Pomeroy weekly telegraph. [volume] (Pomeroy, Meigs County, Ohio) 1860-1866, 1860-02-28

bly, shall be citizens OF the State. A stat
ute of the State provides a somewhat
singular mode by which citizenship is to
be determined. Any free white citizen
is allowed to file petition in court as
suit of civil nature, against any per-
son who may claim to exercise the rights
and privileges of a free white citizen of
the State, in which he shall allege that
the person so claiming is of mixed blood,
and not a free white person After pro-
visions made for process, trial and judg-
ment, two concurring verdicts being re-
quired, it is provided that cit shall be
lawful for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant is descended from, and stands
in the third generation to him or her
who was or is not free white citizen of
the State, or any other State whose con-
stitution and laws tolerate involuntary
servitude, or that said defendant has one
eighth of Negro or African blood in his
OF her veins" (T r. R. Cobb's New
Digest, 531.) And as result of this
statute, it is said in Bryan VS. Walton
GO Georgia B. 479-512,) of a person
having less than one-eighth of African
blood, that che may exercise the rights
and privileges of a freeman.
It has been said that ''those least dis
posed to consider persons to be white
who have any proportion of African
blood, have admitted that persons possess
ing only one-eight part of such blood
should be regarded as white" (Bailey
VS.. Fiske, "a Maine, TITS; Kent's
Com, 36, note, 7th ed) The prevalent
disposition appears to be that some de-
gree of blood affords the most satisfac-
tory rule, but in South Carolina differ
ent rule prevails. No rule as to degree
Of blood has been prescribed by Statute
OF settled by decision, and there appears
to be a difference of opinion as to the
propriety of such rule. In the first
case in which the question arose, refer
ence was made to the law of Louisiana
and the Code Noir of France for her col
onies, as providing that "the descendant
of white and quadroon, or a person
having only one-eigth part of negro
blood, is accounted white" And, it is
added: "Perhaps it would be desirable
the Legislature should adopt some such
uniform rule here" Estate VS.. Davis, 2
Bailey, 559-560) But in a subsequent
case it is said: cit would be difficult, if
not impolite, to define by precise and in
flexible rules the line of separation be-
tween the two classes" (White VS.. Tax
Collector, 3 Rich, 136-139.) The de-
cisions in the State show that no rule
has remained fixed In the case of the
State vs. Davis, the rule stated was,
''that where there is a distinct and visi-
BILE admixture of negro blood, the per-
son is to be denominated a mulatto, or
person of color G Bailey, 558-559.) J
But in the case of The State vs. Cantey,
it was said: "The condition of the in
dividual is not to be determined solely
by the distinct and visible mixture of
negro blood, but by reputation, by his
reception into society, and his having
commonly exercised the privileges of a
white man." G Hill, S. c., 614-616.)
And it is said that it must be ''regarded
as settled, that it is not every admixture
of negro blood, however slight and re-
mote that will make person Of color,
within the meaning Of the law" Cd.
GIG; White VS.. Tax Collector, 3 Rich,
136, 400
But it is useless to multiply instances
or authorities. We do not think one
can be found which will countenance the
idea that any the least admixture of Af-
rican blood, will preclude a person from
being considered citizen Of the United
States Of course we cannot conjecture,
and it is matter with which we are not
properly concerned, what rule upon the
subject the courts of the United States
may think proper to adopt, in cases
which may hereafter present the ques-
tion for their determination. We feel
entirely clear, that no restriction or lin
itation upon the meaning Of the term
'citizen of the United States supposed
to result from the decision which has
been recently made by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or from any
which may be made, can affect, its mean
ing as used in our Constitution. There
can be no doubt that those who framed
our Constitution, had the power to con-
fer the right of suffrage upon any class
or description of persons.
This is no where more fully and clearly
admitted than in the case of Dread Scott
v. Sandford. 90 How. 4O9) If we
were satisfied that the trainers Of the Con-
stitution intended to confer the right of
suffrage upon particular description of
persons, and, in doing so, used phrase
in sense, which as then understood was
sufficient for the purpose, and which is
shown to be mistaken one only by sub
sequent research and newer light, we
would still be bound to give effect to the
sense in which the phrase was used
The question is not, what the phrase
'scitizen of the United States means in
the light of the decision in the case of
Dread Scott " Sandford, but what the
trainers of our Constitution intended by
the use of that phrase, and what in the
connection in which it is found, and with
the light and knowledge possessed when
it was used, it was intended to mean.
We think it entirely clear that the
phrase "citizen of the United States"
was inserted in our constitution with a
view to the exclusion of aliens, until
they should be naturalized, and thus be-
come citizens of the United States. We
are confident that the phrase was used
with no reference to color, and cannot
believe that the idea was then enter
tained that independent of the word
''white," the phrase "citizen of the
United States would operate to exclude
any person, on account Of color from
the exercise of the elective franchise.
In truth, it seems too clear for argument
that, had the phrase 'citizen Of the
United States then well understood
! nonnntatinn Or sinnifcatinn. that neces-