New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-06-01
tility Of our citys fuDctionares from highest to

in England found the Credit Mobilier as Mr. Pereire
says in the attitude Of the intelligent sentinels Of
" finance and credit, taking in Z" more extended
horizon than other people "on different steps OF
"the ladder, capable Of avoiding alarm 80 well
"asovere1ctement, "turningits undivided solicitude
to the lofty end Of maintaining national labor and
"credit" Indifferent 'tO interested or jealous
" CRITICISM" smiling at violent or calculated
attacks" and towering high above vulgar " mis-
representations At that critical epoch, the Bank
Of France, it seems, proved rather FESTIVE against
the demands which the Credit Mobilier, prompted
by its exclusive zeal for public prosperity, found
itself induced to press upon it, We are therefore,
given to understand that - the crisis owed its
" violence and its rapidly to the measures which
" the Bank Of France adopted under the empire Of
" the constitution which governs il" aud that
that institution is still highly imperfect from the
" absence Of any bond and Of all harmonic cOnlbI-
"natiOns." While the Bank of France on one hand
declined helping the Credit Mobilier it refused on
the other to be helped by it. With Characteristic
bOldBss Of conception, the Credit MOber cOnsid-
cred a financial crisis the true season for great
financial strokes. At the moment Of gen.
eral confusion, you may take fortress by
storm which, for years, you have failed to
take by regular maneuyers. Accordingly, the
Credit MobiIer offered to purchase, with the CO.
operation of several foreign houses, the reHteS or
public debt held by the Bank of France, 30 as to
enable the latter establishment "efiectualy to in
" crease it's metallic reserve, and continue it's ad-
" vances on rentes and railway shares" When
the Credit Mobilier made this disinterested and
phllantbropc proposal, its treasury was encum'
bered with renteS to the amount of about $4,000
francs, and with railway shares to the amount of
IL, 900, 600 francs, the Bank Of France holding
simultaneously Tentts to about $4,000, 900 francs
In other words, the Credit MObilier held more
than twice the amount in railway shares which the
Bank Of France held in TtnteS. by throwing It's
rentes on the market, in order to strengthen its
metallic reserve, the Bank Of France would not
only depress the rtntes, but still more all other
securities, and particularly railway shares. The
proposal amounted therefore, in fact, to an invita-
ton to the Bank to keep the renes held by Itself oil
the market in order to make place for the railway
shares held by the Credit Mobilier. Besides, the
Bank, as Mr. Pereire says, would then have hah an
excuse for disseminating its advances on railway
shares. Thus it would have secretly come to the
rescue Of the Credit Mobilier, while publicly owing
vassalsgo to that magnanimous institution, and
appearing to be saved by its aid However, the
Bank smeled rat and turned q cold shoulder TO
the " intelligent sentinels.'
AZ firmly resolved to save France from the fnan-
cial crisis its protector had been to save her from
Socialism, the Credit MObilier made second pro-
DC sa, addressed not to the Bank of France but to
the private baDker Of Paris. 1t generously offered
. to provide for the wants of all French Railway
4" Companies by subscribing to the amount of 3OO,-
1000 600 francs to the loans which they had to issue
for 1857 declaring that it was ready to engage
tself in those loans to the amount of 2OO, OOO, 900
"francs if the Of 100, 600, 900 were subscribed
"by tho other banking houses" Such subscrip-
ton was sure to effect sudden rise in the price of
railway shares and bonds, the very commodity Of
which the Credit Mobiier was the principal holder
Moreover, the latter by one bold stroke, would
have installed itself as great proprietor ins all
French railways and drawn all the great Paris
bankers into some sort of forced partnership with
itself. Yet the scheme failed. Compelled "to re.
"nounce the idea Of any united measure the
Credit Mober had to shift for itself. The lofty
conviction that the sole fact of its having made
"such propositions dOubtlessly contributed not
little to allay uneasiness, cOnsoled il not little
for the tendency the crisis had ito reduce in
"materia manner the profits on which the Com
"pany thought it might calculate
Quite apart from all these untoward events, the
Credit Mobilier complains of having till now been
precluded from playing its trump card, namely
the emission of Goo 900, 900 francs In bonds
paper money of its own invention; payable
at very long dates; based, not on the capital
Of the company, but on the securities for which II
would be exchanged. THE resources, says Dir.
Pereire, (which We should have derived from the
tissue Of our bonds would have allowed US to alb
"sorb such securities as had not yet found their
"defnitiye investment and TO give an immense ex-
"tensiOn to the benefits rendered to industry In
1858, the Credit MObier was just about emitting
24O, COO OOO of francs in such obligations an issue
authorized BY its statutes when d" the exalted Wis
dom" Of the Tuileries cut short the operation
Such an issue Of fduciary money the Credit hc-
bilier calls augmentng its capital; common people
are more likely to call it augmenting us deOI''
The forced halt, then, imposed on the Credit Mo
bilier by the Government in March, 1850, the com
petition of the Societies Ell COmmsndlte, the hnan-
cal crisis, aud the nOI-issue of It's own paper
money. all these circumstances will sufficiently ac-
count f the fall Of its dividends.
In all former reports of this great '"indling con
Germ the substitution Of industrial JOINT stock COM
panies for private industry has been trumPeied as