Holmes County Republican. [volume] (Millersburg, Holmes County, Ohio) 1856-1865, 1857-05-21

subject while thus within our limits. The
relation of subjection as property, created
by the local law of the State he has left,
cannot follow him beyond the limits of the
sovereignty which established it. In Ohio,
he is man; liable, it may be, to be deliv-
cred up on due claim and proof but yet q
man, 'a person held to service" !" and, in eve
ry other respect than this, a free man.
When once so delivered up, and taken back
to the State from which he escaped, the
relation of slave may reattach under local
law. Until then, subject only to this IL
ability, he remains free.
In the case now before this Court, there
was no escape from Kentucky into Ohio
Poindexter came into Ohio, on several oc-
casions, with the consent, or by the order
of the plaintiff. So coming, he was be-
yond the reach of the local law which had
enslaved him, and subject to no claim as n
fugitive servant. So coming, he became
entitled to the full benefit of the express
prohibition of Slavery by our State Con-
slitut:on. To all intents and purposes
whatsoever, he was free; his condition and
status was that of a free man; his master,
he consenting to his coming, must be held
to have consented TO his freedom, which
whether he consented or no, was establish
ed by law. And being thus free, wherever
he might go or be taken be could not again
be ensIaved by any law which this Court
can recognize as valid.
And this doctrine has been frequently
held. even in States where enforced prop
erty in men, with all its repulsive features
and odious attributes, is sanctioned and
upheld by the local law. Marie Louise v.
Marat, L. R. AIS; Smith v. Smith, 13
L. R. 444.
If a person held rs slave can be brought
or sent into Ohio for one hour, and still
retain his status as slave, then the same
thing can be done for day, week, a
month, a year, lifetime; and thus this
institution, the shame of our country, and
the opprobrium of Christendom, be virtual
ly established on soil so early, so often,
and so solemnly devoted. to absolute freedom.
Upon the declaration of independence
until very recently, it was never questioned
that, in the United States, person once
legally free is always free. The doctrine
has been regarded as a part of American
common law. Courts have differed as to
facts which constitute title to freedom,
but havn, almost with one mind, concur
red in the doctrine that no man once free,
can be again enslaved except for crime.
In my judginent-and such understand
to be the Judgment also of four of the five
members of this Court-Po Poindexter, hav-
ing come into free State otherwise than
by escape, was free; and having thus be-
come free, could not again be reduced to
slavery. And this opinion governs the de-
cision of majority of the Court; because
if free, the note given in consideration of
emancipation, was without considerations,
and therefore void.
But, it is said that the note was last
given in consideration of compromise
and release of doubtful claim and there
fore is valid. Not so; the promise was
made by Poindexter Will, under duress,
and wrongful duress, in consideration of re-
lease from that usurped dominion, and
therefore imposes no valid obligation either
in morals or in law. Parsons on Con-
tracts, 81 ,Maysv' Cincinnati, O.S.R,26s.
We are aware that in Kentucky it has
been decided that person held as a slave
in that State, who may have been taken
for temporary purpose, into Free State,
and brought, or coming back again, is not
thereby enfranchised, but is remanded to
the condition in which he was before held ;
and it is urged that the principle of inter
national and interstate comfy requires us
to recognize and enforSe this rule. The
clear and sufficient answer 10 this claim is,
that comfy is not a matter to be demand
ed as right, else it would cease to be comi-
ty. Like courtesy among individuals, how
far the principal of State comfy shall be
carried in any case or class of cases, is at
the discretion of the State called on for its
exercise. And no State of the civilized
world has ever felt itself bound to carry
the doctrine of comfy to the extent of SUBJ
verting its own established policy. But,
it is said, it is no part of the policy of
Ohio to discourage emancipation in Ken
lucky. This is true; and it is also true
that it is no part of the policy of Ohio 10
encourage emancination in Kentucky
Ohio has nothing to do with the subject of
emancipation in Kentucky. But she has
something to do with the status of persons
coming within her own jurisdiction; and it
is properly part of her policy to see to it
that violation Of the rights growing out
of that status shall not, in her courts, be re-
cognized as valid foundation of n legal
obligation.
The enslavement by local authority of a
man once free, presents the monstrosity of
n legalized wrong; it is iniquity intensified
and hardened into law; and when the sub
ject is legitimately before us, it is due to
the principle of righteousness which is the
soul of all law worthy of the name, and it
becomes us as the administrators of such
law, to protest against, condemn, and, as
far as may be, consistently with the con-
stitutional obligation, to nullJyd. because
it IS acrong, rather than to lend it an lndi-
rect sanction through morbid exaggera-
ton of the spirit of courtesy.
The policy of Kentucky is to uphold the
claims of masters. Her courts, upholding
this policy, refuse to recognize and obliga-
ton of comfy or otherwise, to enforce the
Ohio rule of Freedom. Collins v. Ameri-
ca, 8, B. Monroe, 512.
Tho fundamental, organic and unremit-