Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1862-12-25


placed our forces in the rear Of their ex-
treme left, and which, I thought at the
time, would shake their forces on the
ridge to such an extent that the position in
front could be easily stormed and carried.
Question-To what do you attribute the
failure to accomplish that
Answer-To the great strength Of the
position and the accumulation of the enc
my's forces there. 1 expected that the
bridges would be built in two or three
hours after they were unloaded, which was
about daylight. Instead Of that those on
the right were not built until three o'clock
in the afternoon, and had only the
means Of getting across one division over
the bridges on the right
General Frankhn's bridges were built
about noon, and were held by our troops on
the opposite bank. This gave the enemy
time to accumulate their forces, which
were stretched along the river from Port
Royal up to the battle field before I was
able to order the attack. There had been
a great deal Of division Of opinion among
the corps Of commanders as to the place
Of crossingi but after all the discussion
upon the subject the decision to cross over
here was well received, and understood by
all Of them.
Question-Whrt was the conduct Of the
officers and men during the attack
Answer-With the exception Of q single
regiment it was excellent.
Question-Have you any knowledge as
to the force Of the enemy2
Answer-ltis estimated at all the way
from 100000, to 100000. think it was
less than 100000.
would add here that although at the
time 1 ordered the column of attack to be
formed, on the morning after the battle,
II thouGht the anarnT,s Ezsslza- -as1ald ha- S1ls-
ried and adhered to that opinion during
that day. Afterwards became convinced
that that could not have been done owing
to the strength of the enemy, the time
given them for reinforcing, and the belief
also of our officers that it could not be
done. I accordingly telegraphed to the
President Of the United States that with
drew our army because felt the enemy's
position could not be carried.
Burnside's testimony here closed
The following is a portion Of Hooker's testi-
mony:
He did not know Why they did not take pos
session of Fredericksburg, but the feeling SEEM
ed to be that they could take possession Of Fred
ericksburg at any time 1 think it would have
been better 10 have held the lines where we were
by repairing sufficient force to threaten the en-
emy and keep them up to their works at Gull
pepper and Gordonsvillei but instead Of that,
we withdrew every man, and even burned the
bridges, thus exposing our plans to the enemy
the very moment we cid so,
If General Summers corps had come down
here and left one up there threatening to ad-
vance on their line it would have led them to be-
lieve We were going to advance on both lines.
1t would have been better, but the enemy saw
at once what we were at and came right on here
and they were nearer here than we were. This
country is such that whenever you give them two
or three weeks to fortify, 10000 men can make
any place impregnable to any other 100000 men.
UestIOn-WOuid there have been any dificul
ty as to supplies in your moving down the other
side OF the river as you proposed,
AnsWsr-I had three days "a tons there. I
was preparing TO march down through Caroline
county, where the people had Just gathered the T
crops would hase got pien.y OF forage and
provlsions-enough for week or a fortnight.
At the time Of the conversation between Hal
leck, Msigs and Burnside, there was some talk
OF forwarding some supplies 40 the Rappahau-
mock. SAID that at Bowling Green I could
draw my supplies from Port ROYAL as easv a. I
could get them when Eas at HARDWOOD knew
that could take position W tn 90 600 men that
the whole rebel amy could not move me.
Queston-WOuld that movement have been
safe in view Of the fact that the enemy had not
means Of crossing here2
-Answer-Ye sir; because I could take the
heights with my command, and then put them
IN condition Of defiance. II / had gone there
not man Of the enemy would have come to
Fredericksburg, but they would have gone to
some other river and fortified there, if we had
mad given them time, as effectually as they have
here.
regard the rebel position on the Rappahan-
mock as strong one. l mean the one they re-
tired to from Manassas. They had the advan-
tage oftw0 railroads, one to bring supplies from
the west and the Ofhar r1flrnaH
to bring troops from there. 1t is the strongest
R@2sti96P @ 6 is theY 9aFf F6p 5aa e. iP Po5 sss @
ing to cross the river and attack it are such as 1
have never seen before.
The following is from Haleek's testimony:
Questlon--Was there or not any agreement or
understanding between Won and Burnside that
the PontOOns and army stores, or either Ofthem,
should be forwarded to him by the authorities
here without his looking after them himselfl
Question: will say any stores necessary for
HIM to cross the river and move forward for
Fredericksburg2
Answer.-Ye5. I requested Gen. Meigs and
Gen. Haupti IN charge Of the railroads, to 20 with
me and consult with Burnside, and told him
everything was at his disposition. He must make
his own requisitions and give his own orders.
That would not interfere except to assist in
carrying his views out as much as could when
ever anything was eported to me as not being
done That woulu render all the assistance in
my power.
X
there was any discussion when you were there us
to the point that it was necessary that the pom
toons and the army should arrive at Falmouth
at the same period Of time, 50 that the enemy
should not know the point Designated for the
crossing2
Answer do not think that was mentioned
This matter j know was mentioned, that the
pontOons should be there as soon as they could
after we had got possession Of the road.
QuestiOn-At any time did General Woodbury.
go TO you and suggest that it would be impessi-
ble to get pOntOOns or stores at Falmouth as
soon as expected, and that was the reason it
would be advisable that the movement Of tho
army Of Burnside should be delayed
Answer-Not to my recollection.
Woodbury. in conversation spoke Of the diff
Guilty otgetting instantly sut tent transportation
to 60 down, an1, therefore, that the train shou
60 by land. The transports we required to
set dOSn provision, and 1t was sue gested that
as few as possible should be u=ed for moving the
pontoon trains.
Question.-Since General Burnside has been
its movements been made according to his
judgment and discretion as You know
Answer.-Yes, entirely.
Question: understood you TO say that delay
in the bridges was caused by the elements and
lnethcleney Of the men, and that there is nobody
to blame that you know of
Answer. will not say meficieney Of men, but
will say this, that Burnside reported TO me
that the officer IN command Of the land train had
not been as efficient as he ought to have been,
and he afterwards modified that report
told him to arrest anV person who had neg
lected his duty and send him 20 Washington inn
mediately, and he SAID to me that he did not
thinsit neces arg.
IN MS opinion there was a mistake in expecting
pontoOns, which he believed were at the time at
Berlin, TO be brought to Falmouth while the
army made tWo-and -a-half days march.