Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1861-08-20

mlllor with the lOCallt5 mi6n
Judging merely by tho eye-Whetner these
troops were advancing TO, or recurring 'loni
B%lackburn's ford. The impression seemed TO
be quite common among US tnat tIcy "elc
retiring. / was perfectly sure mai they were
columns moving up to meet Us :'ro" Aiahas'
sas.
At nv interview with the commanding Gene.
raj that evening he informed me that he mad
CONVINCED himself that the nature OF the coun-
trv f. the left, or southwark of Manassas, was
n1ft for the operations ola large army; that
he had determined to move BY the right, turn
inc the cncmy's left that the provision trains
we're lust coming in, and that the troops would
reouirc the next day to cook their provisions
for another march.
told him I would cndcavOr, the next day
IN obtain such information az would enable
10 decide on his future movement.
The next most prominent crossing OF Bull run,
above Blackburn's ford, is the Stone Bridge OF
the Warrcnton turnpike. Such 4 point could
~scarccly be neglected by the enemy. In.
formation from various quarters gave good
cause for believing that it was guarded oy sew
oral thousand men-that at least four cannon
were stationed to play upon it and the ford not
far below and moreover that the bridge was
Mined md extensive abattis INSTRUCTED the road
on the opposite shore. w.,
bridge Is . ford laid down on our maps as Sud-
10y sn,jnr, Reliable information justified the
belief that the ford was good, hat it was unior'
tilted. that it was watched by only two COM
pnnies, and, moreover, that the run above It
was almost everywhere passable Tor wheeled
vehicles,
Midway bcIsee: the Stone Bridge and Sud-
lev Spring maps indicated another ford which
was said to be good.
: Notwithstanding our conviction ot the prac.
ticability Of these fords, no known road con-
ncctcd with them from any of the main roads
on our side of Bull Run. We had information
that a road branched from the Warrenton turn.
pike Il short distance beyond Cub run, ny
which-opening gates and passing through
private grounds-wc might reach the fords.-
it was desirable to show ourselves that this
route vas entirely practicable. In company
with Captain Woodbury. engineers and Gov.
ernor Spraguc, and escorted by n company Of
cavalry, !, on the 10th, followed up the valley
of Cub run until We reached a point vest ten
degrees north, ard about four miles, in an ri:
line, from Centrcvilla, near which We struck
q road which we believed TO lead to the tords.
Following it fer a short distance we encoun.
tered the eaeny's patrols. As we were most
anxious TO avoid attracting the enemy's attcn-
tion to our designs in this quarter, We did not
care to pursue the reconnaissance further. we
had seen enough to be CONVINCED Of the perfect
prac,icabiIity OI the route. To make more
certain Of the fords, however, Captain Wood
bury proposed to return at night, and with a
few Michigan woutsmea from Colonel Sher.
mans brigade to endcavor to find them. On
returning to camp it was determined 10 send
Captain Wright and Lieutenant Snyder (Engi-
netrs,) With Captain Woodbury.. At the same
time The commanding General directed Captain
Whipplc Typographical Engineers) and Lieu
tanant Prime (Englneers} to make . night re
cennoissanco Of t.e run between WarrentoE
bridge and B!ackbuTn's ford. Both these night
expeditions failed. II was found the enemy
occupied the woods too strongly on our side
of the run to permit the reconnaissance to be
accomplished. 1t was not our policy to drive
in his pickcts until nc we're in motion to
attack.
On laying before yol tha information OBJ
~taiuel, the commanding General believed him,
self justified in adopting the following plan OF
attack, which was decided upon on the 20;h:
First. \ false attack to be made by Rich
ardscn's brigade Temporarily attached 10
Miles divisiunJ on B%iackburn's ford, the rest
of that division remaining in reserve 81 Cen.
~trerillc.
Second. Tyler's division to move from its
camp at three !. NJ. uhe 2lst) towards the
Stone Bridge Of the Earronton turnpike, to
feign the main attack upon this point.
Third. The divisions Of Hunter and IlcintZ'
Gilman lin the order namcd) to leave their
camps at hali,past two \. II. (thcy were en-
camped about Two or three miles behind Ty-
lcr); and, following his movement, to divcrge
from the Warrenton turnpike ct the byroad
beyond Cub run, and take the road for Sudlcy
Spring-or, rather, it was provided that (f |
mistake mott Hunters division should proceed
to Sudley Spring, and Heintzclnan TO takc the
lower ford. These matters, however, to be
regulated By circumstances
1t was intended that the head Of Hunters
division should be at the turn Off at early day
light, OF about four 4. n, and that it should
reach Sudley by six or seven.
You arc aware Of the unexpected delay
The two leading Lrigadcs Of Tyler's had not
CleHTCu tIle IOiu lOE llu.lleE " LEIS pOibI ohI'A
h~alf.past i've, and our guide, alleging that a
nearer route to the lord would bring our col
umns in sight Of the snemy's batteries, led
them by 50 circuitous n way that Hunter did
rot reach Sudle5 until half. past nine or there
sbouts.
Accompanying the commanding General, We,
Us you are aware, after waiting Two or three
hours at the turn off, rode on to overtake the
front of Hunters division, when We emerged
from the woods, nearly northeast Of Sud!ey,
into the open country, from whence the course
of the run and the slopes Of the opposite shore
could be seen; we could perceive the enemy's
columns in motion 10 meet US. The loss OF time
here, in a great measure, thwarted our PLAN
We had hoped to pass the ford and reach the
rear Of the encmy's forces at Warrcnton Stone
Bridge before he could assemble in sufficient
force to cope with US.
1t now became necessary to have Tyler'5 d!-
vision force the passage OF the bridge. 1t had
always been intented that this division should
pass at OF near the bridge, but it was hoped,
by taking it's defcnces in the rear, it could be
passed without force. The commanding Gen.
eral promptly sent orders to Tyler to press his
attack with all vigor.
j nlu yet llluCl CcinlucliCc ltal, tiOiSI NJ
had been anticipated lowing to the delays men
toned the enemy was rot yet assembled in
numbers to oppose us in great force, IA conf
dence which I think the facts justified that
we might successfully attack him in front while
the division of Tyler should fall upon his flank
and rear.
When re reached the front of Hunters
column the battle was just commencing. The
events Of the battlefield will be described in
the reports you will receive from other quar-.
tiers. was near the commanding General
until som time after the arrival of Sherman's
brigade on our left. Being accidentally Sc.
parated, I saw yourself on the right, and join
Ing you we observed for some time the action
on the heights, where the enemy made his final
and successful stand As we were observing,
the Zouave regiment Of Heintzelman was dri-
ven back, leaving Ricketts, battery, upon which
we observed the enemy charge.
You left me here, and I remained a few minutes
longer al anxious spectator, and for the first