Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1861-07-29

attempt reply. Yours, W.
Who Was Responsible for the Battle.
Since the defeat at Bulls Run the great
question has been, who was responsible for
the order to give battle. The N. Y Times
gives editorially the following report of
conversation at Gen. SCOTS dinner table, by
which it will be seen that the veteran Com
mander-in-chief is guiltless of all response
bility. The article will be read with an
interest commensurate with its great import
ance:
On the Tuesday preceding the battle, Gen.
Scott at his own table, in presence of his
aids and a single guest, discussed the whole
subject of this war: in all its par s, and with
tbe utmost clearness and accuracy. He had
adislincJ and wcll-defned opinion on every
point connected wi. h il; and stated what his
plan would be for bringing it to a close if
the MANAGEMENT of it had been left in his
hands. The main object of the war, he said,
was 70 bring the people of the rehellious
States to feel the pressure of the Government;
to compel them to return to their obedience
and loyalty. And this must be done with
the least possible expenditure Of life, COM
patible with the attainment of the object.
No Christian nation can be justified, he said,
in Waging war in such way as shall destroy
SOL lives, when the object of the war can be
attained at cost of 500. Every man killed
beyond the number absolutely required, is
murdered. Hence, he looked upon all shoot
ing OF pickets, all scouting ferays not requir-
! = - IL, L., ~ -
the war, all destruction OF life, on either
side, which did not contribute to the general
Tesult, as so many acts Of unjustifable hom-
ieioe.
i the matter had been left TO him, he said,
be would have commenced by perfect block
ads Of every Southern port on the Atlantic
and the Gulf Then he would have collected
a large force at the Capital for defensive pur-
posss,-and another large one on the Mis-
sissippi for offensive operations. The sum
ner months, during which it is madness to
take troops south Of st. Louis, should have
besn devoted to tactical instruction and
with the first frosts Of Autumn be would
heve taken column of 1000 we'll disci-
plined troops down the Mississippi, and
taken every important point on that river,
New Orleans included. II could hare been
9ons, he SAID, Nth greater ease NTH less loss
Of lite and 70 th fur more important results
than ggouId attend the marching of an Army to
Richmond At eight points the river would
probably have been defended, and eight bat
ties would have been necessary; but in
every one of them success could have been
made certain for US. The Mississippi and the
Atlantic oLce ours, the Southern States
would have been compelled, by the natural
and inevitable pressure of events, to seek, by
return to the Union escape from the ruin
that would speedily overwhelm them out of
it. "This," said he, " was my plan. But
am a subordinate. 1t is my business to give
advice when it asked, and to obey orders
wien they are given. shall do It. There
are gentlemen in the Cabinet who know
much more about war than do, and who
have far greater influence than have in de-
termining the plan of the campaign. There
nezer was q more just and upright man than
the President never one who desired more
sincerely TO promote the best interests of the
country. Bat there are men among his ad-
vissrs wh0 consult their own resentments
fer more than the dictates Of wisdom and ex-
perienee,-Gnd these men asiU probably decide
The plan of the campaign. l shall, do or at
tempt whatever l am ordered to do. But
they mast not h9Ld me responsible. Ill an or
dered to go TO Richmond, I shall eLdeavor to
do it. But know perfectly well that they
have no conception of the difficulties We
shall encounter. know the country,-how
admirably adapted it is TO defence, and how
rssolutely and obs'instely it will be defend
ed. l would like nothing better than TO
take Richmo id:--now that 1t has been dis
graced by becoming the capital Of the rebel
Oonfederscy, feel a resentment towards it,
and should like nothing better than to scat
ter lis Congress to the winds. But have
lived long enough 10 know that human re-
sentiment is a very bad foundation for pub
lie policy; and these gentlemen will live
loag enough 10 learn it also. / shall do
what am ordered. l shall fight when and
where am commanded. But If I am com
Ptlysd to fight before am ready, thy shaU not
hold Ms responsible. These gentlemen must
take the responsibility of their acts, as I am
willing to take that Of mine. But they must
not throw their responsibility on my shoul-
ders."