The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1859-08-23

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rSx u.A4 ~ Wellington and the Bassae 81
s-~aaess waterloo.
yssA auyht probably TO make An SpoIoQ 20
a., rearsers for Introducing suh5set 20 OLD
MA - often discussed - that which II indi-
..,e.a nv the caption Of this article. We oasr
"a in the words Of the Edinburgh Rssisr,
whose STRUCTURES upon the life Of WKLLixe-
TON. BY Captain DnIALxrSr, we are MOTTO
ing. ~Neariy every other controversy" says
the Rsrisxe, swith regard 70 tbs campaigns OF
that arr. has been settled. But the Waterloo
arpaisn remains almost a. active problem
a. waen II ApoLnoS was debating TO his Gen.
erals at Lonxwood.n It is, indeed, and IL will
Id ali probAbiiity continue TO be, subject OF
dtspate. INIT, somc great General shall arise
who shall absorb the attention Of the worid
~ entirely rs NAPOLEON did In MS asJ JUS
n ~. learn from JsvESAL that In his iiihc'
the question whether HANNIBAL oasn' "
{ hnve marched upon Rome after the battle OF
Sns discussion, In the schools OF ROME '"iee
hundred years after the event
I, has been said that the allied armies ought
NOT TO have hazarded q battlein front OF brus-
sells. that their forces were scattered over 700
large a space of ground al the commencement
of the campaign; that they thus ohered 70 tue
French General an opportunity to attack them
before they could unite; that the ground o'
ST. -, q
Waterloo having the forest OF Soignies IN i'S
rear was badly chosen, &c 10 these pp9ee"
tons tho Recise opposes the reply Oh inc Duhe
81 Wellington himself, who in certain
memorandum alluded to by the her's~' sayS
this. the alternative to such battle was the
surrender Of the line, that he was ooiig-
sd to watch five roads by which NAPOLEON
nigh, advance under cover of his fortresses
q. on the from tier, and that his environments
war; sufflciently near TO allow of his bringing
a force upon Quatre Bras SUFFICIENT to check
the enemy. &e. A brief glance at the events of
the arst two days OF the campaign, Will, we
think, dispose Of these answers.
The combined forces Of WELLINGTON and
BLucHxR numbered $4,000. They were the
advanced guard Of /, 100, 900 men who were ad-
vancing upon France from Russia, from Swe-
den, from Austria, from Prussia, from all
Y,
policy Of this mighty army TO avoid all partial
Actions, and to take care that no operation OF
consequence should be undertaken unless b,
an overwhelming force. II was as clearly tbe
policy Of NAPOLEON to bring ON such actiots,
and especially TO overwhelm the advabced
guard, which the armies of WELLINoroy and
BLucHnR were before the arrival of THIN
body. The destruction of these two armies
ha nf ,irTS
England, and change Of ministry would have
disconnected all the projects Of the Allies, who
would thus have found themselves deserted by
that one Of their number who bore al the ex-
pensss Of their enormous armamens. They
would have been compelled to fall back and
relinquirh q certain victory. 1t was, there
fore. the policy Of WELLINGTON and HLUCHER
TO avoid general action, since it. put a GER
tainty to hazard, aAd they could only have
avoided il by falling hack behind Brussels, at
least as early AZ the 18th May, and strengthen
ing themselves with the thirty thousand
troops that Were arriving from America
1t seems certain that NAPOLEON would not
have attacked them in that position, and in
the meantime IL he advanced into Belgium at
ALL he would have been compelled, in a very
short time, to hasten back to Paris. in order to
defend his own capital; for three hundred
thousand Of the invading army were already
within three weeks march Of the Rhine. The
apology that such a movement would have
amounted to an abandonment Of tlia coast
line, is not tenable. 1he ba.e of tho Date of
Wellington's operati ems was Antwerp, and
he would have still had that city so complete
ly In his rear, that the French could not have
reached it without marching through his
army II his enemy attempted to cut him off
from the coast lying south of Antwerp, he
would not only have presented him his flank
as MAHMoNT had done at Salamanca, and
thereby ensured his own defeat, but even if
he had been successful, he would have
pressed him upon the Prussians, there
by rallying the whole allied army, and
leaving their communications open, with the
advancing hosts of Prussians, Bavarans,
Swedes and Germans, who were fastening to
the Rhine. WELLINGTON thought it n matter
of great importance to avoid the moral conse-
Quences that would have resulted from sur
rendering SO large portion of the territory
settled by the treaty Of Vienna. When it is
considered that the surrender would only
have been temporary, and would have been
followed, in a few weeks, by a re-occupation
more formidable than ever, because it would
not have been again disputed this argument
falla to the ground. The moral effect Is al-
ways against General when he retreats but
when the retreat is to cover movement that
must result in victory, no good General ever
hesitates to make it. WELLINGTON did not
hesitate to give up four-fifths of Portugal,
when he withdrew his army within the lines
of Torres Vedras. Sir WALTER SCorT's apo
logy for the failure to concentrate the two ar
mics behind Brussels--viz; that they could
not subsist in q country which had supported
MARLBOROUGH and EUGENE with 10000 men
q century before, for years-is SO ridiculous
that nobody has repeated it, The very fact
mentioned by the Reviewer, as an apology for
tho scattered condition of the allied forces
when the campaign opened-viz: that they
had five roads TO guards proof sufficient that
they ought to have retired behind Brussels, in
which city all these roads conyerged.
Let 1t be admitted, however, that the Allies
were right in their determination to accept |
hattie in front of Brussels. The Reviewer tells |
Us that WELLINGTON had every right to think
he should DO able to concentrate $50, 900 men on |
QuAtre Bras and Ligny on the 10th June
We think 1t will not be difficult to prove that |
this calculation was based upon false princi- |
pies.
Z The army Of BLUCHER, consisting Of 1000 |
Prussans and Sexons, was divided into four |
corps, Of nearly equal strength, and was dis |
perssd over an extent Of thirty French leagues, |
or between eighty and ninety miles, forming |
. eemi-circle, or figure nearly approaching a |
ssini.crcle. The advanced corps was At Ligny, |
three miles from Quatre Bras, another was at |
Namar, another between Namur and Liege,
and fourth at Liege itself The Anglo
Dutch army was cautioned over an extent of |