Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-04-11
VECTORY.

From the New Orleans Deltal
The hour of victory Is scarcely less trying
tban the hour of defeat. If the losses and diff
cUlties Of the one % foTtitude and skill to the
]seVeTest test. The opportunities and gains Of the
other put prudence and energy to the highest
proof. To know wtsh to bring on a battle to
know how to conduct a battle when begun; TO
know what use to make of victoTy-these are
three essential attributes of q gen
erai. The last IS the browning quality. The
others are inconseqUential without it. The vic
torlous column remains a fragment which can
oe nJted to no grand, symmetrical and enduring
superstTuctUre.
We have fought and won a great battle on the
Tennessee river. IN tie language Of Gen Beau
regard, our victory was complete. The details,
such as have been received by telegraph, are suf-
nclen. TO show that, with respect to the enemy's
forces engaged, the result was decisive. Driven
back upon the river, with immense slaughter and
the loss, apparently, Of nearly all his artillery,
STOKES and camp equippage, there would seem to
have been but one hope of refuge for his beaten,
broken, and scattered column, and that was in
the facilities Of retreat that might be afforded by
his SUu50sts an transports. The flying troops
of Grant, Prentiss, M~cClernsnd, and others were
wildly seeking escape upon the transports under
cover of the gunboats. But numbers OF them,
& would appear, were cut OF from this chance.
Thousands Of them must have been slaughtered
and captured IL their confused and panic efforts
TO avail themselves Of the transports and gun
boats to cross the river. The effect of the battle.
then, would be the virtual humiliation Of the
Federal army engaged, unless such q result were
prevented by the interpo5iti0n Of some circum-
stance not now definitely ascertained.
The appearance of Buells army, or q large
portion OF it, to act Is a reserve aud a cover tor
the remnant of the defeated forces, might save it
and check, perhaps, for q time the operations Of
our victorious troops. We can not believe that
the arrest would be more than temporary.
Gen. BeaUregard would doubtless Immediately
proceed to devise another plan of attack, the re-
suit of which may be readily anticipated.
SuPpOsing, however, that Buell. failed to effect
a Junction with the routed Federal army, and
that he remained on the upper side OF the Tennes-
see river, We can hardly doubt that Gen. Besure-
gard would, as soon as possible, cross the river
aud proceed TO attack him. But first he would
have TO be sure that the euemy's army on this
side the river was eiectually disposed Of and
could not recover and menace his rear.
A5 for the Federal ganboats and transports
they could not moest him seriously without an
accompanying land force. Nor is it probable
that Federal reintorCenents could be speedily
sent up that river from Cairo and Paducah. The
euemy's whole dispOsable forces at these places
were no doubt in the expedition which has lust
been defeated If Gen. Pope's army at New
Madrid are not detained there by Gen. Van
Dorm, jhe latter would be able, 20 doubt, TO
reach the Tennessee river quite as soon as tina.
army could ascend It.
Iaeso remarks presume that the enemy will
Dot at once evsCuate Tennessee, but viii renew
Lis attempt to penetrate the lower Mississippi
valley iTOm the base of the Tennessee river.
However this may be, .he situ- ton, viewed in
any aspect, is one to call for the very highest
exhibition Of sagacious and vigorous general
ship, in order that the fruits OF the recent vie
tory may be plucked when ripe, and not lef. tC
ripan until. they are withered.