Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1861-09-07

our ctttitthdi S'uc-tVI'uiut VI Acc'~vv.
Dv this it will he seen that any per-
IN who kills another in the perpetra-
ton or attempt to pepetrate any OF the
crimes therein named to wit: rape, ar
son. burglary, robbery, or administer
;ns poison, is guilty Of murder in the
frs; degree; that is if homicide &C.
ours. Produced by the party committing
or attempting to commit any Of those
highest order OF felonies. the parties
committing it is guilty Of murder in the
first degree. In addition to this class
81: cases, any person who shall pur-
posely and of deliberate and premedita-
lated malice kill another" shall be
deemed guilty of murder in the first
degree. At first glance this section
would seem to express so clearly what
shall constitute this offence. that read
ing i; to you would he sufficient: but
the court feels it TO be its duty to say TO
YOU, that all the terms used in the
clause last quoted have distinct mean
ing. Purposely, would seem to indi-
cate an intention to kill. and must be-
judged by the circumstances of the case,
the action Of the parties. the weapon
with which death is inflicted. Then.
too. the phrases deliberate and pre-
meditated malice these terms also go
to show the condition or state of the
mind in which the party is found-the
intent or onimus of the homicide, rs the
law expresses it. Ard here premoiita-
tcd nor deliberate does not require any
great lapse of time to answer the pur-
poses of the law, to constitute u homi-
eide murder in the first degree. The
older works on tho law term it malice
aforetllought, and this malice which is
strictly condition of the mind of the
party committing the crime, if shown
either by words or actions bctraying
tixcdness of design to kill, an act ofrca-
son, a volition Of the mind, though the
act may be almost spontaneously with
the carrying such Intention into effect,
renders the party guilty OF murder in
the first degree. And here l may call
your attention to the Specification Of
the word mulice, for upon its construc-
ton in great degree, If not entirely,
turns the distinction between the two
degrees of murder according to our
statute. 1t is not confined to the inten-
ton of doing an injury to any particu-
lar person, but intends and evil design,
corrupt and wicked motive against
some one at the time of committing the
crimc-it is defined to be wicked in
tention to do an injury: as if A B hav-
ing haG difficulty with G d, retires
and arms himself with a revolver, re-
turning finds g d surrounded by a
crowd, and firing at him kills + F,
against whom he has no ill-will. Now
though he had no malice, in common
parlancc against Z +, nor any design to
kill him, yet is he guilty of murder IN
the first degree according to our statute,
and from the act and circumstances the
law infers all the necessary ingredients
Of the malice aforethought necessary to
constitute the crime Of murder.
Sections 10, IA and fifteen of our
statute define what is murder in the
second degree. The killing must be
pnrposely aud maliciously, but without
dcliberation and premeditation. This
would seem to inclade all telonious
homicide not murder in the first degree,
which were regarded by the common
law as murder. The distinction be-
tween these degrees arises probably
from the charity Of the law, and its
great regard for the sanctity of human
life. The use of the words purrosely
and maliciously, guarded by the provis-
ion showing All absence of deliberation
and generalization would seem to rem
der definition of this crime hasty
aud undersigned killing of a fellow
being with all the malice required by
law to constitute murder in the first de-
gree, yet unaccompanied with a spe-
citic intent to kill. It wants the aggra-
waited and express malice aforethought
Of murder in the first degree, and yet
it IS neither excused nor cxtenuatcd by
the rash, hot blood killing on sudden
heat or anger, while reason is unseateb
and the offender a slave to his pas
sion, which characterizes manslaughter.
Similar statutes by enlightened jnrists
have been construed in this wise That
it is o safe rule tn analizc the difference
between these degrees at the intent of
the accused by the nature Of the wca-
pom used. Thus where all the malice
necessary to make or constitute murder
in the first degree exists in the breast
Of the accused, he purposely obtains
weapon which may inhict great bodily
harm or physical injury, but is not such
an one as he would naturally selec; If
lie intended toproduce death, or in other