The Council Bluffs nonpareil. [volume] (Council Bluffs [Iowa]) 1857-1867, 1861-04-27
49,, NAV Siu,e..

From the n 7. Times.
THE CONTEST AND THE RELATIVE
STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES 10 II.
From the progress Of the inventive Arts
the chances Of war among nations possess
ing an equal amount Of courage and endur-
ance are almost exactly measured BY tee
amount Of noney belligerent can COM
mand. Money 10 equivalent to numerical
superiority in men, in ships, in means OF To-
comotion and subsistence,sn in the perfec-
ton and completeness Of Instruments OF de-
ssruction. SUGGESTS no longer An attribute
Of peculiar nationality, or the fortune OF
. particular General, or matter OF acci-
dent, but depends upon mass, and the skill
with which this is welded. The combatant
excelling in these two conditions must In
the end win, no matter what reverses 1t may
at frst suffer from want Of preparation, or
training, or habitude.
This premise, which is universally con-
ceded, should relieve rs OF any concern g
to the result OF the contest in which We are
now engaging, no matter how wide may be
its range or the extent to which it may be
pushed. Wemay concede personal courage
to our opponents, fully equal to our own,
and still leave than in hopeless inferiority
as to their ability to maintain anything like
an equal fight. The Confederate States con-
tain a white population of 100000, or
about one. eighth the population of the
Northern States. The latter can, if neces-
sary, bring force eight times greater into
the field. All the Slave States together have
white population Of only 5000, 900 against
Is, 200, 900 in the North. Measured by num-
bers, the north is twice and half as power
full, assuming all the Southern States to be
a unit in sentiment and purpose. But this
is impossible. Missouri in no contingency
will join the Gulf Confederacy, neither will
Delaware, nor Maryland, nor Western Vir-
ginia, nor Eastern Kentucky, nor Tennes-
see. In case of hostilities, the proper SUR
reiuaace over the negro would compel at
least one-half Of the white males to remain
at home as local police, increasing the dis
parity to such degree as to render it the
height of fool hardness for the South to
venture upon the contest.
How is it with regard to munitions Of
war? In heavy ordnance and the like, the
South m y be pretty well supplied, from the
forts they have seized and plundered. But
in the seeding States there is neither pow
der mill nor foundry for the casting of
cannon, nor an establishment for the man.
ufacture of arms. Did any such establish
ment exist, they could never turn out mate
rial or arms that could match those manu-
featured at the North. The seeding States
to-day are being supplied from ourselves
with everything they use. But for this
source they could not put regiment in the
field. Disarm them, and they must remain
so until they can again supply themselves
by purchase. The Southern States are
people without artisans. Labor is held in
disgrace. The greater portion Of the white
population are ignorant. To say that such
a people can supply the very FIRST conditions
upon which success depends, proper arma-
the North, is an absurdity, that carries its
own REPUTATION. Take away the arms the
Government have distTgipqsed ttbroas5
they would be impotent for any military ex
plot whatever.
They are equally weak in their commits
sariat. The seeding States cannot manu.
facture yard of clothing fit for soldiers
wear, nor raise the food for his rations.
These must be supplied from the North, if
at all. They are still weaker in the grand
sine qua non-CAsH. This the seeding
States are literally without, and with the
exception OF one or two points, never had
any. II is the law there, that the crop is
realized and spent, long before it is gather
ed. Charleston was looked upon as the
richest city South. in proportion to its pop
ulation. YetCharleston is almost complete
ly exhausted. The State is so pressed that
it cannot carry on the work necessary to
complete its Capitol. All its banks are bro
ken, with hardly dollar of hard coin in
their vaults. Its contributions to secession
are forced loans. There is no other city
South that had any money except New Or
leans, and this can be had only BY forced |
loans from the banks. This resource will |
soon be exhausted, and then there must be |
an end both of borrowing and forced loans. |
With all the bluster displayed, the $l5 ,OOo,- |
900 loan cannot be sold to voluntary pur |
chasers. Nor can a second loan be put off. |
should this one be wrung from unwilling |
victims. The moment State seccdes her |
credit is ruined. The conviction is univer-
sal that secession will end in repudiafioa.
A people that SO readily trample under foot
the most sacred obligations, will not be long
in throwing off debt the moment it is re-
garded as burden. Nominal,y, Virginia |
is still q loyal State, but the fear that she
will secede, has caused her bonds to fall to |
5l-the same bonds that few wears ago
we're sought after at lis, and but for seces. |
sion would to, day BIO selling at handsome
premium
Seeding States, individually cannot Dor
row, because they deny all legal RESPONSE.
bilities. The Confederate States cannot,
because they allow any one to secede from
them at will, and because they embrace two
bfack sheep among them, Mississippi and
Florida. No one will trust a 6rm when
these two are leading members, neither at
home nor abroad, nof among themselves.
In whatever direction the Confederate States
may look, they can get no money except by
spoiiation, which soon exhausts what it feeds
on. Their people have none, and they can
show their face in no foreign market.
The South lies entirely at the mercy of
the North in their innumerablc points yul.
nerable to attack. They want 200, 600 men
as defence against 10, 900 on board q we'll
appointed feet. One day this force could
threaten Norfolk; the next Wilmington
the next Charleston; the next Savannah; the
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