The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1861-11-01
Affairs on the Potomac.

may be safely presumed, as nearly
as possible to reflect the plans and
purposes as we'll as expectations. Of
General Mcclellan and the army Of
the Potomac:
The simultaneous announcement
Of the loss oil Colonel Baker and the
retreat OF q body of troops before a
superior force on the upper Potomac,
and of the closing OF the river below
Washington by the rebel batteries,
will deepen the prevalent impression
of the necessity OF an early battle. -
General Mcclellan, Of course, has a
definite plan OF operations from
which he will not be diverted except
by some unforeseen movement of the
enemy. The closing Of the Potomac
has been 80 long threatened, and
WAS moreover an event so possible,
and 40 likely to occur, that all the
military operations OF the last six
weeks must have been concerted in
full view Of such a contingency
Tho fact that new railroad tracks
have not been laid, nor any cxtraur-
dinary means used to discover aud
dislodgc the rebels on the right bank
OF the river, cannot fairly be regarded
as proving lack of foresight on the
part oi the government. Ii ought
rather to be accepted as an indica
ton that general battle at an early
day is an essential part Of General
McClellan's plan, and that the GER
tainty OF victory is so great that no
apprehension is felt OF the permanen,
closing OF the Potomac. The fact,
which, at first blush, might seem 30
disastrous. or at least 80 threatening
affnrds conclusive proof that Gen.
eral Mcclellan has never, at any
time, intended to make the Fall
campaign consist of defensive oper
ations. Ii his views were 90 narrow
as to contemplate nothing beyond
the security Of the federal capital,
the omission to provide against the
consequences Of the closing of the
Potomac would be grave end in
expiable error. II a large army,
with its thousands Of horses, is to
Winter at Washington with form.
: i'll BILE army menacing it in front,
the loss OF its principal channel tor
receiving forage and military sup
plies, woull deed be very great
calamity, the failure to guard against
which by providing additional rail-
road facilities woul, ho blundcr
'a!li1g little short OF crime. Bn,
il the enemy is to be driven back
into his stronghold aud ont Of his
stronghold at Manassas within the
com NJ ten days, the closing OF the
Potomac is o small matter, ii the
supplies Of forage and provisions in
Washington are sufficient to carry
the army throu.h that int rival. -
Vessels detained in the lower Puto
mac below the rebel haiti, rirs loa ed
with military stores, can b0 tu.ged
up in single day. when the river is
once re opened. IfGrneral McClcl.
Ian gives rs II great victory this
week OF next, the rebei batteries will
be imme lately thereafter eserteJ
without our firing a single gun o,
losing a single man. They could
be attacked in tie rear and carried
! with 80 much certainty by dctach.
menis from victorious .rmv. that
, the rebels working them would think
OF nothing but how to make good
th. ir retreat.
General Mcclellan has, in fact
already commenced his advance ant
has removed his headquarters from
Washington To the South side of tn,
. Potomac. IL is evident from wha
, we krow Of tie position OF his force,
that he contemplates an immeJiat,
approach to the stronghold Of tht
rebels for the purpose Of compelling
! them either to fight or retreat. Th'
! sailing of the great naval expedition
( confirms the suppositiOn that tn,
E period for hard fighting is close a
= hand. lts departure, which csnno
|, be unknown to the rebels, must com
t pei Davis and Beauregard to elec
= between seuding away a large par
IS OF their army Tor home defense, O
IS retaining it t) meet General Nc, lei
o lah's advance. II they retain it, tn
success Of the naval ex. .edition i
n reasonably sure, and we shall hav
taken important points on the South
e ern coast, without any possibility G
y the rebels getting in our rear an
i cutting off our communication wit
IS the sources of our supplies and re
4. Inducements, as they have no navy
r, But il they send part of their force
,e to protect the ports on the coast, tn
naval expedition will still have il
chances Of success, as the enem
N cannot know against what points
ls is directed, and General McClella
T. will have the advantage Of tightin
l. an enemy who is weakened by tn
'e diversion.
IS as But whether the enemy conclude
a. to divide his force or not, it is a pieC
rs OF comprehensive strategy to max
70 10 the departure OF the naval expeditio
lie and the advance of the army simu
Is taneous, ss it insures the success
D. one, and favors that OF both unde
takings.
ut Even il the rebels decide to reta
ng their whole army near the Potoms