The Opelousas patriot. [volume] (Opelousas, Parish of St. Landry, La.) 1855-1863, 1856-10-18


mean the people Of the territorial organization
that is formed by Congress? Yes. Does not
the Territory end when the State begins?
Yes. is there any restriction as to the time
when this power is to be exercised I Certain
ly none in the bill I've will soon show that
there is none anywhcre). Then the plain in
tent and meaning Of the bill" is, as Judge
Douglas, the author Of it, states, in his report
as chairman Of the Committee on Territories,
in Senate, June 30, 1856 : that the PEG of
the Territory have the power, " seh,ae a Terri
tory, to FORM and regulate their own ~institu-
tor !. etc. Their power begins with the
beg ming, and continues to the end Of the
y sorial organization. Judge Douglas,
"a. Cass, and others, stated this distinctly in
the Senate when the bill was pending. And
on July 2, 1856, q remarkable debate took
place in the Senate, j which this very matter
was discussed; and Lhators Cass, Douglas,
Bigler, Toucey, and dbers, the very best Of
" the Natural allies of the South" ., declared
that the plain intent and meaning Of the act
was, that the Territory, at any time during its
Territorial existence, and through its Legisla-
ture, could admit or exclude slauery:-AND NC
SOUTHERN SENATOR DARED GA1NsAY IT not
even that "lion Of the tribe of Judah " who
with jaw and talons, (jaw and talents, SO
brayely tore in pieces his bound and defense
less victims at the barbecue--that lion, fierce
in attack on foes that could not retaliate-
wa-ay out here in Opelousas, but tame and
submissive in the Senate, when Southern
rights ought to have been defended against the
above clases Of the " wild Bill"-the Caliban
of Congressional legislation.
But Senator Benjamin was estopped from
denying the aboveexpressed meaning of the
act and this is the cause Of his silence on
this subject then and now for on May 2, 1856,
he said in the Senate in regard to the princi.
pies of the Kansas bill, that: " all agreed that,
whether Congress had the power or not to
(" exclude Slavery FROM THE TERRITORIES, it
" ought not to exercise it. All agreed that il
3" that power was owned by us, ue ought to
" delegate it to the people, mhose interests qcere
" to be affected by the institutions established at
" home. We therefore put that in the bill y.
We have here then, Senator Benjamin's posi-
tive declaration, in addition to those above
cited, that the intent and meaning of the Kan
sas bill was to give this power to the people
of the Territories. He was present at the
above debate of July 2, and did not deny this
meaning and he has never denied it any
where, though it is every where charged. In
the name of common honesty then, it is to be
hoped we shall have no more denials in
Louisiana.
Now we know what Mr.. Buchanan means,
in his letter Of acceptance, when he says,
Congress has provided that "Me people of a
I" Territory like those Of a State), shalt decide
/" for themselves, whether slavery shall or shall
/" not exist within their limits" And it should
be noted that, in said letter, he goes on with an
explanation, which makes this meaning, if pos
sible, still more plain.
But, Senator Benjamin said there was a dis
agreement in the Senate only about tile pouur
Of Congress to legislate on the existence Of
slavery in the Territories--some affirming,
Others denying and some even, said the power
Of control was inherent in the squatters there.
fore " ue said in this bill, that ae transferred
"to the people Of that Territory, THE ENrIRs
" W TO CONTROL, BY THEIR OWN LEG1sLA-
" TON, leir own domestic institutions, subject
"only 10 the provisions Of the Constitution
" that W. would not interfere with them thai
they N ght do as they pleased on the subject
" that y Constitution alone should gove,n."
This is quoted, not only because of its de
cisiveness in fixing squatter sovereignty on the
bill, but because it contains a general allega
ton of the defense, to wit: that the phrase
subject to the Constitution of the United
States" restraints squatter sovereignty, ant
makes the Kansas bill mean only what thu
Utah and NewMexico bill means, to wit: tina
the people of the Territory when assembled ii
Convention to form o Constitution for admis
sion into the Union, shall have the power tt
decide upon the existence of slavery. The per
feet baselessness of this is easily shown. Kcer
it in mind that slavery is the subject of thu
clause of the Kansas bill under discussion, ant
that, by its plain import, plenary power ovel
slavery is recognized in the people Of the Ter
ritory. Then note
l. That the exercise of the power is limited
to no time by the act, and that none is fxet
by the Constitution.
2. "'i'erritory " and State" in the clause
are placed in contradistinction the same
thing is asserted of each THE "1eerritory
ends when tie "State" begins. The estate
begins when the people meet in Convention tc
form the Constitution and this is the " State )
that is meant-not one sovereign already; fol
such an assertion in reference to a sovereign
State would be Congressional i'upertinence
Hence it is the people before the beginning OIL
the " State that are meant by "Ierritory"
they have this power, under the bill, from The