The Washington union. [volume] (City of Washington [D.C.]) 1857-1859, 1857-10-20
WASHINGTON CITY.
TUESDAY MORNING. OCT. go. 1867.
JUDGES DECIDING IN ADVANCE.


JUDGES DECIDING IN ADVANCE.
We learn from the New York papers that eight Of
the judges Of the supreme court met and delivered
opinions in advance of cases coming before them on
questions connected with banks in that State. The
responsibility and honesty Of these judges cannot be
questioned nor their general intelligence and ability
But we cannot doubt but what the excitement of the
times has led them to take step beyond their con
sttutonal and legal duty In mere matters of prac-
tice, no one can question their right to make and
publish rules, where the statute has not elsewhere
lodged that power. The law of tho State required
all the judges of the supreme court to meet in Alba
ny on the FIRST Wednesday in August IN 1852, and
every two years thereafter to make and revise their
general rules of practice, to produce harmonious
ton throughout the State and of course they perfect
ed them in August of last year, in conformity with
their official duty. Hence, portion of the judges
are not now authorized to make new rules or amend
old ones. Cases not provided for by the existing
rules only be determined by the courts and judges
when they practically arise. But in the present
instance the opinions of the eight out of thirty
Judges, are not confined to matters of practice, but
about which eminent counsel are said TO differ in
opinion, and lay down important principles of law,
thus preudging the rights Of parties without hearing
Them or having practical case with actual parties be-
fore them. If this is tolerated aporon of the judges
may assemble and declare their opinions in advance
upon every question which they think exists under the
law and thus PREJUDICE every open question, although
none can deny that the light shed by counsel is often
essential to judges in leading them to correct concu
sions. This course, if adopted last spring, would
have disposed of the numerous questions under the
metropolitan police and other bills, without hearing
counsel considering practical case. If courts
can thus dispose of questions, the rights of parties
can be prejudged without hearing. An extraordi-
nary circumstance in this proceeding of the eight
judges is that of commissioning of their number
to circulate their decisions to the other twentyour
Judges and asking them also to volunteer their opn
ions. This is manifesting an extrajudcial anxiety
which nothing short of an allabsorbing excitement
can account for But the motives of the judges are
above all possible suspicion Our object is to pro-
test against their mode of determining legal ques
lions in advance of argument, and when there is no
practical case before them. We do not even assume
that they have not arrived at the proper conclusions
concerning which we have not at present the means
of forming opinion. We take it for granted with
out our knowing anything about it, however, that
they have done what would be right and proper for
them to do practical before them But we be-
leve they erred in delivering opinions in advance Of
practical cases. and that if this precedent shall be
pursued hereafter it will greatly impair, if not de-
stroy, the respect and usefulness of the Judiciary
We think they should hear the argument before they
adjudge point g.
In relation to the mode Of doing business in courts
there can be no just reason for not pursuing the
course when banks are concerned as in those
relating to other corporations individuals. 1t is
the first instance in judicial history where they
have been made an exception, and where the judges
have voluntarily given an opinion upon great class
of subjects which may come before them. We hope it
will not become precedent but that those who have
taken this step WILL reflection retrace it, and leave
justice to take her ordinary course whoever may be
parties, or whatever may be the subjectmatter
STATE, DEP ARTMEN,r REPORTS OF FOREIsN roN