New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-08-11


1.-THE troops IN the depots really bebng, not to the
homs bun toe foreign establishments They arc por-
tons of the hstaons serving abroad and there moth
ne strange In their being comparatively ineffective Tor
duty at home"
In short they are merely an ineffective body, com.
posed of recruits not over three months in the se
ice, who are shipped of quarterly or oftenef,
when enlisted, to the regiments abroad, and old
invslids who have been Left at homo a. useless, $50
"tbat, what with those who areeIhaused and those
"who are untaught the corps itself is never In the
"conditisn of regular battalion"
SO much for the depots. Now as % the volun-
teers and militia. 1t is only necessary to repeat
that ct least 200 900 exist at present. only on paper
Mr.. Mcguire recently proved in parliament that
nearly every regiment of militia had from 200 to
800 men more on the books of the Horse Guards
than could ever be got together on parade. MIR.
Sidney Herbert made similar admission. Of the
Irish militia regiments whose members are COM
PEELED, from hardship and poverty, to report them
selves more punctually than their English neigh
bors many now estimated at 800--the Waterford
for instance-have only 400. The estimate giving
the strength of militia and volunteers Of England
at 1873, $50 is probably as near the mark a. 1t Is
possible for an impartial statistician to make 1t.
The force of the regular army at home, accord
ing to the recent report from the War-Oifice, Is
6s,778. The Household cavalry Q,3l7), Royal
Engineers (2,OS9), the Army Hospital corps OF
discarded invalids, the military train, and other
partially unavailable troops, are here included.
To avoid trespassing on disputed grounds, we will
admit that the entire 6S, 900 are available. This,
supposipq all militia and volunteers embodied, and
under arms, would give grand total Of 2O6,6O
men. We will even add fhe Irish police to the
List which will increase it TO about 25 900. The
nominal strength of the regular army and embodied
militia Just now, is given at 100 900; about l6oOO
in excess of the real fgures but we willtake SIT
stands. Conceding that $1,000 of tho volunteers
could be assembled at given point, within three
days of the landing of the French, England would
still have at her disposal an army OF ll5,Oou VI
these, it must be borne in mind that fully 25,oOO
are noyices in the use of arms. Now, all the
Navy-Yardr, Arsenas and Government stronghOlds,
would require extra garrisons for there are never
more than 5000 marines ashore at the naval
ports. Ireland without attaching any i'm
portance to the influence of the " national
" petition" in creating a friendly disposition
10 the soldiers of Mcmahon, will need an
army. All volunteers or militia would not
suffice to keep order in the Emerald lsle with the
prospect of fight in view. Her Majesty author
tiles should at least detail 10000 regulars, and
25 900 rregulars for that country beside the police
This would make about IS, 900 in all, and would
leave only 90 900 soldiers to England and Wales, to
guard arsenals, armores and navy yards. 1t is
idle TO suppose that less than 10000 serviceable
troops would be sufficient for this important duty,
allowing even the worn out or inexperienced men
in the depots to be able to hold their own. So
NapoleOn's 100000 Frenchmen, Zouaves, &C.,
would be opposed by 10000 red coats, of whom
little more than As 200 would belong to the line
The probable result of rencOunter between the
two forces, thus brought face to face, hardly ad-
mits of doubt.
1t will be objected that France could not equip
and dispatch across the channel 100 900 men, with
out its becoming known. 1t may be; but England
would not know where the blow would fall, and
would naturally tremble for the safety Of her pos
sessions bordering the Mediterranean, and try to
reinforce her garrsons there lest the threatened
attack on London might be intended to cover ute
rior designs on Malta and Gibraltar. She would
send over to those places. in few vessels of the
channel fleet, 20, 900 or 80, 600 soldiers who would
not be volunteers" thus throwing on the latter
the weight of resisting the enemy at home. Some
distinguished writers assert that even the sacking
of London would eventually be less injurious to
England, than her Punishment from Malta and
Gibraltar.
But it will be argued that the mere announce
ment of national danger would be sufficient to
arouse every Briton in the land, from the Cheviot
Hills to Cornwall, to hurl the intruder into the sea.
This is plausible. But experience teaches us that
no matter how intense the patriotism of the masses
may be, the fact that they, general thing, have
no arms, and do not know hsw to use them if they
had, renders their disposition in emergency of
very little value. Cane-swOrds and ptchforks
may be weapons exceedingly dangerous to human
life in the Seven Dials, or in the Provinces but it
is not reasonable to assume that they would be
irrepressible in repellng the Zouaves. 1t may
also be seriously doubted whether the middle
classes, who almost exclusively represent the
volunteer force, would be so ready to answer
muster, with the French on their native island,
as they are when summoned to receive the
congratulations of her Majesty. At ali events,
it is not more absurd to admit the possibility
of the invading army numbering 10000 than
to suppose the volunteers can turn out $780, 600;
since cordial invitation from Buckingham Palace
al in hvip OF and IF a fUaya