The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1862-07-12

BURLINGTON WE
our backs to the James River, facing the enc.
my, Who pursued from Fair Oaks, our left rest.
ed on Malvern Hill, which looks down into
Turkey Island, in Turkey Bend. Our left wins
IS We faced, WAS posted on the crest Of the bill
about opposite the head of the island, mile
from the river. A narrow valley lay between
the hill and the river-covered both by the
army and the gunboats. In front Of the left
wing, up the river, there is wide cultivated
bottom, with an intervening swamp and heavy
forest. The centre bowed out towards the
southeastern corner of Richmond, and swept
around northwafdly in irregular horse shoe
course towards White Oak Swamp. And the
left curved back again towards Harriaon'e
Landing. Malvern Hill, as you now understand
it, is . lofty bluff, unapproachable, almost i'm.
pregnable on the river side and on the declivity
looking down on the swsmpI have described.
The north front however, is much less abrupt,
but the hill itself, perhaps q mile square (may
be more) in area, could with fresh troops, De
made very powerful fort within thirty-six
hours The exterior positions were simply
woodlands and plantations alternately, with
some considerable undulations on Turkey
Creek, below Malvern Hill, the plateau termin.
ates in bluff and . swamp-materlslly con-
tributing to the defensibleness of the position.
In short, the site is admirable for defense-
with the proviso that the army has time to for
tify it. it is strong in any light, and its SAM.
tary merits are conspicuous 1t IS about
seventeen miles below Richmond via the river
and some forty miles above the mouttrof the
Chickahominy. Fort Darling is on the oppo-
site side of the river, some ten miles, think,
above. Three main thoroughfares-the Charles
City, Central and New Market-roads and
one obscure road, passable in dry weather by
infantry and artillery, lead to it from the
Chicahominy, so that the enemy could launch
columns upon it from the front and both TANKS.
The gunboats, however, protect the Aanks
directly, and the river and Turkey Island pro.
tects the real. am not familiar with its
strategic relations Extensively, in any other
sense than that which will occur to readers and
the enemy.
STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.
Of the exhaustion of the army you have read
enough to distress you. It would not be pru.
dent to attempt to state definitely how much Of
it has been reduced numerically. But there
can be no improperly in stating that General
Mcclellan was never able to carry over 80, 600
effective men into battle. When he landed at
Fortress Monroe his muster roll exhibited lis,
900 men of all arms. A considerable proper
ton of these, say 5000, were cavalry, ofwhich
1000 we're serviceable. The remainder would
have served their country better behind their
plows at home. Others were necessarily detail
ed to keep open our communications and pro-
tect our fanks-leaving about 100000 to be
disposed of. A large per centage of sick was
then to be subtracted. 1t is not very ex,rava-
gantto say that wounds and deaths at Yorktown
cost US 1000 thousand men; Williamsburg cost
us 5000; West Point $50; Hanover Court House
500; Fair Oaks, SO say official bulletins, ZOO.
wish could believe that we're all. Sklrmish-
es and affairs in front of Richmond, 1000 at
least; Mechanicsville, 3O0at least; Gaines Hills
1900; Savage Station 200; White Oak Swamp
and Turkey Creek-oh, how many! Where are
the stragglers? To be sure, the enemy have
lost still as many, but they could afford it.
Without attempting to estimate the average
number of sick, will give one exceptional fact
which may cause you to shudder. When Gen.
Casey's division landed Mt Fortress Monroe it
numbered 5000 men. When his division was
routed at Seven Pines it mustered less than
5000 men. All the rest were dead and in hos.
pital. After Seven Pines it was no division at
all. Many of these losses were compensated
by reinforcements-sevenr regiments, say 1000
men, from Fortress Monroe, and Gen McCalls
division of 10000 electives from Rappahan.
mock. But even with all these reductions, the
army could sustain itself against attack if it
had requisite rest and supplies. state these
facts because the crisis seems to have passed.
Requirements and supplies have been forward
ed.
OUR LOSS OF MATERIAL.
Some of the eastern papers have published
so many misrepresentation of affairs since the
army landed on the peninsula, that no man can
hope to counterfeit their influence. Extrava-
CANT statements made with view to apologize
for Gen. McClellan-doing him much injury
have been published about his late misforrunes.
will not now attempt to specify. The grand
facts in relation to the retreat have been
already communicated to the Commercial. Our
actual LOSSES Of war material were compare
lively trifling. could not learn thatany siege
guns were lost. saw none at Fair Oaks but
six Rodman guns and four large pieces of ship
ordnance. They were in positions on Malvern
Hill on Tuesday evening. All our twenty and
thirty pound Parrot guns were carried safely
through. l think no field pieces of ordinary
calibre were lost on the route, excepting one
three. inch ordnance gun. Twenty three inch
guns were lost in Porter's battle and an aid to
General Mccall told me that twenty more were
captured by the enemy in Monday battle.
know that RandalPs battery was lost. Excep-
ting the stores destroyed at Savage Station, 1
think no others we re lost, save about 200 wag-
ons and wagon loads which were destroyed
Monday afternoon. Our loss of war material,
excepting guns) therefore. was not important.
McClelIan's address to hls Troops.
HEADERS ARMY OF THE PoroNAo,(
Camp at Harrison's Landing July 4, 1926
Soldiers of the Army of tho Potomac:
Your achievements Of the last few days have
illustrated the valor and endurance of tho Amer.