Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1862-12-25

the works Of the enemy could be carried
While on his way here, Hooker, on the morn
ing of the Goth OF November, wrote me @ note,
which received on the 2lst, in which he eug-
gested that he should cross his force over the
Rappahannock at the ford nearest the town,
| Richards Ford, and move rapidly down TO
Saxton's Station, and take position there He
stated that he had three days provisions, and
that he could meet any force Of the enemy in
front of him. replied WAS always very glad
TO take the advice OF my General ofhcers' ana
should be 10th to make q move without consult
ing them, but could not approve OF the move
he had suggested, because, in the hret place.
| he would have to march some thirty-eix miles
to Saxton Station. 1t was raining, ana nc
would have TO ford two rivers, wnien might
rise and cut him off from the main BODY oil the
command, and as. ! had no means OF crosslng
at fredericksburg, would DC preVeHteu RON
sending him supplies and assistance; and al
thouo6 he might reach Saxt0n Station and not
meet any force of the enemy at that time, yet
| it would be a very hazardous movements 10
throw column like that beyond the reach OIL
its proper support. Hooker thanked me, and
Oaid he only made it as suggestion, ana Ine
weather, as il was raining, rendered IL Oh course
impossible to make the movement he sug'
gested.
Question--What reason do you Ssagh ICE the
failure of your attacks
Answer--It was found impossible to get the
men up to the works. The enemy'a nre was
too hot. The whole command fought most GAL
lantly the enemy themselves say they never
saw our men fight go hard as on that DAY
Queston-Were their works very strongf
Answer-Their workswere not strong works'
but they held strong positions. IL 10 posslpIes
the points of attack we're wrongly ordered Ii
such Ia the case, can only say did 20 the
best Of my ability. IL ia also possible thas we
wonld have done better to have crosseo az
Skinner'B Neck, but for what supposed 10 Dc
good reasons felt We bad better cross mere
that We wo1ld have more decihive engage
ment here, and that If we eucceeded IN deieat-
Ing him we would break up the whole OF the
army hsre, which think now is the most ue,
sirable thing, not even second to the taxing OF
Richmond. For if this army was Droken up
though they might defend Richmond Tor
while, Trey would not make any protractod de-
fense there.
Quesiion--by Mr.. Gooch-DO understand
you to say that il wss your understanding that
Gen, Halleck and Gen. Meigs, willis at your
headquarters in WaFrenton and before you
commenced the movemect Of your army sent
Immediately sent to Falmouth
AusEer-That was my understanding GER
tainly.
Question--In your Judgment could tie pom
toOns be forwarded In time for you to cross che
Rappahannock when you expected, IL all pos
sible efforts had been made by those charged
with that duty?
AnsWer-Yes, If they had received their or
ders in time.
Question-Did the non-arrival of the pom
toons at the time you expected, prevent your
crossing at the time you expected TO crOGs, and
interfere with the success of your plane?
Answer-Yes.
Question-Since you have assumed command
of the Army of the Potomac have all it's move
ments been made by you according to your
ewn judgment, or nave some OF them been di-
rected by the Genersl-in Chief, tho Secretary
of War, or tho President of the United Statss7
Answer-They have all been made in accOr.
dance with my own judgment. In some cases
have submitted my views which have beel
approved.
Question did you understand was re-
sponsible for the forwarding of the pontoons TO
Falmouth?
Answer.-I understood that Gen. Halleck
was to give the necessary orders, and then the
responsible for the pOntOons coming here /
could have carried out that part Of my plan
through officers of my own, but having Just
taken command of an army with which 1 was
but little acquainted, it was evident that it was
as much as could attend to-, with the assistance
OF all my officers, to change its position from
Warrenton to fredericksburg, and felt indeed
| expected, that all the parts of the plan which
were to be executed in Washington, would be
attended to by the officers at that place, under
direction of the different departments to which
these parts of my plan appsrtained
Questionable yon or not understand that
you were to be responsible for seeing that
these orders were carried out7
Answer.-I did not. never imagined for
moment that l had to carry out anything that
was required to be done at Washington Gen
Meigs told me distinctly, several days ago in
Washington, that he never sAw my plan of
operations until | showed it to him on that
day.
Queshon-Do l understand you to say in
your statement that you expected Gen. Frank
lin to carry the point at the extreme left of the
ridge in the rear of the town, and thereby en-
able our troops to storm and carry their fortif-
cations2
Answer-I did expect him to carry that point,
which being done would have placed our forces
in the rear of their extreme left, and which l
thought ct the time would shake their forces
on this ridge to such an extent that the position
in front could be oaaily stormed and carried.
EQuestiou-To what do you attribute the fail
ure TO accomplish that2
Answer-1o the great strength OF the posi-.
tion and the accumulation of the enemy's for
ces there. | expected that the bridges would
be built In two on three hours after they we're
unloaded, which was about daylight. Instead
of that those on the right were not built until
three O'Clock 7. M and had only the means
of getting across one division oves the bridges
on the right. Gen. Franklin's bridges we're
built about noon, and we're held by our troops
on the opposite bank. This gave the enemy time
TO accumulate their forces, which were stretch
ed along tho river from Port Royal up TO the
battle field before was able to order the at,
tack. There had been great deal of division
of opinion among the corps Of commanders as
to the place of crossing, but after all the dis
cusslon upon the subject the decision to cross
over here was well received and understood by
all of them.
Question What was the conduct Of the Off
Gers and men during the attsck7
Answer--With the exception of single reg
iment, il was excellent.
Question-Haye you any knowledge ss to the
force.of the enemy2
Answer-ltis is estimated at all the way from
one hundred thousand to two hundred thou
sand. think it was less than one hundred
thousand. Iwould add here, that although at
tho timeI ordered the column of attack to be
formed on the morning after the battle, l
thought the enemy's works could be carried,
and adhered to that opinion during that day.
afterwards became convinced that that could