New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-12-24

n. Every hln'le tDhit VI 'HN"' WV |
FIRE and abont half of them were at different tunes
formtd In cunmn of attack; every man was Pun III
column Of attack that could DO got in. ..
o. Have YOU auy knowledge as TO the force oil the
enemy here ,,o ooo %
A. 1t is estimated at ell the way from 100 ooo 70
900, 000 | think my ELF it was less than ioJoOo'
O. What was the extent OF the casualties on our
eide resulting from all the fighting ,.u.,
a. IL will not be far from lO,Oo0 men kiiled,
wounded and missing
O. What is the present condition OF our troops
here 49,.
A. As far "a my knowledge and information goes,
it is good.
o. DO You or not consider your troops democrat
lied. or the efficiency Of your army impaired, ex'
cept 80 far Is it has been from the loss OF 30 many
troops7 ,,u, -.
A. do not; 1 would add here, that although 81
the time ordered the column Of attack to DO formed
Cd the morning after the battle, / thoaght the
enemv's works could be carried, and adhered to that
opirion during that day. :,
/ af,erward became convinced that that could
not have Teen dons owing TO the great strength OF
the enemy, the time given them for re'e1lorcing,
and the belief also Of our officers tha, 1t ccnd not be
done | accordingly telegrsphed 10 the President OF
the United S:ates that withdrew our army because
felt that the enemys portion could not be carried
Mai. Gen. L. V. Sumner sworn and examined oy
the Chairman.
O. Whit is your position in tho Army OF the To-
A. command the Right Grand Division of that
army consisting of the Second and Ninth Corps
dAmee.
@. OF how many men does your Grand Division
consist.
A. Before the late action it consisted OF about -
men; il ia being increased by new troops as they
come up; it was originally intended to be something
over mon.
O. Would II have been better, in your Judgment.
to have crossed the river and engaged the enemy
Y A.. NNQ 4
4. When Gen. Burnside was ordered TO TAKE
command OF the army hs told me what he proposed
to do that s to march on Fredericksburg instead Oh
Cupepper thought that the wisest plan Tor 'hcse
reasons: Ii We had marched on Culpeppef accord
inr TO the former plan even II We had been success
| fuI. we would have had TO fall back for supplies
whereas by coming on this line, on reaching
Fredericksburg, | confidently expected to take tue
hightS in the rear OF II before tho army
of he enemy would como from CgiPoprer, sud
thought the chance Of making Richmond wns much
better inan by going the other way, because II The
pontoons had been here my arrival, and In tine
Tor me to havs crossed and occupied The nights In
tie rear Of Frederi ksburg before tue e1eEy could
max them we should Lave kept pursuing the enemy
Oil fro the line OF railroad keeping II IN oar own
rossersion and if we could not have preceded them
! in Richmond we couId have kept 70 ciose to them
that they would have bad 10 time to build foitih-
cations.
These were the reasons why thought that II was
a very iudicions measure on the part OF Gen Barn
side TO cnauge bis base OF operations Instead OF ad-
vauciug on Cnilepp.r, which, believe G1n NC
Clellan intended TO have done.
= On my arrival here, on the l7ih Of November, a
battery of artillery on the other eide Of the river
opeuel upon MS tho moment portion of my troops
anpcared Oh the ridge bank Of Falmouth. imnic-
datcly put battery in position, ana ttink iu DOT
70 exceed fifteen ninues they drove every man on
the othe- ,de from thor gins Gnd They ran OIL ana
lett four guns Oh tie held.
NV Orders were 10 advance and hold Falmouth
not 10 cross but the temptation was s'rongfo 60
over and taks those guns the enemy had ci that al
ono time actually gave tue order 20 cross tie lords
y, ell eyeni8 and elze the gnus ana occnpy the ey
bat on reflection l concluded was rafber 30 old
.oIdi3r 10 disobey direct order, ana there was NJ
other reason, too. 1 had Il lutte too much exreri
encc on the Peninsula OF the Consequence OF getting
ss ride Of riverto wish II here. toE tais reason
revoked M order that nis5t.
That came nigh: / rent y note 70 Cen. Bur side,
who was some IN, or ten miles distant, afking hin
if | could take fredericksburg IA the morning,
should 10 able 20 find practicable ford, which, by
the way, knew wien wrote tie note that could
find.
The General replied through bis Chief Of STAFF
that he dld not think II h1fisaJle 10 occupy ffo Ter
lex burg until has communications established,
and on reelection MY, II thought he was iisst,
that il WA prudent aid proper TO have the tidg-1
ready before we occupied rud"ncksDufR.
thiDk | could have Gakel tlAt city and The Nights
on the other vide Vi al nuy time wiihiu three nays
after my arrival here II lie rontoous hed been elc
for do Lot think there was much force Of the
enemy here up 20 that time.
Nh regard TO the delay IN making tho attack,
do not think that tie movement could have teen
made sooner than IL made IL will be recOllected
,hat no preparations bad been made ~ hcqui.
Greek.
When We came across here there were no means
az Acqnia Creek for landing anything there. All
those things lad 10 DO prepared aiterwuid. The
railroad had to DO npleied before we could get up
supplies for this great army.
IL takes M ENORMOUS amount Of Incarceration to
supplying an amy VI 1907 900 men, ana % rot
think i tho General could have made bis piepara-
ilons, could have done al that w.s necessary 10 60
sooner than lie did after tho arrival Lcg, o. Tie
poutoOns.
I The frst proposition 70 cross The river was 70
cross 40 Sni kers Neck. II seemed % uo that you
con scarcely .. river in the face OF an enemy
Of equal or superior force, except by suTprise.
Ineteioro after tie preparations wrso made -
Cross q. SuiclcI's Neck alter a Ilr.c number 81
X agoas had been sent by tho General down there
in order To de eve che enemy, WAS decidedly W
favor 81 throwing the bicg over uete, aud carry
iny the iODD, I'D c.uy Il, boy bGggnse, az Tie
enemy were massir8 tleir uoois down below, ex-
pecilrg we were going to crots below there.
/ was in favor Of cl9taiug tho RAPpahaunock, BE-
cause neither thc Government noT our peolls would
b. sa'Nied 10 bava or Amy rCtlfe from tins p0.i-
ton, O. 20 into Winter quarters until We knew tle
force that was lie other tIio o. t.e yer. aud te
Only way ia which 80 cOl!d have done % @as by
going over there and feeling Of them.
| ihlnk IL was ueaef'nry TO haye made the itt1ca
on that Gly-on StutoIy-.ud - was Jcc.,safy
therefore 10 attack tieif strorg %0,he, end The
pulse Wa, what fiequ uiiy naiy ,us lu campaigns.
lie works were stronger tutn Wg believed them
10 De-; 1 su-s n was "a VIZ iaIDIOls movement
bGi I $50 believe that Wa could cary tie enemy %
wo.ks; tns attack FILLED ewing 10 tls enemy iur-
iiIoltious being uG.n mono .0rnidaDIe tllu We sup
- -I .Arn 10 De.
Q Niii you ,.ecribo those Notifications
-. ] ca.uo. describe them any further than the:
Ttly were tier ulOn ter Ior two or three mere. J.