New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1859-06-27
NETWORK DAILY TRIBUNE, MONDAY JUNE g. 1850

there from IRE beginning were fesrpi ne ofhcers
who seemed TO have done al IN Ter power wsIe
shove ali cu. I'd. Scarcely lees were the men;
,Ley too fueht biAv.y, bu;, satigued So hey were
nd exhausted after their marVn and bad feeling tney
could Dc little agairs; the Ne, whose troops are N
f--t.rs'e csudion.
how 10 lake sdvsr tage II their numerical suPeron'y IN
the beginning Until = too ate, and toe MISSES .,
the Allies which syrved the field Of bai'e depiived
them Of every cbsaee. Indeed, they may 'hank shsu
..ars thai hey had not more troops on tue ned i'i
they wosli probably have me: The same iste-
"WhRs the Aus.riaps viii do next remains 70 De
sse cancen,T-e their forces 20 the scu'h ,sse 1p
,,os,ot "a se rish. flank Of the Anies ard aecep,
battle. bis may indeed, perhaps torcs tae All 70
rrvn agsiust them, and they wish Tor nothing else Oh,
Il defeated the Austrian army msy lose ts me OF r.
treat, which j. already little compromised by the
tskipr ii Milsn Now that Feld-AarsSal Hess Is Az
arrived II may be supposed INST they VII ionoN ne
nlsp which j. attributed 20 hntaa ss 20 retire 70 taer
positions They have LEFT their strength dds With weak
aarr~ops and have to LIKEWISE Zoo Their rear ron
.he Ttscan army begin 20 think that the trst set,
the csmpaicn OF Cen Gyuali, Is over, and that ihe
campagn Of Feld-Marshal Hess Is aboat to CON-
:. f,rco, 10 .el Won thar the nperor himself WAS
rreseut a. the feh: Of Pone di Magenta, and directed
the whole operations from San Martino, where he
= There u ay be a chance Of going up 70 Milan to-
day the eyacustion should prove true; so conclude
haste.
BTom he IcEfoS tunes JhHe IT,
We have been favored With the following letter
from the same correspondent to whom we are already
so largely Indebted for the only authentic details OF
the proceedings of the Allies which have yet appeared
| either here OF in France;
"MAGESrA, june Z.
aTbe details which SEN. you in my las; letter
! about the combat at Pone ii Magenta touched only
this part Of the battlefield, and would be incomplete
were not 70 tell you hat happened the other side at
a.xrslla af eynl9upl before.
while the division Of the Grenaters 0, the Guard and
Zousyes attacked the front of the position at Ponte di
| Magenta and Bufalora, General McMahon now Due
| de Magenta and Marfc4dl dc France received the
! order 70 advance with the Divisions EspinaSse, La
Motterouge and the division of the Cha:seurs Pied
and Fusliers de Ia Garde from Turbigo, anu take the
| AustIaus posted a, Magenta in their right flank and
In support Of this force was the Sandman army,
! Of which several divisions had already passed the
TicpO 1t Turbgo. From this later place 70 Magenta
there the shortest road more than II miles. II
is only by-road branching of from the main road
leading from TurtigO toward the latter most places
not more than sufficient to allow two carriages to pass
each other. The country on both sides OF 1t u much
tbckly wooded than the other side of the Tcno,
and exei planted with vineyards was obliged to
draw Your attention TO this in order 10 show the diff
Guilty which existed for body of men like the division
# the Guards from = 600 to 10000 strong to march
II miles 20 the battlefield. You will better
dersand this difficulty, if tell You that the division
of the Fusliers and Chasseurs OF the Guard, which
formed the started at a. IN. from Turbgo,
and could not take part ,n the bstte before p M.
while the drdhtgdrde Of the Sandman army, formed
Of the Division FAINT, did not reach the battlefield
till p M, too late To take any part in the action IL
, was noon before q sufficient number of troops had
come up to ugage the enemy. As you know, the at
tack on the other side against POnte di Magenta and
Bualora ordered for 10 a. M, but could not take
place till noon, when the guns were heard toward the
left front in the direction Of Marcello.
:" spoke with an Austrian field officer who took
prominent part in the action, wounded and taken
prisoner. lie says the AustIians had idea of an at
tack on their right flank from Turbgo. In general,
during the whole campaign the great dlihculty they
had to contend with want of intelligence of the
movements of the Allies. Neither money nor threats
could induce the country people to diyugs anything,
while the other eide, such the vigilance OF the
Allies that spies were almost OF no use Thus II came
that they never could make ont where the chief force
Of the Allies was and how far they had adv anced with
their preparations This explains likewise the vague
incertituie which puzzled all Europe so much. They
had nosne 20 60 upors and obliged 10 feel their
way hbout ike blind men-frst toward Turin, and
then toward the Pc and beyond it. The result was
tina while they complained of the ridiculous inactivity
Ofthe Allies these latter concentrated their forces on the
left Of their line aud the Austrans knew only where the
danger threatened when they the Allies enter Nova
IA aud appear on the Ticro Then 1t was too late
They left indeed their position fast as they could
evacuated MortaIa, and abandoned the Pc line; but
they could longer concentrate their army in time to
defend the line of the Tcino and keep the Allies out of
LOmbardy They brought up IN all haste whatever
they could collect and posted il at Magenta and the
cara which forms q second and almost more formula
Bile lire Of defense than the Ticino itself. But although
they exerted themselves to their utmost, and although
they almost killed their soldiers with marching, they
could only bring up portion OF the Let Clam, 81
(Schwarzenberg, ID Lchtenstein and the 9Th ZObell
corps darm6e. How great this portion was, 1t is inn
possible to say with certainty; 1t IL estimated here at
10000 men, and certainly, from the number of regi-
which represented among the prisoners, one
w0ud be inclined to think that from 10 600 10 $1,000
men must have been in the neghb)rhood Of
Magenta. They Were commanded by Gen. Clam,
l.l L.. Ey.rr Irf had
not entirely arrived for stance, Of the - guns which
il ought to have, not more than Is there. But
this not Of much importance, because the ground
admits only very limited use of artillery. There
Likewise q dlyison OF cavalry present. but It never
appeared tie foreground. But Gyula and Hess
were present. but had nothing 70 do with the com
maid. The precipitation with which the troops were
brought up DID not admit OF their being properly taken
care Of 80 that, beside the fatigue they had to endure
hunger which was an aidtonal source of weakness
to them. And il this last circumstance which
must have told most, for as regards marching, the
French and Sardinians have done surely more In the
lost ten days, and the very corps OF the Due de Ma
gents had to make a long march in the scorching
before arriving on the field of battle.
" In ccmple ignorance OF the movements OF the
Allies, and doubly deceived by the inactivity toward
Turbgo, and the demonstration toward Buffalora, the
Aus;riSns prepared for the attack On this latter side
When the thing came 10 the test il was found that
the fee d. D0n formed on the Sandman side of the
ToiIo, at San MsrtiDo, ll-cOpstrucsd that
atteInptiI 10 hold il would have merely led to
sacrifice Ct the troops encased there 1t was, there
fore determined to abandon it, and blow up the stone
bridge Of Bufalors. The five battaions which occu-
pied the ftie de D0Ht were Withdrawn the night Of
the lst-Zd, and m attempt made to blow up the
brcge, which as you know, failed. The solid book.
Of granite resisted the small quantity Ot powder. 1nis
seess rot have been the fault OF the engineers 50
much as Cf the general direction Of the whole cam
pagn. Tie Austiians seem 10 have been 80 sure OF
Their that they thought Of retreat and
did Dot prepare themselves for the contingency hav-
ing TO blow up the bridges. There was no blasting