Delaware inquirer. (Wilmington, Del.) 1859-18??, 1859-11-26


right there asserted was stated as pertaining
'to the people collectively, or as law-abid-
ing and peaceful community, and not to the
isolated individuals who may reside upon the
public domin in isolated violation of the law,
and such as can only be exercised when there
are inhabitants sufficient to constitute gov
ernment and capable of possessing its various
functions and duties fact to be ascertained
and determined by Congress; !" and that then
it was right to be exercised, "subject to the
Constitution of the United States" That
power, whose very existence depends on some
other authority, and which has to be used in
subordination to admitted paramount control,
is not sovereign, in the sense imputed by the
Attorney General, is too obvious to need proof
The whole doctrine of the article is inconsis-
tent with such an assumption, and the error of
constituting it otherwise can only be ascribed
| to that general failing, which often is the
weakness ola controversial writer. The pow
er claimed is exclusively that which belongs
to Legislative authority, granted without
limitation rs to any particular subject of leg
islation, and by an authority which has no
congressional jurisdiction to impose limita-
ton and which, therefore, knows no restric-
ton, except such as is common to every other
kindred subject. In this view, and in this
language Of the Supreme Court, ''to determine
what is best for their own interests or in that
of Judge Douglas, that which belongs to a
title, ito all the rights, privileges and immu-
mites of self-govcrnment, in respect to their
local concerns and internal polity, subject only
to the Constitution of the United States" lie
who contests these propositions, or their APP
plication to slave property, is bound to estab-
lish that such property has other guarantees,
and is entitled to other rights than belong to
other property. Such task is beyond the
reach of any conceivable reading of the Con-
stitutou, and is, consequently hopeless I'M
| dertaking AT its date the rcpugnance of sla-
very to the public sentiment of the time, the
general wish for its ultimate extinction, the
provision TO arrest, in few years, its increase,
and the absence of any other special power in
| relation to it, it may be considered as clear
| that proposition in the convention to secure
it BY other guarantees, than such as were pro-
yidcd for other property, and, more particular
ly, with such as would greatly delay, if not
prevent its extinction would, perhaps, not
have received the support of any member of
the body. Certain it is that no suggestion of
the kind was made, and that this property
stands but secured by the provisions which
equally embrace and protect all other kinds.
As has been seen, this doctrine is not only not
inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme
Court, but maintained by its principles.
| 1t is now proposed to show that it has the
clearest congressional, and democratic, and
executive sanction As to the first, this might
be done by an exam nation of the compromise
of 1850. The terms of that legislation, and the
grounds upon which it was supported and OPP
posed, from its proposal TO its consummation
would, il is submitted without other proof,
establish the fact of such sanction. But it is
sufficient for the purpose to refer TO the ensu-
ing legislation of 1854. The Kansas-Nebraska
Act,--the principles of that Act, as it was pas
sed, and those of the Senate amendments pro-
posed and advocated py Judge Douglas, and
lila onnosition Ia the antaoonstc nronositions
offered by the Senators from the States in
which slavery does not prevail, ali demonstrate
that he, and those who agreed with him. then
claimed for the neonle of n Territory thc very
right for which he now CONFERENCE.-The right
without other restrictions than the Constitu-
tion contains, TO legislate concerning slave
property. as a concern belonging 10 them. dur
inc their territorial condition. in like manner
as they could lepisate concerning other pro-
pcrtv Ana whatever donhts might tben hova
prevailed, as to the establishment of this right
by the principles of the former compromise, it
is not for those who concurred with the Judge,
and voted for the passage of the last Act, now
| to deny that such Act, ms far as such property
was involved, but carried out the doctrine of
the former, now to deny that the doctrines so
carried out involve the power, which the words
used in il clearly include. Nor is II for those
who opposed the latter Act, on the very ground
that such would be its effect, and proposed
amendments to avoid it, now to maintain that
such is not its operation. What then is the
meaning as to this question Of the Kansas and
Nebraska Act? Does tmaintain Judge Dong
las doctrne2 Unless language has lost its
use, and serves only to mislead and delude no
other meaning can be given to it. Before
quoting il, let us see the state OF things exist
ipf, han Arf ,Ior Al,