The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1862-08-03
OPERATIONS AT PORT ROYAL.
Letter from Brigadter General tt w
Sherman.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE Few YORK HERALD.

Letter from Brigadier General Tt w.
Sherman.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE Few YORK HERALD.
.-- WASHINGTON, July 20, 1852
An editorial in your paper OF yesterday condemns the
operations Of the land forces OF the Southern expedition
70 such extent and such grounds as to force TO
departure from the silence have hitherto studousy
maintained against the repeated and most unjusthable
attacks that have boon made upon my In some Of
the public journals. not here going to enter upon
defence my any farther than to hastily reply TO
of the accusations and nsnuatons which You have
at TO make against myself and the force comman ded
for whenever am, officially or otherwise, informed or
obtain any tangible evidence that my course was un
satisfactory to the government shall be prepared 70
justify every act OF commission or omission that may be
charged against me, and entertain no fears but the
investigation will result In the acquttal o.
myself and my command Of the charge OF
.'casting discredt upon our army and IT, you say,
the great Union Of the nation have become dis
prited with the result Of the expedition think 1t will
be found that those masses have been strangely deuded
probably by too csntious pross. into false notion that
the expedition Of 900 men, intended for special and
secondary though important object was 70 overrun and
conquer tho whole South.
The expedition not fitted out to operate on Charles
ton and Savannah Here you have promised your argu-
mont with grand error that is sufficient Of itself to
The object Of the expedition to ssze upon and hold
two harbors Southern coast sufficient for depots
and harbors OF refuge for the vessels of our bockadng
squadron in pcrious storms At that time we had pos
Of not single nook coast from the Chesa
psake Key West except Hattcras Inlet, which would
swer such purpose The blockade whose efficiency had
been questioned by the Powers Of Europe was thus to BE-
made effective
The two harbors were not definitely determined on
afta thA rtu M
may be said that the expedition fitted out with the
disadvantage Of total ignorance OF the localities where
We might be called upon to operate.
On the capture Of Port Royal (Which agree with you
covered our navy with gory"), the prescribed duties
Of the land force foriy that valuable harbor
that it might be securely held depot and refuge for
navy and army with the least possible FORCE and to
cooperate at the same time with the feet in the capture
occupation of tho second harbor fixed upsn The land
force that portion set apart for the purpose was in
readiness proceed at to Fernandna and the only
the expedition did not proceed does not attach
to any want Of will on my part-which you assert
belongs exclusively to the navy Indeed, it will re-
qure no assurance from me 70 provo that the
most intense anxiety existed on our part to got
of as possible. This second point Of attack
was srsore not Savannah Charcston but had 1t
bssn either, the reason-necessary controlling
one-that rendered immediate advance impossible,
would still have existed. This obstacle not removed
until early In December when indeed certain special in
strucon having received by the naval commander
at the same time virtually prohibited the movement at
that time, and required its stu further posponement.
The fine harbors. besides Port Royal which had provi
denally fallen into hands, and boon occupied and
secured by Notifications in the meanwhile rendered the
continuation OF the expedition to Fernandina. as first
planned perhaps OF not much Importance but still
the army held itself lin readiness to proceed at any
into possession early in March without battle and
the result Of mere demonstration OF the combined
An T an0 works a Hilton Head against land
attack were at cnce commenced and prosecuted
with that activity and energy by Captain Gmore Of the
Engineers aud Brgadior General /. l. Stevens and his
brigade TINT elected my sincerest and warmest common
datons The necessary and important works In St. Helena
Soand and Tybee Island were also prosecuted with
c1mmcndable activity and although the expedition 70
consist OF 900 men, always in readiness TO start at
December considered myself condition. though the
works not entirely completed TO remove tho bulk
OF our force from the islands other sphere Of
action, had we the means OF moving them.
In regard to your structures upon my dsgracefu In
seyy IN stopping % oTy sand banks aaa % 1o1
| need no reply from me. Had ! been sufficient
| ly vain and prssumptuous to resort to the Don
Quxotsism Of landing my forces, completely raw
| and cooped up in crowded ships for the space Of
fifteen and twenty days and maching straight into the
interior (even had the means OF doing SOY, without
gard TO establishing any point OF support or base OF sup
plies, say nothing Of the immense labor that the cha
racter Of the shore required to unload ships and all
this too. beyond and in sminenty hostile country,
should have deserved straight Jacket or prompt dis
say this whether the enemy had few or many troops 10
immediate hand TO oppose u.s. viii you tell mo what
point could have occupied interior Nhorc the
enemy could not have easily concentrated fifty thousand
men against ma in less time than renforcsmens could
have reached me from tho North! DO you know how
many troops actually did concentrate at different points
| between Savannah and Charleston during tho first
| three weeks Of our occupation What right had |
to convert expedition go, up for special object
| column entirely secondary IN its chafacter-into
principal army in tie field, and that, too, beyond
sea? Would the government have supported meS Would
course, think you have entered into tho general
plan OF the campaign Until you can answer these qnes
would respectfully recommend you TO iclloc upon
i The oil wuu lOl In
well in the public estimation In soating himself with
a small body 0! troops in hos.c country something
less than d thousand miles from his reserves and with
fortified base 10 prevent his being driven into the
Of reverse and uncertainty dependent upon bis
transports FOR support II such course should result as
il most likely would; IN disaster would prefer the
rrowns OF the holdes Ignorance, and the malice OF tho
wanton attacks 10 the severe bet honest punish
ment due to offence. Hence, you may be assured
that such immediate advance you suggest would
posing that had the means Of navigating tie creeks
aud illand passages, and had made an attempt on
point not more distan. than savannah, what pros,
have been available al that time for such oporaion after
doducg the force which was bound To keep hand for
Fernandins and that, too without the assistance OF gun
boats? l say without the assistance OF gnr5oats for II,
whole surrounding country had oesn rsconnoter
ed, and it's opog Apply and photography become known
was decided By the navy impraccabie for gunboais 10
the Savannah river from either the north or south
side and ascend 20 savannah in tho month OF January
what was the state q the case in November when we
entirely ignorant Of the nature OF the obstacles,
whom passage existed on the north side for thing
but rowboats, and not a IN the cot tho army
knew OF any passage the south sdc3 The fact naked
ever, Isl that had 10 means of operating on that
city, whether by the Savannah or Vernon river.
You speak Of the fow troops oppose When did
that fact IL true become known Certainly not til after
the event The fact Is could not have known with any
certainty what troops the enemy had Further than tho
fac-whch ascortsned letters 2czed Mt Hilton
Headthai there we're 10 900 troops Charleston and
harbor three four days before the capture Of Port
Royal everything remained for long time in profound
mystery. The contrabands the only Of
information and their accounts in the way Of numbers
wore always strangely conflicting as 10 be unworthy
Of the least attention. SO far savannah con-
cerned enabled to obtain the least reliable
Information until early In January.
In consequence Of tho special character Of the cxped
ton no means Of transportation taken along with
which . operate n tho Interior. All transports were
and inland passages except few surf boats furnished
for landing purposes Evon the few light draugh steam
boats that taken along TO facilitate rapid landing
in face OF the enemy either lost in the terrible
gale tho expedition encountered or were compelled
o.