Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1861-01-09

toldtc VI SuUSN NlNhuld, NuCiC ~ was H>--
have no application whatever to the removai
of slave by the master or his agent, with or
without warrant. Such was the undoupteu
law of the State under the statute OF 100,
and in re-enacting that statute, in the act OF
1925, with an increased penalty, it is maniiest
shat the intention and object OF the Lesis.aa
ture was to protect free persons OF coioi' -
to punish those who, by fraud, 1orce - Ia
lence, where guilty of kidnapping, anu M hotu .'
ing or selling free men as slaves. 1hls .he
State had a clear right to do; ana nothihS
but miscopstruction of her act, coulu nave
induced the declaration that ~ was loroiooeu
by the CONSTITUTION OF the Unlteo otates. II
is perfectly clear, that Edward Prigg had COM
mitted no crime in removing Margare. morgan
from the State of Pennsylvania to the State
of MARYLAND, and delivering her up to her
owner /; and it is equally clear, that no attempt
was made, by the statute of Pennsylvania, TO
declare his act crime. He should have been
discharged, not because the act of the State
was unconstitutional, but because he had not
transgressed its commands.
The Supreme Court of the United States
not only pronounced the particular section oil
che act of 1926, then before them, unconstitu-
tional, but majority Of the court held that
the whole act was void, because the power 10
provide for the rendition OF fugit1Ves from Ia,
Dor, was vested exclusively in Congress, ana
the several States were, therefore, lncompe-
tent to pass statutes either in aid OF, orto MN
der, delay or prevent, the delivery oil such
fugitiyes. That this was the extent OF tne
decision, as delivered by Judge Story, not
only appears from the opinions of the majori-
ty, but also from the dissenting opinions de-
liyered by the minority of the court. BY this
unfortunate decIsion, it was anthorltatlvely
proclaimed that Pennsylvania, in enacting her
liberal statute of 1926, making it the duty OF
her own officers to aid in arrestlng and deliv-
ering up fugitives from labor, had mistaken
her constitutional obligation, and that her act
was in violation of, rather than obedience to,
the Constitution of the United States. Under
such circumstances, it was the manifest duty
of the State to repeal her law thus declared
Unconstitutional. This was done by the act
of l847 and if that act had contained nothing
II. ore than a repeal of the law of 1876, and the
re-enactment of the law against kidnapping,
Il could not have been subject to any just
complaint. But the third section OF the act
of lS47, prohibits, under heavy penalties, our
judges and magistrates from acting under any
act of Congress, or otherwise taking juriSdic-
ton of the case of fugitive from labor; and
the fourth section Furnishes with fine, and i'm
prsonment, the tumuituous and riotous arrest
OF afugitiye slave, by any person or persons,
under any pretence of authority whatever, so
as to create breach of the public peace.
The sixth section, denying the use of the
county jails for the detention OF fugitive
slaves, was repealed in 1852, and need only
be referred to as showing the general spirit of
the act. The seventh section repealed the
provisions of the act of 1880, which authoriz-
ed persons passing through our State to take
their slaves with them, and gave to sojourn-
ers the right to bring their slaves into the
State, aad retain tdem here for any period
not exceeding six months.
The provisions OF the third and fourth sec
tions of the act of i847, seem to have been
prcdicated upon the language of the Supreme
Court In Prigg's case 1t is there admitted
that the several States may prohibit their own
magistrates, and other officers, from exercising
an authority conferred by act of Congress !;
and that while au owner of slave, under and
in virtue of the Constitution of the United
States, is clothed with power, in every State
of the Union, to seize and rccapturc his slave,
he must, nevertheless, do SO without using
any illegal violence, or committing breach
of the peace. 1t is evident that the framer of
the act OF lS47, had closely studied the case
Of Prigg rs. The Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania, and had kept his law strictly within its
letter. In many respects, the act is codi6-
cation Gf the principles enunciated by the
eonrt; and more fault may justly be found
with its temper than its want OF constitution
atty.
II fugitive slaves were still claimed under
the act of Congress OF 1898, the denial to the
master of the aid of State judges and magis-
trates, might be a source OF great inconyeni-
ence to him but the complete and perfect
remedy now provided by the act of Congress
of 1850, renders him entirely Independent of
State officers. And the punishment of arrests
without warrant, BY master in the exercise
OF his constitutional right of reception, but
made in violent, tnmultuous and unreasona-
BILE manner, amounting TO a breach of the
peace, is but recognizing, by statute, what was
before the common law. These sections were
re-enscted in the revised penal code OF Penn
sylyania, at the last session of the Leg iSiatuie
and are still the law of the State; bat they are
not now of any practical Importance, and as
their retention on our statute book is calcula-
ted to create the impression that the people OF
tlis State are uniayorable to the execution oi
the fugitive slave law, and the discharge OF
their confederate duties, and with the view OF
removing this subject of reproach, L earnestly
recommend their unconditional repeal
While majority of the judges of the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in the Prigg
case, held, that State had no constitutional
right to provide by legislation for delivering
up fugitives from labor, minority were then
OF the opinion that State laws, consistent with
and in aid of, the constitutional injuction
were valid and proper. And this minority
opinion is now the Judgment of the present
court, as recently indicated in case which
arose in the State of Illinois. There is, there.
fore, nothing 20 prevent the revival of the ACT
of 1926, and its restoration to the place in
our code to which, by its merits, II is so Just
ly entitled. This would leave to the option Of
the claimant, whether he would seek his rem
edy under State or National laws. He had
this right before the repeal of our act of 1926
and, in my opinion, no good reason can be as
signed for refusing to place him again in the
same position.
would also recommend that the consent o.
the State be given, that the master, while so
.iourning in our State, for limited period, ol
passing through it, may be accompanied BY
hia slava wifhonf losinn his riohf To his Ser