Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1861-07-11

not De fully unuerstOol, tnaL Dy many II
would be construed as a voluntary policy;
hat at home it. would discourage the
friends of the Union, embolden lis adverse
ries and go far to insure the latter recog-
nition abroad, and that in fact it would be
our national destruction. This could not
be allowed. Starvation was not yet upon
the garrison, and ere it would be reached,
Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This
last would be clear Indication of policy,
and would better enable the country to ac-
cept the evacuation of Sumter as militia
ry necessity Then an order was at once
directed to be sent for the landing Of tho
troops from the steamship Brooklyn inte
Fort Pickens. This order could not go By
land but must take the surer and slower
route by sea. The first returning news
from the order was received just one week
before the fall Of Sumter The news itself
was. that the officer commanding The Sa-
bine. to which vessel the troops had been
transferred from the Brooklyn. acting up
on some armisticc Of the late administra-
tion and of the existence of which the
present administration. up to the time the
order was despatched. had only too vague
and uncertain rumors to fix attention. had
refused to land the troops. To now rein
force Fort Pickens before the crisis would
be reached at Fort Sumter was impossible,
rendered so by the mere exhaustion Of pro-
visions in the latter named Fort In pre-
caution against such a contingency the
Government had q few days before COM
menced preparing an expedition as we'll
adapted as might be to relieve Fort Sum-
ter. which expedition was intended to be
ultimately used or not according to- cir
cumstances. The strongest anticipated
case for using it was now presented, and
it was resolved to senl it forward. as hal
been intended. In this contingency it was
also resolved to notify the Governor Of
South Carolina that he might expect an att
tempt would be made to provision the
Fort, and that If the attempt should not be
resisted, there would be no attempt to-
throw in men, arms. or ammunition, with
out further notice. or case Of au attack mp
on the Fort. This no ice was accordingly
given, whereupon the fort was attact ed
and BON mbarded to its fall, not even await
ing the arrival Of the provision expedition.
1t is thus seen that the assault upon and
reduction OF Fort Sumter were in no sense
matter of self defence on the part Of the
assailants They well knew that the gsxrf-
son in the Fort could by no possibility
commit aggression upon them. They
knew they were expressly notified that giv-
ing bread to few brave and hungry men
Of the garrison was all that would on that
occasion be attempted unless themselves.
by resisting SO much, should provoke
more. -"
They knew that this Government desir-
ed to keep the garrison in the fort. not to
assail them. but merely to maintain visible
possession. and thus to preserve the Union
from actual and immediate dissolution,
trusting. as herein before stated. to time.
discussion and the ballot-box for final ad-
iustment; and they assailed and reduced
the fort for precisely the reverse object
to drive ont the visible authority of the
Federal Union. and tins force it to imme-
diate dissolution. That this was their OBJ
ject the Executive wtll undestood;; and
having said to them in the Inaugural ad-
dress, You can have no conflict without
yourselves being the aggressors," he took
pains not only to keep this declaration
good. but also to keep the case sofar from
ingenius sophistry that the world should
not misunderstood it. By the affair at F't.
Sumter, with its surrounding circumstsn-
ces, that point was reached, Then and
there, by the assailants of the Government,
began the conflict, without gun in sight
or expectancy to return their firing. save
only few in the fort, sent to that harbor
years before for their own protection in
whatever was loyal. In this act. discard
ing all else, they have forced upon the
country the distinct issue of Immediate
dissolution or blood. and this embraces
more than the fate of these United States.
It presents to the whole family of man the
question whether a constitutional Repub-
lie or Democracy, government of the
people, the same people can or csr-
not maintain its territorial integrity
against Its own domestic foes. It pre-
sents the question whether discomfort
ed persons, too few in number to-
control the Administration according to
the organic law in any case. can always
upon the pretcnse made in this case or any
other pretense. or arbitrarily. without any
pretense break up their Government and
thus practically pnt an end to free govern
ment upon the earth. 1t forces us to ask,
is there in all republics this inhercnt and
fatal weakness Must Government Of
necessity, be'too strong for the liberties Of
the people. or too weak to maintaia its
own existence? So viewing the issue. no
choice was left but to call out the war
power Of the Government and SO to resist
the force employed for IT'S destrnction by
force forit preservation. The call was made
and the response of the country was most
gratifying. surprising in unsninnity and
spirit the most sanguine expectation. Yet
noue of the States conrronlt callsl slave
Ststes, except Delaware. gave 8 regimeRs
through the regular State Organization
A few regiments have been organized
within some other Of those Ststes By IN
divfdual enterprise. and received into the
Government service of course. The seced-
ed States, so called, and to which Texas
had been joined about the time of the in
auguration, gave no troops to the cause OF
the Union. The border States, so called.
were not uniform in their action, some Of
them being almost for the Union. while
II, others as IN Virginia. North Carolina.