Arkansas true Democrat., 1858-02-09

| poPoseu NOW, what did they get as a con- sideratlon for their money or labor? Did they get lands merely? The answer is obvious:-- they not only got lands, but with them, the solemn undertaking of the State that they should be exempt from taxation for the period specified in the act The argument that this was not a contract, but was a mere inducement held ont by the State, is not easily understood. for it may be affirmed, of every contract, that the party offering to make it, held out an inducement to the party who accepted it. Whether the State sold her swamp and overflowed lands too low or whether the disposition made of them. was wlse or unwlse, are matters which we are not permitted to consider.
 But It Is insisted that the terms of the offer, made oy the State and accepted by the purcha- sers are so vague and uncertain that no definite meaning can be attached to them; and it is asked, when does the exemption begin, and how long does it last?
 We concede that there is some ambiguity in the phraseology of the I4th section of the act as to the duration but not as to the eristence of the exemption; and the settled rule of construc. tion is, that privileges and exemptions, granted by the State are strictly construed; that any ambiguity in the terms of the grant must ope- rate against the grantee, and in favor of the public; and that nothing passes which is not clearly and explicitly granted. Soulbridge Canal rs Wheely, Burn. 3- Adol 793; Ohio L.fe Aas. dr Trust Comp vs Debolt 16 Ho,o. 435; Ohio Barak Us. Knoop, D. 38S.
 The language, out of which the amb guilty arises, is, that the swamp and overfowed lands shall be exempt from taxation for the term of ten years until said lands are reclaimed" That the exemption begins at the date of the purchase from the State, and continues for ten years, if the lands are not sooner reclaimed, and If they are, ceases upon their reclamation; and. In no event, exceeds ten years, no matter whether reclaimed not, we hold to be clear and explicit; because, without doing violence to the plain meaning of words, shorter period cannot be fixed, but, owing to ambiguity, it is doubtful whether longer one could be. Here the rule of construction, above laid down, ap- | plles, and limits the exemption to the shorter | penod. In this connection, it becomes neces- sary to ascertain what Is meant by the term reclaimed" and to do so, we must look to the subject matter of the act in which it was used. 1 The act provided for the reclamation of the swamp and overtlowed lands, and made it the duty of the commissioners "to determine the locality, extent and dimensions of the necessary levees and drains, in order to reclaim the lands'' (sec 3: Thus prescribing both the mode and extent of the reclamation contemplated-th reclamation was to be by means of levees and drans, and they were to be such as the commis- slonerS might determine Y" to be necessary to accomplish that end. No other reclamation is mentioned; nor can any other be implied. The legislature certainly did not mean to leave the question of reclamation an open one, as to each particular tract of land, after the levees and drains provided for had been constructed- Whether all--or what part of the swamp and l ha d f fnrc ,fr1 cultivation, is, and must be, in the physical nature of things, matter of doubt and experi- ment The Legislature provided for general system of reclamation, and prescribed what should be done. Farther than that, it did not go. The term reclaimed," then, must be construed to have reference to that general sys- tenn and standard of reclamation, and to nothing l else. Whenever, therefore, any of the levees and drains, provided for by the act were con- peted, the lands intended to be protected or drained thereby, were, within the meaning of the law, reclaimed.
 Upon the whole, we are clearly of opinion, that the proposition, made by the State and ac- cepted by the purchasers, was contract There were competent parties, sufficient considera- ton, and all the other elements necessary to constitute valid contract. Woodruff us Tlap- naA, 10 Ho,o. 2O4; Fletcher vs. Peck 6 Cranch 67; Wooa,oard vs. Dartmouth College, Wleat. 51S; Charles Bridge us. Warren Bridge II Pet 42O; New Jersey us. Wilson, Cranch 164; BI hngs vs. Providence Bank Pet 415; Ohio Lafe Lss. i. Trust Co. vs. Deboh, l6 Ho,o 429; Union Bunk us. IAe State, 9 Yerg 494; Gordon us. 4p- paul Ia1 How 133; O. DonneH ct al. vs Bailey ct al., 24 Mss. 386; State Bank Ohio vs Knoop Is Ho,o. BIT, 3S4.
 The validity of the contract is assailed, how ever upon two grounds:
 1st. That the 14th section of the act of January, 1851, is repugnant to the constitution of the State, and that the contract made under it's provisions, is void. And,
 2. That the contract was for a partial relin- punishment of the taxing power--a power which the State had right to resume at pleasure and that the contract at most could only operate exemption from taxation for such length of time as the State chose to permit. We will consider these objections in the order in which We have stated them:
 1st. The provision of the constitution, with which, it is contended, the 14th section of the act of 1851, conflicts ordains that, "all property subject to ta1ation, shall be taxed according to its value-that value to be ascertaned in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct: making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of property, from which tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than another species of property of equal value." Const Arks., Art VIL, TiHe Reuenue sec 2; and the case of Pike vs. The .Stute, 5 Ark. 205, decided by this court, is cited and relied on as an authority in point While we concede that the decision of the court, in the case of Pike vs. The State upon the point then in controversy was correct; we are con- strained, after much consideration to deny the soundness of those views, expressed in the opinion of the court, which are relied upon as authority in the case now before us. The ques- tion, then before the court was, the constitu- tonality of so much of the Revenue act, ap. proved, and in force March 9th, 1888, as imposed a tax upon improvements on town lots. That act provided that all lands lying within the State, claimed or owned by any person cor poration, whether such land had been patented or not, except such as were exempt from taxa tion, by virtue of the compact between the State and the United States, should be taxed according to their true value, to be ascertained by the oath of the owners taking into conside- ration the fertility of the soil, etc.. but "hdving no reference to the improvements ereOn:' and that "all town lots, and the improvements Mereon,' should be ta1ed according to their true value, to be ascertained as above mentioned; and the court said, "that property of every character and description, upon which State tax may be levied, must be taxed in proportion to its real and true value, and, according to that basis, be made to contribute to the revenue of the State" To this proposition, which was sufficient 10 have disposed of the question then before the court, we yield our assent. But the court further said: "that no portion of any distinct genus or species of property, upon which such tax is imposed can ever be exempt therefrom.-- Therefore, if such tax be, at any time, laid upon land, no land within the limits of the State, except such as are or may be exempt by some authority superior to our State constitution, can be legally exonerated from the imposition, and it matters nothing whether the land be situated in city, town or village, or in one portion of the State or another; because the rule is gene ral and intiexible, comprehending, in such case, all lands subject to the jurisdiction of the State, and liable to be taxed by her authority, etc. This rule, we consider so great and comprehen-
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