Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1861-12-04

4 shoulder, and victoTiously, too, against th
. enslaVers and brutalizers of men, and ;
: gainst the traitors to the best goveInmer
, on earth.
Removal of the Rebel Congress fror
Richmond to Nashville.
The Rebel Congress, according to a re
: port forwarded from Baltimore, has author
lied the seat of the insurgent governmen
, to be transferred to Nashville. The Con
gress, it is added, will presently adjourn
to re-assemble there This legislation i
the slow fulfillment of an old promise
Last Spring, when the fate of the Borde
States was still uncertain, the location o
the Confederate capital was a bribe witt
which it was attempted to allure each il
turn. Virginia, as the most essential t
the project of capturing the National cap
ital, was first caught with the bait, anC
the capital was removed from Montgomery
to Richmond. Tennessee was next want
ed, and Kentucky and Missouri were sur,
to follow the lead of Tennessee; and n,
sooner was Virginia first deceived, anC
then fairly subjugated by the Confederate
army. than the offer was made for the fnal
location of the Capital at Nashville. 1t il
difficult to over estimate the efficacy o.
this dazzling temptation in producing the
the almost unanimous vote of Middle Ten.
nessee for secession.
Tennessee was bought; but Missouri
hesitatcd, and what was worse. kentucky
absolutely refused to follow. This failure
of a plot otherwise excellest, rendered ii
both unsafe and impOlitic to remove to
Nashville. That city was too near hos
tile frontier. By railroad and river it was
easily accessible to attacks from the swarm
ing loyalists of the Northwestern States,
and, indeed, 50 long as the main military
strength of the rebellion was grouped be-
fore Washington, it would have been in
the last degree reckless to have confded
the rebel executive and legislature to the
protection of Buckner's ill-organized, un-
provided, and sickly moo Of misnamed SOL
diery.
Why these apparently sensible reasons
for delay have now been set aside, we are
without positive knowledge. 1t will be
remembered, however, that Davis, in his
recent message, announced his intention to
place the insurgent forces in Winter quar-
ters; and it may be the design to leave no
larger force on the Potomac than is neces-
sary to held the powerful works at Nanas-
sas against the advance of the National
army, while the remainder is transferred
to the boundary between Tennessee and
Kentucky. Serious apprehensions are IN
questionably felt at Richmond in regard to
the communications with the South and
West Davis has little confidence in the
safety of the coast line and the Tennessee
road, as to recommend the Congress to de-
vote itself to the completion of an interme-
diate inland route through Danville and
Raleigh.
Upon communications thus doubted, it
would be the extreme of hardihood to rely
for the supplies Of an army so numerous
as that which spreads from Leesburg to
Norfolk; and withdrawal of the princi-
pal body to Tennessee, would at once re-
duee the peril of such reliance, and afford
protection to the railroads through the lat
ter State. 1t is impossible that the de-
structiOn of bridges in East Tennessee
should not have profoundly shocked and
alarmed the rebel Government. The threat
of reiterated attacks upon the Southern
coast, any Of which, if conducted with e.
quail prudence, must be quite as successful
as that at Port Royal. and of far more i'm
mediate effect and importance, must also
suggest the necessity of having the main
rebel force at soma central position, from
which it may radiate its energies in all di-
as occasion may indicate. These
have unquestiOnably had
weight in urging the change at this partic-
ular juncture.
The propriety of assuming that the re-
moval of the rebel Government implies the .
of the principal portion of the .
rebel strength can hardly, we think, be .
Questioned. From the inception of the
war, Davis has been in direct superin-
tendence of the insurgcnt army, restraining
It's advance and directing its movements
1t is well known that he has found much
difficulty in maintaining due subordination
to his authority and plans. That he will
consent to remove so far as Nashville from
Inc most important theatre Of operations
and that at the very moment the destruc-
ion of the Tennessee bridges and telegraph
SiEes, shows how unlikely he is to have
-,IIablo Moons Cc aou,vrrrT..4;o,o :. ~ Z
for one moment to be regarded as proba-
bic; still less that he will intrust his per-
son or the personnel of his administration
70 the worthless protection Of Buckner,
as that leader is in front and
flank by increasing National forces. Nash
vile is not fortified; there is nothing to
prevent its capture by National flotilla
ascending the Cumberland. Evidently the
lreh-rebel has no intention of moving with
,ut his forces. He needs them for protcc-
ion, and they need him as their captain
With this act then, the dccadence of the
may be dated. Virginia once
iorsakon by the Confederate army, there
viii be nothing to arrest the southward
march Of our troops. To prosecute win
er campaign in Virginia would indeed be
| formidable task But the task grows
lighter as we advance toward the Gulf
States; the evOlutions of seige train and
baggage train become more Practicable
As it has been abundantly proved in East
ern and Western Virginia, in Kentucky
and Missouri, rebellion promptly yanishes
With the coming of National troops in any
force, 50 that every step abandoned by the
retiring enemy and occupied by our soldiers,
is territory restored to the Union aud the