New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-06-22


Garibaldi entered Calatsfmi on the day that
Landi had left it-on the 10th; marched on the
18th to Alcamo 90 miles); on the 18th to Parte-
nco 90 miles), and beyond that place toward
Palermo. On the 10Th, incessant torrents Of rain
prevented the troops from moving
In the mean time, Garibaldi had ascertained
that the Neapolitans were throwing up intrench-
ments around Palermo, and strengthening the old,
decayed ramparts Of the town on the side facing
the Partenico road. They were still at least
% 600 strong and thus far superior to any forces
that he could bring agailst them. But they were
dispirted; their discipline was loosened many OF
them began to think of passing over to the insur-
gents while their generals were known both to
their own soldiers and to their enemy, 10 be imbe
Giles. The only trustworthy troops among them
were the two foreign battalions. AS matters
stood, Garibaldi could not have yentuTed upon
direct front attack upon the town, while
the Neapoltans could not undertake anything deci-
sye against him, even if their troops were fit for
it, as they must always leave strong garri-
son in the town and never move too far away
from it, With General of the common
stamp in the place of Garibadi, this state of things
would have led to a series of desultory aud undec-
siye engagements, in which he might have
trained portion of his lcvies to warfare, but in
which also the royal troops would very soon have
recovered a good deal of their lost confidence and
discipline for they could not help being successful
in some of them. But such a kind of warfare
would neither suit an Instruction nor Garibaldi.
bold offensive was the only system of tactics per-
mitted to revolution; striking success, such as
the deyerance of Palermo, became necessity as
soon as the insurgents had arrived in sight OF the
city.
But how was this to be done Here ii was that
Garibad brilliantly proved himself general iis
not for petty partisan warfare only, bat also for
more important operations
On the Goth and succeeding days, Garibaldi at
tackled the Neapotan outposts and positions in the
neighborhood of Monreale and Parco, on the roads
leading to Palermo from Trapani and Corleone
thus making the enemy believe that his attack
would take place chiefly against the southwestern
face of the town, and that here his main forces
were concentrated. BY skillful combination OF
attacks and feigned retreats, he induced the
Neapolitan General to send more and more troops
out of the town in this direction, until on the
24th some 10000 Ncapohtans appeared out
side the town, toward Parco. This was
what Garibaldi intended. He at once engaged
them with part Of his forces, slowly retreated
before them 80 as to draw them further and further
away from the town, and when he had got them
as far as Piana, across the main range Of hills,
which run across Sicily and here divide the
Conca DOrO 1.-THE golden shell, the Valley Of
Palermo), from the Valley of Corleone, he at once
threw the main body of his troops across another
part of the same ridge, into the Valley of Misil-
meri, which opens out to the sea, close to Pa
lermo. On the 25th he took up his headquarters
at Misilmeri, eight miles from the capital. What
he further did with the 10, 900 men entangled on a
single line of bad road in the mountains, we are
not informed, but we may be sure that he kept
them well occupied with some fresh apparent
victories, so as TO make sure they would not come
back too soon to Palermo. Having thus re-
duced the defenders of the town by nearly
one half and transferred his line Of attack
from the Trapani road to the Catania road,
he could proceed to the grand attack. Whether
the insurrectiOn in the town preceded Garibaldrs
assault or whether it was produced by his knocking
at the gates the conflicting dispatches leave unset
tied; but certain il is, that the morning Of the
9th, all Palermo rose in arms and Garibaldi
at the Porta Termini, on the southeast
face of the town, where no Neapoltan expected
him. The remainder is knOwn-the gradual clearing
of the town, with the exception of the batteries, the
citadel and the royal palace, from the troops; the
subsequent bonabardment, the armistice, the capt.
ulation Authentic details of all these proceedings
are still wanting; but the main facts are pretty
certain.
III the mean time, we must declare that Carl
baldi's maneuyers preparatory to the attack on
Palermo, at once stamp him as General of very
high order. Hitherto we knew him as very skill
full and very lucky guerrillaehef only; even in the
siege of Rome his mode of defending the town by
constant sallies gave him scarcely an opportunity
of rising above that level. But here We have him
on fair strategic ground, and he comes from the
trial proven master of his art. His manner of
entcing the Neapotan commander into the blum
der of sending obe-half of his troops out of
reach, his sudden fank-march and temperance
before Palermo, on the side where he was least,
expected, and his energetic attack while the garri
son was weakened, are operations far more i'm
printed with the stamp of military genius than
anything that occurred during the Italian war Of
1859. The Sicilian instruction has found first
rate military chief; let hope that the politician
Garibaldi, who will soon have to appear on the
stage, may keep unsuied the glory Of the General.