Rutland weekly herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1859-1877, 1862-12-11

may nnd IN his SUBJECTS, or any one OF them,
10 commit treason against him, For We are no
more obliged, strictly speaking, TO respect the
right no has over his subjects and dependents,
and the fidelity they owe HIM as such, than
their lives and fortunes, of which we may GER
tainly deprive them by right of war"
He points out mischievous error into which
Judge Curtis had been led;
at is, that no man can, at the same time,
be our enemy, deserving our utmost wrath,
and friend, entitled TO our support and pro-
lection. Rebels in arms against the constit,s-
tioa mast not be spoken Of as men having con-
stitational rights. The whole scheme of
Judge Curtis argument seems grounded in
studied confusion of these two classes of per-
sons and snch solecism, at such crisis,
becomes almost crime" ...
"What, he asks, does the President or COM
mander-in- Chief propose to do2 To restore
the constitutional relations between the United
States and the people thereof, in certain in
surgent districts. More than this he has no
right or occasion to do, and succeeding in this,
his duty will be fully performed.
"What, then, were these constitutional rela-
tons which are now suspended or disturbed?
They were the obligation and privilege to join
in a common government; the obligation and
the right to enjo- protection under the SUI
preme law Of the land.
I -" But was the right to own horses one of the
constitutional relations between the states
No. BUTT was right nevertheless, and its
chief protection was the constitution, though
that instrument contains no mention Of K. e.
ga" Was the right to hold slaves one of the
constitutional relations referred to?
"Gulded by the same principle, we answer,
No! But it was right, nevertheless, enjoying
the same kind and degree of protection.
Though often carelessly spoken of as a con-
sttutional right, it had no special constitution
al warrant over any other property right, but
rested under the same general provision which
reserves TO the states as powers for the regula
ton OF their local concerns not granted to the
general government The same provision pro-
tected or permitted the protection in Georgia
of the right to life, the right to own horses and
the right to own slaves. Constitution. 10;
ther could be said to have a higher warrant
than the other, but the two former had b;oh
natural and traditional authority which The
latter lacked. Yet the privation of those two
by force IN time OF war is not generally con-
sldered unconstitutional, or disturbance of
constitutional relations.
As to the charge that the proclamation in
terferes with the rights of states, he says:
But such is neither the intent nor possible
consequence. The act being military, is capa-
bic OF producing only military result. The
military power suspends, but never DESTROYS
the law. So well has its effect been under
stood for ages, that it has grown into a max
I'M: Inter arma silent 6ges. But though mil
ltary power never destroys the law, its yery
hrst and principal effect is to destroy rights
and things existing under the law. It is this
which constitutes war. 1t may also suspend
the relation between persons and things, under
such circumstances, that the right or relation
can never be restored Thus military power
may seize a mans house, and suspend his
right to ITS occupancy; yet, when the war
ENDS, and the enemy retires from its posses
SION, ne will, If no treaty stipulation intervenes
lind himself in the very fact of peace, reinsta-
ted in all his rights to his property. But if, in
the mean time, the military power has DESTROY
cd the house, the owner will find himself de-
barred from its enjoyment, it is true, but. by
the operation of the necessity which caused its
destruction, and not by anything inherent in
military law or power. The general rule as
to immovable property is, that peace restores
the proprietor to his former rights, unless the
terms of peace prescribe otherwise as to NAV
able property, the contrary rule, that peace
confirms and perfeots the title of the cantor.
prevails, subject to exceptions hereafter to be
mentioned. a. aa
what, this proclamation or general order
proposes to do is to suspend the relation be-
tween robert Toombs, voluntary white resi-
dent of Georgia, who is, by that fact, pre-
sumtively rebel, and Tom, his slave, who is
presumtvely loyal, so far as he is free to be
anything. The civil status of Tom was slay-
cry, because certain civil interests demand il
This does not abolish slavery: it only abolish
es the slave. For though Tom may take ad-
vantage OF his new status to remove beyond
the reach OF future contingencies, yet, when
the martial law is removed, Mr.. Toombs NAV
purchase another slave in Maryland, or wher-
ever else ne can procure legal title, and hold
nm, afterward, In Georgia, under the same
law as before.
The right in time of war, to seize. DESTROY.
convert and TRANSFERRING property of the enc
my,ls uncontroverted. These rebels call these
slaves property; and were it proper for our
government so to regard them, our right to ap-
proprlate or sell them would be undsputed.
One point Of Judge Curtis's cavil against the
action of the commandments is that he
has declared these slaves free, in advance of
his ability to lay his hands upon them, and
convert them into possession ceremony re-
qured by the law of nations to vest in the
captor of enemies goods any transferable title.
10 this several things may be answered; and,
first, if MIR. Lincoln fails to make good his
declaration and promise, the only sufferer will
be the slave, and do not understand that it
Is IN his interest that Judge Curtis complains.
Second, the customary law of nations requires
the belllgerent first to possess himself of his
enemy's property before he can exercise acts
Of ownership over it, not because of any lack
Of right IN the belligerent, bnt because of a
lack Of physical ability to make good his right
in every other way. The right Of the beliig-
erent is, to do his utmost to derive the enemy
Of the use OF his property as to irrational en-