American union. [volume] (Morgantown, Va. [W. Va.]) 1855-1859, 1856-01-05

purposes, or IN OtOet wO<iS, 10 retain as
much as possible, consistently with those
purposes, Of the independent powers Of The
individual States. For objects Of common
defence and security. they intrnsted to the
general government certain carefully defined
functions, leaving all others as the undele.
gated rights Of the separate independent
sovereigniies.
Such is the constitutional theory Of our
government, the practical observance Of
which has carried us, and US alone, among
modern republics, through nearly three gen.
eIations OF time without the cos, OF one drop
OF blood shed in civil war. With freedom
and concert of action, il has enabled us to
contend successfully on the battle field a
gains, foreign foes. has elevated the feeble
colonies into powerful States, and has raised
our industrial productions and our commerce
which transports them, 10 the level of The
richest and the greatest nations Of Europe.
Aud The admirable adaptation OF orr politi.
cal institutions to their objects, combining
local self.eovernm't with aggregate strength,
has established the practcability of gov.
eminent like ours to cover O continent with
confederate States.
The Congress Of the United States, is, in
effect, that congress of sovereignties, which
good men in the Old World have sought for,
but could never attain, and which impart
to America an exemption from the mutable
leagues iot- common action, from the wars,
the mutual invasions, the vague aspirations
alter the balance of power, which convulss
from tine TO time the governments Of Eu-
rope. Our cooperative action rests in the
condition OF permanent confederation pres.
cribed by the constitution. Our balance Of
2owet is in the separate reserved rights of
the States, and their equal representation in
the Senate. That independent sovereignty
IN every one oil the States, with its reserved
rights OF self government assured to each b.
the co.equal power in the Senate, was the
fundamental condition Of the constitution.
without II the Unon would never have ex-
listed. However DESTROYS the larger States
might be to re-organize the government so
as 10 give to their population its proportion
ate weight in the common counsels they
knew /, was impossible, unless they conced:
ed to the smaller ones authority to exercise
at least negative influence in all the mea
sures OF the government, whether legislative
or executive, through their equal represent
alton in the Senate Indeed the larger States
themselves could not have failed to perceive
that the same power was equally necessary
TO them, for the security Of their own do
nestle interests against the aggregate force
OF the general government. In word the
original States went into this permanent
league on the agreed premises, Of exerling
their common strength for The defence of the
whole, and OF all its parts but Of utterly
excluding all capability Of reciprocal aggres-
sion. Each soemnly bound Itself TO all the
others, neither to undertake, nor permit, any
encroacllments upon, or intermeddIing with
another's reserved rights.
Where it was deemed expedent, particular
rights of the States were expressly guaran.
iced by the constitution; but, in all things
beside, these rights were guarded by the
limitation OF the powers granted, in the
compact of union. Thus, the great power
of taxation was limited to purposes Of com
mon defence and general welfare, excluding
objects apperaining to the local legislation
OF the several States; aud those purposes OF
general welfare and common defence were
afterwards defined by specific enumeration
as being matters Of correlation between the
States themselves, or between them and for
eign governments, which, because Of their
common and general apature, could not be
lett 10 The separate control of each State.
OF The circumstances of local condition,i in
teresl. and rights, in which portion of the
States. constituting one great section Of the
Union differed from the rest, and from ano-
Their section, the most important was the pc.
culiarity OF larger relative coored popula.
ton in The Southern than in tie Northern
States.
"A population Of this class held in subjec
ton, existed in nearly all the Statos but was
more numerous and of more serious con.
cernment IN the South than in the North on
account OF natural differences Of climate &
production; and ii was foreseen that for
the same reasons, while this population
would diminish, and, sooner or later, cease
10 exist, in some States. il might increase in
others The peculiar character and magni
tude Of This question Of local rights, not in
material relations only, but still more i'm 40.
cial ones caused il to enter into the special
stipulations Of the constitution.
Hence, while the general government ms
well BIZ the enumerated powers granted tc
II, as by those not enumerated, and there
fore refused 10 il, was forbidden 10 touch
this matter in the sense of attack or offence
il was placed under the general safeguard OF
the Union, in the sense Of defence agains,
either invasion or domestic violence, like all
other local interests OF the several States.
Each State expressly stipulated, as well fol-
itself as for each and all Of its citizens, and
every citizen Of each State become solemnl Y
bound by his allegiance TO the constitution,
one State, escaping into another, should not,
in consequence OF any law or regulate
thereof. be discharged from such service or
abor, but should be delivered mp on claim
Of the party TO whom such service or labor
might be due By the laws Of his State.
Thus, aud thus only, by the reciprocal
guaranty of all the rights Of every State a.
gainst interference on The part of another,
was the present form of government, pSta h.
lished by our fathers and transmitted to ms
and BY no other means is |, posslble for il to
exist. II one State ceasesto respect the rights
OF another, and obtfusively intermediates
with it's local interesis,--if portion Of the
States assume to impose their institutions
on the others, or refuse 10 fulfil their obiga.
tons to III em, we are no longer united
friendly States, but distracted, hostile ones,
with little capacity left Of common adyan.
tage, but abundant means Of reciprocal in.
jury and mischief