The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1856-05-28


has sought to establish in every Of her treaties
since the year l7l3; the Berlin and Milan decree
having been merely an oct Of retaliation on the Bri-
PoINT o Establishes the rule that the goods OF
friend (neutral) shall be exempt from capture,
even under the enemys flag. This il also o prin-
ciple for which the United States and France, in
Guiding all the MINOR maritime powers Of Europe,
have contendfd for nearly century century
and half respectively. The above two points APP
ply, of course, only to goods not contraband Of
war under the law Of nations.
PolNT 2-Recognises no blockade and no belli-
gerent right flowing from 1t, unless that blockade
Is established and maintained by sufficient num-
Der of ships of war to render It effective. This
puts end to the paper blockades established by
England during the long wars Of the French Revo-
luton, and will certainly be received with reoicngs
| ly the United States; but, then, there is
pective parties to the convention waive the beili-
or armins priya.eers: Were it not for this
point, the United States might hail with
| pleasure the conclusion of the convention,
and become themselves party to it. To obtain the
adhesion Of the United States to all the four points,
is the especial business now entrusted to the Count
de Sartiges, the French Emper0rs Plenipotentiary
| in Washington, diplomat of much experience,
great shrewdness, extensive practical knowledge,
and enjoying In very eminent degree the respect
| and confidence OF the French Emperor. The Count
de Sartiges may also have received special instruc
lions from Count Walewski in respect to the Cramp
| ton and enlistment difficulties but his principal
business you may rely on it, is to procure the adhe-
@ Of the @ the above
vention concluded here in Paris; in other words, to
procure promise or solemn agreement from the
United States, in case Of var with any European ma
tion not to employ our fast and elegantly built COM
merciaI marine as privateeES.
I. is shrewdIy calculated here in France that this
is question which does not interest all portions of
the United States in the same degree. The South
ern States it is thought, would have great objec
ton to the abolition of the bellgerent right
Of arming privateers, provided their cotton,
rice and tobacco were exempt from capture
on board the vessels Of neutral nations. The COM
merce in our great staples would 60 as usual and
great losses to our planters would be avoided with
very little trouble and expense A similar sort of
reasoning might be employed by some Of our West
ern people, whose cargoes Of breadstua and provi
sions would continue to arrive in Europe during the
war and who might continue profitable commerce,
though our own ships might rot in our harbors.
The maritime States Of Union, however, will ne
cessary adhere to the belligerent right Of arming
privateers, not only as measure Of profitable en-
ployment Of their ships during war; but as o most
efficient element Of maritime power, and formidable
! means of aggression against commercial foe. Du-
ring the negotiations which will take place, these
the question, as they furnish, no doubt the only
ground Of hope which the French government che
rishes at this time of bringing them to successful
conclusion.
The present period is very unpropitious one for
the United States to negotiate q treaty or bind
itself by conventions, which we have not our
selves had share in concluding in the
first instance It was but proper for the
20 fho Ara< <tron ptr1 DAWN
the late war; the consideration OF the belgerent
as well as the neutral nations; but the war beng
over, and the question being no longer urgent to
secure the interest of our neutral commerce. can.
not see what immediate object the United States
could have in accepting the fourth point as means
of securing the other three. It is not likely that
France or England will secede from the first three
points, lin which France is quite as much interested
as ourselves,) and there is need, therefore, OF
paying for boon which is already secured by
crIce altogether exceptional and OF specific damage
| to m 4ritime power.
| Our privateers in time Of war, are our maritime
militia, only, if possible, holder, more enterprising
| and more daring than any we can be expected to
employ at home in protecting our own frontiers. By
means of our prlvateers, war with the United
States does not merely mean war in America, but
war in India, at the Cape Of Good Hope, in the
West Indies, in the Chinese and Japanese seas-in
word wherever the enterprise Of sturdy mariners
| is capable Of sending ship and crew. 1t Is
| this maritime militia of ours which commands
| the respect Of the world, and makes nations pause
! before they pick an unjust quarrel with US. We
| have 10 navy at ell TO compare in Number and
| efficiency to the present naval force of England,
which consists, according to Lord Pamerstons Of
fetal state in Parliament OF $40 vessels OF war;
but we can arm more privateers than any nation in
| the world, and check or destroy the commerce Of
any nation with whom we may chance TO be at war.
To abandon the right to arm privateers in time Of
war would be tantamount to suffering eur hands to
be tied to our backs while our enemies are pre-
pairing to strike US. The Carthagenians, after the
battle Of Bama, agreed to deliver their arms to Sci
pic, as means Of securing peace, bn LEY had to
forge rev ones; which, however, did no. save them
| from utter destruction.
Our liberal institutions do not favor large stand.
| ing armies nayies. Our wars must necessarily
be popular ones; for Congress alone has the power
| to declare war; the President only wages it. In
| popular war the principal element OF defence Is
the people themselves, armed as they all are, and
capable Of being enrolled in battaons Of volunteers
| and militia The sane assistance we must
expect nom our maritime population, in
and interest. England, in time Of war can arm her
numerous cruizers species Of craft of which she
must always keep respectable supply from her
| proximity to other maritime Powers, while the
United States, separated from Europe by distance
Of three thousand miles, have no need OF expanding
annually millions on such branch Of naval service.
There is yet another confederation which we must
not lose sight of when discussing the question Of
privateering, which Is this:l For the last twenty
| years 80 it has been found more profitable to
DnlIQ S0lp8 large tOnua8c bIIldlcI Onco NOt
emily are these large ships capable of taking in
larger cargoes but they are found to be safer and
to sail faster because their momentum (the product
of the into the velocity is better able TO
| come the resistance Of the medium. For the same
reason, other things beng equal, large steam
er will outrun smaller one; and for the same rea
son our monster clipper ships outsail even fast
steam eIs. Now these large vessels, Of which we
have lately built toerably large number, are the
very best crafts in the world to arm for pr-
vateers, being not only fast saers, but from their
| size and strength, capable of taking large arma-
| ments and crews on board, which in time of war
| would be more than an oyermatch for the small
! vessels Of war-the cruizers Of an enemy.
| The United States occupy an exceptional position
| Their government is different from any other, aud
the genius Of our people ia distinct from that Of any
/ European nation. Why should we not, as sove
reign nation, have right in time Of war; to select
for aggressive and defensive purposes such weapons
| to greatest advantagef Why should we stipulate
| Beforehand the mode Of fghtng-throwing away