New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1857-10-13
vidua responsibility might be doubtfal-ss least in
tie present times-nto the hands Of holders OF IN
question able means.

yesterday has two prominent points, namely, tuc
failure of Gen. Hsveock to advance to the relief Of
| Lucknow, and the persistenee Of the English at
| Delhi. This latter fact finds q parallel only in
Britnh annals, and in the Walcheren expedition.
The failure of that expedition having become GER
tain toward the middle of August, 1909, they de-
lsyed resmbarkiDg until November. Napoleon,
| when he learned that an English army had landed
at that place. recommended that it should not be st
tackled, and that the French should leave its de-
struction to the disease to do them more injury
than the cannon, without its costing one Genuine to
France. The present Great Mogul, even moro ia
vored than Napoleon, finds himself able to back the
disease by his sales and bis salies By the disease
A British Government dispatch, dated Cagliari,
Sept g. tells us that the latest dates from Delhi
"are to the 10Th ofAugust when that city was still
Sin possession of the rebels; but that an attack
"was expected to be made shortly, as Gen. Nichol-
"son was within days march with considerable
"reenforcements.' If Delhi is not taken till Will
son and Nicholson attack it with their present
strength its walls will stand till they fall Of them
selves. Nicholson's considerable forces amount to
about 900 Sikhs-a Reinforcement absurdly dis
| proportonate for an attack upon Delhi, but just
large enough 10 afford new suicidal pretext for
not breaking up the camp before the city.
After Gen. Hewitt had committed the fault, and
one may even in military point of view say the
crime Of permitting Meerut rebels to make their
way to Delhi, and after the two first weeks had
been wasted, allowing an irregular surprise of that
city, the planning of the siege Of Delhi appears an
almost ncomprehensible bunder. An authority
which We shall take the liberty Of placing even above
| the military oracles Of The London Times, Napo-
leon lays down two rules of warfare looking almost
like commonplaces: 1st That "only what can be
supported ought to be undertaken and only what
presents the greatest number of chances Of sue
:" cess" and 2dly. That "the main forces should
"be employed only where the main object Of war,
the destruction of the enemy, lies." In planning
the siege of Delhi these rudimental rules have been
violated. The authorities in England must have
been aware that the Indian Government itself had
recently repaired the Notifications Of Delhi so far
that that city could be captured by regular siege
only, requiring besiegpg force of at least 1000
to 90, 600 men, and much more, if the defense was
conducted in an average style Now, $1,000 to
90, 600 men being requisite for this enterprise twas
downright folly to undertake it with 5000 or 1000.
The English were further aware that prolonged
siege, matter Of course in consequence OF their
numerical weakness, would expose their forces in
that LEGALITY in that climate, and at that season, to
the attacks of an invunerabe and invisible enemy,
spreading the seeds Of destruction among their
rar ks. The chances Of success, therefore, were
all against siege Of Delhi
As to the object of the war; it was beyond doubt
the maintenance of English rule in India TO attain
that object, Delhi was q point of no strategical
significance at all. Historical tradition, in truth,
endowed it in the eyes of the natives with
superstitious importance, clashng with its real in.
luence, ard this was sufficient reason for the
mutinous SepOys to single it out as their general
place of rendezvous But if, instead of forming
their military plans according TO the native
prejudices, the English had left Delhi alone and
isolated it, they would have Invested it of its fanced
influence; while, by pitching their tents before it,
running their heads against it, and concentrating
upon it their main force and the attention Of the
world, they cut Themselves off from even the
chances Of retreat, or rather gave to q retreat all
the effects Of signal defeat. They have thus
simply played into the hands of the mutineers who
wanted to make Delhi the object Of the campaign.
But this is not all. No great ingenuity
was required to convince the English that for them
it was of prime importance to create an active
field army, whose operations might stfe the sparks
of disAfection, keep open the communications be-
tween their own military stations throw the enemy
upon some few points, and isolate Delhi. Instead
of acting upon this simple and selfevident plan,
they immobiize the only active army ct their dis
posa by concentrating it before Delhi, leave the
open field to the mutineers, while their oHn garri-
sons hold scattered spots, disconnected, far dis
tant from each other and blocked up BY overwhelm-
ing hostile forces allowed to take their own time.
By fixing their main mobile column before Delhi,
the English have not choked up the rebels, butpet
rfed their own garrisons. But, apart from this
fundamental blunder at Delhi there is hardly any
thing in the annals of war 10 equal the stupidity
which directed the operations Of these garrisons,
actrg Independently irrespsctively Of each other,
lacking all supreme leadership, and acting not like
members of one army, but Ike bodies belonging 70
different and even hostile nations. Take, for In
stance, the case Of CawnpOre and Lucknow. There
were two adjacent places, and two separate bodies
Of troops, both very small and dsproportiOnate to
the occasion, placed under separate commands,
though they were only forty miles apart, and with
a. little unity Of action between them as if situated
at the opposite peles. The simplest rules Of strate
ey would have required that Sir Hugh Wheeler,
the military commander at CawnpOre, should be
.mpowered TO call Sir II. Lawrence, the chief
: n,1a Ma troons hark tn