New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-07-21

the gallant Leaders who fell az the head OF their men
bids us abstain from saying single word when may
pngravaie the pain of our lOss of their untinely
fa;e These daily remarks of reed by large
por;ion Of the civilized world, but more especially
tley are read, and read with aydity, by those whom
thew most conccrr-by our countrymen IL the camp
h,tore Seya,'opcl: and, however Indifferent we may
be In general 10 the praise blame Of Interested
parties. We sbould be sorry to write a single word
which could be thought inaccurate, UNJUST or dis
couraging By the army.
We therefore confne ourselves 10 the general con-
siderstior which tie problem of this siege still sug-
cests and which must eventually decide the ia'e OF
Seyastopo Ii is now universally admitted by all me
enniroers English and French, before the place that
tie Malakoff Tower and the works about it are the
KEY to the whole POSITION and tas against thls POINT
the main operations of the attack must De directed
The chief importance OF the Msmeon, which was cap
tured by the French the 7th of June. and IS sow
called by them the Branciou Redoubt, Il, that u at
orce enabled the besiegeI' 10 advance tner lines
and works about seven hundred yards nearer 10
the Malakof than they wete befoe, and con-
seouenlly 10 drive heir approaches with greaer
erergy against tie main position. Inc surprise
we lave already expressed on previous OCCASIONS
that n Gsures not simultaneously taken on me
IN 10 secure this advantage was equally lett Dy
The army and by tie Russians themselves: for III
tic cour;e OF The armistce which was 50 strangely
granted e. if to enable the enemy 10 repair his WORKS,
some Of the Russians asked gteher The Generals TeTe
drunk Wien tiey acceded 10 such request. General
Pesser says mat after the capture of the outer works
they he'd been rapidly converted into the basis OF
attack against the Karahelnaya suburb itself But
works by zap or otherwise had been driven beyond
them and tie ar illery placed in them still650
wards from the MalGkof Tower. Nevertheless an
assault under these extraordinary conditions de-
min "a upon after the bsmbardment of the l5th aud
i was 10 be rected auost at the same time by Tue
Frcrch sgans' tho Maickoh works and by me Enslsh
orsius; the Redan. Upon his arrangement another
reusrk Of great importance presents leclt ~ shouid
lie borne IL mind that the Redan is.a work WI, n pro-
ie,s or advances considerably infront OF inc haahoh
ead that the fire evoI from the Mameion taxes tne
Rcden in flank, The Redan is mQre2for, lower
than these wufks ard is Commanded Dy them. The
double alterations Of the lsh OF June is therefore
drctd 10 this dilempa: Ii tho French attack on the
Nalakoff porks proved unsuccessful It vas totally I'M
rcsse for the English or any other troops Ia occupy
ibo Redau or 10 mold il even # they crossed the abat
liz and the ditch; but if the French attack on the
Mnltkof works had succeeded, then neither could the
Russians have continued TO hold the Redan; they
must inevitably have been driven out of 1t N ie"
hours Nv the fire of the MalakOif ami the Manelon
directed against Themselves end this result would have
been obtsined with certainty, and without any as
ssut of he Redan at all. Or, to express the same
prouos;tion in fewer words if the Malakoh works were
not tsken the Redan could not be held by u.s. and II
they were taken the Redan could not be held by the
Russians In 10 case could the capture OF the Redan
have contributed 10 the fall OF MalakOh works, because
the latter are in the of the former AID completely
epflode Il. If this argument be sound a. We believe
it to be- the result is that no attack on The kedan ought
net 10 have been made at all, or al most iGse httcN
10 divert the attention Of the enemy from the main
ront The real English attack would have produced
far more serious effect if it had been directed against
the Beraok Battery the pont assaulted by zen Eyre
ar if n erul body of troops had penetrated there
thew might even have caught the Russians In the Re-
can on their flank and rear. redan Is redoubt not
closed behind but to attack II by assault 10 front IL
to attack it precisely where IL strongest lne cross
fire of such work from the faces of The baston and
the hankirg batteries ia perfectly irresistible, and the
consequence was that got within 20 yards of the
ditch alive. Nothing, in short could jus ty such an
attempt except the moral obligation Lord Raglan
might feel to share the peril of our Allies. But there
was Is difference in our posihon-if the French had
caniod the Malakof, they would have decided the
fee of the SIEGE ii the English had carried the Redan
only, they would have decided nothing.
1hs being the unfortunate but inevitable result OF
premature attempt TO carry by assault works still
flaming the superiority of their fire, the course now to
be pursued by tie engineers Is clear They have l. IN
I. cir power push forward by regular approaches
from tle position Of the MamelOn against the hiaa-
khoff Tower and eventually to establish in these adj
vanced works batteries of sufficient weight 10 subdue
the fire of the enemy, and have reason to believe
that this ular operation has been commenced. In
deed, General Peissier states in his Geographic dis
patch of the Sd inst that works are progressing
satisfactorily and It Is probably to this operation that
be refers. Hitherto in spite ofthe prodigiOu
WI ich have been brought to- bear against Sebasopo,
the FIRE Of the besegrs has been too distant and too
difiufe to produce decisive effect any point.
Tie siege has now assumed q more precise direction,
and with adequate amount of time. of labor and Of
artillery the approaches against the Maakhof Tower
will acquire mole of that certainty which has hitherto
been tie boat Of the science of military engineering.
But while the allied armies are obviously endeavOr-
ing 10 concentrate their attacks upon the place.
persevere in the opinion that there many points in
the adjacent districts of the Crmea aganst which the
large bodies Of effective troops not employed in the
siege works might with advantage be directed. The
recent excursions conductor with judgment and success
bv Omar Pasha and by General La MarmOra at the
head of the Turkish and Sandman corps dGrmee, have
penetrated to a considerable distance into the lateral
valleys of the Tchernaya. Nearly the whole country
on tie left bank of the Bebek has been visited by
these troops far the pass of Aitodor and without
encoupterng any serious resistance reconnaissance
have been made halfway from Baaklaya To
Bskshisera II il still extremely uncertain what
amount of forces the Russians have in resere in the
interior and there are strong reasons for believing
that the main body of the Russian army has been
withdrawn TO reinforce the garrison of sevastopol
All appearances Of an aggressive movement on the
part of the enemy from the north have for the present
ceased: and though the country hey )nd the Belbek 10
exceedingly unfavorable 10 field operations, Gen. Bos-
Duets army Of observation, assisted by The means OF
transport al our command, may in a few hours men-
ace any part Of the coast II is Of course apostolic
for us 10 enter with more detail the possibility of
such operations; but while the allied forces amount
ing to zoo GOO men, remain cor fined within the pa-
which extends from the Ichernaya to the sea, as
If they bockaded by superior force, IT Il more
than doubtful whether any such force exists. We dis
covered by experience the weakness Of the Russians
at kercb, at Yenikae, at Anapa and on every point
We have attacked except SebastOpOl, and cordially
hoIe that advantage will be taken of the delay in the
sego operations TO make at least another diversion
against the enemy some other point Of the heater
Of war.
FROM THE CAMP.
Letters from Paris state that there is reason for be-
eving that instead of adopting the slow approach OF
sap and mine, was generally believed just after the