Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1861-10-22
Federal sPecuiHtiOus abOut the Affair on
the Potomac.

We find in the Cincinnati Commercial Of the
9th the following article, Specializing as to the
position, strength and intention of lie Federal
army, under Mcclellan. That paper holsters up
northern courage, by making great promises,
the fulfllment of which depends upon successes
that Beauregard and his forces will brayely and
certainly prevent. Let the Commercial mark
our prediction
THE NEWS PROM WASMNGToN.-The situ-
alton at Washington is made intensely interest
ing by McClellan's forward movement. 1t is
certain that our Grand Army Is gradually adj
vancing, and that heavy divisions of troops are
now several miles in advance of the Potomac
Notifications. The attitude of our army has been
slowly and surely changed from defensive to
offensive. The rebels are no longer invited to
cross the Potomac or assail our forts, but are So
licited to accept a fair field fight.
Our columns are now further advanced than
at any time before the advance of McDowell's
army. They are mastering the situation, learn
ing the ground, and becoming accustomed to
movements by brigades and divisions in the face
Of the enemy. The advance, instead OF being
Il grand struggle at a venture, like that inJuly,
is systematic and solid. As his lines are extend
cd, General McClrllan's personal activity and
/ NlgllduCt seem 10 increase. lie Is WIN Iut
troops constantly, and they know their leader.
His movements-pushing forward here, stand
ing fast there, now creeping at a snail's pace,
cutting roads, and planting batteries, and then
sweeping from point 10 point with celerity-re-
mind Us Of his strategy in Western Virginia,
which resulted in hemming in and destroying
Garnett's army. Whether if the enemy do not
give battle sooner, he will push on 70 Manassas,
we'can OF course only conjecture. But the pre-
sumption is-and we are justified in making il
by his OWL words-that he does not mediate a
falling back.
il was McDowclrs misfortune, to find himself
in front Of the enemy at Manassas, under a ire
medous pressure 10 force the fight without delay.
He could not stop to secure his position on the
range Of hills beyond Centerville, because the
hour was approaching when the three months
men who were the flower of his army, wen 70
be ~disbanded, and the shameful fact Is fresh in
our memories, that OneOf his regiments and one
Of his batteries deserted him because their time
was up, and in his Own expressive Language pro-
ceeded 10 the rear to the sound of the enemy's
guns. Mcclellan has no troops with him whose
time is up They are all with him to the end OF
war, and he can take his time. Then Mcdowell
depended upon Patterson's division, to give en-
ployment to Gen. Johnston, and would have
won the battle if his expectations in this regard
4 u4'A ~ AAo4-FAs W. hAdN ~ oAlt mt 1114h7
viii not fail Mcclellan. Ills division is within
striking distance, and will strike. We should
not be surprised to hear at any moment that he
had crossed the Potomac, and was pressing the
enemy's left wing,
If the pending fight comes off at Manassas,
the chances are the enemy win be found much
stronger there than on the 2lst OF July, but the
attack win be MAIDEN far different style. Ne.
Clellan hiss now as many regiments as Mellow.
/ ell had companies Of cavalry, so that there win
be no danger of trouble on the TANKS, and he
has at least four times as many field guns as
Mcdowell had, and they are heavier in calibre,
and longeri in range, while his supply of ammu-
milton viii be unlimited. The chances are, the
enemy will decline 10 risk a battle in the open
field, and await the assault. If so, we expec.
Manassas viii be taken by regular approaches
and that the masses of infantry viii not be
hurried forward before our artillery has cleared
the way. 1t is Mcclellan well-known opinion
that this war will be decided by the artillery
and we anticipate such an artillery duel at Ma
nassas as the world never saw, save at Sebas-
tOp0l.