New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-03-20
The PRO.SLAvENV Rebellion.
FROM SOUTH CAROLINA.
HOW MANY MEN ARE REQUIRED TO RE-
ENFORCE FORT SUMrERa

n will require twenty thousand men to reinforce |
Fort Sumter. That the commanding officer OF |
Fort Sumter entertans such an opinion DO not
believe. So utterly inconsistent would IT be with |
what are understood to have been the views |
which for upward Of two months be repeated to |
his Government, namely: that lis position re-
CURED neither re6Dforcements nor supplies, ana
90 much at variance would such an opinion be |
with the facts in the case, that one is compelled
10 reject the idea that Major Anderson has ever |
given expression to anything of the kind.
can ace how, should il be announced from
Washington one month beforehand that troops
weuld be landed at Charleston, as many as ten
or fifteen or possibly even twenty thousand men
would be necessary to place the success OF the
expedition beyond question and to meet oil con-
singences; for after such notice JEFF. DAVIS
would doubtless manage to bring together at
ssst point good many more than that number
II would be doing the gallant commander of Fort
Sumter no credit to believe that up to the Inau-
guration Of;President Lincoln he was so blind to
his situation as not to discover something OF Its
extreme necessities, and that 1t was not TIL MI
BuchaDsn had gone out Of office that he per-
soi,ed. IA it would seem he did, all at once,
that twenty thousand men were required where
o few days before neither men nor supplies were
pecosgary 10 maintain the American nag. For
hundred reasons of kindred character, If there
were no other arising from practical examlna-
ton OF the question, / instantly reject what has
been imputed to Major Anderson under this head,
II NAV be asked bow many men would be re-
CURED to reinforce Fort Sumter, ard place the
Sftnu7
Having, at q time when it might be thought pre-
sumptuous in me to do so, expressed opinions on
two other important points connected with this
subject, which opinions appear now TO be con-
sarred in at headquarters, to wit: that the re-
enforcement or abandonment Of Fort Sumter
would, before long, become imperative, and that
70 accomplish the first @ lard force would be ne
esssery, / viii mOdesty venture an opinion Oh
this pOint; and if should happen to be wrong, II
would only be once in three times. Five thou
sand regulars aud Inarines-four thousand OF the
former and one of the latter-judiciOusly distrib-
cited. would be able to do what it ID now re-
ported viii require twenty thousand men 10 DO.
That number would be more than equal to
tho forces of the CarOlinians and it is no credit
10 say that the United States army ask an ad-
vantage of four to one. There would unques-
sonsbly be general and perhaps sanguinary en-
gagement, for while ships engaged the batteries
ON Sulliyan's and Morris Islands, troops would
,...ult them in the rear. The Carolina forces
would be divided by the harbor without being
Ab,e 10 cooperate. They have ships TO count On,
10 flying artillery, or other appointments not
with express reference to the particular work OF
veAucing Fort Sumter. A fire in the real"
has hardly been thought of; certainly it was not
before Gen. Beaaregard took command. / ven
ture TO say that almost any officer Of the Army,
equal tothe undertaking. would agree to relieve
Fort Sumter with five thousand men, including
proper proportion of marines, in the right sort of
ships. Twenty thousand, or even ten thousand
aaen, would be superabundance. Having
gained possession of either side Of the harbor
rssnforcements could then easily be thrown into
ne Fort II the Carolinians divided their forces,
thus placing, at the most, two thousand on each
HAND, as they doubtless would do, they would
thus weaken themselves one half, while the
attacking forces would be able OF any moment to
concentrate on the side thought best; thus if the
attacking force was five thousand, it would be
met by less than one halt its number. Whoever
reooIects the events of the battle of Fort Moul-
sris, in the Revolutionary War. viii remember
sAat there was q state of things something like
this then.
The City of Mexico was captured BY employ
ing less than ten thousand men, believe, while
Il was defended by upwards Of twenty-five thOus
sand Carolinans are not Mexicans / am aware,
ncr have they the means Of oiIense and defense
Tat the Mexicans had. In and about this harbOr
tbsy are formidable only for doing the particular
thing for which their batteries have been erected.
Take them in any other shape, and you noDplus
them Cummings Point battery is strong only
for operating on Fort Sumter. So of the other
batteries. 1t is mainly to operate them to re-
dacs Fort Sumter in front, that their men have
been drilled. They may DO said to have been
srected for little else, for Little else has been
contemplated.
Sumter, if it should take place, will be for other
reasons than because it cannot be reinforced.
As it does not seem at this near standpoint to |
be q military necessity, so l am slow TO believe |
that the Fort is to be given up on that ground, |
II at ali. In my judgment, it would be wiser TO |
surrender the Fort, IL at all, az peace meas
ire, and as matter choice. The effect would |
BE- better on the disaiected States, and such
reason would accord better with the idea of
oar having something more than shadow of q
Government 1t would far less offend the pride
which the plea Of necessity 20 much humiliates.