, 1862-12-25
TIVE WAR IN VIRGINIA.
The Committee on the Conduct
of the War.
THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
FREDERICKSBURG AFFAIR.
Abstract Of the Dispositions Of Burn-
side, Halleek, Sumner, &C., &c.

dD6LIatt VI Lille Otpuhlllou6 0l -bllIu-
side, Halleck, Sumner, &C., &c.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 23.-The report Of the
Committee on the Conduct Of the War, EN-
braces the dispositions Of Generals Burnside,
Sumner, franklin, Hooker, Woodbury.,
Haupt, Hal1eck and Meigs. The Committee
report the testimony without comment.
ABSTRACT OF GEN. BURNsDE's DEPOSITION.
Gen. Burnside said, when after the battle Of
Antietam Mcclellan decided to cross the Po-
tomac, said, that in my opinion, be would
never be able to take the army on that route
beyond the Rappahannock, unless hesueceed-
ed in fighting the enemy at come place on
this side. That if he proposed to go to Rich
mond by land he would have to go to Fredcr-
icksburg, and in that he partially agreed with
me.
On the 9Th Of November, after this CONVEX
sation, Mcclellan gave an order to Capt.
Drum, Chief Of Engineers, to have all the
pontoon bridges at Berlin and in that neigh
borhood, that could be spared, taken up and
sent down to Washington, with view Of get
ting them down to this town in case he de-
cidcd to go by way Of Fredericksburg.
The letter conveying that order was written
OIL the 9Th OF November, hut, as I understand,
was not received until the 12th Of November.
Gen. Burnside speaks Of the surprise with
which he received tle Presidents order to
take command Of the army Of the Potomac,
and that he lid repeatedly expressed the
opinion lie Burnside) vas not competent to
command SO large an army, aud that McClcl-
Ian was tie fittest person.
He then says: Hallcck came to see me Nov.
4tll. On the 9th made out a plan of opera
tions in accordance with HalIcck's order, and
sent it to Washington.
Gen. Burnside then gives detailed account
Of this plan, and speaks Of the disastrous de-
lay IN receiving pontoons, and says: On the
18th he started Il column to Fredericksburg,
not knowing Of the delay. The pom
toons did not, however, start till the
19th, and that day it commenced raiu-
ing, which delayed them SO much and
the roads became so bad TINT when they got
to Dunlfries, they fioated the pontoons of the
wagons, sent to Washington for steamer
and carried them to Aqua Greek, sending the
wagons around by land. The pontoons did
not get there until the 22a or 23d Of Noyem-
her.
Afterthe first delay in starting the pontoons,
l think they were sent as quickly as they
could Lave been, and the supplies and quar-
termastcr's stores haycalways been in as great
abundance as VIC hare expected, for after the
18th Of November the weather and roads were
particularly bad.
After reaching Fredericksburg, I saw at
once there was no crossing the Rappahannock
with tho army at that time.
Q.-Sincc You have assumed command Of
the Army Of the Potomac, hare all it's move
ments been made according to your own judg-
mcnt? or have some Of them been directed By
the General Chief, the Secretary Of War, or
the President Of the United States?
A.-1hey haee all been made IN accordance
1oith 1'Y OUR judgment. In some cases have.
submitted my views, which have been ap-
p$ for shs axan Sa xS1 Tas rs5goas
Al understand that Gen. Halleck was to
give the necessary orders, and then the off
GERS who should receive the orders were
here.
I could have carried out that part Of the
plan through officers Of my OWL, but having
just taken command Of an army with which 1
was but slightly acquainted, it was evident
that 1t was as much as could attend to, with
the assistance Of all my officers, to change its
position from Warrenton to Fredcriclsburg;
and felt, indeed l expected, that all the parts
Of the plan which were to be exccutcd in
Washington would be attended to BY the Off
GERS at that place under the direction Of tic
different . departments to which those parts
Odd you or not understand that you
were to be responsible for seeing that these
orders were to b. carried outs
A. did not; 1 never imagined for mo-
ment that bad to carry out anything that
vas vas required to be done at Washington; Gen.
III Washington, that he never saw my plal Of
operations until showed it to them on that
day. ''''~-
Q.-Do I understand you to say in your
statement thai you expected General Frank
the ridge, in the rear Of the town, and thereby "
enable our troops to storm and carry the for
tjEcations?
Al did expect him to carry that point,
which being done, would have placed our
forces in the rear Of their extreme left, and
which thought at the time would shake their
carried.
accomplish that?
A--To the great strength Of the position,
and the accumulation Of the cnemy's forces
built in two or three hours after they were
unloaded, which was about daylight. Instead
Of that those on the right were not built until
three o'clock in the afternoon, and had only
the means OF getting across one division over
the bridge on tile right.
General Fra,aklin's bridges were built about
noon, aud were held by our troops on the o,,-
roslte bank. This gave the c.1emy time 10
accumulate their forces, which were stretched
along the river from Port Royal up to the
battlefield, before was able to order the at
tack.
There had been a great deal of division Of
opinion among the corps commanders as to
the place Of crossing, but after all the discus-
sion upon the subject, the decision to cross
over here was well received and understood
by all of them.
g. o;3Nhat vas $ the conduct Of officers and
A:-With the exception Of a single regiment
it was excellent.
Q;-Have you any knowledge as to the force
of the enemYe
Alt is estimated at all the way from 10o,-
COO to 600. I think it was less than 10o,-
w. would add here that although at the
time We ordered the column Of attack
to be formed on the morning after the battle,
I thought the enemy works could be carried
and adhered to that opinion during that da7.
afterwards became conrfncedth TINT that could
not have been done, owing to the great
strength Of the enemy, the time given them
Tor reinforcing, and the belief also Of our OIL
GERS that It could not be done
j! aecordlngly te1egraphcd to The President
OF fhe United States, at Washington, that I
withdrew our army because felt the enen,r,s
position could not be carried.
Gen Burnside's testimony here closed.
It commenced raining and the river began
70 rlse; did not know how much it might
rlse: there were no means Of crossing except
going up to the fords, and it wou1d be imuos-
sih1e to do that, because Of inability to sun
ply the troops after they should l.aTe
crossed; General Sumner arrived here with
his troops in advance. - He sent to me
asking me if he should cross the river: /
dld not think it advisable that be should At
It was first decided to Cross at Skipncr,s
Neck, abont twelve miles below here, but our
demonstration was simply for the purpose of
drawing there as large force Of the enemy
as possible. I then decided to cross here. be-
cause in the first place felt satisfied that
they did not expect us to cross here but BE-
low. In the next place felt satisfied that
battle, because five could divide their forces bv
piercing their lines at one or two points, sep
arating their left from their right, then 4 viz
orons attack with the whole army would suc-
coed in breaking their army to pieces.
Two attacks we're made and NC were re-
pulsed, still holding portion OF the ground
we had fought upon, but not our extreme ad-
vance.
That night I went over the field on our
right: and in fact was with f1,e officers and