New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-12-26

roads, prepared The way Tor gram duNh" =" ~"
enemy wherever he il in force IL Is almost iocredi-
BILE that he will refuse to anvil himself Of the aus
pieces which thus smooth bis p4th. The untowaru
affair on Friday last at Dranesve will probably IN
spre bis soldiers with some confidence IN themselves,
and conspire with the excellent roads to invite al
advance.
II is said that Mcclellan has repeatedly given
orders for II forward movement upon cur INES, ana
that M many troops as could be used upon the helas
before Manassas have been for some lime On lni,
side OF the Potomac, aud that n0tbipg MS r.Venteu
grand battle long before now bat Tue aOsoin,e In
possibility of inducing the reluctant aud tmld an
KEGS tn move forward The disgraceiul and dlsas-
irons defeat they received ht Leesburg filled them
with dismay. aud has rendered a forward movement
with men thus stricken with fear and distrust I'M
possible.
The Affair at Dranesyille has probably taught
them however, that, odds being IN ihelr iaVor,
possible 10 defeat and drive back Southern troops
Ii il should have this effect and shonld thus induce
a forward movement by Mcclellan, tbs DraDesViile
eotfretemps will real y prove one OF tie most i'r'u
nate occurrences of the war. Our army only irk
for n fair fght in open field II the enemy VIII bu.
come forward far enough TO afford the chance OF u
decisive battle that s ali our generals or 1nelr ne
dgsire or ask This granted they will take care OF
the rest ana il is much to be- hoped that the rampant
polt iaps In Washington will be able, by the lever
aye viii this Dranesville business will give them,
TO force Mcclellan into the Held.
Trusting to a large superiority of numbers, tie
enemy seem steadily TO be pushing forward their
troops in keutucky for attack In force upon our
army under General sydney Johnston. From all
the indications in that quarter, grand engagement
within few DAYS seems unavoidable. thus "a cum
stances all combine to bri about two great engage
ments ON either eide of the Alleghanes, which, but
for the relations of Great Britain 10 tDe Nofth,
would be decisive OF the war.
1.-THE South should he beaten on both fields, she
could hardly expect for some time 10 get together
two armies of any magnitude; and would have %
pend altogether upon the virtues OF Fablln poi
ICY AID general system OF ssirmlsiing against ne
enemy. IL the Sonth, on the other hand, thouiu
ram both battles, toe North would be compelled To
desl.t from aggressive measures Tor such length oil
time as il would require 10 organize and discipline
other new armies Considering the low state OF
their exchequer the period qnired for tits purpose
would be 50 long that virtual suspension oil inva-
sion would be the result, and the South would DC
enabled 10 carry inva.ion TO their own door. Such
all invasion though only partially successful, would
virtually end the war; especially II u Resulted IN
stampeding the Lincoln Government from wash
ington.
The appearance of England on the field OF strife
would have a decided Influence upon the contest
The first effect Of the iDbrogliO even II II should not
result in war between that country and tie North,
must be TO preoipitate the latter III whatever ACTON
it mas have been preparing against the South, our
Jog the ast few monibs Of bury activity. An htiacK
upon our armies in Kentucky and on the Potomac
lniRht otherwise have been postponed until The
Spring; but the complication with England must at
once determine the Administration 10 strike its blow
without DELAY. successful battle uIon the PotO-
mac and in Kentucky, might avert a war with Grea
Britain; for defeat by the South on these two
fields would BE- taken by the world Gs conclusive proof
oi be r inability 20 make good her Independence.
Thus all the circumstances of the hour unite 10
force on two great battles in the next iew days. To
refuse to fight under the inhuences low pressing
upon it, would argue an imhecilty 10 the No,'h. rs
generals and tie armies, which conIu no, ,H. 80 y"
interpretoa moe. unfnvorby agiins, that se'uon'
such failure ought % produce tc'ni loss 90 CONF
depce In the Lincoln Administration among ns own
people and that would most probably be NE real
effect Both the North itself. AID more particularly
the Administration In power, are inielIed TO ohrr
battle nj this moment by necessiie- which seem TO
us AZ imperative as Irresistible. They must hghti
and we are ready for the fray. The defiant cry Of
the whole South II, Lay On Maeduf.'
THE RATTLE or ALLEGHASY suMNIr-uNiON
ACCOUNT.
corr..pondenc- Of The Wksel a. lnlel.ls'nccf. .
CAMP ELKwAIER, Va. Dec. IL, le6l.
Since NV last have been waiting, hicas ber-llhc,
for something 90 "turn mp" which something dli
turn M on the 9th INST. An order wa received from
bendonar,ers at Nationwide for portion OF The "a
Virginia TO report at Cheat Mountain Summit imne-
diaoly or M sVon The weather and muddy roads
would permit. About o'clock I. N. o. that day,
X I'm all about 100 men, under command Of Major
Owens took M the line Of march for lie summit,
where we arrived at gOclock, and were Joined by
deischmf nts Of the 18th and sd Ohio, nh ana 18Th
Indiana Regiments, making a colamn OF J 40 men
AT the summit. The object OF the expedition was
explained 10 VS. il being TO clean ont Camp Baldwin,
situate on top Of the Aloghany Mountains, distant
from Cheat Mountain Summit about - miles
On the llth instant We left there The Summit,
and marched to the old camp Of tie rebels al Green
brer aud there halted long enough TO get supper
and ret where our force was divided, 200 going up
the Cr.enbapk River and Ike number up the turn
nike toward stanton. where the two columns We're
to make the attack at O'Clock in the morning; but
owing 10 the roughutss OF the road md three miles
Il IL up the mountain, much sleeper than any pat
Of Wheeling Hill, the column which your cor
RESPONDENT was with, could not get up until about
o'clock in the morning, when we commenced the
fight on our side, by woundng two OF tho rebel
pckets and killing Que; our lines were formed, and
forward, charge bayonets given; away we went,
whoopug like devis, within 200 yards OF tie n bel
intrencLments when the fire became 10 hot that all
had 10 take shelter behind logs, tIees aud whatever
el-e could be found. In this position we kept up
regular Indian fight for over four hours; toward the
last the liring became accurate that II I'm inch Of
one person was exposed be was sure TO catch u.
AT lsat came orders u draw OIL, which was done in
tolenble good order. My opinion IL, that there
were over 5000 rebels we had To fight, and ut no
time had we over 20 men in the fight; opposed 10
this force was at least 800 rebel nukets and four
or five pieces OF artillery, among which was u
FOUNDER.
Our loss in killed and wounded, | think, will reach
nearly $50, and The rebel loss ia killed aloNe
800. IL wa one Of the hardest fought battles that
has vet occurred in Western Virginia. The tight oc
Cured in Highland County seven miles from Mon
terey. from which place they the rebelsl received
largo re-epforcements. notice that member OF
the Convention proposed to Include Highland in the
new State. think if he had been AT the fight he
would accept the amendment to strike out that
county.
The loss in the Second Virginia Regiment is three