The Council Bluffs nonpareil. [volume] (Council Bluffs [Iowa]) 1857-1867, 1862-08-16

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sfaI ~ advertised the world saae Mith hi.
- - - ~ 1ods 10 - % 10UeoaHyy ne0
''pooee4 AM2yl Dor o IL sSutPrieine that the
H4toes 0d6Ql0 comgnaud s0n0Nhat less q
ao0puqe4e WITH every fresh instance q Its
repstltt0n: 0siIl, ehe c9untry y steauily,
m3geh slowly, bringing lt5eit up 80 the task
o. tohA ding u tho purpose Of she Govern.
Mens, 70 3eonse fhe war 80 speedy and
snceeastnl end. The,. sRpoiotmsntI OF
.ekitlfhl and expselepqed ldiee - command
the. aEpis nhas dpasp nofs than any otbei
ssolreumstsnae to- Ms nae cload iofgloem
that Wastfapidly settling down upon the
public mindss for y gisee ne reason % hope
/ shat the Govesnms1sasees sde.tase theweak
point tDliats 1Cntesss with the retcll i0ns sod
that e INN ne acoufdk sous self district "a
apply the femedy. u - from no lack u1
mOney On me6; u e not from Mck Of Outrage
or god conduct in tht field E i % from DO
failure on the part of the people, that anl
past misfortnpes have arisen, We hayl
placed power enough 10 the bands Of fhe
Government TO- have crushed the rebellion
long ago. But the power has not been
yielded with the skill the yigor. the concen-
trated and determined energy which the task
|, required. The fsult has beenlwith the Gov
eminent and not, with the people, and it is,
therefore, Ter the. Government 20 apply the
te@edys .Fssh 3 iSi,sf 5sfsr *. 4 .s9.ssg
We tfpstftbat in its fresh assurances the
Government does mot deceive itself or the
: ountry, az to the nature and character of
the greater Uigor that is required and prom
ised IN the future conduct Of the war. We
hope its view Of tho subject is broader than
that OF some OF those who have been most
clamorous for change of plan. 1t may
be very well that We should desist from
guarding rebel property that our armies
should live upon the enemy as they march
sloDg-that We should free bis slaves wher-
everiwe can reach them, and set them at
work whenever their work is needed. All
this is very xell-but all this is also very
little. 1t does not touch the heart Of the
disease. 1t will contribute nothing sub.
stantial to the strength Of our armies
nothing whatever lie tho absence o. other
measures of larger compass, to the con-
summation OF our final triumph. The grea-
ter Uig0r we heed is not.-greeter vig0r in
foragIng-is not in despoiling the fields and
and folds Of foe, nor even in setting
loose his slaves. 1t Is 10 fghtjng him that
we need increased strength. -~
1t is greater military vigor, greater skill
and energy in bringing overwhelming, for
ces to bear upon the enemy, greater knowl-
edge of his strength, his purposes and his
plans--greater Generalship in the Cabinet
and in the field that the country requires,
and must have, If the rebellion is to be
crushed at all. Thus far it is idle to deny
that we have been beaten in just this par
ticular. With less resources, smaller ar
mics, inferior arms and discipline, and a
bad cause, the rebels have contended sue.
cessfully with the Government and they
will do so still, unless we are reinforced,
not only in the ranks of the army, but in
the character and vigor of the Generslship
which directs its action.
1t is clear that the rebels stake every
thing upon the defence Of Richmond
They have accumulated there all their
force-and that force is much greater .han
we have been led to suppose. It is there
that it must be crushed, and that, too,
without delay. The Government must lose
no time in hurting upon the rebels there
whatever force is necessary for their de-
struction. Every weeks delay gives them
increased strength-augments the ravages
of sickness in our own ranks land dis
pirits the people by postponing the fruition
of their hopes. Foreign influences, more
over, which are constantly at work in every
direction in aid of the rebellion, derive
strength from delay, and every month for
which it's defeat is postponed, adds largely
to the permanence and solidity OF the Con-
federate Government in the eyes of the
world. England and France can scarcely
fail to regard our late repulse before
Richmond rs strongly indicative of the
ability of the rebels to MAINTAIN them
selves and the conviction will certainly be
strengthened By our delay to reverse it, al
most as much as by fresh and still more
decisive defeat. All the news We get from
the South shows that the rebels are concen.
srating oil their forces upon Richmond. and
Al: &ko.~