New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-01-27

ara the CONCENTRATION OF ulktecs iVi ScV-'t'V 80
ties rot 70 be obtained in Alpine countries But
from the frs! Alpine campaign Of Napoleon in 1885,
ard his march across the Jalian Alps to Vienns IN
1877, I'd TO 1901, tie whole history Of warfare
proves that Alpine ridges and valleys have com
p,etely lest their terror for modern troops; nor
have the APPS ever since, up 10 1915, Offered soy
defensive positions worth speakisg d to either
France or the Coalition.
When you pass through one Of these deep
Iaviles which wind up the roads that lead from
the northern slope of the APPS to their southern
decliyity, you find the most formidable defensive
positions at every turn of the road. Take the
we'll Known Via Msa, for instance. There is not
an tffcer bu. viii tel you be might hold that defe
with battalion sgains. sn enemy, i be was sure
Of net being turned But THAT is precisely the point.
There is co mountain pass, even in the highest ridge
Of the Alps, but can be turned. NapOleon's maxim
for mountain warfare was. Where 8 goat can
"pass, man can pass; where man, battalion;
"wbere battalion, an army" And Souwarof
had to do it, when he vas closely shut up in the
valley of the Reuss, and had to march his army
along shepherds tracks, where but one msn could
pass at time, while LecOurbe, the best French
General for mountain warfare was at his heels.
1t is this facility of turning an enemy which
makes up and more for the strength of defensive
positicns, to attack which in front would often be
perfect madne,s. To guard all roads by which
position can be turred would imply, in the defend
ing psrty, such a dissemination of forces as must
insure immediate defeat. They can, at best, be OBJ
served only, and the repulse Of the turning move
ment must depend upon the judic:Ous use Of
reserves and in the judgment and rapidty Of the
commanders Of single attachments; and yet, if Of
three or four turning columns ore only successful
the defending party is placed in as bad condition
90 if they had all succeeded. Thus, stragetically
speaking, the attack in mountain warfare is deci-
dedly superior to the defense.
II is the same when We come to look at the sub
ject in purely tactical light The defensive posi-
lions will always be narrow mountain gOrges occu-
pied by strong columns in the valley aud protected
by skirmishers on the nights. These positions may
be turned either from the front by SIX FINISHING par
ties climbing up the sides of the valley aud outaank
ing the ,harp-shOOters Of the defense or BY parties
marching along the top of the ridge where this is
practicable, or BY a parallel yaley-the turning
body proftiDg by a pass to fall on flank or rear OF
the defending post. In all these cases the turning
parties have the advantage of command; they
occupy tie higher ground and overlook the valley
occupied by their opponents. They may roll
rocks and trees down upon them; for now
adsys 10 column Is so foolish as to enter
into deep gorge before its sides are cleared
90 that this late favorite mode of defense is
now turned against the defenders. Another
disadvantage of the defense is that the efec.
of firearms, on which it mainly rests, is very much
reduced on mountainous ground. Artillery is
either all but useless, or, where it is seriously
used, is generally lost on retreat. The so called
mOuntain artillery, consisting of light howit-
gers carried on the backs of mules, is of scarcely
any effect, as the experience of the French in Alge
ria amply proves As to musketry and rifles, the
cover offering itself everywhere in such ground de-
pri7es the defense Of very great sdvsntsge-shat
of having in front Of the position open ground
which the enemy must pass under tHe Tao
tically, then, as well as stra.egcslly we arrive at
the conclusion of the Arcbduke Charles Of Aus
tra, one of the best generals in mountain warfare
and one Of the most classical writers on that sub
Jet, that in this kind OF war the attack is vastly
superior to the defense
Is it then perfectly useless TO defend a noun
famous country Certainly not. II only follows
that the def-nse must not be merely passive one,
that il must seek its strength in mobility, aud ac.,
wherever opportunity offers, on the offensive. In
alpine countries battles can hardly occur the whole
war is one continuous SERIES of small actions, of
attempts, by the attacking party, to drive the thin
end of the wedge in one point or the other of the
enemy's position, and then TO press forward Both
armies necessarily scattered; both must expose
themselves q. every step 10 advantageous attack;
both must trust to the chap of accidents. Now,
tie only advantage the defending army can take is
to seek cut these feeble points of the enemy and
TO throw itself between bis divided columns. In
that case the strong defensive positions on which a
merely passive defense would alone rely become so
many traps for the enemy where he may be aured
into takiIg the bull by the horne, while the main
Efforts of the defense are directed against the turn
ing columns, each Of which may in is turn be
turned and brought into the same helpless condition
into which il intended 10 bring the defending party.
1t IT, however at once evident that such an active
defense presuppOses active, experienced and skull
ful generals, highly discipGred and mobile troops,
and above all very skillful and reliable leaders of
bri, a1ts, bsttalisns, and even companies for, on
the prompt judcious action Of deta ,hments, every
thing depends in this case.
There is still another form of defensive mountain