Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-02-12


side of the Cumberland river, is said to have
been, in a military point of view, untenable
We had entrenchments, it is true; but they are
said to have been utterly indefensible against
an attack by a superior force. We had twelve
pieces Of artillery-but against the long range
guns of the enemy they were useless A deep
and rapid river was behind our army. and the
means of crossing it were a small steamer and
three ferry fats, only sufficient in all to trans
port st one carrying three hundred men. The
country around was utterly devoid of provi-
sions. The most untirinl efforts of commissa-
ries had been only availing to drain the country
for twenty miles southwark of every article for
purchase; while on the immediate road to
Knoxville, enough provisions could not be
team. A more indefensible position than Beech
Grove, 1t is said, could hardly be imagined as
long as an enemy was in front. Mill Spring
could haye been better defended; but even
there, the entire absence of facilities for sup
plies in the rear, and the stoppage of commu-
nication with Nashville by the river, would
have compelled an advance at a very early
date, or retrogsde movement, even had no
enemy been threatening A movement of one
kind or the other was military necessity.
Amid these unpleasant facts word was
brought to Gen. Crittenden Of an advance by
the enemy-say of eight to ten thousand men
from Columbia, and OF a large force from Sumer-
set, evidently with a view to storm our in
trenchments. The result may be imagined
had this been attempted; for we were without
suitable means of transportation across the
river, and all avenues of retreat could have
been effectually cut off by the enemy crossing
above and belew Mill Spring. Gen. Critten-
den Is stated to have had bat three courses to
pursue Ito at once fall back ingloriously, and
retreat without q blow; to stay still and be
stormed out, and surrender whenever the
enemy approached be starved out and sur.
render within q week; or else to make an alb.
vance movement into Kentucky. The entire
army at Mill Spring had been reduced to a
simple ration of beef and a half ration of corn
the latter eaten as parched corn, and not is.
sued as meal.
Under these circumstances, andwith the re.
port of the advance movement of the enemy
both from Columbia and from Somerset, q
council OF war was held on Saturday evening
Jan. IS. With 5000 brave men behind them,
the council of war thought that they could
drive before them twice that number Of north
ern hirelings. The council is positively said
to have been unanimous in its decision. Both
brigadier generals, all the colonels, and the
captains Of artillery and independent COM
panies, viewed the matter in the same light.
The alternatives presented were an iuglorious
retreat without blow, an impracticable de-
fence of intrenchments, ending in q surrender
or an eventual starving out, with a similar re-
suit
At II o'clock at night our columns moved
and marched ten miles before break of day
There they met the enemy, drove them back
half mile, three times charged them, and as
often swept their adversaries from the field
We brought into action less than 900 men
Almost one-half of the 18th Mississippi regi-
ment-commanded by Lieut.. Col E. C. Walt
hall-fell upon the bloody field. Over 200 of
the 440 the 18th brought into action fell in
battle. II is said that this gallant regiment
fought with the enemy almost at ten PAGES
and, for fifty yards in their onward charge,
had to walk over the dead bodies of Yankees
The battle is said to have been turned by
the untimely reinforcement of the federal
troops. Instead Of ten regiments opposed to
rs, We had to fight nearly thirteen, and that
with only seven regiments on our side, and
these reduced to one-half their ordinary size
One reliable fresh regiment at the turn of the
hght might have secured for US the battle, and
broke efectually the enemy's recruited ranks
AS 1t was, regiment after regiment of the en-.
envy deployed into the field. 1t was not until
the breaking of our cavalry, communicating q
false alarm to some Of the Tennessee troops
and the pouring in of fresh regiments of the
enemy, that retreat was made, nor was il
ordered by the General commanding.
The retreat was made in good order, and by
three O'Clock in the afternoon our army was
we're cannonading was commenced by the en-.
emy, making it evident that their superiority
OF guns could eventually drive our forces from
their camp.
Between dusk and dawn our entire armv
was taken across the river, with the loss mere.
| ly of the artillery, and worn out tents and
camp equipage. Long before tho enemy
Il dreamed Of the evacuation, our forces had
gained an available point to resist any onward
movement of theirs. The abandonment of the
artillery was a necessity. The approaches 10
the river on both sides were very high and
precipitous; the roads almost belly deep in
mud to horse, and the conveyance of the
guns across would have exhausted hours and
means imperatively demanded for the men.
The army camped on Monday night two miles
beyond Monticello, the sick and wounded hay-
ing been sent on before. From Monticello i,
marched by easy stages to Livingston, where
1t spent Saturday, the 25th, and reached Gains
boro' Sunday evening. Here Gen. Crittenden
is sencamPed for the present, fully supplied with
provisions, and busy with the work of reor.
ganization. One steamer has already arrived
from Nashville with stores and camp and gar.
rison equipage, and another is daily expected
Our informant is satisfied that Gen Critten
den was placed in an emergency of dific alt
choice, and that the battle, however disastrous,
saved his command from the alternative of sur.
render or fate Of equal severity.