The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1862-12-17

embarrassmentsn Of Mcclellan in con.a-
quence Of his diminished ranks preclud-
ing him from concentrating the whole
land and sea forces Of the Republic upon
this single point. OF the subsequent de-
lays which greatly retarded the success of
the expedition and the withdrawal of por-
ing account:
IA few days had been half lost in
useless pursuit of the enemy, while tie
transports were assembling at Alexandria.
At last they were assembled, and the or
| der came to embark, but here a new mis-
understanding awaited the General He
had been promised transports which could
convey 1000 men at time. He found
vessels hardly equal to the conveyance of
half that number. !. Instead of moving at
once, as Mcclellan had intended, whole
army, with Its equipage, number of trips
had to be made The emharkation com
menced March II. The force consisted
of eleven divisions of infantry, 5000 to
10000 strong; one division of Regulars
Gnfantry and calvary 5000 strong, and
| $50 pieces of artillery.
""The total effective force may have
been 12O, 900 men. At the moment of
departure whole, division was detached
| to form, we know. not why, an indepen-
dent command upder General Fremont,
lip the mountains of Virginia. We shall
[see the Potomac Army undergo other not
less inexp1icable diminutions. But we
anticipate. - -. - -'- SJ
T. az fortnight was required to move the
larmy to Fortress Monroe. This point
was chosen because the apparition of the
lMerrimac, and her tremendous exhibition
fof her strength, had made it impossible
! to regard the. Federal navy as absolutely
mistress Of the waters of Virginia. I"
The Prince then shows how the pres
ence Of the -Merrimac, by depriving us for
a. short time Of the absolute command of
'the waters of Virginia, converted sure
and rapid movement into long and dan
gerous campaign. Of subsequent opera
tions, he says: p, si f..sit3- ~
eve were here twenty-four miles from
Yorktown, and we could not learn what
works the enemy had thrown up, nor what
was amazing, that Fortress Monroe had
always been held by a strong garrison
which ought to have been able to obtain
4 some information or to make some recon
noisance in this direction. But, by &
strange alteration, this fortress, now be.
came the base Of operations of the Army
Of the Potomac, hid been specially Sc
4 lquestered from the command of General
Mcclellan, together with its garrison, al
! though the General in command of it wa.
i his inferior in rank Hence arose militia
~ susceptibilities, which were by no mean
favorable to the exchange Of confdentia
communications. @ @
4 ."So the Army Of the Potomac moved
en- in the dark toward Yorktown w
were two days on the road The column
! of the General -in-Chief had passed som,
: fortified positions abandoned by the enc
my A few horsemen were occasionall,
seen at rare intervals. No sooner had W
come under the walls Of Yorktown, thai
we were arrested by the cannon"
The difficulties of the situation cause
a by the flooding of the country by the reb
$ els are graphically described, but wit
b these facts our readers have been familia
long since. We are then afforded an in
sight into General McClellan's plans, an
i their arrangements by tho 'blundering {
= Washington officials. The Prince say
%" In order to gain time and avoid th
e tedium of a siege, General Mcclellan ha
. thought out the means Of turning th
|. position. The enemy held the Jane
q with the Merrimac and his gunboats; th
s York was closed by the Yorktown and tn
Gloucester Point batteries. Nevertheless
o by a Decentralization on the Severn, b,
Q yond Gloucester, we might carry the lat
d ter position and open the way of the Fec
eral gunboats into the river York. .
q subsequent movement up the left bank, i
n the direction of West Point, would p,
: us SO far in the rear of the army charge
g with the defense of the lines of ori
n town, that it would have been in peri
3; Gus position. This accomplished, Il
n Confederates must have abandoned Glol
% cester and fallen back hastily upon Ricl
ofl lmond. The execution of the coup Z
l. main had been left to corps of the arm
e commanded by General Mcdowell. Th
d corps was to be the last to embark
q w ashington. and it was calculated that
r-f ought to reach Yorktown in body {
D. it's transports at the moment when ii
10 rest of the ARMY moving by land shou
t, appear before the post from Fortress Mo
le roe. iT aQt fIl5 aainisflf fs6e3'
N =" Instead Of finding it, we received Il
at inexplicable and, as yet, unexplained i
s. telligence that this corps, 50, 900 stron
K had been sent to another destinatio
~ The news was received in the army wi
10 stupefaction, although the majority cou
10 not see the deplorable consequences of t
o. step taken, it must be supposed with +,
a. evil intention, but certainly with an i
is conceivable recklessness Fifteen da
s. before, this measure, although it must s
IT, ways have been injurious, would have be-
Sc much less so.a We might have made, a
D. rangements upon a new basis. TAX
We when it was, it deranged whole syste
rs of machinery fairly at work. Among t
ce divisions of McDowells cerps there "
- one, that of Franklin, which was mo
is regretted than all TIE others, as we'll
I'd acc cunt of the troops themselves as