Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-06-07
n.nnben ra Fiela. and o,her,.

The complainant, who is femme eOUert, by he
next friend, brought this bill against the defend
ant, her husband being party, to recover certain
slaves claimed by her as her separate property.
The Bill was dismissed on demurrer, and the
cause is brought here by appeal.
The simple facts Of the case are as follows
BY decree of the Chsncery Court at Shelby
VILE made at the August term, 1857 the slaves in
question were settled upon the complainant, EVira
NJ. Campbell, 'to her sole and separate use, free
from the debts, contracts, or arrangements OF her
present or any future husband, reserving to her
'tbe right to sell any Of said slaves that she deem
advisable, and to reinvest in other slaves, to be
held in the same manner as the above named
slaves"
On the 4th of June, 1858, the complainant joined
with her husband in bill of sale for one of said
slaves to the defendant HALEY; and on the 9TH Of
September, 1858, she is in like manner Joined in
bill of sale for four others to the defendants Fields
and Cooper
No money was advanced by the purchasers Of
said slaves in either instance. The sole considers
tion was the preexissing debts Of the husband for
which the defendant held his obligations, which
we're surrendered by him.
The complainant alleges that she was ;mportuned
and induced by her husband 10 join in the sales,
upon the promise to settle upon her other property
Of equal or greater value, bat that he was uttsrly
insolvent and unable to do 20.
The decree is in direct opposition to the settled
course of decision in cur Courts.
The principle is established by series Of ajjudi-
cation that when property given to femme eoret
BY deed or will or by the decree of Court Of COM
peten jurisdiction settled upon her with power to
dispose of it in particular mode, ber power Of
disposition is restrained to the prescribed mode,
and che cannot otherwise dispose Of it. So, Il q
qualified power of disposal, fer specific purpose,
be given, she cannot dispose of it for any other
purpose.
The specification of q definite purpose would
seem to operste as a restraint upon the power of
disposal, as mush as the limitation of 8 definite
mode.
We are not called upon to determine vhether or
not bona tide purchaser, without notice, from
femme covert of her separate property, under such
settlement as the present-if such may be
supposed-would be bound TO the application. OF
the purchase money advanced by him to her, or, in
other words to see that it was re-invested in the
prescribed mode.
No such question can srise in the present case.
The decree by Whica the settlement was made, Ess
constructive notice to sl persons and from the al
legations of the bill, the defendant had actual no
tice likewise.
The property WEE exempt from all liability.
from the sdebts, contracts, or any agreement" Of
the husband.
The complainant has no power to sell it for the
payment of his debts or for any other purpose than
to re invest the proceeds IN properly OF the same
kind. In making the sale. the husband was guilty
Of breach of trust and the defendant participated
10 that breach Of trust.
Their purchase Of the property for the Satisfaction
of the pre-existDg debts Of the husband due to
themselves, was manifest fraud upon the rights of
the complainant.
If the full value Of the slaves in money had been
advanced to the hus band, still, the purchase would
have been in fraud Of the power, and unavsiling as
agAinet the eomplainant's rights.
Upon the allegations of the bill, which stand ad-
mitted by the demurrer, the complainant is clearly
entitled to recover the slaves, their full cssh
value, at the time Of the sale, together with the
hire.
Decree reversed MCKINNEY.
correct copy. ]. P. CLARK, Clerk.