New-York daily tribune., 1861-08-22

Government sent three army 0fhcers across Lao |
Atlantic to survey the gigantic events then trans
prlng IN the contest between the three great
European Powers. These officers were MAJOR
Delh6elJ Of the Engineers, Major Mordecai OF
the Ordnance, and Capt George Is. Mcclellan
of the Cavalry. They visited the Crimea, though
not till after the fall of SeVastopol, gauged the
dimensions of that world-renowDed siege, and
carefully studied the character and condition OF
the principal armies Of Europe.
After an absence Of some two years, the Com
mission returned aud each of its members reported
the result of his observations 10 the Secretary of
War, who laid them before Congress, by whom
they were published, in the shape Of three huge
quarto volumes. Being upon subject in which
the mass of our people then took little interest,
these elaborate and important reports excited slight
attention outside Of our small army.
The most full and valuable OF these reports, is
that of Captain (now General) Mcclellan. 1t con-
ssts Of $50 wide quarto pages, and is accompanied
with large number of plates aud diagrams, and an
elaborate map Of Seyastopol and the surrounding
works and camps Of the belGgerents during the
siege of Is54-5. IL contains chapters or reports
upon operations in the Crimea; European engineer
troops; the French, Austrian, Prussian, and Sar.
dnian infantry; the entire Russian army oil ell
CORPS; the Prussian, Austrian, French. English,
and Sandman cavalry; the United States cavalry,
AUTHORIZATIONS and instructions for the United States
cavalry in time of war.
The impression made upon the mind OF care
full reader of these reports ia, that Gen. BIC
Clean combines in an unusual measure breadth
of views and keenuess of observation; that be has
great capacity for generalization, and rare tact
for selecting and arranging details; that be has
a keen appreciation of the Importance OF skIltul
combinations for eGectiDg important results; that
be is an independent thinker, and accustomed to
cultivate sell.reliauce, and that be is rigid dis
siplinarlan, aud fond and proud of the profession
Of arms.
These reports Mcclellan embraces each OF the
topic. named in distinct repOrt), do not claim
to be entirely from his pen. They are often
mere coDdensatioDs, in bis own sty OF language,
of heavy European works, mingled with remarks
and suggestions of bis, and comparisons between
tho arrangements, tactics, discipline, aud equip
ments of the armies of the Great Powers OF
Europe and our own. They also institute yslua-
ble parallels and contrasts between the opera
tions of The troops employed in the Crimea and
our own in the Florida and Mexican wars. They
are crowded brim full Of facts, bristle oil over
with sharp criticisms and relate TO every con'
ceiyable matter and thing touching European
troops and camps, from the organization OF the
GRAND army OF Russia down to the drilling OF q
| M tha
formidable feld.works for reducing fortified towns
down TO the cut of dragoou-saddle and the
furnisbment Of an infantry knaPsack.
CAPT. Mcclellan deyotes twenty-four pages OF
his work 20 description and criticism Ut the
sege Of sevssiopo. IL is plain to see that he
has q high appreciation Of the engineering tai
eats of Todtlcben, who planned tho Russian
earthworks, which so long bafied the skill aud
endurance Of the allies; that be admires the
] d..h .rl la,i-1 of fLe T--soL, ..nd --LJo .P-
plau5ipR "the steady aud magnificent courage"
nf the English soldiers, a exhibited on the
bloody field Of Inkermsnn, he does not hesitate
10 speak Of "the foles and unskillfulness OF
tLer commanders" Indeed, he sharply criticises
the conduct Of all the allied generals IN the
early part ef the sege, faying OF them (and his
words have peculiar significance now, "theIr
measures were halfway measures, slow aud
blundcrng; they failed TO keep constantly in
view the object OF the expedition, and to press
rapidly and increasingly toward it, II
deficiency m men and means is assigned as a
reason for the early operations Of tue allies. il
is but another proof that, in undertaking the
affair, they neglected one Of tho cearest rules
of war; that is, TO undertake no important
operation without full and reliable information
as to the obstacles to be overcome, and the
means Of resistance in tho hands Of theRemy."
In connection with this subject, and as indicating
the bent Of Gen. McClellans mind on this most sug-
gestiye snbect, will cite from another part Of his
work, where, under the head OF " Reconnossan-
ce.," he says, :" 1t is always necessary to know
beforehand with what troops We have TO deal,
and the nature Of the country in which the opera
ton is to be effected; and this information can
be fully obtained neither by Interrogation nor by
maps, but only by a Reconnaissance" In the
same chapter he deprecates "plungiDg beailong
into action without q proper knowledge OF the
ground"
The bearing which these remarks have upon
the battle before Manassas, is obvious.
His report upon the European Engineer Corps
Is highly interesting. abounds with valuabs IN.
formation, and, in connection with his lively
sketch of tho siege operations and intrenchments
at Seyastopol proves that his mathematical mind
takes naturally to his branch Of the service.