The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1862-03-19
Strategy Of tho Rebels,

The desperate stand which the rebels have
made at Island No. 10, between Hickman and
New Madrid on the Mississippi, leads US to be-
iicvo that the abandonment of Columbus was a
part OF their strategy of defense of the passage
Of the river. We had heard 50 much of the
,mpresnability of Columbus that when it was
evacuated we at first reoiced at it, as though it
opened at once the way for our gunboats to
New Orleans. The rebels, however, evidently
had :hair own notions about the defense of the
river, and possibly in their judgment the Island
Was regarded as better position than Columbus
They had opportunity to remove all their guns
irsm the latter pl'ce to the Island, and concen-
trato all their force there. The successes of
Federal troops nave, no doubt taught them
that when they have any purpose of resisting
the advance OF our army or navy, it will not
answer to attempt it with any uncomfortable
fragment Of lhler force. One rebel fertilization
on the Mississippi, we'll and strongly defended,
Is better than the same strength divided between
two positions, and having determined to fortfy
Island no. 10, at all, it was their wisest policy
toa5andon Columbus, and concen trate all their
strength at the Island. And it is not impossl-
bic, that Beauregard, in his recent visit to Co.
lumbus, and the rebel deiences of the Missis-
slppl, may have determined upon the Island as
the lest point for a stand in that vicinity, and
at the same time concluded to abandon Colum-
bus.
The boast, for so long time INDUCED in by the
rebels, that one Chivalrc Southerner" Was
match for five Northern mudsills,'' has not
recently been paraded in Southern papers, or
uttered by Southern orators The rebels have
found to their cost, and by the convincing logic
OF experience, that Yankees will fight, .and they
have no stomach for fight unless in their stron.
gest positions and with their best material of war.
This knowledge will lead them to fight at as few
places as possible on the Mississippi, but to bring
into action, wherever they do make stand, all
their available strength in that vicinity. If
their force and their guns had been divided be-
iween Columbus and Island No. 10, both places,
OF course, would have been weakened by the
division and could have made a much less for
ndable resistance to Com. Foote'S feet and
would moro quickly, and with less loss of lite
20 us, have fallen into our hands. 1t was only
by uniting their strength, that they could have
any hope of success.
And ever since the battle Of Fort Doncson,
this policy of falling back, contracting their
lines OF defense, and bringing their forces nearer
together TO be mutual supports ag .insv the over
wheIhing Union armies thatare marching South
ward, has apparently been adopted by the lead
ers of the rebellion. 1t was this that led them
70 abandon Bowling Green and Nashville. Thew
understood that the struggle was to be for tho
valley of the Mississippi, and II stand at Nash
vile would have aided, in defense of Memphis
or New Orleans but little. even if there had
oeen IN 1t one desperate chance of victory. Gen.
Buell. s army at Nashville, does n t appear to be
any part OF the expedition to New Orleans, our
land force in that expedition having gone up the
tennessee, and not tho Cumberland river. But
it is no, at all probable that Memphis, and is
approaches along the river are TO be surrendered
without II blow What the rebel strength is
there We DO not know, but the preparations for
resistance at Island No. 10, warrant the suppo-
s'Fon that the defense Of the river nearer to the
city has not been neglected, and that if there is
much light left in the rebels, some of it will
come out soon. Indeed, we have had specimen
already at Island No. TO-
ana the recent movements in Virginia nd-
cate the same rebel policy of narrowing their
! inc of Defense 1t has been extended, until r.