Pomeroy weekly telegraph. [volume] (Pomeroy, Meigs County, Ohio) 1860-1866, 1860-02-28

tenable ground, that all should be re
garded as citizens of the United States
who owe allegiance to the government of
the Union, whether they are vested with
the elective franchise or not" (Mr:
Taylor, Id 81 'American citizenship
is generic and comprehensive term, and
much more so than the term subject
under monarchial form of government.
The term of "a citizen of the United
States, therefore, includes men, women,
and children-every one, in short, who
can demand the official protection of the
Federal Government, or may be amena-
BILE for the crime of treason" (Mr.
President, MediH, Id, 81
We are aware that the General As
sembly of the State by an act passed
April I'd, 1859, has expressed view of
the meaning of the word ''white" in the
section of the Constitution regulating
the elective franchise, in conflict with
that which we have stated to be the one
intended There are cases in which sub
sequent legislation may be properly
looked to, as rejecting light on the con-
struction of former laws, though it
would not furnish rule obligatory upon
the Courts. There are cases involving
this very question of color, in which leg
islative intent would properly be our
guide Such was the case as to the clas-
sifcation of youth entitled to the benefit
of the public schools, in which major
ity of this Court held, that the legisla-
ture had expressed an intention that a
classification should be made, founded as
we'll upon the visible admixture of col
or, and upon social intercourse, as upon
the degree of the blood of the African
race. (Vancamp VS.. Board of Educa-
tion of Logan y But surely, it
cannot be claimed, and will not, at this
day, be claimed by any intelligent states
man or lawyer, that it is within the scope
of Legislative power to give to the courts
an authoritative construction of pro-
vision of the Constitution of the State
The simple question with us, is, in what
sense the word white" was used in the
Constitution, and that sense, when ascer-
tanned, we suppose to be obligatory both
upon US and the General Assembly of
| the State
The word we have shown had re-
ceived, at the time of the adoption of the
present C Constitution, clear and settled
construction. Doubtless, this construc-
tion may not have been satisfactory to
many persons, but the time and the op-
oortunity, to have expressed dissatisfac-
tion, were during the deliberations of
the Convention. 1t was entirely COM
petent for the Convention to change the
construction which the Courts had given,
and, we cannot doubt, had a change been
desired or intended it would have been
made
In this view, it is obvious that itwould
be grave error to suppose that the
Judges of this Court, whatever might be
their individual views, have the same
right to re-examine the construction Civ
en- to the white" as Judges sitting un-
der the old Constitution. Indeed, set
tied construction, acted upon and acqui-
esced in for series Of years, is unusually
obligatory upon Judges, whatever doubts
they may have of it's correctness. But
whenever that construction has been
acted upon in the framing of laws, and
much more in the framing Of a Consti-
tuition, to attempt a change might well
be regarded mere arbitrary exercise of
power, and beyond any legitimate au-
thority of Judges.
We are unanimously of the opinion
that the description of persons, of which
the plaintiff is one, were not deprived by
the present Constitution of the right to
the exercise of the elective franchise,
which they enjoyed under the construc-
ton which the old Constitution had re-
ceived The plaintiff, therefore, was en-
titled under the Constitution to vote at
the election, and was deprived of this
constitutional right by the act of the de-
PENDANTS. He is therefore entitled to a
judgment in his favor, against the de-
PENDANTS, under the agreed statement OF
facts.
The judgment of the Court of Com
mon Pleas reversed, and judgment en-
tered for the plaintiff.