The daily Wabash express. (Terre-Haute, Ind.) 1857-1867, 1861-08-13

seeing them. and without having been togeth
CT before In a brigade. The sending rein
forccmenth to Gen. Patterson. by drawing off
the wagons, was further and nnfavorable
cause of delay. Notwithstanding the hercu-
lean efforts OF tho Qnartermasler General.
aud his iasoring me in every way, the wagons
for ammunition. subsistence, kc aud the
horses for the trains aud the artillery. did act
arrive for more than week after the time
appointed 10 move. | vas not even prepared
A. late az the 10th nlGimo. ani the desire
should move became great, aud IL was wished
should not, II possible, delay longer than
Tuesday, the 10th ultim0 When / did set
out, on the 10th. was stiIl deficient ia wag.
ons for subsistence. But | went forward,
trusting 10 their boiag procured in time 10
follow me. The trains thSs hnrriedly gath
cred together, with horses, wagons. drivers,
and wagon managers. all new and unused ~
each other moved with difficulty aud disor
der, and was the canse Of a DAYS delay in
getting the provisions forward, making It
necessary b make on Sunday the attack we
should have made on Saturday.
could not. with every exertion. get for
ward with the troops earlier than We did.
wished to 10 90 centreviile the second day.
which you'd have taken us there on the lIth,
and enabled " 50 lar a. they were concerned,
To 60 into action on tho 18th instead Of the
2lst, bur when | went forward from Fairfax
Court House, beyond Germantown. 10 urge
them forward, was told IL Was impossible
tor the men To march further. They had
on come from Vienna. about six miles,
and IL Was not more than six and hale miles
| farther 20 Centreville--in all n march OF
about twelve and half miles; but the men
were foot weary. not 50 much, was told. by
/ the distance marched, As by the time they
had been on foot, caused by the distractions
| la the road and the slow pace We had 10
move 90 avoid anbuscados The meu were,
moreover, unsccustomed TO marching. their
bodies not In condition Tor that kind OF work.
and not used - carrying even the load OF
! light marching order
We crossed Buii's Run with about 900
men OF all arms. the nth division miles
and Richardson's bTigade) the lett, at
| Blackburn's ford 10 Centreyllle, and
Schenck s brigade. of Tylers division. on tho
/ lett of the road, near the stone bridge, not
participating in the main action The nun.
bers opposed TO a. have been variou<ly esti-
mated, may safely say. and avoid even the
appearance of exaggeration, that the enemy
| brought up all he could which were not kept
| engaged elsewhere. He had notice OF our
coming on the 18th, and had from that time
until the Dist to bring up whatever he had
IL Is known that ia estimating the force 10
so AGAINST Manassas. engaged not to have
| To do with the enemys forces ander Johnston.
then kept in check in the valley by Major
General Patterson, or these kept engaged by
Major General Butler, and | know every
effort was made by the General in Chief that
this should be done, and even If Johnston
joined Beauregsri. il would not be because he
\ could not be followed by General Patterson.
but from Causes not necessary for me TO refer
TO, he knew them all. That was not done,
and the enemy was free TO assemble from
every directian in numbers only limited By
the amount OF the railroad rolling stock and
his supply of provisions. To the forces,
therefore, We drove in from Fairfax Court
House, Fairfax station, Germantown and
Ccntrsville, and those under Beauregard al
Manassas, must be added those under j ohm
ston from Winchester, and those brought up
by Davis from Richmond TO other places a,
the South, TO which is to be added the levy
sn masse ordered by the Richmond authori
ties, which was ordered TO assemble at Ma
nassas. What all this amounted 10, cannot
say-certainly much more than We attacked
them with. ..
could not, as | have said, more early
push on faster, nor could / delay. A large
and the best part o. my forces were three
months volunteers, whose term OF servics
was about TO expire, but who were sent for
ward as having long enough to serve for thu
purpose of the expedition. On the eve o
the battle the Fourth Pennsylvania regimen;
Of volunteers, and the battery OF the yolun
teer artillery of the New York Eight militia
whose term OF service expired, insisted o,
their discharge. | wrote to the regiment
expressing request for them to remain
short time, and the Hon. Secretary of War
who was at the time on the ground, tried Il
induce the battery 10 remain NJ least I've
days. But in vain. They insisted on thei
discharge that night. 1t was granted, ans
the next morning, when the army moved for
ward into battle these troops moved 10 tn
rear to the sound Of the enemy's cannon.
In the next few DAYS day by day, | shoul,
have lost ten thousand of tie best armed
drilled differed and disciplined troops in tn
army. In other words, every day whcl
added TO the strength of the enemy, made u
weaker
In conclusion, desire TO say. in reference
to the events of the Dist ult., that the gen
eral order for the battle TO which ! referre
was, with slight notifications, literally con
! formed 10; that the corps we're brought owe
Bull Run in the manner proposed. and pu
into action as before arranged, and that up {
late in the afternoon every movement or
dered was carrying out successfully TO III
object We had proposed before stariing-tha
Of getting TO the railroad leading from Man
assas to the valy of Virginia. and going o
= il Ear enough to break up and destroy tn
communication and inerveins between III
forces under BeaTegari and those unde
Johnston And could we have Tough. da
or few hours sooner. there is eve, ything {
show how We could have continued success
full, even against the odds With which "
commended
I have the honor 70 be. very respectfully
your most obed.ent servant.
IRWIN MCDOWELL,