Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1861-07-27
Gen. Scout and the Moy-men. unon Rich.


In reply TO an article that appeared in the Ne,y
tribune, stating that General Scott had flll con-
troll or all the war movements and also organized
tne columns, appointed the officers, and selected
me tlme and points Of attack at Gull Run. the
New York Times gives what purports To he
The substance of the renarks made by the General
on the Tuesday preceding the battle at his own
'aoie' In the presence Of his aids and single
Gen Scott. it is said discussed the whole sub
J'ct or this war, in all its parts and with the ut
most clsarnCss and accuracy. He had distinct
anu en- utIhPo opinion on every point connected
with II; and stated what his plan would be for
lngtng 10 to Close. # the MANAGEMENT of ~
had been left IN his hands
The main object Of the war he said WAS IN
bring the people of the rebpllious states tn feel
the pressure OF the government; To compel them
10 return TO their obedience and LOYALTY And
THIS must De done with the least possible expen-
dlture OF life. compatible with the attainment of
the object. No Christian nation can be justified
he said, In waging war in such a way IA shall
destroy sol lives, when the object Of the war can
he attained at 4 cost Of 500 Every man killed
peyona the number absolutely required is murder
ed Hence, he looked upon all shooting NJ
plckets, all scouting forays not required in order
To advance the w@r, all destruction Of life on
either SIDE, which did not contribute 20 the gen-
efal result az so many acts Of unjustiaable homi-
II the matter had been left to him. he said he
would have commenced by a perfect blockade of
every southern port on the Atlantic and the Gulf
capital for defensive purposes. and another large
one on the Mississippi for offensive operations
The summer months. during which II is madness
to take troops south Of 1t Louis, should have been
devoted TO tactical instruction, and with the first
frost of autumn he would have taken a column Of
10000 well-disciplined troops down the Missis-
slppl, and taken every important point on that
river, New Orleans included.
IL could have been done he said with create,
ease, with less loss Of life and with far more i'm
portant results than would attend the marching of
an army to Richmond At eight points the river
would probably have been defended and eight bat
Ties would have been necessary; but in every one Of
them success could have been made certain for
us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours
the Southern States would have been compelled
by the natural and inevitable pressure of events
to seek, bv return to the Union, escape from the
ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out of
il.
This" said he, ''was my plan But am only
a subordinate. IL Is my business fo give al v;ca
when IL is asked, and to obey orders whom they
are given. shall do 1t. There are gentlemen in
the cabinet WHO know much more about war than
| do. and who nave far greater influence than 1
have In determining the plan Of the campaion
There never was a more lust and uprigbt man
than the President never one who desired more
sincerely to promote tle best interest of the coun-
try But there are men among his advisers who
consult their own resentments far more tpan the
dictates OF wisdom and experience-snd tbsss
men will probably decide the plan Of The am
paign. ! shall do, or attempt whatever am
olutfeu 10 40. buI tney must not hold me respon-
sible
'slf ! am ordered TO go to Richmond. I shall
endeavor to do 1t. But know perfectly well that
they have no conception Of the d culties we shall
encounter. 1 know the country-kow admirably
adapted II Is to defense, and how resolutely and
obstiGately II will be defended I would like
nothing better than to take Richmond .-nCyy
that 1t has been disgraced by becoming the can't
tai of the rebel Confederacy, feel Resentment
towards 1t, and should like nothing better than tn
scatter its Congress to the winds
/" Blu: have lived long enough to know that
hSman reSt ntmeAt is a very bad foundation for A
public policy; and these gentlemen will live long
enough to learn u also 1 shall do what am or.
dered. lshall fight when and where | am com
mandPd. But IL am compelled to fyht before
am ready, they shall not hold me responsible
These gentlemen must take the responsibility Of
their acts, as am willing to take that of mine.
But they must not throw their responsibility on
my shoulders"
This 10 the substance and very nearly the Ian
euage OF portion of Gen Scotts conversation on
the occasion referred to. 1t proves conclusively
that he Was opposed TO the advance upon Rich
mond by way Of Manassas at that time and also
that the administrationwas almost certain TO over
rule his objections and command a battle Taken
In connection with what was said In the House OF
Representatives on Wednesday, 1t leaves no doubt
on the subject.