Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-11-14
CAMP CAVALRY, AT LONDON, KY,
R7 F1ORr


CAMP CAVALRY, AT LONDON, KY,
October 81, 1861.
should not write tonight, but We had
another furry to-day, and verify believe
this much vaunted Cumberland Gap expedi-
ton was designed for more display than ac-
tive, earnest service, my sense of duty re-
quires me TO record each passing incident,
that it may not utterly perish from public
remembrance. Early this morning a mess
enger arrived from Gen. Thomas, announc-
ing that large force, 81, 900 strong, was
menacing Somerset-about 35 miles west of
this point, and 81 from Crab Orchard The
dispatch stated that Colonies Bromlett's and
Fay's Kentucky regiments, and the 3Ist
Ohio, had been ordered forward to reinforce
Col Hoskins, who held Somerset with an
unerganized body of Kentuckians, and that
fight was promised. Gen. Shoepf, how
eVer, was not required to do anything i'm
portant, besides he regarded the informa-
ton as groundleSs alarm, caused by for
aging parties of rebels, or at worst feint to
induce him to move part of this. column.
from Loudon
If you examine the map of Kentucky,
you Will discover that the rebels are not
likely to attack Somerset while we are at
Loudon. Ii wolid amount to nothing if
they should even make successful demon
strat1on- But if the enemy has appeared
In the vicinity Of Somerset, in any force, il
is important only because it indicates that
they have occupied Williamsburg-a point
as important, either to the rebels or our
selves, as Cumberland Gap, because it COM
mands the only other accessible military
road from this part of Kentucky into Ten
nessee. 1t is also in the line of communi-
cation betw en- Zollicoffer and Buckner. By
occupying it we could have divided the two
rebel columns and threatened the right
flank Of Buckner's and the left of Zollicof-
fer's armies Why Gen. Thomas did not oc-
cupy it some time ago is one of the many
mysteries of this mysteriously managed ex-
pedition. 1t may have been risky, but I
have always understood war to be game
of hazard, in which the bold succeed better
than the timid.
A study OF. the map is interesting. The
reader is presumed to understand the route
so far as this column has reached. He will
remember that we left the two roads leading
to Lexington at Pitman's, three miles north.
From that point road also diyerged to
Somerset. Before us is the direct road to
Cumberland Gap (54 miles) via Barbours-
vile and road leading almost due South
to Williamsburg. But ten miles this side
of the Gap, Zollicoffer is strongly fortified
in formidable natural position at Cumber-
land Ford. Here, then, is an obstruction
we cannot easily pass. BY going to Will
iamsburg, however, we may go around the
enemy with less difficulty than we can 60
through him at the Ford If our column
should be sufficiently strengthened, Zolli-
Golfer is not likely TO push in behind rs,
because it would seem propable to
him that We have left reserves sufficient to
hold BIN in check. It follows, then, that
he would regard it prudent to fail back from
the Gap in order TO prevent us from moving
upon the Railroad at Knoxville-only four
days march from Williamsburg.
l don't pretend to be military man, as
Major Ward would say, but I understand
two and two added together makes four.
The map of this field, therefore, seems as
plain, in military point of view. as simple
sum in addition. OF course, We all defer 10
the superior opinions of the Con manding
General, who comes recommended by
diploma from that center of all military wie-
dom, West Point, but most of our officers
have presumed TO differ with him in his mode
of conducting this campaign But it may
be that he is obstructed by the Cabinet.
He certainly is hampered in some way or
other.
But we remain at London fortifying the
hills. Our hardy fellows have fallen don't
know how many acres of timber, and con-
structed banquette defences for infantry, 1
cannot say how many hundred yards long.
Whether they will ever be used for defensive
| or offensive operations. is more than / can
presume to guess. The probabilities are
altogether in favor of their being deserted by
us at some future day without having applied
them to their legitimate uses. If "old
Zolly - would only condescend, we would
be delighted to let him have fair chance
at the q Wild Cat Brigade" in this very
valley.
Speaking of Wild Cat, am reminded of
the extraordinary amount of credit Colonel
Garrard has received in the Kentucky news
papers for his alleged conduct in the Wild
Cat affair. Now, there is no doubt Colonel
Garrard is brave man, but the integrity
of history requires me to say that he was
not actually in the fight. Part of his regi-
| ment did good service on the right wing,
but they were under the immediate direc-
tion of Lieut.. Col Rigell, a gallant officer
who has not figured at all in the reports
Col. Garrard was at his post, which was not
under fire; and he was not in command, be-
cause, after the arrival of Col. Connell, the
| latter was in command by seniority, and
the arrival of Gen. Shoepf, Sunday night,
of course, superseded all the Colonels. But
the General being totally unacquainted with
the position deferred TO the advice of his
Colonels, and they conducted the action ac-
cording to their own judgment. The chief
credit of the fight belongs to Col Coburn
and four companies of the 33d Indiana,
their officers and Adjutant Durham The
18th Ohio did important Service and would
have fought gallantly, if the Hoosiers had
not whipped the rebels before the Buckeyes
got fair show. l refer to this matter be-
cause il is manifestly unjust to deprive gal
liant officers and soldiers of the credit won
in deadly combat / am sure Col. Garrard
does not desire to wear laarels won by
others. ss
In conclusion, permit me say that the dis
that Zollicoffer made another attack on
Monday night, in which he lost 400 or 500
men, was a gross fabrication. W. d. B.
From the Cincinnatf Com merciai, 4th.l
Arrest Of Persons with Letters for