The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1859-07-25

/ have gratiiied the malevoience Of Russia to-
wards the House of Hapshurg, too plainly
shown In the late official correspondence; or
/ To haye set all Europe in blaze by showing
| favor 10 aentimentai enthusiasts and impossi-
BILE nationalties. A kingdom Of Italy is possi-
bic, because it exists. kingdom of Hungary
| belongs 10 the Middle Ages.
| The eyontful drama of nine weeks war is
over The epic is compieie--tofus, teres, atqne
rotaidas There was the oppressed virgin,
weeping and in chains, amid olive grounds and
| vineyards. The tyrant stood over her, with
| the lash in his uplifted right hand. There
We're those not far off who raised their voice
| in her favor, and made heroic efforts at her
I rescue, to their own great peril and suffering
| The oppressor had his myrmidons around him.
| who gave him encouragement and assistance
As he bound the cords tighter and more tight
ly, till the piercing cry OF the victim ascended
| to heaven. And then sounds the blast of
| trumpet, followed by the tramping of hoofs
and knight appears, armed pie in he'll
| met ana breastplafe and coat OF mail, who
| shakes his spear ut the tyrant, and dares him
| to single combat. The myrmidons flee in
| terror-the slave bursts his chains, while the
| foes engage fercely for awhile, till ono of
| them is down. But then the champion, whose
cause is avenged, and whose enemy is humbled,
sheathes his sword once more, raises his yizor
! and bids the foe depart in peace. For Italy is
| free.
From the London Post, Government organ,) Ju-
| To ourselves, therefore, we confess, Judging
| from history and precedent the announcement,
| though unexpe ted at the moment, was not al
| together astonishing. To certain extent,
| former wars between Austria and France sup
piled no exact parallel with the circumstances
OF this campaign. Had there been such for
| tresses as the we'll known Quadrilateral, we
should certainly have anticipated cessation
OF hosulities Immediately after the hoekle of
Solferino. This would have followed the CAM
| paIgn of AusterlitZ. On the day succeeding
! that great battle the Emperor Francis went in
person to the tent occupied by Napoleon to
range the terms of an armistice. Although re-
| inlorcements were not distant. the Austro-
russian army had been defeated in an open
country, where little shelter was to be gained
from art or from nature. Austerlitz there
FORE coming after Ulm, suggested hardly
| an alternative to negotiation But at Solfe-
rlno the case was in many respects otherwise.
The Austrians retreated into a compare
| lively strong tract of country, with river in
| Its front, and with four fortresses at the four
| quarters of the Quadrangle. Even when the
| intelligence first arrived that the Austrians
had declined to contest the passage of the Min
| clio, it was impossible wholly to ascribe their
| passive attitud to the discontinue of their
| troops; for it was thought that the advan-
tages of Peschiera and Mantua for debouching
on the rear Of an advancing enemy might rem
der the withdrawal of the Austrians from the
| Mlncio strategic measure. To suppose,
| therefore, that the Austrians, with these de-
tensiye advantages, would have assented to an
armistice without trial of the capacity Of
| the four fortresses, for a war of resistance was
equivalent TO supposing that their famous
gineering works We're after all abortive. Aus
| tria, however, has had to take in to account the
| CONTINGENCY lndl, II Her 1OrtGeSSeS should 1aIl,
| she would be in worse position as q nego-
| tiator than while they remain her own, and
she bas had to contend with the yet graver
peril OF 4 Hungarian Instruction, while she
| was maintaining forlorn struggle with the
| French on the Mincio.
From the London Herald. DERBY organ) July O.
| The remarks in the Moniteur, by which the
/ announcement respecting the armistice was
accompanied, were received at q later period.
| and for a short time checked the buoyancy OF
/ in he E'rlnc
official organ is as follows 1T is necessary
| that the public should not misunderstood the
| extent OF the armistice it is limited merely
! a relaxation OF hostiiities between the bellig-
! erent armies, which, though leaving the field
open for negotiations, does not enable us for
| the present TO foresee how the war may be ter
minated" From this it is probable that the
| armistice was proposed by Austria, and thar
lis acceptance by France does not imply that
| the Emperor Napoleon is willing to make
peace without ample concessions. Any infer
ences that may be drawn from this gratifying
| announcement must be, however, purely con-
lectural, until further Intelligence comes to
| hand, and we do not consider this n proper
subject for induiging in speculative criticism.
| Most sincerely do We trust that this cessation
| in the struggle may lead to the re-establish-
| ment of tranquility There are certain con-
! ditionS on which this result might be secnred.
| Each party must be prepared to make some
| concessions. If the Emperor OF Austria should
prove less obstinate than has been predicted: ii
| The King of Sardinia could be induced TO dis
miss from his mind those ambitious projects
| by which he has of late been tempted into
| false and dangerous policy, and if the Empe-
ror Napoleon should, at this crisis in his ca
reer, display the sagacity, moderation and for
| bearance for which his admirers give him
| credit, then the war might be speedily termi-
| mated, and peace restored TO Italy and to
| Europe. In that case tranquility will be re-
| established sooner than the most sanguine an
ticipated Great, indeed, will be our satisfac-
ton if a stop can be put to those terrible sac
rifices of life and of treasure that have brought
| desolation upon the garden of Europe.
From the Manchester Guardian, July 81
The note in the Moniteur confirms the gen.
eral anticipation that the armistice wa. die
tated by political and not by military consid-
| erations The Emperor of Austria has not
| yet been thoroughly beaten that he is re-
duced to the humiliating necessity Of begging
| terms of peace from his adversary. The VIC
| tory of Solferno complete as it was, only
| forced the Austrian army to retire to its natur-
| al base of operations; and, although peoples
| faith in the equadrilateral, as in many other
| Austrian illusions, is beginning to fail, no one
doubted that, covered by their strongholds, the
| Austrians would still fight another desperate
battle to save the empire that is being Wrested
out of their grasp At the same time if the
Emperor Napoleon were ambitious only Of the
fame of conqueror, and desired nothing else
than to bring the war to an end speedily as
possible, it would have been gross blunder
for him, in his military capacity as comman-
er-in-chief, to delay for single day
pressing the enemy while his own resources
We're all complete. and the Austrians had not
|
their defeat at Solferino Therefore, if Louis
Napoleon had only been French general, we
may presume that supposing Francis Joseph
TO have prayed for an armistice, he would per-
emptorily have refused the petition. But as
the ruler of the nation whose armies he leads
to victory, the Emperor of the Frenck has to
think OF other things than planning attacks on
Verona and Mantua. His coup d'0i! must en-
brace the whole of Europe, instead of being
restricted to the battle field of Lombardy, and
he has to calculate the effects of his military
not nnl on hon RI, of
his rifled cannon, but at the Courts Of London,
Berlin and ST. Petersburg, and upon the
whole German people, which mpatiently
awaits the moment when it will have an ex-
| cuse for entering into the war.
Having regard, then, to his political posi-.
| ton, there can be no doubt that it is a master
| stroke of craft on the part of the Emperor
| Napoleon to grant an armistice to Austria at
this conjuncture. Prussia, after long hesita-
| tion, seems after the battle OF Solferino to have
made up her mind to act. Her military prep
arations were completed, and orders given for
such disposition of the German army that it
! mix hit be ready at any moment to assume the
| offensive in a war with France; and having
| thus taken her measures. Prussia offered to
the neutrals and the belligerents proposals
| which, in her opinion, ought to serveas basis
| of peace. What these terms are is still uncer-
| tain, but it seems probable that they would
| give freedom TO Lombardy and retain the
| province of Eenetia under the rule OF an Aus
| trian Archduke, and leave other points of the
| Italian question to be discussed by a Europe
| an Congress. Ofcourse the Emperor Napoleon
might reasonably urge that 1t is unfair IN
| Prussia TO try to check his corquerinS career
by insisting on such terms now instead of at the
| CONNIE ncement Of the war; when he was rea-
| DIV to listen to negotiations. Austria, he
| might say, had declared war for the purpose of
| determining, once for ALL whether she could
maintain her hold on her Italian provinces, and