Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1858-1860, 1859-03-15

sum OF money much larger than any cnnvic-
ton in the minds of those who moved it, of
the necessity of such a vote founded on any
view of public necessity; but | must say that
If this vote is required or expected 10 test
the confidence of the Congress oe the United
States in the present Chief Magistrate it
seems 10 me his friends are to be taxed Ia an
immcasurale extent. The vote OF $50 .000,-
O0t for that. or any other obi ct. won d imply
such total forgeiiuiness ard abandonment
If the jealous principles upon which this
Government was founded, that l venture to
say, but few who take a tull and rational
view of the subject will be disposed To agree
to it. Thirty million dollar! 1t would give
90 the President Of the United States the CON
troll of the Army and Navy for two years
with the present small estimat, :. taking the
amount OF the regular annual appropriation.
| Three years of the control of the Army and
Navy is as much as any duspot or any traitor
to the liberties of his country would ask. 1t
| is dangerous experiment What is eyperI-
mrnt TO-DAY, would inevitably, in time he
come the esIa lish, d practice Although Mr.
B .chanan might he trust d safely with the
management OF this fund. long b fore our
! empire shall have extended throughout the
! tropics, AS some gentleman said it was our
! policy TO extend it, Some successor to Mr..
| Buchanan may be found whose ambition is
! not rrgUlat 4 by the calm, temperate passions
! OF our present Chief Magistrate Even if
! that other m"a~urr. Iwsn born TO this, from
! the Committee on Foreign Relations he
! adopted which proposes t. arm the President
! of the United States with the power to red
| ress all the wrongs committed upon Amer
| ican citizens within the States of Mexico and
G ntril Am, RIGA, implying substan
| TALLY surrender of the war-making power
should pass. do not know that / would
answer for the perfect fidelity even of til,
present Chief Magistrate, in the disposition
| which h. would make of this vast fund.
But, sir, dsmis-ing these views for th'
! present, and assuming that some Other
| motive or object more substantial than a mer,
! vot" OF confidence in the President is intend
ed, proceed To examine. briefly as | can
what may be the Other motives and tn,
objects which lie at the bottom of this move
mcut. ! need not state to the Senate what
! is the character and condition of the Island
| of Cuba. | need not poiut ont its advantages.
nor shall | advert to The unhappy condition
of it in a!.y degree, nor in any detail which
| geutl, have pointed out in reference
either to its political or social organization.
1t is an island which, for two or three hun
drcd years, from its position its climate. it,
! unsurpassed fertility, its capacity to fuTn-
in the most valuable, the richest and most
| desirable products of the tropics and it,
capaciuus harhors. could not have escaped
| The attention Of the great commercial nations
of the world; nor has it escaped their alien
tion. 1t is an island which IA great IN uitim
and commercial Power might well covrt n
any TIM. The committee who madr thi
report might have spar, d also any clahorat,
| Argument to show that this island nigh
! hecome Of great importance to the UutrC
! States, that the question of what Power shall
| possess il ultimately might become one
! Indispensable iutere>l and regard on the par
| of the United States 10 the development o
! its own resources and its own power. From
| the moment of the acquisition of the territory
| Of Louisiana, from the first dawning OF tn,
! population of the States that are now spread
! over the great central valley OF this continent
| this has been the popular estimate Of the ad
vaniagcs of that island, geographically situa
ted so as to control in great degree the
vast commerce that passes through the
waters of that inland sea, the Gulf of
Mexico. Nor have foreign nations been
blind to The acsrsSipn of strength and curl
ty that II might bring To the United States in
process Of time: but it has 30 happened that
Just in proportion to the magnitude of the
interests involved in the possession of that
leland and in the question who is to possess
it. or may possess il. have the obstacles to
| the acquisition of il Ivy the United States
| been increased and multiplied. We are sup
! posed to have great interests ut stake in the
! acquisition Of Cuba. Other commercial ma
| tionS, particularly the great maritime Powers
! oi Europe, our rivals in the great contest for
| the control at the commerce of the world
! not yet decided. ar apt to suppose their in
! interests to be nearly. If not of equal. magui.
| tude in preventing Us from acquiring the pos
| session of that island, and have shaped their
| course accordingly.
Sir. from the thst moment that Spain was
| shOrn of the large portion of her power
a a nation, by the revolt of her provinces on
this continent. the true policy of this country
rs understand it and believe it to he, or To
| have been. with view to the ultimate ac-
| q.isitiou Of Cuba. was to cultivItr the most
friendly and cordial relations with Spain, not
iusidiously, but in good faith; giving her "a
| surancc of our maintenance of her dominion,
| and oar protection in the enjoyment OF it.
| over that little remnant OF her once great
! Amer can empire. BY such course of policy.
| long pursued. the United States might have
! expected To enjoy brncGcent Influence over
| the councils of Spain, aiding them gradually
| into tn" secret of the preservation of coonic,
| by conciliating the inhabitants, 10y the in
| PRODUCTION OF a more enlightened system OF
! governments; coucliating the creole popula-
| lion 10y allowing them rights of government,
! by putting them upon an equal footing with
! the native born subjects ufSpain by encourag-
| ing the development OF their agricultu-
raj ard industrial pursuits; and lessen
! ing the burden upon commerce.. This
would have been policy worthy of great
| Il public and many advantages would have
| followed in its train To the United States.
| We should have been able, at all times sue
! cessfully to combat and countcract the hostile
and mischievous policy of our rivals across
| the Atlantic. and we should have enlarged
| our trade and commerce with Cuba.
In truth Mr. President, by such n course
! of policy Us that. we should have derived aud
| eui ny,d all the substantial advantages of the
actual possrssiun of the i,land, wilh"ut the
| burden of defense or protection, except oaly
| the strategic position; and, in the extremity
Of war. when the law OF scl-proscrvation
might dictate to us the necessity Of acqcir
| ing that il would have been easily within our
control .po rhapS with the consent of our friend
| IL -ighbor;and, in timc.in the vicisstud and
| changes in the fortunes of that kingdom, and
| the States of Europe generally, VII n she
| hid found herself In a condition that she
| could sol. aud probably with profit, a large
| pprt of the sovereignty of the island, II
| would have fallen naturally into the hands OF
thust. who had been her allies and supporters
for half a century and more. We should
have gained the coveted priZc; the ripe fruit
would have fallen into the lap which II Is
said, natnre had provided Tor it, without nois-
and without commotion.
This was the policy. rs | understand 1T, 81
the wi>c>t aud most eminent statesmen of this
country. who, Tor long time, directed its
affair. | need not refer 10 any other evidence
of this than To recur To the testimonies fur
nished BY this report, aud the extracts from
Official and private corr, spondeucc. aud other
pap r. To Ice found In the report which the
| Committee on Foreign Relnti0ns has present
| ed Tn us. In truth. from thv date OF the treaty
of Louisiana, 10y which Louisiana was acquir-
! ed, there has been perfect accord, until a
| late day, in the opinions OF all the most emil
ncnt men who have written or spoken nu this
sui jet, a. "a our true policy. All agreed ia
! the main AID essential points which oonsd-
tute the basis Of Il sound policy. All agreed
! for example. that, ia time, II might become