New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-08-09

should learn fully Of our movements and PROVIDE
themselves against il with re6niorcements and
otherwise. The plan was interrupted on the
second day. Instead of proceeding to Centre
vile, the troops were halted at Fairfax Court
House aud about Germantown, where they had
arrived at an early hour in the afternoon Gen.
Mcdowell did not fail to urge thcm forward,
but be was told it was impossible for the men to
" march further" That thus seemed to him poor
excuse is evident, tor he explains that "they 'nd
"only come from Vienna, about six miles, and
" il was not more than Elk and half miles fur
" tier to Ceutreville" Ia this statement Gen.
Mcdowell keeps well within the mark The TACT
is, that the head of the column was, not
more than two and q half miles rom
Centrcyil!e. However, he I'D not sue
coed in inducing his officers to hold TO
bis plan, and one unfortunate result OF The
DELAY (which he does not mentiOn) was the ee-
cape of five or six Rebel regiments, which passed
from Fairfax through Centreyipe in the evening,
almost within our grasp, some four bours a'ier
our army had halted. The march was resumed
early the next morning, but was not CHECKED ~
Crntreyille. On the contrary the leading dNl-
sion pushed forward about five miles, the c0nse-
ouence Of which movement was the sklrmlsh ci
ThUrsday, an event which Gen. Mcdowell mel
ther approves nor disapproves, asudipg TO II Only
incidentally We may presume, however, that 1t
oDerated 10 the further delay OF the grand o.
tack, which had already been put back by the
shortness Of Wednesdays march. Gen. McDo"eh
omits to state-eitber by accident or because he
does not CONSIDER it important-the precise rea-
sons which induced him to hold back two days
later than he had originally intended, instead OF
one. He mentions, however that no had ar
ranged A reconnaissance for Saturday afternoon,
| which he afterward discovered would not be ne
ccssary to his purposes.
The conse Iuences Of this prolonged inaction
are tersely described in the report. lie (the
enemy had notice Of our coming on the i'th,
(" and had from that time until the Plat to bring
{. ND whatever he had" "The enemy was free
.s 10 assemble from every direction, in numbers
:. only limited by the amount of his railrosd
rolling stock and his supply of provisions.'
a. may safely say that the enemy brought up
call he could which were not engaged else
where" could We have fought day, or
few hours sooner, there is every thing to snow
~ how we could have continued successful.
1t is plain, then, that the delays, fret before
reaching Ccntreyille, and aftcrward ia Withhold.
inc battle, formed an important element Of our
defeat. II should be understood that we are not
here cri,icizilg Gen. McDOwelrs conduct, but
simply putting the facts which be freely offers to
the only use that can properly be made Of them.
Passing on TO the day of battle, we learn that
the General had wished to relieve his troops
from all unnecessary fatigue by marching them
t. their position on the previous even
ing; but TO this the subordinate COM
uanders objected. They preferred " stsrt-
ing early in the morning, and making but
one move" 1t is impossible not TO recur to
! the experience of the previous Wednesday, when
! Gen. Mcdowell had felt compelled to allow an
! early halt, on the ground that the troops were
| overcome by fatigue. although they had marched
/ only six miles, If this Wore true on Wednosday
/ it would be equally so on Sunday; but the mat
ter was suffered to pass as tke subordinate com.
manders desired. Gen. Mcdowell appears sub
seauently 10 have regretted this. Abiding to the
period toward the close Of the battle, when our
exhausted troops were assaed by fresh rebel
force, he Gays, ave had been fighting since IOl
4" O'Clock in the morning. aud II was after >
O'Clock in the afternoon. The men had been
up since o'clock in the morning and had
made, what, to those unused to such things,
seemed long march, before coming into
A." action"
The description Of the preparations for tic
battle, aud of the battle itself have been aLiici-
pated in various wnys. The facts have been re
peated score Of times. One very general mi.
! apprehension, however, is corrected. IL appear
that abundant provisions were furnished the
troops on Friday night, and that orders to carry
rations for three days were issued at the same
time. II, them there was any scarcity Of food
on the day Of the battle, it must have been the
fault of the reemental Oifcers or Of the soldiers
themselves. The object Of the battle is for the
first time authoritatiyey stated. II was not TO
assault Manassas, but to push through the
enemys lines 10 Gainesville, where, By destroy
ing the railroad, the communication between
Beauregard and Johnston should have been
broken up. But although this might have been
effectively done Oh Friday the 18th, on Sunday,
the 2lst, it was too late, and even if the rail
road had been reached, the ayowed object would
not have been accomplished, since the two Rebel
forces had already united.
An awkward delay in the morning march APP
pears to have been caused by want Of sufficient
reconnaissance. Gen. Mcdowell admits that
(" the wood road leading from the Warrenton