The Jeffersonian Democrat. [volume] (Chardon, Ohio) 1854-1865, 1860-12-14

10 their respective abodes,
within limited time" This duty cannot
bv possibility be performed in a State
where no judicial authority exists TO issue
process, and where there is no Marshal
10 execute il, and where, even Il there
were such au officer, the entire population
would constitute one solid combination TO
resist him.
The bare enunciation Of these provis.
ions proves how insdequ ne they are with.
out further legislation % overcome uni
ted opposition in single Stale, not 10
speak of other States who may place
themselves in a similar attitude. Con.
gress alone has power 10 decide who,nar
the present laws can or cannot be amend
ed so as 10 carry out more effectualy
the constitution.
The same insuperable obstacles 60 not
lie in the way Of executing the laws for
the collection Of the Customs. The revenue
still continues to be collected, as hereto.
fore, al the Custom House in Charleston,
and should the collector unfortunately re.
sign, a successor may be appointed 10
perform this duty.
Then, in regard 10 the property of The
United States in South Carolina. This
has heen purchased for fair equivalent,
"by the consent Of the Legislature of the
State" "for the erection of forts. maga-
zines, arsenas," &c., and over these an
authority "to exercise exclusive legisa.
tion," has been expressly granted by the
Constitution to Congress. 1t is not be.
lieved that any attempt will be made to
10 expel the United States from this prop
erty by force; but il in this should prove
TO be mistaken. the officer in command Of
the forts has received orders 10 act strictly
on the defensive. In such a contil gency,
the responsibility for consequences would
rightfulIy rest upon the heads Of the as
sailants.
Apart from the execution Of The laws, so
far as this may be practicable, the Execu.
tive has no authority 10 decide what shall
be The relations between the Federal Gov
ernment aud South Carolina. He has been
invested with no such discretion. He pos
sesses no power 10 change the relations
between them, much less TO acknowledge
the independence of that State. This
would be 10 invest mere Executive Of
icer with the power of recognizing tie
dissolution OF the conlederacy among our
tbirty-three sovereign States.
| 1t bears no resemblance to the recogni-
ton OF foreign de .fdcto government, in.
voiving no such responsibility. Any attempt
to do that, would, on his part, be make
act of usnrpation. IL s, therefore, my duty
to submit to Congress tho whole question in
all its bearings. Tho course of events is SC
rapidly fastening forward, that the emer.
eoncy may soon arrive. when you may be
called upon to decide the momentous ques
ton whether you possess tho powor. by force
OF arms, TO compel State TO remain in the
| Union. | should feel myself recreant to
my duty were not to express an opinion
on this important subject.
Tho question fairly stated Is: Has the
Constitution delegated to Congress the pow
ar to coerce q State into submission which
is attempting to withdraw or has actually
Withdrawn! If answerod 10 the affirmative
it must be OH the principle that tho power
has been conferred upon Congress to declare
and 10 make war against State. After
much serious reflection have arrived at
tho conclusion that no such power has been
delegated TO Congress or to any otheay do
partment Of the Federal Govermont II is
manifested, upon an inspection of the Con.
stitutiOn, that this is not among he specific
and enumerated powers granted t6 Con.
grcss; and it is equally apparent that its
exercise is not necessary and proper for
carrying into execution" any one of these
powers. So far from shs power having
been delegated to Congress, i. was expressly
H. ~ -.
! the Constitution.
i 1t appears from the proceedings of thai
body, that on tho 3lst May, 1877, tho claus,
"aulhorizirg an cxortion Of tho torce of tn,
whole against delinquent State" came W
for consideration. Mr.. Madison opposed /
in q brief but powerful speech, from whicl
| shalt extract but single sentence. II
observed Tho use of force against ,
: State would look more like Il decara ton O.
war than an intiiction of punishment. RnC
would probably be considered by the part,
attacked as a dissolution of all preyiou
compacts by which it might be bound,
Upon his motion the clause was uuanip ous
ly postponed. and never, / believe agail
presented. Soon afterwards, on the s.I
June, 1857, when accidentally adverting tc
the subject, he said Amy government fol
tho United States, formed on tho supposed
practicabiity OF using force against the un.
constitutional proceedings of the States
would prove as visionary and fallacious as
the government of Congress" s"-eyidently
mentioning the then existing Congress OF
the old confederation.
Without descending to particulars, II nav
be safely asserted that the power TO make
war against State is at variance with the
whole spirit OF the Constitution. Suppose
such war should result in tho CONQUEST OF
a State, how arc wo to govern it afterwards.
Shall we hold it as province, and govern
it by despolIo power: In the nature OF
things we could not, by physical force, con.
troll the will of the people, and compel them
to elect Senators and Representative to
Congress, and TO perform all the other duties
depending upon their own voition, and re.
qured from the free citizens of free State
as constituent member of the con!ederacy
But, if We possessed the power, would il
be wise to exercise it under existing circum
stances The object would doubtless be tc
preserve the Union. War would not onIy
present tho most etfectual means of DESTROY.
ing it; but would Danish all hopo of il.
peaeea5le reconstruction. Besides. in the
fraternal conflict vast amount of blood
and treasure would be expended, rendering
future reconciir'' IN between the States i'm
possible. In tho meantime, who can foretel
what would be the sufferings and priyationl
of the people during its existence:
Ia Ia haN I,fA