Lamoille newsdealer. [volume] (Hyde Park, Vt.) 1860-1877, 1862-03-21
The Campaign in virsinia,

There is much and excited discussion
about the retreat of the rebels from rbo;.
Potomac line and the changed military
situation in that quarter. 1t seems 70 h.
generally taken for granted that fl.
fight Of the enemy is Disappointment fl
Gen. Mcclellan and disarranges for tbo
present, if it does not entirely defeat his
plan of the campaign in Virginia But
neither of these suggestions is known to
be true, and as to the latter Gen Ma
CleIlan must be more stupid and short.
sighted than his enemies allege if he has
not taken into account the possibiGtv.
that the enemy would retreat beforehih,
and made some provision in his plan Sr
such contingency. Gen. Mcclellan NAV
be bunker in religion and politics, and
may for some unknown reason be worthy
of general hatred and contempt, but he i,
not a fool he has not planned to defeat
himself and those who are on the bipb
rampage because the enemy at Manassas
has eluded his grasp may have reason to
acknowledge in few days that they have
made fools of themselves.
The Richmond Examiner frankly con.
fesses that the rebels retreated because
they could not hold their Potomac line
against superior force. To blame Gen,
Mcclellan for not getting in their rear
and preventing their retreat is to blame
him for not doing what was impossible.
A force could not move to the rear of Ma.
nassas without going through the rebel
lines somewhere and thus giving them
notice of the movement. Gen. Hooker's
division did make flank movement from
below Alexandra, but an army marching
over the rough and muddy highways of
Virginia cannot be expected to compete in
speed with railroad trains All this may
be wide of the mark, however because it is
by 10 means certain that Gen. Mcclellan
desired to hold the rebels in their fortf
cations at Centervillc Manassas and VIM
chester. 1t is quite likely that the presi-
dent and secretary Stanton, and all who
understand the significance OF the present
movements, are entirely pleased with the
rebel "change of line" in Virginia.
tits at least possible that flank move
ment' is going on on larger scale than
our newsp aper strategists generally sus-
pect, or than the enemy can possibly de-
feat by running. Has it occurred to any
body that there must be strategic reason
for Gen. Burnside's long delay to follow
up his successes on the North Carolina
coast? He has been making various ex-
plorations in the direction of Norfolk !; he
has led the rebels to believe that he will
move in that direction, and they are COL
Letting their forces at Suffolk to oppose
his march But it is at least conccivna-
bic that he has misled them, and that we
shall next hear of him in just the opposite
direction, and in possession of the coast
line railroad running south from Virgin
ia. He has had the better portion of his
troops embarked for several weeks, ready
to move on the instant the signal is given,
and his men are inpatient at the mystic
rious delay. 1t is at least conceivable
that he awaits signal from the comman-
der of the Potomac army in Virginia.
Looking straight across the map to our
line on the other side of the Cumberland
mountains, we see our little army there
strangely hesitating for many weeks to
press on to Knoxville, Tennessee and
take possession of the only other railroad
connecting Virginia with the South.
Are they too waiting for the signal from
the commander of the Potomac army /?
And when he is ready, shall we see both
these railroad lines in our possession, and
the rebel army shut up in Virginia, to
fight or surrender, with the rebel congress
president and all? That would be STRAIT.
egg to some purpose. Such conjectures
as these may prove to be wide of the mark,
but if events do not soon prove that Gen.
Mcclellan and the able commanders asso-
ciated with him have at least ordinary
military sagacity, then let us superscde