Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1862-12-24
A SYNOPSIS OF THE REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT or
THE WAR. u ......... ..- ...

Thelate hour at which we received this report,
precludes our giving more than an abstract in
our paper to-day. The entire report viii make
some eight columns, rs We stated yesterday;
more than we can possibly find room for in this
issue. II Is document which will be widely
circulated, and read by the whole people.
General Burnside's testimony commences the
report, but, as much he states refers to ante
cedent facts not materislto the matter in issue,
we give simply those statements Of his before
the committee which relates to his move upon
fredericksburg.
While at Warrenton, General Burnside says:
General Hslleck came down to sec me on the
llth November. On the 9th l made ont plan
of operations In accordance with the order OF
General Halleck, which directed me moi only
to take command Of the army, but also to state
what / proposed TO do with Il. That plan
wrote on the morning of the 9th of November,
and sent II by special messenger 10 Washing
ton. can furnish the committee copy OF
that plan II they desire 1t. I have not got Il
here now. 4n.
Question. State the substance Of IL, If yon
please. That may do as well.
Answer. stated, In substance, that thought
Il advisable 10 concentrate the army In the
nelghborhood Of Warrenton; TO make small
movement across the Rappahannoek as feint,
with view to divert the attention of the enemy,
and lead them to believe we were going to move
In tho direction of Gordonsville, and then to
make rapid movement Of the whole army TO
Fredericksburg, on this side Of the Rappahan.
mock.
The following are his reasons for moving
upon Fredericksburg t.
In moving upon Fredericksburg we would all
the time be as near Washingtonn rs would tho
enemy. And after arriving al Fredericksburg,
We wOnld be at a point nearer to Richmond than
wewould he even II we should take Gorionsvile
On the Gordonsville line the enemy, In my
opinion, would not give us decisive battle al
any place this side of Richmond. They.would
defend Gordonsyille until such time as they
felt they had given MS u check, and then, with
80 many lines Of railroad open TO them, they
would move upon Richmond or upon Lynch,
burg, and In either case the difficulty OF follow
Ing them would he very great
TESTIMONY or oES. SUMNER.
In reply TO the following question, he said
Question. Would It have been better, in youI
Judgment, to have crossed the river and engaged
the enemy earlier than you did, and If SO, why
was IL not donef .f .r ... ... ID
Answer. When Gen. Burnside was ordered
to take command of this army he ttld me what
he proposed 10 do, tint Ia, TO march on Fred
erlcksburg instead of on Culpeper. thought
that was the wisest plan, for these reasons: II
we had marched on Culpeper, according to
tho forme plan, even II We had been success
| hll, we would have had 10 fall back for SUI
plies; whereas, by coming on this line, on
reaching Fredericksburg confidently expected
To take the heights In tile rear of II before the
army Of the enemy wonld come from Culpep
er, and thought the chance Of making Rich
mond was much better than by going the OtheI
way, because IL the pontoons had been here Oh
my arrival, and In time for me 10 have crossed
aud occupied the heights In the rear of Fred
ericksburg before the enemy could mask them
We should have kept pursuing the enemy of
from this II ie OF railroad, keeping IL In our owI
possesslonj md " we could not have preceded
them In Richmond, we could have kept so clos,
to them that they would have had no time L
build 'fortlncatlons. These were the reasonl
why thought II was u very judclous measur
IN the part Of General Burnside 10 change tL,
base OF operations instead OF advancing OIL
Culpeper, which believe Gen. Mcclellan In
! tended 10 have done.
On the night Of the Eth Of November / sen
q note to Gen. Burnside, who was some eigh
or ten miles distant, asking him, II ! shoul,
take Fredericksburg In the morning should
4 be able to ind practicable ford, which, by thl
way, ] knew, when ! wrote the note that
could find. The General replied, through hi
chief Of staff, that he did not think II advisabl
TO occupy fredericksDurg until his communl