Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1860-12-05
THE RAFTs6DAM's JOURNAL.
FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.

j FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW.
The Democratic papers have recently been
saying great deal about several of the North
ern States, including Pennsylvania, having
laws to obstruct the Fugitive Slave Act. The
following extract from an exchange will per-
haps enlighten some folks about the design
and nature of the Pennsylvania law:
In 1926, the Legislature of Pennsylvania
passed the act ssto give effect to the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, rel
atiye to fugitiyes from labor, for the protection
of people of color, and to prevent Kid nap
ping. Under this act person, named Ed
ward Prigg, was indicted by the Grand Jury
of FORK county for having carried off negro
woman from the State, with intent to sell, and
dispose of her a slave. The negro was
shown and admitted to have been slave who
had escaped from Maryland. The defendant,
Prigg, was agent of her owner, who had OBJ
tanned a warrant from magistrate, in accord
ance with the act of 1926, on which the negro
was arrested and brought before the magistrate,
who then refused to have anything to do with
the case. Prigg then took the slave back to
Maryland without complying with the provis-
ions of that act, requiring him to establish his
claim before magistrate. And tor this he
was indicted under the act. The defendant
was found guilty, and the case was carried ND
on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which gave pro forma judgment a.
galnst the defendant, and thence to the Su
| preme Court of the United States On the
argument before the latter tribunal the cause
was conducted on the footing of an amicable
suit between Pennsylvania and Mary land which
had become a party in interest and the good
| faith of Pennsylvania in passing the act of
| 1926 was admitted by the counsel for the de-
| fendant. The Supreme Court decided that
| that part OF the act of 1926 under which the
| n dafa naanf has beep Indie fed and f,r
| kidnapping, was unconstitutional; because
| under the clause OF the Constitution, the own
| er fugitive slave had the right of reception
| provided be can do it without any breach of
| the peace or illegal violence. And the court
went further and decided, though with some
! dissenting voices, that the whole of the por-
tion of the act which provided the mode in
which the reclamation of fugltives from labor
should be conducted was unconstitutional be-
| cause Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over
| the subject. The court further decided that
| the constitutionality of the power conferred
| upon State magistrates by the act of Congress
of 1898 was doubtful, although such magis-
trates might, if they choose, exercise that au-
thority, unless forbidden by the State Legisla-
ture. The case was decided in 1912, ,and the act
against kidnapping being held to be unconsti-
| tutional, large class of persons were left
without any protection from abduction; since,
! if the negro stealer could only escape with his
/
dispose of him beyond recall. Accordingly
the Legislature of this State, in lS47, passed
| an act on this subject, which is still in force
| except single section repealed in 1852 for
| bidding the use of the State and county -pris-
ons for the detention Of fugitive slaves. This
! act Is In substance, as follows THE first and
! second sections against kidnapping are almost
/ identical with those of the act of 1926 except
| that the words ssfree negro or mulatto'' are
/ used instead of s'negro or mulatto." These
sections have since been held constitutional.
| The third section prohibits judges and other
magistrates of the State from exercising anv
jurisdiction in fugitive slave cases. This sec
tion is predicated upon the principle recog-
nized by the United States Supreme Court
that the States have a right to prohibit their
magistrates from acting under the fugitive
| slave law of 1898. The admission Of the court
| that q State might prohibit her magistrates
| from acting under Congressional law, did
not require that every State should proceed to
do so. Now, however, the present fugitive
| slave law, by implication, takes away the pow
| er to act under it from all State judges and
| mag giStrates, and confides these powers exclu-
| sively to the United States commissioners and
judges. The fourth section of the act of 1S47
| prohibits the owner of the fugitive from re-
taking him in violent and tumultuous man
ner, to disturb or endauger the public
peace, and imposes penalty or fine, of not
more than one thousand dollars, and imprison-
ment tor not more than three months, on con-
| viction. The limitation to the right of recap
ton, indicated by the Supreme Court, was that
the owner must exercise it without any breach
of the peace or illegal violence. The fifth Sec
tion of the act of 1S47 reserves the right of
the State Judges to issue writs of habeas cor
puS IN all cases of arrest and Imprisonment.
This act has been re-enacted in the penal code
passed at the last session of the Legislature,
1 with an additional section, prohibiting, under
a penalty of five hundred dollars any attempt
to enforce a sale made within this State OF a
fugitive slave who is within this State at the
time Of the sale.