Nashville patriot. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1858-1860, 1859-03-15

resist the pretensions of the United States
and our purpose to a transfer of the island
from her, and rather to seek the guarantee of
the aid of France and England TO protect
her in the possession of it; if that was the
effect of the first manifesto, this second one
is enforced with arguments calculated to be
still more offensive. Having the sanction of
the President of the United States, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate of the United States, it can scarcely
fail of uniting and cementing the most
hostile factions in Spain in the unalterable
purpose TO make every sacrifice, incur every
hazard. even that of making an unequal war
rather than yield to the demands of this Cow
ernment; and, finally. when the hour APP
preached that they found they should have
to yield the possession to the superior power
and recources of this Government. they
would take care TO yield it blasted. black
ruin. This the natural, if not the I'M
avoidabe consequence of this mode of con-
ddciing the pegOtiation. The last spring OF
the bayed aud hunted tiger, even after the
mortal dart has reached its vitals, is often
most fatal to the pursuer.
But, it is asked. why should this PROPOSE
| tion he so deeply offensive to the people
| of Spain, or to the Government of Spain?
| Why should simple proposition to purchase
portion of her territory for a full equiva-
| lent, be considered offensive to any Power
| Well. sir, there is no reason why it should
! have been offensive. There is no reason, that
| know of, to suppose that it would have
! been offensive if the offer had been made
| with the observances aud courtesies usually
practiccd in negotiation tween individual
| Powers for such a purpose. 1t was the
violation of all those ObServances and
courtcsies which is calculated to render the
| proposition offensive. The publication Of
| the Ostend manifesto announced to all the
world. not only our dcsirr, but our de-
| termination. to have it; and this was en-
! blazon,d to the world without any necessity
! whatever; and now. again, this measure is
presented, If possible, in a more offensive
| form than that manifesto. inasmuch as it has
| the solemnity of pr sidential sanction, not
any longer simply James Buchanan's name,
| Minister to London, but James Buchanan,
| President of the United States, and further
| Endorsement by the Committee on Foreign
| Relations of the Senate.
No nalion.~no matter how fallen in its
fortunes a. long as it maintains itself erect,
| and is recognized as one of the great tamily
of nations, would he apt to listen to an
overture for the purpose of purchase of
| portion of its territory, even when made IN
the confidence of diplomatic intercourse
| under the seal of secrecy; no nation would
| he apt TO receive such a proposition with
| favor when it was prefaced by studied
reminder of its falling fortunes, of its
! straitened finances, OF It's decayed power, and
that it would not long be able and
to maintain its grasp over the object
! which i the subject of negotiation, and mad
| better take what was offered than to lose 1t
| without any compensation. Sir, the prince
of the mot petty Power in Europe would
| scorn the offer, when made 10y Il public
| AMBASSADOR or minister who had taken pains
TO expose to all his neighbours, and to the
whole world, all the necessities of his treasury
| his internal diSsensiOnS fecblenes-, and
! imbr cility; and that he would soon have to
release the possession Of the oiject which was
! ought in negotiation. These are the clrcum
| stances attending this case.
| Mr. President. | think one of the greatest
mistakes that has been made in the proce d.
| ing was in the open demand for $50 100000
! to precede any new or further attempt at ne
| gotation upon this subj ct. 1t is all honora-
| bly, meant. no doubt; but it is liable to great
misinterprctation. 1t is unprecedented, too.
! Who ever before heard of IA proposition open
| ly made OF such "A sum, surrounded partlcu-
! larly with such circumstances a. attend this
| case? Why. sir, when Mr. Jefferson wanted
S2.O00,OO0 to be appropriated to aid him
! IN eifecting Il treaty for the purchase OF
| Louisiana, and again for the purchase of Flo
rlda, the request was made 10y confidential
messages 10 both Houses of Congress. and
| the subject was considered with closed doors;
and, H. far as | can trace the history of it.
never disclosed To the public until the object
| for which the appropriation was made was
| accomplished. The appropriation of So
900, 900, to be used in effectIug treaty with
| Mexico, was in the midst of II war; the McXi-
| can Government was not represented at this
| Government; and 1t might, or might not,
! have aay information that such an appropria-
ton had been made; but whether it had IT
not, this Government might be well justified
in employing ii in cOnciliating the most pow
erlul of the factions of Mexico, AMI closing u
war in which we had already got as much
glory us could reasonably be desired.
Thus, say, this proposition is unprecedent-
! ed. The cOrrupteSt faction that ever existed
in the most corrupt Government wOuld be
| apt to recoil from brihc, when openly ten
dcred to them. II these be the natural con
sequences as | assume them TO be. the natural
results of the mode in which this negotiation
has been conducted. which has been adopted
since the year 1854 in the management OF
| our relations with spain. | take the liberty OF
saying, (and hope il will not be offensive TO
! any one il seems TO me that nothing but a
sort of infatuation could lead any one to sup
pose that success can follow such hereto
| fore unimagined. or rather | should say, I'M
Imaginable. mode of conducting a negotia
ton for such a purpose. The gentlemen who
have participated in it from 1854 tn this time
| both those who initiated the councils at Os-
tend and those who have followed up the
same subject here, are quite too intelligent
| quite too able. quite too experienced, not to
J have had from that nom mt am speaking
of the moment from lS54-any expectation
that Cuba could ever be acquired by nego
tiaiion. The SAM confidence that have in
the ability and intelligence of those gentle
! men-I say it with snc-rity-has driven me
| to the conclusion that the O,tend council
manifesto as well this proceeding. have
been adopted under the perfect conviction
that Cuba never could be acquired by negO-
tiation; that if they left the acquisition TO
the slow PROCESS of time aud Of further ne
gotiations, it would have been postponed in.
definitely; and they believeit to be expedient,
! in conformity with she supposed spirit aud
demands of public 'ntiment in this country.
TO rouse its pride, ifyou please the first effect
| OF a menace of war, and next. contemporaries
ously to use means To reconcile the country
to actual war, should il bc necessary Tor the
acquisition of Cuba.
! II | had time. or could have strength, 10
view this subj CT as / should wish, should
! Ike to refer TO some passages in this report
| which confirm thisconviciion on my part. This
| report il An able and skilltully-drawn paper.
Independently OF those paragraphs or the sug-
! gestiOns contained in them, which are mer, "
| taken from the Presidents IN .sSagc, there
are suggestive ideas in other parts Of the
report that confirm me in this conviction.
said it was a skilliul aud ably-d-awn paper.
Ii addresses itself directly 10 all the strong
| passions which give activity To the political
| and social movement. Ii is addressed To
what is supposed to be- the predominant and
| charac tcTlstic trait ot our population
cupidity. or the lust of gain. Ii is not unfair
To do 81; not at all. 1t appeals TO the inter
ests of all the most widely-diffused branches
of public industry. Ii promises increased
markets. increased activity to the commerce
and navigation aud manufactures of the
| North and East. Ii promises more extend
ed and profitable field for the employment OF
the labor peculiar 20 the South. To the great
agricultural States of the Northwest and