Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1860-08-05


hat species Of property thus recognized, when ne
'essary, follows as corollary, which the Banner
lare not deny II the editor of the Banner differs
with Mr.. EWING i does not effect his consistency,
because it is sufficient for him that he regards the
decision cOnclusvs, and is willing to carry it out
when necessary, to its logical sequences But mas
much as the Baver is arraignilg Mr. E upon his
opinions, it would be matter Of some public inter-
est if it would express its opinions and those of its
party as to whether the decision of the bred Scott
is conclusive to the rights of the slave owners
to own their slaves irrespective Of the action Of the
Territorial Legislature. 1t would probably, how
ever, not have been necessary to make distinct
declaration of the duty of Congress to protect,
when necessary the rights of persons and property
in the Territories and wherever else its constitu-
tional authority extends" if Mr.. D0UeLAs had not,
in reply to Mr. LINCOLN, in his Freeport speech, as
serted that
.IT MATTERS NOT WHAT WAY THE SU-
PREME COURT MAY HEREAFTER DECIDE AS
TO THE ABSTRACT QUESTION WHETHER
SLAVERY MAY OR NAY NOT GO INTO A TER
RITORY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THE PEG
PIE HAVE THE LAWFUL MEANS TO INTRO
DUCE OR EXCLUDE 1T AS THEY PLEASE. for
the reason that slavery cannot exist day an
lice regulations. Those police regulations can only
be established by the local legislatures; and if the
people are opposed TO slavery, they will elect
Representatives to that body who will by unfriendly
legislation effectually prevent the introdut tim
of it into their midst If, the contrary, they are
for it, their legislation will favor itsl extensl1n
Hence, NO MATTER WHAT THE DECISION OF
THE SUPREME MAY BE ON THAT ABSTRACT
QUESTION, STILL THE RIGHT OF THE PED
PIE TO MAKE A SLAVE TERRITORY OR FREE
TERRITORY Is PERFECT AND COMPLETE UNDER
THE NEBRASKA BILL. hope Mr.. Lincoln deems
my answer satisfactory on that point.
Furthermore, Mr.. DOUGLAS, supported by large
portion of the Northern Democracy, assumed the
ground that although large majority of the Judges
of the Supreme Court had announced such views
they were not binding on them, as they were o6aer
dco and that the only question involved in the
was whether DRIED ScoTT was citizen of the United
States and had a legal status in the court This was
evidently mere bubble, to make such plea in
avoidance of a great constitutional question, that
not only divided great party, but the whole ma
ton and that too when Mr. DOUGLAS and his friends
were understood to be pledged abide the judgment
of the Supreme Court whatever it might be. Such
a bubble might have admissible by a court
where sorely pressed in an argument by one OF
their own decisions, to avoid It's force by announc
ing that the case might have been properly deter
mined on other points. 1t might do, too, for spe
cial plea, by lawyer, to save his client from dam
ages punishment but it is scarcely the argument
of great statesman and patriot, whose first de
sire should be to harmonic vexatious differences
and difficulties in his party and lead them on tc
victory over the sectional domination that threat
ems his country.
This was great constitutional question, elabo
ratey argued at the bar and by the BENCH in which
the people feel deep and pervadiDg interest and
it is worse than idle when the struggle is ended and
matured and elaborate opinion announced, to avoid
its force by such an expedient
In accordance with the opinion expressed in the
speech of Mr.. EWING of 1885, the Democratic party
ought to have submitted to the decision in the case
DRIED ScoTT, and adopted it as the party creed ant
this is exactly what was done in the second resolu
ton of the Democratic State Convention, and in thu
first resolution adopted by party IN Convention
at Baltimore. By this means it was sought to give
effect to the decision by inserting it in our platform
so as to contravene and nulify the dangerous doc
trine of Mr. DOUGLAS that Territorial Legislature
may, by lawful MEANS exclude slavery from the
Territories 1t is true that the doctrine of Con
gressional protection was regarded by MIR. EWING
at our last State Convention, logical corollary
from the denial of Squatter Sovereignty. The Stat'
Convention thought otherwise, and deemed it neces
sary to affirm that idea in order to meet the un
friendly legislation suggested by Mr.. DOUGLAS OF
the part of the Territorial Legislature 1t il
certainly true that if slaves were, under the
Constitution, recognised as property, and neither
Congress or the Territorial Legislature car
interfere with them, their protection by the Fedora
Government in all its departments is duty to tha
property, as to all other property The doctrine
that Congress has no power to establish or inhibi
slavery in the Territories was the view of the
Democratic Party in 1856, and is wholly unchanged
The Cincinnati Platform adopted by the Balti
more Convention of 1861 and distinctly and une
uuivocally presents this idea. The I'd explanatory
resolution of our Convention, which says, Tha
it is the duty of the Federal Government, in al
its departments, to protect when necessary, the
rights of persons and property in the Territories
and wherever else its Constitutional authority ex
tends is not inconsistent with this idea nor does
infringe on it in the least. The principle of thu
above resolution is that when property is recognized
by the Constitution or the decision of the Supreme
Court, it Is then the duty Of the Federal Govern
ment to giCe the projection. The kind of legisla
tor demanded when necessary is not the repeal OF
Territorial law unfriendly to the right of slavery
Such alaw Is annued by the decision of the Supreme
Court 1t is only asked that Congress and the Execu
tive aid in enforcing the Constitution, by calling GU
the militia and giving efficiency to the arm ofthe mar
shall Nor do we ask the Executive or Congress, to say
that slavery exists IN a Territory, but when recog
| nized as SO existing by the Courts, we claim tina
they accord the same protection to it that they
would and ought to other property.
Now, does the editor of the Banner hold that thu
protection to property recognized by law is not thu
duty of the Federal Government, or does he holC
that the power to establish or inhibit slavery by
Congress follows from the simple duty of protection
to rights already recognized by law? If he main
tains either of these views, the country would like
to see his reasoning thereon; but if not where i:
MIR. EwNG's change of front on the powers of Con
gress over slavery in the Territories? Before he
again arraigns BRECKENRIDGE men" upon these
questions let him enlighten the public touching his
own position.
SOver.