Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1861-12-21

EBTrORs LEADEE:-I prOpOse 70 offer Jon
two or three remarks about the campaign Of
ne Potomac.
It s pretty apparent thal thus 81 Il has
besa1 carried on without any plan whAtsvst
beyond the mere defence Of the Capitol,
which e really all an army ever ought to Be
set 70 do, u or from this point. Oivilians
now kroW what military men must have al
WAYS known, that q more difhcalt point from
which to iavads the enemy does not exist
purely from the formation Of their adjacent
ooutEy,prossndne Us IS Il does q series ofnst-
ural advantages for defence, almost equal N
Mexico; and fortified Is these nOW are, and
defended BY the AoEer and strength Of the
rebel army, 0mg wsl Be Soubtsd wksthsT our
arEy ought o atiaspf az GSpaass. Tue rebels
threatsned Tie Capitol; they could not be said
% have msnaeed H. for they had no army in
~thIaagion, and we rushed our raw, unframed
soldiers hithsr til their very numbers nenA-
csd Richmond. The rebels were obliged 70
concentrate q large defensive force which
brought more on our side, and 20 we went on
mutually augmenting, till that advance and
repuhe ht Bull Run. Had we, however, got
beyond that point we probably should have
come to a stand Stin within ten miles beyond.
Since that time we have mutually gone on
aagmsuting, threatsning and msnaclng till
now and had We kept command Of the Po-
tOmac, we should have accomplished nearly
ell that this line of operations admits Of.
Now mark-this state OF things win con
dnus all winter. Thsrs giH Be no advance
md no battle. Next spring viii find the
Grand Army Of the Potomac much where j
now is. OF course BY this I mean only tC
express my COMMISSIONS rather decidedly. II
lock for any good to bs thus attained, VI
shall frst, furnish enough employment for
the flower and strength of the rebelS ant
at a point and in q way that prevents theh
hArming or resisting rs elsewhere. Second
an opportunity to drill, discipline and mort
thoroughly organize our own forcs-mucf
needed on this side Of the river.
Our way TO Richmond does not lie direct
from Washington. Our nearest route IN
q~usstiOnabIy Is by way Of York river. TWC
or thrss Of our steamers would shell out al
the rebel batteries on that river in a day
Nothing could prevent our landing an army
within thirty-hve miles of Richmond, viii
an open eOHhry intervening.
So, too, an overwhelming advance int
Tennessee would efeotuaTy menace Rich
mOnd, and Oblige their army to retreat from
the Potomac, or ultimately to fight and Ia!
down their arms where they are. You 70
member that Mr.. Davis in bis last message
calls for the construction Of " new rail
roads: one as If be expected to loss tn
Charleston line, and the other as Il he feare'
We should make this very advance into Ten
neasee-the thought Of which strsngleS him
HoE suggestive these limitations Of his are
!. / think l may venture one word further
and do injustice 70 nobody. The plan b,
which the whole army Orall the armies, ar
put under the command OF one General, is Il
itself vicious. To WELD successfully $4,000
men, IN these immense and Independent
t lines surpasses the capacity of any General
, The Potomac is enough for one Western Viz
: giaia for another; Kentucky for 3 third; an
Missouri for 3 fourth; all holding direct com
msnds from the Secretary of War, under tn,
President Without 9 word Of reflection upOr
{ Gen. Mcclellan, the truneheon is too heaY!
for him. A division would put every Gene
nal on his swn resources and responsibility
and secure As much unity Of action as th
vide field would allow.