Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1859-07-30
ST. LOUIS CORRESPONDENTS.

Among our communications will be found a Sec
ond letter from our st. Louis fiiend, some points
OF which we will briefly notice.
We take, with our friend, Blackstone's definition
of municipal law, but the difference between US 10
this:-IIe takes IL verbatim we receive 1t as
Blackstone evidently meant it to be understood, as
shown by his language in other places. and as
judged by tho opinions Of his commentators. The
definition reads thus:
Municipal law is a rule Of civil conduct, pre-
scribed by the Supreme power in a State, com
handing what is right and prohibiting what is
wrong"
Family law might justly be defined to be a rule
Of conduct prescribed by the head of the house,
commanding what is right aud prohibiting what is
wrong. But every body would understand that to
mean, that the head of the house was to be the
judge of what was right and what was wrong, and
that his views were to be the rule of conduct, the
law to be enforced, and not those of the servants
or children. The Ruling Po,cer in toe State, as in
the Family, is to judge of what is right it's decis-
ion is 6nal, and it's rule legally binding, whether
others think it right or wrong. The author OF the
Ordinance of 1887 thus defines law, and, we think.
gives tho meaning that Blackstone intended to
convey in his definition, and which is certainly the
only rendering that is practically recognized by
any court or government of whose existence we
are cognizant.
municipal or civil law, says Nathan Dane,
sis tho rule Of municipal or civil conduct. pre-
sc-ited by the Superior power in the State COM
handing what the Legislature deems right and pro-
ti5itipg what it deems wrong"
In regard to the validity OF law, it is true that
Blackstone says,
This law Of nature, being cooval with mankind
and dictated by God himself, is of course superior
in obligation to any other. 1t is binding over all
the globe, in all countries, and at all times no
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to
this and such Of them AS are valid, derive all
their force, and all their authority, mediately or
Immediately, FROM this original"
Colridge, in his edition of Blackstone declares
that there the author means merely that a
law, contrary to nature, has no binding force on
the conscience. According to our correspondence
Interpretation of Blackstone, no laws which are
contrary to the law of God or the law of Nature,
are valid all laws contrary to reason are contra
~ to the Divine law, and if Cur correspondents
premise be correct, have no legal force-ure not
lao, in fact. What says Blackstone on this pointf
II know it is generally laid Town more largely.
that acts OF Parliament, contrary to reason, are
void. But if the Parliament will positively enact
$ a thing to be done which is unreasonable, | know
D of no power, in the ordinary forms of the Consti-
tuition, tn 1t is vested with authority to control it
and the examples usually alleged, in support o.
{ this sense OF the rule, do mono of them prove, that,
: where the main object cf a statute is unreasonable,
the Judges are at liberty to reject it for that we're
to set the ~ju1icial power above that of the Legisla-
ture, which would be subversive of all Govern
ment. y If we could conceive
it possible for the Parliament to enact that a
| mnn shnn1d f-p no prnl Lila a"D ,,e nc
those of other persons, there is no court that he's
power to defeat the intent of the Legislature, when
5 couched in such evident and express words. as
leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the
Legislature or not"
The latter part o: the above quotation does no
exactly harmonic with the opinions expressed by
our friend in regard to Blackstone's views concern
r ing a judge acting in his own case. We leave bin
to reconcile the discrepancy as be best can.
We do most certf inly believe that Legislative
enactment, which is contrary to the law of God,
|, is nevertheless law, and in the Old Book it is des-
|cribed as "~iniquity framed by law" and we re-
gard it as legally binding upon all subjects Of the
government which adopts it, and no Judge has
any right TO 70 behind it except 20 com pare it with
the Constitution either written or unwrit,en, or any
legal document which is superior to a legislative
enactment.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the bred
Scott case as given by Judge fancy, is one thing
his extra judicial opinion upon points not raised in
the case, is another. The latter part of the first
quotation our friend makes comes very near des-
Icribing the c. ndition of woman in this country,
! for she has in government no authority, rights or
| privileges, but such as those who hold the power
of government choose to grant yet it would hard
r ly be just TO affirm. that Federal and State govern
ments therefore declare, that woman has no rights
t which men are toand to respect. For however
few may be her legal or political rights, men
are bound to respect them. So of whatever rights
which the government recognizes as belonging to
the colored man.
The first quotation relates to the rights of the
, colored man to citizenship the second. purpors
to be a historical record, containing the we'll
| known phrase, 'they, 1.-THE negroes) had no rights
; which white men are bound to respect :" referring
I ored man was certainly more universally degraded
3 in law and in fact than now. We may be mistak-
en- in our estimate Of Judge Taney's decision. 1t
D was bad enough as we regard it but we would
5 give even the Devil his due. If it was merely an
Q extra Judicial opinion, mot even in.he present tense
r that negroes had no rights lat a certain time
, which white men were bound to respect, we should
Q be sorry to mistake that for the decision of the
! Supreme Court-it would be unjust to the Court
and doing the colored man harm. rather thar
Q good.
SMALL BY DEGREES, AND BEAUTIFUL