New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1862-12-24

evening received q nose from Ger. Hooker ana
about 10 o'clock 81 night Gen. Bnieiheld came over
with messago from Gen Hooker, stating that ne
Gen Hoosef felt It his duty TO represent 10 me ire
condition Ill which was leaving the town abd t,f
troopa in it, After n long conversation on tue SUD-
iest with Gen. BuIt,rfe,d, felt that the troops
propo ca TO leave behind would not be aoie 10 ho!d
Tire town. then partially dec ded TO withdrsw inc
whole command, a still more perious operation.
1t commenced raining which 70 some exteat was an
assistance to ne, but was very bud thing N the
moving of the troops. thought over the matter ior
about two hours, and GbouS one O'Clock sent over
an order 10 withdraw the Whole force, which war
successfully Accommodated. There had been great
deal OF division OF option among the corps com,
randers as TO tho place Of crossing, but after ali
the DISCUSSION upon the subject the decisoh 70 coSs
over here was well received, understood ~ sit Oh
them. While on bis way here, General HoohSi'
on the morning of the 20ta OF November,
wrote me q note, which 1 received on me
2lst in which LIE suggested that lie shou'a
cross his force over the RappahaNpocA 81 the ioio
nearest the town. Richards Ford, and more rapidly
down TO Ssxton's alton, and take position 'usi9
! He stated that he had three days provisions, and
tboaght no could meet any force of the enemy III
! front OF them. replied TO him that was always
very GLAD TO take the advice OF my genera o.Ie4'
and should always be 10th TO make move Wlthou'
consulting them Bat j could not approve OK the
move he hsd suggested because, in the first place,
he would have 10 march come thirty-sN mics
to &c. TO Saxton's Station. 1t was RAINING;
and be wonli have TO ford two nVefs,
! which might rise and cut BIN oil from tne
maia body Of the eommand and as Lao no means
o. crossing at Fredericksburg, would be prevented
from sending him supplies aud assistance; ana al
,boucb he might reach Sayton's Station and not
meet any force of the enemy 81 that time, yet It
wonld be a very hazardous movement 10 throw "A
column like that beyond the reach of ito proper sup
mort. this reply sent to Gen. Hooker by an ABIDE
Camp: he thanked me- and said nc bad Only made 1t
T as q suggestion. and the weather, rs II was then
mining of course rendered 1t impossible 10 make
the movement he had suggested.
Q. What reasons DO you assign FOR the failure OF
your attack here
M to the works; the enemy's fire was too hot ior
them; the whole command fought most calamity;
the enemy themselves say they never saw orr men
! fight a. hard as on that day..
o. Were the euemys works very strong
4. Their works not strong works but they
occupy strong positions; i. ia possible that the
points OF attack were wrongly orderedi If such IL
the case, ] csn only say, did TO the best OF my
ability; Il is alec possible that we wond have done
better 10 have crossed at SINNERS Neck; but FOR
. chat | supposed 10 be good reasons felt we bad
better cross here, that we would hp'e more deci-
sive engagement here, aud that we succeeded IN
defeating the enemy here we wonid Nreah up their
whole army, which think is now the wot deeiraoie
$ thing NOT even second 10 the taking of Ricbmond
{ for 4 this army broken up though they might
h defend Richmond for while, they c0ald lot make
J. any proirac,ed defence.
o Q. BY Sir. Gooch--Do understand you 70 gay
Il thai it was your understanding that Gen. lIalle,k
}. aud Gen. Aeigs, while Al your headquarters IN
5 Warfen;On, aud before Won commenced the move.
, uent OF your army cent orders to Waiting On ior
e tae pontoons 10 be Immediately forwarded TO Fal.
I mouth
r A. That was nv understanding; certainly.
e o. In your Judgment could tho pontooDs have
been forwarded time for you to have crossed ne
4 Rappahsnnock when you expected. If all possible
oGorts tad been made by those charged wi!h that
A. Yes Sir, if they had received their orders in
time.
time YOU expected, prevent your crossing when you
extracted TO crcss and interfere with tho success Of
your plan
! A. Yes, Sir
o. Since Won have assumed the command OF the
Army Of the Potomac, have al Its movements been
made by Won according 20 your own Judgment, or
have some of them been directed blythe Generalin-
Chief, the Secretary OF War, or the President Of the
United States
/ A. They have all been mads in accordance with
nv own Judgment. In some cases | have submitted
nv views which have been approved.
/ .. VINO did yol understand was responsible for
/ TIE forwarding OF the pOnt0Ons TO Falmouth
A. understand that Gen. HdccR was 10 give
tie necessary ordeis aud then tie officers who
shou receive the orders were the ones respOuslDo
for tie pom oons coming here. eouid have carried
out that part OF my plan through office of my
| But having inst taken command Of AN army with
which was but little acquainted, 1t was evident
that il was az much az | could attend 10 with the
s.istance ct al my officers to change It's ponioon,
from War enton 10 Frederick burg; and fell, IL
deed expected, that all th- parts % the plan which
were 10 10 cxecnto1 in Washington would - a.
ten ed 10 by tue cliceIs Oi thai place under tie d.
rection OF tie dAcrout Departments to which those
parts Of the plan apler';in.
( @. Did you or did yOu rot, understand that you
were 10 be gesqontOe for seeing taa, these orders
/ were car'isd out
/ A. did not; never imagined for q moment that
bad 10 cary or. auyttug tnat required 90 be done
AZ WasaiI ION. Gen. msi's told me distinctly sew
eral Gays 40, in Nasli g.On that 10 never saw
10Y plan Of operations until showed II to hi.n on
ttAt day.
u O. Do understand Won 70 sny in your statement
tnaI YOU expected Gen. Franklin 10 cary tie point
AZ the cxtfcme i.t Of tho ridge N the rear Of the
town, aud thereby enable our ,r0ops 10 storm .nd
cary tbeir lortiications
! :. did expect bin 10 carry that point, which,
/ being done, wO1Id have placed orr troops ~ toe
Irfar u their cxt.e.ne ieft aud which l thOCpl' ~
.Le time woui1 shake their forces on The rd 90 60
ouch ~ extent that the poiion In front could easily
! b. s'Cr1cd AID carried.
0. 10 what DO you attribute liz failure to accom-.
/ pi.-h THAI
! A. Totle great straI IN If tho position and 'he
accIuu oiiOn oi taa eD-rg's Jrces thcrei | cX-
! pectod tue brlg.l void b. out m two o. three
hour. ai er tieg were uulIsd.1 which Was at abOIt
Id4vioht; TO- cad O. that, iu0e on the iiylt we're
not bGiit until 0'ciOc m the afternoon, aud lad
OILY TIC means OF getting across ono oIgision over
/ Cd, bridge, ol ne ri-lt
/ Co.. FrnA,ins bridges were built about noon,
and were held by cur roopa Oh tie oppoalo hank.
Tai. gave the enemy ice 20 Iu0' to heir forces
which W &c b'ati90ed along the Iiycr from Port
r. wal up 70 tie battlefield. before was abls 10
Imtack. Whle tie men here vDe unfolding tie
Bird es ard pnttirp them mo The wator ibe enc
Iuys fh.yp.sAoo,srs opened a very heavy ire from
the Town. and our batteries opened on the town
Ul'l ID yIow 10 slsGciug them.