The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1861-08-02
General scO,l,s Plan Of A Campaign.


against his Judgment and in opposition 10 hrs
firm convictions oi what should be the plan OF
operations. The declaration OF Col. Richardson
of Illinois, IN the House of Representatives,, IN
which the language OF General Scott was re-
pealed, confirmed what we had stated 10 be The
views of the GeneraI-I mi Chief, and fixed the
responsibility upon the President and his incom-
pefent advisers, within and without the Cabi-
net.
The New York Tunes of Friday contains an
editorial article on this subject, which strength
ems and establishes the fact in question and
although il does not 10 our minds, relieve Gen.
Scott from responsibility fixes the primary cause
OF the disaster upon others. General Scotps
fault consists in having allowed himself TO be
made the instrument of plan which did not
command the approval OF his own judgment,
and which he believed sure to result in disaster
TO our arms. He could not prevent il, but he
could have resigned his position, and thus re-
lieyed himself from the odium which must now
and forever attach to this unfortunate military
exploit.
! Even in this view Of the case, General Scott
should be judged chatitably. Had he refused
| to be made instrumental in carrying out the
plans OF Editorial and Congressional Generals,
which the President bad Deen forced 10 adopt,
| The whole cabal would have aimed stab al his
! fair fame, by limitations of lncompetency and
cowardice, if not by actually branding him as
traitor. Good and men all about US, have
been maligned IN This manner, for dissenting
| from the impracticabIe and unwise plans Of the
war party, and Gen Scott would have been
victim OF their highest ambition.
The real views of the General, as developed
in the accompanying extract from the Times,
are slngularIy 10 contrast with the bloody poll
cy OF the partisan waR advocates. While theirs
Feeks with hate, revenge and blood, his is dis
! tinguished for humanity and the welfare OF the
whole country. It is probable that Mr.. Ray
mond has authority Of General Scott for pub
| llshlng the words attributed to him at his own
! table, " in presence Of his Aids and a single
guest" Otherwise Mr.. r. would not have vi
olated the rules OF hospitality and propriety, Agy
making them pubic. They are as follows As
On the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gen.
/ Scott at his own table, in the presence OF his
aids and single guest, discussed the whole sub
| ject OF th,s war, in all its parts, and with the
utmost clearness and accuracy. He had dis
tlnct and well defined opinion on every point
connected with it anl stated what his plan
would be for bringing il TO close, If the man
| agement of II had been left in hts hands. The
main object OF the war; he said, was to bring
the people of the rebellous States TO feel the
| pressure OF the Government to compel them
| 10 return to then. obedience and loyalty. And
this must be done with the least possible expen-
dhure OF life compatible with the attainment of
| the object. No Christian nation can be justI-
| fed, he said, in waging war in such way as
shall destroy sol lives, when the object Of the
war can be attained at a cost Of 500. Every
man killed beyond the number absolutely re-
qulred, Is murdered. Hence, be looked upon
all shooting 0: picKets, all scouting torays not
required IN order to advance the general object
I = L. al I+--.--f I.fa - ~.sisvs I'D, !
which did not contribute 10 The general result,
as 50 MANY acts Of nfjjastifable homicide.
Ii tho matter had been left to him, he said,
be would have commenced by perfect block
ade of Of every Southern port on the Atlantic
and the Cult Then he would have collected
large force at the capital for defensive purpo-
ses,-and another large one on the Mississippi
for offensive operations. The summer month";,
during which IT is madness to take troops south
OF St. LOUIS, should have been devoted to tacti-
cal instructions and with the first fYosts OF au-
tumn he would have taken column of 900
well disciplined troops down the MississIppi,-
and taken every important point on that river,
done he sad, aolh greater ease, tcith less loss
Of life, and NTH far more important results
team Uoutd attend the marchiqg of an army TO
Richmond. At eight points the river would
probably be defended, and eight battles would
have been necessary but in every one Of them
success could have been made certain for us
The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours,
the Southern States would have been compell-
ed, by the natural and inevitable pressure of
events, to seek, by return to the Union, escape
Iirom the ruin that would speedily overwhelm
them out OF it. E'This," saId he, "was nv plan.
But | am only a subordinate. Ii is my business
to give advice when It is asked, and to obey.
orders when they are given. | shall do 1T
There are gentlemen in the Cabinet who know
much more about war than 90, and who have
far greater influence than have in determn-
ing the plan of the campaign. There never
was more just and upright man than the Pres
ident never one who desired more sincerely
to promote the best Interests of the country
But there are men among his advisers who con-
suit their own resentments far more than the
dictates OF wisdom and experlence,-an these
men toW probably decide the plan OF the cam
pGigR. ! shall do, or attempt, whatever / am |
ordered TO do. But they must not hold me re-
SponSible. II [ am ordered TO 90 to Richmond,
l shall endeavor to do it. But I know perfect |
ly well that they have no conception OF the
difficulties we shall encounter I know the |
country, y,-how admirably adapted il is 10 de-
tense and how resolutely and obstinately il will
be defended would like nothing better tnan
to take Richmond - now that il has been dis |
graeed by becoming the capital OF the rebel
Coufederacy feel resentment towards it, |
and should like nothing better to than scatter its
l1n1,-rr..r Tho n,inds R,,i hn., l...oL