Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1861-08-03
THE WAR MOVEMENTS.

From the st. Louis Democrat OF July Su'
We had visit, yesterday morning, from
soldier lately attached to Jackson,s grand ar
my OF emigration, which he LETT some days
ago. This gentleman is native OF Missouri
Is a farmer in time of peace, but was impress
sed into the "sesesh" service by order OF the
former governor of the state. He was with
them at Lexington, and accompanied them IN
their hfgTd to the southeast. 1t was, ne says
the most rapid exodus-and many pig ana
chicken, OK and horses, owes his safety to the
want OF Time to steal him. Our informant
was not present at the battle OF Carthage III
consequence OF his friends having no conn
dence in his loyalty. He distinctly heard the
firing, and assisted in the running aterward,
until they W re safe in the extreme southeast
corner of Macdonald county, when he lelt
jackson and his cohorts.
He says they have large force scattered
through the different camps in that nelghDor'
hood has heard it estimated at Io,OOO uleh'
The rebels are poorly armed and badly EQUIP
| ped generally. Their food consists altogether
IN what they steal. The soldiers receive daI
| ly halt rations of bread and double ralionS oil
fresh beef The farming cattle in the vicinity
are universally seized. Ii is not the intention
OF Jackson 10 attack Lyon until some other
movement is made. Ben McCuIloch had lett
to join Bowen, as had most OF their best arm
ed troops-at least it was so reported III MS
camp. He passed over the field OF the late
battle at Carthage, and states the stencil to
| be intolerable from the decomposition OF horse
flesh which fell on that day
| There isl no order or discipline in the rebel
army. Gen Rains is generally drunk, ana
jackson is in constant fear OF being taken The
! CHEROKEE Indians are frequent visitors to the
camp, but will not take any part against the
government of the United States. Many are
anXiously awaiting the arrival Of Uncle Sans
boys to take leave of the rebels, having been
impressed into service. Most of them declare
they will not go out of Missouri to serve the
southern conlederates. Altogether our nior-
mant is satisfied that the rebels are III bad
Tx, and if aid is not soon obtained, they VIII
dlsband from necessity.
THE DEVOTED BAND"
The Richmond papers refer mysteriously 10
an organized band of assassirs to be employed
in the service OF treason. The Richmond
Wing of July "a, under the head OF "The
Devoted Band'' has the following THE short
est path to peace is that which carries havoc
and desolation to our invaders. 1t is believed
south ready and willing to share the fate OF
Curtus, and devote themselves to the saliva
ton of their country. Ii is proposed tina! all
who are willing to make this sacrifice, shall
arm themselves with sword, two five-shoot-
ers anda carbine each, and meet on horseback,
at some place 10 be designated, convenient for
the great work in hand. Fire and sword must
be carried to the houses of those who are Wis
iting those blessings upon their neighbors.
Philadelphia, and even New York, is not be-
You'd the reach of long and brave arm The
moral people of these cities cannot be better
taught the virtues of invasion than by the
blazing light OF their own dwellings. More
need apply for admission to "THE DEVOT.
ED BAND" but those who are prepared to
take their life IN their hand and who would in
dulge not least expectation of ever return
ing They. dedicate their HUes to The destruction
I'0f their enemies A. S. B. d. B.,
Richmond.
All southern papers are requested TO give
this notice few Insertions.
ABOUT THE BATTLE.
A letter from Richmond to the New Orleans
| Delta, evidently from one Of the rebel chiefs
speaks of the battle of Bull Run as follows:
"Two weeks ago it was evident that boil
Johnston and Patterson were influenced, IL
their maneuvers, by considerations connected
with the line Of Manassas johnson desired
to occupy Patterson in the Shenandoah valley
and Patterson desired TO occupy Johnston il
the same region. Each aimed to force The
| otlo, tO,,, s.,s..---- A..sas-ld
| IMPOSSIBLE to extricate himself and participate
in operations between Washington and Manas
sas junction. In this game Patterson was out
| 4 r Had |, tai
alike in boldness and caution, in vigilance and
activity Keeping his communication with
the Manassas line intact, he could not be de-
ceived by Pattersou's feint demonstrations,
but Just so soon as the latter had fallen back
towards the Potomac, he set out at once, from
Winchester TO join Gen. Beauregard's column
near Manassas junction, marching eighteen
miles to Strasburgb, and proceeding thence,
about fifty miles, by railroad. He arrived not
an hour too soon, with twenty regiments Ills
men had one night to rest before waking 10
meet the bloodiest fury Of The battle on the
left of Stone Bridge.
will not say that Gen. Johnston's presence
was absolutely necessary to turn the scale in
our favor / firmly believe that Gen. BeduTegard' S
force o0as considerable enough, It's disposition skill
fiji enough, its detences strong enough, ats men and
officers determined enough, 10 administer signal
| WUSo u0fhSft
Gen. Scott Wds able to send against han from
Washington. But it would have been by a vic
tory bought at a terrible sacrifice of what the
south should most assiduously economic, the
| precious liies of her noble defenders. AS it
was, one of the most brilliant victories of the
age was achieved with loss of lite almost In
| credible, when the weight of the enemy's col
umn and the length OF the battle are consider
| ed The enemy seemed 10 stake the issue OF
| day on turning our flank on the left. 1t was
then that Johnston, after having batted Patier-
son, as Butcher bafied Grouchy, did more
| than was done by Butcher at Waterloo.
| 1t is not easy to believe that Gen. Scott II
lett to pursue his own plans, would stake the
| issue OF campaign on battle fought under
| the circumstances of that of the list. Two
months ago he committeda mistake IN hating
at Alexandria, after crossing the Potomac, in
stead of pushing forward briskly towards Rich
mond. But that mistake. sprang from excess
| OF prudence, and it is not reasonable to deduce
| from such mistake another arising from the
| opposite fault of rasness. For rash IL certain
| IN toas to attack Gen Beamegard on ground achich
he himself had selected and deliberately fortified.
| Po itical considerations must have prevailed
| over military considerations when Gen. Scott
consented to the attack, without the support
| of Mcclellan from the- west and Patterson
from the north. 1t was a fatal departure from
the anaconda policy which he had previously
| been pursuing. The consequence is, the back
| bone of the serpent is broken. The advance
OF McClellan's column in Western Virginia is
rendered inconsoquential, and if il advance lar
into the mountains, its destruction is inevita-
BILE, while Butler at Fort Monroe is constrain.
ed to moderate his exorbitant military ambi
ton to the humble Office Of performing garri-
sou duty.
FROM THE KANAwHA VALLEY.
"UP THE KANAwHA," FIFTEEN MILES FROM
GAULET BRIDGE, Saturday, July u, 1851