The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1861-12-27
A Southern View.

Tie rebels admit that the recent brilliant veto
ry of our troops at Drainsyille was disaster te
their arms. This is quite decisive of the result OF
the engagement. They pretend to be comforted
however, with the belief that the Federal troops
will be 50 much encouraged by this success
that it will lead to general advance of our
troops on the Potomac, and decisive battle in
tho vicinity of Manassas, and they seem to be
anxious for this. The Richmond Despatch in
the same strain says:
Trusting to a large superiority of numbers,
the enemy seem steadily to be pushing forward
their troops in Kentucky for an attack in force
upon our army under General Sydney Johnston.
From all the indications in that quarter, Il grand
engagement within few days seems unavoida-
BILE. Thus circumstances all combine to bring
about two great engagements on either side of
the Alleghanies, which, but for the relations of
Great Britain to the North, would be decisive
of the war.
If the South should be beaten on both fields,
she could hardly expect for some time to get to-
gether two armies of any magnitude; and would
have to depend altogether upon the virtues of a
Fabian policy, and a general system of skirmish-
ii's, "Saioo Viz ohciny. Ii VIC DOutu, Ou Inc
other hand, should gam both battles, the North
would be compelled to desist from aggressive
measures for such length of time as 1t would re-
mics. Considering the low state of their ex-
c'.equer, the period required for this purpose
would be 50 long that virtual suspension of
invasion would be the result, and the South
would be enabled to carry invasion to their own
Supl n mi artio liz,
successful, would virtually end the war, espec-
tally if it resulted in stampedng the Lincoln
Government from Washington.
The appearance of England on the field of
OF strife would have a decided influence upon
the contest. The first effect of the imbroglio,
even IT it should not result in war between that
country and the North, must be to precipitate
the latter n whatever action it may have been
preparing against the South, during the las, few
months OF busy activity. All attack upon our
armies IN kentucky and on the Potomac might
otherwise have been postponed until the Spring ;
put the complication with England must at once
determine the Administration to strike its blow
without delay. successful battle upon the
Potomac and in Kentucky, might avert war
with Great Britain; for d. feat Ivy the South
on these two fields, would be taken by the world
as conclusive proof of her inability to make
good her independence.
thus all the circumstances of the hour unite
to force on two great battles in the next few
days 10 refuse to fight under the influences
now pressing upon it, would argue an imbccilty
IN the North, its generals and it's armies. which
would beintcrpreted most unlavorably against
that section. Such failure ought to produce
total loss CT Confidence in the Lincoln Admin
istrailon among its own people ; and that would
most probably be the real effect. Both the
North itself, ard moic particularly the Admin
'stratIon in power, are impelled to offer blttle
at this moment hy necessities which seems to us
as imperative as irresistible. They must fight
and we are ready for the fray. The defiant cry
Of the South Is, Lay on Macduf,"