New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-12-05

have been worth four times it, value when q rest;
that the clearing Of Upper India, with the eIcep
ton Of Delhi, the ree.tablishing Of the comauni-
cations, the crushing Of every attempt of the
insurgents to concentrate force, would have been
obtained, and with it the fall Of Delhi as natural
and easy consequence, are iudnputsbls facts. But
political reasons comm anded that the camp before
Delhi should not be rsised 1t is the wi.eicres 1t
headquarters who sent the army to Delhi that
should be blsmed-not the perseverance, OF the
army in holding out when once there. at the
iar time We must not omit 70 state that the enect
Of the rainy season on this army vas far miider
than was 70 be anticipated, and that with anything
Ike an average amount Of the sickness consequent
upon active operations q. such period, tbs with
drawal or the dissolution of the army would have
been unavoidable. The dangerous position OF the
army lasted till the end Of August The re-
endorsements began to come in, while dssensious
continued to weaken the rebel camp. 10 tue be-
ginning Of September the siege-trsn arrived, and
tie defensive position was changed into an offensive
oue On the eth Of September the first battery
opened its fire. and on the evening of the 18th two
examine what took place during this interval.
II We were to rely, for this purpose, on the off,
cisl dispatch Of Gen. Wilson, We should be very
badly # Indeed This report i, quite IS confused
a. tie documents issued from toe English head
quarters in the Crimea ever were. No man living
could make out from that report the position of
the two breaches or the relative position and order
= - h. Ua ayraruai
IA TO the private reports, they are, Of course,
still more lopeessly confused. Fortunately one of
those skIlful scientific officers who deserve nearly
he whole credit Of the success, member of the
Bengal Engineers and Artillery has given report
of what occurred, in The Bombay Gazette, as clear
and busness-lke as it 10 simple and unpretsndins.
During the whole of the Crimesn war not one En-
glish officer was found able TO write report as SEN
sble as this Unfortunately he got wounded on
the first Day Of the as,ault, and then his letter
stops As to later transactions, are, therefore,
still quite 10 the dark.
The English had strengthened the defenses Of
Delhi so far that they could resist siege BY an
Asiatic army. According to our modern notions,
Delhi was scarcely to be called fortress, but
merely place secured against the fsrcibe assault
Of field force. Its masonry wall Is feet high and
II feet thick, crowned by parapet of feet
thick IS ind feet hight offered feet Of masonry
tssde the psrapet, uncovered by the glacis and
exposed to the direct FIRE of the attack. The
narrOwnets Of this masosry rampant put it out OF
the question TO place cannon anywhere, except In
the bastious and martelo towers. These latter
fauked the curtain but very impsrfectly, aud a
masonry parapet of three feet thickness being
easily battered down by siege guns field pieces
could do it, to silence the fire of the defense, and
particularly the guns HsnkDg the ditch, was very
easy. Between wall and ditch there was wide
BERN or level road, facilitating the formation of
practicable breach, and the ditch, under these cir
cumstances, instead Of being coupe gorge for any
force that got entapgled in it, became resting
place to reform those columns that had got into
disorder while advancing on tie gacis.
To advance sgsinst such place, with regular
trerctes, according 10 the rules Of siege, would
have been insane, even II the first condition had
not been wanting, viz, force sufficient to invest
the place op all sides. Tie state Of the defenses
the Reorganization and linking spirit of the de-
fenderr would have rendered every other mode Of
attack than the one pursued an absolute fault
This mode is very well known to military men
under the name Of the iorcible attack (dttagus de
rire .toree). The desenses, being such only as to
render an open attack impossible without heavy
guns, are dealt with sumnarily by the artillery;
tie Interior Of the place is all the while sheled, sod
IS soon as the breaches are practicable the troops
advance 10 the assault.
The front under attack was the northern ono, d.
rectly opposite to the English camp. This font is
COMPOSED of two curtains and three bastOns, form.
irg ,lightly reanteriDg argyle at the central (the
Ca.hmere) bastiOn. The eastern position, froa
the Cashmere TO the Wafer bsstiOn, is the shorter
ore. and projects little in front of the western
position, between the Cashmere and the Moree
bastions. The ground in front OF the Cashmere
and Water bastions was covered with low juogle,
gardens, houses, &c which had not been le7eied
down By the Sepoys, and afforded shelter to the at
tack This circumstance explains how it vas
penible that the English could so often follow the
sepo,s under the very guns Of the place, which was
at that time considered extremely heroic, but was
in fact matter of little danger so long IS they had
this coyer) Besides, at about 400 or 800 yards
from this front, deep ravine ran In the same di
rection as the WALL so as to form natural
parallel for the attack. The river, besides,
giving capital basis to the English lefs the
slight salient formed by the Cashmere and
Water bastions was selected very properly as the
main point Of attack. The western curtain aud
bastions were simultaneously subjected to simu-
lated attack, and this msneuver succeeded 90 well
that the main force of the Sepoys was directed