New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1861-10-28

! Six months of hostllities between the Federal
| Union and its domestic assallants have devel-
opsd some traits of character which stand
out so broadly and clearly that they may now
be deemed unmistakable and abiding. They
are as follows:
]. The Conlederates, thus far, have shown a
decided superiority i'll strategy. They choose
their points of attack far better than our lead
ers do, make better use of their opportunities,
and coutriye never TO attack with a weaker
force and rarely to be attacked with n stronger.
Their central position, which enables them 10
face US on different frontiers and transfer their
men from one to the other in half tae time re-
quired TO move our troops around aud confront
them on the opposite line of operations, ac-
counts in part for this superiority; their in
fnitely better knowledge Of the country on
which the war is prosecuted and greater iaci-
ty Of obtaining information from the Inhabitants
remaining therein, also contribute to their
ability TO strike sure and safe blows, and will
do SO until we shall be ready to advance in
force and replace partial by general conflicts.
Then they live IN good part on the yiclnage
and of course are incumbered with far less
baggage than our marching columns, and
can move with far greater rapidly. Yet,
after making fair allowance for these
circumstances, il must be admitted that
their officers have thus far eyinced
greater capacity, more genius, than ours And
this is very natural, when we consider that
this is the rebellion of the arstOcratc caste of a
section wherein ability and readiness to fight
have long been deemed essential TO the quality
of a gentleman, and the passports to social
consideration. The aspiring young men Of the
South naturally look TO the Army as probes
sion, and gil large share OF its responsible
positions When tue cOnspirators were plot.
ting the rebellion, they managed to secure the
cooperation Of most Of the ADLER, more active,
and clevercr OF these officers, leaving the SUI
perannuated the equity. the incapable, to be
supported aud endured by the Union All their
officers have their hearts as well as their necks
in the contest; many Of ours are lukewarm
when not absolutely disahected, and are not
ashamed TO declare that, if the Government
does this or that which fails to accord with
their ideas of propriety, they will resign. We
have lost q dozen opportunities to strike de.
cisiye blows through information REASONABLY
given from within our Lines to the enemy; they
have never had an enemy in their camp save
the Union men cOerced into their service, who
are merely prvates, and have no opportunity
to carry tidings, unless in the rare case OF one
finding chance TO desert. But, from what
ever cause or causes it is clear that We have
thus far been outgeneraled, and that we have
lost battles which we ought never to have
fought, or might, with better management,
have won.
ii. Through all the reverses of this conflict,
one cheering fact stands forth in striking re-
lief-that Of the superiority Of our rank and
file, not merely in our own estimation, but in
that Of the able and shrewd leaders of the
rebel forces. The courage of those leaders is
undoubted; they fight with the fury of desper-
alton; yet they rarely risk battle with equal
forces, and when they do they are always de-
ieated. Thus, they won two-thirds Of Missouri
by conflicts with one-tbird to one-tenth Of their
own numbers at Carthage, Springfield and
LexDgton; but the moment Gen. Fremont