The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1861-03-28
Fort PickenS.

necessary withdrawal of Anderson from
Fort Sumter. 1t had better stop crying
over what cant be helped, and spend It's
time ia preventing a similar humiliation
at Fort pickens.
Says the New York 7ribunc: Ii not
relieved ia six weeks from this time, Fort
Pickens will have to be abandoned just
like Fort Sumter and for the same reason.
Fort Piekens and its approaches arc being
gradually commanded by sand batteries.
If it be not forthwith garrisoued and pro
yisisned for a siege, it cannot be done at
all. 1t must be surrendered without
blow; for the United States must suffer no
defeats If the Government cannot main
tain the position, it ought to yield 1t up
without struggle If this be done, then
the Confederate States will become one OF
the nations Of the world; and the United
States of America will cease to be a first
rate power.
We know that the Administration does
not contemplate this, for in that case 1t
would as disgracefully betray the country
as did Buchanan As it does not purpose
this, it must mean to maintain the lnteg-
rity of the Union; and to this the holding
Fort Pickens seems to US absolutely essen
tial. The only question, then, IS what Is
necessary to accomplish that purpose. The
first step is to garrison the fort, and pro-
vision it forthwith to It's utmost capacity.
But this is not al. When garrisoned and
provisioned, it will still be attacked by the
revolutionary forces under competent Off
GERS. No matter how full of men the fort
may be, seige is mere question of time.
After few weeks of battery in breach, its
walls will be a heap of ruins, and the be-
sieging forces will mount to the assault.
For garrisons and provisions alone will
not secure the fort nor the dignity of the
United States.
The siege will be successful unless it is
raised. 1t can be raised only by a superb
or land force driving off the besieging
force. Three or four thousand men can
take the fort by the regular process of a
siege in three or four weeks from the
the opening of the batteries, if undisturb
ed. But FIVE or seven thousand men will
at once arrest their proceedings and drive
them from the siege all their works will
be destroyed and their battering trains
taken by such force. The United States
must therefore instantly begin to organize
this force to raise the siege of Fort Pick
ems.
If this work is begun at once, the revo-
lutionary authorities will be driven to
adopt one of two courses Either they
must abandon all idea of siege and leave
the fort unassailed, or they must hold III
readiness force of FIVE or six thousand
men to support and cover the siege opera
tions. To this the United States must be
ready to respond by ten thousand men,
which will still suffice to raise the siege.
Thus it will become, like the siege of Sc
vastopol, a real trial of strength between
the two parties.
Therevolutionary States cannot possibly
raise, and arm, aud support, and concen-
trate at Pensacola as many as $4,000 men;
their whole population is not sufficient
and at least one-half of the population is
for the United States, and will refuse to
bear arms, and cannot be trusted to bear
arms tor the purpose of ing the Uni
ted States in its own forts
But no matter how many men the rev.
o,utionists can assemble. it is certain the
United States can assemble, arm, support
aud pay, two to every one the revolution
lists can concentrate and maintain on tn,
spot The revolutionsts vii; therefor.
either be driven to Withdraw their militia
~ force or to see it destroyed If the,
withdraw, their prestige is forever gone
aud the people will rise on them ard expe
them from power, and the Union is main
tained II they fight, their whole militia
~ strength will be crushed on the sand.
of Pensacola, without one act Of violence
or injury or war against any but those
actually in arms assalinc the Cnitee
sn.os troops, and the people Of the (tul