Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-12-15


than it has ever yet brought together.
TashingtoH Eos safe ff the Army 81 tse
Potomac Advances.
From the Washington Republican, Dscsmbsr IL
SHALL Tns ARMY OF TIE PoToHAC ADVANCE ?
This i great question before ths country, ii
indeed, that csn D. called question, so far IS
its advocates are eosesyned that has but one side
There vas tins When we should have had 40
hesitation in taking the pOpulsr sids Of this
question; but thss time has passed, and the cir
camstarcss which would have influenced our
decision no longer exist
While it is probable that such movemeDt,
under the right military auspices, would have
been crowned with success, still, we are nov
satisfied that, under the circumstances, il il not
safe move, and, therefore, not wise one This
may be easily determined By a trite military
maxim Of universal application. It will be
found in the c5llection Of msxims Of Napoleon,
Tepubished in this country under the ausp;ce.
of Lieatsnant-General Scott, and Is from Monte
cuculh, one of the greatest military authorities
of the age. It is to this effect That the cir
eumstences under which battle Is to be
avoided, or declined, are, when there Is greater
danger to be aPpTeaended from defeat than ad-
vantages 70 be derived from victory"
Now, let Us test ths wisdom of this proposed
advance BY this maxim. Il is admitted that at
least 50 .0O0 men are. or rather were, necessary
for the defense Of Washing ton when the last
advance was made upon Richmond By the way
Of 'hs Peninsula This force wsg evidently
considered adequate to meet the force likely to
80 sent against us with our army menacing
RichDOnd, for it was deemed sufficient, with
the foTtihcstions, to defend this city.
The raid Of Jackson aud Lee into Maryland,
H. -l,.H, Z 4 u q
Virginia in the immediate vicinity, demon
stTstes the fallacy of such an idea.
The invasion of the rebels shows that three
times the number Of troops is required for the
defense of Washington, if asssilsd by the
whole rebel army. .---f --.
The question, it appears to us, which now
presents itself is this;. Can we spare from the
army OF the Potomac sufficient fores for The
defense Of Washington, and still have suffi.
cient force to advance upon Richmond.
If the govornmant aud tho Union generals
can safely answer this question in the sfirma-
tive, then they msy safely offer battle TO the
rebel army between this city and Richmond,
without violating The cardinal maxim Of war
quoted above If they entertain the least doubt
upon the subject, then they move on at their
peril, for, while their triumph over rebels should
60 but little way toward crushing the rebel
lion, their defeat would inevitably involve the
fall Of Washington, and the consequent triamph
Of the REBELLION. The victorious rebel army
would surely follow back our routed and DE-
moralized legi0ns, Oyerwhelm the army Of the
defense of Washington, capture il, and, with
the supplies and munitions which they get here
and the prestige they would thus acquire push
on to the backs Of the Susqaehsuns, and even
to the Hudson.
But it may be suggested, if this reasoning be
correct, that the army of the Potomac will never
be able to move, as the rebels viii oay ave to in
crease their force between this and Richmond to
peTpatually hOldUs in check. As this may be true,
snd still the srmy Of the Potomac play an im
portant part, and even decisive part, Ia the CON
test. The army Of the Potomac "a pronerly an
army Of observation and defence combined
that is to say, an army 20 defend Washington
and menace Richmond whenever the rebels re-
duce their forcs sufficiently 10 enable US, con
Eistently with the cardinal military maxim to
which we have referred to do it. As long as it
compels The rebels to keep up their force, and
protects Washington, it does all that it ought to
ds. under present circumstances.
II is the right wing and the vulnerable center
Of this gigantic military position Of tho -5bsl
Gates which ought to be asssiled aud carried
The remaining wing may then be simultaneously
assailed on both Sides and the front must finally
succumb.
LIST US illustrate by arranging the eombasants
upon battle field precisely as they are now
arranged By their geographical location Let
Us suppose that the Federal left now rested upon
foItitcations which, while it, the lefs, acted
strictly upon the defensive, vendsrsd It not only
impregnable, but supplied e rallyiug point for
the discounted center and right wing, but that
the moment il assumed the offsn'ive it became
useless would any military man in Europe or
America advise that our left wing should attack
before the en6my's center and left should have
been carried
We think not. Yet this appears 70 US to be
the exact policy of an advance of She army of
the Potomac. under existing circumstances
Possibly tho fortunes Of war might favor Us in
such 3 movement. Still, we know that thrse
times already has the tide of battle been against
us ia tAis disastrous campaign.
We shall have more to say upon this important
topic hereafter.