The national Republican., 1861-03-14
THE POLICY OF THE ADMlNISTRA.
TION

lstraton In this, the most eventtul crisis OF our
history, presses home upon the American heart,
creating a profound aud painful anxiety,
throughout the leugth and breadth Of the land,
which can be allayed by no pomps of inaugu.
ration and no distribution of Federal offices.
In judging of this policy, we look only to the
sentiments Of Mr. Lncoln's inaugural, as seen
in the light of his political antecedents and
personal character, and to the course Of events
by which this policy-not its distinctive prin'
ciple, but its application to particular cases
must, o. course, in some measure, be controlled.
The inaugural enunciates two cardinal propo.
si;ions First, "that the laws (shalD be faith.
fully executed in all the States y second, that
"the course thus indicated will be followed
with view to a peaceful solution Of our ma
tonal troubles" To reconcile this seeming
incongruity in the practical operation of the
Government, is the most delicate and difficult
task of the present Administration. So far as
its general policy is concerned, this is sufi-
ciently obvious, being as briefly stated in the
inaugural, "to hold, occupy, and possess the
property and places belonging to the Govern.
ment, and to collect the duties on imports"
The questions of retakng the forts captured
BY the seeded States and OF the mode in which
the revenue shall be collected may be safely
left to be decided in the future, after the most
ample consideration. The first and most grave
responsibility which meets the Administration
is in reference to Fort Sumter, inasmuch as its
present condition imperatively requires imme.
diate action. Shall it be relieved or evacuated,
is the simple question. One thing is clear, no
halfway policy can be adopted. The troops
must be at once Withdrawn from the fort, or
they must be at once reinforced. The idea Of
leaving seventy men cooped up in Govern
ment fertilization 10 perish by starvation or as.
sault in the presence of thirty million OF people
looking on in fearful socitude and hopeless
imbecility, is not to be tolerated for a moment.
The conseq uences of such a catastrophe are
fearful to contemplate. The blood Of these
brave and loyal men crying aloud for ven
| geance, and for the redress of the insulted and
disgraced honor of the nation, would demand
the recapturo of the fort, as the alternative of
Northern revolution, at whatever cost of life
and treasure and the country would be inevita.
bly, preciptated into civil war whose end no
mail could foresee.
Shall the troops then be Withdrawn or rein
forced? there is much that may be urged
with great plausbity upon both sides of the
| question. On the one side, it is said that By
such withdrawal the Government in effect alb
dicates its trust, and with its own hand hauls
down the old flag upon one of its own iortif.
cations before the rebel forces, which are ar.
rayel against it; that it virtually yields to rev.
olutlon and recognises secession an accom-
plished fact that thereafter it must reluqush
the other forts and abandon all thought Of the
collection Of the revenue; and that the principle
is conceded that the Government can only be
maintained, il at ui by moral suasion.
| On the other hand, the evacuation of Fort
Sumter is pronounced q military necessity. The
oldest and abest military and naval command.
ers III the service are understood 50 20 regard
it. The vessels of war necessary for the elect.
ual relief of the fort could not be concentrated
at the port Of Charleston in season to accom-.
plsh it, and there is no available force to man
them. Again, the fort does not command the
entrance 10 great inland sea, like the forts OF
Florida, and its occupation is chiefly desirable
for loca defence, that of the harbor and State
Of South Carolina, which, in these times, there
is no hardship in leaving the State to look to
itself. Even if actual war existed between the
Government and the State, the fort is not worth
what it would cost to reinforce, and the true
policy Of war dictates no useless expsnd ture Of
life and treasure. General Scott, it is said, ia.
vors this opinion-the old hero whose loyalty
shines as bright as the sun at MONDAY, and in
following whose counsels disgrace can never
come upon any people. If this assumed neces
sty exists-and of this the Government has
the best, ii not the only means of Judgment
then there is nothing more to be said the ques.
| tion is concluded.
If the withdrawal of the troops is determined
by this necessty-and this, in our view, could
alone justify it-then it involves no surrender of
principle. 1t is no acknowledgment of the
defeat of the Federal Government" or that
"the Union is utterly dissolved, past oil posi-
bIity Of reconstruction, except by the most alb
ject concessions" Itwoull form no precedent
for the surrender of any other fort not in the
same extreme peril 1t has no sort Of connec-
ton with the collection Of the revenue, which
is, after all, the practical test of the Govern.
ment, and the vital condition of the Union.
Nay, may it not be thatthe frmness of the Gov.
ernment may be more conspicuously illustrated,
and with less offence, if it should yield what,
after all, may be regarded, in great measure,
as point of pride, rather than needlessly, as
many would regard it, plunge the country into
war? The exception to rule often brings into
greater distncness, or, in other words, proves
the rule" itself
The question of principle being disposed oil;
that Of policy may well be considered ; not as