The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-08-09

"SseIs pnee's Rfd fIaWS.
The army correspondent OF the New Or
leans Pmayune. writing from Manassas on
the "a of July, makes some revolutions
| which. even at this late day, are worthy OF
p~rusal
The statements of prisoners and acciden tai
occurrences are hourly throwing new and
| important light upon the la,e expedit,on of
Gen scott. even npon his Utmost plans and
thoughts IL Is now clear that the men
DIT neht together on the upper Potomac I'M
der zen. Patterson and tho-e under General
beheT at Fortress Monroe, were never de-
signed 10 Act separa teIy, or, except as Skin
inish'nS parties. The movements in both
THESE diretfions We're, in fact, feints designed
TO divide and distract us.
Inc grand expedition which was 20 do the
principal work OF the Invasion, was that
ntted out At Washington, and directed against
TINS place. Livery man that couid he made
available for this OF isct there loine ed to It,
every piece Of artillery brought al and every
resource exhaustei.
For several days previous to Gen. SCOTS
advance, we had observed great activity on
the Potomac. Gen Beauregard doubles
understood them, but to the army and gene
raj 'hSsrvrr they s~emed only suspicious-
The chief mystery a bout Them was that troops
seemed To be going down and not MP, " here
the real expedition was being H. t.t ont
This, IN fact, WAS the statement OF Northern
correspondence and papers; il WAS heralded
even from MOI folk ana The Yorktown PENN
snla thai Fortress Monroe was being largely
rel n forced.
Nevertheless, to observers at various points
on the Potomac, near Dumfr es, Acolyte Mills,
&c, in the vicinity of the Occoquan, these
movements did not appear TO he pre- isely
what they were said to be. The feet of
steamers on the river frequently carried up
more men than they Carried down, and NOT
seldom what appeared TO be ammunition,
stores, artillery, a..
1ae truth OF All This has now come Out -
Fortress Monroe was never reinforced. On
the con tiary, very thing, both of men, artil l.
ieTy and aumnniti lion, that could be spared
ther-irom, was all the time being brought up
10 washington for thts very expedition. The
,-ms, Also, Is true OF the movements OF ien =
eral fattel SON on the Upper Potomac. Those
movements We're, from the beginning, teint =,
designed only to distract our attention annoy
ns, ami Hualiy to GO Operate with General
Scutt on the Manassas Plans. This explains
all his advances and retreats, his repeated
oilers OF battle and refusal to accept the
same, MS loud sounding pretsnsions, and real
inability To cope with The man he was trying
~ amuse.
This, Gen. Johnston saw from tho begin
ming, ana 1t viii serve to explain many OF his
movements, before Misunderstood He kne ~
inat Patterson meant nothing serious and
nnder no circumstances would engage him.
lie kne" that ms ultimate object was to mite
Win Gen Scott before Alexandra He thsrs-
tore deliberately Tell back 10 Winchester and
patiently awaited the hOur when all TINS
grand scheme was to % carried INTO effect.
IL Is pro bable that Gen. Scott sa " at las /
that tf-ns. Benuregard and Johns ton hau
fonnd Ont his pians ne PROBABLY saw, more
over, thai ms plans IN glt by means work
wen that III TACT Gen ohnston had 1t in HI $
poW-r 10 be with Beauregard hours befoi 4
Patterson Could 10 before Fairfax.
Ii was III Consequence Of this that Just be =
fore The advance Scott ordered Patterson ~
engage Johnston near Winchester At any odds
ana at Whatever cost. THIS Patterson, lao
doubt, rs We inter from his movements Ut the
Al 10 h..u FIJI lath Inv
Johns .on, who refused 10 gravity him now by
giving tim battle, except on mis- own terms.
In the meantime, the day Of the grand adj.
vance APPROACHED niece ssarIly the original
plan WAS - last resor ted TO. Unable TO engage
Johnston, Patter.o on Was immediately ortt-IeL
GU 10 Fairfax. he lett MartinsDurg ON " ed
nesday, and arrived at Charleston, near Har-
pei Ferry, that night. This movement was
0orVed and understood. That same day the
NAemy advanced from Alexandria, and this
be sure that PdttersOn's movement was not
a feint- 50 soon as this determined
johnston, ever ready, moved forward wi'h all
possible speed, leaving, however, sufficient
force Mt Winchester to defend that place
FRIDAY morning his men WeIe at Piedmont
on The Manassas Gap road, and had the rail-
road done its work promptly and efHcien tiy
they would all have been IN Manassas on FIJI
day night or early Saturday morning. The
railroad, however, worked badly, and finally
Gen. Kirby Smith, who commanded Junn-
stOns rear forces, had TO take 1t INTO his own
hands. Hs stopped the cars at the Plains
took off hi. men, and marched straight across
the country 20 the battle fied, saving not
only the time Necessary TO so from that point
| to Manassas, but IA hve-m!les march in the
heat of the day.
In the meantime Patterson himself was on
his march round the northern spur OF the
ridge. He arrived too late, and with his men
in an exhausted condition.
The fact is, this was to be the grand wipins
| q - I Da1l n ia hal ia nrp.
oahe sven that The movements Of Mcclellan
IN the g Orth west we're principally designed Il
| deceive Beaureg&rd here, and 80 far rs pos
| sible TO play into the hands of General Scott
here. The federaiists certainly cannot have
| sX pected to make Roadway either in the noun.
| tains or the Valley OF the Kanawha, = rug ged
| country, where the masses of the people are
| hostile, however disaffacted indiv lduals III Nv
| he. The promptness with which Mcclellan
| was summoned to Washington Imniedia IL II
| alter the defeat of Mcdowell, also shows tina
he vas not greatly needed where he has re.
| Gently been pretending to operate.