Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-11-28

every precaution possible to avoid adding the evil.
OF foreign war to civil connection Now, even i
this Southern Confederation there ia notbino ~ IN
sleate that It would take any step more difectly
hostile TO the Northern Government: and Il mus
De assumed, therefore, that the Northern Govern.
ment itself would take the initiative a4ainst The
european FOWer which should SO interfere in an
American quarrel
In order 70 arrive at the quarter frDm which in
the second place, the United States Government
n apprehends such an act Of interfererice we have
only TO look to the character Of the defences which
II ~ recommending to the legislatures Of the dler-
ent Northern states. Mr.. Seward states that ..fIt
most obvious precaution, against the langerl ia to
put In eenditlon Of complete defence AL the ports
haroors, sea coasts and lakes The Iorts and the
seaeoasts, it il well know, would be ssssilsbIe bv
every maritime power, but the lakes are tie
ooundIy between the United States and British
North America, and sssailaby only by Great Rri-
tain. Very possibly Great Britain nav not be the
only power at whose hands a recognition bv tba
South Is thought possible by Mr.. lsin,oln and M.
Seward; but Great Britain is assuredy the power
agslnat whom there is distinctive preautiou here
taken. Ads
Now, we muetsay that tie American f;ovnrnn,eus
IN our Judgement never took step more uncallod
for and so unwiSe. We deeply regret tic lanents,
bic contest to which they hnd themselves cofnmit
ted and we have looked throughout more in sor-
row for America than in anger for our own losses
upon the contest for authority which Is row vTsgir
But with all this sympathy and with the utmost in
berest both pecuniary and moral in the American /
civil war, We have firmly and fxedly rsfrain-
ed from pronouneing any judgment between
lne oelhgerents. II we thought that we could ar
rest bl0odsned and terminate the war we Uould Il
most gladly offer our friendly mediation Butfrom
ae very commencement we were persuaded that
he scope and herceness of the hOstties were sI,cb
3 European mediation would rather intensity than I
lay: we hsVe, therefore, at once as q nation and
a rsauIn Ir~oTs -. ? i
nd to pronounce no opinion whatever il, the nues.
ION while los hope to remain friendly lDb IoLk pa1tes
Mr.. Seward therefore altogether mi,cs slenlatss {
be intentions both Of the British Government ana {
ne British people II ne thinks that any design e Q
US (unless It be among few forward ana 1,n,n / q
uenual members of Parliament) TO recoeniza fba d
outh such resolution Of neutrality upon orr f
art Is recommended on grounds both Of policy and "
lstlce The only incentive Of either this country c.
france to take an opposite course would be To a
'-estaoIsh the supply OF cotton, but we believe
at sneh hypothesis Is altogether deluslve and d
ST while the Northern Government continued its
oekade there would be no more export of eottos 70
ON recognized than from an unreeeenized Soutb bs
% COnfederacy. 1t would also be at present alto in
tneF premature TO recognize bOdy Of States d
hleh cannot be said to have yet demonstrated ar
elr capacity to maintain their own Independence of
the prediction Of the North should be realized We
d their armies should, before spring sirch right R
er the Southefners, what would become OF a m
lLlsu OF rencn recognition! pc
We think, therefore, that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. hI
ward are providing against danger which can al
rdy be said to exist, and that in doing so they TEL
E wasting upon useless objects at once rlen. mon.
and materiel, which it should be their aim to 81
ncentrate upon their real and Immediate enemies on
Washington Cabinet are themselves deIjberatel no
owing the Southern Confederation the advantsre vi
their sehemes. The Southerners care for Euro eh
an recognition chiefly, we have said in order po
divert the military power Of the North Although bl
re is no likelihood of such RECOGNITION tsri6o de
ce the North nevertheless dsspates 10, strenot6 sit
though anxious to eYince its power by extending ca
number OF Its enemies. They might make sure wi
I we shall notrecOgnizs the South that still less he
II We stack the North, and thsrefore-that the sel
enemies they have to contend with are thoss jsc
sady before them. his