New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-01-19
PROGRESS OF THE MOORISH WAR.

which might bring to close the first or prepare
tory period of the war. But in vain. Marshal
ODonneIl seems to be in no hurry to leave
his camp on the Nights of Serrallo, and so we are
compelled to review his operations while they have
hardly yet begun.
On Nov. IS, the first division of the Spanish
active army, under Gen. Echague, embarked a.
Algesras, and few days afterward was landed at
Ceuta. On the 18th it marched out of the town
and occupied the serralo or White House, large
building about mile and half in front of the lines
of Ceuts. The ground u that vicinity is very rug
ged and broken, and very favorable for skirmshing
and irregular fighting. The MoOrs, after an unsuc-
cessul attempts on the same night to reconquer the
Senalo, retired and the Spaniards began to con-
struct en- intrenched camp to serve as base for
future operations.
On the 22d, the Serralo was attacked by the
Apjerites, the Moorish tribe occupying the country
near the Ceuta This engagement opened series
of fruitless fights which gil up the whole of the
campaign to the present moment, and of which
every ONE is exactly like all the rest. The MOors
attack the Spanish lines in greater or lesser force
and try by surprise or feint, to get possession of
part of them. According to the Moorish reports,
they generally succeed in this, but abandon the re-
doubts because they have DO artillery. According
to the Spaniards no Moor ever saw the inside of
Spanish redoubt and all their attacks have
proved utterly unsuccessful. On the frat attack
the Apjerites counted no more than 1,6OO men.
They received the next day reinforcement of
A a 10 tbaa ffa Tha
22d and 23d were filed up with skirmishing but
on the 25th, the Moors advanced with all their
forces, and a severe combat took place. in which
Ger. Echsgue was wounded in the hand. This at
tack by the MOOrs was serious, that it spurred
little the slecpness with which Cid Campead0r
O'Donnell had so far carried On the war. He or
dered at once that the second division, under Gen.
Zayala, and the reserve division, under Gen. Prim,
should be embarked, and left himself for Ceuta.
On the night of the 9th, the whole Spanish active
army was concentrated before that place. On the
Doth, there was another attack by the MOOrs, re-
peatcd on the 30th. After this, the Spaniards be-
gan to think of their confined positions the object
of their first move was to be Tetuan, about 20
miles south Of Ceuta and four miles from the sea.
They cOnmenced making road toward this town;
the Moors offered no opposition till Dec. 9. On
the morning of that day they surprised the garrisOns
of the two principal redoubts, but as usual, aban-
doned them later in the day. On the 18th, another
engagement took place in front Of the Spanish
camp, about four miles from Ceuta; and on the
Goth O'Donnell telegrapbs that the Moors had
again attacked the two redoubts, but were,
as usual, gloriously defeated. Thus, on Dec 90,
matters had not advanced one jot further than on
Nov. 90. The Spaniards were still on the defen-
sve, and, in spite Of announcements made fort
night or three weeks before, there were no symp
toms Of an advance
Tie Spaniards, with all the reGnforcements re.
ceived up to the 9Th December were from $4,000
to 40 600 strong, and 30, 900 men might be availa
bic for offensive operations With such force, the
conquest of Tetusn ought to be easy. There are
certainly no good roads, and the provisions Of the
army must all be carried from Ceuta. But how
did the French manage in Algers, or the English in
India Besides, Spanish mules and cart-horses are
not so spoiled by good roads in their own country
as to refuse to march on Moorish ground. No mat
ter what O'DonDell may say by way Of apology,
there can be no excuse for this continued inactivity
The Spaniards are as strong now as they can rea-
soDably expect to be at any time in the campaign,
unless unexpected reverses should bring on extraor
binary exertions. The Moors on the contrary, are
daily getting stronger. The camp at Tetuan, under
Hadii Add Saleem, which furnished the bodies at.
tacking the Spanish line on Dec 3, had been
sweed to 10000 already, beside the garrison Of
the town. Another camp, under Mu'ay Abbas
was at Tangiers and reanforcements were arriving
constantly from the interior. This consideration
alone ought to have induced O'Donne to advance
as soon as the weather permitted it. He has had
good weather, but he has not advanced. There
can be no doubt that this is sign Of sheer irreso
luton, and that he has found the Moors less des
pcable enemies than he expected There is no
question that the latter bave fought uncommonly
well, and the great complaints arising from the
Spanish camp of the advantages the ground in front
of Ceuta gives to the MOOrs is proof of it,
The spaniards say that in brash-wood and ra-
vines the Moors are very formidable, and, be-
sides, they know every inch Of the ground; but
that, as coon as they get into the plains, the
sodity of the Spanish infantry will soon COM
pei the Moorish rregulars to face about aud rum
This is q rather doubtful way of arguing in an
epoch where three fourths of the time spent in
every battle is devoted to skirmishing in broken
ground. If the Spaniards, after hating six weeks
before Ceuta, do not know the ground well the
Moors, 80 much the worse for them. That broken
ground is more favorable to irregulars than level
plain. is clear enough. But even in broken ground