Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-07-19

i
of SafeTino, the Ausirians suffered much more than
the loss of numbers or even the forced retreat over
the Mincio and the abandonment Of its line Of de-
fence.
This defeat annihilaisd the last hope that they
would be able to meet their enemies in the field with
any but disastrous result. For The Ausrians com
menced the battle with every advantage they
chose their own time and their own ground lin
short it was a surprise regards the French army.
The French generals knew that the Ausrisns had
retrealed beyond the Mineio and did not know that
they had reerOsCed 1t; and when, early the morn
| ing of june Is, the Sardinian army advanced on
the road to Pesehiera expecting only to fall in with
the outpests Of that position, they very found
themselves engaged with the whole hight wing Of
the Austrian army, with unmisiakable signs Of the
near presence Of its main body indeed, SO sudden
| ly and rapidly was it necessary for the divisions
stationed on the French left to be moved up
/ to the support Of the Sardinans that they were
near being so far separated from the centre as to
leave its flank expOsed,-a thing which would have
resulted and probably with fatal consequences had
not the Emperor himself thus early in the fight or
dered up the cavalry and artillery of the guard to
! fill up the vacancy The truth il, that the French
army was at this juneture ia the most imminent
danger; it was being outaanksd on beth right and
left and the continuity of its line broken st most
| Important point Let cndeavor now, before see
ing how they we're rescued from their peril to lock
at the strategy Of the earlier stages Of this battle
from an Austrian point of view: We cannot with
hold from their commanders the credit of wisely
planning the action; they had indeed every ground
for calculating upon success on grander scale than
that Of sny of their defeats; they not only had the
choice of ground and time and preparation, bu. they
must by this time have very considerably ounum-
berel the Frcnch,-in the various actions which had
taken place. though compelled to retreat their losses
had not been very much greater than those of the
French, snd these were vastly csunterbalanced by
the fact that as they retres,ed they called in the
garrisons Of the vast fortresses they successfully
abandoned, -Pavis, Piaceuz1, Milan, Como, Ber
gamo and Brescia, AncOns and Bologns,-so that as
they retreated their army was swelling, while that
of the French diminishing through the pseessi-
ty of establishing communications in their rear.
Superior therefore, in numbers their pirit
ed by fighting on their own ground, aud especially
with the advantage of surprise if they could
the Mincio without the knowledge of the French
(Which they evidently did, they lad decidedly the
chances in their favor of crushing that army before
which they had now been reLreatng for two months,
with continuous succession Of disasters, add as
far as we can see they would have done so but for
stratcg cal blunder their own part, and consum-
mate generalship on that Of the French Emperor.
Baron Hess is said to be great military tbeorst
rather than practical commander, and his conduct
of this battle to characteristic of the theo
rist the plan Of the attack was we'll arranged &C.
cordng TO the rules of military science, but tae de-
tails of that plan adhered TO after circumstance
hal become such that they ought TO have modified
the original idea. Knowing that they were con-
siderably superior in numbers, it a strictly or
thodox mode of attack to eudeavor to turn both
TANKS, and after having routed the wings of the
enemy close in upon his insulated centre with their
whole line of battle attacking in front and on both
TANKS at the same time. Such maueuvre sue
eessfully executed would have involved the total an
Inhalation of the French army.
Why was it not done! A theorist is always a man
of idea, aud apparently Hess could get nothing
into his head but his operations the TANKS Of the
French These were successful on both sides.
On the left of the allies, Sardinia, with BARA-
QUAY D'HILLIERs was unable to form his shattered
forces in line, and the French right, under CANRoB-
EaT, slowly yielding, and it only needed that
the Austriaus should stand stand firm until these
two successes of their wings we're complete to in
sure the full success Of the msneuYre. - When
Hess, order to follow up his attack upon the two
hanks, detailed large reiuforements from his centre
to these points, the Austrian centre already
gagged in equal conflict with the corps d'armee of
MCMAHON and NEIL, aided by the artillery and in
fsniry of the Guard, under NAPoLEOS himself, fits |
cavalry having been sent to the support of the right
wing). This weakening of the Austrian centre was
the fatal movement of the day, the splendid artil-
lery Of the French tore Up its thinned ranks, and
the Zouaves then charged through its liue compl 20
ly breaking the Austrian army in two Hal the
French Emperor been also q man of theory and
routine he also would have detailed forces from his
centre TO support his broken wings; but with the
coup d'oeI of q NAPLEoS he saw that the fortune of
the day past restoring there, and that the only
safety in flashing his success where success was
possible, and the broken centre of the A1slrians
was proof that he hal not calculated wroug-the
Ausriaus were compelled to retreat at the moment
their victory seemed complete.
The losses on both sides must have been under
stated-half million troops could not have been
engaged in 50 furious a conflict for sixteen hours
with aggregate loss Of not more than between
80 and 40 00O But with the Ausrians much more
than numbers have been To- THE last hope of their
being match for the French in the field is de-
stroyed, and the French army has achieved a VIC
tory against odds never surpassed by the Graads
Armec of the first NAPOLEON, and the Emperor him
self has already heprssige attached to his personal
eput ltion that his great predecessor acquired only
by years CT uninterrupted success.
But failing in the open field, is their success like
ly TO be greater in their defensive position?
The success of RADETsKY in 1882 in holding !
this position against the Sardinians till he could
Issue from it and with the aid of The Russians re-
conquer Lcmbardy, grested from Austria the year
BEFORE furnish but little grounds Of hope of this.
The circumstances are vastly different from what 1
they were ten years ago.
The ssrdinians we're then without allies, the Aus
rians had the alliance Of Russia; now the Aus
rians have no allies, and the Sardinians have the
alliance Of France. The Sardinisns then had no
navy; the Austrisns had their western ports pro-
ectsd by powerful marine; the Austrian
lavy hOrS de combat and the Sardinians supper