Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1861-08-30
From the Boston Journal.
The Fall Campaign.

luC buDHldllAlRi iNohA'o W. NA'N Ao
we'll as look with a more intelligent eye
upon the future. 1t is often said that the
battle has indefinitely prolonged the war.
But we doubt the assertion, unless we
wholly refuse to profit by the experience.
Suppose we had carried the day and
driven the rebels back. The want of
real, reliable organization, which our
army betrayed from the start, would have
been immensely aggravated by the tram
sent success, and would inevitably have
brought on defeat before we arrived at
Richmond-and a repulse in the heart of
Virginia would have been altogether a
different thing from what it was within
sight of our own lines. Everything going
on well, we should in all probability have
had had no reserves at Washington, which
would have been open to the enemy. The
moral effect upon the people would have
been far more deadenng and the diff
Guilty of supplying adequate reinforce
ments increased on every hand, As it is,
we lost the day, and that is about all. The
enemy made no advance, and does not
seem in a hurry to do so now. Our ex-
perience has made US a real army, now
proof against such mistakes for the re-
mander of this war, and already capable
of taking the field in much greater num-
bers than ever before.
We admit, also, that the rebels are now
out in greater numeral strength than at
any previous time. In fact, we believe
that they will never be able to raise here
after SO large force as they have now
in the field, because the exultation of a
first success will soon die away, and the
utter impossibiity of paying the troops
will soon become manifest. We know
that every measure of almost unlimited
power has been resorted to to bring out
these new levles. A gentleman from
New Orleans recently sad IN TINS city
that there were but two courses open to
able bodied men IN that secton-eltheF
to enlist or be forced into the rebel army.
SO it has been all over the South But
take away the single element OF stlmula-
ton produced by the first victory OF a
desperate cause, and the whole machinery
of raising recruits will be materially de-
ranged, Besides, if the blockade is en-
forced as we have every reason to believe
it will be, arms cannot be supplied for
any more rebel soldiers, aud the proba-
bility is that they are short now.
We may assume, then, that when our
forces are ready to take the offensive
again, Ike rebel army will amount to
about 100000 men. We ought to have
at least 100000 movable troops-and
there is every probability that we shall
have them. The rebels may or may
not wait for our movements but it is
most likely that the fall campaign will be
actively opened by the middle of Sep
TENDER. We can afford to wait much
better than the rebels, but it is doubtful
if they allow US to remain inactive be-
yond that time. If they do not move for
ward in the vicinity Of Washington, they
must be doing something toward recov-
ing their grounds in Western Vir-
ginia and Missouri. We shall have
to meet them, for our best policy lies
in effective action Just as soon AS we
are in condition for il. Whether we
look at home or abroad, at the effect upon
the loyal or the disloyal sections of the
country, we cannot doubt that our best
course is thorough preparation and then
vigorous action all along the line. After
ALL our soldiers must learn the best part
OF their discipline on the field
WIN such mighty forces IN hostile ar
ray, the iall campaign must be one or
thrilling interest and momentous conse-
quences. If it goes decidedly for the
Union, the backbone Of the rebellionwllt
be broken before 1862. From one or
tor the recuperative element is not strong