New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-27

Crmea The rochs forming the edge OF this
plateau toward the south. east, and the plateau
itself, are pierced BY few passes only, yrinci-
pally where the Belbek, the Katsha. the
Alma, ard their tributaries, force their passage
toward the sea Thus, while tbs ridge ITSELF
at least as isr as Chutut Kale, may be considered
impossible TO troops, the few passes leading
through it form defes easily defended aud which,
if intrenched, Lay be considered as almost imPres
nable The line from Mackenzie by Aitodor to
Clufut Kalc il rather more than hfteen miles,
which i. certainly good length Of front; bat the
main points of possible attack being known the
mass Of the troops can be stationed toward the
rear, so as to be able to march down to any mea-
aced point 1t is certainly disadvantage that
Bakshiserai the nearest chief depot is situated al
most in the very front OF defense aud another dis
advantage, that Sympheropol, the principal depot
of the whole Crimea, add in fact the whole lice Of
retreat is situated in the prolongation OF the ont
not behind il but the grestest disadvantage is that
the whole of this line can be turned By fes days
march
Our readers may remember we stated long ago, all
the possible modes of turning the Russian positioa
and hat even then the more advantageous course
seemed TO be turning march by Aldsata, along
be coast, round by the Chstyr Dagh, aud down
the valley OF the Salgbir direct upon SympheroPoL
What We then stated is still our opinion, aud the
late events, together with the certainty now &C
quired respecting the Russian defensive position.
have still more confirmed il.
All the possible approaches to the Russian poa.
ton from the south and southeast are b. mere
Tartar country roads sheeptra,k Ks, unit for the
movements of an army in season when rain may
be expected, as a days rain renders them com
pletely impossible There are two highroads oaly.
that from rraktir bridge to Mackenzies and that
from Alushta to Sympheropol. IL is true the
French are constructing ROADS toward Aitodor,
but to make road before operating on il would
be to give up operations for this year at once. Now
however mscadamized road may be spoiled, cut
up and destroyed, it can always be easily repaired
in country rich in stone and wood such as the
south eastern coast and hills of the Crimes Thus
if it can be shown that the road by Alushta Is &C
ceptsble on military grounds, it must certainly
have the preference before all other approaches to
the Russian position.
The Upper Belbek is open to the French. be-
cause they have been there, From the Upper Belbek
there are several country roads toward the Upper
Katsha thence others lead into the valley of tho
Upper Alma and the country between the Upper
Alma the Upper Saghir and the coast is intersected
by more roads and paths, encircli. Chatyr Dagh on
all sides, than any other part Of the Crmean hills.
The distance from BaIdsr valley TO the village Of
Salghir, on the river of that name and on the
northern foot of Chatyr Dagh is about ehiry miles,
an extent of front Lot large for a country Of Al
pine conformation and with comparatively few
passes from valley to valley In the Alpine and
Spanish mountan-wars, armies of less strength
than the Allies could spare, were almost always
expected to occupy far more ground AS the i'm
practicablty of the roads in that neighborhood
is confined to artillery only, and bur partially to
cavalry, while infantry aud light cavalry would
everyw here be able to move, though perhaps after
rains with difficulty and as plenty of passes lead
down toward the south coast thus securing tho
retreat, there could be no difficulty in gradually
extending the allied outpost as far As the
/ Upper Alma, keeping supports Of infantry.
and perhaps mountain artillery among the
hills to the rear, and pushing a column al NJ the
/ coast toward Alushta Ii this has been carried
out, and the Russian position thoroughly recon
notered, the system OF false attacks would have
to be extensively ell )lOy ed, until finally the chief
| column advances upon the pass Of the Chatyr
| Dsgh, where no doubt it ill find itself arrested
| by strong intrenchments well guarded. Bot here
the detachments Of the Upper Katsha and Alma
would be ready to march by the country roads
down into the valley of the Salghr and turn those
/ intrenchmenta. This might be done unless tho
season be too far advanced il 10 nothing more thaa
what has been done 10 every instance of mountas
warfare That this movement, if properly exc
cuted, would force the Russians TO open the pass.
/ is certain and at every point where the Russians
make stand it can be repeated, until the whole
of the Saghir valley as far as Sympheropol, where
the plain begins, is opened; and then either the
Russians would have to offer battle, or to retreat
| in haste.
There are only three reasons why the allied
generals may avoid this course of action. First,
/ the Russians might, while the msa force Of the
/ Allies is on the south coast, detach strong body
from any point OF their position, and by the Upper
! Belbek and Katcha march upon the hills, oross
| them and descend TO the coast road, thus cutting
/ of and turning the position Of the allied army
! int. nded to turn them. This maneuyer would
however, be so full Of Iisk to the corps executing
it, that it ia not likely to be attempted. The allied
! troops cut off BY it, would be able to reemssrk
Oh board the fleets, which would of necessity nave
TO be about tie south coast dlriOg the whole q
The oneratiop or 10 march toward kertch where