Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1862-12-05
[oTYIcIAI COPY.

no CoVVroIAI COPY.
ss HEADoUARrERs OF rHR ARMY, \
WAsHiSGToS, Nov. %, 1862.
To this Gen. Halleck returned the fol-
lowing reply:
"wAsnlSoFOS, Aug 6, 1862,
MAJOR General Mcclellan, Commanding, ETC.,
BsrksLey, Va:
General, your telegraph of yesterday
was received this morning, and immedi.
ately telegraphed brief reply, promising
to write you more fully by mail. You,
General, certainly could not have been
more pained at receiving my order than
was at the necessity of issuing Il, was ad; /;
yised by high officials, in whose Judgment
l have great confidence, to made the order
Immediately on my arrival here, but de-
termined not to do so until could learn
your wishes from personal interview, and
even after that interview tried every
means in my power TO avoid withdrawing
your army, and delayed the decision as long
as daredito delay it. / assure you, Gen.
erai, 1t was not hasty aud iuconsiderate
I but on the contrary it caused me more anx-
iety than any other of my life, but after full
and mature consideration of all the pros
and cons. was reluctantly forced to the con.
elusiOn that the order must be issued. There
was to my mind no alternative. ALLOW me to
allude to few of the facts Of the case. You,
and your officers at one of the interviews
estimated the enemy's forces In aud around
Richmond at two hundred thousand men.
Since then you and others report that they
have received and are receiving large re-
endorsements from the South. Gen. Pope's
army, now covering Washington, is only
forty thousand; your effective force is only
about ninety thousand. You are thirty
miles from Richmond, and General Pope
eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly
between you ready to fall With his superior
numbers upon one or the other, as he may
elect neither can reinforce the other 10
case of such an attack. If Gen. Pope's
army be demanded to reinforce you, Wash
iugton, Maryland and PennsylTnnia would
be left uncovered aud exposed If your
force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you
would be too weak to hold the position you
now occupy, should the enemy turn round
and attack you in full force. In other
words. the old army of the Potomac is split
in pieces, with the entire force of the enc
my directly between them, They can't be
united by land, without exposing both to
dsstrqction; and yet they must be unite,i.
To send Pope's force by water to the PEN
insuln is, under present circumstances, q
military impossibility. The only alterna-
tive is to send the forces on the Peninsula
to some point by water, say Fredericksburg,
where the two armies can be united
Let me now GlIude to some of the Objee-
tions which you have urged. You say to
withdraw from the present position will
cause the certain decentralization of the
Rrmy, whirhis hoEtiu excellent discipline
and condition. cannot understand why
a simple change of position to new, aud
by no means distant base will demuralize
an army in excellent discipline, unless the
officers themselves assist in the demoraliza-
ton, which ! am Satisfied they will not
Your change of front from Your extreme
right at Hanover o. H., to your present po-
sitiOn WAS over thirty miles but have
not heard that It demoralized your troops,
Notwithstanding the severe losses they sus-
tanned in eHeeIing it.
A new base on the Rappahannock, at
fredericksburg, brings you within about
sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re-
enforcement of 10000 or $4,000 fresh and
disciplined troops. The change, with
sReh advantages, will. think, If prop
erly represented 70 yonr army, encourage
rather than demoralize your troops.
Moreover. you yourself suggested that
a junction might be effected at
4 Yorktown; but that a faux march across
/ hAG |Wuulh ON luOEG uaLhEQOub
than to retire to Fortress Monroe You
will remember that YorktoWn is two or
three miles further from Richmond than
fredericksburg is besides the latter is be-
tween Richmond and Washington, and COW
ers Washington from any attack By the
enemy. The political effect of the with
! drawat may at 6rst be uufavorable; but /
think the public are beginning TO uuder-
stand its necessity and that they will have
much more confidence in a united army
than its separate fragments. But you will
reply why not reinforce here 50 that can
strike Richmond from my present position.
\ To do this you said at our interview that
I you required $4,000 additional troops. /
told you that it was impossible to give you
SO many. You finally said that you would
have some chance Of success with 10000,
but You aftetward telegIaphed TO me that
you would require 81, 900, as the enemy was
being largely reinforced. II your estimate
of the enemy's stFength mas correct, your
4 requisitiOn was perfectly reasonable; but
it Was utterly impossible to 6ll il until
i troops could be enlisted and organized,
which would require several weeks. To
reach your army in its present position,
/ until IL could be so reinforced, would al-
most destroy 1t in that climate. The
4 months OF August and September are Hl-
uIOSt W le1iph ph " ~ Nuitss - ny ny thte on thAI part
Of James river, and even after yon got the
4 te-enforcements asked Tor; ysu must reduce
FpTt Darling and the river batteries before
y9p gould advance on Riehmoqd, a, It is by
no means cettain that the fed1ctieh of the
j Qualifications Wonld not reqnire as much as
those AZ Yorktown. This delay might not
only be fatal % the heath of f7yonF army;
but in the meantime Gen. P0pss3 t6reSs
would be exposed TO the heavy blows Of
Che enemy, without the slightest hope OF
Rssistsnce from yon. zf l.li- E.fEFs
In regard % the demoralizing effect Of 4
I vithdPavv7l F1,, cha p amin ants a. tts PEE