Sioux City register. [volume] (Sioux City, Iowa) 1858-1871, 1862-12-06

by water, or to marchupou Richmond by
land jSSuch waS the grave question to be
settled by the young General in inisera-
BILE room of an abandoned house at Fair
fax, within twenty four hours. Aud it
was at this mqmeut that the news Of his
removal as Generakn.chief reached him;
the news, that Is, that he could no longer
count upon the co operation of the other
armies Of the Union, and that the troops
under his own orders we're to be divided
into four grand corps, under four separate
chiefs named in order OF rank, change
which would throw into subal,ern posi-
tioi.s some youns generals oi division who
had his persona confidence. ltis easy to
see that here was matter enough to cast
cloud ulon the iirmest mind But the
General's resolution was promptly taken
''"T The land march was therefore api.n-
doned, ani we CANE back to the move,
mrnt by water. Bu. this operation also
was no onger what il had been waen Nc
CIeI!an had conceived it. The revelation
of his plans to the enemy bad allowed the
latter to take his precautions. The eva
cuation Of Manassas had preceded Instead
OF following the opening Of the Federal
campaign. The movement by water could
no longer be a surprise Unfor,uaately i;
was also to lose the advantages OF rapid
execution. '"t1
"' "A few days had been half lost in
useless pursuit of the enemy while the
transports were assembling at Alexan
dria. At last they were assembled and
the order came 10 embark Ba, here
new misunderstanding awaited the Gen
eral. He had been promised transports
which could convey 10000 men at time.
He found vessels hardly equal to the con
veyance Of half that number Instead of
moving At once, as Mcclellan had intend.
ed, whole army with eqaipase, number
OF trips had to be made. The embarka-
tion began March II. The force consist.
ed of III divisions Of infantry, 5000 to
10000 strong; | division Of regulars Inf
end cav 5000 strong; 800 pieces Of ar,
tiliery. The total effective force may have
been l2O, 900 men At the momen, o!
departure whole division was detached
to form, we know not why, an indepen.
dent command under General Fremont in
the mountains of Virginia. We shall see
the Potomac army successfully undergo
other not less mex xpIicabe d;munitious.
Alter much delay the army reached
Yorktown, again were McClelaD's plans
defeated by the enen4y in the rear: i.
I" 1t was by such roads that We reached
the Confederate lines. where we were re-
ceiyed Uy vivid lire Of artillery. Through
out the seven miles Of the Confederate
lines We encountered the same attitude Of
alert defense. Everywhere cannon and
camps. Of course the inference was that
We were arrested by forces apparently
formidable and before a position not to be
easily carried. Bat this case had been
iorsseen- In order to gain time ANA avoid
the tedium OF Il siege, General Mcclellan
rad thought ou! the means OF turning the
position. The enemy held the James
with the Nerrimac and his guuboats the
York was closed by the Yorktown and
Gloucester Point batteries. Nevertheless,
by a disem barkalioa on the Seyera, be-
you'd Gloucester, We might carry the latter
position and open the way Of the Federal
gunboats INTO the riyer York. 4 subse
qnent noyemen, up the left bank, in the
dTection OF West Point, would put US So
far in the rear OF The army charged with
the deteuse OF the lines of Yorktown that
1t would have been a most periluus posi-.
ton. This accomplished, the Conleder.
ates must have abandoned Gloucester, aud
fallen back hastily upon i.icha,uud. The
execution ot tnis coup dc main had been
LETT 20 corps OF the arm, cUmnanled
by Geneta. MeDoweI. This curps was u
b. The last to embark at Washington, aua
it WAS calculated that it ought to Reach
Yorktown in body on its transports al
the moment when the rest OF the arm Y
moving by land should appear before tha,
post from Fortress Monroe. -ras- s-..t
Instead OF finding it, we received tht
inexpiicsble, and, AS yet, unexplained in
telligence that this cotpe, 81, 600 s.roug
had been sent 10 another destination. The
Dews was received in the army with stupe
faction, although the majority could no;
foFesee the deplorable Consequences OF d
step taken, itimust be SUPPOSED. with NJ
evil intention, but certainly with all ineon
ceiya BILE reckless'.sss. Fifteen days before
this measure, although it must always have
been injurious, would have been much less
! 10. W. might have made arrangement,