Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1861-09-12
THE DEoLINE Of THE RnBEL-

ls As the outbreak OF the rebellion iouuu
its leaders in a condition for active opeF-
tions, with defnitehess of purpose and
unity of counsels, the result of years of
preparations, during which they had .ex-
clnsiye possession of the Government,
which they believed they had so thorough
ly undermined by corruptiug the loyalty
of a large number of its officers us to rem
der il incapable of any vigorous action for
its perniauence or safety, their policy was
clearly that of a vigorous offensive, and to
strike an Overwhelming blow before any
efTectual resistance could be offered. Up
to the bombardment Of Fort Sumter ale
baads of the Government were tied by the
sentiment of "a large party at the North
against coercion. Attbat mOmGntthe reb-
els were relatively stronger than they have
been at any subsequent enc. They had an
exeitabIe population which could, by APP
peals to their pride, their love of power
and hatred to the North, bccalled, in mass,
almost instantly into the field, and in II
condition we'll fitted for any enterprise
which had smack of hazard, or one in
which the dash which distinguishes South
ern character would be a good substitute
for military training. Both their internal
and foreign commerce were entirely free.
Not a single industry had been interrupt
ed. If they did not have the sympathy of
foreign powers, they certainly impressed
them with the conviction they thus could
not be put down by my force that Gov
eminent could exact. The North was diH
vided and only united by the conduct of
the rebels themselves. 1t took it, always,
slow in its deliberations and action, a long
time to come to the conviction that mis-
chief was intended; and equally long,
through its cumGrous methods, to prepare,
first for effective resistance, and then for n
vigorous offensive.
All Ills precious time the reGels threw
away without any great achievement cal
culated 10 inspire confidence, or. give IN
illustration of their power. In April they
were vastly superior to us in men, in
equipments, in military preparations and
munitions of war. They must have fore
seen that this disparity. with 2O,000,000
against 100000. would soon be removed
hence au early fight promised the best re-
suits to them and the most disastrous to
ourselves. They were perhaps equally
strong, with us, in the field. at the time of
that great victory at Bull Rull. But the
only result of this affair was TO arouse the
North more fully TO the magnitude and
Importance of the contest, and the necessi-
ty Of n still greater preparation. Not
single blow have the rebets struck in the
WuOlt Two IuOullS winch uhNe SluGG GluDa-
ed, which were to settle aud have really
settled their fate. They have allowed the
North to concentrate and marshal its vast
power; to draw IL Gordon around them, cut
thug off all communication with the world,
destroying all the results of their indus
try, and reducing them to destruction by
the slow but inevitable results of II siege.
They have allowed the great ally of the
North, tue cool weather of Autumn and
Winter TO approach in which our feet, our
great arm, can operate in Southern waters
without fear of the maluria SO fatal to
Northern constitutions in Summer months.
They have now double enemy to fight in
stead of Oneea month ago-Gn enemy in
command of an element upon which they
can hardly float n scow not stolen from
ourselves They have waited tillall mortal
prestige is lost by the decided disapproba-
pean powers; till they have witnessed the
explosion one after another of their inan-
cial chimerns; till their utter poverty and
nakedness is exposed to the glare of the
world, which of itself would prove fatal
| to their cause, were not the overwhelming
power OF the North directed against them.
In their desperation they subscribe their
growing crops to their Government, but
| dare not move them from the spot where
they are raised, for fear they may fall into
the hands of their enemy. This financial
scheme, which is n striking evidence of
their actual want of means, does not PIT
a penny in their treasury. 1t is public
confession of poverty, without single
compromising advantage,
Do we want any better proof of the con-
temptible weakness of the rebels? They
may have a large force in Virginia, but
why have they not turned the Bull Run
victory to some account? Why have they
allowed MS to repair ten fold its disasters
They must now fight to recover the pres
tige which their victory cost them, while
we arc daily adding to ours, by declining,
till our preparations Nre fully Completed,
another contest. These have already given
prcponderance which is equivalent to
victory. In the extent of snch prepara
tiOn the effect of our late defeat is entire-
ly elTaced, because tits seen that defeat
has developed II strength vastly greater
than a victory could have done.
Secure from attack, aud with our prepn-
rations nearly complete, we can now move
forward with Overwhelming force 1t may
he well 10 postpone any advance from
Washington till we have dissipated u con-
siderable portion of the rebel force in Vir-
ginih. We have seen how effectively few
hundred men were used, directed against
North Carolina. Heuceforth the troops
of that State will be retained at home
for self-defcnce. A force of 5000 men
sentup BeaufoEt Sound. an inlet capable of
floating large ships, and nenrly equi-tlis-
tant from Charleston and Savannah, would
draw home in the greatest haste the troops
of South Carolina and Georgia now upon
the Potomac Beaufort Sound is surround
cd by n population of which four-fifhs are
slaves. This tact coupled with au invasion
of their territory, would be enough to
strike terror into every Southern heart;
Five thousand men, sent in this direction,
would weaken the rebel army in Virginia
more than four-told their number;
still more by the complete Generalization
that would result We have seen that
when strongest the rebels were powerless
In nndertalte or accomnlish any great en-