Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-12-04
From the \. o. Dela. l
The situation.

magnitude of preparations for dscisiveac
ton on both sides, and longs for and yet
breads the arrival Of the moment when the
hostile armies, after exhausting the manoeu-
yers of strategy, shall meet in the deadly
shock of battle. That moment must come
at last, unless the war is a hollow mockery;
that moment, indeed, from all appearances,
is even now approa ching with impetuous
strides, and the dawn of great battle day
is crlmsoning the prophetic horizon.
Two points along the circle of the land
campaign divide about equally the strained
attention and the acute expectation. The
enemy has been concentrating an immense
force in western Kentucky, southern Illinois,
and eastern Missouri, in order to make con.
centric movement from several directions
against our position at Columbus. But such
a movement Is liable to many delays, and
it is possible that the enemy's approaches
may for some time resemble a siege more
than an assault. Yet some circumstance,
neither designed nor foreseen at present on
one side or the other, may precipitate ter
rible battle at Columbus or in its vicinity at
an early day.
Looking towards the Potomac, we are met
with thickening signs which seem to portend
an inevitable conflict between the hostile ar
mics whose lines, sweeping from Fairfax and
Centreville alorg stretch OF miles towards
the Potomac, are almost impingiDg upon each
other. Mcclellan has been for more than three
months fighting the Confederate army with
the spade. In fact spade work, and an active
chess-like sort of contest fer advantage of
position, have constituted, with two or three
sharp episodes, the operations of both armies
for the period named. But at last it would
seem that under the persuasion OF military
or political exigency, perhaps of both, Nc
Clellan has come to the conclusion that it is
necessary to stop digging, at least upon sta
Honsry line, aud push forward to test the
strength of the Confederate positions. He
does not lay down the spade, however, even
in advancing, but like circumspect engin-
eer, entrenches at every half mile of his pro
gress. His plan would seem TO embrace
simultaneous attack upon our army at Cen
treviIle With his land forces, and upon our
batteries at Transport with land and naval
forces combined. Or, it may be that the i'm
mediate purpose of his advance towards Cen
treville is to occupy our forces in that
quarter while he throws a force across the
Potomac below to move upon Transport in
cooperation with feet in The river. Now
if this be his purpose, aud our Generals nen-
citrate it., they will of course proceed to frus-
trate 1t by measures which will compel him
TO fight on terms not entirely of his own
choosing, or to re-arrange his programme
upon new combinations. Let this or that
eventuality ensue, then battle near Centre
vile would seem to be either necessity or
strong probability. Ae
But, laying special plsus and operations
aside, it is certain that two such armies can
not long lie so near each other in "masteriy
inactivity" Indeed, Mcclellan is not mac
tive, nor can we believe that that the attitude
of our army is one of passive observation.
Every move of Mcclellan is intended to gain
an important advantage, and point must at
last be reached where our Generals must eX-
tricate themselves from the meshes of his
strategy by vigorous and .decisive action.
The present situation on the Potomac cannot
long be maintained. The enemy must re.
treat, our army must retreat, or both must
seek solution OF the problem in battle.
The gathering of Federal forces at Port
Royal is in fuifllment of a gigantic plan of
invasion by land aud sea which had been fire.
quently enough sketched in Northern jour
nails to warn our military authorities when
and where the heaviest blows would fall.
The movements on the seaboard, on the Pc
tomac, and on the Mississippi. proceed with
simultaneousness that shows they are de-
signed to support each other in one grand
concentric attack. The relation of the sea-.
board operations at Port Royal to McClel-
lens maloevers on the Potomac, is perhaps
Of still closer nature. Allowing for tele-
egraphic exageration, the total Federal force
on or sailing for the South Carolina coast
may be safely estimated at forty-five thou
sand, the greater part of it drawn from Ma
ryland; and much of it perhaps from McClel-
lan's immediate command about Washing
ton. Upon this superstition, there would be
strong reasons for believing that one of the
chief objects Of MeClellan's threatening adj
vance towards Centreville was to conceal
the depletion of his army by drafts upon it
Al ts1,aa n IL a
possible, for the seat of war in the West, and
thus to prevent reinforcements going from
our Potomac army to points of greater dan
ger in Kentucky or South Carolina end
Georgia.
But let these speculations be worth what
they may, the game of mere strategy, of mys.
flying marching and counter marching, of
digging bitches which the enemy does not
come near, and keeping up breastworks which
be never thinks of storming, would seem to
be almost, if not entirely, played out-and
we are heartily glad of it. If the whole of
war consisted in a contest of positions mere
ly, in the art Of strategicsl overreaching, it
would be quite appropriate to continue mas
terry spade-work to the end of the chapter.
But in that case the musket might as well be
laid aside; nay, armies in the field wonld not
be necessary to the performance, and the
actual spade itself, By q happy fiction Of
science, might be superseded by fodient
implement purely imaginary. The opposing
Generals would only haveto compare statis-
tics of available military resources and mark
their successive positions on a military map, |
TO decide the contest. But war does not end
with strategy. When that has done its ut
most, the soldierly arm, the impetuoas conr-
age, the unconquerable soul wooing victory
"o'er the impetuous graye'-they mus do |
the rest If the fight Is truly won. Surely |