New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-08-02
RECEPTION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S
MESSAGE.

President LiDcOin s second Message dlogetDeI cou-
krms q impression produced by tie inst IL Is an
unreteudng ana Dpsinesske justification Of lis past
pchcy, End invites Congress, without q cumocuiloD,
TO provide tie legal mcans for Gtlog tins contest
short and decisive one. Homely in language and
sonss hat spoGgetic II tone, II shows the same clear
though not very comprehensive appreciation OF the
point at issue and the tenacity Of purpose vi
has characterized Mr. Lincolns ranifesOef. We can
imagine The Kind of State paper 10 which Fit or q e
First Napoleon would have proclaimed tie motives and
OBJECTS of sn European war. But neither the untneh-
ing ego-m of the the majestic argument OF the
oter would suited the temper Of the American pub
lie. They reglrd the war rs their own IN sense
which hardly be Ineligible TO the subjects Of the
most limited monarchy, and require Of their Chief
Magistrate, above sl things, strict account OF his
Stewardship. About tlird of the inesssge Is co.,
10 vindication Of the long foTbeaanee OF the
Gove nlent and OF the measures subsequently, taken
BY President on bis respo sbLity, such as the
0ei abandonment Of Font Sumter 10 It's fate, tie
organization Of the volunteer army the orders estab-
h ing blockade Of tie Southern ports and The sus'
pension, " in proper cases." Of the wit Of habeas
coTpns. Another third is devoted TO the exposure
Of what New-Tork eotemporaries distribute
rnder the pregnant headings Of The Neu-
"The Sophism OF the Rebel Leader" and 20 forth.
The passsges from which can Gull any indication Of
Er. lncUln's present intentions scsnty enough,
and are 20 involved with controyersi general les,
that do feel certain could viii that he
has natl ely weighed all the chances or consequences
Of ntersecine war. Men With arms in their hands
vii hardly listen to distinctions, however jlst,
between "S-Cessipn" and "Kebellion." Il is too
late 70 diseuss tie right Of the Southern States TO
sceede; the fact il that they have done co. and the
OILY questions that how worth arguing are
whether tLey can le OF ought TO be- recovered to the
Union by force.
TIE Pres dent lie at much pains TO explain The 1ro-
eeecings Of hi Cab Let III relIOn 10 Fort Sumter. 1t
now appears that tLis posicn was REGARDED as unite
nnbe 10y Gen. Scott from TIE FIRST. To relieve il ef-
foctusiy would have required reenforcemenis larger
than the Government could tben command. Mr. Lin
coin therefore resolved to throw the responsibility of
she initiative the SecessOnts by giving them express
notice that no attempt would be made 70
Strengthen the garrison or 70 Introduce any
thing bat provisions into the fort. Upon the re-
cept II this intelligence the State troops forthwith
bomOarded it, and hereby constituted themselves the
sggressors. Mr.. Lincoln attaches the highest import
sIce 70 the flc that lbe assault uoa ana reduction Of
Foit Sumter was N a matter Of self-de1ehse
Oh tie part OF the s,sailaute. At al events the
sequences OF lie fall were most conspicuous Nir-
gma, hitherto pledged TO Union, d, Glazed for Seces-
sloD, and Was followed more sH heartily by other
Border States, while the North rallied az one man
roud tie President. The suddenness OF this change
u teHtmeit led many this eide of the Atlantic TO
doubt lie sincerity and permanet &c; but ii is manifest
shsi ar. Liheoin has no such misgivrgs. Ills appeal
20 lis co nIrymen for men and mOuey is perfectly
srtaightiorward and explicit;
sout II s s for II. wO y l; s y1u ,ss
.nd 400 10 TO That number q s about tenth Of
sose Of piper sse within tho regions where appaen'y all
"A y
ssyose whoe,r
fno~buG those whom he addresses are in earnegt too
Moreover, the President confirmed by The Secretary
O. War IL his assertion thst the supply Of Volunteers
exceeds tie demand, and that the Government
bsrrassed by sho zeal Of lite supporters We sarn
Goo, that the number Of troops Engaged Tor tnse
months service is email compared with that of those
WHO nave enlisted for three years or for Tie whole
wa, and Mr.. CsaerOn exuiDie q paper force Of 49,
on aleady enrolled, exclusive of the three months
men Ihe Secretary OF the treasury Is equally san
guiue w 10 tie popularity OF the loan aud of the
various hscal e.pe'ielts, iocluding rerenchMeuts
end the contsg ton o. piolertybe0neing 70 rebels
BY winch he has s'riyea 10 make taxation agreeable
and +" 10 traasmule the burden into q bcneGI .
In short, must assume that the North is preuared
tcm,ke any Sacrifices to secure the objects Of war
which PROMISES 10 be iuteTInnable
What these objects, after al that transce nd the
paramount importance Of preserving peace between
neighboIs aud brethren This IL point on whish
Che Fietidents MoesAAe with al lis elaborate refuta-
an Of Secession theories throws very hide light.
OTe Thing If very dear aud that is that AboliiioIn
has huie or not ing 70 do with il. The word Slay-
cry does not ia this document, AID tie social
question rs entirely merged IA The constitutional La
tscf II We are &c take bfr. LacOln as cur guide the
English Tori.s have not greatly erred in regarding
The American ciisis 10 sup:eGe trial Of Re-
puck an Institutions. lie expressly declares it
70 be 10, anu, though lac describes the object
c that form Of government Ia some vague
ard Ligh-souDding phrases equally april sable 10 sny
oe u Is well that tie poole OF the Uuited States
saou b jeslous for tho honor and integrity
g tbeir Constitution Tie absurdity OF Ina ntai,ing
A1 We instrument Of confederation contained pr0y
sns lot anngIik itself has teen amply demonstrated,
aI NhaI io.owSl Certainly not TIA. il mus. be ell
.'eea al al llzr1sat tie risk Of running those in.
etess wsieh wa designed TO secure Of esranging
nose States which designed TO uile If
ss .'o oiseredit those principle Of which is was
49,. "a l'ese enooolmeut. We cannot think that Mr.
L.. III r1es 70 The hight Of this practical, but not
''' "! argument. lie clDgs to The shadow Of