The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1853-1911, 1861-07-11
NO25

tion was not yet upon the garrison. and
ere it would be reached, fort Pickeus
might be re-euforeed. This last would
be clear Indication of policy, and would
enable the country to accept the eyacua-
tion OF Fort Sumter as a military neces-
'sity. An order was at once directed to
be sent for the landing OF the troops from
the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pick
ems. This order could not 60 By land,
but must take the longer and surer route
BY sea.
The fret return news from the order
was received just one week before the fall
of Sumter. The news itself was that the
officer com anding the Sabine, to which
vessel the troops had beer transferred from
the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi ar
mistice of the late Administration, and Of
the existence of which the present Admin
lstration up to the time the order was dis
patched, had only too vague and uncertain
rumors to fix attention, had refused to land
the troops. Tonow re euf force Fort Pickens,
before crisis would be reached at Fort
Sumter, was impossible, rendered so by
the near exhaustion of provisions in the
! latter. named Fort
J In precaution agsiust such a copjuDc-
ture the Government had a few days be-
fore com meuced preparing an expedition,
as well adapted as might be, to relieve
Fort Sumter, which expedition vas inten-
ded 70 be ultimately used or not, accord
ing to current circumstances. The stron-
gest anticipated case for using it was now
presented, and it was resolved to send il
forward, as had been intended.
In this contingency it was also resolved
to notify the Governor of South Carolina
that be might expect an attempt would be
made to provision the fort, and that if the
attempt should not be resisted, there
would be no attempt to throw in men,
arms, or ammunition, without further no.
tice. or in case of an attack upon the fort.
This notice was accordingly given, where
upon the fort was attacked and lombard
ed to its fall, without even awaiting the
arrival of the provisioning expedition.
1t is thus seen that the assault upon,
and reduction of Fort Sumter, was in no
sense matter of self defense on the part
of the assalants. They well knew that
the garrison in the fort could, By no pos
sibility, commit aggression upon tbon;
they knew they were expressly notified
that the giving of bread to the few brave
and hungry mcn CT the garrison was all
which would on that occasion be attemp-
ted. unless themselves, By resisting so
much, should provoke more.
They knew that this Government de-
sired to keep the garrison in the fort, not
to assail them, but merely to maintain
visible possession, and thus to preserve
the Union from actual and in mediate
dissolution, trusting as herein before sta
ted, to time, discussion and the ballot box
for final adjustment, and they asssiled
and reduced the fort. for precisely the
reverse object, to drive out the visible su-
thority of the Federal Union and thus
force it to in mediate dissolution; that this
was their object, the Executive well un-
derstood, and having said to them 10 the
inaugural Address: "You can have no
conflict without being yourselves the ag-
gressors."
He took pains not only TO keep this
declaration good, but also to keep the
case so far from ingenious sophistry as
that the world should not misunderstood
it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with
its surrounding circumstances, that point
was reached. Then and thereby the as
sailauts of the Government began the
conflict of arms without q gun in sight or
in expectancy to return their FIRE, save
only the few in the fort sent to that hsr-
Dor years before, for their own protec-
ton, and still ready to give that proteo-
tion in wbatever.wss lawful. La this act,
discarding all else, they have forced upon
the country the distinct issue-immediate
dissolution or blood. And this issue en-
braces more than the fate of these United
States. 1t presents to the whole family
Of man the question whether a constitution
al republic OF democracy, government Of
the people, By the same people can or can
not tmaiDtainitsterritorial IN integrity against
its own domestic foes. 1t presents the
question whether disconteDted individuals
too few In numbers to control the admin
istration according to the organic law in
any case, can always, upon the pretenses
made in this case OF any other pretenses.
or arbitrarily without any pretense, break
up their government. and thus practical
ly put an end to free government upon
the earth 1t forces Us to ask, 'ls there
in oil republics this inherent and fatal
weaknessi' Must 8 government OF ne
cessity be too strong for the liberties of
its own people, or two weak to maintain
its own existeDeel
So viewing the issue, no choice vas
left but to call out the war power of tho
Government, and so to T. sis. the force
employed for its destruction By force for
its preservation. The call was made and
the response of the country was most
gratifying, surprising in unaDimity and
spirit the most sanguine expeetations.--
Yet none OF the States commonly called
Slave States. except Delaware, gave a
regiment through the regular State OF
raUization. A few regiments have been