Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1861-10-04

-
and above and below it for number of
miles The object OF the enemy, then,
must be to cross. If they attempt it at all,
either below or above this impregnable
line of defence.
Should they succeed in crossing, despite
the Potomac HotiIla under Commander
Gillas, at Freestone Point, the mouth OF
occoquan, at Acquia Greek, or at any 9th
er point below Washington, with a large
number of men, how could they convey
horses, cannon, heavy munitions of war,
wagons, and tent equiPage across in suth-
Gent quantity or numbers so as to cousti-
tute a force Sufficiently formidable orpow-
erfnl to take the field, and advance upon.
Bladensburg, Annapolis. or Baltimore?-
Their means Of crossing the river consist
simply of oId-fashioned1 fiat-bottomed
scows, few light river craft, and some
very small, Indifferent steamers, incapable.
of transporting a force of any numbers,
cannon, munitions of war, ETC., except in
the most limited and time consuming man
ner.
But suppose that presses should succeed
in planting forty or fifty thousand rebels
in the narrow peninsula lying tetween the
Potomac and Chesapeake Bay, these would
have 70 march over most difficult aud
rough roads for more than two days
before they could reach any assaillble
point upon our rear, with their own rear
perfectly unprotected, and wide, deep
river to cross in case of disaster. Uuter
such circumstances, an advance upon
Bladensburg, Annapolis or Baltimore, by
the rebels, would bea holacaust-a hetn-
comb; for they would be Outnumbered by
men in fortified positions, even il the re-
mainder of their forces made a simulta-
neous feint, or series of feints, upon the
positions in front of Washington.
The Potomac, from Point of Rocks
twelve miles below HIrper's Ferry, to Cum
berland, following the line of the river,
more than a hundred milesabove, is guard
ed only by a Iiue,of sentries, embracing a
| force OF not moro than five thousand men
all told Throughout this whole line,
there are abundant fords over which we
have passed wagons, cannon and soldiers.
These fords are, in bnt exceptional cases..
not even guarded by cannon on our side.
The enemy, therefore, according to all the
doctrine of chances, all the law of probA-
utilities, will seek to force our lines where
most weakly defended. By forcing them.
at Harpers Ferry, Shepherdstown, Seven
Springs Ford, or Williamsport-all prar-
lticnble lords, especially tile three latter, for
4
ture Hagerstown, and advance directly up
on McCIellan's rear in single days march
to Frederick, and thence menace Balti-
more or they can rapidly push up the
Cumberland valley into Pennsylvania
valley less susceptible of defence than any
other IN the State, because of its width and
level surface. The latter mode of advance
would raid the richest valley in the State,
exhaust its wealth, threaten Harrisburg,
and menace Philadelphia.
That Mcclellan fears an attempt of the
kind alluded to, and that he has penetrated
the design of the enemy to advance either
| in tile Frederick Baltimre dissection or the
Hagerstown-C hnmbersburg direction, is
clear from the fact that he is gradually ex-
tending his right wing on the Virginia side
of the Potomac toward Leesburg. Bysuch
u westward movement he seriously menaces
any flank movement the rebels can make in
the direction named, whilst he is in readi-
ness to advance from Alexandria, Arlington
Heights, tue Chain Bridge and Great Falls
upon their Manassas buse of operations.
Gen. Banks must checkmate any such
movement by rapid march westward,
and offer those who cross, il cross they do,
battle upon any terms. The gage OF bat
tie once thrown down by them to him must
be accepted on any terms, and fought a Ia
entrance.
If our facts, and reasoning therefronl,
be correct, Gen. Banks holds the post of
danger, and therefore of homer. America
expects him TO do his whole duty. ll