Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1861-03-14

nipe-express age that what an editol
writes in the morning from the facts then
at hand, may he uoOntEadicied BY the tele-
ela,h before his paper reaches any Of Its
fsaaers. At this writing the question Of the
s6,naanment Of Fort Sumter is not deter
mined upon, but 1t is expected. It will be
sadly humiiating retreat when brave MAJ
Anderson marches bis little garrison
through the eats Of that Fort which has been
the centre Of attention frOm the whole world, !
and when the hateful secession Gag aies
from the staf which has so long upheld the
glorious Banner Of th, free. But the cow
srdly course Of the late administration served
to hem this one about with all manner of
difficulties, and it may be impossible to save
even that stronghold from the grasp Of the
secessionists
We giTe below opinions upon and reasons
for the proposed svaeuatioh, from WASH
ington authorities. sllat. ..-s
The eQrfespOpdept Of the Tribune thus sets
forth the hcts Of the case;
The 9Th of March found Fort Sumter eve
rywhere surrounded with bristling fortidca-
lions; batteries at every point Of access to the
Harbor of ChaFli stop, the ship-ohannel OBJ
| structed by sunken vessels and night and
day watch on guard to prevent the approach
Of small craft steamers, or boats, either
openly OF by stealth, by day or by night
without their being challenged and in
gpactea. ,ssl-l5 E.
The difficulties in the way Of sseret rein
forcements were thus very great, apparently
almost insurnOuntable, when the new Ad-
ministration came into power. It is very
natural to ask the question, What will be
! done? What can be doBe in such case p
And il is no wonder the inquiry perplexss
I the ppblic mind. Il would not be strange
/ il it should perpleI the Administration.
One thing seems clear If the fort cannot
/ be reinforced by sea, nor suecored by mill
/ tary force on land, before its supplies are
exhausted, then its garrison will have to be
retired in the end. In other words, it viii be
starved out.
Assuming that reiniOrcements by sea are
/ impracticable, the question arises, can mill
| tary force on land be sent in sufficient num-
bers, and with sufficient expedition, to succor
I the besieged. In 8 word, can an army be
promptly sent to that quarter large enough
TO invest Charleston, and engage successfully
any force that can be brought against it. If
we had an army already raised and disci-
plined, It could be done. But we have none.
| And armies are not created or moved in a
day. It is physical impossibility to raise
/ an army, discipline, arm and provision ii,
Il l. ~, kha ugrr,rlfnd nf
Sumter will be entirely exhausted.
Such are the naked facts Of the case, which
everybody can see and appreciate; and they
constitute the problem with which the new
Administration has to deal.
On Monday evening, the correspondent tel.
egraphed:
There is no longer doubt that Maj. An
derson's command is to be Withdrawn from
FurtSumter. Gen. Scott decides It to be a
military necessity, and his Judgment deter
mines the question, as It has done some others
ne rly as delicate. Conferences have been
held for several days past, with Mr.. Bache Of
the Coast Survey, in regard to the access to
the Charleston hsrbor; with Ar. Totten, Of
the Engineers, and With other distinguished
Officers Of the different corps. After a full
consultation it was agreed that the attempt
to reinforce Fort Sumter could only be made
IN two ways, and then with doubtful success.
| First BY 4 large naval force breaking into
the harbor, through the obstruetious in the
channel, If possible; and, second, by landing
an army Of over 10000 men, and attacking
the batteries in the rear, which command the
entrance to the harbor The President has no
army at his disposal for this purpose. Eight
com panies are now stationed in this city, and
seven at Fortress Monroe, none Of which can
be spared. The troops recently dispersed in
! Texas will not Be available for several months,
l1f at all, and but $50 are reported as on the
way back \ The force in Utah cannot be
reached Immediately. Congress gave no
power to call out volunteers in case Of neces-
sity, and, therefore, the President is confined
\ "a the actual and regular force. His hands
are tied, and tiS resources crippled BY the
reasonable conspiracy OF his predecessor and
Cabinet. This predicament was deliberately
contriVed TO embarrass the new Administra-
| tion. TAa I-T-i Ige rerH rt-
The decision TO withdraw Major Anderson
4 naturally excites much feeling, particularly
among the Western delegations. What eff
lect it may produce upon foreign Govern
mehis, which looked to the assertion of a
strong policy at all hazards, remains to be
seen. Here, il Is regarded as a compulsory al
ternate, to which Mr. Lincoln has yielded
from overwhelming necessity, and because
he was poWerless 70 carry out his own pur-
pose.
Il is supposed in some quarters that the
withdrawal will operate bene6cially in concil-
iating the South, but this opinion is not
. / - 1ks tne Norfh-
ern Democracy viii, Of course, assail the
Administration, though Mr.. Douglas is pre-
committed to the very policy which has been
adopted by his recent speech in the Senate.
The British Consul at Charleston recently
notified his Government that the obstructiOns
il the main channel, which had been filed
up TO prevent the ingress Of ships of war,
l were all removed, and vessels drawing l6
feet could easily enter. This important fact
mar or may not have been taken into ac-
count, in determining the feasibility of send
ing re-infOEcements. q Oh
/ The Forts at Key West and Tortugas can
not be given up, because they may be easily
i reinforced, and are OF national importancs
I 10 military and commercial aspects. Fort
Sumter involved point Of honor only.
4 The correspondent of the n. Y. Times SAYS
that quite q sensation was created at the
Capitol and Departments, by report that
Mr. Chase had resigned the treasuryship, on
account of the determination to withdraw
the troops from Fort Sumter. There is, how
ever, no foundation for the report except
that Mr.. Chase is known to be strongly Op-
posed to that policy.
Ofthe effect of the withdrawal upon seces-
-siOn, he says LUr#
The report Of the intended withdrawal Of
the troops has scattered CONSERVATION among
the Secessionists. Wigfall, who is undOubt-
sdly honest, however tauatical, expresses the