Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1862-12-20

the 1ith our troops slept On the field they
uau SD oraveiy won. On the 18th neither
party renewed the attack, and in the night
OF the 18TH and 10Th Gen. Lee withdrew
MS army to the south side of the Po-
tornac
Our loss in the several battles on South
Mountains and st Antietam was l,742
killed, S,O66 wounded, and o. missing.
making total of 1921. Gen. McClel.
Ian estimates the enemy's loss at nearly
80 900, but their own accounts give their
loss as about IA, 600 in killed and wounded.
On the approach of the enemy to Har-
per's Ferry the officer in command on
Maryland Heights destroyed his artillery
and abandoned his post, and on the 18th.
Col. Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry
with only slight resistance, and within
hearing of the guns of Gen. McClellan's
army. AS this whole matter has been H.
vestigated and reported upon by mill.
tary commission, it is unnecessary for ME
to discuss the disgraceful surrender of the
post and army under Col. Miles command
Gen. McOlellan's preliminary report of
his operations in Maryland, including the
battles of South Mountains and Antietam,
is submitted herewith, marked Exhibit
No. 4. No reports of his subordinate of
fcers have been submitted.
From the 18th of september to the Goth
of October, Gen. McClellan's main army
remained On the north bank of the Poto-
mac in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and
Harper's Ferry. The long inactivity If so
large an army in the face of defeated
foe, and during the most favorable season
for rapid movements and a vigorous cam
paigD, was matter of great disappoint-
ment and regret. Your letter of the 9th,
and my reply of the 2sth of October, in
regard to the alleged causes of this untor-
tunate delay, submit herewith, marked
Exhibit No. 5.
In reply to the Geographic order of the
9th of October,* quoted in my letter of the
disapproved of the plan of crossing the
Potomac south of the Blue Ridge, and said
that he would cross at Harper's Ferry and
advance upon Winchester He, however,
did not begin to cross till the 26th of DC.
tober, and then at Berlin. His passage
occupied several days, and was completed
about the Sd of November. What caused
him to change his views, or what his plan
of campaign was, l am ignorant, for abont
this time he ceased to communicate with
me IN regard to his operations, sending
his reports directly to the President.
On the 9Th instant received the writ
ten order of the President relieving Gen.
Mcclellan aud placing Gen. Burnside in
the command of the Army of the Poto-
mac. This order was transmitted by
special messenger, who delivered it to
Gen. Mcclellan at Rectortown on the 7th.
Gen. Halleck here devotes column
and half of his report to a summary
statement of the various movements and
exploits of our armies in other parts of the
South, and Of the West and South west
since he was called to assume the duties
of General-in- Chief. But, being limited
in space. and the events recorded having
received a general publicity as they occur
red, we omit this part of the report, which
though interesting as, presenting a concise
view of the magnitude Of the operations of
the war, are OF less Importance to our
readers than the recaptulation above in-
serted Of the campaign in the Immediate
neig hborhood of Washington. The re-
port concludes as follows
1t is seen from this brief summary of
military operations during the last three
or four months, that while our soldiers
have generally fought with bravery, and
gained many important battles, these VIC
tories have not produced the usual results.
In many instances the defeated foe was
| not followed from the battle field, and
even where pursuit wac attempted it
almost invariably failed to effect the cap
ture or destruction of any part of the re-
| treating army. This is matter which
requires serious and careful consideration.
| A victorious army is supposed to be in
| condition to pursue its defeated foe with
| advantage, and during such pursuit to do
him serious if not fatal injury. This re-
| suit has usually been attained in other
countries. Is there any reason why it
| should not be expected in this
1t is easily understood that in g country
| like that between Yorktown and Rich
mond, or the thiokly wooded swamps of
| Mississippi and Louisiana, a retreating
| force, by telling trees across the roads, and
destroying bridges over deep and marshy
streams, can effectually prevent any rapid
| pursuit. The one in a few minutes blocks
| up or destroys roads which the other can
| not clear for hours or even days The
| pursuer has very little hope of overtaking
his flying foe. But this reasoning is not
| applicable TO the greater part of Virginia,
Kentucky and Middle Tennessee 1t must
be admitted that in these theatres of
war the rebel armies have exhibited much
more activity and mobility than our own.
Not only do they outmarch US, both in
advance and retreat, bnt on two memora-
BILE occasions their cavalry have made
with lmpunity the entire circuit of the
army OF the Potomac. If it be true that
the success OF al, army depends upon its
arms and legs" ours has shown itself
deficient in the latter Of these essentia l
requisites. This defect has been attribu-
ted to our enormous baggage and supply
trains, and to want OF training in making
marches.
There is no doubt that the baggage
trains OF our armies have been excessively
large. Every possible effort has been
made within the last few weeks to reduce
them, but this is no easy task. Once &C
customed to certain amount OF transport
tatlon, an army is unwilling to do without
the Injuries which it supplies in the field,
BY the recent increase Of the army ration.
which was previously larger than in any
other country, a considerable amour. of
transportation is employed in moving pro-
visions and supplies which are not neces.
sary for the subsistence of the soldiers.
An examination Of the returns of the