Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1861-08-22

next morning. The troops at Fairfax sta
tion leaving by the cars, took with them
the bulk of the supplies which had been
sent there. Ny Aide de Camp, Major
Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax Court
House till late in the morning. to see that
the stragglers and weary and worn out
soldiers were not left behind.
transmit herewith the reports Of the
several divisions, and brigade comman-
ders, to which refer for the conduct of
particular regiments anl corps. and con-
missing. From the latter it will be seen
that our killed amounted to 19 officers and
462 non commissioned officers and pri-
Yates. Many of the wounded will soon
be able to join the ranks, and will leave
our total of killed and disabled from fur
ther service under 1000 The return of
TIE missing is very inaccurate. the men
supposed to be missing having fallen into
other regiments and gone to Washington
many OF the Zouaves to New York. In
one brigade. the number originally report
ed at GIG. was yesterday reduced to ia.
These reductions are being made daily
In few days a more correct return can be
maje.
Of course nothing accurate is known of
the loss Of the enemy. An officer of their
forces. coming from them with a flag of
true. admitted 1.S00 killed and wounded,
and other information shows this to be
muci under the true number.
The officer commanding the 11th New
York Zouaves, and Col. Heintzelman, say
that the returns of that regiment cannot be
relied on. as many Of those reported among
the casualties have absented themselves
since their return and gone to New York.
Among the missing reported are many of
our surgeons. who remained in attendance
on our wounded, and were, against the
rules of modern warfare. made prisoners.
The issue of this hard fought battle. in
which certainly our troops lost no credit
in their conflict on the field with an enemy
ably commanded. superior in numbers. who
had but short distance to march, and
who acted on his own ground. on the de-
fensive, and always under cover, while our
men were of necessity out on the open
field. should not prevent full credit being
given to those officers and corps whose
services merited success if they did not at
tain it.
AS my position may warrant even if it
does not call for some explanation of the
causes. so far as can be seen, which led to
the results herein stated, trust it may not
be out Of place if refer in few words
to the immediate antecedents of the battle
When submitted to the General-in- Chief,
in compliance with his verbal instruc-
tions, the plan of operations and estimate
Of force required. the time l was to pro-
coed to carry it into effect was fixed for
Sth of July. Monday. Every facility pos
sible was given me by the General-in-
Chief and heads of the Administrative de-
psrtmeAts in making the necessary prep
arations. But the regiments. owing, l
was told. to want of transportation, came
over slowly. Many of them did not come
ACROSS till eight or nine days after the time
fixed upon, and went forward without my
even seeing them, and without having
been together before in brigade. The
sending re-enforcements to Gen. Patterson.
by drawing off the wagons. was q further
and unavoidable cause ofdelay. Notwith-
standing the hercuican efforts Of the Quar-
termaster- General. and his favoring me
In every way. the wagons for ammunition.
subsistence. DC, and the horses for the
trains and the artillery, did not arrive for
week after the time aproiated to move.
l was not even prepared as late as the 18th
ultimo. and the desire 1 should move be-
came great. and it was wished should not,
If possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the
18th ultimo.! When aid set out on the
10th, was still deficient in wagons for
Subsistence. But i went forward, trusting
to their being procured in time to follow
me. The trains thus hurriedly gathered
together. with horses, wagons, drivers.
and wagon managers, all new and unused
to each other. moved with difficulty and
disorder. and was the cause of days de-
lay in getting the provisions forward, ma
king 1t necessary to make on Sunday the
attack. We should have made on, Saturday.
could not, with every, exertion, get
forward with the troops earlier than
we did. I wished to go to centreville the
second day, which would have taken us
there on the Hth. snd~enabled us, so far
as they 'wers concerned. to go into action
on the 10th. - instead ef the fist; but
when | went forward from Fairfax Court
House beyond Germantown to urge them
forward. I was told it was impossible for
the men to march further. They had on
ly come from Vienns, about 6 miles, and
! it was not more than 81 miles further to
( Centreville-in all q march of 12l miles;
but the men were foot-weary, not so much,
was told. by the distance marched. as by
the time they had been on foot. caused by
the distractions in the road and the slow
pace at which we had to move to syoid
ambuseades. The men were. moreover,
unaccustomed to marching. their bodies
not in condition for tha. kind of work. and
not used to carrying even the load Of light
marching order. ysu soisa8o9 Srisa -
I'VE crossed Bull Run with about 18.-
600 men of all arms. the Filth Division
(Sfiles and Richardson's Brigade) on the
left, at Blackburn's Ford to Centreville,
and Schehck's Brigade. of Tyler's Divis-
ION. on tho left of tho road near the Stone,
Bridge, not participatipgin- tho main &C.
ton. The numbers opposed to us have,
been variously estimated: may safely, ,ssa say, 8
and avoid even the appearance of exdgger.
alton. that the enemy broaghs up oaH jhe
couii which were ask kept engaged else
where = - Eow had = osscn r,f 49, xnxn inc an