The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-02-01
The Cuhan Q.uest,on.
rFrom the JournsI of Com merce Ian

The Cuban Question.
tFrom the Journal Of Com merce, Jan. 81.
Tho pubic mind Ia at present occupied W unusual de-
gree with the proposition 70 p,aoe at the disposal of tho
Presidents OF the United States extraordinary
enable him 20 negotiate for the acquisition of Cuba should
favorable opportunity occur for It's purchase The deep
interest always felt this country questions OF terri.
orsl scqu'siion sud expansion 10 augmented in this
our Southern border and the control which W possession
Is supposed 10 give Of the Mexican Gu and the great
commercial interests seeking devel0pemcat she Central
American States and the Wcst Indian Islands.
Tho acquisition OF Cuba has long been avore project
with the manifest destiny Gloss OF the American people,
but whether considerations q . commercial or political
character are most potent In prompting this dsIre for
securing one OF SPANS most valuable dependencies,
might be dicult 70 decide. Arguments based both
bese are freely urged Ia behalf or mca
sure which. be confessed has wisely wisely,
been brought 80 prominently before the Americao people,
discussfSn In the puolic press.
Productive "a the island of Crta, and commercially
and geographically important s there grave
sons for doubling the wisdom OF making its acquisition
measure Of public policy tho present. indeed at any
future time These reasons have doubtless suggested
themselves tebe rejecting reader quite f0rcby 10
ourselves; but may be amss TO rsfor TO some Of
them briefly in this connection
II Cuba were low populated by race having Ian
gusge and soc az habits In harmony with people,
one Of the objections 10 its incorporation into the Union
would be removed But TO minds the proposition to
Cuba constituent part OF republic is fraught with OBJ
ectons OF the most serious character and should only be
It6Oou d6 cDOCe OF evils, measure OF the
sernest and most imperious political necessity
On another point we have been unable fully 10
agree with the advocates Of speedy acquisition of
Cuba Ine argument so strongly urged, that its pos
session il important element Of protection and
defence, 10 not by any means incontrovertibe. In
Decd may be seriously questioned whether in this re-
spect would not DO OF weakness rather than of
strength. Once in our possession must be prepared
to bold against he powers Of the world undertake
ing which would necessate wide departure from the
peaceful Icy hitherto recognized by this government
and an OF our army and navy far beyond
the scale thus far deemed sufficient for the enforcement OF
our rights and tho protection and security OF pos
sessions If Cuba is strong in strategec view, 1t also
requires powerful armament, and constant prepara
ton TO maintain the advantages which it offers in this
spect.
In caae Of war between the United States and any
Power possessing largely superior navy plain that
Cuba defended; for our communication with
It, either for the supply OF provisions, would be
cut of by vast intervening hostile fleet. Moreover, any
aemptto defend It, by throwing into It large force in
ticipaton Of would by much weaken at home,
and still more If by any possibility we could keep up
communicate on with during the war. " would be like
having defend foreign country in addition
must be admitted that the possession of the island
would In some respects enhance our commercial advan
tages, giving TO as would more decided control Of
the sugar market than have at present. and that in
exchanging, as we should then more freely do our
products for those of Cuba instead Of ing for half
Of pur chases in specie bills England ad.
vantages would result not only to commerce, but
the the sugars other productions OF that
island On the other hand present sugar interest in
Louisiana and Texas, which by means SMALL would
be nearly not entirely destroyed, could not stand
served that in its trade with Cuba the United States
stands the footing of the most favored nations Spain
asss as 70 most articles over every other nation Our
trade with Cuba s largo and profitable now; 1t might be
more so we owned the sland but is generally safe
To the philanthropst anxious for more effective sup
preston Of the slave trade the transfer Of Cuba which Is
now the great market for African slaves, to the jursdc
ton of the American Union would TO promise such
result case Of the Wanderer may well create
some misgvs on this point instead stopping the
should become channel for their importation from Africa
into the United States, there would be NO gain on the
Of humanity Then, again, nae might expect grand
political eervescence here 1t h0me the question of
admitting slave State not at present belonging to
Union.
While we have not hitherto BEEN and probably shall not
hereafter be- found advocating the RADICAL and be-
eve dangerous policy Of pushing territorial acquisi
tions TO extreme mits-of extending institutions
means Of acquiring power, rather than the result
Of the working OF superior system Of government
do not reject the responsibilities which the egt-
mate Influences Of political system impose upon U.S.
and therefore accept the theory that territorial
possessions must from time to time be increased as
the governments Of adjacent contiguous countries
fail TO perform their legitimate functions and their people
demand that higher and better protection which afford
ed by government and political fabric, like that under
which the United States have greatly prospered Such
expansion, however to command our approval must not
be aggressive and forced but peaceful and natura-no
Of national ambition, but fulhlment Of
hopal deatny.
The time may come when in the spirit we have indi-
Gated Cuba will easily and Justly and beneciay become
part Of the American Union, and certainly not
inclined to place any obstacles in the way of such
this time is uuduy excited BY causes having no just CON
necon with the principles above referred TON fact that
may be- designed political which shalt
largely influence II does not control the next Presiden
any complications Of this character, preferrng
70 stand on OUT own opinions, and TO let
a Ssnseves Mot asauredy would we not end
to the for the acquisition of Cuba support for
the benefit of either Of the political parties could
N. noA
that highest interests Of tho people Of the United
States Of Cuba and Of Spain ITSELF may be thereby pro-
NOTED and secured
There not go far as the public are informed any evil
depce that Spain will be willing now to part with
Cuba than at previous periods in her history Indeed
far the declarations Of her ministers Co. she would seem
TO TO any negotiation the subject But such
is estimate Of the men in power at Madrid that
attach no importance whatever their declarations
this question The louder and more boserous their pro-
feesions the greater dsrust Of their sincerity
Assuming that Cuba, il ever acquired by tho United
States only to be obtained by peaceful means; that Is
no part Of policy TO wrest 1t from Spain to
her to dispose ofit in short, that 1t only fall
into our hands the result Of the devolope
ment and progress Of our institutions we can see no
serious objection TO placing now or at future tne
may accord with the views and feelings Of the two
houses of Congress- such means In the of the Pros
dent shall enable him TO negotiate whenever Spain sha
be disposed to meet this question We do not deem
il important that such authority shall be given at the pre-
sent session Of Congress- do any objection
comforting upon the President at this time. II lie not
probable that any opportunity will be afforded for its
ercse and therefore its possession is not question Of
present moment concern, while IL could not the
other hand well be productive Of harm.
AS we look upon the subject, its agitation at this
mept has greater political than commercial moral sig
ncance and likely to enter largely into the politics Of
the country the next few years. With the radical ten
denotes of the American people, We do not think 1t I'M
likely that majority Of them at the present moment are
in favor of Cuban acquisition and hence Is likely 10 be
popular topic with political leaders, and 10 the ends
IN one form or another Of designing and ambitious men,
The question s worthy Of higher and moredgnaed po
eton and its consideration demands the best efforts and
the most dsinerested labors Of the statesmen TO whose
charge it may be committed.
Police Intelligence.
TEE people vs.. JOHN O'BRN-The defendant in this
case assures that the report Of his suspicion
In