The Washington union., 1857-10-02

sions and resentments, whether growing out Of poll
fear of the consequences. They measure out fayors
and kindness to friends without stint, and withhold
them from political adversaries and there is rem
edy. They may favor friend and prejudice an op-
ponent on questions within their discretion sway
Jury in their charge without effective accountable
ty Their partiality may manifest itself in thou
sand ways and become notorious TO all without their
being subject to impeachment removal. Such
things would destroy every hope before the people
where Judges are elective No public functionary is
more closely watched than Judge. He is continu-
ally on trial before the people. Whatever he says
and does is the subject Of criticism. His motives
are as closely scrutnized those of the litgatng
parties, and the opinions formed by those attending
our courts of the ability integrity, and fairness of
our Judges are usually correct. They less likely
to be deceived than an Executive, who does not wit
ness what occurs in court. From necessity Execu-
tives often appoint men to be judges whom they
have They act upon representations OF
their political friends, who often wish to remove
rival out of the way wish to reward partisan ser
vices, or promote the fortunes of relative.
The Executive may select with reference to his
own reelection or that of favorte to de-
sired political results. He may do 30 for the ex-
press purpose of securing determination of anti
rent squater right other question known to be
before the courts, to meet his personal wishes in
terests He may appoint judge with reference to
his known opinions upon constitutional or legal ques
tions which expected to arise deeply affecting
himself his friends, party. Such motives, though
often at the time, it is known have exercised
an influence in making selections. No Executive has
appointed judges whose known opinions were ad-
verse to his own great constitutional and legal
questions and seldom have nominations been con-
frmed where they were not approved by the ratify-
ing body None of these considerations can act more
powerfully and few of them as strong, if at ALL in
electng judges. Managing men may act from i'm
proper motives in making nominations but the fact
that their selections must be submitted to the sober
judgment of the people will induce caution and
restrain exceptionable acts. If dull, weak, bad
man is nominated, they know his unftness will be ex-
posed to the electors and his defeat rendered proba-
BILE. Policy will dictate making the best possible
nominations. When in Office the elective Judge
will bave the strongest possible inducement to act
well his part to reelection. If he conducts
himself improperly, the chances clearly against
his reelection If he the people unfaithfully,
their eyes being upon him, they will know'i and act
toward him accordingly. In this there is security
which cannot be found in executive appointments,
where there is independence of the people and the
public will, and ability safely to set both at defiance.
The real difference between the two systems is
that the places its trust in the representatives of
the people, and the other in the people themselves.
We do not believe that the agents of the people
more wise and patriotic and above political and i'm
proper influences, than the people themselves. We
cannot understand why the people not compe
tent to elect wise and good Judge as to elect
governor to select one for them. A theory which
holds that Executive is competent to select
Judge than those who confer his office upon him is
in direct hostility to the great principles of segov
ernment 1t rests upon the supposition that the
people incompetent to select class of their
necessary agents. If carried out, this theory would
result in declaring them incompetent to appoint any
agent whatever If they are qualified to select a
head agent they must be equally competent to con-
stitute subordinates. The assumption that such
agents will be impelled to unfairness and dishonesty
through fear of their principles is only another form
of alleging that the people cannot be safely trusted
in Judging of the acts of their agents Such argu-
would destroy it. Fortunately the tendency of the
public mind is strongly against such absurdities