New-York daily tribune., 1859-07-04
Ar,lri. I. regm, 10 that Of rv..is the Y.ds,. Act

A,sfris Is regcr 10 that Of frrsss the Fsdeui Act
e,trrSsy reserves n the Diet the exclusive right s(
legislation fcr the internal organisation Of Gsrnsay,
ard therefore, esen If the right oi military transport
I between neutral German &ses were acknowtetged
(shere 10 this case the hostile "ivcws obvioasI,
could only arse uLdor an eDactsGtt oi The Dset
That the Diet has enacted nothing Of the sor I, cie~
from the special negotiation of the Pf9ssisp Ccmm,s
siorers. Here Therefore we have at oLee breach of
the terms Of the C0nieieracy .rcr bee the D$
has given no sanction 10 engagements thus tentng 70
hoSries and viola,h II the neutrality II Gerrnse
Sates toward France and SARDINIA in tue aiding sad
abettirg the hing o. Lombariy aud Venice.
Il may be umed that, vbLe the object of Austns
in this Is mltsTy, the oejec, ot Pra,sia
chiefly at any rate IN the hrt instance. plons.c
Prussla has lust taken three concurrent steps, trr-
specty.ly of her arrangement nts at Dresden ana Me-
pIcb S,e bas mobilZ-d sODe J1, 900 troops; she hae
contracted loan Of 81, 900 00O thslers and her En
baseajor to Nierns IA nos probably at the Austrian
headquarters Though Intrigue IS RE enough =, oW-
lin To render Pruseian policy waysarc and the Regcs<
hary master of bis own actions u Is certainly TO be
contemplated tina, Prus'is may develop, dragged %
by the u,nor States and the cabas OF her owa Court
the position Of arL,d mediator. That such resuk
would be an unqualified disaster 20 European coaures
still q, peace we need hardly observe. Austria oB the
o'Ler hand, by throwing her Bohemian army into IT,
rol has probably been guided by two distinct maneu
She has thus either been able 10 strengthen the
gs1isOrs of the Quadrangle with the least delay.
or she has reserved 10 herself the alternative
of debeuChpg from the Tyrolese molnsias upoa the
let marx OF tnc Alts Nuttc perhaps engaged IN toC
siege Of Verona with the bold desiga of compromising
their communications with the Tcino, which Is soW
their natural base. These fs,taes-es lie withia hfy
miles cf Verona ana Peschera; ana there is no dcu6t
that Austrian army IN Tyrol, II led by al soe gen-
eral, might descend on either side ot the Lake u
Garda and fall ver'csly on the allied flank. L. mY
thus be the design IL Austria either 10 relieve tho
Quacrangle, If besicged or. II il should have fallen,
10 arrest the allied advance on Padaa and Venice, o.
even thirdly. to en'ice the allied army into Tyrcl in
order 20 bring the Confederation into the field. We
have little fear that the astute commanders OF the
allied army would suffer surprise; but some such de-
yelOpmsnt of Austrian tactics IL evidently not improb
able.
1t ore eccentric result of this sruggi, to tigstss
the gripe of German despotism IN proportion ~ It re-
lakes foreign domination ia ltsy. Gernau Govern
ments thus to get the consolation Of security a.
home which they have very little deserved. la orir
to ocour,ervs what hey lose abroad War with Frsses
is osersibly popular GerGany jd-t because the mas
of the Germans or he more oo,y who ldsivey rep-
esent the mass cannot distinguish bet~eeu the sss
of the hrst and of the second French Empire. Tho
Germans are apparently forgetting the hstred they
still legtmsely 10 their sovereign TO revive
the hatred they once owed 70 former generation ot
Frenobmen This effect, however Is obviously s.enpo-
fary II viii soon be perceived by tue
German people that their Govern nents arc
SIMPLY abusing their credu'ty. in Pslmsag
off an alleged hostility Of F-aoce toward
Gernsuy orcer 20 tura away their sympathies from
the French liberation of Italy. But there are two con
nictI pels in the plolong ,,on Of the 10 which
no urnsst can close bis eyes. Ii there is
nent melting Germany against France, there is assur
edy another melting Hungary against Austria and
Russia sgainst Germany In word, there Is an sscef
tained ana incontetable prepouderance of Eurcpesa
power prepared aud resolved to e'ectua.e tue inds
pendeDce Cf Italy. Against tha, prepon iersnce it 10
vain for Austrians or Gefmanso contend. III German
Governments only po,c-be they As tyrannocs -
they may-they will not commit themselvesto TO coarss
which will serve incalcuabyto widen the social csam-
tiles Of war--to render hercer longer and more despe-
the struggle which is maintained without the
possibility of preclading the eventual triumph Of ltsa
ian nationality and Italian freedom.