Fremont journal. [volume] (Fremont, Sandusky County [Ohio]) 1853-1866, 1856-01-18

hioIIOW VOJes Tor and IS represented by but
one Each elector in Hamilton county may
appeal, as constituent, to eight different
members of the House Of REPRESENTATIVES
while each elector in Morrow county can an
peal to one only. The elector in Hamilton
IS thus preferred, in political consideration.
to the elector in Morrow. The inequality
is aggravated by the reflection that the ma
jority by which the eight representatives
from Hamilton are elected may be less than
that which elects the single Representative
from Morrow.
Let the same plural district be compared
also, with a number of single districts. hav-
ing the same aggregate representation in tho
more numerous branch of the General As
sembly. Hamilton county occupies the
Southwestern part of the State. Fifteen
eonnties in the Northwestern part of the
State, constitute eight single districts. The
Representatives of those districts, separately
elected and separately responsible, are often
divided; while the Representatives from
Hamilton, elected together, and compare
lively irresponsible, act together and in con-
cert. While, therefore, IN the choice of
Senator of the United States, and upon ma
ny other questions, Hamilton county, with
her undivided representation, will have,
practically, eigllts votes, the fifteen north
western. counties, their Representatives being
equally divided, may have, practically, none.
For the sake of perspicuity I limit this
comparison to the arrangement Of the Rep
resentative districts. Your own reflections
viii extend it to the arrangement of dis
tricts for the choice Of Senators.
1t hardly needs to be. remarked that the
existing system, while thus unjust to the
counties arranged in single districts, IS prej-
judicial to the interests of the moro popu.
lous counties themselves. Its necessary
tendency is to excite jealousies in portions
of the State against other portions, which
must prove hurtfuI. 1t fails, also, to secure,
in the plural districts, a satisfactory repre-
sentation Of the various interests and senti-
ments of the people. In the county Of
Hamilton, for example, the political minori-
ty, however considerable, can have no ade-
quate representation. Townships and wards,
with populations which, with a system of
single districts, would entitle them to sepa-
rate Representatives, are liable to have their
political interests and views overlooked and
disregarded under the pressure of political
Iexigencies. Constituents cannot well know
their Representatives, and Representatives
are absolved in q great measure, from their
individual responsibilities to their eonstitu--
ents. The demands of the people, under
such circumstances, viii necessarily be sub
ordinated to the demands of political organs
izations, and the public good must often
yield to party necessities.
That system of single districts will prove
an absolute remedy for these political evils,
no one, perhaps, viii venture to expect. /
am fully persuaded, however that it would
secure much moro perfect popular repre-
sentation than VIC have at present, andI
therefore recommend that an amendment to
the Constitution providing such a system
be submitted to the people for their adop-
ton or rejection. 8
While the trle principles of popular gov
eminent thus require the most complete and
perfect representation of the people which
is attainable, they require also, and no less
imperatiyelv, frequent meetings of the Rep
rcsentative Legislature, for the thorough SUI
pervision of administrative action, for the
prompt remedy of evils, and for the due pro-
vision of necessary means aad measures for
guarding the public interest and promoting
the public welfare.
The existing Constitution authorizes only
biennial sessions except in cases when the
Governor, upon extraordinary occasions,
may deem himself warranted in specially
eonvening the Legislature.
Under this provision the whole admins
trative power oftbe State IS left for two
years in the hands of the Executive and Ju-
dicial departments without legislative check
or limitation. There can be no impeaeh-
ment or removal, during that period, of any
State officer for any cause, however urgent.
The Constitutional responsibility of State
officials to the immediate representatives
of the people, IS thus in great part, practical
ly nulhfed. A profound writer has well
observed that every departure from annual
Legislative sessions IS an approach towards
irresponsible government and despotism.
Numerous occasions must necessarily
arise, in State so large as ours, from past
Legislative acts CT omissions, as well as from
various contingencies of other descriptions,
which in the aggregate, will imperatively
require the attention of the Legislature, al
though no one ofthem may constitute such
an extraordinary occasion as viii warrant
the exercise of the special power vested in
the Governor. Expediency, therefore, no
less than principle, seems to torecommend an
nual, rather than biennial sessions.
There are some collateral considerations,
tending to the same conclusion, which
should not be overlooked.
The present Constitution allows no
of its provisions, except such as
may be agreed to BY three-ffths of the mem
bers of each House, and by majority of the
electors voting at the next election for Sen
ators and Representatives. 1t follows that
no amendment of the Constitution can DO
made, however unanimously sanctioned by
the Legislature or demanded BY the people,
until two years after il shall have been pro-
posed. The substitution Of annual for bien-
nial sessions will necessarily require annual
elections for Senators and Representatives
and will thus remove this needless and dis.
paraging restriction upon upon the exercise
Of popular sovereignty.
T. -. l....o,. H. Al Al ko.---- -