The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-03-23
The Russian Campaign of 1912.

horo Wa andaavored 10 show in our last, |
thar the campaisn of Russia was not an ex- |
trayayant undertaking--that 1t was not con-
Quoted on the principle of Transporting every
thing a distance Of six hundred miies-that IL |
simply involved the question OF the march "a
100 900 men three hundred miles 10 ATTACK 'he
onannv,s capital-that this was not an unusual |
dis stance for an invading army to march from
;,s basis of operation-that from its front, AT |
Smo,ensko. to it's rear AT Mentz on the Rhine, |
ithat is. all the way from France the French |
army of invasion had entire and peaceable |
possession of the whole country. We viii
now show that the most renowned Captains
that have lived, made, each, at least one or
rnor. exhibitions more extrayagant than this
Rut who are these great Captains NAPoLEoS,
who was somewhat Of a judge in sucn mat
ters. has told us. He says there are eighty
eight campaigns, from the close study OF
which Of they were properly written) the
whole theory of the art of war would De
gathered They are the eight campaigns OF
ALEXANDER, the seventeen OF HANNIBAL, inc
thirteen of julius CESAR in ancient times
the three of GUsTAvUs ADoLPHCs, the eighteen
of TusgSsg the eighteen of Prince EUGENE Oh
SAVOY and the eleven of FRBDERICK the
Great in modern times The weapons OF an
Gent times, the organization OF ancient ar
mics and their method of encamping, 1narch-
ing, and giving battle, We're OF course din erent
from what they Were in the days OF GUsTAVrs,
TURBINE ErGESK, and FREDERICK. But three
are certain great principles inseparable from
war, and which form the essence OF the arr,
the others being modified by circumstances
These principles, NAPOLEON tells us, were
carefully observed by each OF these great
commanders, and it is because they were thus
observed that he designates them as the great
masters of the art, and holds them up as
models for imitation. We shall so on to show
that each of them made campaigns, to all
appearances, more hazardous than this OF
Russia.
In thayear 334, B. g., ALEXANDER undertook
the conquest of the Persian empire. To all
appearances no'enterprise could be rasher or
more hopeless. The empire counted its SOL
diers by millions it extended from the Medi-
| terranean to the nations bordering on India,
| and from the extreme south of Egypt to the
| CAPITALIZATION, its capital, was $500 miles
| from Macedon-and he had but 4o,o men to
| commence his enterprise with. But he knew
| perfectly well the full extent of the danger ne
| had to encounter. He had calculated all the
| chances. He knew that the Persian empire
| was nothing more than an union OF confede-
j.. rate States, not forming a single compact ma
! ton, capable of putting forth nation
| strength that the kings allowed each one OF
| them to be governed by its own peel laws |;
| that, as he aimed only at the throne OF Persia,
! if he left each of these States its laws and in
| stitutions. they would as soon have him Ior
| their ruler as DARIUS that the Greek COLO
! MES on the Mediterranean and Black Sea
were all in his favor; that the Greek soldiers
| in the armies OF the Satraps We're secretly in
clined to join their countrymen and that a
single victory in Asia Minor would give him,
| for these reasons entire control oVrS mat
country. The result answered his exiecta-
tions. He defeated the Persian army at the
pass of the Granicus, spent whole year Ill
consolidating his power in Asia Minor, and
from this base moved, in 332, upon
Cilicia, the extreme eastern province OF
that country, where DARIUS had assembled
an army of SOC, 900 men, encountered this
mighty host on the Issus, with the straits OF
Ciicia III his rear, routed it, entered Syria
took Damascus, with all the kings treasures
laid siege to Tyre, at that time mistress of thf
commerce of the world, took it after Siege
of nine months, besieged and took GAIA in
two months crossed the desert in seven days
entered Pelusium, took possession of Mem
phis, founded Alexandria, and was master o.
Egypt In less than two years, all the coas
of the Black Sea, all the coast of the Medi
terranean, as far as Alexandria,, Asia Minor
S Syria, and Egypt, acknowledged his dominion
This huge conquest was rendered compare
e lively easy by several circumstances: LIST
:. Syria and Egypt had always had intimate
e commercial and other relations with Greece
e I'd The Arabian nations hated the Persian
d for religious reasons. Sd. The Greeks, in tn
Q armies of the Satraps, joined him. Repassin
: the desert in 33l, he halted at Tyre, an,
d thence marched through CRlosyra passe
the Euphrates and Tigris, defeated DARIUS a
= Arbela, and entered Babylon in triumph. Tn
IS next year, having forced the pass of Suza, Ii
- extended his conquests to Persepolis, wher
d, was the tomb of the great CYRUS, took Pasar
% garda and, in 329 turned his arms to tn
% North. During this year, he overran Ecba
n tana, punished the assassin of DARIUS, ez
tended his conQuests to the Caspian Sea- an
70 actually penetrated into Scythia, where h
gained a victory over the Scythians. In 80
!, he forced the passage of the Oxus, and sui
;s ice ted the neighboring nations, after havr
# received IL, 900 recruits from Macedon. In 3.
;s he passed the Indus and defeated PoRUs, tt
:. most diffic ult of all his achievements. 1t ws
then that he wished to pass the Ganges, b,
!. fused to follow him. The next year he a
~ complshed nothing extraordinary, and, in 80
=. he returned to Babylon, where he died Il
n year after.
re- If we examine these campaigns of ALExA
s DER we shall find that while they were col
ly ceived and executed in a spirit of enterpris
So they were likewise conducted with the u
"a most prudence. None of the results tn
spring from enterprises rashly conducted, a
of to be found following in his train. None
10 his conveys were in Intercepted, and his armi
Tx kept on increasing as he advanced, until
az the Indus they were three or four times
lie strong as they were at the Granicus. No
of at the battle of Issus, the army of DARII
c. SOC, 900 strong, was drawn up upon his line
Id retreat It. moreover, rested one flank on I
lie mountains and the other on the sea. The nj
C. cedonians were drawn up with the pass of {
he lica in their rear, and If they had been defea
or ed. must have been annihiated before tn
II. could have gotten through it. Suppose ALE
he AMBER had been defeated; or suppose he h
lv been beaten at A rbela where he had the desc
TO- and the Euphra ties and Tigris in his rear h
.rs no fortresses, and was nearly three thousa
Dr. miles from Macedon. Or. suppose he had IL
In. the battle with PoRus, and it was very sto,
on Iy con ties ted. He was still farther from hon
aif had still no fortresses had still an addition
,ns river in his rear, and still depended solely
the yalor of his troops. Would he not,
Vs. any Of these cases, have been set down a
,eh rash, headstrong, obstinate man, who b
ro. blindly rushed upon inevitable destruc ton
wo Would not every historian, or secret mem