The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1856-03-27


undermining the House of Lords.
1t was difficult and nice task to establish
such a balance between the Senate and the
House of Representatives, ia our system. When
we study it closely, we shall be apt to conclude
that our fathers builded more wisely than they
knew. The Constitution gave some towering
and controlling advantages to the Senate. Its
members were to hold their places six years,
while the members of the House were to serve
only two years, under one election. Hence the
Senate would derive the advantages of greater
experience and practical ability. The Senate
was to be small body, in which the widest
freedom of debate could be combined with the
facility of bringing all questions debated TO an
early decision; while the large number of the
members in the House of Representatives would
render restrictions on debate and complex rules
of order necessary. To the Senate was assign
ed power Of rejecting all the Administrative
officers nominated by the President for office
practically, a potential share in the Executive
administration of the Government. 1t is
power of transcendent importance and inhu-
ence. If a time shall ever come when Pres
ident shall mediate, by coup d'etat, a subver-
sion of the Constitution and of pablo liberty,
the Senate, remaining interrupted, will have
the power to prevent the atrocious design, by
the exercise of its constitutional power to con-
troll the civil, military, and naval agents Of the
Government, and even the counsellors of the
President himself. To the Senate was assign
ed another and Distinguishing power, Legislative
in its character, and comprehensive in its ac-
ton. That is the power of ratifying or reject
ing treaties between the United States and for
eign Powers-through which power the Senate
actually controls the course of the Government
in the conduct of our external regulations. Be-
sid he of TTp,to1 fofo so n
High Court for the trial of impeachments.
The House of Representatives, to sustain itself
against the Senate, has these exclusive powers,
namely: LIST. A right to originate money bills
for the support of the Government; I'd. A right
to elect President of the United States, when
the people fail to effect an election; Sd. The
exclusive power of presenting impeachments
against public agents.
/ think it must be admitted that the relative
independence and influence of the Senate are
continually increasing, while those of the
House Of Representatives do not increase.
Much the largest share of bills, as well those of
minor Importance, as those which are general
and comprehensive in their objects, originate
in the Senate. think that the public at home,
and foreign nations, are accustomed to look
with more respect to the Senate than to the
House of Representatives. If this be so, then
it is necessary TO take care that we do not, by
enlarging the accustomed range of action of
the Senate, disturb the balance which is essen
tial to the independence of the House of Repre-
sentatives. However advantageous it may be
to the Senate, and even to the country, that the
public business shall be transacted promptly
and wisely, yet the equilibrium of the Con-
stitution must be preserved-for when there
shall cease to be House of Representatives,
retaining its just and designed integrity and
Importance, then there will also soon cease to
be Senate, and a Republican Government.
The independence and Importance of the Senate
will be enhanced by this measure; and when it
shall have Invested the House of Representatives
of the exclusive right to originate general ap-
preparation bills, which it has hitherto enjoyed,
the Independence and importance of the House
of Representatives will be diminished in Just the
same proportion. Are you sure that even this
disturbance of the equilibrium may not prove a
fatal one?
l am well aware that these speculations will
be called fanciful but the Art of Government
is very complex, and the principles best estab-
lished In that science are yet regarded by man.
kind as theoretical maxims of questionable
soundness. find all my positions supported,
firmly supported, by the elementary principles
accepted in the debates which attended the
formation of the Constitution.
Mr. President, if / were asked what l deem
the cardinal and saving principle of this Con-
stitution, that one principle which distinguishes
it from all others that have existed or that now
exist, that one which will carry it safe through
all the storms of faction at home, and all the
peris of external collisions, should answer,
that cardinal and saving principle is this the
Government of the United States relies not
upon fraud, not upon force, not even upon laws,
for the performance by the citizens of all their
duties, but upon the voluntary and intelligent
consent and acquiescence of the people in
the action of the Government. Every days
observation increases my admiration of the
machinery by which that acaaiescence is OBJ
tanned. Those men foretold in the Constitu
tiOnal Convention that the acquiescence of the
ambitious classes would be secured through
the peculiar organization and constitution of
the Senate, while the acquescence of the un-
ambitious and disinterested classes-far more
numerous than the other-would be secured
by the organization Of the House of Repre-
sentatives in such way that not one dollar
which the Government should desire to expend.
whether for purposes of peace or of war, could
be obtained without the previous consent of a
majority of the citizens, expressed by Repre-
sentatives chosen by themselves, and directly
responsible to them for the discharge of their
trust. If this nation shall ever be brought into
perilous shoals, what will save it will be the
action of the one hundred thousand persons
in each Congressional district appoisting and
maintaining patriotic and faithful Representa-.
tives in the House of Representatives, and not
the corporate action of the States operating
through their delegates in this honored Cham.
Der.
L confess therefore, sir, to strong desire,
an earnest desire, to save for the House of Rep.
pfot,x he Il
has exercised from the foundation of the Gov.
eminent until this day. Nevertheless, | am
not amongst those who decry the intelligence,
the virtue, or the patriotism, of the Senate Of
the United States. No man. think, is more
reverential of the wisdom or the virtue of past
ages than l am. No man is less likely to be
extravagant in praises Of contemporaries than
L am for l am little accustomed to seek to win
power or position by such means. Yet, sir. I
regard it as among the glazing weaknesses of
the times, that we are accustomed to suppose
our fathers we're either wiser or purer than we
| ourselves are. On the contrary, feel sure
that the of heaven never cast it's genial light
| upon body of more patriotic or enlightened
| Legislators than that which have the honor to
| address. 1t is chief qualification of my pride,
and reward for many sacrifices, that have
been deemed, by the State to which l belong,
worthy to be one of her representatives in 80
august an assembly. Far from believing that
the Senate has deteriorated, or is deteriorating,
l believe that it has gained and grown, ever
since it was founded, in wisdom and in virtue.
l think the same of the House of Representa-
tives. If could think otherwise, indeed, then
/ should be without hope for the future of my
| country and of mankind; for / should see
nothing before either, but decentralization, de-
cline, and desolation. If thought otherwise
how could l hope that those who shall come