Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-10-30

tons Of the Government. With great confidence
in his own generalship and in the classic style for
which he is distinguished. be asserted that he
could take forty regiments from the army
Of the Potomac and in a few weeks clean out
every vestige Of secessionism in Virginia. If the
military commando of our forces in not to be
entirely trusted, il he is not permitted 10 take
his own course. and Senators like CHANDLER are
to direct the operations of the army, we must
look for continued disasters in future engage
ments with the 1t must be admitted that
General MCCLELLAN has exhibited great energy
and ability in the reorganization of the army.
Thus far he has done everything well. His ca
pacity 10 direct the movements of large forces
upon the field OF battle has not yet been tested.
We can only hope that be has will enough not to
be forced into an engagement by the clamor of
civilians, no matter how high may be their posi-
lions, at a manifest disadvantage. This
experiment was tried at Bull Run, and
certainly that experience should teach US wisdom.
Ii the Administration have not confidence in
those whom they have put in command they
should be promptly displaced, not forced into a
battle to prove their incapacity. This would be
too great n sacrifice TO relieve the Administra
ton from the responsibility of doing its duty.
The cause in which we are engaged and the lives
of the brave men who have volunteered to fight
the battles of the Union are consideration far
beyond the reputation or feelings of military
leaders, or rather would-be Generals. As evi-
dence that we are not mistaken in stating that
the Republican leaders distrust the 9eneralship Of
those now in command of our forces we quote the
following extracts from prominent Republican
papers which seek to give direction to public SEN
timent. The Cincinnati Gazette in criticising the
military operations of the Government thus far,
remarks:
We come now to the defense Of Washington.
That Washington should be defended is what
every man will admit. But this question will be
asked by common sense: Ii Beauregard could
not move from the lines of Manassas in three
d, ys after Bull Run. how much defense did
Washington needr We will answer it by the
opinion of one OF the ableSt officers of the army.
He said: Washington was only twice in danger
once in Nav, when "A sudden rush might have
been made. and again for two or three days after
Bull Run. For three months the newspapers
have been full of the most absurd stories about
an attack on Washington, which we will now an
swer in a few words. Ans man who has read the
least of military history, wi! see. at a glance.
that for Beluregard to have crossed the Lower Pc
tomac, would have been infatuated folly; to have
attacked Washington would have been equally so,
and to have cros-ed the Upper Potomac ii he Gull,
would be 10 subject his army to being cut off and
utterly destroyed in Maryland, which it certainly
would have been. His policy and the rebel policy
was wisely to keep up a constant threatening on
Washington, while he lay in what they think the
impresuable lines of Manassas. Thus Rich
mond would have been defended at a distance
our great strength p~aralyzed by a moral paralysis
and the border States be made to endure all
the sufferings and sacrifices of the war. This
makes, perhaps, the worst feature in the rebel
lion. The Cotton States, with n meanneSs which
all history will execrate. threw off upon their
friends in Virginia, Missouri and Kentucky the
burdens of n war which they alone created for
their own selfish purposes. That, however, they
may settle for themselves. The question for US
to settle is, whether the vast army we have rails
ed, and the immense expenditure of money we
have incurred, shall be employed solely for the
purposes o defense? What binders our march
into Nashville and Memphis? Nothing but the
want OF will. Ii it be answered we have not
force enough, we answer the people are ready to
raise force enough. But il is not force we want.
We want 9eaeTdlship.
This certainly is not an indirect condemnation
of the policy and skill of Scorl of Mcdowell.
of MCCLELLAN and of Fremont The New York
Tribune. a paper exceedingly aubilious to dis
play its sagacity in military affairs and which was
the noisiest in the clamor of Onward to Rich
mond, f" thus reviews the military policy which
has thus far characterized the management of the
war:
The three months volunteers lay around Wash
ington week after week without being even bri
gaded. They were never exercised in the move
ments of an army. They did not know, even by
sight, the Generals who finally led them into bat
tie. They were allowed to stroll idly about the
streets of Washington. begging and getting drunk.
Their field evolutions were limited to the sacking
of one grog shop and three or four brothes. And
all this neglect, incapacity Imhecility or treIchery,
was exposed from day to day through these col
umns, with sn earnest enueatv that somethinQ
should be done-that this great army should not
be allowed to wear out its term of service idly,
useleSsly, mischievously, doing nothing and
learning nothing but generalization
AT last, when the three months enlistments had
nearly expired. so that when our army was sent
into battle, a part of il refused to fight, and turn
ed its face homeward, because its time was out, n
forward movement was made, not toward Rich
mond, but in a very different direction, and our
utterly undlsciplined soldiers were precipitated
upon the enemy's stronghold, where he had ac-
cumulsted all the enginery of destruction most
formidable to raw troops fighting at disadvantage.
And even thus, with not half our men on the
battlefield that should have been. with the least
generalship that the world ever saw, our brave
rank and file fairly wrested victory from their
strongly posted far more numerous adverSaries,
and would have kept it had the reserve been or
dered to the front when it should have been. In
short, that battle OF Bull Run. after we had fairly
won it, was thrown away by the grossest incapac-
ty and mismanagement ever known in the annals
of war.
Under such a ssste of facts Mcdowell was
forced into the battle Of Bull Run to safety the
demands of Republican Congressman. Shall a
similar disaster be repeated to satisfy the renewed
clamor for offensive operations by the command
er of the Army of the Potomac?
The Union Army.
The Gel erals of the Union army along the
whole line, from the Atlantic to the Far West,
have now at their control as magnificent a force,
perhaps, as ever were put under the command of
any number of generals. From reliable sources
we have compiled a table showing the number of
troops each loyal State has now in the field or on
their way to the seat OF war;
Inganng oasalry. A,taesy. zotal.
Connecticut. -. 4,1sS l0D - 4,26S
Illinois. 80. Al. 900 5000 $4,000
Indiana. -. 80. $4,000 1000 500 $4,000
Iowa......... 1900 $500 1900
Kansas........ 1000 1000 900 $500
Massachusetts. 1000 $50 29,350
Maine & O10 100 q ON