Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-01-22
The State re-. Bonner.


At the January Term 1885, of the Circuit Court of
Warren, presentment was made against the defend
ant, by the grand jury in which it is charged, in
substance, that on the 2Sth day Of March, 1853
being the Sabbath day, in said county, certain ne,
gro slave, the property Of John Il. Hopkins, did
retail epirituOus liquors to him, the said George
| Bonner; he, the said George Bonner, thea and
there aiding promoting, and encouraging the said
retailing sforCssd
The Court, OF motion Of the defendant, orssh-
ed the presenlmeat; and the attorney general ap~
peaed.
Passing By ohjec ions to the form of the presents
men, We proceeito enquire waetherit subs sntisly,
cbsrges ne defendants With any act indictsble by
Law. This Is a aeW question, but we think il pre-
sents no serious difficulty.
1.-THE acts charged, mad taken place since the new
code went into operation the question would admit
Of no discussion. BY 2Gl7 CT the Code, slaves
absolutely forbidden to sell any spirituOus H.
quors; and by section 2G72-3, it IS made an indot-
able gfence, 20 purchase or receive from slave any
article; unless it be Of be slaves manufacture
without written permit frOm.the master, specifying
the time Whsn, and the article TO be s0d.
To purchase, receive, spirituous liquors from
a slave, would clearly fall within the prohibition
aud penalty of the latter section. Aud it may be
observed, that, slaves positively disqualified
to sell spirtuous liquors by the section first referred
to, "permit" from the master to do SO, would be
a nulty; and, of course, no defense to the person
-
the slave.
1t remains to be seen, whether the acts, imputed
10 the defendant amount TO an indictable offence,
upon general principles of the common Law, prior
10 the adoption Of the code.
In the case Of t5hits man, we suppose il cannot
be seriously cOntroVerted, that, upon general prln-
ciples, the purchaser Of sprituous liquors. in VolaS
tion Of the statutes passed to suppress tpplng is
much guilty Of a violation of the law, and as
much smenable TO criminal prosecution and pun
ishTent the seller. They are, in all respects,
rdrtceps criutnis; they alike Hilful violstors
of the law. The express prohibition to sell, upon
every just principle of construction must be con-
sidered as implying prohibition to purchase. The
purchaser, whether We regard Dis intent, the eff
feet and consequences of his asst is less guilty,
less within the mischief intended to be suppress
ed, than the seller. 1t matters not that the former
is placed under obligations of bond, oath this
takes nothing from the force Of the argument He
still stands guilty of Wilfully participating in and
aiding and encouraging the commission OF 8 criminal
offence. Does not this, upon the soundest princi-
pies of common law, constitute him principal in
the offence? We think it does. And perhaps it
would scarcely be going too far to say, that he
ought to be regarded less exeussble than the sell
ler He has notthe poor pretext Of the latter that
the forbidden traffic is, in part, his means of pro-
curing living.
If this conclusion be correct as between citizen
aud citizen, is il not equally ndictabe offence for
q white man TO purchase liquor from sLaUe2 We
think it is-with the qualification that it H. perhaps,
q more aggravated, and, if possible, more misehev-
Gus wrong
By the act of 1929, Oh. "a, sec. / slaves are
forbidden sell spIrtuous liquors (underths penal
ty of limited number of stripes, to be Inflicted by
order of justice) unles by PERMISSION Of the
ter But the act of 1885, en-. 81, sect. 3, contains
a prohibition upon the master to permit q slave 10
sell spirituous liquors.
By these provisions taken together, the sale Of
ttu ais Iuin afFo 81. Int
prohibited under rporsl punishment. If 30, is
the white man who tempts the slave To commit
offence and aids, ale F, and encourages him in
doing so, as much guilty Of . misdemesnor g. a
principal offender, II the seller had been Of his
own color? The complex on and social condition
of the slave, does not enter into the gist of the
offence; nor Is it Of any consequences, 81 We shall
See presently, that the mode Of prosecution, AID
kind of punishment, in case Of the white man, are
different from that prescribed for the slave.
1t is well settled hat white man may be either
an accessory, or principal, 10 homicide commit
ted by slave in like as if the crime had
been committed by the white See State vs.
De Arm. IL Humph., 494 Ia thst case, it is said
the offence is The same, though the punishment is
different That case proceeds upon the doctrine,
to secure the punishment Of offenders, will SO mod
ify the rules and principles Of the common Law, 90
TO sdap; them to new offences created by statute
or to new cases IS they srise.
Hence, if a new felony be created; or il an act
which, at common law, was only misdemeanoT,
be made felony the rules and principles Of the
common Law, as to principals and accessories, and
in other necessary respects will be spilled to the
fslOnes though the statute creating the felones
be silent the subject So, n McArn's case, It
held, that although BY the penal code Of 1923,
pri oipsls and socesgO les to be punished in
like manner; yet, under our Law, white men and
slaves are to be punished differently; a white man
convicted accessory 10 . crime committed By
slave, must be punished in the same manner as if
the principal had been a white man; and the slave,
convicted as principal, must be punished as pre-,
scribed by the statute in such cases.
If the dsctrine If McArn's case can be sound in
respect to felonies surely it is less applicable to
Risdemeanors And. if 80, the Princps Of the case,