The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-07-26

While oar little army was occupying Harrer's
Ferry, the old chiet, falsely calcr atng that
We would hold that point ut al hazards,
planned al incursion into Virginia by two
columns; the one marching for Winchester to
the South of the Ferry, the other from Mar
>ipSburg to the North of it, the two to converge
at Winchester, thus cutting of our army
at Harper's Ferry, and obtaining possession of
the commanding strategic point of the Vir-
giuis Valley We I'll know how promptly this
design was defeated by Gen. JOHNSTON, who,
des pite the murInufings of his own troops, and
the gruinblinss CT the prsss, abandoned liar
per's Ferry, which WAS a mere trap possessing
no military value, and fell back to Winchester,
where his position commsnied all approaches
IS well from the East AS from the Northeast,
and gave protection to tho whole Valley
Leaving part of MS command at Winchestor
GEN. Jomxsros advanced towards " iliiams-
pot aud tempted the advancing columns of
the caemy to battle. Ills retirement from
Haryers Ferry, however, had completely up
set all PArrERsoN's Instructions from Genera,
Scorr; and instead of giving battle to JONI
sroN, nc retreated in the night across the Po-
,omac ana sought safe ground on the Mary
land side.
1t was very plain from all that occurred,
then and afterwards, that the falling back to
Winchester Of JoHNsTos's command had not
been contemplated IN SCOTS Instructions to
PATTERSON, and tuat the enemy had been
l.. .Ixy %b.t ri,
moy uiacut. All that has occurred since, IN the
r. gion Of country COMMANDED by Winchester,
has shown that an invasion OF Virginia by way
Of tho VALLEY had been abandoned by 0CoTr
alter the falling back OF our army from liar
pers Ferry. That the chief movement OF the
enemy brfvre that event was intended
to be made n that direction, is proved 10y Tie
fact that the TOUR best batteries VI artillery in
the Federal army nsa beon sent to pATTEKsoy's
command, t1at ui SBERNAN's and the Rhode
Island battery among the rcst.
La the many mafcnlngS and coun;ermarch-
inss OF the two armies in the county sur
rounding Winchester, Gen. JJEEsToN tour
! times oitSied battle To his adversary, aud Was
de often distinctly refused.
From all that occurred, Gen. JOHNSTON came
to the conviction that the movements of the
| enemy III that quarter were mere i:ints, and
tnat Gen. Scorr mad roE determined u make
tho invasion 10y way OF Manassas. lie CON
Guided naturally that the great and DECISIVE
ratiie Of the campaisn Was to be fought along
the line of BEAUREGAEp, that all Of PArrER-
SONS movements before him were made Tor
the purpose of concealns tie Iuain intention,
AID tAat the ultimate destination Of PATTEC-
SONS column Was to bo the field before Ma
u86sas. Accord ely, as long ago Is tw9
weeks be mmunicat.d bis Impressions to
tie President and asked leave, il facts CON
tnuCd to support bis suTHiise, TO march With the
bulk Of tbU ioIce under his COMMAND to the
support OF BEAuREcARD. The instructions
were al once gwen, greatly to the credit Of
the sasacity Of the President, who is the sort
Of man at once to appreciate the force OF mill
tary argument.
On Monday week last, General PATTERSON
moved down from Martinsburg to within six
miles of General JoHNsToN's lines at Winches-
ter, aud displayed himself az if to offer
battle. Gen. JOHNSTON persisted, however, in
the opinion that it was a decoy, intended to
tempt him six miles further from Manassas
ihan Lo was. in order to draw him of from
tic reinforcement Of EAuREGARp. ia was
satisfied that he Was to be INDUCED in no bat
tie, and that his advecsary's intention was to
fall back across the Potomac at his approach,
and to hasten away to the aide Of MCDOWELL.
PATTERSON, therefore, was allowed to 50 un-
l1oiested, and was soon found to have il fact
fallen back across the Potomac, and to be
making his way towards Georgetown. Gen.
JOHNSTON of course determined at once to move
his army towards Manassas; but the distaste Of
his army to al apparent retreat was 80 great,
that, 10 prevent absolute mutiny, he had to
iiyulge the reasons and design of his march
ing orders.
The sequel shows that ten thousand Of bis
command arrived in time to take A leading and
decisive part in the great action of the 2Ist
the last half ofthis force, under General kIRBY
SMITH, reaching the field only at the last
hour, but yet in the nick Of time to turn the
tide of battle and give the final coup lie grace
to tie enemy. The concentration of the flower
OF his troops for the grand demonstration
against BEAUREGAEp's left wing, and the or
derin3 down of PATTERSON. with his fine bate
res for that decisive blow, was a master con
ception of SC0Tr. But his strategy Was dis
tiDcuy read, at every movement, by JoHfsToE,
and was hafied and defeated in the moment
he was expecting its triumphant success
Never were the mastery conceptions OF
consummatc General moro completely anhcl-
pated and brought to nsught than were those
of ten. SCorr by one of his once most favor
lie pupils. We believe that Gen. BEArRE-
GARD would have managed by genius and
bravery to have maintained his position, even
if Joi,ysrox had not had the sagacty to come
to his support but this is certain, that all
the movements of JOHNSTON, from the absn-
donment Of Hlrpor's Ferry to the mighty
events of the 2lst, stamp him as a master Of
strategy, that highest department Of General
ship.
What Gen, SCoTF'S plans viii now be, can
not be corjecturai. If ever a great com
mapder WAS completely bafied in his gre 4test
conceptions OF strategy, Gen. Scotr may be
considered, that man. Iutfm in health ard
dis;rusted by his superors, VIC d1ub; If his
genius viii be able to rally from the dreadful
blow he has sustained, and we believe that,
neglected and snubbsd, his future fate will lie
a. deplorabio as it will be merted.
Il. +. Mea.her.
Ii is stated on reliable information that T.