Weekly hawk-eye and telegraph. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa) 1855-1857, 1856-02-06

pect and admiration. 1t was, no doubt, this cir
| cnmsance which won for Catherine the title of
"the heroic"
The Boquct--an unpublished Miscellany
A Russian View of n Baltic Campaign.
lie Nord, of Brussels, discusses as follows the
chances of the expected Baltic campaign:
an The plans sketched by the English press,
| and said to be those which the allies have formed
for the ensuing year, the project of landing in
Finland occupies the foreground. To attack
| Russia Simultaneously in the north and the
south, by land and sea- to place her between
two tires-this is, indccdsa gigantic plan, but it
appears to us, for that very reason, to be imprac.
| ticable.
Admitting that the allies may be disposed to
renew by war in the Baltic the enormous out
| lay and the sacrifices cntailed on them by their
expedition to the Black Sea- we may ask our
selves whether, after they have usclessly been
scratching Russia's feet they will succeed in
oyerthrowing her by selling her by the hair
by pinching her ear? For it is to be observed
that upon landing an army in Finland, or on any
other point of the Baltic coast, the allies would
find themselves confronted by obstacles far
| greater than those Of the Crimea. In that pc
ninsula the campaign, interrupted by the winter,
| could be resumed in the spring.
''ln the Baltic, where the navi cation is only
| open for four or five months in the year, it must
! be otherwise. The allies must obtain Il complete
and decisive victory in single summer; they
must smite Russia terrible blow as to pre-
vent her recovering herself during the winter
Now, if the allies--if England espccally-have
| been able to make preparations for so great
enterprise we must suppose that the Russian
Government has not remained passive specta-
| tor on her part.
1--WE confess We do not believe in the destruc-
ton of Cronstadt and the English believe in it
Just as ttlc as ourselves; but conceding for the
sake of our argument, of course, that this
| eventually is probable or posSible-admtting
even that the allies may be able make de-
monsration against st. Petersburgh-it will be
seen that we making very large concessions
| do they imagine that Russia would thereupon
consider herself vanquishcd? She would be
stunned, we grant, but not overthrow, and one
! winter would serve to put her on her legs again,
And, even in this can it be reasonably ad-
mitted that this blow can be dealt her in a sin
| gle campaign.
"Why; the allied army would be obliged to
| rc-cmbark in the autumn, or else on the APP
! proach of winter it would resign itself nolcnS
ro!enS to the disagrceable alternative of seeing
its retreat utterly cut off, communication with
| the feet driven away by the ice, destroyed-this,
too, in country where it would not havcaroof
| over its head, or sack of -four for its sustcn-
ancc where the cold, far different from that in
| the Crimea, sinks to 30 and 40 degrees of Rcau
| muir; where, lastly, the Russian army, which
| would then be in its own element, might choose
its time to swoop upon it when exhausted by
| cold and hunger, compelling it to Weld
| cept battle, the result of which could not be
| doubtful
'Iet this expedition be made to Finland or to
the Baltic provinces, or even to both points at
| oncc-a thing less practicable than cver-still
| the conditions under which it could be carried
| out would be the same. 1t is not upon hypOth-
| csis we ground our reasoning, but on the nature
! of those countries thcmseves-that is to say, on
| the winter, Russias potent auxiliary. As we
see the trosts OF the north have their own little
| special advantages. Then, again, Russia pos
| scsses at this moment, one army in Finland,
| another in the Baltic provinces, third in Po-
| land and vet fourth in st. Pctersburgh and its
| ncighborhood.
Surely these are obstacles not to be Surmount-
| ed in hurry, nor can any one dream of doing
| so. In every case, it will not be the English
troops that can do it. 1t will hence be on the
| shoulders of the French army that Great Britain
would once again lay all the burden of this
| fresh expedition. Now, we are of opinion that
| the French Government, a better Judge than
| England of everything connected with military
| operations, would look twice before it vcnturcd
on so difficult and formidable an enterprise. 1t
|
for two years doing Englands work for her, and
| paving dear enough for her alliance, not to
| consider themselves now completely ont of her
| debt.
"lf it is the task of these English 10 destroy
| Cronstadt-if that is all they have to do-why
| have they not done it this year. when they have
been showing off before it all the summer?-
And if it is by the help of their new gunboats
and floating batteries, which they talk SO much
about, that they count on efccting their object
next year, we are afraid they will once more have
to be satisfied with feeding their imagination
and shooting away their powder.
in the first place Cronstadt is not Kinburn;
| again. the success attained by those floating bat
| tcries at the bombardment of that petty for
tress, where they were employed for the first
| time, is not yet proved, for the simple reason
| that kinburn, the construction and armament
! of which had undergone no change since the
last century, possessed none of those engines
that may be happily employed against these said
| batteries. There was not even Il single Paixhan
gun in that fort. 1t is different with Cronstadt,
and, FORMIDABLE this fortress has always been,
consisting notoriously of several forts, it is more
than probably that since floating batteries have
been known at st. Petersburgh, they have
discovered the means of counter-arming them
: selves.
"fhe present war has proved that the arms of
the engineers and artillery are not so badly
welded in Russia, and that under this head their
inventive powers are not so poverty-stricken as
previously supposed. The Russians, it is true,
are not In the habit of trumpeting their progress
and discoveries. If others feel inclined TO con-
slider this reserve of theirs as proof of weakness,
we, tor our parts, see in it pledge OF success,
for which both tact and prudence are the first
conditions.
THUS, even wheu reasoning on the hvpothe-
sis most favorable TO the allies the possible
chances of a favorable issue to an approaching
campaign in the Baltic-whether we consider il
TO be Ii gigantic enterprise comprehending the
inyaSionS of Finland and the Baltic provinces OF
whether we reduce it to its simplest EXPRESSION
that is to say, to the mere bombardment of Cron.
stadt, it cannot, by any possibility, have for
Russia those consequences to which the Eng,
fish journals are so pleasedto see her already re.
duced"
I'VE have not yet spoken, our readers per.
ceire, OF ain active cooperation on the part OF
Austria, tor We do not suppose they can serious.
! ly depend on such thing either at Paris or Lon.
don, Besides, ii Austria were really to take the
field against Russia, We are justified in believing
from the private information possess, that she
! would encounter more violent resistance than
she. expeets-a resistance which on some future
day might reeoi Austria, and work more
mischief than they seem to calculate upon nj
| Vienna.
The reflections just submitted TO the reade,
are not Intended 10 prove that Russia ought moi
70 make peace. Quite the contrary. They arr
given merely by way of answer, TO those threat
ening, and, as we think, unreasonable camor:
raised within the last few DAYS by the semi-oili
$ clai organs OF the Vienna and London press
The object IS so transparent, under existing cir
: camstanees. that of creating a sort of mora
+ pressure, that no one will allow himself to b
4 taken in by it.
4 III il Is passing strange to sec the journal
e of England, who in this war has only PLAYED
/ secondary part, holding forth every day TO Ru:
II sia in a thraa .euinfr to,a ,ha ,.,,, ,;,;o,.