Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1861-07-12
VOL. XIII.
THE PREsIDzMT6 MESSAGE.
WAsHIEoToN, June 5. 1861.
FelEoU Citizens of tie Senate

binary occasion, as authorized BY tn,
Constitution, your attention is not call
ed to any ordinary subject of legislation
At the beginning of the present pres
idential term, four months ago, tht
functions of the Federal Gotefnfngl
were found to be generally suspended
within the several states of South Caro-
lima. Georgia. Alabama Mississippi Lou.
isiana and Florida, excepting only those
Of the Post Office Department. Within
these States the forts, arsenals, dock
yards, custom houses, the like including
the movable and stationary property in
and about them, has been seized and
were held in open hostility tO the gov.
eminent. excepting only Fcrts Pickens,
| Taylor aud Jefferson, on and near the
Florida coast, and Fort Sumter in
Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
The forts TINS siezed had been put in
approved condition. New ones had been
bnilt, and armed forces had been organ
ising, all avowedly with the same hos
tile purpose.
The forts remaining in tbs possession
of the Federal Government, and near
these States, were either beseiged or me-
naced by warlike preparations, and es-
pecially, Fort Sumter was nearly sur
rounded by we'll protected hostile bate
ries, with guns equal in quality to it's
own, and ouInumbering the latter, ten
to ones perhaps. A disproportienate
share of the Federal muskets and rifles
had somehow found their way into these
States, and lad been seized 10 be used
1 against the Government. Accntfulations
of the public retenue lying within them
had been seized for the same object. The
navy was scattered in distant seas, leav-
ing but a very small part of it within the
| i'm mediate reach Of the Govern ment.-
Officers of the Federal Army and Navy
had resigned in great numberss and OF
those resighihg. large proportion of
them had taken mp arms against the
Government. simultaneously, in con-
hectiOu with all this, the purposes to
sever the Federal Union was openly
avowed. In accordance with this purp-
ose, an ordinance had been adopted in
each of these Statas declaring the States
respectively to be separated from the Ma
tional Union. For inssitRting a com
bined Go vel nmant of these States a for
mnla had been promulgated, and this
Illegal organization in the character of
the Confederate States we're already in
voking recognition, Intervention and aid
from foreign powers.
Seeing this condition of things, nRd
believing IT TO be an imperative duty on
the Incoming Executive to prevent, il
possible, the cohsdmnation of such an
attempt to destroy the Federal Union,
choice Of means 20 that end become in
dispensible. The choice we made was
declared in the inaugtiraf address The
policy chosen looked to the exhaustion
of all peaceful measures before a resort
to any stronger o hes 1t sought only to
hold the public places ard property not
already wrested from the governments,
ana to collect the revenue, relying for
the Test on time, discussion and the bal
lot box.
Isplomised continusrce Of the mails
at government expense TO TIE very peo-
pie who were resisting the government
and gave it repeated pledges against any
disturbance to any of the people or any
of their rights, of all which President
might constitutinnally and iustiiably do |
in such case. Everything was lorborn, |
without which it was believed possible |
to keep the government on foot. On the |
fifth of March, the present incumbent's ;
first full day in Office, letter of Major
Anderson's, commanding at Fort Sum
ter, written Oh the 2Sth of February, |
and received at the War Department on
the 4th of March, was, by that Depart |
ment, placed in his hands. Fbis letter
expressed as the professional opinion OF
the writer, that reinforcementS could not
be thrown into that fort in time for its
relief, rendered necessary by the limited |
supply of provisions, and with vieT
of holding possession Of the same.
with force of less than twenty thous
and good and we'll disciplined men,
This opinion was conc0rred in by all |
the officers of his command, and their
memoranda on the subject were made
and enclosed in MAJOR AnGerson's letter.
The whole was Immediately laid before
Lieut. General Scott. who at once con
cured with Major Anderson in this
opinion. On reflection, however. he took
full time for consultation with other Of |
ficers, both of the army and the navy.
and at the end of four days came reluct
antly, but decidedly, to the same conclu-
sion as before. He also stated et the
same time that no force was then at the
control of the Government, or could be
raised and brought to the ground within
the time, before the provisions in the forts
would be exhausted. In a purely mill
tary point of view, this reduced the duty
of the Administration in the case to the
mere matter of getting the garrison safely
out of the fort.
This could not be allowed, starvation
was not yet upon the garrison. and ere
it would be reached, Fort Pickens might
De reinforced. This last would be'a clear
indication of policy, and would better en-
able the country to accept the evacuation
of Fort Sumter, as military necessity.
An order was at once directed to be sent
for the landing of the troops from the
steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens
This order could not go by land. but it
must Eake the longest and slowest route
by sea.
The first return news from the order
was received but one week before the fall
OF Sumter. The news itself was that the
officer commanding the Sabine. to which
vessel the troops had been transferred
from the Brooklyn, acting upon some
quasgt aYs,istice of the late Administra
tiOn fand of the existence OF the late ad
ministration, up to the time the order
was dispatched having had only TOO
vague and uncertain rumors TO fix atten-
ton, had refused to land the troops to
reinforce Fort Pickens before crisis
would be reached at Fort Sumter. This
was impossible, rendered. SO by the near
exhaustion of provisions in the latter
named fort. In precaution against such
conjunction, the Government had a
Jew days before commenced preparing
an expedition. as well adapted as might