Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1861-08-22

had before this been driven nearly a mile
and half, and was beyond the Warren
ton Road. which was entirely in our pos
session. from the Stone Bridge westward.
and our engineers were just completing
the removal of the abattis across the road,
to allow our reinforcement (Schenck's
Brigade and Ayers Battery to join US.
The enemy were evidently dishearted
and broken. But we had been fighting
since lO1 o'clock in the morning. and
1t was after three in the afternoon.-
The men had been rp since 9 O'Clock in
the morning. and had made what to those
unused to such thing seemed a long
march befare coming into action, though
the longest distance gone over was no more
than 81 miles; and though they had three
days provisions served ont to them the
day before, many no doubt did not eat
them, or threw them away on the march
or during the battle. and were without
food. They had done much severe fight
ing. Some of the regiments that had
been driven from the hill in the first two
attempts of the enemy to keep possession
Ofit. had become shaken. were unsteady,
and had many men out of their ranks.
1t was at this time that the enemy's REIN
forcements came to his aid from the rail
road train, understood to have inst arrived
from the valley with the residue of John
ston's army. They threw themselves into
the woods on our right. and in the rear of
our right. and opened a fire of musketry
on our men which caused them to break
and retire down the hill side. This soon
degencrated into disorder. for which there
was no remedy. Every effort was made
to rally them. even beyond the reach of
the enemy's fire. but in vain. The battal-
ion of regular infantry alone moved up the
hill opposite the one with house on it,
and there maintained itself until our men
could get down to and cross the Warren
ton turnpike on the back way to the posi-
tion we occupied in the morning. The
plain was covered with the retreating
troops, and they seemed to infect those
with whom they came in contact. The re-
treat soon became route, and this soon
degenerated into panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond
the efforts of all those who had assisted so
faithfully during the long and hard days
work in gaining almost the object Of our
wishes, and that nothing remained on the
field but to recognize what we could no
longer prevent, gave the necessary orders
to protect their withdrawal, begging the
men to form in line and offer the appear
ance. at least. of organization. They re-
turned by the fords to Warrenton road,
protected. by my order. by Col. Porter's
force Of regulars. Once on the road. and
the different corps coming together in
small parties. without officers. they became
intermingled, and all organization was
lost
Orders had been sent back to Miles's
division for a brigade to move forward
and protect this retreat. and Col. Blenk.
er's brigade was detached fer this purpose.
and was ordered to go as far forward as
the point where the road to tie right left
the main road. taf
BY referring to the general order it will
be seen that. while the operations were to
go on in front, an attack was TO be made
at Blackburn's Ford by the brigade Rich
ardson's) stationed there. Areference to
his report. aud to that of Major Hunt,
commanding the artillery. will show that
this part of the plan was well and effective
ly carried out. 1t succeeded in deceiving
the enemy for considerable time. and in
keeping in check q considerable part of his
force. The fire of the artillery at this
point is represented as particularly dcstruc-
tive. ...,.fls~n -. ,,.s .id
At the time Of our retreat, seeing great
activity in this direction, much firing and
columns of dust. became anxious for
this place, fearing if 1t were turned or for
ced the whole stream of our retreating mass
would be captured or destroyed. Alter
providing for the protecting of the retreat
by Porter's and Blenker's brigades, / re-
paired to Richardson's aud found the
whole force ordered to be stat Toned for the
holding of the road from Manassas, by
Blackburn's Ford to Centreville, on the
march. under the orders from the Division
Commander, for Centreville. / immedi-
ately halted it, and ordered it to take up
| the best line of defences across the ridge
that their position admitted of, and subse-
quently taking in person the command of
this part of the army. / caused sueh dispo-
sition Of the forces which bad been added
to IL by the 1st aud % New Jersey and
the Dekalb regiments. ordered from Run
yon's reserve. before going forward. as
would best serve to check the enemy
The ridge being held in this way, the re-
treating current passed slowly through
Centreville to the rear. The enemy fol-
lowed us from the Ford as far as Cub Run.
and owing to the road becoming blocked
up at the crossing. caused us much damage
there. for the artillery could not pass, and
several pieces and caissons had to be aban-
doned. In the panic the horses hauling
the caissons and ammunition we're cut
from their place for persons to escape
with. and in this way a confusion was
caused. the panic aggravated. and the road
encumbered. Not only were pieces of ar
tillery lost. but also many OF. the ambulsn-
ces carrying the wounded. t,a...
By sun down most Of our men had got
behind CentreyilIe Ridge. and it became
a question whether we should or not en-
deavor to make stand there. The con-
dition Of our artillery and its ammunition,
and the want Of food for the men, who had |
generally Abandoned or thrown. away all 4
that had been issued the day before, and
the utter disorganization and consequent
dem oralization Of the mass of the army. I
seemed 10 ali who were near enouch io ba