Fayetteville observer. [volume] (Fayetteville, Tenn.) 1850-1966, 1856-12-18
DBC D MBhR Is, 1856.

aud after the most deliberate cOnsld-
Grafton, the Supreme Court of the
United States had finally determined
this point, in every form under which
the question could arise, whether
as effecting public or private rights;
liz questions of the public domain, Of
religion, of navigation, and Of ser
vitude.
The several States of the Union
are by force of the constitution Co,
equal in domestic legislative power.
Congress cannot change law of do
mestic relation iG the State Of Maine;
no more can it in the State of Mis-
souri. Any statute which proposes
! to do this is a mere nullity; it
takes away no right, it confers none.
If it remains on the statule-book
unrepeaIed, it remains there only as
monument of error, and a beacon
of warning to the legislator and the
statesman. To repeal it would be
only to remove imperfection from
the statutes, without affecting either
in the sense of permission or cf pro-
hibition, the action of the States, or
of their citizens.
Still. wheu the nominal restriction
Of this nature, already dead letter
in law, was IN terms repealed by the
last Congress-, in clause Of the act
organizing the Territories Of Kansas
and Nebraska, that repeal was made
the occasion Of a wide spread and
dangerous agitation.
1t was alleged that the original
enactment being compact of perpct-
ual moral obligation, its repeal con-
stituted an odious breach of faith.
An act of Congress, while it re-.
mains unrepealed, more especially
if it be constitutionally valid in the
judgment Of those public funetionaries
whose duty it is to pronounce upon
that point, is undoubtedly binding on
the conscience Of each good citizen
of the Republic. But in what sense
Can it be asserted that the enactment
in question was invested with perpe-
tuity, and entitled to the respect
Of solemn compact? Between whom
was the compact?
No distinct contending powers OF
the Government, no separate sections
of the Union, treating as such, en-
tered into treaty stipulations On the
subject. 1t was a mere clause Of an
act of Congress. and like any other
controverted matter of legislation,
received its final shape and was pass
ed by compromise cf the conflicting
opinions or sentiments of the men,
bers of Congress. But if it had
moral authority over mems con-
sciences, to whom did this authority
attach? Not to those of the north
who had repeatedly refused to con-
firm it by extension, and who had
zealously striven to establish other
and Incompatible regulations upon
the subject. And if, as it thus ap-
pears, the compact bad no obligatory
force as to the north, of course it
could not have had any as to the south,
for all such compacts must be mu.
tuaI and reciprocal obligations.
1t has rot unfrequently happened
that law givers, with undue estima-
ton OF the value of law they give,
or in view Of imparting to it peculiar
strength, make it perpetuaIin in terms;
but they canuot thus bind the con-
science, the judgment and the will
of those who may succeed them, in-
vested with similar responsibilities,
and clothed with equal authority.
More careful investigation may prove
the law to be unsound in principle.
Experience may show it to be imper
feet in detail and impractieable in
execution. And then both reason
and right combine not merely to
justify but to require its repeal.
The Constitution, supreme as it is
over all the departments of the gov
ernment, legislative, executive, and
Judicial, is open to amendment by
its very terms; and Congress or the
States may, in their discretion propose
amendment to it, solemn compact
though it in truth is between the
sovereign States of the Union. In
the present instance, a political en-
actment, which had ceased to have
legal power or authority Of any kind
was repealed. The position assumed
that Congress had no moral right to
enact such repeal, was strange enough,
and singularly SO in view Of the fact
THAT the argument came from those