Litchfield enquirer., 1862-05-29

1 COMPRISING WITH REBEL OFFICERS The Yorktown correspondent of the New York Post has conversed with Capt. Conner O Mississippi, Capt. Newton and Capt. Lee 0 Virginia, who were lately taken prisoners, res pecting the war. He says they are educated and courteous men, and gives the following in teresting report of the conversation. It shows how they view things from their side: Question:" Why was the official report oi the battle of Manassas so long withheld from the public by your generals ?'''
 Answer" Principally because Gems. John ston and Beauregard did not consider expedient to disclose the strength of our force at that bat tie. Your official and newspaper reports had greatly exaggerated the strength of our army at that battle. It was not the policy of our com manders to disclose the true strength of our force Jas our army of the Potomac was designed as an army of menace merely, and not of attack. The of our president was not to attack Washington but to so continually threaten it that you would be obliged to hold large army in the vicinity to protect the city, thus obliging you to withdraw your troops from other points of attack at the south or vest or preventing you from reinfor. oO dearly won that the official report of it at an early day would have given your troops more encouragement than ours.'
 O." Why did Mir. Davis reject the policy of Gen. Beanregard in regard to the attempt to take possession of Washington" m A" Because we could not have held th5 capital so long as you had the possession of the Potomac. It was the policy of Gen. Beauregard and other of our leaders to capture that city and liberate Maryland"
 O." What Regiment of our army flo ught.the most gallantly at Manassas?
 A--"The l4th Brooklyn and Griffins and Rickett's batteries fought by far the most gal lantly. That is the opinion of of our officers e." What errors do your officers think we committed at this battle that caused us to lose the day?
 A-"If you had fought the battle Thursday ol Friday, you would have won it. The delay at Backburn's Ford was fatal to you. You made great military error in allowing Johnston to reinforce Beauregard. You fought the battle by regiments, while we fought it by brigades and divisions. There were many times before one o'clock ln the afternoon of that day in which you might have won the battle if you had viz orously attacked our centre, since the centre of our line of battle had become very weak by req son of the continual achievements Gen. John ston was obliged to send to the left which was so fercely pressed by your right. It was SC. verely contested battle nyour side. You sol ders fought gallantly, but they were not com handed"
 o." Why did you not followup our retreat ?''
 A" We had no idea of the completeness of our victory at the time, and besides we were in no condition to follow up the retreat.'
 WHY MANASSAS WAS EVACUATED.
 Q-"Why did you evacuated Manassas?"
 A" Because Gen. Mcclellan had so strong ly fortified the City of Washington that fifty thousand of his well disciplined troops could as well have held the position as two hundred thou sand Our generals knew that he designed, as early as Febuary, to send large part of his force by water to some point near Richmond, to take that city. It was the desire of our con- manders, during all the winter, that Mcclellan should attack Manassas, but as he avoided to dc so, it became necessary for us to secretly with draw our forces, so that we could concentrate them at once in the vicinity of Richmond, inas- much as your army, by water, could reach that city much sooner than ours could fall back by land. Our evacuation is considered by our off, cers as the most masterly movement in the his tory of war;
 O." What was the number of your troops at Centrevle and Manassas during the winter"
 A" do not feel at liberty to state the num- Der. However it was greatly exaggerated by your newspaper reports"
 THE REBEL FORGE AT YORKTOWN.
 O." What was the number of your troops at Yorktown and Gloucester when our army first made its appearance ?"
 A" Not far from ten thousand" O. -"Why did you not evacuate at once?" tn time for the concentration of troops from all quarters about Richmond. We were strongly reinforced at Yorktown during the time you were pushing forward the siege supposing it was the policy of Gen. NJ Clellan to land sufficient force insthe rear of Gloucester, to take that place, and then if possible to cross the York river and cut off eur retreat. 1: was the expectation that this might be accomplished, with the aid of your gunboats which determined the council of war te evacuate Yorktown and Gloucester" e." Does not the frequent retreat of your troops tend to discourage and demoralize them ?'' A-"Not in the least. The have the utmost confidence in Gen. Joe Johnston. He has got them out of so many worse scrapes that they now believe that whatever he does, no matter what is purely strategical. Our forces retreated from Yorktown in good order. History will so record it. Our small loss in the retreat against ese to this-That division of your army which pushed forward on land seriously threatened our rear guard but the delay in getting up your troops bylwater to West Point allowed our army to es cape.'
 O." What was your force at the time you evacuated Yorktown? P A" Of course am not at liberty to state the number of our troops, but the strength of oul army in Virginia to-day is much larger than at any other time during the war. Every inch ot ground after your army reaches the vicinity of Richmond will be contested by at least an equal force to your own'
 THE VANDERBILT vs. THE MERRIMAc.-lt was designed that the steamer Vanderbilt should run down the Merrimac in case the latter could be disposed of in no other way. The following cal eulation will show with what force the former would strike the Merrimac, if moving at her av- craze speed: The dead weight of the Wander bilt is, in round numbers, 4000 tons, and her av- craze speed is at least fifteen miles an hour- That is equal to 6O,OOO tons moving at the rate of one mile an hour which, in turn, IS equivalent to 300 tuns moving at the rate of 200 miles an hour. The velocity of cannon ball may be ra- ted at 200 miles an hour. The Armstrong gun one of the heaviest in use carries 100 pound ball. Three hundred tons is equal to six thous and pounds In other words, the Vanderbilt would strike vessel like the Merrimac with 6 force of six thousand lOOpound balls from al 1 Armstrong gun, at the same instant and in the same spot. A further calculation shows that the momentum of the Vanderbilt would be equal tt 1900 balls from the Union gun on the Rip Raps each one ot which weighs about 800 pounds. -~> >
 A few weeks after a late marriage, the dotinl husband had some peculiar thoughts when put