Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1862-11-17

the Merrimac, by depriving US for a short time
of the absolute command of the waters of vir-
ginia, converted a sure and rapid movement into
a long and dangerous campaign. Of subsequent
operations he says:
We were here twenty four miles from York
town, and we could not learn what works the enc
my had thrown up, nor what was his force within
them This was the more amazing, that Fortress
Monroe had always been held by a strong garri-
son, which ought to have been able to obtain
some information or TO make some reconnaissance
in this direction. But by a strange alteration,
this fortress, now became the base OF operations
Of the army of the Potomac, had been specially
seQuestered from the command OF Gen. McClell-
an, together with its garrison, although the Gen
eral in command of it was his inferior in rank
Hence arose military susceptoities, which were
by no means favorable to the exchange of conf
Dental communications.
So the army of the Potomac moved on in the
dark toward Yorktown. We were two days on
the road. The column of the General in Chief
had passed some fortified positions abandoned by
the enemy. A few horsemen were occasionally
seen at rare intervals. No sooner had we come
under the walls of Yorktown, than were
rested by the cannon.
The difficulties OF the situation caused by the
flooding of the country by the rebels are graphic
ally described, but with these facts our readers
have been familiar long since. We are-then af-
forded an insight into Gen. McCLELLAS's plans,
and their arrangements by the laundering of
Washington officials. The Prince says:
In order to gain time and avoid the tedium OF
siege, Gen. Mcclellan had thought out the
means of turning the position. The enemy held
the James with the Merrimac and his gunboats;
-
cSster Point batteries Nevertheless, by dis
embarkation on the Severn, beyond Gloucester,
we might carry the latter position and open the
way of the Federal gunboats into the river York.
A subsequent movement up the left bank, in the
direction of West Point, would put us so far in
the rear of the army charged with the defense of
the lines of Yorktown, that it would have been
in a perilous position. This accomplished, the
confederates must have abandoned Gloucester,
and fallen back hastily upon Richmond. The
execution of the coup de main had been left to n
corps OF the army commanded by Gen. Mellow
ell. This corps was to be the last to embark at
] Washington and il was calculated that il ought
to reach Yorktown in a body on its transports at
the moment when the rest of the army knowingly
land should appear before the post from Fortress
Monroe.
Instead of finding IT, we received the inexpli-
cable and as yet unex planed intelligence that this
corps, $4,000 strong. had been sent TO another
destination. The news was received in the army
with stupefacton, although the majority could
not see the deplorable consequences of the step
taken, it must be supposed, with no evil inten-
ton, but certainly with uncomfortable reck
lessness. Fifteen days before, this measure, al
though it must always have been injurious, would
have been much less so. We might have made
arrangements upon a new basis. Taken when il
was il deranged whole system of machinery
fairly at work. Among the divisions of Mellow
ellis corps there was one, that Of Franklin, which
was more regretted than all the Others as vel!
on account of the troops themselves as Of their
commanders. The General. in Chief had be-
slowed special pains on its organization during
the winter and earnestly demanded its restora-
ton. 1t was sent back to him without word of
explanation, precisely as il had been detached
from him. This fine division, II 900 strong, ar
rived and for a moment the General thought of
intrusting TO it alone the Gloucester expedition.
But this intention was renowned.
A regular siege of Yorktown now became
necessary, but we omit the details of this as al
ready familiar to the public. The Prince shows
that General MCCLELLAN was always anxious TO
bring on a decisive battle, as he regarded a vic
tory as a necessary means TO secure peace.
The constant interference 10 his designs TO this
end, induces the belief that there existed domi-
nant power in Washington which favored pro
longation of the war, and therefore thwarted the
intentions Of the General in this respect. by
Gripping his resources and weakening his com
mand.
The battle of Williamsburg, and the conduct
Of General HOOKER, who is eulogised as can adj
mrabe soldier" are then described and full
merit is awarded to General KEARSEY. After
the battle, the siege OF Richmond fairly com
menced, and of the situation at this time we find
the following:
Cavalry reconnoissances pushed in all drec-
tons demonstrated that nearly the whole hostile
army had crossed the Chickahomny, and every
| thing indicated that we should meet desperate
resistance under the walls of the Confederate
capital. Prisoners had been taken who belonged
TO corps which had up to this time been station
ed opposite General Burnside in North Carolina
IL was plain that this corps joined the Army Of
Virginia. We soon learned Of the evacuation Of
Norfolk. IL was manifest that Davis could only
have made this sacrifice in order 10 bring Huger
with his $4,000 men 90 Richmond. Finally the
Confederate chief had ordered levy en- fnasse OF
every man able 10 bear arms. .
The result Of all this threatened the army of
the Potomac in It's only superiority, that of mum.
| bers. Unhappily. too, willie the enemy was con-
centratng and strengthening his forces, ours
we're fading away. We have already seen at
/ Alexandria division detached and sent TO Ere
mont. Before Yorktown we had lost two other
divisions under Mcdowell. We had since left
| garrisons in Yorktown, Gloucester and Williams
burg. We had lost men under fire and by dis
ease, as well rs by struggling. Nothing came to
| Gil up the gaps. When an American regiment
marches 10 the war IL goes as a whole, and leaves
behind IL depots OF recruits 10 restore its ranks
as they wasted away.
After the news Of tie ruin Of the Merrimac,
that Gen. McCLELLAs might perhaps have ad
vantageously changed It's base TO the James
River. but here again the evil Of depri,ng him
of the supreme command by precluding any cor
dial cooperation Of all the forces became mani
fest, and rendered the success of the movement
more than doubtful. Besides II was impossible
for Gen. MCCLELLAN to foresee the June fresh
cts, or that $4,000 men would be detained idle
around Washington, and no, cooperate in any
way for the reduction Of Richmond. On this
subject the Prince Dir JoiSvILLE speaks In indg-
nant terms. and we commend the following to
the especial attention Of our readers:
But here the responsibility IL Ear from belonging
TO the Chief or TO his army. Who were the men
who. driving them into untimely campaign
had 40 revealed 20 the enemy operations not vet
ripe for executionf Was Mcclellan responsible
for that want Of unity In the ends and in the &C.
ton OF the Government which had trammeled the
movements Of the army since he had been de.
/ priyed of the chief command and supreme direc