New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1856-05-16

it cannot be doubted that the invitation holds out
to the other maritime States to become parties to
1t will be speedily and generally accepted. As to
two out of the three points agreed to by this con.
veniOn, the United States are indeed fully commit
ted already. They have always insisted that any
goods not c0ntraband of war, on board neutral
vessel were sacred from seizure by the fact Of their
position, and that begerents had no right to insti
tute Inquiries as to the ownership of such goods or
to claim to seize them on the ground that they
were enemys property. We have also always
maintained that neutral property was equally en-
titled at sea as on shore to be respected by beger-
ents, and that it ought more to be forfeited be-
cause found on board captured chip than because
found In captured city.
So with respect to blockades. The rule adopted
by the Convention of Paris is precisely that for
which the United States have always commended
Though undoubtedly these views of the rights Of
neutrals, all along sustained by the United States
ard now admitted by Great Britain, had equity,
justice and reason on their side yet our advocacy
special national interest which we had in their
establishment. At the time when we became the
advocates of these doctrines, we occupied a posi-
ton Of neutrality, and of course we had direct
interest in extending as far as possible the rights
and privileges Of neutrals. And not only were we
neutral at that time; it was and still is our policy
always to remain SOL and of course our interest still
combines with our sense of justice in securing our
adhesion to the new system of maritime law in
aueurated by the Convention of Paris.
But with respect to the third provision of that
Convention, and by far the most important OF the
three-that which abolishes privateering-'he idea
is current, and, indeed, has been formally an.
nounced by President Pierce in one Of his annual
messages thatwe stand upon different grounds that,
however reason and humanity may prompt US to
consent to this arrangement, to do so would be to
make a sacrifice of our special national interest.
The idea is that, as our national marine is small, if
we should become involved in war with nation
better provided in that respect than ourselves-as
Great Britain, for instance-Our only chance would
be to supply BY prvateers the small number of our
national ships; whence it would be unequal for us
to agree with Great Britain not to use prvateers,
she having the less occasion for them BY reason OF
the greater number of her national cruisers.
Even if this were 80. such an excuse on our part
fer not coming into an arrangement so loudly de-
manded by humanity and justice would hardly seem
to be sufficient Great Britain had precisely
the same sort of special reasons for declining to
acknowledge that extent of right on the part of
neutrals which she has now conceded. Neutrality is
rot the part which she is accustomed to act.
Where there is lighting going on she is very apt to
have q share in it. Her strength is in her feet,
and her national interest has been supposed to be
in pushing maritime bellgerent rights to the ut
most. In adopting our system of neutral rights she
makes certain sacrifice of possible advantages on
her part and why should not we show the like
maenanimty on this question Of privateeriog.'
But it is unnecessary to insist upon this, since
the supposed special advantage to us Of resort
on our part to privateering in case OF war with
Great Britain, is unfounded in fact, and I'M
sustained by experience. The advantage In
case of q war-which Heaven forefend that
Great Britain would have over US by reason of the
vast superiority in numbers and force of her ma
tional armed ships, is absolute advantage which
il would be in vain to expect to neutralize or ma
teriay to offset by the fitting out Of prvateers Pri-
watering was extensively resOrted TO in the earlier
years of the Revolutionary war, and with no little
damage to British commerce. The same thing hap
pened in the earlier part of the war of 1912; but
the success of this prvateering system on our part
in both those cases, was owing entirely to the fact
that in neither case did Great Britain proceed at
once to employ her naval superiority by putting it
TO its most efficient use. Tbs advantage over us
which Great Britain has in the possession of her
immense fleet, is the power which it gives her to
close all our principal harbOrs by blockade and
to cut of departure from or access to our coast by
a whole feet Of cruisers. Privsteers, to accom-.
plish anything, must have facilities for getting out
of port, and for getting back. They have frequent
occasion to recruit and reft, and they must be
able to get their prizes into port or it ia fpecula-
ton that will not pay. That was exactly what we
found by experience, both in the Revolutionary
war and the war Of 1912. So long as our harbors
remained open and the coast clear for our priva.
tiers to come and go, and to send 10 their prizes,
the bu,iDess paid well; but the moment the British
adopted the policy Of blockading our coasts and
closing our harbors, the game was up. Large
numbers of the privateers were taken, and those
that escaped, even if they made prizes, lost them
again by recapture. By this method on the part
of the Brti,h prvateers were, before the close
of both those wars, substantially swept from the
seas; and in case Of new warwick, we say
again, may Heaven forefend instead of watiog a
number of years before putting their Navy to use,
we might expect the British to commence opera.
L.,