Glasgow weekly times. (Glasgow, Mo.) 1848-1861, 1861-08-01
Tbs Defess-Who IL Responsible 70,
the Forward Movement?
Gen. scotps Plan of the Campaign

Gen. SCOTS Plan OF the Campaign
The New York Times has thrown bonn
into the Republican camp q, Washington
which has created quite buzz. We hay
not room for the entire article, but give
lew paragraphs, which partially settle
question that is just now being much dis
eu'sed. 1t says
On the Tuesday proceeding the battle
General Scott, at his own table, in presenc,
OF his aids and single guest, DISGUISE.
the whole subject Of this war, in all il,
parts, and with The utmost clearne.s an.
accuracy. He had distinct, and well-de
fined opinion Oh every point connected will
II; and stated what his plan would be fol
bringing 1t 10 close, ii the management O
II had been lett III his hands. The main OBJ
jecl Of tile war, he said, was 10 bling IN,
people of the rebelllous States 10 feel III,
pressure OF the Government; TO cornpe
them TO return 10 their obedience and loyal
ty. And this must be done with the leas
possible expenditure of life, compatibl,
with the sttsinment of the object. N,
Christian nation can be justified, he said
IN wagirg war in such wsy as shall de.
stroy sol lives, when The object of the wa,
can be attained at cost OF 500. Ever,
man killed beyond the number ab.olutel;
required, is murdered. Hence, he look &c
upon all shooting Of pickets, all scouting
fOrsys not required in order to advance ,be
general object of the war. all destruction Of
life, on either side, which did not contribu,,
to the general result, as 50 mnay acts O
unjusliiable homicide.
II the matter had been left to him, h,
said, he would have eof3...nced BY per.
feet blockade Of every Southern port on III,
Atlantic and the Gulf. Then he wouls
have collected large force at the Capita
Tor defensive purposes-and another large
one on the Mississippi for offensive opera
lions. The summer months, during which
ii Is madness 10 take tro>ps south of 81
Lrnis, should have been devoted to tac,ica
insIruciion-an with the first lrosts of Au
tumn, he would have taken a column O.
10000 well disciplined troops down III.
Mississippi-and taken every important
point oil that river, New Orleans inclu
ded. 1t could have been done, he sale
with greater ease, with less loss of lie
and with far more important results thar
would attend the marching of en- army &c
Richmond. AT eight points the river
would probably have been defended, ant
eight battles would have been necessary
but m every one Of them success coulc
have been made certain for us. The Mis-.
sissippi and the Atlantic once oiIrs, the
Southern States would have been com.
PEELED, by the natural and inevitable pres.
sure OF events, to seek by a return 10 the
Union, escape from the ruin that would
speedily overwhelm them out Of it. This
laid he yves my plan. But am only q
subordinate. 1t is my business 10 give
advice when it is asked, and 10 obey orders
when they are given. SHALL DO IT.
There are gentlemen in the Cabinet who
know much more about war than do, aud
who have fer greater influence than have
III determining the plan ol the campaign.
"There was never a more just and up
right man than the President-never one
who desired more sincerely TO promote the
best interest Of the country. Blu, there are
men among his advisers who consult their
own resebtmenis far more than the dictates
of wisdom and experience, and THESE men
WILL PROBABLY DECIDE the PLAN OF THE
CAMPAIGN. l shall do, or attempt, what
ever am ordered TO do. Bur THEY MUST
NOT HOLD ME RESPONSIBLE. II am order.
ed TO 60 Richmond, shall endeavor to do
it. But | know perfectly well that they
have no conception Of the difficulties We
shall encounter. know the country, how
admirably adapted it is 10 defense, and how
resolutely and obstinaieiy it will be de:en-
ded. ] would like nothing batter than &c
take Richmond how thai it has been dis.
eraced by becoming the capital Of the rebel
Coniedrracy, feel a resentment towards
it, and should like nothing better than 10
scatter its Congress 10 the wirds. But /
have lived long ehough.io know that human
resenitDenls is a very bad foundation for a
public policy; and these gentlemen will live long
emo ugh 10 learn it also. shall DO what ] am
ordered Il shall fight when and wh ere / am
comm nded. BUT If lam COMPELLED TO FIGHT
BEFORE / AN READY, THEY SHALL NOT HOLD ME
RESPONSIBLE. These gentlemen must take the
responsibility OF their acts, as am willing 10
take that of mine. But they must not throw
THEIR responsibility onmy shoulders.".
This is the substance and very nearly the lam
guage of portion Of Gen. Ssott's conversation
on the occasion referred TO. 1t proves conclu-
sively that he was opposed to the advance. upon
Richmond by way Of Manassas at that time, ard
also that the Administration was almost certain
10 override his objections and command battle.
From Western Virginia.
CiscINSArTr, July 26.-Gen. Cox occti
pied Charleston on the Kanawhs. yesler-
day, the rebels re,reaiing, burning bridges,
SO. A rebel steamer was abandoned and
burned. 1t is. supposed the rebels will be