Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-02-10

dgGIIC, g II TTlSTIOT Dbl
good of all the States, and which imposed stric
limitations and checks against abuses and usgrpa
tions. IN administering the delegate6S mowers
the Constitution provides. very properly ii crdc
to give promptness and efficiency, that the Covers
ment shall be organized upon the principle Of thu
absolute. majority, or, rather. of two maioritie
combined; a majority of the States considered a
bodies polite. which prevails in the Senate and
majority OF the people of the States estimated il
Federal numbers, in the other House OF Congress
A combination OF the two principles prevails il
the choice of the President and also in the anDoint
ment of judges, they being nominated by the Presi
dent ana confirmed by the Senate. 1t is thus tina
the concurring and the absolute maorities are com
biued in one complex system. The one in formin
the Constitution, and the other in making and exc
cutting the laws; thus beautifully blending the mod
Grafton. Justice, and equality Of the former ant
more perfect majority, with the promptness an,
energy of the latter, but less perfect
Is this a Federal Union2 Union of States a
distinct from Individuals Is the sovereignty in tn
several States is it in the American people in tn
aggregate? The very language which we are com
PEELED TO use when speaking of our political insti
tutons affords proof conclusive as to its real char
acter. The terms Union, Federal united. all inipi,
combination of sOyereignties-a confederation o
States. They are never applied to an association o
individuals. Whoever heard of the United States
of New York. of Massachusetts,. or of Virginia
Who ever heard Of the term Federal Union ap
piled to the TIE aggregation OF individuals int
one community? Nor is the other point les,
c,ear-that the sovereignty is in the severa
States, aud that our system is a Union of SC
many sovereign powers under constitutions
compact and not divided sovereignty between the
States severally and the United States Sovereign
ty is in its nature indivisable 1t is tine supreme
power in State, and we might as well speak OF
half square, or half triangle as half sovereign
ty. 1t is a gross error to eonfound the exercise
of sovereign powers with soeerciqnty itself or the
g H.
them. A sovereign may delegate his powers TO be
exercised by as many agents as he thinks proper
under such conditions AID with such limitations as
he may impose; but to surrender any portion of his
sovereignty to another is to annihilate the whole
1t is the very essence of federal system that the
ereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole Or
to use other language, the parts the units in
such system, and the multiple; and not the whole
the unit and the parts the fractions Ours then is
government Of so many sovereignties, united by a
constitutional compact for the purpose of exePcs-
ing certain powers through common government
as their joint agent and is not union of the differ
ent sovereignties into one, which, according to the
language of the Virginia resolutions would form a
consolidation Whatever modification was made in
the condition of the States under the Constitution
were notifications extending only to the exercise of
their powers by compact, and not to the sovereign
ty ITSELF it is conceded point that it is competent
to sovereign States to stpulate TO exercise their
powers in a particular manner, or to abstain alto
gether from the exercise, or to delegate them to
agents, without by such stipulation mpairing SOW
eregnty itself
The relation between the State and the General
Government is the relation of principal and agent
in whatever light we may consider the Constitution
whether as compact between the States, or Of the
nature Of legislative enactment by the joint and
concurring authority of the States in their high
ereignty. In whatever light it may be viewed it
necessarily results that in the case of power be-
ing disputed between them, the General Govern
ment, as the agent. has right to enforce its con-
structon against the construction OF the State as
one OF the sovereign parties to the Constitution any
more than the State Government would have against
the people in their sovereign capacity the relation
being the same between them. Such is the case be
tween principal and agent in the ordinary trarsac-
tons OF life and Ii is not possible to assign reason
why it Is not as applicable to the case of govern
ment to that of individuals. The principle in fact
springs from the relation ITSELF and Is applicable TO it
IN all its forms and characters. The General Gov
eminent is a case of joint agency-the joint agent
of all the sovereign States. 1t would be its duty.
according to the principles est bshed in such cases.
instead Of attempting TO enforce its construction OF
its powers against that Of the States to bring the
subject before the States themselves, in the only
form in which, according to the provision of the
Constitution it can be, VIZ: By proposition to
amend in the manner provided in the instrument to
be acted on by them by expressly granting with
holding the contested power. Against this conclu-
States have surrendered transferred the right in
question. If such be the fact, there ought to be
no difficulty in establishing it, The grant of
powers delegated is contained in a writ
ted instrument, drawn up with great care,
and adopted with the utmost elaboration
lie provides that the powers not granted are re-
served to the States and the people. If it be sur
rendered let the grant be shown, and the controver
sy will be terminated and. surely, it ought to be
shown plainly and clearly shown, before the States
are asked to admit what would not only divest
them of a right which under all its forms, belongs
to principal over his agent, unless surrendered,
but which cannot be surrendered without in effect,
and for all practical purposes, reversing the rea-
ton between them: putting the agent II the place of
the principal, ard the principal in that of the AGENT
which would degrade the States from the high and
sovereign condition which they have ever held I'M
der every form of their existence, to be mere sub
ordinate and dependent corporations OF the Govern
nent of its own creation. But instead Of showing
any such grant, not provision can be found in the
Constitution authorizing The General G0UsrHaeRt to
cercse any control lrhdeUeT orer state by force. by
veto, by judicial process or in any other form. y
most important omission designed and not accident
Al; omitted by the dictates ef the pFQfoandest wis
iom.
The great and leading principle is, that the Gen
eraI Government cmanated from the people Of the
teveral States. forming distinct political communi
les, and acting in their separate and sovereign
capacities. and not from all the people forming one
aggregate political community: that the Constitution
If the United States is, in fact, compact to which
ach State party and that the several States or
parties, have right to judge of its infracons and
n case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of power not delegated, they have the |
light in the last resort. to the language Of the
Virginia Resolutions to iptHpoSe FOR drresttn1 the
}r0gress of the eUU, and fer atntanng within their
respective limits, tine authorities rights and lber=
les appertaining TO Them This doctrine. so far
pom being auarchical revolutionary, Il the only I
cid foundation of our system and of the Union !
tself The opposite doctrine which denies to the !
States the right of protecting their reserved powers
md which would vest in the General Government /
it matters not through what Department. the /
light of determining, exclusively and finally, the pow
.rs delegated to it. is incompatible with The sove
eighty Ct The States and of the Constitution itself
considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As |
strong as this language is it is not stronger than
hatgsed by the illustrous Jefferson, who said that
rive to the General Government the final and e3-
elusive right to judge OF It's powers is to make lis
iiscreon ana not the Constitution, The measure Of is
,ocers,' and that in all of compact between
PARTIES having no common judge each party has an
qual right to judge for itself losH Of the infrdc
ion as of the mode and measure of redress Language
annot be more explicit nor can higher authority !
,e adduced.