St. Charles City Republican intelligencer. [volume] (St. Charles City [Charles City], Iowa) 1857-1861, 1861-07-18

! uC uSCu dgdlilSI lnc Government |.
Accommodations of the public revenue
had been seized for the same object.
The navy was scattered in distant
seas, leaving but very small part
within the immediate reach of the
, Government. Officers Of the federal
army had resigned in great numbers,
and of those resigned a great portion
had taken up arms against the Gov
crument. simultaneously aud in con.
nection with all this, purpose to sew,
er the Federal Union was openly
avowcd. In accordance with this
purpose, an ordinance, had been re-
ported in each of these States, dcclar-
ing the States respectively to be sep
arated from the Federal Union. The
formula for instituting a combined
Government for these States had been
promulgated, and this illegal organi.
zatlon, in the character of the Confed
crate States, was already asking rec,
ognition, aid and intervention from
foreign powers. Finding this condi-
tion Of means, and believing it to be
an imperative duty upon the incoming
Executive to prevent, if possible, the
consummation of such attempt to de-
stroy the Federal Union, choice of
two things to the end became indis-
pcnsable. This choice was made and
declared in the inaugural address.
The policy chosen looked to the ex-
haustion of all peaccable measures
before a resort to any stronger one.
1t sought only to hold the public
places and property not already
wrcstcd from the Government, and to
collect the revenue, relying for the
rest on time, discussion and the ballot
box. | promised the continuance of
the mails at the Governments expense
to the very people who were resisting
the Government, and gave repeated
pledges against any disturbance of
any of the people or any of their
rights--of all that which President
might constitutionally and justitiably
do in such a case. Everything was
forborne without which it was belev-
ed possible to keep the Government
on foot.
On the fifth of March, the present
incumbent's first full day in office, a
letter from Major Anderson, command
ing at Fort Sumptcr, written on the
2Sth of February and received at the
War Department on the 4th of March,
was by that Department placed in his
hands. This letter expressed the pro.
fcssional opinion of the writer that
reintOrcemen:s could not be thrown
into that fort in time for his relief,
(rcndcred necessary by the limited
supply of provisions and with a view
of holding possession of the same, }
with force of less than 10000 well
disciplined men. This opinion was
concurred in by all the officers of his
command, and their memoranda on the
subject mere made Enclosures of Ma
.jor Andcrson's letter The whole was
Immediately laid before Lieutenant
General Scott, who at once concurrcd
with Major Anderson in his decision.
On reflection, however, he took full
time in consulting with other officers,
both of the army and navy, and at the
end of four days came reluctantly but
decidedly to the same conclusion as
before. He also stated at the same
time that no such sufficient force was
then at the control Of the Government
OF could be raised and brought TO the
ground within the time when the pro-
visions in the Fort would be exhaust
ed. In a purely military point OF
view, this confined the Administration
to the mere matter of getting the gar
rison safely out of the Fort. 1t was
believed, however, that to so abandon
that situation under the circumstances
would be utterly ruinous that the ne
cessity under which it was done would
not be fully understood that by ma
ny it wonld be construed as part of
voluntary policy; that at home it
would discourage the friends of the
[ mon, emboldcn its advcrsarics, and
go far to ensure the latter recogni
tion abroad, and that in fact it would
be our national destruction. This
could not be allowed. Starvation was
not yet upon the garrison and ere i,
would be reached, Fort Pickcns might
be reinforced. This last would be a
clear indication of policy, and would
better enable the country to accept the
evacuation of Sumpter as q military
necessity. Then an order was at once
directed to be sent for the landing OF
the troops from the steamship Brook
lyn into Fort Pickens. This order
could not go by land but must tax,
the surer and slower route by sea
The first returning news from the or
der was received Just one week befor,
the fall of Sumpter The news itscl
was that the officer commanding th(
Sabine, to which vessel the troops ha,
been transferred from the Brooklyn
acting upon some armistice of the late
Administration and of the existence
OF which the present Administration
up to the time the order was de
spatched, had only too vague and un
certain rumors to fix attention. hat
refused to land the troops. To nov
reinforce Fort Pickcns before the cri
sis would be reached at Fort Sumpte
was impossible, rendered 50 by til,
mere exhaustion of provisions in th,
latter named Fort. In precautiol
against such u contingency the Gov
ernment had few days before com
menced preparing an expedition Il
: we'll adapted as might be to reliev
J Fort Sumptcr, which expedition wa
. intended to be ultimately y used or no
according to circumstances. TIL
strongest anticipated case for usiu;
it was now presented, and it was re
, solved to send it forward as had bee
intended In this contingency it wa
, also resolved to notify the Governo
Of South Carolina that he might ex
pect an attempt would be made To pre-
: vision the Fort, and that if the al
/ tempt should not be resisted, ther
would be no attempt to throw in mer
+ arms, OF ammunition, without furthe