The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1857-04-02
THE NATIONAL ERA: WASHINGTON, D. G, APRIL 2, 1857
tiff; by force of the laws of he Territory of

tiff, by force Of the laws of he Territory o
Wisconsin.
l say the law of Missouri, Eecause a judi
cial tribunal, in one State or oAtien, can rec
ognise personal rights acquire 5Sby force of tn,
law of any other State or natiees only so far al
it is the law of the State that the rights should
be recognised. But, in the absfnce of positiv,
law to the contrary, the will of svery civilized
State must be presumed to bl to allow such
effect to foreign laws as is in sscordance with
the settled rules of internatio.Al law. Ane
legal tribunals are bound to act ca this presump
ton. 1t may be assumed thatthe motive o.
the State in allowing such operation to foreign
laws is what has been termed comfy. But
as has justly been said, (per CA.ef Justice Ia
ney, l3 Pet, 5S9,) it is the comfy of the State
not of the court. The judges seve nothing tt
do with the motive of the State. Their duty i:
simply to ascertain and give e}sect to its will
And when it is found by them hat its will tt
depart from q rule of internstic al law has moi
been manifested by the State, tsey are bound
to assume that its will is to gle effect to it
Undoubtedly, every sovereign S, Ate may refuse
to recognise change, wrought W the law OF 8
foreign State, on the status of person while
within such foreign State, even n cases where
the rules of international law r auire that rec
ignition. Its will to refuse 81 ID recognition
may be manifested by what term statute
law, or by the customary law Of the State. II
is within the province of its JUG scial tribunals
to inquire and adjudge whetE Err it appears
from the statute or customary Il W Of the State
to be the will of the State to ref e to recognise
such changes of status by force If foreign law
as the rules of the law of nation require to be
recognised. But, in my opinion it is not with
in the province of any judicial tri .unal to refuse
such recognition from any poll ical corsidera
tons, or any view it may take { the exterior
political relations between the 5. ate and one OF
more foreign States, or any imp essions it may
have that q change of foreign Union and &C
ton on the subject of Slavery may afford a
reason why the State should e iange its own
action. To understand and giS just effect to
such considerations, and to chaa e the action Of
the State in consequence of then, are functions
of diplomatists and legislators, bot of judges.
The inquiry to be made on bis part of the
case is, therefore, whether the z Iate of Missouri
has, by its statute, or its custot ,ary law, mani
tested its will to displace any Vile of interna
tional law, applicable to chares of the status
of slave by foreign law.
/ have not heard it suggested that there was
any statute of the State of Mi sfigan bearing
on this question. The custom'ty law of Mis-
souri, is the common law, introd ICED by statute
in 1916. Il Ter. Laws, 1867 And the com
mon law, as Blackstone says, ID CON-, 67,)
adopts in its full extent the law of nations,
and holds it to be part of the aw OF the land.
/ know of no sufficient warrant for declaring
that any rule of international lass, concerning
the recognition, in that State, G a change OF
status, wrought by an extra-terri orial law, has
been displaced or varied by tbA will of the
State of Missouri.
l proceed, then, to inquire wllst the rules OF
international law prescribe 60 lcerning the
change of status of the plaintiff, ' rought by the
law Of the Territory of Wisconst.
1t is generally agreed by wriIess upon inter
national law-and the rule has been judicialy
applied in great numbers of caats--that wher
ever any question may arise etncerning the
status of person, it must be determined &C
cording to that law which has ,.txt previously
rightfully operated on and fSsa that status
And, further that the laws of a.c ountry do not
rightfully operate upon and fs he status Of
persons who are within its limit ~ ainere, or
who are abiding there for def liie temporary
purposes, as for health, curiositt, Or occasional
business that these laws, kb ,en to writers
on public and private INTERIM tional law as
ants of the country. Not that it is or can be
denied that each Independent nation may, il
it thinks fit, apply them to all persons within
their limits But when this IL done, not in
conformity with the principles { internationa
law, other States are not unfefstood to be
willing to recognise or allow eject to such ap
plications Of personal statutes.
1t becomes necessary, theret ere, to inquire
whether the operation of the las of the Terri
tory of Wisconsin upon the stat IS of the plain
tiff was or was not such an operation as these
principles of international law require other
States to recognise and allow eject to-.
And this renders it needful t, attend to the
particular facts and circumstances of this case
1t appears that this case caAe on for tria
before the Circuit Court and q tlry, upon ar
issue, in substance, whether tie. plaintiff, to
gether with his wife and chilarAn, were tht
slaves of the defendant
The court instructed the jury. that "upon the
facts in this case, the law is with The defendant
This withdrew from the jury tbs consideration
and decision of every matter of Sket. The evi
dence in the case consisted of ssitten admis
sons, signed by the counsel of BE- parties.
the case had been submitted tc the judgment
of the court, upon an agreed sta eshent of facts
entered of record, in place of Fecial verdict
it would have been necessary fct,the court be
low, and for this court, to pronfiunce its judg
inferring any other facts Their from. By tn,
rules of the common law appl 4ble to such
case, and by force of the seventltsarticle of tn,
amendments Of the Consttuticgs this court il
precluded from finding any fact lot agreed t.
by the parties on the record. No submission
to the court on statement of fits was made
1t was trial by jury, in which e rtain admis
sons, made by the parties, were he evidence
The jury were not only compel mt, but wer,
bound to draw from that evidepci every infer
ence which, in their judgment. exc 'cised accord
ing to the rules of law, it would arrant. Tn,
Circuit Court took from the jury the power t,
draw any differences from the &C missions mad
by the parties, and decided the na,se for the de
PENDANT. This course can be jltaifed here, i
at all, only by its appearing, that tpon the fact
agreed, and all such differences o. TACT favorable
to the plaintiffs case as the jurI might have
been warranted in drawing from those admis
sions, the law was with the defen ant. Other
wise, the plaintiff would be deprive of the bene
fit of his trial by jury, by WHOM, for aught W
can know, those differences favora ale to his cas-
would have been drawn.
The material facts agreed, beaIi2g on this par
of the case, are that DR.. Emersoi;the plaintiff
master, resided about two years &, the militar
| post of Fort Smelling, being a rgeon in tn
army of the United States, his dor ,icil of origi
being unknown; and what, if any hiug, he ha
done, to preserve or change his iouicil prio
to his residence at Rock Island, icing also un
| known.
| Now, it is true, that under som, circumstan
ces, the residence of military offc er at partio
ular place, in the discharge of his official du
ties, does not amount to the scfHisition of
technical domicl. But it cantsos be affirmed
with correctness, that it neve,s ioes. Their
being actual residence, and this icing presumr
tive evidence of domici, all the circumstance
of the case must be considered before a lega
conclusion can be reached that Ais place of re: