Des Arc citizen., 1860-09-26

| can limit, it makes them complete sover- eigns; while, at the same time, it admits that sovereignty is rgh,fully derived, or, to use the language of Judge Douglas, "rests in abeyance in the General Gov ernment as trustees for the people of the Territories. In it's practical application to the question of slavery it assumes that a Territorial Legislature has control over the question of private rights, and is com petent to determine. the permanent poli,i- cal status of Territory as to slavery or freedom. As corrollary from these pos tuales it deduces the conclusion that, il the legislature of Territory should pass an act impairing the rights of shareholders within it's limits, and Congress were to re- peal it and protect the shareholder in his rights, it would be the most palpable usur- patton. qay as3aAess. ea# Now, I deny in toto that any such doc trine is enunciated in the Compromise measures of 1850. and am willing to test it by an appeal to the record. By refe- renee to the acts organizing the Terrlto- ries of Utah and New Mexico. (which was the only Territorial legislation embra- ced in these celebrated measures, it will be found that the second section provides that,
 "Whem ada,itted as Mate, the said Territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received into the Union with or with out slavery, as heir Consultation may pre- scribe at Me ttnse of their admission.
 It is further provided that,
 "The legislative power of said Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of leg islaton, not inconsistent acith the Constitu- lion ofth United Mates or the provisions ofthis act"
 Again: nfil a
 ".AU the laws passed by the Legislatiue Assembly and Governor shali De subnsitted to he Congress of the United States, and g disapproved of shall be null and uoid. 2
 An examination of the body of the bill shows that it had about it the following marked characteristics, any one but the first of which is inconsistent with Judge Douglas notion of popular sovereignty:
 1. A distinct repudiation of Congressional prohibition.
 9 That the Territorial Government is pro- visional and subordinate in it's character, and that, as such, it's acts are subject to the appro- val or disapproyal of Congress. aj
 3. Complete power to the people to deter mine, Gas their Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admissions" the character of their institutions. ho
 4. The placing of each citizens life, liber- ty and PROPERTY, not subject to the vary ing whims of the populace, but under the old safeguard of the judgment of his peers and the laws of the land. 6l
 5. The retention upon the part of the Fede- ral Government of the right to prescribe, not only what shall be it's organic act,and to throw around said organic act such limitations as 1t may see proper, subject only to the Constitu- ton of the United States, but also to appoint its executive and judicial agents and to super wise it's legislation.
 Any one of these characteristics, but the exceptional one already indicated, is who'll ly irreconcilable with Judge Douglas as- sumption that "the great principle which underlies these measures is the right of the people of each State and each 1erri- tory, aohiie e Territory, to decide this ques- ton for themselves" In no clause is sovereignty given, and in none can it |arlse by implication. The very limita- tions thrown around the organic act are inconsistent with the idea of sovereignty. It is necessary attribute of a sovereignty to establish its own organic act. 1t is another necessary element of sovereignty to make and execute its own laws. The Legislation of lS5O, however, withholds all these essentials of sovereignty from the Territorial Government, and assigns to the Federal Government the power, not only to establish its organic act, but also to ap- point its executive and judicial officers, and to determine the validity of it's laws. Within and of itself, 1t has only qual- flied power to enact law, and the judi cial construction and execution of its enactments must depend upon Federal agents. In word the whole acl shows that the government established by it was intended to be temporary and pro. visional in its character. It is absurd te attribute sovereignty to any such govern- ment; fer no government which is crea. ted and limited by Congress, and has its existence by the suferance of that body can be sovereign. It gives the people, i is true, the ultimate power to determine this question; but it virtually inhibits the exercise of that power until they come to form State Constitution, preparatory te Itheg admission into the Union. In ,le meantime their legislative power IS limited and dependent upon the will of Congress
 The platform of 1852 simply pledge; the party to abide by the Compromise measures of 1850. I have shown that the Legislation of that year is not based upor toe idea of popular sovereignty of course then, the Pierce platform does not en dorse squatler sovereignty.
 The Territorial legislation of 1854 which Judge Douglas also assumes to bt based on the idea of popular sovereignty differs very slightly from that of 1850. l gives the people the ultimate power to de termine the character of their institutions "subiect torhe Constitution of the United States" but leaves the rights of the slave
 holders, during the Territorial condition subject to the general principles of th' Constitution and the courts of the country
 The repeal of the Missouri restriction o 1920 clearly entitled shareholders to ente
 the Territory with their slaves, while th