Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-12-13
REVEH OVERWHELMINGLY an
NEGLECT.

GAGA9SA
II our enemy has sheWn e more persistent
determination to accomplish a purpose distinctly
svowsd, than that Of controlling the navigation
of the Mississippi river, the observing public
of the South must hsvs failed to discover it. and
that il is still their primary object must be OBJ
viOus to al sTeeps such IS are ignoranily blind,
Oh, psrhsps, nsrcenaTy or interested aiders
sod sbsttorI-" Sectional pride at the outset of
existing difficulties led them to claim 4 right to
uninterrupted passage through our domain /;
next, Commercial advantages, arising from the
necessities Of the Agricultural rsgisns Of the
Northwest 10 find q cheap yet sIpsdi6ous chan
mel Of transit for their surplus products, in
creased the desire to use the great natural artery
Of the country and finally, in the prosecution
OF the war, the Federal Gathoritiss have found
1t necessary to success to cover the bosom o four
great " inland sea with their ganboss, aad
is shores with their sOldiery. Their spirit, at.
all times patent, has not tagged; aAd to-day We
rad them more buHily engaged in preparations
TO eomplets the cherished design, than they were
syesr and half ago to eommsnee what they
thsn Imagined would be a task easy of secomp-
lshment within e few wssks.
The importance of controlling the rivers of
The Cenfederscy was sAsly ~foreses., sad from
the Inauguration Of the war We have eontinued
70 advocate the employment Of every means
possible to de 50. This policy was adopted BY
government, and defensive preparations ware
made on the tennessee, Cumberland and Mis-
sissippi The fall, however, Of fs unfinished
Werks at Fort Henry in an attack made BY gun
boats, and Of Fort Donelson in a combined
effort Of q feet and an overwhelming land force,
seemed to have paralizsd all, and the people
were soon called upon 10 witness the aba ndOp-
1Hsnt Of the works at Columbus, Madrid Bend.
Island 10, and Fort Pillow, in the construction
Of which millions had been spesi Following
this came the occupation Of Memphis, and the
navigation Of the Mississippi without i~nterruv-
ton, until the enemy had landed bis armies In
West Tennessee and Eastern Arkansas. and
anchored bis powerful fleets in the vicinity of
Vicksburg.
The loss Of our fOrifcatiOns LETT us, Of course.
but one mede Of impeding the eneny's opera.
lions on the river, viz by attacking his boat,
on every opportunity. Months ago we urged
the use Of every cane-brske a. an ambusea5a
and lsVee as a forti6catien, from wheh c resist
snes so ehectual might have been made as vssld
have driven evsry pilot from the river. or At
least have made it hazardous for any but iron
elsds to navigate. Had this policy been viyor
ously adopted, the immense transportation of
forces and supplies would not have been mads
and today we believe the enemy's power in the
Mississippi valley would be confined 10 dspreda,
tons on the banks Of the river, sueh as could
only have been committed by the small forces
he might have been enabled to land from his
war fleets. With these he could never have
obtained a permanent foothold, or have pene
irated the country as be has done, nor should
we have been compelled to witness the several
!" sank which have, from time to
time, caused eur army 10 abandon its strong
positions and leave 50 large a portion Of the
country ct the mercy Of the fee. 1
The abandonment Of the line Of the Cold !
Water, and the destruction Of the valuabls |
stores at Abbeville, Of such recent occurrence. f
was one Of The fruits Of the do-aothing policy s
on the river. Fer some tine previous he river c
had been made dangerous by the separations Of
a few gallant bands Of earnest pArtisans to an
extent that almost prevented the advance oil 4
the enemy. Additional effort in this direerion
sscn became apparent, would have entirely f
dsns So. But unfortunately other eOunssls pre- @
vailed, and al effort was abandoned. The re- b