The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1858-08-22

! An Intsregt1me Hlstoxlcal d umsnt.
| DEFENCE OF WASHINGTON AND ORsG0 TERRrrORJBs.
| In view of the interest attached to our distant
territories ON the Pacific, as well from the gold dis
coveres there and ON Fraser river as from the hos
tiity of the Indians the following suggestions for the
military defence of those regions made thirty four
| years since by Quartermaster General Jessup to
the father of the present Secretary of War, then
member Of the House Of Representative cannot fail
| to be interesting
WASHINGTON CRY, April 7, 1924.
( Hon. JOHN FLOYD, House of Representatives.
SIR-In reply to your letter, dated the 30th ultmo,
I requesting me to communicate "any facts, views or
| opinions which may have presented themselves TO
me- relative to the probable difficulty OF making an
establishment at the mouth of Columbia river, and
| the military advantages of that establishment"
have the honor to remark that ever since my atten
tcn was first directed 10 the subject have considered
| the possession and the military command of the
Columbia necessary, not only to the protection of
the fur trade, but to the security OF our western
frontier. That flank Of our country extending from
| the lakes to the Gulf Of Mexico s everywhere 10
| contact with numerous, powerful and warlike In
dian nations who altogether might be able to briog
| into the field from twenty to thirty thousand war
rors Most of those nations communicate either
| with the British to the north and west, the Spa
niards to the south. In the event Of tnat force
with few hundred foreign troops, or under the in
/
| formidable to us than any force which Europe con-
bined could oppose to u.s. On the other nand, If
such measures be adopted as to secure proper inhu
| encc over them, and, in the event of war, TO COM
mand their cooperation, they, with the aid o. few
| small garrisons, would not only afford ample pro-
lection for that entire line, but would become the
| scourge of our enemies.
| The dangers to be apprehended can only be avert
ed by proper military establishments; and, whether
the post at the mouth of Columbia be intended to
secure our territory protect our traders. or To cut of
all communication between she Indians and foreign
ers, should consider line Of posts extending from
the Council Bluffs entirely across the continent
| cessary. Those posts should be situated as well
with view to command the avenues through which
| the Indians pass from north to SOUTH as to keep
open the communication with the establishment at
| the mouth Of the Columbia.
post should be established at the Maudan
| villages, because there the Missouri approaches
within short distance of the British terri
| tory, and it would have the effect of holding
| in check the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Conpa
Mrs, and of controlling the Rckarecs, MaIdans
| Minnetarees, Assnneboins and other Indians, who
either reside range the territory east north aud
west Of that point.
A post at or near the head of navigation on the
Missouri would control the Blackfoot Indians, pro
tect traders, enable us 70 remove the British
companies from our territory and serve depot
| at which attachments moving towards the Columbia
might either be supplied, or leave such stores as
| they should find il difficult TO carry with them
| through the mountains. IL might also be made
| depot OF trade and Of the Indian Department.
10 keep open the communication through The
mountains there should be at least one small post at
some convenient point between the Missouri and the
Columbia and the latter river and its tributaries
| there should be at least three posts. They would
afford present protection to traders and on the
expiration of the privilege granted to British sub
jects 10 trade on the waters Of the Columbia, would
enable to them from our territory, aad to
secure the whole trade 10 our yn citizens. They
would also enable us to preserve peace among the
Indians and in the event Of foreign war TO CON-
mapd their neutrality or their assistance, as we
might thing most advisable. The posts desig
mated might be established and maintained at
an additional annual expense not exceeding
forty thousand dollars. by extending to these
posts the system Of cultivation now in opera
ton at the Council Bluffs the expense Of supplying
them would in u few years he greatly diminished.
Ills might ne erected at all the posts a. tcing
expense. aud the whole couutry abjundipg in grass,
all the domestic ANIMALS necessary either for labor
or Subsistence nigbs he supported This would
| render the establishments m,re secure, and conse
| uuenrly more formidable to the Indian nations in
| their vicinity.
As 10 thu proposed posts on the Columbia, IL
is believed they might be supplied iame-
| dat.ly 1t low rate. Wheai may bs OBJ
| tanned ct New California NJ ABOUT twenty-five
| cents per busbel, aud beef cattle at three
or four dullirs each. Salt in any quantity
required may be had island near the Peninsula
| Of California Should transportation not be readily
obtained those attic vessels might he construct
| ed by the troops
To obtain the desired advantages II is important,
that we commence our operations without delay.
| The British companies are wealthy aud powerful;
| their Establishments extend from Huds,ns Bay and
Lake Superior to the Pacific, many of them within
our territory. IL is not 10 be supposed that they
| would surrender those advantages wlinOat a strIg
gle; and, though they should not engage N hlstii-
ties themselves they might render all the Indians IN
| that extensive region hostile.
| The detachment intended to occupy the mouth Of
the Columbia might leave the Council Bluffs ia June,
and one hundred and fifty men proceed With the
beats and stores, and, as the country u open and
abounds in grass, the remaining fifty might proceed
by land with the horses intended Tor the trans9orta
tion across the mountains and might drive three or
-four hundred beeves to the Mandan Villages, or % the
falls of the Missouri At one of those places the par
| ties should unite and spend the winter The latter
| would be preferable, because there they might be
| able TO establish friendly intercourse with the
Blackfoot Indians or at all events, by impressinQ
| them with an idea Of the power Of the nation re-
| strain their depredotioDs upon the neighboring
tribes aud deter them from acts OF outrage upon
traders They might also, during the winter, recon
noitre the several passes through the mountains,
prepare the provisions necessary to support them
| on their march, aud down the Columbia, and If
thcrizcd 20 do 81, remove from our territory all
| British traders the waters Of the Missouri They
would necessarily remain at or IN the vicinity OF
their wintering ground until June, but might be oc-
cupied during the months OF April aud May in OPEN
ing road 70 the mountains and constructing bridges
| over the numerous streams on the route. This work
| performed, they might in about twenty days reach
/ the navigable waters Of Carks river q branch of
| the Columbia, and Ia ten days more prepare trans
portation 20 descend to their destina boil where
| after every necessary allowance f.. accidents and
delays-thcy would certainly arrive by the month OF
| August
The vessels employed 10 transport the stores by
sea might leave the United States in the month of
| November, and would arrive at the mouth of the
| Columbia in April-at least four months before the
detachment from the Council Bluffs could reach
| that point-and unless the ships should be detained
during that time, which could not be expected, the
| stores would be exposed 10 damage and depreda-
ton and, perhaps, by the time the troops should
| arrive. would ~ entirely destroyed. II would,
| therefore, seem to me a measure OF prudence that
| Mt least one company Of artillery be transported
with the stores. That description of force would be
| found necessary NJ the post and the ships would
| afford them ample accommodations.
| That the route from the Council Bluffs TO the
,nouth of ,,nin 40 h uracticable has bccu prove1