Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1852-1859, 1859-08-05
THE INTELLIGFNCFR
louis NAPOIRON,s apoToC1,


?. Two hypothesis had been proposed. e;tbor
was to be free from the Alps to the Adri.
atic, or austria was to dominate over the v,boIo
OF the Peninsula. France rose. took mn ar,ns
gained victories; and no sacrifice was spared bV
hypothesis. VI ''e urse
Italy, then, will be free, according TO enpaoo.
'hents contracted in presence of the whole world
-lree from the Alps to the Adriatic Whom
we passed the AIincio, and when our victorious
leglonS began the seges of Verona. Peschiero
anu Mantua, the partisans of the policy of con.
:eSS'ons got alarmed. They spoke about nm
independent Archduke at Venice, and some sort
oI Uermanlc combination for the occupation of
the iortresses and the famous quadranele. Bnt
the oolect OF the war would not be attajne6 If
austria had a single foot in Italy, even by
proxy, and If the fortreSSeS on the Mincio and
the Adige were not Italian. Can the KEYS of
Italians DU'
What we are enabled to tell our adversaries
OF the war In Italy, the political Spectators of
the morrow, is, that outside the programme (the
Emperor'S) announced at the opening of the
campaign all seems to US n falsehood, and all
must be false. Let but a single Austrian sol.
oier remain IN Italy-but the mnutest Austrian
influence there abide, and we shall have to be.
gin everything again i'll few years. The in
vIncl6Ie courage of our soldiers, their generous
oiood, will have been shed in vain History
|
nation. therefore, no AUstriH, no Austrian
l4pWence an Itaty-Such, in our opinion which,
thanH Heaven, has many adherents, is the strict
execution of the French programme.
The corollary OF this programme is the com
plete expulsion of all those petty princes who,
since 1910, were in permanent completely with
austria for the absorption of Italy. If single
one OF them be tolerated., it is evident that his
state would become the centre of the counter
reVoluton-not only italian, but even Euro
pean.
We copy this article to show what the French
themselves were led TO expect from the language
OF their Emperor. 1t is needless to say that
they, in common with the whole liberal world,
| have been disappointed and deceived The
partisanS OF the Emperor in vain cndcavor to
prove that he has accomplished substantially
all that he has promised; it is in vain they say
that the Austrian hold on Italy has been relax
ed, that the national eXiStance of Italy is recog-
missed, and that the petty sovereigns will be
compelled to introduce reforms into their gov
ernments. Even admitting all this, it is still
the universal feeling that the French interVen-
ton has been failure. 1t has unquestionably
done great deal for Italy, but it has left un-
done that which most needed to be done, and
which, not being done, leaves the italian qucs-
tlon as unsettled as it was before this pretended
settlement
Louis Napoleon feels this himself and his
address to the French heads Of administration,
" " Z nave Il Geographic report, Is MOTH
ing less than apology for the shortcomings
OF his compaign. He avowS that he was COIN
PEELED to contract the scope of his programme
and to eXtinguish, by sudden termination of
/ the war, 'the noble delusions and patriotic
hopes Of many honest hearts, He could not
express, more emphatically, his consciousness
] that he had failed to meet the wishes OF Italy
and the aspirations which his own proclamation
of Paris had called forth
I But Louis Napoleon excuses himself on the
ground that the peace was with him an absolute
IneceSSity-uOt arising, however from his own
exhaustion or wearineSs, bnt from external cir.
cnmStanccs, and chiefly the menacing position
of the Germanic Powers. He hints moreover
at the exigency which had arisen for accepting
the concurrence'of the revolutionary forces, and
/ this, We have no doubt had more influence
over his mind than he is willing to confess
more, indeed, than even the threats of the Ger
mans The Italian feeling had been intlamed to
such pitch that it would soon have been be-
yond the control of the monarchs, and with his
usual sagacitY Louis Napoleon got himself out
of the difficulty before it was too late OF his
tearS-as to the complications of the papal Oucs.
ton, as effective, MS any other motive in prodnc-
ing his decision, tits to be remarked that Louis
| Napoleon says nothing No incidents of the
war were more perpexing than those which oc-
Cured in the Papal territories and the some
what defiant attitude assumed by the Govern
tncnt OF the Pope must have revealed to the
French Emperor the real difficulties of his plan
for a free and Independent Italy. The spiritual
chief of the numerous Catholic populations of
Austria, Italy, Spain and France, asserting the
rights of the Church to her Patrimony, and in
sisting upon the continuance of the temporal
rule, was not to be made an enemy, if it could
be avoided. Rome, say what they will of the
iimpotenceof Papacy, still rules the Latin races,
and for Louis Napoleon,to have got at logger
heads with Rome would have been but to court
| his own over rth1ow
Admitting, however, the force and even the
validity of the EmPeror's EXCUSES admitting
that he found himself in. an exceedingly tight
place, and that it was wise in him to get out of
it as soon as he could-thc criticism then occurs
in the query why he got into il9 When he first
contemplated the Italian war, he must certainly
have contemplated all its relations and liabilities
II announcing that he meant to drive the Aus
trians TO the Adriatic, he knew that he was like
ly to provoke the interference of the Germans.
In declaring his intention to render Italy indie
pendent, he knew that he would be more or
less involved with the government ofthe eccle-
sastical states. These results were not merely
contingent, but almost certain. No statesman
or general would have thought of the war for
NrithOut tnG tho,,, into ,ooo,,,,t