Democrat and sentinel. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1853-1866, 1861-07-17

opinion was concurred in by all the officers of his
command, and their memoranda on the subject
were made enclosures of Major Anderson's letter.
The whole was Immediately laid before Lieuten-
ant General Scott, who at once concurred with
Maj. Anderson in opinion. On reflection, h0wev-
er, he took full time, consulting with other off
GERS both of the army and the navy, and at the
end of four days came reluctantly, but decidedly,
to the same conclusion as before. He also stated
at the same time that there was not a sufficient
force then at the control of the Government, or
could be raised and brought to the ground within
the time when the provisions in the Fort would
be exhausted. In purely military point of view
this reduced the duty of the Administration, in
this case, to look to the mere matter of getting
the garrison safely out of the Fort 1t was be-
lieved. however, that to so abandon that posi-
ton, under the circumstances, would be utterly
ruinous, and the necessity under which it to
be done would not be fully understood that by
many it would be construed as part of volunta-
ry policy; that at home it would discourage the
friends Of the Union, embolden its adversaries,
and 60 far to insure to the latter a recognition
abroad that, in fact, it would be our national
destruction consummated. This could not be al
lowed. Starvation was not yet upon the garri-
son. and ere it would be reached, Fort Pickens
might be Reinforced. This last would be a clear
indication Cf policy, and would better enable the
country To accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter
a military necessity. An order was at once
directed TO be sent for the landing of the troops
from the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pickens.
This order could not 90 by land, but must take
the longer and slower route by sea. The first re-
turn news from the order was received but one
week before the fall Of Fort Sumter. The news
itself was that the officers commanding the Sa-
bine, 10 which vessel the troops had teel trans
ferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some
quasi armistice of the late administration, and Of
tie existence Of which the present administration,
up 70 the time the order was dispatched had only
too vague and uncertain rumors 70 fz attentiJn,
had refused TO land the troops. To now reinforce
Fort Pickcus before crisis would be reached at
Fort Sumter was impossible, rendered s. by the
near exhaustion Of provisions in the latter named
Fort. In precauticn against such a conjecture,
the Government had, few days before, COM
mencei preparing an expedition, as well adapted
as might be, to relieve Fort Sumter. which expe-
dition vas intended to he ultimately used or not
according to circumstances. The strongest an
ticipatei case for using. It was now presented
and It was resolved t. s=ni It forward, as had
been in ended in this contingency. It was also
resolved TO notify the Governor Of South Carolina
that he might EXPECT an attempt would be made
to provision that Fort and if the attempt should
not be resisted there would be no effort to throw
in men. arms or ammunition without further
tice, OF IN case Of N attack upon the Fort This
.otice was accordingly sven. whereupon the fort
was attacked aud bombarIed to its fall, without
even awaiting ;he arrival of the previous expe1-
tim. Il l. l,lrs zelL that tue assault upon anu
the reduction Of Fort Sumter was in no sense
matter of self defense on the part Of the ass,il-
ants They well knew that the garrison in tie
fort could by no possibility commit aggression
upon them. They knew they were expressly no.
titled that the giving of bread to the few brave
aud hungry men Of the garrison was all which
would. on that occasion, be attempted, unless
themselves, by restricting so much, should pro
woke more; they knew that this Government
desired 70 keep the garrison In the fort not to
assaiI them, but to merely maintain visible pos
session. and thus to preserve the Union from ac-
tual and immediate dissolution trusting, as here
in before stated to time. discussion and the bal
lot box, for a final adjustment, and they assailed
and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse OBJ
! iect, to drive out the visible authority Of the
Federal Union, and thus force it to an immediate
! dissolution. That this war was their object the
I Executive well understood. And having said to
! them in the inaugural address-you can have no
| couf1ic: without being yourselves the aggressors
he took pains not only to keep this declaration
| good, but also keep the case so free from the
power of ingenious sophistry that the world
| should not be able TO misunderstood it. By the
affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding cir
cumstances, that point was reached then, and
thereby the assailants Of the Government began
the conflict of arms without gun in sight or in
expectancy to return their fire, save only the few
in the fort sent to that harbor years before for
their own protection and still ready TO give that
protection In whatever was lawful in this act
discarding all else, they have forced upon the
country the distinct issue-immediate dissolution
or blood-and this issue embraces more than the
fate of these United States; it presents to the
whole family of man, the questions whether a
Constitutional Republic or Democracy, govern
ment of the people by the same people can ol
cannot maintain its territorial integrity against
It's own domestic foes. 1t presents the question
whether discontented individuals, too few in mum
bers to control administrations according TO or
ganic law in any case, can always, upon the pre-
tences made in this or on any other pretence
or arbitrarily without any pretence, break uI
their government and thus practically put al
end to free governments upon the earth 1t force:
US to ask. is there in all republics this interest,"
and fatal weakness ? Must a Government of z