New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1856-01-25


hour of danger by the cOwardly Turks, for whose
sake they sacrificed themselves. That during the
assault they were foremost in the ranks of the de-
tenders, we do not intend to deny; the Englishman
Is of so pugnacious nature that the greatest and
most common fault of the British officer, in a bat
tie, is to forget his duty as officer and to fight
as private soldier Indeed when he does this
be is sure of the applause of his countrymen, al
though in any other army he would risk being
cashiered for loss of presence OF mind But on the
other hand, the Turkish soldier is so accustomed
10 see his own officers run away that when once
his spirit is up he nothing at all for officers
or command, but fights where he happens to stand
and is not at all the man to notice or much
less to be inspired by the fact of half dozen
Englishmen beside him, attempting to display
their bravery That the Notifications Cf Kars
were planned in an exceedingly faulty manner we
fully demonstrated Immediately after the assault OF
September 80 was known here, and the Judgment
we then passed upon them has sincebeen completely
confirmed by the official map of these tortlications
published BY the British Government. Finally
then. the merits Of these British officers at Kars
must De measured ~ tue ltuCu PiV''A"'
.'the kingdom Of the blind, the One-eyed is king
Many man who cannot muster the knowledge ne
cessary to pass the examination for Sub-Lieutenant
in France. would make great General among the
Cochin Chinese: andf British officers are notorious
in their own country for professional incompetence
il must not be expected that they will be illumin
ated by sudden floods of knowledge or genius on
taking service in Turkey For our part, we be-
lieve that Kmetty deserves as much credit as any
man who partook in the defense of Kars.
While this was the state of things at kars'
what was going on at Erzerouml A dozen old
Pashas passed their days in smoking their CHI
bouks. quite unconscious that any responsibility
rested upon them, that Kars was hard pressed, or
that the enemy was within few marches, on the
other side of the Dewe ROyun hills. A few thou
sand regular troops, accompanied by some irregu-
lars. marched TO and fro never risking an attack
On the enemy and returning as soon as they had
deserted his outpOsts There was neither the force
nor the spirit to relieve Kars, and consequently
Kars was starved out while the army of Erzeroum
scarcely dared to demonstrate in its favor Cen
eral Williams must have known that he could not
expect any assistance from that quarter. But
what reports what promises he received respect
ing the effect of Omer Pasha's movements, We
have no means of guessing. 1t has been said
that Williams intended, at the last extremity, to
force his way with the garrison through the Rus
sian army; but We doubt whether such plan was
seriously entertained. The billy ground, offering
but very few passes by which Erzeroum could be
gained. was all in favor of the Russians; if few
defiles were we'll occupied by them, this plan was
not feasible. On the other hand, movements OF
troops become almost impossible toward the latter
end of October in a country elevated from 5000 to
5000 feet above the sea- where Winter sets in
very early and lasts from six TO nine months. Ii
Kars could hold out till Winter, the loss of gar
rison of 5000 regular troops would be nothing in
comparison 10 the time gained by the prolonged de-
fcHse ErzrrOum the great center Of all the Turk
sh stores in Armenia, was almost without forth
fcations, and would thereby be made safe till
Nav. 1855; while the actual advantage gained
bv the Russians would be confined to the
virtual possession of the villages of the kars
Chai ard the Upper Araxes, neither of which
could have been disputed to them, even if the gar
risen Of Kars had succeeded in reaching ErzerOum
This town was scarcely fortified at all; if the gar
rison of Kars had actually found its way thither to-
ward the middle of October, there would not have
been sufficient force to defend it. AS an open
town only can Dewe Royun be defended, by bat
tie in front of il, in the Pass. Thus the patience
of the garrison of Kars saved Erzeroum.
Again. the question is asked, whether Omer
Pasha could not have saved Kars, and almost every
European correspondent in the East has an answer
of his own TO IT, II is even now attempted to lay
all the blame of the fall of Kars on Omer Pasha,
and that by the very parties who formerly were
full Of his praise The fact is, that in the first ln-
stance Omer Pasha was retained in the Crlmea,
against his own WILL until it was almost too late to
undertake any thing on grand scale before Winter
When finally be went to COnstantinope TO settle
his plan of operations he had to spend his time in
counteracting intrgues of all kinds. When at last
everything was ready, the promised British trans
ports were not forthcoming; and when the army
was concentrated near Batoum, and later on at
Sukum-Kaleh, no stores ammunition and means OF
transport were provided. How, under such cir
cumstances, Omer Pasha was expected TO march to
the direct relief of Kars, il is not easy to make
ont. We find that during his Mingrelan
expcdition. he could never venture to 60 more
than two or three days march from the
coast. and vet there he had good Russian military
roads 10 march on. But in going 10 kars, by
Frzeroum or Arabian, he would have had to march
Iat from tha