Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-05-11
OFFICIAL.
Opinions OF the Supreme Court OF the state
of Tennessee, at Nashville December
Term 1885.

Scott, Baker & Co. R. @. Dandy.
The defendant is sued as ac;eptOr Of draft or
bill, which reads as follows:
"Sl, l45 o. Nashville, August 10, 1854 TWelvs
months after date, pay to the order or Scott, Baker
& Co., eleven hundred and feriy-fve ard S-l00 dol
lars, value received and Pls'e 20 account Of
To Messrs. Bowling s. Bandy."
This draft was drawn by Robert P Bowling Of
the firm Of Bowling & Wheless, and was accepted
for accommodation by George S. Bowling, Of the
Arm of Bowling & Baudy. Il was drawn and used,
for the payment Of note for that Gmount then held
by the plaintiffs against the drawers for goods.
By the law Of partnerships, each partner is the
authorized agent Of the firm, aad may bind it in all
matters in the scope aud range Of the business in
which it is engaged, but not beyond this, except
by some express, implied authority. In mer-
camille partnership, one partner has Get the power
TO bind the others By any note, endorsement, or
acceptance, in aaY transaction unconneeted with
the partnership business, and known to be go by
the party taking Il; nor for his own debt. Story
on art. p. 208; note, cited In Bank Of Tennessee
vs. Saffarans, Hump. 60 Such fact itself raises
a presumption Of want Of authority, and is fraud
upon the other members by both parties. See same
authorities
It is no part of the business Of mercantile arm,
to draw, accept endorse the PaFsr Of neighbors,
for accommodation; no such thing is presumed to
be contemplated by the parties in the formation Of
q
10 do such acts is not communicated to any Of the
members, without express stipulation, and the firm
is not bound, except by antecedent or subsequent
sanction But the proof Of approval or ratification
may be presumptiV9. That one member was in the
habit of extending these accommodations TO Others
firm name, With spprObatiOB, without dis
seat, would be sufficient evidence Of authority, and
all would be bound. This does lot result from the
fact Of partnership but presumed assent from such
general course OF dealing.
1t will be readily seen from these general princi-
pies that the defendant is liable in this case as
member Of the firm Of Bowling Bandy, unless it
can be established by proof, positive, pTesump-
tive that the act Of acceptance by his partner
authorized or sanctioned by him
This is attempted to be done by proving what be
said as to his authority from his partner and also
by his own deposition. This evidence was rejected
by the Court inadmssible, and that is the error
relied upon for reversal There is no question but
that actiGn must fail, if this proof is incompetent
The acceptance was by Bowling in the name Of
Bowling & Bandy, for the accommodation Of Bowl
ing Whsless, not in the presence Of Bsndy, and
without any evidence Of his authority sanction,
either expressed or implied except what is contain
ed in the selected DISPOSITIONS. There is 70 con-
troversy d the existence of the partnership at
the ds'e OF the acceptance To prove that was not
the object Of introducing the partner Bowling For
that purpose he would have been clearly inoompe-
tent by all the authorities. But it is just as clear
that, II tD8b was admitted or proved Oiner5. ne
could be called to prove the '1stiee Of the plain
tiff g demand" VanZant Vs. Key, Hum. H.
But what does that meant The fact in that case,
which it was held, he was competent to prove,
was that the note, to which he signed the name Of
the firm, was for Just account against II, and so
the demand against the firm was just, and should be
q charge upon all the members, because 1t was
made ny partner in the business Of the firm.
Whether even that position be reconciled to the
decision IN Foster vs.. Hall & Eaton, 4 Hum. 354
may be questioned The came rule would extend
to proof Of the justice Of account, or other pro-
Per demand arising out Of the firm business
But the matter to be proved here BY partner
was that an act done outsiie Of the firm business,
and an Obligation created by him in the name Of
the firm, was authorized or ratified By the other
member. Not the 'justice Of the cemand, - bat the
existence OF it sgaiDst his partner. Can he prove
that? The eaee of Yanzant vs. Kay does not extend
10 that question.
The proposition is to prove By one partner that
an obligation created by him in the name Of the
firm, not within the scale Of its business, was au,
thorized or accepted by the other member, 50 10
create joint and several liability. He is solely liza
ble snd the effect of his evid,ncs for the plaintiff
would be to cast it all upon the shoulders Of another
in the first instance, and half ultimately, aud in
any event. There can be no principle that would
auihorizs this It is not to establish an existing
demand against the firm, originating in the course
Of its legitimate operations, in the Of Van
Zlnt; DIT 10 eStAOLSn new ana 0i5tinct authority
for an unauthorized act of his own, deetsrious to
the firm, and binding aIeHe upon himself, without
this evidence.
This is more analogous to the case in Hump.
449 where one joint maker Of note was held in
competent as witness against the other TO prove the
making of the note.
Some other points are made upon the charge Of
the Court, but they are not seriously pressed as
grounds for reversal and need not be noticed. II
is very manifest that, without the excluded eTi>
denoe, the plsiniiff could not have succeeded in
making the defendant liable
Let the judgment be affirmed. CARurHEBs.
correct copy, J. P. CLARK, Clerk