The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1861-08-15
,19DownLL,s OFFICIAL
GEN. McD PORT. ssE
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Gen. McDoweh, W. . was chief in command
of the Feder" FORCES at Bull Run, concludes
his official report as follows:
- As my position may warrant even lift does
MT call for some explanation of the causes as
far as theQ can be seen, which led to the results
herein stated, l trust it may not be out of plan,
if refer in few words 10 the immediate an
teeedents of the battle. When / submitted 10
the General-in-Chief III compliance with his
verbal instructions the plan II operations and
estimate of force required, the time | was tot
proceed to carry it into effect was fixed for the
sth of July, Monday Every facility possible
was given me by the General.in-C hief and heads
of the administrative departments in making
the necessary preparations. But the regiments,
owing | was told TO want Of transportation,
came over slowly. Many ct 'hpin did not come
across till eight or nine days after the time fix
ed upon, and went forward without my even
seeing them, and without having been together
before in a brigade The sending reinforce
nents to Gen. Patterson, by drawing off the
wagons, was further and unavoidable cause
OF delay.
Notwithstanding the herculean efforts of the
Ouartermaster- Genara, and his favorng ule in
every way, the wagons for ammunition, subsis-
tence, &c, and the horses tor the trains and
the artillery, did not all arrive for more than
week after the time appointed 10 move. | was
not even prepared as late as the 18Th ut., and
the desire that should move became great and
it was wished should not, if possible, delay
longer than the 10th ut. When did set out,
on the 10th, | was still deficient in wagons for
subsistence. But | went forward trusting TO
these being procured in time TO follow me- The
trains thus hurridly thrown together with hors.
es wagons, drivers. and wagon managers, all
new and unused to each other moved with diff
fculty and disorder, and was the cause OF
days delay in getting the provisions forward,
making it necessary TO make Sunday the
attack we should have made on Saturday.
could noe with every exertion, get forward
with the troops earlier than we did. wished
10 go to Centreville the second day which would
have taken there on the l7th, and enabled
us, so far as they were concerned, to go into ac-
ton on the 10Th, instead of the Dist but when
/ went forward from Fairfax Court House, be-
yond Germantown TO urge them forward was
told it was impossible for the men to march
further. They bad only come from Vienna
about six miles, and il was not more than six
and half miles further to Centreville-in all a
march of twelve and half miles but the men
were foot weary. not so much, was told, by
the distance marched as by the time they had
been on foot, caused by the Instructions in the
road and the slow pace we had to move to avoid
customed to marching, their bodies no. in con
dition for that kind of work, and not used 10
carrying even the load of light marching order
We crossed Bull Run with about IL, 900 men
of all arms, the Fifth Division Miles and Rich
ardson's Bngade) on the left, at Backburn's
+ ord 20 Centreville, and Schenck's Brigade of
Iyier's Division, on the left OF the road, near
the Stone Bridge, not participating III the main
acnon. The numbers opposed to US have been
Vanous!y estimated | may safely say, and
avoid even the appearance of exaggeration, that
The enemy brodght up all he could whichwere
not kept engaged elsewhere. He had not no.
tice OF our coming OH the 18th, and bad from
that time up to the 2lst TO bring up whatever
he had. 1t is known that in estimating the
force TO 90 against Manassas engaged not TO
have to do with the enemy forces under John,
son, then kept in check iii the valley by Major
General Patterson, or those kept engaged by
Major General Butler, and / know every effort
was made by Generan Chief that this should
be done, and that even if johnson Joined Beau
regard, it would not be because he could be fol-
lowed by Gen. Patterson, bat for causes not
necessary for me to refer to. if know them at
all
This W Is not done, and the enemy was freo
to assemble from every direction IN numbers
only limited by the amount OF his railroad roll
ing stock and his supply Of provisions. To the
Il
Court House, Fairfax Station, Germantown, and
Centrevile, and those under Beauregard at Ma
nassas must be added those under Johnston from
Winchester, and those brought up by Davis
from Richmond and other places at the south, to
which is to be added the levy en- masse ordered
by Richmond authorities which was ordered to
assemble at Manassas. What all this amounts
to cannot say-certainy much more than we
attacked them with
I b,tr al ual,,
on faster, nor could / delay. A large, and tho
best part ofmy forces were three mouths voluu-
teers, whose time OF service was about to ex-
pire, but who were sent forward as having long
time enough to serve FOR the purposes of the ex-
petition.
On the eve Of the battle the 4th Pennsylvania
Regiment of Volunteers and the battery ofvol-
unteer artillery of the New York 9Th Militia,
whose term OF service expired, insisted on their
discharge. / wrote TO the regiment, expressly
request o them TO remain short time, and
the Hon. Secretary of War, who was al the time
on the ground, tried TO induce the battery to
remain at least five days. But in vain. They
insisted on their discharge that night 1t was
granted, and the next morning, when the army
moved forward into battle these troops moved
to the rear to the sound OF the enemys cannon
In the next few days, day by day. l should
have lost 10000 Of the best armed drilled of
fcered and disciplined troops in the army. In
other words, every day which added to the
strength of the enemy made us weaker
In conclusion, desire to say, in reference to
the events of this Dist ult. that the general or-
der for the battle to which | referred was, with
slight modification, literally conformed to; that
the corps were brought over Bull Run in the
manner proposed, and put into action AS before
arranged, and that up to late in the afternoon
every movement ordered was carrying us sac
cessfuly to the object we had proposed before
startng-that OF getting to the railroad leading
from Manassas to the valley Of Virginia, and
going on it far enough to break up and destroy
the communication and interviews between the
forces under Beauregard and those under John.
son. Aud could we have fought day or a few
hours sooner, there is everything to show how
we could have continued successful even against
the odds with which we contended
have the honor to be, very respectfully your
most obedient servant
IRWIN MCDOWELL,
Brigader Gdneral Commanding.