The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1862-12-26
THE WEEKLY PIONEER AND DEMOCRAT.


close the opening between his right and
Gen. Gilbert's left His orders for the
following day were to hold his position,
taking advantage of any opportunity that
the events of the day might present.
The corps of Generals Crittenden and
Gilbert were to move forward at six O'Clock,
and attack the enemy's front and left flank.
The advance on the following morning,
in pursuance of these orders, discovered
that the enemy's main body had retired
during the night, but without any indica-
tons of haste or disorder, except that his
dead and many of his wounded were left
upon the field. The reconnaissance during
the day showed that his whole force had
fallen back on Harrodsburg, where the III
locations seemed to be that he would make
stand. .....
1t will be impossible to form any correct
Judgment Of the operations from this time,
particularly without considering the condi-
ton of the two armies, and the probable
intention of the enemy. ..t d..
The rebel army has been driven from
the borders Of Kentucky without deci-
sve battle. 1t is spoken of as if it were
comparatively insignificant force, and pur-
s1ed by an overwhelming one, which had
nothing to do but to send out patrols, and
gather in the fragments of routed and
disorganized army. The very reverse was
the case. The rebel force which invaded
Kentucky, at the lowest estimates, has
been rated at from 55, 900 to 5000 men.
1t was composed Of veteran troops, well
armed, and thoroughly Injured to hardships.
Every circumstance of the march, and the
concurrent testimony of all who came
within reach of its lines, attest that it was
under perfect discipline. 1t had entered
Kentucky with the avowed purpose Of
holding the State its commanders declar-
ed that to be their intention to the last
intercepted communications disclosed their
plans, and the disappointment experienced
by the Southern press at the result, show
that to have been their purpose.
The enterprise certainly seemed despe-
rate, but it was entered into deliberately,
was conducted by the best talent in the
rebel service, and there was nothing to in
dictate that it would be abandoned lightly.
Some manoeuvreing for advantages and
one decisive battle, were to be expected
before Kentucky would be rid of her inya-
ders. Everything goes to show that the
final retreat of the enemy was suddenly
determined on, and that it was not at the
time to be calculated Oh SIS q matter Of
course. ....
Any movement On my part solely in an
ticipation Of it would only have turned the
enemy in different direction, and any pre-
sumptious attempt TO capture superior
l,,-I ofo 10,
all probabilities, have been more likely to
result in defeat than in success.
The effective force which advanced on
Perryville, on the 7th and Sth, under my
command, was about ffty-eight thousand
infantry, artillery and cavalry. OF these
about twenty-five thousand were raw
troops, with very little instruction or none
at all. The reports show an actual loss Of
upward Of four thousand killed, wounded,
and missing in the battle, which would
leave the effective force about fifty-four
thousand after it. | did not hesitate, there
fore, after crossing Chaplain river, and
finding the enemy had fallen back, to await
the arrival of Gen. Sill's division, which
had marched to Frankfort, and had been
ordered to join via Lawrenceburg and
Chaplintown, whenit was ascertained that
Kirby Smiths force had marched to form
junction with Bragg.
1t was not eXpedient to continue the
pursuit beyond London partly, because it
was impracticab'e in manner to afford
any material advantage partly, because
without any advantage, it took the troop
out of the way, when they were likely to
be required elsewhere. They were, there
lore, promptly turned upon other routes
toward Tennessee. A portion were to be
at Bowling Green, and the rest at Glasgow
on the 31st ult., and thence continue their
march by certain routes. In that position
| relinquished the command of the army
on the 30th to Major General Rosecrans,
in obedience to instructions from the Gen
eral-in-Chief
The campaign, whose history l have
sketched, occupied a period of about TWEEN
ty days. The result can he stated in few
words.
An army prepared for the conquest and
ledge of our means of resistance, and with
a confident expectation of prevailing over
them, has been driven back, baffied and
dispirited, from the borders Of the State.
1t is true that only one serious battle has
been fought, and that was incomplete and
less decisive than it ought to have been.
That it was SO is due partly to unavoid-
able difficulties, which prevented the
troops marching on different roads from
getting upon the ground simultaneously,
but more to the fact that / was not ap-
prised early enough of the condition of af-
fairs on my left. can find no fault with
the former, nor am disposed at this time
to censure the latter, though it must be
admitted to have been grave error. I
ascribe it to the too great confidence of
the General commanding the left corps,
Major General McCook, which made him
believe that he could manage the difficult
ty without the aid and control of his COM
mander
AS before stated, there was skirmishing
along the whole front, but after a certain
hour, for the reason stated, no general en-
gagement was anticipated that day, and
no sound of musketry reached my head
ouartarS NV which the SharnneSs Of the