The Buchanan County guardian. (Independence, Buchanan County, Iowa) 1858-1864, 1861-07-16


ernment, and it gave repeated pledges
against any disturbances to any of the
people or any Of their rights, Of all that
which a President might constitutional
ly and justitiably do in such case ev-
erything was iorborne, without which il
was believed possible to keep the Gov
ernment on foot.
On the 9th OF March, the present in
cumbent's first full day in Office, a letter
from Maj. Anderson, commanding at FI
Sumter, written on the 23th OF Feb, and
received at the War Department on The
4th of March, was by that Department
placed in his hands.
This letter expresses the professional
opinion of the writer, that re enforce
ments could not be thrown into that fort
within the time for his relief, rendered
necessary by the limited supply Of pro
visions, and with view of holding pos
session Of the same, with a force of less
than 10000 good and well disciplined
men.
This opinion was concurred in by all
the officers of his command, aud their
memoranda on the subject were made in
closures Of Maj. Anderson's letter. The
whole was Immediately laid before Lieut..
Gen. Scott who At once concurred with
Maj, Anderson in his opinion.
On reflection, however, he took iuEl
time, consulting with other officers, both
of the Army and Navy, and at the end
Of four days came reluctantly but deci-
dedly to the same conclusion As before.
lie also stated, at the same time, that no
such sufficient force was then at the con
troll OF the Government or could be rails
ed al brought to 4 e ground within the
time when provision in the fort would
be exhausted. In purely military
point of view this reduced the duty oil
the Administration in the case TO the
mere matter o. getting the garrison safe
" out Of the fort.
1t was believed, however, that to s.
abandon that position, under the circum
stances, would be utterly runous that
the necessity under which il was 10 b.
done would not be fully understood that
by many il would be construed as part
Of a voluntary policy; that at home i'll
would discourage the friends Of lie Un-
ion embolIcn its adyersarics, AMI 90 far
to insure a recognition abroad that. in
fact, il would be our national destruction
consumnated.
This could not be allowed. Starvation
WAS not Yet upon the garrison. and, ere
il would be reached Fort Pichcns might
be re-eniorced This last would br a.
clear indication of policy, and would en-
able the country to accept lhe evacua.
ton Of Fort Sumter as q military neces
siiy. An order was at once directed toI
be sent for the landing Of the troops from
the steamship Brooklyn into Fort Pick
ems. This order could not 90 by land, /
but must take the longer and surcr route
by sea
The first return news from the order
was received Just one week before The
fall Of Sumter. The news itself was tha
the officer commanding the Sabine. 10
which vessel the troops had been trans
lerred from the Brooklyn, acting upon
some quasia armislice OF the late Admin
Isl a ION, aud of the existence OF which
the present Administration, up to the
time the order WAS dispatched, had only
too vague and uncertain rumors 10 fix
attention. had refused TO land the troops. |
TO now enforce Fort pickens. before
crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter,
was impossible, rendered SO by tile near
exhaustion of provisions in the latter
named fort.
In precaution against such oniunc
lure the Government had few days be
fore commenced prepal iag,an expedition,
as we'll adapted rs might be, TO relieve
Fort Sumter. which expedition was in
tended to be ultimately used or not, ac-
cording to carrent circumstances. The
strongest anticipated case for using ii
was now presented, and it was resolved
to send it forward, as had been intend
ed.
In this contingency it was also resolv.
ed 10 notify the Governor Of South Caro-
Ina that he might expect an attempt
would be made 10 provision the fort, aud
that if the attempt should not be resisted
there would be no attempt to throw in
men, arms, OF aIHHuUllOii, without Iut-
ther notice, or IN case OF an attack upon
tie fort. This notice was accordingly
given, whereupon the fort was attacked
and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning
expedition,
1t is thus seen that the assault upon,
and reduction OF, Fort Sumter, was in no
sense matter Of self.defense on the part
of the assailan,s. They we'll knew that
the garrison in the Fort could, BY no pos
sbllity, commit aggressions upon them
they knew they were expressly notified
that the giving Of bread 10 the few brave
and hungry men Of the garrison was All
which would on that occasion be attempt
ed, unless themselves, by resisting 80
much, should prove more
They knew that this Government De
sired TO keep the garrison in thc tarl not
to assail them, but merely To main
tain visible possession, and thu, to
preserve the Union from actual aud inn
mediate dissolution, trusting as herein
before stated, TO time, discussion and the
ballot box for final adjustment, and they
assailed aud reduced the fort, Tor pre-
cisely the reverse object 10 drive out the
III. r. Il.