The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1861-07-10
PREsIDENT's MESSAGE.
Fsl1o,s. Citizen, Of he Senate,


ject Of legislation.
At the beginning OF the present presidential
term. four months ago, the functions OF The
Federal Government were found to b. general
ly snsnended within the several States OF South
Carolina Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi Louis
lana. and Florida, excepting only those Of the
Post Office Department. Within these States
the forts. arser ais, dock yards cuS'om houses,
the like including the movable and stationary
property in and shout them, Lad been seized
and were held in open hostility To the Govern
ment, excepting only Forts Piekens, EaN'of
and Jefferson, on and near the Florida coast
and Fort Sunpuer In Charleston hlreoh IN,
South Carolina.
The forts thus seized had been put in appro.
we'd condition. New ones had bcen built, and
armed forces had been organized and were or
ganizing, all avowedly with the same hostile
purpose.
The forts remaining in the possession OF the
Federal Government, and near these S'a'es,
were either besieged or menaced by warlike
preparations, and especially, Fort Sumpter was
nearly surrounded BY we'll protected hostile
batteries with guns equal in quality to It's own,
and outnu,ntering the latter, perhaps ten TO one
A dispropnrtionate. share OF the Federal muskets
and riHes had somehow found their way INTO
these States, and had been s,ized, to be used
against the Government. Accommodations OF
the public revenue living within them had been
siezed for the same object The navy was scat
tered in distant seas, leaving but small part OF
it within the immediate reach OF the dovern
ment. Officers OF the Federal Army and Navy
had resigned in great numbers, and OF those re-
signing, large portion had taken up arms a.
gainst the Government. simultaneously, IN
connection with all this, the purpose to sever
i i ,1,r cd In or
cordance with this purpose an ordinance had
been adopted in each of those States declaring
the States respec' lively to be separated from the
National Union. For instituting a combined
Government ofthese States formula has been
promulgated, and this illegal organization in
the character of the Confederate States were al
ready invoking a recognition, aid and lnterVen
ton from foreign powers.
Finding this condition ofthings, and believing
it TO be an imperative duty upon the incoming
Executive TO prevent, if possible, the consum-
nation OF such an attempt to destroy the Fed
eral Union, choice Of means to that end be
come indispensable. The choice we made was
declared in the inaugural address, The policy
chosen looked to the exhaustion OF all peaceful
measures before resort TO any stronger ones
1t sought only to hold the public places and
property not already wrested fIom the govern
merit and to collect the revenue, relying tor the
rest on time, discussion and the ballot box.
1t promised continuance OF the mails at gov
ernmept expense to the very people who were
resisting the government; and 1t gave repeated
pledges against any disturbance to any OF the
people or any of their rights. of alr' which the
President might constitutonaliy and iustifiably
do in such a case. Everything was lorborne
without which it was believed possible to keel
the government on foot. On the fifth of March
the present incumbents Grst fe}l day in office
a letter Of Major Andersons, commanding a
Fort Sumpter, written on the 28j h day oi Feb
rua-y, and received at the War Department OF
the 4th OF March, was, by that Dcplr' ment
placed in his hands. This letter expressed
the professional opinion Of the writer that rein
jorcements could not be thrown into that for
in time for its relief, rendered necessary by til
limited supply of provisions, and with view
holding possession Of the same, with orce
less than twenty thousand good and well dis
ciplined men,
This opinion was concurred IN by all the ol
fieers Of his command, and their memoranda o
9he subject was made, and inclosed In Majo
Anderson's letter The whole was immediate
" laid before Lieut.. General Scott who a
once concurred with Major Anderson in thi
opinion. On reflection, however, he took iul
time for consultation with other officers, bot
of the army and the navy, and at the end c
four days came reluctantly, but decidedly Il
the same conclusion as before. lie also state
at the same time that no sufficient lorce wa
then Mt the control Oft the Government, or cou
be ralsed and brought to the ground within tn
time, before the provisions in the fort would b
exhausted. In purely military point OF ev
this reduced the duty Of the Administration |
the case to the mere matter OF getting the gal
rson out Of the fort.
1t was believed, however, that to so ahando
that position under the circumstances, would
utterly runous; that the necessity under wh'c
1t was to be done would not be fully understood
that by many it would be construed as a pa
of voluntary policy: that at homc it would di
courage the trends o. the Union, emboden
adversaries; and 90 far to ensure to the latter
recognition abroad that IN fact it would be
national destruction consummated.
This could not be allowed, starvation W
not yet upon the garrison, and ere it weuld
reached, Fort Pickens might be reinforced.
This last would be clear indication oil polio
and would better enable the country to ace
the evacuation OF Fort Sumpter, as militia
necessity An order was at once directed to
sent for the landing OF the troops from !
steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens.4 II
I0TQeT cOulu not 20 Dy lailt, pue iAuS' '"i>o
longest and sowest route by sea.
The first return news from the order was
ceived but one week before the fall OF Sumo
Ths news itself was that the officer, commar
ing the Sabine, to which vessel the troops h
been transferred from the Brooklyn acting |
on some quassi aynisttce Of the late Adminlst
ton land OF the existence of the late Admin
tration, up to the time the order was dispatc
ed having had only two vague and uncerta
s rumors to fix attention,) had refused to la
the troops to reinforce Fort Plckens be'or
crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter, II
was impossible, rendered so by the near eXha
ton Of provisions in the latter named fort.
precaution against such conjunction, the G'
sernnent had a few days before commenced P
paring an expedition, as well adopted as miE
Abe to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedlt
was intended to be ultimotely used or not,
cording to circumstances. The strongest or
cipated case for using it was now present
and it was resolved to send it forward as
been intended in this contingency.
1t was also resolved to notify the Cove
f1nent ofCaroipa that she might expect an
tempt would be made to provision the Fort, Q
that II the attemptshould not be resisted, tn
would be no effort made to threw in m
arms or ammunition, without further noti
or in case fan attack upon the fort. I
!, notice was accordingly given; whereupon
fort was attacked and bombarded to its
without even awaiting the arrival Of the
visioning expedition.
1t is thus seen that the assault upon, and
reduction Of Fort Sumter, was III no sens
matter Of self defence on the part OF the ass
ants They well knew that the garrison in
q