Ashtabula weekly telegraph. [volume] (Ashtabula, Ohio) 1853-1873, 1862-02-22

TOW. Col. r. J. Thomas. Col. Fisher. are
named as killed on the Geld, beside Gen.
r. X Smith and many other officers SC.
verely wounded; vet when he comes 70 sum
up his losses, he gives the whole number
Of his killed at tho hradrsd and sirty.ains,
with | 1888 wounded--a proportion utterly
unprecedented; nor was It ever before
known that an army lost IN fair battle a
general aud three colonsls killed, with but
269 others. The statement Is utterly in-
credible.
On one point, there surely was no excuse
for douht--that Of tho Uuiouist dead not
one was brought away by our routed sur
vrvors--not even Cal camsFos. tEoiher Of
the sscretsry Of War. Every uuionis,
killed BY the coufsdsra,es was baried by
them. so that they had no excuse for not
sseertaIning and stating the exact
number. Yet hear Beuurrgard on this
point;
"'rhe actual loss Of the enemy win uever be
known; it may now only be conjectured Their
abandoned Dead as they were buried By our
/ people where they ell, NeFsrtnnateig tcere not
enamsruted; bur many parts Of the field we're
thick with their eorpses. as but few baftle 6slds
have ever been"
Way 'uot enumerutsdf" They certain
ly we're not buried IN haste, nor ill some
days after the hattie; why not coun: them,
but for the fact Aas they lSsre eHtnzmbered
b. the dead rr5eis2 IL II could have been
truthfuIiy stated that our dead we're the
more numerous, rest assured that they
would have been "enumeratsd' to the last
man.
Gen Beaurcgard states (as We have
seen) bis own loss 10 wounded at 1888,
and with regard to ours asserts that a.
46O Of their wounded, and others who fell
into our hands we're sent to Richmond"---
and be guesses that enough were sent to
other points TO raise the fall number to
1900 As our men run fiom the battle
Geld like sheep, It is certain that very few
wounded were brought of BY Us; so that
our loss In wounded and prisoners together
--he keeping tally--scarceiy exceeds that
which he copfesses to have suffered in
wounded nlone.
Let US look now at his assigned reasons
for not pursuing our panic.sricken troops.
who we're seen racing of the feld Will,
four hours Of good daylight were still re
maining:
I'm conclusion. Il Is proper. and doubiles
expected that through this report my cnuairy
men shcud made acquainted with some of the
sufiicient causes that prevented the advunee oi
our forces. and prolonged vigorous pursuit
of the enemy to and beyond he Potomac
The War Department has been fully advised
long aince Of all those causes some Of which
only are proper 60 be here communicated. Au
army which had fought like ours on that day
against uncommon odds. under July snu. most
Of the time without water aud without food
except a hastily snaiched meal at dawn. wos
not in eondiIion for the toll ofan eager. eF.ct
i've pursuit Of an enemy Immediately after the
battle.
"0u the following day. an unusually heavy
and unintrrmtring fall Of rain infervencd to
ohstruct our advance with reasonable prospect
of fruitful results Added to this the want Of
cavalry force of snfirient numbers made an
efficient pursuit military impossibility.'
Reject that considerable portion Of
this army had barely arrived on the 6eld
when our soldiers fled--that it was their
coming whieh induced the panic--and il
must be felt that the reason here given Is
absurd An army completely victorious
at 4 P. M--whch has only fought on the
defensive-whieh has lost in killed aud
wounded together but QUE fifteenth Of its
admitted nnmhers-which has whole bri.
gades which have hardly been under fire.
fails TO pursue q panic stricken, fleeing foe.
because it is weary and has had but one
meal that dayi Nay, Il does not pursue
the day after. because rain Is falliugl--
Who does not see that Beanregard has
enormously nnderstated the losses and de-
moralizalion of bis sroopS--that men who
have fought as well as his did do not fail
to prrsue their defeated enrmies if they
have not suffered feaFfully themselves aud
have any true conception Of the complete
ness Of their triumph? Cenlreville is nearer
Manassas than TO the iheater Of our defeat
"a few regiments hurled from the rebel
center on that key Of our position mnst
have swept all before them; yet our van
guard rested quietly at Contreville till / A.
NJ. Of Monday, and then retrcated in order
without experiencing molestalion. Nay,
some Of our men went down to the battle
field after nightfall and brought away
arms which our men had recklessly aean-
doned, but which the enemy had not ven.
tured to appropriate. Rely on II, the true
reason for this caution is not given by Gen.
Beauregard, who styles the Unionist ad,
vance iu,o Virginia this Wicked inpasiOn cj