Des Arc citizen., 1860-09-26

.-s......-s..s....--... himself in the very speech we are review ing admits that the friends of ihe bill differed in regard "to the limitation im- posed by the constitution on the Territo- rial Legislature and that this point was referred to the Courts"
 have now shown both from the face of the bill itself, and the contemporaneous interpretation of il by is leading suppor- ,ers ,ha, 1t was intended by it to refer the question not to the people but to the Courts. Since the passage of this bill, the very point to which Judge Douglas ailudes as :" the only one referred to the Courts" and which he declares to be, .. the extent of the limitation imposed upon the Territorial Legislature by the constitution" has been before the highest Judicial tribunal known to our Laws Here is its decision:
 !" The powers over person and property to which we refer are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms de- nied, and they are forbidden to exercise l them. And If Congress cannot do Mis. it is beyond he powers conterred on Me Federal Goveyn- nsent, it wiH be admified, zoe presume, that it could not authorize Territorial Cor- crnment to exercise them. # could confer no po,per on any local gouernment estab- lished by it's prouisions 10 uioiate the Con- sttution."
 am aware that Judge Douglas pro- poses to evade this by declaring that only the judgement of the court is binding; that what we have quoted is not germain to the case before the court--that it is obiter dicta and outside the jurisdiction of the court; in word that i. is merely the opinion of Citizen Fancy and not of the Chief Justice Here, however, he comes in direct conflict with the Chief Justice and the recorded decision of the court; for Judge Fancy after disposing of the demurrer in that case, undertakes to go on and decide it upon it's facts and merits, and, said he, in doing that. WE ARE MET WITH THE DIRECTION THAT ANYTHING WE MAT SAY UPON THAT PART OF THE CASE WILL BE EXTRA JUDICIAL AND oBt- TER DIoTA. THIs IS MANIFEST MISTAKE. Thus, not Chief Justice Fancy, but the whole court with but two dissenting voices, decided that 1t was not ''obiter dicla 2 that 1t was exactly in point within the jurisdic- ton of the court, and that 1t was the duty of the court to decide it. believe it is settled, in law, that court is competent to determine the extent of it's own juris- | dctions
 Butt itwas wholly unnecessary for Judge Douglas to resort to this heterogeneous quibble; for, although he says that .'the ex- tent of the limitation imposed upon Ter ritorial legislature by the Constitution was referred, by the Kansas bill, ito the courts,' and although the platform upon which he was nominated declares 1t 10 be 'the true interpretation of the Cincinnati platform" that the measure of restriction imposed by the Federal Government upon the Territorial legislature shall be the sub ject of judicial decision, and proposes to abide by such decision of that question as has been, or may hereafter be made; yet, in his celebrated Freeport speech he avows that "the people of Territory may, by lawful means, exclude slavery from thelr limits prior to the formation of State Constitution" and that mo matter what may be the decision of the Supreme Court on that abstract question. still the right of the people to make slave Territory ora free Territory is perfect and complete un- der the Nebraska bill. This is a repudi- ation of any decision of the Supreme Cour: may make in regard 10 "the extent of the
 limit imposed by the Constitution upon the Territorial legislature" when it conflicts with the action of the legislature. It is the extreme of folly to trust Judge Doug-
 las longer, when he tells us at one time that "lhe extent of limitation imposed on the Territorial legislature was referred to the courts," and at another, that "let the decision of the Supreme Court on this abstract question be what it may, still the right of the people to make slave Terri tory or free Territory is perfect and con- plele under the Kansas Nebraska bill" | l now propose 10 enquire what reason there is to believe that the Cincinnati Platform is based upon the idea of popu- lar sovereignty. Lawyers and jurists who are in the habit of construing laws and constitutions by the light of experience, know that in order to decide what law of doubtful import means. you must look at the cause of it's enactment, the evils t was designed 10 correct, and the remedy it was designed to give. By the light of this established rule of construction. let us determine what is the meaning of the Territorial branch of the Cincinnati pIat- | form. I First, then what was the subject matter upon which il was baseda It was the right of the owner of slaves to emigrate and settle and hold slaves in the Federal I Territories. Next, what was the cause demanding the passage of that resolutiona It was tha, the South was restless and dissatisfied with the admission of Califor- nia under squatter sovereignty principles; dissatisfied with the law forbidding the internal save-trade between citizens oI the slave States and the District of Co!um- bia, und claimed perfect freedom to go into any Federal Territory with their slaves, and remain until forbidden by constitution constilutionally framed and I admitted into the union. The South