Cincinnati daily press. [volume] (Cincinnati [Ohio]) 1860-1862, 1861-11-29
From the New York Herald.l
The War Policy Of the South.
THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN AND GEN.
BEAUREGARD'S REPORT.
SHARP CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
REBEL JOURNALS.
WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NON.CAPTUBE
OF WASHINGTON, DAVIS OR BEAUREGARDS
[From the Charleston Mercury, October % ]


Presidtnt DdUis, and no one else, responsible
for The irdr-Or, rather, anti ,oar policy of our
army on the Potomac. By strange perversion
of truth, the newspaper press Of the Confederate
States were persisting in charging on the gem
erals in command The extraordinary and uppre-
cedented inactivity which characterized the
army. We eudeavored to correct this injustice,
and pointed to the true source Of this very gen
orally condemned policy, and ventured to sug-
gest that an advance on Washington, or an
Invasion of Maryland, was inconsistent with its
false requirements, and was therefore never
intended; and that the result would be, the in
vasion of the Southern coasts by the naval
armaments now fitting out in the Northern
ports, and the indefinite protraction of the war
so far as fighting is to end it. The retreat Of
cur army back to Bull Run has verified our an
ticipations; apd now the publication of General
Beauregard's report Of the battle Of Manassas,
we think, tends strongly to support our views,
and to prove who is really responsible for their
realization. Our readers will find an abstract
Of this report in our columns to day. 1t states
that
General Beauregard opens with statement
Of his position antecsdent to the battle, aud of
the plan proposed by him to the Government
Of q junction of the armies of the Shenandoah
ard Potomac, with q view to the relief Of May
land and the capture of the city of Washington,
which plan was rejected by the President. Gem
pertinent on the 18th Of July, of the contem-
plated attack on General Mcdowell, urgently
asking for a junction Of General Johnston's
forces with his OWL, and continued to make
urgent requests for the same until the 18th of
July, when the President consented to order
General Johnston to his assistance"
Now here is proof positive, that, before the
battle Of Manassas, President Davis did con-
troll the movements of the army, He rejected
the plan of General Beauregard to take Wash
ington and relieve Maryland; aud when Gene
raj Beauregard knew of the attack Of General
Mcdowell, he teegraphsd the fact to the War
Department, on the 18Th of July, "urgently
asking for junction of General Johnston s
| forces with his own" The request not being
granted, he "continusd to mako urgent re-
| quests for tho Same until the 18th of July,
when the President consented TO order General
Johnston to his assistance" Here is proof
conclusive of the absolute control and restraint
of President Davis over the army before ths
battle Of Manassas. We know President Davis
on the battle field ordered the pursuit to be
| arrested But General BsauIegard's testimony
does not end with this report. In his letter
laid before Congress, very generally known in
Richmond, he complained bitterly of his not
being enabled, or allowed, to realize the fruits
of bis victory at Manassas, by folio wing up the
enemy. Both before and after this battle, we
thus find Ger eral BeauregaTd, with his army,
vigorously under the control Of President Da-
Wis, and he is responsible, to great degree,
{, r IFS inactivity.
Every body oi:likes disagreeaole truths; and
very of:en tie first impulse to vi ard those who
tel dissereeable truths, is oppOsidon-some-
times hate. 1t hatters self complocency, and
relieves fears, to suppose some evil influence OF
bad motive may actUa.e the informant, and
hence, these unpleasant things are misappre-
tensions and exaggetatiOns. Greek orator
in addressing the AtbeDians, says, concerning
another, "You hated the truth he told you
and baDishtd him, aud now you are ready tt
raise monument over his remains"
[From the Richmond Examiner, October 3l.I
Some days since a communication appeared
in one Of our cotemporaries, and giving wha
purported to be synopsis of General Besurs'
CARDS official report Of the battle Of the 21st
Of July. The writer states that he has beer
permitted by that officer to read this report
aod, as We may infer from the fact of its pub
lication, without any restrictions as to SO
crecy. The whole thing looks very much lik
On attempt to occupy the public mind in ad
vance of the regular publication of the docu
meDt, and is hardly consistent with the under
stood rules of military etiquette. Weregret Il
observe such an uneGsines8 as to his reputation a
is eUinced by General Beduregard in this some
what curious mode of appearing before tn
public. after strangely declaring for thre
|
the county was go deeply interested, an
thereby delaying the promotion Of many meritoriou
officers, who would otherwise have been ap
pointed for gallant conduct in action, it is har
10 understand why this General could not hav
waited, at least for a brief period, befor
rushing into print. We can readily inagin
that the very worst consequences will ensue,
this case is to form precedent for other CON
msnders in their correspondence with the De
partment. Every sound rule Of public polio
requires that this correspondence should
confidential, and published only when the De
partment shall deem it prudent to do 80.
| In this synopsis, which We believe to be
faithful one, We fnd it stated that, anterior
, the battle, General BeauregaId submitted
/ plan to the government for junction of tt
armies of the Shenandoah and the Potoma
, and an advance upon Washington, and thi
: this plan was rejected by the President. I'll
connection between such point and the inc
: dents of the second engagement at Bull Run
= not very apparent, and the introduction
4 what can not be regarded otherwise than
making up an issue with the President is, "
3 believe, without precedent. For the failure
| advance, prior to the Battle of Manassas, I
one blamss either General Beauregard or h
. official supeIiors. We had not then measure
!. our strength with the enemy; we had won I
\ victory, and hardly knew what we could d
) But, after the enemy had been complete
!. routed-when his army was demoraliSed-wh
be had not time to complete his works arOuT
! Washington-'0hy ,0Gs Il that due advantage 70
\ \ not then taken Of this state Of hings9 This il
: question upon which public opinion is near
> unanimous in its answer. But, while the fa
ure TO advance is regretted by all as deplor
e BILE oversight, we are certain that there is di
! position to believe that those who have the co
Il troll of the matter have acted with the best m
8 tivss, and perhaps have had sufficient resso
u for an inactiOn which, with thelights before U
= appears totally inexplicable.
q THr PIRATE SMITH AND COLONEL, CoRcoRA