The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1861-01-31
slus of tbs dNeek.
Irom the Mobile Advertiser.
The Pensacola Forts.

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Charleston was the only point ffr5hs ffr[5Sh which
radiated the war excitements of the day
The immense interest of at least three
States-Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida
lis becoming alive to the Importance OF
occupying the forts within the borders OF
the latter commonwealth. We see re-
peated at Pensacola the maneuvre of An
derson at Moultrie There are three forts
at Pensacola, Navy Yard, and a re-
doubt. Commandant Armstrong has aban-
doned the Navy Yard and Fort Barances,
removing munitions, and spiking guns,
and transferring his forces, amounting in
the aggregate to between two and three
hundred men, from the main land to San
ia Rosa Island, has prepared to make
good his position within the immensely
strong fortifcations of Fort Pickens.
Whether he has abandoned Fort McCree,
also, we are not advised, but we doubt if he
has. This fortress is powerful and cas-
tle-like masonry erection, built on a low
sand-pit of the main land, and appearing
to rise out of the water. 1t is further sea-
ward than Fort Pickens, of which it is
the vis-a-vis across the channel, and q yes
sci entering must needs run the gauntlet
of its guns before approaching the latter,
which, however, of itself effectually closes
the harbor against the admission Of an
enemy of even very heavy force.
Fort Pickens is designed to mount no
less than two hundred and twelve guns,
and under the protection of its immense
batteries the ships ofan enemy could make
good their barbor in the Bay of Pensaco-
Ia, or'if they did not care to run the risk
from shore batteries, which could not be
in very dangerous range, they could not
land forces and supplies on the fort to the
eastward of Santa Rosa Island, which is
some forty miles long, and thus throw in
reinforcements and rendezvous even an
army at the fort withoutinterruption, un-
less of a force intrenched on the Island
itself, in the rear of the fort-which, how
ever, is almost if not quite as defensible
from rear as front. If we are to have
war, the seizure of this stronghold is, Of
course, of the first Importance, for unless
it is occupied by us, it will secure to the
enemy base of operations along our
whole gulf coast, and keep open road
right in the heart of the South, which
cannot be obstructed by any fixed fortif-
cations. Once within the gates of the
sharbor, and an army could be disembarked
at any point on the wide bay which it
might select. 1t could run up beyond the
Escambia river and land many hours
ahead of any opposing force which might
be at Pensacola; beside placing a wide
river between it and the latter-or even
two rivers, the Escambia and Blackwater
by going far enough up. Hence, with
start Of at least forty-eight hours, it
could march into Interior Alabama. An
enemy holding Fort Piclzens could rem
devious naval force there and keep up
a blockade of all the ports of the Cult
unless we could meet it on the sea.
News from Washington of the position
of the Administration should very soon
advise us whether the risk of bloodshed is
to be incurred in. Selling Fort Picllens. or
whether we shall find reason to delay the
alternative of appeal to that terrible der
'lisr resort in fair prospect of peaceful
cession. If it is to be seized by direct
power of arms, it will not be by force
coming under its guns from the water ap-
proach. 1t must be stormed by a heavy
force concentrated on the Island to the
eastward, which will take it with Zou-
ave-like rush in double quick time-pour-
ing into it in such numbers as to at once
overpower every chance of resistance on
the part of the garrison. Though done
in the night, and with the quickest
movement, and though escaping loss from
the batteries in the approach, the work at
the walls will be bloody business if the
garrison have mind to make it So The
commander has committed the same act
of hostility that Anderson did at Moultrie,
but we do believe that he will soon sur
render the fort, as the commandant at
Baton Rouge did the arsenal, on the
grounds of the presence of an overwhelm-
ing force and the plea of avoiding useless
bloodshed. He is reported to have said
that he would not fire on his countrymen.
We do not believe that he will