New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-10-03
The pcscr,cd Itcr,cL Posts.

: The Deserted Rebel Posts.
.roul ouTlSpeCiI Correspondent
: WAsHrV0ToS Sent 60 IsiI
$ The yav is now opcn between the Capital and the
cent Rebel cncamumen,s, aud such visitors 40 can
srocurc permission, are passing from point 10 point
! interest and following the new lines Of our ed.
Vance 70 their outer inits. The barbados and
. baths which blocked the Lecsburg and Columbia
,rnpikes have all been cleared away, so that car
AGES can now easily pass over the roads which on
.aturday were hardly open TO horemen. Munson's
IN is at times throDged with eager nquireFs into
ne Southern order OF army encampments, their
ethod OF engineering, and so forth. The intrench-
en,s continue 10 excite amusement, not becauee OF
cir deusive character rs observed from distance,
II on account Of their singular and unprecedented
,othlessness as works Of defense. a second exam
aion OF them only reveals additional defects aud
!, eakuesses. A RAPID ride yesterday along and
!, rough the abandoned Rebel posts, afforded little
opportunity for discovering than their uncondi-
ynal ineiciency, which is, perhaps, all that really
eds TO be known OF them; but the fact that their
sIaracter is made the subject Of good deal Of odd
,ccation and inquiry here, gives them q some what
sculiar interest. Everybody is wondering whether
,e Rebels ever meant fight behind such works or
IMPLY meant to screen otcer operations from detec-
on by temporarily Offering show of formida-
: le preparation in this immediate neighbor-
God. Some believe that the Munsons
Elm intrenchmems were nothing but shams
End decisions; others, that the position was
HELD as "a post Of observation, sud that the works
we're ust sufficient for the temporary shelter Of q
small force; and Oh that really powerful station
was intended to lie established, from which the
4nemy hoped to oppose with success any advance Of
the Union armies. Notwithstanding the ridiculous
quality OF the Notifications, and The comparatively
feoble body Of troops which were stationed here
ana inclined 10 believe this latter sppostOn The
most correct one. IL needs only casual glance 10
prove that the works were not ercted ieints for
on Munsons Hill, fort Of much magnitude and
rroenson had been planted directly IN the rear Of
the shallow pits upon the crest in position com
petely concealed from any poist Of view held by
troors before the advance Il was impossible for MS
70 know Of its existence as Affairs stood Again, on
Masons Hin interior lines OF defense had been
rndey arranged in manner also secludng them
from discovery until the outer bressivorks were
sur1nountcd. The opinion that the intrcnchmenis
were designed only for the protection Of body Of
sklrmishers or, at most, a regiment or two, seems
equally 10 be ovcrthrown 10y the fact that the sscond
fortiGcation on Munsons Hil was pieiced with near
~ score Of embnsIes which never would have
been cut without 81 intention OF occupying them
with guns. A fort mounting twenty guns is too
serious an affair for the protection Of small detach
;uent. And yet il is apparent that these works were
never held by more than one regiment At time.
The marks Of The caGp-nounds sill distinct, and
they are Of Just about the extent required for the
commodation Of five Or six hundred men.
DO not suppose that the leading generals Of the
army ever contemplated marching upon Washington
or opening any aggressive movement whatever,
under cover Of such forts as they have cft in our
hands; but have no doubt that they encouraged
this belief among that portion Of their army which
formed TIE advance. Otherwise, tie oarthworks,
as they are could not DO accounted for
We know how inpctaogsiy the Southern army had
been clamoring for the attack, and that at one time
Ire conviction generally expressed in the South
EN- newspapers thst iheir eagcrness would III due
lime be uatfed-;he occupation Of 30 near a situa-
Jon az Nlunsons Hill being offered as proof 20 this
effect. We know too, how inadequate TO rigorous
oil the Southern muscle usually is, and how impo,si-
DE Il would be 10 devote Southern soldiers 10 the
construction Of field works, excepting for specified
sad clearly understood purposes. The Publications
were not reared fOr nothing, and they we're not
eurcd for the security Of IL mere handful Of troops.
10 seems probable then, that they were erected
iLler the conviction that permanent stand at Mum
,ou's Ilill was determined upon, and that forward
movements were TO be made thence. Very recent
correspondence IN Richmond papers justiGos THE pre-
sumption. II was stated by writers who had yisiicd
DC spot that he works were nearly completed, aud
hat when rendered undoubtedly iEpregnaLlo, asI
hey appeared likely 10 be without much delay, the
lceent upon Warrington woHld be no longer de-
erred. OF ooUrsc there ere plenty Of officers IN tho
Rebel army who knew how insignificant TIE pIcpa-
atons really were. but this knowledge appears
never 20 have been very general.
trast that tho Rebek were entertained with THEN
various defensive operations; We arc, who view
bcia UadeT different aspects from what they had an
ic,patcd. Scayps at angles so gradual that troops
ould easiy Oyerrun them; bitches 20 shallow as 10
nierPosc but step down ard "a step mp; cmbrasures
Trough which guns could be worked only with the /
reatost difficulty; are the characteristics Of their
rinelpal work, 10 presents only thee irregular
ldes, without angles, bastions, anything Of the
ort. Tie rear is open. Within there rs scarcely
ny protection afforded, and the connonest appli.
noes for successful defense are omitted There Is
o bsnquettc for infantry 70 fire from. There II