The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-10-30

was called on put down tho most terrible and wide spread
rebellion that has ever occurred IA her Indian empire
fires OF Dsurrecton in that distant empire the number
Of troops and quantity OF material she transported to
dia and that too, whilst she sending hostile expe
diuon 70 China are too fresh In the mcmories OF all "a
need more than reference. This year France Though
profcsscdy unpreArcd in ncreaby short time threw
powerful naval expedition carrying 40 o0o troops In The
Adratc, and We know the result.
The i,sIlns existing between England and France
is not ut MI probable either Of them viii relax their
efforts to perfect their naval establishments That they
are now vastly superior To knew but 90 what
tent they wall carry them IL impossible to tell We are
looking for tho arrival ono OF our ports OF an
English steamer, which u said cross the Atlantic
SIX days, and u capable OF TRANSPORTING 10 900
troops with their arns and supplies. The practcabity
q employing ocean steamers Of such capacity is even
view. II such transports can be successfully employed
tho Atlantic ocean 10 now scarcely greater barrier
years ago Indeed the ocean becomes rather oonve-
ncnoe han obstacle to the Power which can
i il by superior naval force. w N
| With thcsa facts before eyes and . view Of our
own preparations, can any intelligent nAA doubt tho
ability Of either England or France o land an
naval force, blockade our ports, ssso somo., Of
our principal cities, destroy our navy Yards ma
some Of our forts and in short, sharp campaign Jus
In The discussions to which the supposed prospect Of an
invasion Of England have given RISE u seems TO be adj
mttcd that the ability Of France to e tho In vason suc
cnssfuly depends on her ability 70 obtain command for
cw weeks Of the British Channel Thai scoomplished il
is admitted that there little nothing 70 prevent tho
French army occupying london and the principal points
the coast and destroying her dockyards
Tho subject ably treated in an article said have been
written by sir Howard Douglas published In tho London
Quarterly Reu for July Of this year. Alter speaking of
the contemplated invasion Of England by tho hrs Napo
Icon in lS04s, he says
CONTINGENCIES OF AN INVASION or ENGLAND.
"Ihe present proposed plan Of campaign is based
precisely shs same principles, but 80 conceived as %
first. It is so simple that child may under
stand IL, while no man living has yet sug-
In few years France viii possess forty or ATTY sail Of tho
line, all Of the first class and all propelled by
she will then have available even larger number Of fri
capable Of carrying At least 600 persons.
If in this contingency she were TO content herself by
bockadmg our harbors, destroying mercantile ports
and sweeping richly laden ships prizes into her
harbors, she might do infinite damage and bring
frghul extent Of misery and ruin upon population
But the blow would not be fatal Probably within three
months, certainly within six, we should be than
match for her the ocean With our trade destroyed
and mercantile idle there would be no want
Of sailors. Every public and private dockyard would be
at work. night and day Every engineers shop would be
turned into gun factory; every ferryboat and river
craft would be strengthened and fitted with gum large
SMALL and in shape other could easily put
1000 guns the sea, with $50 900 them
would again be safe This the French know as we'll as
ourselves and this is precisely the form of the problem
which they prepared to accept and believe that they
solve TO their own advantage They equal to
heightened contest the with us; they know
that be successful the campaign be short and
they only consider the fleet as the baerng train which Is
TO open the breach through which the troops may march
to meet the shore Ii the French can obtain com
mand Of the Channel for three months, or three
weeks they easily land 200 900 $50 men on our
Shores this accomplished there is absolutely nothing
to hinder them taking possession Of the capital The
question is not so much what we could do when tho disas
ter happened and we were fairly reused to struggle for
existence what likely to be able to do to pre-
vent 50 fr'ghtful contingency from occurring.
Gan this reasoning is based on the assumption that
France and France alone is to undertake the task OF
clear that this will be the case Sho is not vet
quite ready to undertake single handed but If the
ion supposed to exist the 2Sd of last April between
the Emperors OF France and Russia had really taken
place. and their fleets had appeared together the Chan
mel within month or six weeks from that period they
would certainly have numbered twice many guns as
we could have prepared; and conceivable amount OF
either skill or courage part could have enabled
to hold the command Of the Channel for hour
prevent that army which Is now in Lombardy from land
ing on our shores. In such they could certainly
have entered London in less time, and with little loss
as they encountered on their entrance into Milan.
seven might have shut eyes tho before,
cannot after the experience Of the few months be
French military establishments always exist Though
there no doubt Austria precptated the before tho
allies were quite ready to begin, yet in month from
brought from the interior Of the country and
actually in possession of thu encnys capital, in spite Of
than themselves What has been done once can be more
easily done again. and any will take the trouble to
plan % san n % Ss
chances Of successful resistance pages 1872
CAN WE GUARD THE ATLANTIC?
NO rational man. We presume, will contend that we can
guard the Atlantic ecctually than England can
Channel Probably IL we duly notified of the intend
cd invasion, and allowed time to prepare would be
reused 10 put ourselves in proper state OF defence But
is not commenced in that way 1t sudden and
swift The thunder follows the flash Of ighning-the de-
caiaon Of may follow the flash Of the cannon. We
certainly have right to expect that will be warned
by declaration Of war before the trst blow
y struck. We have ourselves given an example OF
against Mexico? Our troops entered the disputed terrific
ry-Mexico resscdwe defeated in two battles, and
then Congress- lodging the formal declarati of war;
solved, thatsby the act Of Mexico exists Who
knows when some other nation, following example,
may declare that by the act United States ar ex
istsg Might England this mc for instance declare
that by the OF the United States taking military DOS
session OF the island OF san Juan the title to which IS in
dispute, exists That. believe, Is very pro-
babe sHppos'ion. We believe that the accomplished and
distinguished Lieutenant General OF the army who
been despatched TO that distant point, will settle this ms
he has other difficulties amicaby and give another proof
| that when difficulties arise he is the whom the
nation can rely But there are other suggestions less
improbable Suppose for instance that England France
both should guarantee to Spain the possession OF the
island of Cuba (Which are bound 70 have) not very
probable suppostion then suppose that island TO be
mocsted by band OF hibGsters from coast--cer-
tany hot an impossible eveutmght not either both Of
declare tina, by the act OF the United States
existed and send the declaration to by army
/ prepared to commence the campaign.
The article in the london Quarterly Reiew, from which
the invasion OF England few alterations In the para
| graphs we have extracted and in the plan suggested
changes Of numbers and in the of paces-woula
render as applicable TO the United States as it is 10 Eng
land We have no inclination, IL We had the ability
u suggest plan OF invasion for enemy There are
officers OF the government whose especial duty it is to
investigate that subject and 10 suggest the best plan OF
defence. They doubtless better qualified for tue
proper performance Of that duty than TO olar
useful suggestions those points. But may be sure
that weak points well known in Ioadon and Paris
as they in Washington The admirable maps Of Coast
l I'm 1ntHf ly
preserved in the War Offices Of England and France.
And when the time enemies will, doubt,
find the heads TO conceive the plans Of campaign and the
| cult to prevent.
MILITIA IN THE FACE OF DISCIPLINED TROOPS.
Before adopting the paragraphs have quoted, and
| the plan which follows them, the United States, we
should make material change. We should strike out
all, or nearly ALL that said Of the number OF regular
troops we could place IN the field asuddcn emergency.
We say this certainly without any intention to dsIaragc
| or undervaue ttl. army. Whenever called II has