The Council Bluffs nonpareil. [volume] (Council Bluffs [Iowa]) 1857-1867, 1861-07-13
Ss"s7I . tNs AIsssoaFi Kspaeiiesn.
PRESIDENTS MESSAGE.
Feiou-ciii-eHs Of The Senate
and Hause af Rsr~.nn


,e OCCASION, as authorized by the Constitution
your attention is not called TO any ord,uar
subject OF legislation at the beginning O
The present Presidential term.
-Four months ago the functions Of tb
Federal Goyernmens were found to be gen
orally suspended within the several State
of South Carolina, Georgia. Alabama
Mississippi. Louisiana and Florida. exeep,
ling only those of the Postofice Departmen
within these States. The forts, arsenal.
docks, harbors, Custom Houses, and th
IKE, including the moveabie and stationar,
property IN and about them had been seized
ana we're held, 10 open hostility TO the Gov
srnment, excepting only Forts Piekeps
Taylor and jefferson, on and near the Flor
da coast, and Fort Sumter. in Charleston
harbor, 5. T.. The forts thus seized hac
been pat IN a defensive condition, new one.
had been built, and armed forces had be.,
organized and were organizing, ell avow ed
with some hostile purpose; the forts remain.
. ing IN the possession of the Federal Govern
, ment IN aud near these States were eithe,
! beseIged or menaced by warlike prepara.
tions. and especially Fort Sumter was nearly
surrounded by well projected hostile bat.
teries, with guns equal in quality to the bes,
OF It's own, and oatnamberiug the latter as
perhaps ten to one; disproportienate
share of the Federal musaets and rifles had
somehow found their way into these States
and had been seized to be used against the
Government; accommodations of the public
revenue lying within them had been seized
for the same object; the navy was scattered
in distant seas, leaving but very small
part within the immediate use of the Gov
ernment the officers of the Federal army
and navy had resigned in great numbers and
OF those resi- lgnlng, Il large proportion had
,ske up arms against the Government sim
uItanc lusig, and IN connection with all these
the purpo,e 10 sever the Federal Union was
openly ayowst. In accordance with this
-rp6se an ordinance hsd been adopted in
y # these States, DECLARING the States
e"on ,Iy to be separated from she Ma
v,pIir1; ,;alsI - and formula for e5-nbiniTg
a,"p%. IA o.., combined Government, of
these States had been \. sp.as aso r ."'s
Illegal organization in tie {. aotef oi CON
federate States was already Inv. 80
nition from foreign powers. Finu '.'o
condition of things, and believing 1t TO De
the imperative duty upon the incoming
Executive TO prevent, if possible, the con
summation of such attempt to destroy the
Federal Cnion, a choice Of means to that end
became indispensable. This choice was
made aud declared in the inaugural address.
The policy chosen looked to the exhaustion
of ell peaceful measures before resort to
auy stronger ones it sought only to hold
the public places and property not already
wrested from the Government, and to collect
the revenue, relying for the rest 90 time,
discussion and the ballot box. Il promised
| a continuance of the mails at Government
expense to the very people who were resist
| ing the Government, and il gave repeated
| plsdges against nny disturbance 10 auv of
| the people or any of their rights of all that
which q President might constitutionaliy
and justliiaby do in snch case. Every
| thing was foFborne without which it was
beies sG possible to keep the Government on
foot. On the 5th Of March, the present in-
cumbents first full day in Office, letter of
Major Anderson. commanding at Fort Sum-
ter, written on the 2Sth of February, and
received at the War Department on the 4th
of March was by that Department placed in
his hands. This letter expressed the pro-
fessonal opinion of the writer, that rein
| forcements could not be thrown into that
| fort within the time for his relief rendered
necessary by the limited supply OF provisions
and with q view of holding possession of
| the same. Win itFCs bl less tti'i .-t-Jpt
| good and we'll disciplined men. This opn-
lion was c0ncurred In by all the officers of his
commsnd and their memoranda on the snb-
iect we're made Enclosures of NJ Andeyson's
letter. The whole was imme ediateiy laid be-
fore Lieut.. General Scott, who at once con-
Cured with Maj. Audersop's opinion. On
reflection, however. he took full time and
consultation with other officers. both OF the
army and navy, aud at the end Of -four days
came reluctantly but decidedly to the same
conclusion as before. He also stated al toe
same time, that such sufficient force was NOE
at the control Of the Government. or could
be raised and brought to the ground within
the time, when the provisions IN the fort
would be exhausted. In a purely military
point Of view. this reduced the duty of the
Administration IN the case TO the mere mat
ter Of taking the garrison safely ont of the
fort. IL was believed, however, to abandon
that position under the circumstances would
be utterly ruinous: that the necessity under
which il was to be done wauld not be fully
understood; that by this means 1t would be
construed as a part Of voluntary patev !:
that at home il would discourage the frieuds
of the Union, embo.den its adversaries. and
go far TO insure 10 the latter recognition
abroad: that in fact it would be our na-
tional destruction eonsummatei. lhis
, could not be al we'd. Starvation was not
yes upon the garrison, ard ere IL would be
reached Fort Ptckens might be reinforced.
, This last would be clear indication oil
Ipahcy. and would better enable the country
r TO accept the evacuation cf Fort Sumter as
military necessity. An order was at once
. directed {, be sent for the landing of tbs
troops from the steamship Brooklyn into
! Fort pickens. This could not 60 By land
but must take the longer and slower route
by sea, the Srs: relurn news from the ordei
was read but one week before the fall o'
i Fort Sumter. The news itself was that sh'
officer commanding the Sabine. to whiet
vessel the troops had been transferred fruu
the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi arm
i.tics Of tn late Administration. and OF th
existence Of the late Administration up q
the time the erjsr Was dispatched had Ont,
ltso vague and uncertain rumors to Ok a.
tsasion. had refused TO land the troops &
Iyeinforce Fort Piekens before a crisis wsul'
be reaehei al Fora Sumter was impossible
i-renasrej so by the near exhaustion o
ip-syIxioas in the latter named fort. II
lprscausaan agaius. sueh esuiancsurs, th
I,,ayarnusut had few days before com
meneea preparing an expediIlon as We
.aaptssI a. might be, 20 relieve Fort Sumter
which expedition MAS intended TO De uisi
massly nsei or not. according 10 ciFcam
stances The strongest anticipated case 10
using 1t vss nos presented. snd u Was re
Q solved 10 send il forward as had been N
suded 10 thss csutingsnev u Vas ats
resolved to notify the uoserner oil Seas
CaraIias that he might expect an ai'smf
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