Red Wing sentinel. [volume] (Red Wing, M.T. [i.e. Minn.]) 1855-1861, 1859-11-26
THE TROUBLE BETWEEN SPAIN
AND MORNOCCO. HOW ENGLAND
AND FRANCE 4 llE AFFEC'rEI).

THE TROUBLE BETWEEN sPAJN}
AND MOROCCO. HOW England
AND FRANCE ARE
The possession Of Gibraltar by England
las always been source Of grief and morti-
icaticn to Spain and jealousy and envy to
France and other powers bordering upon
he Mediterranean. The Journal des De-
,ats in a recent article declared the pre-
tension Of the British Government to domi-
leer at Gibraltar and Perrin and to permit
n" other power to establish itself beside it,
Or opposite it, Is in:o'e, ab,e.'
The nature Of the Spanish proposition is
thus stated in the Gibraltar paper, aud was
evidently framed to meet refusal:
The rupture Of Pacific relations between
France and Morocco, is in all probability
an accomplished fact. Letters from Tan
sier, written yesterday, state that it was ex-
pected that the Spanish Consul wonld strike
bis flag in the course Of the day. Mr.
Blanco del Vale returned to 'rangiers from
Algesiras on tho night Of the sixteenth, and
was the bearer Of demands which it was
considered impossible the Moorish govern.
ment could admit. These demands arc said
to comprise session # Territory adjoining
Cueta, SO Is to include the Sierra Bullones
taking in Cape Negro in the direction Of
reutan and Apes Hill, on the Straits. II
this demand be persisted in, war is consider.
ed inevitable. No Sultan of Morocco could
consent to such an alienation Of National
Territory and even were the Moorish
Government 10 yield on this point it is con.
s'dered doubtful whether war would be
averted, since this concession would proba-
bly, cost the Sultan his throns.--qi6raA.r
CAr~nicle." t-" @'t
rhe Nord, Of Brussels, which il author
ity on Diplomatic questions has statement
to the effect that very animated CONVEX.
sation' had taken place between the French
Ambassador in London and Lord Palm.
erston on the affairs Of Morocco. Lord
Palmerston observed that England could
not permit Spain to occupy both siees Of
the Straits, and would resist by free her
attempt to DO SO, and further that that
Cabinet would consider the question IS one
II European interest. 1t adds that the
French Government, while attaching ccr-
tain importance to the language Of the
Prime Minister, would not change its policy
As regards Morocco, and would not the less
continue to take all the necessary measures
for the protection Of the Algerian frontier
against the Moorish tribes .,. -
A significant hint, and one Of interest to
US is the following from the London Herald
Of the Gath of October:
"Growing commerce prevents insulation,
and gun fired in the Straits Of Gibraltar,
would reverberate to the most distant seas.
We have no desire to write word that could
be const, aed into threat; but the Spanish
ministers should remember that If they
commence an attack against our interests,
BY Selling and occupying Tangier, Mega
dore or any other portion of Morocco, we
can at once strike deadly blow at Cuba.
It is with sincere pain that We even allude
to such contingencies aud possibilities, but
We hesitate not to proclaim in nnm,stakeable
Terms that England will hold her own
against any pewer or combination of powers
that may threaten her supremacy"
1t would not be strange if the relations be.
tween France and England and England
should be broken in the complications Of =
quarrel between Spain and Morocco, and
The opportunity Of the acquisition Of Cuba
BY us should result from it. If naval
war should arise, Spain could not hold Cuba,
wen with the aid Of France, except by On
Uncertain tenure. And if England seized
il, it would not be able to hold it: for
~itaout slavery it would be worthless, ana
With it it could not remain an nglish pos
session: Either power would be willing to
'art with it for round sum, to us-a con.
to be wished.