The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1862-12-19
Barren Victories.

Gen. Halleck, in his official re-
port to the Secretary Of War, has
made one admission or confession
which shows not only that some o.
our claimed victories were really no
victories at all, and that the popu.
lar judgement in regard to them wat
after all, the really correct one.-
Says the Commander.in- Chief
1t ia seen from this brief summary
OF army operations during the las
three or four months. that while onl
soldiers have generally fought with
bravery, and gained many impor
tant battles, these victories have moi
produced the usnal results. In many
instances the defeated foe was not
followed from the battle field, and
even where pursuit was attempted il
almost invariably failed to effect the
capture or destruction Of any part o.
the retresting army. This is a mat
ter which requires serious and care
lul consideration. A victorious ar,
my is supposed 10 be in a condition
to pursue it's defeated foe with ad
vantage, and, during such pursuit
to do him serious II not fatal injury
This result has usually been attained
in other countries. Is there any
why it should not be expected in
this? 1t is easily understood that
in country like that between York
town and Richmon or the thickly
wooded swamps of Mississippi and
Louisiana, that q retreating force by
telling trees across the roads and de-
Istroying bridges over deep and
marshy streams, can efsctnslly pre-
vent any rapid pursuit. The one
in a few minutes, blocks up or de.
stroys roads, which the other ot
clear or repair for hours, or even
days. The pursuer has very little
hope of overtaking his flying foe.-
But this reasoning is not applicable
TO Maryland, and the greater part OF
Virginia. Kentucky and Middle
Tennesso. 1t must be admitted that
in these theaters of war the rebel
armies have exhibited much m ore
nobility and activity than our own.
Not only do they out march us,
both in advance and retreat, hut on
two memorable occasions their cav.
airy have made with impunity the
entire circuit of the army of che Po
tolnsc. If it be true that tn Success
of an army depends upon its "arms
and its legs" ours has shown itself
deficient in the latter of these essen
tial requisites.
Coming from the hero OF CORN b
the compulsory evacuation OF which
if it was such, by the rebels, conlti
tuted his most important achieve
ment in the field, this is really a
most significant ndinportant state-
ment. o its correctness and truth
fitness there can be no question.
whatever in any honest anu candid
mind A victory to be such in fact
must result in the more or less com
plete demoraliz .tion and dispersion
OF the defeated army. Anything
short OF this is q failure according TO
the circumstances, more or less com
plete.
Ye, the evacuation OF Manassas
was heralded by innumerable ton q.
gues through the country as O most
brilliant success. So also the evac
uation o! Corinth. Yet in Meth
er case was there any pursuit
that amounted to anything, OF the
evacuating foe. So in the battle oi
Fair Oaks, Antietsm.and numerous
Others OF lesser note, there was no
following up of successes. In each
case there was "brilliant victory" "
but it was entirely barren of any
immediate and direct result.
True, Gen. llalleck endeavors to
break the farce OF his own statements
by alleging the quantity of bag
gage transported Tor the army as
preventing successful pursuit. This
does very well in general, but not in
any particular csse. The Genera
in command, could most certainly
on the eve OF victory and for the pur
pJse Of pursn,og the beaten enemy,
at once divest his soldiers of all un
necessary impediments. Why was
not thls tone in the cases referred
1t Really the partial plea OF Gen
ualleck does not cover the confessec
failure aud only leaves that failure
whore it properly belongs -on thu
General in command OF the army
gaining a victory. True, in case,
not few, as at Pea Ridge, pursuit
was not possible, and 10 blame at
taches. But in very mapy othel
cases, wherethe circumstances wer'
altogether different, there was and
and could 5e no excuse.
In the light OF Gen Halleck's wei
considered and truthful utterance
we shall have to write down a nun
Der OF our victories which were pro
uouneed complete" ell that coulC
be desired, as in tact not victories q
all. but only repulses OF the enemy
Had we had decisive victories, sucl
as are embraced in the idea Of Gen
Halleck, our military affairs woulC