Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1861-06-04

the geometrical theories of military science !;
those theories which would reduce every mill.
tary operation TO question of scale and com.
pass. And certainly, so far as the writings of
JOmini and his followers have this tendency,
we readily coincide in the criticism. That
they possess it to certain extent there can be
no doubt 1t will be well, however, to consid-
er the question more generaly-in what
science war can be looked upon as a science
THE ISSUE OF WAR NOT DECIDED BY CHANCE.
Let us put case, impossible in itself, yet to
certain degree attainable in many instar ces,
and suppose that we were fully acquainted
with the moral and military qualities of the
generals Of two opposing armies, with the
skill and energy of their staff, commissarat,
medical and all other departments, with the
characteristics both of officers and men, with
the numbers and composition of each arm,
with all the antecedents and with the resource
es at the disposal Of both armies; further,
that we know well the country in which they
were about to act, its physical and local pecu.
liarities, and the habits of its people then we
may safely say that the result of the war would
be, if not absolutely at least to the highest
degree of moral certainty, practicable. Now
what does this fact which will hardly be dis.
puted, imply? 1t implies that the issue ofd
war as not a matter of blind chance that it de.
ponds, humanity speaking, upon a combination
of qualities and resources in the opposing
forces, and that these qualities must be exer.
csed, and these resources destroyed, accord
ing to principles which, whether known or
unknown to us, are beyond doubt equally fixed
and real The fact that the game of war is
frequently found to be the most uncertain of
all games proves nothing TO the contrary. 1t
only shows that the true apprehension of the
above elements of the calculation is excessive.
ly difficult in practice. Experience in war is
universally acknowledged as the best teacher
and the precise knowledge which experience
brings of the data before mentioned and of
the principles OF action which spring from
them, proves that there is in war sufficient
sequence of cause and effect to constitute a
science.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR.
These are then, principles of war, fixed and
real and if principles, then there is science
which combines and celebrates them. fwhat
nature, then, is this science +? Napoleon gives
us the best clue to the answer by telling us in
what respect war is not science. We must
not expect with the limited knowledge which
under the best of circumstances we can hope
to acquire of the data above mentioned, to at.
tain to anything resembling a demonstrative
certainty. Nothing says the great warrior,
rs absolute in war" Accordingly we find
that principles which in some wars are I'M
questionable are not applicable at all to others
for instance, the principles on which wars
against independent chiefs of halfsavage PEG
pies should be conducted are totally different
from those which should govern military on
erations against regular armies
If any one doubts this, we will ask him to
take one of the first principles laid down in
all scientific military works, from Jomini
downwaIds, viz: that of destroying your enc
my in detail by opposing masses of your
forces fraptinuS M hfS NDtp in, a ,por cunh
as we are considering, as far from this
being the object to be attained, the real OBJ
ject is to induce the enemy to unite his forces
in order that you may destroy them once and
all. Again the first OF all principles of war is
said to be to concentrate superior forces upon
the decisive point. But as in the illustration
just given, there is in many cases no decisive
point whatever. 1t is of little consequence
where the enemy is. There may be decis-
i've object to be attained, and this object may
be to provoke him to concentrate in order that
he may be the more easily annihilated. But
the use of the term point evidently introduces
geometrlcal or at least a typographical idea
into the axiom, which had best be avoided.
Bat although the real science of war; as de.
dnced from historical fact, has been sadly
overloaded with definitions and axioms, ii
would be unsafe to neglect on that account
the study of the principal writers of strategy
and tactics. One writer, indeed, is almost ab-
solutely exempt from this fault, and, which
strongly confirms the truth Of our position, that
writer is the only one who ever commanded
large armies in the field. We alludc of course
to the admirable work of the Achduke Charles
on the principles of War" OF tactical
works we know scarcely any that can compare
with Frederic's instructions to his Generals"
and Crawfords standing Orders" But the
best of all studies is that which the student
fOr binoSpf Inv pn1la TIM tl,o