New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1859-07-18

LdctIc4 30 Lnab ID cOmmHnQ 70 reCT0S9
the Mincio appeared rather the result Of caprice
than deliberate judgment it into these uplands
that be led his army. The village OF P0Zzolengo,
which he describes as having been occupied BY bis
right wing, is about six miles to the southwest Of
Peschiera. Solferino, which played 80 important
PAT IN the battle s little village about six miles 70
te southwest Of Pozzolengo, and is situated at the
ioos OF We upands and Just at the point where they
descend INTO the plain.
Away 70 the LEFT across the plain another six miles
distant, Is that Castel Gofredo, which we are told
was occupied ~ the Austrian left wing. Here We
nave ne line Of battle. The three places are nearly
saa,.n. ano form straight 'front.' in south
the line is as nearly as possible Of the length which
the French Emperor mentioned in his esss oe To the
Empress Its right extends over the hjohIands from
pIan so@ % !. M s along the
the center and the key Of the position Behind thee
three points lies second line Of posts marked il he
dispatch, and important in the events Of de dsv.
Ggdezzolo and Cavriana are the villages that afIofd
this second line Of stations, and Volts also mention
ed In the telegram Is town about four miles In the
rear Of that second line Of posts, and within very
short distance Of the westernsbank Of the Mincio.
We have thus the Austrian order Of battle and dis
tribution of force perfectly indicated. What the
French positions may have been we only copjec-
ture. They probably formed line which would have
Castgone for its center. As the Austrians say that
their left wing advanced beyond Castel Goredo, and
nearly reached the banks Of the Chese, it is proba-
BILE that the allied force was principally concentrated
in the higher district which approaches the shores
the Garda Lake.
The Austrian line seems to have advanced in a
crescent form, pushing forward it's wings from Poz-
zolengo and Castel GoAredo with great energy, and
some success, and attempting to force forward their
center along the slopes of the uplands towards Cas-
tiglione. Here, however, they were met and de-
carried BY the French troops. The Austrians had bad
extended their line too far even for their immense
force Having thus lost the key to their whole posi-
ton the Austrian center must have been forced back
70 the village Of Cavriana, four miles in the rear.
They must again have been dislodged by the pursuing
French and Sardinians, and again must have re-
treated upon Volta, six miles still further in the rear.
volta 49, We believe, an open town, and the Austrian
center which now occupied it, was ten miles in rear
French were following up their successes, and we're
preparing ior an attack upon Volta with their main
Oooy. Ii TINS should succeed, the Austrian army
must % cus IN TWO and entirely routed. The Aus
greatly in advance Of his center and drew Of his en-
tire army not however, retreatiug very far bat as
il would appear, retiring only to the bank Of he
Mincio, which, after Volta had become his central
position, WAS close 10 his rear Next day he crossed
the river, and we have now the significant announce
ment that Gen Hess takes the command and that
important business requires the presence Of the EN-
peror Of Austria in Vienna.
The most wonderful part of this batte-and indeed
the most wonderful characteristic of the whole cam.
paign-is, that the AAustrians when beaten were al
lowed to evacuate the field of battle without pursuit
Whether this is moderation or policy or necessity on
the part of the French Emperor We cannot yet tell
Nor can we tell whether be looks upon this Austrian
army IS sportsman looks upon the game in his pre-
serves, and manages them with design of getting
IS many batues out Of them as possible, or whether
i has always been chance-happily decided in biz
favorwhether be should drive back those obstinate
Austrians, or fail himsefin the effort. Napoleon III
keeps bis own counsel too closely to let Europe know
this interesting truth 1t appears certain, however
that when the Austriaus content to retreat the
contemplated attack upon Volta was suspended and
the advance Of the French ceased
Was it the bridge Of gold to the flying enemy, OF
was it the accord of peace to the beaten and yet
abiding foe? We cannot quite comprehend The
restraint of the French upon this and other occasions
except upon the superstition that they had good
reason for avoiding any further conflict at that par
ticular moment. But, whatever may be the determn.
ing cause Of these tactics it certainly is not the want
any personal enterprise on the part Of the French
Emperor, which has allowed the Austrian army "a
remain unbroken after this defeat He has shown
himself to be as personally brave as any one Of bis
own grenadiers and we must not cavil at the steps
Of progress which are lesurely but apparently 80
surely mounted We should rather look forward with
interest for tokens of that moderation in victory
which, after ALL must test the ultimate prosperity Of
even this most prosperous of men.