Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1861-06-26
Selette0 Mistfllang.
From FraSer's Magazine.
soldiers and Their Science-Progress
OF Modern Military Tactics.
A FRESH IMPETUS.

Apart from all questions of the merits or de-
merits of Frederics strategy, there can not be
ouestion that he gave a fresh impetus to military
science. He was the first, in modern times, to
appreciate the value of thoroughly educated
staff And here we may observe that In the
Peninsuar war, especially toward its close, the
importance of such corps was equally appreci-
ated in our own army; and so high was the
opinion the French entertained OF our Quarter
master Generals staff that they carefully studied,
after the peace, the system of military instruc-
tons st the Staff College of that day, and ulti
mately founded upon it the EcOIe d Etdt MAJOR.
We may rest assured that what Alexander and
Frederic found necessary for their armies, and
what Wellington encouraged in his, must be a
matter of the greatest importance to the well
being and skillful direction of the troops, and
hence the necessity Of carefully watching the ct
feet Of the present Staff College, which has been
established on the broadest possible basis for the
instruction of future staff officers, at the public
expense, and which we believe is well adapted to
the purpose for which it is designed.
THE RANKS.
Another great advance in military science is
due to Frederic-in the lightness and rapidity, as
compared with the tactics of the times before
him, which he infused into the movements of his
troops of every arm His infantry was formed IN
three ranks, thus presenting striking contrast to
the formation of Gustavus Adolphus, century
before, in six ranks, which was itself an innova-
ton upon the usual order of that line in ten ranks.
The change is due to the gradual increase in the
number of musketeers, with the extinction of the
pike men, and to the necessity which was at once
felt of developing to the fuller extent the line of
the fire; while there was no longer the same rea-
son for the deep mass of ancient times, for more
weight and physical force, which could in very
few instances be now brought into play.
L. d. u oil has for
many wears adopted a still thinner formation, that
of two ranks, and it would appear, that the
French army, since the Italian campaign, has
followed our example, In point of fact, another
element has made its appearance in the question
since the days of Frederic, and even of the First
Napoleon, namely the tremendous force and ac-
curacy of modern firearms. Of the accuracy,
however, we can at present say little in regard to
its practical effect on war, saving that in the re-
cent Italian battles the improvement in this re
spect does not appear to have rendered the con
test shorter than were general actions in the days
of good old Brown Bess- Nor were the lists of
killed and wounded greater, though in point of
fact Ii was not to be expected that they should be-
since one of the most certain lessons taught us
in military history is that the more formidable
the weapon the less will be the carnage. The
reason is that the affair is in nearly all cases de-
cided before it becomes a hand to hand conflict
and the more accurate the firearms the greater
will be the distance between the adverse lines al
which the decision takes place, and consequently
the facility afforded to the beaten party of making
good its retreat But the increased force of pen
etration of modern firearms may not improbably
give rise to the question of formation in three oI
even in two lines since it is certain that the same
bullet will in very many, perhaps in the majority
of cases, prove the destruction OF both front and
rear rank man together.
We see then, that the order Of formation has
become more and more shallow from the time
of Gustavus to the present day; and the question
is, has il reached its limits? There is much te
be said on both sides in the reply; but upon thu
whole it seems not impossible that the ultimate
formation is not yet attained, and that the mex
great change in tactics will be the advancing tc
attack in single rank, followed by a second, anC
possibly by third rank, sufficiently near to re
place the first in case of disaster, at the critca
moment to Join with it in the contest; thus pre-
senting a succession of waves of attack, eacl
light in itself and easily stemmed, vet in thei
accumulation irresistible. But this question
merits far more space and time than we have Z,
give il, and we merely suggest it for the consid
Grafton of those interested in such speculations.
ARTILLERY.
When to what we have already said of the in
creased lightness and activity given by Fredericl
to his infantry and cavalry, we add that he adopt
ed the same view with respect to artillery. by or
ganizng horse artillery batteries, it will be evi
dent that this principle, with the illustration af
forded to it by its actions, is the legacy that grea
warrior has left to military science.
RAW LEvIEs.
From the military inaugurated by tn
Great Frederick, the elementary tactics Q
which have, in great part, survived to our owl
day, we descend through the American an
French revolutionary eras to the times of Napo
leon and Wellington. The wars, however, Q
those revolutions must not be altogether passe
by. Indeed, as paving the way to the more reg
ular wars of the nineteenth century, they coul
not be neglected witlont manifest detriment {
military history. Both showed what could be e
fected by raw levies properly directed, with refer
ence to the circumstances in which they wer
placed-the Americans in thickly wooded cour
try, acting in light skirmishing order, and de-
pending on the natural instinct of the individua
marksman; the French fighting in masses, yet nc
trusting their undisciplined hordes to the assau
in line Of regular troops, advancing in dense CO
umns, and overthrowing the comparatively thi
lines of enemies who were not possessed of SUI
fcient moral force to resist such an attack. Bot
were instances of Paixhan's remarkable sayin,
that "the strength of nations is no longer
their barracks" Both were, after a severe strus
gle, eminently successful.
NAPOLEON AND WELLINGTON.
Seldom was there greater contrast presentt
by two generals in the same age, than betwet
Napoleon and Wellington. Each represente
somewhat to excess, the peculiar characteristic
of his nation; Napoleon the furia Francese, We
lingson the English soldarite. When they me
il was a battle of giants If we were required
compare their modes of action, we might say tn
never was attack like that of Napoleon new
was defence like that of Wellington. Yet ii
would not by any means exhaust the subject;
while, on the other hand, the attack of Assay
the passage of the Douro, the onset at Salama
ca, and the strategical advance upon and bait
at Vittoris prove the English Generals capaci
for attack, the battle of Dresden, and the cal
paign of 1914, prove the French Emperor's t.
ent for defensive war.
The battles Of Wellington were mostly foug
on what our neighbors term the defensive offe
sive" plan-that is, receiving the enemy's gen
raj attack on the position, but at the same tir
meeting him, exhausted by his march, at
charge, and in many cases catching him in &
act Of deploying. The principle was still furth
carried out in the readiness in which the who
body was held to move to the attack il occasi
should offer, trait remarkably exemplifed
the battle Of Salamanca. In short the defense
every case not of a stationary character,
that of the Prussians in their villages
Lghy, but eminently mobile II nav be add
that the defensive element in weIIington's a
tions was in general forced upon him by circul
stances; the instant readiness IN which hrs fore
were kept for the return blow was peculiarly
own
CAUTION.
One point we must allude to by way of CAN'T
to the young military students, namely the a
parent, but only apparent denial, in the introdu
ton to the work, Of all military science whatev,
Its general tenor. indeed, is a sufficient correcti
to this error, if error it be, which probably
merely the expression Of a nervous, rapid train,
ideas. The author protests strongly against VIII
may be termed the geometrical theories of mi
tary science; those theories which would redu
every military operation to a mere question
scale and compasses. And certainly, so far
the writings of Jomini and his followers ba