Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-03-09

war Straterv OF the Confederate states.
MANY uersons have apprehended that the coer-
Give character of the Inaugural Address would in
duce the government of the Confederate States 70
Immediately attack Forts Sumter and Pickens and
thus to deprive the Executive of the United States
of the power to carry out his designs.
In strict moral right the Confederate States hav-
ing been forewarned by the President of the United
States of his intention to force his obnoxious au
thu rty upon them and to use coercion in executing
laws from which they have in form, absolved them.
selves, would be perfectly justable in taking eve
~ step necessary to thwart his bloody designs But
yet it is question of policy with themselves whe.
Their they will drive the Federal bayonets from all
the places which Mr. LINCOLN intends to hold
and possess" or whether they viii quietly and
firmly await an aggressive movement on the part of
the United States Government.
This question is ably discussed in well matured
article in the Charleston Mercury of the 5thinstant.
being the conclusion of its structures on Lincoln's
inaugural From the tone of these remarks, we
are induced to believe that the policy of siege of
Fort Sumter viii be determined on. The only dan
ger there has ever been of premature attack of
Fort Sumter has arisen from the ardor of the South
Carolinlans President DAVIS is man OF great
forecast and cool-headed as well as of clear mills
tary judgment. The South Csrolinlans having
withdrawn their opportunities for attack on Fort
Sumter he will be left free to pursue the dictates of
his cooler and more experienced Judgment, without
embarrassment. The following are the observations
Of the Mercury;
But still we would say to our people, for the pres
emit. keep cool and bide your time. The henor of
this State is no further involved in this matter II
has been transferred 70 the shoulders of the Gov
eminent of the Confederate States Of america Wheth-
err wisely or not it is too late to discuss Our
course is now entirely of policy and war strate-
gy We do not profess to be accurately coguisant
Of the plans of President Davis. If there is no war;
there must be aplan and policy for the campaign.
These must originate from the heads of the Govern
ment We have DOW nothing TO lose by time-every-
thing to gain. War sixweeks ago might have placed
Virginia now by our side War should have been
IN the name of the State of South Carolina The
glory, prestige and historic fame would have been
here. 1t is no longer SO. The blood will be hers;
but little of the profit. That blood, however her
people are still as they have ever been, willing
to she'd Nor viii any foreign foe
molested cross her border by sea or land. Beyond
this policy and strategy must rule the action of the
General Government at Montgomery. Their deci
sion with regard 10 this harbor will be carried out
by the troops of Carolina.
That President Lincoln will attempt to eollectrev-
enue off the Bar is now beyond question. What
then? Here lies the question in which alone this
State is directly concerned. What course is then to
be pursued by the Southern Government? There
are but two open. The one, immediate attack up
on Fort Sumter; the other, to beseige and starve
out the fortress. To attack the Fort will not re-
move the men-of-war from off our Bar. What,
then, will be gained? 1t is question.
To declare martial law over the whole harbor
including both shores and the wharves of the city,
prohibiting all approach 10 Fort Sumter by night or
by day, excluding from it all supplies of ary de-
scripton, and al information or communication to
its inmates, may be the policy decided upon. Salt
meat and warm weather may most effectually do
our work for To reinforce Fort Sumter is
now only to hasten the period of starva-
ton. FOR ship of war can enter our
harbor and land supplies. Should she succeed in
running TO the FORT she will be under the constant
fire of three four batteries within telling and de-
structive distance She must be quickly destroyed
In the meantime our ships. or ships ladened with
our goOGs for foreign ports, may continue their
course usual Even should blockade be de-
clared, it In way interfere with the egress
and ingress of neutral bottoms in their ordinary
avoca,ions of trade A duty may doubt ess for the
present. be collected on such imports as arrive here
directly from abroad. Of this reckoning must De
made in the calculation of costs pro and con- few
months must settle the whole question. And the |
taking of Fort Sumter Immediately cannot, far as
we perceive hasten that period. We will be |
little further when we have finished than when we |
0egun-minus some valuable lives.
The above calculations are, of course, based upon
he supposition that matters inside the harbor re |
main Ia stain quo belgerent attitude on the part
If Fort Sumter must precipitate war; and the
ort must be taken in seifprotection.
In throwing out the above suggestions, We do not /
TO adv sc those much more competent TO /
leal with the emergency than we can be. They are
ldvanced simply as thoughts that have occurred to
Is in weighing and balancing the issues now before
Is. We let them go for what they may be worth.
rhe proper authorities will decide upon the course
hat will seem best to them, and we will be en-
irely satisfied to assist in its execution, whatever
nay be.
We shall soon learn what are the plans of Presi-
lent Davis. They will probably be decided by the
uture action of Lincoln.