Washington sentinel. [volume] (City of Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1856, 1856-02-26
From the Richmond Dispatch, of Feb. %
The Parsons Case--Rtg hts OF Slave +

=
Owners. 4H
The Governor communicated to the two
Houses of the Legislature, on yesterday, the
report of John Randolph Tucker, esq, the
commissioner appointed by him under the au-
thority of the Legislature, to attend the trial of
James Parsons, jr, at his recent arraignment
before the court of Blair county, Pennsylvania.
The Governor takes occasion to express very
decidedly, his opinions and sentiments touch
ing the Northern encroachments upon South
ern rights, and the duty of the South TO resist
them. -zssaast 80 ssasassaaa..
The report of Mr.. Tucker is an able docu-
ment. We extract below from it the argument
relative to the case of Parsons, and the general
view touching the rights of slave owners, which
will be found highly interesting.
Mr.. Tucker having briefly stated the time of
his departure, and after some delay his arrival
at Hollidaysburg, in Blair county, on the 10Th
January, the day before the trial, proceeds as
follows: 1870
was gratifed to learn from several sources
reliable IN their character, that the public SEN
timent OF the county was not unpropitious to
the fair and impartial trial of the case, which
your appointment had conided to me; and as
the result proved, the information was correct.
1t is further, but just to say, that the utmost
courtesy was rendered, and that respect was
paid to me, which, however agreeable, per-
sonally, was more SO, as it was no doubt in
tended to represent as a tribute of honor to
the State was deputed to represent.
70 hat hal, L. ~
ington, | learned that Mr.. Parsons had secured
the services of the Hon. c. j. Faulkner, whose
matured experience and abilitywere guarantees
of the efficiency of the defence of the cause
Upon the morning of the both January, the
day of the trial, | was surprised to find that
new charge had been made and new indct-
ment sent to the grand jury then in session.
The indictment was found charging in sub
stance riotous seizure and carrying away Of a
negro-breach of the peace, &c. This re-
newed attack while it seemed to be an ac-
acknowledgement of the weakness of the prosecu-
ton upon the prior indictment for kidnapping,
seemed to indicate tenacity of purpose, in
holding to some penal responsibility the young
citizen of Virginia, whose rights had been SO
seriously invaded and whose liberty had been
endangered. This view was confirmed by the
fact that in Pennsylvania jury, in cases of
misdemeanor, Ito which class kidnapping,)
though punished by confinement in the Pen-
tertiary, belongs,) may find the accused not
guilty, and yet adjudge in their discretion, that
he shall pay the cost of the prosecution, and
it was insisted in the progress Of the cause that
such verdict should be rendered.
We determined to try all the charges by the
same jury. A curry was selected according to
the form prevailing in the State, and was sworn.
The two indictments transmit herewith.
The statute under which this prosecution was
conducted may be found in Purdon's Digest,
Gil. l
That the purpose of its enactment was prac
tically to annul the constitutional rights OF the
STAKEHOLDER, is upon its face clear and indisput-
able-and is historically certain. The bad
faith indicated in the section, refusing the use
of the jails of the State for the reception of
fugitive slaves, throw shadow over an honor,
which has been, in great degree, removed by
its repeal.
But the provision, the obvious tendency of
which is to make the STAKEHOLDER Rotor when
asserting his constitutional rights, become no.
toriously opposed by mobs, continues as a blot
upon the statute book, and good faith earnestly
demand its repeal. 74a
In the opening Of the case by the counsel,
assisting in the prosecution, it was insisted,
that as JAS Parsons, jr., was not the owner Of
the slave seized, but was an agent, he had no
right, without written authority under seal, from
the owner, and warrant from the u. s. Com
missioner, to seize the negro slave, because the
act of 1850 required these forms in certain pro-
ceedings under it. This view seemed to rest
upon the idea that the provisions Of the fugitive
act of 1850 were restrictions upon the rights of
the slave owners and were mandatory upon
him.
1t is wholly fallacious. 1t rests at last upon
the notion that the legal status Of the fugitive
is changed by passing from the slave State to
the free State. The service TO which he is
held under Virginia law, in Virginia, binds
him and is not discharge in Pennsylvania &c.
u. S. Art. A, sec. 81 The same right, there
fore, which the master had in Virginia the
slave carries in his fight to Pennsylvania.
The right to seize him pertaining to the
master in Virginia, by virtue of the Constitu-
ton, pertains TO him in Pennsy lvania, and as
the constitution is the supreme law, irrepeal-
able by ordinary statute, Federal or State, that
right is independent of and cannot be taken
away, or modified by any Federal or State law.
The same reasoning applies to the right Of
an agent Of the master to seize the fugitive. 1t
exists by parol in Virginia, il exists by parol
in Pennsylvania.
State and Federal laws may aid the master,
and help to carry out the Constitution, in his
favor-but by no jot or title can either restrict
or impair his rights under it.
This is the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Priggs' case reported in l6 Peters. 1t was,
in fact, substantially similar TO this case, and
the point mooted by the prosecuting counsel in
this was decided in that, according to the rea-
soning / have adopted.
Three forms of opinion prevailed upon the
bench Chief Justice fancy and others held
that the Constitutional provision was, as stated
above, selfexecutive that Congress was bound,
having the power, to pass laws to facilitate its
execution and that The States scere hke,oise
obliged TO do the same.
Judge Story and others concurred with Chief
Justice fancy, in the two points, but denied
the last, though they held that all the State
legislation, restrictive Of the Shareholders right
or remedy, under the Constitution and law Of
Congress- was Unconstitutional and void.
Judge Mclean alone held that while the
Constitution gives Congress the power to pass
law in execution of that clause-and, though
prior to the passage Of such law by Congress-