The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1862-09-22
The Fight on the Left Wednesday.

gress. His attack on The bridge had been sue
c~essful, but toe delay had been 50 great that t
the observer it appeared as If Mcclellan plan
must have been seriously disarranged. 1t il
impossible not to suppose that the attacks Oh
the right and left were meant to correspond, 10
otherwise the enemy had only to repel Hooke
on the one hand. then transfer his troops ant
hurl them against Burnside.
Here was the difference between Smith ant
Burnside. The former did his work at once
and lost all his men ut once-that is, all whom
he lost at all Burnside seems to have attacked
cautiously in order to save his men, and sending
successfully insufficient forces against = position
of strength, distributed his loss over a greater
period Of time, but yet lost none the less in the
end.
Finally, at 4 o'clock, Mcclellan sent slmulta
neous orders to Burnside and Franklin to the
former to advance and carry the batteries in his
front at all hazards and any cost to the latter
to carry the woods next in front Of him to the
right, which the Rebels still held. The order to
Franklin, however, was practically counter
manded, in consequence of a message from Gen.
Sumner that if Franklin went on and was re-
pulsed, his own corps was not yet sufficiently re-
organized to be depended on as a reserve.
Franklin, thereupon, was directed to run no
risk of losing his present position, and, instead
OF sending his infantry into the woods, content
ed himself with advancing his batteries over the
breadth OF the fields in front, supporting them
with heavy columns OF infantry, and attacking
with energy the rebel batteries imme IIatcly op
posed 10 him. His movement was a success, so
far as it went. the batteries maintaining their
new ground and senai2Iy affecting the ateadIncss
OF the rebel fire. That being once accomplished,
and all hazard Of the right being again forced
back having been dlspelled, tho NOV ment of
Burnside became At once the turning poiu. OF
success, and the fate Of the day depended Of
him.
How extraordinary the situa ION was may b.
judged from d moments consideration OF the
facts. 1t is understood that from th1 outset
Burnside's attack was expected to be decisive
as it certainly must have been if things went
we'll elsewhere, and if he succeeded in establish
ing himself on the Sharpsburg road in the reNei
rear.
Yet Hooker. end Sumner, and Franklin, and
MANSFIELD were all sent to the right three miles
away, while Porter seems TO have done double
duty with his single corps in front, both sup
porting the batteries and holding himself in re-
serve. With all this immense force On the right,
but Ii, 900 men were gwen to Burnside for the
decisive movement of the day.
Still T.ore unfortunate in its results was the
total failure of these separate attacks on the
right and left to sustain, or in any manner CO.
operate with each other. Burnside hesltated
for hours in ront of the bridge which shou Id
have been carried at once by a coup de main.
Meantime Hooker had been fighting for four
hours with various fortune, but final sue
cess. Sumner had come up too late to join in
the decisive attack which his earlier arrival
would probably have converted into a complete
success and Franklin reached the scene only
when Sumner had been repulsed. Probably be.
fore his arrival the rebels had transferred a con-
siderable number of troops to their RICH, &c
meet the attack of Burnside. the direction OF
which was then suspected or developed.
Attacking first with one regiment, then with
two, and delaying both for artillery, Burnside
was not over the bridge before 2 o'clock-per.
haps not till 3. He advanced slowly up the
slopes in his front, his batteries in rear cover
ing, to some extent, the movements of the infant.
ry. A desperate fight vas going on in a deeE
ravine on his right, the rebel batteries were ir
full play and, apparently, very annoying anC
destructive, while heav7 columns of rebel troop.
were plainly visible, advancing as if careless O
concealment, along the road and over the hilll
in the direction of Burnside's forces. 1t was a.
this point of time that Mcclellan sent him tn,
order above given.
Burnside obeycd 1t most calamity. Getting
his troops well in and, and sending a por ior
of his artillery to the front, he advanced then
with rapidly and the most determined vigor
straight up the hill in front, on the top of which
the rebels had maintained their most Dangerous
battery. The movement was in plain view o
McClellan's position, and as Franklin, on til,
other side sent his batteries into the field abou
the same time, the battle seemed to open in al
directions with greater activity than ever.
The fight In the rayine was in full progress
the batteries which Porter supported were firm
with new vigor, Franklin was blazing away o.
the right, and every hilltop, ridge and wood
along the whole line was crested and vale
with white clouds of smoke. All day had bee
clear and bright since the early cloudy morning
and Low this whole magnificent, ~unequale
scene shore with the s~plendor of an a~fternoo
September sun. Four miles of battles, its g!o
ry all visible, its horrors all vailed, the fate {
the Republic hanging on the hour-could an
one be lnsensible of its granduer.
There are two hills on the lett of the roac
the furthest The lowest. The Rebels have bait,
ries on both. Burnside is ordered to carry th
nearest 10 him, which g the turthest from tn
road. His guns opening first from this new p,
sltion in front, soon entirely controlled and s
fenced the enemy's artillery, The infantr
came on at once, moving rapidly and steadll
up, long dark lines, and broad, dark masses, b.
ing plainly visible without a glass as they move
over the green hillside.
The next moment the road in which the Reb
battery was planted was canopied with clouc
rs 1,ot a,,t,l, Jo,oaoA,o, .,to tbo u.lu. r.