Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1862-11-26
GENERAL nccLELLAS,s CAREER.

The removal OF Major General Mcclellan
! from the command of tho army OF the Pnto-
mac is an event which has occasioned much
feeling throughout the country. Some per-
sons have reg arded it as a malicious act OF the
Government. aimed particularly at the man,
and intended TO take the glory of great vic
tory from him al the moment when his tri-
umph seemed to be- assured. Others consid-
er ii measure that could not have been
avoided, in consequence OF the tarly manner
{ in which General Mcclellan has hitherto con-
| Quoted his operations Ii it is misfortune
that General Mcclellan should have been re-
moved just at this time, ii may safely be in
| ferred that the Government believed that il
would have been a greater misfortune If be
had been allowed 10 ihwart the wishes of the
country by his slowness. In one of his early
! speeches, General McClella- declared that the
war should be s.short, sharp and decisive
| Months have since rolled by. and the only
phrase applicable to the contes. is that it has
| been sslong, dull and indecisive." The rebel
| lion that was almost in our power three months
| after General Mcclellan assumed command,
has been, by the procIastnation upon our side,
| given full power to swell, to grow. and assume
! the offensive. All last winter the rebels to
Manassas were much inferior in numbers 10
the army, before Washington. They were al
| lowed to remain as long as they pleased, and
| they abandoned their entertainments at their
own convenience by slow and systematic
| movements, in the course of which they car
| ried Oft everything that they deemed worthy
of transportation. The advance upon Rich
mond. by way of the Peninsula. was conduct
ed with caution which gave TO the rebels
every advantage for procuring reinforcements.
When the army sat down before Yorktown
there were scarcely twenty thousand men
| there; but, while the slow approaches of the
siege were In progress, that army swelled TO
ninety thousand hundred thousand to
whom the back door was left open for entrance
4 E.rr
army was unsheltered, and exposed to storms
and sickness, which wrought fearful havoc in |
its ranks. Had there been ssshort, sharp and
decisive action there, Yorktown would have |
| been taken by assault and, although the loss |
| OF life might have been great, il would not
have been near so heavy the loss of the |
troops by sickness and exposure. The battle |
| OF w Williamsburg-whch was barren victory |
might nave been avoided, and the Fedora
| army would not have been compelled 10 sit |
| down for weeks on the banks of the Chicka |
| hominv as il the task of building bridges to |
cross that stream was serious difficulty to
| the engineer corps. The subsequent bloody |
battle ci Fair Oaks, causing immense loss of |
! life, was not victory to either side its ef- |
! feet upon the campaign. however, was 10 |
cause further delay, during which time the |
| rebels were strengthening their army by heavy |
| reinforcements, hurried forward from all parts |
| of the Confederacy. Whilst the Federal ar |
! my was wasting away under the fevsrs of the |
swainps and the heat of the climate, vast |
| rebel force. treble that of Mcclellan, was per- |
| mtted to be collected together, organized and |
| put into the most effective condition. By the |
delay which had interviewed, at every step |
| from Fortress Monroe to Malvern Hill. the |
enemy benefited; and when it suited him |
| to show his intentions by Stuart's raid upon
| the Federal rear at White House Station aud |
Garick's Landing, General Mcclellan was |
| compelled to accept the broad hint and pre-
pare Immediately for the change of his base, |
which was hurried up by the attack upon his |
| right flank at Mechanicsyilie and Coal Harbor |
on the 26th OF June. The incidents of that |
bloody retreat are even now but imperfectly |
known by any official report OF the series of |
battles from the Commander-in- chief The |
confused accounts OF newspaper correspond |
ents, ungifted with ubquity, are all that we |
have to rely upon. The true history of those |
terrible six days is yet to be written. Bnt we |
know enough 10 understand that, while the |
logged resistance OF our troops bloody |
impeachment to the enemy, there was no sub |
stanfial success upon our side before the /
dreadful finale at Malvern Hill. When the az
| my reached the James river, and the faint /
fOot-sOre and battIe-worn soldiers threw them.
selves wherever they could find resting place /
upon the earth, the only victory which we had |
was that the army had reached place OF ret |
uge, from which II was enabled in time, BY |
the diversion made by General Pope's ope- |
rations upon the line of the Rappallannock to |
make a safe retreat. The whole PeuinsuIar I
campaign was a fearful. costly faiIuIe-custy /
III precious lives: costly In stores, arms and |
equipments, which were destroyed costly in |
the maintainance OF troops which achieved /
nothing towards '.driving the enemy to the /
wall'' or ssbreaking the back bone of the re- |
bellion." 1t is net offset to this failure of /
Mcclellan that Pope also failed and was driv-
en- back to Washington. That officer blames |
the disaster at the second battle of Bull Run |
to the tardy manner in which reinforcements |
within the power of General Mcclellan to send |
him were put forward. Those reinforcements |
might have saved the second day at Bull Run. |
They only served to make the defeat more |
signal.
When General Mcclellan was again placed |
IN command his operations in MARYLAND al |
though much more energetic than any in |
which he had yet figured, were not sufficient
ly swift. The Commission which has lust |
closed Its inquiries in relation to the loss of |
Harper's Ferry have put it upon record that |
the march OF General McCle Han alter the fleet
footed "Stonewall Jackson was only sir miles
day. They say that if he bad been as swift |
as he might have been Harper's Ferry could |
not have been surrendered even by its imbe-
clie commander. The loss of Harper's Ferry |
is scarcely compensated by the battles OF |
South Mountain and Antietam. The latter
might have been brilliant victory had il been |
followed up; but after it was fought General |
Mcclellan kept his reserves idle, and did not
move until the foe had completely flown |
that even his rear guard escaped. Possibly |
the fall OF Harper's Ferry interfered with Gen. |
eral McCleilan's plans to ssbag the enemy 20 |
but as military Court has declared that the |
post could not have been captured il the Gen |
eratin chief had been prompt, he seems him |
SELF to have been responsible for the disaster
Alter the battle OF Antietsm the duty of |