The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1861-01-16

had stolen certain Slaves, WIN lntenJ LO
defraud tho imputed owner; and in the
other case, the demand was predicated on
an indictment, charging the accused with
aiding sfemaIe slave" to escape from
cher owner and possessor. These cases
did not, in nay judgment, fall within the
scope of authority conferred on me in
this behalf, and my conclusion, with the
reasons therefor, was duly made known to
the Executives by whom the respective
demands had been made. Each replied,
controverting the rightfulness of my con-
clusion.
The legislative power vested in the Gen,
eral Assembly compreEeBds an authority
to provide for the surrender of fugitires
from justice III cases not covered by the
Federal Constitution, and this considera-
tion, added to the Importance of the sub
ject itself, seems to render it proper that
the reasons which, in these instances, con-
trolled nv action, should be laid before
you. q
The persons demanded by these recla-
nations were then sojourners within this
State, owing to it allegiance, and enti-
tied to the correlative right of protection.
It's constitution aud laws secured to them,
while dwelling here, the same measure o:
personal freedom and personal security,
which belonged to its own citizens. Speak
ing the language of the "great charter OF
English liberties" the State had declared
that no one within it's limits "should be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, with
out due process of law" The same p7in-
ciale has, in some form, been asserted by
every other Sta,e, and finds conspicuous
place in the Constitution of the United
States.
Upon the acquisitions being made, it
was my first duty to enquire whether the
cases were such as called for the exercise
of the power thus invoked. 1t was readi-
ly ascertained that all my authority, in
this behalf, came from the familiar provi"
sion of the Federal Constitution, relating
to the surrender of fugitives from justice.
Inasmuch as this provision operates in
restraint of liberty, it must be rigidly con-
strued, and every case not fairly included
must be held as beyond its scope, and
every doubt must be resolved against its
! application. Rigorous as this rule seems,
it's existence and wisdom are alike beyond
question. 1t is the same rule in favor of
liberty which has obtained for centuries
in that country from which We have drawn
our systems of criminal Jurisprudence, and
the same rule which is to-day in oil the
States applied to criminal proceedings in
every stage of their progress. Adopted
to protect the citizen against the exercise
of arbitrary power, the experience of
many ages has proved its value, and still
retains its place among the chief safe
guards of personal security. 1t has be-
come fixed principle of law, and yet,
independent of Its clear dictates, l am
satisfied that upon no recognized rule OF
construction eau the constitutional pro-
vision be made to cover the cases in qucs-
| tion. a;
These reclamations presented substan-
TALLY the same question, and were there
fore to be determined by the application
of the same general principles. Each OF
them charged the accused with the COM
mission of an act by which ian owner and
master" had been deprived of his alleged
"slave" The question was thus present
ed, whether ar act of this nature can DC
considered as either "treason, felony, or
other crime," in which these phrases are
used by the Constitution. Manifestly,
it is not treason, and maDifsstly it is not
felony, according to the import of tina,
word when the Constitution was adopted
Does "other crime' include every Of
fense declared to be such by the laws of q
'State?' Ifso, my duty to surrender was
placed beyond question. But this l con
ceive would be most mischievous and
impracticable Interpretation. For. if by
"other crime" is meant any act made GRIM.
inal by the law of State, then the Ex'
ecutive of each State is under constitu
tional obligations to remand its citizens
to another, for any act which the Legis
lature of any State may designate as 9
crime. In this sense the word "crime'
has no other meaning than that which 6
Legislature, in its discretion, may give it
and the constitutional obligation of tht
Executive of each State would be created
by the caprice, and the liberty of the cit
izer would be deprived, upon the legisla
7 stion of the others. Such a construction
}of the constitutional provision could no
3 be tolerated, for it would lead to infinite
abuse; nor could its obligations be en-
forced.
If, then, by "other crime" it was no
intended to make the citizens of eacl
4 State liable to rendition at the discretion
t of the Legislature of every other State
anc more limited and definite meaning
is to be given to the term 'or other crime,
: where shall that Limitation be found?
The provision under consideration wa
: introduced as q rule of international la1
between the States. As intern rational ia,
it must have o. definite meaning, under
stood and recognized when entered int
by the States 1t must have the sam