Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1856-01-23

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1 with Morrow county, a single DISTRICT
: llamilloa county has eight Representa-
S lives, while Morrow county has but enc
e Each cleciur in Hamilton, therefore, vote
for and is represented by eight delegates
=. Each elecior in Morrow votes for and i
Z represented by but ore. Each elector il
I Hamilton county may appeal. as a con
: sliIuent 10 eight different members of III
| House of Representatives, while eacI
%elector ia Morrow county can appeal Il
one only. The elcc;or in Hamilton i
thus preferred, in political consideration
to the elecior in Morrow. The inequality
is aggravated by the reflection that thu
majority by which the eight Representa-
lives from Hamilton are elected may bt
less than that which elects the singl,
Representative from Morrow.
Let the same plural district be com
pared also, with a number of single dis
tricts, having the same aggregate repre-
seniation in The more numerous branch o
the General Assembly. Hamilton county
occupies the Southwestern part of The
Safe. Fifteen counties, in The North.
western part If the State, constitute eight
single districts. The Representatives o
those districts, separately responsible, are
often divided; while the representative
from Hamilton, elected together, and
comparatively irresponsible, act togeth-
er and in concert. While, therefore, in
the choice of a Senator of The United
States, and upon many other questions,
Hamilton county with her undivided rep
resentaticn. will have practically, eight
votes, the fifteen Northwestern counts S,
their representatives being equally divi-
ded, may have, practically, none.
For the sake of perspicuiiy | limit this
comparison 10 the arrangement Of the
Representative Districts. Your own re-
Elections will extend it 10 the arrange.
ment OF Districts for the choice of ST. a.
Tors.
1t hardly needs to be remarked that
the existing system, while thus unjust to
the counties arranged in single Districts,
is prejudicial TO The interests of the more
populous counties themselves. lis neces-
sary tendency is TO excite ~jeIlousies in
portions of the Safe against other por-
lions, which must prove hurful. 1t fails,
also, TO secure, in the plural districts, a
satisfactory representation of the various
interests and sentiments of the people,
In the county Of Hamilton. for example,
the political minority, however conside-
rahle and respectable, can have no ade-
quate representation. townships and
Wards, with populations which, with a
system of single districts, would entitle
them 10 separate Representatives, are
liable TO have their political interests and
views overlooked and disrcgarded under
the pressure OF political e~xigencies. Con.
s~tituents cannot well know their repre-.
sentaiiveS, and representatives are al,sulv-
ed, in great measure, from their individ-
ual responsibilities 10 their constituents.
The demands of the people, under such
circumstances, will necessarily be sub
ORIGINATED 10 the demands Of political or
CARNATIONS, and the public good nus
often yield 10 party necessities.
That a system of single districts Will
Prove an absolute remedy for these polit.
ical evils, no one, p, rhaps, will venture
20 expect. am fully persuaded, how
ever, that i: would secure a much more
perfect popular representation than We
have al present, and | therefore recon-
mend that an amendment to the Consti-
tuition providing such a system be sub
mitted TO the people for their adoption or
rejection.
While The true principles Of popular
government thus require the most COM
plete aud perfect representation OF The
people which is ~attainable, they require,
also. and 10 less i~mperatively, frequent
meetings of the representative Leglsla-
lure, for the thorough supervision Of ad-
ministrative action, for the prompt remedy
Of evils, and for the due provision of ne
cessary me ms and measures for guarding
the public interest and promoting The
public welfare.
The existing Constitution authorizes
only biennial sessions, except in cases
when the Governor, upon extraordinary
occasions, may may deem himself war
ranied in specially converting the Legis.
laIure.
Under this provision the whole admin
istrative power of the State is left for two
yeaIs in The hands OF the Executive and
Judicial departments without legislative
check or limitation. There can be no
impeachment or removal, during that Pc
riod, Of any State officer for any cause,
however urgent. The Constitutional re-
sPonsibility of State officials, TO the i'm
mediate representatives Of The people, is
thus, in great part, practically nullified.
A profound writer has well observed that
every departure fiom annual legislative
sessions is an approach towards irrespon-
slbie government and dospotism.
Numerous occasions must necessarily
arise, in a State so large ours, from past
legislative acts or omissions, as well As
various contingencies of other de.
s%criplions, which in the aggregate, will
lmperatively require the attention Of the
although TO Que of them
may constitute such an extraordinary &C.
casion as will warrant the exercise of the
special power vested in the Governor
therefore, no less than prin.
ciple, seems to Tt commend annual, rather
han biennial sessions.
There are some collateral considera-
ions tending the same conclusion, which
moi be overlooked.
The present Constitution allows 10
amendment of lis provisions, except such
Is may be agreed 10 by three fflhs of the
members of each House, and by a major
ty OF the electors voting oil the next cleo.
ION for Senators and Representatives. 1t
ollows that no amendment of The Consti-
uiion a be made, however unanimously
ianciioned by The Legislature or demand
d by the people, until two years after ii
hall have been proposed. The subsiiru.
ion of annual for BIENNIAL sessions will
necessarily require annual elections for
senator's and REPRESENTATIVES. and will /