The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1861-02-05

To re Ei'tor oj The n. \. Sun!
NAVY iAEn, Washington. ria.)


NAVY NAEp, Washington, Tia,,)
January l4tu, lSGl.
Irrorcse giving to your readers q statement Of
t''ts in reference to recent events connected with
tie Nay Yard here, and the forts tia, pro,ec, and
Sona-and the entrance Of this hsrbor A, such
times as these, facts that exhibit prominent political
moves arc Interesting, even II they are 10, from
the l"n cf a ready writer.
tpou the right hand Of the cutrance Of the b, or
FeLsscula stands T irt PiCkens uIun the ert baad
Is Port Mctre", and upon the shore With tho
after, ol.t nj q snd quarter further up the bay
is lott BirSuCas. These hits are nearly emu.
distant 'rUp each other and situated as 10 com
r!etely commend the entrance " the hsrbor. For
Pickei II an hnm rably constructed fort al
the extremity o. long hollow sand spit, that Sepa
rates the b'y iinm the Gulf for SONS distance and
the i"ft "a >" sttu'ted as really to Commsnd the
entrance g. tue bay completely. II Is ap.
pruachHbio hy land only slong the narrow
htch tn'Ht ChCd above, AMI It's dei,nCes are So ar.
ranged I'll 4, even n small force rrsy dafed il
against vastly superior numbers. Fort McCre, is
rnner d!npIdAl.d concern, hut is n.ysrthe.e ess
str uy water battery. Fort BirrNnCls IL well built
sui powerful dr'ruca of the entrance uf the har.
bof, bus neither its cons,iuction nor position ia
tiAPt-d to to.it strCng land Attsck.
These three larye bruhcattons with all their
guuS amfnunitions, &c, were IN Charge Of y single
conn anv OF artillery, under the command at pre-
seat OF Lieut.. A. SLrNarR. The navy yard /,
stltei 'ht san" STORE OF tia bay with the forts
n, e. "a aud Btrruucas, about ono aud a haf tnile.
aluNe the latter, u was uudrr command of G. m.
JANIS ARMSTRONG the next officer in c Jmu md was
C"u'Tards, EuESZER FARRANp. The disprs,be
iorce az tue yard consisted of alout seventy s.ors
or ordinary rnen, az they are termed, aud forty-
tiRLt marines, under Captain JANIS WATSON,
there was a'so at the ys'd. subject N the c.mm aud
OF Con-. AUM-TRING the |. \. store shin slpp v,
With two thlrty pnunders, and thiTty-eight men'
and the stfarntr wyandotte with six thirty ,wo's
anil eighty men. For n number Of days runors
bad been In circulation cf Intention on tie part
ElOritl aha aua t,t
possession Of the Navy Yard and forts at this point
On tie night oi thc9th Lieut. SLEaNAR stationed a
guard at Fort BTrancas. GA ,the morning of the
10Th he received orders from the war department
requiring him ~ use every means In his power ~
protect govornment property, and especially u
keep control of the en'rance to the harbor. lie
was also informed at the same time that the COM
uander of the Navy Yard would lie directed 10 CO.
operate with him.
on consultation with Com. ARNsrRoSa, and the
promise OF ass, tan o fom him, Lieut. SLPMMrR de-
Cilsd on removing at once into Fort PIcksns that
rost being the most tsnable position, aud where he
could uore nearly obey 'the spirit Of his tnstruc-
lions" This matter being decided upos, the army
officers went To work with will, and during the
ncNt "a hours, had thrown their entire force with
all the!r provisions, camp equipage, &c, int the
font sni by the stancc OF bnats itom the supply
aud Wyundutto, had removed tho ammunition from
Foit B,rpncas b. tho magazines Of Fort Pcken.
To what extent Com. ARNsraosa was ordcrsI t.
vn-oI+rate with tue army off ters, do not know,
hut It is fair presumption, that It u the ex
tent OF his power.
The Navy Yard itself is so situated that no mill.
tary man would think Of defending Il against q
large attacking force, with the means at the Com
modOre's command. In military point OF view,
retaining possession OF the Navy Yard was of small
cons, quence, compared N a successful defense of
the entrance of the harbor, and where II was neces-
ssry " make choice the available force ought 10y
all meIns To have been concentrated Ia Fort 4 uk-
ems. Taking this view Of the case, not th 'ukug he
was asking too much from the CDmrnplure,
Lieut.. SLENNIR urgently requested that the ina.
rims might lie sent tn assist HIS own com.
pany. The ordinary men Of the yard, use ess where
they were, wUuil also have bren ~ not uide.
shUbe addition, aud the swo ships could have
boru 50 placed n iu make their gus completely
cover an eBal,y's n vance by land. Lieut. 3. asked
IN ap GOOD faith for this co operation. Even
aner The Navy Yard was taken, aud surrounded
hy armed men, ana before IL was taken, he wruts
e. the Conuo lore repeating his request, that the
ma !uoS uIigut be scut him while thsIo was vet
time This again met with no attention, aud three
hours later these nan had all been ken prisoners
without havi-g ma 10 even shnV of resistance q and
the brave little army haud, already Ia fot Pickens
wee LETT To- thor own resources IN ca rrying
cut their instr,ut ous. Why such u cuur.e
was pursued, ly the authorities n, the NAVY
Yard, and by what and whose counsels II was
brought out may yet becouea subject tor Off al
investigation and II would bs improper for me at
this tine ~ NITrss my regrets, that white Lieut.
SLEuNrE, ably Seconded 10y Lieut. GuNAS-has 80
lar, met heavy re-, AT sblity with degree Of
tTgy aud dcv SION worthy OF very hugh praise. 1
caunot speak ia ter ms oi communication of tho way
in which the Nutiuitie Ht tue Navy Sard met the
I,spons ililitcs that developed upon them Ia tnis
case. NLNo.