, 1862-08-23
Interference with hToClellan's Plan of
R.ffla

Washington, June ODD says;
When General Mcclellan promised that the
war would be short one, though it might be des-
perate, he expected to be permitted to finish the
campaign on military principles. The country
expected the same thing, and having faith in
McClellan's military sagacity, believed implicitly
that he would bag the rebel army of Virginia, and
thus virtually end the war as one of large armies.
When McClelans plans to that end were spoiled
by the malicious intermeddling of Secretary Star
ton, the people hoped still that time would vindi-
cate the wisdom of the change of plan-and so it
/ continued cheerful. But cry step since Mellow
ellscorps rs 9e '.e 20 ,-..., .e part in
the advance upon Richmond which Mcclellan had
assigned it, has only exposed more and more the
terrible blunder then perpetrated. Public conf
dence is shaken by the fact-many, and even
among those who have the highest faith in the
Presidents honesty of purpose, are beginning to
fear that he cannot be relied upon either to con-
duct the war himself or permit single general to
carry it on with sufficient independence of cliques
to insure unity and rapid success.
GENERAL MCcLELLAN's POSITION AND PLAN.
On repeated occasions your correspondent has
related the circumstances under which McClelans
original and best plan of operations on the PENN
su.a was spoiled but it will bear repeating, in
view of its essential bearing upon the war; the i'm
portant results already flowing therefrom and to
flow IN the future Mcclellan had $4,000 men
in front of Yorktown and Mcdowell had $1,000
opposite Washington. 1t was McClellan's plan
to draw the rebel army of Virginia to the PENN
sula, and there to surround. capture and destroy
it, On the other hand, it was the policy of the
enemy to prolong the struggle as far as possible,
to show bold front as long as convenient, and
then retreat southwark, with the view of carrying
the war into the heats of summer and compelling
the National Government to yield or to accept
another six months of inactivity and next win
ter's campaign, within which time host of events
might turn up to aid the failing cause of the re-
bellion. The only way of defeating this rebel
scheme was to hem in and cut off the rebel re-
treat. Under McClellan's plan, Mcdowell with
his $4,000 men. was to march direct towards
Richmond from a point on the Rappahannock
below Fredericksburg This would have brought
the rebel army between two fres-would have
compelled tie concentration in front of Richmond
of every rebel soldier who would be brought there,
and at the same time would have rendered Wash
ington-- defended by the troops under Banks and
Shelds-perfectly safe. The result could not
have been doubtful. The united army OF MoClel-
Ian and Mcdowell, numbering 10000 men,
would have swept away all opposition, captured
Richmond. and captured or utterly routed and
disorganzed the rebel army, upon which it closed
from two sides.
HOW THE PLAN WAS SPOILED.
This plan was ruined by Stantons order giving
Mcdowell a separate command, and (after por-
ton of his troops had actually embarked for the
RappahannocI) sending him to try to find his way
to Richmond uia Manassas. With the ruin of
this we-devised though simple strategy went our
anticipations of substantial end of the war in
May. Within ten days the President discovered
the magnitude of Stanton's error, and did what
he could to repair it by detaching Franklins Di-
vision from Mcdowell and sending 1t to reinforce
Mcclellan, and soon after ordered Mcdowell him
self with the remainder of his corps to move over
to the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. And
at last after the lapse of two months, McDoloeH
and all has force has started to reinforce No CLeLLon.
Unfortunately he can now be employed only in
operations in the enemy's front. The original
mistake cannot be corrected. While everybody
rejoices to see these reinforcements going to Nc
Clean, the fact is so suggestive of the blunder
involved in withholding them when they might
and would have given the coup de grace to the re-
bellion, as to excite no little gloom and despon-
dency Thoughtful men tremble lest similar blum
ders are in store, the evil results of VIII ch may be
still more disastrous. Itremains to be seen wheh-
er the victory which Mcclellan is about to win at
Richmond can be made practically decisive of the
war. If it is not, we may well make up our
mind to another year of struggle with all its in
convenience. suffering, and possibly contingent
disasters.
A Niger Coachman setting up for himself.
The ST. Louis correspondent Of the S. F. BuL-