Weekly national intelligencer., 1857-06-27

clsration any thing in the constitution laws Of
Missouri could confer take away any privileges i'm
munity granted by the Constitution But it is also true
that it expresses the then conviction OF the legislative
of the United States that free negroes citizens
or some Of the States might be entitled the privileges
and immunities Of citizens in all the States.
The conclusions at which have arrived this part
of the case
First That the free nativeborn citizens of each State
sre citizens Of the United States.
Second That free colored persons born within some
of the States citizens of those States such persons
are also citizens Of the United States
Third That every such citizen residing in any State
has the right and is liable to be sued in the Federal
courts citizen of that State in which he resides.
Fourth That the plea to the jurisdiction in this case
shows facts except that the plaintiff of African
these facts inconsistent with his citizenship of
United Sates and his residence in the State of Missouri
the plea to the jurisdiction bad and the Judgment Of
the circuit court overruling it was correct
dissent therefore from that part of the opinion Of
the majority of the in which it is held that per-
Of African descent be citizen Of the United
States; and regret must go further and dissent both
from what deem their assumption of authority to ex-
anime the consttutionaty of the act of Congress COM
monty called the Missouri compromise act and the
grounds and conclusions announced in their opinion.
Having first decided that they bound to consider
the sucency of the plea to the jurisdiction of the cir
cult and having decided that this plea showed
that the circuit court had jurisdiction and
quently that this is which the judicial power of
the United States does not extend they have gone to
examine the merits of the they appeared the
trial before the court and jury the issues Joined
the pleas in bar and have reached the question of the
power of Congress pass the act of 1920 On
subject this feel obliged to say that, in my opin
ion, such exertion of judicial power ranscends the
limits of the authority of the court described by its
repeaed decisions, and as understand, acknowledged
in this opinion of the majority of the court.
In the of that opinion it became necessary to
comment on the case of Legrand Darns reported in
pafor &c n In hat n W
alleged to be citizen of Maryland against one alleged
be citizen o. Pennsylvania The bill stated that the
defendant the of white man by one of his
slaves; and that the defendants father devised to him
certain lands the title which put in controversy
by the BILL These facts admitted in the answer,
and upon these and other facts the court made its Decree
founded the principle that devise of land by mas
slave by Implication also bequest Of his
freedom. The facts that the defendant of African
descent and born slave, not only before the
court bat entered into the entire substance of its uqui
res The opinion of the majority of my brethren IN this
disposes of the of Legrand Darnal by say
ing. among other things that the fact that the de-
fendant was born slave only before this court on
the bill and answer it then too late to raise the
question of the personal disability of the party and
therefore that decision is altogether nappcable in this
case.
In this concur Since the decision of this court in
Livingston Story III Pet, 351 the law has been set
tied that when the declaration bill contains the
of citizenship this court look
the record TO whether those averments
cept far they put in issue by plea to the ju
risdction In that the defendant denied by his
that Mr. Livingston citizen of New York. as
he had alleged in the bill Both parties into proofs
The refused examine those proofs with refer
to the personal disability of the plaintiff This is
the settled law of the court affirmed lately Shep
herd Graves IA How, q and Wieklif .. owings
III How, 51.) (See also De Wolf .. Rabaud Pet
476.) But do not understand this TO be rule which
the court may depart from at its pleasure If it be
rule il is as binding the the suitors. ft
removes from the latter the power take any objection
to the personal disability Of party alleged by the re-
cord to be competent which is shown by plea
the jurisdiction it is because the forbidden by
Law to consider and decide objections taken do
not consider 1t to be within the scope of the judicial
power of the majority of the pass upon any
question respecting the plaintiff citizenship ia Mssou-
III save that raised by the plea to the jurisdiction and
do not hold any opinion of this court any court bind
ing when expressed on question not legtimatey before
1t Carroll .. Carroll, 10 How, 1851 The judgment
of this is that the to be dismissed for want
Of jurisdiction, because the plaintiff citizen
Missouri, as he alleged in his declaration. Into that
Judgment according the settled of this court
nothing appearing after plea TO the merits
great question Of constitutional law deeply affecting
the and welfare of the country, not my opn
ion, ft subject to be thus reached.
But in my opinion, the circuit court had jurisdic-
ton, am obliged 10 consider the question whether its
judgment the merits of the should stand or be
reversed.
The residence of the plaintiff in the State of Illinois,
residence
acquired from France lying north of latitude 36o S and
north of the State of Missouri relied on by the
plaintiff in As the residence in the Territory af
fects the plaintiffs wife and children as well as himself
l must inquire what its effect
The general question may be stated to be- whether the
plainlfs status, as slave changed by his resi-
dence within that Territory that he was not slave in
the State of Missouri at the time this action brought
In such cases two inquiries arise, which may be con-
founded, but should be kept distinct
The hrst IS, what the law of the Territory into
which the master and slave wen respecting the relation
between them?
The second is whether the State of Missouri recog-
nises and allows the effect Of that law of the Territory
on the status of slave, his within its juris
diction
As to the first of these questions the will of States and
nations, by whose municipal law slavery is not recog
nised has been manifested in three different ways.
One is absolutely to dissolve the relation and termi
nate the rights of the existing under the law of
the country whence the parties This is said by
Lord Stowel in the of the slave Grace q Hag Ad
r. "a, and by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the
ease OF Maria Louise Msro 20 Louis. b. 473 to be
the law OF France and it has been the law of several
der certain conditions Wilson Isabel, Calls b.
430; Hunter Hucher Leigh, liz; Stewart .. Oaks
Har. and John, 107)
The second is where the municipal law of a country
not recognising slavery it is the will of the State
fuse the master all aid to exercise any control his
slave and if he attempt do so in manner ustiable
only by that relation to the exercise of that
troll But law exists designed to operate directly
the relation of master and slave and put en that
relation. This is said by Lord Stowe in the above
mentioned to be the law of England, and by Mr. Chief
Justice Shaw, in the of the Commonwealth Aves,
rs Pick, 1857 to be the law of Massachusetts.
The third is to make distinction between the Of
master and his slave only temporarily in the country,
ammo sanead and those who there to reside for
permanent indefinite purposes. This is said by Mr..
Wheaton TO be the law of Prussia and was formerly the