Daily national Democrat., 1861-08-13
1ailp 9latlonalQrmoftat
From the New York Tsaes of July 25'h
co,erai Scott and the Cabinet~-The Duty
OF the President.
THE following paragraph appears in the

uMo
treat injustice when he places upon him the
yHesponsiJiity of refusing mounted men We
iesp is nretty good reason for knowing that
e"oretarv Sa' Cameron has accepted regiments
,%'.t have cen refused by Gen. Scott, who
'n;,h his peeuliar iteration Of manner, replied
W don't want any cavalry, SIR | don't want
onv cavalry, sir. My plan of campaign doesn't
n1ynire cavalry, sir 1t is but justice to the
p.dasdent and Cabinet that the country should
law that G. eneral Scott has kad full control
"foll the war movements, and also organized
,he columns, appointed the officers, and se-
,nctel the time and points of attack at Bull
Run"
tro special service assigned it is concerned it
!. undoubtedly true that General Scott did
have full control. He probably did "orgauize
she columns, aud appoint the officers and
he may have "seectcd the time and points of
attack at Bull Run after that attack had
been percmptorily ordered by his superors-
though we are inclined to believe that these
details were confded to Brigadier General
Mcdowell, who was on the spot, and who
couid form from personal examination OF the
approaches, much better opinion, as 10 the
points of attack, than General Scott. The
fact that both the time and point of attack
indeed, that in this respect he was left to the
exercise of his own Judgment. The original
nurpose was to attack the enemys position
On Thursday afternoon, or Friday morning,
I,y turning it on the south side and General
Mcdowell went personally with Col lIeint-
zleman's column TO supeiintend the attack.
But he found the roads on that side imprac-
ticable for heavy artllery--and ON that ac-
count abandoned the plan. Friday was de
voted to q survey on the other flank. aud
there he found the roads in such condition
as to Justify the attempt to turn the enemy's
position on that side The fact that General
Mcdowell thus changed the time of attack
from Friday to Sunday, and the point of at
tack from the southern to the northern flank
shows that the control of these details was
conGded wholly to him 10y General Scott, and
we presume every one will concede that this
discretion was wisely exercised, and The
change judicious.
Eat ali this leaves the main point IN
touched. The question is. who decided that
The attack should be made2 Who determin.
ed that the road to Richmond should be by
Manassas Junction? Who is responsible for
the plan of operations 10y which battle at
this point, selected by the rebels themselves,
admirably adapted for defense, fortified thro'
three long months of incessaut labor, accessi-
ble to their rentorcements from both dircc-
tons, and in all respects precisely such Il
position as they might wish to make it, be
came matter of necessity The paragraph
quoted above, for the purpose II relieving
the President and Cabinet, throws the re-
sponsihility uIon General Scott. We have
not the slightest desire TO involve the Prc-i-
dent and Cabinet in any responsibility That
does not belong to them but on the other
land, we do not intend that General scott
shall be loaded with blame for acts which
were done by others. We know that General
Scott was opposed to this plan Of The ca
paign from the beginning; he deemed it un-
wise to make Richmond the maiu point Of The
movcment but after that had been decided
against hjm, he was opposed to marching
against it by the longest aud most difficult
route through country every foot Of which
would he obstinately defended, aud which
must be held by strong force after /. had
once been taken This Uc know to be true
and in spite Of the deiicacy O: sucl d+g'os-
ures, We shall not hesitate to state the nu~
thority for it. u j. tha; Of General Scott
himself
On tho Tuesday preceding The lattIe Gen.
Scott, at his own table. in presence Of his aids
and single guest, discussed the whole suh-
Jet of this war, in all its parts, and with the
Utmost eleaross and accuracy lie had
distinct and well defined opinion on every
point connected it'll it and stated what lis
plan would lie for bringing it 20 u close if the
management Of it had been lcf, in his hands
The main object OF the war, Ac said WAS TO
bring the people Of the rebeinous States to
feel the pressure Of the Government; to com,
,pcl them TO return TO their obedience and
loyalty And this must lie done with the
least possible expenditure Of life compatible
with the attainment Of the clyet No Chts
tiaa nation can be justified, he said, ia wag-
ins; war in such a way as shall destroy 5Jl
lives when the object Of the war can I've at
tanned at a cost Of 500 Every man Killed
beyond the number absolutely required, is
murdered. Hence, he looked upon all shoot
ing of pic5ets, all scouting forays not required
in order toadyance the general object Of the
war, all destruction Of life, on either side,
which did not contribute TO ,he general re
suit as SO many acts Of uujust.h>.LIe homi
eide
If the matter had been left to him, be said,
he would have commenced by a perfect
blockade of every southern port on The At
lantic an1 the Gulf Then he woud have
collected large force at the Capital for de
iensive purposes-and another large one on
The Mississippi for offensive operations. The
summer months, during Which it is gladncs4
TO take troops south of st Louis. should have
been devoted TO tactical ..nstrucuoB--nud
with the first frosts of Autumn he would
have taken a column OF So 600 well discplin
ed troops down.:he Mississippi ppi-and taken
every Important point or that river, New
Orleans included. 1T would have been done,
ne said, with greater ease, with less loss Of
Hfe, and with far more important results
lhan would attend the marching Of an army
to Richmond. At eight points the river
would probably have been defender and
eight battles would have been necessary but
ih every one of them success could have been
made certain for us. The Mississippi and the
Atlantlc once ours, the Southern States
would have been compelled, by tie natural
ana inevitable pressure of events. TO SEEK by
return to the Union, escape from the ruin
:""V would speedily overwhelm them ont of
II, lhls," said he, twas my plan. But am
"n'y subordinate. It's my business to give
""I'lce when it is asked, and to obey orders
o" 'hey are given. / shall do it, There
gentlemen in the Cal met who know
more about war than do, and who
'".e 'af greater influence than have in de-
'U,.,.IIi,ling the plan Of the campaign"
mere never was more Just and upright
man than the Presdent--ueler er one who de-
. sneu more aucurely to promote the best in.
eelesV OF the country But there men
"u'ohS Ills advisers who consult theirown re-
echtnents far more than the dictates Of wis
uoIh and experience, and these men will prob
aoIy decide the plan of the campaign [
snail DO, or attempt whatever am ordered