The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1861-07-05


cloth enough to make new. The old shoes
will wear out, and the South has no shoe
makers. We often hear, in the North, of
soldiers going without shoes, or without
proper shoes, for few days. How must it
be in the South, where there is little leather,
and no mechanics to work it into shoes? Our
soldiers complain of improper and insufficient
food, though the granaries of Illinois, and
the pork of Ohio and Indiana are behind US.
What must be the case in the South,
where meat and meal is habitually bought
for the laboring population? Our surgical
departments are said to be defective, and
our medical stores wanting in some neces-
saries. How is it at the South, whose medi.
cines, with the exception of ''roots and
yarbs," can be had only by purchase at the
North? Our troops complain of not being
well armed; yet we have the best rifle man.
ufactory in the world THAT of Spring6eld),
which turns out arms for regiment every
week. We have indeed all the mechanical
genius as well as machinery adapted to the
construction of arms de precision, which
exists upon the continent; and we have be-
sides the market of the old world open to US.
The rebels have only the regulation arms
they have stolen, and miscellany OF pistols,
shot guns and bowie-knives not of much
service. Floyd, the great gun.stealer, is
already begging that guns be given by his
neighbOrs. The man who robbed our arse
mails of tens of thousands of new muskets,
asks for shot guns to defend his home.
The more the situation of the hostile Sec
tions is studied, the more certain it appears
that the rebellious section is the weaker, and
must 60 to the wall-and that while the
military power of the North will become
greater every week from this moment until
the war closes, the South is now displaying
| greater force than she can a month or
even fortnight hence. If this be true the
North gains by waiting-and delay is
| death to the South. But we are told that
the war must be short. 1t will not be short,
in the sense that it will only last a few
| weeks or month or two We may as
well make up our minds that it will last
year at least. We may conclude to suffer
| all the sacrifices that a state of hostilities
for year signifies. But commerce, manu-.
factures, trade will be prostrated To be
sure. We must make up our minds to that.
Shall we not be as ready to make sacrifices
to maintain the Republic, the Union, as
men in the South are to overthrow it?
Why, the Southern men of substance are
now, in thousands of instances, being drained
to the bitter dregs of poverty, to feed the
army that represents the insolence and vio-
ence of their pampered local pride and
prejudices. If the North were not prepared
10 make sacrifices, it should abandon the
contest and the hope of preserving the Un>
ion. The power of the loyal action OF the
Union, is vastly greater than that of the
disloyal section, and yet the preponderance
is not so signal that the loyalists will vidi-
cate the Government without protracted
and vehement exertions. The North must
put forth its strength, not in spasm, but
with iron handed aud enduring power.
Gen. Scott bases his war policy upon
three considerations. In the first place the
States that entered into the secession cons
spiracy had for some time been talking of
war and preparing for it. They were there-
fore in better condition to make q dash.
ing fight than the loyal States, which were
not at all in a warlike condition. The won.
der is, that with the forwardness of their
warlike preparations, the conspirators did
| hOu Neoh uPOu w QOulUSGCu, duu Ldhc IL
right away after the bombardment of Sum,
ter. In the second place, some troops fight
best when behind deienses, and the invasion
OF Virginia with the design of carrying the
State by storm, would be giving its defend.
ers an undue advantage; and there would
be every reason to expect such affairs as
that at Great Bethel and Vienna,On larger
scale. In the third place, considerations Of
humanity. The General believes the rebel
lion can be crushed without filing the land
with widows and orphans. Let the block
ade be made effectual. Let the army enlisted
for three years or the war, be placed in the
highest efficiency, armed with the best
weapons, and the rebellion, which is an af>
fair OF conspiratOrs and creature of the
passions, without the resources of nation,
or good cause, or decent excuse, to sus.
tain it, must recede constantly, and speedily
perish. In this way the fool>hardy insolence
OF the mlnOriy section will be rebuked, it's
crop OF traitorOus politicians deprived of
their ability to be mischievous, and the
Union restored in its integrity. Everything
| goes to show that these are the ideas of
General Scott. The fact that he opposes
the enlistment of large force of cavalry, is
in itself proof. He don't want many regi-
ments OF hOrsemen, because be does rot in>
tend that the war shall be one of headlong
forays and destructive collsions-but that
on the part of the Government, its power
shall be gradually and irresistably develop>
ed, as superior to that of the conspiracy by
which it is threatened.
But slowly as Gen. Scott moves, he un-
derstands that his hardness is more con.
| spicuous and seems more remarkable now
than it will be presently. He expects to
crowd the COnfederates out of Richmond
within few weeks. He expects to see
| them slowly and sulenly backing out with