Democrat and sentinel. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1853-1866, 1858-01-27
EBENsBURG, JANUARY 27, 1853.

T., l
was never intended to give a legal control over
the proceedings of the Represen tatives of the |
people in the Enactment of laws It is, there |
fore a right of communication with them, |
which, while prudenly and reasonably exer-
cised, can give no just occasion for Jealousy
objection or complaint. The Executive, when
exercising this right, is but performing plain
duty, and cansapprehend no difficulty in spea-
king with respectful freedom even upon
questions where an entire agreement of senti-
ment cannot ae expected. But there is an
other and mare delicate power which pertains
TO to4teaTelis<fdsss sss Between the Legislative and
Executive departments. BY the twenty-third
and twenty fourth sections Of the first article
of the Constitution, ali bills passed by the
General Assembly, and most Of the orders,
resolutions and votes in which they may con-
cur, are submitted to the Executive, and if
disapproyed by him can only be made valid
by a vote of two-thirds of each House. This
power of disapproval is among the most i'm
portant duties of the Executive, and is con-
stantly becoming more so, from the operation
of obvious and natural causes. La my opin-
ion it is the clear and binding duty of the'ex-
ecutive TO return for reconsideration every
| bill, order: resolution or vote, presented to
him which he cannot approve-in other words
shall be actually given to any measure before
he permits it to go into effect; unless, in
deed, it be passed against his objection by q
two thirds vote. The words of the Constitu-
ton are ''if he approve he shall sign at, but
if he shall not approve. he shall return at with
his objections to the House in which it shall
! have originated Words could not convey
power and prescribe duty in q more clear
| and definite form.
1t is manifestly the intention of the Consti-
tuition that the deliberate and conscientious
approval of the Governor shall be given to a
bill before it becomes law, in addition to the
approval of the two Houses that have previ-
ousy passed it unless the majorities after
wards given to it upon reconsideration in each
House, shall be so decisive as to clearly in
dlcate the wisdom of the measure. 1t is true
that upon things trivial or indifferent, where
no great interests are involved. nor constitu-
tional princi pies in question, nor private
rights assailed. consideration of expedlency
may be taken into account by the Executive;
but certainly no substantial objection. wheth-
er of policy or of principle, can be waived by
him in view of his oath to support the Con-
stitution. Ten days Sundays excluded) are
allowed the Executive to consider bill, and
to approve or veto it, after which it will be.
|
viously returned. The practice of my prede
cessors has been occasionally to permit bills
to become laws by this limitation of time
They have taken effect in the entire absence
of Executive action. But [ believe this ha!
only occurred where the Executive has fount
it impossible to form positive opinion upoI
the Ineasure-where, though not oblectiona
bic, it was trivial-Cr, where it was manites
that !. veto would not cause its defeat. Thi!
Executive practice ought not to be extended
and the practice itself is open to question -
For if the provision that bills neither signeC
nor returned within ten days, shall become
laws, was intended as guard against Exec
utive abuse, in holding them an undue perioC
and not as a mode by which the Executive
might cause them to take effect, it would seen
clear that the practice of holding them owe
for such purpose cannot be defended.
, But the Legislature by its adjournmen
, within ten days after the passage of a bill
may deprive the Executive of due time TO
considering it, and hence it is provided tha
in such ase it shall become law unless sen
! back within three days after the next meet
, ing. In modern practice a large number O
bills are usually sent to the Governor within
a few days of the adjournmentof of the Legisla
: ture, which it is impossible for him to consid
, In fact many are sent to him in the very clio
= sing hours Of the session, But it would seer
i plain that the Executive could reasonbly as
e in such case only the full constitutional perio
E of ten days for forming his opinion, and thu
: all bills he believes it his duty to apptoy
shall be actually signed within that period
/ BY the exercise of reasonable industry thu
i can in all cases be accomplished. Then, sue
: bills as he disapproves will be held over to
g returned to the proper branch of the Gener;
: Assembly within three days after their ne2
meeting, according to the constitutional pr'
e vision. This will properly dispose OF all bill
It in his hands al the adjournment,- unless II
= deed it be allowable to hold over bills ar
J. permit them to become laws without his a
IF ton.
: The propriety of signing bills by the Go
l. ernor between the sessions of the Legisl atu
;, has been questioned 1t does not accord VII
Is the old practice, and is certainly liable
is abuse During my term it will be strict
l. confined to the first ten days after an adjour
of ment, and all bills not then approved, IN;
r be considered as awaiting the next meetil
le of the General Assembly, to be returned wi
< the Executive disapproval, The Executi
ID should not be subjected for long periods
D. time to the solicitations of those interested
of bills, nor should he be subject to the lmput
tions of indccision, or favoritism almost un
m voidable in such cases Nor is it right th
ly he should have in his hands the means of i
th fuence which the holding open of his dec
ch ion upon bills during recess would conf
u Besides, a great wrong may be done to tht
ng interested in legislations by continuing th'
ds for an undue period in uncertainty as to t
he fate of bills in which their rights, their pre-
er erty, or their business may be involved. Th'
"a are evils which an Executive may obyia
of by settling his policy firmly in the outset
g his administration. II would be well, a.