The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1856-05-29

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A1fg los son appro ring tefaregn policy
minis'ers TIE following the Of The motion
msy be produced by the trst Of pss,s b,sh for sy
zsuon IN general and for the mont II ovde
ana 10 the !!saa peninsula, aud resoeniz,ns
me noEor rnich the policy Of The governmcrt and
eIct OF the duan p!eniponsiaes have ,sd In these
heRpy lesaI1s, expresses its en- Ire satisfaction
mo',on was passed UNANIMOUSLY, - was vote oi
Tbs D1fy Reavs thinks the Cabinet will wait for some
hat the ration Is thoro ,gny interested 70 the
sao queeuon before Will inter serious in italy.
The opinion Of Parliament ought to be sscersred VITA
out aslsy. Ths question ~ prscscAssnd urgeot aly
must Do regarded a. who'e Woros viii suffice but
the csmonstra Ion must he mace Ia earnest.
Inc Fo& al serts tina the IAiian question uat be set
ted me &C .uA sste Of Italy dA gerous to neigh
pors sna Dangerous IN its bearings upon Easopsan
,iarc.s. What Italy wants Ia that aoders fsedom
which contains within SELF the principle Of dsvs pmsn
The emperor Napoleos's Piau Against so-
basxOpOl.
In n De Bszancourts secono volume of the History Of
fund the following letter from the Emp ror of the
French, which Commancant Fave had bs+n caargsd to
French army In the East after the rupture Of
erepces OF Vienna. may b. mberei that the En-
pIor hso to proceed In psrson TO the Cmea to
share the fagues and pers oe the French army, but
had been prevented BY grave # Toe fol-
lcwrg eter communicates 20 General Canrooert the plan
OF campsign ON whoh the Emperor Intended to ast hsd
ne gore there. 1t sayt:-
APRIL 2s, 1856.
The FIRE which has been opened against ss,lstopol
Will Dy this time have eitrer seeded failed.
In sither case 1t 10 absolutely nscessy TO quit tho
defensive position in which the army has remained
accord with the English govern ueut, would have
tre troops divided into three armies-one siege
army, and two e operations The first 10 destined to
protect kamiesch and to blockade the garrison Of Sebas
topol the second to operate ct short distance
Ak'sva and in case Of need to sks possssson OF The
heights of Mackenzie and the third otendsd to elect
diversions II as Ihavs reason to think, tae Russians
have &c. 600 men in Sebasopo 16 900 to the north OF
VCh0rDaVR 4 RI havo 0nnd
troops to destroy al the Russian army which miga be
taken In the rear before could uite all its forcs and
be almost equal; for that great principle Of must
rot be forgotten, that If diversion Is made a csr-
tain distances from the base of operations 1t
ry that the troops employed In such . diversion
shruM be In sufficient number to b. able of thsm-
selves to resist the rmy Of th' susms wao
this being well 'nsicessd " uld seut into
valley OF the BsdAr 20 900 man taken fr,n Tn.
army Of sebastopol; and, supp,,tsd by L,-c R.glsn
would have occupied from Skeiia 90 Ar The idgs
reule and rchorgoun, the four Is whi:n aroe ne
Tchernsya; ~e sboo thus bave h.s ul.uy tels
the hfjgh.s OF MCKENZIE ter tas ,uld
have left Lord Raglan ali POSITIONS ON the
le.. q me rsheIn.ss fIou stsia q. "ra' rcaog,,u
BY the English tie 40, ,0t0 Of tbs active .rmy,
the cavalry and the Of transport 1T my di para
waiting In that position for the srsa OF 10Y corps e
d1met, which. coming from iroole, would nave
received orders to recopnoire Cape Whist would
have been our position as regarded the klssini rhe
movement on Badar, by giving he passages the
Tchenaya, would have IhreAte ed IN sf. aud ied them
to suppose that was our intention to disocse hem
from the heights Of lnkermarn suo Mcseozs The Rus
Stars would have been thus kept chez nd their Attsn
tior drawn on lnhermann and Perexop, Que positions
would have been excellent and my ans being untnovn,
II sny hing had derapged them hing puid been
CON promised But supPosns .ha. no hrg nad oeposed
the general pan It would have been csrfd out ia the
following manner As soon the feet, bringing the
$500 men Of the reserve, had been approaching,
orders would have been given for them to proceed
waaf nd fnvG h1a for a laud A 1yot
body Of 5000 would Immediately their landing
ss'abah themselves three leagues from Aloushta be-
until information had been received Of the cc,upa
Of that deHie. After such information had been
ispi, and the 600 assembled Il Ba.dar would
receive orders to march along the road which skir is
,fe sea coast by Yaa. In h es days-thAt is to say
two days after the lane ing Of the army At Aouchta-
tie 46,o00 men from Baidar wound have lined
under the walls Of slnpheropo tho 900 jast landed
i've would have been taken possession of, and
sufficient garrison left in it, or good position would
hve been taken on the road hsd just passed. to
s,cu,e lhe ear Of the army Now Of two thing. one
sosndoped that formidable position to meet tho army
which would advance from the side of Bakshisera and
Easan, woud pnsh orwsrd take possession Of the
pstion OF lnkermai the Russians would await in
TER lines the arrival of the army advan siog f:om
imphercpol snd then the latter, advancing from Bsk
isersi on sebastopo always supporting Its left the
Mountains, would form junction with the army Of
larshal Raglan who had advanced from BAidar on Al
A repulse the Russian army, and drive it back into
ebastopol or into the sea- This plan appears to me to
POSSESS advantages In the first place. thu army
Aouchta, would be in communication with the sea- the
is very healthy, and better supplied with water
than any other part Of the Crimsa; #. rear woud be
always secure 1t would occupy ground where our in
feioriy in cavalry would sensiby fet and last
IT, would te a ct the Russian lice Of opera
toIs ard cut e all the supplies, by probably taking
pot session OF their psrks Of reserve If the defe of
Ayer-an indispensable element In the success of the
psn-shoud be fortified not to be capable Of being
al fhn NM hn AnnA flrf hat nka
would have been re-embarked; the army OF reserve
would then have been laLded Balsklava and the d
would have been made by Badar but with fewer sdvan
tages. As to the march Of The 40 600 from BAidar
70 Ak ucha, IT would have been without danger as the
ground s projected by almost inaccessible mountans
and is at geat distance FROM the Russian AMY Our
army night during almost al the distance along
tue seAAEoro have been f ucaej by steamers I.
receive the sicbt. IT. on the c n rary, It had
been w.hed TO make diversion oy EupAtoria, my
opinion IS Mt Lothns could havs been ie dangerous
opposed to the rules Of ar and to the
Of prrdtnoe. In order to operate tr M Eupatoria
rhercpo, the army Eng ged you'd re IL open and
ground ~here he Russian cavsiy, whoa is vsry
numerous, woplo have every OF and ii
would lave 70 make march of 10 Leagues IN face OF an
suenJ VIII oh might me from the North well feorr
III. scr,h tall tho conn MS, and cut cf all retreat
Tie wi Of the army woua have support from the
oature 4 the ground In order to 60 from Eupatoria
Smpheropol IL should carry with 1t All ia provisions
all its ennunifon for when once the army had ie
EuIatoria he Is 600 Russians in tea and
most Wnom cavalry, Woulu neEfAss tnoH rear
preven the arrival of any conveys. If it should mset
with resistance at Smpheropo and the Russian
Should ny q change Of front, have taken posu on
the road which The had passed army would
be either annihiated out There is besdes
ther abb oute principle and that s that flank arch
lot possible unless at distance from the enemy aud Wien
hetered by the nature OF the ground the army which
would operate from Er patoiia to Tmpheropol W ulo
consequently have line Of operations any defence
assured for ts TANKS, any mesEs OF retreat nor
favorable aeld Of bat le, means tf procuring food
Lastly, this army OF operation instead OF beng
composed Of soldiers of nation Commanded oy
single chief wCulo bs formed in great part Of Turks
and some allied divisions would be added 70 it. there
would be neither unity security, absolute
foence. II. instead of marching Simpbercpol, he
leaving Eupatoria should desire proceed dfrec
70 seoastopo 1t must recommence uncer disadvalt IA
geous coneiiens the campaign which made in dlsem
barking in the Crnea. 1t should cary toe formidable
positions OF the Ama Of the Katcha and Of the Beoek
fhis enterprise Is impossible tor 1t would be disastrous
Hence follows the absolute necessity of only leaving
Eupatt the number Of Turks strictly indispensable c
oe'.nd the place. Such La the plan which ~ishe1 to
xecute at the lead o. the brave troops when you
hi hsito commanded and 1t is with the st proourd
sLc acute that fink that grsver in erests force
me 10 rems 10 IA Europe NAp0 EON