East Saginaw courier. (East Saginaw, Mich.) 1859-18??, 1861-04-18
,Fhe Fall OF Suurpfer.
from tho New York Times :

From the New York Times Aprl l5th.
1t is by no means impossible, after all,
that what seemed at first to be q nation
al calamity, and which rendered yester-
day memorably dark day in the expert
ence of every patriot, was after all sub
stantial and browning advantage, antici-
pated and provided for in the plans Of the
Administration, It's policy has been un-
form and consistent-to protect the prop
erty of the Government, and enforce its
laws. 1t will yield nothing belonging to
it unless dispossessed by superior force,
but it will not weaken the reputation Of
it's military arm, by reckless waste of
men or means in the maintenance or at
tempted recapturc Of any comparatively
yalueess position. This arm is welded
by that illustrious Chief and Patriot,
whose Forty years of active service have
never known dishonor or defeat, who, in
tho disappearance Of our great leaders, is
providentially left to us, and under whose
guidance, though we may not for the time
be advised of his plans, we are always
sure of being led to substantial success.
1t is altogether probable that Fort
Sumpter could not, at any reasonable cost,
have been relieved, after Mr.. LINCOLN as
sumed the reins of Government, till he
had collected the Army and Navy, dis
porsed by Mr.. FLOYD, in order to render
Washington and the forts and magazines
of the South an easy prey, and could as
sumo something like vigorous offensive
action. 1t was important that Fort
Sumptcr should be retained as point up
on which to concentrate the military
strength Of the rebels, securing to him
precious hours in which to concentrate
his forces upon more important and me-
naced points. To abandon, it would in
stantly relieve large force to operate
against Washington and Fort Pickens.
To hold this force inactive till they could
be reinforced in manner to defy attack,
was master-stroke of policy, and does
credit even to Gen. ScoTT's military rep
utaion.
This advantage being gained, tho Ad-
ADMINISTRATION was then prepared to test
the question whether the Confederated
States would allow the sending of sup
plies TO o handful of famshed soldiers,
cooped up in Fort Sumpter. To relieve
their wants was an act Of mercy as well
as peace. To prevent it, would be an
act of war. This war the rebels have in-
augurated. Major AYpERsoN's orders
were to act as he did at Fort Moultrie-
to consult the emergency; to yield, if
necessary, to superior force. The feet
did not render assistance, as it could not
without the risk of being disabled, and,
perhaps, destroyed. Government was too
weak in its naval arm to encounter any
such risks. 1t would interfere with its
proper command of the sea, and with its
plans, to commence an immediate enforce
ment of the revenue laws at the ports of
the rebel States. Fort Sumpter, as a
strategetic point, is of no sort of consc-
qucnce. 1t was constructed solely for
defence against foreign invasion, which is
not contemplated by the Government.
The port of Charleston, we learn by
way of Montgomery, is blOckadsd. Every
vessel entering or leaving it is to pass the
Surveillance of ship-of-war. No wonder
that "the Charlestonians regarded with
execration the feet that refused to come
to the rescue Of tho gallant ANDERSON.
1t was not the plan of the Administration
that they should 90 to his rescue at too
great peril. 1t was from the start dcs-
tined to an entirely different field and
mode Of action. Neither the retention
or. surrender of Fort Sumptor could have
any bearing on tho policy the Govern.
ment had marked out for itself. This
was an isolated case, that stood solely on
its own merits. Government could not
lallow its Flag to be dsgraced by retreat.