Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1857-05-16

the original wrong, may attach Immediately after
birth, as the effect Of positive law in derogation of
natural right. But still. it remains true, that the
absolute snd equal freedom Of all persons at birth,
isa fundamental principle Of American institu-
tons, proclaimed with indie Evidence, and incara-
BILE Of abrogation. This principle was, by the
ordinance of 1877, impressed on the soil of Ohio,
before there was an organized community within
her limits it is fundamental in her organization
always embodied in her constitution and her
laws, her policy, and the convictions, the morals,
and the religion Of her people, ore instinct with
its spirit,
The moment any person comes within the terri
torial limits of Ohio, his personal rights are ascer-
tanned and determined by tho constitution and
laws of Ohio. There is no exception to this rule,
save in the case oil q person, who, being held to
service in another State, escapes into this. In
such a case, tho Constitution of the United States
declares that the fugitive "shall he delivered up on
claim of the party to whom such service or labor
may be due"
There is nothing in this article Of compact
which gives any sanction TO that slavery, the es-
sential elements of which il asserted property in
man nothing inconsistent with the purpose OF
the Trainers Of that Constitution, clearly manifest
ed in their debates as reported by Mr.. Madison, to
avoid all recognition of 1.-THE idea that there may
be property in man."-3d Madison Papers, 1929
80.
1t establishes no rule which does not apply
! CHuuiiN w MI HOIoOio ntIu W AZ tohSo
up and deals with the broad and general relation
of master and servant, but has nothing whatever
to DO with the relation of owner ond property.
When therefore, a person held MS a slave in
another State, escapes into this State, he ceases
to be, in any proper sepse Of the word, n slave
And the Courts of Ohio, | apprchend, would de-
cline to recognize or enforce any contract or pur-
chase or sale, wherever made, If which he might
be the subject while thus within our limits. The
relation of subsection as property, created by
the local law Of the State he has left cannot
follow him beyond the limits of the sovereignty
bic, it may be, to be delivered up on due claim
and proof, but yet n man" n person held tu serv-
ice" and, in every other respect than this, a free
man. When once so delivered up, and taken
back to the State from which he escaped, the re.
lation of a slave may reattach under the local law.
Until then, subject only to this liability, he re.
mains free.
In the case now before this Court, there was no
escape from Kentucky into Ohio. Poindexter
came into Ohio, on several occasions, with the
consent, or by the order oil the plaintiff. So com.
ing, he was beyond tic reach of the local law
when had enslaved him, and subject to no CLAIM
as a fugitive servant. So coming, he became en-
titled to the full benefit of the express prohibition
Of Slavery by our State Constitution. To all in.
tents and purposes whatsoever. he was free his
condition and status was that of q freeman his
master, by consenting to his coming, must be held
to have consented to his freedom, which, whether
be consented or not, was established by law. And
being thus free, wherever he might go or be taken
he could not again be enslaved by any law which
this Court can recognize as valid.
And this doctrine has been frequ emily held,
even in States where enforced property in men,
with all its repulsive features and odious attri.
butes, is sanctioned and upheld by the local law.
Marie Louise v. Marat, 9 L. X. AIS Smith v.
Smith, Is l.. X. 444.
If a person held as a slave can be brought or
sent into Ohio for one hour, and still retain his
status as a slave, then the same thing can be done
for o day, a week, a month, n year, a lifetime
and thus this institution, the shame of our coun-
tually established on a soil so early, so often, and
so s0lemnly devoted to absolute freedom.
From the declaration of Independence until
, very recently, it,was never questioned that, in thu
E United States, a person once legally free is Away,
I free. The doctrine has been regarded az n par
of American common law. Courts have differed
as to facts which constitute q title to freedom bu
have almost with one mind. concurred in the doc
trine that no man once free, can be again enslav
2 ed except for crime. In my judgement-anC
D such / understand to be the judgement also of fou'
' of the five members of this Court-Poindexter
2 having come into a free State otherwise than BY
escape, was free and having thus become free
could not again be reduced to slavery. And thi
opinion governs the decision Of a majority of tn,
Court because if free, the note given in consid
Grafton of emancipation, was without considera
ton, and therefore void.
But, it is said that the note was at least given il
i conside ration of a compromise and release of
doubtful claim, and therefore is valid. Not so
sl the promise was made by Poindcxter while under
t duress, and wrongful duress. in consideration o.
release from that usurped dominion, and therefore
imposes no valid obligation either in morals or in
law. | Parsons on Contracts, 3lS: Mays V. Gin,
cinnuti, l O. S.. r 26S.
We are aware that in Kentucky it has been de
cided that a person held as a slave in that State
who may have been taken for q temporary pur
nose, into q Free State, and brought, or coming
back again, is not thereby enfranchised, but is re-
manded to the condition in which he was before
held and tits urged that the principle of inter
national and interstate comfy requires us to rec
0gnize and enforce this rule. The clear and sufi
cient answer to this claim is, that comfy is not
matter to be demanded as a right, else it woult
!. cease to be comfy. Like courtesy among indi
! viduals, how far the principle OF State comfy
shall be carried in any case or class of cases. ia o
the discretion Of the State called On for its exar
else. And no State of the civilized world ha,
ever felt itself bound to carry the doctrine of com
ity 70 the extent of subverting it's own established
policy.
But, it is said, it is no part of the policy Of
Ohio to discourage emancipation in Kentucky
This is true and it is also true that it is no par
of the policy of Ohio 10 encourage emancipation
in Kentucky. Ohio has nothing to do with the
subject of emancipation in Kentucky. But she
has something to do with the status of persons
coming within her own jurisdiction and it is pro.
perly part of her policy to see to it that a viola
ton of the rights growing out of that status shall
not, in her courts. be recognized as a valid founda
Of n legal obligation.
The enslavement by local authority of a man
once free. presents the monstrosity of a legalized
wrong it is iniquity Intensified and hardened into
law and when the subject is ~legitimately before
US, it is due to that principle Of righteousness,
G which is the soul of all law worthy of the name
. and it becomes Us as the administrators of snct
a law, to protest against, condemn, and, as far al
may be. consistently with constitutional obligation
9 10 nuu!H ii. because ii is ,Orong, rather than to lent
0 il an indirect sanction through a morbid exagge-a
. ton of the spirit of courtesy,
The policy Of Kentucky is to uphold the claim
o Of masters. Her courts, upholding this policy, re
fuse to recognize any obligation of comfy or other
> wise. to enforce the Ohio rule of Freedom, Collin
n v. Americ, 9, B. Monroe, $40.
e The fundamental, organic and unremitted polio,