Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1861-08-10
GEN, McDowELps REPORT,

lie of Bull Run, adds something TO what las
already been published from other sources.
He states that the battle was fought according
TO the plan previously arranged, and that it
was won, and that it would have remained
permanent victory il the rebels lad not been
saved by the sudden, and for them most for
tunate arrival of renforcements. After stat
ing at considerable length the plan OF the bat
tie, and describing how Tyler's and Hentzel-
mans divisions went into battle, he describes
"a follows the heaviest fighting, and that on
which the fortune of the day seemed to hang:
Beyond the Warrcnlon road, and to the
left of the road, down which our troops
marched from Sudley's Spring, is hill with
a farm house on it, Behind this hill the enc
my had, early in the day, some OF his most
ANNOYING batteries planted. Across the road
from this hill was another hill, or rather ele
waited ridge, or table OF land Inc hottest
mart Of the contest was Tor the possession of
th. hill, with house on it. The force en-.
gagged here was lleintzelman's division, VIII
cox's and Towards bIigades on the right, sup
ported by part OF Porters brigade, and the
cavalry under Palmer, and Franklins brigade
OF Heintzelman's division, Shermsn's brigade
of Tylers division in the centre and up the
road, whilst Keyes's brigade of Iyers divls-
ion was on the left, attacking the batteries near
the stone bridge The Rhode Island battery
of Burnsde's brigade also participated Ill this
attack BIZ its fire from the moth OF the turn
pike. The enemy was understood TO nave
been commanded by j, f. Johnston. Kick
ett's battery, which did such effective service,
and played SO brilliant a part in this contest,
was together with Griffins battery, on the
side of the hill, and became the object OF the
special attention Of the enemy, who succeeded
our officers installing one of his regiments
for one OF our own, and allowing it to APP
proac without firing upon Tin disabling the
battery, and then attempted to take It, Three
times was he repulsed by different corps in
succession, and driven back, and the guns
taken by hand, the horses being killed, and
pulled away. The third time it was supposed
by US all that the repulse was final, for he was
driven entirely from the hill, and so tar beyond
it as not TO be in sight, and all were certain
the day was ours"
"Hhe enemy" he says, "were evidently
disheartened and broken" while the federal
troops were very weary. AT this moment
came the reiniorcements OF Johnston's regi-
ments, and the federal troops were driven
back. Then came the panic and the retreat.
The rebels seem to have mistaken Ricketts,
battery for Sherman's, it having done tremen
dous execution among them. His account o
the killed, wounded, and missing is as fol
lows
81 transmit herewith the reports of the seN
eral division and brigade commanders, t
which i refer for the conduct of particua
regiments and corps, and consolidated RI
turn ~of the killed, wounded and missing
From the latter it will be seen that our klle
amounted to nineteen officers and four hundre
and sixty-two non commissioned officers an
privates, and our wounded to sixty-four OF
GERS and nine hundred and torty.seven MOI
commissioned officers and privates Many
the wounded will soon be able to join tn
ranks, and will leave our total of killed an
disabled from further service under one thou'
Washington-many Of the Zouages to Ne,
York. In one brigade the number originally
reported at six hundred and sixteen, was yes
terdly reduced TO one hundred and seventy
four. These reductions are being made daily
In few days more correct return can b.
made.
Of course nothing accurate is known of the
loss of the enemy. An officer of their forces
coming from them with a flag of truce, admit
ted eighteen hundred killed and wounded, anl
other information shows this to be much un
der the true number.
The officer commanding the eleventh New
York Zouaves, and Colonel Heintzeman, say
mat the returns of that regiment cannot b,
rehed on, as many of those reported amonl
the casualties have absent d themselves since
their return and have gone to New York
Among the missing are reported many OF on
surgeons, who remained in attendance on ou
wounded, and were, against the rules OF mod
ern warfare, mad9prsoners.
lie does not Say that the movement agans
the rebels at Manassas was mistake, but thi
is evident from what he does say, as well a
HgT what we know. The army was NO
ready for such a movement, had it really bee
desirable at that time. Add to this the unaC
countable strategy Of Patterson who seem
to have been in league with the enemy, for h
allowed Johnston to go to the aid of Beaure
gard, obtained reinforcements from Washing
ton which he did not need, and even sent al
urgent request for more reinforcements OH the
very night before the battle was fought, and
while Johnston's army was on the way to
Manassas junction. Gen. Mcdowell does not
accuse Patterson directly. In closing his re.
port he discusses all these matters as follows /:
''When submitted to the general in chief.
In compliance with his verbal Instructions the
plan OF operations and estimate of force re.
CURED, the time / was to proceed to carry il
into effect was fixed for the Still July Monday.
Every facility possible Was given me by the
general in chief and heads OF the administra.
tive departments, in making the necessary
preparations. But the regiments, owing |
was told, TO want OF transportation, came over
slowly. Many them did not come across
till eight or nine days after the time fixed
upon, and went forward without my even see
ing them, and without having been together
before i'll brigade. The sending reinforce
ments TO Gen. Patterson, by drawing off the
wagons, was 4 further and unavoidable cause
OF delay. Notwithstanding the herculean eff
iorts oil the quartermaster general, and his ia
Voriiig me III every way, the wagons for am.
munition, subsistence, &c., and lie horses for
the trains and the artillery, did not all arrive
for more than a week after tile time appointed
TO move. was not even prepared as late as
the 10Th ultimo, and the desire should move
became great, and it was wished should not
if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the
10th ultmo When ! did set out, on the 10th.
was still deficient in wagons Tor subsistence.
But | went forward trusting to their being
procured in time to follow me. The trains
thus hurriedly gathered together, with horses,
wagons, drivers, and wagon managers, all new
and unused to each other, moved with difficult
ty and disorder, and was the cause of days
delay in getting the provisions forward, max
ing it necessary to make on Sunday the attack
we should have made on Saturday
l could not with every exerton, get forward
with the troops earlier than we did | wished
to go to Centerville the second day. which
Hould nave taken us there on the Nth and
enabled us, so far as they were concerned n
go INTO acqon on the 18th, instead of the Dist:
but when went for,rard &c., =, =,