The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1861-07-23

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tations Wheat closed heavy for most Kinds, EXCEPT
prime shipping lots which in (atr demand fOr
port Corn was in good request, While prices were
changed. Fork was heavy and rather easier SHES Of
mess were made Al S5 37 SIS 80 ara If prime at $40
Sugars were steady viii sales c 100 hhd and $50 bosses
| al rates given IN another column Frclshl engagements
were moderate, while rates were 3teady
| Startling News rrcm w'nshingson---A
Promising victor. EARNED inio 81 Dis
Gstro.Is Defeat,
! Our reioiciugs over the promising victory AZ
! Bulls run were premature. Thei promising
victory was turned into disastrous dsfeat'
! The details so far IS received, are before our
readers. and We do moi care 90 dwell upon
them. We have no explanations to make OF
The panic which seized upon our relreatine
troops except this. Shat expecting nothing but
victory, they were wholly unproparcd morally,
strategicaly and from experience for the duties
Of retreat. The best disciplined armies, under
great reverse however, have frequently fallen
prey to such poniqs In this case onr soldiers
have been taught useful lesson, bHt al an ey-
pense OF life and in he materials OF war which
is very heavy. Now the Gret duty is instant
action In all the loyal States for the rcscue Of
Washington.
THIS damaging reverse may be really nc
counted for. First, our administration appears
to have been strangely ignorant or increduous
concerning the forces, positions and deienccs of
the enemy at Manassas Junction; secondly,
General Patterson could aud should have de-
tanned and cut mp the rebel Johnston with his
twenty thousand men in the valley of Virginia,
instead of permitting him to slip of AMI join the
army Of Beauregard. In failing to push for
ward and bring the retrealing Johnston TO a
battle, Patterson turned over to Beauregard
twenty thousand men, and Mcdowell practi-
cally lost the services OF twenty-five thousand
With regard to the ignorance OF the adminstra-
ton Of The strength Of the enemy, il would up
pear from numerous reports 10 BE largely al
tributabe TO the confidence of General Scott in
The superior strength Of his own forces. Out
own opinion il that our noisy and fanaticai and
| foolish politicians forced General Scott into
this thing against his superior Judgment What
ever may be the truth in this respect. it is now
manifest that the Secretary Of War and the
| whole Cabinet have been unequal 10 the exigen-
cies of the crisis, and far behind the spirit and
! liberal patriotism Of the loyal States.
We now perceive, what the Cahine! should
have known in advance, that in making this
late march upon Manassas Junction We should
have had reserves distributed in strong posi-
tons along the route from Centreville TO the
redonbts on the Potomac river of fifty or sixty
| thousand men, instead of reserved force Of
twenty thousand stretched along line of ten
miles from Arlington Heights to Alexandria.
| We know, too, that even month ago We might
have had in front of Washington one hundred
and fifty thousand men instead OF fifty thousand.
But the Secretary of War has refused the SER
vices of infantry, cavalry and artillery regi-
ments and companies, exceeding, perhaps, a
hundred thousand men, implOring to DC aci
| cepted into the armies of the Union.
The whole responsibility, in the end falls
upon the President of the United States. He
cannot fail now to comprehend the dangers and
duties Of his critical position. Washington is in
| great peril. II occupied by the enemy 1t will
I require vast outlay Of money, means and men
10 recover IL; but IL held by our forces for only
a few days it may be saved from the dissertation
Of revolutionary coup d'ftof. The salvation OF
Washington now becomes the paramount duty
OF the administration, the loyal States and the
loyal cities and people Of the Union. Let us
hope that those Notifications ON the south bank
of the Potomac, wisely constructed, under the
direction Of General Scott. against the pos
siblc contingencies Of reverse, may prove suf
feient to hold the enemy in check until an over
whclming Union force can be thrown into
Washington. Let us hope that General ri,
will be able TO keep Baltimore and Maryland
qaiet meantime. and that the column Of Genera
Patterson. under General Banks, will be com
petcnt TO guard the upper Potomac until Gen
Mcclellan can come to bis support.
The danger which now menaces Washington
is positive and formidable. and all the troops
from all quarters that can be spared for tn,
capital of our country should be sent forward
al once. The army. too should Instantly b,
supplied with educated officers to the fulles
possible extent, and Mr.. Lincoln should lose II,
more time in strengthening the weak places o
his Cabinet. We had hoped that this wa
would be finished in short triumpbal rnio,
campaign. We were mistaken BIT we havt
been misled by DE misplaced confidence Of oul
government in the strength Of its army, and b,
the fatal deluson Of the army itself in regart
TO the retrcating stratagems Of the enemy.
The war now ceases 10 be an nnntcr
rnpted onward march Of our forces south
ward. The government. in y single day
and at the capital Of the nation. is thrown apo,
the defensive and under circumstances demand
ing the most promp, aud generous cforis {.
strengthen our forces al that point. Ever,
other question, all other Issues. and al othe
business. among all parties and all classes o
oar loyal people, should he now made -ubcrdi
nate to The paramount objec, OF securing Wash
inetop. The loyal States, within three day.
may despatch twenty thousand men 10 tina