The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1862-10-02
SH.5O PER ANNUM IN ADVANCE.
KENOsHA, WISCONSIN, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1862


ar ed him to expect every moment an attack, ar
of to hold which, if the enemy again brought u
,e reserves, would take his best energies and be
+ troops. But the long strife, heavy losses, il
s cessant fighting over the same ground, repeat
e edly lost and won inch by inch, and more tina
II all. perhaps, the fear of Burnside on the lef
# and Porter in front, held the enemy IN checl
"a For two or three hours there was lull even
q the cannonade or the right, which had hitheI
g been increased. Mcclellan had been over o
a the field after Summers repulse, but had speed
g ly returned to his headquarters Sumner agai
IF sent wcrd that he was able to to hold his pos
n ton but could not advance with his own corp;
|. [ Meantime where was Burnside, and what wa
t he doing2 On the right where had spen
a the day until two o'clock, little was known Q
j, the general fortunes of the field. We ha
. heard Porters guns in the center, but nothing
from Burnside on the left There was no i'm
81 mediate prospect Of more fighting on the RICH
B and left the field which all day long had seel
: the most obstinate contest of the war, and rod
over to McClelan's headquarters. The differ
ent battle-ields were shut out from each othi
: er's view, but all partially visible from the cen
trail hill which Gen. Mcclellan had occupied
, during the day. But was more than ever i'm
, pressed on returning with the completely de
, ceitful appearance of the ground the rebels had
, chosen when viewed from the front.
Rockers and Summers struggle had been
carried on over an uneven and wooded surface
their own line of battle extending In semi
circle not less than mile and half. Perhaps
better notion of their position can be got by
considering their right. centre and left as form
ing three sides of a square. SO long therefore
as either wing was driven back, the centre be-
came exposed to a very dangerous enhladlng
fire, and the further the center was advanced
IF,gH III. H. ,YNnJ IN I a n a
and rear were firmly held. This formation res
suited originally from The efforts of the ere
nv to turn both TANKS. Hooker at the very
outset threw his column so far into the center
of the rebel lines that they were compelled to
threaten him on the flank to secure their own
centre
Nothing of all this was perceptibe from the
| hills in front Some directions OF the reoel
lines had been disclosed by the smoke OF their
| guns, but the whole interior formation OF the
| country beyond the hills was completely con-
cealed. When Mcclellan arranged his order
| of battle, it must have been upon information
or have been left to his corps and division com
mander to discover for themselves.
| Up to 8 o'clock Burnside had made little
PROGRESS His attack on the bridge had been
successful, bat the delay had been so great that
to the observer it appeared as 1t Mcclellan.
plans must have been seriously disaranged. 1t
! is i'm possible not to suppose that the attacks
on right and left were meant in a measure toI
CORES pond, for otherwise the enemy had only
to repe Hooker on the one hand, then transfer
his troops, and hurl them against Burnside.
Here was the difference between Smith and
Burnside The former did his work at once,
and lost all his men at once-that Is, all Wnom
he last at all Burnside seems to have attack
ed cautiously in order to save his n,and send
ing successfully insufficient forces against
position of strength, distributed his loss over
a greater period of time, but yet lost none the
less in the end, .-l 49,
Finally, at o'clock, Mcclellan sent stimuli
taneous orders to Burnside and Franklin; to
the former to advance and carry the batteries
in his front at all hazards and at any cost; to
the latter to carry the woods in front OF him to
the right, which The rebels still held. The or
der to Fianklin, however, was practically coun-
fernandez, in consequence OF a message from
Gen Sumner that if Franklin went on and was
repulsed, his own corps was not yet sufficiently
reorgauized to be depended upon as reserve.
Franklin was thereupon directed to run no
risk of losing his present position, and, INSTEAD
of sending his infantry into the woods, content
ed himself with advancing batteries over the
breadth of the fields in front, supporting then
with heavy masses of infantry and attacking
with energy the rebel batteries Immediately
opposed TO him. His movement was success
{ Idr AS IL went ,luS DdLJCilOS thC1i
new ground, and sensiblY affecting the steadi~
ness of the rebel fire That being once accom-
plished and all hazard OF the right being again
forced back having been dispelled, the move
meut of Burnside became at once the turning
| point of success, and the fate OF the day de-
pended on him
How extraordinary the situation was may be
Judged from a moments consideration OF the
facts. Is is understood that from the outset
! ID - otad ha n
as it certainly must have been if things went
wei elsewhere, and if he succeeded IN estab-
fishing himself on the Sharpaburg road IN the
rebel rear
Yet Hooker and Sumner, and Franklin and
Mansfield were all sent to the right three
miles away, while Porter seems to have done
double duty with his single corps IN front, both
supporting the batteries and holding himself
in reserve With all this immense force on the
right but I6 5000 men were given 10 Burnside
for the decisive movement OF the day
Sill more unfortunate in its results was the
total failure of these separate attacks on the
! ght and left TO sustain, or in any manner CO.
operate with each other. Burnside hesitated
! for hours in front of the bridge which should
| have been carried at once by coup de mGtn.-
Meantime Hooker had been lighting for hours
with various fortune, but final success; Sumner
had come up to late to Join in the decisive at
/
have converted into complete success /; and
| franklin reached the scene only when Sumner
had been repulsed. Probably before bis arri-
val the rebels mad transferred considerable
number of troops to their right to meet the at
tack il Burnside the direction of which had
been suspected or developed.
Attacking first with one regiment, then with
TWO, and delaying both for artillery, Burnside
was not over the bridge before o'clock per
4 al oAuo nm 20
slopes in his front, his batteries in rear covers
ing, TO some extent the movements OF the infanN
iry a desperate fight going on in deep
iayine OH his right, the rebel batteries were IN
full play, and apparently, very annoying ana
destructive while heavy columns OF Rebel
troops were plainly visible, advancing as If
careless of concealment. along the road and
over the hills in the direction OF Burnslde's for
ccs 1t was at this point of time that McClel-
All sent him the order above given.
Burnside obeyed it most gallantiy. Getting
his troops well in hand, aud sending portion
of his artillery to the front, he advanced them
with rapidity and the most determined vigor,
right up the hill in front, on top OF which the
rebels had maintained their most dangerous
battery. The movement was in plain view of
McClellan's position, and as Franklin on the
other side sent his batteries into the feld about
the same time, the battle seemed to open IN all
directions with greater activity than ever:
The fight in the rayine was in full prowess,
the batteries which Porter supported were fir
ing with new vigor, Franklin was blazing
away on the right, and every hilltop, ridge and
woods along the whole line was crested and
vailed with white clouds of smoke. All day
had been clear and bright since the early cou-
dy morning. and now this magnificent, une~
quaed scene shone with the splendor OF an
aftern DON September sun. Four miles of battle,
its glory all visible, its horrorsall yelled, the
fate Of the Republic hanging on the hour-couid
anyone be insensible OF its grandeur?
There are two hills on the left Of the road
the furthest the lowest. The rebels have oai-
/ teries on both. Burnside was ordered to car
ry the nearest to him, which is the fursh is'
from the road His guns opening hrSt from
this new position in 'front.' soon enureiy coh7