Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-04-13

direct authority to this effect ana meets orr an
prevail Inc wen settled rule as laid down in that
=, slsss 70 maze division effectual to give title
uuSr ~ - second dsseisor it must appear that
the latter holds the estate under ,ha s;sss;- -
that the disselsn Of one maybe Connected ,;tf that
of the other. Separate successive d;sseis n -
ald one snosner where several persons SUCCESSFULLY
enter on land as diseisors without anv -orr,-osy
from one 20 another or any privitv Of stst ..ee
them other than that derived from the mere $780, -.
sion of the estate, their several couseentiva nss
sions cannot be taxed so to make continnitv 81
dsseisin Of sufficient length Of time to bar the time
owners Of their right Of entry. To sustain sanarate
successive disseisns, aseonsntutng acontinuous Dos
session and conforming title upon the last dissei
sor, there must have been priyity of estate be-
tween the several successive dsseisors. To create
such privity there must have existed, as between
the different disseiso-s in regard to the estate Of
which title by dissesor is claimed, some such re-
lation as that of ancestor and heir, granter and
grantee or devisor and devisee. In such cases the
title acquired by deissisin passed BY descent deed
or devise But if there is such privity upon the
determination of the possession Of each dsseisor the
scsm Of the true revives and is reyested and
new distinct disseisin is made by each successive
dsseisor. The Court then declare thst inasmuch as
the widow showed no deed or devise Of the land to
herself BY her husband there was no privity be-
tween her and him. BE occupied it during his life,
not by right of his wife, but by virtue of his own
act OF dsseisin; and that his wife could commit
act OF dissesin TIL her coverture ceased by his DEATH
and that the subsequent disseisin by her was her
own seperate act, unconnected with the previous
dlsseIsln OF her husband. 1t was further held In
that case that the right of the wife to dover in land
Of which her husband died seised would create no
sufficient prIYIty of estate between them to enable
her to connect his possession with her own. The
right OF dover confers title to any part of the
husbands land after his death until assignment of de-
merls made Until then the wife has no sesn or right
Of entry IN any part Of the husbands land and the
heir well maintain his writ of entry against her
to which her claim of dover would constitute no
defence. 1t is a mere right which does not ripen
into title until some specific portion is set out and
assigned as dover.
The case of Vances heirs VS.. Fisher decided BY
this Court, 90 Hum. 2ll) went upon the same prin-
cipe. 1t was there held that the administrator not
being the representative Of the real estate of his
intestate had authority to dispose Of deliver
the possession of the same to another and that the
possession thus acquired could not be united TO the
previous possession of the ntestate to create
a continuity of possession there being in regard to
the real estate no priTiy between the ntessate and
administrator.
In the case now before us Mrs. Hardin exhibits
no deed or devise from the husband to her of the
land in question, and we have seen she can,
as tcid0lo, claim ne privity with him. Neither
does IL appear that the premises IN dis
pute have ever been assigned to her as
dover, and as was done in the case from Aassachu-
setfs we decline to express any opinion to whe-
ther such an assignment would create q privity Of
estate with the husband in the land SO assigned.
We think it results also from these PRINCIPLES and
author ies that the possession of the heirs of Pleas
ant G.. Hardin whether they resided with him upon
the land in question at his DEATH entered upon it
Immediately thereafter, may be united with his pos
session, whatever it was; and that as between the
different defendants and those under when they
claim to derive title, whatever creates priEity of
estate between them in respect to the land In ques
tion-as the relative Of grantee and grantor and the
Ia will al n hqi Y,Oao
sions That this may be done viii also appear from
the principles stated by Mr.. Angill in his work on
the limitation of actions, Ed. of 1916, pages 4461
He says, there must be pricy Of estate or the seU-
erai titles must be conReceGso that the possessions
may each be referred to one entry in the case Of
landlord and tenant or in the case of the heirs of
oissesor, as father and son. These make eontin-
uity of possession. But if one merely enters and
commits trespass and then goes of and another
comes after him and commits a trespasss there is
no priUty between these persons and No continuous
possession.
But if the successive possessions be connected in
the manner before stated they not to be regard
ed many distinct possessions, on the entry Of
each successive disseisin but they BY force of pri
witty, become one and the same continued possession
to the original entry and disseisin, and
have the same effect if there had been no muta-
tIon or transmission of the land
This principle of lacking uniting successive
possessions. does not depend upon the nature of
ken and disseisin made. He who enters under a
conveyance from one who has no title, is as much
disselsOr as he who enters under an unfounded
claim of exclusive right without any color of title
whatever. The estate gained by both is wrongful
and they are BOTH equally wrong aoers- Green
leafs Cruise on Real Property 534, note 2. Pet.
402; II Do: IL. Every disseisin is trespass but
every trespass is not dsseisn. disseisn is when
one enters intending TO usurP the possession and to
Gust another of the freehold, and either takes the
ole he srho I laofT
Cruise 52-3. To use the language of the court in
IL Pet, entry by one the land of another, is
or is not custer Of the legal possession arising
from the title, according to the intention with which
it is done. If made under claim or color of right
it is custer; otherwise it is mere trespass. Ia
legal language the intention guides the entry and
fixes its character. And though such disseisin or
adverse possession is always torti0us, yet the
law attaches to it variety of legal rights and
incidents. Pet 452; Williams ct. ux, VS.. AcMlley
Cheves' Law Rep. 200. A complete title to lands
cannot exist without possession; and when the own
er of the estate loses this though he has the right of
possession and property, he loses something which
the disseisor acquires The first degres of title is
said to be bare possession actual occupation Of
the estate; without any apparent right or pretenc0
of right to hold and continue such possession, as
where diseases another; and which is defined to
be mere naked possession which may, of course,
be defeated by the rghtful owner; but In the mean
time till some act is done by the rightful owner to
al possession is prima acie evidence of legal title
in the possessor and 1t usY, by length of time and
negligence of him who hath the right, by degrees
ripen into perfect and indefensable title. And
though in respect of the dsseisee the dissesor hath
no right at ALL yet against all other persons he
hath and in this respect only he be said to have
the right of possession. Greenleaf's Cruise III,
l32. This possession, position OF the disseisor,
from which, if he lives and continues the occupa>
ton of the land, rights may be acquired-upon
Sc Fl,o7
heir without his option. l Cheeves' Law +. 200;
Smith VS.. Lorillard 10 Johns L. 33S.
1t is laid down by Chief Justice Tilyhman, says
Mr. Angel, (44Il, in giving the opinion of the SUI
preme Court of Pennsylvania in Overfeld vs. Chris .
tie Serg and Rowles r. Ia, that one vino enters
on land as trespassor and continues to reside upon
it. acquires something which he may transfer by
deed, well by descent and if the possession Of
such person and others claiming under him, added
together amounts to the time limited by tie act OF
limitations and was adverse to him who had the
legal title, the act is bar to a recovery. Angel
4OS-447. By the term trespasser, as used by Chief
Justice Tilyhman, is meant one who enters upon
and claims the estate under such circumstances as
to make him disseisor not him who merely enters
as wrougdoer without any claim Of ownership o.
right in the estate.
Whatever may be the dicta in our reports, we
know of no adjudged case which contravenes the
principles herein before stated. Wallace vs.. Han
mum Hum. 443 raised the question whether pos>
the act of 1879 gave title to the land, so that pur
chaser at Msrshaps sale.under judgment and ex-
ecution against the tenant could maintain ejec tment
against the assignee Of the tenant who become pos
sessed of the land under unregistered deed after
the expiration of the seven years but prior TO the
rendition Of the judgment. The Court decided that
party who had thus held possession had acquired
right of possession but not the title and expressly
refused to say that execution might not be levied
on land 30 held but put the case upon the ground
that Perry the debtor. who had only right Of Dos
session. had abandoned it and transferr Il TO White
who occupied the land before the judgment was OBJ
tanned against Perry, 30 that no hen was created
upon his right If indeed lien would exist In such
a case. Norris vs.. Ellis, Hum. ass, is no more
than Wallace vs.. Hannum, with the addition that
seven years possession, under the second section of
the act of 1918, does not make title which is sub
ect to execution saie and that in suit by the pur-
chaser against the tenant be must fail as he acqur
ed nothing BY the purchase And to the same effect
y Crustsinger vs.. Catron, 10 Hum. "a, which
was ejectment by the owner BY the purchss-
er under a il. ia. against one who had