Polynesian., 1858-05-08
HONOLULU, MAY 8, 1858.
Gbe polpnesiau.
Cabinets and Statesmen.

men" and the incongruity, personal lowering of
character and national injury resulting from the
modern doctrine of Cabinet unity, says:
"Now, the special point which we desire to bring
before the consideration of the public is the price
We pay for system and theory of Government
by party and the evils which result from that arti-
Gle of our Constitutional creed which requires the
Cabinet to act a body and TO possess substan-
tia and pervading, or, at all events, suppositious
harmony and unity of view. The sketch which we
have given Of the past and present aspect of the po
litical world, will enable to perceive that these
evils are, at least three in number.
''The desirable arrangement-that which would
most contribute to the welfare and glory of nation
would undoubtedly be that by which the arrange
ment of each special department should be in the
| hands of the statesman who most thoroughly un-
derstood that department, and whose views regard
ing it most sound ie, most III accordande with
the constant, deliberate enlightened opinion of the
country, even though his notions matters
nected with other Government questions by
no means correspondingly judicious; and that he
should be able to impress upon the rest of the Cab
met the stamp of his own mind, and to Undue them
with his doctrines far related to his spec
aLte, and no further. BY such an arrangement, we
should combine the advantages of perfectly united
and perfectly judicious Cabinet
After showing that each Minister can be and
really is only competent in his own department,
and that, when for the sake of cabinet unity Min
listers cOncede to each other an undue influence
over each others departments and degrade their
principles and political consistency, to be given
taken the game requires-then-
"The consequence is that every one of these min
listers has succeeded in damaging the policy OF 9TH
ers, and rendering it comparatively weak vulner-
able, and indeensible; they have all spoiled their
judcious plans and 1t is no consolation to the
country, though it may be so to them, that they
have spoiled those of their colleagues also. The
,Cisdom of the Cabinet has been sacrificed to its
ion-Or rather to the supposition, shadow and SIM
ulacrum of that union. In order to obtain creed
which they could all repeat in unison, they have
put up with creed which none ofthem thoroughly
believes. In order to obtain policy in which they
could all unite, they have adopted policy which
none of them thoroughly approves. The first effect,
therefore, of the constitutional theory CRITICS.
ing is that the destinies of the country are commit
ted to a Government whose principles are far less
sound and whose action is far less energetic and iu
dicious, than would otherwise have been the case.
We pay solid and heavy price for imaginary
gain"
The writer then concludes
Such then being the mischiefs which result
from this supposed necessity for cabinet union,-
viz, frequent and injurious ministerial changes
transference of power to inferior statesmen damage
done to the policy of superior ones, bewilderment
turbance of public confidence in the great and pow
erful,-it may be worth while to consider whether
this necessity is real or imaginary, and whether the
unity of action, at least of opinion, for which we
pay high price, is worth that price, or, indeed
is attainable at any price
And, first, we may observe in passing, that it
is by no means o. such old date is supposed.
Formerly, sovereign consulted or directed each
Minister on matters in his own department. Cab
met Councils, them, unknown in
earlier days. Even late the middle OF the last
century-a time certainly not as awhoe to be drawn
into precdent-the greatest and most avowed di-
vergencies existed III the Government, which yet
held together with considerable Conference"
''Now ministers expected and choose to exam
inc and consider for themselves not only on their
own branch of administration, but those of their
colleagues likewise. Now, it needs proof that
fifteen twenty men who think for themselves
not think alike on half the important questions that
come before them, unless those questions involve
clear principles, and are of nature to test charac-
ter The real agreement aimed at Is therefore unat
tainabe. We attain it only in most imperfect de-
gree, and by most costly process.
"Of what would Cabinets be, (t Is asked,) if
this supposed unison avowedly dispensed
With We reply that their actual, distinguished
from their fancied, value would remain now.
They would be secret cOnclaveS for consultation.
Each Minister would have the benefit of his col
leagues advice his ideas and his policy would be
cleared, mended and tested by discussion with some
Of the aDleSI men IN the Kingdom WNle tney womb
escape the wounds and injury they often sus-
tain by forcible notifications. The good influence
of the Cabinet upon them would remain, though its
bad influence would be eliminated. Moreover, men
of sensitive conscience would not be tortured as
they now are by having to support special measures
which they secretly disapprove, and men of lofty
reputation would not be damaged by having this ap-
parent insincerity brought to light. Statesmen
would have the unspeakabe comfort of being able
to say openly what they thought. and the public
would have the trustful repose of being able to be-
lieve implicitly what statesmen said
''The change we are contemplating would have
another advantage: 1t would facilitate suitable
distribution of Ministerial places it would make
it much possible than it is to put and keep
each statesman in the department which he under
stands. We should not as now, in order to get
tolerably good set of Ministers on the CoLe, have to
leave them to allot offices in utter disregard of nd
vidual qualifications. We should not have to dis
card entire good Ministry in order to get rid of
one Objectionable Member-we should not have to
tolerate entire bad Ministry for the sake of retain
ing one desirable and indispensable Further,
should bring theory more into harmony
with our practice; and in doing we should trench
upon no really extant prerogative of any consttu-
tional power. The Crown nOmindly now appoints
its Ministers-the Parliament really designates them.
Why should compel either the legal or the actual
authority to select them the lump? We think 1t
no strange unwarrantable liberty in the House of
Commons to say, We will commit the Government |
to such or such party Why should We deem it |
stranger inadmissible to say, I'VE will COM
nit this that special department TO this or that
qualified individuals: We shall be told that, under
such a system, the power and action of the Govern
ment, as a Government, would be at an end. In
speaking thus, are we not mystifying ourselves
with words, and dwelling in unmeaning forms
Would not the Foreign Policy of the Government