Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1860-04-14
THE ANTI-SLAVERY BUGLE.

parchment. Then the objections taken to Ills
warrant, on Tho face Of it, as rendering it i%nsufic-
lent to justify Tho arrest Of the petitioner, are
three.
/. That the S2rseant-at.A Arms, in his capacity as
an officer Of the Senate, had no authority to eEe-
cute process out Of the District Of Columbia, over
which the United States Senate have, By the Con-
s%titution, exclusive general jurisdiction.
2. That q Scrgeant.at.Arm is not an officer
known to the Constitution or laws Of the United
States as a general executive, of known powers,
like a Sheriff or Marshal that he is appointed
and recognised by the rules Of the Senate, and
can only exercise such powers as nre conferred on
him by such general rules and orders, made with
a view to The regular proceedings Of the Senate
or such as may be- conferred by the Senate BY
special resolves and acts, as a single department
Of the Government, without the Concurrence Of the
other members Of the Government.
8. That by the warrant returned, tie power to
arrest the respondent was in terms limited to
McNair, the sorgeant-at Arms, and could not be
executed b. a deputy,
In regard to the frs, is seems to us that the
objection opens o broader ground than it is nee,
essary to occupy in deciding this preliminary 1ues-
ton. We are not prepared to say that in no case
can the Senate direct process to be served beyond
the limits Of tho District, By an authority express
ly given for that purpose. The case of Anderson
V. Dunn, (6 Wheaton; 2o4) cited in the argu-
ment, has little application to this question. 1t
is manifest that that was a writ of error from the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia and it
appears that the alleged contempt of Anderson in
Offering q bribe TO a member Of the House Of Rep
rcsentatives was committed in the District Of Col.
/, umbia; the net complaIred of as the trespass was
done therein, and the process IN question was
/ served by the Serg9ant-at-Arms in person, under
al express authority given by the House Of Rep
resentatives by their resolve for that purpose, in
pursuance Of which tho Speakers warrant was
issued.
The second question appears to ue far more ma.
$ terial. The Sergeant-at.arms of the Senate is an
! officer Of that House, like their Doorkcerer. az.
pointed by them, and required by their rules ant
e orders to exercise certain powe mainly with
view to order and due course Of proceedings. IL,
is not a general officer, known to the law, as
sheriff, having power to appoint general deputies
:, or to act by general deputation, in particula'
8 cases nor like a marshal, who holds analogou
e powers, and possesses similar functions, under th
laws Of the United States, with those Of sheriff
and deputies under the State laws. But evcl
when it appears, by the terms or the REASONABLE
construction of a statute, comforting an authorit,
1 on q sheriff that it was intended he should execu,
d it personally, he cannot exercise it by genera
deputy, and Of course he cannet do it by specia
deputation. Wood v. Ross. IL Mass. 27l)
But, upon the third point, the court are ali Q
opinion that the warrant affords no Justification
Suppose that the Senate had authority, by III
Il resolves passed by them. to cause The petitioner t
be arrested and brought before them. it appear
e by the warrant issued for that purpose that tn
lie power was given alone TO McNuir, Sergeaut-at
re Arms, and there is nothing to indicate any inten
ton on their part to have such arrest made BY an,
other person. There is no authority, in fact
y given by this warrant to delegate the authority t
20 any other person. 1t is a general rule of tn,
common law, not founded on any judicial decision
or statute provision; but so universally receive,
. as 10 have grown into a maxim. that a delegated
authority to one does not authorize hin, tic dele
gate it to another. 'Delegata pote8taS non poies
deiegari." (B?oom's Law Maxims, Cd edition
664) This grows out OF the nature of the subject
A special authority is in the nature of a trust. |
implies confidence in the ability, skill, or discre
ton of the party entrusted. The author of sucl
t a power may extend it if he will, as is done il
ordinary powers of attorney, giving power to one
] or his substitute or substitutes, to the acts au
thorizod. But when it is not so extended it i
h limited to the person named. The counsel for til
Is respondent asked what authority there is for lin
iting such warrant TO the person named it rattle
belongs to those who wish to Justify under sue
/ delegated power to show judicial authority 70
&c the extension.
'e On the special ground that this Respondent ha
no legal authority to dotaih the petitioner in hi
custody, the order of the court is that the sal
Sanborn be discharged from the custody of tn
re said Carleton.