The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-05-19

' is gradually becoming certain that the nj
mate success Of the aes, thou yh 1t may be faclitst
BY tne efforts of tie eers VI Be conquered by
sghsg The present position occ apsed By the allie
though admirable for defence,-hav. ug been render
impresnabls by wonderful network OF rsdoubts q,
breastworhc-is most unfortunate WHIT We consld
that offensive operations must speedily be adopte
Then viii become apparent the utter no oelsssness
without eneounssring unconausrasis diff, ,ulties
the shape OF the formidable lines Of fortica Won co
the ~ "a
works been threvn mp BY insefatg able adve ssr
in snticipstior Of another flank march.
Every eDinerce ia crowned with redoubt iv
should the Allies attemp. to force the heights Of
Chernaya they win encounter positions to which that
surrounding country adverse to the Allies, whilst on
road alone exists That which followed in the IA
NOUS asns msrch.sy which our armies ea., adyAnc, an
road even when undsfended by the Russisns ofEsret
great ossssess to the progress Of our troops in th
4 pkted what nature had commenced, and that nume
ress army bars It's passage we firmly bseys tsat an,
i'll advised, but would terminate in disaster.
Tbs circumstance is only too wel known by the aist
commander at We need fear any operations In tha.
quarter but at home feeling Is prevalent that Ad
vance In that direction is the duty of the British ami
French generals and the that
render such step impossible either ignored for
gotten.
There are however other points on which the On err
ges Of the allies may be dreetsd With less danger cad
certain chances Of success The immediate result and
IN fact the aim OF an advance in the field, directed by
sne allies, would De to engage general BATTLE and it
would consequently be necessary select the most u
favorable position possessed by the enemy. TO advance
things and the foe under the worst
auspices. II, therefore, appears evident, that from
directed. To 6sembark the French army OF reserve.
with The Sandman contingent snd British civison at
aons the u IN ON ss
and the Kstcha would be unadvsabe for these natural
strong positions have doubtless been strongly forth
hed by the enemy. 1t may be maintained that opera
tons conducted with energy against Pereknp and the
northern portions the Crmean peninsula would result
inforcemsnt large scale to the enemy would thus
be rendered impossible whilst his forces would
between two powerful res One or two su bat
lies would probably result in the fall OF the Crmea and
the captu,atitn OF the Russian armies descent on
tain rane through which army would be compelled
Afew weeks must still pass away before the opera
tons which to decide the fate Sebasop0l be
comm enced. When the plans that have been doubtless
well matsred BY the allied manders brought into
to us that powerful allied army has happily disem-
bsrked the northern coast OF the Crimea then shall
we anticipate speedy and successful termination Of hs
From the London Times, May 81
We have once more assumed the sssressys az We % have
been successful and the such to
duce our war minister to publish it. The data from
which have to esrn the precise amount OF advan
tsges slight We given to understand, however,
that there has been serious engagement the front
and left and that the result has been the pos
session Of the Russian rife pits, presume before
those particular parts o. our line.
The only rife pits marked in the best and latest maps
Of the siege those that have grown up the unfor
tunately very wide interval which We were obliged to
Russian fortcsons tiff owing to our want Of men for for
the immense and mulfarous work to be done, and to
the nature Of the ground dd not advance our para
els than about 200 yards. As is we'll known,
the reaut has been that the Russians besides construct
ing immense redoubts before Of their strongest
wnrka hayo ahaA Ia
pits AZ smaller redoubts at four principal pointsviz
the Ovens before Fsgsta and Garden batteries
in advance OF the Msmelon which In its turn Is in
Of the Maakhof Tower and rifle pits upon Mount
before the Redan and the Mamelon. II We have done
this and as further reported we have beaten the
ing csy-that IT, wed dnesday-ws have at iessth bsen
able to make up the chief deficiency Of first opera
nsns and pushea our attack within distance whsne-
TONS The cspture Of eight mortars and 200 prisoners
shows how much the enemy had established themselves
in the position We have now made our own, and the
amount Of protection they had made for their men.
It ia evident that these advanced positions m ,de for
BY the Russians no. to be retained without grest
and continued efforts on our plrs The whole Of the
surface exposed to every kind Of FIRE, and as it ap
pears the Russians could not hold their ground there
without large daily average Of losses, SO neither
can we. may be be assumed, therefore, that
affair Of the 10th ultimo, has probably cost Us many
valuable lives, without a. determination to push
with ns so s
they could and answered to lose hundreds day in
the rife pits II at that price they could make us keep
these posts OF danger and honor is voluntary
part, and doubiless also proceeds settled
point of energetic operations whether about to
attempt assault, to concentrate our forces sud-
uot vet lnoWn The N force 81 omes
Pasba on the l9th certainly points to the latter and
result might go some way TO decide the allies in that
have loug suspected the Russian neishbor
hood is very sm.li Probably that force has always
mound, or patrollIpg a hill, q collection OF huts,
and occasional line of camp fres have often deceived
our generals into the belief that large Russian army
was towering in our rear. Every sound calculation
pointed the other way, and 1t s questioned by
Peteht authorities whether the Russians have ever had
reported the other day OF sixty thousand fresh troops
arrived in sebastopo and one hundred thousand more
thorty of Russian deserer who seemed to be dressed
up for the occasion, being evidently superior to his as
had been allowed to pass ffom the Russian lines to
with pcious facility. When the history OF this
gss. ese to b: related BY Eussn pens and 1dns. IL
tie fact most insisted on will be the very small
number Of men who have kept us 50 long at
We are now more alive to the by which the enemy
have multiplied their numbers. We shall now push eur
nearer to the walls; the imposture Tor such We believe
It, viii be better understood and shall take that
as S IN aouIsos % enduGsscs and strength We observed
that thus far there nothing to show whether the
allies would deal first with the city with the army In
the Geld whAtever may be intended, II, indeed, any
decision has been to, the present line OF operations
would be the in either Fer the present. we
compel the enemy divide his forces and weak
him as much possible at each point: unless in
deed, could hope to seduce him in.o such mistake
e intentions as to neg ect the point had resy
marked for attack.
While We are ready to appreciate the courage exhibited
In the advance Of this week. under the actual crcuu
stances and while cannot but think promises much
more, yet remember, with feeling akin 70 humiia.
tion that in this the eighth month Of siege conducted
without stint Of life treasure only just taking
up the position ought TO have arrived at by the l7th
OF last October, not still earlier just at this moment
when slowly mailing up for lost time, and actu-
ally learning siege operations from foe We had been
the spirit that directs the operations Of the besege and
the besegsd letter from Cir John f. Bursoyne gives