The south-western. [volume] (Shreveport, La.) 1852-1870, 1859-08-10

Intelligencer, giving the views OF that aple jour
nal on the conclusion of the armistice, peace,
&C., BY France, her allies and the Austrlans-
For two days the allies remained around Sol
ferino masters of the position, but so shattered
that they could not make the least use OF the
advantage Their foe had, however, been
strong enough to push, with skill and regular
ty, for the base of new position, where the
next move in the fearful campaign was expect
ed to be promptly made. Advantages, how
ever, appeared to thicken this time in favor OF
the Austrians, instead of the allies. They were
200, 600 strong in formidable position With
all the reinforcements which he could gather,
Napoleon, we know, was not able to muster
more than 10000 men fit for instant action.
Hitherto, it is admitted. be had fought against
inferior numbers and won-barely won. How
would it be when the numbers were superior
and the fighting was to be equal? The Pied
montese were-so many of them as could be
re organised after the terrible Soferino fight
placed to invest Peselliera. There were not
enough in prince Napoleon's division to make
good this deficiency.
Here was a dilemma which needed instant
attention. Louis Napoleon was precisely the
man-as all who have studied his career for
twelve years must know-for the difficulty
Events already begin to prove this. The bat
tie of Soferino must have more than satisfied
him that he had to contend with disciplined he
roes, determined to fight. Another such vic
tory as that would, as his own officers confess,
leave him unable to carry out the smallest Of
his great objects, if it left him in no worse con-
dition. Knowing that he had lost more, men
by several thousands than the Austrians, and
that he could spare less-knowing that his re-
treating but not disorgansed foe was able to
move from the scene of carnage with all its war
material and in undislurbed ease-knowing that
the most tedious portion of his war labor was
only about to be entered into, against odds, too,
which he had ceased to egard--knowing
that the Italians among whom he now fought
liked the Austrians as surely as the Lombard
ians did not-knowing that all Germany was
not only on the alert, but on the move, and may
be any day in force al his rear-knowing that
Austria was ready to receive his full front on
the Adige, and that a check, if not defeat, to
his arms was exceedingly probable-knowing
thatin France such disaster would be deep
wound to his own popularity, if not fatal to his
position, against which SO many "dynastc eff
forts" are made in Paris-knowing several other
thought-settling facts IN this direction, Napo-
Icons wisest course-certainly not his most
maguanimous one-lay in doing what is credi-
ted to him by the arnistice proposal.
For Austria to have spurned such an offer at
any time would be to have putherseif defantIy
against the instincts That in such circumstances
govern even the mos barbarous nations That
it came from France, who had SO far made the
winning moves in this bloody campaign, may
be taken as proof, not that Napoleon felt he
he had humbled his Zoe sufficiently or at all,
but turn of the tide Of fortune was likely and
undesirable, and that any fair adjustment of the
dispute could, before entering upon the new
and hazardous steps o. the game, he entertain
ed, if not decided upon, by both powers most
honorably at that moment when the CORY game
was at its height.
There, however, begins the new difficulty;
and it is one which the partizan journals, who,
by-the-by. must be sadly disappointed, that all
they fancied for, each move in the war has been
falsifed almost as soon as fancied-that the
Austrians have not been swallowed up in some
huge French cannon, or gone and hanged them
selves in the willow groves in very fear. Had
Napoleon seen his coarse clear, or, as the Times
would say, "as easy as kiss hands, Z" to free TIA
ly, as he had promised, to the Adriatic, he
would assuredly not have stopped short at the
first change in the desperate part of the strug-
gle, and directly in the middle of his effort
he would have pushed on to Verona at bound,
hurled the Austrians into the Adge, despatch
ed a squadron of horse to summon Mantua,
blown conquering trumpet over the walls of
Peschera and taken itin balloon, sent a com
pany of Zouavessto seize Padua, and achieved
all the other marvels which our partizan CO.
temporaries daily but rainly bloat about In
stead Of doing all these impossiblilies he sees
sudden reason TO ask for truce. What for?
Nominaily to negotiate; it may really be to rest
for the re- rganisationhe confessedly needs
But as what will be good for him in that re-
spect will, we think, be equally good for his
foe, there is small advantage to be reaped from
that effort that is not also to be shared in To
make peace, then, is his object? Perhaps so,
but on what conditions 1t may be that be will
ask Austria to abandon western Lombardy.-
Now Austria should have done this before, and
as the western Lombards hate alike Austrians
and French and Piedmontese when they as
sumo to rule over them, we think Francis DO
seph-whose integrity and generosity no man
questions-Wll not be slow TO use an opportu-
nifty for making western Lombardy indepen-
dent Of him, or of France or of Piedmont
But then about the other parts OF Austrian TIA
ly-the regions of Mantua, Verona, Vivenza
Rovigeo, Dugato, Gin which is Venice, Pa
Qua, Trevigiano, &c, will the Austrian En-
peror be asked to surrender them? The peo-
pie generally do not ask it as do those of the
the other provinces. And if Austria cedes
not those to independence, the boast of Napo-
leon will be mere boast, and he will leave his
proposed work unfinished As.he must know
that Francis Joseph will not, while he has
soldier to fight with him, give up the eastern
part of his Italian possessions, Napoleon must,
we think, be prepared to suggest terms which
will certainly fall short of his main object of
battle, and if it be not something Of this sort
hat is intended, then no one can nationally
except as an act of downright
cunning, the demand for truce. If the par
izan Journals be true, all that he required for
1is liberating object, TO 50 ahead At once,
md Italy was free-sooner and safer and with
ess expense in blood and treasure than if the
work has to be begun again when the truce will
rave expired.
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE SrArE-The !
statement of tba finds IN tbo Ss,to