The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1861-08-14
who Is Responsible for the MannS-
sas Disasteri---ImpOrtant MiIi-
fary Revelation.

1
sas Disasteri---ImpOrtan Will
tary Revelation.
As part Of the military history Of the pres
ent war, we publish the following defense Q
General Scott from the New York Times,
warm Republican journal. The New Yorl
Tribune had said "that General Scott had ful
control of all the war movements, and organi
zed the columns, appointed the officers, and Sc
!ected the time and place of attack at Bull:
Run" That was made the occasion of the ar
ticle which we copy ffoin the Times, and which
may be regarded as semi, official. It is very
important military revelation, and places upon
the President and his Cabinet the forward
movement to Richmond" The Times says:
So far as the preparation Of the army for the
special service assigned 1t is concerned II is un.
doubtedly true that General Scott did have full
control. EIe probably did "organize the col
umns. and appoint the oficers;" and he may
have Selected the time and points Of attack at
Bulls Run"-after that attack had been per-
emptorily ordered by his superiors--though we
are inclined to believe that these details were
conf1ded to Brigadier General Mcdowell, who
was on the spot and who could form, from a
personal examination ofthe approaches, mnch
better opinion as to the points Of attack than
General Scott The fact that both the time
and point Of attack were changed by General
| Mcdowell proves, indeed, that in this respect
he was left to the exercise ofhis own Judgment.
| The original purpose was to attack the enc
my's position on Thursday afternoon or Friday
morning, by turning it on the south side-and
General Mcdowell went personally with Col.
| HeintZelman's column to superntend the at
tack. But he found the roads on that side i'm &.
practicable fer heavy artillery, and on that &C.
count abandoned the plan. Friday was devo-
ted to survey on the other flank, ard there he
! found the roads in such CONDITION as to iueLi
| fy the attempt to turn the enemy's position on
that side. The fact that General Mcdowell
thus changed the time Of attack from Friday to
Sunday, and the point Of attack from the south
ern to the northern flank, shows that the con.
troll of these details was confled wholly to
him by General Scott, and we presume every
one will concede that this discretion was wise
ly exercised and the chanLe judicious.
| But all this leaves the main point untouched
The question IS: who decided that the attack
should be made? Who determined that the
road to Richmond should be by Manassas juno
ton? Who is responsible for the plan Of oper.
by the rebels themselves admirably adapted for
defense, fortified through three long months of
incessant labor, accessible to their reinforce
ments from both directions and in all respects
precisely such position as they might wish to
make it, became matter OF necessity? The
paragraph quoted above, for the purpose Of re-
lieving the President and Cabinet. throws the
responsibility on General Scott. We have not
the slightest desire to involve the Presidentsand
Cabinet in any responsibility that does not be-
long to them; but on the other hand, we do not
intend that General Scott shall be loaded with
blame for acts which were done by others. We
| know that General Scott was opposed to this
plan OF the campaign from the beginning; he
deemed it unwse to make Richmond the main
point of the movement; but afer that was deci
ded against him, he was opposed to marching
against it by the longest and most difficult route
through country every foot of which would be
obstinately defended and which must be
held by strong force after it had once been
taken. This we know to be true-and in spite
ofthe delicacy of such disclosures, we shall
not hesitate to state the authority for it. 1t is
that of General Scott himself
On the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gener.
al Scott at his own table, in the presence of his
aids and single guest, discussed the whole
subject of the war, in all its parts, and with the
utmost clearness and accuracy. He had dis
tinct and well-defined opinion on every point
connected with it; and stated what his plan
would be for bringing it to close, il the man
agement had been left in his hands. Thu main
object of the war, he said was to ering me peo-
pie of the rebellious States to feel the pressure
of the Government; to compel them to re.
turn to their obedience and loyalty. And this
must he done with the least possible expendi
ture OF life, compatible with the attainment OF
the object No Christian nation can BE- iusti
fed, he said, in wagjng war in such a way as
shall destroy sol lives, when the ol iect of the
war can be obtained at cost Of 500. Every
man killed beyond the number absolutely re.
quired, is murdered. Hence, he looked on all
shooting Of pickets, all scouting forays not re-.
quired in order to advance the general object Of
the war, all destruction OF lite, on either side
which did not contribute to the general result
as so many acts Of unjustfiable homicide.
II the matter had Teen left to him, he said
he would have commenced per ect blockade
of every Southern port on the Atlantic and on
the Gulf. Then he would have collected a
large orce at the capital for defensive purposes
and another large one on the Mississippi for Of
iensve op ,rations. The summer months, du
ring which it would be madness TO take troops
south Of st. Louis, should have been devoted
10 tactical instruction; and with the first irosts
Of autvmD no would have taken a column of
1900 well -dsci plined troops down the Missis.
sippi, and taken every important point on that
river, New Orleans included 1t could have
been done, he said, with greater ease, with less
loss Of lie, and with far more important results
than would attend the marching of an army to
Richmond. At eight points the river would
probably have been defended, and eight battles
would have been necessary, but in every one Of
them success could have been made certain for
us. The Mississippi and Atlantic once ours,
the Southern STAGES would have been compelled
by the natural and inevitable pressure ofevents,
| 20 seek, by return to the Union. escape from
ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out
| Of it.
"This." said he, twas my pan. But am
only subordinate. IL is my business to give
advice when it is asked, and 10 obey orders
when it is given. | shall do it. There are
gentlemen in the Cabinet who know much
more about war than do, and who have far
greater influence than have in determining the
plan OF the campaign. There never was more
Just and upright man than the President ney
er one who desired more tincerely to promote
the best interests oil the country. But there
are men among his advisers who consult their
own resentments ar more than the dictates OF
sdom and experience--and these men will
probably decide the plan OF the campaign. /
shall do, or attempt to do, whatever / am or.
dered to do. But they must not hold me re-
sponsible. If am ordered to 60 TO Richmond,
| shall endeavor to do it. But know perfsctly
well that they have not any conception OF the
difficulties we shall encounter. / know the