Cincinnati daily press. [volume] (Cincinnati [Ohio]) 1860-1862, 1861-05-01
The Advan.aSs and Necessity of Block
Saturdays New York Evening Post OBJ.
serves;

Saturdays New York Evening Post OBJ
serves:
No one doubts the necessity of an imme-
diate blockade Of tile coasts now in possess
sion Of the Montgomery mutineers. The
Government has declared its purpose to
make such blockade efficient and thorough I;
but for the moment, by the traitorous fore
thought of members of the last Administra-
ton, fpll half of our small navy is distrib-
uted in foreign parts, far away. -a.t
We can not wait for their return, because
, every day the mutineers are getting supplies
OF arms and ammunition from abroad, and,
doubtless, provisions from secret traitors at
the North. 1t is well known in this city
that guns are now on their way from En-.
gland and Belgium to the Southern ports,
bought by agents Of Davis. 1t was stated, a
few days ago, in a New Orleans paper, that
swords and pistols were being manufactured
in Germany, by contract, for the mutineers.
A rebel privateer has already captured a
United States stesmer-the Star of the Vest.
We read in Southern pspers of privateers
being fitted out in New Orleans and Mobile
and the ports Of Texas; while nearer home,
in Chesapeake Bay, the Virginians have
quickly armed q number of fast schooners,
which have already chased several, and cap
tuIed one, of our Northern coasters.
Moreover, until the blockade is effective it
will do no good to stop the Southern mails
or watch them. REASONABLE communica-
tions can easily be sent to New Orleans by
way of Havana, and it has already been
brought to our attention that certain parties
in this city, who are known to be in sympa-
thy with the Montgomery mutineers, aud
whose movements are closely watched, as
they should be, no longer correspond with
the South by regular mail, but have suddenly
considerable correspondence with Havana.
Ofcourse, parcels from Havana are quickly
forwarded TO New Orleans or Mobile, so long
as these ports are open to all corners.
Further, it is impossible by any vigilance
to prevent the sailing from Northern ports
| of vessels laden with supplies for the rebel
armies. Our collectors may do their duty as
faithfully IS possible, and yet, so long as we
export provisions at oil, they can not en-
tirely stop supplies for the South. Vessels
will be sworn through by traitors, to whom
| oaths are unconsidered trifles, and when once
out of reach of our guns they will 90 where
they please, sure that their papers will be
made all right in Southern custom-houses
| The only cure for these evils is an imme-
| diate and vigilant blockade of the Southern
coast. For this purpose, however, it is prob
| ably not expedient to detach all the nava
! vessels now within reach. The Government
| has no less than six stationed at Fort Pick.
| ems to assist our brave garrison there; and
| il should hold several ready for any service
that may become necessary in the course o.
the war. 1t is evident, therefore, that the
navy needs reinforcement, and it become:
a question how additional vessels can be
most quickly obtained.
Fortunately, we do not need large ships foI
! the blockade. The mutineers have no con.
siderable vessels. 1t would be even q, need
| less expense to detail steam-frigates for 9
service which can be more efficiently per
formed by light steam gunboats, each carry
ing only one or two guns of long range
Such vessels we can get an abundance o
without delay. There are at least fifty gOoC
staunch pIopellers running from this por
alone, besides others owned in Philadelphia
and Boston. These are firmly built clas
of vessels, of good speed, aud from 250 II
600 tuns burden. To fit them as gun-boat
| would require but few days at our fou
Northern Navy yards. A sufficient numbe
of them could doubtleEs, be purchased at
reasonable rate, and at the close of the wal
the Government could sell such of them a
it found supeIhuous, for little less than thei
present cost.
Of such vessels, we estimate, on a carefn
survey of the coast and its ports, that no
more than thirty, or at most thirty five
-psenld be needed, with perhaps two or threi
of our steam frigates to aid them in guard
ing New Orleans, Mobile and Charleston
They could cruise close in-shore, and woult
without difficulty cut ofeven the "long-shore'
trade in small boats. For the Guf feet
transports would keep a large supply Q
stores at Tortugas and Key West; while th
Atlantic feet could be regularly supplied b,
other transports. Thus no vessel need be oi
duty more than day in several months
and we should have secured, at minimum
| expense, a measure of the utmost importanc
| in the war with the mutiDous rebels.