Democrat and sentinel. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1853-1866, 1861-11-13

States, could hold out until reinforced, even
If attacked by superior force.
On bis arrival at ST. Louis, Geo. Fremont
was met Capt. G vender, First Missouri, and
Major Farrar aid-de- camp to Gen Lyon with
statements from the letter, and requests Tor
reinforcemerts Major Phelps. Nj. Z. from
Springfield DR. Miller. of Omaha, and many
other citizens, having ample means or infor-
nation, made the representations. aud
urged the sending Of reiDforcements. Tot Gov.
Gamble. Gen. Fremont said Gen Lyon Is
as strong as any other officer In this line.
/ He failed to strengthen Lyon, and the result
| Is well known, was the defeat of the most
! gallant officer The two regiments at Rolla
should have been pushed forward. and the
whole of Pope's niue regiments brought by
rail to s.. Louis to Rolla. and thence sent to
Lyons force. Any other General IN such an
emergency would have pursued this obvious
courco The battle of Springfield for more
strictly Wilson's Greek, one of the most des-
perate ever fought on this cortluert took
place August 10th wheL the brave Lyon fell,
and the troops borne down by greatly superi-
or numbers wete obliged to fall back but
were unpursued By badly beaten foe.
Gen Fremont called four regiments from
North Missouri, and went with them to Cairo.
1t is eyidoht that he had no Intention of re-
enforcing Gen Lyon, Cor the two regiments
at Rolla. RS miles from Springfe received
no orders to march, and were not supplied
with transportation aud thirty or forty hired
wagons, Just returned from Springfield. were
discharged at Rolla, August 18th seven days
before the pattle, and were returned to St.
Louis.
After the news of the battle reached St:
Louis, four other regiments were drawn from
Pope in North Missouri, and sent to Rola
Better to have called in these troops before
the battle, as after the battle the whole revo-
| lutionary elements were let loose. The six
| regiments accomplished nothing. They were
not ordered to advance and cover the retreat
| of Lyons army. although it was supposed il
! St Louis that Price and Mccullough were
/ following it, and that Hardee had moved up
! to cut off his retreat on the Gasconade.
! An advance Of three regiments would have
enabled the army to retrace It's steps, and to
| beat the forces of Price aud Mccullough SO
badly that they would have been unable to
! follow our force 10 their retreat. lt is said
that every officer in Lyons army expected to
meet reinfcrcements, ard return with them
and drive Price and NJ Cullough from the
Southwest.
I General Hunter arrived at St L 7uis from
/ Chicago, called thit her on suggestion from
! Washington as an adviser. Gen Fremont
submitted to him for consideration and advice
| paper called, Dispositions for Re- aking
/ Spring field 1t sets out with a statement
! that Springfield is the strong ragetcal point
of tGat wide elevation which separates the
waters of the Usage from those of tue Arkan-
! sas, the key TO the whole Southwestern Mis-
/ souri,, commanding an of nearly 10000
miles Why did this not enter the brain of
| Major General Fremont before the fall OF
! Lyon, aud he strain every nerve to hold tha
| important key in his possession.
| Gen Hunter In answer to the paper re-
piled:
Why march on Springfield where there is
no enemy or nothing to take ? Let me rath-
er take the troops and proceed to Lexington
in which direction Price is marching and
where he expects to be reinforced by 10 900
rebels Instead of this he was sent to Rolla
without instructions, and remained there until
| ordered TO Jefferson city. still without in
st uctions, and thence TO Upton, where we
found them (See exhibit no 13 }
No steps have been taken to meet Price in
the field, he moved forward his line Of march
plainly indicating his intention of proceeding
| to Lexington When within some thirty five
miles Of the place. he remained ten or more
days evidently expecting that some movement
would be made against him. None being
made he advanced, and with his much supe-
rior force. laid siege TO Lexington which was
defended by Muligan wl,h 700 men. on
the 18th of September, and captured it in
nine days thereafter. on the 21st of Septen-
ber
Now for the facts to show that this catas-
tropLe could have been prevented, and Price ;
army destroyed before OF after that disaster
Gus affair. Before Price got to Laxing gton.
the forces toresist him were as follows Al
Jefferson city, 800; At Rolla, 1000 a.
long the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad
about o,OO0 on the Western Line of Mis-
souri,, under Lane, down near Fort Scott.
2,3OO; large force In Illinois. along the
Mississippi River an | oD the iowa line =
Outside OF St Louis were some II 900, iu
st Louis itself, Is 900: and Mulligans for
ces, =. 700. Say, however, that there were
only 10000 there. Hunters plan up to Sun
Gay Septenlbnr %, was to concentrate from
st Louis. jefferson city and RolIa, also from
the Hannibal and St Joseph Railroad, 20 ,O00
men, and relieve Mulligan He said that if
Price was a soldier Lexington had already
fallen but with energy Price could be captu-
ed, with all his baggage aud plunder The
objection to this that may be urged-that
there was no transportation an idle ooe
Ihe railroad and the river were at command
aud the march from SedaIia was only forty-
i've miles long. The force could, Gen Hun
ter supposed, be thrown into Lexington by
Thursday, aud as it appears. before it was
taken
zen Fremont ordered Sturgis in North
Missouri to Lexington. and by crossing the
river, to reinforce Muligan Sturgis bad
only l.l0O men, aud on reaching the river
opposite the town. found it commanded by