The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-08-22

front of him in strong force, probably greater
than bis own; but 81 will at least run the
risk of holding them in check here, while I
resume the original plan )" and concludes,
l will do all l can with the force at nv
disposal" Mr.. Chandler, after quoting this
dispatch, INDUCES in one of the absurdities
that men generally commit when discussing
matters they do not understand, and breaks
out with, "He would not try to hold them
in check! He could not hold them. He
could not stop his eager troops from chasing
them" The honorable Senator does not
seem to be awaae that to hold flying enc,
my 10 check he must be followed closely
and attack fercely, as the confederates were
followed and attacked on this occasion. In
the meantime Franklin was sent up the
river to West Point to intercept them, " in
pursuance of the original PLAN" A bloody
battle took place, but we were too feeble
here, as at all other points. 1t was despe.
rate and gallant attempt to accomplish ssthe
original plan" with an inadequate force. 1t
resulted in'still further weakening the army.
Still he continued to telegraph, and, as ever,
a deaf ear was turned to his demands.
The army then concentrated at the White
House, advanced to the Chickahominy, and
portion of it was boldly thrown across
the stream on the line of the railroad, the
bridges of which had to be repaired to be
made available and now the awkwardness
and danger of our position, due solely to
the cause we have named, were made man.
ifest.
The telegraphic dispatches which he con-
tinued to send cup to the dsy he was at
tackled by the rebels" were still unheeded,
and our army found itself in presence of one
of equal or superior force, strongly intrench.
ed, backed by city which relieved it of all
its sick and wounded, their attendants and
guards, and having perfect freedom of moves
ment while we were surrounded by trai.
tors and spies, who could and did keep the
enemy informed of all our movements. 1t
was absolutely necessary, in order to hold
our position. to keep large portion of our
force north OF the Chickahominy, thus ex.
tending and weakening our lines. The diff.
culties OF an attack were much the same as
at Yorktown, with the certainty of being
outnumbered on any given point, from the
shorter interior lines of the enemy, his greats
er facilities of communication and conse-
quent power of concentration. But we were
favored in our defensive position by the en-
emy's exaggerated idea of our numbers.
With no strong position, and no organized
force 10 fall hack upon, il was certain that
without larger army a general assault
would be ruinous, unless completely success
full. Under these circumstances, to attack
with all the chances against US, would have
been criminal in the highest degree; an act
of folly and of madness, for which, had the
issue been unfortunate, no atonement could
have been made. With the ruin of the
army, the cause itself would have been great.
~ endangered, if not LOST. 1t then became
necessary, indispensable, to the safety of the
army, to form an intrenched camp, which,
in case of a reverse, would serve as a ref
uge and rallying point. This the recog-
nized and only course that an army deficient
IN numbers, can pursue under such circum.
stances. Hence, as hard alternative, not
from choice, "digging ditches' was again
resorted to by General McClellan. It was
an unavoidable consequence of taking away
his troops in the first place, and the con
tinued refusal to comply promptly with the
demands of his Geographic dispatches.
In the meantime all that could be done
was effected, and the brilliant affair of Han.
over Court House and the destruction of
the enemy's communication on the Central
Railroad was undertaken and effected by
the troops on the north of the Chckahomi-
ny, led by the gallant Fitz John Porter.
This rendered an advance toward Washing
ton, by way of Fredericksburg, impossible
to the rebel army and removed the last sha-
dow of excuse for still withholding General
McDowell's army from General Mcclellan.
1t is said that his advanced guard was wi b.
in 'the sound of the enemy's cannon" at
Hanover. Had he advanced or been under
McClelan's orders, we might possibly have
entered Richmond then, but special mea
sures had been taken to prevent Mcdowell,
under any circumstances, from being SUBJ
ject to McClellan's orders ;-and still rein.
forcements were withheld.
On the last day of May, taking advan-
tage of rise in the Chickahomlny, which
cut off the communication between its
banks, the enemy threw his whole force on
our left wing at Fair Oaks. Our works
we're as yet imperfect, but the advantage
of the defensive over the offensive where the
lines of attack are few and difficult are here,
as in the subsequent battles, made evident.
The event showed what would have been
the result of headlong attack by our ar
my on the enemy's stronger and better
manned position, and made obvious to all
but the wilfully blind the wisdom of Me-
Clelan's course. The att OK was repulsed,
and the confederates hasten back with enor-
nous loss. Our force also suffered terribly,
and was too small to follow up the success.
Had we done so and attacked him in his
chosen positions, the tables would certainly
have been turned upon US.
Now at last some attention was paid to
the Geographic dispatches, and Gen. WOODS
command was placed under McClellan's
orders. 1t furnished some 5000 men-not
enough to repair our losses at Fair Oaks
AT later period another of McDowells
divisions, that of Mccall, numbering some
5000 or 10000 men, was also sent it
scarcely made good the sacrifice of men in
the swamps OF the Chickahominy." Had
these men been sent in time, they might
have made the victory at Hanover decisive,
-. ou,Liol ,,o &o follox, mn fho ,,,,ooc, "a