Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1857-03-25
From the Philadelphia North American.
THE LATE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
NO AUTHORITY.

ence to the government and laws than in our
own /; and the philosophical observer must pro-
nounee us law abiding people. We have res
pected the decisions of our higher courts, as
though they were oracles of divinity, and have
regarded their adjudication of question as
the end of all strife. We. ourselves still adj
here TO the doctrine of the supremacy of the
law; and if the recent decision of the Su-
preme Court the constitutionality of the
MissouriCompromise and kindred questions is
a lawful and binding decision, We see no alter
native but to treat it as the law of the land
while it remains unreversed, unless we are pre-
pared to revolutionize the government But
the question has arisen-a question full of mo-
mentous consequences-whethcr the decision,
after ALL is actually binding in law, or is moth
ing more than the mere unofficial opinion of
the majority Of the judges. Judge Mclean af-
firms in unequivooal language that it is not
binding and Judge Curtis fully comedies with
him. This is high authority and they estab-
lish their conclusion by the most cogent and
obvious reasons. If these two associate Judges
are correct in their position, then the whole
subject stands just where it stood before the
decision was ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS still has
the power, which it has always exercised, to
legislate on the slavery question in the terri
tories, and the Missouri Compromise, founded
on that power of Congress, is still conStitu-
tional nor has the STAKEHOLDER right to keep
his slaves with him in any part of the national
domain where the institution has not been es-
tablished by law.
We are particular in quoting the language of
these two justices, that we may not appear to
attribute sentiments to them which are not full
ly and clearly expressed in their own words.
Our first extract is from the opinion of the ven
cradle Judge Mclean. sin this case,'' he says,
''a majority of the Court have said that slave
may be taken by his master into a territory of
the United States, the same as horse or any
other kind of property. 1t is true this was
said by the Court, as also many other things
which are of authority. Nothing which has
been said by them which has not a direct bear
ing on the jurisdiction of the Court, against
which they decided, can be considered as au-
torify. / shall certainly not regard it as such.
The question of jurisdiction being before the
Court, was decided by them authoritatively,
but nothing beyond that question" The only
question which the Supreme COuIt consider
ed, in reference to the case of Dred Scott was
the question whether that case legitimately
fell within the jurisdiction of the DistrictCourt
of the United States, from whence it was then
appealed to the Supreme Court in full bench
in other words, whether any United States
Conrt could take judicial cognizance of it.
On the ground that this Scott was not citi-
zen, because of his African descent, the ma
jority of the bench decided that the case did
not legitimately fall within the jurisdiction of
a United States Court. This was the question
which they considered and this was the man
ner in which they settled it. Holding that
they could not lawfully adjudcate upon case
in which one of the parties claiming to be
citizen was yet in reality no citizen of the u
nited States, they dismissed it; and so far
their decision is binding, carrying with it the
highest legal authority.
The position of Judge Mclean is, that when
they had settled this matter of jurisdiction,
the case was ipso facto terminated, and they
had nothing more to do with it. But when they
have decided the question before them, they
are not disposed to stop there. They go on
much farther. They take up series of ques-
tions relating to the subject of slavery in gen.
eral, questions which have entered deeply into
the politics of the country, and give their o.
pinion upon them in all the forms of judicial
decision, intending to settle them forever
But as this whole procedure is without any
bearing on the question of jurisdiction-the
only subject matter before the Court, as they
themselves judically affirm-the judge pro-
nounces it of no authority. 1t is not binding
in law. 1t is not TO be referred to hereafter in
the settlement of any practical question. 1t
is not TO be consulted as precedent. Their
opinion on the power of Congress to legislate
upon slavery in the territories; on the consti
tutionality of the Missouri Compromise; on
the nature of slave property as compared with
other property, being founded on no case ac-
tually before the court calling for decision,
is cxtrajudicial, and is nothing more than the.
opinion of so many private men. s'It cannot
be considered as authority. | shall certainly
not regard it as such.' This is the language
of Judge Mclean, who has occupied seat on
the bench of the federal court for long term
OF years, whose profound iegai ana JuulClal at
tainments, whose ripe experience and calm
wisdom, whose pure character, tried through
long life, and never found to be other than
pold unalloyed, have won for him the respect
of his countrymen, a thousand fold greater
than that which the mere office brings. This
venerable judge.with all the responsibility that
attaches to him, declares that the decision of
the Court on these foreign questions is without