Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1861-07-31


We copy the following from the New York
Times of the 26th: .l-satt
GEN. SCOTT AND THE CABINET-THE DUTY or
THE PRESIDENT. ..
The following paragraph appears In the
Washington correspondence to the Tribune;
"Mr. Moses H. Grinnell does Secretary
Cameron great injustice when he places upon
him the responsibility of refusing regiments Of
mounted men. We have pretty good reason
for knowing that Secretary Cameron has ac-
cepted regiments that have been refused by
Gen. Scott, who, with his peculiar iteration Of
manner replied, Il don't want any cavalry, Sir;
| don't want any cavalry, Sir. My plan Of
campaign doesn't require cavalry, SIR II Is
but justice to the President and Cabinet that the
country should know that Gen. Scott has had
full control of all the war movements and also
organized the columns, appointed the officers. and
selected the time and points of attack al BuA's
Run"
SO far as the preparation of the army for The
special service assigned it is concerned, it is
undoubtedly true that Gen. Scott did have full
control. He probably did "organize the col
umns, and appoint the officers;" and be may
have "selected the time and points of attack at
Bulls Run, after that attack had been per-
emptorly ordered by his superiors, though We
are inclined to believe that these details were
confded to Brig. Gen. Mcdowell, who was on
the spot, and who could form, from personal
examination of the approaches, much better
opinion as to the points of attack than Gen.
Scott. The fact that both the time and point
of attack were changed by Gen. Mcdowell
proves, indeed, that in this respect, he was left
to the exercise of his own judgment. The orig
inal purpose was to attack the enemy's posi-
tion on Thursday afternoon or Friday morning,
by turning it on the south side:-and Gen. Nc
Dowell went personally with COL Heintzelmsn's g
column to superintend the attack. But he
found the roads on that side imprsctcable for
heavy artillery,-and on that account abandon
ed the plan. Friday was devoted to a survey
on the other flank, and there he found the roads
in such condition as to justify the attempt TO
turn the enemy's position on that side. The
fact that Gen. DcDowell thus changed the time
of attack from Friday to Sunday, and the point
of attack from the Southern to the Northern
flank, shows that the control of these details
was confded wholly to him by Gen. Scott, and
we presume every one will concede that this
discretion was wisely exercised, aud the change
judicious
But all this leaves the main point untouched.
The Question is, Who decided that the attack
should be made? Who determined that the
road TO Richmond should be by Manassas juno
tion? Who is responsible for the plan of oper
ations by which battle at this point, selected
by the rebels themselves; admirably adapted for
defense, fortified through three long months Of
incesssnt labor. accessible to their reinforce
ments from both directions, and in all respects
precisely such position as they might wish to
make it, became matter of necessity The
paragraph quoted above, for the purpose of re-
lieving the President and Cabinet, throws the
responsibility upon Gen. Scott. We have not
the slightest desire to involve the President and
Cabinet in any responsibility that does lot be-
long to them; but, on the other hand, we do
not intend that Gen. Scott shall be loaded with
blame for acts which were done by others.
We knOw that Gen. Scott was opposed to this
plan of the campaign from the beginning; he
deemed it unwise to make Richmond the main
point of the movement; but after that had been
decided against him, he was opposed to march
ing against it by the longest and most difficult
route, through country every foot Of which
would be obstinately defended, and which must
be held by strong force after it had once been
taken. This we know to be true-and in spite
Of the delicacy Of such disclosures, we shall not
hesitate to state the authority for it, IL is that
Of Gen. Scott himself.
On the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gen
Scott, at his own table, in presence of his aids
and single guest, discussed the whole subject
of this war, in all its parts, and with the utmost
clearness and accuracy. He had distinct,
and well defined opinion on every point connect
ed with it, and stated what his plan would be
for bringing it to close, if the manage ment OF
it had been left in his handS. The main object
of the war, he said, was to bring the people OF
the rebellious States TO feel the pressure of the
Government; to compel them to return to their
obedience and loyalty. And this must be done
with the least possible expenditure of life, COM
patble with the attainment of the object. No
Christian nation can be justified, he said, IL
waging war in such way as shall destroy sol
lives, when the object of the war can be attain
ed at cost Of 500. Every man killed beyont
the number absolutely required, is murdered
Hence, he looked upon all shooting Of pickets
all scouting forays not required in order to ad
vance the general object of the war, all destruc
ton Of life, on either side, which did not con
tribute to the general result, as 30 many act
Of unjustifable homicide.
Ifthe matter had been left to him, he said
he would have commenced by perfect block
ade of every Southern port on the Atlantic an
the Gulf. Thenhe would have collected larg
force at the Capital for defensive purposes
and another large one on the Mississippi 70
offensive operations. The summer months
during which it ia madness TO take troops Sout
of st. Louis, should have been devoted to tact
cal instruction;-and with the first irosts of al
tumn he would have taken column of 5000
well disciplined troops down the Mississippi
and taken every important point on that rive
New Orleans included. II could have bee
done, he said, with greater ease, with less los
Of life, and with far more important results tha
would attend the marching OF an army to Ricl
mohd. At eight points the river would probI
bly, have been defended, and eight battles woul
, have been necessary; but in every one of thel
success could have been made certain for u.s.
The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours, th
southern States would have been compelle
by the natural and inevitable pressure
events, to seek, by return to the Union, e
cape from the ruin that would speedily owe
whelm them out Of it. "This," said he, "wt
my plan. But am only q subordinate IL
my business to give advice when IL is asket
a and TO obey orders when they are given.
shall do It. There are gentlemen in the Cab
: net who know much more about war than d.
and who have much greater influence than
have in determining the plan Of the campaign
There never was more just and upright ma
than the President-never one who desired moi
sincerely to promote the best interest of th
country. But there are men among his advise
who consult their own resentments far MOI
b than the dictates of wisdom and experience
and these men will probably decide the plan
d the campaign. shall do, or attempt, wha
: ever I am ordered TO do. But they must n,
/, hold me responsible. If am ordered to 20
Richmond, / shall endeavor to do it. But
know perfectly well that they have no conce
tion Of the difficulties we shall encounter.
know the country-how admirably adapted Il
to defense, and how resolutely and obstinate
o, Il will be defended would like nothing be