Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1861-07-13
a vt, RAPIDS MISREPRESENTATION, JULY 13, 1861

call was made for $4,000 militia, ana
rapidly following this a proclamation
was issued for closing the ports OF the
insurrectionary districts by means OF
blockade. So far, all was believed to
be strictly legal.
Finding that condition Of things, and
believing it toabe an imperative duty
upon the incoming Executive to pre-
vent, if possible, the consummatlon OF
such an attempt to destroy the Federal
Union, choice of one OF two things
to the end became indispensable. This
choice was made known in the 1nau-
gural Address. The policy chosen
looked to the exhaustion Of all peace
ful measures before a resort to any
stronger one.
It Sought only to hold the public pla
ces and property not already wrested
from the Government, and to collect
the revenue, relying for the rest on
time, discussion and the ballot box. !
promised the continuance of the mails,
at government expense, to the very
people who were resisting the Govern
ment, and gave repeated pledges
against any disturbance of any of the
people or any of their rights, of all
that which a President might consti-
tutionally and justifably do in such
case.
Everything was foreborne without
which it was believed possible to keep
the Government on foot. On the 5th
of March, the present incumbent's first
full day in Office, a letter from Major
Anderson, commanding at Fort Sum-
ter, written on the Goth Of February
and received at the War Department,
was placed in his hands.
This letter expressed the professional
opinion of the writer that reinforce
ments could not be thrown into that
fort in time for his relief, rendered nec-
essary by the limited supply of hands,
of provisions, and with a view Of hold
ing possession Of the same with force
of less than 10000 well ~diseiplinea-
men.
This opinion was concurred in by all
the officers of his command, and their
memoranda of the subject were made
enclosures Of Major Anderson's letter.
The whole was Immediately laid before
Lieut.. Gen. Scott, who at once concur
red with Major Anderson in his decis
ion. On reflection, however, he took
full time in consulting with other Off
GERS, both Of the army and navy, and
at the end Of four days, came rcluc-
tantly, but decidedly, to the same con
clusion as before. He also stated, at
the same time, that no such sufficient
force was then at the control of the
government or could be raised and
brought to the ground within the time
when the provisions in the fort would
be exhausted.
In purely military point Of view,
this confined the Administration to the
mere matter Of getting the garrison
safely out of the fort. 1t was believed
however, that to SO abandon that stu
alton under the circumstances would
be utterly ruinous that the necessity
under which it was to be done, would
not be fully understood, that by the
enemy it would be construed as part
of voluntary policy that at home it
would discourage the friends of the
Union, embolden its adversaries, and
90 far to insure to the latter a recogni-
ton abroad, and that in fact it would
be our national destruction.
This could not be allowed. Starva-
ton was not vet upon the garrison, and
ere it would be reached Fort Pickens
might be reinforced. This last would
be clear indication of policy, and
would better enable the country to ac-
cept the evacuation of Sumter as a mil
itary necessity. Then an order was at
once directed to be sent for the landing
of the troops from the steamship Brook
I'm into Fort PIckens.
This order could not 60 by land, but
must take the surer and slower route
by the sea. The first returning news
from the order was received just one
week before the fall of Sumter. The
rews itself was that the officers COM
manding the Sabine to which the
troops had been transferred from the
Brooklyn acting upon some arm Of the
late administration, and of the exis-
tence of which the present Administra-
ton up to the time the order was de-
spatched, had only vague and uncer-
tain rumors to fix attention, had refused
to land the troops. To now reinforce
Fort Pickens before the crisis would be
reached at Fort Sumter was impossible;
rendered so by the mere exhaustion of
provision in the latter named fort.
In precaution against such contin-
gency, the government had a few days
before, commenced preparing an expe-
dition as we'll adapted as might be, to
relieve Fort Sumter, which expedition
was intended to be ultimately used or
not according to circumstances.