The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1861-03-22
General Carripgton on Fort Sumter
and Pickens.

ion with the forts at Charleston an,
!, Pensacola, which may have som
I. interest at the present juncture Q
e national affairs. Their previous sug
9 gestion, to friends, was received b,
: some reproach, as unpatriotic ant
: impolitic. | will, however, briefly
/. consider:
lst. What is the intrinsic, STRAIT
! egic value Of those postsp
. 81. Their reinforcement; how 4
be accomplished; and the result.
Bird Other strategic points, to bt
\ substituted.
4th. Political view Of the matter
First. What then is the intrinsic
t and strategic value Of Forts Sumter
and Pickensl
The former is an interior harbol
| defense, which commands the ap
proach to Charleston, but is effective
only, when required to cover tha,
approach. If vessels are permitted
to onter and depart freely, its office
is practically at an end.
Again: AS a federal defense
agsins, organized rebellion, the pow.
er Of Fort Sumter alone, to subdue
aud overcome the dIsaffected, is in
significant. Tho few Columbiads,
of extreme range, can barely reach
the city; but, if they can destroy it,
such use OF its batteries would not
compel peace, or force other subor.
dinate states to submit. On tho
contrary, il would induce general
war. However it might crafty ex
tremists and others who are under
the sway OF indignant feeling against
traitors, it would not meet the pro-
posed end.
#, Again: 1t is covered by other
works, and its reduction is a mere
question OF time, or endurance Of the
garrison.
Its purposes, offensive, are there.
fore negative, neutral or inadequate.
Its purposes, defensive, are no less
insufficient, uncertain, and, at best +,
but temporary. Unless it be assumed
that its retention will, by moral force,
soon compel the sur. ender OF the
covering batteries, or wear out the
spirit and will Of their garrisons, its
abandonment involves a point of
honor only.
AS to Fort Pickens, will simply
say that while il commands the ap.
proachcs to Pens ,colS, the United
States is in possession Of nothing to
protect. Its navy yard is in the
hands OF traitors. The harbor is
useless as a rendezvous Of our gul!
squadron, for the anchorage is GOV.
cred by antngonistic batteries.
Are these forts essential or avail
able for the collection of revenuel-
Neither tort is proper place for re.
ceiving and delivering csrgoes. and
so lar as available for such purposes,
they are no better than a single
steam irigate. The latter hae, more.
over, control OF its position at all
times, whenever the weather would
permit the entry or exit OF any other
vessel, and can perform it's cilicc un
, trammeilcd by the threatening and
opposing forces.
| have put aside the question OF
reinforcement and its consequences
These | will now consider.
REiNFoRCEMENTs OF FORTS SUMTER
AND PicKENs.
: This must include men and pro,
visions. ltmust also involve repeat
ed reinforcement as required. Tc
, land five hundred men and provis
ions for even three months. demandi
time, system and the free action o
| the parties. To do it effectually
under a display Of opposing gums
requires as much larger force on tho
E part of the government, ss nava
7 armaments are inferior to permanent
land batteries. II no hostile gun be
fired, it does not lessen the necessity
. of furnishing an adequate convoy tc
: the supply squadron. doubt mol
E that the project is feasible. either by
+. turning the batteries on Cummins
: Point or forcing the harbor OF Charles
ton. But, if resistance take place
e the relief will fail unless the assail
ing batteries he silenced. To rein
;. iorce permanently and systema aticall,
$ requires permanent occupation q
y those batteries. This involves /,
direct trial OF strength with the com
a bincd cotton states, as their Join
IS action supersede that Of the states il
e which Forts Sumter and Pickeus ar
:, located.
:. Are we ready to meet this issuel
n Again: Ii must be remembers
y that New Orleans is the princip'
n n port OF Southern entry; and, that til
ne forts commanding it's approach, {
he we'll as those of Mobile and Savar
>. - nah, are in the hands Of adversarie
vt IL lie not, then, as material az II woul
he otherwise be. Besides this, the ol
u. u. legation to hold the forts ut Charlie
Oh ton and Pensacola, would compel Il
'm prompt and forcible recapture Of Il
'r' former. Few would urge this
present. When that issue Is pr
We sented, il will be met by the admi
for istration with tirmness, | have I
oa sat doubt. II may come speedily.
nd may not come at all.
Thirdly. will notice briefly, I
i aIa strategic points that should be hel
ZEN ZEN Forts Taylor and Jefferson col
ION mand the gulf. Whatever may
ted the ultimate status OF the colt
oo. oos states, whether independent or loy'
us. the non cotton states represent I