Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-06-26

this tendency, readily coincide in the criticism
That they possess il to n certain extent there
be little doubt. 1t will be well, however, to con-
slider the question more generally-in what sense
war can be looked upon as a science.
THE ISSUE OF WAR NOT DECIDED BY CHANCE.
Let US put a case, impossible in itself, vet to a
certain extent attanable in many instances, and
suppose that we we're fully acquainted with the
moral and military qualities of the Generals of
two opposing armies, with the skill and energy of
their staff, commissariat, medical and other de-
partments, with the characteristics both of officers
and men, with the number and composition of
each arm, with all the antecedents and with the
resources at the disposal of both armies; further,
that we knew well the country in which thew were
about to act its physical and local peculiarites,
and the habits of its people, then we may safely
say that the result of the war would be, if not alb
solutely, at least in the highest degree of moral
certainty, practicable. Now what does this fact,
which will hardly be disputed, implyf Itimplies
that the issue Of the is not matter Of blind
chance; that il depends, humanity speaking, upon
q combination of qualities and resources OF the
opposing forces, and these qualities must be ex-
ercised and the resources developed, according to
principles which, either known or unknown to us,
are beyond doubt equally fixed and real. The
fact that the game of war is frequently found to
be the most uncertain of all games, proves moth
appreciation of the above elements in the calcu-
lation is excessively Difficult. in practice. Expe-
rience in war is universally acknowledged as the
best teacher; and the precise knowledge which
experience brings of the data before mentioned,
and the principles of action which spring from
them, proves that there is in war a, sufficient Sc
quence of cause and effect to constitute science.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR.
There are, then, principles of war. fixed and
real; and if principles, then there Is science
which combines and elaborates them. Of what
nature, then is this science? Napoleon gives us
the best clue to the answer, by telling us in what
respect war is not science. We must not expect,
with the limited knowledge which under the best
Of circumstances we can hope to acquire of the
data above mentioned, to attain to anything re-
sembling demonstrative certainty. "Nothing,
says the great warrior, ''is absolute in war" Ae-
cordingly we find that principles which in some
wars unquestionable, are not applicable at all
to others; for instance, the principles on which
wars against independent chiefs of half savage
people should be conducted are totally different
from those which should govern military opera
tons against regular armies.
If any one doubts this, we will ask him to take
of the first principles laid down in the scien
tifc military works, from Jomini downwards, viz:
that of destroying your enemy in detail by op-
posing masses of your forces to fractions of his
Now in war such as we are considering, 30 far
from this being the object to he obtained the real
object is to induce the enemy to unite his forces
in order that you may destroy them once and for
all. Again, the first of all principles of war is
said to be to concentrate superior forces upon the
decisive point But, in the illustration just
given, there is in many cases no decisive point
whatever Ii is of little consequence where the
enemy is. There may be decisive object to be
po1 and bn IN q m
to concentrate in order that he may be the more
easily annihilated. But the use of the term point
evidently induces a geometrical or at least typo
graphical idea into the axiom, which had best be
avoided.
But although the real science of war, as de
duced from historic fact, has been sadly over
loaded with definitions and axioms, it would bt
unsafe to neglect, on that account, the study o.
the principal writers of strategy and tactics
One writer, indeed, is almost absolutely exemp
from this fault, and, which strongly confirm.
the truth of our position, that writer is the
only one who ever commanded large armies il
the field. We allude, Of course, to the admira
BILE work of the Archduke Charles on the Prin
cples of War" OF tactical works we know
scarcely any that can compare with Frederick.
Instructions to his Generals" !" and Crawford
STANDING Orders" But the best of all studie:
is that which the student carves out for himsel
by collating the historical account of mlitar,
events with the dispatches of the chief actors.
The Right Man i'm the Right Place
The large mass of our fellow Americans ar
not military chieftains. They never set a squad
ron in the field, nor mounted an imminent deadl
breach, nor were under fire. They never evel
| trained Nevertheless, some of them doubles
come up to the standard of military knowladg
which Tom Corwin, in the House of Represents
tives, during his famous debate with Crary, tn
Michigan Brigadier, erected as the measure 70
Militia General, to wit, a careful perusal of tn
title page of Steuben's Tactics, and profound
conviction that, when troops are drawn out il
two parallel lines, the rear rank stands right be
hind the front rank. Whether all who hav'
penetrated thus far into the science of war ar
now engaged in raising regiments, while tn
select few who have gone one step further int
its dread mysteries lie applying for posts at tn
head of brigades and divisions, we are not in
formed. We only fear, that in the scramble 70
military honors in the several States and at Wash
| ington, there is danger that the good old rule
1.-THE right man in the right place"-will some
times be disregarded. A private soldier ma
pass muster with little preliminary drilling. Tn
commander of company may make credit
able appearance in a dress parade, or emerg
from a skirmish without disgrace, even thong
he has not acquired the skill which Captain Bon
aparte, of the Fourth Artillery, exhibited at th
siege of Toulon. But Colonel who undertake
to handle thousand men, oftimes in the mos
irving emergencies, should understand somethin
of his business. And General, who is to be in
trusted with the lead of ten thousand men, durin
Il n campaign, and control their every maneuve
amid the smoke and carnage of a battlefield
ought to know great deal of his profession be
fore assuming such grave responsibilities.
II 1t is laudable, in these perilous times for every
body to try and do something for his countr,
Let each labor in the field best adapted to h
tastes, habits and capacities, remembering, ere b
make the selection, that il does not necessaril
follow, that because a man has proved to be goo
for nothing else. he is therefore fit to lead a chare
of cavalry, conduct siege, or command a dvi
ion in a hotly contested engagement. While it
not expected that every officer who receives
commission in our volunteer corps will be Ne
or Scott, it should be borne in mind that in I'll
exigencies of war of unparalleled importance
the army should not be made a lazar house f
the reception of those who have failed to win SUI
cess everywhere else Care, caution, and Il
sternest tests should be employed in the selectio
of officers to command our troops. Epaulett
/, and batons must not be bestowed merely as r
wards for partisan services, nor as lures to W
political support. They should be given to mt
who possess soldierly qualities, exhibit geni
for war, and show that they were born to con
mand.
Where there are so many posts to be file
!, some mistakes will be made. Let them be rec
fed at the earliest moment. Sterling qualiti
: may not be Immediately disclosed. When di
I, covered they should, according to the Napoleon
Q rule, be rewarded with promotion, even thous
= the ranks supply an occasional Captain of cor
u Iany, and Lieutenant be suddenly advanced
: the head of regiment. Incurable defcienci
Y will for a time be concealed. But, if Colon
> or General proves grossly incompetent, and W
! not promptly resign when required, his swo
e should be torn from his side without fear or
y vor. If the graver offense of cowartce is col
! mitted, it should be duly punished. No man
/ obliged to take Office in the army. He who VI
UNFAIRLY seeks it and then turns craven, should
u he be in high command, be dealt with as Engla
/ dealt with Byng- The example would not ne
; to be repeated, though the contest should last
e long as our Revolutionary struggle. In fin
e this is time for trying doubtful experiments,
e paltering with incapacity and imbeclity in t
II conduct of the war for the Union The crisis il