New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-10-01
GENERALs AND CRgTyCs.

That newspaper criticism Of Military move
mcnts in contemplation or in progress is haz-
ardous if not certainly pernicious, is q point on
which our mind is made up; but we neither
assume nor admit that civilians are incompetent
to detect and expose Military blunder. On
the contrary, when a commanding general OIL.
cialy reports, for example that be desirea 10
have the YariOu8 divisions and br!gades OF bis
army immediately in front of the enemy the
night before the morning on which he gave
battle. but they were nevertheless left ten or
fifteen miles of, because the brigadiers and
colonies preferred that arrangement, it requires
no military training or experience to detect
that commanders error. II he further reports
that, in battle commenced by himself and
wherein he was defeated he had less than half
his army under fire, while the enemy over
whemed him by bringing up bis entire force,
a civilian may be as certain as a veteran that
there must be some other business for which that
general is better qualified than for that Of lead
ing armies. For one OF the most important
and obvious cauOns of the art Of war .s that
which euioins the commander TO be strong at
the deciding point, if weak everywhere else;
and one may thoroughly comprehend this who
does not know how to order or present arms.
/ civilian may know perfectly what ought to
be done IN war, though none but good sol
der can tell how it is TO be done.
! Our objection to outside criticism on army
! operations or progress is based on the papable
| inadequacy of the data Oh which such criticism
| is usually based. just now, for Illustration,
there are loyal journals which evince impa-
! tience at Gen. McClellan's inactivity, while
Rebel gazettes loudly murmur in Ike spirit at
Beauregard'S failure to capture Washington or
at least force its defenders to q decisive battle
Now, if we knew all that ia known to both Gen
rails Mcclellan and Beauregard of the strength
and condition of their respective armies, we
might venture to suggest 10 one or the other
OF them the expedency Of moving on, though
we DO not doubt that either of them knows
hundred times more Of the art OF war than we
ever shall. But can one Of these newspaper
grumblers for an advance, tell the strength of
either main army within twenty five thousand
Who does know to-day whether there arc more
Union or Rebel troops within days march OF
the Potomac Who does certainly know fiat
either army may not fall below 10000 meO,
and that there are not over 100000 confront
ing it, What raShness then, to insist
that either General should give battle without
knowing very nearly with what strength he
could offer it, and what force he would have
TO meet F.! Alter the battle shall have been
fought We may all be wise as owls, provided
the Contederates shall venture to publish their
official report of it, as they have not yet been
gOaded into publishing their official report OF
the Bull Run combat; but there is not a col
der on earth, not to say civilian, who can
decide whether Mcclellan, or Beauregard or
neither, ought TO assume vigorous offensive
unless he knows the relative strength of their
respective armies. And it is highly probable
that each commander alone knows the exact
strength and approximate efficiency of his own
army, while able to give pretty good estimate
of the power pitted against him, while no one
else knows even so much as this. At best, ac-
curate knowledge Of the strength Of either army
is sacredly restricted to very few, and these
the most unlikely to share their knowledge with
journalists or the public And neither desert
ers nor spies can give either commander any