The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1858-02-21

We find in the London correspondence of the |
E,tado ministerial Journal of Madrid) the following
lipas:-
sident of the United States to The general Congress
If that nation, II document of such gigantic pro-
portions that requires very deep conviction OF the
ring to end had the misfortune to do in spite of
go many much more instructive and pleasant things to
psruse in the rich contemporaneous literature of this
country In the said big document, which to Others
contains very interesting things with regard to the
ouarreis in Kansas, the excuses Of the Mormons in
salt Lake City, and the mercantile system OF the
United States, found only one paragraph that
might tie considered as a compensation for the toll
some task of perusing II; and it is that which C.
Germs the actual state Of the relations bef ,N
Spain and the model republic. This pa ,Neeh
deserves the most serious consideration Of s,aappa
men for therein is summed up the VINO Tolicy Of
Mr. Buchanan the relations of the s,sr ,;,h ga"
are far from presenting satisfac ,s:sno Wv" TPar
are number of reclamation .,st,;ng which he
proposes to himself SCI. to settle n d. amicabIe manner,
country does not please bisa The trnp s;ar;Scation
Of all this is that TIE Cnsct States do not give up
ther lnqultous rojecrcf obtaining at any cost the
saa a. v land and in orderto be ever
ioehs hsa rs, they always keep open certain num-
I per Oh + .dculous questions of which to avail
tnemseN .es by giving them an undue Importance
soon Europe shall offer the wished for opportunity
| meat, Of this, unless the Spanish nation wishes
u, pass for the least patriotic and the
| most fmbecie in the world Sooner or
,, latera war between the United States and Spain
will be inevitable if do not take the utmost care
TO give our policy wholesome direction, proceed
ing at the same time with the highest prudence and
| the greatest energy and resolution. In order to
avoid that war, we, above all things must not rely
4 in the least on the assistance which France and
England may furnish for the preservation of our
| Island of Cuba, which is the true object Of the
struggle.
France alone with her best wishes for us Is unable
to give US, under the circumstances, any than
her sympathies. England, in consequence of her
mercantile interests, fears the United States, and
although she would below with rage seeing the
Island Of Cuba passing from possession into that
| of the United States, she would not burn a single
cartridge to prevent such contingency. This is
the truth, and We would be very simple, and would
deserve our misfortune, if we had INDUCED in any
illusion on this point. No, the preservation of the
| Island Of Cuba must be our work alone and exclu-
| sively, and from this time forward we must stand
| prepared for whatever eventualities may threaten
! our rights.
In the first place. in order to arrive at our end il
necessary to set aside the Mexican question and to
disregard the senseess provocations of those who by
ignorance or bad faith might wish to precpitate us
into disastrous war for which not prepared.
Comonfort is but an instrument in the hands of the
United States, and will do his utmost to engage to
declare war on him. No sooner will we be implicated
i'll those hostiites, than the busters of the United
! States, secretly aided by the government of the
Union, viii provide Mexico with whatever soldiers,
money or war ships she may be in need Of and under
| the Mexican flag they will fit out against Cuba pi-
ratical expeditions by the Dozen They will ask for
and obtain as many privateer commissions they
| may want, and seize our merchant ships where
soever they may find them And if that were not suf
fcent, the Anglo American government, profting by
our distressed circumstances, viii avail itself Of
of those pending questions, and joining Mexico de-
clare war on us. Whilst we would be prevented, by
sense Of honor, from acceding to their humiliatng
propositions they would make last effort to seize
hold of Cuba. Such would be the consequence Of
| war with Mexico To conceal il would he the same
as to put our intellect level with that Of the
| tricb which, whilst hiding his head in the sand of
the desert, believes that it is not by the hunt
| ers, because he does not see them himself.
In the second place, we must, by all possible
means, strengthen he ties which bind us TO Cuba;
and this may be attained by multiplying the means
Of communication and by increasing our commercial
relations by considerably reducing the duties on CO
lonial products.
In the third place il is necessary TO submit to all
possible sacrcesin order TO augment our naval forces
mot pretend that we should fit out squadron like
that we were in possession Of in the times Of Charles
III. for many reasons cannot develope here, do
not deem it convenient for US TO venture upon a
pitched battle at But j should wish TO
Spain in the possession of at least fifty screw
steamers OF different forces and OF fair number of
large frgates in the style of the Niagara destined
for cruising in the Mediterranean in the Sea of the
Antilles and in the Pacific Ocean, where they might
hDd support in the Philippine Islands, and Toe capa-
| Die On sweeping from the surface OF the ocean the
p 600 merchant ships Of the United States Of
| the groundworks Of their prosperity. Such a
| naval force would supply with a sufficient
| Number of privateers, recruited by our admra-
| bic mariners of Catalonia, the Baearic Islands
| and the coast of Cantabria. and in this manner
the haughtiness Of the United States would
| soon be considerably lessened. | should not wish
To see our men Of war engage in battle with theirs
save IN those cases where the honor of the national
flag would render II Indispensable; but should wish
| TO see them necessarily pursue and destroy their
maritime commerce, which TO them is the heel Of
Achilles intercept their steamers freightcd with the
gold OF California and seize the rich cargoes which
! proceed from the coasts Of China. This IL no iu.
sion. We are in possession Of means enough for
achieving this plan if we act with prudence activity
and energy, and If we know how TO preserve our
! domestic peace and how 70 develope all our re-
| sources. IL would very much advance this purpose
| five were 70 establish in the Archipelago OF the
! philippines three or four points wei chosen and
strongly fortified, from whence our privateers and
cruisers might start and where they might find per-
| feet shelter.
As regards the Island Of Cuba. the whole power
OF the United States would not be sufficient
Tor taking the Cabana and the Moro forts IL We are
| resolved 10 defend them; and I think that even
IN the open field, IN particular If we increase our
| cavalry-an arm in which the invaders cannot have
the preponderance-ou veterans will he able TO give
| The Yankees lesson by which they may learn
| the difference between the soldiers Of Castle and
| those enemies with whom till now they have mea-
sur'd swords. by these means, and perhaps by ex.
| Tending our system Of fertilization in Cuba and
| Puerto Rico, and above all by making the whole
world understand that we are prepared for the lat
sacrifices and even, should IL he necessary for arm
ing, m eIfreH's the negroes who hate the Yankees
SO that IL Cuba should be lost for US she should be
lost Tor everybody and thst what we 40 often re-
peated might be realized-that Cuba shah be either
span'sh or African, but never Anglo-American--w
shall be able 20 avoid that war for which we shat,
| be prepared. and we shall DC more respected than
we are today and permitted TO live In peace.
"
Army Intelligence.