The New York herald., 1862-12-04

bc and may God grant that am mistaken in my fore
tha. have and spoken frankly sought
70 40 .e beat IN my power " arrest disaster from my
country. G-0 b. Mccl LLi-lN, Macs General
! OFFICIAL COPY.
ttsAaSoAarSRs, An@y, wAsslSaros. d. G. Nov g 1862
/ "ssEaAI uALlhc6 ro GEsEaAL n'o1k-LA Az.
! EksiFT NO 8
Major ceasra GHo. b MtcssI,as, osmmaraing, SC
.enEnaI--Yoar telegram Of yesterday was receives
tas morning. ana Immediately selceraphei briei
reply promising 70 write you more fuzzy by ma You.
Geaera cer;anls could not haze bean more pa.ncd al
goccVing my order than az the necessity OF issuing
Il, 4 was advised oy hish officers in whose joderentI
had great confidence TO make the order immedtely on
my arrival here, but determined TO do so until
could learn yolr wish iIon personal interview and
cven after that int erlew / tried every means In my
power 20 avc.d Withdrawing your army ana DELAYED NV
decision long asl dared % delay assure you ca.
neral it MOI hasy and inconsiderate act hut one
thai caused any6ls thought than any other OF
my iiie B1 after inl ana mature CONSTELLATION " all
sion that the order must DO There was 10 my
Allow mo 10 allade to few OF the facts OF the case
You and your officers at interview estimated the
c'emy forces and around Richmond a. zoo 600
SINCE then You and Others report III they have received
and receiving large ren'orcements from the South
General pspe's army covering Washington Is only
aoOeD Your effective force ia only shout 30 600 You
1 are thirty miles from RIchnond and Genera, Pope
| eighty or ninety With the enemy directly between you,
ready % fs with his superior numbers upon orc or the
oher as 10 may eiee neither caa reinforce the other IN
Il General fope's army be diminished reinforce you
NaStiae'o8 Mary'1hl anu fcohsNivsiia Weuld be sft
uncovered aad exposoi IL your torccs be reduced to
strengthen Pore ycn would bae esk 7" even hold the
tack YOU ~ u! force Ia other words the old army OF
the oonse split into two parts with the entire torce
q tie eAemy directly betwcen them They cannot be
united by land Wkhoa exposing both 10 desrucfion and
yet they be untod To send ropes forces by water
g. oe peninsula is under pgasen. circumstances, mill
| try possibility The only aernatye send the forces
the peninsula to poist by watersay Fredercks
burgwhere the two armies csn be united iet me now
Neu that To Withdraw from the position
8l cause the ceTta nralization Of Jhe arnv which
| now il excailont crnalGion and discipline cannot
understand why simple change o position 10 a
and BY no oncans disent base viii demoraii2e army
ID excellent dscinaa unless the officers themselves aS
S.st IN the Generalization which satisfied they viii
not Your change o. front from yolT extreme right ut
Hanover Court House 20 your present position WAS over
thirty mhe5 but have not heard that il delnoralized
yoa troo' Notwithstanding The severe losses they sas
! tanned y ct3ctinE Il
! A now hsso 81 lle Rappahaan cs at fredericksburg
| brings yo4 Witlu about sixty les of Richmond and
secures ng0rceneat o. Forty fifty thousand fresh
ano disciplined troops Tho change, wilh such advan-
| .ases WY, ! thlps properly Represented 70 your
he Erected at Yorktown, but that flank march
The peninsula would be haxard0ns than - retire 10
/ Fort Monroe. lol wal remember that Yorktown two
or three mites further from Rchmond than FrcaercEs
! burg IT, Besides the latter is between Richmond and
Washington and Washington FROM aay attack by
The political effect OF the withdrawal may at Grs look
| unfayoraole but think the public are beginning to
dcrs,and necessity and that they will have mash more
confidence ,a united army than is separate frag
nenis Bal you will reply. why rot reinforce me here.
that Can strike Richmond from my present positonS
TO do tins you said at interview that you required
$1,000 additional troops told you that impossible
to giyc you SO many You finally thought you od have
ome chance Of success with 20 COO but you aftcrward
teegrapied 10 ne that you would require So ,000 the
enemy was being largely reinforced.
If your estimate OF the enemy g strength correct,
reqns,ion perfectly reasonable, but it ut
tery impossible to f il until new troops could DO enlist
cd and organized, which would require several weeks
To keep your army in its present position until it could be
reinforced would almost destroy in that climate.
The months OF August and September almost fatal to
whites who live that part Of James river; and af
ter yo got the renforcemcnts asked for you admitted
that mist reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries
before you could advance Richmond. 1t is by no
means certain that the reduction OF these forti6catons
Xonla hos require considerable tune perhaps as much as
70 the health OF your army but in the meantime General
ropes forces would be exposed TO the heavy blows OF
the enemy without the slightest hope Of assistance from
Sua
IN regard 10 the demorazing effect Of withdrawal
from the peninsula to the Rappahannock must remark
that large number Of your highest oficers-indesd
majority Of those whose opinions have been reported TO
mc--arc decidedly in favor Of the movement. Even
several OF those who originally advocated the line or the
! peninsula advise its abandonment have not in
qnred and do know by whose advice
what the Array Of the Potomac separated into
/ TIVE parts, with the enemy before them. | must take
wish TO unite them Only one feasible plan has been
presented for doing this. If yon or any one else had
a, all OF your plans require reinforcements which il is
impossible 10 give you II is very easy 70 ask ior rein
oreemeuts bat Is not 50 easy . give them when you
have no disposable troops at your command have
written very plainly. as understand the case, and hone
you viii give nc credit Ger having carefully considered
the matter, although may have arrived at different con-
csions from your own Very respectfully, your osedi-
Oicia copy. j. G. KEI-oS, Assistant Aduant General
CEN. POPE 10 GEN. HALLECK.
HGApQyARTERs ARMY or VIRGINIA,
/, Al August 25-9 r. b. )
| MAJOR General siAftEcS, COMMANDMENT Chief
The column o. The enemy alluded 70 IN my dispatch q
.'ads, aud when isst seen, sunset,
passing % The aortLeast ander the east base
ot Buck Mountain in the direction OF Salem and
| Reciortown am inclined TO believe that this column
culy covering tho flank Of tho main body which Is
moving towards From, Royal aud Thorntoas Gap, though
nf this am not certain. shall push strong rccnnnos
across the river at Waterloo bridge and Sulphur
Springs early in the morning TO ascertain whether the
bod, OF the enemy has really left and n So push
toward n their rear lnere Is certainly no force oppo
\ that IL ~ all reliable, that have.
Sgc, you know Is perfectly unreliable aud suggest
thai some oicer Of Superior rank be sen; TO nd
his array corps His conduct to-day has occasoned me
great dss itisiacton Banks corps j. very weak net
am,uutln. 10 more t,an 5000 men ana IL mitch demo
! raized. kearny's division is the only that has yet
reached me from Alexandria shall, ut all events push
! aicDoWcs corps and kearpys division the enc
my 8 rear. if ind my snspici0ns confirmed In the
ing shall also put Reno across the at Rappran-
mock station and direct him TO move forward cautiously
IN the rear 10 be set up again sgeis corps although
composed Of Of the best 0ghtng material we have
| will never do much service under chat olcer will
communicate further with you IN the morning.
! JN0 POPE, Major General
u the tue Otn Nlts,
referred to in General Haecks letter stanton pub.
lshed IN this paper on Tie eth Of November
WASHINGTON, u. G., Oct. o, 1862
Major General McCLsuAS:
am Instructed q telegraph TO you follows:-Ihe
Pres dent directs that you tine Potomac and give
/, battle 10 the enemy drive him South. Your army
must move now while the roads are good II you
tue river between the escny and Washington, and
the after by line Of operation can be reinforced
with 30 600 men f you up The valley Of the She
nando not than IL 900 l5 600 be sent you
The President advises the interior line between Washing
and the but does order IL. lie
dsslrous that your army soon as possible You
will Immediately report what line you adopt and when
intend 10 cross the river. Also to what point the
nioroenents to be sent II Is necessary that the plan
of your operations be positively determined before
orders given Tor building bridges aud repairing rail-
roads am directed to add that the Secretary Of War
.d Lin Caioe ore.,r