The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1861-08-01
General scoss.s PLAN "a fzae war.

ttlit, although q very unt'meIy and I'M
prudent disclosure or ten. Scott plan
for conducting this war, which shows that
he has far more shrewdness than have the
would be- takers Of Richmond. SO soon as
the scene of hostilities is transferred TO
the Gulf States, you commence, and not
before, to reach the vitals Of the rebellion.
We have always thought that the Rich
mond enterprise was exceedingly doubtful,
costly and risky, and would require armies
of at least from three to tour hundred
thousand men, with trains, baggage wag
ons and stores, cannon. provision, ammu-
milton and caravans which would extend
the whole way from there to Washington,
and then, even if successful-whlch is
ematical-nothing definite or decisive
would be gained. But occupy New Or
leans-a much easier task--retake Pen
sacola. menace the Gulf coasts generally,
and march our armies right through the
very heart of the thronged slave districts
of the Cotton States, and you will so in
tcrfele with their crops, derange all their
pursuits, and create commotlon OF such
a distressing character that Niger panic
will seize them and paralyze all their Ell
forts. The stupid and foolish revelation
of Scott's scheme just at this time, by the
New I York papers, Is not calculated to ad-
vance very much the capture of New Or
leans, and if the war is to be decided IA
vorably to the Union, it will, in cur op;n-
ion, be so decided in spite of the immeas-
urable damage the New York papers, by
their dissensions and insanities and revela-
tions, are daily inficting an the cause
We quote On the Tuesday preceding
the battle, Gen. Scott, at his own table, in
presence of his aids and a single guest,
discussed the whole subject of this war in
all its parts, and with the utmost clearness
and accuracy If the matter had been
left to him, he said, he would have COM
menced by perfect blockade of every
Southern port on the Atlantic and the
Gulf. Then he would have collected a
large force at the Capitol for defensive
purposes, and another large one on the
Mississippi for offensive operations. The
summer months, during which it is mad
ness to take troops south of st. Louis,
should have been devoted to tactical in
struction and with the frosts of autumn
he would have taken a column Of eighty
thousand well-discipl ipliued troops down the
Mississippi-and taken every important
point on that river, New Orleans included.
at could have been done," he said.
''with greater ease, with less loss of life,
and with far more important results than
would attend the marching of an army to
Richmond. At eight points the river
would probably have been defended, and
eight battles would have been necessary,
but in every one Of them success could
have been made certain for us. The Mis-
sissippi and the Atlantic once ours, the
Southern States would have been COM
PEELED, by the natural and inevitable
pressure Of events, to seek, by a return to
the Union, escape from the ruin that
would speedily oTerwhelm them out of it.
'This,' saId he, 'was my plan. But |
am only subordinate. 1t is my business
to give advice when it is asked, and to
obey orders when they are given. shall
do it. There are gentlemen in the Cabi-
net who know much more about war than
[ do, and who have far greater influence
than L have in determining the plan of
the campaign. There never was more
just and upright man than the President
never one who desired more sincerely
to promote the best interest of the country
But there are men among his advisers who
consult their own resentments far more
than the dictates of wisdom and expert
ence, and these men a0iW probably decide the
plan Of the campaign. L shall do, or at
tempt whatever [ am ordered TO do. But
they mast not hold me responsible.
If | am ordered to go to Richmond,
shall endeavor to do it. But [ know per-
fectly well that they have no conception
Of the difficulties we shall encounter. |
know the country-how admirably adapted
it is to defence, and how resolutely and
obstinately it will be defended. | would
like nothing better than TO take Richmond
now that il has been disgraced by be-
coming the capital Of the rebel Confedera-
cy. | feel a resentment towards it, and
should like nothing better than to scatter
its Congress to the winds. But [ have
lived long enough 20 know that human
resentment is very bad foundation for
public policy; and these gentlemen viii
live long enough to learn it also. shall
do what | am ordered | shall fight when
and where | am commanded But if /
am compelled to fight before | am ready,
they shall not hold me responsible. These
gentlemen must take the responsibility of
their acts, as | am willing to take that of
mine. But they must not throw their re-
sponsibillty on my shoulders
DEATH OF. Col. MISUNDERSTANDING
the victims of the late battle was Colonel