The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1859-05-12
WAR IN EUROPE-FINANCE AND
STRATEGY.

OIhhlEG1 I.
The following article is taken from the Lon.
don Economist, and il full of the most valuable
facts and suggestions: 49,
1t is somewhat remarkable that Europe is
now, in 1859, apparently ON the eve of war.
of which the basis is the possession of the
Italian States by Austria under the treaty of
1914, and that just thirty years ago European
war was on the eve of bursting forth, because OF
the operation of the same treaties in relation to
Belgium and Holland. In October of the year
| In which the French revolution in july drove
from France the elder branch of the Bourbous
restored by the Holy Alliance, the Belgians
broke out into hostilities against the Dutch
King for his many attempted expressions, and
repulsed him from Brussels. Europe ran to
arms at once, but conference" was held at
London by the ENJOYS of Austria, France.
Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, and a
protocol dated November 4, 1880, issued, order.
ing the Dutch and Belgian troops to retire re.
spectively behind the line which, before the
treaty of May 30, 1914, separated Holland from
those that were added to it by said treaty
This line was to the last degree indefinite,
and the Belgians replied that they would con-
form, understanding the line to be the whole
left bank of the Scheldt, the ancient limits be-
tween the northern and southern provinces.
The limits were finally fixed by the Holy ALI
ance by giving to Holland the left bank of the
Scheldt and Limbourg, which had been ceded
by Holland to Belgium in 1898, in return for
portions of ancient Belgium. The alliance,
however, let Holland keep both, and compelled
Belgium to submit, on the true Holy Alliance
principle, which, in breaking up the Empire Of
Napoleon for division among the forty thieves,
&c Il
door. The same conference decided the "per-
petual neutrality of Belgium. The question
now is not to rob one small State for the bene-
tit OF another, but to make Austria give up its
possession of the "back door" of Italy, and to
keep out of its neighbours lot. The attempt
again brings Europe under arms again a war
foutrance threatens possibly to be settled as
other wars have been between the Loire and
the Garonne. The contending Powers are not
now feeble States that may be spanked into
silence, bat Ttans that move the world.
grave question here arises, what will be
the effect of the military system of Napoleon,
now that that system has passed into the knowl-
edge and possession of all the belligerents? 1t
was not until towards the close of the career of
Napoleon, and the appearance of the great work
OF the Baron de JOmini, that either writer's or
soldiers would admit that the great conqueror
had any system. The conqueror and his con-
quests have passed away. The humber of
kings reposes beneath the dome of the Inva-
hides. The English oligarchy restored him to
VI ays q EaRss QM hs Eask xhsss hs
followed his eagles to the huimbling of Russia,
their "ancient ally" who now joins them in
backing those eagles against Austria, their
other ally, and millions of men are marshalling
apparently to recOmmence that great game
viii laid at no an h,,
means of the discovery his genius has made,
The military art has two grand divisions,
tactics " and strategies," in relation to which
military writer's have never been very clear,
until the distinction was we'll defined by the
great master. Briefly, tactics are the manual
OF the troops-the forming of columns, of lines,
of squares, advancing, retreating, &C.. strate:
gy, the knowing how and when to pse masses
of men who have been taught tactics. There
| is a tactic of companies, tactic of regiments,
of infantry, of cavalry, of artillery, &c. There
is also distinction in strategy-that of battles,
or in presence of the enemy, was pretty well
understood before Napoleon, Frederick the
Great was master of it, and from him it received
great improvements. 1t was reserved for Ma
poleon, however, to develop the "grande strate-
gique," or mode of directing armies at dis
lance from the enemy. In this respect he
ncus made in astronomy.
In the case of the strategy of battles, the lead
ing principle is, that when force drawn up in
long thin lines, as has been the case since the
introduction of firearms, Is attacked in the di.
rectiOn of the smaller dimensions of the line
that is, on its flank, it is almost sure to be de.
feated, unless the extraordinary activity of the
commander and resolution of the troops COM
pensate for the disadvantage. The reason is,
that the attacked line is compelled 70 change
position under fire. an operation fatal for young
troops 1t resulted from this that the central
| position was the dangerous one-that to occu-
| py the circumference of the circle was for an
army like being to windward Of an enemy in
naval warfare. Old commanders assumed that
| what was true in actual combat was true also
at distance. 1t was assumed, that if Ger
man army had an enemy on each flank within
cannon shot, it was lost, and that its position
| was no better if one enemy was in Italy, aud
the other in Holland.
The First Consul discovtrrcd, that if BY Sc
crscy and celesitv Of movement, and prompt
ness o. Execution, the central army could con
! centrate on one of the enemies before being in
terrupted by the other, it had the best position
1t was mainly the development of this princi
pie that conquered Europe. It was only wter
l
having it knocked into them, that they applied
the remedy of retreating before them. Thi,
discovery of Napoleon has gone far to decide
| the ultimate independence Of nations, since il
demonstrates that an aroused people occupy the
| favorable position in respect of attacking enc
mics. Invaded Italy, for instance, could unite
concentrically into masses far superior to the
| separate masses of surrounding Austrians The
| celerity and vigor with which Austrian troop.
| are now being poured into Italy is to forestal
the Italians in that movement
| The change in strategy wrought by Napo
leon was, however, not his only peculiar
| ity, but it was supported by the marvellous
| genius by which he applied his theory of the
| "grandes chances" or chances IN the long run
1t was theory that could have occurred onlj
to an extensive dealer in war. It consisted il
so projecting campaign that q battle wor
shall be more ruinous TO his enemy than -four
lost ones would be to himself The campaigr
of Marengo is an illustration. The unfortunate
| old Melas was seduced into the corner of Italy
to besiege Genoa, which was at the bottom oil
| the sort Of tunnel formed by the Alps on his
| right and the Apprentices on bis left. Napo
/ leon crossed the Alps in his rear, and so dis
| posed his troops that defeat was annihilation
| for Melas. while six defeats would be required
| to drive the French from his liue of march
The campaigns of Austerlitz and Wagram are
also brilliant examples of this operation.
The surprising ingenuity displayed in the
mode of concentrating the right description Of
| force was feature also Of Napoleon's warfare
| Thus at one time the cavalry was raised te
| 10000 meu, of whom $4,000 were without
horses, but obtained them in the hour of victory
| from the defeated enemy. A result of the sys
tenn of Napoleon is TO reduce the comparative
value of fortresses in modern warfare. They