Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1861-08-14
and we're, against the rules of modern warfare

| made prisoners.
The issue OF this hard fought battle, in
which certainly our troops lost no credit in
| their conflict on the field with an enemy ably
/ commanded, superior in numbers, who had
but short distance to march; and who acted
/ on his own ground, on the defensive, and
always under cover, whilst our men we're of
/ necessity out on the open fields, and should net
prevent full credit being given to those officers
I and corps whose services msTited success If
! they did not attain it.
As my pos tlon may warrant, even If it does
not call for some explanation Of the causes, as
far as they can be seen, which led to the re-
suits herein stated, trust it may not be out Of
/ place il | refer in few words to the immedi-
ate antecedents Of the battle. When | sub
Rtted to the general-in-chief, in compliance
rations and estimate Of force required, the
/ time l was to proceed 10 carry it into effect
was fixed for the Sth Of July, Monday. Eve
| Ty facility possible was given me by the gene
1 Tal-in-Chief and heads of the administrative
/ departments in making the necessary prepara-
I tions. But the regiments, owing, was told,
/ to want Of transportation, came over slowly.
I Many of them did not come across till eight or
nine DAYS after the time fixed upon, and went
! forward without my even seeing them, and
without having been together before in brig
I ade. The sending Teinforcements to Gen.
/ Patterson, BY drawing of the wagons was a
/ further and unfavorable cause Of delay. Not
withstanding the herculean Efforts OF the
quarteTmaster-general, and his favoring me in
every way, the wagons for ammunition, sub
sistence, ETC., and the horses for the trains and
the artillery did not arrive for more than
week after the time appointed to move. | was
not even prepared as late as the 15.h ultimo,
and the desire | should move became great
and it was wished l should not, if possible,
delay longer than Tuesday, the 10Th Ultimo.
When ! did set out, on the 10Th, was still de-
ficient in wagons for Subsistence. But | went
forward, Tus.ing to their being procured in
time to follow me. Tie trains thus hurriedIy
gathered together, with horses. wagons, drivers
ana wagon managers, all new and unused to
each other, moved with difficulty and disorder,
and was the cause Of days delay in getting
the provisions forward, making it necessaryt to
make on Sunday the attack we should have
made on Saturday.
l could not, with every exertion, gel forward
with the troops earlier than we did. | wished
to go to Centervile the second day, which
would have taken us there on the l7th, and
enabled us, go far as they were concerned, to
60 into action on the 18Th, instead Of the 2Ist;
bat when I went forward from Fairfax court
house, beyond Germantown, to urge them for
ward, was told it was impossible for the izen
to march farther. They had only come from
Vienna, 8b1ut six miles, and it was not more
than six and half miles farther to Center
ville-in all a march OF twelve and a half
miles; bat the men were foot weary, not so
much, I was told, by the distance marched, as
by the time they had been on foot, caused by
the distractions ia the road, and the slow pace
we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The
men were, moreover, unaccustomed to march
ing, their bodies not in condition for that kind
Of WORK and need fn he
load of light marching order.
We crossed Bull Run with about IS, coo men
Of all arms, the fifth division (Miles' and Rich
ardson's brigade) on the left, at Blackburn's
ford to Csntervilie, and Schenck's brigade, Of
Tyef's division, on the left Of the road, near
the stone bridge, not participating in the main
action. Ths numbers opposed to US have been
varioaslv estimated, | may safely say, and
avoid even the appearance of exaggeration,
that the enemy brought up all he could which
were not Kept engaged elsewhere. He had no.
tice Of our coming on tie 17th, and had from
that time Un' il the 2ist to bring up whatever be
had. 1t is known that in estimating the force
to 90 against Manassas, | engaged not to have
to do with the enemY's forces under Johnston,
then kept in check in the valley by Mai. Gen.
Patterson, or these kept engaged by Mai. Gen.
Butler, aud / know every effort was made By
the generai-iD-chief that this should be done,
and even if Johnston Joined Besnregard, it
would not be because he could be followed by
Gen. Patterson, but from causes not l. uecessary
for me to refer TO, he knew them all. This was
not done, and the enemy was free to assemble
from every direction in numbers only lm5ed
BY the amount OF the railroad rolling stock and
bis supply Of provisions. To the forces, there
fore, we drove in from Fairfax Court House,
Faitfax station, GermantOTn and C9nterville,
and those under BeauregGrd at Manassas, must
be added those under Johnston from Winches-
ter, and those brought by Davis from Richmond
TO other places 1T the South, to which is to be
added The levy en- m18se ordered by the Rich
mond authorities, which was ordered to assem-
bic at Manassas. what all this amounted to,
cannot say-certainly much more than we
attacked them with.
I could not, as have said, more early push
on faster, nor could | delay. A large and the
best part Of my forces we're three nonths'
volunteers, whose term OF service was about
TO expire, but who were sent forward as having
long enough to serve for the purpose OF the
expedition. On the eve Of the battle the 4th
Pennsylvania regiment Of volunteers, and the
battery Of the volunteer artillery of the New
York 8th militia, whose term of sevice ex-
pired, insisted on their discharge. | wrote to
the regiment, expressing a request for them to
remain a shcSt time, and the Hon. Secretary
Of War, who was at the time on the ground,
tried TO induce the battery to remain at least
five days. But in vain. They ms 'sted on their
discharge that night. It was granted, aad the
next morning, when the army moved forward
into battle, these troops moved 10 the rsar to
the sound Of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few days, day by day, | should
have lost ten thousand OF the best armed,
drilled, off cred and disciplined troops in the
whole army. In other words, every day which
added to the strength Of the enemy, made us
weaker
10 conclusion, desire to say, in reference
to the events Of the 2lst ult., that the general
order for the battle to which referred, was,
with slight notifications, literally conformed
to; that tue corps were brought over Bull run
in the manner proposed, and put into action az
before arranged, and that up to late in the
afternoon every movement ordered was carry
ing us successfully to the object we had pro-
posed before starting-thst Of getting to the
railroad leading from Manassas 20 the valley
Of Virginia, and going on it far enough to
break up and destroy the communication and
lnteTyeins between the forces under Beaure-
gard and those under Johnston And could
we have fought day OF a few hours sooner.
there is everything to show bow we could
have been successful, even against the odds
with which we contended.
L have the honor to be, verY respectfully.
your most o5edient servant,
IRWIN MCDOWELL,
priroJtnr