Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-25


felt satisfied that they did not expect US
to cross here, but below.
In the next place I felt satisfied that
this was the place to fight the most deci-
sive battle, because, if we could divide
their forces by piercing their lines at one
or two points, separating their left front
and their right, then a vigorous attack
with the whole army would succeed in
breaking their army in pieces.
Two attacks were made and we were re-
pulsed, still holding q portion Of the
ground we had fought upon but not our
extreme advance. That night went over
the field on our right and in fact was
with the officers and men till nearly day
light. IfOund the feeling against an at
tack. returned to my headquarters after
a conversation with Sumner. Told him l
wanted him to order the 9th army corps,
which originally commanded, to form the
next morning column Of attack by regi-
ments. 1t consisted offs eighteen old
regiments and some new ones. l desired
the column to make direct attack upon
the enemys works. thought that these
regiments, by arriving quickly up after
each other, would be able to carry the
1l0AG m1LA anu UAAAELlE6 III AAontf 4DEGAuk
the enemy on their next line, and by going
in with them they would not be able to fire
upon us to any great extent.
left Sumner with that understanding,
and directed him to give the orders. The
order was given and the order of attack
was formed. The next morning, Just be-
fore the column was to have started, Sum
ner came to me and said: 81 hope you
will desist from this attack. 1 do not
know of any general officer who approves
Of it, and think it will prove disastrous
to the army Advice of that kind from
Sumner, who has always been IN favor Of
our advance whenever it was possible,
caused me to hesitate. kept the column
of attack formed and sent over for the
Division and Corps Commanders and con-
suited with them. They unanimously vO-
ted against it.
then went over to see the other off
GERS Of the command on the other side, and
found that the same opinion prevailed
among them. 1 then sent for Gen. Frank
lin, who was on the left, and he was of the
same opinion. This caused me to decide
that ought not to make the attack had
contemplated, and besides, the President
had told me not to be in haste in making
this attack, that he would give me all the
support he could; but he did not want the
army Of the Potomac destroyed. 1 felt
that 1 could not take the responsibility Of
ordering the attack, notwithstanding my
own belief at the time that the works Of the
enemy could be carried.
While on his way here, Hooker, on the
morning Of the 10Th November, wrote me
a note, which 1 received on the 21st, in
which he suggested that he should cross
his force over the Rappahannock at the
ford nearest the town, Richards ford, and
move rapidly down to Saxton's Station and
take position there. He stated that he had
three days provisions, and that he could
meet any force Of the enemy in front Of
him. l replied was always very glad to
take the advice of my general officers, and
should be 10th to make move without con-
sulting them, but could not approve Of the
move he had suggested, because in the first
place he would have to march some thirty
six miles to Saxton's Station.
1t was raining and he would have to ford
two rivers, which might rise and cut him
off from the main body Of the command,
and as 1 had no means Of crossing at Fred
erieksburg, would be prevented from
sending him supplies and assistance, and
although he might reach Saxton Station
and not meet with any force Of the enemy
at that time, yet it would be q very hazard
GUS movement to throw column like that
beyond the reach Of its proper support.
Hooker thanked me and said he only
made it as a suggestion, and the weather,
as it was raining, rendered it Of course
Impossible 70 make Lne movement ne sUg-
gested.
QuestiOn.-What reason do you assign
for the failure Of your attack
AnsWer.-It was found impossible to get
the men up to the works The enemy's
fire was too hot. The command fought
most calamity. The enemy themselves
say they never saw our men fight so hard
as on that day.
QuestiOn.-Were the enemy's works
very strOng2
AnsWer-Their works were not strong
works; but they held strong positions.
1t is possible the points of attack were
wrongly ordered If such is the case /
can OUly say that did to the best of my
ability. It is also possible that it would
have done better to have crossed at Skin
ner's Neck; butfor what l supposed to be
good reasons, 1 felt we had better cross
here that we would have a more decisive
engagement and that if we succeeded in
defeating we would break up their whole
army here, which think is the most de-
sirable thing, not even second to the taking
Of Richmond for ifthis army was broken
up, thrugh they might defend Richmond
for a while, they could not make any pro-
tracted defense there.
Question by Mr.. Gooeh. Do understand
you to say that it was your understanding
that General Halleck and General Meigs,
while at your headquarters in Warrenton,
and before you commenced the movement
Of your army, sent orders to Washington
for the pontoons to be Immediately forward
ed to Falmouth?
Answer. That was my understanding,
certainly.
Question. In your judgment, could the
pontoOns be forwarded in time for you 10
cross the RappahannOck when you expect
ed, ifall possible efforts had been made by
those charged with that duty?
Answer. Yes, if they had received their
orders in time.
Question. Did the non-arrival of these
pontoon5 at the time you expected prevent
your crossing when you expected to cross,
and interfere. with tho sucao,s e 49, E,iaHiI
answer. Yes.
Question. Since you have assumed COM
mand of the Army of the Potomac, lave all
its movements been made by you according
to your own judgment, or have some of them
been directed by the General-in- Chief the
Of War, or the President Of the
United States2
AnsWer.-They have all been name in
accordance with my own judgment. In
some cases I have submitted my views
which have been approved.
Question.-Who did you understand
was responsible for the forwarding of the
pOntOOns to Falmouth