Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1856-12-30
For III Enlnil.r.
f0T W' enquirer
On tho Consequences Of Abolition Aaiiniio"
uud of the separation oil tho Union.

fOT WI enquirer
On tho Consequence. Of Abolition Aiitniio
uiid Of the separation Of tho Union
No. VI.
H. then as ~ here charged. the people Of the n0fs
are much governed by selfintersst, II may wen
asked, why do they oppose the Institution % u.
slavery in the south, in the products of when lsy az
10 deeply concerned? 1t has already oeen s.u' ~,
the great body of the northern people are ae'ru I'll,
their leaders. But that is not sniiiceht. =. SIM
required to be explained why any oil me grea noi.
ern party, ii knowing the truth should sun aaw"en.
n policy which, if carried out, would be aeslruc'N
to northern interests, To this question, mere ar
different answers for different portions o! the greg
coursr ihey neither consult reason, nor regard con
sequences. OF the politicians, such as seward an
Hale they mc-"iy aim to join in. and 10 ger Tue u
bt ncf. OF Tn popular camOr against s'aVehn"r.s' 1t
promote their own personal advancement ana GAM.
Such men would oppose as injurious 10 .he n .haa
che working of their own present measures, II ines
measures did not promise still more to serve tnel
, iva.e ends and interests. Further-the polltica
leaders OF the party would not be WILING 10 nee. Wv
consequences of their own complete success u 'ue.
expected that success, ard intended to go 30 lar Du
they and all the people of the north have Deentaugh'
by the long submission Of the south, to believe tat D,
repetition or increase OF oppression by iegsa1h VII
induce the south TO seeede or to offer any DINER ee
tual resistance. Some renegade southerners nave
substance re asserted this opinlen ana thereoy es
taDllsIeu II IN inc confluence VI
| heretofore and our expected future SUBMISSION ar
imputed 10 our dread OF certain ruin, IN inc aesuc
ton of slavery, a result OF separation anu war.
Therefore. our epemes deem thatther oest poiicylo
the purpose of eusuring our SUBMISSION anu coh'pie
humiliation, will be continually to threaten ma U
encroach but still to withhold entirely from strlkini
the final and fatal blow. 1t is also general belei
the north that the southern people, ny tner ihlerc
ty of numbers, and the supposed eneeons operauol
Of the institution of slavery are too WEAK 10 feas
Of thk.
like action of the stronger north. Hence, impene'
By these different considerations, the norm suppose
that il may vfy and wrong the south 10 any eA.e.
that interest or passion may invite withont uanser
the north. And, therefore, the leaders ana lne n1s
powerful of the party, (who in opinion or prlnclpe
are not abolitionsts at all, may push the movement
as far as necessary attain their persons! ends aoe
crush the political power of the SOUTH lwnien s.anu
in their way,) aud yet stop short OF that e1Iremy
injury to the property OF the south ~n'ch "ouu 10
act disasrouslJ on northern interests.
Southern men have met all past vioations Of tneli
rights by threats Of resistance or separation ana
submitted until such threats are oeiieVeu, or "h
be believed, unless unmistakable action snah nave
commenced. This welfounded Is tne ssete
of all the recent and present abolition movements aud
designs Aud even if, by possibility, ana when arlseu
to desperation, the nsuted and oppressed sou.h
should secede it is confidently believed by me norm
that is own stronger military and marine iorcs anu
greater wealth. would serve, speedily ana easny' 10
subdue the southern states Never was there great
er mistake or one which, if acted upon WIZ % cor
rected more efectuay 1t is only TINS 'uea
of southern weakness, together win tne aoseuo1 W
all military preparation in the south, that can posssoy
produce war as the direct and immediate result Of
separation IT, when separating, We snail DC, as now
unprepared for defence mey surely expect 10 nave
war. Bu. due preparation for war will as certainty
ensure the maintenance OF peace.
1t Is assumed By most persons tha1 "ar oe' ecu &c,
the separated portions would be necessary and I'M
mediate consequence Of separation Even II no otnef
ground for war existed, one certain ana una'ocaoie
cause ia Appreciated III the fact OF the Separate own
ersbip by the separated communities, OF the upper
and central waters of tho Mississippi aud OF lite lower
waters and their outlet TO the sea. And one great
consequence Of war las generally believed IN Inc
north and by very many also in the south supposed
would be- that successful insurrection OF the slaves
would be invited and produced by war anu INVASION
and thus their general Acknowledgement effected IN the
mode most disastrous and affecting to the whites
Sane and sufficient reasops have already been offered
10 show in reference to other and general grounds,
tina: war would not be either necessary or probable
result Of separation Other reasons wiz no" oe oi
Tered to nvalidate this particular cause OF war; ana
afterwards will be considered the particular and worst
possible consequence which has been anticipated.
War, in any mode, is an enormous eFii, "nicn
it is far FROM my Intention 10 depreciate. ana
war between separated portions Of the same peo-
ple and previously long Of the same community,
would be- the most deplorable aud calantou, of all
wars. 4 war between the southern anu northern
states, embittered by every growing cause OF hostile
" and mutual hatred, and II waged to e1trenities
With such balanced alterations OF success and de-
feat as might be- expected between foes 10 nearly
equal would be scarcely less destructive 10 the nt'
mate conqueror than 10 the conquered party. lhe
wealth, and rs yet happy CONDITION OF
both powers, would be engulphed IN one Soyss OF
complete industrial and politics! ruin ihe P0ssiolii
" oil thess awful consequences should be we'll CON,
,idered by all. But, as admontion and warning oi
the most solemn import il is for the aggressive ana
offensive party heed and by stopping aud restrain
ing its COURSE, to avoid these consequences, ana mol
for the asgreved and heretofore always yielding
party. The south, if still remsr,nS in the 'no, can
do nothing except to submit entirely aId uncohditoh'
aly to every present aud coming measure u aggres
sion, which will be but another way to reach certain
ruin Rather than entire submission, we should pre-
fer any hazards OF aud liz consequences for
all the caiamities of war should 6e risked, ana met
If necessary by free who deserve To ENJOY iree'
DOM rather than TO yield their freedom without strug
Cling to the last ground of hope in liza defence H.
then we are such men, the threat Of war, with all
and horrible consequences VIII nave no
to induce the south TO purchase peace by
entire submission.
The supposed inducement, or necessity icr war 10
ths geographical character of the Mississippi river,
"a groundess as en- other Of anticipated causes
for war; in the incidents Of the separation o the pre-
aent ccns.deracy. Moreover, this result from tins
particular cause of divided possession OF the course OF
navgable river is opposed By the laws OF malone
and the peages and experience of the whole civilized
world AZ, However the fsilacy in question has me;
with very ge cal admission. it may be necessary 10
examine and Expose at more length :hen ''s npor
lance would otherwise require This will be attempt
ed in the next number. SEIEI.