Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-07-06

aud the upper valley Of the Pc However this |
may be. it is certain that GAEIBAEDzn astonishing
successes on the west and then on the east Of Lake
Maggiore and then successfully ct Varese At Como,
at Dsrgamo, and lastly at Brescia have vniforn
ybeen the prscursOry siguals THE Austrian retreat
over the Sesa. the Ticino Ihs Aids, and the 0glio
No battle Of MarsngO this tims preceded the rstrsst
over the Pc No sAnguinary conflict st the bridge
Of Lodi imTsded the passage Of the French tho
AIDA; flying not fighting. enemy this time pre-
ceded these advances of the French; sad for ali
this the first thanks due it seems 10 TO Carl
bsldi. This occupation of Brescis alone was an
event of The deepest Importance, in compelling
reirogrsde movement from the fact that it is situated
right on the railO.d BY viii h alone supplies and
reinforeenents can be dispatched from the central
Austrian possessions to the valley of the Po
fThs above was written before receiving the news
which arrived BY the Vanjerbilt this intelligence
leaves il cert ain that the Auslrians terrifying
themselves as fast possible in what has been ia
miliarly termed the Historical quadrangle We
proceed to describe this fortified district so ofen al
/ luded to-.
| Our readers may find it on any map Of Italy, Oo-
cupyiug az irregular square, having Lake di GAria
on its NORTH the 20 its SOUTH the Mineio and the
Adige on its east and wet respectively At the
angles of this square the rePutedy impregnable
! fortresses of Peschera on Lake di Glrds, MAnlua
J on an islam 10 the MiOciO Verona and Legnago on
the Aiige; its front is protected by the fortified
line Of ths Mincio, from Peschiers 10 Mantua, and
thence to the PO By the impossible marshes lying
! bet wsen the lower Mncio and the Pc. Il commnui-
Gates with the home provinces by railway along
the valley of the Adige and with the Adriatie
by railway communication with Venice aud Trieste.
1t is not unlikely that the French may force an
other action before all the AusriAn troops are en-
trenches within this position but the Austrisns win
Tor should) avoid one if possible
This position once attained, military events can
not be expected to follow another in such rapid
succession as hitherto, and time win be left for ne
gOtiations.
To estimate the probable results of diplomacy
during the period OF comparative inaoIon that may
be expected to intervene and to calculate upon the
probable results, whether Of peace which shall an
tcipate further hostilities, or Of the engagement
of more European powers in the struggle, We nust
consider the position of several nations directly or
| indirectly concerned.
And first, that of Prussia and the German powers
of Northern and Central Europe.
Much error has arisen from supposng Prussia
and Germany to be unity ia action and political
feeling such that the policy Of is necessarily
the policy of ALL This is very far from being the
case, and the conflict of opinions in the Diet at
Frankfort and between the various Courts Of Ger
many is an excellent illustration of the real state
of things.
Germany, apart from the German possessions Of
Austria may be considered as consisting Of three
dstinguishable elements, Of which Prussia is one !;
the second is made up of the three kingdoms of Ba-
varia, Hanover and Saxony; and the third Of the
small prineipslities most of which would follow
the political lead of Prussia. The three kingdoms
the most jealous powers for despOtism in Europe,
are all eager for war, and are endesyoring to
pei Prussia to join with them in drawing the sword
for Austria, and threaten If Prussia remain inactive
to act without her. The Prince Regent of Prussia
(actng as Regent account Of the insanity of the
King) indignantly protests his Independence, and
while he recognizes the probability that it msy be-
come necessary TO declare alliance with Austria,
refuses to be forced into war, asserting his right
and intention of deciding for himself This Prince
is from all that We can hear Of him, probably the
ablest sovereign Prussia has had since the days of
Frederick the Great
The worst that could happen for Germany, and
indeed for Austria would be that the soveregns OF
Bavaria Hanover and saxony, with such of the
smaller States as could be induced to join them,
should throw themselves into the war without wait
ing for the action of Prussia, and SO induce the
Russian Emperor to throw his immense resources
into the other scale, without furnishing Austria
with any adequate support TO eouuterbalance these
fearful odls
The position Of EsGLAND depends upon the bal
, ance of parties in that kingdom While Lord DER-
GY was in power, though the government was for
the time being pledged to neutrality. it clearly
understood that that neutrality might at any mo-
ment be put an end to by a necessity for declaring
with Prussia for Austria. But now that Lord PALM
ERsToS, with Lord JOHS RUSSELL for his Foreign
Secretary has though by small majority, made
his way ID the Premiership, things are widely al
tered. Neutrality is much more decidedly reeOg-
nized the British policy, with evident desire
that the Frsnco-SaIGlnian armies may be successful
OF least SO far as TO expe the Austrian empire from
, its Italian possessions. The immediate efforts Of
the PALMERsTsS government will probably take the
form Of mediation the Emperor will if possible,
be induced to acknowledge his defeat, to give up
the WHOLE at least part of his Italian posses
sions on condition that they be governed iniepend
emily of that empire, but By of the princes Of
its imperial family-a denouement not in oFin
ion desirable as it will leave open all the ola
grounds of dissatisfaction, and like the peace aft
the capture of sebastOpOl, leave nothing settled
which was unsettled before
RUSSIA will remain neutral, unless either Prussia
or England, or both, declare for Austria, and then
unite in an offensive and defensive alliance with
| France
Thus much for Che present attitude Of parties.
Our next paper will be occupied with speculstons
on the probabilities of the future. DEW