The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1856-03-27


the right of the Senate to originate these bills
is justly drawn from the fact that the restric.
tion-in both its forms, as well the comprehen-
slye as the limited one-was discussed largely
in the Convention, before the proviso which /
have recited was finally adopted.
But there is argument in reply to that
presumption, which seems to me absolutely con-
elusive, in respect to the spirit of the Constitu-
ton. That opposing argument is this How
ever the Convention may have understood the
provision in question, the Senate has never,
from the day when the Constitution was adopt
ed until now, exercised or claimed power to
originate any general appropriation bill, while
during all that period, nearly three quarters of
century, the House of Representatives has
exclusively claimed and exercised that power.
Such practice, cordially concurred in by both
of the parties, could not have been accidentally
adopted. 1t was manifestly adopted from de-
sign, and with distinct purpose. The design
aud the purpose were those of contemporaries
of the Constitution itself. And they show thas
it was their understanding of the provision in
question, that it conferred an exclusive power
on the House of Representatives to originate
general bills of appropriation for the support
OF the Government.
We can easily understand why they 80 con-
tinued the power; for, while the design was to
subject the Executive power to the control of
the House of Representatives, when necessary
for the safety of public liberty the constitu-
| tional provision would be Intellectual and value
less for that purpose if it did not confer on that
House the exclusive power of originating the
general appropriation bills, well as that of
| originating bills for raising revenue. We are
shut up and bound to concede that the purpose
was important and beneficial. Let us now see
how utterly it failed, if the power is confined
| to bills for raising revenue. Practically, the
Congress of the United States passes bills for
raising revenue only once in three, five, ten,
or fifteen years. We have never, at least for
very many years, except in time of war, passed
a bill for raising money by direct taxation.
That power is practically obsolete. AT the
time when the Constitution made, it was
expected that here, as in Great Britain and all
other countries the money required for the sup
port of the Government to-day, would need to
be raised to-day that the money required to
build Capitol, or build or enlarge navy, or
organize or increase an army, would need to
be raised when the laws directing such expend-
ture were passed. This is the only Govern
ment, think, which has ever existed, in which,
owing to the almost uniform prevalence of
peace, together with the enjoyment of prosper
ity derived from the application OF many mil
lions of free hands, under the direction of free
minds, to the improvement of vast national re-
sources the revenue raised to-day, or for the
purposes of the present day, continue to pour
into the Treasury abundant funds for the unan-
ticipated purposes of tomorrow, of next year,
and even of the next ten years.
Sir, under these considerations, the exclusive
power of the House of Representatives to origi-
nate money bills is valueless, if it is confined
to bills for raising revenue only. Because we
do indeed SO seldom and infrequently pass bills
of that sort, that the House of Representatives
practically has no useful check upon the Elk.
ecutive Government by means of that provision.
But the restriction is effective, and the purpose
of it is saved, if the provision is practically
held to cover general appropriation bills for
the support of the Government.
Is the purpose worth saving? Can it be
safely defeated? To answer these questions, let
seize it, and study it carefully. l read from
speech of DIR. Franklin, in the Convention,
his description of that purpose:
DIR. Franklin did not mean to go into a JUS
tiiicatiou of the report but as it had been
asked what would be the use of restraining the
second branch THE Senate) from meddling
with money bills, he could not but remark that
it was always of Importance that the people
should know who had disposed of their money,
and how it had been disposed Of 1t was
maxim, that those who feel cam best Judge
This end would, he thought, be best attained,
If money affairs were to be confined to the
immediate representatives of the people. This
was his inducement to concur in the re-
port
/ submit to the candid Judgment of the Sen
ate, whether have not shown satisfactorily, that
although the letter of the Constitution allows
US to adopt the principle embodied in the reso-
lation under consideration, the spirit of the
Constitution, as ascertained by the light thrown
upon IT by cOntemporaneous history and debate,
and by the uninterrupted practice of the Gov
eminent through q. period beginning with its
organization, and lasting seventy years, forbids
us from assuming power to originate the gen.
eral appropriation bills, and commands us to
leave it where it always hitherto has been, and
where it now is, in the hands of the House of
Representatives. the Commons of America.
Mr.. President, | am sure, at least, of this
that have cast on those who advocate this in
novation the responsibility of showing why it
should be made. know, indeed, that they can
give some plausible reasons. The honorable
Senator from Pennsylvania Mr.. BRoDHEADl
has already told us that the House of Repre-
sentatives Is accustomed to delay, until
period too late in the session. the preparation of
the general appropriation bills, so that the
Senate is denied full opportunity to examine
their voluminous details, and propose desirable
amendments. / know that the advocates of the
measure may also question the practical uses
Of the exclusion of the Senate from the exer
else of this power, and they will have the au-
thority of some very good and very wise men,
who were members of the Constitutional Con
vention, and who differed from Mr. Mason of
Virginia, and DIR. Franklin, on that subject
But submit, in reply to these and to all similar
arguments, that the simpler the form of any
Government is, the more easily the public bust
| ness is transacted; that the financial system of
Russia is conducted with more convenience and
promptness than that Of the United States or
| of Great Britain; that have no doubt that the
| financial affairs of France under "the despotic
sway of Napoleon III, are conducted with much
greater facility and despatch than they were
under the Republic which that usurper has SUBJ
verted. But all that Is foreign from the ques-
ton. 1t is enough for me that the House OF
Representatives can and does originate and
prepare, and send TO Us, the general appropri
alton bills, and that the Senate also enjoys and
exercises its power of proposing amendments
TO and concurring in those bills. The object OF
the establishment of two separate Houses, con.
shutting one Legislature. was not to facilitate
business, certainly not TO facilitate the passage
of bills for either raising revenue or for ex
pending it.
Such bills, any bills, would pass far more
easily through one House, than through two
Houses; and so an edict or law can be passed
far more promptly through the Council of King
an Emperor or President, than it can through
our own Legislative Assembly, much more
} through two Independent but concurrent egisla
, tive Chambers. The object of the constitution
al division of the Legislature into two Houses
was altogether different from the mere dispatch
} of business. 1t was in accordance with tina
!. Il Il L A If ia