The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-02-05
The Great Wlrepuller Of European Diplo-
maey-Morsl OF the Russian War.

OF war and the errors OF diplomacy are daily
turning up in the present European contest,
only one Of the Powers interested seems to be
steadily converting them to his own profit
The difficulty itself, in fact, has been s~tealthily
~foetered, If not originated, by him. He has all
along played the part of wirepuller to the
political puppets who fill the high places in
European diplomacy, and he is now reaping the
fruits of his labors. Need we say that we allude
to the Emperor Of the French.
The disclosure to the world of the secret
correspondence which took place some years
sgo between the Car and the British govern
ment, in reference to the projected partition of
the heritage OF " the sick man." although it
failed to compromise the latter by what lawyers
would call an overt act, clearly showed tina. the
idea itself was not so very repugnant at the time
to the feelings of British statesmen. Through
out the whole OF thai precious epistolary chapter
Of secret diplomacy, we search in vain for those
generous and chivalric sentiments which have
since been put forward as the pretexts for a
coalition as inconsistent in its religious Us
it is antagonistic in its national elements.
With the manner in which her pre-
tensions were ignored in the agitation Of
so important o question, France had just
reason to quarrel, and all the efforts of her GO
vernment have accordingly since been directed
to foil and defeat Russian designs in the East.
The sagaeious mind of Louis Napoleon foresaw
the double advantage to himself that was to be
reaped from this course of policy. He fels on
the one hand that nothing could strengthen his
equivocal position amongst the European Powers
more than his assertion of the right Of France
to exercise a voice in the decision of the ques-
tion of Ottoman independence, and he was equal
ly certain, on the other, that the worst COM
plications that might arise from his interference
could only have the effect of consolidating the
then insecure fabric of his power at home by
concentrating the attention. Of his people on
their foreign interests. He accordingly des
patched NJ. Lavalette to Constantinople upon
an apparently frivolous and Ill defined mission;
its real purpose being to stir up the jealousy Of
Russia, aud provoke o quarrel Of some sort. 1t
is unnecessary for as to recapitulate the success
sive events which SO fully realized his expecta-
tions. Suffice it to say, that in her well founded
apprehensions of his bold and ambitious de-
rtSbcj isuShiu eAOukus ~ htRH tliuI W Iudhc
good the pretensions that the Gear had
advanced in his correspondence with the British
government, the more especially as at that time
there was no reason to apprehend any very
tiDcere or active opposition from the latter.
The Emperor Nicholas did not believe, nor in
deed had he any reason to believe, that Great
Britain would be disposed to stretch the pro-
visions Of the treaty Of July, ls4l, into a
guarantee OF the independence of Turkey, or
that an inv aston of the territories Of the latter
by his troops would be regarded as a European
question. And SO he was led on step by step
until it became too late to recede, as much,
1T must be owned, by the apathy and indi fer
ence manifested by the British cabinet in the
early stages Of the dispute, as by any real ao-
prehensions that he entertained with regard to
France.
In the meantime Louis Napoleon was gradu.
ally paving the way at home for that grand
stroke Of policy by which he hoped at once to
crush The power of Russia and consolidate his
own dynasty-the Anglo-French alliance. His
election to the presidency, after the revolution
of 1S4S, had already seriously alarmed the
moneyed and landed interests both in England
and France, who could only see in his accession
to power a revival Of the old imperial feud be-
tween the two countries. The coup d'Etat and
the subsequent confirmation Of that daring step
by the elective voice OF France, terrified them
still more. Every one recollects the consterna-
tion that prevailed amongst all classes Of the
English people, and even amongst the highest
military aud. naval authorities, at the imminent
probability of another attempt at q French in
v%asion, and at the ineficiency of the national
defences. No one dreamed at that time that
the author Of the Hfes .N~apoleoniennes and
the inheritor of the great Emperor's throne and
wrongs. could render his prejudices and resent
ments subservient to the objects Of o grander
policy, and forget in its requirements his heredi-
tary griefs. Still less did the English expect
to find the man who was born to this legacy Of
personal hatred, stretching out to them the
hand Of friendship, cultivatiog with them the
kindest and most cordial relations, and fiually
proposing to them on alliance apparently bind
ing together the future destinies of the two
nations. Had the English people reeollected
the prudent warning conveyed in the
Timeo Dana0s of the Latin poet they
would have hesitated before they at
tached implicit credence to the professions
and coquetries of this new and unnatural
sutton for their favors. The Corsican vendetta
is not to be thus easily extinguished.
Let us examine the results Of the Anglo.
French alliance up to the present time, and We
win see that If it had been Louis Napoleon's
object to weaken the power and humiliate the
pride Of the English nation, he could not have
more effectually accomplished it than by
yoking it to his policy. Thus far everything