Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-04-11
Forts Sumter and PIeken..s

Forts Sumter and Pickens.s
To these two points the public eye is chief
~ directed and the public ear turned to see
and hear the first demonstration of force to-
wards settlement of onr most unfortunate
and calamitous inter-sectional troubles
They are the only two military positions OF
any importance within the seeded States.
now held by the Federal Government. If
blood shall flow soon in the contest, il will
be shed at one or the other of these points.
When it does flow, neither side can determine
absolutely where the stream shall terminate
neither can foreeee the political and social
results which is to ultimately crown the in-
cipient act of war. 1t should therefore re-
ceiye the maturest consideration OF the cniei
actors on both sides-it should also receive
the maturest consideration of the people OF
both sections, who are to sustain by men and
money the immediate consequences OF that
incipient act
To our mind war at present is uDjustifiable.
1t has nothing to commend it to the Federal
Government, certainly. For, what can the
= Guerra 0OfCiAuicns 6oih ~ - - ~ -
fatuated as to believe it can bring back the
seeded States under the sword? Does it
expect to restore the Union through the in
strumentality of gun-powder? Does it sup
pose the Border Slave States will be more
firmly welded to the Union by butchering
their brethren in sympathy and interest
South of them? Has sectional majority
deliberately arrived at the conclusion that
sectional platform is to be indicated as the
rule of our public administration at the
mouth of the cannon! Is it concluded that
the authority of government constituted
and maintained by the voluntary consent of
q free and intelligent people, is to be main
tanned by the power of war-ships and armies
Is there an American born statesman so ire
trievably mad?
Peace is Union, life, prosperity-war is
disunion, strife, dissolution, death. What
are Sumter aud Pickens in question of such
magnitude? What can the Federal admins
tration gain by holding them for few weeks
or for few monthsf Can it thereby enforce
any law? Can it collect any revenue? Can
1t bring back the seeded States to the Union,
and restore brotherhood and confraternity
Can it benefit a partizan administration, or
the citizens of the country? Can the Federal
Government, by holding these Forts over
power the Confederate States" and reduce
them to the condition of subject provinces,
If that be the policy? Is any of these ends
to be reached by holding Sumter and Pick
ensf Who is so obtuse as to believe it!
The theory of the seeded States is that
these forts belong to them, and that their oc
eupation by an authority which they do not |
recognise, is an act of hostility in ITSELF |
This theory may be altogeth T false in point |
of fact, but there is no one so blind as not to |
know that these people who set it up and in |
dulge it will stand by it at all hazards and
to the last extremity 1t is said that to
evacuate these forts would be cowardly and
But why so? Would it be any
greater exhibition of dishOnOr and cOwardice
than the failure to collect the revenue under
the existing Federal tariff. We do not even
attempt TO collect the revenue in any of the
ports in the seeded States and this would
amount weekly to as much as the whole
money value of Sumter and Pickens. Our
Federal theory contradicts the Secession
theory, and makes the seeded States moth |
ing more nor less than rebels. 1t claims the |
revenues as well as the forts and our honor |
and our courage requires US to maintain the |
one as much as the other. 1t is just as much |
our duty under the Federal theory to 60 to |
Charleston and Pensacola and Mobile and |
New Orleans and to every other importing |
point in the seeded States, and take pos
session of the Custom houses and collect the |
revenues accruing und er our tariff, as it is to
retain possession of Sumter and Pickens.-
We know that we could not collect the reve-
1ues in the Confederate States" without |
and we refrain from the effort. 1t |
s equally certain that these Forts cannot be |
ong held without resort to force, and even |
hen it is probable they would fall under the |
attacks which the secessionists, it is known, |
are prepared to make upon them. What |
hen is our duty as matter of wisdom, |
granting that war is inevitable? In such |
, case, it is clear that the war will not be a |
laval one. 1t must be fought mainly on the |
and Where then would be Sumter and |
oickens? They would be hundreds of miles
rom the seat of actual war. Why not, then,
them?
But We have higher considerations for
lesiring the abandonment OF these Forts and |
he maintenance of peace. AS friends of the
Union we cannot assent to any course of |
policy which we are confident can result in
nothing but final and permanent disunion.-I
That war would thus eventuate we can enter
ain not the slightest doubt. Let the pow ers /
It Washington calculate well the conse-
Luences. Let them hesitate long before con- |
ributing in anywise to the permanent over
brow OF that government which they are so
ager to uphold. Let them give the Border |
states chance to prosecute their noble |
fort to preserve the country and its eonsti-
ution. Let them give the people of the |
eceded States aud those of the Northern /
;tates an opportunity to speak for them
elves on these momentous questions, before |
hey are hurried into calamitous war.
1t. TALBOT, who left Washington for Fort |
umter n few DAYS ago with desDatches for 1