, 1861-03-25
Why Sumteris not Fvneuato1--Cause
OF tie Delay.

NAs nov over week since the country was
electrified by the announcement In the Htrdld
Of the intention Of the new administration to
abandon Fort Sumter. When that humbling
piece Of intelligence first l4shed over the land,
d shock o[indignant surprise was experienced
citement and wrathful disappointment became
manifest on all sidea, and . asweeplng storm Of
opposition appeared imminent. But second
sober thought prevailed in the end. Facts
aud figures benumbed The stlngirg senee Of
wounded pride and deep humiliation. Gradu.
ally, thoug gh Reluctantly, the rank and file Of
the Republicans grew 1econeilea to the idea Of
giving away for the nouce, from inexorable
necessity to treason and rebellion. To be cure,
to withdraw Major Anderson wss to 1hsm like
reuouncIpr an article of their political faith,
aud abandoning the ardent hopes and recalling
the feryent srayess OF many month"; Yet the
dose Of modification, compounded for them
by Mr.. Lincoln's predecessor, had to DO sual-
lowed, however large and bitter, and hence
they set about preparing their minds for the
Bus, although the majority Of Northern Re-
publicans are evidently resdy for the consum-
nation Of what they have learned to consider
Inevitable although they are ready to youch-
esfe, If not their active appreciation, at least
their passive tolerance, OF tie most unpopular
and yet necessitous step the government Of
their election could possibly take-they loathe
TO be kept on th- rack Of suspense. They in
tend to abide by the action OF the new Admin
istration in the premises. but they desire it to
act with promptnesH. They want to be I'd OF
Bible moment. They yearn to be relieved Of
tho taunts, jeeIs and ridicule the sorry evapo-
ration Of their promises and pledges, boasts
and threats, in regaId to Fort Sumter have
heaped upon them. They know that the only
plausible argument in justification Of It's aban.
donment by order OF the Republican Executive
was its "ine1orable aud. immediate necessity u
and that 1t was losing force by'every hour OF
delay. They feel that boldness Of resolution
and energy of: execution are essentially tndis.
pepsable qualities with those in powtr at the
present jnncture Ct public affairs, and hence
they chaie under the indecision and procrasti
-natlon that appesr to characterize the first at
| tempt Of the new regime at the practical con
| structton OF the inaugural phrase " to possess
hold and occupy the federal property
Dlurnhly for the last ten days the Cabinet
| has had protracted meetings. At every ses-
sion, 1t is known, the question Of what waste
he done with Fort Samterand the other posts
|. In: the seceded 6tatea still occupied by thf
| Federal troops unfnilingly came up, and We:
the subject Of long aud animated discussion
! The counsels OF such experts as Gen. Scott
| Col Totten, Prof. Bache, and other military
aud scientific eminencee, were sought ane
| obtained upon the welghty matter at Issue
Bnt although not only the President, 6nt aiss
every member of hfsmfnlsterial council, yield
| ed their political objections at an carly mo
| mept, before the conclusive demonstration
| bY those nuthcrities Of the impracticabi1ity q
| reinforcement, except at fearful sacrifice
life and property, recognized the 1neSltaehitl
/ Of an Abandonment, and determined then II
eub1nit to i, they concluded not to act npol
the resolution.
The geutrA impression appears to be tha
] the evident hitch arrived at. IN tho treatment
| Of this subject Ia the result Of indecisions a
| to the mera determination to evacnate. Blu
The real obstruction lies in 8 different dlrec
tiop:- It Is the. question no" to effect III.
| Withdrawal of M.j. Anderson and his sn1a.
baud with eafety, and without compromising
the honor aud dignity Of the Federal Govern
ment, too much Of which will already be vi Id
ed by the surrender Of its property md armn
ments to rebels. and tra1tors. Still furtht i, II
delibersting upon thie point, an entirely new
brogllo presented itself to the Cabinet In th'
/ ghape Of authentic information that the com
mander-tn- chief of the revolutionary forces o
the cotton confederacyhad instructed Genera
Beaureeard not to allow the peaceful with
draWl Of tie garrison Of Fort Sumter, with
f-curity not only against all rases, but also 70
the delivery Of the post and all It's appurtcn
auce. in Al intact condition. This intention
OF the real chiefs to dictate terms to the 1egiti
! mate government may be bold; but, untoFtu
1atelY, they seem to have the power to realIz
1t. Their command of: ali the inlets to Charles
ton harbor itself is 40. absolute that neithe
the safe approach Of any fedegsl vessel nor th
7 safe embaTkation Of The garrison would b
practicable without their consent. What
: then, can the federal Executive do In case the
: shall presume, IN their consciousness Of th
impracttcability,, Of q reinforcement and II
impending reduction IT the occupants -oss -th
~fppst to the staryation point, to allow the eyat
Il uatlon upon the above conditions on1yy Nott
. ing but either to bind Itself By advance stlpu
lalions not to attempt q stealthy reiptorei
ment while pretending to Ee about evacuatinE
not to eplEethe guns, and not to burn or hlos
| up the tort, or surrender at discretion. "a
:. both horns Of this dilemma imply an indires
F-recoeuition Of, as we'll as a most humhlin
1 anhmfseton to, the Revolutionary aAthoritiet
both the President aud The Cabinet loatae t
| touch either; and their reluctance In this II
! spect has contributed as much IS any othe
cause TO their manifest hesitation to act def
/ nfte]y relative to the erucuat1cH
= What the ultimate solution Ct this difficult
, | may be, it s.ceTtsin that the administraslo
, has nothing to gain ~ delay. The entire 4:
, tion considers the question Of; the .Souther
: 1 forts the most important issue betore It, an
! sooner they decide 1t, either ona way or tt
pther, the better for itstlf and ~ Its friend
Symptoms Ola re: cfinn il pnbNc oplnian {
to the absolute necessity of. tue abaaidonme1
, Of Fort samter are already audible M in the ION
! Of loud groH1s Of many OF the :Repnbtica
7. leaders now here. They 'ask If 1t must /
+ done, Why not do 1t at once; and expfesat tAeu
7 l. selves uuahle to understand how so much tin
. aud attention can be. bestowed upon the dl
}>frJhnf}on >nf VIA ei>nf1a and matfars ;tf ANf