The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1856-10-20
Financial Amsirs IN Europe-The Bank OF
France.

Financial Aasirs IN Europe-The Bank OF
France.
The latest accounts from Paris--which IL now
the centre Of financial operations on the Cont
nent OF Europe-report that the bankers appre-
hended that the Bank of France was on the point
of suspending payment. The step, in their opin-
ion, had been rendered imperative by the drain,
first of gold, to unknown boards, second, of
silver to Vienna Hamburg and China; by the
heavy loss entailed upon the bank by the required
importations of gold from England amounting
to l per cent on say eight millions
| Of dollars per week for several weeks;
and by the impossibiliy of resorting to
the usual recourse of monetary insti-
tutions and curtailing the accommodation afford
| ID by the Bank to operators on the Bourse. They
urged that If the bank suddenly refused to con
| tinue to carry these operators along, restricted
her line of discounts in short, to the point which
would be fixed upon here in like emergency, a
financial revulsion would occur, which would con-
vulse France, and probably overthrow the gov
ernment. Therefore they inferred that for his
own sake, the Emperor would compel the bank to
suspend specie payments, and would again de-
clare her paper a legal tender.
| 1t may be observed, en- passdnt, and before we
I examine the character of the premises on which
| this conclusion rests that the authors OF this
! theory give Louis Napoleon credit for very
shortsighted wisdom If the bank suspended,
she would not only continue to accommodate
spectators, as heretofore, but would in all pro-
| liability considering the ease with which the
thing could be DONE enlarge her line of discounts
| Again, before long, the government will need
money evidently, if the bank is non-specie
paying concern the simplest way Of getting it
would be to authorize new issue Of hundred
| or two hundred millions. In word, If the bank
suspended, though she might in a certain way and
| a certain place avert the impending storm, it
would clearly be at the cost of the future; the
crisis Of ls56-'57 can only be escaped by render
| ing future crisis perfectly inevitable and far
more severe. Now, to suppose that Louis Napo-
leon, with his dynastic schemes, would thus pur-
chase days peace at so fearful a cost for the
morrow, is to give him very little credit for
| sagacity. It is TO intimate that his rejoicings
over the birth Of his heir were not sincere.
! However, we are quite prepared to show, that
i
| likelihood Of q suspension Of the Bank Of France.
In the first place, the rate Of interest has just
| been raised to six per cent. There lie no doubt
| but this hos caused very considerable inconre-
| nience has frightened the market, and has proved
serious trouble to mercantile men. And it is
equally certain that it has pro aaeo relieved the
k-though Of course in the present condition
Of that institution il will not suffice to eytrc ate
it from impending endorsements. Now if it
had been the intention Of the Emperor to compel
the bank TO suspend, would he have begun by fol-
towing the contrary policy? There were two paths
open 10 him; the one was to have the bank sus-
pend; the other to Yet the bank proter. itself,
BIZ adopting stringent measures 70 retain its spe
Gle in It's vaulta On due reflection, Louis Ma
poleon seems TO have decided on the latter; the
bank has raised her rate of interest to SIX is it
| reasonable to suppose that the Emperoc viii now
alter bis policy, turn round upon what he has
| done, and try the other method? We think not,
1t Icant for the present.
There il another point OF view in which the evil
of the S, spcnsion Of the Bank Of France must be
assumed TO be constantly studied by the Emperor.
Financially considered, the French people, like
their neighbors divide into two classes-specu-
iators on the Bourse and non-speculators. The
former class comprises that snail circle o. men
who live by gambling in stocks and by getting
up Credits Mobil ers and other swindles, and
the daily og': the latter comprises all the rest Of
The Frenct--that i to say, the people who ac-
quire and use money solely for the purpose Of
purchasing the commodities they require Now,
the suspension Of the Bank of France would af-
feet these two classes differently. The specula-
tors would be benefited by II, for It would make
money easier, and would enable them to carry
their stocks, and keep their bubbles afoat but
the people at large would be seriously injured
first by the depreciation OF what notes thsy
might have on hand q. the time; secondly. by
the check given to trade and the uncertainty OF
exchanges; and thirdly by The general distrust
which such step would create both at home and
abroad. Operators on the Bourse would under
stand well enough that If the bank suspended,
with pecie equal to one third Der circulation she
would be really In a much stronger position
after than before the suspension; but the country
people, the merchants Of Hlvre, Bordeaux,
Nantes and Marseilles; the manufacturers OF
Lyons and Lille. the storekecpers Of Paris,
would not reason thus. They would call suspcn-
sion a failure; they would consider themselves
half ruined by the bare announcement Of the
stoppage Of the bank and with French feverish-
ness, aggravated by a disastrous financial expe-
rience Of full century, they would be quite
likely 10 turn round upon Napoleon, and lay
upon bis shoulders the blame Of the accident. II
+ II
ton.
icing one Of the two classes-either the men Of
the Bourse or the people Of France-it seems
that the Emperor can hardly hesitate without
cgrecious folly. No doubt, by throwing the
| fnanciCrs overheard, serious inconvenience