in his attempt, |
but Napoleon was equally unsuccessful At As |
perm and Essiing, and his failure at Waterloo |
WAS awful Burnside has made no blunder. |
His plan was worthy Of the best General in /
Europe. He had used it before with skill and
success at RoaIoke Island and Newbern, and
though it filled in the present case. that does
not prove that The plan itself was defective.
| The main features If his military system seem
/ to be to attack the enemy's center in force,
very wise men, who think the President and
Cabinet ought to resign, nrge that both these
| ideas were wrong. and that the progress Of
tie age has exploded them. We do not be-
licye q word Of this, and we will say why:
noke Island and at New bern, these two Napo-
leonic ideas were used by Burnside, and were
the leading features of his operations He
paid no attention to outposts, to fanklng ef-
forts, etc. In this he vas right Baron JONI
ini expressly says, in his Summary Of the Art
Of War, that these HanEsing operations ilnperi1
an army By making Its line too thin aud weak,
So that IN attack By the enemy may easily
break it: and if tue fanking party is sepa-
rated and sent by a detour to mike q rear di-
version, it is. very apt to fail through . mis-
take Of roads, or delays Of yarious Kinds, aud
if encountered by the enemy in force, is sure
| to be annihilatcd- In the desperate battle Of
Springfield, ,Sigels flank attack Was disastrous
| failure, and his whole division was cut up.
despite the great skill Of the General and hia
tried abilities on many i har,l-fought field
In war, the most obvious aud ordinary Of
all efforts by generals, Of every grade and tai
ent, is to outfank the enemy. Napoleon
achieved the greatest and most wonderful Of
all his successes l'y avoiding this lackneEed
| mode Of operations, and risking his whole
. force On singlc desperate attack Of the cen.
ter. Perhaps it will be said that every gen
| era1 il not Napoleon, and therefore such
risks ought to be avoided To this We reply
, that in every battle where these fearful at.
: tacks Of tue center proved successful 1c VA Tas
on the very brink Of distraction. In his first
signal victory ct Marengo, the battle was &c
: tual1y lost bis army was thoroughly bcatcr
i and lying in all directions. when DessaiS ar
rived. He, too, thought the deld lost but Ma
i po'eon renewed the contest with the ftcsf
troops. and won the day by his attack on tht
center. Waeram was . memorable instanc.
Of this terrific risk, and the terrible slangh
: ter Of Macdonald's column in the decisive
: charge still causes the reader Of history tt
; thrill as he pondcrs on it.
: Our soldiers at Fredericksburg we're not .
e whit worse than those Of Napoleon Hi
+ troops reco1led in many battle before tn
e awful lire Of the opposing army, and the bes
: troops i'll the world sometimes fail in
i charge. The British storming party failed u; !.
: the kedan before Ss SsxastopeI: TheE .e aed H. M
Il poleon' veterans from \ hundred battle field
l. were scattered to the winds at Waterloo
n is idle to expect that men with reasonin
# faculties will not recol before such horrors d
1t our troops encountered IL r FREDERICKSBURG!
: It may be said that if this is true. the charg
,r in column and on the center must be an errt1
# But here is Just tile point where modern mil
a tary science shows itself most t7iunlphautll
d Napoleon knew that the risk Of such
e. clarge was :lEfui, aud that rs in a great VT
it mist always be increased by the fact th*
Of most Of the troops in the field arc new lerie
le and, therefore, to q ccrtain extent untrus
at worthy, means must be found to gua1
It against the possibility Of their being able
ID take flight. To do this he made his ehaTgi1
ut columns always very heaTy, that hoNev
ID could turn and tee, Is the vast Hnltitut
M pressing forward in the rear prevented
ed Aiacdonald's charging column at Wagra
IS, started out with some 5000 strong, Al
e.. when it reached the Austrian lines had on
as 1.sCo left. But it broke the enemy's Hue a,
III gained tile victory.
n Something Of these t,ctics was resorted
id | by Burnside in the late battle When Meade
n. division, after its successful charge, bro
ii before the fearful Ere Of the enemy, Birnes
ly. division was Immediately pushed forwal
ut and drove back the enemr, and took scve
IT. hundred prisoners. This method Of attack
NJ now the accepted one in all tire European
no mics. The Russians used it at Inkcsnsan, Il
a despite the dreadful slaughter, they would I
nd arrival Of the French. Napoleon Ill nscd
re- at Magenta and Solfsrino, aud the carnage u
in SO great that for months after these couti
The Emperor's nerves were completely uns
ro- tied, and his mind filed with morbid inaa:,
mt | one time, notwithstanding the bravery of {
troops aud the strength Of our position,
canc near succeeding. But Taylor arrived
g. the right spot at the opport9lnc moment, /:
ldc renewed the battle with Bragg's batte
in | O'Erien's having been lost.
70 Here is Just the perilous point This me-
is | cd Of :ttack is ncrera thing without risk,
Or requires General Of great resources aud
m bounded courage When the slaughter
ate | greatest, he must be able to command hi1a
css most; This Eas where the mighty geniu:
,ut Napoleon sAone resplendent. Riding III
20 the thunder and the horrors Of the battle,
seized upon the moment Of fearful peril
, make his decisive charge with all his fol
'' lending to it MI the enthusiasm and cour
-, which his own example could infuse into
Sn Sn an error in not allowing Sumner to go on
sS field and take the command Of his men at
~- critical moment. The old hero cfafed ut
as1 ing prevented. HeWould lie most at hom
the midst OF danger, and, had he been al,o'
sx1e to go, he would have saved the day, and ]
ia haps hare won tie battle. Burnside him
Il could have done it, or Hooker OF Helnt
. man.
$50 Ne do not think Burnside deserves {
ER. sHre for his plan Of the recent battle. It
saa army, but to annihil,te it. Ead he succe
as ed in his attempt to pierce the center
12S seize the railroad in the rear, their rctl
= would have been cut of, the whole re
,1A army divided into two fragments and attac
in front flank and rear. 1t is worth all
400 men we have lost to have tried 70 gain SUI
1Y5 | victory; AE4 so tar from Visiting any
,ts7 with blame for it. we fir our own part
~ -. rather rcioiced to find that at last VIC b
sa%4 some one able to make plan faction We
IN. the risk incurred in carrying It out. The
tor Of Roanoke Island md NeWbeln is nj
,tal. man to he da1nfed at trl1es, and we trust
,193 great Republic will not be led into cenSu1
l,64 him too hastily.
1870
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