Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-12-27

fortnight have been extremely slight. The altitude
OF operators has been enc Of suspense-Wsiting to
see how the government was going to raise money
ier tne war. and how England wa going to receive
me Trent affair. IPwas expected that the report Of
me SECRETARY of the Treasury would solve the
former problem but the Secretary threw upon
congress the responsibility of providing ways and
means, ana nus report consequently exercised no
eneet Whatever upon the market. The news per
hensS, When hAd been measurably anticipated,
caused slight though general advance; but people
generally seem to be waiting for further adTices.
The public mind seems quite prepared for q gen.
eral suspension Of specie payments and there Is no
sign OF panic or alarm anywhere. Many persons
stiH cling to the notion that Congress- can devise
some means Of obtaining money without resortlng
to the policy which has been invariably adopted By
nations engaged in expensive wars. Il would DO
very agreeable TO see these hopes realized. Is
would be great thing for eur financial future,
II We could carry on the war 10 the complete sup
preston Of the rebellion without disturbing the ord
nary relations of currency. But to calm observer,
this seems IS impossible a. to vanquish the rebels
without calling large army into the field, and
taking pains to drill il according to the rules Of
war. We must, in finance, as in strategy, submit
70 the laws of nature and tread the beaten path
No nation, whatever its financial standing has ever
been able to raise the enormous sums required
in great wars rapidly enough BY the ordinary pro-
cess Of leans to satisfy the wants Of its government
Il Is not reasonable to expect that we can form
exception to the rule.
Mr.. Chase has thus far done better than any for
eign finance minister ever did. He has raised over
5000 600 OC0 IN five months by loan, at reasonable
rate Of interest. But in order to do this, he has
obliged the banks Of the three leading loyal cities
to sink their entire capital in Government loaIs so
that they cannot now loan any more money to the
government, unless they dishonesty lend the money
Of the depositOrs, which does not belong to them.
The public have relieved the banks Of about S4S-
100000 Of 80 Treasury notes, and nave besides
absorbed nearly $4,000 coo Of demand notes.
They would subscribe literally still, in the event
of victory Of decisive character; but in the alb
sence Of victories Of this kind it is not likely that
under any circumstances, their subscriptions to
government loans would exceed two millions q
week-less than one>thir1 the wants Of government.
As TO the reform in the currency proposed by
Chase, it Commands the approval of everybody who
Is net interested in country banks but il is obvious
at glance that its operation under the most favor
able circumstances win be so gradual and slow
hat it cannot serve the purpose of financial ex-
Dedlent IN the present pressing emergency. I
therefore, that we have reached the point which
has usually been met with much earlier by nations
engaged in expensive wars; in other words can we
borrow, except at SEINE extraYagant rate Of inte>
rest, the large sums now imperatively needed
rapidly enough to subseFve the necessities Of RoV-
srnment. Ii thls be so, Congress can only pursue
one course which is to authOrizs Mr.. Chase to pay
soldiers sailors and other creditors Of
he government in paper which shall not be redeem
1Oie or eODYertaDle I'LL atbeF t1e war.
The country is rich enough and confident enough
to absorb any amount of this paper, even if It
reached the sum specified by Mr.. Chase as the Ut
most that would BE required TO carry on the war
al July, 1863 and there is reason why il should
AL to anything below mere nominal rate Of dis
count That il would cause the banks to suspend
specie payments, az q precautionary measure 70
prevent boarding Is admitted on al sides The on
y question thar now calls for debate-admittinR
he position Of government 70 be what we have
ststed-is when our banks should take the step Of
specie payments. Many of our bank
managers feel natural scruple at doing 80, WheR
he necessity for the measure is neither immediate
Tor obvious to the masses. But il simRly resolves
tself into q question whether the banks shSu sus-
Iend while they are strong, or whether they lhaH
wait i'll they are forced into suspension.
Ii il Transparent that when government begins
o pour out irredeemable paper money people will
,egin to draw gold from the banks for the purpose
f harding, il they can do so. And experts noe
warns that it is much more difficult V get specie
ut Of boards than il 70 prevent the beginning Of
Ioardings. u the bAAks wAit and allow lbAF tad
OruplSs - prevent tAe adoption Of bold var poll
y az oncs, they viii probably go through q rapid
rOcea Of depletion and be forced - suspend with
wenty milliOaI Of gold On hand, when they night
uTpend with forty. Whether their depositors viii
ain by this eourse 81 events II is easy 70 decide.
our associated banks had q recognized head, or
re were under enc general management, the feE-
1res of the case would have bsen realized long
go, and there would be no hesitAncy now in
dopting the only policy which can be safely pur-
ned, due regard being held to the separate inter
'ts Of depositors, bank stockholders, the govern
lent and the public at large.