The Tipton advertiser. [volume] (Tipton, Cedar Co., Iowa) 1856-1962, 1860-11-15
DECISION OF JUDGE DILLON ON
THE FEE CASE.

THE FEE CASE.
C. G. Ripley,
,r, NJ f.; clifford. Petition for
As Clerk OF the Distric; Court "anuahus.
of Scott county. Iowa.
The precise question presented in thi
case is whether there is now in force an,
law authorizing the Clerk of the Distric
! Court to demand from the plaintiff, as
! filing fee, the sum of So so, on the com
mencemcnt Of an original suit in tha,
Court. The decision of this question
necessarily involves the determination OF
the broader one, whether chapter 1876 of
the Code of 1851; (Which is incorporated
into the Revision OF 1860 and designa,
ted in the Revision as Chapter 1872 there.
OF, Is IN force, or whether it is repealed?
To proper understanding of the sub
ject, it is necessary to be stated that
chapter 1876 in the old Code (lS5l) after
providing that no officer should be allow
fffadf fff f"fs IS s1pfesssfy ;ssf PsT&tfs:d brthsr hsr
(Scc. 1924, Code 1851, went on to pro-
vide specifically what compensation the
Secretary of State, Clerk of Srprcme and
District Courts, County Judge Recorder,
Sheriff, Coroner, Constables, Justice of
the Peace, &c, &C., should receive, and
what fees they were sevcrally authorized
to charge. This chapter, viz. chapter
1876, was incloscd in part Mird of the
Code cf 1851. In the Report of the
Code Commissioners made to the last
General Assembly chapter 1876 was in,
cludcd. There was also included in the
report the general repeating section,
which is now numbered in the Revision
Of 1860 as section 4lS7 to be more tully
noticed presently In the Senate before
the passage of the new Code, which in
cludos section 4ls7 above. chapter 1876
Of the old Code was stricken out of the
Code Commissioners Report, and no
modification was made Of the repeating
section above alluded to-
This section (4l77 SO far as it is now
material to be noticed provides as follows:
" SEC 4lS7. This Act includes many
sections of part third of the Code of Iowa
of ISL" &c, &c Now it is intended
that the PORTIONS of part third of tho
Code aforesaid which is incorporated in
to this act shall be substituted for part
third of the Code of 1851 aud to that end
every portion of part third of the Code
of 1881 not set out herein, either literal
Iy or by numerical designation, is hereby
rcpealed,' &c. The word heyein means,
as will be seen by the express and explic-
it language employed the Act as it final
ly passed, and not the Report as prescn.
ted. Chapter l36 Of the old Code is not
set out either literally or by designation
in the Act as it passed and therefore
stands repealed, unless the presumed in
tcntion of the Legislature shall be held
to overcome the express language used.
lug lMi gdslse h" neal" add tn,utho,guous,
The who'd difficulty results from an
omission to modify the repeating section
after striking out Chapter 1856 from the
Report This omission was, doubtless,
insdvertcut. it cannot reasonably be
that the Legislature intended
to produce the confession which would
result from having no law de-
fning what fees public officers might lc
raly charge The Sheriff, for example,
by other portions of the Statute is requir
ed to execute process, sell property on
execution etc, and it is not to be pre-
sumcd that the legislature intended that
he should do this uiihow compensation,
or without any .teed and certain compen-
sation.
Acts of the General Assembly are in
writing, and the originals thereof are by
law required to be kept in the Office of
Secretary of State
Printed copies are only prima l"c,o
evidence, and are inferior in dignity and
value to the enrolled copy.
Says the Supreme Court Of Iowa.
{ Clare Is Me .State, 5 Iowa 500 "The
Original act in the sccretary's Office is
the ultimate proGJ Of The Tar. -
In tn agreed statement Of f~cts in this
case it is admitted that the enrolled copy
that is the Original Act as approved by
the Governor, does not contain Chapter
l62 as printed in the Revision of 1860,
(that being the chapter which provides
for the " Compensation Of Officers, but
that the same was stricken out Of the re-
port or the rtFlSO!S.
If this chapter, is, in fact, repealed,
the mere insertion of it in the Revision
of 1860, by the revsor, on his own mo-
ton, can have no effect.
The question then recurs: Which is
to prevail, the presumed Intention OF the
Legislature, or the clear and positive lam
guagc they have used to express their in.
tention? | understand the well settled
rule of the law to be, that, while Courts
are governed in the construction OF stat
utes by the intention of the Legislature
vet where the terms of the act are plain
and unambiguous, Courts must judge Of
the intent of the Legislature from the
language they have used to express that
intent If the language is clear and cx-
plicit, and susceptible of hut one mean
ing, and there is nothing incongruous in
the act, the Court is Jound to suppose
that the Legislature intended irhot their
language imports. Walker, ch. X. 394,
MorueH U. Collins, 8 Ind, 3s.
In such cases no resort can be had ev-
en- to the title or preamble.-C. y. vs.
Fisher, > Cranch, 1856; I Ohio, on P.
sc.
" When" says WRIGHT 9. j.. Iowa
p. 276, "the words used are explicit they
are to govern, of course. Ii not PLAIN,
then recourse is to be had to the context, -
&C., &C., but not otherwise.
And it makes no difference, that the
language used was undes'g"edy too
broad. CO.,
The neglect to include chapter 1856, or
n modify See. 41S7 was doubtless unin.
tentional. 1t is cdsus omtssns.
But in such case the law is well and
properly settled that it is not within ths
rightful power or province Of the Courts