The star of the north. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1849-1866, 1861-12-18
The Work 10 be Done.


fierce battle on the Potomac or elsewhere
landing al Port Royal, seizure OF Savan-
nah, or indeed in any other sudden manner,
st down with map of the United States
before him and study the prospect for ten
minutes, without passion
The magnitude OF the territory TO be re-
posseeed at once strikes the eye. This IS
no war between two nations separated by
oceans or foreign soil. In such cases, gen.
crafty, as in the Crimean war, the struggle
resolves irsel into a sort of duel or a trial
of strength, at one or more chosen points.
And alter due trial, and a reasonable deter
minarion oil the comparative ability OF the
combaianis, or when the question of the ex-
hans,ion of one or The other is settled, The
result is treaty OF peace. This is no such
war. The people OF two immense tracts OF
territory, lying contiguous for thousands Of
miles are here opposed 10 each other, and
where they are not engaged in vast armies
they are occupied in guerilla fighting all
along this immense frontier.
General Mcclellan has before him no
mere problem of beating an enemy in
battle on The Po.omac, or elsewhere. A
successful engagement with the army at
Manas sas, defeating and driving them back
might produce either Of TWO results, but
would not be certain 10 produce either one.
Ii might result in destroying rebel conf
dence and spreading terror in their forces,
Of shaTr
defeated army; or i; migat only drive them
10 a new point OF ralyiHs, aud new stand
against the Union troops. victory on The
Potomac might therefore be OF vast benefit
while on the oher hand it might be an aw-
fuI sacrifice, without corresponding gain
10 the great cause.
We preseme this 10 be the reasoning of
the Comm ander-in Chief. 1t is uudonbted-
ly the result of calm and di>passiouate
examination of the map, by men who do
know much of military affairs.
But The Commanding General has vast
work before him, and how will he proceed
TO do liz Certainly not by plunging head
long into expensive battles, which however
hriiiari and successful, may not he either
final in their effects, or even useful as con-
iributng materially 10 ultimate success
Looking at the vast territory of the rebels,
taking into consideration the thousand of
miles OF their connected lines their ability
10 retire into strong positions, even after
defeat their nlercommuncaiion with each
other in their extensive States, and in brsf,
the general truth that the rebellion 10 be
conquered is not at Manassas. nor Rich
mond, nor Columbus, nor New Orleans,
bul is spreads over the entire tract OF South
ern States, it is very evident 10 US that the
Corn mander-in Chief has larger plans in hls
mind than would be fulfilled by mere
battle on he Potomac, or the Mississippi
We have already intimated the idea o
cutting the rebellion into two pieces. i
this could be accom- Plished il would be &
final aud fatal blow.
The possession of three points would ac
com plish this, but those points are not oil
of them 10 he easily acquired. Savannah
/ CoIumbus. and Knoxville are really OF more
| importance TO the rebellion than RichmoTC
! or New Orleans Whether the possession
| of these points is or is not part OF III,
! grand plan, II is OF course useless even iC
| conjecture !: but on the same principle /
is of vast importance TO the Union cause -
! II there were a hundred Thousand Uniol
troops in the neighborhood OF Knoxville
with or without any considerable rally O
Union men there and in Western NorlI
Carolina and North GeorIia, il is morrall
certain that the great rebellion would b
virtually dissecied.
We do not speak of this BY way Of proph
ecy but as afording 10 those who are impa
tient, a subject of consideration, and
ground OF patience. We can all see th5
if we were aoLg on with series Of battles
in which our success was ordinarily certai
we should be excited, and possioly jubiIan
hut we should by no means be certain tn;
the work Of inaily crushing the rehellio
was gaining ground On the other han'
we can see that if the master mind is iull
sensible OF the maan rude of The work, an
not al all depressed or discouraged by III
prospect, il is the dictate of good sense
wait his movements with patience.
We have spoken entirely on conjectu
TINS lar. But we have reason 10 know tn
Gen. Mcclellan is not desirous OF mere ten
! porary advantages. al The expense of lii
5 He will not place the final success of h
: by local victories. whose effects may be r
ally of no great value. We believe that
: knows his ability to-day TO drive the eneu
before him from Manassas, and the enen
know it al.o. But he probably secs, as Il
T result of ballle fought now an awful ie
/ OF blood, glorious victory. and yet no &C