The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1862-07-02
FROM WASHINGTON.

The Rationale Of the Rebel Attack ON Nc
Clellan's Rear a, ThnstaU Us-The Reb-
L els hdue Ascertoiaed the Practicobility
| Of Getting IN Nc Ciellan's Rear-.Shetch
Of the Typography of the C0uat'y-1he
Lesson aohich this Occurrence Teaches:
Ha,5t 1t be Throaom AUays
| lECorrespondence of Chicago Times.l
! 49, WASHINGTON, June 16.
The attack of the rebels on Tunstall's s
Station, on Friday, is an affair of by no
means small consequence. The occur
renee of this event is what I have been
expecting all along, and I only wonder
that it has been SO long delayed. L know
the ground we'll / have ridden over the
whole country between the Pamunky and
the aChickahominy, and between West
Point, Jones' Bridge, the Long Bridge,
Bottoms Bridge, the New Bridge, Han
over, Mechanicsville, DIR. Curtis planta-
ton, Cold Arbor, the White House and
Cumberland, including New Kent and
Baltimore Cross roads. It will be re-
membered that we have no troops on the
right bank of the Chickahominy lower
down than Bottoms Bridge, and none fur
ther west than the scene of the battle at
Seven Pines Cor Fair Oaks.) This fact,
of course, is perfectly well known to the
enemy. There is nothing, therefore, .ex
lcept a possible lack of troops on their
side, to, prevent the rebels from moving
a large force along the roads down the left
bank of the James River, crossing the
Chiekahominy at the Long Bridge, outside
of our extreme left, passing Baltimore
Cross roads, and seizing and holding
Tunstalls Station, Their attack of Fri
day furnishes the key to the plan of the
, rebel leaders, and it is undoubtedly some
thing like this. 1t seems that the force
which made this attack came from Rich
mond, around our extreme right, by way
: of Hanover. This distance is much short
!, er than by the way of the Long Bridge
: and Baltimore Crossroads, and avoids al
together the crossing Of the wide part of
the Chickahominy But the fact that they
were able to get to Tunstall $ Station from
the north, and around our right, is an om-
: inous circumstance. If they have done
this with small force, they can also do
it again with force FIVE times as large;
g for it has demonstrated that our army on
e the .Chickahominy is not large enough tc
: prevent its being fanked. Tunstall's sta
It ton is point susceptible of speedy and
strong defense. If the rebels should sue
/ ceed in getting possession of it with 20,
b 1000, or even $1,000 troops, with suitable
# artillery, they could, in twenty -four hours
so intrench themselves on the surround
i ling hills as to make their dislodgment ;
{ work of serious difficulty. Their tactics
would then be an Immediate and furiou;
: attack on McClellan's army, at once il
y front, in the rear, and on both fanks. Ht
J. might be able to withstand such an attack
1t But, if heed did SO successfully, he woult
y do what no other General, Of ancient O
h modern times, has ever done.
y In making this attack, the enemy mad'
4. a complete circuit around Mcclellan
l. army, passing between him and the Pa
a munky River. They started from thei
n encampments north of Richmond, crosset
d the head waters of the Chickahomin,
e where it is but mere rivulet, proceeded
r. eastward to the Pamunky, at Fingalt
e Point, or Garrick's Landing (which is nea
$, land south of the mouth of Mataduquil
g Greek, J burned the schooners and wagon
there, then went southwark to Tunstall'
y tStation and Baltimore Crossroads, thel
e turned to the south west and crossed tn
1t Chickahominy at the Long Bridge, ant
l. then proceeded westward, to their encamp
i ments south of Richmond The who'll
f thing was probably undertaken as mucl
as q reconnaissance as for any other pur
e fpose. The whole rebel force engaged il
N it did not exceed $500 men. The resul
IF fof the dash is to- demonstrate that Nc
IS Clellan's rear is entirely unprotected, ant
p that he may be entirely surrounded witt
J. the, enemy, if they. have troops enough +
J do with, and his communications cut of
1t It will be observed that, although this ex
IN pedition was composed mainly of cavalry
IS yet they had with them also eight pieces 0
ID artillery. This artillery was drawn owe
<, the whole route, which they have thus as
ID !certained to be one over which artiller,
can be brought, even after the recen
lc heavy rains. agf .fo;t..a Is 3r.,-f.- .l
A.. / trust that this attack, when viewed il
es the light in which I have endeavored t.
k place it, will awaken the President, a
l. least, to sense of the absolute necessit
a. of Immediately reinforcing McClella
r. with at least 75 900 disciplined troops.
:" is no longer a question of taking Rich
es mond. 1t is believed that the Secretar
k of War determined, two months ago, tina
q that should never be done by Mcclellan
ee It is now a question of whether or nc
to Mcclellan and his army shall be saved, Q
IN whether they shall be left to be cut Of
g, for the country may rely upon it, the
G. will never surrender. !. If these reinforce
OF ments are sent to him promptly, and
Z thew are the ripht Find of froOns he ma
Id yet be able to take Richmond. But
r. they are not sent, the army of the Potoma
will be in peril. And if any disaste
of should befal Mcclellan, the country wi
IS, not need to be pointed to the author of th
s. calamity, nor will he escape the just ver
RS geanee of an outraged nation.
lGEN. MCCLELLAN JOINED BY M,
a DOWELL'S DIVISION.