Delaware inquirer. (Wilmington, Del.) 1859-18??, 1859-11-26
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY.

should be admitted, protected or excluded in
violation of the wishes of the people with
whom 1t is or is to be, and in disregard of the
of all general or local power, ia doctrine SO
extraordinary that it almost defies human
Judgment. No proof short of demonstration
can be given to bring such judgment to sat
isfactory conclusion in its support and when
we reflect on the length of time during which
this state of things is to prevail, the doctrine
becomes yet more startling. The territorial
government may exist as long as the will of
Congress shall have it exist. Admittance as
State into the Union, depends on congressional
discretion. No population however large, or
other condition gives legal title to such adj
mission. The language is: "Ncw States may
be admitted by Congress into this Union"
The territorial State may thus be practically
made perpetual and no power be found any
where to put au end to African slavery What
renders this hypothesis still the more extraor-
binary is, that in 1881, when this great char
ter was adopted, such slavery even for its pc
culiar labor had comparatively but a slight
hold on the public mind, and little if any on
indeed it is not to exaggerate to say that the
repugnance to it with Southern statesmen was
then much greater than with the statesmen of
the other States. In some of the latter the
trade was proving a fruitful source of pecuni-
airy profit, which they or the people were as
unwilling to surrender, as the people of Liver
pool were, at one period, as evidenced by their
long continued untiring efforts and unceasing
zeal to defeat tho abolition OF the slave trade,
blythe English Parliament. It's impossible to
believe that such men designed to place this
then almost universally admitted blot beyond
the possible reach of removal. Feeling as they
then did, that it was wrong, and in every
| way mischievous it never could have been
their purpose to perpetuate it. They could
not but have supposed it would be within the
| reach of some power, and if not be found in
| Congress, is nop decided, where else can it
be but with the people in whose midst the
wrong is found 1t has however been thought,
| and this too by gentlemen of unquestionable
I
often referred to, has decided that such power
| does not reside in territorial government.
This, Ii is submitted, is misconception of the
| decision. The single question before the
| Court in this connection, was whether Con-
gress possesses the power to prohibit the in
PRODUCTION of slave property into a territory.
In ruling it adversely, the Court does not say
or intimate that such property in territory,
has other safeguards, or that the owner Is en-
titled to any further protection in its enjoy
ment, than exists in regard to other kinds of
property. A sentence or two from the opinion
of the Chief Justice will, it is believed, make
this plain.
1t had been eontended that there was Pc
culiarity in slave property, that placed it on
different footing from other property. For this
the laws and usages of other nations, and the
reasoning of statesmen and jurists upon the
relation of master and slave, had been referred
TO. These says the Chief Justice cannot ten
large the powers of the government, or take
from the citizens the rights they have receiy-
ed = and as 'sthe Constitution recognizes the
makes NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THIS DHscRIP-
TIoN or PROPERTY, AND OTHER PROPERTY owned
by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the au-
| thorty Of the United States, whether it be
legislative, executive, or judicial, HAS RIGHT
TO DRAW SUCH A DISTINCTION or to deny to il
the benefit of the provisions and guarantees
which have been provided for the protection of
| private property against the entertainments of
| the government and after referring 10 the
| fugitive clause as expressly "atIirming tho
| right of property in slave" the Chief Justice
thus concludes; ''And no word can be found
| in the Constitution which gives Congress
greater power over slave property, or which
entities property of that kind to less protection
than property Of any other decription. All,
| therefore, that the Court has decided is that
slaves are property, as much 80 as anything
else that may be owned by man, and that
such property il entitled to the same-not to
less or greater-conslitntional guarantees as
any other description of property, it can do in
regard TO this. If any other kind may be ex-
cluded, this may be excluded if any other
kind may be more, or less, or not at all pro-
tected by legislation, the same is true az to
this. lfany other, after its legal introduction,
can be, upon public grounds, excluded or
abolished, it is also the case as to this. II is
but sameness, identity of title and protection,
which tho Court maintains, not inferior or
paramonnt-that all stand on the same footing,
liable alike to the same restrictions and iimi-