The Council Bluffs nonpareil. [volume] (Council Bluffs [Iowa]) 1857-1867, 1861-05-04

!" gun to FIRE upon our forts and murder our
"people. Look upon your hands! They are
s. stained with the blood Of your relations |!
o. You and were long friends ; you are now
.'my enemy, and am yours!'' As it is
here, so it is everywhere. In the East, in
the West, in the North, the Messenger with
the burning brand has rushed over noun
tains and through valleys, and fierce fame
shoots up from every city, and town, and
J village, and shedding a lurid glare over the
| Southern sky which may well appal the
stoutest heart among the mad and misguided
traitors who are doomed to quick subjection
| or to swift destruction.
FORT PiCKENs.
Nov that the public attention has ceased
to be SO exc,edIy fixed on Charleston, PEN.
sacola Bav, and the siege probable there,
takes the first place Of interest. .....
| In regard to this, as concerning all like
events Of the last six months, it is di!icu!,
TO form even general idea. as to what are
| the real intentions Of our Executive, and
whether it acts with regard 20 political or
military plans, or vihrates rs these two in
/ huences may in succession most powerfully
attract.
Political considerations and the mild dc
termination not to commence the attack,
and to regard nothing rs an attnck, but the
discharge OF hostile cannon, might allow the
same cords to be wound around Piekens as
have just nettled Snmpter. Ii batteries
arranged in pence and quiet can be placed,
some within preaching distance Of the fort.
others able to drive nE all war vessels ani
to rrpel all attempts landing reinforeemenss
/ in launches or boats, without opposition
| from any quarter, then the surrender of the
one fort is rs certain in the future, as that
of the other is in the past.
! The approaches ali lost, the fort is lost,
as We have no force TO raise the siege, and
an open surrender in name would be pref
erahie TO n delusive defence. A man who
quietly allows his enemy to take, load, cock !,
aud ann a pistol at his head, and wait 10
resist till the discharge has taken place,
would not pursue maider course than is
this not firing first shot style of defend
ing a fort. The attack really commences
q. when the first act is done which interferes
with the permanent holding Of the work.
On the hypothesis. however. that the de-
fence will henceforth be conducted on a
purely military basis, and from the plane
and advice of competent and professional
advisers, We can, within certain limits, an.
/ tlcipate results.
! The field Of operations at Pickens is cs
septlaliy as follows, and may be traced upon
the map which We publish on our first page.
/ The harbor Of Pensacola is M indenturc on
the Gulf coast, shut in by the .ong narrow
island of Santa Ross, which continues the
line Of coast, running nearly east and west.
| On the west side Of the entrance TO the bar
Dor is Fort McRae and water battery !;
I I'D In A,at, M.
west point Of Santa Rosa, stands Fort Pick
! ems. Taking this last as a centre, the line
of the main land sweeps round from McRae
| a quarter of n circle, where II little back
from the water is For, Barrancas. II then
continue nearly parallel to the island,
about two miles to The Navy-yard, where il
runs ID to the north, making a spacious
| bay. at the head Of which is Pensacola,
| Picsens is thus exposed to the fire of the
Barranea., and McRne. and such batteries
as may be erected on all The stretch OF shore
between them. and on the more distant line
towards the Navy-yard. his FIRE is all re
mote, too much so to effect any brencb
which would be imprac,icat!e it the fort j..
/ fully garr,s0ned.
TIE beseigers will then be compelled ei-
ther to deliver an assault at once, success
| in wbich would he nearly impossible with
/ their present resources or 90 through With
al regular siege. and its consequent delay and
EXPENSE IN men and money.
| Their parallels must be made on, and
their attack delivered from. the Island Of
Santa Ro.a itself while the forts on the
main land can render no very Elective as
sistance. One imporssn, element in siege
is, that the attacking force should more or
les encircIr the point attacked. take the en-
emies' batteries in flank AMI deliver a con
rery.ng FIRE. This, on account Of the mar
/ rowpes. Of the Island IL NOT practi:able TILL
the fort is nearly reached, and the be.siged
and beseigers will each deliver the other n
direct ERE. Again, the Southern forces viii
be exposed to a Eank attack from the men
of-~ar, which can take positions amply near
for that purpose, snd this Ere from them
will be far ~orse on their shifting positions,
especially during their elementary move
mer,s, than any aid ,hsy will receive from
the batteries on the main land bearing on
the guns Of Pickens facing them. Their
com m unica,ions with the mainland will nj
|. u.ys be threatened, and may be cut o6 al
|, these many circumstances caused by ihs
presence Of sses, and the peculiar po.iiios
of the fort, will Cause great delay. aid tbs
defence. and render the sisge, even with.
, ont reinforesmen,s, protracsed and dia
cult.
Il Fresh troops At any time before ;he 80.
aault vii enabl. the garrison to erect out
works. and IL Sufficiently strengthened, the,
in their turn, may bscame the ausackins
/ party. IL the garrison IL now suahcfeni, o.
1 should become so before parallels are open
, ed. aat-works OF various kind.-as redsn
t 81 Il
! / vsseed svsn - fas - opposite the Navy