Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1858-06-22

uTITJItu Ut UItTU0UDUTuV ~ -.
where thew couId make a proft on them, and were
far more extensively employed in thia cotltieioe .i nn
any other nation in the world. lhe op'''o' III
and acted upon in England was na,u'aHs
upon the colonies lllsy inuhaed On mus
eide Of the Atlantic. And. accordingly, a negro "l
the African race WA regarded by theih o, "n Nv.
of property, and held. aud bought, ana soiu d o suS"'
in every one Of the Is colonies which uhlted VI lhe
Declaration OF Independence, ana winch W Gu" n'
formed the Constitution of III, United othIes. ino
slaves We're more or less numerous as slave lhbor "as
found more or less profitable. But no one seems !"
have doubted the correctness OF the preSa,i'hg ppm
ion at the time. The legislation oil lne coioh'ts '"
nishes positive and indieputable PROOF Oh 'his iac''
~ Howard 4O7, 8.
We have seen what strong and clear proof both the
legislation and the courts of Virginia FURNISH o' H'
truth.
An application of ihs foregoing principles and de-
cisiuns, ought, AZ ii seems to me, To sel'ie tI'e chre
For We have seen that the will under consideration
amounts to but a promise OF HI option OF freedom or
slavery to these slaves on condition, or III cons'uer"'
ton of dutiful aervice, on their part, !" hs "'u'"
during her life. Ii they should b- refractory or
hard 10 Manages they were To be sold int" pepe'uh'
slavery. 1t was only in case that they did not prove
refractory or hard to manage" that h'lt was on'y
in case of obedient service on their part our'us Tue
life OF the widow-Of which the executor WAS Ut De
the i%udge-that the option was given then' a' her
death, OF freedom or slavery.
/. Now grant, for the moment. that slaves a = sucn'
are endowed with the civil right and legal capa-
city to exercise such An option aud VIZ nave
the case narrowed down 10 q simple eAecntory
contract or bargain, by the master with the slave, by
which it il stipulated and agreed that, on c"hul'ioh
or in confederation of future obedient service, iOr u
time certain, the slave shall be free. II IA AL ons rs II
the master had by deed covenanted with hH slave
that in consideration OF obedient service Ior Il term-
say 5 or 10 yesrs-the slave should be tree NJ the
end of the term. Now TO my mind there IS no con
ceiysble legal difference between a contract OF this
aorf ior frupdnm in which futurp ODpiltnt services
constitute the consideration, and 4 contract tor Tree
dom at the end Of a term, upon the payment 10 'ht
master, by the slave. of q given sum of money. Nay,
more: There is no difference between a contract ul
this sort, and Il contract with the slave that he shal
be- free, upon the payment, or whenever he shall pay
to the master a certain sum OF money. The serVice'
10 be rendered are the confederation II there ls any
considerations the one case; the money ~ IN. con
sideration in the other. Both considerations ara Of
equal dignity, and are the same in law. Both belong
absolutely to the master, from the very nature OF the
relation between master and slave. Even If both
contrU hing parties were SUI JHrsS, the contract would
bs nudum p0etum, and of no effect, slnre the services
and the money of the slave are alike the property OF
the master. But the contract IL void al 7Htl0. And
we have seen that even though the money be actually
paid by the slave, the contract 10 ensncipate cannon
be enforced against the master; Sawnsy v. Carter, /
Rand. 1T3; Stevenson v. Singleton, | Lsigh, IL; and
a t~ortori, it could not be enforced against hs repre-
sentstives, legatees or distributes.
This doubtless would be the law in the case oil q
contract to smancipate, in consideration OF future ser
vices, evidenced by deed or other instrument OF writ
ing. 1t is not perceived that there is any distinction
in this respect, in favor OF wills. The giSt at the
contract can never be affected by the nature of the
evidence which supports it. If the contract DE ma
lure rel be void, no manner OF proving 1t can give
it validity. Ii ia no answer 10 ray that II will implies
bounty and ought TO be literally construed 10 effect
uste the intent. A deed might expressly rscite that
the master in bounty to the slave agrees to give him
his frAad0n IL ha tCiI ngrfOrm 1utiful seryice for one
year, or pay to the master 500, end the slave could
never allege conditions performed, and enforce a spe'
ci6c execution OF the contract. And a man can no
more make a binding legal bargain with his slave,
for dutiful service 10 be performed after his des'h,than
for dutitul service to be performed during life
However clearly expressed may be the intent,
it is just such an intent as the law will not
allow the master TO bind himself 10 etfectu
ate, nor the slave to enforce; The master, it ne ne
chooses, may emancipats his slave by deed or will;
but he cannot bind himself by an executory promise
or agreement evidenced, either by deed o. will Il
emancipats his slave upon condition, or in tonsldsr a'
tion OF so much money TO be paid by him, or 80 much
dutiful service to be performed. A promise or agree
ment originally and necessarily void, can acquire no
validity from the solemnity OF legal forms. Aud the
conclusion appears TO be clear, that though these
slaves may have rendered faithful and obedient ser
vice to the widow during her life, they are in no wise
entitled on that account, at her death, TO demand
their freedom. nor an election between freedom and
slavery.
9. The argument thus far has proceeded upon the
conces,um that the slave is legally capable of making
an election between freedom and slavery. But, it a-
We contend, that capacity does not exist, then these
slaves cannot become free even though they could or
should BIZ entitled TO a specific performance Of the
aforementioned eIecutory contract for their emanci
patton. For that contract does not ~stipulate that they
shall he fres on the performance ct the prescribed
services On their part; but that they snail then have
their choice of being enpancipated or sold publicly;
and is thpv cannot make that choice. thew muSt, OF
cOurss, remain in slavery.
We have ehown that they can in no manner entltle
themselves to make m aleGfion ii they were legally
capable of making il. But suppose them entitled 10
make 1t, il they are legally capable Of 70 doing can
they make i'll Are they endowed with the civil Ca
psc,ty 10 choose between freedom and slavery Can
they emancipste themselves by their own %voliatlen !
Can they devest the property OF others in themselves
by any legal act of their own!
1t has bsen shown that slave has no civil rights
whatever. II has been shown that bs has no civil
status; that he can do no legal, civil ACT; that he hse
no legal mind, will Or discretiou; that hn has abso.
luteiy n, existence in the eye nf the civil %jurlsdic'
ton, except az a chattel, the subject Of property, and
the object of the civil rights OF others. With what
reason then can it be cOntended that hs has the civil
right and the legal capacity To devsst the property OF
others in himself; or to do that great, transcendent
act of supreme, civil dignity, and sovereign power,
the transformation Of himself from n thing into II
person, from n chattel TO u man, clothed with all the
high attributes of q citizen which can attach to his
race7 And il his master, endowed with all civil rights,
and with plenary civil capacity, cannot emancIpht7
him except by deed or will, executed in solemn form,
can hs emancipate himeelf by the simple expression Of
his pleasure to be free7 Or, on The other hand, II the
law requires that IN order TO enslave himself, II free,
a negro must go through regular prescribed forms IN
a high Court of Justice, with ali the safeguards OF
judicial protection around him, shall II he asid that he
can enalave himself forever, perchancs by the mere
light voIition of a moment, the utterance Of q word,
or tie nodding OF his head! Where ~ the legal con.
sistency ia such enonolies and contradictions IA these!
How csn they be r-c0Dclled with The established legal
incapaciiy Of the slave, or wifii either The spirit or the
letter, or the purposes and policy OF tbs emancipation
Iaws2
But IL is earnestly contended that although it ia true
that slsves are chsttels in Virginia, and are incapable
rs slaves Of forming any legal contract, or doing other
legal civil act, yei :hst they are not mere chhtteIa;
that they are human, %sentien;, moral, and intellectual
beings, that az such they ara dealt viii: by the law ;
and therefore, that they ought to be held capable ct
an election between freedom and slavery. And IN
support OF this view, one OF the COUNSEL for the appel
lees, (Judgs Crump,) refers to Summers ana al. v.
Bean, Is Graf. Az, in which there occurs this remark
of Moncure, j., delivering the opinion Of the Court ::
'Slaves are not only property. but rational beings ;
and are generally acquired with reference 70 thelr
moral and Intellectual qualities"
Now il ia to be observed in this discussion, that The
true inquiry ia, not wha: il the moral aud intellectual
character Or capacity of the negro race, or tor what
qualities. or habits, slaves are generally acquired or
esteemed, but what is the relation they sustain To the
law of the land Aud by references to the rnse cited,
it will be q. en- that the remark OF the Judge, above
quoted, had no aIlusion whatever to the civil relations
or status of the slave, but on the contrary referred Ia
his moral and intellectual qualities AZ affecting his pc
culiar value az an article OF property. The question
was, whether a Court of Equity will decree the specific
execution of a contract for the sale or delivery OF
slaves at the sui: of the purchaser, without any ale
cation or proof of peculiar value; and in dealing with
this question, the Court looked to the character OF the
slave az an article OF property, and to his moral and
intellectual qualities as calculated TO engander senti.
ments Of friendship, affection, and esteem, on the
part of the master. towards the slave, which might IN
vest the slave with such special snd peculiar value. in
the eve Of the master. rs that adequate compensation
for the loss of The slave could not be had at law in III
action for damages. All the South Caroiina decisions
cited in the opinion of the Court, proceed upon the
same ground See particularly Young v. Burton, Mic
Null Eq. R-255. And they decide, as the Court OF Ap'