Arkansas true Democrat., 1858-02-09

that the Legislature has the power. under the constitution, to select the objects of taxation. and upon the exercise of this power there is m constitutional restrictions. When the Legisla- ture has selected the objects then restrictions attach as to the imposition of taxes upon them. and the end intended to be accomplished is equality and uniformity in the taxation of all the property ta1ed, throughout the State, and not equality and uniformity throughout the State, as to the aohoIe of eacb any particular species or property from which objects of taxation may nave been selected. The restrictions relate to the valuation of the property taxed, and to the rate of taxation imposed. They require all the property selected for taxation to be taxed ac- cordlng to It's value, and that the rate of taxa. ton imposed. shall not be ixed higher upon the property or one tax payer than upon that of an- other' no matter whether the property be of the same, or of different species; and when this equality, In valuation and rate has been ob- served, It necessarily follows that the taxation of the property tared is equal and uniform.
 Fms IS manitestly the construction which the Legislature has always put upon this clause of the constitution. The first Legislature which assembled after the adoption of the constitution. and in which were members who had been dele gates Tn the Convention in which that instru- ment was framed, passed revenue law which provided that "all horses mares and neat cat tle' under three years of age; "all jacks, ien- nles and mules'' under two years of age; Gall slaves under eight and over sixty years of age and "all household furniture belonging to any one family" under the value of four hundred dollars should be exempt from taxation And the Legislature has recognized these exemptions from then till now, modifying them from time to tune, and at times, making other exemptions as Tn the judgment of the Legislature the public interest required. The Legislature is co-ordi- nate department of the government, and the con- Structlon which It has put upon the constitution ever since It's ad"ptlon, ought to have weight and cause the courts to pause, before they declare the many laws enacted pursuant to that con- structlon, void. For if 1t is unconstitutional to exempt swamp and overhowed lands from tax atlon, It Is likewise unconstitutional to exempt young negroes, young cattle, churches, grave yards and the like, because in each case, the property exempt is part of particular species or description of property, the remainder of which IS ta1ed Both are the same in principle, and both must stand or fall upon the same ground.
 1t would be strange to suppose, that the fra mers of our constitution did not mean to give to the Legislature the power to exempt part of any particular description of property, lest, in the exercise of that power, an inequality in the burdens of taxation might be made, and at the same time, meant to give to the Legislature the power to exempt the ,ohOle of that description of property for is plain that the exemption of the Whole would produce a greater inequality than the exemption of a part, by causing the burdens of taxation to fall entirely on those other de- scnptlons of property which might be selected for taxation. If equality was meant, the pro- vlslon made to secure 1t, was most remarkable one. It was in effect, that the Legislature should not have the power t. make the burdens of taxation slightly unequal, but it should have the power to make them greatly so! And yet, the construction contended for by the court, in the case of Pike us Ihe State, necessarily runs into this absurdity because it is there said, that to secure equality, in taxation, no pa,t of any particular species or description of property can be exempt, but that the whole of it may
 It follows from what has been said that the 14th section of the act of January, 1o51 is con- stitutonal.
 2d. The only question which now remains to be considered is, whether a subsequent Legis- lature had the power to impose taxes upon swamp and overfowed lands purchased under the provisions of the 14th section of the act of January, 1851, before the period of exemption provided for Tn that section, had elapsed.
 It is earnestly contended that it did; and the argument relied on, Tn support of the position is, that in the nature and structure of our state go- vernments, the taxing power Is prerogative of sovereignty that must of necessity De always exerted according to present exgencies, and consequently must, of necessity, continue to be held by each succeeding Legislature undimin- ished and unimpaired; and that if it be parted with III one instance, 1t may by an abuse of power, be parted with h every other, and the State left without the means of raising revenue.
 If the principle which this argument asserts has precedent to warrant it, we can truly say that, after careful and patient search, we have not met with it. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly held, by the highest authorities, both State and Federal, and is now settled beyond controversy, that contracts made by State, ex- empting property from the imposition of taxes, are valid and binding. and that by the con- stitutlon of the United States, such contracts, and the rights of individuals growing out of them, arc protected. See NeU Jersey vs. Wilson, 2 Crunch 164, State Bunk of Ohio us Kaoqp, l6 Hos. s369; Dodge vs. Woolsey. IS Ib. 331-360. Johnson vs Tue Commonwealth, Dana 343; Bank of Cape Fsar vs. Etvarts, Ire. 5l6; Union Bank us. The State 9 Yerg. 495; Bunk
 
 Ryegate 3r NeWbery, 15 Rerna. 75l; Herrick Us. Con. 338; Paler us. Redfelt, 10 D. 490; Sey- moo us. Hartford, 2l B 4S5; Atoater us Woodbridge, 6 Ib 23O: Illinois Cent <. R Co us. County of McLane ct a., F ". 291; Gartlner us. Tue State, ZpJ. $50; O'DonneN ct al. vs Bailey ct d., A Mss 3S6 State Bunk Illinois us. The People, 4 Scam. 304; Camsden 3 Anaboy R. F. Co. vs. Commissioners of Appeal, 3 Har. 71; Gortion us. Appeal Ia1, 3 How. 133; Green vs. Bitiie, 8 Wheat S5-98; Ohio Life Ias. d Trust Co. vs. Debolt, 16 Ho,o. 416.
 All the authorities here cited, are cases where, by contract, the taxing power of the State was limited in its exercise, or entirely and perpetu- ally renqushed, and in every case, it was held, that any law passed by the State, impairlng the obligations of the contract, was unconstitutional and void.
 In the case of Fletcher US. PecE, 6 Cranch l35, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall. speaking of the power of one Legislature to bind another, says: " The principle asserted is tha.::one Legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former Legislature was competent to pass, and that one Legislature cannot abridge the powers of a suc- ceeding Legislature. The correctness of this principle" he says, !" so far respects general legislation, can never be controverted. But if an act be done under law, succeeding Legis- lature cannot undo it. When, then, law is in its nature contract, repeal of the law cannot divest those rights; and the act of annulling them, if legitimate, is rendered so by power applicable to the csae of every individual in the community"
 And in another part of the opinion, he says, Whatever respect might have been felt for the State sovereigntes, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the constitution viewed with some apprehension, the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment, and that the people of the oited States, in adopt ing that instrument, have manifested deter imitation t, shield themselves and their proper ty from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.
 The restrictions on the legislative power of the State, are obviously founded on this senti- ment: and the constitution of the United States contains what may be deemed bill of rights for