Daily Democrat and news. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1859-1864, 1861-08-01

! o1snoieh rGolsv 11sia0oplmen' ooiuma -
Aese retd - ~. Bat 10 fo(nd
\ Tho Il ~ = ~ Ids impsaesieabll ps
4 hs(Ry 4 llcs} and On that accd %
ADD 11es1a u pleae Friday wss Do.
voted to . survey o. the Other hank.
aad ihees hs Enssd tie rosds in such .
condition - t. justify the attempt to
turn The snsmy's position on that side.
The tact that Gen. Mcdowell thus
chaugsd the slssS Of stack from Friday
TO Saturday, and the point Of attack
from the southern TO the northern flank,
shows that the control Of these details
fs1 'cosodsd wholly % him BY Gen.
$500 - - pgQpqe svesy one will
eoscede Inst This dissection ~ wisely
exercised, aud the change judicious
Bot oil this leaves the main point IN
touched. The question H.: Who de.
cided that TIE aSedck shOuld Be made ,
Who determined that the road to Rich
Wond should be BY MaDassos Junction /!
Who is responsible Tor the plan Of ope-
rations By which battle 1t thu point,
selected By the rebels themselves, admi.
rably adapted for defence, fortified
through three long months Of incessant
labor, accessible to their achievements
from both directions, and in oil respects
precisely such position as they might
wish to make it, became . matter Of
necessity? The paragraph quoted
above, for the purpose of relieving the
President and Cabinet, throws the re
sponsibility upon Gen. Scott. We have
not the slightest desire to involve the
President and Cabinet iu any response.
bility that does not belong to them but,
on the other hand, we do not intend
that Gen. Scott shall be loaded with
blame for acts which we're done BY
others. We know that Gen. scott was
opposed to this plan Of the campaign
from the beginning; he deemed 1t un-
wise to make Richmond the main point
Of the movement; but, after that had
been decided against him, he was op.
posed to marching against it by the
longest aud most difficult route. through
a country every foot Of which would be
obstinately defended, and which must
be held by a strong force after 1t had
once been taken. This we know to be
true-and, in spite Of the delicacy OF
such disclosures, We shall not hesitate to
state the authority for 1t. 1t is that Of
Gen. Scott himself.
On the Tuesday preceding the battle,
Gen. Scott, at b own table, in presence
Of bis aids and single guest, discussed
the whole subject Of this war, in all its
parts, and with the utmost clearness and
accuracy. He had distinct and we'll
defined opinion on every point connect.
! ed with it, and stated what his plan
would b. for bringing it to a close it the
management Of 1t had been left in his
hands. The main object Of the war,
> he said, was to bring the people Of the
rebellious States to feel the pressure oil
the Government; to compel them to re.
turn to their obedience and loyalty
!, And this must be done with the leas,
: possible expenditure Of lite compatible
: with the attainment Of the object. Nc
, christian nation can be justified, he said
IN waging war in such a way as shall
destroy SO lives when the object of the
] war can he attained at cost OF 500
t Every man killed beyond the number
absolutely required is murdered. Hence
g he looked upon all shooting Of bckets
, all scouting forays not required in order
to advance the general object OF tn.
war, all destruction Of lite, on either
J, side, which did not contribute to the
: general result, AS SO many acts Of unus
, tifiable homicide.
Ii the matter had been LETT to him, ht
, said, he would have commenced by per
iect blockade OF every Southern port OF
the Atlantic and the Gulf. Then he
: would have collected a large force a,
, the Capital for defensive purposes, and
another large one OH the Mississip,ai iol
offensive operations. The Summer
months, during which it is madness to
take troops south OF st. LOUIS, should
have been devoted to tactical instruc.
ton F; and, with the first frosts of autumn
he would have taken column OF $4,000
well-disciplined troops down the Missis-
sippi, and taken every important point
on that river, New Orleans included
IT could have been done, aud with more
ease. ,cith less loss of life and wiM far
greater important results, than ,oould
attend the marching Of an army to
Richmond. At eight points the river
would probably have been defended, and
eight battles would have been necessa
~; but, in every one OF them, success
could have been made certain for us.
The Mississippi and the Atlantic once
ours, the Southern States would have
been compelled, by the natural and in
evitable pressure Of events, to seek. by
return TO the Union, escape from the
ruin that would speedily oyerwhelm
them out Of it. "This," said he, I" was
my plan. But arm only subordiate.
1t is my business to give advice when it
is asked, and to obey orders when they
are given. I shall do 1t. There are
gentlemen in the Cabinet who know
much more about war than l do, and
who have far greater confidence than l
have in determining the plan Of the
campaign. There never v 40 more just
and upright man than the President
never one who desired more sincerely
to promote the best interest Of the coun-
try. But there are men among his ad-
visers who consult their own resent
ments far more than the dictates of Wis