The daily exchange. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1858-1861, 1859-07-13
-.s EUROPE.
sd DETAILS BY THE STEAMERS.
THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.
( From the London Times. June %. !

Ihe Emperor OF the French has named his
victory. The village of Soferno is to be identified
with the tremendous battle of the oath of June
The action is not of unmitigated triumph to the
conquerors, nor of utter defeat to the yanquished
1t resembles rather Wagram than Austerlitz. 1t
is, as usual where Austrian troops fight and Aus
trian generals command just an inclination of the
balance in favor of the enemy. 1t is example of
stubborn discipline nontending at once against an
enterprising and intelligent enemy, and against the
evils OF a divided command. While the Xouaves
were being borne back by the Austrans in position
at Butfaora, and Napoleon himself was engaged in
an unequal contest, four Austrian Generals were
| quarrelling to the manner in which supports
| should be sent up, and quarreled until the victory
| was torn from them. Let apply the lesson as
! the facts march forward before our eyes, changing
as they go the rank and precedence of nations
b. The recent battle has been properly named. The
Austrians write of it as the battle of the Mincio
but this is incorrect. The conflict took place on
the district which is bounded by the course
of the Chiese on the west and by that Of the Mncio
on the east. ALI the places mentioned in the tele-
| grams will be found about midway between these
two rivers. Great as was the force assembled, and
enormous was the amount of ground covered,
the battle did not reach down to the neighbor-
hood of Mantua, extend southwards bevond
halt the distance between that fortress and Peschi
era. The tide of the battle did not run parallel
with the course of either river In this campaign,
which is fought in a network of waters great
rivers do not appear to play their usual important
part; they passed and repassed they are bridg-
| ed and forded, they are fortified and abandoned,
| defended. llclQO
and the Sesia submitted to the passage of the nva
der, and the Po crossed and recrossed sew
| eral times with impunity.a ..5 .-t .
When in their turn the French and Sardinians
wished to pass the TicnO, the tetedepont at Butfa
| lora discovered to be untenable, and the in
vaders of Lombardy marched over almost as unre-
sisted as the invaders of Piedmont. After the bat
| tie of Magenta the Lambro was not an obstacle the
AIDA was reached only to find broken bridges and
dismantled fortresses, but enemy such as once
before had defended that bridge of Lodi. The Serio
| and the Mella were passed by both hosts, and the
Chiese, which had been so often and so tercely de-
Tended, swarmed over by the Zouaves as though
it had been a river of France. This is novelty
in tactics. Perhaps it has been discovered that the
old masters of the art of war wrong, and that
| the passage of great rivers is not an operation
during which enemy may be taken at advantage
Perhaps this is the new principle of those ''stra-
| getic considerations which have been developed
with such marvellous results in this campaign
However this may be, it certainly is not the battle
| of the Mincio or the battle of the Chiese which
was fought on Friday last, and the Emperor of
the French has full title to the victory after
the centre of the Austrian position, and if it shall
so please him, to create his new Marshal Duke of
| Solferino.
1t is singular that we are indebted to the van
quished for all our reliable information as to the
circumstances of this great BATTLE Not only is the
Austrian bulletin the most candid acknowledgment
of a defeat given to the world, but it is also
the most satisfactory history of battle ever put
into the same number of words. By the light of
GneSc seventeen lines OF print ana tOeraDle map
one almost the situation of the comba tan IS
and the great features of the engagement. The
ground upon which this battle was fought differs
much from the spongy plain through which the
Austrians had been so long retreatng and the
French had been so long advancing. The south
ern end of the Lago di Garda consists of hills and
broken uplands, which have always been consider
ed as~tavorable to defensive operations. When the
Austrian Emperor changed his tactics suddenly
that the command to recrOss the Mncio appeared
rather the result of caprice than deliberate
Judgment it was into these uplands that he led his
army. The village of Pozzolengo, which he des-
cribes as having been occupied by his right wing,
is about six miles to the southwest of Peschiera
Solferino, which played so important part in the
battle, is little village about six miles to the
southwest of PozZOlengo, and is situate at the foot
of the uplands, and just at the point where they
descend into the plain. Away to the left across the
plain, another six miles distant is that Castel Gof
tredo which we are told was occupied by the Aus
trian left wing. Here we have the line of battle
The three places are nearly equ-distant, and form
straight front, in southwesterly direction, from
the Garda Lake
Moreover, the line is nearly as possible of the
length which the French Emperor mentioned in his
message to the Empress. It's right extends over
the highlands from PozzoengO to Solferino. Its
left passes along the plain from Soferino to Caste
Goredo. Solferino is the and the KEY of the
position. Behind these three points lies second
line of posts marked in the despatch and important
is the events of the day. Guidezzoo and Cavriana
the villages that afford this second line of sta
tons; and Volta, also mentioned in the telegram il
town about four miles in the of that SECOND
line of posts, and within very short distance of the
western bank of the Mincio. We have thus th,
Austrian order of battle and distribution of fore
! perfectly indicated. What the French position
may have been only conjecture. They prob
= ably formed line which would have Castiglion
for its centre As the Austrians say that their ef
, wing advanced beyond Castel Gofredo and near-
reached the banks of the Chese, it is probable tha
the allied force principally concentrated in th
higher district which approaches the shores of th
: Garda Lake. The Austrian line seems to have ad
vanced in crescent form. pushing forward its wing
l from Pozzolengo and Castel Goffredo with grea
energy and some success, and attempting to force
forward their centre along the slopes of the upland
towards Castiglione. Here, however, they wer,
met and defeated; Solferino heroicaIly defended
was at last carried by the French troops.
e The Austrians had extended their time too fal
even for their immense force. Having thus lost
the key to their whole position, the Austrian cen
tre must have been forced back to the VILLAGE q
Cavriana, four miles in the rear. They must agail
have been dislodged by the pursuing French anC
Sardinians, and again must have retreated upol
Volta, six miles still further in the Volta is
believe, an open town, and the Austrian centre
f which occupied it, ten miles in rear of tn
, position it had held in the morning. The Frencl
were following up their success and were preparin!
for an attack upon Volta with their main body.
this should succeed the Austrian army must be Gu
+ in two and entirely routed. The Austrian Empero
therefore called in his wings, now So greatly in ad
+ of his centre, and drew off his entire army
not, however, retreating very far, but, as it wOu
appear, retiring only to the bank of the Minco
which, after Volta had become his central position
r was close in his Next day he crossed the rv
y er, and we have now the significant announcement
2 that General Hess takes the command, and tina
/ | important business requires the presence of tn
4 | Emperor of Austria in Vienna.
p The most wonderful part of this batte-and in
r deed the most wonderful characteristic of the Who'll
campaign-is, that the Austrians when beaten wer
allowed to evacuate the field of battle without pur
suit. Whether this is moderation or policy or ne
! cessity on the part of the French Emperor we can
not yet tell. Nor can we tell whether he look
{ upon this Austrian army as sportsman looks upo
the game in his preserves, and manages them witt
7 design of getting as many baHues out of them a
J possible, or whether it has always been chance
happily decided in his fayor-whether he shouI
drive back those obstinate Austrians, or fail him
= self in the effort. Napoleon III. keeps his ow
! counsel too closely to let Europe know this inter
u esting truth. 1t appears certain, however, tha
when the Austrans were content to retreat, tht
n contemplated attack upon Volta was suspended, an
l. the advance of the French ceased. Was it tn
e bridge of gold to the flying enemy, it the
A cord of peace to the beaten and yet abiding foe
e We cannot quite comprehend the restraint of tn
g French upon this and other occasions, except upo
the supposion that they had good reason for avoid
5; ing any further conflict at that particular moment
y But, whatever may be the determining cause
these tactics it certainly is not the want of any pei
IL sonal enterprise the part of the French Empero
which has allowed the Austrian army to remain ur
o broken after this defeat. He has shown himself t
n be as personally brave as any OF his GrenG
}, ders and must not cav at the steps of progres
j. which so leisurely but apparently so su~el
= mounted. We should rather look forward with il
=; terest for tokens of that moderation in victor
/ which, after ALL must test the ultimate prospert
= OF even this most prosperous of men.
i From the London Nelos of June 27M.l
The second great battle against the Austria
. power in Italy has been fought, and second tim
:. the Austrians have been utterly defeated.
u Magenta the victory was in some respect due
: the incompetency of Gyulai-at Sulferno the Aus
!, trian army fought nobly under the eye of Franc
;, Joseph himself, but unable to resist the ove
whelming proves of the Allies. We have befor
observed that this battle would test the courag
and endurance of the rank and file in either hos
and the event proves that our prediction was nc
x erroneous. 1t is abundantly clear that the Au
le trians were thoroughly prepared, for they then
selves began the attack; and it is equally clear tha
,e army which continued the struggle from
o'clock in the morning until s o'clock in the ever
III ing has not only been well handled but has fougt
'e with determined courage.
Imperfect the accounts of the battle of Solf
II rno still are, it would be idle to attempt any d.
tailed description of the engagement. But its ger
eral features and the principles which determine
the Austrians to deliver it are not hard to conieC
y ture. The serious danger to which the allied arm
Z must have been exposed in attempting to cross til
/ Mincio between Peschiera and Mantua-a distanC
'r of twenty miles, in the face of hostile army e,
ceeding 100000 men-has been already pointe
III out in these columns IL probable therefor
y that the French Emperor would wait until the arm
=, about to be landed near Venice and the forces
Prince Napoleon had come up so as to threaten til
rear and left flank of the Austrian army In tt