Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1861-09-06

thee months men at least haG been
three months under arms. They were
probably at least as martial and as ready
to fight as the rest Of her people. Just
as they are most required and likely not
to be quite unserviceable, they retired to
receive ill-deserved and ridiculous ova-
tons, as though they had been glorious
conquerers and patriots, instead of being
broken and routed fugitives, who march
ed off from Washington when it might be
expected the enemy were advancing
against it. In their place come levies
who have not had even the three months
training, and who are not as well equip
ped, so far as | can see, as their prede-
cessors, to face men who are elated with
success. and the prestige of the first bat
tie gained, and to be associated with
regiments cowed, probably, and certain
ly in some instances demoralized by de-
feat.
The artillerymen who cut the traces Of
their horses from caissons and carriage,
at least know more about guns than the
men who will be put to the new field bat
teries, which government are getting up
as fast as they can; and the muskets, Of
the best description, left on the Geld or
taken, cannot be replaced for long time
to come. In fact, much of this army
must be recognized in face of an enemy.
That enemy is either incompetent or art
full it is quite certain he is not actuated
by clemency or generous pity. Engi-
neers are hard at work strengthening the
position of the south bank of the river /;
but forts do not constitute safety. With
out stout hearts behind their lines and
breastworks, abattis and redoubts avail
nothing 1t must be that the Confede-
rates are deficient in the means of trans
port, or in actual force to make an attack
which is SO obvious, if they desire to
show the North it is not possible to sub
due them. The corps which went from
Winchester to Manassas under johnson
is put by the Federalists at 10000. Let
us take it at hall chat number. Beaure-
gard and Lee are said to have had so, 900
at Manassas, including, / presume, the
force between it a I Richmond. Divide
that again. There Were certainly 20, 600
between M9nr 80 Court. and Rich
oldh1, 81 whu1 0SaG9 could be spared /;
and on the wcs inside Of the capital of
the Confederate otatea there was availa-
BILE at least another corps of 10000,
which could have been readily strength
ened by 0,00o or 1900 more from the
South in case 1f supreme effort There
seems no reason, not connected with
transport, equipment, or discipline, why
the Confederates should not have been
able last week to take the field with 49,.
600 men, in two corps; one quite strong
enough to menace the force on the right
bank of the Potomac, and to hold it il
check, or to prevent it going over to th'
other side; the other to cross into Mary
land, which is now in parts only KEEP
quiet by force, and to advance on Wash
ington from the west. and north. In thu
event Of success, the political advantage
would be very great at home and abroad
and there would be new base Of opera
tons gained close to the enemy's lines
while the advantages Of holding the Pc
tomac and Chesapeake Bay would be
much neutralized and finally destroyed
The Navy Yard would fall into the enc.
my's hands. Fort Washington would
probably soon follow Fortress Monroe
would be condemned to greater isolation
Philadelphia itself would be in imminent
danger, should the Confederates attempt
greater aggression But, for one, Gen.
Beauregard will consent to no plan Of
operations in which success is not rem.
dered as certain as may be by all possible
precautions, and he might not favor o
proposal which would lead to dividing ar
army into two parts. with river between
and an enemy on each side Monroe and
Hampton, which are the true bases Of
operations against Richmond, have been
weakened to reinforce the army covering
Washington and Harper's Ferry, and yei
| doubt if there are on the south bank o.
the Potomac at this moment 40, 900 mer
all along the lines who could move oui
and offer an enemy battle, leaving any
adequate guards in the trenches and gar.
risons in the tete-du-pont and works.
The Confederates, as you were in
formed from the South, have enlisted mer
to serve for the war, and take no others
The staple of their army will undergo no
change, and as it grows older it ought Il
get bette r, unless it be beaten. You will
pardon me for referring to remark IN
one of my previous letters, that there
might be fierce skirmishes, and even san
culinary engagements, between the two
r armies, but that these would be followed
, by no decisive results, owing to the want
, of cavalry. Strange to say, though the
r panic and very discreditable rout wat
caused by alarms Of, and might have
! been prevented by the presence Of cayal-
ry, no steps are taken TO remedy that
great deficiency. The volunteers who
were at Manassas will never stand the
man on horseback again, and believe
! the Confederates are quite aware of theil
advantage, though they may have hat
TO mourn the loss Of many gentlemen
, who fell during the day. The northern
papers are increasing the amount Of but
ter in proportion as they decrease thu
, losses Of their loaves, and they do no
appear 10 perceive that the smaller the
latter were the less should be the layer
!, of the former-for it is no credit 10 ar
, army to lose its guns, abandon its posi-
: tons, throw away its muskets, leave ii
, wounded in the hands Of the enemy, anC
+ run some thirty odd miles from front o.