Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-06-19
The Conquest of Yfrxinia. /.


to be posted upon war matters, gives the follow
ing details of the plans for the conquest of Vir
ginia," as that paper terms it:
1t has been generally supposed that the rebels
at Harpers Ferry would evacuate without bat
tie, and their preparations to decamp have been
cited in proof. 1t may turn out so. though We
are inclined to disbelieve it. chiefly because there
is at present no military reason why such thing
should take place. If their retreat were endan-
gered, the evacuation would be natural, but as
yet their communications are all secure and open,
and their position is well supported. The main
body at Harpers Ferry is supported on the right
by the force at the Point of Rocks, and on the
left by the regiments at Shepherdstown, opposite
Sharpsburg, and at the point opposite Williams
port. In fact, from Point of Rocks to Williams
port, there is continuous stretch of pickets and
rebel posts This constitutes perfect line of de-
fense along the south bank of the Potomac, and
in all probability the enemy will be found in con-
siderable force and well posted and defended. 1t
is to break this line that Gen. Patterson is pre-
pairing.
In order to do this, ii has been generally sup
posed that he would concentrate his whole force
upon the center, and capture Harper's Ferry.
That would be an essential part Of his plan, but
not necessarily his whole object, for in that case
the enemy would merely fall back upon his sec
burg on the east, to Winchester on the west,
where strong detachments now posted, and at
the same time embarrass Gen. Patterson's opera =
tions by throwing body OF men in his rear, sent
from Leesburg to the Point of Rocks, and so on
up to cut off his line Of communication with
Pennsylvania, while the me object could be pro-
NOTED from Shepardstown and the post opposite
Williamsport
If Gen. Johnson had intended to retreat at once
from Harper's Ferry, he could have done it by
means of the railroad to Winchester, whereas he
has ordered two hundred baggage wagons to Har
pers Ferry, showing that he intends to march
down the valley of the Shenandoah river to po-
sitiOn on his second line of defense between Lees
burg and Winchester. His preparations for re-
treat, therefore, are conditional upon his commu-
nications being hereafter cut off. No good gene
raj can neglect to take care of his means OF re
treat. Now, before attacking the center, Gen
Patterson will, of course know what is to be done
to provide against the danger of his own commu
nications being interrupted in the manner stated
How he will do this We prefer not to discuss just
at present.
The third line of defense of the rebels extends
from Fairfax Court house and Manassas Junction
on the east to Strasburg on the west, and is very
strongly fortified. Before the United States
troops had crossed the Potomac, this line
stretched to Alexandria, and thus there was
the whole bank of the river to Williamsport
This was broken by the advance of Mcdowell:
column, but the ultimate advantage OF this move
will depend upon the subsequent conduct of tn,
campaign. As unexplained on Wednesday th:
advance looks to an attack OH Manassas juno
ton, and the cutting off of the communications
of the Harper's Ferry rebels, operation tn,
perfect success Of which requires the occupation
of Strasburg and Winchester by Mcclellan
a. Al. ..l.
operations of these three armies must be simulta
neous in order to be effective. If the army un
der Mcdowell were to take Manassas Junction
before the armies of Patterson and Mcclellan
reached their positions, it would be difficult Il
keep open the communication with Washington
the line would be threatened on both sides.
But supposing all this Northern ground to b
cleared of the enemy, their next line of defens
would evidently be that of the Rappahannoc
river from Culpepper Court house on the west t
AQUA Creek on the east, the main point of attac
beng Fredericksburg, because that commands tn
railway approach to Richmond Beforce this lin
could be reached the accumulated armies on bot
sides would attain the most formidable dinner
sions by the union of their various divisions. Pat
terson and Mcdowell, reinforced constantly fror
Washington. would conduct the operations, Will
McClellan's corps, sweeping down the valley {
Staunton, would secure the mountains against th
enemy's retreat in that direction, and be prepare
TO take, in due time, the railroad ria Charlottes
| vile TO Richmond. Were it not for this in
portant fact, and the simultaneous danger frol
4 Buffers corps the southeast, the retreatin
enemy might delay the advance of our troops
every successive river, and render our progre;
tedious.
| From this state of facts it is clear that ver
careful and thorough preparations are requisit
or speedy success in Virginia There has bee
no unnecessary delay General Mcclellan hs
already 1000 men in Grafton, and has conquere
nearly all Western Virginia. He can not NOV
from Grafton until all his forces are gathere,
with abundance of artillery. cavalry, and mt
nitions of war, as well as good baggage trail
General Patterson is delayed by the want of a
tillery and he has too much sense to make an
important move without it, Until these two a
mics shall be ready, there would be no use oftf