The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1860-08-31

The power to acquire territory, as well
as the right, in the language of Mr.. Madi-
son, "to institute temporary governments for
the new States arising therein" for territorial
governments, as they now are called) having
been traced to that provision of the consti
tuition which provides for the admission OF
"new States, the court proceed to consider
the nature and extent of the power of Con-
gress over the people of the territories
All we mean to say on this point is, that as
there is no express regulation in the cOnstitu.
ton defining the power which the general gov.
eminent may exercise over the person or pro-
perty of citizen in territory thus acquired,
the court must necessarily look to the provis-
ions and principles of the constitution. and it's
distribution of powers. for the rules and princi.
pies by which its decision must be governed.
Stalking this rule to guide us it may be safely
assumed that citizens Of the United States, who
emigrate to territory belonging to the people
of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere
c0lOnists, dependent upon the will of the gener-
al government. and to be governed by any
laws it may think proper to imp ose.. .........
The territory being part of the United States
the government and the citizen both enter it
under the authority of the constitution, with
their respective rights defined and marked out;
and the federal government can exercise no
power over his person or property beyond
what that instrument cOnfers, nor lawfully de-
ny any right which it has reserved"
Hence, inasmuch as the constitution has
conferred on the federal government no
right to interfere with the property, domes.
tic relations, police regulations, or internal
polity of the people of the territories, it
necessarily follows, under the authority of
the court, that Congress can rightfully
exercise 70 such power over the people of
the territories. For this reason alone, the
Supreme Court were authorized and CON-
PEELED to pronounce the eighth section of
the act approved March 6, 1920, common
ly called the Missouri COMPROMISED inopera-
tive and void-there being no power dele
gated to Congress in the constitution
authorizing Congress to prohibit slavery in
the territories.
In the course of the discussion of this
question the court gave an elaborate expo
sition of the structure, principles, and
powers of the federal government ; showing
that it possesses no powers except those
which are delegated, enumerated and defined
in the constitution and that all other
powers are either prohibited altogether or
are reserved to the States, or to the people.
In order to show that the prohibited, as
we'll as the delegated powers are enumerated
and defined in the constitution, the court
enumerated certain powers which cannot be
exercised either by Congress or by the
territorial legislatures, or by any other
authority whatever, for the simple reason
that they are forbidden by the constitution
Some persons who have not examined
critically the opinion of the court in this
respect have been induced to believe that
the Slavery question was included in this
class of prohibited powers, and that the
court had decided in the bred Scott case
that the territorial legislature could not
legislate in respect to slave property the
same as all other property in the territories.
A few extracts from the opinion of the
court will correct this error, and show
clearly the class of powers to which the
court REFERRED as being forbidden alike to
the federal government, to the States, and
to the territories. The court say:
ga reference to few of the provisions of
the constitution will illustrate this proposition.
For example, no one, we assume, will contend
that Congress can make any law in 2 territory
respecting the establishment of religion, or the
free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press, or the right of the
people of the territory peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for the redress
of grievances.
"Nor can Congress deny to the people the
right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to
trial by jury, nor compel any one to be a wit.
ness against himself in criminal proceeding.
So, too, it will hardly be contended that Con.
gress could by law quarter soldier in house
in territory without the consent of the owner
in time of peace; nor in time of a war but in
a manner prescribed by law. Nor could they
by law forfeit the property of a citizen in ter
ritory, who was convicted of treason, for a
longer period than the life of the person con-
victed, nor take private property for public use
without just compensation.
1.-THE powers over persons and property, of
which we speak, are not only not granted to
Congress, but are in express terms denied, and
they are forbidden to exercise them. And this
prohibition is not confined to the States but the
words are general, and extend to the whole
territory over which the Constitution gives it
power to legislate, including those portions of
it remaining under territorial governments as
well as that covered by the State.
1T is a total absence of power. everywhere
within the dominion of the United States, and
places the citizen of territory, so far as these
rights are concerned, on the same footing with
citizens of the States, and guards them as firm
ly and plainly against any inroads which the
general government might attempt, under the
plea of implied or incidental powers. And if
Congress itself cannot do this-if it is beyond
the powers conferred on the federal govern.
ment-it Will be admitted, we presume, that it
could not authorize territorial government to
exercise them. It could confer no power on
any local government, established by its au-
thority, to violate the provisions of the Consti-
tuition"
Nothing can be more certain than that
the court were here speaking only of forbid
den poaUers, which were denied alike to Con-
gress, to the State Legislature, and to the
territorial legislatures, and that the probibi-
ton extends "everywhere within the domin-
ion of the United States" applicable equal
ly to States and territories, as well as to the
United States.
If this sweeping prohibition Just,
but inexorable restriction::upon the powers Of
g0vernment-federal, state, and territorial
shall ever be held to include the slavery
question, thus negativing the right of the
people of the states and territories, as we'll
as the federal government to control it by
law land it will be observed that in the
opinion of the court l." the citizens of terri
tory, so far as these rights are concerned,
are on the same footing with the citi-
zens OF the states'0, then, indeed, will the
doctrine become firmly established that the
principles of law applicable to African slave