New-York daily tribune., 1858-07-09
How 70 supply an army for India still continues

How 10 supply an army for India still continues
an anxious subject of discussion in tie British jour-
mails, ard We recommend their trlbulatons on this
score to the attention of those among US, of whom
we fear tie number is not small, az xious TO engage
the United States 10 q career of foreign conquest
and territorial extension. There is strong party,
with The London Times at its head, which strongly
urges an army for India composed entirely of
European toops. But the objections to this
course are numerous, and apparently decisive.
First comes the cost enhanced, in the case Of
European soldiers, not on'y by the excess of pay
but still more by the coat Of recruitment, OF pas
ssge TO India, of the different style Of barracks and
provisions required for Europeans, and above all
by their mortality When native soldier dies The
vacancy is filled, or used to be under the old sys-
TEN, without difficulty or expense. No bounty
was needed to obtain recruits, and the Government
may even be said to have been the gamer, by escap-
ing its liability to pension. On the other hand,
the replacing of every European soldier involves
ccst, at the smallest calculation, of not less than
$500.
But suppose the morey could be found to pay
them, whence are the men to come When the
vast extent of India is considered, it would be
impossible to think of getting on with less than a
hundred thousand Mon. Even in Algeria, compa-
ratively small as it is, and within q days sail of
France, the French maintain force Of seventy or
eighty thousand men. In Georgia, which Russia
considers an integral part Of her empire, though
oh iged to hold it by force, the army is not less.
But how is q force of hundred Thousand men,
especially considering the mortality to which it
would be subjected, to be maintained aud recruited
without exhausting the whole British material
available for military purposes and leaving the rest
Of the empire without any army at alll Great
were the straits 10 which Great Britain was reduced
even to the extent of attempting to eyade our neu
trality laws by picking up recruits in our American
cities, even by the small drain occasioned by the
late Russian war. To meet the drain of long
continental war, and at the same time to keep up
an Indian army composed exclusively of European
soldiers, would be out Of the question.
Besides, it does no! seem to be quite certain that
even such an army would afford an absolute secu-
rity against mutiny aud revolt. 1t would by no
means be impossible that tuch an army, instead Of
holding India for Eogland, might be made the in
strument by some bold commander-perhaps by
some ambitious Governor General-for establishing,
or attempting to establish, an independent empire.
Remote and improbable as such a contingency is,
it is not more so than the general mutiDy Of the
Bengal army would have been thought to be three
years ego.
But even if the men could be had, they would
not answer all the purposes for which an Indian
army is needed. The climate forbids that Euro
peans should do more than live with difficulty in
caLtonments, SO as to be ready in bodies for field
seryice, with heavy consumption of life when 80
employed. They cannot be disseminated all over
the country, nor held in small detached bodies.
They cannot do the work of soldiers or even Of
escort under ordinary circumstances. AT this
moment the commander in chief is obliged to
employ body Of Sikhs at bis headquarter camp
because they stand the sun better.
Thus driven ba:k to India for soldiers, it 10 i'm
possible not to recognize the fact that tho late Ben
gal Sepoy army was composed of the best materials
for that purpose which India affords. Physically
ard morally, the SepOys constituted superior class.
The Bengal Sepey was commonly small lsndholder
lsLdholder anxious to establish link connecting
him with the British Government. At least two
million Of landholders were thus brought, directly
or indirectly to feel a personal interest in the
permanency Of the British rule--a soft Of con-
nectlon with the native population difficult TO
be established through any other class Of
recruits. The native forces employed in sup
pressing the rebellion, ard which already
amount TO some 80, 900 meD, are mostly Sikhs from
the Purj jaub. But though brave and wsslike, there
are great objections to employing them. Unlike
the late Bengal Sepoys, they are notoriOusly turbu
lent, druLkards on sysxm, and cebauctees Of the
erossest description. They are doubtless ffeer
from religious prejudces than the other Hndoos,
Jet they too are easily capable Of beirg wrought up
to high pitch Of religious ENTHUSIASM. Besides,
TO compose an army exclusively Of them would be
to repeat the great fault Of the army just lost by
revolt, which consisted quite as much in identity of
LEGAL origin as in identity Of caste. Already, In
deed, rumOrs come from India tha, these Sikbs
begin to take on airs though the British owed India
to them. The favorite idea in England just now is
in favor Of an army Of men Of lew caste or no
caste. TIE notion is generally received that had
tie Bengal army been composed Of men of low
caste, there would have been no revolt High
caste is assumed to mesa bisotry and fanaticism,
and low cate to imply comparative indaer-
eItsm and freedom from religious prejudice.
1t is asserted, however, BY persons vel! acquainted
with India, that the reverse is the fact. They tell