Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1861-10-12
.Gbe Ohio 6tates,pra1r
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II Is clear that the t6bels do not rnean IN ,ob.
on anything like equal terms. We shall not
have any great battles unless we are rash
enough to butt our heads against strong en-
trenchments, as at Manassas. We have already
seen enough OF the military operations of the
rebels to get tolerable idea OF their style, and
all goes to show that the plan which they have
deliberately adopted for conducting the war, Is
to exhaust our resources and weary out our ma
tience, by compelling us to keep large armies
on foot without giving US opportunities 10 keen
up the military spirit Of the people by important
victories. When theycan pounee on an Inferior
force, or lure our troops into an ambuscade,
they Will fight; but as soon as they confront
equal numbers they either retreat behind en-
trenchments or scatter and ruu. They made a
hasty retreat from Fairfax Court House preyi-
ous to the battle Of Bull Run; they retreated
from Munson's Hill when they suspected that
Gen. Mcclellan meant to attack them there:
Johnston retreated iroA Harper's Ferry and
continued to retire from before so unepterpris-
ing commander as Gen. Patterson; the brisk
campaign in Western Virginia has been little
else than series of rebel retreats followed up
by Federal pursui!s in Missouri, where thew
defeated Lyon and captured Mullgan by over.
whemlng superiority Of numbers, Gen. Price
abandons Lexington and divides his forces the
moment he learns that Fremont is advancing
at the head OF an army. IL is settled pripci
pie in rebel strategy not to fght except when
they have the National troops at dsadysnt
age.
This policy is dictated by the known inferior.
ity OF the military resources of the rebels. If
they lose large army they canrot replace IL;
and 30 they have deliberately decided not to In
cur any serious risks. They will make no az.
gressive movements Into States where the
whole population is loyal, for they thoroughly
understand the Disadvantages Of conauctne
military operations amid hostile population. -
ihey interd that our armies shall encounter
these disadvantages at every step. They mean
that we shall consume our strength In iruitIess
and harrassing marches through sections of
country with which we are imperfectly acouaint-
ed and where every inhabitant is an enemy.-
They count on the impstience and discontent
that will pervade the North, when enormous
preparation and heavy expenses are followed by
ieeoie results. BY making demonstrations
along thousand miles of frontier, they will at
tempt to con6ne the contest ID the border
States, where they will protect themselves
against defeat by always declining to fight on.
equal terms. There will be no great and de-
cisiye battles, If the rebels can help it, except
by the imprudence Of our commanders. ur :
This being their plan, our method of conduct
log the war must look not so much to the win.
ming Of great battles as to the seizure and hold
ing of important strategic and commercial
poin,s. We must advance seaward and transfer
our most active military operations to the cot.
ton States If we can take Charleston, Sayan.
nah, Mobile, and New Orleans, and open these
ports, maintaining a vigorous blockade else
where on the Southern coast, we can afford to
leave the rebels in other respects to the natural
consequences of their folly. They would, in
that case, be compelled to Withdraw so large
part OF their force from the border States that
the defense of the frontier would be compare
lively easy, while the necessity OF attempting to
retske the chief cotton shipping cities, which
had been wrested from them, would bring on
battles the loss OF which BY the rebels would be
fatal Z, their hopes,-N Y. World.