The Feliciana Democrat. (Clinton, La.) 1855-186?, 1858-03-13

| k. ClllCk. Fort Hudson.
JOHN \. McIIuGII. Plains Store.
THE WAR IL THE CRIMEA-It will be re
menbcrcd that in 1855 our Government sen,
out three officers of the army to the seat OF
war in Europe, commissioned to report upon
the military systems Of the different Power.
engaged in the contest. The report of Cap
tain George B. Mcclellan, Of the cavalry, has
been presented to Congress, and in that part
OF it relating to the operations in the Crimca
we find some statements which many of our
readers will find interesting. After speaking
OF the Battle Of the Alma, he says that in.
stead Of offering this battle the Russians
might have destroyed the harbors of Balakla.
va and kamiesch, and, leaving sufficient
force in Sebastopol to secure it against assault,
then operated on the left flank of the A lies.
This might have been easily effected, and he
thinks it would have been had the command
been entrusted to professional soldier, and
not, as 1t was, to sailor He praises the
moral courage and energy of the Admiral, but
thinks he failed to take an enlarged military
view Of the events he so largely controlled
or the Battle Of BalaKlaya he says, no more
favorable place could be selected for charge
of cavalry, but, the Russians being in the 20.
siton which they then occnpcd, it is difficult
to understand how any officer could direct such
a charge to he made; de truction was in
cvitabIc, and nothing could be gained He
quotes the well known remark of the French
general, "C'ea Jna mognifque mais &c NEST
por Ia Suerre'
Had the Russians anticipated the siege of
Sebastopo it would have been an unparlon.
1n I,,. 4 H..
a small permanent work, and their not having
entrcnchcd the position from the beginning
appears to have been a grave error After
AN account of the defcnccs Of SebaStopo it is
known that there was little foundation for the
GENERALLY received accounts of the stupcndous
dimensions Of the works, and Of new systems
OF Notifications brought in play The drten.
ccs were simply temporary Notifications of ra,
thcr greater dimensions than usual and not a
single new principle of engineering was here
developed. The merit consisted in the admi-
ra5le adaptation Of wcll-known principles to
the peculiar locality and circumstances Of the
case. No attempt is made to detract from the
reputation Of Todtlebcn, whose name, it is
said, must ever be placed in the front rank Of
engineers. 1t must not be forgotten that the
inert works which lie raised would have been
useless without the skilrll artillery and heroic
infantry who defended them There is no
doubt that the siege called forth the most mag
nilicent defence of Notifications that has ever
yet occurred
In reference to the statement which at one
time gained credit, that this siege proved the
superiority of earthen Notifications over those
OF permanent nature, it is remarked, that it
proved nothing Of the kind. Itproyed that
temporary works in the hands of brave and
skiliul garrison can be defended for longer
time than was supposed Permanent fortif-
cations present an insupcrablc obstacle against
assault which temporary works do not Their
walls can only be destroyed by establishing
batteries on the end Of the gacis or edge Of
the ditch. In the siege Of Sebastopol, the
treuchcs Of the besiegers never reached the
edge of the ditch, SO that had the fortfcation
been permanent one. the most difficult part
Of the siege remained to be undcrtakcn--or or in
other words, when the weakness of the tenn
porary works became apparent, the true
strength of the permanent ones would have
come into play
OF the approaches of the allies, it is stated
tice their system of sapping--that rarely can
afforded excellent cover, and We're well def
ladcd With regard to the English, it seems
as if they Intentionally abandoned the excel,
lent system taught and perfected at Chatham.
Wherever the ground was difficult their
trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; Il
few stones thrown up, or shallow excavation
in the rock, they considered sufficient. Their
trenches were often faulty in direction as well
as profile, not untrequently badly dciladed OIL
not gaining ground enough, and entirely too
cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the
Redan as they should have been, before civ