Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1855-08-25


forms, he went as near it as can be done with
straight lines still he felt that he could not
escape slight dead angle in front of each of
his four bastons and he sought 10 remedy
this by placing a large casemaied barrack in
the rear OF each, so as to have a direct fire over
the salient angle in tina, direction, in which it
was otherwise deficient. Throwing back the
ear,hen parapet, and rendering il independent
OF the masonry, would have effected this OBJ
ject far more easily as well as more eflectually
The town, properly so called, lies entirely
on tae south side Of the harbor. The general
form is that Of a semicircle described with a
radius Of mile in extent. This is, however,
divided into two quadrants by the Dockyard
Creek, running north and south at right angles
to the harbor. The dockyard, the arsenal, the
hospitals, and all the principal military estab-
lishments, are situated on the eastern quadrant,
against which the English attack is directed -
The western division includes the Tartar town
at Akhtiar, which has since been extended in
TO the Russian city of Sebastopol.
When we appeared before tho place, the on
ly finished forti6cation which existed on this
side was the Maakoff, or as it was then called
the White Tower, which occupied the central
and most important position on the eastern qua
drant. As it was knocked to pieces by the
first days fire, its name only now remains to
designate the earthworks which have grown up
around its base.
The only fortifcation on the western side
was loop-holed wall extending from the har
Dor to place behind the cemetty 1t does
not, however, seem 10 have been designed SO
much as defence for the town, but rather as a
reirenchmeni to prevent Judgement being
made in the Onaraniina Eort, in ,l.s ef
that work being destroyed from the sea, and
landing being effected there.
CONDITION OF AFFAIRS AT THE OUTSET.
The chance Of serious attack BY land on
the side of the town was evidently considered
as an extremely remote contingency by the Rus
sian engineers. When, however, the one CON-
bina,ion took place which could render such an
attempt feasible, the allied generals were prob
ably not far mistaken when they thought they
had discovered the weak point--the de|du de
Ia ctarasse-and determined 10 attempt the
place from the southern side. Had they as
saulied 1t when they first arrived, there is lit
tie doubt but that they could have penetrated
into the town and made prisoners Of as many
OF the garrison as could not escape to the north
side; but it is very questionable indeed il they
could have held it. We had nothing but a
few feld-guns to oppose to the FIRE Of flee,
which still mounted not less than 500 or 600
heavy guns, and occupied such position as to
bring every portion OF the town under their FIRE,
and with the northern shore still in the pos
session of the enemy, they probably could have
pounded us out of the place, and with immense
slaughter. Any disaster at that moment might
have been fatal to the whole expedition, any
lmIsunuerstanuing ov.wv-n inc s~o sruies,
which hardly yet knew each other,--any dis
pute about plunder,-any panic caused by an
unexpected xplosion--might have thrown ev-
cry thing into confusion We had no point
d'dpyii on shore no commissariat, landed no
hospital arrangements nothing to rally round,
and Menschikoff was close at hand with an
army still powerful enough to take advantage
of any disaster that might occur. The assault
might have succeeded, but it was fearful risk
to run, and one for which there did not, at that
time, seem to be any justification for according
to all precedent, an open town ought to have
fallen an easy prey to The besiegers, as soon as
first parallel armed with few guns, and a
flying sap pushed mp to the edge of the houses.
. THE RUSSIAN PLAN OF DEFENCE.
There can he little doubt that this would
have been the result if the Russians had en-
trusted the defence of the place 10 some vener-
able General of Engineers, who had passed
: the prime of his life in the wars of Napoleon
L., who had greatly disting guished himself in the
.. construction Of redoubts al the Borodino or al
Bautsen. In the Russian service, however, q
good digestion and consequent length of days
is not the only passport to high command and
, the honors Of the service and they chose fol
,his rsrPsee -@-y ye.-s nfieor, "ho had
= raised himself to distinction entirely by his
e own merits and the superiority of his genius
3 Instead of defending the place scion les regtes,
d and surrendering 1t after the prescribed mum
0 ber Of days, he at once set 10 work TO put-intc
o practice the lessons learned at Silistria an,
S Bomarsund, Of which he had grasped the sig
!, niGcance and determined to try ifa little bold
ness and originality might not enable The place
i to make better defence than at first sigh
n seemed possible.
: In the middle ages it was the fashion to arm
II warriors cdp-a-pie in suits Of plate armor Of th'
70 most elaborate construction. Nothing cou
J. be more ingenious than the deviee-nothng ap
d parently more invulnerable than the man s.
IS defended. In process Of time, however, il wa
'e discovered that this steel-clad warrior was ut
ID terly useless for the purposes Of offence, thoug
il tolerably safe so long as he remained wholly o.
ID the defensive, or fought only with others en-
,e cumbered like himself And it became eviden
that even a weaker and inferior soldier, ifmor
n lightly equipped, could work round him, and
a keeping out of his reach, wear him out, an
l. eventually, as it were, sting him to DEATH
ID Men in short, learned that the true secret of dc
n fence lay in the power of offence ; defensiv
Is armor was abandoned, and the soldier laugh
n, to rely wholly on the bullet and the bayon'
for his means of safety. Forifcaiion alon
he still retained its clumsy plate armor and fror
. its unwieldy character il was easily worke
u round and destroyed from distance by III
he lightly armed attack, which relied on its powt
IN of offence as its only means Of victory. 81
-. + ckuhta