The daily exchange. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1858-1861, 1859-01-22
BALTIMORE.
SATURDAY, JANUARY %, 1859.

by whom QueSuOUS OF law anu Idct SHALL De QlS-
cussed, as well as the time to be occupied in the
arguments before Court and Jury The trial
docket of the tribunal in question contains as we
learn, more than thousand cases, at the present
term and it certainly is of grave Importance to the
community that its manageable dimensions
should be reduced, by any fair means, compatible
with the rights of the litigants and proper ad-
mnstration of public justice. If we could per-
suade ourselves that the rules alluded to were
likely to contribute in any degree, to desirable
result, Or that they removed any obstacle which
has thus far tended to prevent its consummation
we should welcome their introduction as most
important and practical judicial reform We re-
greet to acknowledge however, that their adoption
does not seem to us to be recommended by the
considerations to which we have referred.
1t is the object of Courts of Justice, not merely
to dispose of cases, but to hear them patiently
and decide them justly. The necessity and duty
of deliberate hearing and careful decision are not
in the slightest degree diminished by the existence
of an appellate tribunal, where errors may be
corrected The citizen is entitled to the best
ability and most studious and intelligent labor
and consideration of the inferior, as well as the
so heard and decided below, as to save him, ifpos-
sible, the delay expense and anxiety of an appeal
and to place him-f an appeal must needs be
taken-n the most favorable position which the
merits of his case will justify. If the inferior
Judge adopts any other theory of his own obliga-
tons than this-if he supposes that it is his bust
ness only to press cases through and get rid of
them-leavng the Court above to set things to
rights as best it can--he certainly mistakes his
duties sadly and does gross injustice both to
suitors and the appellate tribunal. He makes
trials in the court below mere pro torma con-
test, and renders an appeal a matter of necessity
in almost every case. While we are far from sup
posing that any respectable Judge would deliber-
ately adopt such principle of official conduct, the
experience of the public-to say nothing of that of
the bar-cannot be blind to the fact, that some
thing very like the result of its adoption has made
itself disastrousy manifest, in many of our large
cites-under the reformed institutions which have
tended so much to lower the judicial standard.
1t seems to follow, from what we have said,
that inferior tribunals ought to be very cautious
in cutting themselves off from that instruction,
which no Court is too wise to receive from the
intelligent discussion of legal questions before it,
by counsel. 1t is simply absurd, to suppose that
any Judge is as competent, without preparation,
to understand and appreciate cases and questions
brought suddenly before him, as counsel who
have carefully and deliberately considered them,
in all their bearings With but very rare excep-
tons, all good-certainly all great-Judges have
been good listeners. Men of moderate abilities,
promoted to the bench, unless they listen can
never learn, and unless they willing to listen
and learn they ought not accept the promotion,
and do not deserve it. In the appellate Courts,
where the questions are circumscribed by the
printed record, and where the Bench is aided by
printed briefs of counsel and has ample leisure
to examine the authorities and pronounce deliber-
ately upon them, the length of the arguments
may be very properly and usefully restricted.
But in the primary tribunals, where no such
facilities can exist, and where the field is open,
and often most ample, and justice cannot be done
without hearing all, considering all, and deciding
alrestrictive rules, of the character referred to-
must result, in nine cases out of ten in depriving
both Court and Jury of the information and as
sistance, without which their duties cannot be
fairly or intelligently discharged. So well was
this understood by Judge LEES respectable pre-
decessors, that they habitually adjourned the
Court, in important causes, in order carefully
to examine and consider the cases cited, after
hearing them amply and fully discussed. The
result of such delberation constantly was to pre-
vent appeals and the delay and loss involved in
them. 1t universally tended to inspire public
confidence in the administration of the law and
in the judges who dedicated themselves, so patti
emily and conscientousy 10 the investigation of
truth and the enforcement of justice.
In the presentation of these views, we have not
considered either the convenience of the Courts or
the privileges of counsel. These are quite sub
ordinate, it is true, to the great end in view-the
administration of justice-and yet they to be
considered. There is however, this difference be-
tween them-that the convenience of the Judge
is his personal convenience, while the privileges
of the counsel are those of the client-that is to
say of the public, whose servant the Judge is.
While, therefore, Judges entitled, like all
faithful public servants, to all proper considera-
ton and all reasonable indulgence-they have
no right whatever to regulate the proceedings
of the tribunal over which they preside, by the
standard of their own personal desires or con-
venience. No Judge has the right to restrict coun-
sci in discussing the of their clients because
it may be disagreeable to him TO hear argu-
ment for in so doing he inf1icts an injury on the
clients whose rights are very much superior to
the Courts pleasure and convenience He ought
to resign his place, if his functions, in their pa
tent and proper exercise are too disagreeable to
be performed deliberately and justice requires.
1t may be quite true that there are many counsel
who are weak and many who are prolix, but
those who are neither weak nor prolix are quite
as numerous as patient and wise judges.
So much for the general aspect of the question.
Coming down to the case before us-we are per-
suaded that the new rules established by Judge
LEE are very unjust in the implication which they
involve-that the accumulation of cases upon the
docket of the Superior Court has been attributable
heretofore, to the long speeches of COUNSEL
The members of the Bar of Baltimore have never,
class, been remarkable for their trespasses in
that particular. On the contrary-the very oppo-
site has been the case, with but few exceptions.
They are as they have always been, chiefly dis
tingushed by the practical and busnessike ability
with which they try and discuss their causes. In
the Circuit and District Courts of the UNITED
STATES, and in the Court of Common Pleas of the
city, where there restrictive rules they dis
pose of their cases without any complaint as to
their prolixity, and without any hindrance to the
prompt administration of justice. They did the
same thing in the County Circuit Court under
both Judge CONSTABLE and Judge PRICE. In the
Common Pleas-with the same bar-the docket
originally larger that that of the Superior Court
has been reduced to perfect control, and is kept
constantly within limits-athough so considerable
portion of the time of the Judge is occupied with
the vexatious trial of appeals from Magistrates
There is no accumulation of business of any sort
under Judge MARsHALL's energetic and exemplary
fulflment of his many and various obligations.
And if this is the case, in Court where the
amounts involved are smaller than in the Superior
Court-it would certainly be the in the latter
Court also-were other things equal-because the
interests well as the duties of counsel would
prompt them to dispose, most speedily, of the busi-
ness which concerns their clients most, and pays
themselves best. To say nothing of higher motives
it must be quite clear, upon the most sordid
principles, that the bar do not willingly allow to
sumber, untred, those suits, the trial of which is
of the largest Importance to their own pecuniary
interests. Some few may be negligent, but it is
not possible that all can be. Some may be
tedious, but the majority are not. The evil to be
remedied must be outside of their negligence or