Cedar Falls gazette. [volume] (Cedar Falls, Iowa) 1860-1895, 1861-10-18
Military Criticism.
From the New York Tribune. Oct, 1st,

Our objection to outside criticism on op-
erations of progress is based on the palpable
inadequacy of the data on which such criti-
cism is usually based. just now, for Illus
tration, there are loyal journals which cvince
impatience at Gen. McClellan's inactivity,
while rebel gazettes loudly murmur in like
spirit at Beauregard's failure to capture
Washington or at least force its defenders to
a decisive battle. Now, if we knew all that
is known to both Generals Mcclellan and
Beauregard of the strength and condition of
their respective armies, we might venture to
suggest to one or the other of them the ex-
pedency Of moving on, though We do not
doubt that either of them knows hundred
times more of the art of war than we ever
shall. But can one of these newspaper grum.
blels FIR an advance, tell the strength of
either ;Hnain army within twenty-five thou
sand? Who docs know to-day whether there
are more Union or rebel troops within days
march of the Potomac? Who does certainly
know that either army may not fall below
100000 men. and that there are not over
100000 confronting it? What rashness,
then, to insist that either General should
give battle without knowing very nearly with
what strength he could OVER it, and what
ioICS hc Noull lftNc W AIleF the pat
tie shall have been fought, we may all be
wise as owls, provided the Confederatcs shall
venture to publish their official report of it,
as they have not yet been goaded in publish
ing their official report Of the Bull Run COM
ba. but there is not soldier on earth, not
to say civilian, who can decide whether Nc
Clellan, or Beauregard, or neither ought to
assume vigorous offensive unless he Knows
the relative strength of their respective arm
les. And it is highly probable that each
commander alone knows the exact strength
and approximate efficiency ofhis own army,
while able to give pretty good estimate of
the power pitted against him, while no one
else knows even as much as that At best,
accurate knowledge of the strength of either
army IS sacredly restricted to a very few, and
these the most unlikely to share their knowl-
edge with journalist or the public. And
neither descrters nor spies can give either
commander any trustworthy account of his
opponents strength, however willing to tell
all he knows. 'a
These strictur4s apply in spirit and sub
stance to the current criticisms on General
Fremonts management in Missouri, cspec-
tally the failure to relieve Lexington. These
may be Substantially just; but who kno,os
them to be so? Who knows how many men
General Fremont had in hand when first ap-
prised of the peril of Lexington? Who
knows how many of these were armed, or
could have been until arms were received
from the East? Who knows what was the
proficiency Of these troops in field evolution'
Who knows what was the supply Of muni.
tons? Who knows why the expedition actual.
ly dispatched up the Missouri the Monday be-
fore Lexington fell, failed to reach its dcsti-
nation? DO let us ascertain the material
facts in the case before proceeding to judg-
ment and execution " A' =