Centre Democrat. [volume] (Bellefonte, Pa.) 1848-1989, 1861-08-08
CENrRM DEmoCRAT-
Plans of the Rebels.

say, deceit, I have come into possession OF the
outlines of some Of the designs of the Rebels,
and of the means at their command with
which they hope to execute them. 1t will
nor, IF course, be expected that should des-
ignate even remotely the Sources OF this IN
formation Il is enough 10 say that it is dl>
rect and authentic.
The information thus acquired enables me
to say that Beauregard and Johnston had no
idea of the extent of the defeat of our troops
on that disastrous Sunday. They were not
surprised az the retreat of our forces, because
they knew the superiority of their numbers
and artillery over those engaged on our side;
bat they were surprised, that. having an
army of 80 900 troops here, we should only
have sent 90, 900 OF them into tie action
They attributed the retreat of the regiments
engaged, scithout being efsctually supported,
to the supposed Iact that we were retreating
as they have often done, in order to draw
them into an ambuscade. They supposed
that besides the 10000 troops engaged, we
had 10000 more behind our entrenchments
and in Washington and that the reason
why these troops were not drawn out to COW
er the retreat of the columns engaged was,
that they were being kept fresh and vigor-
ous, in order that the Rebel troops. after be-
ing wearied by hot pursuit Of ten or twelve
miles, might be surrounded by them and cut
to pieces. | am assured that Beauregard
had no correct information as to the real
condition of Washington on the Monday and
Tuesday following the battle and that if be
bad really known 1t, he would have risked
all on the issue of bold attempt to seize the
Federal Capital.
Tba def &c ~ thsa
ment was not unexpected to the Rebel chiefs.
But when, by the Wednesday following. they
became aware of the full results of the battle
a special meeting of the Rebel Cabinet
Heaven save the mark was held, which was
attended by Beauregard, Lee, and several
bther officers Of high rank. At this meeting.
the plan previously agreed upon fo. the con-
duct OF the campaign on their part under
went several important notifications; and
as the general result Of the meeting, a bolder
and more aggressive mode of warfare was
determined on, than had itberto been con-
templated. Up to this time / am positive
in saying an attack on Washington had form
ed no part of their plans. 1t had been agreed
after full consideration of the whole subject,
to make the war, on their par; strictly
defensive one. But now it was determined
to abandon this course. and 30 assume the
offensive, until three great objects shall have
been achieved. They are =
First The re. occupation Of Hampton,
Newport News, and of all the territory now
held by General Butler outside the walls of
Fortress Monroe.
Second The re-possession Of the line ct
posts on the Upper Potomac, from Williams
port and Martinsburg dDwn to the Fail Of the
Potomac, including Harper's Ferry. and all
the fords and ferries on the stream.
Third. The capture of the Federal Capt.
tai to be accomplished either by crossing
the Potomac above the city and making an
attack on the northern side, or by storming
the eutrenchments IN the right bank of the
river; or by simultaneous attack in botn
directions.
Not only are these plans fully resolved on.
but the forces intended to be employed are
already raised, and the officers to be in COM
mand are alrea5y assigned to their respec-
tive posts. The troops, however, are NOT all
on the ground. Statements were laid before
the meeting showing that there were now in
the field. available for the execution of these
plans, 100000 mer.
II will seem from this outline of the plans
Of the Rebels, that it is the part of prudence
to be we'll prepared for an attempt on the
part OF the Rebels to execute either of their
designs. /. may be considered certain that
they will not attempt the third one until they
have succeeded in the other two. Washing
ton is safe, indeed, in any event; but it is
idle to deny that nothing but the most v;gor-
Gus exertions on our part will prevent the
Rebels from accomplishing their frst two
plans.
In regard to the Upper P, t)mac, the Ad-
ministration seems to be fully aware Of the
Importance Of strengthening our positions
there. Twelve regiments of the very best
troops, in the highest state of efficiency, have
been sent up to General Banks, and he Is no
doubt by this time in command OF an army
that will enable him to defeat the Rebels
second plan. IF be has. as reported, taken
possession of the Maryland Heights, and will
fortify them as we'll as Johnston did, he can
defeat this part of the Rebel programme
Tae MARYLAND Heights are the highest and
most commanding positions at the Ferry
Whose bolds them, holds and commands
Harper's Ferry as well as if he was on the
Virginia side: and hence it is mark cf
good generalship Cd his part to have secured
them. But the fact that General Banks has
no experience whatever in the field is a grave
circumstance which may lead to overlooked
for results. It is not yet to late to retrieve
this error, for error it certainly is. We have
splendid army at Itarper's Ferry. Let US
have an educated General to command it, =
Let General Banks be placed where his ex-
celent administrative powers can find exer-
else, as in Baltimore, for instance and let
soldier by education be sent to cope with
General Johnston. Unless this is done, who
can answer for the result?
A CORRESPONDENT OF THE INQUIRER.