The weekly Lancaster gazette. (Lancaster, Ohio) 1860-1863, 1861-03-21
Adiutant-GeneraI CarriugtOu Of ohio' on
the Military Situation
WHAT TO DO WITH FORTS SUMTER AND PIcK

WHAT ~ " WIN Tvs uSs d,
MEssERs EDIroRs.-I submit view OF = :,
he stoius of the Federal Government In - -
with the Forts at Charleston a. a,
and Pensacola, which may have some IN II II
terest at the present juncture OF AFFAIRS T
Their previous suggestion, to friends, was g
received by some reproach, as unPatrionc !.
and impolitic. l will, however, briefly .
consider: Il
1st. What is tile intrinsic, strategic rdIHe O
of those postsE .
Cd. Their reinforcement; how TO be ac'
complisbed. andthe result +
Sd. Other STRATEGIC points to be sub ,
stiIuted, I
4,h Political view of tie matter.
First What then is the intrinsic and
strategic value Of Forts Sampler and P'cS'
ems.
The former is an interior harbor de-
fense, which commands the approach to
Charlie ton; but is effective only when re-
ouired TO cover that approach. ltvesseis
arc permitted to depart freely, Its once is
practically at an end.
Again Aa a Federal defense against
organized rebellion, the power OF Fort
Sumter alone, to subdue and overco comc
the disaTecled. is insignificant The few
Columbiads, of extreme range, can barely
reach the city; but ifthey can destroy 1t,
such use of it's batteries would not compel
npacc or force other insubordinate States
/, 10 submit. On the contrary, it would in
duce general war. However, it might
crafty extremists and others who are
Under the sway Of indignant feeling
AGAINST traitors, it would not meet the pro-
posed end.
;; Again: It is covered by other works,
1 and its reduction is mere question OF
time, or endurance ot the garrison.
Its purposes, offensive, are therefore
d NEGATIVE, neutral, or inadequate. Its
. purposes defensive, are no less insufficient,
uncertain, and at best, but temporary
o Unless it be assumed that its retention
'-c will by moral force, soon compel the sur
81 render of The covering batteries or wear
Ol out the spirit and will of the garll lsons'
n its abandonment involves point Of hon
or only. =,
As to Fort Pickens, l will say thai
while it commands the approaches TO Pen
sacola, the United States is in possession
e. Of rothing to protect. Its navy yard Il
in the hands of traitors. The harbor Il
A useless as u rendezvous of our gulf squad
o. ron, for the anchorage is covered by an
d. tagonlsic batteries.
N Are these forts essential or available 10
": the collection of revenue? Neither fol
a is proper place for receiving or deliver
bv inc cargoes, and so far as available 10
ed such purposes. they are no better tina
y" a single steam frigatc. The latter has
,ot moreover. control ofits position, wbeneve
wn the weather would permit the entry
ast exit of any other vessel, and can perfor'
md its Office untrammel ed by tArcatnnS an
a opposing forces. :.
ma . have put aside the question of re'l
forcemcnt and its consequences. Thc'
In. | will now consider.
Der RE ENFORCEMENT OF FORTS suMprER An
'"u PICKENS,
nan
,h;. This must include men and provisio'
of 1t must also INVOLVE repeated reinforc
ned ment as required. To land 500 men al
p,oyisions tor even three mouths, deman
in. time, 81 stem and the free action OF
.ch- parties 70 do do it ctfectually under
in display of opposing guns requires
,nly much larger force on the part OF the uo
by ernment, as naval armaments are infer
the to permanent land batteries, If no hi
tile gun be fred it does not lessen tho
leu. cessity of furnishing an adequate cony
tied to the supply squadron. ldonbt not IL
Inn. the proiec, is feasible, either by tdrni
we're the batteries on Cummings Point Or 10
ann ing the harbor of Charleston. But
odrr resistance take place, the relief w'll J
u. unless the assailing batteries be silenc
were To reinforce permanently and system
arms cally requires permanent ocupauon.
ne those batteries. This involves on
heir trial of strength with the combined
ntry ton States, as their joint action superce
,enis that of the States, in which forts Sun
their and Pickens are located,
alton Are we ready to meet this issue.
,srch Again: 1t must be remembered
,hich New Orleans is the principal por
are to Southern entry; and that the forts c.
les Of handing its approach, as we'll as thos
Mobile and Savannah, are in tNe h'
of adyersaries. Is it not, then, as
f the rial as it would otherwise be. Bes
this, the obligation to hold tho fort
10 the Charleston and Pensacola, would
paper pel the prompt and torcible reception
lead the former. Few would urge this at
py of ont. When the issue is presented, 1t
y Mr.. be met by the Administration with
N line ness, | have no doubt 1t may
t that speedily. 1t may not come at all.
lists as Thirdly, will notice briefly, the
he fol. agc,ic points that should be held
an are Forts Taylor and Jefferson CONT
the gulf Whatever may be the uI'l
y Con- status Of the cotton States, whether
be the pendent or loyal, the non'cotton
which represent the aaiioaul commerce..
ratify rornia with her center OF the Pacific
ide, it belongs to Mis portion. The occup
os not of the Florida reef is, therefore, more
rompt' cssary than Gibralter IL 10 hhS'ahu
their re enforcement is worth hui
Mont Fort Sumters.
power These are Key positions. Such
,rayely hare been the Charleston, Pensacola
will. in bile and Louisiana Forts. II the.
ard of been occupied by garrisons, at the