New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-06-20

Partisan rather than French institution. The
new privileges bestowed upon it by the Revolution
airy Government transformed it into private con-
Germ Of national dimensions. Thus, thanks to the
clever management of d'Argout, the monopoly of
the financial ari,tocracy which the Revolution
of February intended 10 break down, was ex-
tended, strengthened, recognized, through the
very fundamentally Of that Revolution itself
The second great catastrophe which dArgout
had to confront was the coup dctat the success of
which mainly hinged upon the forcible opening Of
the Bank Golfers intrusted to his guardianship.
The plant Governor not only winked at Bonapartss
burglary. but contributed much TO assuage the APP
prehensions of the commercial world, by sticking
to his post at moment when the exodus from the
administration Of all respectable or would-be re-
spectacle people threatened seriously to cOmpro-
mise the usurper In reward for these good SER
vices Bonaparte consented to take no advantage of
the proyiso in The last renewal of the Bank charter
in $40, by which its statutes might have been re-
yised in 1885, DArgout, ike his friend the late
Marshal Soult, never evinced fidelity to anything
but place and salary. His resignation at this mo-
ment Of the GOvernorship Of the Bank of France
can only be accounted for on the same principle
that, according to popular belief, prompts rats to
leave falling houses.
The history of the new Bank law marks it as
one Of those low jobs that distinguish the era of the
present Empire. During the financial crisis which
broke out in Europe at the end of 1876, the altera-
ton If the existing Bank law was first moOted on
the plausible pretext that the enormous transactions
of the Bank rested on too small a capital For
more than six months, mysterious conferences were
held in the presence of Napoleon I'LL, between the
representatives of the Bank on the one hand, and
the great fDanciers Of Paris the Ministers and the
Council of State on the other. Yet the present
bill was not presented to the Corps Legslatif till
that body was on the eve of its final dissolution
In the preliminary discussions in the bureaur,
it was violently attacked the Committee ap-
pointed to report upon it literally tore it
to pieces; and there were even threats OF
rejecting the project altogether. But Bona
psrte knew his creatures. He caused an init
nation to reach them that Government was deter
mined, and that they must make up their minds
either to pass the bill or be turned out of their
sinecures at the approaching election. To assist
them in parting with the last remnants of shame,
the last day of the session was singled out for the
discussion of the law. 1t was then OF course
passed, with some insignificant amendments. What
must be the features of law which required so
much management in order to its passage by such
body as this Corps Legislatfl
In fact, in the time of Louis Philippe himself,
L. DonJ oc on1 tba Pat bech;lds
VIGOROUSLY enabled to lay an embargo upon all
legislative projects not to their taste, no minister
would have dared to propose such a complete
surrender of the State to them. The Government
resigns the power, still guaranteed by the Charter
of 1876, of amending the new Bank Act before
its expiration. The privileges of the Bank, which
have still ten years to run, are beneyolenty pro-
onged for further term Of thirty years. 1t is al
lowed TO lower the denomination of its notes to 50
francs the importance of which clause will be fully
understood when we consider that the introduction
in 1913 of 200 and 10a franc notes enabled the
Bank to replace about $50 000 900 of gold and sill
yer by its own paper. Of the enormous profits,
which are sure to accrue to the Bank from this
change no share whatever is reserved for the ma
ton, which, on the contrary, has to pay the Bank
for the credit conferred upon the latter in the name
Of France. The privilege OF establishing branch
banks in the departments in which they do not yet
exist, is bestowed upon the Bank of France, not as
a concession made by the Government to the Bank
but, on the contrary, as a concession made by the
Bank to the Government. The permission to
charge its customers more than the legal per cent
interest is encountered with no other obligation but
that Of adding the profits thus derived to its capital
and not TO its yearly dividends. The reduction of
the interest upon its current accounts with
the Treasury from four to three per cent
is more than compensated by the dropping Of the
clause of the act of 1910, which obliged the Bank
to charge no interest at all whenever the account
stood below 1000, 900, the common average of
those accounts being 81, 0C0 00O Last, not least,
the newly created 81, $50 shares of the nominal |
value of ,000 francs exclusively ascrlbed to |
the holders of the 81, $50 shares actually exist
ing; and the Bank shares being now sold on the |
Bourse at the price of $500 francs, these new
shares are to be be delivered to the old sharehold-
ers at the price of 100 francs This act, so en-
tirely framed in favor of the BankOcracy at the
pense of the State affords most conclusive proof of
the monetary straits to which the Bonapartst Gov |
eminent finds itself already driven. As an equva-
lent for all its concessions, that Government re- |
ceives the sum of S2O, coo, 600, which the Bank is
obliged to invest in three per cent reHtes, to be
created for this purpose and the minimum price of
which is fixed at 75 francs. The whole transac
ton seems strongly to support the notion circu-
lated on the Continent of Europe, that Bonaparte |
has already drawn 10 large amount on the Golfers