The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1861-08-09


81 toned Evidence. 81 Esd 3ay4s 9va
''3 The following is copied from the New
York Times, Of the 18th ult. 1t clearly
establishes the fact that the movement of
the army towards Richmond, which result.
ed in its disastrous rout at Manassas juno.
ton, was against the advice Of Gen. Scorr,
and formed no part Of his plan for subduing
the rebellion. The country has been dis
graced through this disregard Of his coun-
sells 4; and the people will demand either that
the opposition to the gallant old veteran
shall cease, in the Cabinet, or that bis OPP
ponents shall retire from the position which,
in such case, they will show themselves
incompetent to fill. h.
The extract following is the concluding
portion OF a long editorial in the Times,
and contains all of it in the nature Of evil
dence on the point suggested by our head.
ing: oI es
On the Tuesday preceding the battle,
General Scott, at his own table, in presence
of his aids and a single guest, discussed the
whole subject of this war, in all its parts,
and with the utmost clearness and accuracy.
He bad distinct and we'll defined opinion
on every point connected with it and stat
ed what bis plan would be for bringing it
to q close, if the management of it had been
left in his hands: The main object of the
war, he said, was to bring the people of the
rebeious States to feel the pressure of the
Government; to compel them to return to
their obedience and loyalty. And this
must be done with the least possible expen>
diture of life, compatible with the attain.
ment of the object. No Christian nation
can be justified, be said, in waging war in
such way as shall destroy SOL lives, when
the object of the war can be attained at
cost OF 500. Every man killed beyond the
number absolutely required, is murdered.
Hence, be looked upon all shooting of pick
cts, all scouting fOrays not required in Or
der to advance the general object of the
war, all destruction of life, on either side,
which did not contribute to the general re-
suit, as so many acts of justifable hon.
icide. 't 49, Ha. .f4
If the matter had been left to him, he
said, he would have commenced by per.
feet blockade of every Southern port on the
Atlantic and the Gulf. Then he would
have collected large force at the Capital
for defensive purposes, and another large
one on the Mississippi for offensive opera
tions. The summer months, during which
it is madness to take troops south of st.
Louis, should have been devoted to tactical
instruction; and with the first frosts of
autumn be would have taken q column of
10000 we'll disciplined troops down the
Mississippi, and taken every important
point on that river, New Orleans included.
1t could have been done, be said, with
greater ease, with less loss of life, and with
far more important results than would at
tend the marching of an army to Richmond.
At eight points the river would probably
have been defended, and eight battles would
have been necessary but in every one of
them success could have been made certain
for us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic
once ours, the Southern States would have
been compelled, by the natural and inevi-
table pressure of events, to seek, by re-
turn to the Union, escape from the ruin
that would speedily Overwhelm them out of
it. "This," said he, "was my plan. But 1
am only subordinate. 1t is my business
to give advice when it is asked, and to obey
orders when they are given. I shall do at.
There are gentlemen in The Cabinet who
know much more about war than do, and
who have far greater influence than have
in determining the plan of the campaign.
There never was more just and upright
man than the President,-never one who
desired more sincerely to promote the best
interests of the country. But there are
men among his advisers who consult their
own resentments far more than the dicta-
ties of wisdom and experience-and these
men will probably decide the plan of the
campaign. l shall do, or attempt, whatev-
er l am ordered to do. But they must not
hold me responsible. If am ordered to go
to Richmond, shall endeavor to do it. But
know perfectly we'll that they have no
conception Of the difficulties we shall en-.
counter. l know the country,-how ad-
mirably adapted it is to defence, and how
resolutely and obstinately it will be de.
tended. would like nothing better than
to take Richmond now that it has been
disgraced by becoming the capital of the
rebel Confederacy, feel resentment to.
wards it, and should like nothing better
than to scatter its Congress to the winds
But have lived long enough to know that
human resentment is very bad foundation
for public policy and these gentlemen
will live long enough to learn 1t also. l
shall dc what am ordered. shall 60 when
and where l am commanded. But If am
compelled to fight before am ready, they
shall not hold me responsible. These gen.
tlemen must take the responsibility of their
acts, as am willing to take that Of mine.
But they must not throw their responsible
ty on my shoulders"
This is the substance and very nearly the
language of portion of Gen. Scett's con-
versatlOn on the accession referred to-. 1t
proves conclusively that he was opposed to
the advance on Richmond by way of Man.
assas at that time, and also that the Admin.
istration was almost certain to override his
objections and command battle. Taken
in connection with what was said in the
House OF Representatives on Wednesday, it
leaves no doubt on the subject:
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