Daily Democrat and news. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1859-1864, 1860-11-15
forced. but the mode and manner is al


forced, but the mode and manner is al
ways subject to legislative control. 1t
is not unusual for a legislature, at a SIN
gle session, TO change the whole remodi-
al sy stem of the State, but no one ever
dreamed that those who made contracts
under the old system acquired a vested
right to the old remed es
Whenever the Legislature attempts
to deprive the banking corporations Of
rights which they are entitled to by a
far construction of the act of 1851, the
Cases cited in the able argument OF
coInplainant's counsel would be cheerful
y adopted As a>is of decision. But
IN this case, where no right is invaded
no obl'gat on is sought to be enforced
which the complainant has not volunta-
riIy assumed. | cannot ccncede, upon
the ground Of authority or reason, that
mere change in the remedy, If IT Is one,
| is an unconstitutional act o. the Legs
lature On the other hand, under our
c, institution, every individual and cor
poration in the State is subject to the
control OF the Legislature, SO far AS II
relates to the mode of enforcing obllga-
tons Of whatever character or dcscnp'
ton they my be.
Tie traditional rule OF the Medes aud
Pcrs ans has rot been recognized as
principle Of the common law, or adopted
AS q principle in State legislation. But
on the other hand, the practice II not the
rule, has obtained la most OF the States,
that no law or rule shall long remain n
changed.
The distinction between vested
right, or the obligation OF a contact,
and the remedy given by law to enforce
the right or obligation, has been uni
formly recognized by the courts.
In the case of .Sturyis Us. Cror'tin-
shield, 4 Wheat, 122, the Supreme
Court of the United States decided that
it is competent for Legislature to pass
Ii imitation laws in relation TO contracts
then existing, and that it could abolish
imprisonment for deprivng creditor OF
the power of imprlsoning his debtor in a
case where he had the power when the
contract was made. SO, in the case OF
Broom Us. the RenobScot Bunk, s .nuss.,
the Supreme Court decided that it wa,
competent for the Legislature to pass a
law imposing damages, in the nature OF
penalties, upon banks previously char
tered, for future neglect to redeem their
bills in specie on demand, case, in
principle, exactly like the present.
But | may rest the decision of this
question upon the authority Of the case
Of the Bunh Of tie Republic u.s. the
County Of Hamilton, u Ill. SO, before
referred to. The principle upon which
that decision rests, embraces this case,
though it has much wider range, and
embraces a large class of provisions
which cannot be said simply to affect the
remedy. The principle stated and Illus
trated in that case, though perhaps new
il its application, commends itself to
my mind as sound and just, and the
reasoning of the Court is conclusive ana
unans werable, leaving nothing to be de-
sired by way of argument or Illustration.
But it is insisted tina, the proviso to
the third section of the act of Februa-
ry, l4th, 1857, amendatory OF the Bank
lng Law OF 1851, applies only to the
party presenting the bills, and not to
the bank. The proviso is in these words:
provided, IN presenting notes or bills
for payment under this section, the par
ty presenting shall not be required to
present or receive payment for each bill
separately, but the whole amount pre-
scented shall be treated as though it
were a single obi Cation Of that amount.
The language Is plain and explicit,
and leaves no room for cons ructlOn. 1t
first provides that a person presenting
bills may present the whole amount
when so presented shall be treated as a
single obligation. Treated by whom
The person presenting has nothing to
do after presenting the bills, and until
then the treatment does not commence
because the party presenting make
demand before the obligation to red EN-
accrues. If, then, the provlso does no'
apply to the bank, it has no force OF
meaning, and presenting the whole
amount together effects no Object unless
the bank is bound to redeem all the bills
as single obligation. But the proviso
says that the party presenting shall no,
be required to receive pay meut OF eacl
note separately. 1850, the bank La.
no right to pay them in that manner
for it would be Assured to say that the
party is not bound to receive the re
demption of the bills separately, ane
that the banks had the right so to re
deem. The right to demand and thu
obligation to redeem are necess rily re
ciprocal. The existence of the RICH
, to demand pre-supposes the obligation
to redeem. In what sense would de
mand by the bill holder constitute
: right, ii no obligation was imposed up
on he party Of whom the demand wa
made? Aud what KIM Of dcman,
). would that be, which, though authorize.
by law, the party of whom it was mad
could satisfy by refusing to comply will
. it, or by doing some other act than thu
= one required.
|, Lorenzo Leland, Clerk of the Su
prcme Court of the Safe of Illinois, d.
hereby certify, that the foregoing is
true copy OF the final order of the ssl'
Supreme Court in the above enti,le
cause, of record in my office.
In testimony whereof, have set ID,
y hand and affixed the seal {
. l.. 5. the Court, at Ottawa, this ii