The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1861-11-08
REMARKS.

to the public, MajorNGencral Mcclellan re.in-
gushod the command in Western Virginia.
The report on that account, was made in dupli'
cate, aud one copy of II delivered with the ac.
compluying documents to Major General Nc
Clcllsu aud another 80 Brigodicr General Rohc-
Grams ThJ.r commanders having knowledge
OF The instruction, undo, vliah acted and Of
the et.rf ~ nls dutirs, os ,lU g., Tie official
ropora AID correspondence prior to the Eth ot
July, ond Of the topography OF the country,
coul! see the bearing and relation ol matters IN
the foregoing reports as the public might not
without some additional facts which now pro-
pose to submit.
My brigade proper, ordered by General
Mcclellan, consisted OF the l1ih. 10th, 18th,
2Uth and I'D Ohio Regiments with .cyeral dc
tuchcd companies of Virginia Infantry, one
company OF Cavalry and one cl artillery, and
for portions OF the time, the 5th, 9th, sth, lOth
and 18th Ohio Regiments were attached 10 nv
command. WIKI these troops was required to
gurrison AND hold both lines Of railroad from
Rowlc,burg 10 Wheeling and ParEersburg aud
the country adjacent thereto aud South toward
the Kauawha, and up the Cheat River and cast
ward to West Union.
The written Instructions from Major $. viii
lilms Assistant Adiutaut General, prescribing
my duties, contained the following language -
"lhe Commanding General nslructs me tO add
that he has intrustcd to you the most important
| du'y next to his own, In this territory, viz -
III 10 Of securing The base OF his operations aud
| hi. line OF rcueaL Al any cost, that OF your
ll-t man. you will preserve the Cheat River line,
| Grri.ou and the line thence 70 Wheeling. On
| this depends the cu,tr success o., tho line Of
opcrGtca3.'
To strengthen and .uppori the columns of
| Generals Mcclellan, Morris aud Cox, troops were
| drawn FROM my lines, !hus reducing them to the
lowest point OF sliety, 80 that when | was np
| pcalcl TO on the i.h OF July to send 500 men to
| Oakland 70 pro,cc, the railroad bridge at that
| place. and kccp opeu our communications East
against 1t strong force OF rebels, no, man could
be spared General Mcclellan was KEEP. fully
| advised At all times o! everything material for
| him to know, 80 that he might give special IN,
| sjruc,ions Oh any question, Summing up Il
| brief review OF my transactions in dispatch Oh
the 9Th OF July, he says: Your course, thus
far, has been in all respects Gdcious and soldier
| ly."
The instruction Scre 20 Increase the Cheat
| River garrison TO l,o,J men ard supply /. with
| cac t.. This wcs done. Ron'es' ig was The
poiu. 81 support on ,hc railroad .lr this glrrj-
sor, md in al o G.u. McClellnns Instructions
| relative 10 movements on and El5f Of Cheat
| By,f, .c contemplated Rowle'burc e. tho Point
| q Ayy,i. The Cheat River colamu, under Col.
| Irvine ou The >'A q! Jp'y consisted ol compA,
nio' Of the 18Th Ohio, companies OF the 10Th
! Ohio, companies OF the lst Virginia and 20
cavalry On the llth OF July he was reinforced
| from Grafton with companies OF the Sth Ohio.
The two Pennsylvania Regiments which Gen.
| Mcclellan ordered 10 Join me from Cumberland,
| Nd, were cut oil by the burning o, the bridge
| or the r. " y. road below New Creek and thai
on the Frostburg road near Piedmont. This was
| done by the rebels on the 18th OF July. They
also destroyed the telegraph lines At the same
| points. On the evening OF the same day | seat
adyices OF these facts to the Department Head
Quarters, but they were not received thorc until
the next day.
| When | received my orders on the 18th, 10 was
perfectly apparent that the two Pennsylvania
| Regiments could not reach me at all, and very
| probable that they had no; even received the or
! der to ioiu me- Two complete regiments, then,
| intended by Gen. Mcclellan to be promptly in
position, at what lie considered to be exactly the
right place, must be dropped from tho estimate
of forces, and their places filed as best they
might, by small detochments, drawn from garii-
sons between Grafton, Wheeling aud Parkcr'-
| burg. The result was unavoidable, that the
whole expedition must consist OF fragmentary
Regiments and detached companies, almcs.
| wholly destitute of mems OF transportation--to 70
| be organized and put in the field In the utmost
haste and under no common emharrassmcnts.
Lieut.. Col j. W. Fuller OF my staff had been
| sent forward to Oakland on the l2th, to aid In
| getting means OF transportation for Col. Decays
4 companies OF the Sth Ohio, over to Chsholm's
| Sill, as reinforcement to Col. Irvine, and did
not return 10 Grafton until the mornng OF the
| 18th. Orders had been given to hire and il nee
| cssary impress teams from Oakland aud vicinity,
| fn tta bp lra nf nj Nal a
Irvine, but enough could not be obtained and a
| considerable quantity remained at Oakland under
| n guard from the Sth Regiment. There was also
| Il company Of Home Guards there 10 protect the
Railroad bridge. IL was reported that some Fed
| erhl troops had II ached Piedmont that might ho
disposed to cooperate, with u.s. Having ad-
vised Col. Fuller that was taking steps to inter-
cept Gnrnett's army and should move In by way
OF Oakland, aud directed him 10 remain in the
telegraph office aud keep me advised until |
should reach ROwlcsburg, sent him the follow.
ing telcgnms
GRAFTON, July l3th--S Z. NJ
| "CoL FULLER Order all the men over from
Oakland that can be spared, with one days cook
ed rations, if possible but do not wait to cook
| Retain all the teams not needed to send forward
until Telegraph you from Rowlesburg"
RowLEsnURG, July 10.
Col FULLER Have teams and guides ready
on our arrival Mt Oakland. We will bc there by
quarter to J. NJ. Send forces from Pied
mont to re enforce n Junction, with our forces,
on North west Pike, near Chlshomh Mill, as
soon as possible. On our arrival you and Capt.
| Dayton will return to Grafton whero you will
| take command"
IL hardly need be repeated that the first train
did not reach Oakland until II P. M.-that We
could get no teams and received no troops from
| Piedmont.
In making Oakland instead OF Rowesburg
| the point Of departure from the railroad, thus
deviatng from the plan Of Major General Nc
Clellan, | was influenced by considerations of
| distance, want OF transportation, the condition
of roads and the supposed locality of Col Irwin.
From Rowlesburg up the Cheat River 10 the ~
| W. Pike was five miles; thence to West Union,
eight miles thence to Chisholm's Mill, six miles;
aud 10 tho Red House, two miles. Total twenty.
ono milea From Rowlesburg to Oakland, by
railroad twenty three miles; thence 20 Chishom's 3
Mil, eight and half miles or from Oakland 10
| Red House Junction, nine miles. To march an
army from Rowlesburg to Red House would or
dnafily require from ten TO twelve hours
whereas, from Rowlesburg via Oakland to Red
| House would not require over five or six hours.
transportation of supplies and fatigue of men
should be thought Of The space from Cheat
River to the Red House (sixtecn miles) he's
heen alluded to by many editors and leLter-wri-
ters who had heard something about that coun-
try, as Gap through which tho rebel army es.
capped Seven different roads dlverge and run
northery from Leedsvillc and intrrsect to N. ".
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