New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-06-19

Virginia that he was one Of those who believed
in waeing the War in earnest-miking il short,
sharp and decisive. That was all We wanted
to know. But he was called to the command
of an army demoralized By needless aud
shameful defeat, and manifesily required time
TO reorganize, discipline and strengthen it.
We acquiesced in the wisdom of taking
were recruited, drilled and rendered
efficient, for which We gave Gen.
Mcclellan due credit. The Summer heats
passed away-the leaves fell-the roads were
admirabe--the weather all that could be
desired. Port Royal restored the prestige of
our arms. Balls Bluff showed that our sol.
diers, even when misled, betrayed, Outnum-
bered and hopeless, were still of the true
heroic mold. They wanted to go ahead, and
we approved and shared their aspiration. 1t
was rebuked and depressed at headquarters
aud we submitted. Finally, our patience wore
out and our faith with it. We beeved-we
still beeve-that the Union Grand Army was
kept idle too long, and that it ought to have
commander who believed in going ahead.
For this reason--for this reason malnly-we
desired change. 1t is true that We did not
sympathize with Gen. McClellan's hnbitual
Difference to Slavery aud his repression OF
Anti.Slavery singing in his camps; but We con-
sidered this but another manifestation of the
one spirit.
The President decided that Gen. Mcclellan
should lead the advance on Richmond That
closed the discussion. Thenccforward, we have
only desired TO strengthen him in every posi-
BILE way. The division of commands in East
ern Virginia has seemed to us in some aspects
unfortunate, though it is very true that Cen
eral operating in front Of Richmond cannot
well direct operations for the defense of the
CAPITAL. the Shenandoah Valley, and the Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad. These can be much
more inegently and safely controlled from
Washington than from camp in front OF
Richmond in view Of the immense labors and
cares there pressing on the Commander-in-
Chief, and the moral certainty that the wires
leading thence to Washington viii be cut by
Rebels at least every week. Still, we could
wish that all the troops in Maryland and Viz
GINA east OF the Alleghanes had been left
under the command of Gen. Mcclellan.
We now urge, as We have long urged, that
every regiment that is not absolutely
needed somewhere else be sent 10 the
General in command before Richmond.
Expose Fremont ard the Valley Of the
Shenandoah to disaster, risk Washington, BaltI-
more, any thing, in order 10 so strengthen
Mcclellan that he may strike speedily and
surely. His Military capacity has nothing to
do with the question in hand. If he is a good
General he should have men enough. If bad
one, he needs still more. Let him be- 90 re-
enforced that he may advance forthwith from
those pestilent Chickahominy swamps, aud go
Forward to Richmond" To this end, we
would postpone every other, anl risk all that
can be placed in jeopardy. Delays are notori-
ously perous, and every hour that the decisive
step is postponed will render success more
costly and difficult. Ii j. be necessary to call
on abe States for more regiments and 10 hasten
their equipment we trust that necessity will
be promptly acknowledged and acted on.