The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-06-27
DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE BY THE
LONDON TINES CORRESPONDENT.

ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES AT rURBIGo.
The details which ! sent you in my last letter
about the combat at Ponte di Magenta touched only
this part of the battle field and would be incon-
plete were not TO tell you what happened on the
other side, at the village of Magenta itself. AS
explained before, while the division OF the Grena
diers of the Guard and Zouaves attacked the front
of the position at Ponte d Magenta and Bufllora,
General Mcmahon, now Due de Magenta and Mare
cha de France received the order to advance, with
the divisions Espnasse, La Motterouge and the d.
vision Of the Cbasseurs Pied and Fusiliers de IA
Garde from Turbigo, and take the Austrians posted
at Magenta in their right flank and rear. IN
support Of this force was the Sandman army
of which several divisions had already passed
the Ticino at TuIbigo. From this lat er place -
Magenta there are on the shortest road more Than
twelve miles. II is only by-road brlnehlnS on
from the main road leading frQm IureiS0 '9Warls
the latter on most places NOT more tnt1 >llciei1
to allow two carriages 20 p1ss edcn 0Iler tle
country on both sides OF u : mucl more tnicAy
wooded than the other side 0I me liGii0, anu dH-
tensvelv planted with vineyards, I was 1higeu
10 draw vCur attention 70 this N 0Iyier ~ s0w tio
difficulty which existed ior 3 bmiy al men Ike me
division OF the Guards rum - JUu 10 "a JJu strong
to march twelve mites 70 tte hattie 'ott. You VIII
now better understand ms .llihNuity teal YOU
that The DIVISION 1t me tlssileis nu hasseuie "a
Of the Guard, whlen T1rned Ele rssarYe.
stared 81 a. NJ. tum rurnigu, AMI
could not take part N the oaS1ie before
P. NJ. while the GrGHtyLrJts Of tie >ardi
MAN army, formed Of the Division Falt, did not
reach the battle field till P. NJ, too lac to take
any part in the action. 1t was noon before suii-
cient number of troops had come up to engage the
enemy AS you know, the attack on the other
side against Ponte d Magenta and Buifaora was
ordered for 10 A. NJ, but could not take place til
noon, when the guns were heard towards Inc -ssi
front, in the direction of Msrcelo.
THE AUsTRIASs I6SozASr CT EzT sIazInEErz Gg
vEE AzZEEs4
I spoke viii Il LIlsT,iE1 i,ssit u,nH' WIN TDDt
pTC- i1fzi yErT II Lig u1Liul VIA ynirlrtac mt
TAXA .ii,lln' "a. Eg9 Iiis ElHi,sInui nat IL tat
.Tstfs.tp ttfnls N
-tT.f ruTnlr tila yiiiOe campaign. e great diff.
IAil u ccnteiJ viii vas r.ln y nplli.
uelll. -tlfe Ll5Vel.s1B, O tie Als-. f,eliIIe
nulta- i0 t1reai c-rii ubltc' tie CnuIlt-' lienpe
~ utTii,p JIit1,. l5Ail-. ~ tn 1tife sBau
VIA tie Tfgl3I---1 tge iltss il9l SPIES 81,
IiFT % -uu /, S.aun lin tnes u''ta'
tgI.ii mia III y'ileTt ie cna' inrg. VI .e q llles
WIS, AnE huv 10, Ike, mat ut''0uGst vilt tuar
pTepG1zlll- Tins sTl,lGlH ifs.sygs. li. rurus IL.
gertrude Which g-.zz3s-,i-- lIrplt - nIueE Tnsy
had nothing &c = -pa-- Eua were ,'slirs. 10 isel
Their WY abou. Ike bind -nt5-1-sI i0varas u
rim and then towards lie p and bsTo-d l. Tie
result was. thst while they comrllilei OF the
ridiculous inactivity oi the Allies, these latter con-
centraed their forces on the left Of their line and
the Ausuians knew only where the danger threa.
tened when they saw the Allies enter Novara and
appear on the Ticino. Then it was too late.
They left, indeed, their position as fast as they
could evacuated Mortara, and abandoned the Pc
line: but they could no longer concentrate their
army in time to defend the line of the Ticino and
keep the Allies out of l-ombardy They brought up
in all haste whatever they could collect and post
ed it at Magenta and the canal, which forms a
second and almost more formidable line Of defence
than the Ticino itself. But although they exerted
themselves to their utmost, and although they
almost killed their soldiers with marching they
could only bring up portion Of tho lst CLAIM
Sd (SchwarZenberg), I'd (Lcthenstein), and the
9TH (ZobeD corps ddrnl(c How great this por
ton it is impossible to say with certainty
it is estimated here at 100000 men, and Ger
talnly, from the number Of regiments which are
represented among tie prisoners one would be
inclined to think that from 10000 to 10000 me1
must have been in the neighborhood OF Magenta
They we're commanded by General Clam, whose
corps had lately come from Bohemia but had moi
entirely arrived: for instance, of the seyentytwo
guns which it ought to have, not more than
eighteen were there. But this was not Of much
importance, because the ground admits only very
limited use Of artillery. There was likewise divi
sion of cavalry present but it never appeared on
the foreground. Both Gyuai and Hess pre-
sent. but had nothing to do with the command
The precipitation with which the troops were
brought up did not admit of their being pro
perry taken care OF, so that, besides the fa
tgue, they had to endure hunger, which was
an additional source Of weakness to them. And
it was this last circumstance which must have
told most, for as regards marching the French and
Sardinans have done surely lmore in the last ten
days, and the very corps of the Due de Magenta
had 10 make long march in the scorching SUI be-
fore arriving on the field of battle.
FAILURE TO BLOW Up THE BRIDGE AT BUFFALoRA.
In complete ignorance of the movements Of the
Allies, and douby deceived by the inactivity to-
wards Turbigo and the demonstration towards Buff
faora the Austrians prepared for the attack on
this latter side When the thing came to the test,
it was found that the t6ie de pont formed on the
Sandman side Of the Ticino, at San MARITIME was
80 i'll constructed that attempting to hold it would
have merely led to the sacrifice of the
troops encased there. 1t was therefore
determined to abandon it, and blow up
the stone bridgs Of Bufiaora. The five batta-
lions which occupied the tete dc pont were with
ra fhp nj oh NJ flp ef md IN at
was made to blow up the bridge, which, you
know failed The solid blocks of granite resisted
the small quantity of powder This seems not to
have been the fault of the engineers much as Of
general direction of the whole campaign. The
Austfians seem to have been so sure of their sue
cess mat they never thought of retreat and did not
prepare themselves for the contingency of having
to blow up the bridges There was no blasting DOW.
der at hand and so little ammunition TO spare that
it the whole amount which was found had been
taken out of the cartridges it would not have
amounted 10 SIX cwt. Inc commander telegraphed
to Milan for blasting powder, which might have been
sent up from Milan, and the answer returned was
that there was none. This was the reason that the
stone bridge over the Ticino could only be shaken
and the two bridges over the canal at Ponte Nuoyo
Oh Magenta are not injured at all. The chambers
were prepared but there was no powder to put into
them AS the position in front of the bridges was
oI great strength, is was determined to defend it,
anu not dreaming OF an attack from the right the
me OF battle of the Austrans went from Bufa-
lora through Ponte di Magenta towards Robccco.
al as nearly as possible parallel to the Tcino and
tne canal with the reserves in the village of Ma
Sensa' Inc only force towards the road coming
rom iurpgo was battalion which occunied
one OF the large isolated cascnes or farms To
the right II, OF the road, behind the village of Mar
ceno: ms was more with the view of observa
tlon IMAM resistance. The advance of tho GRAVE
diers from Ponte di Buaalora at ten or about
two hours before the column of Marshal Mcsiahon
showed itself on the road from Turbigo, was
calculated to leave them in their original arr
and they massed their troops SO as to neo;
this column and crush it After show;ny
itself. this column, as you will rememhere
received orders to halt in order to give time to
the other column to arrive, and it was only when
the cannon of the latter was heard that it dcnit;ye
ly advanced.
In spite of its heroic bravery it would scarcely
have succeeded in taking this formidable position
e on the canal had not the advance Of the