The Memphis union appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1862-1862, 1862-07-09
Editor and Proprietor.

painfully apparent, before our brave fellows
gave way, that they must finally break before
! that ever-surging tide. One other error was
percoptible Our officers seemed to fight not
50 much TO win victory as to display the couI-
age and endurance of our soldiers. Instead Of
| standing fast in secure cover of forests, that
| the enemy might be compelled to fight on our
| terms, they advanced into the open fields and
were cut down by scores by the more crafty
toe. But We were beaten. 1t was a melan-
choly satisfaction 10 know that we occupied
the field of battle after the conflict was ended.
| We had about 1000 men engaged, perhaps
$4,000. The enemy had four divisions en-
! ployed, besides Jackson's admirable army of
| 10000 to $4,000 disciplined troops.
We had fourteen batterles-s4 piecss-in
| the field, and often one half could not be used
| to advantage. Martins Tidhals and Weeds
| ems were most serviceabte Tidhals was on
| the extreme right and to the enemy wss an
| object of special attention. Lieut.-Col. Denni.
son, son of Ex-Governor Dennison, had charge
of one section Of the battery, aud his captain
| complimented him upon his conduct. The
| conduct of the entire force that day was adm
rable, The regulars, who had previously COM
planned of restraint, had full scope, and they
| re-established their ancient fame.
Duryea's Zouaves, clad in crimson breeches
and red skull caps emulated their regular
comrades, winning the admiration of the army
| Bu. they suffered terribly their conspicuous
uniforms drawing upon them an awful fire
wherever they appeared In the fell But
volunteers and regulars alike won glory on
that bloody field.
| Battle in Front
Meantime while tumult ragged over in the
| forest, excitement was scarcely less thrilling
| in front Battle was Imminent on the entire
line all the day long. There were incessant
hurries on the picket lines and no respite for
any. Men stood in line of battle at the breast
works from day break-well, they have been
under arms and under fire ever since, as they
had been during the preceding twenty seven
days and nights The world never witnessed
more devoted courage.
Smiths division at Gouldin's, on the edge
of Chickahominy valley, and Sedgwick's on
his left occupied the most sensitive points on
the whole line, since Fair Oaks. They
threatened the key of the rebel position before
Richmond. Hancocks and Burns brigades
held the most exposed lines. The former had
taken a critical position in front of his in
trenchments with strong battery. 1t was
altogether probable the enemy would attempt
, to drive him back. The afternoon was wear
ing away wearily without serious demonstra-
tions, and we had begun to suspect the enemy
of some sinister design in remaining SO unde-
monstratiye. 1t was probably four or five
o'clock, however, when, without premonition,
u strong force pressed strongly upon Gen.
, Burn picket line. He sent word instantly to
, Hancock to prepare for action. The latter
. was vigilant, but he had hardly received the
message before q rebel battery Of heavy guns
, opened furious storm of shell upon him A
! moment later strong brigade pounced upon
his pickets, pressed them in irresistibly, and
dashed at his battery. Burns was also ut
: work. His pckets had fallen back to their
. strong supports, and warm battle was in
9 progress in T. woods. The bullets ratified
, briskiy am "a camps but the combatants
! generally II. asa,d invisible from the main
i line Of battle re seen, was now exciting
IN the higheSt arms was WORKING n
dozen Napoleons "a, #i'arrots; Smiths bate
E Fies were hurting shells fast and furious, and
/, the rebel guns were bowling away as nerrily.
= The air was filled with bursting shells and
q sutfused with sulphurous smoke, while the
! forests were obscured with musknt mist. Our
= picket reserves, however, held their ground
q manfully, and the enemy was hriskly driven
= back, our lads yelling at them triumphantly.
:, / Hancock victorious after bitter fight, in
: which two Georgia regiment were almost cut
= to pieces. a4
: Oar loss, though not half 50 great as that Of
\ the enemy, not trifing. Among the pris-
) oners captured by Hancock, was one of the
: smartest and most mischievous OF southern
! politicians Col. j. O. G. Lamar, of the First
Georgia regiment. once member Of Congress
His Lieut. Colonel was also captured.
:, !, But apprehensions about Porter's battle had
: distressed officers all along. 1t seemed appa-
rent that if the eneny defeated him, ruin
threatened US from tne rear. An attack in
) front indicated disposition the part of the
- rebels to force the issue now deprecated. 1t
1t was grateful relief TO drive them back iu
: front so easily. All our supports had been
:, sent to Porter. We had more than men
. enough to hold the front Ii would have been
70 madness to have contended with an equal force
/ of disciplined troops in front and rear. There
Is would have been no alternative but hasty re-
q treat at the sacrifice of most of our equipsge
e and the siege train with the butchery Of thou
= sands of our troops
q BY this time, sunset, tidings of gloomy
I, character had been received from Porter
a Not much later the extent Of our misfortunea
IL was partially comprehended by officers. For
he the first time we heard a whisper OF a serious
. determination on the part of Gen. Mcclellan
= to "change his base Of operations ~ to James
s, river" 1t was considered a most critical
= movement-especalyu under compulsion. You
"a have already heard some, and you viii hear
- many more explanations of this calamitous
III but neceesitous plan, but sincerely believe il
never would have been attempted but for the
III attack on our right wing. This question, how.
as ever will be the subject of controversy;
a. SHALL therefore, withhold consideration of it in
s. detail until more favorable conditions offer.
r. Preparations for Retreat
ly Even before Porter had been driven back
I'd. I was struck with the singular operations al
al general headquarters. / discovered that they
tz we're being removed to Savage's Station, anc
il a competent officer explained gravely that il
ch was thought advisable to go there although
I'd, it was in the rear of our left wing. Aftel
p- dark there were other ominous symptoms
ma general officers confded to their stats thei
n fears of coming disaster. Even with the bes
ne disciplined troops, and under favorable aus
els pices: to change a plan Of operations in th,
IT. face of an enemy, is regarged by military au
DO. thorities as one of the most dangerous enter
re- prises. In our situation it was case of des
With nt1r fnrna rrn MD r,l,4 Ill