New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-08-08

not 90 mnch Importance but sill the army held it.
self in readiness to proceed at any moment when
the navy was ready. The harbor, however, with
many oihers fell into our possession early 10 March
without battle, ard 40 the result of mere demon
stia,ion of tie combined and and naval forces On
particular pOiUt.
The works at Hilton Head s.,ains, land attack
were at once commenced, and prosecuted with that
activity and energy. Wy Capt. Gilmore OF tie In
rinsers and Big. Gen. l. l. Stevens and lis Is ade,
that elifIed my sincerost a'd ~armest conia eDds-
lions. The necessary aud important works ia 81.
Helena Sound and the Tybee leland were slso prose-
cued with comuieudable activity. And ALTHOUGH
the expedition above mentioned, To consist I'd 4,0Oo
men, WAS always IN readiucss To ttart al any mo,
rnent, vet by the middle Of December considered
myself in a condition, though the works were not
entirely ompleted, TO remove the bulk OF our force
row the Islands to OF her sphere Of action, mao
We the proper means of moving them.
In regard to the above s'rictures upon nay " dis-
graceful inactivity, in stopping 70 fortiiy sanu'
H. nix. and 10 buili whsrves for boats end Eans-
ports" &C., they strictly require no reply from me-
II had cen eutlcirnly vain and presuuptuous 10
resort TO the Don QuIxotis,n Of lanong NY foroer,
completely raw and cooped up IN crowded sbips, Tor
tie space of twenty days, and marching them
straight into the interior even had tbs Means Of
dong co. without gard 10 establishing Any point o.
support or base OF su plie--to gay netting OF tho
immense labor that the character OF the shore re-
osirsd 10 unload sbipsand all teis, too, beyond
sea and in an eminently host 10 country, should
have de.erved straight jacket or prompt dsrssal
f,om the army aud / venly believe both. Aud say
this whether the enemy tsd few or many troops in-
nediutely al hand 10 oppose us. VIII ;he wfier oil
tho article till Inc what point could have occupied
il the interior where the enemy cou not have easily
concentrated 5000 men agains. mo III less time than
sny r. endorsements could bave reached mo from he
North Does he know how many troops actually
did concentrate at different points between Charles
ton and Savannah during the first three weeks OF our
occupation What right had 10 convert all expo
diton, got up for special object-s column entirely
secondary in It's character-inloa principal smy III
the field aud that too, beyond the sea WOnd The
Government have supported me Would such Il
cour.e have entered into the general plan OF cam
paignl
Leaving the writer to answer these questions, l
would respectfully recommend him TO reflect epon
the position viii h officer would hold, III his oven
as well rs the public estimation in isolaiug him'el'
with small body Of troops in a hostile country,
something short Of thousand miles from bic re-
serves, with no fortified base 10 prevent hi. being
d1von into tie sea in case OF reverse, and un err
taiulv de, ebdent upon bis transports for support, II
such q course should result rs it would most likely,
in di, aster would prefer the irowas OF tic bodies
ignorance and the malice Of the most waUton At
~, ks TO the severe but homes, punishment due 10
such Al oilense. Hence he may be assured that no
such immediate advance ss be suggests would have
| been made in any state Of the case.
| Even supporting we bad tho means Of navigating
the creeks and iuland Tassages AMI hadan nnue1Gte
aitem,t 90 point not more diststt han Savannah,
with what prospect OF success COZ ID i have been
done with the handful OF men thu, would lave been
available at that time for such az operation, Ter
dednc,ing the force was bound 20 keep o. hand for
Ferpsndina and that too, without the assistance o.
some putbOai.f l say without tho assurance oil
Qunbo~ls; for IT, after the whole country had been
reeol moi cred. and its topography and hydrcsrnpby
become kuo~n, il was decided by sho navy 10 he
| ,icsi, Ia Z
River from either the north or the south aide, and
ascend 10 the city in the middle OF January, what
vss the state oil the case In November, when we
were EN- rcly Ignorant Of the nature Of the obstacles
10 10 overoome-whsn no psssase existed ON ite
moth aide for anything but rowboais, and no, nan
In tho f~et or TIE army knew OF any passage on he
south aide, except Augustine Creek. impraeiieabie
| by reason o. powerful deieussf
The article speaks of the few troops 10 oppose
When did that fact become known, sveo II trnc
| Certainly hot till after the event. Ire fact IL
could not have SHOWN positively what troops Vie
! ell, nv had. Farther than tie fact, whlch Iscsr.
tanned FROM letters 10 zed ~ Hilton Hs~d that there
were ten thourand troops in Charleston aud IL. bar
Dor ~ the time OF the capture Of Port Royal. every
ding Of the remained In profound m, -tery. The
contrahznd- were the ouly source Of Information,
aud their statements Ia the way OF numbers were -
strangely conflicting ss TO be nnsofihy ~ The loAs,
Afternoon. SO far as Savannah was concerusd " "a
never enabled TO obtain The least trust worthy ia
formation until early m January.
| In conseq OF the special character Of the
petition, no means Of transportation were tai en-
along with which 10 operate in the interior All our
transports were sesgoing vessels, and Of too deep
draft Tor the rivers srd crooks and inland p,sssgs.
except the few si-boatr furnished for landing pur
poses. Even the few hgit-dfhii steamers iha. were
iaken along to facilitate rapid landing In floe OF
the enemy .itner Loot Ia the terrible Y lie the
expedition encountered were compelled ~ return.
Thus We Were 20 destitute OF hgh-draf trans ora-
liuu J. not only TO reud,r the moy,men OF trO' IT,
supplies AID material TO suitable positions for opera
tons the main Land impossible but eveo 10 Inlo d
our transports with that expedition which the ext
gcncies of war require was exceedingly Diff uii.
From what i have here stated IL viii be Seen, Ia
the fret place, that tue expedition WAS hot calca-
lated ior any such Object M you suggest.
Secondly Had any such object been practicable
ut the time and proposed !, could not have been
riei oii Tor the want OF means.
| ThUdly II any delay occurred in carrying out
the actual objects of the expedition IL not owing
TO want Of energy. activity, or will on tho pat oil
myseli or the army.
Fourthiys Had attempted to have operated at the
tine OF landing III tie uanuer the New York critic
suggests should have been properly subject 10 the
| charge Of fool or mailman.
| However, Immediately after efecting landing ut
Porl koyal-a lace that had not been Agreed upon
TO land until after the departure OF the AIediton-
studied he genera state OF affairs far a. i was
de- and concluded that Ia Consideration II the un.
ooked-ior extent OF the success Of tie combined
lediOn tins lar which involved the capture of tie
whole coast from Edi.to To Ossabaw Soardj, with a
re-enf0ic.eDt OF ten thousand men, five lii ht drdught
steamers, certain number Of row boats aud GER.
tain additional amolnt land trans oftation, sys
len Of internal operations that would not c0ahici
with the general plan Of cam paigo, but would be
n great support To II, might he w.sy conducted flon
Port Royal soon our positions ured,
aud thai wo1li lead TO the capture OF SayauS,h and
Fort Pulaski, snd, IA an immediate consequence,
The whole coast South, aud at.rwa'd CharesroD.
This plan, MS IA generally, was proposed 20 the War
Department, and the re-eDlorcoments ind means as
above, asked for.
Tne Dian for redncing Pnlnshi WA fnlly md ane.