The Council Bluffs nonpareil. [volume] (Council Bluffs [Iowa]) 1857-1867, 1861-10-12
cor. nLAIRH LETTER.


DEAR JEDGk WtOt0
about our aGairs here BY Judge uAmo,s'
and am moro and more convinced OF sne
viex / stated to you in that letter. Anas
are becoming quite alarming IN INC nol.
eru part at the State as veil as 10 the oousu.
Men coming here TO give Information arg
no, alloxeito approach Fremont, anu 81
away IN disgust. -,
have felt it nv duty to tell him what
they .ay, and he ihrows himself behind Tue
reports Of his officers, who are tryinS topre-
yasica,e and shield themselves from neg'ec'
af dusy !: and he still c,ings to them AM r.
fu.es 10 see for himself. ! told MIN ne
would not escape responsibility 10 tha.
vay. and he would very soon ind an army
of rebels 10000 strong on his hands 10
North Missouri. threatening 81. Louis, anu
occupyiug the forces he desired 10 use
against MeCuiloch and Pillow. lie take
Of the rigor he Is going to use, but can see
none of il, and fear il will tur out to De
some rash and :nconsideraee move, adopted
in haste to make head against Formidable
force, which could mot have accumulated
except ,hr ugh gross and inexcusablo neg.
bsence. Oh, for an hour of our dead
Lyon. Many have been disposed to blame
Fremont for not sending reInforc-ments TO
LYON, and thus aver,tng the calamity brought
on by his death, and the Abandonment OF
Springfield by his command. 1t is certain
that IL he had sent the regiments to Lyon
that he took to Cairo, when it was supposed
that place was threatened, Lyon would have
driven McCulloch from the State. can
not say whsrhsr the attack was seriously
contemplated on Cairo at that time or not,
but am disposed to believe that the move
ments of McCulloch and Pillow were in
tended to be Simultaneous and Cooperate
but Lyon should have had some part OF the
reinforcements at any rate, and 1t he had
received two regiments, his victory would
have been complete. | undertake to say,
that il Fremont acted on them as he does now
(l was away and cannot speak on that head)
he could not have informed himself very nc
curately Of the necessities of his position.
The event shows that no attack was made
on Caro-, and it was probably averted by
the re- endorsements sent. Ii the same, or
one half Of the regiments had been sent to
Lyon, We should have had equally satisfac-
tory results.
The views have given Of this matter are
fast becoming public opinion here, and |
think the Government should knnw ill.,
Probably you have Information which will
satisfy you that Fremont was not to blame.
Ii so, the public here should know il also,
in order that the confidence of the people
should not be Withheld from the command
ing General. could not think, when |
first returned here, that any part of the
blame could rest with him, but my obser-
va,ions since have shaken my faith to the
very foundations.
There is one point which did not refer
to in my letter, and which Intended to re-
mark on, aud that is. the utter want Of dis
ciplue in the camps around and about st.
Louis. Ii is IA rehearsal Of the state Of af-
fairs in Washington before the fight at Man
a>sas, an will, am apprehensive, conducs
to similar iesults. brought these matters
to Frrmont,s attention, but ne put it aside
by saying it would not do to be too exacting
Ut once. Our enemies are ut the door, and
yet too early to impart discipline to our
troops, and keep them out of the whiskey
shops! know that you and are in some
sort responsible for Fremont's appoint
ment, and for bis being placed in command
Of this Department, and therefore feel
another and IN additional motive to speak
out openly about these matters.
Ny decided opinion is that he should be
relieved OF his command, and man Of abil-
ity put in his place. The sooner it is done
the better. | have given you my opinion
and the grounds for it. Ii the Government
knows more Of his plans than know-if
you are satisfied with them, then you can
burn this paper and say that am an alarm
list you know, however, that ! am not
No man has been mo,e hopeful and conf
dent than have been up to within few
days past. felt satisfied on my return
here that affairs were critical, but that the
success and citation of the enemy could be
turned to goad nccout, II the proper steps
were promptly taken. They hare not been
taken, and either the Government has fail
ed 10 support Fremont as he should have
been, or he has failed to apply the means at
his disposal. Affairs are worse now than
two weeks ago, and gsstrg worse every
day. Secession increasing Union men
driven out, and the General, fear, incapa.
Bile Of compromising his POSITION. His re-
cent proclamation is the best thing Of the
kind hat has been issued, but should have
been issued when he first came, when he had
The power to enforce it, and the enemy no
power to retalate. Now they are substan
TALLY enforcing against us the substance Of
his proclamation, outside Of st. Louis and
our garrsons, and his proclamation, / fear
nm impotent, attempt ut retaliation.
want you to lay these things to your
heart, aud get ready to apply the remedy
before 1t Is too late.
will write you again very soon. hope
| may have better news to give you. Ishall
be but too happy IT ANYTHING occurs to re-
store my confidence 10 Fremont.
am we'll better than have been for
eight months. .
Yours, aff'y,
[Signed1 FRANK r. BLAIR.