Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-08-14
A. NJ. WAND.
s. b WILSON.


Taose who speculate on political events will err
widely unless they take into consideration the fun
damental principles of human nature. Men do not
commit great crimes or achieve great exploits with
out adequate motive. Spite Of extreme theories Of
human depravity evil deeds rarely if ever per-
petrated simply because they are wicked, nor, we
fear would the lustrious virtues of even the great
est sustain the test that virtue shall be adhered to
for virtues sake alons,-the best we can hope for
human nature, in its improved condition, being that
out of all the conflicting motives by which it is &C
tuated, it should observe which OF them leads to-
wards good and which towards evil, cherishing the
former and snbduing the latter.
Accordingly, if we have expressed eur great
dissatisfaction with the peace of Villafranca, our
disappointment with the conduct of the French EN-,
peror in agreeing to it, we have not been 50 unreal
sonable or so irrational as to infer that because
it vas an iEdefensible peace LOUIS NAPOLEON was
monster of iniquty for making it, or that because
it left italy, as we believe still ensa7ed, still in the
power of Austria, the Preach Emperor desired that
Italy should so continue.
No: the more phio sophical course is to search in
surrounding circumstances for the inducemsn is
which could constIain resOute man to stop
short in his hitherto victorious career aud retire
from it under terms which he might know would in
the eyes of ali Europe stamp his enterprise with
the stigma of failure.
Success lie such potent element in the prestige
of NAPoLEoN that the motives must have been pow
erful indeed which induced him to allow Europe TO
believe that it was possible for him to fail.
To estimate these motives then it will be necessa-
ry to enter upon two topics the character of the
man, and the character of the circumstances by
which he is surrounded.
We believe of LOUIS NAPOLEON as We do of his
illustrious uncle that he has been enormously esti
mated, when far reaching and profound views of
policy have been supposed to be entertained by them
Snd infexibly pursued, all circumstances being
made to bend before them until the conceptions SO
long existing only in the intellect which conceived
them were realised and made potent in the executive
reality SO that all men could recognise them as the
tmanatons from the creative intellect which devils
ed them.
We believe that the true character of both the
NAPOLEoSs is very nearly the reverse of all this.
We believe that so far from framing line of policy
which was to be n1exibly adhered to under all cir
with which they appreciated circumstances, and
framed their policy in accordance with them That
the promptilude with which they modified, and even
reversed their whole policy at a moments notice. and
the marvellous rspidiy with which they have initis-
tee their combinations under the spur Of ne and
unexpected ciIcums aRces, was much more poten-
tia agent in achieving their success, than aay pro-
found or far-sghted conceptions which have been
attributed to them. TWAS this rapid aud vigorous
executive force which enabled the elder NAPOLEON
to put in execution the conceptions of ohess,-his
great strategic movements of piercing the eaemy's
centre and destroying his disointed forces in detail
was the Invention, not of himself but the great
mathematician and engineer CARNor, he himself
only supplying the scumen of observation which
determined the right moment for its adoption, and
the executive force which gave such irresistible en-
ergy to its execution. And to pass to civil matters
the Code NAPOLEON only the realization Of that
necessity for the codifoation of the French statute
law which the jurists of France had seen and ex-
pressed from the time of LOUIS XIV, only the var
GUS Fictitious interests which were opposed to the
change as being identified with the various abuses
and anomalies, needed central force as irresistible
ton of NAPOLEON coutd create to overcome the
opposing influences.
So with his great diplomatic transactions: tenaci
y in the pursuit of line Of policy adopted is
not nearly so prominent an element of NAPoLEoNrC
success as the prOmptues and rapdty with which
the whole principle of his policy could be reversed
to suit circumstances. fine illustration of this is
the treaty of Tilsit: previously to this the leading
principle of NAPoLBoN's policy had been that the
power of Russia must be limited checked if posi-
BILE, destroyed, but decided military advantage
Northern power, the probable advantages Of a con-
federation with his humbled foe with the purpose
of debating to the rest of Europe, inspired change
Of purpose which implied total reversal of all pre-
Vious combinations; an interview between the two
emperors took place, aud France and Russia were in
close alliance, their two emperors in state of con-
ddentisl friendship.
And the treaty of Tilsit has already been twice
pa-odied by the present NAPOLEON in the treaties
which followed the Crimean war and the recent war
in Italy In both cases, LOUIS NAPOLEON was the
friend and more than the friend eff his beaten foe
before the hostile alliance against him dissolved
In the first of these treaties the French and Russian
combined to outwt the English
!iplomatists and secure the benefits of the war to
Russia, France and even Austria, rather than to
larry out the purposes for which war was ostensby
declared; and, again, in the peace of VIllafranog
he interest and feelings of Austria the enemy, are
much more carefully regarded than those of Sardi-
1ia, the friend and ally.
All this goes to show that profound and far reach
ng views are not SO much the forte of the NAPo-
-EoSs as the acute appreciation of current cireum-
aanoes and the adrOit adaptation of their conduct
these changing events, always placing themselves
n advance of the ebbing or flowing tide, SO that