New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-08-10

rapioiy ds mu5nrOOms anu rs rum ae tne croPcT5
Of tropical forest. The Government seem to TO-
si,t upon it that there must be something to show
for the money; but that will be the principal use Of
all these splendid structures.
So long as the dOckyards are not safe against q
eoup de main, so long invasious might be under.
taken, with the sole aim of destroying one Of them,
and then retiring. Thus they serve, 80 to say, as
safety valves for London. But as soon as they
are secured against an attack by main force, and
even against regular attack for fourteen days
and this is evidently necessary-tbere is no other
object left for an Invasion except London. All
minor ends are secured; local invasiOLs are no
longer to any purpose; an invasion must 90 in for
the chance of apDihilating England or suffer ami
bation in it's turn. Thus, the very fact Of the
fertilization Of the dockyards weakens London.
1t c. mpeIs the invading power to concentrate all
its strength on the attempt at once upon London.
London, we are told by Lold Palmerstoo, NUT be
defended in the field. Suppose this to be SO: the
stronger the army, the safer London will be. But
where is that strong army to come from, II Ports
mouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Sheerness, aud,
pfrbaps Pembroke, are converted into frstrato
forffesses of the size Of CherbOurg, Genoa Cob
entz, or Cologne, requiring garrisons OF from
rs, GOO to 2O,OCO men TO defend them Thus, the
stronger you make the dockyards, the weaker you
render London and the country. And this is what
you call national defenses.
In any case, one lost battle would decide the
fate of Loodon; and, considering the immense
commercial Capitalization of the country, and the
dead lock to which the occupation OF London
would bring all the Industrial and commercial ma
chinery of England, there can be no doubt that
one battle would decide the fate of the whole king
dom. And thus, while twelve millions are pro-
posed TO be spent on the security of the dock yards
The very heart of the country is to remain
unprotected, and is left to hinge on the result of
one battle
There is no good in mincing the matter. Let the
dock.y ards, by all means, be fortified in rational
manner which could be done for less than half the
money now proposed to be squandered upon them;
but il you want national defenses, Get at once
about fortiyipg London. 1t is no use saying, as
Palmerston, does that this is impossible. 1t is the
same talk that was heard when Paris was to 90
fortified. The surface inclosed in the continuous
rampant round Paris is not much less than that
occup ed by London; the liae of forts encirc ing
Paris has an extent of q miles, and circle round
London six miles from CbarDg Cross would give
a periphery Of 81 miles. This circle might very
well represent the average distance of the forts
from the center; and ten miles more Will not rem
der the line too long, if proper system OF radial
and circular railway communication facilitates the
rapid movements of the reserves. OF course,
London cannot be defended in the ef.hand way,
ed in the CornhW Magazine where six
large forts are to do ALL the plumber of forts must
be tweoty at least; but, on the other haod, Lon
don need not be fortified in the pedantic stye of
Paris, for it will never have to stand siege. To
defend it against q coup-de.main, against the re-
sources which an invading army can bring against
it wi hin fortnight after landing, is all that is
required. The continuous Enclosure may be dis
pensed with; the villages and groups of houses on
the outskirts may be made TO serve in its stead
quite eflectuay, if the plan Of defense be properly
prepared beforehand.
With Londsn thus fortified, and the dock-yards
Strengthen ed on the sea fronts and protected On
the land fronts against forcble, irregular attack
and even slight siege, EDglaod might d-fS ans
invasion, and the whole might be done for some
thing like fifteen millions sterliog. The dock
yad would not absorb, in all, more than 10000
regulars and Is, 900 volunteers; while the whole
rest of the Dine the militia and the volunteers
say so, Geo line and militia, and 100000 volun-
teers-would defend the intrenched camp around
Lor don, or accept battle in front Of it; aud while
the whole country north of Loudon would remain
at full liberty to orgaLize fresh bodies of volunteers
al d depots for the line and militia. The enemy
would in all cases be compelled to act; ho could
not, even il be would then escape the attraction
If the great iDtrehcbed camp of London, and he
would have only the choice either to attack it and
be beaten or to wait, and thereby increase every
day the difficulties of his position.
Instead of this the Government plan OF ma
tiOnal defepses would bring matters to this pass,
that if the forces of England consisted Of 80 900
line and militia and 49, COO volunteers, the gar
risOns would, at least, absorb $4,000 regulars
and 5000 volunteers, having for tho field 10
which to defend Londoo, So 900 regulars and $4,000
volunteers, while 3d. coo men who might be very
badly wanted on the day of battle, would be
sitting quietly and unmeDaced behind stOne walls
which nobody had thought Of attacking But not
only would this army be weakened by $4,000 men,
it ould be deprived of fortified position out of
which it could not be driven except by a regular
siege; it would have to expose its $4,000 badly Of
ficered ard inexperienced volunteers to hight III
the open field, and it would thus fight in circum-