Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1858-03-20
NJ | S { f L L A n Y.
THE CRISIS AND CURRENCY.

TO HIS EACELLLNCY RYLAND FLETCHER.
SIR The financial convulsion from which
the country is just emerging, possesses features
unlike those attending any previous pressure,
and. viewed from the present standpoint, ELECTS
various opinions to the causes which have
produced it, and discrepant theories for pre-
venting its recurrence.
The shock was sudden and unexpected. The
sOundcst hnaneicsr and the most careful aud j."
dicious business men. as well as the more Nis
ionary and adventurous, were alike unprepared
for it and none had any premoniton of so sud
den a collapse. 1t happened at time OF great
prosperity and plenty, and after season OF un-
precedened health throughout the whole coun-
try. 1t happened while the country was COM
parativelv independent of foreign debt, when no
unusual foreign balances were against us, and
it is belle, ed at no previous period has there
been so large an amount Of the precious metals
III the country.
The financial embarrassment which so sud
denly ana unexpectedly fell on US, extended
across the Atlantic, and was alike severe in Great
Britain. in France, in many parts of Germany,
and even in the commercial centres of Russia
and Sweden. No exception has been observed
in favor of or against those countries whose cur
rency is confined wholly or mostly to the pre-
cious metals.
The suddenness and universal extent of the
conyulsion is only cqualled by the suddennesS
with which confidence seems to be restored in
great measure, and a superabundance of specie
amassed in the cities. But the effects of the
pressure have been too marked, and too impor-
tant not to call for careful investigation of the
causes which have produced it, with a view, if
possible, of guarding against recurrence of
such catastrophe.
The science Of political economy, embracing
Al. al.
understood, Hence in reviewing the history of
the late financial troubles, and the various mon
etary operations preceding this period, it is not
singular that theories widely differing should be
entertained, both as to the causes and the rem
edy.
1t is obvious to remark that the growth and
increase of the United States, in population and
wealth, has been without parallel in any other
age or country and our progress in the develop
ment of our resources i'll works of public inn
provement, in agriculture and manufactures, has
been such as to excite the admiration of states
men in every civilized country.
While this wonderful progress is attributable
in 10 small degree to the energetic character of
our citizens it is certain that it has been prin-
cipallv promoted by our system of credits, and
the confidence which has existed in all the de-
partments of commerce and productive industry.
overtrading and imprudent speculation, and
hence to periodical reyulsonS, yet the evils re-
suting from such revulSiOns, which are severe
i'll individual cases, are by no means commen-
surate with the benefits, in the aggregate, of the
credit system, in its application to the masses
There is recuperative energy in the people
and an adaptcdness Of the credit system to the
existing state of things, which quickly restores
the country to its accustomed prosperity.
The great source of national wealth is labor
But labor, to be most productive, must be aid
ed directly by capital or indirectly by credit. In
the former case there is tendency to monopo-
lies, in the latter to the greatest diffusion of
wealth among the masses. The desideratum is
"A proper distribution of capital in connexion
with credit. But it is obvious that any legisla-
ton, whether by the general or state govern
ments which shall essentially restrain or change
the credit system, under which the country has
grown up and expanded, will be fraught with
evil not TO the capitalist, but to the masses en-
gagged in labor and productive industry.
The question asro the causes of the late fl
nancial pressure becomes important only, or
principally, as it leads to the promugation Of
plans by legislative enacments, ostensibly for
the purpose Of preventing Il recurrence OF sim
liar revulsions, but which are at best but exper-
iments, and would be more likely to result in
eyil than in any general advantage.
AS the institution of Banks of issue is a part
OF our credit system, and the medium of none
tary transactions, it is perhaps not singular that
statesmen and writers upon political econom,
should place these institutions in the front rank
among the causes Of the late pressure But it
is noiicahe that there is much diversity Of opin-
ion as TO the manner by which the Banks have
contributed to produce this eilect, whether by