Pomeroy weekly telegraph. [volume] (Pomeroy, Meigs County, Ohio) 1860-1866, 1861-12-20
Letter from the Camp.
BENTON BARRACKS,
ST.. LOUIS, Nov. Is, '61

'''''e"' NioPPcu Jou iluC
week ago, Informing you that we were
on the point of starting to Springfield.
We went as far as Sedalia on the r. r.,
distance of one hundred and eighty.
nine miles. From there we were or
dered back. We would have had
march of one hundred and sixty miles
before US besides the return We were
much disappointed by the change of
orders, as we were anxious to visit that
portion of the State, the only portion we
have not seen. Arriving at Sedalia, the
present western terminus Of the Pacific
Rail Road, we ascertained that the OBJ
ject of our movement was to guard the
Pay master and army chest, with the
money destined to pay the troops of the
army at Springfield. At first, from the
secresy with which the movement was
commenced, we supposed that we were
to serve as an escort for bearer of dis
patches to Gen. Hunter, and the com
mander of the expedition knew no bet
ter until we were aboard of the cars
We were absent only about fftytwo
hours.
[ see by the papers that the removal
of Gen. Fremont produces a great deal
Of excitement throughout the country,
and as l am on the ground, and there
fore may be presumed to know some
thing of the merits of controversy which
has led to his removal, you would like
my opinion on the subject. The deep
interest l feel in the success of the
Union cause has led me to scrutinize
with anxiety everything which effected
our army, especially that portion of it
in the western department. L very early
came to the conclusion that Fremont
was not the man for the place. His re-
fusal to re-enforce Gen. Lyon, whereby
that gallant officer lost his life and our
arms suffered defeat, was only one of
series OF blunders which finally culmi-
mated in the capture Of Mulligan at Lex
ington, and caused him to be removed
and Gen. Halleck to be appointed in his
place. But if the appointment of FIRE.
mont was an error, his removal at the
precise time at which it was accomplished
was a much greater one, and one which,
| fear, will prove much more disastrous
in its consequences. Already our army
is in full retreat from Springfield, by
orders from Gen. Hunter. Had Ere
mont been continued in command, |
have not the slightest doubt but the army
would not only have maintained itself
in that position, but would, before this
time, have made another advance, thus
driving Price entirely beyond the limits
of the State This would have finished
| the war in Missouri The rebels would
have no force in the State, except a
small one under jeff Thompson, which
is skulking in the swamps in the vicinity
of Bloomfield, and is of no consequence
Now l venture to predict that the war
| in the south west will have to be fought
over again The soil which drank the
blood of Lyons, will be enriched by the
mouldering bones of many other true
patriots to regain what the mistaken
policy of the war department has volun-
tarily abandoned to the enemy.
said in the beginning that Fremont
was not the man for the place to which
he was appointed. He has not that kind
of ability which is necessary to manage
the affairs Of an extensive military dis
trict. He has the faculty of getting
verything into confusion. Placed at
the head of an army, with some one else
to manage the details, he would be for
midable antagonist. As strategist, l
believe he is the equal of any general in
the United States. But history fur
nishes but few examples, where men have
been endowed with the capacity to man
age an army in the field, and to make an
able commander of military district.
Gen. Washington is an example in point.
Washington's ability to manage the af-
fairs of military district, embracing the
regions occupied by several separate ar
mics, has rarely been equaled, and yet
l do not hesitate to say, that number
of his subordinates would manage an
army in the field to better advantage
than he could. In nearly every action
, he fought in the open field, he was beaten.
Fremont's errors arose, l think, in
part at least, from his anxiety to do ev-
Ferything himself, and thus monopolize
all the glory. With almost superhu-
man energy, he organized an army, of
about forty thousand men, and instead
of dispatching column, as he clearly
ought to have done, to the relief of Null
ligan, he delayed until he was ready to
take the field himself. Then it was too
late. Lexington had fallen, and its fall
carried Fremont with it. He is down,
but believe that purer patriot does
not live; and that our western army is
cursed with generals dozen of whom,
could they be concentrated into one,
would yet be unequal to Fremont in