The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-07-26
(ooPYRIsHT SECURED By THE AUTHoR.l
For the National Era.
THE LEGAL TENURE OF SLAVERY.
LETTER xxXIv.

LETTER XXX1V.
| MIGRATION AND INPORTATIONn-" SUPPRES-
SION OF INSURRECTIONn -" DOMESTIC VIC.
LENCE-n
To the Friends Of american Liberty:
have already disposed of THE rwo-rHE
| ONLY LIVING clauses of the Constitution cited
by the shareholders as being concessions to
Slavery, guarantees of Slavery, or compromises
with it. A decent regard for the memory OF
the DECEASED may, however, require of us some
notice of the clause that was predestined, by
the good will and pleasure of its parents, the
sovereign people, to expire at the age of TWEEN
ty years.
"The migration or Importation of such per
| sons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited
by the Congress prior to the year one thousand
eight hundred and eight, but tax or duty may
be imposed on such importation, not exceeding
ten dollars for each person."-Art. l. Sec. 8,
Clause /.
This clause, like the others cited in support
of Slavery, would never have been supposed to
refer either to the slaves or to the slave trade,
had slaves and the slave trade been unknown
in this country, or accounted illegal. 1t makes
no direct mention of Slavery or of the slave
trade. The terms employed do not describe
either the one or the orther. 1t speaks only
of persons and persons cannot be slaves
By the rules of "strict construction" there
fore, it cannot, in legal Interpretation of the
instrument, be applied to the slave trade.
Neither can we decide that such was the inten-
tion of the clause, if we adhere to the rule of
the Supreme Court, that the intention must
be collected from the scords." The words do
not say so. They say what cannot consist with
it, without wrestling the words from their ac-
customed meaning. We cannot thus decide
without transgressing that other rule of the
Supreme Court, so often cited:
"Where rights are infringed, where fnnda-
mental principles are overthrow, where the
general system of laws is departed from, the
intention must be expressed Nth irresistible
ctearness, to induce court of justice to sup
pose design to effect such objects"
The common-law rule, that "where the
question is doubtful, the decision must be in
favor of liberty" would forbid any construc-
ton of this clause (if doubtful) against liberty
And so do several other legal rules Of interpre-
tation before cited.
The common construction of the clause
stands wholly on the unfounded assumption
that there aods a legalized slave trade and a
legalized Slavery when the Constitution was
of their legality is exploded, the common con.
struction of the clause evanishes at once.
To illustrate my meaning. The common
construction makes the clause preclude Con.
gress from prohibiting the foreign slave trade
prior to 1908. Now, suppose Congress had
prohibited it in 1900. Suppose slave trader
to have been captured, and to have been pros
ecuted under the statute. The cause comes
into court Defendant pleads that Congress
had no right, under the Constitution, to pro
hbit the trade, until 1908. Hoac will he make
it appear? The general scope, design, object,
and aim of the Constitution are evidently
against Slavery and the slave trade. The old
Continental Congress- as well as several of the
States, had passed strong resolutions against it.
The States had, accordingly, restrained it. Vir-
GINA and North Carolina had been particularly
forward in these measures. "Articles of AS
ISOLATION" between the States had been entered
into and signed by the delegates of the several
States, at Philadelph with Peyton Randolph,
of Virginia, at their head, October 20, IVA,
containing the following:
"THAT WE WILL NEITHER IMPORT NOR PUR.
CHASE ANY SLAVE imported after the first day of
December next; AFTER WHICH TINE, WE WILL
WHOLLY DISCONTINUE THE SLAVE TRADE, and
will neither be concerned in it ourselves nor
will we hire our vessels nor sell our COM
modities manufactures to those who are
concerned in it."
Sand we do further agree and resolve, that
we will have no trade, commerce, dealings, or
intercourse whatever, with any Colony or Prov
ince of North America which shall not accede
to OR WHICH SHALL HEREAFTER VIOLATE this
association, but will hold them unworthy of the
rights of freemen, and as INIMICAL TO THE
LIBERTIES OF THIS COUNTRY"
Popular meetings, in Georgia, Maryland, and
Virginia, responded to all this, at the time
In October, 1873, the General Assembly of
Virginia passed law prohibiting, under heavy
penalties, the further importation of slaves, and
declaring that every slave thereafter imported
should be set free. Similar demonstrations,
both in Congress and in the Colonies, had been
made, in favor of the speedy abolition of Sla-
very itself The Articles of Confederation con-
tanned nothing in favor of Slavery or the slave
trade.
Now, be it remembered that all these solemn
"cOmp0cts" against the Stare trade soere in full
force, unrepealed, and unrepudidted, when the
Constitution was formed. No one uttered any
complaint against them. They were part and
parcel of our free institutions and all volators
of them were pronounced, by the organic law of
the land, "inimcaL to the liberties of this coun-
try" They may have been violated by lawless
men, as were the laws against other piracy.
"We are not aware that any State allowed the
importation of slaves at the time when the
Constitution was adopted. The first State that
renewed the traffic, so far as we know, was
South Carolina, in 1903"
Now, in such prosecution of slave trader
as l have supposed, the counsel for the pros
ecution would not overlook such historical
facts as these. He would have been likely to
connect them, in his argument, with the Dec
laration of Independence, and the Preamble of
the Constitution, in which its objects were set
forth. He would then run over the express
provisions of the Constitution in favor of iber-
ty, and the ample powers conferred on the
Federal Government for making these specific
provisions effectual. He would then demand
strong evidence, on behalf of the defendant,
that in Constitution of such antecedents, of
that general character, and with those explicit
provisions, there was any tolerance given to the
slave trade. And what could be adduced in
reply? Why, simply, the clause of the Con-
stitution under review And does it express
the "intention" to effect such objects" with
irresistible clearness?" Can the intention
be gathered from the words?" The very
reverse of all this, as have already shown, was
the fact. Most assuredly, if the existing rules
of the Supreme Court should have been follow
ed, in the case supposed, the slave trader would
have been convicted and punished. And, BY
the common law, {" if the question were ever
doubtful the decision must be in favor of liber-
ty," and against the enslaver.
But for the arguments sake, and to give the
Slavery interest all the benefit it can, from any
construction, derive from this clause of the
Constitution, will, for the present, concede
that it means just what it has been held to
mean, namely, that, until the year 1903, Con-
orocs could NOT nrob;h;t tho slave troda yVho+