The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1862-12-17
The Amy Movements near Frederick sburg

j
While much of the rationale of the movem ent
of the Army of the Potomac, since it arrived il
front o! Fredericksburg, is yet mystery
sloush is known to satisfy the public that Their
has been gross laundering somewhere. Tn
re)ple were led to believe, when Burnside mad
his sudden and rapid march from the neighbor
hood of Warrenton to the Rappahannock, oppo
si'e Fredericksburg, nearly four weeks ago, ant
Gen. Sumner, in the name OF his chief on the 2 Is
Of November demanded the surrender Of the cit,
before five O'Clock OF that same afternoon, tina
the new administration OF the war in Virginia was
to be characterized by sudden, unexpected, anG
victorious attacks upon the rebels, where they
least looked for it, and were the NEST poorly pre-
pared to meet it. For some reason, however
and possibly, if not . good one at least an un.
avoidable one, the Army of the Potomac congre-
gated 90 the north side OF the Rappahannock
waited until the llth of December, more than
three weeks in pre- paraon to cross the river and
attack the r-bes. At last, successfully, and with
comparatively trihins loss, the whole army
was moved across the river. There was then a
hard days fighting with heavy loss, in fruit!ess
attempt to carry the enemy's position. After
two days more delay, the Army of the Potomac
re.crossed the Rappahannock safely, took up tho
pon,oon bridges, and apparently abandoned the
attempt to dislodge the rebels from their en-
grerchments behind Fredericksburg. This is not
the c,n;luSioa that the people expected and We
thiuk they have abundant reason for demanding
full AMI clear statement of the causes which
have led to such untoward results.
Why, in the first place, was the route by Fred.
eri2lsolrg to Richmond selected instead of the
one by Gordonsville, upon which the army APP
peared to be moving when Burnside took COM
anand Oar troops hal before occupied Frede,
ricksburg, and our Generals knew its strength as
u defensive pos.tlon,-or at least ought to have
known i,,-thoroashly. We supposed, when the
sudden movement to the Ra ,pahanaock was
made, that the purpose was to cross the river
Immediately, and not allow the enemy time to
entrench himself in the admirable defensive posi-
ton back Of Fredericksburg. We presume now
that this was the plan and the failure in accom-.
plishing it has been charged to this Department
that should have provided Burnside with his pom
toons. If this be SO, however, the movement
vas failure a, the start, and should have been
abandoned as soon as it was understood that the
rebels were improving their time to SO good ad-
vantage on the opposite bank. AS it has turned
out, the attempt has failed, as we have often and
d!sastrously enough failed hitherto in the war, by
waiting before the blow was struck until the enc
my was fully prepared to meet and resist it.
1t very likely is true that Burnside had no
choice but to wait, but it cannot be true that after
waiting urtil the heights behind Fredericksburgh
brstled with hundreds of cannon, and an army o!
100000 men, or more, had been gathered to re-
sst his advance, there was no alternative but to
push directly in the face of such desperate odds,
and make breastwork. of his dead aad wounded
in fruitless attempts to storm the enemy's works.
Hs might have moved suddenly to some other
point, it seems to US, as we'll as be had before
moved suddenly to Falmouth. He is capable o
quick movements and sudden decisions, and nigh
have made them available, one cannet help think
ing, in abandoning the advance on Richmond b!