The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1859-08-12

fact, the true and correct Interpretation. am,
very respectfully and truly yours,
CLARENCE A. SEWARD.
20 NASSAU ST., New YORK, August 8, 1852
LETTER OF MR.. T. A. JsNcKEs.
Providence, August G, 1859.
HORACE H. DAY, Esq.:-Dear sir-I have receiv-
ed your letter calling my attention to articles in
some OF the New York papers signed by William
Judson and Edward N. Dckerson, making certain
statements concerning the conduct of the suit re-
Of the United States for the District of Maryland.
II these statements are made for the purpose of
impeaching the correctness of the decision, it
seems to me that those who are interested in the
in the opinion Of the Court. If they are designed
TO convey the idea that the cause on their side was
imperfectly presented in argument they do injns-
tce TO tAe learned counsel who represented the de-
iendants did not have the pleasure of listening
to the argument of Mr.. Marshall but its merit was
fully acknowledged by my learned associate who
closed Me cause, and by the Judge in giving his
decision; and have examined a pamphlet Of some
thrty printed octave pages, prepared by Mr.. Mar
shall and handed to the Court, in which every point
heretofore taken by the counsel for Mr. Judson, and
some other positions in favor of Mr.. Judsons aeg.
ed title, were stated with clearness and force and
with knowledge of the subjects of controversy
which would have been highly creditable to any of
the counsel who have been engaged in this India
rubber litigation. If the statements in these cards
are intended TO create the belief that all the papers
which have been deemed by Mr.. Judson and his
counsel important in sustaining the title he sets
up, were not before the Court and considered by
counsel, the record will prove the contrary; for
know, from having taken part in all the trials
which have taken place since the controversy
arose, that there was no document which has been
relied upon by adverse parties at previous hear
lngs which was absent from the case at Baltimore,
and some new ones, which was informed had
been forwarded by Mr.. Dickerson, were admitted
as evidence by consent of your counsel after the
argument of the case had commenced. am not
aware OF having omitted to call the attention of
the Court to each and all Of these documents and
to state the bearing which, in the opinion Of your
counsel, they had upon the questions at issue. One
OF tnese papers was copy OF an affidavit OF VIM.
Judson, annexed to what purported to have been
printed copy of proposed bill in equity against
you, with exhibits attached, containing upward of
one hundred and fifty closely printed octave pages
in which Mr.. Judsons pretended title, and the
history of it were stated at length. Upon an ex-
animation of Mr.. Judsons card I do not find
suggestion that the record of the case at Baltimore
does not contain every document that affects the
claim set up by him. / was not aware till after
the papers in the case had been read, that Mr..
Dickerson would not take part in the argument He
was expected to have been present, and l did not
learn that there was any objection on the part of
the defendants or their counsel, to his arguing in
not present and active in the conduct of the cause
it was clearly because they chose TO be absent and
doubt if any one who has read the opinion of the
Court and their several cards, can perceive where
absence. Their case was fully made up and pre-
scented to the Court think it will be difficult to
perceive how their personal presence would have
affected the result Their absence was regretted
by none more than by your counsel who argued the
cause.
This controversy has been settled, where every
will agree that il should be determded in court
which has full jurisdiction of the whole subject
matter, and which has pronounced its decision
and entered its decree upon final hearing and full
argument. In the usual course Of litigation in
the courts of the United States, that decision
will stand as the law of this controversy
unless reversed by the Supreme Court. If
the cause reaches that tribunal your counsel will be
happy to argue it, but in the meantime cannot
advise you to accept the appeal which Mr.. Judson
and his counsel seem DESTROYS of taking to the pub
lie press and to reargue questions of tigated titles
in that form. Such questions belong to the courts
and lawabding citizens conform to their decisions.
The present state of this controversy is not such
will satisfy those who are DESTROYS of trespassing
upon your rights and of pirating your inventions.
But the right and justice Of your claim is made so
apparent by the clear statement and logic of the
Judge who has decided in your favor, that all
honorable merchants and dealers in the articles
which the Court has declared to be included in your
titles, will not hesitate to acknowledge them.
Your opponents, in their published cards.
have referred the public to two decisions of
the Circuit Court of the United States for
the district of New Jersey, in other branches
of this India rubber litigation. One Of those deci-
sions was upon motion for new trial by your
adversaries after verdict in your favor, affirm
ing your rights under the contracts of 1916, be-
tween yourself and Goodyear, after an attempt to
par ties claiming under him. The other was a de-
csion against you upon a suit brought by Good
year. and in which you alleged the invalidity of his
patent one of your grounds Of defence, as is
usual in all patent causes. The contracts of 1916
and the rights and liabilities of the parties to them
were re-affirmed in this decision. Both decisions
were final in that Court, and have been generally
acquiesced in by all other courts of the United
States of coordinate jurisdiction. There was much
newspaper controversy over each decision; but the
public and those engaged in the trade, whose inte
judgment of the Court rather than the criticisms
upon the opinions of the Judges. In the present
position of this India rubber litigation, the Circuit
Court Of the United States for the District of Mary
contracts of 1876 to "al kinds of SHRED
or corrugated goods whether cemented, woven
or sewed," containing vulcanized India rub
Der. This Court has the same jurisdic-
for the district of New Jersey, and its decisions
upon final hearing should have the same respect
and should be regarded as of the same binding
effect as the decisions of the latter Court for which
your opponents have always claimed implicit ODE
dlence.
Nor is this decision of his Honor Judge Giles
without precedent. While the titles under the con-
tracts of 1916 were owned by the Congress Rubber
the United States and two of the Judges of the Su
preme Court, holding Circuit Courts Of the United
States in different districts, took the same view of
these contracts, and awarded injunctons against l
dealers in woven shirred goods. am not aware
that any different construction has been given to
those contracts by any judge except Judge Inger-
coll, when denying motion for a preliminary in
junction 1t is true that these decisions upon pre-.
iminary motions are not regarded as of binding
authority the Court is only called upon to deter
mine whether the party seeking relief shows title
which the Court will protect during the progress of
the cause to final hearing. But this question of |
construction was raised and argued in those cases,
and the great majority of the opinions expressed
upon such partial hearings were in concurrence |
with that arrived at by his Honor Judge Giles upon
full and final hearing.
You ask me to prepare correct history of your
titles and of the litigation which has resulted in this
late decision. Permit me to say that think those
who deal in the articles covered by your contracts
with Goodyear are more interested in what the
Court has declared to be the effect of those titles as