Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-11-17
Expo.,t,on or mcCelIan.. plans.

The following description of Gen. McCLEL-
LAS's plans we find in the Washington Star, and
if correct, viii constitute his best vindication
from the charges for which he has been dismissed
from his command:
While IL is very true that there has been nearly
ever since he has been called to the command OF
the scattered, broken and dispirited forces OF
Pope, an issue between General Mcclellan and
the military authorities here, with reference TO
the suificiency of his supplies, Especially OF
horses fit for cavalry and artillery service,) we
are satisfied that the true reason for his delaying
the order to fight; the battle which is probably
TO decide the result. of the war, when and where
he was ordered to do so by Gen. Halleck, is
very different one That order directed him to
fight it in the Valley, while, as he evidently be
lieyed, he would be deprived OF the assistance OF
perhaps fifty thousand of his troops, regarded by
him as necessary to be kept on the Maryland side
at the fords, to save his rear and Maryland and
PENNSYLVANIA from the disastrous consequences
of another raid of Stuart's cavalry, which would
almost surely bring about his defeat when the en-
envy accepted battle in the Valley, ifby that time
Stuart had succeeded in cutting OF his communi-
cation with Washington and Baltimore, and de-
stroyed his supplies, necessarily accumulated and
| left on this side OF the river He must also have
been influenced by the fact that if permitted to
follow bis own plan of campaign, he could OBJ
tain the assistance of from thirty to fifty thou
sand troops who could not be spared from guard
ing the National Capital so long as Lees army
was between his own and Washington; as it
would continue to be, had he essayed to march
directly from Harper's Ferry upon Lee in the
Valley.
His subsequent movements clearly demon
strated the fact that, however his proverbial ret
cence may have induced him 70 keep the secret Of
his plans in his own heart (tor fear that if any
one here knew them they might possibly come to
the knowledge Of the enemy, and thus To plead
embarrassment from want of supplies which may
not have seriously existed, his decension to move
when ordered so to do was really occasioned by
his conviction that if he waited until the rise OF
the river made him 50, 900 stronger for the move
ment from his immediate command and AZ, 900
stronger from this vicinity, he could fight, not
only with the assurance Of victory but just where
victory would be likely to end the war in favor of
| the Union.
Had he essayed the battle in the Valley, with
out these additional 10000 troops, he must have
fought when and where Lee chose. Had he been
victorious in il, the result would have simply
been more or less loss of men and material on
both sides, as at Antetam; with many other sub
sequent battles they fell back, at mountain
passes, in all OF which the rebels would have had
choice Of position He evidently preferred to
wait until the elements permitted him to move IN
greatest force In his progress to the point where
he proposed TO fight the enemy-where he knew
well the enemy must fight or soon surrender Rich.
mond without a battle-he left at every gap al
which Jackson (who remains in the Valley with
from 5000 to 10000 troops) might possibly
threaten his rear, sufficient guard TO hold IL quite
long enough to secure his communications with
his case of operations and supplies, and he
steadily pushed his army on for the field OF hi:
own choice We refer to the banks of the
Rapdan, the throat of Richmond, because il il
the defense of Gordonsville. through which the
rebel capital receives three fourths of its sup
plies of every description. He knew very vel
that Lee must fight there TO the sacrifice Of his
last man in its defense, that il victoriou:
there, Richmond would speedily be as much al
his mercy rs Washington would be at Lees witt
the Potomac as closely guarded as James riveris
It's communication with Frederick by turnpike al
seriously threatened as Petersburg now Is from
Suffolk, and with Annapolis junction in the hands
of victorious enemy.
Were such the situation of Washington, tho
time for which il could continue TO hold GU
could easily be counted by hours and IL is evident
to US that Gen. McCleans plan of campaign
contemplated getting Richmond into that situa
ton within week from to-day at farthest Blu
i has been determined by his superiors in com
mand that the cause Of the country will b'
safer in other hands; and with his advance
within thirty two miles of the point where the
battle must take place that will probably de
eide the fate Of the war, he is prompt 10 obey the
order directing him 10 repair TO Trenton, New
Jersey, and there await further orders.