Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-09-25

darkness that ret upon il. I had hoped thai
there could be no doubt in the mind of any rea
sonable man, as to how stand in regard to the
war-and search in vain for. and sincerely in
vite any man to point out i'm the columns of my
paper since, or before the Wat began, one word or
line which betrays infdelity on my part to the
Federal Union OF the Constitution, or the least
sympathy with those who have attempted TO sub
vert the noblest system of governments known 70
history. 1t is not improbable that | may have
failed to please the zealots of any party, for L
have never sought. nor desired nor hoped 70 please
them.
1t is a fact which no man can truly gainsay that
the Republican party of 1860 was not homogene
Gus in its members, nor congruous in its princi-
piles. Ii had its ultra and its conservative ele-
ments, and few men believed that they would
long cohere in the same organization. either I'M
der the exhilaration of victory or the depression
of defeat. / never attempted to conceal the fact,
and my readers were Therefore we'll apprised, that
my opinions and sympathies were with the con-
servative element of that party. was educated
a Wing in the school of Henry Clay and Daniel
Webster. They were the Gamaliels at whose
feet / sat and learned my political principles
the love OF the whole country and its Constitu-
tion-and fidelity to all its compromises. there
fore could not be ultra in my politics. without be-
ing false to my own convictions. Upon the de-
feat and disintegration of the Wing party saw
no organization embracing so many OF the Wing
leaders whom was accustomed 10 respect-and
representing so much OF Wing opinions, as did
the Republican organization of lo6O-and /
therefore cast in my lot with it, and gave il my
support, hoping that in its success, the corrup-
tons of Buchanan's administration would be ended
and the conservative elements of the Republi-
can party, far prevail in the Federal admins
tration, ms to check the violence of extreme men
on the slavery question, disabuse the minds of
the Southern people of the belief of any hostile
/ intention of the North to interfere with the Con-
stituton in regard to slavery-and gradually re-
store lraterfal feeling between all the States.
1 Had not the election Of Mr.. Lincoln been almost
Immediately followed By overt acts of the treason
which had been long plotted in the South, i be-
! leve his administration would have resulted as
had hoped; but the traitors of the South have
| given him no opportunity TO test by peaceful
administration of the Government his fidelity to
the Constitution aud the whole nation. Upon
the false representation that Dir. Lincoln was to
be but the organ and exponent of Northern Abo-
litionists the Southern leaders of rebellion have
been able so to inilame the minds of the masses
OF the Southern people, as to thrust upon the IA
ton the calamity of civil war. When history
shall have truly written the story of this war;
while she will not exonerate from blame such of
the people of the North as have, by their inordi
nate zeal for the confinement and determination
the South feeling of insecurity and a spirit hos
tile to the peace and permanence of the Union,
she will not fail to charge upon the secession
leaders the fearful responsibility of beginning the
war. Up TO the hour when South Carolina pass
ed her ordinance of secession, the Federal Gov
eminent had invariably fulfilled its obligations to
the Southern people, and stands clear of offence
towards them. The secession of that State was
an act of rebellion and revolution wholly uniusti-
fed by any such course or act of oppression, as
will in the judgment of nations Justly remit an
oppressed people to their final remedy--the over
throw OF the Government that Expresses them.
Whether or not between the secession of South
Carolina, and the fall of Fort Sumter, the FEEDER
al Government could without dishonor lave
adopted any measures of Cancellation that would
have been accepted, and have prevented further
progress in civil war, is a question about which
patriots may well differ. During the session of
the XXXVI Congress, we hoped for and advo-
Gated compromise aud peace. We did nc: then
approve we do not now approve the vote of those
men, who III face of the giant revolution, whose
form then shadowy but threatening, was clearly
pictured on the Southern horizon, could say ''no
conciliation," ono compromise" The interests
at stake were too mOmentOus to be submitted to
the arbitrament of war until every hope OF peace
had expired Many who look calmly over the
whole field of controversy are of opinion that it
was not too late-even after the fall of Fort
Sumter-to have done something, nor is even
now too late to do something to avert civil war
without further imperiIing the honor or safety of
the Union. There is wisdom and force in the
language of Count Gortschakoff-the Russian
Minister of Foreign Afars-to NJ. DeStoeckel-
published in this paper of the 18th inst, when he
saws: t
There are no interests so divergent that it
may not be possible to reconcile them by laborng
to that end with zeal and perseverance, and in a
spirit of justice and moderation
Be this as it may, upon the wanton and afro
cious act of treason which resulted in the surren
der of Fort Sumter. we in common with the mass
of the Northern people accepted the war as a ne
cessty. The evil which had defiled our threshold
by its foul but shadowy presence, had assumed
shape and substance and essayed to enter our
doors, and the North could not do otherwise than
meet il in the spirit of men, conscious of the jus
tee of their cause and determined to maintain it.
therefore justified as an act of public necessity,
demanded by the public danger. the Presidents
call for IS 600 men, and the subsequent action OF
Congress and the Executive for the vigorous
prosecution of the war. Without official action
| for peaceful measures, on the one side or the
other by which the conservative mind of both Sec
tons at war could be brought together to consider
terms of peace, | have been unable to see how
the war could do otherwise than 90 on, until the
bravest heart and strongest arm had decided the
controversy by a victory from which the defeated
had no power nor hope of appeal. war, which
the intelligent sentiment of all loyal men has
based aud justified solely upon its necessity as a
defense to the Union and Constitution cannot.
unless the whole field of controversy is changed
by the onward march of events, be suspended or
abandoned until the Union and the Constitution
are made safe. So long, therefore, as the avowed
purpose and object of the seeded States is not
| to demand and enforce redress for grievances as
members of the Federal Unon but to establish a
national status pithout the Union-a status utter
y subversive of the territorial and political rights
Of the Federal Government, there can be no com
promise and no peace-the war must 20 on, and
say let it 20 on. and NAV God prosper the right.
In saying thus much am also free to say. that
such is my conviction of the dangers and evils of
the war, that whenever there is any, even small,
ground of encouragement TO believe that the
| Conflderate States prepared to treat to
the terms of their resuming their old position
within the Union, would not feel that the Federal
Government was dshonoring its Constituents, but
rather doing its duty to them in holding out the
olive branch, and with becoming dignity inviting
peace. t.,st ..--.s.. t. rs-i =
While I have substantially sustained the meas
ures of the Administration in regard to the war,
and abstaned from the personal denunciation of
the President and his Cabinet, in which some of
my leading contemporaries of the Republican, as
well as other presses, have largely indulged, /
have not felt il to be my duty-neither did Con-
gress at its late session deem it to be its duty
formally to approve all the acts of the President
in the conduct of the war. The President has
his constitutional duties and responsibilities. and
the Congress and the people have theirs. and it is
slavish doctrine that would demand from either
the Congress or the people formal :. Amen," and
"well done" to the Presidents every official act.
Let the character and necessity ofthe act deter
mine its merit. If the President on the assump-
ton of public necessity, transcend his consttu-
tional powers, there is less danger in temperate
censure, even if the necessity be conceded, than
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