The Union and journal. [volume] (Biddeford, Me.) 1858-1882, 1861-07-12

which IL was Delievcu possible 70 keep tns
Government on foot.
On the 5th day Of March, the present in
cumbent's FIRST full day in Office, letter ol
Major Anderson. commanding at Fort Sum
ter, written on the 2Sth Of February, and
received at tho War Department on the 4th
Of March, was by that Department placed in
his hands.
This letter expressed the professional opin-
ion Of tho writer, that reinforcements could
not be thrown into that fort, within the
time for his relief, rendered necessary by the
limited supply Of provisions, and with view
of holding possession Of the same with a force
Of less than 10000 gosi and well disciplined
men.
This opinion was concurrod in ,by all the
officers Of his command and their memoranda
on the subject were. made enclosures Of Maj.
Anderson's letter. The whole was immcdi.
ately laid before Lieut.. Gen. Scott, who at once
concurred with Maj. Anderson In opinion.
On reflection however he took full time, con-
sulting FIVE other officers both Of the army and
navy, and at the end Of four days came re-
luctantly but decidedly to the same conclu-
SION as before.
He also stated at tho same time that no
such sufficient force was at the control OF
Government, or could be raised and brought
to the ground within the time when the pro.
visions of the fort would bo exhausted. In
q purely military point of view this reduced
the duty of the Administration In the case to
the mere matter Of getting the garrison safe
ly out of the fort. 1t was believed, however
that to 50 abandon this position under cir.
cumstances would be utterly ruinoiis; that
the necessity under which 1t was to be done
would not be fully understood; that by many
would bc construed as a part Of q voluntary
policy; that at home II would discourage
the friends of the Union and embolden its
adversaries, and go far to insure the latter q
recognition abroad; that in fact II would be
our national destruction consumated.
This could not be allowed. Starvation
was not yet upon the garrison, and ere 1t
could bc, Fort Pickens might be reinforced.
This last would DO clear indication ofpolicy,
and would better enable the country to accept
the evacuation of Fort Sumter as military
necessity An order was at once directed to
be sent for the landing Of troops from Steam
ship Brooklin into Fort Pickens. This order
could not 60 by land, but must take the
longer and slower route by sea. Tho FIRST
return news from the order was received just
one week before the fall Of Sumter. The
news itself was that the officer cammdaning
the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had
been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting
npon some quasi armisticc Of the last admin
and of the existence of which the
present administration, up to the time the
order was dispatched, had only too vague
and uncertain rumors to fix attention, had
refused to land the troops.
To now reinforce Fort Pickens before q
crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was
rendered so by the near exhaustion
Of provisions in the latter named fort. In
precaution against such conjunction, the
Government had few days before commen-
ccd preparing an expedition US we'll adapted
as might be to relieve Fort Sumter, which
expedition was intended to be ultimately
used or not according to circumstances.
The strongest anticipated case for using It
was now presented, and 1t was resolved to
send il forward as had been intended in this
II was also resolved to notify
the Governor of So. Carolina that he might
expect an attempt would be made to provis.
ion the fort. and that IL the attempt should
not bc resisted, there would be no effort to
throw in men, arms or ammunition without
further notice or in case Of On attack upon
the fort. This notice was accordingly given
whereupon the fort was attacked and BON.
barded to its fall, without even awaiting the
arrival of the provisioning expedition. It's
thus seen that tho assault upon the reduction
Of Fort Sumter was in no sense matter Of
on the part Of the asailants.-
They well knew that hogarrison in the fort
could by no possibility commit aggression
upon them.
They knew that they wcrc expressly mott.
fed that the giving Of food to the brave and
hungry men Of the garrison was oil which
would on that occasion be attempted, unle~
they themselves by resisting so much should
provoke more. They knew that this govern.
ment desired to keep tho garrisoni In tho fort,
not to assail them but merely to maintain
visible possession, and thus to preserve the
Union FROM actual and immediate dissolu.
ton, trusting as hereinbefore stated, to time
discussion and the ballot box for FINAL adjust,
ment; and they assailed and reduced the fort
for precisely the reverse objcct-to drive out
the visible authority Of the Federal Union,
and thus force It to immediate dissolution.
That this was their object the Executive
well understood, and having said to them In
the inaugural address, "you can have no con.
ilict twithout being yourselves the agsres'or'.'
lie took pains not only to ks'p this dcclara-
ton good, but also to keep the case 20 free
from the power Of ingenious sophistry as that
the world should not be able to misunder-
stand II by the aaair at Fort Sumter with its
surrounding circumstances. That point was
reached then and they began the conflict Of
nrms without gun in sight, or In expectsn-