The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-06-28
FULL SOUTHERN ACCOUNT OF TIE RETREAT or
BEAURIGARD.

FULL SOUTHERN ACCOUNT OF Tue RETREAT or
BEAURIGARD.
THE EVACUATION OF CoRIETH 1t was an
nounced by telegraph in yesterdays Guardian
that Corinth had been evacuated. "P. W. A."
the correspondent of the Savannah Republican,
writing from Mobile on the goth ult thus de.
tails the reasons which led to this step:
You will probably have learned by the tele.
graph, before this reaches you, that Corinth has
been evacuated by the Confederate army. At
leas. infer, from what I saw before leaving
that place, aud from news which has reached
down the Mobile and Ohio railroad, probably to.
night or tomorrow. I am not informed of the
precise locality where they will "pitch their
tents" but have heard it is about As miles below
Corinth and short distance above the Okalo.
ma Station. The evacuation of Corinth, under
the circumstances which environed the army,
was both wise and necessary, as brief state.
ment will suffice to demonstrate.
The coil around Corinth is of that peculiar
character which is very wet in winter and very
dry in summer. As was stated in former let.
ter. I saw mule drowned in a small branch,
near the town, where, two weeks afterwards,
there was not drop of water to be seen. The
consequence was at the time of my departure,
both the troops and horses were suffering for
water to an extent you can hardly imagine.
The chief supply was obtained from the standing
pools in the beds of exhausted streams. Steps
had been taken to bore number Of wells, but
it was ascertaned that there was no'rope or tools
to be had in the town, and that it would be ne.
cessary to send to Columbus, Miss, for the par.
ticular kind Of rope desired The rope had not
been received up to the Goth and, but for timely
showers which renewed the springs and the
wells dug by the men in the low, damp places
the army could not have remained there a. long
as il has The citizens use rain water. caught
in csterns, from the LIST of October to the LIST of
May, but the supply in the cisterns was not suf.
ficient to supply the army week.
In the neighborhood Of Pea Ridge, the local..
ty of the enemy's chief encampment the water
is better and the supply more abundant
But it was not the want of an adequate supply
of water alone that rendered it necessary for our
army to retire from Corinth. Our encampment
was bounded on three sides by Bridge Greek
and dense swamp-in front, on the right. and
in the rear-and our bresstworks were Just be.
bind the swamp, and ran parallel to it for
considerable distance. The swamp was crossed
by four or five roads, near which welhad planted
formidable batteries to cut of all approach by
the roads, 1t would now appear that the same
thing has been done by the enemy, who has ad-
vanced up near the swamp on the other side
thrown up breastworks and posted heavy siege
guns, which not only command the roads leading
out from our side, but are of sufficient calibre to
shell nearly every part of our encampment. He
has also thrown up strong works near Farming
ton and Pea Ridge, and erected heavy batteries
at commanding points along the several routes
to the rear. Indeed, the Federal works are su-
perior to ours, and the position equally strong,
if not stronger, while their force is one.fourt6,
if not one-third greater.
1t was hoped and expected that Halleck would
attack US in our position; but that he was too
sensible to do, tor defeat would have been the
certain result Gould We expect different re-
suit if we should attack him behind his formula
BILE works, and with bis superior force? 1t was
never intended to allow him to approach 80
near, and to get into position without irst offer
ing him battle. This we did at Pennington,
when he declined to pick up the gauntlet thrown
down to him; and this we sought to do on the
22d, when it was found impossible, because the
ground had not been properly reconnotered and
mapped, to get our right wing. which was to
lead the attack, into position. Had we encoun-
tered the enemy on that day, in accordance with
the order of battle agreed upon BY our officers,
do not see how we could have failed to win the
greatest and most decisive victory thus far
achieved in the war. That night, however, and
the next day the enemy moved up and got into
position, where it would be as great madness for
US to make The attack as it would for him to at.
tack us.
Why, then, it may be asked, should we, and
not Halleck, retire? Becsase Halleck is provided
With guns OF long range and heavy calibre, with
which he Can throw shot and shell into almost
every part of our encampment, every two or
three minutes, day and night, as long as he |
pleases; and because he has better water and
more abundant supply than we have.
The chief advantage the Federals will gain by
the change will be the use of the entire line of
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Ste
venson to Memphis. They are good workers,
and will son rebuild the bridges over the Ten.
nessee river and Bear Greek, and those over the
9atchie AID other streams west of Corinth,
which the Confederates will doubles destroy.
As soon ,s these last bridges can be rebuilt,
Memphis and Fort Pillow will be occupied, as
we'll as lose sections of the Mobile and Ohio
and Tennessee and Ohio Railroads, which lie
north of The Memphis and Charleston read.
The withdrawal down the Mobile and Ohio
road willdiminish our transportation, and bring
the armyinto more healthy section of country
where allkinds of supplies are more abundant
contrary, should he follow US, will have to march
sixty-6ve or seventy miles into the interior,
where, il case of disaster, he would be cut to
pieces aid destroyed.
McCEILAN's PLANs.-Hon. Henry J. Ray
mond, writing to his paper, the n. Y. Times,
from th' camp before Richmond, on Tuesday
last, says
"For:he last day or two there has been an
ominoui silence all along the lines. The opin.
ion ia beginning to prevail on our side that no
active operations, by way of an advance, are to
be expected for some time to come-but in this
opiniorI do not share. Gen. Mcclellan will un-
questimably take all the time for preparation
which lie deems essential to success-but he
will tale no more. He has full and entire con-
hdencein his troops, and will not hesitate to
put thin in motion the moment he is able to
move hem with certainty of being able to