Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1861-12-28
ARebei view OF theiVar--Great Bat
ties In Prospect



AiRebei view OF thsiTVar--Great Bat
ties In Prospect
fFrom the Richmond Dispatch, Dec. =
IL is the warm sun that orin.s out the.
adder. The splendid season Of dry Weath a
er that We have had for three weeks has
hardened the earth, restored theroHdsl pre-
pared the way for grand advance Of the
enemy wherever he is in force. II Is al,
most Incredible that be will refuse to aVail
himself of the auspices which thus sno9In
his path. The untowaFd affair on ftluAy
last at Drainesville will probably tnsplEe
his soldiers with some confidence IN tnetn-
selves, and eonspire Withthe exeelIentFoaus
TO invite an advance.
Il Is said that Mcclellan has lepeateat1
given orders for a forward movement upon
our lines, and that as many troops no eoqld
DO used upon the fields before Menassas
have been for some time on tins sue o.
the Potomac, and that nothing has preven-
ted grand battle long before now, nnt me
absolute ilnpossibility Of indu;iug the re-
luctaut and timid Yankees TO move lor-
ward. The lisgrareful and disastrous de-
feat which they received at Leesourg .hi!et
them with Iismay, and has rendered tor
ward movement with men lhus stricken
with fear and distruSt impossible
The affair At Druinsyille has pro|aoly
taught them, however, that, odds 1elIlg IN
their favor, il is posSihlelto defeat h19
drive back Southern. tEo"ps II u shoul9
have this effect, and should thus inueSs
| forward movement Of Mcclellan, TINS
Dranesyille contretempS will really prove
one o. the most Fortunate occurrences OF
the war. Our army only ask for fair
6ght in an open drid II the enemy will
but come forward far enough to afford tue
chance of decisive battle. that Is All OUT
generals or our men. desire or ask rms
granted, they will take care of the rest, ana
liz is much TO be hoped that the rhmphRt
politicians in Washington will be able, oy
The leverage which this Dranesvllls bMsi-
ness will give them, to force M1Olellnn into
| the field,
/ Trusting to large superiority OF num-
| beers, the enemy seemed steAdlly 10 De
pushing forward their troops in Kentucky
for an attack III force upon our army nn-
der General Sydney Johnson, From all
| the indications in that quarter, a grand en-
| sugempnt within ~ few days seens nnnvolt-
| sbie. THUS circumstances all combine TO
1 hiring about two great engagements on
| either side uf tile AIIeghinies, which, but
/ fur the relations of Great Britain TO the
1 Nur'h, would be decisive of the war.
4 If The South should be beaten on both
fields, she could hardly expect. TOR some
time to get together Two Armies OF any
4 magnitude; aud would hnvp TO depend al
together upon the virtues of "a Fabian pol
tirv. au,I u general System of skirnishlne
against the enemy. n tue SpuIh. on tht
other baud, should gain both battles, the
North will be compelled 10 dssist from
aggressive measures for sUvh length q
time as it would require to organize anc
discipline other new armies. Considering
Il .kNsaF
cd required for this purpose would be SC
Hong That "A virtual suspension OF invasion
would he the result, and the South wouiC
be enabled to carry invasion TO their "W'
ors Such an invasion, though onlI
partially successful, would virtually ent
the war, especially il il resulted in STAN
peding tue Lincoln GoTrrnment from Wash
ingtou. :.
The appearance of England on tile fell
of strife would have decided influence
upon The contest The first effect OF ih
irnbroglio, even if it should not result il
war between that country and the North
must be to precipiInie the latter in what
ever action it mry have been preparing
against the South, during the last teV
months of bury Mrtivity. An attack npoI
our armies in Kentucky and on the Poto
mac might otherwise have been postpone'
1
with England must at onre determine tn
Adminislr tim TO strike its blow withou
deIuyg A successful battle upontbe Polo
mae and III Kentucky, might avert W"
with Great Britain; for. u defeat by III
South on these two fields, w3uli be takei
Ehv the world asronrlus:ve prOotlOf her in
ability to make good her Independence.
Thus all the circumstances of the hou
unite to force on two great battles in III
next few days. To n'f'se to fight nnde
the Influences now pressing upon il, woul
argue an irnbtciliiy in The North, its gen
er"ls and its rrmirs, which could not fai
to be fnterpretedimostu nfavonhly agalns
that section. Such II failure ought TO pro
duce7a total loss OF confidence in the Lin
coin Administration among ITS own PEG
hple; aud that would most probably be TIT
real effect. Both theNurIh itself, and NOR
I.pnrriculnrly tue Administration in power
are irnpellpd to offer battle al this momen
by necessities which seem toiuS rs impera
tive as Irresistible. They must fghti AM
we are ready for.the fray. The defiant c.
of the whole South is. Lay on MAcdutf.