Litchfield enquirer., 1862-03-27

.haglssaW WHO4fE NOe 48S&' timsuts written in pencil Ono psos iAIlOw had
 out of this" Another wrote ,." Piches duty is
 the hardest thing soldier can be put kt," under which was the. comment :, s That's so." Tho | house, evidently an old aristocrasc mansion, must have been sufficiently shabby and dilapida.
 ted before it's occupatiou. V1sT fiI .fvr The hills now sloped down eastward tovnrd Bull Run, which was some two-thirds of q mile distant The creek here makes . bend from south to southeast, and leaving bottom space on the left side, while it's right bank (has occupied by the rebel batteries) Is highland steep
 Anarrow gully leads to the ford: Along lt6e crest of the bank which is forty or iy feet hieh. runs single intrenchment, somewhat lnFgcr than rife pit. I saw no signs of fA masked hAt- tesy, and am told by officers who oknnined oth- sr parts of the bank. tlat they. also, sav 70 tFar ces of any. Between Manassas Junction and the Stone Bridge-a distance of i've milsg-- there is not a single forti6easion. lam not abIs to discover any evidence that the rebels had 1ny intrenched batteries at Bull Run. Their artills- " was no doubt masked by the trees and bushes. but 1t was hauled down to it's position and haal' ed back again after the battle. to s.as. s54si3
 The ford-indicated on Corbett's map as tho point where the rebel cavalry charge was made across the stream upon Ricketts batteries es-Whs easily passed, :he water not rising to our saddle skirts. took road leading from tho bottom drier than that through the open fieldg, and thus missed the site of the hand-to-6ght overthe bat tery but l discovered rebel encampment to the right, in 6 sheltered hollow. There were quarters for regiment, the huts well built of squared logs, stopped with clay. Tha roofs,
 however, had been carried away, and the obliter-
 ation of all traces of recent occupation showed
 that many weeks must have elapsed since they
 were abandoned. It is, indeed, possible that they were never wholly completed. After wind
 ing for mile or two through the woods, came
 upon the Warrenton turnpike, short dissancs
 east of the Stone Bridge I had ridden across the left skirt of the bastlo field, the main portion of which was now between me and Bull Run, on both sides of the turnpike. The last low hill on this side of the stream was the main position assumed by our forces. Shar. mans battery was further on, beyond house, still standing. which was then used as hospi. tai. l learn from several officers who were in the fight, and who rode over the ground last eve. ming, that our batteries were placed too low on that memorable day. Tue true positions were neglected, and we suffered far more than, from the nature of the ground, was really necessary. : The most vulnerable approach to 1lannasSas, apparently. is that by way of Blackburns Ford. Here, however. Gen. Tyler was instructed not to bring on an action, and the reconnaissance force' which terminated in the withdrawal of tho troops might have had very different tarmina- ton, had the affair been vigorously pressed and supported. There the opposite bank of Ball Run is lower than at Stone Bridge, and melts almost imperceptibly into the plain of Manassas; the masked batteries might have been shelled from the knoll on this side, and the stream, at that season must have been easily fordable for infantry. Of course, if our leaders at that time believed that three successive terraces" beyond the stream had to be scaled before reaching the high table land of Manassas" they were right in acting with proper caution. In summer when the woods, in full leaf, hide much that is now visible, the weak points may have boen thor. onghly masked. l am told, in fact, that great deal of timber has been leveled since July ; but l cannot understand why a reconnaissance in force. at the end of November, should not have developed satisfactory reasons for an advance d that time. But nothing of the sort was ever made.
 From the battlefield of Bull Run the ground is undulating, but with gradual increase of elo- vation, to Centreville, q distance of four miles. In fact, from the low hill upon which Chinnb House" stands, I saw the long fortified ridgo towering high above the surrounding country, aud have no doubt that it is the highest land bo- tween the feot of the Alleghany spurs and tho Potomac at Occoquan. There were few camps on the road, but none of them seemed to have been very recently occupied. '.T'' '1l CONCLUSIONS.
 First: That the typographical character of the position at Manassas has been wholly mis- understood. Instead of high plain, with e. cending terraces, furnishing, concentric lines og defense, it is low plain. of which the only nat. ural advantage is the stream of Bull Run, with low bluff bank. t3 f..s . 9 a76. sF
 Second: That the position, at Centreville, though naturally formidable to an advance from Fairfax, has no flank or rear defeuses, is imper fectly fortified, and from all indications, nevss had any heavy siege guns. fi .., sil. a. sls ss1
 Third :: That the three or four small forts near Manassas Junction, on an open plain, do not constitute strategic position of any import ance. aal aF ".o. .t,t- es t.ds "a ana ,s
 Fourth That the strongest of the rebel woris was inferior, both in construction and armament to the weakest of our forts on the Virginia side of Washington. s,- t5I..- el .ssr 4
 Fifth That the rebels never had. at any time, in all tbe camps between Centreville and Mar nassas, more than 75000 men.
 Sixth That an advance of our whole army, made any time since the first of November last. would very likely have reached Manassas with as much expedition and as little loss as the advance at this tne It is scarcely likely that the rebels who have been, all along, so well informed @ to our strength, and OUT contemplated movements, would have hazarded an engagement which must