Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-09-06
pho Fa,ure.

/ From t17 Richmond Examiner.
The Obi Ct OF war IS honorable peace. Merely
70 defeat an enemy IS not to conquer q paciica-
ton NJg Is driving an invader oil the invaded
soil the most adequate means Of preventing
further aggression. The true mode Of securing
peace Is to exhibit the power Of enforcing It.
The sole object of the South in the present
war, Is peace. She desires no conquest She is
aTerse in the abstract TO carrying desolation into
tde c2nhaes OF neigh60riBg people. She
lights for immunity from aggression Suppose
( the present armies of the North are defeated
and snnihiiaied by the armies now msrshaled
under Cur banners. Tha5 country Is raising
new army Of SIX hundred thousand, aud our
own armies viii be diminished more than one
half bT She efforts it IS now putting forth. SIP
pose we still should have one OF twO hundred
thousand men left after all the casualties Of the
present campaign, with which TO oppose the new
Northern levy Of six hundred thousand. The
very tac5 OF this small force would tempt furtAer
aggression; whi.s if we bad an army of half 8
million Of men organized, that fact alone would
secure peace without striking q blow.
30 long as we seem TO be unprovided with
large army, we tempt the enemy to co1tiuuad
hostiIities. We fores.aH sll bis views wben we
sinply display Az army of half a million Of
men. The existence of such an army would
be equivalent 10 an sctusl peace. It is surpris-
icy Of the South IN this paipsble light Here
after" IN the event of 81 emergencies not now
anticipated" the necessity for two hundred and
fifty tn usaud men may be % suddenly devel-
opgd during the recess of Congress :" there !
fore, "ou. of q wise foresight" " e means should !
exist for calling forces into the field" Such is |
the Presidents language to Congress. " Sud /
denly" developed this necessity for an army
may be, indeed but what does "a wise fore |
49,
sudden emergency than toe scsual organization /
of an army Of reserve, in advance Call the |
new army an army of reserve; leave it in It's |
camps Of instruction, close to the sources Of
supply; hold 1t back from sctve campaigns |
inactive in the interior, if y0a choose; but in 1
the name Of all that is wise and prudent, do not
neglect the organization of this reserve force.
It may not be necessary to bring this force /
into the held it may never be confronted with |
the enemy; i may turn out to be dead charge
upon the Treasury, as respects actual fighting; /
but notwithstand ng all this, the fac. that We
have = quarter or half million of men in reserve
viii do more TO bring Yankees to terms and
frigb,en them from renewed invasions of our
soil than all that cur active armies can accom-
plish, even if they march into Philadelphia or
to 3 jston. The expense Of organizing this army
of reserve viii be the wisest expenditure Of the
war. It may cost Us hundged millions, but it
will save Us five hundred. Il may-cest our
country the services of valuable citizens in It's
economy; but in preventing aggrs5-
sion, it will save many bloody battles and hosts
Of valuable lives. Ii that celebrated maxim of
Washington, in peace prepare for war, be
true, no = much mos wise will it be, in war to
lO.d the enemy in awe by the amplitude of
your preparation to meet him How shall we
provide for a suddenly developed" necessity
for an army, except By organizing that army in
advance Of the deveLopment7