Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1861-06-22

ses at full rates. ~ - -
shallyve have Battle soon in VIr.
gInIa.
from the Philadelphia Americaul
Since the evacuation of Harper's Ferry
by the enemy, and the sudden and ranid
march of General Patterson's corps South
ward, 1t has become somewhat dificult tn
comprehend the movements of either side
ana hence we have preferred waiting for
! Hulhenuc Information of actual move
ments before discussing the position Of
affairs. No sooner was it known that
General johnson had marched Southward
from the Potomac than the correspondents
OF the press Immediately jumped at the
conclusion that the enemy was concentra-
ting his whole forces at Manassas Junction.
and that great battle would occur there
Both of these conclusions, in our iudO-
ment, are mistaken. That the enemy nt
the junction has been, reinforced seems
clear enough from the accounts which we
have carefully examined and sifted, though
1t Is MOI less plain that two-thirds of the
accoun OF enormous forces at that point
arc pure fdbricAtions. We are satisfied
that some of them proceed from spies sent
across the lines by the rebel leaders for the
purpose OF deceiving; others are narrated
by loyal persons who have been iuten-
tonaily deceived. AT the very moment
when certain parties were representing
that the rebel forces at the Junction num-
bered 20,0OO, it WAS ascertained by ca efIlI
spies thatthe real number hardly reached
5000.
We do not believe that General John
| sons whole army has gone to the juno
ton, and where it has gone is the mystery
yet to be solved before any important
movement on our side, can be undertaken.
1t may yet be il the valley, at Winchester
and Strasburg. If it be true. as is said.
tnat the enemy has deserted Northeastern
| Virginia,th the Junction will soon become
an untenable position, without any .neces-
sity on our part to fight battle there,-
4 But Il is not clear that any such evacua-
/ tion has taken place, and indeed we are of
| opinion that the enemy will be found there
at various points. Nor is it true that Gem
eral Pattersou-s corps has been ordered to
Washington. Such movement would be
withoutany reason whatever. There are
forces enough there for all practical pur-t
poses. II may us well be understood once
tor all that unless the rebels make the at
tack there will be no great battle at Man.
assas junction or east of it at present
We might lose skirmish near WASH
ington without any serious consequences.
But 10 hazard great battle there in any
offensive operations would be capital
military blunder. For if we were to risk
it and lose the battle at the junction, the
rebels would Immediately close aroaud
and lay seige to Washington, whereas, if
we were to gain the battle We should there
by obtain no great advantage, there being
no other points between that and Rich.
moud where the same fight would have to
hn rR6 Il b,
thetwo main points in this campaign, in a
military point of view, are, first, the de-
fence of Washington, and second, the cap
ture of Richmond, and that both arc to Ge
managed together by the same plan of OPP
eratiOns. Ii Washington be rendered ST.
cure Richmond is threatened, and if Rirll-
mond be safe Washington is in dauger-
Manassas Junction, it is true, is point
having an important bearing on both, but
chiefly upon Washington. Should we be
drawn into battle there we shall thereby
put ourselves upon defensive, and thus
lose sight of the grand purpose in view
If we cannot take Richmond the campaign
will not be success.
| 1t is, therefore, of no consequence where
the enemy chooses to post himself in force,
unless it serves the purpose of screening
Richmond, for if that be left exposed, It
does not matter much how seriously Wash-
iDgtou be Threatened, since the first draw
! ing. of our lines towards the former win
cause an immediate rush of rebel troops
to its defence. IL may be true, and prob
ably is, that General Scott has ordered the
regulars in Patterson's corps to march to
Washington. They were only needed to
give tone to an army going to attack for
midable position; and as the enemy had
fed from the post without fight, the reg
ulnrs must go where there mightbe use for
them, TO Washington, since it is the OBJ
vious policy of the enemy, il be be in a
condition to assume the defensive atsaII,
to precipitAte n battle at or near Arlington
or in the arof Washington.
Gen. Patterson had not quite completed
his arrangements when the retreat of the
enemy rendered the immediate advance of
his first division necessity. He had or
ganized and sent forward Eve brigades,
and was about forming the sixth when ac-.
tiOn in the field becrme unavoidable. This
sixth brigade may still be formed, though
it is now a matter of doubt. The army
was in three divisions, for the purpose of,
moving upon three points of attack, the
centre being led by Col, ,Keim. Most of
the regulars Werein Cadwallader's divis-
ion, which led the van, and crossed the
Potomac at WilliamspOrt. Before crossing
the river, General Cadwallader sent de-
tRchment TO Cumberland to reinforce the
/ Indiana troops stationed there against the
threatened rebel attack. This detachment
consisted of the Rhode Island and Wiseon-
sin troops, with the battery of the former,
and squadron of horses. 1tIt,s- llz
The threatened attack ofthe enemy up
on Cumberland is intended to prevent the
| junction Of McClellan's corps with that of
Patterson, or to interrupt their communi-
cations, and at any rate to cutof Col. Wall
lnces regiment at tCumberlAnd. Il was uu-
iderstood tfat the rebel force narchinP to