North Branch democrat. [volume] (Tunkhannock, Pa.) 1854-1867, 1862-11-26

says " this is instantly balanced by the correl-
ative right on the part of the Federal Gov
ernment against an interior State OF States to
re-establish by force Unnecessary, its former
continuity of territory" For this he cites
Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy,
last chapter" II may be there, but have
been uuahle to find IT'D Whilst it is difficult
to ascertain his precise meaning in this pass
age, he renders what he did not mean quite
clear IN his supplementary "views." In these
he says: "lt will be seen that the "yews"
only apply to case of secession that makes
q gap IN the present Uuion.'. The falling off
| say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States.
from the Potomac south, (the very Case which
has occurred,) was not within the scope Of
Geneal SIS provisional remedies ;" that is to
say, to establish by force, Unnecessary, the
continuity of our territory. In his " views
he also states as follows: " But break this
glorious Union by whatever line or lines that
political madness may contrive and there
would be nc hope of recruiting the fragments.
except by the laceration and despotism of the
sword. To effect such result the intestine
wars Of our Mexican neighbors would in COM
parison; with ours, sink into mere child's
play" In the Generals opinion " a smaller
evil (than these intestine wars) would be to
allow the fragments of the great Republic to
form themselves into new Confederaces, prob
ably four" He then points out what ought
to be the boundaries between the new Unions
and at the end of each goes so far as even to
Indicate the cities which ought to be the cap
ltalS OF the three first on this side of the Rocky
mountains, to wit, " Columbia, South Carroll
ma, y" Alton or Quincy, Illinois" and Albany
New York." excluding Washington city al
together. This indication Of capitals contain
ed in the original now in my possession is Gu
riously omitted in the version published
in the National hteILigencer. He desig-
mates no capital for the fourth Union on the
Pacific. The reader will judge what encour-
agement thes views, proceeding from SO dis
tinguished source, must have afforded to the
secessionists of the cotton States.
trust have said enough and more than
enough, to convince every mind why did
not, with d force Of five companies, attempt
to reinforce Forts jackson and St. Philip, on
the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile
Forts Pckens and M'Cree, in Pensacola har-
Dor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah Forts
Moultrie and Sumpter, Charleston harbcr,
and Fort Monroe, in Virginia
These views" both original and suple-
mentary, were published by General Scott in
the National LtelLgencer of January, Is,
1861, at the most important and critical pc
riod of the administration. Their publica-
ton, at that time, could do no possible good,
and might do much harm. To have publish
ed them, without the Presidents knowledge
and consent, was as much in violation Of the |
sacred confidence which ought to prevail be .
tween the commanding general of the army |
and the commander in-chief as it would have |
been fer the Secretary of War to publish the |
same documents without his authority
What is OF more Importance, their publication |
was calculated injuriously to affect the com
promise measures then pending before Con-
gress and the country, and to encourage the |
in their mad and wicked attempt
to shatter the Union into fragments. From
the great respect which | then entertained
for the General sed it over in silence.
1t is worthy of remark that soon after the
Presidential election, representa- ions of what
these " views" contained, of more or less cor
were unfortunately circulated, espe-
cially throughout the South. The editors of
the National LnteIhgencer, in assigning rea-
sontor their publication, states that both in
public prints and in public speeches illusions
had been made to them, and some misappre-
tensions of their character had got abroad
III and III General Scott states that he ar
rived in Washington on the 18th, and, ac-
by the Secretary of War, held a
with the President on the 18th
December. WhilstI have no recollection
whatever of this conversation, he doubtless
states correctly that did refuse to send
three hundred men to reinforce Major An
ierson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then
this refusal is manifested to all who recollect
the history Of the time. But twelve days
before, in the annual message of the Sd De-
cember, had urged upon Congress the adop-
ton of amendments to the Constitution of
the same character with those subsequently
proposed by Mr.. Crittenden, called the +" Crit
tenden Compromise" At that time high
hopes were entertained throughout the coun-
try that these would be adopted. Besides, l
believed, and this correctly, as the event
proved, that Major Anderson was then in no
danger Of attack. Indeed he and his COM
mand were then treated with marked kind
neVs by the authorities and people Of Charles
ton. Under these circumstances, to have
sent such force there would have been only
to impair the hope of compromise. to pro-
woke collision and disappoint the country.