Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1859-07-09
THE HABEAs CORPUS CASE.

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The gage d our St. Louis corrospondent-the
one. we meah, who writes upon hnbeas corpus-is
not lhe ono to measure legal decisions by. He
speaks as q man. not IS d politician, and far less
ms an authorized arbitrator Gpoh a question Of law.
The judges referred to, may be, FOR abght we know
to the contrary, abunddntly able to aetids is RpeS,
any question of principle which mag be presented
for adjudication but when thcy are required as
judges to decide q question of law, they have moth
ing to 60 with Examining and affirming princi-
pies" except so far ns principle may incidentally
be affected by points of law, or rather, as points OF
law may incidentally be affected by principle.
To suppose otherwise, is to fall into the mistake
which our correspondent, together with many
others, has fal Ell.
The duties b! a judge ARE exceedingly circum-
scribed. He has to con6ne himself to the law and
to the testimony and if in certain courts, and id
certain cases, he can go back of statute law, he
cannot go back 30 far as the Higher Law, but must
rest upon the authority OF the State or National
Constitution-th organic law of the land. Tbs
End commandment, which is regarded by many as
a portion of ON early transcript of the Higher
Law, clearly forbids idol worship. A recent de-.
cision made in California declares tina, the Fed
eral Constitution as clearly tolerates idolatry; and
no lawyer would risk his legal reputation BY
pleading the authority Of the fJrmer against il:
and no judge would quote Jehovah Us. the people,
Sinia, commandment 2ud, as q precedent to jus.i-
fy him in setting aside the later decision of a legal
court.
Our correspondent will probably admit tina. d
man may believe that the Constitution provides
for thu rnndtttOp IF ,-,t,, H.. :
being necessarily unprinciplcd; that no thay regard
the Fugitive Slave Law as constitutional, without
his being wholly depraved ; and if these two arti-
cles OF faith are found in his creed, we are unable
to see how he could have decided otherwise than
did Judge Swan, had be sat in Judge Swans seat:
We wish our friend had quoted the precise Lam
guage OF those decisions. to which be gives a diff.
erent construction from that placed upon them bv
the State Court. We cannot readily turn to them.
but our remembrance of the decision in the Pripo
case, is very ditferen. from his. 1t was not that
all State legislative enactments in relation to the
rendition of fugitive slaves is unconstitutional
but simply unnecessary, n work of supereroga-
ton, and unconstitutional when such legislation
conflicts with the provisions Of the Constitution, or
the laws OF Congress. In regard to the case OF
Dred Scott, we would say, that we believe. the Su-
preme Court, neither when considering that case,
nor at any other time, really gave an official decis-
ion that negroes have no rights which white men
are bound to respect" The principle upon which
the decision was based, if carried out, would how
ever, lead to that conclusion, but no more so. than
the recent action of the Republican Legislature Of
Connecticut, which denied the extension of the
elective franchise to that class which the U. 8.
government had denied the possession of oil tho
rights of citizenship.
The United States Supreme Court may be a pc-
litical court, as our correspondent afirms. and all
else he charges upon it may be true. But what OF
that2 Isn't it built after the constitutional model.
and the judges all appointed 10 the manner therein
provided ? Admit that every judge, North a, we'll
as South, was appointed because of his pro-slaverv
proclivities; should anti-slavery politicians ever &C.
quire the control Of the government-and imagina.
ton Will have to grow her wings considerably b..
fore she can fly that far-would not every new
appointment to the Judiciary be made precisely
upon the same principle, and every applicant cate
ehlsed as to his views upon the slavery question :
Until Ohio is ready to r~epudiate her Constitutional
obligation, not simply to catch slaves, but also her
obligation to accept as the highest judicial autbori.
tyithe decisions of the u. S. Supreme Court. until
in other words, she is ready for Disunion, il seems
the sheerest folly to speak of the moral effect of any
decision her State Courts might make contrary to
the dic'um of fancy & Co. 1t would only be n
waste OF the paper upon which the decision was
written presenting a sublime specimen of moral
'ns'gnihcance, and exhibiting in its lack of re-
suits, an unmistakable evidence of legal eosl.vs
ment.
we confess that we are unable to sec any vast
difference in moral principle between the decision
OF Swan and his tweedle-dce associates, and the
u dissenting opinion of Sutlif, and his tweedle-d dunn
coadJutor. Strip them of legal tecbnicalities and
verbiage, and what are they The Court said.
The United States Constitution provides for tho
rendition of Fugitive Slaves, the act of so is only
a practical calculation of The said constitutional
provision; therefore, these men must suffer the
penalty attached to the violation of the Fugitive
Slave Law. We differ with you, said the dissent
ing judges; that provision of the Constitution is
0 simply a compact between the States. u. s. off,
a GERS have no authority to catch slaves; that is a
duty which belongs to our State officers, therefore.
these men should be discharged.
The former opinion we think is sound law who
can say that the latter is good moralsf
. LONDON EMANCIPATION COMMITTEE.
(lnr NIr m n n n a,4-l@I lL - I-A