New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-08-01

~. a,ber t6rd-wonid that the leless bronze conld
have spoken for itself the sorrowful and indignant
words which the spirit of Washington would have
prompted, Instead of being made apparently to give
that great sanction to the eloquent madness OF the
political orators Of our day.
/ grant that for the defense Of the capital against
attack supposed to be imminent il was "a right aud
a duty that | think we would both have recognized
and both obeyed, rally TO that long as it re-
mains the seat of the Federal Government OF what
remains of the Union. But between that great,
supreme and single duty and the further idea wolch
seems equally 10 have peryaded all your proceedings
and which seems 70 be now the passionate purpose
OF the whole North, the idea OF great Clvil war 10
be carried down into the south, for lis eubJuSalon,
for It's reeonquest back Into the Union, there Il.
vast distance. This latter idea seouls 10 lie iitie
short OF sheer insanity. And yet this ara noi the
mere defense of Warrington, is the undertaking
I 10 which the Administration has summoned ue
North, summons TO witch the North does, indeed,
seem 10 he responding with an enthusiasm substan-
italy unanimous. i nowhere observe any dlstlnc-
ton even intimated Except, perhaps, IN pierce :
speech az ConcOrdl between the indspuabie duty Ii
general rally Tor the repuisOn OF Southern ATTACK
from the CAPITOL and the very different thing OF Il
war o. Northern lnvaton, 10 be carried down 10 lhs
Sonth and throughout the South. l suppose 1t VIII
be called treason and sympathy with rebellion, Du'
10 fear o; unpopuarty shall restrain my sayingthst
| regard this as folly which would be wicked were
1t not mad.
Suppose the Southern forces beaten out OF the
field AS presume they would be along the line OF
the border and great Northern armies then To move
down into the Seeded States, and to be victorious
even there also, by dint OF NUMBER, collars, ana
serve tumus in the great and terrible battles thus
TO be pIOvOked-how much nearer snail we ihen pe
10 any possibility OF the reconstrrcti0n of the Union
Are the SOutheuers Of such different "sh ana oiood
from ourselves, inferior Iii temper o. r.ce nc 10
allow us 10 imagine that such humiliation, however
it may throw them on their back, vii ever bring
them TO their knees Must 1t not necessarily pro-
duce the effect ot uniting as one man TIC Whole 81
their people hitherto more or less DIVIDED between
Seces ion and the Union Can II be hoped that any
of them will ever again be willing 10 live hereafter
with us Ill the iraternnl bonds OF Confederation.
in any form and under any cirssAisiduces,
when such gulf Of bloody meu,sSs aid
of degrading shame, shall have been aug
between them and us Or can the idea be dreamed
Of of retaining prolonesI military occupation OF
those States How long prolonged by how
many hundreds Of thousands Of permanent Northern
Troops 7 At what incalculable and Impossible ex-
peusc With what reciprocal and almost equal
Industrial ana commercial ruin TO both North and
South And to wha. good in reference to Interior
reunion Can they be forced TO unvOte their Seces
sion, 10 vote themselves back INTO the Union
Though the legal fiction may be kept up for awhile
of their being presumed TO be stu III IT, Can they I've
forced TO elect Senators and Representatives, to
| Congress or to do any OF The voluntary acts which
constitute participation in the political life Of the
Union Can it be hoped that utder such circum-
stances even any party in those States can he found
TO side with the triumphant invaders Can there
! be anything but the deePest and most unanimous
passion OF hatred and resen ment Oh the part Of the
whole Southern peOpe-nan, woman, and child
against ibe North and all Nortnernersl Will this state
oil things be the maintenance OF the Union, even
while such military occupation shall last And when
the occupying forces are withdrawn, sooner or
later they must be, W II not the Southern Confed.
eracy rise again instantly to it's feet, IN tenfOld de-
gree embiitered and irreconcilahle
All this on the assumption of Northern triumph at
the South; but is il certain that success Tou'd
follow the invading banner evtn though II be our
dear and hitherto sacred and glorious Stars and
Stripes, when thus borne far into tie depths of
hostlle country, the hone OF millions Of rice second
to none known ia history 10 bravery, spirit ard kill
in lrms7 True, they have their slaves TO take
Of but do any Of you count on those anxiiItesi il
the North ready TO resort 10 this horrd Improvement
upon the British recourse 70 the Indians in our own
Revolutionary wari Apart from humanity apar, from
all memory Of past relations, apart from AL thought
Of the myriad bO1ds Of cOntang ui.y still uui
in spite OF our mad discords, yet Is II not mani
fest that such dread Iun TO the south, the more COM
uete SO much the worse, would lay equally low in
ruin the whole laDrc OF The common national Undue
try, commerce AID prosperity
/ IL is idle TO cream Of holding the South In tie
Upion ly force Of Northern arms, against It's own
/ determined will After Secession AZ a fact which
do not Justify, though l do say that 1t had "A great
deal Of provocation 10 explain and 10 pa late it the
onlv possible hope Of reunion lay IN the IOhcy OF
wisely and shliuly developing the latent Union
sentiment at the South ITSELF Til IL should acquire
sufficient moral and numerical strength, operating in
combination with concaiory ssions from the
North to assert itself, and assume the political
troll at hone. The influence Of the Border States
was a most important element toward tual eventual
result. line, reasOn, Tor Jeafance, redress OF past
grievances secure guarantees for tie future, with
all forms OF kindly demonstration Should have been
brought into play, and kept ia operation; and this
policy wond have been perfectly compatible WI
selfTespect, self-assertOn, end the continued mann
tenance oil the theory that tie seeded States
sti legally in the Union. his policy would have
held tie Border States, and through them have pre-
served a strong moral hold upon tie rert OF tine
South. The cOerciye policy, we all well knew
ia advance, would DO the immediate signil for the
secession o. Virginia, To be eventually followed,
unless reunion can be effected, by that Of most II
not all the rest. The Union party in those States
though in prepOnderence while still hopeful Of
cessions from the North, had already all It could do
10 hold its own at home; and UNANIMOUS votes OF
their Legislatures aud Conventions had pledged
them against tue Federal Government the niou.ent
the latter should have 10 coercion. that IS
10 say, 10 Surely the very Devn, who seeras
10 have directed from tie very outset all this
wre ched bueluess OF the breaking W Of our Union
making equally of the vices AID the virtues Of
men, OF TIE adverse passions and OF the c0nilIc ing
opinions Of sections and OF parties, the direct
author and inspiIer OF the unhappy determination
the part OF the Federal Government 10 adopt that
fatal recourse.
Ii anything could have aggravated its evil and
its danger, 1t the mode OF It's ADOPTION To have
fret given the country, North aud South, 10 uuder
stana that Fort Sumter 10 be evacuated ~ have
then held for weeks in anxious aud irritating
pense; TO have then, latter all, quibble Of
iorm wheeled round from that purpose, and to have
determined 10 hold aud re-eniorce II at all hazards-
and even then not to have made the attempt by sud
dea surpiise, which might have presented some
chances of success, but to have sent the defiance,
not TO ray tie taunt, OF formal notice that it was
about t. be done-wby, had the batteries around