Holmes County farmer. [volume] (Millersburg, Ohio) 1857-1926, 1861-07-11
PRESIDENTS MESSAGE.
WAsutSGToN, July I


Gets Of legislation.
At the beginning of the present Presidential
erm, four months ago, the functions of the
Federal Government were found TO be generally |
suspended within the several States of South |
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama. Mississippi, Lou
,siana. and Florida. excepting only those of
the Post Office Department. Within these
States, the forts. arsenals, dock yards. Custom
Houses and the like, including the movable
and stationary property in about them, had
been seized and were holden in open hostility TO
the Government, excepting only Fort Pickens,
Taylor and jefferson. on and near the Florida
coast and Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor,
South Carolina.
The forts thus seized bad been put in approx
ed condition. New ones had been built, and
armed forces had been organized, and were or
ganizing, all avowcdly with some hostile pur.
pose. The forts remaining in the possession OF
the Federal Government, in and near these
States, were either besicged or menaccd by
warlike preparations, and especially Fort Sum-
ter was nearly surrounded by well protected
hostile batteries. with guns equal in quality to
the best of its own, and ouinumbcring the lat
Ter as perhaps ten TO one. disproportiOnaie
share Of the Federal muskets and rifles had,
somehow found their way into these States, and
had been seized. TO be used against the Govern
ment Accumulalions of the public revenue
lying within them had been seized for the same
object. The navy was scattered in distant seas
leaving but very small part of it within the
immediate reach of the Government Officers
of the Federal army and navy had resigned in
great numbers. and of those rcsigning, large
proportion had taken up arms against the Gov
ernment
Simultaneous in connection with all this, the
purpose to sever the Federal Union was openly
avowed. IN accordance with this purpose, an
ordinance had been adopted in each Of these
States, declaring the States respectively TO be
separated from The National Union.
A formula for insttituiing n combined Gov
crnmeni Of these States had been promulgated.
and 'hs illegal organization in the character OF
Confederate States, was already invoking re-
cogniion and Intervention from foreign powers
Pending this condition of things and belicv-
ing 1t TO be an imperative duty on the incoming
Executive TO prevent. if possible, the consum-
nation Of such attempt 10 destroy the Federal
Union, choice OF means to that end became
Indispensable The choice was made and was
declared in the inaugural address. The policy
chosen looked to.the exhaustion of all peaceful
measures before n resort 10 any stronger ones.
1t sought only TO hold the public places and
property not already wreslcd from the Govern
mcnt, and to collect the revenue, relying iuf
the res, on tim", discussion and the ballot box.
: II promised continuance of its mails ut gov
ernmcnc expense 10 the very people who were
! resisting the Government and it gave repeated
pledges against any disturbance TO any of the
people. or any of their rights.
OF all that which President might consti-
Itutionally and jusIiably do in such case every
thing was forborue without which it was be-
lieycd impossible to keep the Government on
fool;
On the 5th day of March, the present ncum-
bcnts first full day in office, letter of Major
Anderson 3 commanding at Fort Sumter, writ
ten on 2Slh of February, and received at the
War Department, on the Ah Of March, was by
that department placed in his hands The let
ter expressed the profess lonal opinion Of the
writer that rcintorccmcnts could not be thrown
into that Fort within the time for relief, rem
dercd necessary by the limited supply ofprov
sions, and with view of holding possession of
the same. with "A force of less than 2O.G coo good
and well disciplined men. This opinion was
concurred in by all the officers of his command
and their memoranda on the subject were made
enclosures of Maj Anderson s letter, The whole
was Immediately laid before Lieut.. Gcn Scott.
who ut once concurred with Mai. Anderson &
opinion. On reflection however, he took full
time for consultation with other officers both of
the army aud the ravy, and at the end of four
days, came reluctantly but decidedly to the
same conclusion ms before. He also stated, at the
same time, that not sufficient force there
nj the control of the Government. or could be
raised and brought to the ground within the
time. Then the provisions in The Fort would
he exhausted in apurcly military point of view.
This reduced the duty of the Administration
in the case to the mere mntter of getting the
garrison safely out of the fort. 1t was bciev-
ed however, that Ia 80 abandon that position,
under the circumstances, would be utterly ruin
Gus; that the necessity under which it was to
be done would not be fully understood; that by
many it would be construed as n part of vol
untary policy; that at home it would discourage
| The friends of the Union. cmbolden its adverse
rics, and go far to insure to the latter recogni
tion abroad that, in fact. 1t would be our ma
tional destruction cor summated.
This could not be allowed. Starvation was
not yet upon the garrison. and ere it would be
reached Fort pickens might be reiniorced.-
| This last would be n clear indication of policy,
and would better enable the country to accept
the evacuation of Fort Sumter as q military ne
ccssity.
An order wns Mt once directed to be sent for
the landing of the troops from the steamship
Brooklyn into Fort Plckens. This order could
moi 60 by land. but must take the longer and
slower route by sea. The frst return news
from the order was received but one week before
the fall of Furl Sumter
The news itself was that the officer COM
manding the Sabine. TO which vessel the troops
had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting
upon some quasi armisIicc of the late Admins
traiun, and of the cxislnncc VI which the late
| Administered ion. up to the time the order was
! dispal chcd, had only too vague aud uncertain
rumors TO fix at cnlion, had refused to land
troops To reinforce Fort Pickens before crisis
would he reached at Font Sumter was impossible
rendered 50 by the near exhaustion OF prov Nisions
III the latter named fort.
In prccaution against such conuncture, the
Government had u few days before commenced
preparing an expedition. as well adapted as
might be-. tu relieve Fort Sumter, which expc-
!lion WAS intended 10 be ultimately used or
not, according To circumstances. The strongest
anticipated ease for using II was not presented
and II was resolved TO Send ii forward, rs had
bccn intended IN this contingency. 1t was also
resolved to notify the Governor of South Caro-
lima, that he might expert an attempt would be
made to provision the Fort. and that if the nj
tempt should not be- resisted, there would he
no effort To throw IN men, arms or ammunition;
without further notice, or in ease of an attack
upon the Fort. This notice WAS accordingly
given, whcreupon the Fort was attacked aud
homharded 10 its fall without even awaiting
the arrilH nj Of the provisioning expedition,
II is thus seen that the assault upon and the
reduction of Fort Sumter was. in no sense, u
matter of scll-dcicnse ON the part of the nssail-
ants They well knew that the garrison in the
fort could. by no possibility. commit nggrcssons
upon them. They knew they were expressly
notified that the giving Of bread to the few
/ brave and hungry men OF the garrison WIS all
which would on that occasion he attempted. un-
less themselves, by resisting ~ much, should
provoke more. They knew that the Govern
y mcnt desired to keep the garrison in the fort
o not To assail them, hut to merely maintain vsi
nlo poSs'sslon, and thus to preserve the Union
nom actual aud immediate dissolution, trusting
ata tad a.