The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1856-01-18

abolition Speaker, and the fierce war Of sec
tions in the election Of 1856.
The SIEGE on SEBAsTopoL REVIEWED BY IN
AMERICAN MILITARY AUTHoRTY-RUssIAS YER
sus ANGLo-FRENcH SrRArEGY.-In another col
umn will be found communication from Lieu
tenant-Colonel Roberts, U. S. A, giving an
analysis Of the strategical faults committed
by the Allies at the siege Of Sebastopol. Col.
r. thinks that, considering the MAGNITUDE
and importance Of that fortress, and the enor-
nous sacrifices made in the commencement Of
the siege, it should either have been abandoned
earlier or taken at any cost. Nothing less THAI
the capture of Sebastopol, north as we'll as
south of its harbors, armies and materiel of
war-would, in the eyes of competent military
judges, justify the fearful expenditure of blood
and treasure which has taken place. He com
ments in severe terms upon the absence Of the
British reserves, which should have been ready
to launch upon the Redan when Col. Wynd-
hams stormers had gained the curtain in the
second assault, and observes that when the lat
ter were driven back the British army became
forlorn hope and its commanders the leaders.
Placed in such a position, it was the duty of
every man in that army to save highlands
honor or fill a soldiers grave instead Of that,
the British beat a Extraordinarily covering
themselves with disgrace, retreat being the
stormer's act OF outlawry. Another fatal blum
der was the no. having in readiness to support
the English storming columns some Of the nu-
merous French divisions which were kept idle
during the conflict. The fact that after such
an assault Prince Gortsshakoff was able to eva
cuG.e in mastery and deliberate order the
south side of Sebastopol, and to leave nothing
but ruin and devastation to the enemy, was q
sufficient proof in itself of the strategical
er7ors and unskilful combinations of the Allied
Generals.
Col. Roberts thinks, on the other hand that
the Russian defence realized the highest ideas
Of modern military science. In it were found
combined all the promptness of decision, ideli-
~, energy, and unyielding frmuess Of purpose
which constitute perfection in the art of war.
According to him there never was defence
in Which fewer errors were committed by the be-
sieged, Or more important results achieved. The
clecks which the Allies met with in the course
Of It, and their inability to capture the north
err forts, are looked upon by scientific judges
as irremsdiable military defeats, which no fu.
tnre successes can compensate for. Nothing
but the miraculous interposition Of the Al.
mighty himself can, in short, retrieve the dis
astrous consequences of such blunders.
Such are the conclusions arrived at by mi
litary writer, whose position entities his opin.
ions to some weight They in fact prove but
little further than the admission already made
by the English and French press. On all hands
it is confessed that this memorable siege has
disappointed all the calculations founded on
long established military prestige and the ira
diiioDs Of the old fashioned systems Of military
tactics. Those who fancied that they had
learned the art Of war under the best European
masters, arc discovering to their modification
that they are but mere tyros to the Russian
stJategists.
COMING TO THE SCRATcH-tt AFTER THE WFA.