The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1859-12-02
The Right Of Self Government in the
Territories.

The Right Of Self Government I'm the
Territories.
The inherent right Of the people of the
Territories to regulate their own affairs in
their own way, has been so persistently mys-
titled by organs of both political parties
ostensibly based upon certain language in
the opinion of the court in the bred Scott
case, that we gladly reproduce the following
article from the Minneapolis Plaindealer.
The idea that the people could ever derive
any intrinsic rights of self-government from
their servants, the Congress of the United
States, was always so absurd in our estima
ton, as to be almost unworthy of notice /;
but in view of the continued misapplication
of the language of the court, to sustain that
ridiculous absurdity, we give Mr.. PURDY's
answer to it. The people of this country
will never endure the disgraceful restric-
tions attempted to be put upon the inhabi-
tants of the Territories, as exhibited in the
Organic Act for Minnesota, by which the
Congress claimed the right to itself to null
lily the acts of the Territorial Legislature.
1t was through such arbitrary attempts at
the Capitalization of power in this country,
that the people have been aroused to the
vindication of their rights to self-govern-
ment in the Territories, subject only to the
restraints of the Federal Constitution. And
they are certain to maintain those rights
THE DRIED sCOTR STUMBLING BLOCK.
In delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, in the bred Scott case, Justice fancy
made this declaration:
And if Congress itself cannot do this (prohib.
it slavery in a Territory)-if it is beyond the
powers conferred on the Federal Government
1t will be admitted, we presume, that it could
not authorize a Territorial government to exer.
local government established by its authority
to violate the provisions of the Constitution.
This declaration of Chef Justice fancy
has been the subject of much discussion and
great contrariety of opinion among public
men and the press. For our part we see
nothing peculiarly strange or heterodox in
the position of Judge fancy, nor do we
see anything, strikingl y alarming in it. Let
us look at its bearing for moment:
l. Congress can exercise no powers not
specifically conferred upon it by the Consti-
tuition. 1t cannot confer these powers upon
another, or add to or diminish them.
2. The powers possessed by Congress are
conferred upon it by the people, speaking
@brorcl, tho ballet hov ord fho Nopotitu
ton. All power is inherent in the hands
of the people," and hence, Congress can con-
fer no power upon the people, but the re-
verse-the people delegate to Congress all
the power it possesses. The people have
delegated to Congress certain powers for
the creation of National laws, and the work
ings OF the machinery of National Gov
ernment, but they have delegated to that
body no power for controlling or interfering
with their domestic concerns. Congress is
the representative will of all the States, and
can pass no law which operates to the dis
advantage of one portion of the Union, with
an especial view to beneftting another por
ton.
3. The same instrument which specifies
the powers which Congress may exercise,
also specifically declares wherein all other
powers shall be vested. It says: "The
powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people," This. is the
language of the Constitution. 1t shows
that that instrument is as specific in shut
ting out of the hands of Congress the exer-
else of implied powers, as it is in specifying
what powers it may exercise.
Now, what is the conclusion Congress
cannot prohibit slavery in the Territories
because the people have not given it the
power. Congress cannot confer that power
upon any agent because the people have not
delegated to them power to do so-and
those powers not delegated by the Constitn-
ton are reserved to the States or the people.
The conclusion is irresistible, therefore,
that the people, not having conferred upon
Congress any power over the subject, have
reserved its control to themselves, and they
are omnipotent to delegate power to To-
cal or State agents to prohibit or estab-
lish it.
Can the conclusion be avoided? 1t in
wolves no violation of the Constitution, but
it is in strict accordance with both its spirit
and letter. 1t requires no musty researches
or legal lore to reach the conclusion from
the premises assumed by the Supreme
Court. We believe the premises right, and
the conclusion that flows from it as newt
able as the dawniug Of the day upon the
rising of the sun i:
The poavsr not being conferred upon Con-
gress, as among those reserved to the States,
rsspeetively,o or to the people.
Judge Douglas and the Attorney.
General-.C0rrect Principle Vindi-
Gated and Acknowledged.