Smyrna times., 1861-08-29
Our Exaggerations of the Strength of
the Rebels.

the Rebels.
If the estimate commonly placed upon the
numbers and appointments of the rebels now
in the field against the Government be correct,
| history cannot furnish parallel TO the power
put forth by so small population as that which
composes the seeding States. All told, their
whites number only about 100000. scattered
over an area Of nearly 100000 square miles
AS rule, people are weak for active opera
tons in proportion to the extent of the area
they occupy. Neither Texas nor Arkansas
can be represented to any considerable extent
in the army in Virginia. The same difficulty
exists throughout the South. The more dense
the population, the more readily, and 10 great
er numbers, can large bodies of men be con-
centrated. The city of New York can furnish
twice the number of men for the war than can
any equal population in the farming districts.
In large towns the male population have fewer
local ties than in the country, and can with
much less inconvenience turn themselves into
soldiers, and he moved TO distant quarters.
According to popular estimate, the rebels
must have at least 100000 men under arms.
This is one soldier for every twenty inhabi.
tants. The same ratio for New York would
call out an army from that State of $4,000
men; or for all the loyal States, Of !, 100, 900
men We can hardly CINE an emergency
that could put such a vast force in the field
nor can we conceive its maintenance for any
length OF time possible. To withdraw so large
proportion ofthe laboring population from the
various industrial pursuits would put complete
end TO many OF the most important OF them,
and threaten society with speedy starvation
The Clothing, equiPping and provisioning such
host would be the work of years, instead of
months, and when completed society itself
would fall, exha listed with the effort. Think
OF the vast preparations 10 tents, vehicles of
one kind or another, munitions Of war, cloth.
ing and cured provisions for the mobilization
OF such host. Imagination cannot picture
the magnitude of such preparations. If posi-.
bic at all, they would be the work of years, di.
rected by the most competant method and ex.
perlence.
/ Nearly the whole of the 100000 men which
are estimated 10 compose the Southern forces.
and which are assumed to be in condition for
! offensive as we'll as defensive operations, are
now in active service, chiefly in Virginia and
Missouri. But is not their number. as well as
! their discipline and appointments, vastly over
rated We do not see how It is possible to be
otherwise.
| But the greater part of all this vast military
power of the rebels exists only in the imapiEa.
tion of the people. They had the start Of US,
because they were in earnest and we were not
They had an object and purpose, while we for
a long time had neither. They seized our
forts and arsenals, end planted themselves
wherever they chose by our sutferance. We
permitted them to capture Sumter, Norfolk,
and HarPer's Ferry; to erect vast works for
the reduction Of Fort Plckens, and TO secure.
lyIHtrench themselves at Manassas. We made
a fool-hardy attempt upon this position, and
failed. From its strength, force ought to ha We
held it against three times their number. Be.
fore attacking it we allowed It 10 be reinforced
from every quarter. Without such reinforce.
ments II would have undoubtedly been captur.
ed. With the exception Of this attack, We
have thus far in the Eastern States ATTEMPTED
nothing. Perhaps we were not in postie
for forward movement The calling out of
the three months volunteers was a terrible
military blunder, and for a time periled tho
whole campaign. We deliberately rendered
ourselves inca pable of any successful forward
movement. We disba nded our army in the
sight Of the enemy. We were compelled TO
abandon Southwestern Missouri for a similar
reason.
These enlistments not only deprived US Of
large portion the Army when most needed.
but their effect was more disastrous upon those
enlisted for longer period. These plumbers.
arising naturally and inevitably from our Ma.
tiona inexperience in war, and their conseuuen.
ces, have really been the history OF the cump.
aign. We have never been in position 10
achieve anything but defeat. We are only new
for the fret time since the war commenced,
getting on firm ground. and really organizing
an Army from which we have a right 10 anti.
cpate success. Our misfortunes are our own
work, not those of the rebels, who have given
no evidence whatever of the fabulous strength
in men and preparation which we have assign
ed to them. Had the force al Mannassus
Junction been we'll appointed; it would never
have remained a month in camp after a bril-
liant victory. II has not moved because il
cannot with safety, nor will il act Extensively
far beyond its fortified lines, all the rumors "a
the contrary notwithstanding. We are equally
! confident that when our forces are prepared
to move, the rebels will be able 10 offer nc
effective resistance. We shall then find that
with our national habit of exaggeraiion, we
have magnifed many fold their power and
resources