The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1856-01-09

COUNcuIcuO ~ AiSNhy ~ vi !
their association, by giving to the general
government direct accsss, in some respects
to the people of the States, instead of
confining it to action of the States as
such, they proceeded TO frame the exist
ing Constitution, adhering steadily to one
guiding thought, which was, to delegate
only such power as was necessary and
proper to the execution of specific pur-
poses, or, in other words, to retain as
much as possible, consistently with those
purposes, of the independent powers of
the individual States. For objects of
common defence and security, they en-
trusted to the general government certain
carefully defined functions, leaving all
Others as the undelegated rights OF the
separate independent sovereignties.
Such is the constitutional theory of our
government, the practical observance of
which has carried us, and us alone, among
modern republics, through nearly three
generations of time without the cost of
one drop Of blood shed in civil war. With
freedom and concert of action, it has en-
dDlcu us " COutCilu huCCCSSiuIif Ol lIlS
battlefield against foreign foes, has eleva-
ted the feeble colonies into powerful States,
aud has raised our Industrial productions,
and our which transports them,
to the level of the richest and the great
est nations of Europe. And the admira-
BILE adaptation of our political %institu-
lions to their objects, combining local
self-govcrnmeut with aggregate strength,
has established the p~racticability Of a
government like ours to cover a continent
with confederate States.
! The Congress of the United States is,
in effect, that Congress of sovercjgnties,
which good nsn in the Old World have
sought for, but could never attain, and
which impart to America an exemption
from the mutable leagues for common ac-
ton, from the wars, the mutual invasions,
the vague aspirations after the balance of
power, which convulse from time to time
the governments of Europe. Oar CO.
operative action rests in the conditions
of permanent confederation prescribed by
the constitution. Our balance of power
is in the separate reserved rights of the
States, and their equal representation in
the Senate. That Independent sovereign
ty in every one of the States, with its re-
served rights of local self-governmeHt as
sured to each by the co-equal power in the
Senate, was the fundamental condition of
the constitution. Without it the Union
would never have existed. However de-
sirous the larger States might be to re-
organize the governments SO as to give to
their population its proportionate weight
in the common councils, they knew it was
impossible, unless they conceded to the
smaller ones authority to exercise at leSst
a negative influence on oil the measures
of the government, whether legislative or
executive, through their equal represen-
tation in the Senate. Indeed, the larger
States themselves could not have failed to
perceive, that the same power was equal
ly necessary to them, for the security of
their own domestic interest against the
aggregate force of the general govern
ment. In a word, the original States
went into this permanent league on the
agreed premises, of exertinG their com
mon strength for the defence of the whole,
and of all its parts; but of utterly ex-
cluding all capability of reciprocal aggres-
sion. Each solemnly bound itself to all
the others, neither to undertake, nor per-
nit, my en~croachment upon, or informed
ding with, another's reserved rights.
Where it was deemed e~xpedient, par
~ticalar rights of the States were express
ly guaranteed by the constitution; but, in
all things beside, these rights were guard
ed by the limitation of the powers grant
ed, and by express reservation of all pow
ers not granted, in the compact of union.
Thus, the great power of taxation was
limited to purposes of common defence
and general welfare, excluding objects ap-
pertaining to the local legislation of the
several States; and those purposes of gen
eral welfare and common defence we're
afterwards defined by specific enumeration,
as being matters only of correlation be-
tween the States themselves, or between
them and foreign governments, which, be-
cause of their common and general ma
ture, could not be left to the separate
~control of each State.
.0Of the circumstances of local cOndi.
ton, interest, and rights in which a por.
ton of the States, constituting one great
section of the Union differed from tho
rest, and from another section, the most
important was the popularity Of a larger
relative colored population in the south.
ern than in the northern States.
A population of this class, held in sub
lection, existed in nearly all the States
but was more numerous and of a NOR,
concernment in the South than in TIT
North, on account of the natural differ
ences of climate and production; and i
was foreseen that, for the same reasons
while this population would diminish, ant
sooner or later, cease 10 exist, in som,
States, it might increase in others. Th'
peculiar character and magnitude of thi
question of local rights not in materia
relations only but still more in social ones
caused it to enter into the special stipu
lations of the constitution.