Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-08-14

of the contest was for the possession of this
hill. with q house on it.
The force engaged here was Heinfzelmsn's
division, Wileox's and Towards brigade on
the right. supported by part of Porter's brig
ade and the cavalry under Palmer; and
Frankiin's brigade of Heintzelman's division,
Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division in the
center and up the road, whilst Keys brigade
of Tyler's division was on the left. attacking
| the batteries near the stone bridge. The
Rhode Island battery of Burnside's brigade
also participated in this attack by its fire
from the north OF the turnpike. The enemy
j was understood to be commanded by J. f.
Johnston. Ricketts, battery, which did such
effective service, and played so brilliant
| part in the contest, was, together with Grit
| inns battery, on the side of the hill. and be-
| came the object of the special attention of
the enemy, who succeeded-o officers mis-
taking one of his regiments for one of our
own, and allowing it to approach without
firing upon it--in disabling the battery, and
then attempted to take it. Three times was
he repulsed by different corps in succession,
| and driven back, and the guns taken by
hand, the horsesl being killed, and pulled
away. The third time it was supposed that
| the repulse was final, for be was driven en-
| tirely from the hill, and so far beyond it as
not to be in sight, and all were certain the
| day was ours. He had before this been driv-
| en- nearly mile and a half, and was beyond
| the Warrenton road, which was entirely in
our possession from the Stone Bridge west
ward, and our engineers were just compet-
| ing the removal of the abattis across the
road, to allow our reinforcements (Scheuck's
| brigade and Ayres' battery to join US.
| The enemy was evidently disheartened and
| broken. But we had been fighting since half
/ past ten O'Clock in the morning, aud it was
after three O'Clock in the afternoon. The
| men had been up since two O'Clock in the
| morning. and had what to those unused TO
such things seemed long march before COM
| ing into action, though the longest distance
| gone over was not more than nine and a half
| miles; and though they had three days pro-
| visions served out to them the day before,
| many no doubt either did not eat them, or
| threw them away on the march or during
| the battle, and were therefore without food.
| They had done much severe fighting Some
| of the regiments which had been driven from
the hill IN the first two attempts of the enc
| my to keep possession had become shaken.
were unsteady, and had many men out of
the ranks.
1t was at this time that the euemy's rein
forcements came to his aid from the railroad
| train, understood to have just arrived from
| the valley with the residue OF JohnstOn's ar
my. They threw themselves in the woods
| on our right, and towards the rear of our
right, and opened a fire of musketry on our
down the hillside. This soon degenerated in-
| to disorder, for which there was no remedy.
Every effort was made to rally them, even
beyond the reach of the enemy's lire, but ln
vain. The battalion of regular infantry
alone moved up the bill opposite to the one
| with the house on it. and there maintained
| itself until our men could get down to and
| across Warrenton turnpike, on the way back
| to the position we occupied in the morning.
The plane was covered with the retreating
troops and they seemed to infect those with
whom they came in contact. The retreat
soon became a rout, and this soon degener-
ated still further into panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond
the efforts of all those who had assisted so
faithfully during the long and hard days
work in gaining almost the object OF our
wishes, and that nothing remained on the
field but to recognize what we could no lon
ger prevent, 1 gave the necessary orders to
protect their withdrawal, begging the men to
form into line, and offer the appearance, at
least, of organization. They returned by the
fords to the WarrentOn road. protected, by
my order by Col. Porter's force of regulars.
Once on the road, and the different corps
coming together in small parties, many with
out officers, they became intermingled, and
all organization was lost.
Orders had been sent back to Miles diVi-
sion for brigade to move forward and pro-
tect this retreat, aud Col. Blenker's brigade
was detached for this purpose, and was or
dered to 60 SO far forward as the point where
the road to the right left the main road.
By referring to the general order, it will
be seen that, while the operations were to go
on in front, an attack was to be made at
Backburns Ford by the brigade Orchard
sons) stationed there. reference to his
report, and to that of Major Hunt, command
ing the artillery, will show that this part of
the plan was well and effectively carried out.
1t succeeded in deceiving the enemy for a
considerable time, and in Keeping IN check
a part of his force. The fire OF the artillery
at this point is represented as particularly
destructive.
At the time of our retreat, seeing great &C.
tivity in this direction, much firing, and col
umns of dust, / became anxious for this place,
fearing if it were turned or forced the whole
stream of our retreating mass would be cap
tured or destroyed. After providing for the
protection of the retreat by Porter's and
Blenker's brigades, 1 repaired to Richardson's
and found the whole force ordered to be sta
toned for the holding of the road from Ma
nassas by Blackburn;s Ford to Centreville,
on the march, under the orders from the Di-
vision Commander, for Centreville. l imme-
diately halted it, and ordered it to take up
the best line of defense across the ridge that
their position admitted of, and subsequently
the army, l caused such disposition of the
forces which had been added to by the First
and Second New Jersey aud the De Kalb re-
giments, ordered up from Runyan's reserve
before going forward, as would best serve to
check the enemy. The ridge being held in
this way, the retreatiug current passed slow
ly through Centreville to the rear. The en-
envy followed US from the Ford as far as Cub
Run, and owing to the road becoming block
ID OF fhn Il
age there, for the artillery could not pass,
and several pieces and caissons had to be
abandoned. In the panic the horses hauling
the caissons and ammunition were cut from
their places by persons to escape with, and
in this way much confusion was caused, the
panic aggravated, and the road enc1mbered.
Not only were pieces of artillery lost, but
also many of the ambulances carrying the
wounded.
By shutdown most of our men had gotten
behind Centreville ridge, and it became {.
question whether we should or not endeavor
to make a stand there. The condition of our
artillery and its ammunition, and the want
of food for the men, who had generally aban-
doned or thrown away all that bad been is
sued the day before, aud the utter disorgani-
cation and consequent demoralizrtion of the
mass of the army, seemed to all who were
near enough to be consulted-divisiOn and
brigade commands and staff-to admit of no
alternative but 10 fall back; the more so as
the position at Blackburn's Ford was then in
the possession of the enemy, and he was al
ready turning our left. On sending the Off
GERS of the staff to the different camps, they
found, as they reported to me, that our decis-
ion had been anticipated by the troops, most
of those who had come in from the front be-
ing already on the road to the rear; the panic
with which they came in still continuing and
hurrying them along.
At o'clock the rear gnard (Blenker's
brigade) moved, covering the retreat which
was effected during the night and next morn
ing. The troops at Fairfax station leaving by
the cars took with them the bulk of the sup