New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-03-17
troops were young, and not s,>>cestomed TO war.
He cannot be blamed for r>ot having adopted this


course.
But this he might undoubtedly have done. With
every man carrying weeks provisions, WIN al Ills
mountain guns perhaps battery Oh ne'a gums
and as many stores az be could carry Oh inc Va0n1
Of his muIes and horses he might have marcned U"
from Ceuta. and approached Tetuan as quichy a'
pog s;h,o Take all difficulties into consideratioh'
o;cht n;les davis certainly little enough. But say
five, this would give four days marching Gay '"o
dovs for engagements although they must De poor
v;ctores that do not imply gain of FIVE miles of
oround. This would give six days in all, and would
;ncude all delays caused by the weather, for an
army without a train can certainly do four or i've
miles day in any weather almost. Thus the army
would arrive in the plain Of Tetuan before the pro-
visions il carried were consumed; In case OF need,
the steamers were there TO land fresh supplies
during the march, as they actually did. Morocco
is no worse country for ground or weather than Al
peria, and the French have done far more there in
the midst of Winter and far away in the hills, too
without any steamers to support and supply them.
Once arrived on the heights ofthe Monies Negroes and
master of the pass to Tetuan, the communication
with the feet in the roads of San Martin was safe,
and the sea formed the base Of operations. Thus,
with little boldness, the period during which the
army had no base of operations but itself, would
| have been shortened from a month to week, and
the holder plan was therefore the safer of the two;
4 for the more formidable the MOors were, the more
| the slow march of ODonnell became dangerous.
And if the army had been defeated on the road to
Teuan its retreat was far easier than if it had been
GoI1 rt,l
ODonneIl's progress from the Monies Negros,
which he passed almost without opposition, was
quite in keeping with his former slOwness. There
was again a throwing up and strengthening OF re-
doubts, as ifthe best organized army had been OPP
| posed to him. week was thus wasted although
against such opponents, simple feld-works would
have suffced; he cOudnot expect to be attacked by
any artillery equal to six of his mountain guns, and
for the construction Of such camp one or two
DAYS ought to have been sufficient At last, on the
4tb, he attacked the intrencbed camp of his
opponents. The Spaniards appear to have behaved
very well during this action; of the merits of the
tactical arrangements we are unable to judge the
few correspondents in the Spanish camp dropping
all the dry military details in favor OF good painting
and exaggerated ell thusiasm. AS the correspondent
of The London Times says, what is the use of my
describing to you piece Of ground which you
ought to see, in order to judge ofits nature The
Moors were completely routed, and the following
day Tetuan surrendered.
This closes the first act of the campaign, and if
the Emperor of Morocco is not too obstinate, it
will very likely close the whole war. Still, the diff
fcultes incurred hitherto by the Spaniards-diffi-
| cultes increased by the system on which they have
| conducted the war-shOw that if Morocco holds
out, Spain will find it very severe piece of work.
II is not the actual resistance of the Moorish rreg
ulars-tbat never will defeat disciplined troops so
long as they hold together and can be fed; it is the
uncutvated nature of the country, the impossibity
of conquering anything but the towns, and to draw
supplies even from them; it is the necessity of dis
persing the army in great many small posts, which,
after all, cannot suffice to keep open regular
communication between the conquered towns, and
which cannot be victualed unless the greater part
of the force be sent to escort the conveys OF stores
over a roadess country, and across constantly re-
! appearing clouds of Moorish skirnishers 1t is
well known what it was for the French, during the
first five or six years of their African conquest to
ItNICLudl even cuu 1icucoh1 hOb w Spun VI
stations further from the coast With the rapid wear
and tear of European armies in that climate, six
or twelve months of such war will be no joke for
o country ike Spain.
The first object of attack if the warbe continued,
will naturally be Tangier. The road from Tetuan
| to TaDger lies across a mountain pass, and then
down the valley Of a river. 1t is all inland work
no steamers near to furnish stores, and no roads.
| The distance is about 20 miles. How long will it
take Marshal O'Donnel TO do this distance, and
how many men will he have toleave in Tetuan He
is reported to have said that it will take 1000
men to hold it; but this is evidently much e1agger-
sted With 10000 men in the town, and local
brigade in an entrenched camp at San Martin, the
place should be safe enough; such force might
always take the field in sufficient strength to dis
perse any Moorish attack Tangier might be taken
by bombardment from the sea, and the garrison
brought thither by sea also. 1t would be the same
with Larache, Sale, Mogador. But if the Spanards
intended to act in this way, why the long march to
Tetuan This much is certain: The Spanards
have much to learn yet in warfare before they can
compel Morocco to peace, if Morocco holds out
for year
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GRECO-SLAVIC FEDERA TON.