Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1861-07-10
Presidents Message.

sio;, as authorized by the Con ututiOn, your
attention is not called To any ordinary subject
s.f legislation. At the beginning of the pres.
.td Presidential term four months ago, the
functions of The Federal Government were
found 10 be generally suspended within the
several States of South Carolina. Georgia, AL
ALBANIA. Mississippi louisiana and Florida, ex-
c.ptiug those only of the Post Office Depart
ment. Within these States all the forts, arse
mails. dock wards, custom houses, etc. lnclu-
ding all the movable and stationary property
in and about them. had been seized aud held
II, omen hostility To this Government. excep-
ting only Forts Pickins, Taylor and jefferson.
on and near the FlOri coast. and Fort Sum
ter in Charleston harhor. The forts thus seiz-
rd had been put III improved condition, new
ones had been built and armed. Other forces
lad been organized and were organizing. all
avnwcilv for the same hostile purpsses. The
forts remaining in the Federal possession in
and near those States were either bcseiged or
rlcnared by wariike preparations. Especial
~ Fort Sumter was nearly surrounded By well
protected hostile batteries, with guns equal in
quality 10 the best of its own, and Outuunber-
iug ;he Latter az ten to one. a dlspropOItIon-
ate share of the Federal muskets and rifles
Lad somehow found thcr way INTO these States
md had been s'ized to be used against the
Government. Accumulation OF the public
revenue had been seized for the same Object
The navy was scattered in distunt seas. leav-
ing but a very small part of it within the i'm
mediate reach Of the Government. Officers OF
the federal army had resigned in great num-
Lers. and of those resigned, a great PORTION
had taken up arms against the Government
simultaneously and in connection with all
This. purpose To sever the Federal Union WAS
openly owed. In accordance with this pur
nose am ordinance had been reported, in each
of these States, declaring the States respec-
lively to be separated from the Federal Union.
The formula for instituting a combined Gov
ernment for these States had been promulga-
ted. and this illegal organization in the charac-
Ter of the Confederate States. "a already ask
ing recognition. aid, and Intervention from
foreign powers. Finding this condition of
means, and believing it to be an imperative
duty upon the incoming Executive to prevent
if possible, the contamination of such attempt
10 DESTROY the Federal Union, a choice of two
things to the end became indispensable. The
choice was made and declared in the inaugu-
raj address The policy chosen. looked to the
exhaustion Of all peaceable measures before
resort to any stronger one. 1t sought only TO
hold the public places and property not alrea-
DIV wrestcd from the Government and TO col
lee. the revenue. relying for the rest on time,
discussion and the ballot box. | promised the
continuance of the mails at the governments
expense, to the very people who were resisting
the government. and gave repeated pledges
against any disturbance of any of the people
or any of their rights-of all that which a
President might cOnstitutiOnally and iustitia-
bly, do in such a case. Everything was for
borne without which it was believed possible
m keep the government on foot.
On the fifth of March, the p 5sent incum-
beut's first full day IN office, letter from Ma
ior Anderson, commanding at Fo!t Sumter,
written on the 2S,h day of February, and re-
ceived at the War Department oil the 4tl of
March, was by that Department placed in his
hands, This letter expressed the professional
opinion Of the writnr that reintorcements cod
not be thrown MO that fo;t in time for his
lief (rendcrei necessary by the limited sup
PLY of prOyisiO and with view OF holding
POSSESSION of the samr) With a force OF less
Than. 10000 veil disciplined men The Opin-
ion was concurrad in by all the officers of his
command and their memoranda 0u the subject
were made Enclosures Of Major Anderson's let
ter The whole was immediately laid before
Lieutenant General Scott. who at once con-
cured with Major Anderson lii his dec!sion.-
On reflection, however. he took fail time In
consulting with other officers, both Of the ar
my and nav and at tie end offour days came
reluctantly but decidedly To the same concu-
time that no such Sufficient force was then at
the control of the government or could be rais-
ed and tr lught to the groudd Within The time
when the provisions in The Fort would be ex
lausted. In pnrcly mililarv point of view,
this confined the Administration tn the mere
matter of getting the garrison safely out of the
Font. 1t VIZ. belle el, however. that to so
abandon that situation under the circumstan
ces would l,e utterly rIlinous that the ueces-
stv under which II was TO be done would not
I've fully understood that by many it would
he construed as part of a voluntary policy :;
that at home it would discourage the friends
of the Union. emholdcn its advcrsaries and go
far to insure To tbs latter recognition abroad,
and that III fact it woCld be our national des-
truction. This could not be allowed. Star
vation was not vet upon the garrison. and ere
il would be reached. Fort Pickens might be
reinforced. This last would be clear indi-
cation of policy, and ould better enable the
country to accept the e":cuation of Sumter as
4 military necessity. Then an order was at
once direC ted TO be sent for the landing OF the
troops from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort
Pickens. The order could not 90 by land but
must take the surer and slower route by sea.
The first returning news by the order was
received Just one week before the fall of
Snlnter. The news itself was that the Off
Ger commanding the Sabine. to which vessel
the troops had been transferred from the Broo
klyn, acting upon some armistice of the late
late Administration and of the existence of with
the present Administration, up to the time the
order was dispatched had only too vague and
uncertain rumors TO fix attention, had refused
To land troops. To now reinforce Fort Pick
ans before the crisis was reached at Fort Sam
ter was impossible. rendered so by the mere
exhaustion ofprovisions in the latter named
Fort. precaution against such contin-
gency. the Government had few days before
commenced preparing an expedition as well
adapted as night be, to relieve Fort Sumter,
which expedition was intended to be used or
not according TO circumstances. The strong
est anticipated case for using it was now pre-
scented, and it was resolved to send it forward
as had been intended. In this contingency it
was also resolved to notify the Governor of
South Carolina that he might expect an attemt
wouh be made TO provision the Fort, and that
if the attempt should not be resisted, there
would be no attempt to throw IN men, arms
or ammunition. without 3Zrther notice.; or IL,
case OF an attack On the Fort. This notice was
accordingly given. whereupon the Fort was al
tackled and bombarded TO its tall. even await
ing the arrival Of the provision expedition. II
is thus seen that the assault upon and reduc-
ton OF Fort Sumter were in no sense matter
Of self defence on the part of the assailants.-
They well knew that the garrison in the Fort
could by no possibility commit aggression on
them. They knew they were expressly noti-
fed that giving bread TO the few grave and
hungry men in the garrison was allthat would