Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1861-05-08
WAIT AND SEE.

Seldom. in any age or country, has an Ad-
ministratiOn been SO hardly circumstanced as
that OF President LINCOLN. Certainly never
since the Revolutionary Congress has our
Government been so Kindred and almost help
less, as on March 4, 1861. On first coming
into power, or rather into weakness, it found
heavy debt, a plundered treasury, dropping
credit, and in every hole of every department,
treason brooding over corruption, and hatch
ing the ruin of the nation. Not only must
all pernicious matter be expelled from the ad-
ministrative body of perhaps hundred thou
sand limbs-not only was order to be drawn
from sschaos worse confounded"-but the
Government had to make new creation-a
something out of almost nothing-a living
world from the dormant elements of things
Men, money, munitions, ships, stores, equip
ments, means OF transportation, routes, stra-
tegic points, were all to be extemporized. In
brief and almost literally, the men means and
defences of a vast army in complete array
were to spring at once and full grown from the
ground. Not only SO. The policy best to be
pursued was doubtful with the wsest, and dali
ly shifted with the change Of circumstances
and the progress of events. At the North
many were averse to haSty or ultra action
while most were eager to strike sudden in
discriminate, crushing blow; and while it was
difficult to tell at once how much sympathy
the North might have with the South or how
general punishment, it was impossible to guess
how weak or how strong was loyalty at the
South, and how much or how little of her soil
could be retained in the Union. 1t seemed
not well to crush the innocent with the guilty
not we'll to exasperate the loyal into trail
tors-not well to drive all to combined, con-
solidated rebellion. Meanwhile the Govern
ment knew not what power it could command,
and had it not in readiness if known. 1t also
was uninformed on the all important point as
to what would be the feelings and course of
England and France towards the old Union
and the new Coniederacy, they being likely
to shape themselves by the aspect and nature
of the struggle. and by the principles avowed
and the action taken by the cOntending par
ties. Thus, besides the law of necessity, there
were many good reasons for delay, delibera-
tion and diplomatic management. Meantime,
corruption and treason were most weeded from
the Executive departments, confusion was
marshaled into system, credit restored, the
treasury replenished, and many vigorous prep
arations made, while the governmental duten-
were carefully exploring the hearts of our
own people and the pulse of foreign nations.
Since the ssmasterly inactivity at Fort
Sumter allured the traitors to overt guilt,
clear even to the blindest all know how much
has been done. in how short time, and with
means how unready, scattered and remote.
All know how, at the call of the President
Northern money noWed Ike water, and ORTIZ
erD men surged to the war in masses, with
the tide still rising and roaring behind them.
On the whole, then, we judge that the SEEM
ing delays, temporizlDgS, soft words, and qua
81 negotiations of the Cabinet, were mostly to
gain time for gathering in from all sides the
force for simultaneous blow by and land
"a two-edged, general, overwhelming blow.
When, under the sleepless, and, in military
sense: all-seeing eye of WINFIELD ScoTT, his
lines shall have all met in their appointed CEN
tres, his plan will be found by its issue to have
been harmonious and infallible, like that of a
faultlesS wat ch or steam engine.