The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-05-30
The Expectancies Of tho Wharf.-The FRS
Battle.

The Expectancies Of tho Wharf.-The First
Battle.
The New York, arrived yesterday, brought
three days later news from Europe. There was
noe intelligence at Southampton on the 18th
inst. of any battle on the plains of Italy.
The human mind is singularly constituted.
Much as it breads war, it breads the suspense of
pending conflict more. Thus, the impatence
which is manifested for the commencement Of
the Italian campaign presents striking contrast
to the earnestness with which it was deprecated
This feeling displays itself in the most unrea.
sonable way. To the surprise, for instance, Gre
ated by the inactivity Of the Austrians have sue
ceeded speculations as to the motives of the in
activity of the French. If people would only
take the trouble to read and reflect they would
be at 10 loss to account for it.
There seems to be growing up in the minds of
the ignorant the same faith in the genius and in
vincihility OF Louis Napoleon which the masses
once entertained in regard to his uncle. The ex-
traordinary abilities which he has displayed as a
ruler are with them aguarantee that he must also
be "heaven-born general. We ourselves be-
ieve it will be found that the Emperor's military
requirements are of no common order, and that
to an intimate acquaintance with the science of
artillery he conjoins as thorough knowledge of
tactics as can be acquired out of the field. This,
however, remains to be proved, aud if he has
not attempted impossibilities since his arrival in
ITALY, the fact is no Encouragement to his military
promptitude. In reply to those who wonder
that be has not as yet struck a decisive blow
against the enemy, we beg to remind them that
the Emperor only left Paris on the 10th, that he
arrived at Genoa on the 18th, and at Alessandria
on the 14th of May. As our latest advices from
Liverpool are dated the 18th, there was, of
course but little time left for him to consult with
his generals and to decide upon the final plan of
campaign. Under these circumstances it is alb
suld to expect Of him to realize the Vemi, vidi,
vici," Of the Roman cOnqueror.
A greater General than Louis Napoleon is
ever likely to prove took considerably more
time to make preparations for this same cam
paign. The great Emperor left Paris on the 1th
of May, but he did not fight the battle of Maren-
60 until the 14th Of June. It is true that he had
of the Great st. Bernard, and smaller divisions
over those of st. Gothard, Little St. Bernard
and Mount Gents. He did not possess the facil-
ties which steam at present affords for the GER
tain and rapid conveyance OF troops; but against
those advantages he balanced those Of a well
digested plan Of campaign and commissarat
thoroughly organized. In both these respects
the present Emperor has been taken at fault, and
the fact should be placed to his credit in the
consideration of the motives that have led to
this war. The VIGOROUSLY unprepared condition
in which the French commissariat was found on
the declaration Of hostiities is, we think, salts
factory evidence that Louis Napoleon was sincere
in his professions Of desire to avoid an appeal
to arms. 1t is true that his uncle made the
same protestations In $780, before he set out
for Italy, but at the same time he silently
and stealthily made his arrangements for
hostilities by the concentration of troops
and immense magazines of grain at Dion and
other points along the frontier. With the expe-
rience of that campaign before him, Louis Napo-
leon would not have neglected these precautions
had he not been, up to the last moment, persuaded
that an accommodation with Austria was posi-
BILE.
In these days of railway and steamboat faci-
ties we know that it is difficult to make people
comprehend the Delay which must attend the
transportation and provisioning of large armies.
These conveniences, however, like all others.
have their limits, and although they unquestioa-
OH al, l.
made to provide against circumstances of unex-
pected urgency or the absence of those supplies
and auxilaries of war which require previous
forethougbt and settled purpose to concentrate
They were, as we have shown, wanting in this
iDstar CO. for the simple reason that up to the last
moment but few believed in their necessity.
1t is to their absence alone that is to be ascribed
the time that has been lost in driving the Aus
TRANS from the Sandman soil before they had had
an opportunity ofgratifying their plgndering pro-
pensities, although we are Of opinion that the de-
lay will be productive of advantage. The Aus
trian commanders have exhibited in their rash
advance, and as precipitate retrograde move
ments, evidences of indecision which have
damaged them immensely in the opinion OF
military men. 1t is supposed that they are either
without any settled plans, or that they are con-
trolled by vacillating orders from vienna--pre-
sumptions both fatal to success. A Power oc-
cupying the unfortunate position of Austria
should hesitate long before entering on CAM
paign of this kind; but having once decided upon
it, she should betray no symptoms ofirresolution
or hesitation. To advance into an enemy's coun-
try simply to lay it under contribution, perpe-
trate barbarities unworthy Of civilized nation,
and then beat an inglorious retreat, is an error
Of strategy that cannot be readily redeemed.