The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1856-11-05


be under the special projection Of the Shah Who had
granted them an asylum during the British occupa-
ton OF Affghanistan: and their summary election
IRON sne country thus nealy touched The honor OF
Bet the Shac, even at the last moment, made an
effort TO keep on the shady side Of the law Desi-
rous If possible 10 obtain possession Of Herat drive
back The tide OF Caboo Invasion, and recover Can.
dahar for Kohendils family, without provoking the
armed interference OF England, he published before
despatchng the troops a manifesto in the Teheran
Gazette, in which he repudiated all feeling Of hos
tility to England represented MIR. MurTays retire
ment as mere personal misunderstanding and ex-
planned the Herat movement as an expedition I'M
dertaken at the urgent entreaty OF Shahzada Yus-
souf in order to save the place from the threatened
attack of Dost Mahomeds forces from the eastward.
The object OF this manifesto, which bears strong
marks OF European manipulation, was, OF course,
TO bring the immediate operation in which the
of Colonel Shells reserved condition; and it is
not improbable, as the intention was simultane-
ously announced Of despatching another body OF
10000 men 30 Candahar, to reinstate kohendii
Khan's son in the government, that the Persians,
with their fatal fondness for verbal bubbles, may
have also supposed the emission OF the name OF Can
dahar in the convention of 1858 to preclude the
British government from interfering on behalf Of
DOst Mahomed.
AS to the subsequent march Of events we have no
very certain intelligence. Shahzada Yussouf, pre-
ferring the Kujurs to his blood enemies, the Baruck
Eyes is supposed to have rather favored the
manded an advanced detachment, was, by consent
of the Governor, admitted into the town; but when
Sultan Murad Mirza at the head of the reserved
army OF the Persans, approached, the Heratees de-
termined on resistance. SanO Khan was elected;
Shahzada Yussouf was deposed and murdered (),
and Esau Khan, an Alekozye chief of some note,
though not Immediately connected with Var Maho-
med's family, was elected in his place. The siege
has been continued for the last four or five months
with varying success The Afghans who went out
to meet the Persians were cnt up at Ghorian, but
they subsequently repulsed the besiegers in several
attempts at and even made successful sorties
blowing up the Persian magazines, and destroying
their supplies. According to the last accounts, the
Heratees were in great distress for want of ammu-
milton and provisions. They have made unsuccess-
fnl appeals for relief both to Dost Mahomed Khan,
at Candahar, and 10 the British Chief Commissioner
in Scinde; and it is probable that, ere this, they
have capitulated. Nothing, indeed, but the dssen.
ions between Sultan Murad Mira and Sano Khan,
which have paralysed the Persian movements, could
have I'D TO the siege being already so protracted;
and If the place be ultimately saved, il will be the
most miraculous escape in history.
The British government cannot be accused of
precipitancy in dealing with the Persian diff Guilty.
Although the manifesto above alluded to was pub
ished in Teheran in February, it was not until Ju
ly, after negotiations had been carried for
raj months through Constantinople, that Ministers
took up the question in earnest. An ultmatum, it
is understood was then sent to the Shah, requiring
him, whatever might have happened in the interim,
to withdraw his forces from Herat and retire within
the Persian frontier, to prepare for war with
England; and instructions, It is shown by the recent
overland advices, must have been at the same time
forwarded to India to organize a powerful expedi-
ton and hold it ready for service in the Persian
Gulf as soon az the monsoon was over and the great
heats Of the Gulf had moderated. The Shahs an
swer 70 the utimatum, which has lately arrived is
said TO be conceived in the same spirit the ami
festo. He will withdraw his forces from Herat il
we will undertake to compel Dost Mahomed Khan
10 retire 10 Caboo leaving Candahar in the posses
1f ~nft
evasive nature is equivalent to refusal, should
be authorized 10 declare at once; but there is
still channel open for negotiation Terrackh Khan,
who was deputed from Teheran to Constantinople TO
arrange the mission affair, before our ultimatum
reached the Persian court, has since, IL Is said
received plenary powers to discuss and if possible,
TO adjust the Herat question also and although no
great hopes are entertained Of pacific settlement
through this officers means, (since there Is in
fact no ground for negotiation, the question of
peace or Of war depending on simple yea
or "Isy,) sfill il would be inconsistent with dplo-
matte usage TO commence hosities before receiving
the profered explanations. There is only one point
against which we ought most especially 10 guard,
and that L. the indefinite proongation OF state OF
suspense. There is, in reality, very little room
for diplomatic argument and the assertion by Persia
Of counter rights is altogether fictitious. Persia Il
bound by a special convention with Us not TO send
troops 10 Hera unless the place be attacked and her
assistance be demanded. The place has not been
attacked-has not even been threatened with attack
and SO far from Persian assistance being demanded
the Heratees have been fighting sword In hand
pro arts f tocis, against the invader for the last
four months Persia is therefore acting in fragrant
violation OF her engagement 10 rs; but there Is no
similar promise Of forbearance upon our part. We
are under no engagement to Persia TO IN aintain
kohendil khans family In power, or TO prevent
Dost Aahomed Khan from occupying Candahar.
We might even ourselves march an army TO that
city from Scinde, without giving Persia any diplo
matte right 70 complain Of our advance. II, there
FORE ~ IL reputed rerTackh ksans instructions are
TO continue to ventilate the Candahar question: and
II defeated at Constantnopie to transfer the arena
Of discussion TO Paris and eventually TO London we
may be sure that the object Ii merely TO gain time
Persia being sufficiently quick sighted to perceive
that we cannot maintain in a state of preparation
the expeditionary force for an indefinite period
at Bombay. and that II even enter the Gulf, dis
embark our troops, and occupy karak and Bushire,
Persia IN the meantime retaining occupation Of
Herat the advantage Is all upon the side OF the
Shah.
IL would be well, accordingly Mt this early stage
OF the affair not only to prepare our troops, but to
make up our minds as to future operations. We
must remember, in the first place, as fixed prin-
cpe, rising far above the passing considerations Of
the moment, that 10 cannot be 10 our advantage to
wea ken or dismember Persia. Whatever be the
disposition 70 rs Of the reigning monarch and his
Ministers the integrity Of the country Is essential TO
our political system. Persia, indeed, Is geographi-
Calfy placed a. buffer between the West and
East, and upon is continuing 70 occupy its present
place In the map Of Asia depends prospect Of pre-
venting collision beEween the forces OF Russia and our
Indian empire. With this paramount consideration
before u.s. Il viii be seen that war with Persia re-
ouires the most delicate handling. II should be
care TO exert Just sufficient amount OF pressure 10
effect cur object, and not one iota more. On pre-
yious oc sason Persia yielded TO demonstration Of
the most patry proportions but, with experienced
European advisers at his elbow, the Shah IL not
likely again to give way 70 mere Intimidation. We
must he prepared, then IN the present instance, not
merely 70 make descent On the sea coast, hut II
need should be- 20 operate also In the interior and
this Is far more serious matter than may at first
sight apper.
Persia q military power Is contemplate. Single
handed, she would be unable 20 cope in the field
with three or four good Indian bngases-and In the
present state Of Russian exhaustion, single handed
she would most assuredH be-but she has other
means OF defence besiies her armies. Her sea coast
is git by range Of mountains which are all but
impossible. The low country would not afford sup
plies or carriage sufficient for single regiment.
Everything must be brought from distance: pro-
visions from Bakrein, Muscst and Bombay camels
horses and mules from Turkish Arabia and kur
distan; me time and expense required 10 complete
tine cornmssariat being thus beyond all computation