Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-11-17
The Penin.uIar Campaign.

The PeninsuIar Campaign.
The PRINCE De JoISvILLE, who was a member
of Gen. McCLELLAS's staff during the organiza
ton of the Army of the Potomac and the PENN
sular campaign, has published a careful and elab-
crate sketch of the campaign which began with
the evacuation of Manassas by the rebel army
and ended with the retreat of MCCLELLAN from
before Richmond. The review has been care
fully prepared by one who is yersed in the high
est military science and diplomacy of the age,
and whose statement of facts will not be called in
question. No one can read the comments of
Prince De JoISvILLE without being convinced
that Gen. MCCLELLAN in that memorable cam
paign was the victim alike of jealousy and weak
and irresolute Cabinet. If he had been sustained,
as he should have been, by the representatives of
the Government, the rebellion would have re-
ceived severe blow and the condition of public
Affairs would have presented far different as
pect from what they now do. MCCLELLAN was
stricken down when il was in the power of the
Administration to have given the rebellion check
from which it could not have recovered aud now
again when he was on the eve of decisive battle
he is again removed from command Who
then, is to blame for the indefinite prolongation
of the war2 The conspirators who twice have
done all in their power to produce the disasters
which our arms have suffered and who have thus
given vitality and power to the rebellion will be
held to a fearful account We have only space
for few extracts from the paper of the Prince,
but enough to show the embarrassments of Nc
CLELLAN n the campaign of the Peninsula,
which should have been, il he had been properly
sustained, triumphant success instead of a re-
verse to our arms. With respect to the deposit
ton of MCCLELLAN from the chief command, the
Prince denounces il as &c restriction of force and
deminution of usefulness" and regards it as "a
blow in the rear at the very outset of the cam
paign." He adds:
let this was but part of the mischief done
him. Mcclellan had long known, better than
anybody else, the real strength of the rebels ut
Manassas and Centreville He was perfectly ia
milar with the existence Of wooden cannon" by
which il has been pretended that he was kept in
awe for SIX months. But he also knew that till
the month of April the roads Of Virginia are in
such a state that wagons and artillery can only
be moved over them by constructing plank roads
tedious operation, during which the enemy,
holding the railways, could either retreat, as he
WIS bnth ACTUALLY uOlnGs or move Tor n blow
Oh some other point. In any event, had McClel-
Ian. attacked and carried Centreve, pursuit was
impossible and victory would have been barren OF
results. single bridge burned would have
saved Joheston's whole army, Such are the vast
advantages of railway for a retreatng army
advantages which do not exist for the army
which pursues IT,
We have the right we think to saw that Nc
Clellan never intended to march upon Centre.
vile. His long determined purpose was TO make
Washington safe by means Of n strong garrison,
and then 70 use the good navigable waters and
immense naval resourc es Of the North TO trans.
port the army by sea 70 point near Richmond
For weeks, perhaps for months, this plan had
been secretly maturing. Secrecy, as well as
promptness, il will be understood, was indspensa
BILE here 10 success. To keep the secret il had
been necessary 20 confde il TO few persons and
hence had arisen the long i'll feeling toward the
uncommuncative General.
BE this as Il may. as the day of action drew
near. those who suspected the Generals project,
and were angry at not being informed Of IL; those
whom his promotion had excited 10 envy: his DO
litical enemies; (who Is without them In Ameri
cat In short all those beneath or beside him who
wished him III, broke out into chorus Of accu-
sation Of slowness, naction, ncapaciry. Nc
Clellan. with patriotic courage which I have
always admired disdained these accusations and
made no reply. He satisfied himself with pursu-
the moment came in which, Notwithstanding the
loyal support given him by the President, that
funcuonary could no longer resist the tempest
A council OF war OF all the divisional Generals
was held; plan Of campaign not that Of Nc
Clellan was proposed and discussed. Mcclellan
was then forced TO explain his projects, and the
next day they we're known TO the enemy. In
formed. no doubt, by one of those female spies
who keep up his communications into the domes
tic circles Of the Federal enemy, Johnston evacu
ated Manassas at once. This was a skillfu ma
newer. Incapable Of assuming the offensive;
threatened with attack either at Centroville,
where defense would be useless II successful. or
at Richmond, the loss Of which would be grave
check, and unable 10 cover both positions at
once, Johnston threw his whole force before the
latter Of the two.
The consequences resulting from this unfortu.
nate pressure Of the radicals, and the prompt re
solution OF Gen. McCLELLAs to attempt the cap.
ture Of Richmond from the Peninsula are then
described.
An attack on the rebels In their position on the
Rappahannocl aud at Gordonsville Is shown 10
be a military absurdity The Prince then de-
scribes the embarrassments Of MCCLELLAN in
consequence Of his diminished ranks precluding
him from concentrating the whole land and sea
forces Of the Republic upon this single point.
or the subsequent delays which greatly retarded
the success Of the expedition and the withdrawal
Of portions Of bis command, we find the follow
ing account:
few days had been half lost in an useless
pursuit OF the enemy. while the transports were
assembling NJ Alexandra. At last they were
assembled and the order came TO embark. But
here new misunderstanding awaited the Gene
raj. he had been promised transports which
could convey $4,000 men ut time lie found
vessels hardly equal 70 the conveyance Of half
that number. Instead Of moving at once. AZ Nc
Clellan had intended, n whole army, with IL
equipage. n number Of trips had to be made.
The embarkation began March IL. The force
consisted Of
II divisions Of infantry, 5000 TO II. 900 strong.
division Of regulars (infantry and cavalry,
5000 strong.
$50 pieces Of artillery.
The total effective force may have been 12U,.
900 men. At the moment Of departure a whole
division was detached to form, We know not why,
20 form independent command under General
Fremont, IN the mountains Of Virginia. We shall
see the Potomac army undergo other not less in
applicable diminutions But we anticipate.
fortnight was required 20 move the army 10
Fortress Monroe. This point was chosen because
the appariton Of the Merrimsc. and her tremen-