Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1861-07-10

dscip!inei men. This opinion was con-
Cured in by all the officers Of his COM
mand, and their memoranda on the sub
,ect were made enclosures of Maj. Ander>
sons letter. The whole was laid
before Lient. Gen. Scott, who at once con-
Cured with Major Anderson in opinion:
On reflection, however, he took iull
time, consulting with other officers,
both of the army and navy, and at the
end Of tour days, came reluctantly but de-
cidedly to the same conclusion as before.
lie also stated, a. the same time, there
wus not sufficient force then at the con-
troll of the government, or could be raised
and brought to the ground within the
I time when the provisions in the Fort
would DO exhausted. In purely military
point of view, this reduced the duty Of
the administration in the case to the mere
matter of getting the garrison safely out
o! the fort. 1t vas believed, however,
THAT so TO abandon that position, under
the circumstances, would be utterly rum
Gus that the necessity under which it
was 10 be done wonld not be fully under
stood-that by many it would be constru-
ed as u part of voluntary policy; that at
home it would discourage the friends ol
the Union, embolden its adversaries, snd
90 far to ensure to the latter recognl-
ton abroad that, in fact, it would be our
national destruction. Consummated.t this
could not be allowed. Starvation was not
vet upon the garrison, and ere it would
be reached, Fort Pickens might be rein
forced. This last would be clear indi-
cation of policy, and would better enable
the country to accept the evacuation OF
Fort Sumter as military necessity. An
| order was at once directed to he sent for
the landing OF the troops from the steam
; ship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens. This
Iorder could not 60 by land, but must take
the longer and slower route By sea. The
first return news from the order was re>
Iceiyed but one week before the fall OF
Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that
the officers commaL ding the Sabine, to
whica vessel the troops had been trans
fcrred from the Brooklyn, acting upon
some quasi armistce of the late admins
tration, and of the existence Of which the
present administration up to tho time the
| order was dispatched, had only two vague
- and uncertain rumors TO fix attention
: had refused to land the troops TO now re,
info:ce Fort PickenS before crisis would
be reached at Fort Sumter-was impossi-
1 BILE, rendered so by the near eXhaustation
| Of provision in the latter named fort in
precaution against such conjuncture, the
Government had, few days before, COM
menced preparing an expedition, as well
adapted as might be, to relieve Fort sum
ter. which expedition was intended to be
alternately used or not. According to
circumstances the strongest anticipated
y case for using il was presented, and 1t was
resolved to send it forward. As had beer
intended in this contingency it was alsC
resolved to notify the Governor o. Soutl
D.. Carolina that he might expect an attemp
= would be made to provision the fort, ant
, that if the attempt should not be resisted
I there would be no effort to throw in men
arms or ammunition without further no
f tice, or in case Of an attack upon the fort
O This notice was accordingly given
i whereupon the fort was attacked and rom
+. b,roed 10 its fall, without even awaiting
o a. 40 ...-0 soU,. r..tEii
c the reduction Of Fort Sumter was in NJ
e sense matter Of seiiss.taeiGence Oh tho par
d of the assailants. They we'll knew iha
/, the garrison in the fort could by no posi-
4 bility commit aggressons upon them. -
; They knew that they were expressly noti
, fled that the giving bread to the few
: brave and hungry men OF the garrison
= was all which on that occasion would b,
, attempted, unless themselves, by resistn!
S so much, should provoke more. They
] knew that this government desiret
] to keep the garrison in the fort no
: to assail them, but to merely maintain Wis
, ible possession, and thus to preserve the
? Union from actual and immediate dissC.
luton, trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to
7 time, discussion, and the balot-box, for
7 final adjustment, and they assailed and
; reduced the fort for precisely the re, erse
, object: to drive out the authority of the
: Federal Union, and thus force it TO imme
diatedissoluton. That this was their object
{ the Executive we'll understood, and hay
, ing said 10 them, in the inaugural address
you can have no conflict without being
; yourselves the aggressors," he took pains
not only to keep this declaration good, but
} also to keep the case so free from the pow :
! er of ingenious sophistry as that the
world should not be able to misunder,
stand it by the affair at Fort Sumter, with
its surrounding circumstances. Thet
, point was reached then, and thereby the
! assailants of the government begun the
conflict of arms, without gun in sight or
in expectancy to return theie fire, save
only the few in the fort sent to that har
Dor years before for their own protect on,
and still ready to give that protection in
whatever was lawful. In this act, dis
earding all else, they have forced upon
the country the distinct tssue-immediate
dissolution or blood-and this issue EN-.
braces more than the fate of these United
States. 1t presents to the whole family
OF man, whether constitutional Repub-
lie, or democracy a government of the
people 10y the same people-can or can
not maintain its territorial integrityagainst
its own domestic foes. 1t presents the
question whether discontented individu,
ais, too Few in numbers TO control the Ad-
minish alton according to organic law in
any case, can always, upon the pretences
made in this case, or on any other preten-
ces, Or arbitrarily without any pretence,
break up their government, and thus
practically put an end to free government