Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1856-03-08

that the Court of Appeals having decided that.
10y the laws of that State, they continued 10 be
slaves, that decision was, in his opinion conelu-
sive."
This same doctrine is also fully M. intained by
the Supreme Court of the L. s. in the case Of the
U. ). VS.. the ship Garonc. The facts of the case
were, that Mrs. Smith, a widow lady of Louisiana,
have visited France, and had taken with her the
slave Priscilla. Afterwards she was brought back
by the son.in law Of Mrs. Smith and lived in
Louisiana us his slave.
Chief Justice fancy, in delivering the opinion Of
the Court held: That evan assuming by the French
Laws, that Priscilla was entitled to her freedom,
upon her introduction into that country, the Court
wasof opinion that there was nothing in the act Of
Congress to prevent her mistress from bringing
her back to her place OF residence, and continuing
TO hold her as before in her service, and that, al
though the girl had been staying for n time in
France, in the service of her mistress, yet in con-
temptation Of law, she still continued IN inhabitant
Of Louisiana.
To return to the question: When brought within
the State Of Ohi9 for a temporary purpose by the
consent Os the master. did they become free in con-
sequence of that clause of the Constitution of Ohio
which declares there shall be no slavery or in
voluntarily servtGde within her limits?" We think
not the effect of that clause being to prevent
slavery as an institution within her limits, rather
than to execute the act of manumission upon for.
cign slaves temporarily upon our soil with the mas
ter's consent.
Supposing that Ohio has the right under her
Constitution to pass laws making the slave free
the moment he stands upon Ohio soil. by the con.
sent Of the master, it is sufficient for the purpose of
this case that, at the time Mary Garner and Simon
Garner were in the State Of Ohio as alleged, there
was no law declaring that the relations they held
TO their master as slaves were dissolved and at an
end.
Had they refused to return to Kentucky, it is
quite possible that the owner would have invoked
the aid Of legal process to compel their return In
vain. The Federal Courts could not have re-
inanded them to the custody and control of their
master, because they were present in Ohio by act
Of the master, ard not as lugitives who had es-
capped into Ohio. The Constitution and laws Of
the United States; all powerful as they are, and
trust always will he, in national and inter State
affairs, were imperative when by the act OF the
PARTIES, the whole case was brought within the Ju-
~risliction and disposal Of the State of Ohio. -,
Yhe aid of legal process from Ohio Courts could
not bave been obtained, for Ohio has enacted no
laws for the control and management of foreign
slaves while, for the purpose OF sojourn or transit,
temporarily within her borders.
With this state of the law, slaves asserting their
freedom become, practically free. The master has
no longer the right of violent subsection to his COM
mand, but the State Of Ohio extends to both parties
the protection Of equal laws.
But this possible freedom, this freedom in posse,
rather than in eSSe, is something which the law OF
Ohio rather protects than creates. That the slave
brought by his master into Ohio, and refusing
u ItlHTu DCCUuItS ire, : UAC VI a =
suits of the proposition that slavery is a creature
of law, and cannot maintain itself where the
laws do not regulate it, and provide for its contin-
nance.
But the slaves having been brought to Ohio by
the master, returns with him voluntarily to the
State of Kentucky, what, then, is the relation be
tween them? While in Ohio, the Ohio courts could
have determined that, for the whole matter was
properly within her control. The act of the parties
again managed the jurisdiction, and the whole mat
ter rested again within the control OF the State OF
Kentucky.
The claim upon the State Of Ohio for protection
against violent abduction was not made. The
right to be free was waived. In coming to Ohio
the master voluntarily abandoned his legal power
over his slave, and in returning voluntarily
the slave has equally abandoned his claim to free
dom. 4.
Upon the return of slaves voluntarily to Ken
lucky with their master, their relations become
confirmed by the laws and jurisdiction Of that
State, and with that settlement of the question the
Supreme Court of the United States has declined
to interfere. The law, as thus determined. We
have already stated in the earlier part of our
opinion.
With reference to'the particular case before us,
we therefore are under the necessity of holding
that these defendants, Mary Garner, Simon Gar.
ner, jr., were legally held in slavery at the time OF
their escape on the Goth of January 1856.
We have given those cases which in our opinion
nre the leading ones upon this subject, and which
throw llrHC upon tUc ISSUES 10 Dt ucI III -tnls vase
They are the landmarks by which we have been
guided in our decision.
The next and last question to be settled arises
under the Constitutional provision for the rendition
Of F~ugitiyes from labor, un Ter the Fugitive Slave
Law, and the facts proved 10 the case render oul
duty Il clear and unmistakable one.
The question is not one Of humanity that | an
called upon to decide. The laws of Kentucky anC
Of the United States make it n question Of proper
ty. 1t is not a question of f~oeliug,to be decided by
the' chance current of my sympathies. There arr
to be adiudicated the rights of an institution 81
agreed to in the formation of our Government a
TO make it both municipal and federal in its char
acter. 1t is the essence Of the institution that th'
slave does not possess equal rights with the free
man. The abstract rights to life, liberty and prop
erty are in his case replaced by statutes providin,
expressly for his condition. 1t has been our duty
as a court, to listen with attention, and, we trust
with courtesy to all of those Arguments whic
have urged the decision Of this question upo
moral rather than legal grounds. We conceiy
that our highest moral obligation in this case
to administer impartially the plain provisions {
the law.
However painful the result may be to the defer
dants in this case, it is my duty to deliver then
Simon Garner, Sr, Simon Garner. Jr., and Mar
Garner. fugitives from servive, into the custody
the claimant, james Marshall.
He then proceeded to consider.
The claim Of Gaines, to Margaret alias Pegq
Garner, a maiaHo e0adaj Tom, a negro bog; San
a mulahO boy. and Siia, az iqJant girl, elaine
By archibald X. Gaines, Of Boone county Kentucky
as jugitices from service and labor in the State 9
Kentacky.
In this case it is claimed by the defense. tbs
Peggy, when about six years old was permitted b
her previous master, to come to the State of Obi
and upon that fact they claim that she is entitle
to her freedom; and that being free at that tim
ana her children being born since, they are ais
entitled to freedom.
These facts present for our consideration I'll
same question which was raised in the case
Marshal vs.. Simon Garner ct al, and the decisiO
which we haze just announced applies equally
this case.
We shall therefore make the order that the pa
ties named, to wit: Peggy, Tom, Sam, and Silla, /
delivered into the custody and possession of th
claimant Archibald X. Gaines.
On tho snuaa A. &c tLa Cnr,nnisr;nnnrI dnnisicI