New-York daily tribune., 1859-05-27

some OF our latest kilograms, tnefe Is sun dn Aus
trian force on the road between Piacenza and
Strodella. Whether the reported excursion
to Voehera was intended as a feint against
| Novi and the communications between Genoa
and Alcsssndria, it is difficult to decide at
all events, il misled most of the able editors of
Turin, Paris and London into propbesying de-
cisiye battle on the old battle ground Of NOvi, or
somewhere bout Marengo, which prophecy was
at once negatively realized BY the Austrians with
drawing to the northern side OF the Po and break
| ing up their bridge. After the first few days of
May indeed, very heavy rains had set in. The Po
rose ten to twelve feet near Paya, and the sec
cndary rivers in proportion The inundatiOns of
the fields in the valley Of the Po-no obstacle
ordinarily to marching army. SIS the roads are
form ed by dy kes above the level of the nundations
now became serious matter; the whole coun-
try and many roads were flooded Besides, the
Austrians did not march, they remained in this
swamp, obliged to biyouack either in the roads or
in the wet fields. Accordingly, after they had re-
mained few days in the midst of this food it be-
came imperative to them to withdraw to higher
and drier ground; as it is they must have suffered
severe loss from sickness, especially from cholera
and fever The consequence was a movement Of
concentration t,ward the country about Mortara
and Noyara, retreat not from the enemy (for they
renamed quiet enough in their nes), but from the
elements. Since then the Auatrians have con-
structed Notifications on the line of the Sesa, and
pushed accommodating and foraging parties close up
to the line OF the Dora, which forms the extreme
left of the allied position
In all these series of operations, we cannot see a
single stroke of good generalship. In fact, the
first favorable moment for attack upon the allied
position once having been missed, the whole ad-
vance into the Lomellina became destitute
of any definite and important purpose.
The pushing forward Of the Austrian right
wing was decided mistake. There was
no time to be lost in artificial mineuyerng;
to march straight upon the enemy, to attack and
beat him before he could fully concentrate his
forces was the only correct plan of operations. If
it is true that Benedek's 9Th corps marched by the
southern bank Of the Po, this was another error;
it was separated from the main body by large
river and if the rain had set in aday or two sooner
the throwing across of the bridge at Camblo would
have been impossible and the Austrians themselves
would have been in that disconnected position in
which they expected to find the enemy The
whole passage of the Po appears to have
been forced upon them by the necessity of
bringing Benedek over; why was he not
from the beginning on the northern bank?
By thus bridging the Po and the operations connect
ed with it, they were compelled to stay few days
longer in the pestIential swamps than they other
wise need have done. Finally the whole cam
paign appears to have been msmanaged. There is
no decision in all these Austrian movements; de-
monstratons are made in all directions, but we
nowhere see move for q real attack; and thus they
erope their way all along the enemy's line until at
last the nundatons place an impossible barrier OF
some miles in width between the cOntending hosts
Then for want of something better to do, aud in |
order to appear at ist to be doing, they recon
noitre toward the Dora but all these reconnOis- |
sonces are made by small flying columns which can
not act with any yigor and have to fall back almost
IS soon as they reach any advanced point.
While thus the Austrians are in reality doing |
nothing, their opponents seem to be busy at the |
same game. They are now as much concentrated as
they can be on the long line they occupy. Their |
positions are as follows: The extreme right line |
of the Dora and Po, as far as Casale, is
occupied by the French corps of Gen. Mel,
which includes two divisions; with the |
right at CasaIe, consisting of two Pied
montese divisions and 5000 volunteers under
Garibaldi. The center, at Vaenza, is formed BY |
the French corps of Gen. McMahon, and Pied |
montese diyisiOn-in ALL three divisions. The left,
at Alessandria consists of CanrOberts French |
corps and one PiedmOntese diyisiOn-in all, three |
divisions. The extreme left, at Nov and Argnato,
is paraguay d'Ifilliers' French corps aud one
Piedmontese divsion-in all, three divisions. The
reserve is formed by two divisions of the
French guard in Genoa. Estimating the division
at 10000 men-whch will be high enough, as
the French have not had time to recall their
men from furlough, and will count less, although
the Sandman divisions are stronger-this would
give grand total Of 10000 men, which is about
the strength of the troops now in line on the side
the Allies. Ofthese, 10000 to l2O, 900 men might
act in the field. That they have been so extremely
passive may be caused partly by the want OF prep.
aration on the part of the French, who have very
little artillery and ammunition with them and partly
BY orders from Louis Napoleon, who undoubtedly
means to reap the first laurels of the campaign.
This new General arrived at Genoa On the 18th;
where be was received with popular acclimatlons.
On the 18th he saw the King, who came from the
camp for the interview; on the same day he issued
Napoleonic proclamation, which We copy on an-
xba ha m laay