The daily exchange. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1858-1861, 1860-02-15

rings of their Baltimore tools and stalking-horses
will not bear the light of day. They are afraid
of investigation and the evidence plainly shows
that they have good reason to be afraid.
Those Spanish journalists, who, at the begin
ming of the Moorish war, INDUCED in speculations
to the probable value and effect Of the acquisi-
ton of territory destined to be made, appear to
have committed the mistake of counting their
chickens before they were Matched Marshal
ODoNNELL, if he anticipated either an easy or a
speedy conquest of Morocco, literally reckoned
without his host. Morocco is not conquered yet,
nor, Judging from present appearances, is soon
likely to be. The slow progress of the Spanish
army, and the absence of any conspicuous proofs
Of generalshp on the part of the leaders, or any
remarkable feats of arms on the part of the men,
indicate that the practical lesson in the art of war
which the Spaniards are now learning in Morocco,
has not begun one day too soon. During pc
riod of nearly three months, since the dsembarka-
ton of the troops, the Spaniards have advanced
distance of not quite twenty-one miles along the
coast, and although perpetually in the presence
of the enemy, have been engaged in but one con-
siderable action. For two months the Spaniards
lay idle at Ceuta. On the goth of December, they
began to make road which was to lead across
the billy country south of Ceuta, and in the di-
rection of Tetuan. On the lst of January, the
army began to move. On that day, the Second
and Third corps darmee, commanded respectively
by ZABALA and Ros DE OLANo, with General PRIM's
corps de reserre, numbering in all above 20, 900
men, marched out of camp. After crossing the
high ground south of Ceuta, the new road led
down towards the sea. Here within two miles OF
the camp, was a 'semi-circular plain, the chord
''beng formed by the sea, and the periphery by
"broken ground rising gradually into rugged
mountains" The Moors, who endeavored to
obstruct the advance of the Spanish army, were
driven first into the plain, and then into the
hills which formed its southern boundary.
The skirmshing lasted until the afternoon, when,
intending to bivouac in the plain for the night,
O'DoNNELL ordered General PRM to dislodge the
Moors who occupied the northern slope of the
ridge. This PRM succeeded in doing, not, how
ever, without some hard fighting and considera-
BILE number of casualties. The entire Spanish loss
during the day, in killed and wounded, exceeded
five hundred. PRM encamped upon the ridge,
and it was three days before the army resumed its
line of march. To the position thus gained the
Spaniards gave the name of Castillejos from two
white buildings situated upon the ridge On the
9Th of January the army advanced, and on the
18th it was before Tetuan. On the 18th it was
reinforced by the division of General RIOS, which
had sailed from Malaga, and which landed at the
mouth Of the Tetuan River, and occupied the forts
from which Moors had been driven by the Spanish
feet fortnight before Since then the kilograms
state that 'the news from Morocco is unimpor-
Giant" Doubtless the next intelligence of mo-
ment will be of the taking of Tetuan, which, how
ever, will hardly be effected without serious loss,
for the Moors are capital fellows behind ramparts.
In fact, in every engagement thus far, the Moors
appear to have fought well. They have fought
with that desperation of valor which fanaticism
always inspires, and in nearly every instance
they have made the first attack. With the excep-
ton Of the naval attack on Tetuan on the 29h
of December, when the Spanish gun-boats de-
sroyed the forts at the mouth of the river, the
SpaniardS appear to have uniformly acted upon
the defensive. When in camp before Ceuta, they
limited their operations to the defence of their
lines, which were frequently assailed by the Moors
and to covering the working-parties who were en-
gagged in making the road. The battle of Castilejos
seems to have been rather the result of mis-
apprehension Of orders, either wilful or accidental
by General PRM, than of any settled strategetical
plan on the part of the Commander-in- Chief
PRIM directed TO drive the Moorish skirmisf-
ers from the side of the hills which bounded the
in which IN
He advanced and took possession of the entire
ridge Another attack was made by the Moors,
who continued to hang on the TANKS of the Span
iSh army, on the 9TH Of January, but the particu
lars of the engagement have not TRANSFERRED. On
the 18th there was fighting and the passes of the
Cabo Negro the fourth and last of the mountain
ridges which lie between Ceuta and Tetuan, had to
be forced But altogether the campaign thus far
has not been a particularly brisk or stirring one,
and the Spanish losses by fever and cholera have
exceeded the number of casualties in the field
AT the same time what fighting there has been
seems to have been pretty sharp work. Accord
ing to the Spanish accounts, the Moors fight like
perfect devils, neither giving nor taking quarter
When wOrsted in an encounter, they will readily
seek safety in flight but if retreat prove impossi
BILE, they will rather perish under the Spanish
bayones or kill each other than be taken prison
ers. They are encouraged to this desperate sacri-
fee of their lives by their religion, which teaches
them that in the shade Of the crossing scimetars
''paradseis prefgured, and reserves its highest
wards for those who die in battle against the ndels
Another advantage the side of the Moors, is
to be found in the character of the country which
is exceedingly uneven and mountainous, and
literally without roads--admirably adapted TO the
skirmishng irregular method of warfare to which
the Moors accustomed, but offering innumera-
BILE obstacles to the movements of troops encum-
bered with all the impedimenta of modern army.
1t is doubtful whether, after ALL the Spanards will
be able to do more than capture and hold some of
the principal towns on the coast, such as Tetuan,
Tanger and Larache and will not be compelled to
abandon altogether the idea of subugating and
occupying The country Should they attempt
to advance into the interior, they must not
only make their own roads, but must carry with
them their own provisions. This would make the
conquest OF the country an undertaking of immense
difficulty and uncertain accomplishment, and we
should not be surprised 10 the Spanish Cabinet
advantages already gained, or which NAV he
gained, upon the coast. Certainly it would be the
wiser conclusion, and one perfectly compatible
with the dignity of the Spanish nation, and the
objects for which the war was undertaken. The
Moors had been insolent, and refused satisfaction.
Spain has undertaken to chastise them 1t is not
necessary that the castgaton should extend to the
death of the criminal. The Moors will be sufi-
GENTLY punished by the loss of Tetuan and Tanger
and should Spain attempt to accomplish more than
this, from the length of time already consumed in
operations which as yet have resulted in NOTHING
it may not be difficult TO estimate how much time
will be required to complete the subiugation of the
country.
The COMMISSIONERS OF PATENTS new Commits
sioner of Pa tents, Ex-Governor Thomas, has ar