The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-08-09
From the New York Times.
Les N Have Richn0ntl.


vgor Gad determination. Possibly these deslara
tions command somewhat less of confidence
than similar assurances did some months ago
for they have been made to do duty too often
within the last year to be quite as good as new
The people cannot forget that every new Gen.
ersl has advertised the world that, with bis ac-
cession to office. the era of imbecility had pas
sed away: nor 10 it surprising that the notice
should command somewhat less Of confidence
with every fresh instance of its repetition
Still, the county 10 steadily, though slowly,
bringing itself up to the tast1f confding in the
purpose Of the Government u prosecute the usE
to speedy and saccessful end. The appoint.
msnt Of skillful and experienced soldier to
command the army, has done more than any
other circumstance to lift the cloud Of gloom
that was rapidly settling down upon the public
mind for it gives % reason to hope that the
Government secs Ut last the weak point in its
contest with the rebellion, and that it has the
courageous self distrust to apply the remedy
It il from no lack Of money or men it 10 not
from lack Of courage or Of good conduct in the
heid; 1t 10 from NO failure on the part of the
people, that our past misfortunes have arisen
We have placed power enough in the hands oi
the Government to have crushed the rebellion
long ago. But that power has not been welded
yth the skill, the vigor, the concentrated and
determined energy which the task required -
The fault has been with the Government and not
With the people, and it 10, therefore, for the
Government to apply the remedy. rss f.
We trust that in its fresh assurances the
Government does not deceive itself or the coun.
try, - to the nature and character of the great
r oigo. that is required and promised in the
future conduct of the war. We hope its view
Of the subject is broader than that Of some Of
those who have been most clamorous for q
change Of plan. 1t may be very we'll that We
should desist from guarding rebel property
that our armies should live upon the enemy as
they march along-thst we should free bis
slaves wherever We can reach them, and set
them at work whenever their work is needed.
All this is very well-but oil this is also very
little. Il does not touch the heart Of the dis.
ease Il will contribute nothing substantial
to the strength Of our armies-nothing what
ever in the absence Of other measures Of larg-
er compass, to the consummation Of our final
triumph. The greater vigor we need is not
greater vigor in foraging-is not in despoilinp
the fields and folds Of our foe, nor even in set.
ting loose his slaves. It is in fighting him that
We need increased strength. Its greater mil.
itary vigor, greater skill and energy in bring
ing overwhelming forces to bear upon the enc
my, greater knowledge Of his strength, his
purposes and plans-greater Generalship in
the Cabinet and in the field, that the country
requires and must have, if the rebellion is to
be crushed at all. Thus far it is idle to deny,
We have been beaten in just this particular.
With less resources: smaller armies, inferior
arms and discipline and . bad cause, the rsb.
els have contended successfully with the Gov
ernment; and they will do 30 still, unless We
are reinforced not only in the ranks of the
army, but in the character and vigor of the
Generalship which directs its action. s,
It is clear that the rebels stake everything
upon the defence Of Richmond. They have &C.
cumulated there al their force,-and that force
10 much greater than We have been led to SUP.
pose. It 10 there that it must be crushed, and
that, too, without delay. The Government must
lose no time in hurling upon the rebels there
Every weeks delay gives them increased
strength, Judgments the raysges of sickness in
our own ranks,-a diepirits the people BY
postponing the ffuition of their hopes. Foreign
influences, moreover, which are constantly n
work In every direction in aid Of the rebellion.
derive strength from delay, and every month for
which its defeat is postponed. adds largely to
the permanence and solidity Of the Confederate
Government in the eyes of the world. England
and France can scarcely fail to regard our late
repulse before Richmond % strongly indicative
of the ability Of the rebels to maintain them.
selves: and the conviction will be strengthened
by our delay to reverse it almost as much % BY
. fresh and still more decisive defeat. All the
news We get from the South shows that the rebels
ere concentrating all their forces upon Rich
mond, and that they regard this as their political
stronghold, whatever its mere military posses
sion may be worth. We cannot afford to leave
them in it much longer. If there is power
enough in the North to take it, it should be taken
and the sooner the better.
When Richmond falls. the first grand stage Of
the war will be over. If We take it by defeat
ing the rebel army. their military power win be
broken. They will have no troops immediately
available for further operations, and It will be
for them then to decide whether they will &C..
cept al! the consequences Of defeat, or whether
they will convert the war into that desperate
and unregulated form Of resistance which is al
ways most fatal to the inhabitants of the region
where it it is waged. Every nerve Of our Gov.
eminent should therefore be strained to the ut.
most to capture Richmond. 1t is there that
greater vigor 10 required. Not q day should De
lost in pushing forward whatever reinforce
ments our army may need for it's conquest
And, if volunteers 'for three years or the war;
do not come in fast enough, the President should
make special call for troops for this specific
purpose. Half . million men could be raised in
fortnight for six months or year, or for the
taking of Richmond. Thousands and tens of
thousands would rush into the ranks for that
specific object who cannot and will not volun.
teer for the war. Why not give them chance
! for that particular service It is feared that
they would leave the army when they might be
needed most? If they did, and no other re
source offered, draft would speedily supply
their place. But the country wants men aou
whom it can safely spare hereafter. Ten men