Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1861-08-16
THE ENEMT REINFORCED.

The enemy we're evidently disheartened and bro
ken But we had been fighting since halfpast
ten O'Clock in the morning, and 1t was after three
O'Clock in the afternoon. The men had been up
since two o'clock in the morning, and bad made
what to those unused TO such things seemed u long
march before coming into action though the long
est distance gone over was not more than nine and
q bal miles; and though they had three days pro-
visions served out TO them the day before, many
no doubt either did not eat them, or threw them
away On Il march OF during the battle, 9lt we're
shcrefore wi.h,u ut food. They had done much
severe fighting. Some Of the regiments which
had been driven from the hill in the first tn. at
tenpts Cf the enemy TO X ep possession Of it bad
become shaken, unsteady, and had many
men out Of the ranks.
1t was at this time that the enemys reinforce
uents came TO his aid from the rail road train,
understood to have just arrived from the valley
with the residue Of Johnston's army. They threw
themselves in the pods on our right, and toward
the rear Of our right, and opened fire Of musket-
ry our men, which caused them TO break and
retire down the hillside. This degeuerated
into disorder, for which there was no remedy.
Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond
the reach Of enemy's fire. but in vain.
THE RETREAT.
Efforts were made to protect the retreat
by disposition of forces on the Centreville
ridge
The ridge being held in this way, the retreat
ing current passed slowly through Centrevile to
the rear. The enemy followed US from the ford
as far as Cub run, and owing TO the read becom-
ing blocked up st the crossing, caused us more
damage there, for the artillery could not rass,
and al pieces and caissons had to be aban-
doned. In the panic the horses hauling the cais-
sons and ammunition, were cut from their places
by persons TO escape with, and in this way much
confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and
the road encumbcrod Not only were pieces of
artillery lost, but also many Of the ambulsnces
carrying the wounded.
BY sundown most Of our men had gotten re-
hind Centreville ridge, and it became question
whether we should OF not endeavor TO make
:eland there. The condition Of artillery and
its ammunition, and the want of food for the men,
who had generally abandoned or thrown away all
that bad been issued the day before and the utter
.disorgsnizat and consequent decentralization of
rthe mass Of the army, seemed TO all who were
near enough 10 be econsulted-dyisiun and brigade
commanders and staf-to admit Of no alternative
but TO fall back the more the position Of
lBlsckburn's ford then in possession of the
senemy, and he was already turning our left. On
sending the officers of the staff to the different
camps, they found, as they reported to me, that
our decision had been anticipated by the troops,
most of those who bad come in from the front
being already on the road to the rear the panic
with which they came in still continuing and hur-
Iying them along.
TIE KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING.
From the returns it will be seen that our killed
amounted 70 nineteen officers, and four hundred
and sixty-two non-commissioned officers and pri-
YATES; and our wounded TO sixty.fou officers and
nine hundred and forty-seven non-commissiODed
ofic r. and privates. Many Of the wounded will
soon be able to join the ranks, and will leave our
total Of killed aud disabled from further service
under one thousand. The return of the missing
is very inaccurate, the men supposed to be miss
ing having fallen into other regiments and gone
to Washington-many Of the Zouaves to n. York
In one brigade the number originally reported AT
six hundred and sixteen, yesterday reduced
20 one hundred and seventy four. These reduc.
tions are being made daily. In few days a more
correct return can be made.
OF course nothing accurate is known of the los:
of the enemy. An officer of their forces coming
from them with flag Of truce admitted eighteen
hundred killed and wounded, and other informa
ton shows this to be much under the true number
CAUSES WHICH LED TO TIE RESULTS.
When I submitted 10 the General-in chief il
ooupliauce with his verbal instructions, the plaI
Of operations and estimate Of force required, tn
time was 10 proceed TO carry into effect wa
fixed for the SIN July, Monday. Every facilit.
possible was giveu me by the Oenerai-in-chief
and heads Of the administrative departments L
making the necessary preparations. But tn
regiments owing was told, TO want OF trans
portaton, came over slowly. Many OF them di
not come across till eight or nine days after u
tine fixed upon, and went forward without m
even seeing them, and without having been to
gether before II brigade.
The sending reinforcemerts to Gen. Patterson
by drawing of the Wagons, further an
unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstandin
the herculsan efforts of the Quartermaster- q Ger
eral, an bis fsvorIng me in every way. The wag
for ammunition. subsiste rec, &c., and th
horses for the trains and the artillery did nc
arrive tor more than woek after the time az
pointed 10 move. Tvs not prepared as late q
the 18th ultimo, and she desire 1 should In ov
became great, and i. was wished l should net,
possible delty longer than Tuesday, the lot
ultitno. When did set out. on the l6;h, va
still deficient IN wagons for subsistence. But
went forward, trusting 10 their being procure
In time TO follow me. The trains thus hurriedl
gathered together, with horses, wagons, driver
and wagon managers, all new and Unused to eac
other, moved with difficulty and disorder, an
WAS tue cause of q days delay in getting Il
provisions forward, making it necessary to nal
on Sunday the attack We should have made 9
Saturday.