Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-10-09

clings to them, and refuses TO see for himself. |
told him he would not escape responsibility in
that way and he would very soon fnd an army
of l0, 900 strong on his hands in North Missouri,
threatening st. Louis and diverting bis attention
and occupying the forces he desired 10 use against
Mccullough and Pillow. be talks Of the vigoT
he is going TO use. but can see none of il. and /
fear il will turn out 10 be some rash and incon-
siderate move adopted in haste TO make head
against formidable force which could not have
accumulated except through gross and inexcusa-
BILE negligence. Oil for one hour of our dead
Lyon. Many have been disposed TO blame Ere
mont for not sending reinforcements 10 Lyon,
and thus averting the calamties brought on bY
his death, and the abandonment of Springfield by
his command Ii is very certain that If ks had
sent the regiments to Lyon that he took TO Cairo,
when it was supposed that place was threatened.
Lyon would have driven Mccullough from the
State. / can not say whether the attack was Sc
riously contemplated on Cairo that time or not;
but am disposed to believe that the movements
BY Mccullough and Pillow were intended TO be
Simultaneous and cooperate. but Lyon should
have had some part Of the reinforcements at any
rate, and if he had received two regiments his VIC
tory would have been complete / undertake 10
say if Fremont acted on them as he does now l
was away and can not speak on that head) he
could not have informed himself very accurately
of the necessities of his position. The event
shows that no attack was made on Cairo, and il
was probably averted by the reinforcements sent.
If the same or one half Of the regiments had been
sent to Lyon. we should have had equally salts
factory results.
The views have given of this matter are facts
becoming public opinion here. and / think the
Government should know it. Probably you have
information that will satisfy you that Fremont
was to blame. If so, the public here should know
it also. in order that the confidence Of the people
should not be withheld fom the Commanding
General / could not think, when first returned
here, that any part Of the blame could rest with
him, but my observations since have shaken nv
faith to the very foundation.
There is one point which | did not refer 70 ia
my letter, and which intended to remark on.
and that is the utter want of discipline in the
camps round and about st. Louis. Ii is rehear-
sal of the state of affairs in Washington before
the fight at Manassas, and will, am apprehen-
sive, conduce to similar results. i brought these
matters to Fremonts attention, but he put it
aside by saying that il would not do to be too ex
acting at once Our enemies at the door, and yet
too early to impart discipline to our troops and
keep them out of the whisky y-shops III / know
that YOU and | are both in some sort responsible
for Fremont's appointment and for his being
placed in command of this Department, and
therefore feel another and an additional motive
to speak out openly about these matters. My
decided opinion is that he should be relieved Of
his command, and a man of ability put in his
place The sooner it is done the better.
have given you my opinion and the ground
for it. If the Government knows more of his
plans than l know-if you are satisfied with
them-then you can burn this paper and say that
am an alarmist; you know, however, that am
not.
No man has been more hopeful than have
been up to within few days past. felt satisfied
haro thofo offaf firat tfaf
that the success and elation of the enemy could
be turned to good accoun,, if the proper steps
were promptly taken. They have not been taken,
and either the Government has failed TO support
Fremont he should have been, or he has failed
to apply the means at his disposal.
Affairs are worse than they were two weeks
ago, and getting verse every day. Secession
increasing Union men driven out, and the Gen
eral, l fear, incapable of comprehending lis po-
sition. His recent proclamation is the best thing
of the kind that has been issued, but should have
been issued when he first came, when he had the
power to enforce it, and the enemy no power TO
retaliate. Now they are substantially enforcing
against us the substance of his proclamation out
side of St. Louis and our garrison. / want you
lay these things to your heart, and get ready TO
apply the remedy before it is too late.
will write you again very soon. hope
may have better news to give you. shall be but
too happy if anything occurs TO restore my conf
dence in Fremont
am well-better than ! have been for eight
months. Yours affectionately,
(Signed) FRANK P. BLAIR.
The preliminary correspondence between JESSE
BENTON FRExoSr and the President, and the let
Ter from Judge BLAIR to Gen. FREMoSr forward
ing the letter of his brother are somewhat graphic
and may possess historical interest. For these
reasons we give them:
LETTER FROM MRS. FREMONT.
To the President of the United States:
was told yesterday by Mr. F. P. Blair. Sr.s
that FIVE days since letter was received, from
his son. Colonel Frank p Blair, and laid before
you by his son, Postmaster General Blair, con-
tanning certain statements respecting General
Fremont and his military command in the West
ern Department, which letter was submitted to
You as President.
was further told BY Mr.. Blair that on that
letter you sent Postmaster General Blair to st.
Louis to examine into that Department and re-
port II.
On behalf of, and representing General
Fremont, have to request that be furnished
with copies of that letter and any other commu-
nication, if any, which in your Judgment have
made that investigation necessary.
have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
[Signedl JESSE BENTON Fremont.