Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1862-01-03


A SoCTa SIDE VIEw.--It lie saii that Nc
Clellan has repeatedly given orders for u Tor
ward movement upOn our lines, and that AS
IN ny troops as could be used upon tn fields
before Manassas haye been for sume time on
this side Of the Potomac, and that nOthing
mas prevented a grand battle bei,re NV but
the absolute impossibiliJy Of miucins the
reluctant and timid Yankees u move tor
ward. The disgraceful and disastrous de-
feat they received at Leesburs flied them
with dismay, and has rendered u turw 'rd
movement with men thus stricken with Tear
and dIstrust impossible
The affair at Drainsyille has probably shown
them, however. that odds being IN Their Ia
vor, il is possible 10 dei,at aud drlv o'cH
Southern troops. If il slluid n-ve tL's
effect. and should th1s Induce onward
movement bV AcCleiiaB, this Dra.--rT'lie
corfreieHps will really prove O..e ca ;n- most
fortunate occurrences OF the war Our army
only ask for a fair fight in open field. II
the enemy will but come forward tar enough
to afford the chance OF decisive battle, that
is all our Generals or the.r men desire or
ask. This granted, they will take care OF
the rest, and It is much to be hoped that the
rampant politicians in Washington will be
able, By TIE leverage which this DraInsyiile
business viii give tnen, 70 force Mcclellan
into the heid.
Trusting u q large superiority OF num-
bers, the euemy seem steadily % DC pushing
forward their troops III Kentucky tor all at
tack in force upon our rmy und Gene al
sydney Johnston From all the indicstI, rs
IN that quart, r, a grand engagement within
a few DAYS seems unavoidable. Thus cir
cumstAnees all combine TO bring about two
great engagement on either side OF the AL
leghanies.
1t the South should be beaten on both
fields. she could bard y expect Tor some time
to get together two armies OF any magni-
tude and would have 10 dep.nd altogether
upon the virtues Of Fab IN policy, ant
gsn-ral system of skirmlsnIn- .4e snem
Ii the South, on the other hanI >. --- GI7
both battles, the NOrth wU-I D. c'n-
PEELED to desist from aggressive measures Tor
such length OF time AS 1t would rvqdife 10
organize and discipline other new srlni $,
and the South would 10 enabled To carry iu-
vaslOn to their own doors. Sucn All Iva
sion, though only partially succ''-siul. iad
virtually end the war, especially II II fcSH' ~
IN stampeding the Lincoln GJveruniAt Ir an
Wasuugt-n.
Ine complication with E gland must 1t
once determine the \ 1mInis lr.tIJn 10 st.asc
is blow without deiAy. \ successful os''.e
upon the PJt,m4e uE l. h utloEy, .ni-It
avert a war Wit Great Britain; OF defeat
by the South on these twj 6,.d-, SdIIi be
taken by the world rs Conclusive pr 'Ji oi
her insoility to make gOOd her lndrpen i
ence.
Thus al the circumstances Of the hour
unite 20 TO. &C on two great battles IN the
n II tew days To refuse to fight under tie
influences now pressing upon II, would argue
Al lmbecility IN the North, It's generals AMI
and It's armies, which could not lsil u b.
interpreted most unfsvorsbly against snat
section. Such fsiiure ought to 4 7 &c =
total losa or confidence in the LlhcJln Al
mInistration among its own pe1pl,; An sn it
would most probably be the rel effect Both
the North itself, and moro particularly tue
Administration ID power. are iWpeiled 20
offer battle at this moment BY necsssl'ies
which seem to US as imperative Us irresistible.
They must fight. and we are ready TOR tho
the fray. The defiant cry Of the whole
South is, " Lay on, Mae'lGt. ''-R'eh7o-d
D'sPc.eh. Dec. %.