Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1862-12-13

your present position, was over thirty
miles. But | have not heard that it de.
moralized your troops, notwithstanding
the severe losses they sustained in effect
ing it.
A new base on the Rappahannock, at
Fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a
reinforcement of 10000 or $4,000 fresh
and disciplined troops The change, with
such advantages will, l think, if properly
presented to your army, encourage rather
than demoralze your troops. Moreover,
you yourself suggested that a junction
might be effected at Yorktown, but that
flank march across the Peninsula would
be more hazardous than to retire to Fort
Monroe.
You will remember that Yorktown is
two or three miles further from Richmond
than Fredericksburg is. Besides the lat
ter is between Richmond and Washington
and covers Washington from any attack
by the enemy. The political effect of the
withdrawal may at first be unfavorable,
but | think the public are beginning to IN
derstand its necessity, and that they will
have more confidence in a united army
than IN the separate fragments.
But you will reply, why not reinforce
here, so that | can strike Richmo.4d from
my position. To do this, you said ct our
interview, that you required $4,000 addi-
tional troops. told yon that it was i'm
possible to give you so many. You finally
thought you would have some chance of
success with 10000, but you afterwards
autographed that you would require 50 GOO
as the enemy was being largely reinforced.
If your estimate of the enemy's strength
was correct, your requisition was perfect
ly reasonable; but it was utterly impossi-
bic to fill it until new troops could be en-
listed and organized, which would require
several weeks.
70 keep your army in its present posi-
ton until it could be reinforced, would
almost destroy it. In that climate, the
months of August and September are
almost fatal to whites on that part of the
James River, and even after you got the
relniorcements asked for, you admitted
that you must reduce Fort Darling and
the river batteries before you could ad-
vance on Richmond.
Is is by no means certain that the re
dGction Of the Notifications would not re-
Qulre as much as those at Yorktown, this
delay might not only be fatal to the health
of your army, but in the mean time Gen.
Pope's forces would be exposed to the
heavy blows of the enemy without the
slightest hope of assistance from you.
In regard to the demoralizing effect of
Withdrawal from the Peninsula to the
Rappahannock, | must remark, that a
large number of your highest officers, in
deed, a majority Of those whose opinions
have been reported 20 me, are decidedly
in favor of the movement. Even several
of them who originally advocated the line
of the Peninsula, now advise Git abandon
ment.
| have not inquired, and do not desire
to know by whose advice, or for what
reasons the army of the Potomac was sep
arated into two parts, with the enemy De-
tween them. | must take things as | find
them. I find the force divided, and
wish to unite them. The only feasible
plan has been presented for doing this.
If you or any one else had presented a
better one, | certainly should have adopt
ed it; but all of your plans require rein
forcements, which it is Impossible to give
you. 1t is SO very easy to ask for rein
torcements, but it is not so easy to give
them when you have no disposition of
troops at your command.
| have written very plainly, as under
stand the case, and [ hope you will give
me credit for having considered the mat
ter, although | may have arrived at differ
ent conclusions from your own.
Very respectfully, your obedient serv't,
(Signed,) II. w. HALLEoK,
General,in-C Chief
Gen. Halleck states that about this time
he received news Of heavy rebel force
preparing to attack Pope, and menace the
capital. He thereupon sent urgent mes
sages to Mcclellan, but still the evacuation
! of Harrison's Landing was not commenced
; till eleven days after.