The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1862-11-22

Ine voluntary system, ana that for this
vast army ne had to provide an adminis-
| tratlve system of which the rebellion,
shattering the old army into pieces, had
left scarcely and available nucleus Re-
| seeves of artillery, engineers, pontoeniers
typographical brigade. telegraphic corps,
and hospitals-all were to be called ont Of
| chaos Upon this tremendous and vital
! portion of General McClellans task. the
Prince speaks with authority as to its
difficulties, ,irappreciable by the horde of
editors and Senators who have found it so
easy to shout "On to Richmond and SO
| hard to understand why shouts do not
scare Davis and his armies from the field
He speaks, also, with knowledge as to the
manner IN which ii was done:
"This prodigous labor was accomplish-
ed with a rapidity and a success which are
extraordinary when we think that the
whole thing had to be achieved without
any assistance from the past. Not only
was there nobody to be found who knew
! anything, except from books of the man
agement of the numerous threads by which
an army is held together and moved; not
onlo was the country destitute Of all prece-
dents in the matter; the number even Of
those who had travelled in Europe and
seen for themselves what grand collect
ion OF troops is, was infinitely small. The
American army had no traditions but
those Of the Mexican campaing, of Gen.
Scotia brilliant cainraign in which there
were many difficulties to overcome, but
which was far from presenting the gigantic
proportions Of the present war. Moreover,
in Mexico Gdn. Scott had with him the
entire regular army, and here there only
remained its feeble ruins In Mexico the
regulars were the principal, the volunteers
We're only the accessory, and, rs it were,
the ornament The old General, who was
ond day asked what he then did to main
tain discipline in their ranks, answered
oh hey knew that If they struggled oil
they would be massacrcd by the gGerriilas
The two cases, therefore, had nothing IN
common. and the management. Of these
great armies Of volunteers, in spite Of ali
the efforts to legularize them, WAS a pro-
blen which presented many unknown
data
The Prince, having expressed his sense
OF the skill and energy with which this
problem was solved 10y the young General
upon whom it was imposed, proceeds TO
describe the plans Of campaign which were
next TO be considered. TO have made an
army that might be handled for purposes
Of invasion was itselfa colossal task. Next
came the task. not less colossal, Of employ
ing this army with success in an enterprise
of which, 10 this hour neither the govern
ment at Washington nor the people at
large have, in our judgment, AT all begun
10 comprehend the extent and the enor-
nous difficulties.
FIAEs OF CANpAIGy.
The army once iuprovised. it became
necessary 10 settle upon plan o! the cam
pairn The general was simple. The idea
could not De entertained of conquerng and
occupying a territory so vast that OF the
Confederate States: but for the purpose OF
escaping the dangers born or to be borne
from such e formidable instruction, il was
necessary to attain three results: 20 block
aje efficiently the insurgant coast, to be
master OF the Mississippi rlver and OF the
entire system Of western waters; and,
finally. to drive tine rebel government out
Of Richmond, its capical
The letter of these three operations
heins reserved for the army under Gen.
McCleliau's immediate orders, the follow
ing question naturally enough arose:
Should this attack be ventured on as
soou - tAe IA ans -ulp0sedto be sufficient
provided, without awaiting the results OF
the blockade aud oithe Mississippi cam
psisn on that question opinions were
divided Some said yes arguing thus
that an iusurrection should never he given
the time to establish itself, that the Fede.
raj army. with lis defective organization,
would be no better in March than in No
yenber. that splendid success on the
part Of the North. following close upon
Bul, Run, might finish the war in one
blow. 10y prcmlttiug 4 great effort at con
ciii2tjou before either side became too en-
tjtJeryd. Others SAID no According to
them The great work OF reducing the insur-
rection should be performed Oh the coast
and on the Mississippi. The Richmond
campaigns, undertaken IN the spring. with
the Army OF the Potomac hardened by
winter passed in tents, and recovered frosa
the fatal impression OF Bull Run, would DE
the coup dr srqcs to secession. The latter
course was chosen, either as the result OF
real deliberation or of necessity from not
having decided in time TO act IN the fine
days OF the au;um Of lS6l.
On the 10Th OF March. accordingly, the
grand Army Of the Potomac began its
march, and with it the Prince de Joinville
and his neWlhcws set out upon the cam
pasn. OF which they have made them
themselves the first impartial historians.
In crossing the Long Bridge the Prince
records that he passed General Mcclellan
riding alone, without any aids wearing an
anxious expression upon his teac. and
escorted only by .cw Dragons. Who
ever should have that day read the soul of
the General would have found in it some
thing Of that bitterness which was alter
wards to accumulate so cruelty upon him.
This anxious expression, it will now
be seen, was natural enough.
NJ cIELLAS AND THE RETREAT FROM MANASSAS.
awhile we were riding forward grave
events were occurring in the highest re-
gions OF the army There exists in the
American army, a in the English, Com
tnauder-in Chief who exercises over the
head of all the Generals n supreme au-
thorisy, regulates the distribution of the
troops, and directs military operations
These functions, which have been greatly
curtailed in the British army since the
Crimean war, were. still exercised In all
their vigor in America From the aged
Gen. Scott, who had long honorabiy dis
charged them, they had passed to Gen.
Mcclellan. We learned, on reaching
Fairfax. that they had been taken away
from him 1t is easy to understand the
dminution of force and the restrictions
upon his usefulness thus inflicted upon the
General.in Chieg by a blow i'll the rear at
the very outset Of the campaign.
"Yet this.was but part of the mischief
done him. Mcclellan had leng known,
better than any body else, the real strength
of the rebels at Manassas and Centerville
lie was perfectly familiar with the exist
ence of the wooden common by which 1t
has been pretended that he was kept in
awe for six months But he also knew
that till the month of April the roads of
Virginia are in such state that wagons
and artillery can only be moved over them
by constructing plank roads, tedious, op-
Grafton, during which the enemy, holding
the railways, could either retreat, as he
was then actually doing, or move for
blow upon some other point. In any event.