The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1859-12-30

right to do, and for compensation in cash,
as that was the only article the State was
authorized to pay under it's laws and in
fact the only article individuals are obliged
to receive as compensation for work and
labor, of anybody, when no specific kind of
pay is mentioned in the contract.
A detached passage of the opinion of the
Supreme Court in the case of Goodrich Us.
Moore, is cited in the majority report as
though it had some bearing in this case.
The claim of the plaintiff, in that case, was
based upon right to do the printing under
his election as Territorial Printer. The
law provided that the Territorial Printer
should do the incidental iprinting of each
House of the Legislative Assembly; to
print the Journals and Pamphlet Laws,
and all such other Territorial or State
Printing as may accrue during the recess of
the Legislative Assembly," The Court
says the "incidental printing mentioned in
the statute under which the plaintiff claims
is therein expressed to be, the Incidental
Printing for each House of the Legislative
Assembly of this Territory, and consequent
ly cannot apply to the printing of the pro-
ceedings of the Constitutional Convention,
or any body claiming to act as such.
There is" the Court adds, ga further
clause in the section referred to, which re-
quires the Territorial Printer to do such
other territorial printing as may accrue
during the recess of the Legislative AS.
sembly. 1t is improbable that the Legisla-
ture in using this language, intended to
include such printing as that named in the
complaint, wiz: the printing of the Consti-
tutional Convention.) At the TIME Of the
passage of this act, Congress had not author
lied the citizens Of the Territory to take the
initial steps for calling a Constitutional
Convention" twill be seen that the court
based its decisions thus:.far, in that case,upon
the ground-.frst, that the class of printing in
controversy was not specifically provided for
in the law; and, second, that the Legislature
could not have contemplated it, because the
creation Of Constitutional Convention had
not been mooted at the time of the passage
of the law, and it therefore presented an en-.
tirely different case from the one now pre-.
sented to the House. All printing here
contended for by the contractor, is specific
ally and fully enumerated in the statutes,
and therefore Enthusiastically contemplated
by the Legislature when the law was enacted
TheD follows the dictum of the court,
as cited by the majority of the Com
mittee in their Report /; after which
the Court decides the case upon the ground,
that the Legislature subsequent to the
Constitutional Convention, appropriated
$1,000 for the printing and publication Or
dered by the Convention, presided over by
Hon. Saint A. D. Balcombe. This recog
nized in express terms the contract made by
him (BalcOmbe) and ratifes the same"
We are unable to perceive how the
opinion in that case can effect the question
under consideration, while by the uniform
precedents of the several States, elsewhere
cited, where contracts for all the Legislative
printing have been rnade to run through a
series of years, with unquestioned legality
and propriety.
In regard to the allegation contained in the
majority report touching a combination en-
tered into by the Contractor to prevent
fair bidding for the contract, the undersign-
ed would simply state, that, no evidence
having been presented before the Commit
tee tending in the least to substantiate such
a charge, its introduction into such report
must be regarded as entirely gratuitous, and
equally unwarranted and unjust.
The contract thus awarded, within the
bounds of the discretion given to the Audi.
tor by the law authorizing such contract to
be made, having been entered into in good
faith, being executed with legal propriety
and continuing both by law and by its
terms, still in force, is legal contract and
as such, cannot be otherwise regarded THAI
as equally binding upon the State and upon
the individual party thereto. The contract
is thus binding in merely legal sense. In
the light of honor its binding force upon
the State is immeasurably increased. For
while the State, through its laws, places
itself in position of absolute safety, by
demanding and receiving securities, for the
faithful performance by the individual of the
conditions of the contract, the individual
on the other hand, has no security except in
the justice of its Representatives The
State is provided with ample remedies to
enforce the performance of contracts to which
it is party, or to recover damages for their
non performance but the individual enjoys
no such counter remedy against the State
The State can sue, but cannot be sued
This full possession of legal remedies on the
one hand, and the total lack of legal rene
dies on the other, reduces the individual to
reliance, alone, upon the honor of the
State; and increases thereby the obligations
which rest upon its Representatives to render
prompt and liberal justice to those who thus
place their interests under the irresponsible
control of body before which legal rights
cannot be enforced, nor legal wrongs be
redressed.
1t is upon this ground of the utter lack o.
| any efficient and certain remedy on the par
of the individual to compel the State to per
fol- I'm its just and legal obligations, that the
constitution of the State throws its protect.
ing shield over the rights CT the citizen, by
providing in its Bill of Rights, that |" nc
bill of attainder or er post facto law, nor any
law lmpairlng the obligation Of contracts, shall
euer be passed." But while the letter of the
constitution thus prohibits the Legislature
from passing any law impairing the obliga-
ton of contracts, its spirit also prohibits the
Legislature, either by non-action, or by
action lacking the formality of law, from
rendering the obligation of contracts entered
into by the State, worthless to the indiyid.
ual party thereto, The undersigned will
not so far insult this House as to anticipate