Sioux City register. [volume] (Sioux City, Iowa) 1858-1871, 1862-09-20
NUMBER 3.
THE STORY A NUTSHELL.

The Boston Post publishes the fol owing
extract from letter by an officer in the
Army Of the Potomac, who was in the
seven days battles in command of bat
terry, and who distinguished himself
| When Gen. Mcclellan had landed at For
tress Monroe to command the march to
Richmond, he had $4,000 nen. His p'au
was to engage the enemy before York.
town, and the Secretary Of War agreed to
send Gen. Mcdowell, then at Frederieks-
burg. to West Point, to attack them in the
rear. Had the programme been faithfully
followed the result could have 5cen 70 9th
er than The capture of the entire t zee Of
Msgruder. Mcclellan left the fortress with
his splendid army in tie hlgLes, spirits.-
They halted the first nigGt At Big Bethel,
the strong entrenchments OF which the
rebels evacuated without scarce firing
gun. Early the next day the Union army
resumed its march, and in the afternoon,
encountered the enemy at Howard's mills,
strong position, six miles east Of York
town. Here they made a stand for short
time, but gave way before the light came
on, and re,reated to their Notifications at
Yorktown. That night Mcclellan rested
on Howard 5 mills, within the rebel works.
Everything now looked well-he had
found the enemy in large force. General
Porter, in q balloon, had examined the
strength and position Of the enemy; by
bis teiegraphic line, which was completed
each day. he could hold Communication
with Washington at each encamping place.
He telegraphed the satisfactory state of
affairs, aud IN reply was telegraphed by
Secretary Stanton that the Governments
had concluded not to send Mcdowell, as
he had agreed, that be had force enough,
and that it was thought unsafe to remove
Mcdowell further from Washington Nc
CeIians condemnation was great. He
called his generals about him, and showed
them Stanton's telegram The question
what was to be done, was then discussed.
| They knew by actual reconnaissance that
| their own force was insufficient 10 storm
the strong works At Yorktown they were
| equally certain that a retreat at that time
would be disastrous. 1t was finally con-
! cluded to form al intrenched camp before
| the enemys works, and approach them by
| parallels, until the government could rein.
! force them o, carry out the original pro.
gramme. This was done, and as far az
! McCleIlans army was concerned, YOU
knuw the result. BY his ludicous skill,
| he drove the eneny from their strong
works, captured eighty large guns, follow.
! ed them, fought and whipped them at
| Williamsburg, aud then pursued to the
| Chicaahominy. All this time he was urg-
! ing the Government TO reinforce him. The
responses were unsatisfactory, and no new
troops were sent in time to be of service.
! At Yorktown, the army was reduced Is.
| 600; at Williamsburg, 5000; at Fair
/ Oaks, 5000. This battle Of Fair Oaks
was ended Gu the first of June, and it was
| not until the 20rh that the first and oniv
reinforcements r.atheI us; th-v consisted
! Of some 5000 or / 0JI troops, un! !er Nc.
| Call, and not euoa2a e. make good the
| losses by sickness IL JUur.
! Upon arriving at tne Chickahominy,
ana after Fair Oaks, our army therefore
nun bered, including the SICK, 92,000.-
| With this number, so small compared to
| the opposing army, the same course had
to be pursued as at Yorktown. Our in
! trenched camp was indispensable to pro-
| tect our retreat, in the even. Of no. re-
ceiving the required aid. Without it, we
/ could not have held our position week
without it We could not have reached our
! presen, location in short, without it, des.
| trucllon was inevitable.
| Five or six weeks did Mcclellan wait
| before Richmond hoping for reinforce
| ments, but in vain; and then the change
in our base, and the junction with the
gunboa,s agreed upon, and finally sue.
cessfully accomplished.
! Al these facts are known here, and
will, think, explain to you why we are
| not in Richmond, and will also convince
| you that the responsibility of this csm-
-paign rests upon the sAn !ers OF clique
who are jealous O. lac su2rcss Of any
military leader, ar who, mil recently,
have influenced the .Iairs ot h. army TO
an unfortunate extent, -ais clique is
composed of rau.cal political leaders,
among whom are many in the depart
ments. | find that he most intelligent
and best Informed officers. have the most
nnbounded confidence in Gen. Mcclellan.
| You are safe, therefore, in continuing
your good opinion of him.
. -
Stan vopr cryinp soi5 an enraoed