Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1862-05-08
Fren ths Rlchmond EnquIrer, May 5.
TTEN o
GreyvI mt the Growers.

neghborshp or domination Of the enemy ffrcfs Many
of these fresh from their Sacrifices OF home comforts
and property interess. Among the resident citizens
too, there is considerable feeling of insecurity ard OF
consequent uneasness not only sach as is properly due
to the dsigns and WEAKNESS Of the enemy and the IN
certantes of but the anxiety which originates with
the nervous, and spreads by contsgion There are
enough here of men by courtesy if Lpcons law ter ar
resting alarmists were in force, to crowd Castle Gcd
win teore noon this day and there are many others
who set their couutenances by the alarms faces as
man sets his watch by the town clock.
1t is natural that men should be excited by recent
msfortuues, and by seemingly approaching perlls But
we should not therefore surrender our fortude nor re-
nounce our trust We should not permit ourselves to
feel that the country lost because our Individual homes
are lost or endangered. We should take more COM
prehensive view OF things and such q view, we are
persuaded vii. not justify those alarms which the men
Of white ps and banchtd cheeks and startled vision,
have made their business to propagate and those
camors with which it is so fashionable to assall all IN
authority as if they the conscious authors OF tie
alleged impending ruin.
We have never attempted nor do we now, to conceal
the misfortunes that have befaleD We have stated
them conddly. If we had been without confidence IN
the courage OF people, perhaps we might have wish
ed to conceal their magnitude Ii W: had accepted the
spirit of the aarmsts the measure OF the general tor
tude we might have Judged it prudent TO do so. But
taking calm and honest view of the 1t has thus
far progressed and stands what is there to justify
those who in the hotels and on the pavemens OF our
cities divide their deDess between foreb0dngs and re-
Wings? Perhaps association with the brave men in
camp and share in their duties, would relieve them OF
their morbid excitement and dlspephc Tears.
The OF our disasters is included in this fact and
its consequences that not able to conend with
the en- my on the waters Oar attempts to do so have
pretty generally failed. And no wonder. We were
without a navy, while cur enemies had the efficient
equipment which had been provided by the common
sources. We not ship-buildiDg people at tie
South had not the shipyards and ship carpenters
of the North. We not sea-gong or ship owning
people we had not the sailors and the mercantile
rne and steam transports of the North Our floating
deences have thus fallen far below cur necessities and
the waters and shore lines have been weak and
uDprepaed.
We have suffered the disasters cons quent. We have
endured mislortuDes which thought to have
capped. We have received both heavy and an uneX-
pected blow 10 the fall of New Orleans We lost Nash
vile, and bad cur line pushed back in point, low
as North Mississippi all from the same cause-our
weakness on the water What serious reverse have
suffered any where save from this cause?
Curtis arrested by Price and Van Dorm at Blk
Horn and turned back towards ST. Louis. Grant
beaten at Shiloh and would have been destroyed but
for the water at his back and Buell. has been halted
ever since in consequence. Banks has crept his way
along the Valley only as jackson and Ashby have cho-
sea to allow. Mcclellan for weeks has been digging
dirt for fear of Johnston, in the Peninsula. This day
an aggregate army which they boast numbering
200 600 men, is kept at bay by land forces West
Virginia is nearly evacuated by the enemy and our
loyal people and sbarpsbooers there are giving Fremont
rest Where is the occasion for all this repnllg and
reving which We hear from who ought to know
better?
We do rothng but fall back, says one. We fell back
from Manassas, and from the line of the Potomac but
one found to condemn the policy of that movement
Even the patriotic citizens who suffer the chief evils OF
that STEP acquesce in its propriety If it was right
why complain about it And as it was from choice
and not compulson it should rather excite cur conf
dence than our fears
But why did we give up Fredericksburg without
fghr This question asked by the very persons who
say that if could defend Fort Pulaski, ETC., etc.
we ought not to have attempted it, Fredericksburg
was not a point at which we should choose to make
fight. 1t the ter,and we may be justly excused
for hydrophobia. Resistance would have endangered
the town, if i id not sacrifice it. At Pulaski and
similar places the ease was different. There moth
ing but the fort itself to be compromised by resistance
and, il the fort should fnaIy fall, yet the delay occa
stoned n its reduction might be of the greatest conse
quence The protracted resistance of the single town
of Calias the of the victorious Edward Ill,
made that m onarch lose whole campaign and saved
France from his grasp, But for Fort Pulaski ard the
preparations which its reduction required, Savannah
would have fallen long ago. 1t may be that the delay
has carried the campaign to point at which the yellow
fever will lnterp0se It's protection.
If, on the Peninsula Gen. Johnston shall fall back
when Mcclellan may be no longer delayed at York
town. we shall doubtless hear fresh storm of camor-
We do not know that Johnston will. He tells nobody
his plans. But taking common sense view of the
case we do not how he properly do otherwise.
So long Mcclellan fight fanked by guubCas our
men would not have fair chance. We hope there are
none so eager to see battle to wish to subject the
dear fellows who form our army to mere butchery.
| But if yorktown be not the proper place to fight
| why did Johnston go there? 1t may be fer good
reasons. He may thereby delay Mcclellan for month
or more. He makes it necessary for him to bring up
hic UhiC Oth m he m
ployed. He keeps the enemy great army at bay. He
subjects them to enormous transportation. He entails
upon them>tbe continuation of the prodigous expenses
under which Northern patience and ability are rapidly
breaking down. Is not all this sufficient inducemen?
Suppose he thus delays and finally rous the grand army
at period too lat3 for Mcclellan to mend up his
strength before winter would he have made bad
campaign, even marked by several fallngsback? 1t
might not be so sanguna"y as would be desired by
some of those who like Jobs war-hOrse, smell the bat
tie aar of but would it not be successful campaign?
We have made these remarks to show people that
situation is not nearly unproptious the alarm
lists suppose and TO make obvious that we should have
more patience and composure On lard strength is
untouched and supremacy continues and the enc
my will now have to meet us on land
We fully agree nay, unite in warmly urging 1t, that
our situation and true policy require of US active,
energetic wide-awake campaign. We must be vigiaht
in watching adroit in surprising and courageous in at
tackpg the enemy. We must be swift to profit by op
portunties and prompt to seize and advantages
We should bring and hold within lines all the salt
| springs iron mines, &C.. within grasp. We should
arrange railroad ransportatoDs so as to give much
business accommodation possible We sheuld by
system and economy bear lightly as we can on the
resources of the country. All these things must dill
igenty observe and do.
But we have no confidence in the Administration, -
says one. Why have you not, sir? "Ihey do nothing
/ but fall back" We have answered that. "They in