Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1861-10-17
PROBABLE DESIGN OF THE EN-

EhNs
The campaign in Kentucky is rapidly assam
lag increased importance almost with every
passing hour. The lethargic Indifference mani
tested by the enemy 4 few weeks since in refer
ence 10 the destiny of that State, is now being
followed up by active and vigorous movements,
with the evident intent Of cOniesting every inch
of ground before permitting a further advance Of
tbe Confederate army on her soil. We no longer
hear of tb-e transmission oftroops from the North
west 70 the Potomac for the defense of Washing
tln, as was the case some twenty days ago. hut
the lde has commenced to ebb in the opposite
direction, and MCCLELLAN IS forced by popular
clam6r 10 come swiftly 10 the relief Of SHEn-
HAS. Il IS quite probable chat the rumor has
reached the Felosal auihoritiss. intimating All
intention ga he part Of our military lrairr7 q"
@ into wia,er qulrsfa al the Potomac, aud
they have concluded to change the programme
Of the war IN a material respect by transferring
its theater to the West, merely keeping on the
defensive in the East.
However this may be, we an informed by our
llt-st adyices from Cincinnati and Louisville,
thar the rolling stock on the three great trunk
railways, leading east, is SO mOnopoGzed in the
transportation of troops as to entirely iuterdict
even The shipment Of produce IN the opposite
d~irsctien from those metropolitan markets. Ger
tain il is that a tremendous army is being con-
ce~ntratea along the Ohio river for the purpose Of
waging a vigorous war in Kentucky-numbeT-
ing certainly not less than sixty thousand men.
That specific number, indeed, was mentioned by
Gen. SHERMAN in the late order issued by him
in Louisville 10 his commiSsaries, in giving d.
reetions for the purchase of army supplies.
This fact then being sufficiently established
we mean this significant change of programme,
which has been so suddenly devised, and Is being
speedily e1ecuted-we may well look to some OF
/ Is probable consequences with the view of being
prepared to confront them. Most imminent of
all is a forward movement southwark on Genera
ZOLucOFFER, thence in the direction Of East
Tennessee, by way Of Cumberland Gap, This
officers command, consisting only OF a few
thousand troops, is now quartered in Laurel and
Clay counties, about eighty miles from Lexing-
ton. At the latter place the enemy IS eoncentra-
ting a heavy force. The recent i~nexcusable
bluader on our side Of destroying the railroad
bridge over Green river, through a misapprehen-
sioa Of Gen. BUCKSER's orders, is an insur-
mountabie barrier to any immediate forward
movement that viii threaten Louisville. In the
meanwhile ihs enemy has ample time 10
expand his forces and expedite his pre-
p~arations for any advance that may be in
contemplation. The indications, We repeat,
point 10 the probability that this advance rH Be
Epoa East Tennessee. Such a move has long
ben threatened BY the Lincoln Government, and
any feasiblso pportunit fore xecutingi il will not be
los. by is desperate authorizes. One Of the
most certain combinations Of our view of this
matter, is furnished by the recent retreat of
R~OSENCRASZ across the Gsuley river in West
EN- Virginia, and his reported march into East
ern Kentucky. Il is well known that this sud
den mancuver was q complete surprise to Gen.
LEE, and no motive could at the time be assigned
to account for it. Possibly instructions were
sent him to abandon bis hopeless enterprise of
penetrating further into Virginia, and TO project
g movement towards Gen. Z~oLLIcoFFER, for the
purpose OF attacking him IN the rear simultaHe-
ously with SHRNAN's raid upon him from the
North
Should the movement Of ROsENCRASZ, IS
samisNd BY Us, be correctly interpreted, it will
place orr forces under Z~OLLIcOFFER complete
ly On the defensive. The entrance OF the for
mer leader into Eastern Kentucky with twenty
I've thousand troops. would force the latter to
ioin BUCKSER, or retreat 10 Cumberland Gap.
In either instance, East Tennessee would be
confronted with a foree Of from forty TO fay
thousand men, and the repetition Of the dkas
tiers AZ Laurel Hin and Rich Mountain woca
formidably threaten US.
The importance Of penetrating this disaa-cte1
rcgion-tbe aid and comfort that Is expected
froul the resident traitors-aBd cur U1lnerabiliiy
there. inrir the execution of this plan. IL gu
entrance can once be made through CumbeF
Land Gap, whichmay become a Thermopyle and
a large force be thrown into the adjacent region
and ensconced amid the mountain defleS, It Is
impossible 70 tell how soon all communication
NAV be cut of between the armies Of the Mis-
sissippf and the Potomac, by the destruction Of
the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad
The consummation of this end ~alone-whichis a
natural sequence to the result we mentions
worth an immense sacrifice on the part of the
enemy, and the advantage to be expected by
him from its success, we believe, is to-day fully
appreciated. If our only line of diree,
Intercourse with The national capital can be thus
interrupted, an important result win be effected.
the most beneficial 70 the Lincoln govern
ment, indeed, Of any strategic move made by IL
since the inception Of the war.
1t win be well for Us, under such circum-
stances, to be prepared 70 meet and resist this
dangerous design. In prosecuting the war, with
bright hopes of success in The weston and mid
de sections of Kentucky, we should take
care lest We may be out-generaled by Il willy
end interruptions foe in the east. Prudence
would certainly suggest that we keep a vigilant
ere in that direction, SO as not to have the
country startled with another blunder, equally
as culpable and incompambly more disastrous
than the late surprise at Hattsras. Al ounce Of
c~sotiOn, IS the old apotbegm haih il, Is worth a
ucFnd of c14rp. 4