Daily Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1861-1862, 1861-12-12

- ,le,lsd bir OF TIA -llS.ers nat AZ hoIls Is
p,uco tie more irsAd.d TO please oo'o NJ os no.o'
- n, nat 20 .ro-m the easy task of ooayns the Pfes
a., vbIst 20 ii obey him IA 20 espeAss both d.
Aa rysl4 At home even Of his own party. Ne Knows
th,. tina marty nj home has condolences m thefres
do. Than &c has In him and that IL feels vastly more &C.
Heiuds GbOu; the Pseaidents political late tnAn IL aees
for bis
In tbs one solo Is to be poised sympathy for bis Pc
cuA individual interests against the interest OF the
UaOs hone party placed In the other II ia not dihcnt
FOR him 20 dsl- which sale s most apt TO kick the
beam I, hs obsys tAe President be is almost certain
Of forgiveness i Of applause; whilst Il he dsooey
l4Arar9 ,hsNee K he does not ose his seat hls ON
Oss Of rspr,ss- sVs both for emolunent and import
alcs worth more TO him than most oil those "Hhin
TIA gift of the President. Here then, motive amply
slH5ieRt TO make him faithful and subservisnt fol.
lover, 20 say noihing Of that grea. principle OF
cohesion, party spirL without bus ever turelng n
regards towards the palace in the hope oil hien'r
q. few small crumbs, dropped IN BIS
uay for the satisfaction If greedy friends 81
home general clntent him. 10 trulh much the larger
number Of those EhO constitute an administrator ma
iOrty ia COugres expect or even hope Tor hgner
OF D. and amOng Ihem % be slSays ound the mos
fAiihfI OF the faithful For il ia fact standing broad,
" ont in dsprool of all theorzlg, TO the excess OF
Presidential patronage, that for every dessrton which
can bs named out OF shat larger body who never ooH
for any Of the higher Offices five or more eau DO named
from she ess class, Who We pfetenuons 70
those Offices and do look for Them Nor shoui this be
At al wondered at for the punerous and humber
class rscsve 10 personal sht from the Executive, and
have nothing Of tha scr. revenge whereas, II things
we're narrowly looked iniO that cause alone would be
found 90 produce more desertions than all others
Toe Governors Of the different States have generally
pretty much the ga rOnage, on smaller seAle,
that tha President has yet, with the exception OF the
Two lArgs states, where the patronage Is sufficient
20 iadues the formation Of parties for obtaining
t. We hear OF no comp Aint whatever OF Executive
encrolchment upon legislative power Toe complaint
is ali the other way. Toe Legislatures are psrPeuay
euorOlehiDg upon the Executives; aud il is generally
foand practice that the governors have too little, rsIh
or than 100 much, influence with the Legislatures.
Take the case o. the younger Adams. He enjoyed
the same pa .rOnAge General Jackson, and Mr. Van
Blren, aud il would be paying him most rideuousy
eKtravaKant compliment not 10 suppose him equally it,
ensd 20 use Il yet he.tai neither power Influence
over Congress. His only influence to procure the
defeat OF everything hal the OpposO supposed he de-
sired The Of this that he had not been elee
ted b. a pArty and he could not combine party organ
lIatoR strong enough 70 sustain him. The moment be
vas elected he found TO be in minority IN both
Houses. Hence the rapidiiy with which predominant
pFty formed agAins, him, aud the facility With which
he sag turned out.
further Illustrations it may be closed here wish
ing the Just iuerercs be- what everything tends to
prove that al the orbsnt powers Of the President
heavily eomplaned Of, are purely and sOlsy the result
Of the mode Of his election TGil conceded the other
inference necessarily fooss that the Only way get
rid Of this excess OF power Is to get rid OF the mode OF
his election.
So far as reeollect, Mr. Clay "a the ouly prominent
Of your parry Who has Indicted any spscf, RENE
dies for this of power They to be found in
his HnoveF speech aud in the programme there laid
doEn Of the dues OF Congress under the coming admin
jsiration Of General Harrison. He says the
stu,ionl machine has been Jarrei aud jol;ed that
t needs careful animation aud thorough repair " that
the frst and greatest OF those duties si be the cir
eumscr6ing OF Executive power aud throwing round IL
such safeguards and limitations viii NO longer render
is dangerous TO public liberty To this eud lie pro-
poses
First to reduce the Presidential oce to siugs term;
second TO rsdues his power hirj, restrict the
power Of dsmsson from olJs by bringing II under
sponsby; fourth, to pu; the Treasury exclusively
under the control OF Co0gess h1, 20 prohibit the ap
polntmsnt Of members Of Congress to any but few
spec lied Offices
Toe Two first Of these amendments are such ~ Il e
scheme shAll suggest will asO require, and glad,
therefore, TO nod that shall have the high authority of
his opinion in favor Of that much OF it, But AN at
loss 10 apprseAIe the tendency they will have under the
present system 20 reduce executive power ia the
sr he desires. An Ineligible depot OF four years du
ration il no proper Or like what Government
was intended 70 De than despot that is re-egiole.-
Toe power ia in the oce and il Is us penary for
four years duration L il for eight Unless the
powers Of the ocs decreased instead OF making the
con ests Tor il more fequenL true policy required that
they should be made less So and II il reduced TO
term, that term should be extended to ten or fifteen
Ye IL The excess OF the power Of the oiee against
which all complaint is mad aud that excess is uhst Mr..
Cay hmseli seems to desire to curtll. | do not per
esse how the reducing 70 term have any Ell
feet towards doing IL may serve in degree to
tlts from incumbent nducement for the of
power and 20 that extent has merit but il
Ia 90 degree tends to olrtAn his poEer. Such Is
not the theory OF government. IL trusts absolute
plUsr TO no one map, for no length OF time, and
far no plrpose IL nowhere upon the unuie prnc
pc Of trusting - the absence Of motive in Off to
do srOng. /. sVeryshere goes on the contrary prne
H.. ar.1- Ia H.
fore Of keeping him uudsr restraint. The whole result.
% bs attained by sCci amendment is very small
.Vsr shen vossl a. operation upon human motive s
o. personal sllutores sbs you leave the passions o.
party spirit envy personal and political bate and afe
ton 90 influence incumbent 10 use his power TO
cure the eecaoa OF successor, Of his party sand
even OF his own selection from that party. Do you
suppose that Gen Jackson el, any less s0cuds for the
ecOn OF Mr.. Van Buren, than he bad done for his
Osu re-Olscdony
The reduction Of the veto power may be proper under
any sysem but is believed to be among the least per-
Of his excessive powers. lis only sgatiSe and
is Oly eject to leave things they TO- the bal
Of TIE Presidents term. It's worst mode Of
threaten neither liberty permanent national
Interests.
The responsibility Mr. Clay seems to desire to have
the removing poser brought under is barely requiring
the President report moyA TO the Senate together
With his for making them. entertain doubt
that the power to require this to be done already txis,s
ia Congress and that pernacious refusal the de-
nand Of her House. 70 give ms reasons Tor removals
would be fair ana legitimate ground for impeachment-
Taere Il no amendment Of the Constitution needed to
edso, tina, offset. But, when attained BY en- Of
Congress do not see how it viii materially curisil
the powers Of the Office. Toe supposed responsibility
70 which i. would subj act the exercise Of the power
a. in truth, responsibility a! all According 10
the opinion Of Mr.. Van Buren, and Mr.. Benton,
as expressed in the report Of 1926 it 10
iesl than none a. all r. as they say land you AID
Mr. Clay doub. coacur in the opinOn) the power Of
tls President subduss the capacity Of RESISTANCE the
part Of the Senate and enables him TO rule easily and
securely with than without. the nominal check of
the Senate; then also he would with equal ease and
security exercise the poser Of removal after il Wss
rferred 10 that body TO control It's exercise Public
opinion does Senator's great II justice IL they not
about the most hungry Of ,hs hungry ofieesetkers-
They will be the apt Of all others always do ss