The New York herald., 1862-03-26
The English Idea OF a Peace.
IE.nx,, IL L Cndou Tiunaa March IA

an would bo for Russia and the United Sate
than line beginning and ending on British terrtory
The English Idea OF q Peace.
From the London Times, March 49,
IL s very remarkable TO observe the expectation
which have been raised, not only in America out IN ht
country also, Of the approaching end OF the great civil
presentations OF the New York press and tho i'm
preston has been acknowledged in our own Parlia
ment by one Of its most experienced leaders.
Lord Russell on Monday evening gave the ,Ddr just
ninay days to run, being erdcly the estimate of
Mr. W. Seuard. and, although the end anticipated by
his lordship not that contemplated by the federal
Minister the t,oo ssatrsen aprear at any rate agreed IN
their measurements Of the struggle Yet there is certainly
nothing the face Of events to sustain this conclusion
The at Fort D0nelson was great success no
doubt All those prisoners all those guns, and all those
trophies Of would have constituted a genuine vic
tory in any campaign and the prospect opened to the
conquerors was. perhaps, more important still. But
the actual result cannot be presumed. except by some
incredible consequences, 70 affect the fortunes Of the
Even il Tennessee were recovered for the Union
which yet done-Tennessee is but single State
and not one OF the States originally seeding
The only question is whether they will be 80 resolved
whether the North can now intmidae them into
submission persuade them into acceptable terms Of
separation. The federals, beyond doubt, gaining
ground-not sufficiently TO make fOrcibic reconstruc
ton Of the Union probable but quite sufficiently give
them advantage in negotiating for an amicabe part
tion. This evidently the particular end Of the war
which Lord Russell had n view, and this expectation 1t
would be very natural to entertain we could suppose
that either both Of the belgsrents mean somewhat
Al this we receive the address Of President
Davis his constituents, who have just established
permanent instead OF provisional government for the
Confederate States and elected their chief for six years
Of office. this document s TO be accepted as an
preston of Southern feeling It il certain readers
H q once a5 Tns % on9sasra,s ns S S
say little that new, but he recapituates the gricv
Of tho South-their insurrection against 'the
tyranny OF an unbrdled maortythe most odi0us form
OF despot,sm;' their efforts in the struggle, their
past Victories and their recent disasters But, he
adds the heart Of people resolved to 30 free these
hrttO Mat IN
this really the spirit in which recent events are
copied by the South, many "three months must2pass
compromse. On such conditions in short, the North
can never winl Bse PrssideU D0ris count TIE
support which he thus bespeasS Are his constituents all
ssces as hart and resolved at all hazards 70 achieve
their ndependencep We cannot confidently say but by
she ordinary rules OF political reasoning We should
30 led 70 = answer IN the .trm.svs. % &C. ~, ,s sss s
time tried by reverses, which would have been
borne perhaps with greater orttuds 81 The beginning
ANTICIPATED It 10 trde Also that the presence Of large
Northern the frontier Of the South be the
OF svoking expression Of Unionist opinions in
lho seeding states and when We observe the exraOr
dnary confidence which the invasion Of Tennessee has
produced in the North should be justified perhaps
Ia expecting corresponding depression on the part
OF The south II one side attaches such nexplicabs i'm
portance to the capture Of provincial fort why not the
other9 II the Northerners think this action decisive Of
the war; why may not Southsrnors share the boliefT
TO these questions We reply, that nothing hitherto
dscerniblc in the Of the Confederatcs
lead 10 suspect them either Of irresouton, incon
stacy political discord On the contrary their una
nimity and determination have always been re-
markably evinced. We have observed on former
occasions that. whereas imputaons Of treason, SYM
pathy with with .'rebels' and Southern "prociiv
ties, generally were current throughout the fede
raj States hint Of Northern feeling ever reached us
from the south. The fsderas were not saio from
traitors in their camps, where the Confederates
appeared always TO have friends. The expeditions Of the
federal failed uniformly in discovering any loyalst party
at any point Of Southern soil and when reflect upon
the which must have been required before the
nine mli6 Of Conederates could have confronted az
they have done the twenty millions OF federas for ten
months together, II is impossible TO doubt that the
Souherners have been really in earnest AS 70 the effect
of the agn and It's events years fierce and not
ngorous warfare should have brought the South TO de-
re reconciliation with the North the phenomenon will
b. most surprising one.
Nevertheless, though reason would forbid US TO ex-
pect either the voluntary submiss violent subuga
ton Of the South yet the termnaton OF the war" by
the method Of compromise may possibly be at haId,
and the recent successes OF the fedeas may facilitate
this conclusion not only by re- establishing the military
reputation OF the North, but by limiting to more accept
able proper the demands Of the South Te govern
nant Ct Warrington could secure he tcrer Sdtes might
resolre TO let the Gulf States co. Father than prolong, at
prodgons cost which, the best Of suppositions
could only end in the ruinous occupation Of Of hos.ils
troops 10 hold tho petty State Of Maryland. would
take we told federal authority, 200 10
Kentucky, and II Tennessee, Virginia and Missouri
70 bo garrisoncd similar SCALE and the Gulf States
70 be invaded and occupied afterwards, how are such
obligations to be supporteds Possibly therefore, the
federal leaders, in the midst OF their rejoicnge,
thinking Of favorable negotiation. We do not profsss
to hare di corered any such design in he reports
suhicA reach US, and which speak Of nothing but
unbounded and almost irrational confidence In con-
tinuous victory. But, as continuous victory itself
would bring practical except by the voluntary
return Of the South the bonds Of union As this
surn from all infer Ia utterly improbable and on
che alternative that Of military occupation can scarcely
be said represent possibility II 10 but reasonable 70
think that Of the wsest among the NorthsTners
must have contemplated negotiation and separation
course to be ultimately pursued, That course can be
pursued now with advantages which could hardly have
bcsn anticipated months ago, and II the victory at
Fort Donelson should have disposed of the beli.
eerents concessions and the other 70 abae
mont Of its demands it may certainly lead 70 speedy
termination Of the