Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1859-07-22

AAshi EAeE-kae crest irlsn NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
dinary Bodily Manifestation.
FOURrH PAcE-RecsptiOn Of KOssuth in Italy.
, The War---ProbabIe EKesults OG NegotIa-
tfon.
The Austrians having attsiaed their defensive
position, the progress Of military events must neces-
sarily be slower than hitherto, and time win be
given for the dlplsuatists Of Europe to practice the
mysteries OF their craft ard psrhaps there is
better opportunity of doing co. with peace fer re-
suit Of their lsbors, than ct any time since the war
has begur-oertainiy better than is likely to occur
ogaiu for long time if the present opportunity be
. lost.
For VIC sTs convinced that there is at this lime
not one Of the crest powers Of Europe, bsligereut
otherwise, winch does desire peace, provided
it can be procured without the sacrifice Of honor
not even the victorious Emperor Of the French
We have shown already bow the contingencies Of
powers. inyOlyinz themselves in the Struggle,
Pehasd upon acclaim Of probabilities, which might
be determiHsd one way or another By the forces
Drought to besr on any one Of its links How Ger
Nssy, with Prussia at its head, might espouse the
side Of Austria, provided England would join them,
~Bd how Influences we're brought 10 bear even apart
from the English alliance; Row, under these cir
cumstances Russia would join with France, snd SO
restore The bslanee expanding enormously the scale
upon which the war was to be conducted Then
ems calculations were mainly what we're the mo-
Is which EO1ld lead the powers Of Europe TO take
s in the war; now We believe that a mere prsc-
subject fer consideration, is the motives which
likely to dic,sts to each pacific policy.
ye mad written thus far when the telegraphic
.ouncements (see our Geographic column) of an
srmistice, TO las. till The 18th of August, was re-
ceived.
An attempt at apr rate, then, is to be made at
establishing peace Let US consider what are The
circumstances which are liable to influence each Of
.Sa great powers in favor OF peace.
htnd first, LOUIS NAPoLEoK. If any one were TO
DO Supposed favorable to the continuance of war it
Would be the French Emperor. But, even The bril-
liant success OF The Italian campaign to the oentru
~ noiwthstSnag, peacs would now, we conceive,
come most opportanely FOR him. If t1e war were
to closeat this time he would come cut Of it with
a brilliant prestige, both military and pOlitical;-
he would have achieved truly Nspoeooio success
10 q military point Of view, and By Hbersiing LON
hardy If no. the whole Of Northern Italy from the
Austrian rule, he Kovld have ingraiated himself
with toe liberal cause throughout Europe and thus
have gained moral influence in his favor which he
above all men knows how to appreciate, for NAPo-
LEON III. adds to the sagsoity of NAPOLEoE l. en-
experience acquired by years of exile in England
and America. In France alone suoh an influence
would completely neulrsIizs the strongest opposi-
ton elements, viz: the known hostility CT the re
publican element in that political ealirOn to the
Imperial throne. 1t is true that in proonga'iOn
of warfare on 6 magnfed scale there are brilliant
prizes but also crushing disasters among the pos
sible results powerful alliances are now offered
him,-more powerful perhaps than those rendered
10 his foes,-but the experience of his great uncle
tells him how soOn close alliances may be convert
ed into deadly hostility. Then again he would
come ont Of the strife WITH the cordial friendship
instead Of the inveterate eumity Of Euglsnd,-a
Friendship which the policy Of lis whole reign has
shown bin we'll able to appreciate.
sill more must the EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA ne'd
pepcs. The defeats of mis- army in the field oonst
tute the smallest part of his inducements thereunto.
Not only arc his forces defeated and demorslized,
his reputeily inpregnsble fOriressos already sl-
most surrounded by forces who to their cannon
without will add the alliance of starvation and
laria within,-not only his treasury bankrupt his
anticipated allies distant aud reserved, but disaster
has revealed 10 him all The rottenness of that i'm
peria administration so imposing at distance, but
slapped and corrode1 TO the core By peeuaton and
official infielity-and as iftais were not enough
that very army, upon which he has relied to set
right ell other troubles, exhibits corruption and
dislffectioa as well as incOmpetency ami despond-
cy throughout lis ranks Italian soldiers deserving
in companies, whole battslions Of HuGgariaps in
mutany native Ausiriars intimidated and dispirit-
ed their officers tearing the penOAs from their Ian
ces with vexation. OF truth Austria would do
well to accept peace at the cost Of her whole Italian
possessions.
Prussia, Of all the acknowledgement powers has
the greatest reason to desire peace. In truth the
position Of It's prince has since the change Of
administration, grown more and more embarrassing
We have already explained his position so far as this
that the humiliation Of Austria, TO certain extent
would not be deemed adverse TO his interests, new
ertheess he deprecated the complete Of the
French sufficiently 10 incline him TO side with Aus
iris. if he saw that power pressed upon too hard;
he was probably induced to promise his aid. there
fore under certain contingencies, encouraged to do
10 hv the assurance that he should have the ALI
auce Of England. Since that time the contingen-
ciss have arrived but administration has come
int, power in England and the English alliance is
homeless while Russian alliance with France is cer-
Gin lie has 10 temporiss, therefore, with all par
ties the German army including the Prussian forces
ara modified, bat he assures both England and
France that this is the of the commissioners at
Frankfort notof the Prussian cabinet. Vast forces
approach the Rhine and the Russian frontiers bat
der the assurance from Prussia that the arrange
neut is purely defensive regards both France aud
Russia. action and inaction are both imperatively
forbidden tae one by Interest, the other by honor
and the only solution t. his difficulties, which is 81
once safe and honorable, is the speedy establish
ment Of peace.
England, at present stands out unembarrassed or
her basis Of armed neutrality, but this neutrality
would under continuance Of hostilities become
more and more difficult TO maintain The people fol
whose destnies Lord PALNERsToN is a. present re-
aropsible. abhor the Austrian oppression Of Italy
At tAey are also suspicious Of NAPOLEON, and tbey
hold their Minis err = rigorous accoun,-ihoy wouiC
be equally blamed if Ialy we're again to become sub
ieot to Austrian mis-rule, or If NAPOLEON we're t
become too strong: peace made new would at thu
least give some show Of deiversnce to Italy, vhisi