The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1857-04-02
lcoxrrNuED FROM THE rlRsr PAGE. I

So the act OF February 29, 1903, q Stat al
Large, POS to prevent the importation of Ger.
tain persons into States, when by the laws there.
of their admission is prohibited, in its first sec
ton forbids all masters of vessels to imrort or
bring "any negro, mulatto, or other person Of
color, not being native, citizen, or registered
seaman of the United States" &C.
The acts of March 3, 1913, sec. l, e Stat.
at Large, $685. aud March 1, 1917, sec. 8, q
Stat at Large, 35l,) concerning seamen, GER
tainiy imply there may be persons of color, ma
tiyes of the United States, who are not citizens
OF the United States. This implication is un-
doubtedly in accordance with the fact For
not only slaves but free persons of color, born
IN some OF the States, are certainly not citizens.
But there is nothing In these laws inconsistent
with the citizenship of persons of color in other
OF the States, nor with .heir being citizens of
the United States.
Whether much or little weight should be at
tached TO the particular phraseoogy of these
and other laws which were not passed with any
direct reference to this subject, consider their
tendency to be, as already indicated, to show
that, In the apprehension of their trainers, color
was not necessary qualification of citizenship
Ii would be strange, If laws were found on our
statute book to that effect, when, by solemn
treaties, large bodies of Mexican and North
American Indians have been admitted to citi-
zenship of the United States.
In the legislative debates which attended the
admission of the State Of Missouri into the
Union, this question was agitated. It's result
is found in the resolution of Congress, of March
Q, 1871, for the admission of that State to the
Union. The Constitution of Missouri, under
which that State applied for admission into the
Union, provided that it should be the duty of
the Legislature "to pass laws to prevent free
neQrOQa and nuIaffncc from, e.
settling in the State, under any pretext what.
ever" One ground of objection to the admis-
sion of the State under this Constitution was
that 1T would require the Legislature to exclude
Tree persons OF color, who would be entitled
under the second section of the fourth article
OF the Constitution, not only to come within
the State, but to enjoy there the privileges and
immunities of citizens. The resolution of Con-
gress admitting the State was upon the funda.
mental condition, "that the Constitution of
Missouri shall never be construed to authorize
the passage OF any law, and that no law shall
be passed in conformity thereto, by which any
citizen of either of the States of this Union
shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any
of the privileges and immunities to which such
citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the
United States" 1t is true, that neither the
Legislative declaration, nor anything in the Con-
stitution or laws of Missouri, could confer or
take away any privilege or immunity granted
by the Constitution. But it is also true that
1t expresses the then conviction of the legis-
lative power Of the United States. that free
negroes, as citizens of some of the States,
might be entitled to the privileges and immuni.
ties of citizens in all the States.
The conclusions at which | have arrived on
this part of the case are
LIST. That the free nativeborn citizens OF
each State are citizens of the United States
I'd. That as free colored persons born within
some of the States are citizens of those States
such persons are also citizens of the United
States.
Sd. That every such citizen, residing in any
State, has the right to sue and is liable to be
sued In the Federal courts, as citizen of that
State in which he resides.
4th. That as the plea to the jurisdiction in
this case shows no facts, except that the plain
tiff was of African descent, and his ancestors
were sold slaves and as these facts are not
inconsistent with his citizenship of the United
States, and his residence in the State Of Mis-
sour, the plea to the Jurisdiction was bad, and
the judgment of the Circuit Court overruling it
was correct.
l dissent, therefore, from that part of the
opinion of the ma jority of the court in which it
holds that person of African descent cannot
be citizen of the United States, and / regret
i must 20 anu ulsS6Qt DOM from Wndt
/ deem their assumption of authority to exam
inc the constitutionality of the act of Congress
commonly called the Missouri Compromise act,
and the grounds and conclusion announced in
their opinion.
Having first decided that they were bound to
consider the suficieucy of the plea to the juris.
diction of the Circuit Court and having decided
that this plea showed that the Circuit Court had
not jurisdiction, and consequently that this is a
case to which the judicial power of the United
States does not extend, they have gone to ex-
anime the merits of the case as they appeared
on the trial before the court and jury, upon the
issues Joined on the pleas in bar and 80 have
reached the question of the power of Congress
to pass the act of 1920. On so grave a subject
as this, i feel obliged to say that in my opinion,
such an exertion of judicial power transcends
the limits of the authority of the court, as de-
scribed by its repeated decisions, and as ac-
knowledged in this opinion of the majority OF
the court.
In the course of that opinion, it became ne
cess&ry to comment on the case of LIE Grand
as. Damrell, reported in Peters r., 66.l. In
that case, q bill was filed by one alleged to be
a citizen of Maryland, against one alleged to be
citizen of Pennsylvania. The bill stated that
the defendant was the son Of white man by
one of his slaves and that the defendant
father devised to him certain lands, the title to
which was put in controversy by the bill. These
facts were admitted in the answer, and upon
these and other facts, the court made its decree
founded on the principle that a devise of land
by master to a slave, was by implication also
bequest of his freedom. The facts that the
defendant was not only of African descent, bu,
was born a slave, were not only before the
court, but entered into the entire substance o.
its inquiries. The opinion of the majority o.
my brethren in this case disposes of the case O
LIE Grand rs. Damrell, by saying, in substance
that as the fact that the defendant was born
slave only came before this court on the bill
and answer, it was then too late to raise tn,
question of the personal disability of the party
and therefore that decision is altogether map
plicable in this case.
In this / concur. Since the decision of thi
court in Livingston rs. Story, III Peters, 35 l
the law has been settled, that when the deca
ration or bill contains the necessary averment
of citizenship, this court cannot look at tn
record, to see whether those averments are true
except so far as they are put in issue by Pile
to the jurisdiction. In that case, the defendan
denied by his answer that Mr.. Livingston wa
citizen of New York, as alleged in the bill
Both parties went into proofs. This court re
fused to examine those proofs, with reference t
the personal disability Of the plaintiff. This
the settled law of the court, affirmed so lately
Shepherd rs. Graves, IA, How, 27. But d
not understand this to be q rule which the cou,
NAV depart from at its pleasure. If it be rul,
it is as binding on the court as on the suitor
If it removes from the latter the power to tax
any objection to the personal disability of
party alleged by the record to be competen
which is not shown by plea to the jurisdiction
it is because the court are forbidden By law
consider and decide on objections so taken.
do not consider it to be within the scope of the il