Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1862-10-30
General. Braga and Van Dora.


1t can be no longer concealed that the cam
paign in the West has proved q failure. The
| subsidence of the waters of the Western rivers
and the unprecedented drought which prevailed
for many months in that quarter, left the enemy
high and dry in the interior, deprived Il Of his gun
boats, remote from his base Of supplies, and la
bic TO destruction at any moment from q vigi
liant and active adversary. The Southern people
saw this condition Of things with perfect clear
ness, and expectation was on tiptoe all the sum
mer for a brilliant and Successful campaign Of
our armies. The season has passed, winter is
coming on, and the enemy, without losing any
ground, is already acting on the offensive, driv-
ing OR armies before him.
That this dissppOintmentof Southern expects.
stems is due to the want of generalship in the
West, is perfectly clear, and is the universe.
conviction. The public were disposed to be
charitable to Generals Bragg and Van Dorm
No criticism was uttered upon their movements
no complaint was made at their want Of decisive
energy, and the most charitable feeling seward
them was INDUCED in all circles. They have
been allowed a Carte blanche by the government
and people, and the result is a %grievous disaP-
poiniment on the part of both. Tennessee
Instead of being cleared of the enemy, is still
overrun and under his heel. Kentucky, instead
of being relieved, is abandoned to bis mercy
the Mississippi is in his possession and, in fact
everything is in q somewhat worse condition
than it was in tho spring. This Is the ease,
although the general IN command has had q
large army at his disposal as well conditioned as
any that this continent ever before saw.
The cause Of General Bragg's failure is now
sufficiently obvious. Instead Of fighting Buell.
in a pitched battle, when he had him at dissd-
vantage, near Chattanooga, interior in numbers,
aud remote from supplies, wLsre defeat would
have been utter ruin, General Bragg adopted
the plan Of taking possession Of the country IN
bis rear by detachmeuts. The expeditions OF
Morgan and Smith into Kentucky, and the
achievements Of Forrest near Nashville, were
brilliant in themselves and highly cr5@i.sbls to
the officers in command, but ia their effect upoi
the general campaign, they served but litIe
other purpose than to give warning to the enemy
of the danger of Buell., and to hasten the pre-
p~arstions for his reinforcements. After full tins
had been given to allow ample TeintOTcements to
be sent TO Louisville, and forwarded on the line
to Buell., then General Bragg began to move.
The grand object of his strategy being to get
to Louisville and penetrate the base OF Bueirs
operations, he found it necessary, as the result
Of his combinations, to make at last q rapid
march upon that city, to inteTpose himself bs-
tween that general and the new troops pouring
in from north of the Ohio but Buell. beat him
In the race, and the whole object OF the cam
paign was thus thw8rted and defeated. B5sgg
then had no other alternative, confronted as he
found himself By superior numbers, than to fsI
back. This ne has done, and it is greatly to be
feared that he has taken a route of retreat which
viii sfford very little local subsistence TO his
army. The very fact that be has taken the route
leading to Cumberland Gap would seem to
argue that he was forced into It and was hard
pressed by the enemy.
H. - tL;. ~,,o-rr-s-~ f,.trrr h-mnv--r -,
our affairs in the West, that whatever may be
the deficiencies of cur generals in thst quarter,
our armies are in good condition for efficient ser
vice. This is not only the case with the army
in Southern Kentucky, under the immediate
command of Bragg, which has not yot fought a
general engagement, but is also the case with
the army Of General Van Dorm, now transferred
to General Pemberton at Holly Springs, which
has lately sustained a severe reverse.
With every disposition to indulge the largest
charity toward General Bragg, public sentiment
is now in favor of placing som general of larger
brain and more active talents il command Of
important portion Of the Coufedergcy.
General Bragg's capacity for organizing and
an army may be granted; but some
thing more than the qualities Of a drill officer
6iscipHnaTian IS needed IN the West. L is
asserted il favor of this general, that bis army
is in better discipline Than any on the continent;
but ell the advantages Of the most perfected dis
cipline may be lost by i~uaci,i = or b. retreat
they must be Loss in great measure by Is whole
of insctivity followed by q precipits.e rs
treat.
The less of E c4mpsign 10 The West is Q most
7eTious Etfsir to the C5uiederacy. Il may pro-
tract the war for years by encouraging the North
west to hope that il may succeed IN the husi-
ness Of ~subjugstion and by thus prolonging It's
with the fanatics of Nav England. We
are to have peace with the North only through
he counsel and fundamentally Of the North
western and Middle States and every reverse
n failure We meet with in the West tends TO
IDENTIFY the Northwestern States more closely
With Nav England. The campaign may yes he
'etrioyed by 3 general of large brain and active
clients. l. cannot be expected that General
5ragg can achieve in TIE remaining month of
he season what he hss failed 10 achieve in the
TX months that have been lest.