The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1853-1911, 1858-05-27
The New License Law.
From the Philadelphia "Pess.'

: T
Considerable interest having been ut.
tracted TO the contest which has taken
Mace in reference to the construction OF
the new license law. and especially as TO
the recent discussion of it before the
courts of Northampton, in this State, We
have procured from Hon. A. II. REEDER,
of Northampton, the following statement
Of his view of the case. 1t will be re.
embered that he was recently engaged
ip cause in which the whole merits oi
the new law we're discussed:
EAsToN, May Is, 1858.
My DEAR SIR: Os course | have not
the least objection to comply with your
request to state the reasoning on which
| have based my argument upon the ques-
tion to which sou refer. The argument
was made in court, and, OF course, is al
ready public property; and | give it the
more willingly as have the the most
thorough confidence in 1T, and cannot con-
ceiye how it can be answered. Briefly.
it is this:
The third section of the act Of 1884
provides that no tavern shall be licensed
unless it is necessary for the accommoda-
ton of the public, and the entertainmcut
of strangers aud travellers. This section
mained in force until it was repealed BY
the act of l4tb April, 1855, which swept
away all the provisions in regard to tav-
crn licenses, as well as all tavern licenses
themselves. BY the 35th section Of the
general license law Of the 3lst March,
1856, this ealing actlwas itself eapress-
Ly repealed The certain consequence OF
this repeal of repeating law was to re-
yiye the 3rd section of the act of 1874
by the operation of simple rule of con-
stuction known to everybody. The act
of 1856 might have prevented this result,
if it had contained any provi ion irreeon'
liable with the section revived. The
most careful examination of that act,
however, can discover no such provision;
whilst, on the other hand, the 9Th, 18th
and 24th sections (which | shall not stop
to quote or comment upon) strongly indi-
cate contrary intention. Indeed, have
never heard it doubted, that, under the
act of 1856, the courts possessed dis
erection to pass upon the necessity OF the
proposed tavern to the accommodation OF
the public; and, SO far as have learned,
the courts did not hesitate to exercise it,
and to receive evidence to guide them in
doing so. The 9th section fixed ma1.
imum number of licenses, ny reference
to the nun Der of tsxables,) which they
were forbidden to exceed; but, acitjttn this
limit, they possessed, beyond all question
the power to grant or reject, according TO
their opinion Of the necessity 10 each par
ticular case. Ii this is so-and | cannot
ima CINE how it can be depied-wheDce
can the power be derived, except from the
third section of the ac: of 1884, which
have already shown to have been revived
aud in force. This power is gisen there,
and it is given nowhere else. Enough,
however that the power existed under the
act of Is56. 1t was one of the ''requare
nents of the laac," that the applicant
should satisfy the court OF the necessity
of bis proposed tavern. The 9th section
did nothing more than to impose a re-
strsint OF qualification upon the otherwise
general discretion of the court, to license
when necessary, by forbiddipg them to
90 bey oni certain number Thus stood
the law up to the act of eth April. le5-,
and | have never been more mistak u
than / am now if that act mas taken away
this discretion from the court. The ques
tion turns entirely upon the sixth section,
which is mandatory upon the court in GER
tain circumstances. 1t provides that the
court shall grant licenses, &c, &C., "wheu-
ever the requirements Of the laaes on the
subject are complied with by such sppli-
cant" One of these requirements was
that the application should appear to be
for tavern necessary to the accommoda.
ton of the public, &c, as | have already
shown; and how this particular require
ment is to be dispensed and all others in
sisted on, am at loss to to understand.
The very restraint imposed upon this dis
cretiou Of the court by the 9th section
Of 1856, is expressly repealed by the
22d section of the act of 1858, and the
discretion itself il left uutoucbed: so tha;
the Legislature by thus restoring the
general aud unlimited character of the
discretion, gave the strongest recognition
of its exi-tence, and Of their purpose not
to disturb it. The act Of 1858 is no.
where suppletory Of, or inconsistent with
this previously existing provision; and, u
pom this point, excuse we for quoting the
language of the Supreme Court, in l0I
Barr. 44S, where they say: at is in
general necessary that the intention to
repeal be expressed in clear and imam.
biguous language, and not left to be 10.
ferred FROM the subsequent statute.
An ancient statue will
be implicitly repealed by more modern
one, ouly when the latter is couchcd in
negative terms, or when the matter is so
clearly rePuguaut that it necessarily i'm.
plies negative; for implied repeals are
oof favorad ky the low Wbaro ho,b