The weekly Mississippian. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1859-1864, 1859-08-24
The territorial Question.

The only class of directors to the doctrine |
Of the right of the Stakeholder to the protec-
ton of his property in the territories. by Com
aress, of whom it is worth while to take notice,
are those who admit his right to. enter With
his slaves the common domain, but cohtend
that, thereafter, the security of his property is
dependent upon the will of the Territorial
Legislature. Such position we understand to
beluiasually held by all who deny to Congress
the power to legislate upon the subject. The
right of appeal from the Territorial to the Su-
preme Court becomes mockery when Con,
gress is forbidden to enforce the Judgment of
| the latter tribunal. Every candid man must adj
NIT that. under such circumstances the exc
cution of the territorial law viii not be OBJ
structed. The position above stated involves
an absurdity which a little reflection will de-
tect. @Right and obligation are reciprocal
says DR.. Paley. Hehere enunciates an axiom
which is applicable alike to morals and to ev
cry system of consistent legislation. If one
man has an admitted moral or legal right, ev-
cry other man is under a moral or legal obi
cation to abstain from interference Herewith.
If one has right to the hat or clothes he wears,
no one else can rigltfuly take them from him.
Under our Federal Constitution, citizeno
the United States has right to the free exer
else Of his religious faith. 1t would be pal
pable absurdity to hold that a right existed
elsewhere to control or restrain him therein.
Not to multiply illustrations, therefore, the
q6s1aance of right, is necessarily, the mega
ton of right to obstruct or modest its enjoy
ment. To assert, then, that the Shareholder
can enter the common domain with his slave
property and there enjoy it, is to deny to the
| territorial legislature or any other power the
right of hindrance either by direct or indirect
| legislation, and ecORUers0. The ttCo rights
cannot co exist either in logic or in practice.
There is another fact in this connection which
applies 10 legal and not to moral rights, to-wit:
the duty which government assumes to pro-
tect its citizens in the enjoyment of the FORM
en- When we enter the social compact We
necessarily, surrender portion of our rights
to the governing power. Protection to the re-
mainder by the collective force of the whole
society is the consideration for this transfer.
| Now, but for the existence OF our present Gov
eminent each State would be entitled to its
proportion of the public domain. Mississippi
would have her portion and could regulate its
internal affairs as she pleased-eould colOnize
it with slaves and hang every free-soiler with
in its limits. In eonsenting to the federal
compact she parted with her authority over
| the public domain and transferredit to Con-
gress upon the condition, necessarily, that
Congress 4coad protect her citizens an the en-
joynaent Of any portion Of Il NTH their property.
To do this, therefore. there is a binding obi
CATION upon Congress- obligation which it
cannot discharge, but by fulilmentand which
to neglect would make the government, guoad
hoe, a despotism. This view of the matter, il
correct, is an answer to the position held by
some, that Congress cannot exercise this pow
| er in behalf of slave property, because, in the
Kansas Nebraska act, it transferred all its al-
thorty over this subject to the territorial leg
stature. Congress cannot so easily emanci-
pate itself from q constitutional duty That
duty we have said was to protect the slave
holder in his rights in the territories ; an act
| therefore, which assigns to another body moi
only the power to protect, but the power to
modest and destroy those rights, assigns pow
er which Congress never had, and is clearly
unconstitutional. This assumes, what We
deny, that the construction of the Kansas Ne.
braska act, above referred to, is correct.
/ But it is said that, if we admit the right O
protection by Congress, we must also admit
the cognate right of prohibition. That if Con
gress can protect Slavery, it can, likewise, abol
ish it. Letus generalize this idea Whenev.
er power is given for certain purpose, can il
be legitimately exerted for any other purpose
If You appoint an agent to sell your house, may
he set fire to it !? II a man appoints an ex-
a ecutor to take charge OF his estate, may the
latter waste it? fla railroad company places
an engineer in charge of train with the in
| junction that he conduct it safely to given
destination, is he authorize to run off the
track and kill all the passengers? And so il
number ofmen form a,political community
and vest the general authority in certain
body for the better protection of the rights Of
each, and for promoting the general welfare
and security, can that government rightfully go
II
to work to trampleion those rights as. make
slaves of its subjects The proposition is too
monstrous to be seriously argued. It will
not abide the test of analysis 1t is satisfac-
torily answered when we say that the end and
function Of government is to protect and 20,
to destroy property. s9
| We affirm, therefore, that it is. the duty o
Congress, for the security of the STAKEHOLDER
| in the territories, to pass laws for the protec.
ton of his rights. The decree of the Court
| iS Ia ry-nn and worthless &c not axacIftad