Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1862-11-21
From the Indianapolis Sentinel. I

O"AhSuAdI OhmDRtRn, Z '
Inc Prince De Joinville, who was meihbe,
o. Generh McClellanie staff during the organ.
,zsHon OF the Army of the Potomac and ths
reninsuiar campaign, has published careful
anu elaborate sketch of the campaign which
Degen Win the evacuation of Manassas by the
repei army and ended Wita the retreat of INC.
Clellan from before Richmond. The review
mas oeen carefully prepared by one who Is yers.
ca IN the highest military science and diplomacy
oi gine age, and whose statemeni, of facts will
not be called in question, No one can }ssd
the comments OF Prince De Joinville without
being convinced that General McC lelisn in kbai
memorable campaign was the victim alike OF
Jealousy and weak and irresolate Cabinet -
Ii he had been sustained, as he should have
been, by the representatives of the Government.
the rebellion would have received a, sever
blow and the condition of public affsirs WdnIde
have presented far different aspeo. from That
they now do. Mcclellan was stricken down
when 1t was 10 the power of the Administra atiop
10 nave given the rebellion 3 check from which
IL could NOS have recovered, and now akain
wnen ne was on the eve Of decisive battl1. he
10 again removed from command. Who then.
10 to blame tor the indefinite prolorRstion Of
the Waf2 The conspirators who twice Have
done ell N their power to produce disasters
which our arms have suffered and who Have
thus given vitality and power.to the rebellion
will be held to q fearful account. We lave
only space for o few extracts from the paper of
the Prince, but enough to show the embarrass.
meEts OF Mcclellan In the Campaign, of the
Peninsula, which should have been, if be had
been properly sustained, triumphant success
instead OF a reverse to our arms With rsspect
to the deposition of Mcclellan from the chief
ce.nmand, the Prince denounoes 1t as "a restric.
tion of force and demirution Of usefulncss, ;"
and regards Il aa "a blow In the rear at the
very outset Of the campaign" He adds:s
"Yet this was but part Of the mischief done
him. Mcclellan had long known, better than
anybody else, the real strength of the rebels at
Manassas and Centerville. He was perfectly
familiar with the existence of wooden can.
ucn" by which Is has been pretended that be
was kept In awe for six months Bat he also
knew that till the month of April the roadb Of
Virginia ARE In such state that wagons and
artillery can only be moved over them by con-
,.rrctirg plank roads, g tedious operation, dur
ng which the enemy, holding the railways,
could either retreat, as he was then actually
doing, or move for blow upon some other
point. In any event, had Mcclellan attacked
ind carried Centerville, pursuit was impossible
md victory would have been barren of results,
4 single bridge burned would have saved
Iohnston's whole army. Such are the vast ad-
'antages of railway for Tetreating army
advantages which do not exist for the army
vhich pursues it. IF"
"We have the right, ws think, to say that
Mcclellan never intended to marchsupon Gen.
erville. His long determined purpose was to
make Washington safe by means of a strong
,arrison, and then to use the good navigable
Iaters and immense naval resources OF the
North to transport the army by sea to point
ear Richmond. For weeks,perhaps for months,
bis plan had been secretly maturing. Secrecy,
8 well as promptnese, 1t will be understood,
1as Indispensable here to success To keen the
ecret 1t had been necessary to confde is TO few
ersons, and hence had arisen the long III feel |
ng toward the uncommnnicative General
Be this as Il may, as the day of action drew
ear, those who suspected the Generals project.
nd were angry at not being informed OF IL:
hose whom hs promotion had excited TO envy:
lie political enemies; twho Is without them In
kmericaT In short all those beneath or beside
I'm who wished him iii, broke out into chorus
accusation Of sloWness, inaction, incapacity.
dcClcilsn, With pathetic courage which / |
ave always admired, disdained tfess accusa-
ions and made no reply He satisfied himself
nth pursuing his preparations in faborious 81.
ence., Bat the moment carne In which, not
outstanding the loyal support given him by
10 President, that tunutionary could no longer |
esist the tempest. A council of war Of ali the
ivisional Generals was held; Q plan of campaign
ot that of Mcclellan was proposed and ais
used. Mcclellan was then forced to explain
is projects, and the next day they were known
0 the enemy. Informed, no doubt, BY one of
hose female spies who keep up his communics.
ons Into the domestic circles OF the Federal
rerny, Johnston evacuated Manassas at once
his was skillful mahGlver. Incapable Of az.
uming the Offensive; threatened with attack !
ither at Centreville, where defense would be |
eeless II successful, or at Richmond, the loss
( which would beg grave check, and unable
D cover. both positions at onceg Johnston threw
ls,whole force before the latter ofs the tWo.n
a The consequences resulting from this unfor. |
innate pressure Of the radicals, and the prompt |
esolution Of General Mcclellan to attempt the |
ppturs Of Richmond from the Peninsula are
hen described. rggfs4sssss' sss5 m - s,.v, s9
An attack on the rebels In, their position on
be Rappahannock and at Gordonsyille isshown
, boa military absurdity. The, Prince, then
eacribes the ,embafrassmentp Of McC Clellan In
Of bis diminished ranks precludinR
I'm from concentrating the whole land and sea
,scea ef the Republic upon this single ppint,
n The, subsequent delays which. greatly re.
lfded the success Of the expedition and tho I
'ithdrew of portiQnp Of hiS command, We find |
u following account; saea - ~ @..s-.s,s
IA few days had been half lost II, a. uselea.
ufsuit Of the enemy, while the TRANSPORTS war