The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1860-03-09
SAINT PAUL FRIDAY, MARCH g. 1860.

1t is easy to understand the animosity of
such men as Bright towards Judge Douglas.
Not only is Bright indebted to the Senator
from Illinois for all his political success, but
he has also to feel the no less irritating load
to little mind of conscious unreasonable
inferiority to his quondam friend-an infe>
riority mentally, morally and overwhelming.
Without at this time entering into an ex.
animation of the Senatorial caucus resolu-
tons intended to usurp the power of the
Charleston Convention, and with view of
heading off Douglas" brief statement of
Judge Douglas position will demonstrate
that it is impossible for any set of cOnspira-
tors in the Senate to construct mine which
can destroy Douglas position as Demo-
crat, without at the same time destroying
the Democratic party of the North and
leaving the debris to fight among themselves
upon a platform alike Inconsistent with
common sense, the truth of history and the
recognized principles of the constitution
| ITSELF
Judge Douglas entertains certain opin
ions as to the rights of Territorial Legisla-
lures over all purely domestic subjects. He
considers that slavery is protected as props
erty in the Territories, having no higher
attributes, and entitled to no less considera-
ton and that the Territorial Legislatures
have the same control over slave property
and its disposition as all other property
banks, corporations, &c. Bat he says this
is judicial and not political question.
Whether the Territorial Legislatures do or
do not possess these powers is question of
fact and of law, and there is but one tribu-
nal which has the power under the cOnsti.
tuition to pass upon 1.-THE Supreme Court
of the United States.
1t is not matter to be decided by politi
cal conventions hence he is opposed to
the Charleston convention passing upon
question they cannot CONTROL and which is,
after ALL a matter of fact their conclusions
cannot disturb. He holds that the bred
Scott decision is fnal so far as the question
there decided is concerned. But the ques-
ton so decided was simply that bred Scott
was negro, and, as such, not citizen of
| the United States The arguments of each
Judge by which he arrived at this conclu-
sion, are not part Of the "decision" of the
Supreme Court. Judges fancy, Campbell,
Catron, Nelson and Grier, all assign differ
ent reasons in part for the conclusions which
they arrived at, and it is their undoubted
privilege to be permitted to place upon
record the reasons which induced them to
decide that negroes are not citizens of the
United States. But this is all that they
did decide, and all that is binding upon the
people OF the United States. Judge Doug
las holds that a decision of the United States
Supreme Court is final, and that it is not
matter which can properly become the sub
ject either of affirmation or reputation by
political convention. He is opposed to
the Charleston convention endorsing the
bred Scott decision--not because he does
not consider it correct, but because he holds
that no political body has the right to repu.
diate the decisions of that court and estab
lish higher law doctrine and he therefore
will not set the Republicans an example by
acknowledging that decision once made
can be questioned either affirmatively or
negatively. For this reason, therefore, he
holds that it would be inconsistent with the
principles of the Democratic party-a party
which has always been conspicuous for its
strict adherence to the requirements of the
constitutional thus set an example to the
Republicans of belief in "higher law"
which practically set itself above the con-
stitution and the Supreme Court, by leaving
the decision of that tribunal subject for
political platforms and political reputation
or assent.
| With regard to the functions of the SUI
preme Court, Judge Douglas is equally clear
and explicit. He maintains that the supreme
court cannot usurp the powers and attributes
of Congress, and therefore cannot lay down
| cd <of 70 no lori
lation of Congress. The Supreme Court
cannot by anticipation declare that Congress
shall only pass such and such laws. On the
contrary, Congress is free to pass any laws
it may see fit; but after their passage it
becomes then the privilege of the Supreme
Court to declare whether they are constitu
tional or not. And this must be done after
the passage of the law, of course, and only
as each case arises.
have thus briefly touched upon the prin.
cipal points of Judge Douglas position, and
which leads him to the conclusion that is
required at Charleston to place the Demo.
cratic party in a safe, wise and consistent
attitude. The doctrine of popular sover-
eighty, or the doctrine that slavery is pro-
tected inviolate in the territories by the
constitution, is matter of fact to be finally
decided when the question can be brought
before the Supreme Court. In the mean
time it may very properly become the SUBJ
ject of difference OF opinion among the
members of the Democratic party, but very
improperly a part of doctrinaI platform,
which asserts--no matter what may here
after be the decision of the Supreme Court
when the question comes before it-that
there must be but one construction to the
constitution, the one they see fit to record,
and that they are prepared to repudiate all
other constructions, no matter whether the
Supreme Court decides to the contrary or not.