The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1859-06-02

arrival Of reinforeements. In few weeks the
Austrian bugles were heard in the passes of the
Tyrol, and their long columns came winding
down into the plains of Italy. The arrival Of
these fresh battalons put the Austrians in con
dition to take the field, and Radetzky, though
an old man, we'll stricken in years, did not lose
a moment. Issuing from his stronghold, he
completely outgeneralled Charles Albert, turn
ed his flank, and attacked him in the rear. In
fortnight he fought half dozen battles, and
was victorious in every one, driving the Pied
n1ontese army before him from Mantua TO Milan
and across the frontier into Sardinia Thus in
alfew short days the glorious prize of Italian
liberty was lost, and that beautiful territory
again consigned to years of foreign dominion.
But this was not the end Of misfortune. One
bitter lesson was not enough. The disastrous
campaign of 4S was followed by the fatal de-
feat of 40, when, for the second time, the hope
OF italy was lost. In August of the previous
year, when driven out Of LoInbardy, Charles
Albert had entered into an armistiee with Ra-
detzky, which, of course, both expected would be
the prelude TO a definite and permanent peace.
But wIsen the King got back to Turin, he'found
that he had raised a storm which he could not
quell. Stung by their defeat, and conscious
that it was not owing to any want Of valor on
their part, the brave Piedmontese burned for
another chance TO wipe out the national dis
grace This ardor was kept up by the excite
ment in other parts of Italy. The whole pen
insua still agitated and young patriots
were burning to renew the war of liberty. The
popular enthusiasm too strong to be resist
ed. If violently repressed, it threatened TO
break out into republicanism. The Sandman
Parliament came together on the LIST of Feb
ruary, and the King addressed the Chambers
in a speech full of Italian fire, and pointing
distinctly to the necessity Of again taking up
arms
BY the terms of the armistice, it had been
agreed that if either party should decide to re-
sumo hostilities, II should give the other eight
days notice. Charles Albert had decided TO open
the campaign on the 10Th of March, and &C
cordmgly on the 18th, courier was sent of
with all speed from Turin to Milan, to bear the
formal declaration.
Marshal Radetzky had been expecting this
issue, and it did not take him by surprise.
| The old war-horse snuffed the battle from affair.
Never was tidings more eagerly welcomed than
this by the garrison Of Milan, who hailed it as
a new call to victory and glory. Though Ra-
detzky had grown gray IN arms, The was now
eighty-three years old, and might claim exemp-
ton from the fatigues of new campaign, he
acted with promptitude and energy which his
enemies might admire, but certainly did not
| initiate. Orders were at once sent off to the
Austrian attachments to leave small garrisOns in
| the towns, and march in with their whole force
to join him. This course, indeed, involved the
danger ofinsurrections in hisrear. He we'll knew
that if he experienced any check, the whole
| country would break out in another revolution
In fact the people did rise in Brescia, and over
powered the garrison, and were for several DAYS
masters of the place, until Haynau marched
upon them from Venice and put down the re
volt by horrid massacre. But Radetzkv chose
TO run the risk for the sake OF the main chance
he knew that if he could defeat the Sardiuians
in one pitched battle all these isolated insurrcc-
tons could be easily suppressed aud, with that
decision which shows him TO have been a thor
ough master of war, he determined TO concen-
trate his whole force, and march straight
against the enemy. Of his own troops, he left
| but small garrison in the citadel of Milan,
and marched out with all the rest Of his army
| But he did not take the direct road to Turin,
but left by the Roman gate, which led some
who had seen him TiuS depart = year believe
| TO jump to the conclusion that be vas going
to retreat. But they little understood him.
He kept his counsel, and allowed none to
penetrate his designs. He marched south,
as he had ordered the several divisions of his
army to concentrate at Pavia, n city close Ia
the Piedmontese frontier. His orders had been
promptly obeyed. Exact at the hour. every di-
vision entered the appointed place Of rondez-
vOus. On the night OF the 9Th, the whole army
was concentrated around Pavia At twelve
o'clock the next day, the arnistice expired, and
instantly the order was given to march, and be-
fore night the whole Austrian army were on the
soil Of Sardinia.
! This easy entrance into their enemys coun.
| try was great advantage gained. As they
had TO cross river, their passage might have
! been disputed, and division of the Piedmont
ese army had been appointed to hold them in
check But it was not at its post This unac
countable negligence, it is supposed, was owing
| to treachery, and General Ramorino, who com
mandcd this division, was afterwards tried by
court martial, and shot But the leaving Of
such post in treacherous or incapable hands
showed the wretched management witch
seemed to preside over the whole campaign.
While the Austrians were thus moving in
admirable concert, every battalion in line Ia
the Sandman camp all was confusion. If the
Government had shown half the energy and
wisdom in preparing for war, that it had shown
Of rashness in rushing into it, the result might
have been different But its councils seemed
| infatuated. Carried away by popular tumult,
it had declared when totally unprepared.
1t had, indeed, large army, aud Drawer sol
dlers never followed their chiefs TO be H.. bur
all the fruit Of courage was lost by want Of or
ganization. They had not even a leader In
whom they had confidence.
Then they applied for the services of Marshal
Bugeaud, the French General, who had been
so distinguished IN Alrlcaj out ne would not
accept, unless he could have supreme and alb
solute command and this was thought to dero-
gate from the Royal dignity and finally they
took up with Polish general who had gained
some distinction in the revolution of 1881, and
who undoubtedly possessed considerable knowl-
edge of the art of war, but who wholly ig-
norant of the country in which he was to fight,
and the materials which he was 10 command.
He could not even speak the language and had
to give his orders through Interpreters. Of
small, unimposing figure, there was nothing
about him 10 inspire confidence in an army to
which he was a stranger. The consequence
was, that, while every Austrian soldier had un-
bounded confidence in his chief, which was It.
self pledge of victory, the brave PiedmOntese
marched blindly into battle with nothing TO re-
" upon but their own unfailng courage. So
unskilful were the combinations, that the
eral divisions were left far apart, unsupported
by each other, by which they were surprised in
detail; and even on the field of Noyara, 1t is
said that a large part of the troops were not
brought into the battle at all, but Stood wait
ing for orders, while the rest of the army was
being destroyed
When the writer was in Sardinia a few
months ago. he found that the people did not
like to speak of these events. They could not
recall them without shame and bitterness. The
only redeeming thing on that fatal day was the
pallautry of the soldiers, aud Of their unhappy
King. To this no one bore higher testimony
thon Rodatzky himself In his official report