Weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1858-1865, 1861-11-27

all other matters, 1t IS admtted that all the District
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. But Judge Ma
grath fails to distinguish between Courts having
general jurisdiction of the subject matter, and its
having special eognzancs Of the particular case. 1t
is very clear as he says, that each District Court
has jurisdiction Of marine torts, wherever commit
ted, and of marine contracts wherever made, but
certainly of them can take cognizance Of any
particular case unless either the parties with
in reach of the Courts process SO that they can be
arrested, or their estate that it may be attached
in lieu of arrestng their persons, or, the thing pro-
ceeded against, when the proceeding is in rem, SO
that it may be taken into the custody Of the Court
unless the case be taken hold of by one Of these
means, any judgment or decree pronounced therein
is an absolute nullity An analogous case is furn.
ished by the Courts of Common Law. A personal
contract is made in England. The Superior Court
Of Law of Wayne has jurisdiction of the subject,
but can have no cognizance Of any cause growing
out of it. until the parties their estate at least
that the defendant are reached by the process of
the Court This and nothing more than this, is
meant when it is said as in the case of Sandwich,
Pet. Rep, 237 in note, (cited by Judge Magrath)
"the jurisdiction of the District Court is bounded
only BY the nature Of the case, over which it is
to decide"
AS to proceeding in rem in civil causes, the au-
thorties all agree that specale forum tribuit lucos
in quo res sit@sunt. In Conklng's u. S. Admiralty,
it is said at page IS, on the authority of Judge
Story to be very clearly settled that in proceedings
IN rem, or the real actions of the Civil Law, the
proper forum is the ueos rel sito. See also to the
same effect page 81, of the same volume
Judge Magrath seems to have entirely overlooked
the limiting or qualifying words in the statute Just
cited comforting jurisdiction. to wit, "as in civil
cases contra distinguished from prize cases, &C."
and ne himself settles the question when he says
I'm the exercise Of its ordinary jurisdiction the
rant or order Of the Court executed by the officer
brings into Court the specific thing, against which
relief is sought" Now the officer can execute no
warrant or order beyond the limits of his district
Act Of Confederate Congress, No. 83. Sec 5, Claws
LIST Session, page l13 If this be so, and if in civil
cases, "a branch of the ordinary jurisdiction) the
Court can have cognizance jurisdiction where the
officer cannot seize the specific thing, and if the
jurisdiction in prize cases is governed by the same
rules, as in civil cases. it follows inevitably that the
Marshal of the District Court of one State, being
unable to seize and take into custody vessel lying
in the port of another State the said Court can have
no cognzance thereof
1t will he observed that in the Act above referred
to, comforting jurisdiction in prize cases. the qualify
ing words already cited are confined to where
the prize is actually brought within the Confederate
States, and in the act Of the u S. comforting the
same jurisdiction, there is such limitation, the
prize jurisdiction being considered part Of the civil
jurisdiction. No argument, therefore. against my
view of the subject, can be derived from any case
decided in the Courts of the U. S., whether the
prize was condemned while lying in foreign port,
or domestic port not within the District rciSng
jurisdiction of which latter kind however it is be-
lieved that no case can he found) Nor, as is at
tempted BY his Honor from that portion of our Act
which allows the prize to be carried into neutral
port, and, while there, to be condemned by our
Rut fha lirni nf no
statute out Of riew, no argument can be derived
against my position from the general practice Of
condeDning prizes, while in foreign neutral ports.
lbs is violation Of principle and is only tolerated
for the sake of convenience 1t is said in Kent's
Commentaries, vol LIST, marginal pages 103 and
lO4, 1.-THE principle" that actual possession of the
thing, within the local limits of the District is ne
cessary to give cognizance in proceedings In rem,
"was admitted to be correct by Sir William Scott,
in the Hannah and Marlah, and he acted upon it in
a prior case. But he considered that the English
Admiralty had gone too far, in supporting condem-
nations in England Of prizes abroad in a neutral
port to permit MIN to recall the picious practice of
the Court, to the acknowledged principle The Su-
preme Court Of the United States has followed the
English rule. This was deemed the most Convenient
practice for neutrals as we'll as for the parties at
war; and though the prize ~as in .tact within the
neutral jurisdiction, it still to be deemed under
the control Of the captor." Now when the prize is
within the actual Jurisdiction of Court Of the
country Of the captors, it can not be allowable to
establish the riciOus practice and violate :he &C.
knoUledged principle alluded to above, and in order
to sustain such course, resort to the impractical
idea that the prize, while in port of one district,
being in possession of the captor is much with
in the control of the Court if in the possession
Of its officer, an idea that was merely hunted up at
first to sustain jurisdiction that was deemed con-
venient if not necessary
The act of Congress, No. 372, approved SOth
Aug, 1861, (since jurisdiction was taken in this
case.) See acts of the Bird session, page 70, makes
special provision that the Judge of the prize
Court may order the vessel and cargo, lit does not
say where situated) to be Sold in certain cases, by
the Marshal of the adjoining District, thus showing
clearly that Marshal cannot sell out of his own
District; otherwise the Marshal, not Of the adjoin-
ing district but of that exercising jurisdiction could
have sold, and this provision OF the Statute would
have been useless. Would not it then be dsres.
pectful to the lawmakers to suppose, that, without
\ reason founded upon either necessity or convent
ence they intended to confer upon Court authority
to order sale of property 6y an officer, who, in
some cases, could not come within thousand miles
Of it at the time of the sale, who could give no pos
session thereof, and who could not even assure the
purchaser that the property purchased by him was
then in existence. If such sale be valid, it is an
exception to that otherwise u,iuersaI rule that in
sales of personal property by ministerial officers,
the property must be present, and susceptible Of
delivery.
The Act of Congress, No. 1926, (Acts I'd session,
page 49, forbids the captors to remove the prize
after it has been attached by an adverse claimant
or claim has been interposed against it on behalf
of the Confederate States. Why For no other
but that, in proceedings of this nature, 'the
very thing ITSELF must be within the local urisdic-
ton Of the Court whose officer IS to dispose of it
after condemnation.
The language of the Act of the Congress of the
Colonies Of North America declaring that captured
vessels should be libelled in the district into which
they should be brought and which is referred to IN
Judge Magraths opinion, as having been omitted in
the legislation o. both the United States and the
Confederate States was thus omitted because being
in atirmance of generally recognized principle, it
was unnecessary.
1t is said By the learned Judge who cites the au-
thortes to sustain him, that the jurisdiction Of the
District Courts of the Confederate States is as ex-
tensye as that which belongs tn the High Court of