Glasgow weekly times. (Glasgow, Mo.) 1848-1861, 1861-04-11
From the United States Economist. 4.
LET THEN CO." q


policy To- respect 10 the seseded Slsses is
for Congress 10 empower the Governn emf
OF once TO recognise their independent ma
tionaii,y. Coercion was the rash first.
thought Of an excited par,izanship, which
is now gradually cooling down before thf
stern logic of facts. The situation OF the
Republic is fell, 10 be incompatible with
the resort 10 wal, as much as its history
and spiritafe incensistenv with coercion;
and whoever now advocates the policy Of
force, does il mol on the grounds of wise
and prudent conservatism, but rather as q
bare assertion Of authority. This tendency
Of the public mind is eminently hopeful
1t is founded on perception Of the only
method ny which our perils can be escaped
and orr difficulties adjusted 1t is the
asiroug common sense Of The people assert.
ing its intuition Of the duty Of the hour-the
real government Of the country uttering lis
dicium, -slet them CO." The cancellation
party in the Northern States are dying oul
almost as are The coercionist, not because
the dispos ifion TO conciliate is decreasing,
but because SO far as respects the States
actually Secedeo, cancellation is felt to be
now hopeless experiment.
Another party, taking "masterly inacsiv.
ry" for its motto, is daily losing ground
among the people though as most conve-
hiept shelter FOR an Executive that knows
not how 10 escape from lis perplexities, its
policy we fear is gaining too much strength
at Washington. The press Of France and
England, too, are beginning 10 forecast the
- AZ aa,afuI soporatio10 of TINT nm
which the North will unanimously settle
and that on reasons which unbiased re.
Elections must admit 10 be conclusive, Sc
cession Is now fully accomplished fact;-
accomplished undoubtedly. in violations OF
the laws ofihe U. States. but accomplished,
nevertheless, and that with most astonish-
i.hina completeness. The Confederate
States are de tac,o an indspsndeht Govern
'ment. Our control within their province
is no: only disowned, but it actually does
not crust We have there no representa-.
tive, Of the United States Government, no
State Governors recognizing the United
States authority; no officers TO execute our
laws, no collection of revenue for cur Treas
ury. A distinct President, and separate
Congress exist there; forts and arsenals,
with one or two temporary exceptions, are
in The hands Of this new power, q new tar
if is proclaimed, and its revenue collected
by officers not our own, and paid into the
hands Of the treasurer. not OF the United
States. In fact all the seven States are
held by power end governed by an exec
urive originating exclusively with them
selves, and opersting without let or hin.
drance from The power lateiy governing
them. Il, So much ,indisputably is fact; and
SO much is undoubtedly sufficient TO consi.
tute the Confederate States de facto an in.
dependent Government. Matters having
then gnneIato this extent, it is plainly
samere formal euibble To argue that the
Seeded States are still in the Union. Prao'
iically, and for all the purposes Of Govern.
o ment, they are out, Of the United States;
though in the eve of our Federal law they
may be still under our jurisdiction. The
question is, whether il would be wise on
The part of the Government Of the United
States 10 involve thirty millions Of peo-
pie in an internecine war through taking
too positive stand on dejurs aspect OF
Secession. t..-E ftst .--'-- s--g .f.fif
!, II may be calling ,toou pride, il may be
awoHnd in our dignity 10 submit tscitly 10
The defiance TO our national power that has
been presented on q wholesale scale in the
Seeded States, but are we justi6able in
riskiDg the lives<of thousands Of our citi-
zens, and the happiness and interest of the
whole country fer generations TO come,
with no better object 10 support our pride
and 10 vindicate dignity which has signally
failed in the hour Of It's trial3 We opins
that the sent'men Of the civilized world,
and the verdict Of posterily would be ut
terly opposed 10 such policy. What could
we gam by lis adoption2 Let us suppose
il 10 result in the subjugatinn Of the Sece-
ded States (Which is begging far Too much
OF what service 10 the country could such
q recovery be2 We should have six mil
lions Of citizens held under Republican
government against their riN. We should
have in Congress IA Senators and 80 Rep.
reseniatiees, owing their presence there 10
the anomaly Of Republican de- potism, and
eating like caDker-worm into the heart
Of our domestic harmony. Our victory
would neeessitate upon US TO maintain rule
in at least seven States by The perpetual
mehaes ola standing army located in their
midst. The. cotton States in fact. would
be second Hungary, and The United States
government second Austrian despoiism.
Tile mere mention Of such results Is ref
utalion of The policy that would produce
Them. Coercion ii successful, would bring
no compensation. but would increase our
national difficulties; but what if it should
prove unsuccessful? Thousands Of valua.
bic lives would be lruillessly sacrificed; IN
immense national debt would be -accumuIs
ted, our national Status would be lowered
before the world, and The dangerous spd
the Illuminating consciousness would be ev-
er present with Us that by our side existed
a country with population only one fourth
Of our own. with whom we had proved
ourselves unable 10 contend.
9 Coercion, therefore, is clearly policy
not for moment TO be entertained. Con-
citation is TOO late 20 induce any retrsction
st~.,s4tba o,o.,tt1.fa1 ,,o.;t,o., Il T.,