Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-09-27

few additional reflections upon the event. and upon
those subsequently transpiring In this command may
not be entirely devoid Of interest to our readers or
without Significance to the Confederste authorities
st Richmond, should these lines accidentally fall
under their observation.
Since the battle Of Cross Lanes, ia which we de-
feated and dispersed Colonel Tyler's command, our
brigade has remained stationary at Camp Gauley
for want Of provisions necessary to Warrant for
ward movement We were distant more than 90
miles from Jacksons river, the depot CT our army
stores, while our means Of transportation were en-
nreiy inefficient to supply our daily demands. To
move under such circumstances, into country
devoid OF almost every sort Of provisions or forage,
AMI particularly hostile to our arms, would have
been the madness of folly. But for this unavoidable
and vexatious delay, it was our purpose to have
moved against General Cox. at Gauley Bridge, at
| lacking him IN the rear, while General Wise and
Gen. Chapman would have taken him on the front
and On the left
While thus necessarily delayed in our onward
movements, Gen. Roseerans conceived the stragetic
| movement which occasioned our withdrawal from
the other side of Gauley. Without the knowledge
| of General Lee, Rosecrans put himself at the
head OF nine thousand men, four thousand Of
whom were regulars, and by forced march of
three days, P.ecipitat,d his superior column upon
rs when we only had days knowledge Of his ad-
vance. Though our regiments were fearfully deci-
mated by sickness, and with only 1850 available
men to their arms, determined to give the enemy
battle. This cid for more than four long hours,
four times repulsng his assaults and sleneIng his
guns, with a loss to him. as we are credibly in
formed, by those who have since passed through
his camp, Of from $50 to GOO.
Had Gen. Wise reinforced US with 600 men, OK.
had it been possible for the North Carolina and
| Georgia regiments to have come to our assistance
in time, We could doubtless have whipped Rosecrans
as badly on the morning Of the 1Ith, as we had
done on the evening of the 10Th. Indeed we think
it highly probable, we could have whipped him any
how, but as retreat would have been impossible
/ under the fire of the enemy and in the possible
event Of defeat we should all have bsen slaughter
ed or captured, our prudent General thought it
dangerous TO hazard so much upon the cast Of a
single die.
To retire to this side Of the Gauley, therefore,
was the only safe alternative left us and the wis-
dom Of this movement was fully endorsed on the
next day by dispatch from General Lee, advising
US of our danger, and suggesting the step we had
taken.
Our subsequent movements have been entirely
governed by those of the enemy. The night after
the fight we encsmped at Dogwood Gap, on the
main turnpike, mid way bet Ween the Saturday and
Sunday roads, and about ten miles from Gauley.
On Thursday intelligence reached US that the enemy
was crossing Gauley at Hughes Ferry, with view
of cutting US off by the Wilderness road, at Meadow
Bluff, sixteen miles this side of Lewisburg. We at
once moved back to this point, so as TO place our
selves in striking distance of the enemy should he
appear in that quarter and at the same time to hold
the strongest and most defensbls position this side
of Gauley Bridge, the line Of COx's advance. If
men, think we can defeat them, and we are anx~
iously anticipating hght in few days.
Movements in western VIrgInIa...C OIIIS-