Daily national Democrat., 1860-06-17
A Difference.

plain TO be misunderstood, and that it dis
tinetly denies the power of Territorial
Legislature to regulate the question Of slave
ry. Hon. Reverdy johnson. the late Attor-
ney General Of the United States. Attorney
for the Southern side of the question in the
Dred Scott case and present head Of the
American Bar, differs with the Express very
materially. for he emphatieally declares that
the Supreme Court has decided no such
thing. lie says, speaking of the power to
regulate slave property:
ut has. however, been thought, and this
too by gentlemen of unquestionable ability,
that the Supreme Court in the case so often
referred to- has decided that such power
does not reside in territorial government.
This it is submitted, is a misconception of
the decision The single question before tie
Court, in this connection, was, whether Con-
gress possesses the power to prohibit the in
PRODUCTION of slave property in a territory
Iu ruling it adversely, the Court does not
say or intimate that such property in ter
ritory has other safeguards. or that the
owner is entitled to any further protection in
its enjoyment. than exists in regard to other
kinds Of property"
Reverdy johnson is Of the opinion, there
fore, that Judge Donglas is right, when he
says that, according to the Constitution of
the United States, and according to the Dred
Scott Decision, slave property stands upon
precisely the same footing in the territories
as any other property does. and that
it is to be treated in the same manner. lie
goes on:
at had been contended. that there was
popularity in slave property, that placed it
on different footing from other property.
For this the laws and usages Of other nations,
and reasoning of statesmen and jurists upon
the relation of master and slave, had been
referred too. These, says the Chief Justice,
cannot enlarge the powers of the govern
ment. or take from the citizens the rights
they have received and as the Constitution
recognizes the right of property of the mas
ter in a slave, and makes no distinction be-
tween this description Of properly and other
property owned ty a citizen, no tribunal,
acting under the authority of the United
States whether it be legislative. executive or
judicial. has a right to draw such II dstirc-
ton, or to deny to it the benefit of the pro.
visions and guarantees which have beeen pro
vided for the protection of private property
against the encroaehments of the govern
ment;' and, after referring to the fugitive
clause as expressly affirming the right of
property in a slave the Chief Justice thus
concludes: And no word can I've found in
The Constitution WHICH GIVES CoxGREss GREAT
ER POWER OVER SLAVE PROPERTY, OR WHICH
ENTITIES paoFsnTr uF THAT KIND TO LESS PRO-
TEcTIoN THAN PROPERTY OF ANY OTHER DEscRIP
rtoN All. therefore, that the Court has de-
cided is that slaves are property. as much
50 any thing else that may be owned 10y
man, and that such property is entitled to
the same-mot to less or greater constitutions
al guarantee as any other description of pro-
perty. This being obviously the doctrine Of
the Court it necessarily follows, that what
ever constitutional government can do in
regard to any other kind Of property, it can
do in regard to this. If any other Kind may
be excluded, this mag be ercluded; # any 9th
er kind may be more, 0, less, or not at oil pro
teeted By legislation, tie same is true as to
this II any other after its legal introduce
tion can be. upon public grounds. excluded or
abolished, IL is also the case as to this. 1t is
but sameness, identity Of title and protection,
which the Court maintains, not inferior or
paramount-that all stand on the same foot
ing, liable alike to the same restrictions and |
limitations and entitled to the same guaran-
tees What is there in this species of prop
ty to exempt it from territorial legislati> e
power? What is there, to make it the pc
culiar and single duty of such power to
legslate for its admission or protection If
it be but property, and, as such, only en-
braced by constitutional guarantees, it must
share the condition of all other property.
and therefore be subject to the legislative
power If this is not true, the territorial
State would be almost without laws,-be one
of nature The peace aud prosperity of the
people depend upon laws defining and regu.
lating property. Without such a power,
property itself would be in great degree
out of the pale of protection. But if the
pooer erists, it must depend upon those who
possess it, how they will, in any particular
case, ezert it, or Whether they wiH erert IL at
aA These must rest Nth their intelligence
and sense of duty"
Certainly, if the above reasoning be cor
rect, there is no power in Congress to pro
tect slavery in the Territories. 1t stands
upon the same footing with other property,
and is subject to the same kind of legisla.
ton, by the Territorial Government.
The Express says that the language of the
Dred Scott Decision, in regard to this point,
admits Of but one construction. 1t SO hap
pens, however that Reverdy Johnron gives
it one construction and the Express another.
Which is right? We lean to the side Of the
great jurist.
WILL STAND FIRM.-Mr. Pugh, (who is a
delegate from Ohio to the Democratic Ma
tional Convention,) said in the Senate, "a short
time ago, that he wanted the Richmond Con
vention of Secessionists to nominate their
candidates The boiling delegates had no
right to attend the Baltimore Convention.
I. =, u