Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1860-10-26


was great eagcrnrss Oh the purl Of the public
to swallow all kind Of news unfayorable to
Garlbaldi's policy and foresight. The hero was
fast losing ground, especially in the minds o!
the English and French letter writer's; and, as
a consequence, not an inronsderable part Of
our contemporaries followed in their track
This was TO he expected from those people,
who, taking it Tor granted that revolutions are
mere dramas played out for their amusement,
begin to hiss the very moment their favorite
performance does not accord with their notions
Of mclo-dramatic art. That, however, is living
in the clouds
As for Garibaldi, ifhr ever lived in the clouds,
they We're rather stormy ones; and there we
must follow him, among the conflicting elc-
tnentS wht'" struggle among themselves for
equilibrium The question, therefore, is not
whether Garibaldi has been guilty Of political
blindness, in permitting Mazzinian influences
to approach him, but whether he was at liberty
to avoid them entirely, and what were the best
means to dIsarIn the situation Of its dangers
lie had the Mazznians with him and around
him all the tinc-from the day hc landed in
Sicily to the day he entered Naples. They had
Il right to share in the spoils and the policy
Of keeping them back was fraught with moro
dangers than that Of permitting them to play
their part for the best or the worst, provided
the part entrusted To them should be such as
only to cudangcr their own cause in case Of
failure
This, Garibald has achieved, with great sue
cess Had he allowed hinlsclfio pass for being
reconcilcd with Count Cavour, whose guilt,
to Garibal,li's eye, not less than to the eye of
the Italians, is that of having bargaincd Lom-
hardy for Savoy, he would have given life and
substance to the fear not altogether chimerical
of the alleged bargain of Naples for the island
Of Sardinia; Il fear, the consequence of which
would have been to divert the tide Of popu!ari-
ty toward MazziniSm. 1t was stealing an
opponents thunder. Yet, it does not follow
that Garibaldis objections 10 Count Cnvours
cabinet arc not personal and sincere. There is
nothing which rartakes OF the character of ex-
pedicncy in them, but the fclM with which no
made them known, and the circumstances with
which il pleased him to make the event the
more noticeable to the outstanding public, as
neither Count Cavour nor Victor Emmanuel re-
ouirrd that intlnation Of Garibaldi's antiCa-
vournian policy. On the whole, we contend
that although Garibaii talked somewhat Wild
ly--not 50 widely as the reports go--hc acted
wisely, and much more 50, indeed, than he has
had credit for.
Let us take our cue from the facts, and not
from the 0ndits lie has been blamed for
putting of the annexation, but ne has made
the annexation Il fact by placing the Ncapoll'
tan navy under command Of the Sandman ad-
miral, thereby dcpriying himself Of the only
means ut his disposal TO attack Austria in We
nctia. That is, If we arc not mistaken, killing
two birds with one stone; giving TO Piedmont
the best token for the annexation which is to
take place, and the Surcst pledge that no I'M
mature attack is intended against Austria. As
for the threat Of attacking the French in Rome,
il never was uttered, and, moreover. we notice
that At the same time that these loolhardy
projects were ungencrously attributed TO him,
he was bent upon the task Of forcing the King
of Narlcs ont Of lis den at Gaeta. But, then,
he met with "A reverse at Capua; the Garlbal-
dians had been put to flight; foot soldiers had
been unable to stand cavalry and artillery COM
bincd, anI although the attack on Capua was
but stratagen ta allow another division OF
Garibaldans 10 cross the Voltumo, which they
actually succeeded in crossing, although the
attacking column Oil Capua was only guilty OF
the same rlshncSS, which caused General dc
lour,ncTs death under the walls Of Scbasto-
pol; although the flight Of the Garlbaldans
before the Ncapoltan S1lladrons and batteries
was more like war than the charge of Balakla-
W of which the Russians said that it was beau
,iIul but nothing like war; i sentence to which
the English have agreed, not only implicitly,
but most explicitly, by causing court mar
lal to enquire into the circumstances that at
tended that rash order for J. charge; yet the
tiarbadianS were taken to task as Il people who
had better try their hands at something else than
a soldiers calling; and Mr. Edwin James lavors
Us with most graphic account Of the 'panic,
rs the light of Il body of soldiers is sure 10 be
called by civilians, who, not being use to the &C
cidcnts OF war, fancy it is the duty OF Il soldier
to stand fast and give his enemy the satisfaction
of cutting him Of from this world, even wheE
there is nothing which it is his duty to protect
bnt himself. The Garibaldians knew they
were not posted there to protect Caserta t
their rear; but that CaScrta, Oh the contrary
would project them il they could hut reach II
by running back, AMI they ran back.
That lriIling circumstance was construed IN
to IL defeat The political wisdom and the
military prestige had departed from Garlbaldl
Garibaldi's downfall was next to be looked for
and with it the loss Of that magnificent oppor
Of Italy, to which the annals Of history nle1
no parallel.
How, then, does the matter stand? Thl:
may be summed ul in few words pro
grrss more striking even than anything tha
had already happened, has taken place; dari
baldi has resumed the command of his troops
fought battle, and gained victory over th'
Ncapolitan army; Cialdini occupies Ancona
and I.amolicicrc is in Turin, prisoner o
war; King Victor Emmanuel in person takes
the comnand Of his forces, and is on his way
10 Naples; the Sandman Parliament supports
Count Cayour; Count Cavour gives assurance
that no attack will lr made either on Rome Of
Venice, and that the ceSsion to France oil an
other inch of Italian territory Was never alkee
Of Mazzini, in what might be called mode
rate manifesto, claims the right of saying
that the unity being possible in two