The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-11-05
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MsL,raas CoAAAsps FOR C,ssLiass--The
military strength Of poeple, or Of an army,
depends On a combination Of snudry essential
requisites. There must 10 efficient nurses
To Constitute araaies--Lsrdihood aud courage
and obedience "a command of the individrsis
vhe hecone soldiers -h.d ynoaSh OF arais
munitions ct war, supplies Of provisions anc
nraey. All these requisites, IN their full siiea
sa~s, arc ~ vrea, importance. The most short !.
Il .htsd rsaeenef would pronounce that Their
woald be eeanceiy u possibility for suceessiat
vsarfsre ii either one ofthese elements Of mill
sary strength we're entirely wanting. still
necessary az are all Of these and other mean
for military success. in some rneas'ire, there
may be great deficiency in one. or even u,or,
than Que, compensated by abundance In others
Thns, the courage and devoted patriotism 0
sn army, and It's well-rlaeed confidence in
aud obedience to, the leaders, have. in man,
eases, s~rved for the triumphant and gloriou
defence of country, though with dvfectiv.
ssns and sapplies, and eoniending against Is.
move oumervas aud welsuppled ens'nie--
But there ia one other requisite for militar1
snccess witch cannot DO dispensed with wlicl
mast lie possessed In no sti,t-i measure, and
which, If greatly deficient. MIST produce and
en- arc dis ster defeat. EVENT. armies are eve
So uunsesns. brave, and vel supplied with i
phy steal means for warfare Tbs all impc
tans and essential requisite, for every particu
ls.r corps, whether "a regiment, a brigade. Il ii
Vision, OF al eniirs. army. IL m.htary cep.2c,ts
ef iAs c'1smander for iischaTsing the dHtie.
r.qui ei, and uis ebsiafy for military com
alant. Without there. 10 snc4sss III u,ililar
op rat:ons oan be expeated or scare, ly uill D,
possible. nIiess ny accident, or by the militar,
prspara4iuas and Il III operations being re,lil
directed by ssrne Obscure bur better qualities
advi-srsnd guide 20 the authorized com sn,l,rier
and o-iensihls leader snd director Of the oper.
tons IN ql,sti ~
Il is true that there have besn excellent Of
fcars " o afterwards became great aid IN.
rassful commanders OF armies, and even il
naval warfare, without training in military 0
naval scisncs, and even without e&perienc,
except NtCb III llIt-ifiDtaR Sx
amples have been presented in CRoAwGLL.
B.AgE, sad Jackson. 1t NAY be admitted
that great natural talent for military com uland
Is even more ef1caciou-, ard rhould be NOR.
highly estimated ti.:aa either the scientific or
practical trsiuirA OF an officer who il AT a.!
wanting In natural talent. or o;hog requisite
qualities for Command Such cases OF naiu.
rs.l h,pess for military operations and com.
m,ni when Indicated IL a civilian, or proved
hv the deeds of an inferior officer in seryice.
should bs cersf fully cherished. and pnt % Ess.--
8 as!s civilians may lie saf'iy appointed TO mill
e.ry Office. Aud sach ofloers, if Of inferior
grades, should Us promoted 10 nigh positions.
and Ii already OF high rank, should ba kept
employed IN some of the most irpport;sr. con1.
nian0s and servicss. There are such officers
snd commanders, now in our se-viee. who
have well proved their right 10 marked dis
,.nction But such 6prR military officers and
commanders have been bat few, and the tx.
i>sence Of any such should be considered fin
advance Of iacts sor pro0fl "a exec ptions, and
rare exceptions, 70 the general aid proper
rule for appoint scents 20 office viz. that pre-
yt"us instruction ana practical training ere e.
soasial Tor every iuan y 10 Is 10 be entru s.ed
with high military coromasnl--vhether 5f q
regiment only, s brigade, or .-of an arnv.--
The "ny excuse for any departure from this
rule, in appointing or promoting otiicers 70
high grades. ID when there is an absolute de-
tciency Of individuals even partially ~ quail
fed
The most condemnaole, inexouaatle, and
dangerous error which has been committed in
the general direction Of the war Ill which we
ARE now engaged, land for the best success in
which We need 10 employ every element 81
military strength, is the comforting OF higl,
military Positions and commando on infividu
ais who had no military training or expert
eucc, or IN whom, at most, a mere Wea, Point
e'incation. followed by peaceful service az a sub
aitern, for shor. time, and which csa sod many
years ago. is paraded by sP5iegists as sufficient
evidence Of fitness for the command Of u bri
gsda There have been far too MANY Of sucb
appointments rs Coionsls and Generals. the
inducing motives of which may have been the
political srninence Of tho appointee or other
vice mere favor but certainly not because Of
any military knowledge, or peculiar natural
Ronins or fitness of the favored individuals -
Hv possibility and rare chance, some one or
more Of thess appointees may possess natural
mi'i airy talents unknown 10 Themselves when
they solicited such promotion, and certainly
unsupported by the appointing anshorihee, and
may hereafter, if opportunity sboaa offer, ex-
hibit tho military talenrs of Cromwell or a
jackson; bat the probability and the chances
are thousand to one, that in the far greater
nnmher Of soch caees. there viii be found, Oh
trial, rs much want Of caparity and OF etici-
sn~y of such officers, as there was deficiency
Of wisdom aud statesman like policy ia their
appointment