Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-12-13
NtlMBEk 2I8

I Ss rapidly battles would. The retrest frcm
/ London was q fitting finaie 10 General Sherman's g
edmnistratiOn in kentucky, which wasted the most
favorable campaign months by Incompetence, and
n closed with retreat Of column. which ex-ept
tnss there was no enemy, had all the features and
disasters OF 9 rout. IN the suffering loss and Ge
i liberalization of the men
Designing treachery could DO no more than our
| gsneralship has doHe The loyal Southern Kentuek
I ians who have beeRencOuraged By the uraaepee and
protection Of the national troops 70 show thar loy
airy are aow givenupto 20 BE pIandeFed BY the rebe.
/ The Last Tennessesns who lad risen on the Asar
approach Of or GrHstes and loers GidiRg sR by bum
| ing bridges, and cutting of the communications Of
the enemy. are now abandoned to the tender mer-
eies of the Confederates The exile Tennessesns il
our ranks in Kentucky, who have sacrificed eVerJz
thing at home and joined our armies on the prom
ise Of an advance into Tennessee now End them
selves cut of from home and deserted by the gov
ernment, and their devotion to the country wanted
IN service which seems 70 them very like pre-
serving Kentucky neutrality, ID
Our Northern SOldieTs, after the depression and
demOralzltiOn which resulted from The hopeless
lnaetion IN camp, miugated only by the promise
Of an advance 1t some ums suddenly ind ihen-
selves put TO flight, and suffering ali the hardship
aud disaster of fight, with no man pursuing but
merely flying by OrdCr of the commanders Of the
department who, If not formidable il advance has
shown that be Is terrible in retreat So far as ap-
pears up to ths tiEle there was 40 cause for this
other panic, not of the troops, nor teamsters nor
civilians, but Of the commander Of the department.
which seems to have been fully communicated to
the COMMANDER of the Cumberland Gap column
High hopes were formed Of the command in Ken
tucky Il vas the opportunity Of this war. Tho
rspitity with which troops were poured in from
Ohio and Indiana was highly eredit4ble to fe pow
er and energy of thUse States. Our troops were
competent TO meet the enemy, ami confident: and
II was hoped that the West a different policy
would be tried frcm thst Of keeping troops in
camp and away from fire while the enemy occupied
all the important positions sld fortified them. CerS
tain signs IN General Sherman at fret gave peOple
the impression that be had hesdstrOng tyrannlcaI
boldness and energy which would stop at nothing
Bat these qualities extended no further than the
bullying Of few newspaper correspondents and
prIsoners. The fall Campaign in Kentucky, with
an army which, under general would have taken
Possession Of Tennessee has been wasted BY iRcom-
potency, and Gen. Buell., the third commander Of
that department. has now TO begin the campaign.
We began Jnis article to speak Of the way our
troops were wasted by fore marches. The
march Of the OlIo regiments on PIketon, under
Generai Nelson, was another march as severe as q
battle. IL seems singular thai when the general
progress of our army l. deliberate il should be
irivsn such hardship in the little advance il
IOes make. The same management was iuaugu-
ated IN the beginning Of our campaign in Western
Virginia ---..
Armies whose general advance is so cautious and
slow te indicate that they can GDd the enemy in
Orce # they desire IT, arc hsrrassed in detach-
1ents by forced marches Of twenty i've or thirty
mixes, IN tsrribe weather, to surprise detaeh-
usnt Of The enemy. and arrive only to fad them
d, or niTIble enough to escape. Our surprises
lave Rflturned out failures, and have resulted only
n ineIeuBg On our men LOSSES equsttO those Of =
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