New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1859-07-19


While THE "a goirg our right the Pied mont se
A. had been agreed sent forward If cir
one column. a brigade Of the 5th Dvsion with tFo
gu,s towards Peschera ard the Other brigade OF the
30 DIVISION with four guns toward PozZoiebgo. I'M:
lat column had r it, support the other brigade Of the
sh Division While the first went across me country
toward Peschsra, the second followed the railway
liIe which leads from DeseIzauo to Pe,chiera, aud
then leaving Il a. the ibe section Of the road by the
railway rounc ed toward POzzolengo.
The country to the sOuh Of the Peninsula Of Sermi
one rises very gently tokard the mountains. forming
kind Of basin toward the lake. Tricky planted with
irees il is not very favorable for observation. The
SardLisns not sUspectng the yhborhOOf Of an en-
envy advanced with their reconnaissance far a. San
MARITIME, which Is plateau to the right of the road,
rising abruptly from the lower country. This plate su
IL few Thousand feet square, and &, the foD OF 1t are
enscorced among the trees number of farnhouses.
The officer of the Staff who accompanied the expedi-
on thought be saw figures moving toT ard the oppo-
site side while the PedmOntese passed but he thought
them country people. The column passed on there
fore sending skirnis1ers up to the plateau Eho
found themselves received with rife balls from the
houses at the baton. The colu faced round, and,
having disposed is guns to bear On the thlcket 1t ad-
vanced toward the plateau, and succeeded, although
lot without loss in gaining the hight and at the
zane tine a messenger was sent TO hasten the
advance Of the next brigade. Before this could
arrive, however, the Austrians had brought up
fresh troops, and the Piedm0htese were driven
from the position they had taken up. When the
freeh brigade had come up another attempt was
made to get possession Of the hghte which, however
old not succeed and the Pedmonese retired to form
agan and to await the reinforcement of two fresh
brgades. These the Brgades AOsta and CamOu ar
rived about 4 .. M. and then a new effort made
All the guns were united into one large battery, to
throw the houses at the foot of the plateau and
three columns formed for an attack. Although dead
beat by the rapid march, they scaled the nights and
finally not only maintained their position but folio we
the enemy close to Pozzolengo Their loss was very
severe about 900 killed aud wounded They had for
a & -
Benedek, aud were therefore terribly oyera atchet.
No doubt they would have had even greater difficult
ties had il not been for the success at Soferno and
Cavriana, which imperOusly compelled retreat On
the right of the Austrian army as well. Two Pied
mOntese Generals wounded and almost every colonel
of the regiments engaged.
During the fight n message came from the other
wiz TO send division toward Soferino to act on that
eide
/ must interrupt my letter, for the mail leaves.
More Tomorrow.
CAyRIAsA, June u.
III remember right my account of the battle broke
of yesterday with the engagement on our left wing,
between the Piedmontese and the corps Of Gen. Bene
dek As far as our side is concerned the engagement
az San MARITIME must be looked at "a al entirely sepa
rate affair rot ebtereDg into the general plan of the
battle. 1t was only toward noon, short time before
the taking Of Soeiino that their cooperation Ms said
before Was demanded. Having tvs divisions and
half already engaged against far superior enemy, and
having likewise TO apprehend 40 advance OF the Aus
possible to make the movement in the direction Of Sol
ierinO which was wanted.
On the side Of the Austrans, on the contrary, the
movement all along the line was according to one plan
The great difficulty was, however, to give TO the
movements the necessary ensemble on O line oil from
twelve to fifteen miles in length. Until the orders
from CayIiaua could arrive, the situation was very
often entirely changed and to choose the opportune
moment for movement just one OF the inos' import
ant conditions ior the Of battle. As IL was,
no Jolt M poZ1oleupO
from the rest, while the movements OF the eit wing
could like.ise be only imperfectly controlled. The
length Of the line made the employment Of the reserves
equally difficult and caused want of cohesion In the
whole which might have been far more fatal til al 1t
really had the Austrans not thought so early OF
their retreat. All these great mist axes were up to
certain point counter balanced by the number OF lines OF
retreat which the AusrlaDs possessed. But TINS al
vantage told only toward the end and saved them
from what otherwise would probably have been
CON plee rout. During the battle it was curious to
watch the effects OF the too great length OF the me ahu
its corresp spending weakness The French, with their
first impetuosity, invariably succeeded IN breaking
through or pressing back the part OF the line whch
they attacked, and before the reserves came up ney
ha6 usually succeeded in throwing themselves toto the
flank of the Austrians, who eti maintained ther
ground thus forcing them like wise to retreat In spl'e
of their numerical superiority the Alistnans ioahd
themselves almost always too few at the decisive
poipt and at the decisive minute. They were thus
messed back step 10y step The more they retued the
greater became the leugtn of the lac aud the cor
spending disadvantage, for the road To Goto' "hSh
wac II line of for their left wing and at the
same time of vital importance, one OF the chief pas
sages Of he Mnco, runs off diagonaly toward the
riyer. This was, OF course, disadvantage "hcu
IDENTIFY not to have chosen line OF battle "hich
eXposed them TO it. They have SIX passages
op the Mncio-at Peschiera, Sahonge, Monz amoano,
BoIghetto, Valleggio and Goto. Ihey wanted 70
use and had consequently to protect them all. LAKE,
the hen with her numerous Chickens they stretched
out their wings to embrace them all. lney were
probably very confident in their success, and thought
that the more they ADVANCED the snorter lhelr Ilns
would become which was quite true, for Tomato and
Cas,ielione the two places where ali the Minco
passages lead to- not more than four or nve nles
distant from each other aud in pushing bacK the
enemy, they might hope to envelope MS rgn, ~ins'
This was evidently their calculation, only was wrong,
and therefore failed. If one ID certain oil victory,
then one is justified in choosing an order oi patis
which will make that victory the most decisive anu
the enemy defeat the most completes but the events
which have occurred hitherto in this npagn scarce
" justified the Austrians in reckoning, even WIN
superiority in numbers, on certain victory; "ouiu
have been therefore, wiser to be more uouefa' III
In attempting too much they weakened their forces
at tile decisive point and while they tired their omen
siye movement ON their left they lost the Key OF teI
position of Sollerino. One can, indeed, io'GNs the
fcr thinking THE latter impregnabe fortified and gar
ri.oned as 1t was; but in warfare there e1is only
greater or lesser probabilities, and no absolute GER
taintes
After the loss Of Solferino nothing remained but To
tbink of retreat The plain on both sides OF the road
TO Cote became untenabe for it could be taken IN
flank from the spurs OF the hills and the resistance g,
sas too long continued, there was the Danger VI ,s
bng also taken in flank from Medole, and SO lose the
road TO Cote The center could not assist IT. Tor II
aid move toward the right, it exposed It's own hne oi
retreat which was toward Nallegg'o
As ii was the lire Of retreat to Goito coud ohy DC
Lent with The greatest sacrifices and il is but Jnsice
to say that the Austrians somewhat eieened the mis-
takes which they made in their advance oy the mas
try wv In " ch they managet their retrea', under