Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1861-07-06
%PRFGInENTs MESSAGE.

tour months ago, the functions Of the FEEDER
al GoVernnent were found to be generally
suspended within the several States Of South
Oaiollna, Georgia Alabamn, Mississippi
Louisiana and Eorida, excepting those only
ct the Post Office Department within
these States. All ths forts, a~rsenais,
dock yards, Custom Houses, SC, In
gliding all the movable and sta
uonaFy property In and about them, had
been seized and held In open hostility to
this Government excepting only Forts Pick
ems, Taylor and Jefferson, on and near the
Florida coast and Fort S1mter in Charleston
Harbor. The forts thus seized had been put
in improved condition. new ones had been
built and armed forces rad been organized
and were organizing, all avowedly for the
same hostile purpose. Nra
The forts remaining in the Federal posses
sion In and near those States were either be-
sieged or mensced by Warlike preparations.
Especially Fort Sumter vas nearly surround
ed by well protected hostile batteries, with
guns equal in quality TO the best Of its own,
and outnumbering the latter as perhaps ten to
one. A disproportionate share OF the Federal
muskets and rifles had somehow found their
way into these States, and had been seized TO
be used against the Government. Accumu.
ladons Of the public revenue lying within
them had been teized for the same object
The navy was scattered in distant seas, lelv-
ing but q very small part Of it within the i'm
mediate reach of the Government officers Of
the Federal army had resignedi in great num-
bers, and Of those resigned a great portion
had taken up arms against the Government.
simultaneously, and ia connection with all
this. the purpose 70 sever the Federal Union
was openly avowed. In accordance with
this purpose an ordinance had been adopted
In eacn OF thesa States declaring the States
4 respectively TO be separated from the Ma
I tional Union; the fOr1ula for instltuting &
combined government for these States had
been promulgated, and this illegal organizs-
ton in the character of the Confederate
States, was already invoking recognition, aid
and intervention from foreign powers.
Finding this condition Of things, and be-
Iieving it TO be an imperative duty upon the
incoming executive to prevent, If possible, the
consummation Of such attempt to destroy
tue Federal Union, a choice of means to
that end became indispensable. This choice
was made and declared 10 the inaugural ad-
dress. The policy chosen looked to the ex-
| nhu5uOA VI hlA pDAlobDAO WCuouAC0 DCA1AO n
resort to any stronger ones. 1t sought only
to hold the public places and property not
already wrested from the Government, and
to collect the revenues relying for the rest
on time, discussion and the ballot box.
Il promised the continuance of the
mails at the Governments expense to
the very people who were resisting the
Government and gave repeated pledges
against any disturbance to any Of the peo-
f pie or any of their rights, Of all that which
a President might constitutionslly and justi-
fably do in such a case. Everything was
foreborne, without which it was believed
possible to keep the Government on foot
| On the 5In of March the present incum-
; bents first full day in Office, a letter from Msj
Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter,
written on the 2sth Of February and receiv.
l ed at the War Department on the fourth Of
March, was by that Department placed in hi:
hands. This letter expressed the profession.
=, al opinion OF the writer that reinforcement
, could not be thrown into that fort in time
1 for his relief, rendered necessary by the lin.
3 tied supply Of provisions and with a view
|, Of holding possession Of the same with Q
force Of less than 10000 well disciplined
men. This opinion was concurred in BY
all the officers Of his command, and theil
e memoranda on the subject we're made il
5 Enclosures Of Major Anderson's letter
The whole was Immediately laid befort
Lieut.. Gen. Scott who at once c~oncurreC
with MHjUr Anderson in his VPfuiUu.
4 On reflection, however, be took full tim
in consulting with other officers both Of tn
, army and navy, and at the end of four day.
e came reluctantly, but decidedly, to the sam,
0 concll siOn as before. BE also stated at tn
] same time that no such sufficient force wa
then at the con,rol of the Government, o
could be raised and brought to the grounC
within the time when the provisions in tn
o tort would be exhausted. In a military
e DO Mt IF view, this reduced the duty Of TIL
Administra ion to the mere matter Of getting
the garrison safely out Of the fort. @oA
! It was believed, however, that to so sban'
{ don that position, under the circumstance
would be utterly ruinous that the necessity
! under whichit was to be done would not be
fully understood; that by many 1t would be
construed as q part of q voluntary policy
that at home it would discourage the friends
e of the Union, embolden its adversa-ies, and
? 90 far TO insure to the latter 3 recognition
abroad; that, In fact, it would be our nation.
al destruction consummated. This could MOI
be allowed. Starvation was not yet upor
o the garrison, and ere 1t would b
reached Fort Pickens might be rein
forced. This -lsst-Rould be q cleal
Indication Of policy-and would bette
e enable the country to accept the evacuation
Of Fort Sumter as a military necessity. Their
an order was at once directed to be semi fol
the landing Of the troops from the steam.
ship Brooklyn, into Fort Pickens. This or
, der could not go by land, but must take tht
longer and slower route By sea. The FRS
J return news from the order wal received
!, Just one week before the fall of Sumter
The news itself was, that the officer command.
, ing the Sabine, to which vessel the troop:
had been transferred from the Brooklyn,
acting upon some quasi srmistice Of the
late Administration, and Of the existence Of
which the present Administration up to the
time the order was dispatched had only too
vague and uncertain rnmors to fx attention,
had refused to land the troops. To now re-
inforce Fort Piekens before q crisis would be
reached at Fort Sumter was impossible; rem.
dered so by tue mere exhaustion of provis-
ions in the latter named fort. In precau-
ton Of such a conjunctive, the Government
had q few days before commenced preparing
an expedition as well adapted as might be,
to relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition
was intended to be ultimately used or NOT
according 70 circumstances. 81
The strongest anticipated case for using
1t was now presented. and it was resolved
to send 1t forward, as had been intended
In this contingency It was also resolved to
notify the Governor Of South Carolina that
he might expect 81 attempt would be made
70 provision the fort and that if the at
tempt should not be resisted, there would
be no attempt to throw in men, arms or am
munition without further notice or In case
Of an attack upon the fort. This notice was
e~coerdingly given, Whereupon the fort vas
attacked and bcmbarded to It's fall, not even
awaiting the arrivsl Of the provisioning
expedition. tits thus seen that the assault
upon and reduction Of Fort Sumter was in