Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-01-30

one seventh of the days for rest but could it
enact that no Individual should labor for him
self but six. sevenihs of the days? We ex-
press no fixed opinion on the point here, as the
case does not require it. Does it not involve
the patriarchal theory of government?
We are satisfied by comparison, that the col
locations of the sections in the two acts are
different, and that that of the sections in the
act of 1859 was Intentionally adopted to avoid
the particular objection which was held valid
as against the act of 1853. In that act there
was prohibition to sell without license then
a penalty enacted for such selling, then an
exception that the license should not extend to
Sunday, thus extending the prohibition to that
day The court held that the penalty applied
to preceding and not subsequent sections, and
hence did not apply to sales in violation of The
exception. In the act of 1864, the exception
precedes the penal section. so that the penalty,
in extending to all preceding sections applies
to sale on Sunday, to which day the license
does not extend.
T. The objection is made that the law vio-
lates those provisions of the Constitution re-
quiriug uniformity of operation in the stat
utes and that they shall take effect only by
authority of the Legislature and Executive.
Art. l, sec. %, and art. 4, sec. 22. We do not
think the act in question obnoxious to these
objections. Every citizen may obtain license.
See Drapier Us. The State, supra.
g. Ii is argued that the act embraces more
than one subject = that it embraces pro-
visions of civil and criminal law and
the Indiana Central Railway, cs. Potts, 7th
Ind 6Sl is cited. That case in its reasoning
rather than in its facts favors the proposition
assumed by counsel but while we are still of
the opinion that it would contribute to the GER
tainty, simplicity and popular knowledge of
our statutory law, and accord with purpose of
the constitution, could the reasoning of that
case be conformed to in legislation, we are also
satisfied that the courts cannot bring our legis-
lation to such test. They can only ask, does
the title of the act which may be brought in
question, embrace but single subject; and are
the provisions of the act upon that subject or
upon matters properly connected with it,
We are further satisfied we can not say that,
simply because the sections found in the act
may be some of them civil and some of them
penal in their character, they are upon two SUBJ
iects. 1t must be admitted that the Legisla-
ture ray seek to enforce obedience to require
ments in mere civil provisions of an act by
adding penal sections to the act Conforming
then in this, TO decisions we have already
made in other cases, we must say that the pro-
visions of the liquor law of 1859 are embraced
by the title of said act, or are properly con.
nected with its subject matter.
0. 1t is lastly insisted that the law is an
unwarrantahle interference with individual
right; but we think it falls within Legislative
powers conceded in Beebe rs the State, 9Th
Ind, sol; in the Madison and indianapolis
Railroad Company, -. Whiteneck, Ind. 217,
and in Herman, Us. the State Ind. 545 to exist
We think the law can not be regarded as an
unreasonable regulation of the liquor traffic
The judgment below is affirmed with costs