Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-07-03
From the Philadelphia North American, Republican
The Field Movements in Virginia.

At length the grand operations of military
strategy III the open field have fully begun
| in all parts of Virginia, and the aspect of the
board. as it varies from day to day, is one OF
the most interesting studies the Observant
mind can direct its attention to. Gel. Ohm
ston has not gone to Manassas Junction, pre-
cisely as we thought. His retreat was a
ieint to draw Gen. Cadwalader into a snare
and fall upon his division suddenly with an
overwhelming force. Cadwalader had but
5000 men and few pieces of artillery and
and cavalry troop, while Johnston had from
u 900 to 1900 men, with .whOle park of
artillery and several regiments OF cavalry.
The rebel lines stretch from Winchester to
Martinsburg. In crossing the Potomac, Gen
eral Cadwalader's orders were to occupy
Martinsburg, but finding that the enemy was
still close at hand in full force. he fell back.
at the sane time sending ceinfOrcements TO
Cumberland to succOr the Indiana regiment
| there, threatened as it was with an attack of
three or four thousand rebels. 1t is plain
that JOhnsfOn's idea was co throw body of
men between Cadwalader's division and that
of Keim, and when the communications were
thus interrupted to fall suddenly upon Cad
walader's corps with his whole army.
To avoid such a catastrophe. Cadwalader,
duly advised of all the enemy's movements
and easily understanding them. merely came
in sight of the rebel lines for the purpose OF
drawing them in pursuit of him, and then re-
treating in good order rapidly TecTOssed the
Potomac and placed the river between him
and the enemy, with Keim's division in re.
serve. Meantime the force sent by the rebels
as was supposed against Cumberland, went
to Piedmont instead, and has occupied it at
ter the slaughter Of the Maryland volunteer
company at the bridge. This will have to be
dislodged by the troops under Gen. Morris
in Western Virginia, or by some detachment
from Keim's reserve, before any advance
movements can be made. Should Johnston
follow CadwaladeT, which We do not expect
he would encounter the whole United States
army OF %, 900 men. He is probably too old
a soldier Tor that, and will again assume the
defensive.
He is now on his second line of defence,
which we mentioned recently, and will prob
ably maintain it until driven back by a flank
movement or menaced by the operations of
McClellan's corps on his rear. The latter is
moving upon a new line of operations, differ
ing materially from the one first settled upon
by General Scott, but rendered necessary by
the enemy's retrea. from Harper;s Ferry.
AS it has been already made public by the
Western papers, we may point out that his
object is to move up the valley of the Kanawha
either to the Virginia and Tennessee railroad,
which leads directly to Richmond, via Lynch
X
Richmond by that route. Proceeding along
either route he would have serious work to
do before reaching Richmond, but the mere
presence of his large army in tlat region
would necessitate JohnstOn's retreat South
ward or compel Beauregatd to send an army
across the mountains to oppose him.
As the whole object at present is to get rid
of Johnston's army in order to enable the
United States forces under Patterson, Morris,
LII TO 70 fpv ha md
attack upon Richmond, the advance move
ments of McDowell's corps from Arlington,
are intended to push forward our lines grad
ually further toward the mountains. Great
demands for soldiers are made constantly up
on the North in order to enable Scott to
throw overwh, lining forces into Virginia.
rendering il uuas Oii4D.e Tor the enemy to as
sumo the offensive or fall back. Unfortunate
ly we have no superior generals in this corps.
Mcdowell, though a well trained and skillful
officer, appears to lack strategetic ability.
Schenck has none. RunyOn has had no OF
portunity as yet, but is believed to be exceed
ingly careful. With men of this kind Scott
is not likely to take the risk of a battle un-
less he has made up his mind to command in
person. BeauregaIds known character Is,
not to try the test of fight unless the odds
be in his favor. He will. therefore, accumu
late men and batteries everywhere, and from
this cause unexpected collisions may occur
in which we shall suffer from being taken at
disadvantage. 1t is obvious that the ma
noeuvring is close on both sides, and that
nothing Is taken for granted.
Thus far but two generals on our side have
| manifested any marked ability-LyOn and
Mcclellan. Lyon may fairly be styled the
conqueror of Missouri, and no one need be
afraid to compare his splendid achievements
| with those even of Scott himself. He has
subdued great, populous. warlke and pow
erful State without any aid whatever from
the general government; has improvised ar
mics, overcome mobs and rooted up rebellion
wherever it was to be met with. Mcclellan
has done almost as much in Western Virgil
MIA, and seemingly with very little effort
| But in quickness and energy Lyon is so far
ahead of all rivals in this war as to fairly
stand forth the great man Ut the times, and,
unless we are very much mistaken, ne will
soon be recognized as the leader raised up by
Providence 10 provide against the demise of
Scott. We do not hesitate to say that, if the
veteran General-in-chief were to die, Lyon,
so far as present indications may be relied on.
| is the man for filling his place.
| Yet when the war broke out, this profound
military genius was occupying a civil sta
| ton, after filling the Office of captain, in
which capacity he had served with heroic
galIantry in the Mexican war. Who can tell