New-York daily tribune., 1859-07-02
ard il Lsdmirsults disisiop, which swells ths
pumber oftrigsdes 10 I6 and that Of bsttalions 70

ard il Lsdmirsults Division, which swells ths
pumber oftrigsdes 10 l6 and that OF bsttalions 70
1o4. and that Of ccmb.tsuts TO 9o.0 is thas
gliby passed over. we cannot bat expect that sdu
other troops contributed 10 the result Of tie dsy
The AustrAus, too, say that they made prisoner
belonging to almost every regiment forming part
Of the army Of Italy, and it E therefore prob s.bls
that at least l6 brig,des we're eug,ged Tn. gives
the Ffepch nuueric Il superiority. which reflects
the highest honor upoa the bravery ofths Austrian
troops They we're beaten BY just tee widsh ofths
ba'tle. field; they t,ok one gun and ost four. and
Il ey mast have let the battle 6,ld With the ces-
tsinty that if numbers had been even, vicsory
would have been theirs.
Blu, wbst shall we say Of their GenerL' He
expects the attack on the 4th; within miles Of
the battlefield he has l3 brig sdes (the hrst eu.
gagged. . Of Lillias 4 Of the 81 corps); at mules
more Of the 5th at 10 or 10 miles more Of the
sth corps This was at 6: 30 in the morning Now.
is it expecting too much day Of battle, that a.
these c,rps should have been united BY 4. or %
latest 5, in the afternoon close enough to Msgeaea
to take part in the conflict j. il expecting 10
much. that at g O'Clock, when tAe battle became
engaged, In that case the postion-heii. as h
was, tall nigbtfall by i-mght have been ea'ily
maintained with ~ brigadee, and the great lossee
which Cordobs division and TIE ID corps musi
undoubtedly have suffered would have been avoided.
On the arrival Of the 5th corps, the oeosive might
have been taken, aud the French driven back acrsss
the riclno. But the old slowne's Vt movemsss sP-
pes,s ssain to have got hold Of the Austri,ns. AZ
the greater Napoleon said Of them they lose the most
precious mouests in useless pouposity and idle
furmaliiies G,ulsi has done the same, and sivea
Louis Napoleon a victory which woald have been
an easy and decisive one but for the bravery q
the Austrian troops, and which Guylai might him
self have had.
On the morning of the 9TH, Gyulai had under his
ORDERS Of intact troops that had not been engaged
at Magenta:
One Division Of the 81 Corp. Brssdss
One Division tLilis's, Of the 7'h Corps Bns'de.
The sth Corps orssae@
Eleven brigsdes or force equal to that with
Which he bad foua bt the day before OF the troops
engaged the day before only divisions (lst
and I'd corps) were so disore eanzed as to be unsbe
to fght-tb, appears to be the real meaning of the
m, ,sterous retreat of these troops There remained
8 brigsdes, in all 10 brieades or above 100000
men There were opposed to him the is brig
ades Of French engaged on the 4th; more dtvi-
sioDs of the French army, which must have been
ready to fight ON the 5th, and or divisions
of Piedmontese as most Of the latter were still
very far to the rear. Thus on the 5th, GyuA
would have had 10 brigades, and perhaps later
ia the day, % Counting the 1st and % corps.
if brought up again), against about % Franco
Piedmonese brigades, which, perhaps, toward
evening, might haze been reinforced BY or
more PedmoDtese brgsdes. Now We see what
an eyre gious blunder Gyulai committed in send
ing the 9th corps 90 far away With the Th
corps present, his 80 brigades would have been .
match for the whole Allied army, and 1t is not at
all mpos sbe that the battle Of the 9TH might have
had different result to that Of the day before.
Gyula's mistakes may be summed up as follows:
l. When Louis Napoleon made a fank-march
within reach Of the Austrians, from Verceli to
Turbigo, Gyulai did not profit by the uufavorabls
p, siton of his enemy, by pouueing at once, with
all hs forces, on their exposed line of march, by
which be might hsye cut them in two and driven
part of them toward the Mps-repesting Radetzkrs
paDeuver of I649.
9. Instead Of this, he retired behind the Ticino,
aud thus marched roundabout to cover Milan, to
which the straight road was abandoned to the
enemy.
3. He scattered his troops during this retreat,
which he conducted with an ease and laziness
scarcely pardoDabe 10 peace msneugers.
4 HIS 9th corps was go far away that it was
out Of reach Of concentration.
s. The concentration even during the battle was
carried on with uppardonabls slswuess, 10 cOnse-
quepce Of which the troops 6rst engaged had to
suffer unnecessarily, and moreover the battle was
lost instead of won.
IT, with such blonders, be did not suffer q total
defeat, having the very fiite ofthe French army to
Sight, it is merely to be attributed to tue conspcu
ous bravery Of his troops, aud not at all to any
q1alities iD their commander.
1t will also appear from this review OF the baltic
that the desertions Of Italian and usgaIan troops,
on which some of our friends have laid 90 mach
stNss, were really very small, ard bad no caisula-
bio influence on the result Of the day.
We have elsewhere nstced the fact that
ths Rev. j L. Hatch, ana q number Of other
gentlemen equally gifted wth himself, yesterday
waited on the Police Commissioners and delivered
.oDg and elaborate address, beseecbing tho Con-