Lynchburg daily Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1852-1861, 1856-01-29

subjects Of the Sultan their religious anu Poueai
rights, Russia shall be invited. when peace Is
made, to associate herself thereto
The bellgerent powers reserve TO themselves
the right which appertains TO them OF producing
in sn European interest special CONDITIONS Over
and above the four guarantees.
The London Times of the l1ih has common.
tary on these propositions which we subjoin
We have nj last received the exact text of the
conditions Of peace rendered by the Allied Pow
ers to Russia. The definite answer cannot. we
are informed, be received before the 10th OF this
month. Are these terms destined to form
memorable epoch in the history OF European CIV
zation. or ARE they destined TO be consigned To
the limbo Of abor,ive projects with the Treaty
of Uxbridge or the armistice OF Cbatlhn! IL
the presen, war destined here 10 come to an end
while IL vet retains somewhat Of the dispasson-
ate and almost judicial calmness and reluctance
with which il was commenced. or is 1t to take
henceforih a new begianing. with the asowed OBJ
iect no longer Of protecting the Ottoman domin-
ions from the immediate attacks OF Russia, but
Of dcprvng her of the power Of repeating n stint
lar outraged That will depend on the result of
the conflict between the war and the peace par.
ties in the Cabinet of the Czar-on the naturnl
struggle between tho wish to relieve an exhaust
ed people n ruined trade, and bankrupt exche
quer. and the stubborn determination to carry
out the plan of universal monarchy, and rather
To risk the subversion of the whole framework OF
society. than to reccde from single preiension
or forcgo a single dream of conquest, glory, or
annexation that Peter, Catherine, Alexander, or
Nicholas may have entertained.
Regarded from point of yiew, the terms ap.
pear sufficiently reasonable and moderate, and
oouohed in language siudiously measured so rs
To give the least possible offence to the snscepti
bility -four antagonists. When we consider the
objects for which most unwillngy took up
arms we can hardly imagine that Russia herself
can expect that should DO content with less
extensive basis of negotiation. unless indeed. the
fortune Of war had declared decidedly against us.
1t is difficult to put ourselves in the position OF
our enemies, mud clearly To represent 20 our mind
with what feelings patriotic Russian must regard
such an offer, though even he we should suppose,
must feol that in tho demand Of such terms there
is nothing either arrogant ar presnmptuons. No
one can suppose, We should think that after what
has occurred the allied sovereigns could leave The
Danubian Princpaliies in their present disioin-
ted and disorganized condition. They must be |
governed. and governed by power in no res. |
poet subject to Russian influence, if they not
Ia become again in few years once more the
Belgium of the East of Europe. the battle field
on which the advance of Russia is to be checked.
as that of Louis XIV, was on the plnins of Fhn.
ders. Neither can it he expected that the allies
should leave it in The power Of Russia apein 10
place a ligature on the innln artery ot Germany
by blocking up the Sulina mouth of the Danube,
and thus cutting off the principal line If commn
nication between the Fnst and Il West. Nor is
it conceivable how this is to happen without
curing the surrender Of those iortresses and that
territory which give Russia the command Of the
river from the embouchure Of the Pruih Ia the
sea. The complete naturalization of the Black
Sea would also seem the easiest and least often
siye mode of putting an end to Russian domino
ton in those waters. Limitation carries with it
the notion Of tie continual pressure ofa superior
force, and coun,erpose Is but thin veil thrown
over continued state of hostility; but the muu-
al agreement to emancipate the Black Sea for
ever from the presence of hostile fleets. to for
bear from the erection of fortihcations and to nd
nit the Consuls of the allied Powers into Russi
an ports, il. we should iinmagine. less offensive
and less CALLING to the pride of our enemy than
any other manner in which the inevitable cur
tailment of her aggressive powers can be elee=
ted.
While the matter is yet uneer tain, We chnl
lenge the advocates of Russia or ofpcace TO show
TINT we ask anything to which not well
entitled ar abuse the powers which series Of
brilliant successes has placed in orr hands. The
very moderation of these terms makes them the
farest test of the real disposition of Russia. If
she be content to live, rs other Powers live, in
peace and good will with all mankind, improving
her vast territory, and seeking IN the pursuits of
peace and commerce and Naturalization for II
century anda half Of endless war aud conflict
she will accept the opportunity TO escape from
struggle from which the calm Judgment Of her
statesmen and warriors must assure her she has
nothing to expect of glory or success, while, If
she still cherishes the wild dreams of her tradi-
tionary ambition, she will yet tempt once more
the fortune of arms. We could not desire mat
tiers to be brought 10 II fairer issue. Peace must
not be made while Russia possesses both the viii
and the power 10 inlure us. We are content 10
make peace if she possess the power without the
will. or else forced to continue the war until she
no longer possesses the power. Wear unwill
ing, at such II moment, to assume II Wanting
threatening tone in speaking of what we have n
chieved,& what may he looked for IN the next cam.
pnign. We hardly venture to expect TINT Russia
will give her unqualified acquescence TO the terms
proposed, but anticipate II counter proposition
dexterously framed as, ifpossiblc, to disuni,o
the allies. fling Austria back into her former in
action, and introduce discord into the counsels of
France and England. We have said that the
terms are moderate. and in no respect GO beyond
that which, in the most modest view of our own
position. we have "A right to demand Should.
then, the answer amount TO Il direct reputation
of any substantial part of the terms offered by
the allies, the course of honor aud interest is
clear. They are bound to proceed vigorously
with the war, and to try what effect another years
operations may have in changing the counsels
Of the enemy. Should, on the other hand, the
answer amount substantially to YES" we are
convinced that no idle puncto.no adhesion to IA
| formal and verbal consistency. will stand in the
way of mutual agreement The settlement, if
| settlement there is to he. must be prompt and
definite. We cannot afford to repeat in this year
| the diplomatic, any more than the military and
naval mistakes, of the last, and do not intend TO
| be tricked in council ont of terms which we be.
| lieve ourselves able to win in the field.
| For the event. notwithstanding Mr.. Golden,
| we have no fear. We may not indeed be able