Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1861-11-20
voice sE the Commercial Interest


Cores General Aduertser published at Liverpool,
is regarded as one of the highest commercial su-
thorities in England. From the commercial report
in that paper Of the 9th Of October, the following
highly n4resting extracts are taken. The COM
mercisl interest Of England, intimately interwoven
with the manufacturing, hiss potent voice, ard
hence the following extracts are WORTHY Of atten-
ton.
WITH WHOM IS THE BALANCE or SUCCESS?
Whether to superior generalship, or diseiplins.
or pluck. or to grea5er patriotism or entbusizsui
to whatever else il may be attributed there can
be no doubt Of the fact that hitherto the balance of
success has been with the South. This is not the
plsce to discuss the why or the wherefore. View
ing the war and its consequences from CONNER
cia point Of sight the fact alone attracts our atten
ton and we cannot but regard it as Of immense
importance, removing, we think It does the pros
poets Of peace from the proximate to the distant
future. Were it otherwise, were the balahee Of
success ever so little in favor Of the North We
might perhaps have hoped that the Federal Gov
eminent, conscious of its strength to crush the
South bat at the same time adnenished Of It's ina
bnity TO retain military possession Of it for any
Heightened period, would have proposed an armis-7
tic for the purpose Of negotiating treaty Of peace
with the Confederate general. As to the capture
of Fort Hstterss, that is an Insignificant item
against tali the reVerses Of the North. The die
grace Of the battle of Bulls Run would not be sx-
.
undertaken against power without any navy
whatever. The success Of every expedition OF
this kind may be predicated with certainty
But what Of that? What if Mobile and New Or
leans, Ind Galveston, we've in pOssels Or Of tie
North, how would such an occupation influence the
fortunes Of the war; livery way say some wise
scres these ports would then be opened 70 the COM
merce Of the world and the cotton crop would be
shipped to Europe. Ay, indeed We in our sim
plieity supposed that it was the North who had
blockaded these ports, 20 prevent the shipment Of
the cotton which would have supplied % the South
the sineWs of war. On, but the object is to take
the cotton by force and apply the proceeds Of its
sale to the conquest Of its owners. What an inge-
MUS device If it were only practicable it would,
no doubt be master stroke Of policy But the
cotton is not ct the ports, viii it be while ths
war lasts. Long before the maturity Of any per
ton Of the crop, it resolved that it should be
kept at the plantations There it is being put into
sheds without being baled or even ginned-stowsd
away in the seed so thst, at the approach Of in
Tadlng force, match might be promptly and eftica-
ciously applied prevent its falling into the hands
IF the enemy. The expeditions against the cotton
3Jrts whether successful or not are not therefore
likely TO materially benefit the North, and eaRnOt
restore 20 il the balance Of military success which.
lp to the last sdvices from New York, was unquss-
ionabiy with the South. If the Federal Govern
neut be desirous Of liberatng the new cotton crop
or the benefit Of the world, all they have to do is
o raise the blockade, and thenceforth our supply
# cotton will only be limited By the extent Of the
rop We are really ashamed to be compelled TO
reat seriously such absurd speeulations.
WAT ARE TIE PROSPECTS, OF PE4CE2
What then are the prospects Of peace while the
alsnce Of success is 80 decidedly IN favor Of the
outh! It must be confessed that they are both
lConc,Rded on FbeTh Pdgel