New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-03-03

thai the french lOeb WaS secen per cent, AM tk0
Austrian eight per cent. At Soferino the franco.
Sandman army lost ten per cent, the Austria esaf
| per cent.
I Now Mageuta was fierce encounter. AtsvIfsruo
two armies disputed victory during twelve houn
with remarkable pertiuacity, and the result waa that
the losses on both occasions were much les thar
those at the least murderous battles Of the empire
IL cannot be said that the soldiers were inefept %
such; never did Emperors Of France or Austria LEAD
their equal to battle; in fact, far as the French arc
concerned, every French officer who present will
declare that the victories of France those occs.
sons were noby won by the French soldier, and The
soldier alone. The reason seems TO be that which
has been previously pointed ont as the probab TACT.
cal result Of the riiie-the French closed in az nu
possible; never was the bayonet more actia, ct
to- and very few soldiers stand up that encu ter.
TIE quantity Of ammunition wasted was al . : the
same as in the cd battles with the smooth bors.
Guilbert calculated that in the battles Of Oh tn.
CURED million Of cartridges to kill 2,OO0n m
battle. Gassendi thought that of 5000 balls ms
ever hit an enemy. Piobert calculates that, ~
ing to the results of long wars, 5000 to lO,vo"'v.
ridges were the proportion to ono man -
wounded! Unless we train cur men betterth o.
net will be more frequently required than ever, q
The best tacticans will win the day; strategy a.
tsotics will infab'y outwt long range and precison
In spite Of tie defects OF rHes, and rfed cannon,
however owing to the great cnrve OF the trajectory,
it ia certain that we cannot do without them. An
army with smooth-bore muskes and cannon, before
an enemy armed with rifles and rihed cannon, wouh
be in sorry plight. Its batteries would be smash
its skrmshers picked Off annhilated at ,at 90
| where it, balls would be harmless, while it's aet M
reserves mus, he kept at most respectful dstsn,e-
Before tie introduction of rifles, armies I's.c,e&
agarst each other in columns Of various dept l. md
deploye at gun-shot distance to begin the 'eslls.
Ben nd the line Of battle were the reserves 4
fanrry, cavalry aud artillery, forming masses ,
lend assistance ana support weak points. or to ''iss
the decisive blow and make the crisis Of the
Al Waterloo, for instance, Napoleon's column
ployed a. 900 Yards from the English position and
the massos of the reserve and the Cd Guard at 2,He
wards from the formidable batteries Of La Hale
ssinte. Nowadays these near approaches would
no, be admissible. Those deep columns, those inn-
movable masses presenting an enormous target,
would be decimated BY shell. We must Therefore
depoy at double the distance, and then advance 'hs
line M TO the range of small arms. Az foI ire e.
serves they must be conceded under shelter 81 .
well chosen position or divided into small DaSses-
easy TO move and unite for We can no longer fhinC
Of keeping them out Of the range Of artillery without
compromising the CHARGE Of victory; the battle ght
end before our reserves could come up.
The necessity for expecting lines lot engaged ~he
mstsr little 10 brave troops led by intelligent oneef
The latter will make special study OF The ground,
taking advantage Of every kind Of shelter it may a.
forho,lowe, bends, bluffs and hedges; and II hssss
cannot he found, the troops VIII be divided mo ss
many columns IS possible, with small deF'a sS&
consequen, facility OF movement.
As the fire of rided cannon s very esaiar, ana -
the projectiles of battery fall nearly On Tie .'as
line the officers will be able more easily TO post ther
ops out Of reach in the rear OF IN advance oi INC
trajectory OF rifed cannon and rifes.
At those gres. distances the enemys artillery villa
find it difficult to Judge the recruits OF 'ne' n'e'
perceive the preservstiye movements OF mo "'oPs
above reeommended they will, therefore, eon'hss'~
direct their shots on the abandoned position. ana
when they perceive their error, they VIII 'ANs'o
recomnence their experimental tIhl al 'sigp"ns
and Judging Distance
In the advance until the troops are in rea n 10
horizontal trajectory the probability OF being hi
.,;I more diminished BY the constant movement md
rapid march of the enemy; the distance changes q
every moment and the dnngerousspace 10 soon ps.sed
over.
Ancient artillery substituted for the inencien, s'd
shot and howi,zer grapeehot at short distance Aas
rolling balls which. covering tie field Of basi "'sr
proectiles rebounding on the ground and 70 d 81
the height Of a mans waist were much moe sle@"
sious than tie firing az great distances. The ,n~t
accuracy of the new rihed ctnnoa docs not 81 slse
with the use Of grape-shot, or the rcoehst, 'L'
sbrsruel, and there can be no doubt that al sie7''
riied cannon, which, together with sccw sne
great range, does not combine 10 suifcie, c'slee
the other advantages, canno: be reasonapN ives
bv AL army las exclusive field artillery.
Az TO the probable behavior Of the ~
uares to resist cavalry this topic is rather ~
ous. The British squares are splendid formation
A, Waterloo the bodest OF the French cavalry
ouailed before them. But let Ia suppose sou re
med with rides, attacked by cavalry a. the present
day. The cavalry, at 1000 ysldf, viii be init
range of the ride. II will probably msrh 10Y
a. the tros, 300 yards q. the galop, and loo ysrf
thu charge. II will get over TIE first dis'aQf'
three minutes. and the ohen in one minute y
x ,viII a,sume that the commsnier Of the aitas y
so,,re will not commit tie enormous blun' *
Gin, at the crcatest distance, when she hrs won'd
9 be usele.s on line advancing rapidly snli. - }
! ~,i,. mill the enemy gets TO 800 yards wbs
r.alti AT 900 ysrds--rsSdy' IA" e' 81
THAR siehs.' but before hey have nhshed 90 u'S'
tame. i, altered, since the hoIses ADVANCE AZ '""'
ards oer second, so thst the cshs'Fous