Ashtabula weekly telegraph. [volume] (Ashtabula, Ohio) 1853-1873, 1862-12-27
Burnsidt's Report.
HEApoARTERs ARMY OF PoRoMAo,
FALMOUTH, Va, December lQ.

FALMOUTH, hA5 DeceInoer ls.
To II. W. Halleck, General in Chief,
washington-General Il have the honor
10 offer the following reasons for moving
theIArmy of the Potomac across the Rap
pahannock, sooner than was anticipated by
The President, Secretary Of War, or your
self and for crossing at a point differing
from the one indicated by you at our last
meeting at the Presidents During my
preparation for crossing at the place had
first seclectsd. discovered that the enemy
had thrown a large portion of his force
down the river and elsewhere, thus weak.
enening his defences 10 front, aud also dis
covered that he did not anticip te the cross
ing of our whole force at Fredericksburg,
and / hoped by rapidly throwing the whole
command over at that place to separate
by vigorous attack the force Of the enemy
on the river below from the forces behind,
and on the crest in the rear Of the town,
in which case we could fight him with a
great advantage in our favor.
To do this we had 10 gain a height on
: the extreme right of the crest, which height
covered the new road lately made by the
enemy for the purpose Of more rapid com
municatiou along his lines, which point
gained. bis positions along the right crest
would have been scarcely teuable, aud he
could have been driven from them easily by
an attack on his front In connection will
movement on the rear of the crest, how
near we come to accomplishing an object
future reports will, show but for the faul
and unexpected and unavoidable delay i
building the bridges, which gave tn
enemy "a hours more to concentrate hi
forces in bis strong positions, we woult
almost certainly have succeeded, 10 whicl
case the battle wonld have been, in ny
opinion, far more decisive than if we had
crossed ct the places first selected bat a
1t was we came very near success
Failing in accomplishing the main oh
ject, we remained in order of battle tw,
days long enough 10 decide that the enem,
would not come ont of his strong holds t,
fght Us with bis infantry after which WI
crossed 10 this side of the river unuoIested
wIthout the loss Of meh or property.
As the day broke our long lines Of troop
we're seen marching to their different pos
tions as If going on parade. Not th
least Generalization or disorganization e.
isted.
10 the brave officers and soldiers ghe q
complisheaa ;h5 feat Of recrossing the rivt
10 the face Of the enemy, owe everything
For the failure in the attack am respons
BILE. ss the extreme gslIaniry, courage ar
endurance shown by them was never e.
eeeded, and would have carried the poin
had il been possible.
To the families and friends Of the des
can only offer my heartfelt sympathis
bot for the wounded can offer my earne
prayers for their comfortable and 6nal |
eovery.
The fact that decided to move frC
WaFrehton on 10 their line rather again
the opinions OF The President, Secretary
War, and yourself, and that you left +
whole movement In my hands without giViI
me orders. makes me responsible.
! wiN visit you very soon and give u
more de6nite infor nation and finally "
send yoH nag detailed reports, in which
special acknowledgement will be made
sha services Of the different Grand Div
Ions. Division Corps. and my general al
staa department Of the army Of the Pa
omac 70 whom I smso much indebted 4
their support end hearty cooperation.
win add here that the movement wss mat
earlier than yon expected, and after d
President, Secretary and onrself requests
mo act 20 h1 In heste, for the reason thi
re were Supplied much sooner BY the q
isienl s.aa depaEtmepss than was anticipa
81 when ] san you