Weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1858-1865, 1861-02-13
REMARKS OF MIR. WORTH,

the BILL but at the same time protesting against taking the
tax off Of domestic liquors.
REMARKS OF MIR. WORTH,
OF RANDOLPH,
Delicered in the Senate, on tho Stay Blu
The bill entitled "a bill to alter the Jurisdiction Of
the courts of the State and the rules pleading for
the relief of the people" being under consideration
in the Senate on the 9th of February,
Mr.. Worth submitted the following remarks:
The bill under consideration provides that suits
to debts before justice Of the peace the
demand of TIRE defendant shalt be postponed for six
months before he shall be required to plead: that
all actions of debt assumpsit now pending in the
County Courts shall be transferred to the Superior
Court for trial, and the defendant shall not be
qured to plead until the second term after the trans
fer; and that all actions of debt assumpsit, &C.
hereafter to be brought shall be commenced in the
Superior Courts, and the defendant shall not be re-
qured to plead till the next term after the return
term
When this bill came up on yesterday and sudden
y assumed its present shape, resisted its passage
on the ground that l regarded it as an attempt on
the part Of the Legislature to interpose between
debtor and creditor, and alter the agreement they
had male-an attempt to impair the obligation Of
contract and therefore unconstitutional and de-
structive of confidence between man and man. Fur
Their reflection has confirmed these views
The Senator from Berthe, (Mr. Outlaw admits
that act providing longer stay for debts now
existing than present laws allow, would be un-
consttutional-but he says the General Assembly
has the undonbted right to change the jurisdiction
of the courts and alter the rules Of pleading; that
this power has often been exercised by ab0liShing
the county courts as courts of pleas in many
ties and that nobody ever pretended that such acts
were unconstitutional, though the effect neces-
sarily to hinder and delay creditors. Now admit
the Legislature, for the purpose Of facilitating the
administration Of justice, has the constitutional
right to alter the rules Of pleading and the ursc-
ton Of the courts and to abolish the county courts
but deny that such power may be constituticnally
exercised for tho purpose Of hindering or delaying
creditor in tho collection of his debt There is
marked difference where such delay IS the incident
Of such legislation the object being improvement
in the mode of administering justice, and where the
purpose anI design Of such delay is to hinder and
delay the creditor in enforcing the performance of
the debtors contract. In the former case the law
is constitutional, though creditor may be inciden-
tally delayed in the latter it is unconstitutional,
because the purpose is to impair the obligation of
contract But it is asked how can the court know
the purpose! The act does not declare that its pnr.
pose is to delay or hinder the creditor 1t purports
by its title to be act to alter the jurisdiction Of the
courts and the rules Of pleading for the relief of the
people The court cannot know in what way it was
intended to relieve the people. 1t does MT appear
on the face Of the act that the relief was intended
only for the debtor and to delay the creditor. 1t
may be that the judiciary may not be able to get at
the object and therefore may not be able to declare
the act unconstitutional; but re know the object
We are snorn, as well as the judges to support the
constitution and kow that the sole object is to hin
der the creditor and reere the debtor from the per-
torrance Of his contract and we seek, by an ngen-
ous and delusve title to the BILL to evade the sauary
provision of the constitution which forbids to in
terfere between debtor and creditor. We seek to do
indirectly what we know and admit forbid
den to do directly.
have before Inc the decision of the Supreme
! Court in the case Of Jones Crittenden, L.
R. The opinion delivered by Taylor, G. J., is an
elaborate one. will not detain the Senate by read
ing the whole oft regard it precisely in point,
and propose to read certain passages particularly
| bearing on the matter under discussion.
u" The law Of which the defendant claims the ben
eft was passed in 1912, and provides that any
court rendering judgment against debtor for a
debt or damages between the 3lst of December in
that year and the LIST of February 1914 shall stay
the same until the first term session of the Court
after the latter period, upon the defendants giving
two freehoders securities"
This was a manly, direct attempt to give the
debtor longer time to pay than he was entitled to
demand, according to the terms of his contract and
the law existing at the time he made the debt on a
consideration intended to secure the ultimate pay
ment Our bill gives, and is intended to give, the
time to the debtor, without the security to the cree
itor. Again, the court declares that "the first
principles Of justice teach that he to whom pro-
mise is made, under legal sanctions should signify
his consent before any part of it can be rightfuiy
sanctioned by legislative act'
"Thc right to suspend the recovery Of debt for
one PERIOD implies the right disappearing it for an
other and as the state Of things which called for
the first delay may continue for series of years,
the consequence may be total stagnaton of the bu-
sness of society," 5y destroying confidence and credit
among the citizens"
IAN argument urged and much relied on by the
defendants counsel is that the law in question bears
only on the remedy, and is, therefore, within the
sphere of Legislative authority. But If in so doing,
it violates the Constitution it is not less invalid than
if it directly touched and annulled the right Every
one will agree, that law which would deny to all
creditors the power of instnting action of debt,
covenant or assumpsit, or bill in chancery, would
invade the Constitution that law which should
limit the recovery of all debts to SO short period
after its passage that it would be impossible, &C.
cording to the course of the courts to ootan iudg
ment would also be null and void though such
laws would ostensibly bear only on the remedy,
yet they do in reality bear on the right. The law
before US, it is conceded does not 60 to the extent
of either instance yet it certainly dminishcs the
importance and value Of the right 1t is difficult to
conceive how law could otherwise impair an exist.
ing right thar. by Withdrawing the remedy, which
is, in effect to suspend the right"
/" The undoubted right of the Legislature to alter
and reform the judicial system may, it is said pro-
duce delay in the execution Of contract equal to
that which results from the present law and it is
urged that all such acts must, upon the same prin
ciple, be declared unconstitutional"
We cannot acquiescc in the final conclusion
drawn from these premises, which, without hesita
ton, we acknowledge to be correct
Allsuch laws the Legislature have an undoubted
righs to enact right which the people have never
surrendered and the exercise Of which is not for