The weekly Ottumwa courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1857-1872, 1861-09-04
Capf. mcCiei,...n Abroad

1
4 In the summer of 1866, while the war in
the Crinea and the siege Of SevastopoI filled
I so large space inthe eyeof the world, the
4 American Government sent three army Off
\ GERS across the Atlantic to survey the gigan-
tic events then transpiring in the contest
between the three great European powers.
! These officers were Major Dalafeld, of the
: Engineers, Major Mordecai. ofthP, Ordinance,
and Captain George B. Mcclellan, of the
a Cavalry They visited the Crimea, though
mot till after the fall Of Sevastopol, gauged
the dimensions of that world d-renowned siege,
and carefully studied The character and con
dition of the principal armies of Europe
After an absence Of some two years, the
!. commission returned, and each of its mem
bers iieportcd the result Of his observations
to2the Secretary ofWar, who laid them be-
! fore Congress, bywhom they were published
in the shape Of three huge quarto volumes.
Being upon subject in which the mass Of
our people then took little interest, these
elaborate and important reports excited
slight attention outside of our small army
The most full and valuable of these reports
1 is that of Captain (now GeneraD Mcclellan
1t consists of $50 wide quarto pages, and is
accompanied with large number of Plates
and diagrams, and an elaborate map Of, Sc
vsstopol and the surrounding works and
camps ofthe bellgerents duringth siege of
l1s54-5. 1t contains chapters or reports
upon operations in the Crimea European
engineer troops the French, Austrian, Prus-
sian, and Sandman infantry the entire
Russian army Of all corps, the Prussian,
Austrian, French, English. and Sardinian
cavalry the U. S. cavalry, and regulations
and instructions for the u. s.. cavalry in
ttime Of war The impression made upon the
mind Of a careful reader Of these reports is,
that Gen. Mcclellan combines in an unusu-
al measure breadth Of views and keenness of
observation that he has great capacity for
generalization, and rare tact for selecting and
arranging details that he has keen ap-
probation of the importance Of skillful COM
binatiohs for effecting important results !;
that be is an Independent thinker and ac-
customea to cultivate selfreliance, and that
he is rigid discplinarian, and fond and
proud Of the profession of arms. These re-
ports (McGlellan embraces each Of the topics
named in distinct report) DO not claim to
be entirely from his pen They ere often
=
mere condensations, il his own style of
language, ofheavy European works, mingled
!. with remarks and suggestions of his, and
TICS discipline, and equipments ofthe armies
OF the great powers of Europe and our own.
They also institute valuable parallels and
contrastsbctween the operations Of the troops
employed in the Criinea and our own in the
Florida and Mexican wars. They were crowd
ed brim full Of facts, bristlc all over with
sharp eriteisms and relate to every ooucei-
vable matter and thing touching European
troops and camps, from the organization OF
the grand army.of Russia down to the drill
ling of a drummeriboy, and from the con
stIuction Of formidable field works for re-
ducing fortified towns down to the, cut Of q
\ ,draggoon- saddle and the Punishment Of an
infantry knapsack. Captain Mcclellan de-
). votes twenty four pages of his work to a
description and criticism of the seige of Sc
vastopol, 1t is plain to sec that be has a
T nigh appreciation of the engineering talents
ofTodtleben, who planned the Russian earth
works which so long bafflcd the skill and
endurance Of the allies ; that he admires the
dash and daring of the Frence and, while
applauding "the steady and magnificent
E courage of the English soldiers, as exhibited
on the bloody field of Inkerman, he does
hot hesitate to speak of 'the folies and un-
, skillfulness of their commanders" Indeed,
he sharply criticises the conduct of all the
allied generals in the early part of the siege,
saying of them (and his words have peculiar
significance now,) "Their measures Were
halfway measures, slow and blundering
: they failed to keep constantly in view the OBJ.
ject Of the expedition, and to press rapidly
I and INCREASINGLY toward it. If a
deficiency in men and means is assigned as
reason for the early operations of the allies,
: it is but another proof that, in undertaking
the affair, they neglected one of the clearest
rules of war--that is, to undertake noinpor,
tant operation without Gull and ,rela BILE in.
formation rs to the obstacles to- be overcome
and the means Of resistance in the hands, Of
: the enemy" In connection With this sub.
ject, and as indicating the bent of General
McClellan's mind On this most suggestive
: subject, win cite from another part Of tht
work, where, under the head of 'sReconnois
sances, he says: sit is always necessary
e to know beforehand with what troops We
, have to deal and the nature Of the country
| in which the operations are to be effected
E and this information can be fully obtained
. neither by Interrogation nor by maps, but
5 only by Reconnaissance In the sam,
chapt,r' he deprecates. "plunging headlone
S into action without a proper knowledge o
7 the ground" His report upon the European
! Engineer Corps is highly interesting, abound,
Q with valuable information, and, in connec
i ton with his lively sketch Of the siege op
. erations and entrenchments of Sevasto1ol
5 proves that his mathematical mind takes
S naturally to his branch of the service, Tho
e but lit.le of his work is devoted to artillery