The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1856-02-07

fence. Near 10 III are tne relatively sudllef, uuI
vet considerable, islands of Bonacca Utilla Bar
baret. Helene, and Moerat The islands of Ruatan
and Bonacca are said, by British geographer,
to be- by reason of their fine harbors, good soils,
fine air and abundant animals, as well as their
commanding grounds, proverbially known in that
part of the world the Garden of the West
indies the Key to Spanish America, and new
Gibraltar On the 18th of July, 1850, thirteen
DAYS after the conclusion of the treaty of 1850,
proclamation was issued by the British Govern
ment. constituting the islands before named
colony under the name of the Colony of the
Bay Islands.
The United States insist that Great Britain
shall discontinue this new Colony. Great Britain
refuses and alleges that the Colony is within the
Balize settlement, or British Honduras, and so is
excepted from the treaty. On the contrary, the
islands which are excepted are described i'll the
execution as small islands in the neigbborhood
of the Balize Not only there such small ISL
ands in that place, but they are expressly desert
bed and assigned to the Balize, in the treaty of
1886, while the Bay Islands are neither small
islands nor are they situated in the neighbor-
hood of the Baize, but, on the contrary, they are
islands of considerable magnitude and of historic
importance. The treaty of 1886 assigns them to
the "Spanish Continent" and expressly excludes
Great Britain from them. Great Britain shows
no pretence of title, or even of continued occu-
pancy of them. Spain held them until the
Honduras assumed possession, and placed a flag
ON Ruatan, in 1929. Great Britain caused that
flag to be suppanted by her own in 1889; but
this was Immediately afterwards lowered, and
the flag of Honduras was restored to its place
It is unimportant to follow this petty contention
farther Whatever pretensions Great Britain
may have ever before made to the Bay Islands,
they were all soemnly and forever relinqulshed
and abandoned by her in the treaty of 1880.
have thus reached the conclusion that the
American positions are just and the American
demands are right The final question is a prac-
teal one-What ought the United States now to
do?
can now only glance ut some of the circum-
stances which affect the question. l regret that
it involves in any case possibility of war. Al
though believe sometimes juStihable, re-
gard it always nevertheless as a calamity and an
evil do not agree with either those who suppose
it contributes to national prosperity or those who
| regard it as a salutary discipline of States.
should therefore deeply deplore any war with any
nation, and, more than any other, war with
| Great Britain. That Power no longer arms alone.
Its wealth and influence easily secure allies. Nor
| in such contest should we be unaided The
adjacent American States, at least, would CO.
operate with us. 1t would therefore be gene
raj war, and consequently, more extensively in
| furious and widely demoralizing than any other
| in which we could be engaged. 1t would more
over renew and practically perpetuate an aliena-
ton between two fraternal States on whose
| common guidance (only secured through their
concord) the advancing nations largely depend.
| | deprecate a war, moreover, because it can be
avoided unless there shall be fault on both sides,
or on one side and therefore in one sense 1t
would be unnecessary conflict. Notwithstand-
| ing the occasional occurrence of misapprehen-
sions and irritatons the world is yet wide enough
| for both nations and for all nations. We are
| Tho Of crcfa A rpan a
Britain is the centre of another, an European
| one. Almost in spite of ourselves, we are stead
| lily extending and increasing our control over
| these continents Notwithstanding her tena-
city, she is constantly losing her dominion
| here This is within the order of Nature. 1t
| was for three hundred years the business of
| European nations to colonize discipline, and edu-
cate American nations. 1t is the business
| of those nations to govern themselves. The de-
| cline of European power here practically began
1 with the fall of Canada out Of the control OF
| France, in 1853. 1t has steadily continued until
| now only some relics, possessing little vitality,
| remain. Without any war on our part, Great
| Britain will wisely withdraw and disappear from
| this hemisphere within quarter of century
at least, within half century. War might has
| ten, but might also delay it.
| regret Also that war, if it must come must
| also probably concur with the great conflict that
| now convulses Europe. The British Administra-
| ton has long been unfaithful to the cause of
| Free Institutions in Europe, and the French En-
pire is, in my,,eyes, hateful usurpation. Never
ray and prac e ephemera while the Russian
Empire is an obstinate and portentous reality.
| accept the oracular exposition of the first Napo-
| leon; and, believing that Europe must be soon
| eithsr Republican or Cossack, recognise beneath
| the monarchical masks of the allies the Western
Nations contending against advancing des-
| potlsm Although no duty and no propriety
| CURES us to intervene on their side should be
very unwilling to engage my country in cOmbi-
| nation against them.
| regret, also, the sad condition of the Central
American States, which seems to render them as
incapable OF profiting by our intervention as the
French people were, when in 1899 they demand
ed like lnterposition, IN fulflment of our prece-
dent treaties OF commerce and alliance
| Nevertheless, war with Great Britain is now
among the possible solutions of the present en-
barrassment We certainly can look for no mod
Grafton on her part hereafter, if we overlook her
persistent refusal to fulfil this, the most solemn
| and important of all our International engage
ments 1t will be idle dream to suppose our
selves free and safe, if we leave her to waylay us
| on all sides of all our lsthmns passages from
our Atlantic region to the Pacific States.
Nor do fear war, having justice and high
| State necessity side. We outnumber the
| population of the British Islands, Their depend
| Although we have less realized wealth, we have
| infinitely greater resources than those of Great
| Britain; and our revenues, susceptible of large
| Increase are practically free. Our recruiting
| ground is ample, as Great Britain well knows
for she has tried to enter it clandesnely If there
| were any deficiency of native volunteers Great
Britain herself, well other European nations
| has supplied us with this element of war. We
have corps of military officers unequalled and
we have the foundations of an effective navy
| that can speedily be built up and put in motion
In view of the circumstances, it seems to me
wise to adhere to our demands, and vet to cast
on Great Britain distinctly the responsibility of
deciding upon peace war. Some would advise
| US to propose arbitration. But think we have
passed that point already. 1t would imply doubt
OF the rightfulness of the positions on which we
have elected to stand claimants ont of possess
sion Such indecision would be equivalent to
abandonment. Besides, do not know where we
could lind an impartial umpire in the present
disturbed condition of Europe.
do not think that Great Britain will choose
a resort to war. Her Government, hardly less
than our own, is popular one. This contro-
versy grows out of caprice Of her own Admin
lstratlon. a war would embarrass her prosper
GUS industrial system, and could bring TO her
IN return no adequate advantage, if she
were successful My counsel therefore is a
notice to Great Britain that shall interfere to
prevent her exercise of dominion in South Amer
lca II 1T shall not be discontinued within one
year. and also that authority be now given to
the President to execute that delayed purpose.
Great Britain may reconsider-may propose to
US reference or some other amicabe adjust
ment would be ready to hear, and to 90 to
the very verge of accommodation. But this
disposition think ought not to persuade us to