The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1861-07-30
uu TO Warrington,

On to Washing ION.
Frcm this time forward, the war l. to be-
GENE aggressive on the part of the South
The tables are now to be turned, and instead
of awaiting assault from the enemy, We are to
attack ,hom wherever they arc tcbe found
In Missouri. the column Of Gen. McCsLLocH
are advancing upon a retiring enemy, and the
movement will continue until that able Gone
raj and veteran soldier presents himself be-
tore the city of 81. Louis. In Western Viz
ginis, Gen. Wiss's retrcsa3e movement vii,
he only temporary. lie will soon be rein
forced, and will be able to force the enemy
eventually across the 0aio river. In Ran
dolph county, Gen. LoRISG, with a strong
column, r,il re-appeas at Laurel ll:l and Rich
Mountain, and push the enemy back to Graf
ton, TO Wneeiing, and into Pennsylvania or
Ohio. PATTERSON will bo superseded il JEFF
ix son county, and that column of the enemy
Departing Of forcing their way through Wiz
chester, will probably go to Washington, to aid
in protecting the Capital from capture.
Everywhere will the movements Of our ar
mics be aggressive, and the enemy are TO learn
that the vaior OF cur troops il g. irresistible
in ASSAULT AS when Standing fer attack, sus-
tainsd by their pet abonination, those terri
BILE marked batteries
Two great sc;s will occupy the attention
ci our Geuerais-namtiy the taking o! Wash
iugton city and the capture of Fortress Mon
roe. Success in the iirsi PFC icct would utterly
.icmoralize and discredit the LINCOLN Govern
Inent. They may fee and make their head
quarters in some secure: pl ce; they may save
themselves harmless by light, and continue to
carry on sill the operations Of the Government:
bu, the loss OF the Capital will deprive them OF
half their prestige, and the possession OF 1t by
the South invest its own Government with
some Of the most important insignia OF legiii-
macy and authority. The political effect OF
the capture Of Washington would almost lie
eide the war But it would not be more dec-
sive in a politica! point Of view than the cap
ture OF Fortress Monroe would be in mate
rial one. Tie first would destroy LlscoLN's
Government the other would destroy hi0
blockade, bring into existence a large South
ern Navy with layriads OF priva'eers, and
sweep his commerce from The seas
We have no doubt that our Generals viii at
once devote themselves to the deiences OF
Nashington city. Sustained by an army OF
fifty or seventy five thousand men, they will
make speedy demonstrations upon the works
On the Southern side OF tho Potomac. These
Can only lie captured by assault, and we doubt
L. IL "a
70 the task. |. will be for our Generals to
.1rpioy such arts of strategy and such aids OF
science as will render the bcs. aid to the W.
,ertaking; but it will be work at last tor
daring and for hard and bloody fighting. The
mere investment oi these works viii make the
governments stay in Washington irksome and
nervous and even if there were little proba-
biity Of success, the investment should be
made. Any serious cannepading along those
lines viii stampede the whole LINCOLN fra
ternity from the city, and the chief object of
taxing the city would thus lie accomplished
BY an attempt amounting 70 little more than
a feint.
The overthrow at Stone Bridge has put an
end TO all serious idea of invasion from
the Northern forces for sometime. And
even if they could renew their magnii-
cent preparations for marching upon Rich
mond, they can never again get the courage OF
their men up to that point. Their best bat
teres are taken their most effective artillo-
nv, and their horses almost all destroyed
They CO mot, for long time, mature such
Id hat and
army Of invasion. But III ore than all, they
will not lie able to procure tie requisite mum
Der &C men fer long time; and they will not
venture against US with these until they
have had time to instruct them thoroughly in
The drill ard discipline Of the soldier.
The choice of our Southern Generals is
therefore plainly between long insction or
early and active aggression. Every conside-
ration of prudence and strategy urges most
active system Of measures forthwith. 1t will
be moro easy to capture Washington with
forty thousa nd men in the next Ten days than
with twice or thrice the number as many
weeks hence. We are in the midst of the
season for active hostilites, and may by
delay postpone successes for year
which we might secure in month. An az
dacious policy is now the most prudent one.
The moment and the opportunity make rash
ness the highest prudence. Activity, enter
prise, unceasing assault, in season and out
Of season, should now be the order of the day
When standing on the defensive, caution and
wariness are the task oi the General; but
when moving on the aggressive, rapidity, sud
denness and uutiring activity, are the means
for comman ding success.
Northwestern Virginia.
An intelligent gentleman FROM Northwestern
Virginia has given Us some interesting par