Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1861-08-01

From the Boston courierl
The Battle OF Balls Run.
Even misfortune and adversely bear lessons
with them which have healing virtue. And
from consideration of the causes of our misfor-
tunes we may well learn to guard against liko
evil 10 the future In the absence of the official
reports of the various Generals, and guided only
by the conflicting and uncertain rumors brought
by the telegraph, it is not possible to criticise
with discretion the dispositions of the disastrous
engagement. We feel unwilling alike to accept
as true the explanation given in other journals
OF the causes, or to join In the reproaches show
cred on those accused of these disasters Some
general facts are evident. The forward move
ment was initiated on our side, and the action
at Balls Run was sought and brought on by us.
1t is, therefore, incumbent on those administer
ing our government to show that they were JUS
tilted, as military question, in directing the
advance to this entrenched position Of the enc
my and that they had provided sufficient means
for success. To do this, they must show the
causes of the failure--whether it arose from er-
rors of officers in command, ineompetency of the
soldiers, or overwhelming aud unexpected acci-
dent.
Il would at present appear that each cause
had some influence upon the unfortunate result.
IL is a maxim Of war not to fight an enemy on
battle field he has selected-for the obvious
reasons, that he has selected it because it was
favorable to him-and you should seek to draw
him to ground more favorable to yourself
This maxim was violated; we attacked him in
the way, and at the place where he wanted us
to-giving him the advantage of his careful
and thorough preparation and study of positions,
we were at disadvantage, and. probably had
not at the time of the retreat uncovered hall
of the obstacles he had prepared to resist ouI
advance. The position OF General Johnston
with the Confederate left wing was well known
three days before; and the fact that he could
effect junction with their main army with fa-
cility and in less time than General Patterson
could connect with General Mcdowell, was pat
ent to every schoolboy who looked at the maj
Of Virginia. If il was intended that Patterson'
force should participate, why not wait for him
If it was expected to overpower General lie,
before Johnston could join him, why the della.
OF whole day and more reconnoitering7 Th'
railroad to Strasburg considered, and johnson
was as near General Lee in point of time a
was General Mcdowell when the march from
our lines at Arlington commenced. Thes'
things must have entered into consideration
and been determined before the advance
Manassas Junction was ordered. who ne
elected or despised the considerations of OF
dinary prudence concerning these two subjects
Again, everybody knows the axiom attribute
to Napoleon, that God fights on the side ths
has the most artillery. IL has been observe
that our artillery, though admittedly of exec
lent quality, has been much inferior to our Of
ponents in quantity, and that they have shown
marked attention to the development of tn,
g arm during their whole preparation for Il
fight, and indicated their reliance on it as
main arm; on the other hand, we have devote
but little energy to increasing that arm Of se
vice, and concentrated our attention on infantr
In cavalry, again, our force was insignificant
a numbers, though of superior quality-whilst Il
.. enemy had large, efficient and powerful ca
v airy; which, in fact, If rumor be true, won Il
= fight for him. We do not believe for M
3 ment, that gun for gun, dragoon for dragoo
the Confedesate artillery and cavalry cnmpari
n with the small but experienced bodies of the
: arms we had on the field; but have We not
learn that a larger proportion of artillery al
cavalry to our infantry would make q nut
N more efficient srmy7
Passing to the consideration of the battle
self, are we not now to comprehend that W
70 requires something more than courage
troops2 That intellect and training are el
ments OF military success, and raise the arr
to the dignity and capacity OF veterans7 T
{. self confidence of ignorance may frequent
c. lead men to believe that because they put
10 the uniform of soldiers or officers that, ther
is fore, by some special magnetism, or transu
sanitation, the skill and judgment of veter
priystes or officers has become theirs. The
Is too much of this, and it has been too NUT
/. encouraged generally. People will not bet the
!, money on an unframed horse in trottiI
!. match, nor on yokel in prize ring. A gret
hap 10 nj nioa,o mad horh nil
!. nor is the man9uvering of q ship OF W
!. entrusted to him. UnAedged lawyers and dc
tors are not entrusted with important case
!, ror can you get an engine builder to empi
% man fresh from the plough or the sh
bench aa q machinist or engineer. In
the regular armies of Europe private
~ called a, recruit till he has been three YET
in service; and no officer receives q CO
mand till he has worked up through the infer
re grades and acquired his knowledge of the
by practical experience in service, or by arr
~ Gus study and practical experience. We ha
marched upon this campaign with a mass
8, regiments where the officers had no more {
perience than the troops, and the troops W,
raw; an army created in the past three mon
from civil life, destitute of experience un,
l. fire, and of the theory of war, and ignorant
those resources of getting out Of tight pl
without running away, which are known as q
neuvres. The first thing which occurred
yond the routine they had been studying
past two or three MONTHS, utterly discompo
and routed them. The veteran troops of Ro
. were routed by the first war elephants they I
in battle-afterwards they learned to rout
elephants. Our troops, when experience
given them knowledge, will not be overcome
skill. According to the news We have, the
perience of two days fighting there shows
= force did not discourage them nor heavy
/ appal them. They stood the smell of bl
and sight of wounds like game-cocks, and &
fine promise of becoming first rate soldiers
II due time. II was through brilliant and 90
!" cious military evolution of the enemy that I
were trcked, routed, and Unexpectedly to th'
selves dispersed. If this be 80, the inq'
presents itself, whether we have military Il
ers who are equal in strategy aad resolution
, Generals Lee, Beauregard and Johnston; an
Generals Mcdowell, and Tyler, and Sche
are their equals in military capacity, then
%, were not such dangers foreseen and avert
,na In short, let us have an inquiry now, and le
what is the fault In the organization OF that
,n my, and what the remedy. Then let us az
:" the remedy, and give our patriotic soldier
fair chance in another field. ill s,sl.s b
. The Recent Flag OF Truce from J
fers0n Davis to PRESIDENT AtncOiI
g. When first mentioned that flag Of truce