Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1860-11-14
Tn. Invasion OF England.

Ihe AnNnaAOn OF EnsiAAas
The invasion Of England by France is the lion in the
path of all British political writers ane statesmen. 1t IS
their nghtmars Il IS their talk by day, their dream
BY night They ansaek history to show that at any time
during the las, century successful invasion has been i'm
possible and yet by their nervous and feyersh anxiety
on the point they show they have faith in and place
no reliance the lesson which they draw from history
Taey have no. forgotten how much Britain was alarmed
bv the possible invasion Of the 6rst Napoleon But be-
cluse did not take place under that great Captain they
rssou that the difficulties we're found to be insurmoun
abe. But the Westminster Rsvis in its last number
does not holds that idea. It says;
The conquest Of England may be considered an i'm
possibility; but Der humiliation and deprivation Of power
aud riches would produce substantially equivalent ehects
Tna formidable strength Of the French army all OF which
would be available the period selected for quarrel
and is perfect organization are 50 thoroughly out OF pro
portion 70 anything can habituay produce m the
fsi thai were the road open 70 them there can be no
doubt of the success OF well devised and rapidly eXecu
ted scheme Of INVASION Fortunately, hoEever, We have
che intervening barrier Of The in our favor, with It's
three defensive attributes;
l. Difficulty Of transporting across L. with sufficient
rspity the necessary forces with al their accessories
The advantage OF position Of defending force against
the operation Of laEdirg.
9 The opposition OF our own ieet and floating means
gany persons place full ana entire reliance on these
hen, but when they examined and anayzed Il will
be readily seen that Of them can be deemed sui
fcienL"
The great network Of railways which has been relied
upen as aHordng raod concentration Of forces on any
point, looked upon with disirs BY the reviewer as
being quite As likely to lead fatal concentration at
the wrong point Thus:
The attacking forces would issue from al the ports Of
the Channel from Brest to Dunkrk and by steam pow
or could be concentrated on any given point a. any CAV
en- hour: regulating their movements so as TO render Il
ouiss doubtful what part between Margate and Ports
mouth was the doomed point OF attack kilograms OF
alarm would y from all quarters so as 70 beWider the
generals 10 command, Who would necessarily have 20
await the development Of the plan OF the invaders which
would only be made clear by actual landing IN force
for many a demonstration might be made BY landings
,owed bv early Recommendations. Thus might prove
very difficult meet the enemy on the beach IN suih
i'm frce % oppose the real attack Then would come
- trial for the next available operation, namely that oil
rapid concentration Of superior forces, 20 bring on an
a ga with the invader possible after the dis
a larkatOu Thus, assuming 10000 were first landed,
that &c required from twelve 10 tEentyt0ur hours 10
81 l3r-e them, the question H. whether 10000 or 40
or even 10000 gUOd troops could be brought 70 the
4 20 give them battle within that time. Aud here we
Sc calculate upon having 10 quit the railway convey
= a. least ten or twelve miles from the ground occu-
I.si by the main body Of the enemy.
The reviewer argues the question Of possible attack
r means Of deieace at great length, and SUNS up as
ioloss:
'I cannot be too often repeated that so long as a
1y. .abor has a gigantic aud powerful sword waving
a-oulI us ought 70 keep effective guard 20 parry
effects. lie; then consider in general way, Of What
ga. guard should consist
Go, navy has the first place. and there Is dissenting
~ 90 ts increase 10 almost any extent; although how
, sDle d-ets TO De augmented with sufficient Ia
SOW % meet emergencies, remains apparently still
.-c1ism.
oi tae land forces, it is the regulars on whom the
h.l of the battle ia the field must rest these should
decidedly not be less than l2uuou men in the British
t.s. and wheo IL h. considered t4at this uumber viii
1murrhend al the recruits and young soldiers, foe
Inc etre army 90 home aud abroad, there viii nos b.
.r1.e sn COO 10000 at mos. Of All ara at an u' ~
. tue field and this is the Oull force watch VII oe lh
s Ilttely forthcoming. A. arguments no favor OF Seu
-,.i.1.Y io-cs % vUud be far bettcrl 70 may
o. ,.aeL that this would give 10 Ielieis iu equa
period OF home service for that abroad; aud against the
.l ol expense &c must be recOleced that the gross
i1ant Of army estimates is by no means in proportion
10 The strength maintained because so large part OF %
&, necessary oI Is Adjustments OF al kinds which require
.but very hItle addition the forces augmented
Tue militia viii be admirable reserve oice, II sui-
Gent time for embodyng them be obtained before
ley are brought into action; but in our rivals constant
state Of readiness the blow might be attempted within
lev days after the rupture the immediate intention OF
which would be carefully hid BY appearance OF de-
srs for reconciliation for 80 great advantage as tax
the importance OF t has often 6eel alluded 70 and re-
commended BY French military writers.
The pensioners would be speedily got together, and
svaiabe aud their best tor the service for which they
are capable.
%. tue yeOmanry and volunteers We have already DIS
used the merits The latter, possessing such maguin-
u, material and hearty goodwill in the cause, are pro
t0z.ugy near forming mos; poScriu force; aud Will
10 20 In proportion they able 70 remove the I'M
affections in the system which have been indicated
t-p OF very much importance, however, is nseptrahie
rom their very composition; which IS hat they cannot
ne embodied for moving ul the very crisis arrives,
very great drawback 10 the efficiency of any corps nor
oven will the precise strength Of each body tor Service
ID, snoan li then; and they Will have 10 be collected
.o, AZ pars and distances ia the case Of some corps
R log Instance those composed Of the clerks OF govern
men. CHses the ordinary work Of the members VII o-
Increased 40 the period Of iuylsiog; aud they VIII
more inure than serve their country, by leaving their
Ie,s al the time when there is the greatest demanI
for thr services 10 ramse the country in search
U. fee.
B,f.s Of the class Of our volunteers VIII never, and
canlI reasonably be expected 70 abandon their bust
~ ard occupations, perhaps tO- several weeks, IN ant
riutou Of Az attack h0Eeyer tlseateuiny H. may be-
force OF essential local volunteers raised in The miue
.l- ueighbcrho0d Of an ports, and not TO be
moved f0m thence has not YET been organized 20 sucn
"a Arrangement inclined 20 attach the creates.
iihportahee as without abstractng from the industry OF
me country and the smallest possible expense (which
expense should be borne by the pa0c in order to obtain
greater numbcr very good garrsOns for enclosed WORKS
vii be- everywhere the spot; and by their numbers
vii shord gscua security against predatory excur-
s0ns IRON cruisers