New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1859-03-17


t,.Iy useless; but Cassie osu be burned on tbs
rorts il 10, by yercel a. least By Se''o Calende'
Novsrs Bi.Is, Santa end Cre.centino; and II a
superior aruy pass TIE Pc, above Casa'e ana
attack tire rear OF the PiednoDtese, teey are 81
once compelled to give W tue advantages OF
.tropaly ibsrenched position, aud to bsht 10 the
oren fed. Il would be the counterpart oil
Nsrerso. though on the opposite aide OF the
Bormds.
Having thus described the two bases of opera
ton in the basin Of the Pc, that of tie Au'.fAa' IN
former article, that Of tie Franco PIedmontese
in the above remarks, let Us next consider
10 what u.e they may be turned. A glance
at the nap shows tics. TIE whole northeastern part
Of the Alpine chain belonging to Switzerland, from
Geneva 10 within s mile OF the StelSio Pass, Is
NJ utral territory to begin with. until one or the
otter OF the beserents thinks proper TO 7ioAte IT,
As tie Swis, nov. 8 days muster pretty strong
force for defensive purposes, it is not likely saa1
such thing would be done at the very beginning
of the war We shall, therefore, for tho present,
consider Switzerland as really neutral and inacces-
sble 10 either party In that case, the Frenca
have but four ways Of gefios into Piedmont Iae
sruy Of Lyons will bs7e TO pass BY Savoy and tue
Mont Gems. A smaller corp. may pass BY Btian-
con and the Mont Gene7re; both viii emerge from
the mountains, aid unite st Turin. The army con-
ceutrated in Provence may in part, march from
Toulon BY Nice ard the Col di Tenda; in partit
may embark at Toulon and be steamed TO Genoa
in far shorter tine. Both these bodies have their
noint of concentration at Alessandtis. There are
few more roads, but they are either unfit for the
psstase OF large bodies of troops or subordinate to
those named, leading to the same points Of con-
centr,tion.
The disposition Of the French army of Italy, for
We nav now venture to call il By this name, has
alread, been made, in accordance with this s5ate
of things. TIE two main points of concentrs-
ton are Lyons and Toulon with smaller corps IN
the valley Of the Rhine between the two, ready to
advance By Briarcon. Ia order rapidly TO concen-
trate strong French army in the valley OF the 10,
behind AesssL1ris and Cssale, il is In fact neces-
ssry that all the above routes should be used; the
strongest corps coming by Lyons and Mont Gems,
the weakest by Brancon and Mont Geneyre,
aud as large portion as possible of the army OF
Provence being forwarded TO Genoa by water; for
while corps marching from the Var BY the Col di
Tenda will require above ten days to march 70
Aessatdri, it may go BY water from Toulon to
Genos in twenty four bour' and tserce reach
Asssandria in thee forced or four easy marches.
Now, supposiDg, as we are bound TO do, that
Austria will declare war as soon as French
battalion passes into Piedmont, whit course can
her army of Italy pursue IL may remain in LON
hardy, await, with arms grounded, tho concentra-
tioa of 200, GO FIenchmen and $4,000 Piedmont
ese, ard then retire before them to its bass OF
operations on the Mncio, abandoning all LOmbardy.
This course would disbearten the Austrian troops,
and flush their opponents with success bought
Unexpectedly cheap. Or it may await the attack
of the French and Piedmontese in the open plains of
Lombsrdy; 10 tina. case it would be beaten by
superior numbers, having but 10000 men TO
oppose to twce that strength, and besides, be ham
pt red by TIE italian insurrection which would
bresk out all over the country. 1t might, indeed,
reach ts fortrsses, but that splendid base OF
operations would be reduced TO barren defensive,
the ofrr.ye strength Of the field army being gone.
The great purpose for which that system OF
fortre,ses was created, to serve as q base to
weaker army for successful and sheltered attack
upon stronger one, would be completely destroyed,
until support could arrive from the interior Of
Austris; and during that time Peschiera might
fall Lesnsgo might fall, and the communications
through the Venetian territory would certainly be
Lost. Either of the courses considered would be
disadyantsg eous, and indeed inadmissible, unless
dictated by stern necessity But there remains
another course.
The AustIians can bring into the field at least
10000 men. If they chose their moment well,
they have nothing to oppose them but the $4,000
Piejmontese, 500 COO Of whom alone can take the
field The French arrive By fotr routes, all versing
toward Alesssndris. The angles comprised be-
tween these four routes, between Q line drawn
from Mont Gems TO Alesssndris, and from Genoa
TO Alessandria, amount together to about lao de.
grees; thus mutual cooperation Of the different
French corps, while yet unconcsntrated, is CON-
pletely out Of the question. Now, ifthe Austri.ns
choose their time wtil-and We have seen in 1913
and 70 ths. they can DO so-ard march upon the
Piedmonte,e base OF operations, attacking 1t either
in frost or turning it by the north, we venture TO
say, with al respect for the bravery of the Pied
moatese army, that the Sardlnans would stand but
poor chance sgains. superior numbers of Aus
ttians; AID, once the Piedmontese driven from
the field and reduced to passive defense Of their
forsresses, the Austrians might attack with @ps-
rior forces every French corps singly as it de-
bopched ircm the Alps Or the Apprentices; and even
II compelled TO retreat their retreat would be