Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1862-06-06
BEAUREGARD's REPORT OF THE BAT.
TIE OF SHILOH.


or Pi'tsburg Landing, as we call it, is given
in full in the New Orleans papers. We have
room only for extracts from the vainglorious
document Beauregard states that having
learned it to be the intention of the federals
to cut off his communication in West Tennes-
see with the Eastern and Southern States he
determined to foil the design by concentrat
ing all his available force at and around Cor
inth. Calls we're made upon the Governors
Of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama and Lou
isiana for more troops, while Generals Polk,
Bragg and Johnson Joined him with their
commands. Beauregard continues:
II was then determined to assume The ogcsepe and
strike sud 5oio the eteBy ~ position, under Gen
Gra,H, the bank Of the Tennessee at Pusburg
and In the direction Of the Savannah, before he
be advancing for that purpose by rapid marches from
Nashville via Columbia About the same time General
johnson advised that such operation confurmed
to the expectations Of the President.
BY rapid and vigorous attack on General Grant it
was expected be would be beaten back into his transports
and the river captured In time 10 enable profit
by the victory, and the all the aud
munitions that would fall into hands in such
before the arrival Of General Buells army on the scene
IL was never contemplated howeyero retain the posi-
tion thus gained and abandon Cornth, the stategee
point Of the campaign.
Want Of proper officers needful for the proper organi
ration Of divisions and bfgades of army brought thus
suddenly together, and other difficulties in the way Of
enecufe NfganzauOu, delayed the movement until the
hBht OF he ~ instant, when " was heard from reliable
quarter that the junction Of the onemys armies
at hand 1t was then, at late hour, determined that
the attack should be commenced at once, plete
and imperfect preparations for such grave
and moment1us adventure. Accordingly that night At
one O'Clock A. NJ the preliminary orders TO com
madeis Of corps were issued for the movement.
On the following morning the detailed orders Of the
movement, were issued, and the movement after some
delay, commencedthe troops being in admirable spr
its. Il expected should be able to reach the
nys lines in time TO attack them early the 9th inst
The men, however for the most part were unused to
marchng,-the roads narrow and traversing densey
wooded country, became almost impossible after
rain storm the night Of the 4th, which drenched
the troops in biyouae hence forces did reach
the intersection the roads from Pitsburg aud Ham
burg, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, until late
Saturday afternoon
1t then decided that the attack should be made n
the next morning at the earliest hour practicable, iu
accordance with the orders Of movemen'-'ha, is in
Thirty minutes after O'Clock our lines and CO
lumns were in motion, all animated evidently by pro-
missing spirit The front line engaged at once but
advanced steadily, followed in due order with equal
luton and steadinCss by the other lines, which
brought suooessvcly into action with skill judgment
and gaantry by the several corps commanders as the
enemy made stand, with his masses rallied for the
struggled for his encampments. Like an Alpine avail
anche troops moved forward despite the determined
resistance Of the enemy until after O'Clock when
we were in possession Of all encampments between Owl
and Lick creeks but Nearly all Of his field srle
ry about thirty flags eoors and standards over three
thousand prisoners, including division commander
tGen Prenussl and several brigade COMMANDERS thou
sands Of small immense supply Of subsistence
forage aud munitions Of and large Of
Of tTansportationa the fruits Of complete
yctory-such indeed rarely have followed the most
successful battles for never army well proyid
ed as that OF our enemy.
The remnant Of his army had been driven in utter dis
order to the immediate vicinity Of Pittsburgh, under the
we remained undisputed masters OF MS 7electe ad
mrably provided cantOnments after twelve hours
Of obstinate conflict with his forces who had been beaten
from them and the contiguous covert, but only by su
stained onset Of all the could bring into action.
Our loss was heavy as will appear from the aeeompa
nylne te'S'I' ma,Aeu our iI m & @
the field at $50 p. n after having shown the highest
qualties Of the commander and personal intrepdity
thatinspired all around him, and gave resistess mpu
sion TO his columns at critical moments.
The chief command then devoved upon me- though at
the time greatly prosrated and suffering from the
prolonged sickness with which had been afflicted since
early in February The responsibility which,
in ug physical condition. would have gladly avoided
though cast upon when our orces were ssfully
pushing the enemy back upon the Tennessee ycr and
though supported the immediate field by such corps
commanders Major Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee
and Brigader General Breckinrdge commanding the
It after six O'Clock p r as before said when the
enemys last position carried, and his forces finally
broke and sought refuge behind commanding eminenoe,
covering the Pittsburgh Landing not than half
mile distant and under the guns Of the gunboats. which
opened on our eager columns hfTce annoying hfe
with shot and shell Of the heaviest desrption Dark
close at hand Officers and men we're exhaust
ed by combat Of over twelve hours without food and
aded by the march Of the preceding day, through mud
and II therefore impossible % collect the
rich and opportuue spos Of scattered broadcast
the field left in possession, and mpracticabe to
make any effective dispositions for their removal 10 the
l accordingly established my headquarters at the
church Of Shiloh in the enemys encampment, with Maj
Gen Bragg and directed troops To sleep their
arms in such positions in adyanc and rear corps com
manders should determine, hoping rom news received
by special dispatch that delays had been encountered
by Gen Buell. in his march from Columbia, and that his
ain forces therefore could reach the field Of battle
TO Gen. GTAnts shattered fugitive forces
from capture destruction the folio wing day.
During the night the rain fell torrents adding TO the
discomfort and hArrassed condition OF the the
my, had broken their rest by discharge, at
tsured intervals, Of heavy Shells thrown from the
gunboats therefore the wing morning the troops
under my command were not in condition TO cope with
equal force Of fresh troops, armed aud equipped like
Adversary in the possession of his depots
and sheltered by such an auxiliary as the enemys gun
boats
About o'clock on the morning OF the 7th Of April
however, hot FIRE Of muskey and artillery opened from
the enenys quarter advanced line, assured me Of
the junction Of his forces and the battle ragged with
fury that satisfied me that attacked by largely
superior force But from the onset troops, noiwh
standing their fatigue and losses from the battle Of the
day before, exhibited the cheering, veteran like
stoadness On the right and center the enemy was re-
pulsed in every attempt he made with his heavy column
in that quarter Of the field the left, however and
nearest TO the point ofhe arrival Of his einforcements
he drove forward line after line OF his fresh troops which
were met with resolution and courage Of which our
country may be proudly hopeful.
Again and again troops were brought to the charge.
back their foe But hour by hour thus opposed 10
eny constantly reinforced, ranks icere erP ibiy
thfnHed der the uRceaSig, ioih ring re of The enc
my and by twelve meridian eighteen hours Of hard fight
ing had sensiby exhausted large number, my last re-
had necessarily been disposfd Of and the enemy
evidently receiving fresh renfoICements after each
Tepulse accordingly about one r NJ, determined to
withdraw from unequal conflict, securing such OF the
results Of the victory Of the day before then PrSc
ticable.
Officers OF my staff Immediately dispatched with
the necessary orders make the best disposition for
deliberate, orderly withdrawal from the field, and, to
collect and post a the enemy should he
attempt to push after
About o'clock p M, the lines in advance, which had
repulsed the enemy in their last nfoe assault left
and center received the orders retire this done
with uncommon steadiness aud the enemy made no at
tempt 10 follow,
The line of troops established this movement
had been disposed of favorable ridge commanding
the ground OF Shiloh Church from this position our
tiery played upon the wood beyond for awhile, but on
visible enemy and without reply Soon satisfied that
serious pursuit would be attempted, this last line
withdrawn. and did troops leave battlefield in
better order the saggers fell into the ranks and
marched OF with those who had stood more steadily
by their colors second position was taken up about
mile in where the approach Of the enemy was
waited for nearly hour but effort 10 follow
made, aud only small detachment Of hoTsemen could
be at distance from this last position warily OBJ
serving our movement"
It will be observed that his account Of the second
days fight very meagre although 10 boasrul vein,
and that Aluson is made TO the complete failure to
accomplish the object for which he made attack. In
the concluding portion Of the report he states his loss in
killed wounded and missing at TO- 900, and estimates our