New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-04-09

that these measures will be taken by the direct
order of JEFF. Davis, who will ignore the peace
representations of his Commissioners and pursue
bis own course, based on disbelief Of such rep
RESERVATIONS. The policy will BIO to starve Major
Anderson out, and unless the Government changes
his situation, either by withdrawing or strength
ening him, he will before long be compelled to
surrender or vary the programme by taking the
iniativo by opening his guns on the rebels. So
you see matters are getting narrowed down to
very small points, when the Government it
would seem, must act, and either withdraw Ma
ior Anderson or reinforce him.
It is not generally Understood here that Lieut.
Talbot goes to Washington as the bearer Of dis
patches or for information but that he goes in
conformity with the order of the Department, in
connection with his recent promotion and trans
fer to the Pacific Department. The inference is
quite general that he will not return, and that,
therefore, his departure has no immediate con-
necton with the events Of the day.
The men who rowed Lieutennnts Snyder and
Talbot up'to the city improved the opportunity
to purchase some tobacco and some few things
which in the fort are no doubt luxuries at the
present time, but the police nabbed all the arti-
clcs. II ia question whether these rebels are
not base enough to poison the water Of the fort,
if they should get chance.
There arc not a few who are looking for an
attempt TO strengthen Fort Sumter with men
and provisions, especially with the latter. The
idea is that vessel with provisions Will BIO sent
first, and if her entrance is resented, the Ameri-
can flag viii be protected in Charleston harbor
and Fort Sumter both. Another and an iniiu-
entail class cling to the idea that there VIII be
no such attempt, but that the garrison will be
withdrawn. This opinion is based more on the
fact that the attempt would be an expensive one,
aud require more men than the Government can
at present command, than on any good feeling at
Washington toward the Seeded States. When
ever you get the honest opinion of those whose
opinion is worth anything, 1t will be found to bc
that Fort Sumter may be reinforced by no
greater number than fought aud bled" ct
Monterey. Five thousand would make sure
thing Of III; less could do it. OF course, the
enterprise must DO undertaken with the right
sort of WILL and not with the hall-and-halthess
OF which We have feen so much. 1t is practical
bic TO land troops above and below the harbor,
or both. The Rebel forces are now about equally
divided on the two sidcs-eay fifteen hundred, at
the largest, on side They are not appointed
with any special reference TO repeDing land
attack; aud when we recolect how Cerro
Gorto and Cbeputcpec were carried, we cannot
doubt that these batteries may be carried with
comparative ease. The hardest way 20 reach
Fort Sumter would be through the hgrbor, in
The face OF the batteries erected for the special
WORK Of keeping vessels out. A wolf in sheep
fold rv<er produced greater confederation than
would follow the appearance Of troops IN the
rear Can the Rebel forces prevent landing
Not il tho landing is conducted under the cover
Of a vessel of war, whose guDs would eilectuaily
keep at bay the infantry, which is all that could
be brought to oppose The Decentralization.
Among the leaders tho prediction is freely
INDUCED in that after the fret gun is fired it
VII not be three months before Washington city
will DO ia the hands Of JEFF Davis. There are
many who really believe in this, and il would be
folly TO deny that plans are on foot for executing
the purpose.