Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1859-09-14

1 their rule, will be as efectual col4uest BY
the hostile North over the Sou,h as if it were
accomplished by the sword. The vast power
of the Federal Government would be thrown
into the scale Of sbolition-.the elemen Of
fauaticism and hostility at the North would
be stimulated into gigantic developlnent-a
profound encouragement would weigh like
lead upon the bosom Of the SOuth-a hated
sense Of inferiority and degradation would
crush the public spirit; traitors would begin
to raise their hideous heads, nud the hissings
of these horrible serpents would be heard on
every hand bad men would ly to the imperial
capital to get great Offices; the good would
despair OF their country, and suppose that all
was lost, because nothing was done.
assume, then, that the great, actual, prsc.
tical, absorbing, present. immediate para
mount danger with which nc are threatened,
is the domination Of q northern sectional par.
ty, protesting principles which are death to
US, anl impelled by passions Of the most
malignant nature. If this 90 the danger
which threatens US, then by the natural iu-
stinct Of selfpreservation, to. say nothing of
common sense, of craftsmanship, our policy,
or paramount policy, our duty, our necessity,
II had almost added our destiny-is to en-
deavor to guard against ito avert it if pos.
sible; and if it cannot be ayerted, to 80
manage that it may happen under such cir.
! cumsta aces as will best enable US to set up
I for ourselves. In other words, our policy is {:
! first, tu prevent, if possible, the ecton Of q
republican President; second, if this must
occur in spite of oil our wise exertious to the
i 20 ,lnS ,nb
issues as will best enable us to set up q
Southern government. The great question,
then, for US is: What is that policy? How
shall We 90 act as best to accomplish this
double purpose Of preventing the election Of a
black republican OF, if that takes place, to
20 into revolution" Fortunately, the same
line Of policy best calculated to accomplish
the first purpose, is exactly the policy most
like to accomplish the second. In other
words, the same policy best calculated to de.
feat the election Of a republican President, is
best calculated, in case of such election, to
secure 3 Southern contederacy. That policy
] consists of the greatest possible degree of
4 moderation in the political movements Of the
South, consistent with principle and honor,
!: between this time and the Presidential cleo
tiou.. 1t requires no argument to show that
!, this policy of moderation is the most likely
mode of defeating the republican party in the
Presidential election. The very existence of
| this party, which sprung up upon the repeal
! of the Missouri restriction, tests upon the
false assumption that the South are pursuing
an aggressive pro-slGyery course, and using
the Federal Government for this purpose. OF
course, therefore, the greater the ultraism of
| the Souti, the better for this party. They
would wish the South to proceed to every
possible extreme of ultraism. Utrais.u at
the South is the food of this party. Hence
we see hcw they exagserate the extent Of the
! movement at tue South Tor the revival OF the
4 African slave trade; and indeed, upon every
! subject they systematically mis- represent pub
I Il C sentiment At the South. They are anxious
l that We should demand the revival Of the
u African slave trade and what they call slave
anxious that We sh5dd ssHsFE HsHFE ft Upon a1s lie sEE SsEE
to carry aud keep slaves in the free States.
In short, they are feyersh to see us depart
from that long course Of wise conservatism
which characterized the South. In proportion
rs We do this, or they can make It appear that
We ME doing so, 70 that extent 10 they make
capital Now have no desire to give capital
to this party; therefore | wish to sec the South
take exactly the opposite course 20 that which
they desire. They desire the South to proceed
to the widest u!traism; desire the South tu
! pursue the wisest conservatism.
That the course of moderation have re.
commended, is equally important to the inau
guratiun Of Southern CDnfederacy, in case
Of the success of the republican party in the
next Presidential election, is ooTiouS from
,be slightest consideration. What was it
prevented the State Of South Carolina from
seeding in 1922 The Convention invested
with sovereign powers was in session. Why
did that Convention decline to secede 7 The
brief ordinance they adopted explains every
thing. In that ordinance they cay that they
had sufficient cause for secession, but declined
to do so on the groun;l of expcdlclcy. Why
was it inexpedient? Recause the public opin-
ion of the South was not ripe for disunion.
Now how will you best ripen tIat public
opinion by the presidential election When
ask this question | assume that it is the
fixed policy Of the State to secede as soon as
the republican party elect their President.
That is the course have recommended; !; that
is the course which | now recommend. The
great point then is to rpen public opinion
South for dissolution in the contingency
referred to--the election Of Republican
President. The important question then is,
how can this best be done 10 this question
| think there can BIZ but one arswer-Dy pur-
suing such course Of political action between
this time and the election, as that the success
OF the Republican party will produce the
most startling effect South. Nov what is
this course OF political action? 1t il notlera-
tion. 1t is placing ourselves upon the most
conservative platform possible. Suppose that
having done this, the Republican party carry
the election; in SO doing, they will demon
strate in the strongest manner possible the
hostile sectionalisln of t'.s North. The South
ern people will be satisfied that they have
nothing farther to hope from tho NorEh. They
will be proportionately oxaspetated, nnd they
will feel that their only hope is in themselves.
At least such will be the natural tendency OF
things.
Suppose that the South should pursue a
different line Of policy in the elec,on; sup
pose that the South should insist on the re-
vival Of the African slave trade, or other
novel and advanced issues is it not evident
that the effect of the election Of Republ-
can in ripening Southern opinion would be
infinitely weakened2 a great many AZ the
South would cry out that the success of the
Republican party was owing to the ultraism
of the South that the South was responsible
for the result produced; That it was all owing
to her own folly. Thus woulI be getminated
wide-cast the seeds of Southern disspnsiun.
Thus would the South be paralysed. Sup
pose, to illustrate still further my idea that
the South should put herself on Platform
requiring the opening Of the African slave
trade and Congressional Intervention by a
full and specific code Of laws for the protec-
| tion and repuIntion of slavery in the tarrito-