The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1862-11-14
Letter from Ex.President Buchanan.
HIS REPLY TO GENERAL SCOTT.
BEGINNLNG OF, THE REBELLION

.sBx On "Wednesday last, recelVea tne AV"-
tioaal Iateliwescsr, containing General SCOTS
address to the public. This is throughout an
undisguised censure of my conduct during the
last months Of the Administration i'll re gard to
the seven Cotton States nowsin rebellion. From
our past relations, Twas greatly surprised at
the appearance of such paper. flnone subject,
however, it was highly gratifying. 1t has JUS
titled me; nay, 1t has rendered 1t absolutely
necessary that should no longer remain silent
in respect to charges WHICH have been long
vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by
the responsible name OF Gen. Scott.
/. The first and must prominent among these
charges is my refusal immediately to sarrison
nine enumerated fortications, scattered over
six of the Southern States, according to the rec
ommendation of General Scott, in his sviews"
addressed to the War Department on the 29th
and 3Oth of October, 1860. And it has even
been alleged that if this had been done 1t might
have prevented the civil war.
This refusal is attributed, without the least
cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All
nv Cabinet must bear Inc witness that Twas the
President myself responsible for all the acts of
the Administration; and certain 1t IS that du-
ring the last six months previous to the 29th OF
December, 1860, the day on which he resigned
his office, after my request, he exercised less IN
fluence on the Administration than any other
member of the cabinet MIR. Holt was imme-
diately thereafter transferred from the Post Of
flee Department to that of War; SO that, from
this time until the 4th Of March, 1851, which
was by far the most important period OF the
Administration, he performed the duties OF Sec
retary of War to my entire satisfaction.
But why did not Immediately garrison these
niue fortitications, in such manner, to use the
language Of General Scott, las to make any
attempt to take any one of them by surprise or
coup dc main ridiculous?' There is one answer,
both easy and conclusive, even II other v;llld
reasons did not exist. There were no available
troops within reach which couldbe sent to these
Notifications have attempted military
operation on scale SO extensive by any means
within the Presidents power would have been
simply absurd OF this General Scott himself
seems to have been convinced, for on the day
after the date of his first ''views" he addressed
ION the 3Oth OctobeD supplemental views to
the War department in which he states: 'Ihere
is one (regulaI) company in Boston, one here,
(at the Narrews), one at Pittsburg, one at Au-
eusta, Ga, one at Baton Rouge in all five
companies only within reach to garrison or re-
inforce the forts mentioned in the ''yicws."
Five communication hundred meil--to oc-
cupy and reinforce nine Notifications in six
highly excited Southern States! The force s'with-
in reach was SO entirely Inadequate that moth
ing more need be said on the subject TO have
attempted such military operation with SO
feeble a force, and the Presidential election i'm
pending, would have been an invitation to COL
lsion and secession. Indeed, if the whole A
han Of Dplv cixtppu
thousand men, had been s'within reach," they
would have been scarcely sufficient for this pur-
pose. Such was our want of troops, that al
though General Scott. believing, in opposition
to the opinion of the committee raised in the
House Of Representatives, that the inaugura-
,.tion of Mr.. Lincoln might be interrupted by
military force, was only able to assemble at
Washington, so late as the 4th of March, six
hundred and fifty.three men, rank and file OF
the army. And, to make up this number, e.
ven the sappers and miners were brought from
West Point.
r But why was there no greater force within
reachi This question could be better answered
by Gen. Scott himself than by any other per-
son. Our small regular army, with the ex-
ception Of a few hundred men, were out of
reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been
continuously stationed for years. to protect the
inhabitants and the emigrants, on their way
thitlier against the attacks OF hostile Indians.
All were insufficient, and both General Scott
and myself had endeavored, in vain, to prevail
upon Congress to raise several additional regi-
ments for this purpose In recommending
this augmentation of the army, the General
states in his report to the War Department, of
November, 1857, that s'it would not more than
furnish the reinforcements now greatly needed
asin' Florida Texas, New Mexico, California, Or
egon, Washington (r.l Kansas, Nebraska,
Minnesota, leaving not company for Utah"
And aguin, in his report of November, 1858,
'eThis want Of troops, to give reasonable Sc
curity to our citizens in distant settlements, in
Guiding emigrants the plains, can scarcely be
b 100 strongly stated; but / will only add, that
rs often as we have been obliged to withdraw
troops from one frontier in order to reinforce
another, the weakened points have been instantly
attacked or threatened with formidable invasion"
'9s These views of General Scott exhibit the
crude notions then prevailing even among intelli-
gent and patriotic men on this subject of seces-
sion. a. In the first sentence the General, whilst
stating that ssto save time the right of secession
may be conceded" yet Immediately says s'ths is
instantly balanced by the correlative right on
the part of the Federal Government against an
interior State or states to re-estabsh by force,
IL necessary, its former continuity of territory"
-4-fFor this he cites "Paley's Moral and Polit-
ical Philosophy, last chaptor," Itmay be there,
{, But have been unable to findit.) Whilstit is
ifficuit to ASCERTAIN his precise meaning in this
passage. be renders what he did NOT mean quite
eiasr.in bis supplementary "views." In these
bo Gays ,sJt will be seen that the views only