New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1860-07-16
TuK TWO DEMOCRATIC FACTIONS


n sorse in the selection of Presidential candi.
date, some sanguine persons appear to entertain
hopes that q cooperation may yet be brought about
for defeating the Republican ticket and 80 devolv-
inp upon the House of Representatives, or rather
upon the Senate, the choice Of President. Two
schemes having this object in view have been sug-
ge,ted. One 10, that in the Northern States the
whole body of the Democrats should concentrate
on Douglas, while in the Southern States only the
Breckenridge ticket should be voted for. The
other is that the Douglas and Breckenridge men,
in all the States, should agree upon the same ticket
for Presidential electors, upon an understanding
that in voting this ticket the preference of the
voter shall also be expressed upon it, and that
the electors chosen shall divide their votes be-
tween Douglas and Breckenridge in the numerical
proportion Of the preferences indicated in the
ballots.
But to these and all other plans of cooperation
between the two Democratic factions there exist
inyincible obstacles. The same antagonism that
produced the original split operates with undimin-
ished force to prevent any reunion, whether COM
plete or partial. If the desire of defeating the
Republicans had not been overborne BY still
stronger impulse of internal antpathy, the separa-
ton Of the party into two fragments, arrayed in
hostility against each other, never would have
taken place. This internal antipahy, while it re.
tains its original vigor, must be the dominating
power in both the fragments Of the party. 1t is
NO longer the first object with the respect
i've adherents of Douglas and Breckin-
ridge to defeat the Republicans. Family
quarrels are universally regarded rs more bitter
than any others, and the pending controversy be.
tween the Douglas and Breckenridge factions pos
sesses all the attributes of family quarrel. How
ever much they may hate the Republicans, they
hate each other still more. With them, the first
question to be decided isnot the election of Presi
dent, but the leadership Of the Democratic party.
This state of the case is entirely fatal to the idea
of giving up the North to Douglas and the South to
Breckenridge. That would leave the quarrel ex-
actly where it stands now. The Breckenridge men
would certainly never agree thus to strengthen and
confirm that hold of Douglas upon the Northern
Democracy which made him so powerful at Charles
ton ard Baltimore, as to drive them to the
necessity of secession. Their great object is AMI
must be to extiDguish the political power of Doug
las at the North. Especially, it must be grand
point with them to defeat him in bis own State of
Illinois. It is to his ascendency in that State, as
evnced by his reelection to the United States Sen.
ate, that his present position is almost entirely due.
Had he been defeated on that occasion, either he
would have been driven altogether from the field of
politics, or would have been obliged to remain in it
only as the humble retainer and convenient tool
and servant OF that Southern faction which he now
so proudly sets at defiance.
On the other hand, Douglas never would consent
to yield up the South without struggle, to Brock
inridge That would be adding increased strength
and weight to the very obstacle which stood in the
way of his nomination at Charleston. His North
ern ascendency is of no use to him, except so far
as it may enable him to build up a party at the
South, and to triumph over those who seeded at
Charleston and Baltimore and nominated Breckin-
ridge.
The objections are not less decisive against the
scheme of common electoral ticket, to be voted
for by both factions. Putting out of view those
practical difficulties in the way Of such an arrange.
ment, which would prove Of the most serious
character, neither party could on principle agree
to it. 1t might answer very well for those from
whom the proposition oomes-namely, the trim
mers between the two factions, who have no prefer
ence for either; but the part of those who have
made the quarrel it would be humiliating con-
cessiOn.
Such would be the obstacles to the pro posed co.
operation even admitting that provided the choice
Of President could be transferred from the People
to Congress) both the factions stood an equal
chance. But that is not by any means the case.
Douglas and his supporters have nothing to expect
from any such transfer They have no strength
in either House. To agree to any arrange
meut for throwing the election into Congress,
would BE- little short of surrender at discretion to
the Breckenridge faction. Nothing could more
surely tend to diminish the popular vote thrown
for Douglas. The boast that he will carry the
bulk of the Democracy, and so secure an
election by the people, however absurd, will
not be without its weight with q large
class to whose support Douglas looks, and
whose confident ignorance may be presumed upon
to almost any extent But if the campaign is on
tered into merely on the basis of devolvng the cleo
ton upon Congress, all hope of the election of
Douglas must be abandoned, while chance may
still be claimed for Breckenridge or Lane. In this
state of the case great numbers of the Democracy,
who have preference for being on the winning
side would transfer their votes from Douglas to
Breckenridge and Lane on the strength Of this
chance in their favor az against the admitted