The Washington union. [volume] (City of Washington [D.C.]) 1857-1859, 1859-01-04

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work not only of great national utility in CONNER
cial and business point of view, but Of absolute
eessity connected with the immediate operations
Of the government.
1t has been demonstrated that s. stem Of ma
tonal defences for the United States can be either
complete or efficient without a railroad to the Pa
chc. No other of communication will secure
the necessary celebrity in the transportation Of sup
plies and munitions of war. Moreover, the exist
ence of such work is great security against
We have already incurred expense and liability in
the suppression Of instruction in Utah and Indian
depredations in Oregon and Washington Territories
sufficient in amount to construct railroad to the
Pacific. Had this work been commenced seven years
ago, as il should have been, such would have been
the influx of American settlers and rifles into that
region, that these conflicts never would have oc-
curredthus saving both treasure and loss of human
life
1t is obvious that the theatre of another war on
land between this country and any power possessing
sufficient navy to embark in it would be transferred
to the shores of the Pacific There many
sderations to produce such result The main re-
gion between the coast range and the ocean, from
San Diego to Puget Sound, distance of fif
teen hundred miles in length and averaging least
one hundred miles in depth is a rich agricultural
district Astounding in supplies and tempting booty.
East of this tract of country mountains abound
ing in gold fields and rich mines for nearly the whole
distance. 1t would be easy for an enemy to effect
landing at several of the fine harbors on this coast
now comparatively unforti6ed. Once in possession
of the country it would be very difficult to disodge
| them BY seizing the mines, and especially on
the extensive quartz mills already in operation, and
in the process of erection England France would
derive from the mines revenue sufficient to defray
the cost of the war. In the time, the isthmus
routes would all be closed, and every port on the
Pacific not in the actual possession of the enemy in
a state of blockade.
| Nor would movement of this sort be limited to
our own possessions on the Pacific. Either with
without the appreciation Of the Mexican government,
it would embrace in its operations all the northern
States of Mexico and the ports in Lower California
I'd Sonora. 1t cannot be disguised that the whole
Pacific coast is at this moment most tempting prize
| to any powerful and ambitious ruler.
| At present this government has no adequate means
of defending its Pacific possessions. With the
sthmus closed aud its ports on the Atlantic
and Pacific blockaded, it would have no way
of relieving California and Oregon except by a
| long, tedious, and expensive overland march
The difficulties attending such movement are
properly appreciated and have often been alluded
| to by the officers of the army. 1t would be all
after leaving the Rio Grande ,sg f,r,a 81
/
c'eh' % s'ssi.l ssil Considerable army 1t would
po . n''' - nsIrx months to encounter enemy al
toa, xuyIirenched, amply supplied and in full pos
|, session of the country Mr. Secretary Davis, while
at the head of the War Office in his report upon this
subject, said most pertinently and ably:
In the FIRST years of with any great maritime
mower the communication by could not be relied up
on for the transportation of supplies from the Atlantic to
the states Our naval peace establishment would not
furnish adequate conveys for the number OF storeshIps
which it would be necessary to employ and storesh'ps
alone laden with supplies could not undertake voyage
Of 20 600 miles, passing neutral ports, where
an enemys armed vessels of the smallest size, might
! lie in wait to intercept them
1 The only line Of communication, then, would be
oveand and by this it would be impracticable, with
any means heretofore used, to furnish the amount osup
plies required for the defence OF the Pacific frontier AT
the prices over the best part OF this route the ex
nense of land transportation alone for the annual sup
nes of provisions clothing, camp equipage, and anmu
nton for such an army it would be necessary to main
tain there would exceed $40, 900, 600 and TO maintain
troops and carry defensive operations under those CIR
cumstances che expense per man would be SIX umes
Greater than it is now the land transportation of each
field FOUNDER with due supply of ammunition for
one wear would cost So 500 Of each twenty four poun
der and ammunition SO 900 and of the sea coast gun
and ammunition $l2, 900. The transportation OF ann
,nunition for wear for one thousand seacoast guns
would cost $40 900 900 But the expense OF transporta
on would be vastly increased by and at the rates
that were paid on the northern frontier during the last
war with Great Britain the above estimates would be tre
Mod The time required for the overland journey would
Inc from four six months. In point OF fact however
supplies for such army could not be transported across
M ontiaent On arid and barren belts to be crossed
M limited quantities of water and grass would be
xbansed by the numerous draught animals required for
heavy trains and such distances forage could not DC
carried for sheir subsistence,
Every statesman must be impressed with the fact
bat from the exposed and isolated situation OF Cali
fornia Oregon and Washington, they are exposed to
constant danger from the policy and ambition OF the
1 British government and have, therefore, the right
to demand adequate means of defence. This moth
inc can effect so cheaply and with such efficiency as
railroad over which large bodies OF troops can be
moved with rapidity.
II will occur readily to every statesman that the
Pacific region is separated from the rest OF the
Union by ahajns of mountains and arid deserts, and
. without any very srong identity of interests with
| es.- ,fa 10 atmo