The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-08-14
Strength of Napoleon's Army During the
French IL evolution.

! crime.
Strength OF Napoieon's Army During the
French Revolution.
| A morning paper noted for looking at facts
and events through fog, and drawing oppo-
site conclusions from the public generally, has
just been parading before its readers immense
figures purporting to be the strength OF the
French army under Napoleon, with the view
of endeayoring through this means to prove
that it is not necessary for our government
to issue paper money to successfully pro-
secute the war. Its writers are evidently not
very well versed in historical facts else mali
ciously take this course to destroy confidence in
our government. Thus, they put down the
strength Of the French army in 1913 at about
one million, and also assert that it was
increased by drafting that year nearly
million more, and with this enormous
force Napoleon conducted his operations
by refusing to permit the issue of paper
money, and at the close of the long war the
national debt of France was only two hundred
and fifty millions, all of which statements are
wide of the mark.
1t is a well known fact that the policy of
Napoleon was always to fill up his armies and
support them from the nation that he conquered,
OF, in other words, make war maintain war.
His only provision for food and funds was in
levying contributions upon the country that he
conquered and invaded At no one time during
the long war of the French Revolution did
France have over eight hundred and fifty
thousand men in the army. Nor did Napo-
hoIf
Frenchmen under his command at any
one time. In May, 1872, Napoleon left
Paris to take command of his forces gathered in
Poland to operate against Russia. He-had con-
centrated there about five hundred thousand
men, and of this number only about two hun
dred thousand were native French; the balance
were Germans, Italians, Poles, Swiss and Aus
trians-all belonging to nations that he had
conquered, and whom he had forced into his
army. In this way he increased his forces, and
crossed the Niemen and entered Russian terri
tory, according to the imperial muster roll, with
force of six hundred and forty-seven thousand
men. This number was largely reduced and
his ranks thinned before he reached Moscow.
Having provided no other means Of feeding his
army than subssting upon the country through
which he passed. and levying money contribu-
tons upon the people, the plan of the Russians
in laying waste the country in their retreat
was serious drawback to Napoleon's opera
tons. His financial system was based upon
continued victories, and bad no provision what
ever against reverse. U on entering Moscow.
therefore, and finding it deserted and soon after
laid in ashes, he found himself in an enemy's
country in midwinter, without shelter or food
for his men, or means to provide either, and
forced to beat hasty retreat or perish. He
could no longer levy contributions upon the
people; for there was no one left. Disaster met
him at every step on his retreat, until finally he
left his army and fed to Paris. Out OF the
forces that entered the Russian territory only
about eighty thousand ever returned, and Of
this number over forty thousand We're Aus
TRANS and misunderstanding only about thirty
five thousand surviving French soldiers.
Soon after Napoleon's return to Paris the
people became excited at the prospect of France
being invaded. The old army had been de-
stroyed in the Russian campaign, and a new
one had to be raised to take its place. The
Senate, therefore, Immediately voted that
draft of three hundred and fifty thousand men
should be made. But previous conscriptions
had drained the country of those youths liable
to CONSUMPTION. A change in the basis of the
draft was made, and by that means Napoleon
succeeded in placing an army of three hundred
and fifty thousand men on their march for the
Rhine in April, 1918, to hold at bay the invad-
ing army. In addition to this, there were about
two hundred thousand men stationed ipuSpain
and Portugal at this time The disasters Of the
campaign of 1913 were quite numerous and
materially reduced Napolcon's army. Out of
the four orders for CONSUMPTION Issued that
year, the number actually obtained only kept
the army at its strength at the commencement
of the campaign, its numbers falling far short
OF the million and half put down by morn
ing journal.
Napoleon's maxim to make war maintain war
would no longer avail him anything, now that
he was compelled to fight on French soil, in
stead of invading other nations. His allies were
turning against him, and those generals who
once fought in his ranks and led his men into
battle were now marshalling forces against him.
Tie nations TIA. lie had once conquered and
forced 60 ali bin il his Efforts with men and
money were also arruycl against him. Forced
10 fall back upon tie resources 81 France
alone, he found them unequal 20 the task.
Absorbed in war, he left the commerce and
trade OF the country unprotected. Ills financial
system being entirely based upon continued
victories and in conquerng nations, he had
no resources to fall back upon in the hour Of
his adversely. Ills specie currency was made
quatc, and, although he made desperate effort
in his Hundred Days war, after his escape from
Elba, by appealing to the pride of the French
people, yet he was unable to concentrate s,,ffi-
Gent force or provide the means for the defeat
of the allied forces at Waterloo. England on