The daily exchange. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1858-1861, 1860-08-03
BALTIMORE.
FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1860

FRIDAY, AUGUST 3, 1860
c,prn,Lp1 has found it less difficult to drive
,ho Neapolitans out of Sicily, than to teach the
s;ciIians to appreciate the liberty which he has
won for them. Their enthusiasm has died out
with the conquest of Palermo. His aspirations
noint not merely to expelling the Neapolilan gar
rson from Messina, but to more glorious opera
tions on the mainland. They, ON the contrary.
appear to be satisfied to enjoy undisputed possess
sion of their Capital, and unobstructed communi-
cation with the interior. He wants to infuse into
them the spirit which animates his own little band
ofheroes and TO temper their wild, cratic habits
by the salutary rigor Of strict discipline. They
retain their old preference for guerilla warfare,
and the loose and sem-independent organization
which it implies. He desires TO make of them re-
liable troops, prompt, alert, conrageous-acting
in concert, and yielding implicit obedience to the
commands of their superior officers. They are re-
lucant to place themselves under the orders of any
but their local chiefs, to submit to the training
that GARIBALDI would impose. These are among
the chief reasons why the assault upon Messina
has been delayed so long, and why GARIBALD1 has
been compelled to await the arrival of reinforce
mens from Northern Italy. Other causes have
also combined to thwart his patriotic designs.
The Sicilians, suddenly relieved from the grinding
oppression Of Neapolitan officials, and left free to
act and to speak, and to write, as inclination
prompts or fancy dictates; with spies to report
their proceedings: no sbirri DIGGING their steps,
and no instruments Of torture in the perspective,
are in the condition of men bewildered by ex-
cess of light. Their inability to discriminate be-
tween liberty and license has displayed itself on
more than one occasion since the capture of Paer-
mo; whilst the changeful, uncertain, and impressi-
BILE character of the popular mind is evinced by the
readiness with which the insdious suggestions of
Bourbon agents have been received, and by the
manner in which GARIBALDG has been thwarted in
his efforts to form an acceptable Ministry. Twice
already he has been compelled to reconstruct his
Cabinet and it is doubtful whether the members
of his present provisional government will be
suffered to retain Office much longer than
did their predecessors. 1t would be scarce
ly just, however, 10 imputc these changes
wholly to the vacillating temper of the Sicilians
themselves. If they cannot comprehend the mis-
sion of Garibaldi, it is their misfortune rather
than their fault. He has told them frankly and
repeatedly that his object is not the deliverance
of Sicily alone, but to unite the whole of the
mainland-Naples, Venitia, and the Southern
States of the Church included-under the sway of
Constitutional King; that King being VIcToR
EMMANUEL. But the Sicili ans, cut off from the
Peninsula by the straits of Messina, are more dis
posed TO enjoy their own newborn freedom than
to engage in enterprises in behalf of people for
whom they have no special regard and with
whom from their Insular position, they have
rarely been brought in contact. They are will
ling, however, so far as a vote of annexation may
go, to become part Of an United Kingdom of
Italy, and loyal subjects of VICToR EMMANUEL
But they have no stomach for fighting outside the
limits Of their own Island, and even within those
limits they prefer to do their fighting in their own
old fashioned way 1t was by fostering these SEN
timents that FARM, as the accredited agent of
Sardinia, and acting under instructions from
Count CAyoUR, able to embarrass GARIBALDI
in his attempts to form an Administration which
while providing for the security of Sicily, would
cooperate with him in organizing an army for a
descent upon Naples. 1t was, moreover, the diff
ference of opinion that existed between GARIBALpI
and FARM in relation to the proper period for
summoning the Sicilians 10 vote upon the ques-
ton of annexation, which led to the expulsion of
the latter from the Island. Both are patriots of
unquestionable integrity; both are devoted to the
fortunes of VIcToa EMMANUEL, and both are in
favor of annextng Sicily TO his dominons -
FARINI, however, being pressed by CAvoUR, who
himself no Of
diplomacy, advocated immediate annexation:
whilst GARIBALDI insisted that the appeal to the
people should be delayed Had FARM carried his
point, the powers of GARIBALDI, as Dictator,
would have beeen superseded by the powers en-
trusted to FARINI as Royal Commissioner, and the
consequence would have been that the de-
signs entertained by GARBALDI of invading
Naples, and of prosecuting the war of
of liberation until the whole of the Peninsula was
brought under one sceptre would have been effect
ually frustrated. GAR1BALDI well knows that.
while he exercises authority in Sicily, he can
bit out his fleets and organize his troops for more
extended operations, without making Sardinia
amenable for his acts, OR bringing her under the
censure OF other Powers. He knows, also, that
the principle of non-intervention, which has been
publicly avowed by England and France, renders
him perfectly able to hold Sicily for VICTOR EN-
MANUEL, against any force that Naples might des-
patch to attempt the reconquest of the Island, and
and to turn it over to Sardinia whenever the pro.
per time arrives to justify the transfer But he
has evidently resolved to place no faith in CAvoUR
or FARINI in PALMERsToN or RUSSELL; in LOUIS Ma
PoLEoN or THoUvENEL. He believes only in him
self in VICTOR EMMANUEL, and in the justice of
his cause. Whether he will succeed in accom-
pllshng all that he has resolved to undertake, or
whether the intrigues of Foreign Powers and the
repentant attitude assumed by Naples may battle
even his determined efforts, the events of the next
few months will, in all probability, determine.