The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-05-11

double advantages of economy and improved
service
| The New Phase I'm the European COmplica-
| tion-The Alliance Between Franco and
| Russia.
The alliance stated to have been concluded
between France and Russia is one of those events
which people should have been prepared for.
The CONSERVATION which it seems to have pro-
duced in England shows that the public there
have been wilfully shutting their eyes to facts
which were evident to all the rest of the world,
and hugging decisions the folly of which has
been long since apparent. The English have, in
fact, attached to the entente cordale value which
tnever at any time possessed, and which the
| French mind could not comprehend at all.
Dogged in their friendships as in their preju-
dices, they believed that, by the sincerity of their
conduct, they might impart to it an indefinite
| duration. They overlooked, however, in their
calculations, the political necessities of Europe
and the astuteness and selfrelying policy of
their French ally. They forgot, too, the circum-
stances under which the Crimean war was
| brought to premature close, and which
showed that a secret understanding had
| sprung up between the French and Rus
sian Emperors. The meeting at Stuttgart
was not more successful in opening their eyes,
and it required the unequivocal discourtesy Of
the step taken by France in proposing q con-
| gress to Russia Immediately after the departure
| of Lord Cowley for Vienna to induce suspi
| cion that Louis Napoleon was pursuing q course
entirely independent OF them. Even this how
ever, had not the effect Of arousing their suscep-
Utilities, and it is only when they find the fact
| Of the Russian alliance brought home to them in
black and white that they awake to conscious.
ness Of ii. In proportion to their blindness, how
ever, they exhibit an unreasonable degree of
alarm and distrust. II does not follow that be-
cause France sees lit to pursue an Independent
| policy on this Italian question it must necessa
rily bring her into collision with England and
English interests.
! The alliance with Russia was necessity with
Louis Napoleon. He is as little to be accused Of
bad faith in it towards England as he is to be re-
preached for want Of consistency in his general
! conduct on this question. Exposed as he is to
the uncertainties arising from the demoraiza-
| ton Of political parties in England and the
frequent changes of government to which it
leads, be had urgent need to fortify himself
! against Coburg intrigues and conservative lean
ings in favor of old traditions and dynasties
| That the sympathies Of the Derby government
| went strongly in favor of Austria there cannot
| be doubt, and although they would probably
have gone the length Of exacting some temporary
concessions for Central Italy, their interference
on the whole would have only tended to rivet
more strongly the letters Of the Italian people.
| 1t was, no doubt, the conviction of this fact
| which induced Louis Napoleon to give the 60
by to Lord Cowley's mission, and to give prac
teal effect to the understanding, or it may be
positive compact, which he had previously form
ed with Russia. When he found that he could
not rely upon England for its support on ques-
lion on which, as constitutional government,
he considered himself fairly entitled to it, it was
not to be expected that he should reject the ad-
vantages offered him by an alliance with the form
erPower merely out ola sentimental regard to his
Improbable relations with England. Lord
Clarendon may sheer at the liberties of Italy
being placed under the tutelage Of two dcspotic
Powers ike France and Russia but there is not
as much inconsistency in the fact as in that OF
Engiand propping up Austrian msrule. 1t cannot
be denied that in France Louis Napoleon reigas
by the will Of the great majority Of the people,
whilst in Russia Alexander is personally risking
more to give freedom to the masses than any con-
| s!itutiopal monarch in Europe has ever done 1t
| matters little whether in regard to Italy the
| French Emperor be sincere OF not in his profes-
sions Of desire to give its people liberal instit
tions In the absence of other and better means he
is to be accepted as the instrument of this great
! work and until he proves false TO his promises
| there is neither wisdom nor advantage In dis
trusting him Of one thing we arc satisfied
| that if the Italians wait for the aid Of England
| to procure them the reforms Of which they stand
in need, they will have to linger on until they
! have worn out the iron Of their chains. They
| go thoroughly understand this themselves that
they prefer taking all the risks arising from the
ascertained purposes ofLonis Napoleon to trusting
to tie vague hopes inspired by the sympathics Of
the English liberals, and which never can be re-
allied as long as class interests sway the foreign
| policy of Great Britain.
| The alliance between France and Russia ia un-
doubtedly great blow and Encouragement to
the Coburg clique and their supporters in Eng
land; but when it comes to be viewed in it's
proper light we have no doubt that the great
body Of the English people will regard it as a
fortunate event 1t will compel their rulers,
both tory and Wing, TO avoid the dangers into
which their aristocratic and conservative ten
denotes are apt to lead them in their foreign
policy, and to observe only those broad princ-
pies of justice and right which are consistent
with constitutional institutions. Should the
Derby Cabinet or any other, after the lesson
which has been taught it by France, persevere in
interpreting the weight Of its influence between