The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-10-11
TIE Value and Necessity of Sea-Coast De-
fences.

Tie Value and Necessity of Sea-Coast De-
fences.
It's unnecessary to specify examples from
the wars of the French Revolution; the whole
history of these wars is one continued prnCt
OF the superiority of fortifications as mari
time Ion tier defence The a-coast OF France
is almost within stones throw OF the prin-
clpal British naval depotf; here were large
towns and har bors, filled with the rich COM
nerce of the world Offering the dazzling at
traction of rich booty. The French navy was
at this time utterly incompetent to their de-
fence, while England supported maritime
force at an annual expense OF near Ninety mil
Inns OF d0iIdrs Her largest fees We're contin-
ually cruising within sight OF these seaports,
and not unfrequently attempting 10 cut out
their shipping. cat this period says
one of her naval historians, "the naval
force OF Britain, so multiplied md so expert
from long practice, h1d acquired an intimate
knowledge OF their (the french) harbors,
their bays and creeks her ofics.ss knew the
depth of water, and the resistance likely to be
met with in every situation" On the other
hand, these harbors and towns were frequent
| V stripped Of their garrisons by the necess-
ties of distant wars, being left with no other
defence than their fortificatons and militia
And yet, notwithstanding all this, they es
capped unharmed during the entire contest
They were frequently attacked, and in some
instances the most desperate efforts were
made to effect a permanent Judgement; but in
no case was the success at all commensurate
with the expense of life and treasure sacri-
need, and no permanent hold was maGe on
either the maritime frontiers of France CT
her allies This certainly was owing to no
inferiority of skill and bravery on the part
of the British Navy, as the battles of Abon-
tiT and Trafalgar, and the almost total
annihilauon Of the French marine, have
but too plainly proven. Why, then, did
these places escape? We know of no other
reason than that they We're fortified, and
that the French knew how to defend their
tortifications. The British maritime expe-
ditions to Quiberon, Holland BouIcgne, the
SChcldt, ConstantinOPle, Buenos Ayres, etc,
sufficiently prove the i'll success and the
waste of life and treasure with which they
must always be attended. But when her
| naval power was applied to the destruction Of
The enemy's marine, and in Transporting their
land forces to solid bases of operations OF the
soil OF her allies in Portugal and Belgium
the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory OF
their achievements.
Let us now examine the several British
val attacks on our own forts, in the wars Of
the ReYol u ton and OF l>l-.
In 1875, Sir Peter Parker, wi Z. British feet
of nine vessels, carrying about two hundred
and seventy guns attacked Fort Moultre, IN
Charleston hdrbOr, which was then armed
with only tWenty-siX guns, and garrison ID
only by three hundred and seYtnty-fiYc reg
uiars, and few 'nilitia. this contest
the British We're entirely defeated, and los,
in killed and roundea,~tN hundred and
five men, while thcir whole two hrndrcd
ana seventy sunS killed and wounded only
thirty two men in the fort. OF this tria- ot
strength, which vas certainly a. fair one,
t,oOner, in his Naval iii tory. SAYS: i cGts
fully 20 prove the import tant lalhtary y oposi
ton, that Ships oaHuol withstand forts, III =
til, iatrerare properly armed, constructed ma
garriso.ed." Gen. Mouitrie says only thirty
rounds from the battery were tired and Vas
Of opiiion thaJ he want OF powder ai2ne pre-
vented The AmeilcanH rom destroying Lv
men CT war.
lnlal4 British feet of -four vessels, car
ryin- uinety- we guns, attacked Fort Boyer,
!; small redouht, located OH point Of land
commanding he passage tro.h the Gulf into
the BY Of |iObIle. This redoubt was g@rTi-
soned by only one hundI al ana tVeuty
combatants, officers included ana its ar
Iaament was but twenty small pieces of
cannon, some OF which We're almost en-
tirely useless, and most OF them poorly
nounted sin batteries hastily III. ovVll up
and leaving the gunners uncovered from
The knee upWard,' while the enemy's land
| force, acting ia concert With the ips, con-
sisted of twenty artillerists, with q battery
| OF two guns, ana seven Aunured 1nd thir,y
marines, Indians, and negroes. His ships
| carried five hundred and ninety men IN all
| This immense disparity Of numbers and
| strength did not allow to the British military
| and naval commanders be Sigh ;est appre-
| hcusion '-tiiaJ four British ships, carving
! ninrtytWo guns, and 4 land force some Wha /
| exceeding seven hundred combatants, could
| fail in reducing Il small work mounting only
| twenty short clrronades, and defended by a
! little more than hundred men, unproviiied
I
| ments to cover themselves from rockets an q
| shells" Nevertheless, the enemy was com
| pletely repulsed; one OF its largest ships WAS
entirely destroyed, and eIghty-fiye men were
| killed and wounded Ola board the other;
| while our loss was only eight or nine. Here
n naval force Of five to one was Iepelled by
| the land battery.
| Again l>l4 a barbette battery of one four-
| teen FOUNDER and two eighteen -pounder guns
| at Stonniugton, repelled a British fleet o. on 6
| hundred and thirty four guns. During the
| engagement the Americans exhausted their
| mmuni ton and spiked their eigh teen pound
| ers, and only one of them was 4 'terwards used.
| Two OF the enemy ships, carrying one hun
| dred and twelve guns, were engaged during
the whole time of attack, and during much OF
| this time bombarded the town from a posi-
ton beyond reach of the land battery They
| We're entirely too far OFF for the four pounder
| guns to be of any use. Snpposing the two
| eighteen FOUNDERS TO have been employed
| during the whole 2ctlon and also all the guns
| OF the fleet, one eighteen-pounder on land
| must have been more than equiyaient to six
| ty-seven guns afloat, for the ships We're so
| much injured as to render 1t necessary for
| them to Withdraw. The British loss was
4 twenty killed and more than fifty Wounded
ours was only two killed and six wounded.
| The fleet sent TO the attack of Baltimore, in
| 1914, consisted of forty sail, the largest OF
| which were ships -of-the line, carrying an
| army of over six thousand com be- tauts The
| troops were landed at North Point, WhilSeix-
| teen of the bomb-vessels and frigates ap-
| pIoacheu WltHih Tedch OF + ort hcHenry, and
| commenced botnbardment which lasted
| twenty-five hours. During this attack the
| enemy threw ''tifteen hundred shells, four
| hundred of which exploded within the walls
| OF the fort, but without making any impress
sion on either the strength of the work or the
garrison and the British were compelled tc
| retire with much loss.
| In lelj, a squadron of British ships, sta.
| toned of the mouth of the Mississippi, foI
| the purpose of a blockade, assembled the river
as high as Fort St. Philip, which is Il small
| work capable of an armament of only twenty
| guns i'll all heavy fire of SHOT and shells
| was continued with but few and short pauses
for nine days and nights; but making no i'm
| preston either on the fort or garrison, they
reireated TO their former position at the
! mouth of the river.