Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1857-05-15
From the Washington States

In Mr. Cushing's recent speech to Wnlch we nave
before alluded, an extract was mace from secret
+ onlv recently published memorial addressed by the
Count of Amanda to his master Charles Ill. of Spain,
an the occasion of the signing OF the treaty between
SDoin and England, after The termination of the war
yfbich terminated in the acknowledgment of Ameri-
can independence. From the prophetic nature of ran
da's view of the results OF our independence, consId
orebIe attention has been attracted 10 bis memorial
an much in'eed, that it has been translated by the
BOSTON Courier, and published in full b some prom
inent journals. The lntellgencer of Wednesday pre-
faces The memorial with notice of Aranda's career
one point of which, however, il only necessary 10
hear in mind, TO wit that he enjoyed special mis-
sion 10 England for the purpose of negotiating peace
beween that country and Spain at the close OF the
revolutionary war The fact that even respectable
Snanish authority thrown doubts on the genuine
ness of Arandas authorship of the emorial cannot
divert US from its ability, nor lie the insight OF
Spanish policy g ven in it though it may as the In
telligencer says, greatly detract from the Impor-
lance attributed to it by MIR Gushing, as illustrating
the sagacty of the Count of Amanda" Whether the
latter is responsible for it, is Of very great
importance to US. 1t is Spanish in its inception. ad
vice. and purposes, and Nigh as well have emanated
from Amanda any other Spanish politician or Oh
pIomat who had we'll read his countrys past Euro
Dean history and Was aware of the richness OF It's
American colonies. We SMALL at least TO simplify
auson to it, continue to attr butte it 10 Aranda.
The memorial is deep sigh. 1t is strong wall
against what has taken place, conveying such I'M
pOrtant aivce as grows out of misfortune. AS he
cannot war with fate Amanda projects meals to bar
monte natiOns-those, at least, from which SPAN
was to sap life blood. While he outlined in bold
and distinct periods the future of America, he was
utterly opposed to allowing her the chance of be-
coming what he telt she would become. The sign
ing of the treaty has leit" he writes in my mind
a painful sentiment" Et was to him a motive of
sorrow and of fear,' that the Independence of the
English colonies acknowledged and bitterly
complains Of the policy adopted by France, which
not only committed her 10 the cause of TIE Amer.
cans, but also dragged Spain on that side. He COM
plains that France acted without consideration, and
that thereby the Spanish American possessions " now
remain exposed TO terrible convulsions " He writes
"From the beginning, France has operated against her
interests in stimulating and avoring this independence
Many times have declared the ministers of that
ton What better thing could Franco desire than to see
the English and their coonsts mutually destroy one another
in war of partsans which could not fail to augment her
power and favor her interests The anpahv which regns
between France and England blinded the French Cabinet
forgot that the interests Of France consisted III remaining
tranquil spectator of the struggle and launched into
the arena it unfortunately dragged with it, in virtue of
the famypact, to entirely contrary to proper
cause"
Such was the Spanish policy of the day-such the
uRder.current which France kept under-such the
actual spilt of Spanish diplomacy which before the
world has been regarded in ' generous alliance
with America during the Revolutionary
1t is interesting 10 look at the French side of the
business, and whether we can trace any identif-
cation thereon with the principles laid down by
ArGnda in the paragraph quoted.
The French ambassador at London at the COM
mencement of difficulties with America the Due
de Guines q man of sprightly parts, but of not re-
markable capacity. He derived his information
from his witty, but wiser friends politicians connect
ed with the English ministry SO that mach actual
reliance could not be placed upon 1t. In View of the
necessity 10 understand thoroughly the position feel
ings, and opinions of England in the matter, and to
watch the movement of its government, Beaumar.
Chais of the brightest and most subtle int lecs
of the eighteenth century, was sent secret agent of
the French. Graceful, insinuatng, witty and adroit
with dash oil bruSquerle, an audacty untenabe,
an earnestness unwearying, and caution greater
than he has received credit for Beaumarchas was
Just the man for the mission. We soon find him
heart and soul taking sides with the coloniss, be-
cause he believed it for the interest of France. A.
early as September, 1775, he sent secret rial
to the King, in which he pictures with considerable
fidelity the state of the colonies, and the excitement
jn England prognosticates war, and upon the facts
he has received from IS an inhabtant Of Phiadel-
pha," just arrived to confer with the government,
slows that the Americans determined to suffer
any thing sooner than give way. If Beaumarchais
Overrated the possible, or, as he thinks probable eff
feCts of the excitement in London, ii is because he
Frenchman. He could scarcely understand
how the English could get up TO such frenzy, and
fight come of it, His speculations regarding
America and the European policy towards it clear
sound and bold. He takes the triumph of the Amer
lean arms for granted and in the course of his me-
MORALS to the King and the minister M. de Vergen-
nes shows why the Americans must be asSisted:-
In contrast with Arandas notion that France was
operating against her true interests in Assisting
America we find Beaumarchas mpressng his King
with fact the preservation of possessions
in America, and the peace which your majesty ap-
pears to desire much, depend solely upon this
proposition the americans must be assisted" He
calls on the King in the name of God to examine
the matter" with him, and proceeds to show that
First. Ii England triumphs over America, it must
be by an enormous expenditure of men and money !;
and that for compensation the English must take the
french islands on their return, which would make
them forever absolute possessors of the advantages
derived from the contraband commerce carried on by
the continent with these islands" France then
would have TO commence Improbable war, or
preserve the most shameful of inactive peaces' and
lose 28O millions of capital and more than 80 millions
of revenue.
Second If the Americans are victorious, the En-
glsh, in despair, will be the more eager TO seize the
French possessions in America " and we may be
certain they will not fail to do 500
Third If the English forced 10 give up with
out striking blow, the result for France will be the
same the preceding, but quicker
Fourth. If the English conclude a treaty OF re.
union with the colonists the latter, indignant with
France whose refusal alone will have caused them
10 submit will unite with the English TO take the
French islands What then, is to be done he asks:
and replies in substance:
To preserve the peace of France, prevent peace
between England and America. Give sufficient as
ssance to the latter as will place its army on an
equality with that of the former, but nothing be-
You'd. One must not completely triumph over the
other. Secretly assist the Americans without com
promising ourselves. Success depends on secrecy
and celebrity.
Beaumarchais recommends the recall of the French
ambassador and advises the King 10 delay sending
charge d'affaires, 80 that the English would recall