The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-07-01

ruined. policy az violence only produces the dedst
which leads 10 bankruptcy We shall give 10 Austria,
by taking from her itay, the means OF regulating nee
finances; and such 10 the sslutary influence Of good
that shall by dong fortune OF tue
unsratefu holders Of netAcs who violent against
OPINIONS OF LORD FALMERSToN'S ORGAN.
From the London Post June 10
Tho partial mobilization OF Prussiau army IL just
one OF those which do indicate the bege
rent policy OF the but serve to Increase he
importance Of the neutral attitude and TO strengthen Prus
sic among the States Of Federal Germany TO siguif
cant events have almost simultaneously occurred, which
are calculated to influence this piece Of Prussaa policy
We alude TO the Accession OF Lord Psmerston 10 power
and to the circular Of Prince Gorschakor, which,
under como ambiguous phras -ology, expresses It's
desire that the war now c,nhoed TO Italy may,
throughout Its career, be 30 locaisct Hal tnls
order for the partial mobilization OF the army OF
Prusss preceded either the circular OF the kusHSn
government or the fall Of the Derby Ministry, We
dency Of the measure But il Il now sufficiently
clear that both Great Britain and Russia are resolved 70
maintain the general neutrality or Europe N me cosns
In which France and Austria are now engaged. Their
sympathes with the Italian cause; but while they
will not lit hand against Austria, 10 neither will they do
cautious a. the Court Of Berlin would for moment
tempt 70 cast her sword into the scale against such
vo.cpemcnt which Prussia nav give 10 her esc,Iye
strength ~ defensive precautiou or diplomatic move
without any other significance than that Of providing
Power Of the Germarc Consideration. Such an nterpre
tasaon equally In cnnsonanco with the tradonary poll
cy Of Prussia. In 1905, when governed by HsughWiz
aud Lacchesin she content look on though tho
BEAD Of great ANN, aud While, If sue had declared
against France, she could had Russia for
tpgent and possible opponent but for actual ally al
reaoy engaged in the war. she would not tnen JOIN
Austria for the sake OF Germany and In al lance with
Russia ao would abe now join her for the sake Of smpy
preserving tho odious rule Of Austria beyond tho Alps
and 10 opposition to the views equally Of France and
T1n II ~ ,o,;,..to -. -.,..r,-.x .-.. - A.. ~.
man federal army took place in 1853 Upto that year
had consisted u something than three hundred
sand men, OF whom forty thouaana were cavalry with
train Of six hundred pieces Of field and siege artillery
This formed the aggregate OF the contingent which tho
Germanio Diet required cash OF the component States 10
furpish against the eventua'isy OF The force In
question calculated OF 10 hundred 70
the population Of the dGcrent Sates and being simply
the mIomun, did not affect numbers TO which escn
State nigh, army beyond IL nor did Il relate 70 any
forces which any German 10 such Austria Prus-
sa maintain 10 reepec, OF lie German possessons
In 1858 however, the Two first class Powers or Germany
underworld TO extend the federal from three hun
dred thousand four hundred and fty thoasaud but
the smaller Powers resisting this burden the federal army
was finally liked vt three hundred and tfty thousand
While austria and Prussia were thus endeavoring to
force upon the minor Powers increase In the rank
nle OF the army similar coolest regarding the fortresses
assanable from the Rbne divided the north OF Germany
from the south. Nothing mark more distinctly the
seshpess Of each Power than manner in which each
directed its influence according 70 lis special interest
fortcatons IN contemplation Austria and Bavaria
MAD on the subject IF strengthening Of the fordca
more than forty years ago, by her pre- emneuce in the
Diet, forced the expenditure OF the twenty million
francs which Germany had obtained the peace 1885,
"a war SUBSIDY IRON France since that period Aus
trn and Bavaria have contrved 70 spend further sum
OF forty million francs belonging to the Confederation tor
the ortresses aud having thus secured them
selves from attack the Danube and The at the ex
peusc Of Germany, Ausira is enabled forty Verona
Mantua ana Pescbera at her own This, however, has
ern Germany and the whole progress the question
Of German fertilization and German armament We see the
federaton IN spite OF fts theoretc unity We there
fore ADDITIONAL doubt the esrnespess Of pur
pose with which PruasiA preenda address herself 70
the Italian question, which alone at issue.
The Prussan army actually on . war footing was COM
puted at the time the NeufchAel dispute at one hun
dred and eighty thousand while the army performing gar
rison ouy and not ready to marcn computed
hundred and twenty thousand TINS total OF three
hundred thousand has subsequently, been somewhat
increased by The addition Of one hundred to each
Of one hundred and two bsualiops, at additional
expense Of six hundred and fifty thousand tnaiers
Is very clear that tao Pussian revenue as il now
standr would not bear any farther increase OF military
Pruesan government being hundred and twenty
SIX million thsers, and the revenue rather behind the
force Prussia has IAndwehr and Landsrum
But Dether Of these great bodies have lately called
OUT and although almost the only precaution adopted BY
the humber OF officers charged with the inspection or the
former bocy, neither Landwehr Landsrum proba-
bly, effective and ,be reliance Of Prussia must after ALL be
the Prussian army the more defensive measure be-
cause, while other Stsee armng around Prussia, she
has greater length Of defenceIess frontier than any
other State Of Europe Stretching from Russia TO Bel
gium-touchipg at Russh. Austria, Eaxony Hsno-
yer, France Belgium and Holland, without single posi-
no doUs ~ pras. can os
force around her With at least great attention any
other Power Of Europe The policy of Prussia has there
and the nobisaoa OF portion of her army Is oNlv TO be
construed a. a dqessice MEASURE