Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1859-02-04
0deehlp Euquiret.
By RircmIE, DUNSAvANr, TYLER 4 WISE.
-
FRIDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY !.
Difficulties in the Way Of tho Immediate Acquisition
Of Cuhh

rived from the acquisition of Cuba, it is unde
niable that there are very serious difficulties
perhaps insurmountable, attendant on the at
tempt to secure this object as we'll as dangers
and disadvantages reserved for lis, even after
its ultimate attainment if such attainment be
possible
The idea that the possession Of Cuba will be
all-sufficient to render the Gulf Of Mexico a
mare elansum, is altogether delusivc. Sup.
posing that We should obtain possession of all
the West India Islands, we would have no jus,
international claim to treat the Gulf rs an in,
land sea, so long as Mexico or one of the Cen.
trail American States should hold mile Of the
coast And any claim to entire dominion over
its waters would be at once set at naught by
naval forces with which We cannot pretend to
compete.
But there is no prospect of our acquiring the
entire West Indies. They are divided among
six European nations, whose concurrent int,
rests would at once unite them against any
scheme on our part, spasmodic or gradual, for
such extensive island dominion.
More than that, the greatest naval power Of
Europe holds possessions atfordins her facili'
ty of entrance to both the Northern and the
Southern inlcts Of the Gulf scarcely less easy
and equal y available with that which the pos
session Of Cuba would afford. Great Britain
fully appreciates the importance of this double
key to the Gulf, and all the combined powers
Of earth could not avail to snatch it from her
grasp.
BY the acquisition of Cuba, then, We may
expect to obtain an outpost for the security OF
our foreign commerce. and a large addition to
our home trade; but it will not bring us 4 title
nearer the questionable advantage Of entire
dominion over the Gulf Of Mexico. 1t cannot
be denied that these commercial advantages
are worth an effort at peaccable acquisition.
provided it shall not entail attendant and
overbalancing disadvantages. We propose
TO lay before our readers the evident dis
advantages which suggest themselves to our
mind, without attempting to weigh them
above mentioned. At the same time, it is pro-
per to consider the obstacles to the acquisition
of Cuba, which now lie in our path. Indeed,
the questions of the prac,icability and ultimate
expediency Of this territorial accession. are SO
intimately blended that it would be useless To
attempt an entire separation Of the two.
The idea has gone abroad that the ac-
sasition Of Cuba by the United States, will
only be the first step towards continued en-
croachment by our Government on other To-
reign possessions in the West Indies. So long
as this idea shall be uppcrmost in the appre-
tensions of European Governments, the acqui-
sition Of Cuba will be impossible. There are
too many interests at stake and backed by a
power of defence and retrbution too irresistible,
to permit the frs: step in series Of territorial
accession among the islands Of the West Indies.
The last complete body Of statistics upon
which We can now conveniently lay our hand,
is not of very recent date; but suaices for
our purpose From this it appears that the
West Indian possessions Of Spain, including
Cuba and Porto Rico, comprise an area OF
So, l4Osquare miles; population, white, 473, S62;;
black, 554, 963; total l,02S,325.
British possessions, including Jamaica, Ba-
ha,nas, Tortola, Virgingorda, Anguilla, Bcrmu-
da, Saint Christopher's, Nevis, Antigua, Mont
scrrat, Dominica, ST Lucia, St. Vincent Bar
BADGES, Grenada, Tobago and Trinidad, 1916
square miles; population, white, 1854; black,
6l3,752; total, GS5,3s6
French possessions, including St Martin,
Guadalupe, Martinique, Deseada and Mariega-
lante, 1905 square miles total population
265, 5,o40
Dutch possessions, including St Martin,
Saba, St. Eustatia and Curacao; 722 square
miles; total population 4l,4l9
Danish possessions, including St. Thomas,
St. John and Santa Cruz; $50 square miles |;
popua,ion-whitc, 2,953-black, 1914; to-
tai SO, s67.
And the Island Of St Bartholomew, belong
ing to Sweden; 60 square miles; total popua-
ton 5000.
In short, there is a Territory Of 75,4s3 square
miles, with population Of 9,o67,o3o, belong
ing to six maritime powers of Europe. And
we propose, by single stroke Of diplomacy,
to take into our immediate possession more
than two-thirds Of the territory, and more
than one-third of the population. The question
is, will our European neighbors permit it,
when the Joint efforts Of England and France
alone are sufficient to prevent it: We may
safely assume that these two controlling pow
ers will use every effort to prevent this transfer
of territory, if they entertain a reasonable
Apprehension that it will probably endanger
the permanency Of their own dominion in the
West Indies Let us examine the grounds for
such All apprehension.
If Cuba is to become a non-slsrehoiins
State of the Union. there will exist no neceSSi-
ty that we now perceive, for further acc"s'
sion of territory in the West Indies-but II We
arc to take her in this shape, We would much
prefer to leave her where she is--ln the pos
session Of Spain. According to the statistics
Of 1851, the total population Of the island was
/ .oo7, ,a3o; i. c., 565,56o whites 2o4,57e free
negroes, 436, 100 slaves
If. then, we can have Cuba only on the terms
of taking her as free State, with iree negro
population Of at least ZOO 000. we repeat II, We
believe, in all sincerity. that Sl20, 900. 1000 may
be much more proftably invested than in the
purchase Of the island.
On the other hand, if Cuba is to be admitted
as slave State, and slave property IS to re-
ceive permanent protection there, We see very
serious international difficulty in the way
This involves some explanation.
The present state Of things in Cuba, II al
lowcd 10 continue, must eventuate in overrun'