New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1859-03-04

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t,r,,.d uei.Lborhoo1 Of Yero1s, too weak TO take
TIE fed in deei.iTe ss';'e, he removed ns army
by 4. bod ,nd ,iilifal fs.k-L1reh, By LsEssso %
p,n,ua: ard, before the enemy lad Az certain
Lrowl dse Of xts: va g Dg o., Rsde'ZkJ FL
y,pe.d from Maa.u. - s.tsck tsem on The western
hank Of re Niseic; ke drove II ter he Of
bl9.ksoe, ed coz psJtd TIE mMn ,rny OF ,hs
p.eamontese 70 retreat from before yerou:. Sill
BE- could not yre7eDt the fI II Pescaers, and,
having sitaineA su TIE Ies1lt, from is march %
nsn,u. be c0zA possibly eIpsct be again col
Iec.ed BIS troops, MARCHED ~ Legnaso 70 Nieetza,
ard tCok IL fren the Italians, thereby subj1ug the
Whole Of BE Venetian terTIsery On the contloeI,,
recovering bis communications, aid securing the
retosrce. Of large and rich district in his rear
after which be again retired % bis stronghold Of
Verops. from whi:b TIE Piedmontese were 90
much 1t los. Row 70 dive him, that tae! let' 3
Is hole mouth in doing nothing. 10 the 10 ssn TINE,
ho9ever, three ,troBg Austrian briga1e' had ar
rived. sD3 then the tsblss we're turned IN three
day, Rs1etzky swept the PielmoIt.se from tie
bieat. betxtea the Adigs and the Min:io, tlrning,
at the same time, their right flank by MsntGs, and
esve them soch les.on tat they never showed
fight again until they were behind tae Tlcino.
Tbs campaign Of Rade,ztys shows what q gen.
tral can DO with az Inferior army If supported by
w,l-deiended sys:em q riYerlines. No matter
where the Pje3montese st1Od, or which way they
tired 10 mike front, they could not attack TIE
Austrisns; and TIE cropping in TIE DARK TO VII a
all Their military operations were confined f)r the
lat fse weeks before their ultimate defeat, shows
clearly box belplessly fat they were. Now, IL
what cOn'istsd the strength Of Rsdetzkys posi-
ton Merely in this, tina. the fortres.es no, Only
sheltered bim from an stack, but that they con-
telled the enemy n divide hs forces, while RAJ
detzky, under their shelter, could operate with the
whole Of bis frees at any given point against that
portion Of the enemy he might happen 70 6Ld
against him. Peschiera neutrahzed good many
troops; While Rsde'zky was 10 Verona, Min'1s
Deutfalized another portion, and no sooner did he
20 to Msntua, than Veron, compelled the Pied
nOatege TO leave corps o. OhergatiOn there.
Bot more than this: TIE ITALIANS had TO operate
With separate corps On either tlde Of the rivers,
none of which could rapidly support the other,
y,
could al pleasure remove the whole OF biz forces
from one bank 10 the other. Y;enza, the Venetian
Main, would never have fallen bad it been IN the
power Of the Pi,dmoDtese to support them. As it
was, Rsdetzky took both, while the Piedmontese
were kept in check By the garrisons Of Verons and
M,ntua.
When The French, in Algeria, have 10 march
e..
squares Of infantry and place them on the four cor
neIs OF a rhomboid; the cavalry and artillery ia
plsoed in the center. II the Arabs attack, the
steady Fra Of the infantry Iepels them, and - soon
8s they are broken, the cavalry dash among them,
and the artillery unmber to send them their balls
If repulted, the cavalry finds safe shelter behind
the squares Of the infantry. What the solid infan-
Try sgaibst iuch irregular hordes, such is asystem
Of fortresses for an inferior army in the field;
especially if these fOrtresses are situated on net
work OF rverg. VeTons, Mantua, Peschiera,
Legnaeo, form the four corners of asq1are and so
long as q three, Mt least, Of them taken, an
inferior army c. ut be compelled to leave the po
.ition. Butbow are they TO be taken Peschiera,
indeed, will always fall estiy il the Aus.rians can
not hold the field; but Ssntus in l945, was not
even attempted TO be blockaded on all sides, much
less to be be.iege5. To blockade MAntua, three
armies are required; one on the western, one on
the eastern bank Of the MnciO for the siege, and
one to cover the siege against The Aultrans at
Verona by skillful msueuyeripg among the rivers
aud fortresses, each Of these three armies can be
attacked, Gd hbtWm, by the ,ohoio of the Austrian
forces How is siege to be kept going, under
such circumstances If Mantus, alone, took Cen
eIal BonapsIte nine months to statye out, how
strong will it be if supported by 81 army resting
upon Verona, Legnsgo aid Peschiera, capsule Of
msneuvering with uaited forces, on either benk of
the MnciO or Adige, aud to which the retreat can
never be cut off, as it has two lines of cOmmunica
tion, one through the Tyro, and the other through
TIE Venetian MANI We have no hesitation 10
saying thst this position is of the strongest in
Europe, and as it is not only fully prepared, but
alec fully understood by the Austrsu', We beleye
that $50 600 Austrians in it, need not fear double
their number Of opponents.
Bat suppose they get beaten out of il. Suppose
they lose Mantua and Peschiera and Leenago So
long as they hold Verons, and are not totally
driven from ,he field, they can render very risky
the march Of any French army toward Trieste and
Vienna. Keeping Neron, as an outpost, they can
retire into the Tyrol, recruit their strength, and
sgain compel the enemy to divide his forces. One
portion must besige Verona another defend the
valley Of the Adge; will there remain enough 70
march toward Vienna If so, the TyrOlese army
can fall upon them by that Valley Of the Brenta,
fha strAtrnelic imnnrtance Of which On z ms