The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-07-18
CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA.
From the Cincinnati Commercial of Tuesday.

Ian Is responsible TOR the mlsf0rtuneS OF the
Army of the Potomac, because--lst, be
made the movement upon Richmond BY way
of the Peninsula instead of by way of Fred
ericksburg; I'd, bis movements were so
slow that he suffered the enemy to concens
trate an overwhelming force at the point of
attack.
It will be remembered that the unreas0n-
ing and noisy politicians of Washington
we're immensely animated by the evacuation
of Manassas. They discovered in the re
treat of the enemy from that point evidence
of the incapacity of the Commanding Gen.
eral, and the howl that went up for his re.
moral would have overpowered less fexi.
BILE and obstinate man than the President.
The political strategists were especially
rampant. Stanton, the Secretary of War,
roared again. Gurley & Go. discovered
anew the evidence of a variety of military
departments and an assortment of emulOus
Commanding Generals. Mcclellan was
laughed at for his elaborate preparations.
his multitude of batteries, bis patiently dis
ciplined divisions. Stanton sneered at the
idea of the organization of victory by mill
tary men. He had written to the New
York Tribune expressing bis confidence in
the spirit of God, and had peremptorily
stopped recruiting. There were too many
soldiers already. All that was necessary to
crush the rebellion was to give three cheers
for the old flag and 60 ahead. The great
danger was that the enemy would disappear
before he was punished. There never had
been many rebel troops at Manassas, and
they had rot had any guns there but wooden
ones. Mcclellan was fool anyhow, for he
had not con6dentially told the tribe of Con-
gressional blatherskites what his purposes
were.
This was the prevailing sentiment at
Washington. The President, almost over>
borne by the clamor, still insisted that "Mac
must have chance" When the army of
the Potomac marched up the Peninsula,
General Wool teegraphed to Stanton, who
with his accustomed discretion published
the dispatch, that Mcclellan would encoun.
ter very little opposition on the way. 1t
was the opinion of the veteran Wool, who
thought that he ought to command the
army, that there would be no fighting on
the road to Richmond. Mcclellan knew
better, but what could be do? There were
the wooden guns of Manassas playing upon
him at point blank range! He had no way
of convincing the country that there was
anything before him more formidable than
an enormous scare crow fanked by Quaker
batteries. He found the enemy as he had
expected, strong and fortified at Yorktown.
His dispatches that the enemy were there
in force were esteemed ridiculous, and the
political Generals at Washington shook
their sides with inextinguishable laughter.
In the mean time Stanton had provided
" big thing" He would show the world
his strategy, by sending another column to
take Richmond. Hence the Department
of the Rapphannock, and McDowell's adj
vance to Fredericksburg. This was di>
rect interference with and insult to the
commanding General of the Potomac, and
was intended as such. Mcclellan demand
ed Franklin's division, and the President
sent it to him against the emphatic protest
of the Secretary of War. This division
was designed to be used for the capture of
Gloucester Point, simultaneously With the
opening of our siege batteries before York.
town. But the enemy evacuated both
places just in time to save themselves, and
the idiotic laugh of derision at the compe-
tent generalship and gallant army, which
had driven the rebels from series of forth
6cations positively gigantic, resounded
through Washington, and was echoed over
the country.
@But why did Mcclellan wait before York.
town? Why did he not 60 at once and
storm the lines? The lesson received on
james Island the other day may answer the
question for those who, without the expert
ence of that bloody blum er, were iDcapa BILE
of reasoning. Here we must go back a
little way, and see how it happened that
Mcclellan was compelled to /" throw up
dirt" at Yorktown. His plan was to adj
vance with his main force from Fortress
Monroe up the peninsula. He expected to
find the enemy at Yorktown, and calculated
that they would throw ;Eeir main army
down to that position. Then McDoweIl's
whole corps Was, as be understood when be
lett Alexandria, to land at Urbana, on the
Rappahannock river, and march across to
West Point, at the head of York river. II
this had been done, the enemy must have
been driven into retreat of the utmost pre-
cipitation, or they would have been bagged.
lDiS Siuipic MONtuISut WOuiu nave SdVeO Tue
toll 10 the trenches at Yorktown, and the
Williamsburg. But Washington strategy
was opposed to the cooperation of Mellow.
ell with Mcclellan. McD0weli's movements
must be independent, according to the Ga,
zette-Gurley policy of many departments.
So Mcdowell, instead of going to Urbana,
where he could have done much, was sent to
Fredericksburg, where be did nothing.
General Mcclellan was not Oh the field at
the battle of Williamsburg. Why? Be-
cause he was detaine by Que of those com
mittees of Congressional visitors and inqui.
sitors, who were employing Government
steamers to transport them to the seat oil
war, that they might have an opportunity
OF finding fault with the Commanding Gen.
eral, and that their stories might be listened
to when they returned to Washington.
There were several of these Congressional
Committees, and their proceedings were
uniformly disgraceful. They took occasion
to blab in the camp, and when they returns
ed from camp, and it would have served
some OF them properly to have shot them
for melting the troops to characterization.