The weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa) 1858-1860, 1859-05-31

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T07s ~ ~ III ChaaaA,
Va 6 ~ - - os.a ~. = A, osns
s.,Sssiera It = ehte4 - hnvo taken
- ~ Trrsr;ao1io, q which poi.k i : Cd
~ Asr1siene wsro rsplleed i, IN ~
-, "a 49, ~ Pa There seems y b .
:.Psh.' ~ 8 ~ placs q which the %.
.I.sss, eosarfea, and he petition assigned
"a I. " lad . each place % The map, bus
= s i. nijee ifon The Pc, there b town
.sns3 Trne.inet1o, o. ese nap, and Fran
sA.ssn - another. II We ere correct 10
ss...c.ine ~ latter = The point indicated
ss,ISa Assnakeh, lie AUoeriADs must have
1919 :. n considerable fofee, and been driv-
~ - 4 severe losa. Il b in TACT %
1890 ana therefore h 10 probable that our
..rm;sa q % loeallty, 10 correct
ic- n can form oume idea Of the disas-
..ons ehnraceer ofan eight nile route, with
.;,sr lie The Po in The rear.
Tho beeinnine Of the campaign i, il must
A.o-nsd' ~ unpropitious one f0r the troops,
.sn;rs,el aad prepared - the Austrians
49, The crossing Of The 20 At the point
s"a,,.;Ae Traseinetso almost simultaneously
T;th 10 passage Of the Aussrians at Gambia.
s;,,eao miles lower down, con6rms the idea
that the latter movement was the inisiaeory
step Of combined plan oteperatlons cover
ing several pointa We did not attach much
eredit 70 the statement thar the whole OF the
advanced Austrian divisions were to be con-
ceptrated agsinst Alessapdria, although the
importance Of that stronghold, commanding
The line Of Communication between Genoa
and Turin, 10 sufficiently apparent
50 much tune having already been lost by
the Austrian Generals, there remains but
little hope Of their affecting anything by
surprise. The French have taken such ad.
vantage Of their supineness, that results can
only b. obtained now BY m advantage O
large masses Of troops, in separate columns
with their lines Of communication 90 vel
secured, that there shall be NO danger Of theil
interruption, This 10 . tedious plan OF oper
alton. and viii 30 rendered more difficult b.
dangers which will threaten the Austrian
in the rear, from the insuSrectionary move
ments IN the Peninsula, ana the chances o
the revolutionary contagion spreading t
Lombardy. aan
These are the first results Of the error
committed by the Austrians, in not actinl
promptly when they had once made up thei
minds for war. II, instead Of giving tn
French time 10 hasten TO the relief OF thei
allies, they had followed up their ultimatur
BY Immediately crossing tho Sandman from
tier, and advancing 70 Turin, they woul
have gained prestige here. the decision
which would have been usefnl to thei
throughout the campain, to say nothing
the advantage which the capture Of the Pict
montess Capitol would have proved to then
They might besides, have annihilated tn
whole Sardlnian army, had their measure
been sxilfulIy taken !; for what could tn
10000 Of which 10 ID composed, acting
they must have done, in separate bodies, hav
effected against then. H.h.
There % but one way faceouating for tn
hesitation which seized the Austr'ans, at
moment 1t which their preparations SCENE
to have been made for an immediate advance
The revolt Of the two Duchies, and the pros
pect Of its spreading to the rest Of Italy, ~
pear to have had the effect Of paralysin
their movements Ii this is correct, no
blind must have been the Emperor and b
advisers, to the real condition Of the PENN
sula, and Of the Italian provinces under An
trian rule. They should have been prepare
for these results, or not have pushed mattel
to their present extremity. 1t is difficult
understand the generalship which under
takes q campagne Of 90 serious characte
without taking into account chances SO tu
Of danger.
If it should turn out that the delay in col
mencing hostilities was occasioned solely
apprehension for the safety Of Lombard
then the world will say that Francis JOSEF
and his councillors were q puck OF crac
Drained fools for entering on the war at