Daily Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1860-1862, 1861-08-14

rules of modern warfare. made prisoners.
The issue OF this hard fought battle, in
which certainly our troops lost no credit in
their conflict on the field with an edemy ably
commanded. superior in numbers, who had
but short distance to march; and who act
ed on bis own ground, on the defensive, aud
always under cover. whiist our men were of
necessity out on the open fields, and should
not prevent full credit being given to those
officers and corps whose services merited sue
cess il they did not attain it. ~
To avoid repetition, will only mention
here the names of those not embraced in re-
ports of division and brigade commanders
| beg to refer to their reports for the names
of those serving under their immediate or
ders, desiring that on this subject they be
considered as part of my own. 1 claim credit
for the officers of my staff. and for those act
ing as such during the day. They did every
thing in their power, exposing the mselves
freely when required, and doing all that men
could do, communicating orders, guiding the
columns, exhorting the troops, rallying them
when broken, and providing for them The
best the circumstances admitted.
The following officers commanded divi-
siOns and brigades, and in the several places
their duty called them did the most effective
service and behaved in the most gallant man
ner.
Brigadier General Tyler, Connecticut Vol
unteers.
Colonel David Hunter, Third cavalry, Sc
verely wounded at the head of his division.
Colonel S. P. HeinIzleman, Seventeenth in
fantry, wounded in the arm while leading
his division into action on the hill.
Brigader General Schenck, Ohio Volun-
teers, commanding Second brigade, FIRST di-
vision.
Colonel E. D. Reyes, Eleventh Infantry,
commanding First brigade, First division.
Colonel w. p. Franklin, Twelfth infantry,
First brigade, Third division.
Colonel w. T. Sherman, Thirteenth infan-
try, commanding Third brigade, First divi-
sion.
Colonel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth infan-
try, commanding FIRST brigade, Second divi-
sion.
Colonel A. E. Burnside, Rhode Island Vol
unteers, commanding Second brigade, Sc
cond division.
Colonel o. B. Wilcox, Michigan Volun-
teers. commanding second brigade, Third di-
vision; who was wounded and taken prison.
er while on the hill, in the hottest Ut the
fight.
Colonel o. o. Howard, Maine Volunteers,
commanding Third brigade, Third division.
Colonel j. B. Richardson, Michigan Volun-
teers, commanding Fourth brigade, First di-
vision.
Colonel Blenker, New York Volunteers,
commanding Fourth brigade. First division.
Colonel Davies. New York Volunteers,
commanding Second brigade, Fifth division.
AS my position may warrant, even if it
does not call, for some explanation of the
causes, as far as they can be seen, which led
to the results herein stated, trust it may not
be out of place if [ refer in few words to
the immediate antecedents of the battle
When submitted to the General-in- Chief, in
compliance with his verbal instructions. the
plan of operations and estimate of force re-
quired, the time I was to proceed to carry it
into effect fixed for the 9Th of July,
Monday. Every facility possible was given
me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the
necessary preparations. But the regiments,
owing L was told to want of transportation,
came over slowly. Many of them did not
come across till eight or nine days after the
time fixed upon, and went forward without
my even seeing them, and without having
been together before in brigade. The send
ing of reinforcements to Gen. Patterson, by
drawing off the wagons was further and un-
favorable cause of delay.
Notwithstanding the herculeau efforts of
the Quarteruaster-General, and his favOring
me In every way, the wagons for ammuni-
ton, subsistence, &c, and the horses for the
trains and the artillery, did not arrive for
more than week after the time appointed
to move. L Was not even prepared as late as
the 18th ult., and the desire L should move
became great, and it was wished should
not, if possible delay longer than Tuesday,
the 10th ult. When did set out, on the 16tn,
was still deficient in wagons for subsistence.
But | went forward, trusting to their being
procured in time to follow me. The trains
thus hurriedly gathered together, with hor-
SEES, wagons drivers, and wagon managers,
all new and unused to each other, NOV ed
with difficulty and disorder, and was the
cause OF a days delay in getting the provi-
siOns forward, making it Necessary to make
on Sunday the attack we should have made
on Saturday.
l could not, with every exertion, get for
ward with the troops earlier than we did. l
wished to 60 to Centreville the second day,
which would have taken us there on the 18th,
and enabled us, so far as they were concern
ed, to go into action on the 10Th, instead of
the 2lst; but when / went forward from Fair
fax Court House, beyond Germantown, to
urge them forward, L was told it was impos
sible for the men to march further. They
had only come from Vienna, about six miles,
and it was not more than six and half miles
farther to Centreville-in all march of
twelve aud half miles; but the men were
foot weary, not so much, | was told, by the
distance marched, as by the time they had
been on foot, caused by the distractions in
the road, and the slow pace we had to move
to avoid ambuscades. The men were more
over, unaccustomed to marching, their bodies
not in condition for that kind of work. and
not used to carrying even the load OF light
marching order.
We crossed Bulls Run with about $4,000
men of all arms, the fifth division miles and
Richardson's brigade) on the left, at Black
burns ford to Centreville, and Schenck's
brigade, Of Tyler's division, on the left of the
road, near the stone bridge, not participating
in the main action. The numbers opposed to
us have been variously estimated, | may
safely say, and avoid even the appearance of
exaggeration. that the enemy brought up all
he could which were not kept engaged else
where. He had notice of our coming on the
18th, and had from that time until the 2Ist
to bring up whatever he had. 1t is known
that in estimating the force to go against
Manassas, L engaged not to have to do with
the enemy's forces under Johnston, then kept
in check in the valley by Major General Pat
terson, or those kept engaged by Msjor-Gen-
eral Butler, and | know every effort was
made by the General-in-C Chief that this should
be done, and even if Johnston joined Beaure-
gard, it would not be because he could be
followed by General Patterson, but from
causes not necessary for me to refer to, he
knew them all. This was not done, and the
enemy was free to assemble from every di
rection in numbers only limited by the
amount of the railroad rolling stock and his
supply of provisions. To the forces, therefore,
we drove in from Fairfax Court House, Fair
fax Station, Germantown and Centreville,
and those under Beauregard at Manassas,
must be added those under Johnston from
Winchester, and those brought up by Davis
from Richmond to other places at the South,
to which is to be added the levy en- mdsse or
dered by the Richmond authorities, which
was ordered TO assemble at Manassas. What
this amounted to / cannot say-certainl6
much more than We attacked them with.
/ could not, as 1 have said, more early
push on faster nor could delay. A large
and the best part of my forces were three
months volunteers, whose term of service was
about to eXnire hut who were sent forward