The Abbeville banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1847-1869, 1858-06-03
From Stedman's Magazine.
LOVE ENTHUSIASTICALLY CONSIDERED.
BY WILLIAM S. GRAYSOS.

lions; but 1t Is not their Office and province,
but that of the metaphysician to tell of its
origin and relation to the other atlec-
tions.
The first persons you happen to meet in
The circle of social life, will tell you some
of its effects and consequences in their own
experience, or as having occurred under
their observation but how few are there
who can trace the emotion 70 its fountain
head, classify and arrange it, and assign its
position among the other emotions.
Can the reader tell wherein the emotion
OF love of flowers differs from that of love
OF money, if he will withdraw from his
consideration the things loved, and exclu-
siycly consider the two emotions?
We regard the love Of n,wcrs rs very
gentle, very amiahle, very purified emo
ton ;-and we look upon the love of money
for its own sake, us coarse u,ror,ic;l and
degrading. But then, it will not do to say
that the love Of money for its own sake i,
not love at a!l-s not the emotion now be-
ing considered.
Every philosopher is under the necessity
OF saying, there may exist in the human
heart both good and bad iprc.
If this bc SO, then the bad love is as
truly love as good and commensurate
love.
We experience or entertain .rea, variety
OF loves-a great variety Of emotions of
affection for worldly or visible things, and
undoubtedly they differ among themselves,
but whence arises the difference? Is it in
trinsic or external! Does the difference.
tor example, between the love Of flowers
and the love Of money, take its o,iyi~ cx.
ternally,-that is to say. in the distinction
between flowers and money, or intrinsically,
that is to say, within the human heart?
If the reader will coninc his attention to
the passion Of love, ana consider it, separate
and apart from the worldly or visible things
towards which it is usually directed, he
will find it to be a very difficult one to dc
fine. lie will experience that difficulty
when he comes TO reduce his definition TO
specific language, so as to make it intcll
gible to other persons.
Speaking generally, we may be sail to
regard love rs Il strong and dominant af-
fiction; asympathctic tenderness warm
and decided preference for certain visible or
worldly, or certain invisible or heavenly
things.
But the very moment YOU bring into
consideration the Mi"gs 1,rfcrrel, the
things affected, the things sy,npa,hiscd
with, AMI consider them, and the character
which they impart to the affection, you
cease, pro tanto, to consider the afrec-
ton.
The question 10 be particularly consid
cred, is with respect to human emotion
AN emotion that arises in the human bo-
som; and the matter that is not to lie con.
sidered now, is the visible things with
respect to which the emotion is occa-
stoned.
Now, would regard love, as thus con-
sidercd, as the state or condition of the hu-
man will or volition.
Then the question arises, if love be the
state or condition Of my will, can
will to love, or not to love, as pleasel
In other words, is love the subject Of hu
man control?
In the first place, if cannot control my
own emotions, can they he controlled at
all?
And if I cannot control my own state
of affection, that affection must control
me.
If then, we suppose that our affections
have the mastery OF lis, free agency, or
freedom Of action must be destroyed in
that regard. If our freedom of action in
respect to our affections be destroyed, we
are not to be either ccnsurcd for improper
affections, or app:auded for worthy ones.
cannot, for myself, very well conceive
how one affection, Or if you please, one
attachment, can differ from another, unless
IN the particular Of tile strength or potency
ofsthe feeling, if we remove from considera-
tion the things beloved.
For example: My love for my dog, my
love of money, and my love of flowers, is
precisely the very same affection, except
that there may be difference in degree or
strength, il we withdraw from considera-
tion tue dog, the money and the flowers,
things that are external to me.
Let us examine this question more par.
ticularly.
In the first place, my affection is vol
untary.
Now, if my affection be voluntary, it
cannot be said to be caused. Hence, my
affection for my dog is not caused by tue
dog. My affection for money is not caused
by money. Itcannot be caused by anything
external to, or independent Of me, if I have