Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1861-08-23


policy wOich led him 20 the attack whens and
IN the manner be did. and The eaueee assigned
for tbs unfortunate result, are as fsliovs;
As nv position mayWarrant, even II it dQes-
nos cali, for some explanation Of tbs eanSess sas
Tar as they can be sesn. which led g the re-
suits herein stated, I trust It may not be ont
Of place If refer in few words to the imme-
diate antqceJIents Of the battle. When sub:
mitted TO the GeOeFrl-in-Chi in compliance
With bis verbal instructions, the plan Of opera
tiODs and estimate Of the force required the time
l was TO proceed 10 cary it into effect was
fixed for the 9Th Of July. Monday. Every IA
cility possible was given me By the General
in-GhieE and heads Of the administrative de-
partments in making the necessary PFepara-
ti0na. But tho Regimsnts, owing I was told
to want OF transpoFtaIion, came over slowly.
Many Of them did not come across till eight or
nine days amer the time fixed upon, and went
forward without my even seeing them, and
without hzEing been together before in brig
ade. The sending reinfOrcemsnts to Gen. Pat
terson, by drawing OF the wagons, was fur
.ther end unkayorable cause Of delay NotWith-
standing the herculcan Efforts Of the Quarter
master General, and his hvOring me in every
way. the wagons for ammunition subsistence,
&c., and the horses for the trains and the ar
tilleFy, did not arrive for more than E week az
ter the tina appointed to MOVE. was not
even prepared a. late a. The 18th nltimo, and
the desire should move became great, and il
was wished 1 should aOe. il poasible, delay
longer than Tuesday, the 10th ulfimo. When
did set out on the 18th, I was still deficient
in wagons. for subsistence. But went forward
trusting to their being procured in time to fol-
low me-. The trains thus hurriedly gathered
tsgetheF, with horses. wagons, drivers, and
wagon managers, all new and unused TO each
other, moved with difficulty and disorder. and
was the cause Of days delay in getting the
provisions forward. making it necessary 10 make
on Sunday the attack We should haue made on
Saturday.
could not, with every exertiOn, get for
ward with the troops earlier than we did.
wished to 20 10 Cenierville the second day,
which weuld have taken us there on the ITih,
and enabled as. 50 far as they were concerned,
10 20 into action or the 18th, Instead Of the
2lat; but when went forward from Fairfax
Court House. beyond Germantown, to urge
them forward. I was told il was impossible for
the men to march further. They hal only come
froDa Vienna, about s mies. and it was not
more than aix and half miles farther 10 Cen
IreTiIle-in all a march Of twelve and half
miles but the men were foot weary, not so
much, was told. by tia distance marched, as
by the time. they had been on foot. caused by
tho obstruetions in the road, and the slow
pace We had To move TO avoid nmbuscaales.
I'he men were, mnreorer, unaccustomed to
marching. their bodies, not 10 condition for
that kind Of work, and not used to carrying
even the load OF light marching order.
We crossed Bulls Run with about 1870 0
men Of all arms. the fifth division miles and
Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Black
barns ford to CentIeviIle, and Schenck' g
brigade, OF Tyiers division, on the left of the
road, near some bridge. not participating in
| the main; action. The numbers opposed to
u have been,sariOusly estimated. L may safe
lyseay,. and avoid even the appearance Of ex-
aggerAtiOn. that the enemy brought up all
they could, which we're not kept engaged
Eelsewhere. He had notice 7of our coming on
the / 9TH, and had from that time until the
2lst, TO bring up whatever be had. II is
known that in estimating the force 10 90
against Manassas, engaged not to have TO
do with the enemy's forces under Johnston,
then kept, in check in the valley by Mai. Gen
oEal Patterson, or those kept engaged By
Major-G General Butler, and know every ef
fort was made by the General-in- Chief that
this should be done, and even if Johnston
joined Besuregard, It would not bo because
be could be followed by General Patterson,
but from causes not Recessary for me TO refer
to, be knew them all. This was not done, and
the enemy was free to assemble from every
direction in. numbers, only limited by the
amount Of the railroad rolling stock, and his
supply ofprovisions. To the forces, therefore,
We drove in from Fairfax, Court House, Fair
fax station, Germantown and CenlreTille,
and these. under Beauregard at Manasses.
must he added those under Johnston from
Winchester, and those brought up by Dsvis
/ from Richmond and other pIaecsat the South,
70 WHICH il to be added the levy en- E8asse or
dered By the Richmond authorities, which was
ordered to assemble at Manassas. What all
this amounted TO, Il cannot say,-certainly
much more than VIC attacked them with.
could not, As have said, more early
push on faster, nor cOuld delay. A large
and she best part Of nay forces wcrc three
months volunteers, whtse term of service was
about to expire, but who were sent forward
a. having long enough to serve for the pur-
pose OF the expedition. On the eve Of The
battle, The Fourth Pennsylvania regiment Of
volunteers, aud the battery OF the volunteer
! artillery Of the New Y York Eigth militia,
! whose term Of service expired. insisted On
! ~. IL
/ PRESSING . request for them to remain short
/ tine, aud the Hem Secretary Of War, who
| Was at the time on the ground. tried to in
duce the battery to remain at least Eve days.
/ But in vAin., They insisted on their discharge
that night. II was granted, and the next
morning when the army moved forward into
battle, these troops moved ito The rear tosthc
so0nd Of the ehemy's cannon. 5a
| In the next few days, day by dag, / should
have lost ten thousand Of the best armed;
drilled, oficcFed aud disciplined troops in the
army In other words, every day which adj
ded TO the strength Of the enemy, mAdo ur
weaker. Il ,a.e-+ .r-.
In conclusion. I desire to say, in .referen 4
TO the events Of the 2lst ult., that the general
order for the battle to which Feferr; was
viii n slight notifications, literally cOnForInrC
to that the corps were brought over Bul
Run in the manner proposed, and put into posi-
,ion as before arranged, and that up to late il
the afternoon. every movement ordered wal
carrying uS successfully to the object We haC
proposed before starting that of getting tC
lhe railroad leading from Manassas TO the val
ley Of Virgins, and going on it far enoughtC
hry.al< nm ard DESTROY fhes communication and
interviews between the forces under Beaure
gard and these under Johnston. And coul,
We have fought day or a few hours sooner
there is everything 10 show how We coul'
have continued successful, even against tbs
odds with which We con'endej.