The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-04-05
The Expected Blow.

Very much of the news we reprint from the
Rebel journals we interpret by the rule of con-
traries, 80 that their averment that Beauregard
has gone to New Orleans, for instance, persuades
US that he will soon turn up good way from that
city. Still, we are inclined to believe their late
story that jeff Davis has set out for the South
West, because many reasons concur in designa.
ting that as his most desirable locality. We be
lieve the Rebels will not meet our great Potomac
Army in open battle, but will wacth for oppor-
tunites to attack portions of it in superior force,
as lately at Winchester; hut, should no such
be afforded them, they will gradually retire
as our main body advances, hoping only to de-
tain it in Virginia until the season is too far
advanced and the heat too fervid for offensive
operations in the Cotton States Such seems
to be the general purpose of the present Rebel
strategy in Virginia.
On the other hand, we see much that indicates
determination on the part of the Secession
chiefs to strike sudden and heavy blow in the
Southwest. They are evidently concentrating
their forces at Corinth or some other point near
the south line OF Tennessee, with intent to hurl
the great mass OF them suddenly on an exposed
detachment OF ours, thus repeating the lesson of
Bull Run, Wilson's Greek, and Lexington. We
trust they are to be baffled in this game by the
cautious energy of Gen. Halleck and, if they
should not be able to fight at the advantage they
mediate, we believe they will make virtue of
necessity, and fight desperate battle any how,
hoping BY success to recover Tennessee, or at
any rate protect :" the South proper from inva-
sion and restoration to the Union. The yigor
and skill of our Generals are quite likely to in
terfere with these calculations but we are salts
fiedthat, it left to their own devices, the Rebel
chiefs will not soon fight great battle in Vir.
GINA, but aciH fight one in the South West.
The "Anaconda" plan Of surrounding and
crushing rebellion exposes those who adopt it
to great and obvious hazards Since Napoloon's
early campagn every tyro in the art Of war un-
derstands that the first canon is, "Be strongest
at the point Of actual and decisive conflict, no
matter how weak everywhere else" The Reb-
| els profted by their fidelity to this rule at Bull
Run, and in most of their triumphs, as we have
since done at Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island,
&c. To comprehend the value and Importance
of this rule is easy enough to obey and profit
by it requires mastery of the military art. But
the Rebels, holding the interior position and op-
| Grating upon much the shorter lines of commu.
| nicatiOn, can conform to it far more easily than
| the Unionists who confront them. And only a
most resolute offensive on all points can prevent
their troops facing quiescent force to reinforce
an army engaged in active operations, as has
| been recently Witnessed And their advantage
of position is SO fairly counterbalanced by our
command of the seas and our superiority in both
| gunboats and transports on the Western rivers,
that it should not, and probably will not, be al
| lowed TO prove of much avail