Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1861-03-14


MEsRs. RDrroRs submit a view Of the
ss7i,s of the Federal GOverpnent Ia cennec-
ton With the forts at Charleston and Pensa-
cola which may have some interest at the
n7asent iunctura Of national afairs. Their
previous suggestion 10 friends was received
81 some reproseh, ss pHpElriote and i'm.
p5liiio. ] Wlil however, briefly consider;
ist Rhai Z AZ intrinsic, tEatsgierli's of
fAots postsf ~ 81 80.
/ ga Thsir rdsVoreeRqltf Aoig % BE- aecon-
pi5hed, end he rs1tiif ~.
Sd Oiher srRATlolc points . be sabsiitu-
4lh. PORGcal rias q tks matter
Frat Whafthea Is thf intrinsic and sfrGt-
sgie rdl,ie II Eork Sumter and Pie&ehs2 Z 1.
The former Is an interior harbor defense
4 which command he approach 70 Charleston;
bat Is effective, only, when required 10 cover
that approach. Il vessels are permitted 10
enter and d,psr, freely iis Office Is practi-
cally al an end 1..l.t rs.. . tss..sa !
Again Asa Federal defense against or
/ Ranized rebellion, the power Of Fort Sumter
aioue, 70 snbdue and overcome The disahee-
/ ted, Is Insignificant The few Columbiads,
OF extreme range, can barely reach the city;
bat II they can destroy il such use Of its bat
teries would not compel peace, or force other
insuboFdinate Ststes 70 submit On The con-
trary, 1t would induce general war. How
I ever it might crafty extremists and Others
I who are uader the sway Of Indignant feeling
against traitors, ii would not meet the pro-
posed end.
Again Il Is covered by other works, and
its reduction Is g mere question Of time, or
endurance Of the garrison.
It's purposes, Q6essiue, are therefore negative,
Neutral, or inadequate Ils purposes, ddsa-
sius. are no less insufficient uncertain, and, at
best, but temporary. Unless Il be assumed
that It's rsfeRtion, will, BY moral force, soon
compel the surrender Of the covering batteries,
or wear ont the spirit and will o their gar
rsons, its abandonment involves point 9f
koH0r only.
As to Fort Pickens win simply say that
while it commands the approaches to Pensaco-
I Ia, the United States IS in possession Of moth
ing TO protect It's navy yard is in the hands
OF traitors. The harbor IS useless as rem
devious Of our gulf squadron for the anchor
age is covered BY antagoristic batteries.
Are these forts essential or available for
| the collection OF revenue Neither fort IS a
proper place tor receiving and delivering car
goes and so far as available for such pur-
pose, they are no better than single steam
! irigate. The latter, has borrower, control Of
its position ata1 times, whenever the weather
would permit the entry or exit of any other
vessel, and can perform its office untram-
melled by threatening and opposing forces.
] have put aside the question Of reinforce
ment and its consequences, Thsss I OiH HOv
consider.
REINFORCEMENT OF FORTS SUMTER AND RIcKEEs.
This must include H,ea and pTorisioHs. Il
must also involve repealed Reinforcement as
required To land 500 men and provisions
for even three months, demands time, system
and the free action Of the parties. TO do it
eGectually under display Of opposing guns,
requires as much larger force on the part Of
the Government, as naval armaments are in
ferior to permanent laud batteries. If no
hostile gun be fred, it does not lessen the
necessity Of furnishing an adequate convey
to the supply squadron. doubt not that the
project is feasible, either by turning the bat
leries on Cummins Point or forcing the har-
Dor of Charleston. But if resistance take
place, the relief VIII fail, unless the assailing
| batteries be sileuced. To re-fOrce Perzaaaently
and systematically requires permanent aecupa-
| ton Of those batteries. This involves direct
trial Of strength with the combined cotton
States as their joint action supercedes that Of
the States in which Forts Sumter and Pickens
are located
Are we ready to meet This issue2
Again Il must be remembered that New
1 Orleans is the principal port Of Southern
/ entry; and, that the forts commanding its ap-
! proaeh, as Wsii rs those Of Mobile Sud savsn-
! nah, are In the hands Of a6yersaries. II is
not then, as material as it would otherwise
be. Besides this, the obligation 10 hold the
/ forts at Charleston and Pensacola, would
compel the prompt and forcible reception OF
i the former Few would urge this at present.
/ When that issue is presented, it will be met
by the Administration with frmness, ! have
no doubt It may come speedily. II may
not come at all.
Thirdly, will notice briefly, the Strategic
points that should b held.
Forts Taylor and Jefferson command ts
gulf Whatever may be the ultimate status
Of the cotton States, whether Independent
or loyal, the non-cotton States represent the
natioHale0mmsrce California, with her center
Il Of The Pacific trade, belongs to this portion
l The occupation Of the Florida reefs is, there
tore, more necessary than Gibraltar IS 70 Eng
land; and thsiF reinforcement IS worth a
hundred Fort Sumters.
These are key positions. Such would hare
been the Charleston, Pensacola, Mobile, and
Louisiana Forts, if they bad been occupied BY
garrisons, at the proper time. And in this
connection, it may be considered, whether Il
would not be better, also, TO withdraw all forcei
from Texas and combine them for the protec-
ton Of New Mexico, the Federal Capital and
all other vital points, than Fesipitate furthei
conflicts on the frontier.
Four,hly. ItriH notice a fer salient points o
, poll Y suggested By ths above outline.
! What would be, imperative duty, ifthe retea
, lion ofthsss forts, acre Tsetisite 10 maintain
: their integrity against foreign foe, become
I A question, 70 some extent Of expediency
: under other, and present cirrumstanees.-
Z TLsa. It might be well 70 hinge our vary ex
]. istance upon the issue, and pledge our entir
resources 20 the conflict. Here, it becomes
= question, whether we will render reclamation
Of the disahected States impossible and Ii
hercest Of civil wars certain, or conform II
position of these forts to that Of Others, in a
Cotton States.
Asno one expects TO whge war Of eoi
guest, in case no adjustment Of pending issuI
can be realized; so it would be unwise totOr
an issue which would make quasi conque
n requisite even 10 ensure subsequent separ
: ton. If a separation is 10 be the FINAL resul
!. - there can be no doubt that it will be less vi
m lent and destructive by present modera
I. measures. Furthermore, il removes objec
"a Of present attack, and leaves the 30 CALI
to southern COltedeTaey with an immense arm
IL and military tax 70 manage, and no pspul
ns basis upon which to predicate it. This,
II. itself viii suggest 10 candid southern M
n thn rr,adneaa ri fhair lnadern the sslfshne