Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1858-12-18

One is the power given to Congress 70 regulate
commerce with foreign States another is the pow
er to punish piracy and other offences committed
on the high seas and the third is that provision
of the Constitution which it relates in express
terms exclusively to the Importation OF slaves into
the United States. has application to the matter
now before us. The power Of the Government OF
the United States to define piracy. and to punish it
as felony will proceed to notice when consider
the second resolution, and will now come at once
Mr.. President, to the question of the power OF
Congress to regulate commerce with foreign ma
tions The plain Interpretation of the Consti:u-
ton appears to me to be the delegation to the
Government Of the United States of the power to-
regulate the commerce between the United States
and foreign nations. If, therefore. we assume
that the power to regulate includes the power to
prohibit it would confer on the Government tho
power to prohibit the slave trade between the Unit
cd States and foreign country. But the resolu'
tons introduced into this body do not say that 1t
is unconstitutional to prohibit by acts of the Gem
eral Government tho slave trade between our own
States and any other nation. They only assert the
the fact that it is not constitutional nor within the
province of congress to prohibit that traffic between
two foreign countries. No commentator on the
Constitution Of the United States, so far as have
discovered seems to have taken up the question as
to how far the power conferred on our Government
to regulate commerce between these States and
foreign nation includes the tho right to interfere
in the commerce carried on between two other
countries distinct from our own. Justice Story
however, does not touch indirectly on this feature
of the question, when after stating his reasons to
show that the power to regulate commerce incud
ed navigation, he sums up by saying "This
power the Constitution extends to commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States with
the Indian tribes. In regard to foreign nations
it is universally admitted that the words compre
hended every species of commercial intercourse
No sort of trade or commerce can be carried on
between this country and another, to which it
does not extend. So that Justice Story plainly
understood this delegated power to refer only to
the commerce between the United States and for.
egn countries, and not to the commerce between
two foreign countries; and we nave at the present
moment case waiting for trial in this district; in
which the officers and Grew of vessel are charged
with carrying on the traffic in slaves between the
Coast of Africa and the Island of Cuba. 1t is the
consttutionalty Of such acts alone that is denied
in the resolutions before the Senate. Mr. Presi-
dent, in my humble judgement, it is grave ques.
ton, and one that is open to serious doubts, wheth,
er the power to regulate commerce includes the
power to prohibit. any branch of trade whatever-
But this is point that is left undisturbed by these
resolutions, which simply declare that the power
to regulate commerce does not extend to com.
merco, between two foreign nations and therefore
cannot include the prohibition of the slave.trade
between foreign nations. While therefore, my,
self entertain grave doubts as to the right of Con-
gress to infer the power to prohibit any trade
from the constitutional party to regulate commerce
between own and any other country, | shall
suffer that feature of the question to pass uuno-
tced at this time and shall confine myself to the
position that such power does not include the
power to regulate commerce between foreign ma.
tions, and that when the Congress of the United
States to pass acts that interfere with any
trade carried on between foreign countries, it as
sumes authority il has no title to exercise, and
commits an act of usurpatiou for which it has no
constitutional justification. shall now proceed
Mr. President, to briefly consider the second reso-
luton before us, which denies the right of Congress
to mako any act an act of piracy which was not
clearly embraced such in the words or the sense
of the Constitution. When the Constitution of
these States was adopted, the slavetrade was le.
gitimate as the trade in wool, in coffee, or in to
bacco 1t was legitimate and an innocent trade,
recognized as such ut the time by all men and if
the power delegated to Congress, to regulate COM
merce, is to be interpreted into the right to mako
it an act of piracy now to carry on that particular
trade between any countries whatever, then must
Congress surely have the same right at its option
to make the trade in Coffee wool or tobacco an act
of piracy likewise. When the Constitution was
adopted, it was we'll understood what constituted
the crime Of piracy. 1t was robbery on the high
seas. The Constitution, it is true, conferred on
Congress the power to define piracy. There must
be, doubtless, some certain rule or line, for
the purpose Of legal prosecution. to distinguish
what is robbery on the high seas; and it was
proper that Congress should have the right to
poiIt out what acts of violence and robbery should
come within the definition Of that offence But
the power to define is one thing the, power to cre
ate, another. Can it be imagined or pretended
that under the power to define piracy, it was in
,s,,ded 20 confer on the Government the power to
declare an act IN act of piracya If Congress re-
ally possessed the power to make tue siaVe'trade
between Africa and Cu5e pirscy' IL wouid nave
the same power to mako the game Is@ae piracy
when carried on between Louisiana anu Nirg'a'a'
by way of the sea. If it has the right to declare
it an act Of piracy to convey slaves between the
African and Cuban coasts, what is to deprive it of
a similar right in relation to the transport of
slaves between the Chesapeake Bay and Mississip'
pi2 am utterly at loss to perceive how any psr I
son can point out distinction between two cases.
And not only does the exercise Cf this power imply
the right to make the slave trade, when carried
on by sea between the States, act of piracy, but
it implies also the right to declare the trade in cot
ton an act of piracy. whenever that article is put
into ship in our ports and carried over the high
seas TO any other port in the world Let It it al
ways be bornNljp mind, Sir, that we hAseA right