The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1861-08-01
TIC AttaeE l,pon nInnassns.
- NJ rribnne Of saturday last. says

The N. Y, TribuHF of Saturday last, says
.,Tbe Times han the following reply to the re-
.o,+ slaternent Of our Washington correspondent,
that Cen. Scott organized the columns, appointed
The officers, and selected the time and points OF at
tIck at Bulls Run. Its Importance lmpeis US 70
rive il the most conspicuous publicity. says the
Times:
$50 far as the preparation of the Army tor the
enecial service assigned it is concerned, it is I'M
doubtedIy true that Gen. Scott DID have full con;
troll he probably did Organize the columns, ana
appoipt the officers and he may have selected tne
time and points of attack at BulIs hun Iha'
attaclr rad heen peremptorily ordered by his supe'
;osIt bo' we are inclined to believed that these
details we're confded to Brig. Cen McDoWeil' VINO
,ae -, The anot and who could FORM from per
sonsl examination of the approaches, a mucn pet
ter o,inion as the points Of attack than Gen ocot
M fant that both the time and the point OF attack
were changed by Gen. McDoweIl proves, nsHeeu,
tnat in this respect he was lett 10 the Vi
his own Judgment. The original purpose was 10
attack the enemys position Oh ~
or Friday morning, by turning II on lne SCUM Side
cd o. Mcdowell went personally with Col.
ua;ntyeIman.s column to superlntend the attack.
But he found the roads on that aide lmpractlcable
for heavy artillery-and on that account abandon
ed the plan. Friday was devo s 70 a! survey GA
the other flank, and there he found the roads IN
such condition as to justify the attempt to turn
the enemy, position on that side. The fact that
Gen. Mcdowell thus changed the time Of attack
from Friday to Sunday, and the point OF attack
from the southern to the northern flank shows that
the control of these details was confded wholly to
him by Gen Scott and we presume every one WIN
concede that this discretion was wisely exercised
and the change judicious. ..-,
"Rut all tbls leaves the main point untouched
The question is Who decided that the attack shod
he 1o6de3 Who determined that the road to Rich.
mond should be by Manassas junction! VINO is
responsible for the plan OF operations by winch
battle at this point, selected by the reoels them,
oIo cd For cd
thro' three long months of ncessant labor, access
HE TO their reinforcements from both directions,
and in all respects precisely such poslton as they
might wish to make it, became matter OF neces.
sity? The paragraph quoted above, Tor the purpose
of relieving the President and Cabinet throws the
responsibility upon Gen Scott We have not the
Slightest desire TO involve the President and Cabi
net in any responsibility that does not belong to
them but on the other hand, we do not intend that
Gen Scott shall be loaded with blame for acts
which were done by others. We kno1o that Gen.
Scott was opposed to opposed to this plan of the
campaign, from the beginning; he deemed 1t I'M
wise to make Richmond the main point OF the
movement; but after that had been decided against
him, he was opposed to marching against it by the
longest and most difficult route, thro' country,
every foot OF which would be obstnately defended,
and which must be held by strong force after it
had once been taken. This we know to be true
and in spite of the decacy OF such disclosures, we
shall NOT hesitate to state the authority for it. 1t
is that of Gen. Scott himself.
Son the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gen.
Scott at his own table, in presence of his aids and
q single guest, discussed the whole subject OF this
war in all its parts, and with the utmost cearness
and accuracy. He had distinct, and well defined
opinion on every point connected with it, and sta
tod what his plan would be for bringing it to close,
if the management of it had been left in his hands
The main object of the war; he said, was to bring
the people of the rebeious States to feel the pres
sure of the Government; to compel them to return
to their obedience and loyalty. And this must be
done with the least possible expenditure OF life,
compatible with the attainment Of the object. No
Christian nation can be justified, he said in wag-
ing war in such way as shall destroy sol lives,
when the object of the can be attained at a
cost of 500 Every man killed beyond the num-
Der absolutely required, is murdered. Hence, he
looked upon all shooting of pickets, all scouting
forays not required In order to ads ance the gen
eral object of the war, all destruction of life on
either side, which did not contribute to the gen
eral result as so many acts OF uUustlhable homi-
eide
"Ifthe matter had been left to him, he said, he
would have commenced by perfect blockade of
every Southern port on the Atlantic and on the
Gulf Then he would have collected large force
at the Capital for defensive purposes and another
large on the Mississippi for offensive opera
tons. The Summer months, during which it is
madness to take troops south of st, LOUIS, should
have beer devoted to tactical instructlon-and
with the frat frost of Autumn he would have ia
ken column of $4,000 well disciplined troops
Vi
point on that river, New Orleans included. II
could haze been DONE he sad, qcih greater ease,
qCith less loss ofte, and Gctb far more important
results than aoOuid attend the marching Of ar
ma TO Richmond. At eight points the river would
probably have been defended, and eight battles
would have been necessary but in every one of
them success would have been made certain for
ua. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours,
the Southern States would have been compelled,
by the natural and inevitable pressure of events,
to seek by return to the Union, escape from the
ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out
oiit.
This said ne, was my plan But am only q
subordinate. 1t is my business to give advice
when it is asked and to obey orders when they arc
given shall do ii. There are gentlemen in the
Cabinet who know much more about than
do, and who have far greater influence than have
In determining tie plan of the campaign There
never vas more just and upright man than the
President-never one who desired more sincerely
to promote the best interest OF the country. But
there are men among his advisers who consu
their owa resentmens far more than the dictates
Of wisdom and experience, and these men 1oU prob
ably decide the plan 81 the campaign. 1 shall do
attempt, whatever l am ordered to do. Bu
Mey must not hold me responsible Ii | am ordered
to 90 TO Richmond, / shall endeavOr to do it. Bu
know perfectly well that they have no concep
ton of the difficulties We shall encounter. know
the country-how admirably adapted it is to de
tense, and how resolutely and obstinately it will
be defended l would like ing better than tC
take RichmOnd now that it has been disgraced by
becoming the capital of the Rebel Coniederacy,
feel resentment toward it, and should like moth
ing better than to scatter its Congress to the winds
But have lived long enough TO know that human
resentment Is a very bad foundation for public
policy; and these gentlemen will live long enough
to learn it also. l shall do what am ordered
shall fight when and whore am commanded. Bui
If / am compelled TO fgM 6efore 1 am ready, theg
shall not hold responsible. These gentlemen
must take the responsibility of their own acts. as
am willing to take that of mine. Bat they must
not throw their responsibility ON my shoulders.
"Ihs is the substance and very nearly the Ian
guage of portion of Gen. SCOTS conv ersation or
the occasion referred to- 1t proves conclusively
that he opposed to the advance upon Rich
mond by way of Manassas at that time.