Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1861-02-12
REMARKS OF MIR. WORTH,
OF RANDOLPH,

Delivered in the Senate on the Stay Bill
The bill entitled "a bill to alter the jurisdiction Of
the courts of the State and the rules pleading for
the relief of the people" being under consideration
in the Senate on the 9Th of February,
Mr. Worth submitted the following remarks:
The bill under consideration provides that suits
to recover debts before justice of the peace, the
demand of TIE defendant shall be postponed for six
months before he shall De required to plead: that
all actions Of debt aSsumpSIt, now pending in the
County Courts shall be transferred to the Superior
Court for trial, and the defendant shall not be
quired to plead until the second term after the trans
fer; and that all actions of debt, assumpSit, &C,
hereafter to be brought shall be commenced in the
Superior Courts and the defendant shall not be re-
quired to plead till the next term after the return
term.
When this bill came up on yesterday and sudden
ly assumed its present shape | resisted its passage
on the ground that regarded it as an attempt on
the part of the Legislature to interpose between
debtor and creditor, and alter the agreement they
had made-an attempt to impair the obligation Of
contract and therefore unconstitutional and d.
Structve of confidence between man and man. Fur
ther reflection has confirmed these views.
The Senator from BERTHE, (Mr. Outlaw admits
that an act providing longer stay for debts now
existing than our present laws allow, would be
consttutional-but he says the General Assembly
has the undoubted right to change the jurisdiction
OF the courts and alter the rules Of pleading; that
this power has often been exercised by aboliShinS
the county courts rs courts of pleas in many coun-
ties and that nobody pretended that such acts
unconstitutional, though the effect was neces-
sarily to hinder and delay creditors. Now ! admit
the Legislature, for the purpose Of facilitating the
administration of Justice, has the constitutional
right to alter the rules of pleading and the ursdc-
ton of the courts and to abolish the county courts
but deny that such power may be constitutionally
exercised for the purpose Of hihderiHg or delaying
creditor in the collection Of hlS debt There is a
marked difference where such delay is the incident
of such legislation, the object being improvement
in the mode of administering justice and where the
purpose and design of such delay is to hinder and
delay the creditor in enforcing the performance of
the debtors contract. In the former case the law
is constitutional though creditor may be inciden-
tally delayed; in the latter it is unconstitutional
because the purpose is to impair the obligation Of
contract But it is asked how can the court know
the purpose? The does not declare that its pur-
pose is to delay hinder the creditor 1t purports
by its title to be act to alter the jurisdiction of the
courts and the rules of pleading for the relief of the
people. The court cannot know in what way it was
intended TO relieve the people. 1t does not appear
on the face of the act, that the relief was intended
only for the debtor and to delay the creditor. 1t
may DC that the Judiciary may not be able to get at
the object and therefore may not he able to declare
the act unconstitutional but ,ce know the object
We swOrn, as well the judges, to support the
constitution and knO'c that the sole object is to hin
UST the creator ana retlero the DEBTOR from inc per-
Torrance Of his contract and we seek, by an inGen-
ous and deusive title to the bill evade the salutary
provision of the constitution which forbids to in
terferc between debtor and creditor We seek to do
indirectly what we know and admit we are forbid
den to do 1irectlY
| have before me the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of Jones rs Crttenden, car. L.
R. The opinion delivered by Taylor, c. j., is an
elaborate will not detain the Senate by read
ing the whole oft regard it precisely in point
and propose to read certain passages particularly
bearing on the matter under discussion.
THE law Of which the defendant claims the ben
eft, was passed in 1912, and provides that any
court, rendering judgment against debtor for a
debt or damages between the 3lSt of December in
that year and the LIST of February 1914 shall stay
the until the first term session Of the Court
after the latter period, upon the defendants giving
two freeholderS as securities"
This was manly, direct attempt to give the
debtor longer time to pay than he was entitled to
demand according to the terms of his contract and
the law existing at the time he made the debt,
consideration intended to secure the ultimate pay
ment Our bill gives, and is intended to give the
time to the debtor, ciOut the security to the cred
itOr Again, the court declares that 1.-The first
principles of justice teach us that he to whom pro-
mise is made, under legal sanctions, should signify
his consent before any part of it can be rghtfuily
sanctioned by Legislative act"
1.-The right to suspend the recovery of debt for
one peTlOu implies Oh
other and as the state of things which called for
the first delay may continue for series of years,
the consequence may be total stagnaton Of the bu-
sness of society, BY destroying confidence and credit
among the citizens"
IAN argument urged and much relied oil by the
defendants counsel is that the law in question bears
only on the remedy, and is, therefore, within the
sphere of Legislative authority. But If in doing,
it violates The Constitution it is not less invalid than
il it directly touched and annued the right Every
one will agree, that law which would deny to all
creditors the power of nstitutng action Of debt
covenant or assumpsit, bill in chancery, would
invade the Constitution; that law which should
limit the recovery of all debts to short period
after its passage, that it would be impossible, &C.
cordng to the of the courts, to ootain udg-
ment would also be null and void; though such
laws would ostensibly bear only the remedy,
yet they do in reality bear on the right The law
before us, it is conceded, does not go to the extent
of either instance, yet it certainly dimnishes the
conceive how law could otherwise impair an exist
ing right than by withdrawing the remedy, which
is, in effect to suspend the right"
" The undOubted right of the Legislature to alter
and reform the judicial system may it is said, pro-
that which results from the present law and it is
ciple, be declared unconstitutional"
ave cannot acqulesce in the final conclusion
drawn from these premises, which, without hesita-
ton, we acknowledge to be correct"
"All such laws the Legislature have an undoubted
right to enact a right which the people have never
surrendered and the exercise of which is not for
hidden hu the Constitution Of Tho ITn;tol