Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1862-12-24

MAKE rapid movement Of the whole army Il
, mock ~ ~fP
The following are his reasons for moyins
upon Fredericksburg:
All the time DC rs near Washington as wouId
the enemy. And, after arriving at Fredericks.
oure, We would be at a point nearer TO Rich.
tnse aordonsyIsS S Toutd %, be he even II We should
me enemy, In my opinion, would not give ms a
aeSlsI'e battle at any place this side OF Rich.
mono. Ihey would defend Gordons willie until
such TIME as they felt they had given us a
| cLe.k, and then, with so many lines OF railroa a
cl'tn 10 them, they would move upon Rich.
mono or upon Lynchburg. and in either case
4 great. " 'eiy
In regard to the pontoons he SAYS: .-
On the morning Of the 18th Of November.
leehe uneasy with reference to tn. pontoons
| de mad not heard OF their starting, directed
| my chef engineer to telegraph again with
| rs ference to them.
Question. To whom did he telegram,
| answer: he telsgraphed to Gen Woodbury.
or os,rsa 10 MAJ; Slanlding: Itssubsequently sp-
ht ard Of my xIsh 10 have the pontoon train
| started down for fredericksburg, although tbe
an'horiiles in Washington had had my plan
sfa.,o @ 10 snem on the 9Th Of November, and it had
a!sS been discovered by Gen. Hallsck and Gen
Mclgs, at my headquarters, on the 1Ith and I2th
OF Move mber, and after discovering Il fully
mere, mere, they sat down and sent telegrams to
washington, which, rs L supposed, fully COW
crtd the case, and would secure the starring of
the H3ntoon trains at once I supposed. of
courss, ihat tLose portions of the plan which
required 10 De attended to in Washington
would op carried out there at once couId
have sent officers Of my own there 20 attend 10
mos In ne, mamars, alter, Snd perhaps made mistake
IN not CONG 50, as Gen. Halleck afterwards
ieIG me that ought not to have trusted to them
IN W ashingion for the details I'm renlv 10 tha
,tiesTam had ordered TO be sent, q en- Wood
p"I! eiegraphed Rack that the pontoons would
START on sunday morning probably, and GER
talhiy on nj Monday morning, which would have
uesn on the 10th or l7th Of November and
would have been in time. They did not. how
ever, start until the 18th, and on that day il
comp enced raining, which delayed them so
nuch, and the roads become so bad, that when
th.y got TO Dumfries they floated the pontoons
OH the wagons, sent to Washington for q
steamer, and carried them down 10 Aouia
Erssk t.s eg water, sending the wagons round by
land The pontoons did not get here untiI the
I'D or The 23d Of November.
oh 'ne 18TH OF November 1 started the column
Gown tne read TO fredericksburg, not Knowing
ahythlng atout the delay Of the pontoons be.
cause Inc telegram announcing the delay did
hot reach Warrenton junction until had left
10 come down here with the troops. And that
Rlegrah OLD not reach me until arrived here
on the morning Of The 18th, when it was handed
10 me by an orderly WHO had brought il down
10 Warrehton Junction.
A1rr reaching here, saw at once that there
was no chance for crossing the Rappahannock
W!te the army At that time II commenced
RAINING, and the river began to rise-not to any
great extent, but did not know how much II
might rise. There were no means of Crossing
except by gong up 10 the fords, ard ii would he
Impcssihle 70 DO that because Of the inability 10
supply the troops after they should cross
Gen. Burnside says his plan was. had the
bridges arrived in seasoIS TO Ia We made rapid
movement In the direction of Richmond, and
night battle with the enemy before Iackson
could make junction with them.
Alter the repulse on Saturday witness wished
10 make anothf attack the next morning but
unanimously opposed 10 it, From this fart !
and inasmuch also as the President of the |
I hIted Stairs had told him not TO be in haste |
IN making this attack, that he would give him
all the support he could, but he did not want !
me army Of the Potomac DESTROYED: witness
1tlt tnat ne could not take the responsibility of
S5af6p S55aaff6pBbs lRs ssisek' notwithstanding his own
Question What reasons do Won assign tor the
failure of your attack here,
Answer. 1t was found TO be impossible TO get |
the men up To the works. The enemy's fire |
fought most valiantly. The enemy say they |
never saw our men fight as hard as on thai |
Question. Were the enemy-s works very |
Answer. Their works are not strong works, |
but they occupy very strong positions. 1t is |
ordered. If such is the case, can only saw |
that did to the best of my ability. II is also /
possible. that we would have done better 10 |
have crossed at Skinker's Neck, but, fer what |
l suppose TO be good reasons, / felt we had |
bitter cross here. That we would have a more |
decisive engagement here, and that if we sue |
lreak up the whole Of their army here, which |
i think is now the most desirable thing, not |
even second TO the taking Of Richmond, for if |
this army was broken up, though they might |
defend Richmond for a while, they could not !
make any protracted defense there. -
Question. Do understand Won to saw that
1T was your understanding that Gen. HaIleck |
and Gen. Halleck and Gen. Meigs, while at
your headquarters in Warrentsn, and before |
you commenced the movement of your army, 4
sent orders to Washington for the pontoons TO |
be Immediately forwarded to Falmouth
answer. That was my understandins. esr-'
Question. Who did you unds0tans was re.
sponsible for the forwarding of the pontoons |
Answer. l understand that General Halleck |
was TO give the necessary orders, and then the |
officers who should receive the orders were the /
ones responsible for the pontoons coming here |
could have carried out that part Of NV plan |
through officers Of my own. But having inst 4
taken the command Of the army, with which |
that IL was as much as could attend to, with /
the assistance Of all my officers, to change its |
position from Warrenton TO Fredericksburg, |
and felt, indeed expected, that all the parts
Of the plan which Were to be executed in Wash. |
ineton would be attended to by the oncers as |
that place, under the direction of the different
appeTtained.
.. Quest ton. Did You or not understand tina.
you were TO be responsible for seeing that those
orders were carried out! H.E
Answer. did not. / never imagined for a /
moment that had to carry out anything that |
required to be done at Washington. General |
Megs told me distinctly several days ago, Ia |
Washington, that he never saw my plan of /
operations until showed it to him on that day. /
General Sumner testified that il the pontoon /
bridges had been at Falmouth when he arrived, |
he would have taken the crest IN rear Of Fred |
ericksburg on that night or the following day.
Our force and that of the enemy, he thought
" about equal at Fredericksburg. In answer |
to a question il the army was demoralized by |
the battle beyond its loss in men, he said he 1
thought. it was. There was a great deal too !
much croaking and not sufficient confidence.
He considered, however, that with sufficient |
exertion it would be in excellent order again.
Major Gen. w. b. Franklin (the next wit |
ness) thought the arrangements for crossing
the river were all well made, but he always
doubted our power to cross at the points indi-
cate d, and did not believe that the army could
have crossed had the enemy chosen TO prevent
il. In regard TO the pontoon bridges, he said:
"Whoerer is responsible for that delay is respon
sibIc fer all the delays phich hare follotced. We
were rather astonished. when me- down