The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1861-02-15
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.WSeSS6 o.
enc North.
The New York 7r,sssae Of yesterday laughs
to scorn the avowed design or Jefferson Davis
to carry the war into the North, which, II sssere
De war, would undoubtedly be his game. The
Southern Confederate States will not invade
the North unless the North send ships Of war
and armies to coerce them and in that event
the border slave States, and all their popula.
ton to man, win be with the cotton States
who will be sure to cross Mason and Dixon's
line.
So despioable In warlike character does the
| Tribune assume Southern men to be that it says
"a small feet of seagoing steamers and an
army of twenty thousand or thirty thousand
men, concentrated at New York, would keep
the entire South in perpetual check, and not a
man would be sent northward from any of the
Atlantic or Gulf States" The philosophy Of
this hazardous opinion is explained to be that
"no nation or State with an accessible sea-
board can venture on offensive operations
against an enemy who commands the
sea" This might hold good in the
case of an island, such as Great
Britain, whose wooden walls alone have saved
her from conquest by France; but suppose
England, instead of being separated from
France by Dover Straits, were part of the Con
tinent of Europe, and were divided from her
neighbor by stream or only an imaginary
geographical line, how long could "perfdious
Albion" be saved from invasion by the fact
that she held command of the sea? And of
what avail would be the enemy's command OF
the sea if his own land was conquered? The
| command OF the land ia much better than the
/ command Of the sea under such circumstances;
and this is just the case with the Southern
States. Only small forces can be transported
to distance by seattle operations are tedi-
| GUS, the cost enormous and the Decentralization
always attended with peril; while by land, where
there are no mountain barriers or impossible
rivers or chains Of well manned fortresses in the
way, and especially where there are railroads,
large army of 100000 men might be suddenly
concentrated at any given point on the from
tier, and by forced marches advance upon and
conquer the large and populous but unfortiied
cities of the North, where the invaders could
find ample provisions, spoils and munitions of
war; whereas, according to the statements of
the republican journals, an invading Northern
army could find no sustenance at the "starv-
ing" South, and must perish if any acct
dent should cut it off from its base of
operations or stop its supplies But, no matter
how well provisioned it might be, there would
be plenty of troops at the South to take care
of it. Suppose the twenty or thirty thousand
men safely landed, how far would they be
able to penetrate into the country before be.
ing cut off from their ships by larger army in
their rear! AS they would 60 to the South to
"enforce the laws" they could not lay waste
the country, or seize provisions, or slaughter
peaceful citizens OF the United States. They
could only deal with 'rebels" with arms in
their hands. If, therefore, the republicans can
only scrape up live army of 10000 men,
they would act wiser part by keeping it in
New York city, for its defence, than by sending
it as a forlorn hope to the South, never to come
back. Now, the invading Southern army would
not be under the same obligations to respect
persons or property at the North; for, having
thrown off allegiance to the Union they might
treat all at the North as foreign foes, and waste
the land by fire and sword.
On the other hand, as regards the South, a
sparse population, with a large area Of coun-
try, is rather an advantage to the invaded. This
was the case in the war of La Vendee, which
gave the French Directory such trouble at the
| time of the Revolution. An army has to travel,
| in such cases, immense distances without ac-
| complishing anything or seeing an enemy, and
| ii is ever liable to surprise. Ii was this cir
cumstance that so favored the colonies when
invaded by Great Britain in the Revolutionary
war. She had then command of the sea. What
did she achieved In the late war with Russia,
the Allied fleets swept the sea; but what did
they effect on land? In the invasion Of a thick
| ly populated district with large army, the
conquest is greatly facilitated fit contains large
cities without fortified walls, for it Is proved by
experience that all the population who are not
soldiers are only in the way, aud hindrance
to the defence. Hence the panic in England in
recent years about the capture of London by
| the French, when it was feared an invading
force might be successfully Landed on the
coast.
"featner-Ded" SOLDIERS ana amateurs, such
as our militia in great part consists Of would be
of very little use in real war and hard fighting.
II is evident to every observer, Notwithstanding
the numbers of our militia on paper, and
even the occasional parade of uniformed and
partially drilled regiments at the North, that
we are not now military people, whatever
we may have been in other days. The pro-
gress Of commerce and trade, and manufac-
lures, while tending TO wealth and luxury
along the Northern seaboard, tends also to
render us effeminate and unsuited for war.
The degeneracy of the English population is a
case in point. In the late Crimean war the
recruits raised in the manufacturing towns
were, from their appearance, the laughing
stock of the British press They persisted by