The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1861-06-15

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The ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1919 IN CS ssis.
Iron The Cincinnaai Gssetse,J
There h suficient evidence that the Contede-
rates have gathered large force IN virgins,
comnrisipg all their available troops, except
.hose In Gen. Pillows camp At Memphis, and IN
sns,.her large camp near the Kentucky line on
the Louisville 4 Nashville Railroad, who are
waiting 70 carry the Tennessee election Tor Sc
cession, and to take part in the Kentucky seces-
sion movement u..;,a
n.rer civen in another column, that the attack
IN EortPickens is suspended for the present, and
that the best of the troops have been sent 10
virginia, leaving their places to be filled by new
Ievies To an extent sufficient to watch the loft,
and prevent any demonstration from it on Tue
five reflect on the situation, upon their long
nrenaratiop. and upon the fact that the Coniel
crates have thrown all their resources OF Men
and means into the war, while We have oiiy cai.
led out part of our surplus we sna, nliu !. nv
difficult to believe that they have IN virginia ~
positions where they may be conceh'raNu az
short notice, quite as many men as nave oeen
reported by those accounts WHICH We arc
! toned to receive as fabulous.
Il may reasonably be estimated that the Con
federate force in Virginia is more numerous than
ours at Washington and all points in Virginia
| Theirs will operate from center, where IL may
ali be concentrated, whether for offensive or de.
| fensiye movements. Our army is divided, ana
offers an inferior FORCE whether in defense OF IN
an advance movement, to that which may Dc
| concentrated against either division.
| In stating that the Confederate troops may
| all be concentrated, we have not taken into ac-
|
difference between the situation at Harpers Fer
| ~ md at Fortress Monroe, that the mere hold
ing of Harper's Ferry answers the purpose OF
! the Confederates for the present, while General
| Scott has made Fortress Monroe base for an
advance into Virginia. and the larger force there
| will be of little value without that.
The situation seems 10 be to the advantage OF
the Confederates whe Their for offensive or decns-
i've operations, and when VIC take into account
their available force in Virginia, the
gathering of all their high civil and military Of
| ficers there, and the removal there OF the Con.
federate Capital, We may not be surprised TO find
that they do not intend to permit Gen. Scott to
decide the plan of his campaign, and to prepare
at his leisure such various comprehensive and
| simultaneous movements Or such military cor
don that rebellion will we caught in trap and
crushed without bloodshed but that they will
take the offensive and march on Washington, or
possibly on Baltimore.
The Confederates have no scruples about blood
shed, providing it is the blood of the supporters
of the Government or Of Southern Union men ;
SO they have not that impeachment to any OF their
purposes or plans; nor have they any reluctance
above invading States and destroying property.
In fact, they regard these as the first object to
be secured. In these respects they have some
what the advantage of US, who are very sensi.
tive about bloodshed, except of Northern men
and Southern Union men, which we regard II as
the inalienable right of a Southerner to shed ;
and we are very tender about having the troops
of the Government stand on any soil but our
own, especially upon hostile soil. +.
Without attempting to crilicise the plans OF
Gen. Scott, as developed by the situation OF his
forces, it will not be presumptuops to gay that to
advance into Virginia in different corps, too tar
separated to support each other, requires force
greatly superior to that of the enemy They
can concentrate almost their entire force against
either division. Unless we are greatly mista-
ken in estimating their number, they could bring
a superior force against either division. II one
were beaten, the others would probably be in
detail. The prestige gained by one TictosS shs
mere precari6us situation of the remaining d.
visions, and the more effect on them, would nat
uralIy make them easy victories, no matter what
progress they may have made.
This much may be remarked by any one who
has read history, or who reflects on the matter.
The same may be said Of defensive plan, il
that is what Gen. Scott intends. He needs at
Washington, and at any place open to an impor-
tant moyemeu, of the enemy. superior force
to that which the enemy can bring. We say a
superior force, because it is maxim in war not
to trust to equal chances, but to have force
i s,tt,e, 49,. =" make sure any undertaking. We
| -, Cap h,c nj
| force. without which it seems to US any advance
movement would be imprudent; and that the
| Cor,federates will make an offensive movement
very soon. seems to us more than probable.
| The.position at Harper's Ferry would, if secured
! bv us, remove an enemy from the rear OF the
army; but otherwise it would not be any inpor-
tant aid to the advance into Virginia. But
while it is held by the Cunfederates they have
the kew to Baltimore, where the secession plot
has only been temporized with by the miidness
of the Government, and where a rebellion is
ready to rise into formidable power, as soon as
any reverse, or perhaps anv,.division or full oc-
cupation of the Government forces shall furnish
it an opportunity. precipitation at Baltimore,
| opening at once communications with the Con
federate army at uarper's Ferry, might be trouble
some to the Government, at time when it had
| its hands full elsewhere; and this is possibility
which it will keep on hand so long as lis policy
at Baltimore permits secessionests to be organi-
zed and armed with bit little pretence OF secresy
and with only an occasional trifllng seizure Of
arms.
1t is probable that the first important move
ment of General Scott will be on Harper's Ferry.
1t threatens his rear so long as held by the
| Confederates, and as standing temptation and
encouragement to the Maryland Secesonists.
But in the meantime, it is quite probable that
the Confederates will not permit Gen. Scott to
carry out his own plans at his leisure, and to go
on organizing aud disorgauizng the three months
volunteers, and preparing to do up the business
| in the most artistic comprehensive and blood
| less manner, so that nobody shall be hurt, but
will take the initiative and confuse his arrange
ments.
| Rebellions must necessarily be aggressive or
decline jeff. Davis knows that maxim perfectly,
| and there are other impelling considerations to
him and his Supporters, besides the advantage in
the situation.
Concluding, as we inevitably must, that the
Government has not troops enough in Virginia
| to carry on an effective campaign, nor for pru
dent defense, the question naturally arises, why
has It not? There are troops enough to be had
for the asking. 1t might have had hundred
thousand men on the border of Virginia now,
with fifty thousand more in reserve within days
ride by railroad.
With column of hundred thousand men
moving into Virginia, it would be quite unnece:-
sary to surround the State by Gordon of forti-
fed posts, or to wait the reduction of batteries
on the sea coast or rivers. A successful march
on Richmond would carry swath as wide as
from the coast to the Blue Ridge, and all the out
posts and batteries would fall Of themselves.
| The President wants 1000 men for the ad-
vance corps of the army, if he means to crush
the rebellion. The recoHrses of the whole North
are at his disposal, and the people anxious only
that he should call them in sufficient quantity.
II he does not mean to crush the rebellion speed
lily and effectuay, and in the blood oil the rebels
and traitors, he has too many men already.
Programme Of the Campaign in the East.
1t is obvious now that in the plan for the re-
duction of Harper's Ferry, strategic movement,
rather than immediate and direct assault, is the
reliance. From the North, West, and East, the
Ohio and Pennsylvania forces are advancing, and
the advances from Washington are designed 10
close upon them, so that the rebel forces there
mnst either evacuate while a Southern retreat
remains practicable, or await the leisure of the
Federal troops, who may choose the time and
mode they shall prefer for their cap,ure They