The Tipton advertiser. [volume] (Tipton, Cedar Co., Iowa) 1856-1962, 1861-07-11

Fort sumter, written on the ZSth -
-Esbtuasy aud .he-Mse he
PaTt.nsnt on the 4illof March,, was BY
that Department. placed 10 his hands.
This letter expressed the professional
opinion Of the writer Ma. reiuforcemen,s
could not be thrown into that fort in
time for=his=rciief. rendered necessary
blythe limited supply Of provisions and
with view Of holding possession Of the
samel. with force of less than 10000
we'll disciplined. men. This opinion vas
eoncurred in by all the officers of his
command and their memoranda on the
subject We,e made enclosures of Major
Andereon's letter. The whole was i'm
mediately aid before Lieutenant General
Scott, who at once eoncurred with Msjor
Anderson aud his decision. On retiec.
ton, however, he took full time in con-
sulting with other officers, both of the
army and navy, and at the end of four
days came reluctantly but decidedly to
the same conclusions as before. lie also
stated at the same time that no such
sufficient force was then at the control Of
the Government or could be raised and
brought to the ground within the time
when the provisions in the Fort would
be exhausted. In purely military point
of view, this confined the Administration
10 the mere matter Of getting the garrison
safely out Of the Fort. 1t was believed,
however, that to so abandon tina. situation
under the circumstances would be utterly
ruinous that the necessity under which
it was to be done would not be fully
understood i; that by many it would be
construed as 4 part of voluntary policy;
that at home it would discourage the
friends of the Union, embolden its ad-
vers.-ies and 20 far TO insure to the lat
ter recognition abroad, and tina, in fact
il would be our national destruction -
This could not be allowed Starvation
was not We, upon the garrison, aud ere it
would be reached Fort Pickens might
b. reinforced This last would be clear
Indication Of pslicy, and weuld better
enable the country to accept the evacua-
tion of Sumter as q military necessity.
Then an order was at once directed to be
sent for the landing of the troops from
the steamship Brooklyn into Fl Pickens.
This order could not go by land but must
take the surcr and slower ro,ite by sea.
The first returning news from the order
was received just one week before the
fall of Sumter. The news itself was that
the officer commanding the Sabine, to
which vessel the troops had been trans
fcrred from tho Brooklyn, acting upon
some armstice of the late administration
and of the existence Of which the pres
ent administration, up to the time the
order was des patched, had only too vague
and uncertain rumors to fix attention,
had refused to land the troops To row
reinforce Fort pickeBs before the crisis
would be reached at Fort Sumter was
impossible, rendered 50 by the mere ex-
haustion Of provisions in the latter nam.
ed Fort. In precaution against such a
contingency the Government had few
days before commenced preparing an
expedition as well adapted as might be
to relieve Fort sumter, which expedition
was intended to be ultimately used or not
according to circumstances. The strong
est anticipated case for using it was now
presented, and it was resolved to send it
forEard, as had been intended. In this
contingency re vas also resolved 10 hotiiy
the Governor of South Carolina that he
might expect an attempt would be made
to provision the Fort, and that 1t the
attempt should not be resisted, there
would be no attempt to throw in men,
arms, or ammunition, without further
notice. or in case Of an attack upon the
Fort. This hotice was accordingly given,
whereupon the fort was attacked and bonn
barded to its fall, without even awaiting
the arrival of the provision expedition. 1t
is thus seen that the assault upon and
reduction of Fort Sumter were in no
sense matter of self defense on the part
Of the assailants. They well knew iha,
the garrison in the Fort could by no pos
sibility commit aggression upon them
They knew they were expressly notified
that giving bread to the few brave aud
hungry men of the garrison was all that
would on that occasion, be ATTEMPTED
/ unless themselves, by resisting so much,
should provoke more. They knew that
this Government desired to keep the
garrison III the fort, not to assail them,
but merely to maintain visible possession,
and thus to preserve the Union from
actual and immediate dissolution, trust.
ing, as herein before stated, to time, dis.
cussion and the ballo, box for final ad.
justment and they assailed and reduced
the fort f"r precisely the reverse object
to drive out the visible authority OF
the Federal Union, and thus force it tc
immediate dissolution. That this wa.
their object the Executive we'll under
stood; and having said to them in ths
Inaugural address, You can have NJ
conflict without being yourselves tn,
aggressors,' he took pains not only t.
keep this declaration good, but also Il
keep the case 30 far from Ingenious soph
istry that the world should not misun der
stand it. BY the affair at Fort Sumter
with its surrounding circumstances, tina
Il point was reached Then aud there, b.
the assaiiants Of the Government, begal
the conflict without a gun in sight @
expectancy to return their firing, saw
only the few in the fort, sent to tina
harbor years before for their own protec
ton. ana still ready to give that protee
ton in whatever was loyal. In this &C.
discarding all else, they have forced upo,
the country the distinct issue Of irnme
date dissolution or blood, and this EN-
braces more than the fate Of these Unite,
States 1t lresents To the whole tamil,