The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1856-03-27
WASHINGTON, d. G..
THE RELATIVE POWERS OF THE SENATE
AID THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,.
SPEECH OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
l.. aLn Canafa of the Unifad Gtafaa
FEBRUARY :, 1856.

SPEECH OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
In the Senate Of the United States,
FEBRUARY 1885,
The following resolution which had been submitted by
Mr. HUNTER, under consideration:
Rs0irsd That the Committee on Finance be instruct
prepare and report such of the general appropria
lion bills a They may deem expedient"
Mr. SEWARD rose and said:
Mr. President: This is practical question,
which relates TO the transaction of the fiscal
business of the Government, and the chair
man Of the Committee on Finance is altogether
right IN pressing for early decision upon it.
Ii is, moreover, at once a grave question and
d new one. The resolution proposes that the
Senate shall instruct the Committee on Finance
TO prepare aud report such of the general ap-
preparation bills for the support of the Govern
ment, as in their discretion shall seem proper !;
in effect, TO prepare and report all of the gen.
eral appropriations bills for the support of the
Government, if they shall deem it proper to
do so.
Such a resolution would be quite unnecessa-
ry il it the present practice of the Com
mittee On Finance TO prepare and report any of
the general appropriation bills. The resolu
ton itself is a notice to the Senate that such is
lot now the practice here. The consideration
shown by the Committee ON Finance, In ask
ing the instructions contained by the resolution,
proves that they regard the question involved
as a new one, and not only as n new, but also as
an important one for, certainly, the commit
tee would otherwise, without asking or waiting
for instructions, prepare and report general ap-
preparation bills.
Having thus ascertained the present practice
Of Congress, let us next inquire how long that
practice has existed. That practice has exist
81. ,ha aotinp nf fba
stituiion until nov, the general appropriation
bills for the support Of the Government have
been prepared and passed, In the first instance,
by the House Of Representatives, and then sent
to the Senate for amendment and concurrence;
and they have never originated or been pre-
pared and passed, in the first instance, by the
Senate. Since this is the case, presume that
those who advocate the resolution will admit
that what il proposes is an iDnovation-a spe-
cifc, direct, and effective innovation.
The next inquiry is" "What is the nature Of
the Innovation? Among the European mon
arches which existed when our Constitution was
established, there was only one that was truly
a limited monarchy. Practically, all others
were despotsms. But such had not always
been the case. Three or four hundred years
earlier, even republics existed in Europe, and
practically all its monarchies were limited. All
were based. as the British Government was then
founded, and as it still continues to rest on these
principles conservative of freedom, namely
first, that no money should be drawn from the
people without the consent of their own chosen
representatives; second, that the Executive
thority should act in subordination to law; and,
third, that the monarch should, either directly
or in the persons of his ministers, be response
bic TO the nation for the faithful discharge of
his trust. But near the beginning of the six
teentl century, change passed over the nations
of Western Europe; and with the exception of
Great Britain alone, the Parliaments of all fell
into desuetude, and their constitutions hardened
into despotic ones. The British Government
then. as il does now, stood alone, a limited
monarchy, conservative of the freedom of the
people. This benign result, in Great Britain,
of a long struggle against universal reaction,
due to the adherence in that kingdom to
maxims well understood in Europe at that time,
and adopted since In Our own Government. One
of these WAS the maxim, that standing armies
are inconsistent with popular liberty; and an
other was, that the power of originating bills
for raising revenue, and of expanding it, belongs
exclusively to the House of Commons, the
peoples House-to that one of the two Houses
of Parliament which emanates from the people,
and directly represents the people, in contradis-
tinc:ion from the King, or Executive power, aud
from the House OF Lords, which represents only
the estates of the nobility and clergy within
the kingdom.
We we'll know that the British constitution
was carefully studied, as a model, by those who
framed our own. All of us know that Monies
queu had adopted it as a model which filled the
very ideal conception of system of free gov
eminent, and that his commentator scarcely
enhanced the admiration in which it was held by
the lovers of liberty. We all know equally well
that the exclusion of the House of Lords from
the power Of originating money bills, and the
conhning OF that power to the House of Com
mons, was regarded as one of the cardinal fea-
lures or elements of that constitution What
were money bills? Money bills then, as now, in
Great Britain, were all those bills which provi-
ded for the raising of money or revenue; and
also all those bills which appropriated money
or revenue for the support OF the Government.
In our own country, and in our own time, the
general appellation Of money bills is lost,
aud we have come to distinguish between the
two classes of bills which in Great Britain are
called money bills, and we designate the one
class as bills for raising revenue, and the other
as bills for appropriating money. But, in the
British system, both classes were grouped into
the one sort named money bills, and the House
of Commons exclusively possessed power to
originate them. 1t was mainly an adherence
10 this principle that carried the Commons of
Great Britain safely through those political con.
vulsions in which the national liberty was pre-
served from the encroachments and usurpations
of the throne when occupied by the TUDoRs and
the STUARTs
When the formation of an American consti-
tuition was undertaken by the Convention, vari-
Gus plans were suggested. Every one of them
copied from the British constitution this broad,
distinct, and prominent principle, of an exclu-
sive power IN the popular branch of the Legis-
lature to originate money bills" The Con-
vention sat long, and deliberated much. A
difficulty was early reached, which threatened
a total failure of the purpose of the Convention,
with the consequences of anarchy and confu-
sion throughout the country. That difficulty
arose in this way. The smaller States claimed
an equal representation with that of the larger
states in the Federal Legislature. The larger
States insisted on a representation proportional
according to their numbers, or population. AT
ter a time, compromise was proposed. Thi,
compromise was, that all the States should have
an equal representation in the Senate, while
the States should respectively have a represent
alton proportioned to their numbers, or popula
ton, in the House of Representatives. Wher
this compromise was proposed, the larger States
insisted on a further condition, namely, tina
the House of Representatives should exclusively
enjoy the power of risinating all money bills
This condition was accepted, and embodied II
the ompromise. The compromise thus effect
ed then stood in this form: The Senate shoulc
consist of two members from each State, to b,
chosen by the Legislature thereof; and thu
House of Representatives should be composed
of Delegates from the several States, proper
tionally TO their respective population, and Z
n l. Al e IL