The Cadiz Democratic sentinel. [volume] (Cadiz, Ohio) 1854-1864, 1861-08-21

mentS came to his aid from the railroad train
! understood to have just arrived from the vale
with the residue of Johnson's army. They
J threw themselves in the woods on our right an
towards the rear Of our right, and opened fir
OF inusketry on our men, which caused ther
to break and retire down the hillside. This 500
degenerated into disorder. for which there wa
no remedy. Every effort was mode TO rail-
them, even beyond the reach of the enemy
fire, but in vain. The battalion OF regular in
fantry alone moved u the hill opposite TO tn
one with the house on it. and there maintained
itself until our men could get down to and a
cross the Warrenton turnpike on the way bach
to the position we had occupied in the morning
The plain was covered with the retreatinl
troops and they seemed to infect those viii
whom they came in contact. The re treat soon
became rout, and this degenerated still further
into a panic.
Finding this state of affairs was beyond the
efforts Of all those who have assisted so faith.
fully during the long and hard days work in
gaining almost the object of our wishes, and
that nothing remained On Tho Ola 49, 80
cognlze what we could no longer prevent, gave
the necessary orders to protect their withdraw
al, begging the men to form in line, and offer
the appearance at least, Of organization. They
returned by the lords to the Warrenton road,
protected, by my order, by Col. Porter's force
OF regulars. Once on the road, and the differ
ent corps coming together in small parties, ma
ny without officers, they became intermingled,
and all organization Yves lost.
| Orders had been sent back to Miles division
for brigade to move forward and protect this
retreat. and Colonel Blenker's brigade was de-
tached for this purpose, and was ordered to go
as far forward as the point where the road to
the right left the main road.
| BY referring to the general order 1t will be
seen that while the operations were to 90 on
in front, an attack was TO be made at Black
burns Ford by the brigade (Richardson's) sta.
toned there. A reference to his report and
that Of Major Hunt, commanding the artillery,
show that this part of the plan was we'll and
effectively carried out. 1t succeeded in dec,i
wing the enemy for considerable time, and n
keeping in check part oil his force. The fire
Of the artillery at this point is represented as
particularly destructive.
AT the time OF our retreat, seeing great ac-
tivity in this direction, much fling and columns
Of DUST became anxious for this place. fear
ing il it were turned or forced the whole stream
OF our retreating mass would be captured or de-
stroyed. Afer providing for the protection Of
the retreat by Porter's and Blenker's brigades,
force ordered to be stationed for the holding OF
the road from Manassas by Blackburn's ford to
Centrevie, on the march, under the orders
from the Division Commander for Centreville.
| Immediately halted it. and ordered it 10 take
up the best line of defence across The ridge that
their position admitted Of and subsequently, ta-
king in person the command Of this part Of the
army, | caused such disposition of the forces
which had been added to by the First and Sec.
ond New Jersey and the DeKalb regiments, Or
dered up from Runyons reserve, before going
forward as would best serve to check the enc
my. The ridge being held in this way, tho re-
treating current passed slowly thro ugh Centre
vile to the rear. The enemy followed US from
the ford as lar as Cub Rum and owing to the
road becomisg blocked up at the crossing, eau
sed US much damage there, for the artillery
could not pass and several pieces and cnissons
had to be Abandoned. In the panic the horses
hauling the caiSsons and ammunition were cut
from their places by persons TO escape with, and
IN this way much confusion was caused, the
panic aggravated, and the road encumbered -
Not only were pieces of artillery lost, bu also
many Of the ambulances carr, ing the wounded.
At sundown most of our men had gotten be
hind Centreville ridge, and it became question
whether we should or should not endeavor to
make a stand here. The condition Of our ar,
tilery and its ammunition, and the want Of food
for the men, who bad generally abandoned or
thrown awav all that had been issued the day
BEFORE and the utter demoralization ofthe mass
of the army seemed to all who were near enough
to be consulted division and brigade comman
ders and staff--to admit Of no alternative but to
fall back; the more so as the position at Black
burns lord was then in possession OF the enc
my. and he was already turning our left. Cn
sending the officers Of the staff to the different
camps they found, as they reported to me, that
our decision had been anticipated by the troops
most of those who had come from the front be-
ing already on the road to the real, the panic
with which they came in still continuing and
hurrying them along,
At O'Clock the rear guard (Blenker's bri
gade) moved, covering the retreat, which was
effected during the night and next morning -
The troops at Fairfax station leaving by tho
cars took with them the bulk OF the supplies
which had been sent there. My aid de camp,
Major Wadsworth, stayed at Fairfax Court
House till late in the morning to see that the
staagglers and weary and worn out soldiers
were not left behind.
transmit herewith the reports OF the sever.
al division and brigade commanders, to which
| refer for the conduct of particular regiments
and corps, and a consolidated return Of the kill
ed, wounded and missing. From the latter it
will be seen that our killed amounted to nine
teen officers and four hundred and sixty two
non. commissioned officers and privates Many
| of the wounded will soon be able to join he
ranks, and will leave our total OF killed and dis
ahled from further service under one thousand,
| The return Of the missing is very inaccurate
the men supposed 10 be missing hav ng fallen
into other regiments and gone to Washington
many OF the Zouavcs to New York. In one
brigade the lumber originally returned at six
hundred and sixteen was yesterday reduced to
one hundred and seventy our. These reduc.
tons are being made daily. In a few days a
more correct return can be made.
| OF course, nothing accurate is known OF the
less Of the enemy. An officer Of their forces,
coming from them with flag Of truce, admit
ted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, and
other information shows this 10 be much under
| the true number.
The officer commanding the Eleventh New
York Zouayes, and Colonel Helm zelman, say
that the returns OF that regiment cannot be re-
lied on, as many OF those reported among the
causalies have absened themrelves since their
return and have gone to New York. Among
the missing reported are many of our surgeons
who remained in attendance on our wounded
and were, against the rules Of modern warfare
made prisoners
The issue ofthis hard fought battle, in which
certainly our troops lost no credit 10 their con.
iiict on the field with an enemy ably colnlnan,
ded, superior in numbers. who had but sbor
distance TO march, and always under cover
4 whilst our men we're df necessity out on tht
open fields, and should not prevent full credit
to those officers and corps whose services mer
tied success il they did not attain 1t.