New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-01-27

The recent possibility, not yet entirely removed,
Of an invasion Of Switzerland has naturally revived
the public interest not only concerning the defensive
resources of the mOuntaln Republic but with regard
to mountain warfare in general. People generally
incline to regard Switzerland as impreguabe, and
thin of an invading force as of those Roman glad-
stors whose ".ire Cesar, mOrauri te sdintdM
has become so famous. We are reminded of Sem
pach and MorgarteD, MOrat and GransOn, and We
are told that il may be easy enough for foreign
army 10 get into Switzerland, but that, as the fool
of Albert of Austria said, it will be difficult to get
Gu! again. Even military will recte the names
Of dOzsn mountain passes and dehes, where
handful OF men might easily and successfully oppose
0 couple of thousands Of the best soldiers.
This traditional impregnability Of the so-called
mountain fortress Of Switzerland dates from the
time of the wars with Austria and Burgundy, in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In the former
The amor.clad cavalry Of the chivalry was the
chief arm Of the invaders; it's strength lay IN the
irresistible charge against armies undefended by
firearms. Now, this charge was impossible in
0 country like Switzerland, where cavalry, except
Of the lishtest kind, and in small numbers, is even
now useless How much more 30 were the knights
of the fourteenth century, ercumbered with nearly
q hundred weight Of iron. They had to dismount
and fight on foot; thus, their last remnant Of mOb-
ity was lOst and the invaders were reduced to the
defensive, and when csugh. 10 defe were defense
less even against clubs and sticks. During the
Burgundian wars, infantry, armed with pixies, had
become more important portion Of an army, aud
fire arms had BEEN introduced but the infantry was
still cramped by the weight of defensive arnOr the
cannon were heavy. aud small arms clumsy and
comparatively useless. The whole equipment Of
the troops was still so cumbersome az to unfit them
completely for mOun.sin warfare, and especially a.
tire when roads can scarcely be said to have ex-
listed. The consequence was that, as soon as these
slow. moving armies we're once entanged in difficult
ground, they stuck fast, while the lightly armed
Swiss peasants were enabled to act on the often
siye, to Out.maneuver, to surround and finally to
defeat their opponents.
For three centuries after the Burgundian wars
Switzerland was never seriously invaded. The
tradition of Swiss inyineiblity grew venerable
until the French Revolution, an event which tore
into sheds so many venerable traditions, destroyed
ills one too, at least for those acquainted with
military history. Times had changed. The ron
clad cavalry and the heavy psemen had passed
away; tactics had bsen reyOlutionzed dozen times
over: mobility was becoming the chief qualify of
armies the line tactics Of Marlborough, Eu
gene and Frederick the Great were being
upset by the columns and skrmishers OF
The revolutionary arm'es; and from the day
that General BoDaparte passed, in 1876, the
Col ii Cidibone, threw himself betSeen the
scattered Austrian and Sandman columns, defeated
them in front while at The same time intercepting
their retreat in the narrow valleys of the Maritime
Alps, making the most of his opponents prisoners
from that day dates the new science OF mountain
warfare which has put an end to the mpregnability
of Switzerland.
During the period Of line tactics, which immeli-
ately preceded that Of modern warfare all difficult
ground vas stuaiousy avoided by either adversary.
The more level the plain, tue better it was deemed
for battlefield if il only afforded some obstacle to
support one or both wings. But with the French
reyoluticnaT armies, different system began.
An obstacle before the front, covering ground for
z, "
Ousy sought for in any defensive position. Diff
cult ground, upon the whole, was preferred by
them; their troops were far lighter in their move
ments; and their formations, extended order and
columns, admitted not only OF rapid movements in
all directions, but even made it advantageous 10
them to profit by the shelter afforded by broken
ground. al the same time that their opponents
7. r.. 49, - -. Il
ground" was all su. erased from the military
Technology.
The Swiss were made to feel this in l19S when
four French divisions, in spite Of the obstinate re-
sistance OF part Of the inhabitants, and of three
times repeated insurrectiOn OF the old fores. can.
tors, made themselves masters Of the country
which for the next three years, became one of the
most important theaters Of the war between the
French Republic and the Coalition. How little
the French were afraid Of the Inaccessible noun
tains ard narrow gOrses OF Switzerland, they
showed as early as March, 1898, when Massena at
once marched upon the toughest and most noun
tsiuCus canton, the GrisoDs, then occupied by the
Austrian. The latter held the upper valley of the
Rhine. in concentric columns Massena's troops
marched into tina. valley through mountain passes
hardly passsble 10 horses, occupied all the outlets
and after short resistance forced the Austrans 20
lay down their arms. The Austr,ans very soon
prof,ed by this Lesson; under Kotze, General
who gained considerable proficiency in mountain
warfare, they returned to the charge repeated the
same maneuver and drove out the French Then
cane the retreat of Massena to the defen.