The Athens post. [volume] (Athens, Tenn.) 1848-1917, 1860-12-21

act without waiting for the cooperation
Of the other Southern States. Thay be-
lieve it to be essential to the success of
the experiment they are making, that
there should be no delay or hesitancy in
their movements Whilst they would
prefer to be accompanied in their exodus
| from the Union by all the Southern
States, they apprehend that delay might
result in embarrassing them in the ac-
complishment of their fixed purpose to
secede. Hence they want no Southern
| Convention or consultation to agree upon
an uhimatum to be demanded of the
| Northern States. If the Northern States
would come forward and volunteer salts
factory guarantees, they would probably
be willing to pause and await the result
but seeing no such disposition manifes-
| ted by the Northern States they disap-
| prove of any movement originating in
the South which looks to proposals for
additional guarantees. With these views,
| the Southern States now engaged in the
secession movement are disinclined to
respond to the Presidents recommend
| ations as to preparing amendments to the
| Constitution. Whatever can be done
hereafter in the way of obtaining satisfac-
tory guarantees they believe can be bet
| ter accomplished after their secession
shall have been consumated than before
| Their purpose is therefore fixed TO 20 for
ward in their movement without regard
to the wishes or action of the other
Southern States. Hence set it down
that by the 4th of March, 1861, the Fed
cral Union will have been dissolved by
the secessions, of at least five, and proba-
| bly, more of the cotton States.
3. On the 4th of March, 1861, when
the new Administration is installed, the
majority of the Senate will belong to the
party which elected Mr. Lincoln. On
the lst Monday in December, 1861, when
the next Congress meets, the Republican
party will in all probability, have a ma
jority in both Houses of Congress. This
result will have been produced by the
secession OF the cotton States.
In view Of thesf facts, the action of
| the middle and border Southern States,
| between this time and the lst of Decem-
| Der, 1861, becomes II momentous subject
I for consideration. If hostile collisions
between the Federal Government and
the seeding States can be avoided, it
will perhaps be fortunate that the cotton
! States have declined to wait for the CO.
/ operation of the other States. The cot
| ton States, in that event, will have form
| cd their new government and its struc-
ture and character will be open to the
examination and approval or disapproval
of the other States. BY that time also
the middle and border States will have
/ ascertained satisfactorily whether the
| Northern States will agree to such addi-
tional guarantees as will be satisfactory
to the South. With such knowledge
/ both as to the character of the new cot
/ ton State government and as to the dis
/ position Of the Northern States to agree
/ to satisfactory guarantees, the middle
and border Southern States will be pre-
pared to decide, whether they will seek
( admission into the cotton State govern
ment, remain connected with the North
ern States or stand together under Il dis.
tinct middle Government.
Looking at these events it becomes q
matter of vital consequence, that hostile
collisions between the seeding States and
the Federal Government should be avoid
ed. 1t cannot be doubted that such {
collision would at once involve the whole
South, in the controversy and would
place any future reconstruction of the
government at an immeasurable distance
/ From my observations as to the appre
hensions felt on this subject ON all sides
! cannot but cling to the hope that hos
tility will be avoided. At the same time
| am bound to see that this hope founded
on too slender basis to generate any
strong confidence in the continuance o.
peace for the next twelve months.
1t was with the hope that the separa
ton might be peaceful, that have been
solicitious that the Southern States
should all cooperate in demanding an
uLtimatum of the North--believing that il
such ultimat,m ws- ect--<thn ahtiro
South would unite in separating from the
North. The moral power of such united
action, | have confidently believed, would
secure a peaceful separation, whatever
might afterwards be the results. But al
hope of united Southern action HAVING
been disappointed, the next best thing
| is to bear and forbear much, in order tC
| avoid hostilities between the seeding
States and the Federal Governments
Towards accomplishing such result the
middle and border States will have it il
their power rs long as they continue il
| the Union, to exert much influence.
have every reason to believe that the,
will exert all power they have, so long a,
| they remain in the Union, to keep peac,
between the Cotton States and the Fed
| eral Government. | am equally conf
dent that so long as the border and mid
die States continue in the Union, they
| will labor to secure from the Northern
| States such guarantees for the future a.
| will be entirely satisfactory. 1t is in
both points of view that have made tn,
remark that it may turn out to be fortu
nate that the cotton States have declined
to seek the cooperation of the middl,
and Southern States in their secession
movements, 1t is possible that through
the influence of the middle and border
southern States peace may be maintained
and such guarantees be secured us will
enable us once more to reconstruct ou
Federal Union on an enduring basis. Il
is proper, that should say that willis
there are some favorable indications of
re-actionary spirit in some of the North
ern States, i can discover nothing in tn,
temper and tone of the men who leat
public sentiment, promising favorable
response to any demand we may maxi
for addition guarantees. Perhaps, how
ever, it would not be reasonable to OK
pect such indications 50 soon after thei
triumph, and whilst their chief thought
are about the enjoyment of the spoils G
their victory. BY making the deman'
for guarantees we shall be able to brin