Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-07-24
NnEruit.e.. battles.

The New York World and Courier and En-
quirer, said to be the representatives of the Ad-
ministration in that city, thus defines the policy
of Gen. SCorr, and develops the plan by which
he intends to conduct the war:
The cry among certain newspapers is for bat
ties. One of the most hot headed has even de-
manded ga battle day" 1t is very evident that
that there is going to be Il good deal of disap-
pontment in the supply of this sort of sensation.
There will be no battle day-probably not one
a month of any magntude-possibly not more
than two or three during the whole period of hos
tilities The manifest design is to fight no battles
of an indecisive character; and the really decisive
battles must. of necessity, be very few in number.
1t will require but single battle of this latter
kind to put us in possession of Richmond; and it
is with reference to that battle and that alone that
the Government is directingits movements. Were
Gen. Mcdowell to push his forces directly upon
Manassas Junction, he might, perhaps, with his
nearly equal forces, dislOdge the enemy after
sharp engagement; but the enemy would only fall
back upon other positions, and would be in a con-
dition to try the chances of half dozen battles
before making a final stand at the capital We
say try the chances for talk as we may ofskilland
courage, there is no denying that, after ALL a
great deal in every battle depends upon the acci-
dental and the unforeseen. Wellington himself
wits all his ability, so admitted. Instead of al
lowing the rebels any such chances, which might
long postpone the occupation of Richmond, the
policy actually chosen manifestly is to use STRAIT
egy, so that single defeat of the rebels shall put
them completely hOrs du combat. and occasion
the immediate surrender of the Virginia Capital
with the entire State. Therefore the Federal col
umns in Eastern and Northern Virginia do not
advance upon Manassas Junction until General
Mcclellan, with bis division in w estern Virginia,
can move on to the Shenanoah, where he may be
able to take the enemy upon the flank, and, by
his ability thus to turn every position, render it
impossible for the rebels to make stand short of
Richmond itself To accomplish this It may be
necessary for General Mcclellan to move with
some degree of caution, for he is deeper in the
country than the commanders of the other divi-
sions, and has such reserves to protect his
His known energy of character and eminent mill
tary talents are sufficient guarantee that he is
making the best of his means and his time
When he once reaches his intended base of opera
tions, and the combined movement commences,
Manassas Junction, We venture to predict, will
either be evacuated without conflict, or, if one
actually takes place, the enemy will be left in
condition to make n second impossible. 1t is this
combination movement from different directions
upon the enemy that is to crush him, and not any
succession of single dashes in his front; and, for
such a combination to be made effective, time is
indispensable.
the successful termination of a campaign like this
into the heart of hostile country requires quite
different kind of prowess from that simply which
makes soldiers undaunted in battle and irresisti-
BILE in the breach. It demands not only unfinch-
ing vaor and the highest degree of military skill
but the most extraordinary administrative ability
"a fertility of resource, power of combination,
precision of calculation, and range of view
that are seldom possessed by single mind. 1t
thoa fall tbotr
which alone can, for prolonged period, conquer
numbers by skill, conquer rapine by discipline,
conquer cruelty by humanity, and by its very dis
play of moral heroism half unnerve physical re-
sistance. 1t is General SCOTS great glory that
in Mexico he proved himself equal to all these ne
cessites, and thereby effected conquest which,
for completeness and absolute exemption from
verses of all descriptions, stands almost Isolated
in modern warfare. The battles Of Mexico have
often been surpassed; the conquest of Mexico
never.
Invasion is kind of military work that even
| the greatest generals have failed in. Alexan-
der the Great overran Media and Persia, but his
| armies were rolled back before the legions of
| Scythia and India. Cyrus marched his army in
splendid style into Persia, but only to immortal
| ize the skill which conducted the Retreat of the
| Ten Thousand" Hannibal swept down with ir-
resistbe force into Italy, only at last to retreat
from it in ignomny. Crasus carried his cohorts
into the plains of Mesopotama, but only to be
defeated with immense slaughter and to lose his
own head Napoleon led his hosts into the mid
die of Russia, and led them to destruction; there,
too, the Swedish invader, Charles MI, hum
dred years before, had found his doom. Bur
goyne marched his forces into American terrific
~, and marched to a surrender. Sobeski, with
forty thousands, attacked eighty thousand Turk
| ish veterans ntrenched and defended with three
hundred pieces of cannon, slew fifty thousand
and carried the Polish ensigns in triumph to the
banks of the Danube; and yet month after there
was scarcely remnant of his army left. Wei
| lington drove Massena at the head of hundred
thousand men out of wasted Portugal, but
before his full success in the Peninsula, had to
tire and intrench himself behind the Terre Vedras.
/ The British Generals in their invasion of Afghan
| istan, accomplished marches across mountain
ranges and desert tracks unparalleled in modern
times for their length and hardship; but the ssne
thereof may be read in the terrible tragedies of
the kooTd Canoul and the Pass of Jugdalluck,
and the fate of that sixteen thousand of whom but
one man escapted alive to tell the tale of slaugh-
ter.
1t does not answer to talk fiippantly of such
military movements as Gen. Scott is now under
taking. Tremendous difficulties attend them.
Nothing is more certain than that overwhelming
disaster would result if the reduction of the vast
rebel territory were given up to the rash impulses
| ana ignorant cOunseis oil the Iri0une ana Times
school. Our Government might well abandon
the war at once But there is no such danger.
These movements to be conductedby General
Scott, and not by newspaper editors; and in way
that shall secure solid results, though not sensa-
ton dispatches. As little possible will be trust
ed to chance. The main work in crushing out the
rebellion will be effected by noiseless strategic
operations; and when battles are fought they will
be battles that need not be repeated. We regard
the conquest of the rebellion as sure as any fu.
ture event; but it is because we have implicit faith
in the genius that leads, well in the strength
that is led-in the consummate wisdom that
plans, as well as in the heroic courage that exc
cutes.