Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1861-11-27


respecting said seizure canbe properly constituted
many other Court under any circumstances. In
all other matters it is admitted that all the District
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. But Judge MAJ
grath tails to distinguish between Courts having
general Jurisdiction of the subject matter, and its
having special eegnzancs Of the particular case II
is very clear, as he says, that each District Court
has jurisdiction Of marine forts, wherever commit
ted, and of marine contracts wherever made but
certainly Of them can take cogniZance OF any
particular case, unless either the parties come with
in reach of the Courts process, that they can be
arrested their estate that it may be attached,
in lieu of arrestng their persons or the thing pro-
ceeded against when the proceeding is an rem, so
that it may be taken into the custody Of the Court
unless the be taken hold of by one OF these
means, any Judgment or decree pronounced therein
is an absolute nullity. An analogous case is iurn
ished by the Courts Of Common Law. A personal
contract is made in England. The Superior Court
of Law of Wayne has jurisdiction of the subject
but can have no cognzance of any cause growing
out of it until the parties their estate, at least
that of the defendant reached by the process oil
the Court This and nothing more than this, is
meant, when it is said, as in the case of Sandwich,
Pet Rep, 237 in note, (cited by Judge Magrath)
"the jurisdiction of the District Court is bounded
only by the nature of the case over which it is
to decide"
As to proceeding in rem in civil causes, the au-
thores all agree that spectacle forum tribuit tucOs
IN quo res sitBsunt. In ConkhBg's .. s. Admiralty,
it is said at page 3d. on the authority OF Judge
Story, to be very clearly settled that in proceedings
in rem, or the real actions of the Civil Law, the
proper forum is the LucOs rel sta See also to the
same effect page 81, of the same volume.
Judge Magrath seems to have entirely overlooked
the limiting qualifying words in the statute Just
cited, comforting jurisdiction. to w.t. "as IN CIVIL
cases contra distinguished from prize cases, &c,
and he himself settles the question when he says
thaa no
rant or order Of the Court executed by the ofhcer,
brings into Court the specific thing, against which
relief is sought" Now the officer execute no
warrant order beyond the limits Of his district
Act Of Confederate Congress, No. SO. Sec. 3, Qaws
1st Session. page 113) If this be So and if in civil
cases. IA branch of the ordinary jurisdction,) the
Court Can have cognizance or jurisdiction where the
officer cannot seize the specific thing, and ii the
jurisdiction in prize cases is governed by the same
rules in civil cases. it follows necitdbLy, that the
Marshal of the District Court of one State being
unable to seize and take into custody vessel lying
in the port of another State the said Court have
no cogniZance thereof
1t will be observed that in the Act above referred
to, comforting jurisdiction in prize cases. the qualify
ing words, already cited confined to cases where
the prize is actually brought within the Confederate
States, and in the act OF the U. S. comforting the
same jurisdiction, there is no such limitation, the
prize jurisdiction being considered part OF the civil
jurisdiction. No argument therefore, against my
view of the subject can be derived from any case
decided in the Courts Of the U. S., whether the
prize was condemned while lying in foreign port,
or domestic port not within the District exercising
jurisdiction (of which latter kind however it is be-
heved that no can be found) Nor, as is at
tempted by his Honor from that portion of our Act
which allows the prize to be carried into a neutral
port, and, while there, to be condemned by our
Courts. But putting the limiting words of the
statute out Or UieW no argument can be derived
against my position from the general practice of
cOndemning prizes, while in foreign, neutral ports.
lbs is violation of principle, and is only tolerated
for the sake Of convenience. 1t is said in Kents
Commentaries, vol. LIST, marginal pages l03 and
l04, the principle" that dctudt possession of the
thing, within the local limits of the District, is
cesSary to give cognlzance in proceedings an rem,
was admitted to be correct by Sir William Scott
in the Hannah and MarIah, and he acted upon it in
a prior case. But he considered that the English
Admiralty had gone too far, in supporting condem-
nations in England of prizes abroad in a neutral
port to permit him to recall the Uicous practice of
the Court to the acknowledged principle The Su-
preme Court Of the United States has followed the
English rule This was deemed the most Convenient
practice for neuTas, as well as for the parties at
war; and though the prize GGs in fact within the
neutral jurisdiction, it was still TO be deemed under
the control Of the captor." Now when the prize is
within the actual Jurisdiction of a Court of the
establish the Uicious practice, and violate :he
EnoULedged principle alluded to above and, in order
to sustain such course resort to the impractical
idea, that the prize, while in port of district
being in possession of the captor, is as much with
in the control Of the Court if in the possession
of its officer, idea that merely hunted up at
first to sustain jurisdiction that was deemed con-
venient, if not necessary.
The act of Congress, No. 372, approved 30th
Aug, 1861 (since jurisdiction was taken in this
case.) See acts of the 3rd session, page 70 makes
a special provision that the Judge Of the prize
Court may order the vessel and cargo, lit does not
say where situated) to be Sold in certain cases. by
the Marshal of the adjoining District thus showing
clearly that Marshal cannot sell out of his own
District otherwise the Marshal, not of the adjon-
ing district but of that exercising jurisdiction could
have sold, and this provision OF the Statute would
have been useless. Would not it then be disres-
pectful to the lawmakers to suppose, that, without
a reason founded upon either necessity or convent
ence they intended to confer upon a Court authority
to order a sale of property by an officer, who, in
some cases, could not come within thousand miles
of it at the time Of the sale, who could give pos
session thereof, and who could not even assure the
purchaser that the property purchased by him was
then in existence. If such sale be valid, it is an
exception TO that otherwise unrersal rule, that in
sales of personal property by ministerial officers,
the property must be present, and susceptible of
delivery.
The Act of Congress, No 1876 (Acts I'd session,
page 49, forbids the captors to remove the prize
after it has been attached by an adverse claimant
or a claim has been interpoSed against it on behalf
of the Confederate States. Why For no other
reason but that in proceedings of this nature, the
very thing ITSELF ust be within the local urisdic
ton Of the Court whose officer Is to dispose of it
after condemnation.
The language of the Act of the Congress of the
Colonies of North America declaring that captured
vessels should be libelled in the district into which
they should be brought and which is referred to IN
Judge Magrath's opinion, having been omitted in
the legislation OF both the United States and the
Confederate States, thus omitted because being
in atfirmance of generally recognized principle, it
was unnecessary.
1t is said by the learned Judge who cites the au-
thortes to sustain him, that the Jurisdiction of the