Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-03-21


70 His Erod;eacy SHAM G. Harris,
Governor Of TIE STATE Of Tennessee, Nas5cills
SIR- In tunes like the present, when important
events are rapidly crowding upon our country and
creating excitement and comrioti0u not only from
their immense Importance, but also from their ex
traerdinary force and rapility, 1t may not be inn
Il proper 10 can public attention 70 some facts con
necfed with the history Of country. having any
bearing upon those events Just spoken of. and es-
pecially those depending upon the right OF State to
withdraw from insecurity and danger, or, as it is
termed the right Of secession shall examine tI:is
right briefly possible and for clearer view The
matter, shall commence with the origin of cur plan
of self government and follow it through an ia va
rous stages to the present moment, calculating nv
positions, not from the arguments CT differences Of
any partisan leader or politician but from
the arguments and authority of the makers or fra
mers Of the Constitution, of whom Hamilton and
Madison were the most prominent, and have writ
ten most clearly.
l begin with our primitive situation viz:
lst. As cosonies Of Great Britain, when indepen-
dence was resolved upon. the colonies declared
themselves free and independent States The peace
following the Revolution admitting this, they be-
came so in reality; the first step towards Grvern
ment was
I'd. The Articles of Confederation, such form be-
ing considered necessary to properly carry on
and performing acts of sovereignty with a view to
success. Hthese it was stipulated
lst That these Articles Of Confederation should
De p6fpetual
ID That each State should retain its sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every power and
right which is BY the Articles of Confederation
expressly delegated the United States in Congress
| assembled.
After the termination of the war, difficulties be-
gan to arise, regarding the administering of the
Government, and finally, in 1884, the total dissolu>
| ton Of the Government being apparent, Congress
passed resolution, That Convention be held for
the sole and express purpose of revising Articles of
Confederation, &c.. which Convention was accord
! ingly held 1T Philadelphia, in May. l7S7.
Following our history, shall proceed TO show.
lst. The defects of the Articles Of Confederation,
which caused its dissolution and
! I'd. The remedy proposed by the trainers of the
/ new Constitution to make effective Government
The principle Of the strength of all government is
well known TO be, by power OF coercion, to be used
/ against something.
Now, as a Government cannot arrest or hang a
| State, o. make war on any individual, you must
reverse the proposition by either.
LIST. Coercing State by making war upon her;
| or,
I'd, COercing individuals by arresting and trying
| them
The first having utterly failed under the old Com
| federation, as the Federalist states page e.
Sits true, has been before observed that facts
too stubborn to be resisted have produced species
Of general assent to the abstract proposition that
there exist material defects in our national system
but the usefulness of the concession on the part e
the old adversaries OF Federal measures is destroy
ed by strenuous opposition 20 a remedy, upon the
only principles that give it chance of success
While they admit that the Government of the Uni
ted States is destitute of energy, they contend
against comforting upon it those powers which
requisite to supply that energy. They still to
aim at things repugnant and irreconcable; at an
augmentation of Federal authority; without dimi
mutton of State authority at sovereignty
in the Union, and complete independence in the
members. They still. in fine, seem to cherish with
blind devotion tie political monster of an imperium
IN DlpaiO. This reEders full display of the prin
cipol defects of the confederation necessary in or
der to show that the evils experience do not pro-
coed from minute partial inperfecuons, but from
fundamental errors in the structure of the building
which cannot be amended otherwise than by atera-
ton in the very elements and main pillars of the IA
brc The gread and radical vice. in the construction
of the existing confederation in the principal OF L.
gisGtion, for States Gouei 1nesi in theircOpordeor
collective capacities and contradistBguished from
the individuals Of whom they Though this prin
cipal does not run through all the powers delegated
20 the Union yet 1t pervades and governs those on
which the efficacy of the rest depends; except as
to the rule of superintendent the United States have
an indefinite direction to make acquisitions for men
and money; but they have no authority to raise |
either, by regulations extending the individual
citizens of America. The consequence of this is |
that though liz theory their resolutions concerning
those objects laws constitutionally binding
the members of the Union; yet in practice they
mere concentrations, which the the States observe
disregard at their option;
There remained no alternative but to try the lat |
ter, viz: coercion of individuals all of which, is
clearly laid open in page II:
"The tendency of the principle of legislation for
States communities in their political capacities
as it has been exempliied by the experiment we |
have made of it. is equally attested by the events
which have befallen all other governments of the
confederate kind, of which we have any account in
exact proportion to its prevalence in those sys- |
TENS
e Each State, yielding to the persuasive voice of
immediate interest convenience, has successfully
Withdrawn its support, till the fraiI and totterng
edifee seems ready to fall upon our head, and to
crush US beneath its ruins.
"This exceptionable principle may, as truly as
emphaticay, be styled the parent of anarchy has
teen seen that deinquencies in the members of the
Union are its natural and necessary offspring and
that whenever they happen, the only constitutional
remedy is force end the immediate effect of the use
of it, civil 1tremains to inquire, how far so
odious engine of government IN its application
to u.s. would even be capable of answering its end |
If there should not be large army constantly at
the disposal of the National Government, it would
either not be able 10 employ force at ALL or, when
this could be done, it would amount to war be-
tween different parts of the confederacy, concern
ing the infracton of league; in which the strongest
combination would be most likely to prevail,
whether it consisted of those who supported or
those who resisted general authority. 1t would
rarely happen that the delinquency to be redressed
would De c9nnrme0 10 q single member; and, II
there were more than one who had neglected their
duty similarity of situation would induce them to
unite for common defense
"The first war of this kind would probably ter
inmate in dissolution of the Union.
"Ths way he considered, as the violent death of
the Confederacy. Its mora natural death, Is what
we now seem to be on the point of experiencing, if
the Federal system be not speedily renovated in
more substantial form.
1t is not probable, considering the genius of the
that the romnlvinO States would |
Inclined to support the authority of the Union, by
engaging in war with the non-complying States {
They would always be more ready to pursue the |
nilder course of putting themselves on an equal
ootlng with the delinquent members, by an lmita-
ion of their example. And the guilt of all would
hus become the security of all. Our past expert
nce has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its
ull light. There would in fact, be insuperable
lifhculty in ascertaning when force could with 9
,ropriety be employed In the article of pecuniary
contribution, which would be the mos: usual source
# delinquency, it would often be impossible to de-
ide whether it had proceeded from Discrimination
n inability. The pretence of the latter would al c
Ways be Mt hand t
"And yet this is the plain alternative involved by
hose who wish to deny the power of extending its +
peration to individuals. Such scheme if practi>
able at all would instantly degenerate into a mill c
arp despCtsm; but 1t will be found in every light
nPracticable. The resources of the Union would | D
OF be able to maintain army considerable u
nough to conne the larger States within the limits
their duty; nor would the means ever be FURNISH
d of forming such an army in the first instance.
"a project of this kind is little less romantic Il
the monster having spirit attributed to the fab
lous heroes and demi-gods of antiquity. 1t
+" Even in those confedeF4cies which have been | Y
omposed of members smaller than many of our a.
ounties, the principle of legislation for sovereign
tates supported by military coercion, has never U
cen found efectual 1t has rarely been attempted a.
be employed, but against the weaker members
nd IN most instances attempts to coerce the refrac
Try and disobedient have been the signals of bloody
ars, in which one half of the Confederacy has dis o.
layed its banners against the other. II
The result of these observations, to an enghten 10
mind Unjust be clearly this that if it be possible u
any rate to construct Federal Government ca &c
able of regulating the common concerns the pre-
irving the general tranquility it must be founded 70
to the object committed to its care, upon the re-
of the principle contended for by the oppo u
ents of the proposed constitution. 70
1t must carry its agency to the persons of the cit
ems 1t must stand in need of no intermediate leg az
h,afr ho IN e.