Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1860-02-05
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
OFFICIAL.
Opinions OF the Supreme Court of tint
state of Tennessee, at Jackson, April
TerMs 1883.

Opinions OF the Supreme Court of the
State of Tennessee, at Jackson, April
Adams vs. Mayor AID Aldermen Of scnerviIle
This suit was commenced before Justice to re-
cover the sum of $40 co. the forfeiture imposed by
the corporation for breach Of of the ordinances
by the plaintiff in error. The case was removed
by appeal to the Circuit Court, where, on an agreed
case, Judgment was rendered for the corporation.
The case is this
BY the act Incorporating the town of Someryille
(see act of 1854 ch. IL. sec. O. express power Is
conferred on the Mayor and Aldermen, by ordinance
ITO license, tax and regulate all auctiOneers, gro
GERS merchants, retailers, brokers, cOfee-houses,
confectOners retailers Of liquors, bankers, peders,
livery stable keepers negro traders and tavern keep
ers.a
In pursuance of this power, an ordinance was
passed which provides, among other things, that
all 7egro traders who shall expose negroes for SALE
within the corporate limits of the town of Somer-
VILE he or they shall pay yearly license tax OF
$40"
The ordinance requires that license shall be
procured from the Recorder, by paying the tax
thereon and his fee Of dollar and half for IS
suing the same" And 1t is further provided, that
if any other person shall exercise the privilege,
without first obtaining license, " ne shall forfeit
and nav double the amount of the license, and all
costs incident to the collection Of the same"
II is admitted IN the agreed case that Adams, the
defendant was a NEGRO trader" and that ne eX-
nosed negroes for sale and sold one, within the
L
1856 without obtaining license as required by the
ordinance.
THO argument for the plaintiff in error assumes
that if it were competent for the Legislature to
confer such power upon municipal corporation,
sill the ordinance Is invalid because the mode OF
exercising the power provided therein Is different
from and Incompatible with the principle and mode
prescribed by the general laws Of the State, IN re-
gard to this particular privilege IN other words.
the argument is that the corporation cannot adopt
a different principle OF mode Of taxing privileges
| from that adopted in regard to State taxation.
We think this argument unsound. By the second
article of the Constitution section % the power IS
given to the Legislature, to tax privileges IN such
! a manner as they may from time to time direct" And
by the 29th section the power Is given TO authorize
counties and incorporated towns to impose taxes
for county and corporation purposes respectively.
in such manner as shall be prescribed by law, and
all property shall be taxed according to its value
upon the principles established in regard to State
| taxation"
1t must be borne IN mind that, in regard to the
mower Of taxation delegated TO the Legislature, an
important and fundamental discrimination Is made
between property and privileges by the Constitution
The rule laid down as to the former Is, that dH
gropert shall be taxed according TO Its value, and
! no one species Of property from which tax may
be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other
| species of property Of equal value But the rule
as 10 privileges is the discretion Of the Legislature
the letter ought to be taxed IN such manner as may
from time to time be directed by the Legislature.
Ii will be observed that the 18th section which
authorizes delegation Of the power Of taxation to
/ incorporated towns for corporation purposes, is
broad in its terms it does not mention 'prlUusgeS,
at a property alone IS embraced; with reference to
that the only restriction is that the principle estab
lished in regard to State taxation shall be observed
/ by corporations.
But in respect to priUges the corporation is left
to the exercise Of a sound discretion in imposing
tax thereon unless restricted by the Legislature, In
the charter of Incorporation by general law
/ of the State.
In the charter before US the prayer Of the Mayor
! and Aldermen, ito license tax and regulate ne
gro-traders is general and unrestricted. 1t is no
valid objection therefore, that the Board, in the eX
ercse of this discretionary power, proceeded from
different principle, or in different mode, from that
adopted by the Legislature in respect to state taxa
! ton Mayor and Aldermen Of Columbia VS.. Beas-
! ley, Hum. 232, 24O.
The principle of taxation applicable to property
| is altogether impractcabe in regard to privileges
1t is obviously necessary and proper, that the eXeT
/ else of the power 10 impose tax on privileges,
should be left to a sound discretion; because no
| definite Iule-based upon a supposed equality in
/ value-Can be prescribed as respects what are de-
nominated privileges; and if such rule were prac-
ticable reasons founded in public policy might de-
mand, that privileges Of certain kinds should be
taxed upOn very different principle from Others
This is peculiarly proper in regard to town cOrpo
rations. The power the latter to tax privileges
was not intended a source Of TeUeQue merely. 1t
/ was likewise designed as a means for imposing re-
straint upon the exercise of certain privileges,
/ whose tendencies were of a nature to encourage
vice. or disorder; or were contr AIRY to public policy
1t follows them that the validity Of the ordinance
mot being IN itself eXpressive) must depend upon
the grant of power in the particular charter Of IN
corporation. In the present instance the express
grant of power is ample; and the ordinance IS con
! seQuently valid
! The Judgment viii therefore be affirmed.
Test M. d. WEIGH Clerk MCKINNEY.