Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1860-10-30

1t is well known that many of the leading polit-
clans Of all parties in the more Southern States open
ly declare that the election OF LINCOLN would be
cause for dissolution Of the Union. This scnti-
ment Is entertained to a greater or less degree by
BRECSINEIpGE men, BELL men and DOUGLAS men. We
have certainly insisted upon the united vote of the
South being cast for BREcKNFTDGE and LANE, LIST,
among other reasons because 1t is only the possible
chance to defeat LINCOLN; ID, because should
LINCOLN be elected a united South by force of their
unanimty would prevent further aggressions upon
our rights by the Black Republicans 3D. a
united South would be a powerful argument
to the more southern States to delay action. If
they were satisfied that the entire South would
resist every overt act of the Black Republican IA
natics they would probably listen to our counsels,
conGde in our soundncss and stand shoulder to
shouderwitius,in the Union But if in this startling
hour of peril we madly throw our votes away upon
one who has not the rcmotest chance of an election
they may think the earliest departure from us their
safest policy In proof Of the correctness of the
views we have hitherto urged upon this subject we
refer to the following extract from the New York
Nal, portion of which we italicise.
The idea that dividing the South between Breckin-
ridge and Bell will contribute TO preserve the Union
could only have resulted from that JaundIccd view
which party passion always takes VIII not Black
Rpruhlicanism be encouraged to hasten the covert
act when divided South. so temptngly invites TO
its easy and speedy cOnquesty VIII not the Black
Republicans believe that the men who now advo-
cate delay for the overt act, viii be the very
men who. when the covert act comes. will
question its sufTciency, and use the same
guments against resistance to the first overt
net" that they advance against immediate resIs
lance But should the whole, South in the approach
ing election present a solid front, viii not Black Re
pubicanlSm recol at such evidence of determined
resistance and thus the covert act be delayed if
not abandoned So that sound policy. whether Lin
coin be elected defeated, dictates that unity upon
Breckinridge the only hope for the preservation
OF the Union. The united r0e 81 The SO'ft for Brecc
i1riGge cold be argument riih The Cotton States 70
delay action H. Dodd see III such united role great
moral as 1csl physical poJCer for their protection
dqdiltSt Black ReJujbcaRiSIR lrhich might induce
them 10 remain IL tie Union and aJrdH he rerirdl Of
conservatism al tie North Bot should Virginia. loosen
from her mOOriEqS aud ~ UOHg for John Bel create
immediate alarm throughout The Southern States, euev
consideration Of SAFETY co'ii demand Of those States
the speedy dissolution q the cofeeyGcy IN 'rljch their
ancient dlU TlrgiRjG had become leutrd. IN tie rT
;aEf is trq9e1 against item.
To note for Breckinridge is the duty of every Tn
ion man, whether he deems common fate with the
south 10 be the best policy for the state or whether
he wOuld wait for the overt act before reslsSnce.
Voting for Breckenridge may defeat Lincoln, wnle
srppoIt Of John Bell If il is not neutrality is aid 10
Lincoln. Voting for Breckenridge, may postpone
the over act while voting for John Bell nVideslt
Voting for Breckenridge. by uniting the South may
defeat Lincoln but if not it viii be regarded as the
last act OF a brave and determined people 10 pre-
serve the Constitution and VIII be looked upon by
Black RepubhCanism a warning 10 abandon the
covert act' while voting for John Bel divides mo
South encourages her enemies, invites the overt
set demOralises the South, precipitates disunlon,
and may produce civil war.