The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-12-12
Gen. Halleck under Criticism.

In the report of the military commission
that investigated the surrender of Harper's
Ferry, Gen. Mcclellan was 'censured,' -
and principally on the alleged testimony of
Gen. Halleck The National Lntel1igencer,
with all the gravity and dignity of a judge,
reviews the finding of the court with great
power. In speaking of that part of it pre-
Dictated upon Gen. Halle6's testimony, the
HteAigencer thus cruelty explains what it
supposes to be misapprehension of Gen.
Halleck's testimony. 1t says: .g.s....
The testimony of Gen. Halleck on which
the commission base their 'censure" of
Gen: McClellan, is thus described in the
report: gr j v--..sg.. . J.sr.E .ga'a4 oll
The general-in-Chief has testified that Gen.
Mcclellan, after having received orders to repel
the enemy invading the state of Maryland,
marched only six miles per day, on the average,
when pursuing the invading enemy. The gen
eral-in-chief also testified that in his opinion
relieved and protected Harpers Ferry, and in
that opinion the commission fully concur. ~
Doubtless when Gen. Halleck gave this
testimony as to the "relief" of the post,
he did not know that the commission had
found, from other evidence, that in re-
atty " the place was "relieved !" by Gems.
Franklin and Sumner, acting under Gen.
McClellan's orders. And we are sure the
commission drew an erroneous inference
from the testimony of the General-in- Chief
as to the average daily march made by
Gen. McClellan's army during the interval
of his departure from Washington and the
battle of South Mountain. Nobody knows
better than Gen. Halleck that the average
daily march of an army is not capable of
reduction to an arithmetical formula, but
depends on a variety of elements, such as
the size of the army, the morale of its
men, and the condition of its organization.
Even with the victorious army which fought
the battle of Pittsburg Landing, Gen. Hal
leck did not make so good an average daily
march as Gen. Mcclellan with the broken
fragments of forces which, wearied by long
retreats and dispirited by repeated defeats,
he led to battle at Antietam. In fact, the
march of Gen. Halleck's army from Pitts
burg Landing to Corinth, a distance of about
twenty-one miles, was made in fifty-four
days, the average daily march being, ac-
cording to our calculation, precisely three
furlongs, four rods, two yards, one foot,
and four inches. This seems q very slow
advance, but he would be an adventurous
critic who, without being ON the spot,
should assume thatit would have been prac-
ticable or possible for General Halleck to
proceed with any greater rapidity. Yet,
if military commission had been called
to investigate the circumstances under
which General Beauregard effected his sly
retreat from Corinth, with all his military
stores and his army intact, we do not doubt
that men, remote from the scene of Ope-
rations, could have been found who would
have testified that in their opinion General
Halleck might have marched with more
celebrity. But their testimony would have
been likely to avail little in the Judgment
Of the commission, who at least before
proceeding to ''censure'' him, would have
sought to procure evidence from intelligent
men in the army itself, respecting the con-
dition of the troops, or other causes, which
may have necessitated this very gradual
and cautious advance against the evading
enemy at Corinth. And if this considera-
ton applies to an average daily march of
three furlongs, made by the victorious ar
my of Pittsburg Landing, the same may
be pleaded in possible defence of General
Mcclellan for making no more than an av-
erage daily march of six miles, Or forty
eight furlongs, with his .demoralized and
exhausted command.