Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1862-01-17
From tbo Now Yorl- D.. !
The Campaign.

The Campaign.
so often has the patient public been de-
luded with promises of vigorous advance
upon the enemy that the very words is now
greeted with incredulous smiles, and is
consigned by general consent, along with
certain other phrases, such as ''the grand
plan," "the oath of allegiance" "nobody
hurt," &C., to that limbo ofridiculous YER
olage known as reporters slang. Never
theless, we venture once more to believe
that our armies are upon the eve of an ad-
vance IN force, and with, we hope, more
determined purpose than our generals have
yet shown, and more decisive results than
they have hitherto shown.
The details of the movements which are
projected, or the plans which the General
ln-Chief has laid out for his campaign, the
public, of course, will only know when
those are carried into effect. But an at
tentive study of a good military map, show
ing the places of the rebel forces, their
Chief lines communication. and the bear
ing OF our own armies upon these, may re-
veal to the student glimpses of the great
result towards which wise general would
be likely to work.
1t has been remarked by recent military
writers, that the tendency of all modern
wars is to concentrate the efforts of the Op-
posing forces upon some one or two prin-
cipAl points, where the battle may be fair
~ fought out without that general ravage
and destruction of great regions which
formed the unfailing accompaniment of
wars In less civilized periods. Thus the
war between Russia and the Allies was
fought out at and near Sebastopol. IF we
are not mistaken, it is General Mcclellan
who remarks that, had the fall of Sebasto-
pol failed to bring the Russian Emperor to
terms, the Allies would then have attacked
Cronstadt, for which purpose, indeed, Eng
land and France had prepared themselves
with ships and forces. But in so vast a field
of war as continent, which is SO thinly set
tied withal, it is difficult to oconcentrate-to
crystalline operations, so to speak. There are
no great fOrtresses, like Sebastopol or Cron-
stadt, to beleaguer and reduce; there are
no great capitals like London or Paris to
capture; for New York is the capital of
North America, and the rebels have no
means even to threaten it. They rest,
therefore, on the defensive, trusting to time
to be their best ally. Meantime we might
chip away at the edge of the rebellion for
a century and effect nothing what is need
ed is blow which shall pierce and divide
It's spinal cord. 1t is not bloody battles,
but decisive results, which the great gen
might faithfully cut each others throats,
and yet-men being plenty on each side
effect nothing. Our armies might capture
Richmond-and if they only took the city,
or if they took only the State of Virginia,
they would have gained but small ndvNn-
tage after all, and the most sanguinc might
well despair of thus capturing half IL con-
tincnt in detail, and by main strength.
1t is evident, therefore, that comman-
der of genius adequate to the end would
not waste men and means by scattered
blows, which, siugly. can effect but little.
Rather, he would endeavor to work out
slowly Il carefully-studicd plan by which
be could bring all the means Mt his COM
mand to bear upon some decisive point,
where he could hope to overwheIm the ene-
my and destroy not only his forces, but his
cause itself.
Richmond and Manassas have two great
lines of communication, and two only
The Virginia and East Tennessee railroad
connects Richmond with the great South
west, from which Beauregard draws nearly
all his supplies. The railroad system
which is concentrated at Weldon, or ut
Raleigh, in North Carolina, connects Rich
moud with the Atlantic slave States, from
which Beauregard has drawn most of his
men. If these two lines are cut off, the
grand army of the rebels is effectually iso-
lated, the decisive point of action is at once
declared, and this point may be threatened
from front and rear at the same time. But
to make such a blow tell more decisively,
it would be necessary to operate as well in
those states which are cut off from succor,
as against the great army to capture which
would crush the rebellion.
Let us see how our forces are situated
to fulfil these conditions. Buell. is in
Kentucky with one hundred thousand
men. His advance upon Nashville will
isolate Zollicoffer and Marshall, who must
retreat before Schoepf into Tennessee, and
give us command of the Virginia aud Ten
nessee Railroad, the Southwestern commu-
nication. If, now, we can imagine Burn
side striking at the seaboard railroad line
say ut Weldon-we shall at once have
Beauregard's forces imprisoned in Virgin
la, for they have never been able to get
means of transportation together for their
great army, and cannot move, off the rail-
| roads. Meantime Buell. may turn his
forces Eastward, through the loyal dis
tricts of East Tennessee and Western Yir-
ginia, till he threatens Richmond from the
Southwest; Burnside may secure himself
in the loyal parts of North Carolina, and
threaten Beauregard from the South
Mcclellan and Banks lie upon the rebel
front, ready to assail, the moment Beaure-
gard turns to defend himself against Buell.
or Burnside. And while the grand army
of Davis is thus imprisoned on all sides
Sherman has opportunity to strike III
South Carolina; Dupont may join in the
attack on Charleston or Savannah, OF
both; Butler and Phelps threaten jackson
the capital of Mississippi, and Halleck tc
carry his hundred thousand men to New
| Orleans. aG IEG4 . 10 pgfrgtI
Napoleon defeated his opponents BY
piercing their centre; and, by the move