, 1861-05-06
MILITARY sUGQEbTIoNs.
1s4ekK&e Organisation OF. i
1Hfeav44Ey s1Hfe Ey Corps for the State

are, but hayi. -, be twice AZ strong as VI
yaSsa .,ody3 y3of sfssoeasary foS@ Ii
e. lard service, while we have q strong
-~vasry corps, he Will uots : only J bf
I constantly embarrassed in bis movements, bui
tie open pratries. With his infantry be may
/ tAroW u ontof every PARCEL Of wood, ont d
every village but, In crossing the pralries from
one such point to the other, he would be sc
| dangerously. exposed to. our sudden attacks
and 80 shasassad BY onr charges. that be would
hou7,-ieipg:an all the time Obliged to move
| nnd even to btvouac in square, 7jnauch case
| the cavalry is master Of Its Own acttons; moth
Ing can embaTrass it; 1t choose3 the moment
ct the attack it ehooses its position, be It in
front, flank or rear Of the enemy, without any
fear or molestation; It csn sweep Ills battxl
ions; 1t can cut of his retreat 1t can cut OF
his communications anu destroy his baggage,
munitions and: provisions; in word, It be.
comes fearful whip for the most daring and
disciplined, and On, unmercifnl destroyer for d
feeble and undiseiplined enemy. Of course
so take tor the comparison the equally organ:
tzed and equally drilled volunteers on both
sides, .. -: :: :
It is clear, then, that In an open country Ike
Illinois the cavalry, In general, must play the
most important if-not the principal part in
the campaign, aud its thorough organization
te1A AAP.& 4CCfEAtkJs : 3.
Bat, at the sans time, for its complete sue.
cess, the cavalry must have artillery Of such
capacity that it could move and aet at the
aame rate and Hith the Same eelerity
IS cayalrZ; n other words, cavalry
maSt Tsag nas1 ,,e n}hg }hagg ,sTThery at&shsd
deE to be completely and duly orguited; ahall
have q flying artillery, the organization Of
both at once must be done. Certainly the or.
ganizati Of cavalry, and particularly Of fly
Leg artillery, Is far more expensive than tho
Organization OF infantry; but their advantages
a5j so sRd 5aG q the sae
bn]y reasonable but necessary to lave them,
.4s to the possibility Of raising frat rate car.
al19,, there is perhaps no other State in the
Union more capable to do 1t than the State Of
Ininoia. Every farmers 10y, and even every
farmers girl, IN Illinois, knows how to ride on
horseback, the necessity being the principal
teacher Of horse riding. In the ear]y
spring, and particularly in - the late
fall, and down south almost through the
Whnle winter, the country, roads are so I'M
practicable that the communication. between
III tarmB and villages may be done only on
horseback hence the country people general
~ are good, riders, and constitute the mer,
quite ready to fill the cavalry ranks: A to.
taehdrses, being raised in prairiee, they are
acerstomed more to grazing than. to. stable.
food, and this one circumstance gives them an
the campaagn4 when sometimes neither oats
nor corn can be had Again, being exposed
to heat, cold and rain constantly when colts,
they can atald al these things better when:
horses; Thinning sometimes miles to get to
some pond Or creek twice or three LINES every
day p zen colta, they can stand forced marches
when horses; drinking sometimes In swamp
Or pool, ,they will be satisfied with every.
Kind Of water In tbs campaign. In q word,
the prafrie horses for the campaign are
im1nenkely superior to the stable horses,
and that y the reaaon why these
cavalry service ct the whole army. The
Coseacks Of Russia, Hho constitute wonderful
cavalry In q war time, owe their perfection
only to their horses. Being raised in atepes,
those hortes, although. Of q poor breed, are
capable Of enduring cold and heat. and want
Of food. far better than the stable horses, 80
that N the tn every campaign. the partiean
War, the vanguard service, the outpost duties
all that killa the regular cavalry--4s done by
Cgssaeks. The Eame canses must make the
prairie horse here better it for Light cavalry
herTlce than any 9th r horse. -.
lnthe PRESENT var We viii have plenty Of
good Infantry, but tha Infantry alone, without
! atrong. body Of cavalry, cannot eucceed
completely. The cavalry ID the safeguard
Of the army, its eyes and ears in the cam
paigu; 1t Is the thAnierbolt on the field
Of battle in decisive moment On the
most important point; 1t is at the same
time the flying exterminator In pursuit Of the
enemy. The enemy's losses on the field Of
batrle are triflng in comparison with h1s losses
In the time Of his retreat after lest nattle,
#henpuEsued by cavalry. Again, having a
strong body Of cavalry, in case Of retreat,
our own losses will not be 80 large. The
greatest victories Of Napoleon have been, In
The time when be had numerous and spIen-
6idly organized cavalry. When he lost that
cavalry, in 1872 In the Russian campaign, he
organized almost million Of troops, hut
could not organize moEe thau 10 600 OF cayal-
r., while the allied armies had three times a.
many. He gained splendid victories upon the
battle fields Of Litzsn aId Ba1tzen, but they
were not complete, because he had not enough
cavalry to vigorously pursue the enemies and
bring the final destruction upon thl ir
armies. The allied armies, 1nder the
saSs sp9a ot eo.stiSf.a 1hey sse taat
retreated In order, organized their armies and
again and again attacked the enemy; aud the
sueGess of the allied forces. in 1878 and 1914.
except the political circumstances, consisted
mainly IN the preponderance Of their cavalry
over ths cavalry of the French army. Without
strong cavalry. even the genius Of Napoleon
could not stand against the mediocritiss, b.
cause those medioc1itiea had splendid and
numerous cavalry. -,
Nov, LET US take up the State Of Illinois and
see what should be done for her defense, sup.
RH5uk El4I VI AtuUESAEE,- AGGE1cEV Sfl6
Missouri joined ,the seeded States From
Kentucky aud Missouri The State Of Illinois is
protected by natural defensive lines, on one
eide by tho MlsaiEsipp1 river, and on the other
hand BY the Ohio river. Suppose tnat We hold
ourselves for slime time only On the defensive,
win carry Oh partisan var, crossing
the rlVers In small parties in boats, land
Ing on our shor<s,. burning and sacking
villages and making! mischief: III 2eueraf
without daring to move in the interior;
OF, concentrating considerable forces, they may
point and invade Illinois,
Concentrating cur main forces in cue or
TWO central points, "a for inf tauce, grringfe1d
and Genteahs, and occupying With dstsched
parties some important points on the rivers,
as Cairo or o.ht1s. II We hare enough Of cav
alrE, we may -distribute- par1iof il In AinalI
op1pQsts OF videttes all along the rivers Mis--
sassippf Ind Ohio, keeping the Communication
between those poata open by day and night
By patrols. Behind those outposts, on -ihe
principal communication With the iufe1for: |
will stay their reserves; On ths aande points,
tEnnpe may ho easily moval to .Any. point Of !
the shores, will be placed some detacned par-
ties Of infantry, more or less strong, With or |
without artaIery, = cordfu8 I'd ths importance |
Of the place. From the cavalry reserves Of tha |
ootpo.ts ,Wln be organized military or
graphic stationS, or. railroads, and = 10 |
the reserves. Of. infantry; those routea
consisting OF po1ta Of three OK four cava]yv /
msn on every -four: or ire ,niiea. aud oarrvinq
dispatches from the shores. Ry this arrange
mint the Commaudsrln Ghiefo. the amy viii |
be able to learn very quick about Any hostile |
demonstration offuur enemy upon every point !
along the IiVezs, and act acaosdingly,, Sothat
having tbs cham Of cavalry rosts along tha
rivers with bodies Of infantry aud nftillerF AZ
their res erves. and the main body OF tronns
concentrated On one or two central pnInfa- /
with quick communication with eyeTy post /
on the rivers, wa ara sure to BE- safe from any
surprise and ars euEe nany emergency to act I
promptly, dectftyely, and no doubt successful.
~. We suppose that'at the sams time, tbat
On some important points 4xthe ahorea, tst- /
ttries will be thrown up and perhaps at soma |
important points In the 'lnte1for also. It IA
clear, then, from the preceding, that tho oniv !
means to watch themosemeuts Of the enemy. |
and to give eommu1t 1tcatIon pf his Averessiona.
te the caTalIy. But besides TINT, the partfes
Of cavar9 will run from Hmeto time throuoh |
the doubtful counties, and watch the juoen3f. |
artes, enaissa1iea and aympAthlsers with the
rehels..@ !! 5<,... ~, -
Now lat Us take smother: case-the inr,ato,
OF Illinois hy the enemy Ia considerable num- /
bers; and let uB take The most t11ssdyantn. /
geous case, when his forces arc equal or enne,
rior to 1urs. In all probability, II there ia apch
au invasion, 1t will be mnde IN the Eou.hern
part Of Illinois, elther from Kentucky or Ma.
souri. That part of the country being 4iui-
bered, swampy, or hilly, presents ali tie al !
vRntaEes for tnlRnty, and having lust "A gond /