The daily exchange. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1858-1861, 1859-08-19

regulation hour ana take part in the duties of the
day. They are initiated from the first to the
simplest forms of exercise and the most comnlcated
evOlutons of masses. The natural Inference from
remarks such as these is, that Austria has excel
lent generals as well frStrate subalterns in her
armies. But the campaign suddenly terminated
by the peace of Villafranca has practically demon
strated that the Austrian armies had no leaders
worthy the name. Their Wanted experience has
invariably led to defeat. To what cause can this
result be assigned?
The Austrian army had the reputation of being
the best drilled and disciplined and the most ad-
mlraDy organized army in the world. Its Staff
was specially instructed Staff, intimately ac-
qualnted with all the duties of the field It's naterie
was perfect From the smallest cooking-po to the
largest transport wagon everything was in order.
IL could be ascertained with mathematical preci-
sion where the regimental ferrer would stand in
the lines of camp, where the smallest baggage
wagon would be placed. How came it that an in
strument so perfect, worked so i'll?
Narlous causes combined to produce this result
we nave had complaints of favoritsm in the English
Aarmy; but in Austria the system is carried to
point unknown in this country. The right man is
never In the right place.
There is a story current in Austrian circles not
complimentary to the noblesse of that country but
which indicates truth that no one will feel in
clned to disbelieve. An officer, discussing Count
favour policy, and Giating for the benefit of his
hearers upon the horrors of the "Oon8uton8ch,cin-
aet, exclaimed, ''Let these principles but gain
niue more ground among us, and the heads of our
nooSeSse are not worth days purchase" ''You
forget, cried wag, "that the Austrian noblesse
have no heads"
That Count Gyuai possessed all the pride and
Incapaclty OF his class is proved by fact as vet
known TO few persons only. On the morning of
tne Datue OF Magenta, Count Clam, with portion
OF his corps, found himself engaged with an over
Whemlng force Of the enemy. He dispatched an
alde-de-camp with a note to Count Gyulai earnest
" pressing for assistance. The aide-de-camp rode
ene ten miles which separated him from the head
n thn
than twenty minutes, and presented his letter to
count Gyulal, who read IL, and put it into his
pocket 1t was then respectfully suggested that
Count Clam would esteem it particular favor if
some assurance could be given him at that the
assistance he so much needed would be speedily
forthcoming, as in that he would be able to in
fuse new vigor into his exhausted troops
Count Gyuai's reply was characteristic: "l shall
proceed at once to dinner and then give the neces
sary orders; and, by the wav, YOU must be hungry
addressing the aidede e-camp); you shall dine also
Whereupon his Excelency sat down, and quietly
partook OF his mea, leaving Count Clam to wait for
the relntorcements and the comforting assurance
ne was so anxious to obtain. Well might Count
Clam excaim, on the evening after the battle when
he received orders from Count Gyulai to put his
corps IN readiness for renewal of the battle on the
morrow: 'Tell his Excellency that | shall be too
happy to take musket in my hand, and fight with
the rest OF the army, if 1t can be brought together
oat as for my corps, it is in state to do anything
at present"
What, one may ask, would have been the con-
dition OF Count CLAIMS corps had Count Gyulai con-
descended to torego his dinner? In 1918 Venice
was lost to Austria because the General in command
loved his supper too much. In 1859 a province is
lost for a dinner. Count Gyulai retired in dis
grace, but to wipe away the reproach that he was
a General of parade and that he had never seen
shot fired, he refused the Banship of Croatia and
returned to his regiment willing to serve as
Colonel, since he could no longer be accepted as
Commander Chief
The retrospect of Solferino must be very irrita-
ting to all who feel interest in the military fame of
Austria. 1t is needless to dwell the well known
fact that the Austrian army was forced into action
IN positions most disadvantageous to them. That
fact has been explained and commented on 1t has
been shown how difficult it was to defend a series
OF nights like those of Soerino which, living at an
angle obique to the front of the attacking force
were easily assailabe on both fanks. But other
causes beside these combined to produce catas-
trophe. AT Magenta the incapacity of the Com
Chief produced its natural consequence
defeat. At SOlferino, where there was no Com
manderin Chief, and where each General did pretty
much what he pleased, too many of the leaders
proved themselves the worthy emulators of
Gyulai.
1t was peculiarly unfortunate that among all the
corps Of the Austrian army that of Count Clam
should have been chosen to hold the position in
which most energy and decision were required
CLAIMS corps had never recovered the shock it re-
ceived at Magenta. 1t supported but feebly the er
evinced and the confusion into which it fell at the
most critical part of the days operations proved
that Count Clam was not the right man in the right
place. General, however brave he may be in the
heId cannot be said to possess the necessary quail
ties OF command unless he possesses, in addition,
GOODNESS, decision, and keen observation
A General who does not know where his reserves
are placed, incurs blame of no ordinary kind
Such, unfortunately, was the case with Count
Clam. When his corps yielded and fell back, the
reserve Of six batteries (36 guns) might if forth
coming, have retrieved the disaster. But when
that reserve was wanted it was not to be found.
Precious time lost in searching for it, and Sol
ferinO was already in the hands of the French,
when the discovery was made that the reserve Law
at Volta, four or five miles from the spot where it
ought to have been. 1t was enough to raise a
smile on the countenance even of an Austrian to
hear Colonel say, at o'clock in the afternoon,
as he rode over the hill of Madonna dele Piave,
that he was going for the artillery reserve of the
First Corps at Volta.
This, however, was not all. General Zedwitz,
with six regiments of cavalry and six batteries of
artillery, (abOut Is, 900 men and sc guns) unac-
countably remained at Goito and paralvzed by his
absence all the efforts of the divisions forming the
Austrans left The Generals of the Sd, 9th and 1lth
Corps waiting all day for ZedwitZ. Inferior
to the French in artillery, they longed for the mo-
ment when the heavy cavalry and artillery should
appear and restore the equilibrium of the battle
But they waited in vain. No cavalry no artillery,
came on. Lichtensten, too, with his 25 600 men,
up? While the battle ragged many glance was
turned toward the quarter whence he was expected,
but he came not. Like Zedwitz, he never moved.
One example alone will prove that the experience
of years has not preserved the Ausrans from gross
military errors. When the batteries of the 9th
corps opened fire on the plain of MedOe they were
so quickly mauled by the superior number of the
French guns that it was found necessary to with
draw them. In order to do this with effect Mems
DORIS cavalry ordered out into the plain, and
the hostile fire then divided with so much sue
cess that the batteries were numbered up with
smaller loss than might have been expected But
military men very properly inquire whether heavy
dragons were not organized for different pur-
pose than that of drawing off an enemy's fire
from artillery? The veriest tyro understands how
troops may be moved under cover of artillery; but
what shall we say of artillery moved out of fire
under cover of cavalry? Had Count Mensdorf been
near the enemy, there would have been some sense
in ordering him out into the plain; but it was real
ly too bad to send him into a plain covered by hos
tile balls fired from distance of 5000 yards, and
out OF range OF any guns such as cavalry divisions
generally take with them. One can fancy the
rage of the officer in command of the battery that
first accompanied Mensdorf when in five minutes
after he entered the plain of MedOle, five of his
guns dsmounted, at a distance which rem
dered any attempt on his part to fire, perfectly
useless.
A second battery took the place of the first one
In less than minute three of the guns were dis
mounted. The officer in command asked permis-
slOH W udSu lOTWdru OF all OQQS, and lire
volley at close quarters. Count Mensdorf refused
thinking, doubtless, that if three guns could be
dismounted in a minute, at 5000 wards the re-
mainder would be disposed of long before they could
have got into range. Finally, the cavalry division
retired without coming in contact with the enemy
With regard to the purpose with which its move.
ment was undertaken, that certainly was effected
But this purpose was not worth the cost To save
sat OF batteries, another set was sacrificed and
in addition, vast number of men and not less thar
500 horses 1t here that the superiority of the
rlf1ed cannon over ordinary artillery was finally
and decisively proved.
The horizontal fire the plains of Medole dis
mounted guns more than 900 yards off. At Sol
ferno the practice was by no means so successful
and the French, firing from nights against nights
did not aim well. The rife guns may be said, how.
ever, to have rendered invaluable service If a
military man were to be asked what ground he
would choose in Italy for the evolutions of cavalry
he would at once pitch upon the plain of Medole
combining all the advantages that could be desired
The Austrians had the best opportunity of using
that plain. Their cavalry was not forthcoming il
sufficient numbers to neutralize the effects of the en-
emys artillery; but even had they been in force or
that plain i; is doubtful whether they would have
done much, unless they had been fortunate enoupl
to turn the French right.
1t is not alone the riaed cannon that has CHANGED
the conditions upon which modern armies must nov
fght-the use of rihed arms of every description
must alter the old system of man9uvrinp in th
field. Austria, with its fondness for old established
rules, has not realized this as the French have
done. An Austrian soldier retiring from the felC
OF Soferino remarked that the French fired mucl
quicker than their opponents Numbers of them
| he sald fired from the hip without taking aim
This is true. The French, instead of a simple lint
of skirmishers in advance of their columns, had
double line, the rearmGst of which fred over thos
| in advance of them Thus it was that the grounC
in of the Austrian front was alivewith projec