, 1858-10-15

Gen. CLARKE and the brave officers and
men under his command or direction, have
acquitted themselves nobly in the campaign
which appears to have been about brought
to close, and have secured the applause
and confidence of the peoplc7of these terri
tories The duties Of the commaDdaut Of
this military division, have, and are likely
to continue to be peculiarly arduous, and
a hope is entertained that ere lOng-upon
tho arrival here Of Gen. HARNEY, or as
soon thereafter as authority for the same
shall be sanctioned-the Pacific Military
Department will be divided, and a sepernte
division established for the Territories Of
Oregon and Washington. Upon this sub
ject, the San Francisco Herald Of a late
date contains the following remarks, all of
which We most eheerfully endorse, with the
exception that no "holiotc pea1" with the
Indians need now be entertained as having
been CONCLUDED: .Ir.
The Pacific is far the most important
military division of the United States. The
vast extent Of sparsely settled country, the
great numbers of hostile Indian tribes resi-
dent within its borders, the want Of perfect
telegraphic communication, the total alb
sence Of railroads, and the constant recur-
renee Of costly Indian wars, are all charac-
teristics that appeal for the existence
among us Of large aud effective military
force. In the exact proportion that the
white man pushes his explorations and
establishes bis settlements in regions now
occupied by savages, the natural spirit Of
hostility between the two races is more and
more excited, and border disturbances be-
come more frequentand bloody. As tribe
after tribe becomes molested by the intru-
sions Of their white neighbors, they ally
themselves to those already 10 arms, and
bands, formidable in number and 10 expert
ence, are formed to deVastats and lay waste
our frontier settlements In resisting these
aggressions, promptitude is Of the first i'm
portance To be effective and durable in
results, the blow should be struck Quickly
no time should be wasted, and the saYages
should be made to feel that aggreSsions will
be followed by immediate punishment. It
is, however, clear that this can never be the
case. as long as the whole Pacific coast is
embraced in one military division. The
extent of country is too great to permit the
rapid concentration Of troops at any one
point and especially is this the case when
catbreaks occur In places distant from
headquarters. The offair OF Col Steptoe
is case in point. Official intelligence Of
that disaster was not received until nearly
two weeks after its occurrence, and then
orders had to be dispatched for reinforce
ments to almost all portions Of California,
in some instances many hundred miles dis
tant, and requiring an additional delay of
weeks. A long period Of time has now
elapsed since Col Steptoe'S defeat, aud the
troops had but just commenced active opo-
rations about two weeks since. This forced
delay is not calculated to give the Indians
very exalted idea Of our power and re-
sources, and will naturally tend to encour-
age, them in their opposition. or, at best,
conclude hollow peace, until most Of the
troops shall have been Withdrawn and dis
patched TO their original posts, whence it
will require a couple of months to again
bring them in the field. The delay would
have been avoided had Oregon and Wash.
ington Territories formed separate and
distinct military division with troons
enough to Subserve the purposes Of the
command. Gen. Clarke has proved him
self most capable aud efficient officer
but, without telegraphic communication or
railways. and with his forces divided on
into small commands, and scattered over a
vast expanse Of country, he cannot render
prompt aid to far distant localities when
required. Much valuable time is inevitably
lost, and the cost of sending the necessary
troops is more than double what it onght
to be. The breaking up of the Utah cam.
paign, and the large numbers of troops or
dered to the Pacific coast, will furnish an
admirable opportunity for dividing the Pa.
cifc coast into two military divsions--one
embracing California, and the other Ore
gon and Washington Territories. The ef.
tectiveness Of military operations is iu
great measure dependent on their prompt-
tade, aud the required promptitude cannot
be had 10 a country like ours, when weeks
elapse before the information Of important
battles reaches headquarters"
---sOp