Litchfield enquirer., 1861-07-11

PsoPs, ot any or tner flgnts, Of all that which lresident might constitutionaly and iustifably do in such case Everything was 'forborne without which 1t was believed possible to kaan the government on foot On the 9th of March the present incumbent's first full day in office 2 letter from Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 20th of February and ra. ceived at the War Department on the 4tb of March, was by that department placed in his hands. This letter expressed the professional opinion of the matter, that achievements could not be thrown into the fort within the time of his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply of provisions, and with view of holding posses sion of the same, with force of less than 20, 900 good and well disciplined men. This opinion was coneurred in by all the officers of his com. mand, and their memoranda on the subject were made inclosures of Major Anderson letter. The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant General Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in his opinion. On reflection, however. he took full time, consulting with other officers, bot, of the army and the navy, and at the end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the same conclusion as berore. He also stated at the same time, that no such sufficient force was then at the control of the government or could be raised and be brought to the ground within the time when the provisions in the fort would be ex- hausted. In purely military point of view this reduced the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It believed, however, that to so oabandon that position, underline circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity un- der which 1t was to be done would not be fully understood that by many it would be construed as part of voluntary policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the Union, en- bolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter recognition abroad that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummatcd This could not be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garrison and ere 1t would be reached
 Fort Pickens might be reinforced This last would be a clear indication of policy and would better enable the country to accept evacuation of Fort Sumter military necessity An order was at directed to be sent for the landing of the troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the longer and slower route by sea-
 The first return news from the order was received just one week before the full of Fort Sumter
 The news itself was that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi arnistice of the late administration and of the existence of which the present administration,
 up to the time the order was dispatched, had on ly toe vague ard uncertain rumor5 to ix attention,
 had refused to land the troops. To now reinforce
 Fort Ilckens, before a crisis would be reached at
 Fort Sumter, w,'s impossible, rendered so bv the near exhaustion Of provisions in the latter named fort. In precautlon against such con ecture the government had few days before common ced preparing an expedition, aS well adapted as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter, which rxpcdi- ton w;.:s intended to be ultimately used, or not
 according to circumstances. The strongest anti cipatGd case for using it was now presented, and 1t was resolved to send 1t forward, as had been intended. In this contingency 1t was also reSoy
 ed to notify tie goycrIor of South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be na9e to provision the fort, and that if the attempt should not be resstel, there would be no effort to throw in men, arrns or ammunition, without further
 ticc, OF in case of an attack upon the fort IE's notice was accordingly y given, whercupon the torl was attacked and b6mbarled to its tiI!l, without even awaiting the provisioning expedition.
 IL is thus seen that thc assault upon and re- duction of Fort Sumter was ill no sense matter of sclf-d1fensc on the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in tho fort coud by no possibility. commit aggression up- on them. They knew they were expressedly mo- tiietl, that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of lhe garrison Was all which would on that occasion hc attempted, unless themselves, hy resisting so much, should pro- yoke more. They knew that this government de- desired to keep c prr son in e Fort mot toassaii them, but merely 10 maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution, trusting. as hcrclnheiorc stated, to time, discussnn. aud the ballot box for final adjustment and tia,y assailed and re duced the fort for precisely the reverse ohjcc', to drive out the visible authority of t!e federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dlssu!u- ton. That this vas their object the executive ! we'll understood and having said to thea! in the inaugural address: "Iou can have no co"hl 3t without being yourselves inc aggf2s"GTS, ac took pains, not only to ksap tt,s ,tcc!trAtion good, but also to keep the case so far troiA in- genious s"nhistry that thc world shaNid not misunlerstaat. i;. By tEc affair of Fort Sumter, with it's surrounding circumstances. that point was reached Then and thereby tho assaiiauts of the government began the conflict of arms, without gun ;n sight, O. :n eXpeeta'c.r, to re- turn their fire, saYc only the few ill the foit, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection and still ready to give that protect, in whatever was lawful,
 In this act tliscar1ing a!l else, they have fr ced upon the country tAe distinct issue: lnmedl- ate dissolution or blood; tAa issue embraces more than the fate of hcse United State. It presents to the whole tamily of man the question whether constitutional republic or democracy, government of the people, by the same people. can Or cannot maintain it's territorial integrity
  question whether 1iscontented individuals, too' few in numbers to control the administration ac- cording to the organic law in any case, can all ways upon the pretenses made in this case, or any other prctenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up the government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: Is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness !"- Must government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of it's own people, too weak to maintain its own existence So viewing the ls- sue no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government, and so to resist the force employed for it's destruction by force for it's preservation. The call was made, and the response of the country was most gratifying, surpassing in unanimity and spirit thomost san guine expectation Yet none of the states, com monly called slave states, except Delaware, gave q regiment through the regular state organiza- tion. A few regiments have been organized within some others of those states by individual enterprise, and received into the government service Of course, the seeded states, so-called, and to which Texas had been joined about the time of the inauguration, gave no troops to the cause of the Union The border states, so-call- ed, were not uniform in their action, some Of them being almost for the Union, while in others, as in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas, the Union sentiment was nearly re- pressed and silenced. The course taken in Vir ginia was the most remarkable, perhaps the most important convention, elected by the people of that state to consider this very question of disrupting the federal Union, was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell.- To this body the people had chosen large maj ority of professed Union men. Almost immedi- ately after the fall of Sumter many members ot that majority went over to the original dlsunion