The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1859-07-28
8ifblllnnn 4ispattb,
THURSDAY MORNING. JURY Is. 1859
The late war.


The Late War.
weexpect 70 receive immense. applause IoI
yur candor, or 20 become the subject OF I'M
bounded ridicuie for cur old fogyism. ",iea
we acknow ledge that we have never r''a +" '''.'
some writers term the shook OF Tue a''.s'
Others ssThe Sybcliine Leaves OF me '''h I'm
tury.r and the author, more INQUEST '"ah
either. aNapoleonic Ideas" Inc omission,
how~var we take it, has been In some degree
.unpiied nv the quotations we have met with
In IN. newspapers. which are so numerous.
and 20 often repeated, that whereas II was
.a,d ~ every existing copy of the New Tesla
MON, had been consigned to the flames in the
9Th century, IT would have been easy TO
supply the loss TO the most Insignificant
verse from the writings of the fathers, so If
the same uuioward fate should befall the pro-
tuetion Of the French Emperor. il might be
renewed from she columns of the daily jour
nails. The work. we understand. is the essence
of the doctrines and sentiments of the great
NAPOLEON, extracted with much care and
such entire success, that the booksellers
would not greatly err in advertising IL rs
NAPOLEON boiled down" As the British
seamen, when they tapped the Admiral
protested 10 BIZ greatly encouraged and en-
livened by mbibing the genuine NRLsoNfAs
principle, so this taste of the little Corporai
seems 10 have operated with great force upon
France but lately in n fair way to become
Nation of Shopkeepers, like their rivals over
the water now once morea nation of warriors,
with unlimited ideas of glory and conquest
Those who profess to- be better acquainted
with the views and opinions of the writer
than we can pretend to be, affect to read his
the light of the book in question. He thought
the great mistake Of the first NAPOLEON con-
sisted In having too many irons in the fire at
one time-too many wars on his hands al
once-striving to satisfy too suddenly the
qurements of an imperial imagination which
embraced all Europe in its scope--and rush
ing on to fresh conquest, Iefore The blood hEd
sufficiently dried to afford a firm cement 10
those already accomplished When it became
his turn to conquer, he resolved TO avoid these
errors-to divide lis enemies by devices which
he well understood how to employ--to attack
them in turn. and one by one--to use each sue
cessive victory so moderately, as TO render The
vanquished party his fast fripnd-and to SOW
between the parties whom he successfully
oyercame, seeds of irrcconciiable enmity sure
to bear fruit, when n fresh enterprise to be-
undertaken. A magnificent programme of
vengeance, for the wrongs inflicted upon his uu-
Gle Is said TO have been conceived by him. and
the me thod first pointed out is that which he
il to pursue, in order 10 accomplish il. With
this view, it has been said he engaged England
in the war with Russia, thereby rendering
those powers irreconcilable enemies and hui
initiating one of them by his arms, while he
rendered her his friend by his moderation. In
pursuance of the same policy, he stirred up
the hatred of Russia against her old ally Aus
tria, tempting the latter to hold off while the
fight was in progress, by the false lure of great
gains to be made in the Dannbian Principali-
ties, and to prove ungratefui to the former,
who had kept her empire from tumblng to
pieces during the hungarian war Finding
the time come to humiliate Austria, he has
done so, Russia standing by and crying we'll
done, England preserving strict neutrality,
and Prussia cOntenting herself with blowing
rams horns, rs if Paris were Jericho, and
shouting at n distance, us though She expected
its walls to fall al the sound thereof lie has
now succeeded in making Austria the mortal
foe of Prussia and it is supposed his next en-
1erprise will be against that power, which will
find itself without friends outside the German
Confedera ton. while even there Austria will he
against her. As to Bavaria, who has blown
her horn loudest OF all, it is thought he Will
walk over the Rhine, take her under his charge |
and hand her over to Austria, if he should |
not rather content himself with laying her /
across his knee and giving her good spanking |
for her impudence. The last job to be under |
taken is the most difficult of the programme !
England is to be punished either by direct in |
vasion, or by assisting the Car to pocket a
certain proportion of her East India posses
sions.
Such Is the policy ascribed TO the third Ma
PoLEoN, by those who regard the Napoleonic
Ideas az the key 10 his designs. For our own
part, although the facts thus far have conce-
ded with the programme, we are not disposed |
TO place any confidence in the effect of policy
so refined, upon the actual occurrences of life
we believe, on the contrary, that great events
usually spring from causes far more direct and
palpable. Yet we are free 10 confess that
without some such Interpretation, the late war
appears to US one of the most causeless and ]
nnjnstfiable crimes of which there is apv ,
record. 1t was made under the pretence of i
making the Italians independent, and freeing ,
italy from the Austrians. The result has been .
o render the cause Of Italian independence 7
Utterly hopeless, and to leave Austria with r
Ter tremendous strongholds communicating 9
"
'ower at any moment that she may Judge pro- .
'itious for the attempt The King OF Sardinia !
'ets Lombardy, and the patriots WHO have
ushed to his standard from all quarters get
,othing To obtain thus much. one hundred 3
human beings. in all probability |
AVE been hurried into eternity before their | |
ime, many of them without being allowed
ime to pray even in though. We confess the
of this conclusion has taken us en- .
rely by surprise. We never believed that
NAPOLEON III. cared any thing for the Italians;
ut we always believed he cared "A great deal
or himself 1t was our opinion that but for
he hint he had received from ORsfNI he would
ever have taken up the cause of Italy. Urged
y his fears Of assassination we believed he {
would disarm the revolutionisIs by promoting
heir views for the resurrection of their conn
~, under a strong, enlightened government.
Nth Italians at the head oft. At the same time
ge thought IL certain that he would eXpel the I
Iustrians and prevent them from ever return c
ng This we regarded az the only feasible :
1ethod Of preserving his own throne and d
atisfying the Italians As 1t is, the late treaty
{ peace must have reused the hatred of the
airiots to the last degree They cannot but
egard his conduct as snare. n delusion. and
n insult to italian misery and the Italian 5
understanding. L
losses In Austrian and American Battles. o
The New York Herald observes that the losses Y
} the battle of Solferino Were relatively much
mailer than of some American battles In I
lie battle Of Solferno, 100000 troops. were en-. II
aged fourteen hours. Total loss on DO tn sides O.
0,37o, or only about seven per cent OF the J
umbsrs engaged.