Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1861-06-11


which probably is merely the expression OF Q
nervous, rapid train of ideas. The author pro
tests strongly against what may be termed the
geometricai theories of military science; those
theories which would reduce every military
operation to a mere question of scale and COM
passes. And certainly, so far as the writings OF
Jomini and his followers have this tendency, we
readily concide In the criticism. That they pos
cess it to certain extent there can be little
doubt. II will be we'll, however, to consider the
question more generally-in what sense war
can be looked upon as science.
THE ISSUE OF WAR NOT DECIDED by CHANCE.
Let us put case, impossible In itself, yet to
O certain degree attainable in many instances,
and suppose that we were fully acquainted
with the moral and military qualities of the
Generals of two opposing armies, with the skill
and energy Of their staff, commissariat, medi-
cal and all other departments, With the charac-
teristcs both of officers and men, with the'num-
bers and composition OF each arm, with all the
antecedents aud with the resources at the dis
posal Of both armies further. that we knew
well the country in which they were about to
act Its physical and local peculiarities, and the
habits of its people then we may safely say
that the result of the war would be, IL not abso
lutely, at least in the highest degree Of moral
certainty, predictable. Now what does this
fact. which will hardly be disputed, implyf IL
implies that The issue Of The War is not a matter
Of blind chance; that 1t depends, humanity speak.
ing, upon combination of qualities and re.
sources Of the opposing forces, and that these
qualities must be exercised, and these resources
developed, according to principles which, wheth
er known or unknown to US, are beyond
doubt equally fixed and real. The fact that the
game of war is frequently found to be the most
uncertain of all games, proves nothing to the
contrary. Ii only shows that the true appre
hension OF the above elements of the calcula
ton is excessively difficult in practice. Expe
riepce in war is universally acknowledged as
the best teacher, and the precise knowledge
which experience brings of the data before men.
toned, and OF the principles of action which
spring from them, proves that there Is In war a
sufficient sequence Of cause and effect TO con-
stitute science.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR.
There are, then, principles Of war, fixed and
real and If principles, then there is o science
which combines and Celebrates them. OF what
nature, then, is this soience2 Napoleon gives
US the best clue to the answer by telling US 10
what respect war Is not a science. We must
not expect, with the limited knowledge which
uuUeT GBb Utbb VI CECumbtauVco We Cuu uOpO W
acquire of the data above mentioned, to attain
to ANYTHING resembling demonstrative certain
ty. "Nothipg," says the great warrior, "is alb
solute in war" Accordingly, we find that prin.
ciples which 10 some wars are unquestionable,
are not applicable at all to others, for instance,
the principles on which wars against independent
chiefs of half-savage people should be conduct-
ed arc totally different from those which should
govern military operations against regular
armies. ..I
If any one doubts this, we will ask him to
take one Of the fret principles laid down In the
scientific military works, from Jomini down.
wards, viz:-that Of destroying your enemy 10
detail by opposing masses of your forces to frac-
tions of his. Now in a war such 90 We are con.
siderlng, go far from this being the object TO be
obtained, the real object Is to induce the enemy
to unite his forces in order that you may destroy
them once and for oil. Again, the frst Of al
principles of war is said to be to conceptrat,
superior forces upon the decisive point. But
as In the illustration just given. there IL il
many cases no decisive point whatever. Il /
of little consequences where the enemy Is. Their
may be q decisive object to be obtained, and tbi
object may be to provoke bim to concentrate
in order that be may be the more easily annihi.
lated. But the use Of the term point evidentl,
U RCOuobitOet VI ~ iCuet y bypO-
graphical idea into the axiom, which had best b,
avoided.
But although the real science of war, as de
duced from historic fact, has been sadly over
loaded with definitions and axioms, IL would b,
unsafe to neglect, on that account, the study o
the principal writers of strategy and tactics
One writer, indeed, ia almost absolutely exemp
from this fault, and, which strongly confirm
the truth Of our position, that writer is tb,
only one who ever commanded large armies Il
the field. We allude, of course, to the admi
rable work of the Archduke Charles on th
"Principles of War" OF tactical works VI
know scarcely any that can compare with Fred
cries "Instructlons to bis Generals" }" and Craw
ford's "Standing Orders." But the best o
all studies is that which the student carves ou
for himself by collatng the historical scooun
Of military events with the dispatches Of th
chief actors.