Daily Iowa State Democrat. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1856-1859, 1858-09-12
Forthe Democrat.
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS.
NUMBER ONE
are yoa s're Of. and can you yrore, Your
o,ca Physical Eriaence<

Are you s,ere Of. aud ran you l,rors, You
o,ea Physical Existence
] The following is the first of series Q
philosophical Questions, upon subjects yer
generally neglected, which | shall submit
TO the public of Davenport through til
medium Of the columns OF the Democrats =
MY purpose shall te chiefly to suggest idea
leaving the application to be made by tn
reader.
10 state to man that it is impossible fo
MIN to be sure Of a fact apparently so un-
questionable as his physical existence, is a
hrst sight,a startling proposition, and vel
calculated to excite suspicious of the sanity
of the individual who suggests the idea.
But on serious considerating it will be
seen that this proposition. seemingly so en-.
tirely ridiculous, is capable of being sas
tained by the soundest reas soning.
DO not propose to coartnce any man
that he has no physical existence-that he
is sall mind and imaginatic7 with nothing
material about him; but merely to demon
strate that it is impossible to be sure of and
to Prore, either his own physical existence or
the existence of anything material about
him
In order to give the reader full under
standing of the matter, we shall first DEM
onstrate the impossibility Of being sure of
the existence of anything physical about
him, admitting for the purposes of the ar
gument, the existence of himself. both
Phystcatly and mentally, with all the attri-
butes, properties and capabilities, ordl-
naily supposed to be possessed by him
10 this end We start with two propositions
as a basis
First. That the soul or mind Of man is
resident in the brain, or, in other words,
that 1t does not pervade the whole man,
but has its seat in the brain.
This will be readily admitted by all for
il the soul was resident in all parts of the
body, then in case of the ampMation OF a
limb,a portion Of the soul also would be ta
ken away and the man be left with less
soul. and knowing less than before the op
Grafton. We incline somewhat to the an
clent opinion, that the seat Of the soul is at
Pineal Gland situated near the base of the
brain, where all the nerves concentrate: but
it is sufficient for our argument. that il has
its seat somewhere within the brain.
Second. This soul of man can have no
mate ideas regarding material things: or,
stated, all ideas possessed by
the soul, of things physical are procured
entirely by means entirely Of one or more
Of the five senses.
This is self-evident proposition and will
be conceded yet more readily than at first
but we will however illustrate the mat
ter, that no doubt may be left upon it. A
man holding peach in his hand may con-
vince himself Of the fact, that it is peach
by means Of four Of his senses. First bv the
sense OF feeling or touch, by means of which
ne discovers portion of the characteris-
tics OF that fruit second, by sight: third.
by smell; fourth, by taste but If he were
destitute Of all Of these four senses he would
have no means of ascertaininp the character
d the iruit. or even that he held in his
hand. He could get no more idea of it.
han by placing it to his ear and listenin.
Il he had none Of the four senses he could
1ave no idea whatever Of anything about
lm
The soul or entity of the man. being thus
within the skull and in tn, brain
'eaiiy see nothing, hears nothing, smells
1othlng, tastes nothing, touches nothing
'ut all OF Its ideas are derived entirely by
means OF sensations conveyed from the diff
erent organs of sight, hearing, smell |
aste and feeling, to the brain and are by it |
to the soul. When we
ook at an object the soul does not see it
'ut an impressions made upon the retina
If the eye, which in its turn produces an
upon the optic nerve and by the |
'Ptc nervethe impression is conveyed to the |
,rain, the residence Of the soul. The soul |
therefore, sees no object-all it knows il, that |
has received an impression, by means Of |
erve. It's knowledge is confined to the |
imple fact that it has received an impress
ion. The same reasoning will bold good in
egard to the impressions received of things
bout US, by means Of any Of the other
enses.
But to illustrate the matter we will Ii. |
zen man to building two or more stories
Ugh. upon the top Of which is situated
elfry into which no light sound or smell |
rom without can ever penetrate. (The
omparison is lawful by the rules Of reason
ng adopted by Metaphysicians) In this
'elfry, five bells are hung and, in it an in
elligent occupant resides without the pow.
r OF moving about in the other portions Of |
ne house. This occupant has made an ar
angement with five other persons, by
Vhich theyagree to convey to him itelli-
'ence OF what is passing outside of the
'uildlng. by pulling bell ropes and sound
ng the bells above. The sounding Of the
lrst bell TO signify that one event has tran
plred. the second, that another has hap
'ened and so on throughout
When therefore bell number one, sounds,
he. occupant understands, or receives
he impression, that certain event has
without the building; but being |
lone in the belfry. really knows nothing |
bout it personally. The only fact of which
le can be certain is, that the bell has sound !
ID. He cannot be sure that the right man
las sounded the right bell, or that two or
more of his servants have not conspired to
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