Weekly hawk-eye and telegraph. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa) 1855-1857, 1855-11-21

sns,e coad;sioa, xt;ck Ii suaassaoe wss noshina
more = iess sAsn this, tAas u ma;orifs Of the
Iegnl voters ID the State should signify ibsir ~
sent u sccepsace Of the lxw through Tie halaos.
box, den the Aet ehall take effect Ga the first
dr. u Jais, lass. liz force a. iaw VAS not
made contingent npon the vote Of the people.
ba; oaiy the time when II should take effect, and
II lhc svofc bod been sTlc otIses way, the ~
would have taken effect under and BY virtue Of
another iaw designating The time when al gen.
erai laws should 80 into operation. Sach would
be the literal and natural construction Of the ast
Of submission. inasipnch as the legislature has
not declared that the law should be void and IN
operative in the event q majority rOied against
IL But giving the act of submission a. liberal
q construction as It's language and intention viii
admit u. still !; can only be regarded in the ma
turr Of proposition to accept, not to iegisiate.
The people we're not authorized to change or
modify its provisions, or substitute some other
acs 10 suppress intemperance in lea thereof: If
20 this wonid be legislation and not aceeptsnee.
They were required simply 10 express their As
cent in the light, perhaps. of ratification They
did 20, and the act remained just as Il was be-
fore, but II did not become operative as a law
for 90 days thereafter, being the time prescribed
by the legislature. ~ q As@
With what show Of reason can this be called
legislation by the people, without subyersion
OF all proper ideas of legislative functions? Had
they right 30 make a single suggestion look
ing to change or modification OF its provisions?
Had they power or opportunity to exercise their
Judgment or will in relation TO any Of the duties
or penalties il prescribed, or control oyer the
time when it should go into operations Ger
tsiniy none whatever. 1t had previously passed
through all the forms Of legislation, and rcceiv-
ed the Governors sanction, ard the people after
-. it,. ondf fkaraa ia mn.
constitutional and void.
Suppose the people Of this State anterior to
the passage Of this law, had by petition, or
majority vote, expressed themselves in favor OF,
such law, and asked the legislature to enact the
same and in pursuance of their known will, they
did pass law for the suppression of intcmper-
ance; will any one who understands the genius
and theory of our popular institutions, say that
this primary movement on the part of the peo-.
pie, invalidat ed the law2 And is the case alter
cd in the least in principle, if the legislature up
ON its own movement pass such law, and then
say to the people, if you will accept the law, it
shall take effect at given time? Inboth instan-
ces the legislature would be the efficient cause of
the enactment, whilst the people would be SIM
ply the occasion, first of originating its inception,
aud secondly Of calling it into operation at
specified time. sss
Another reason assigned upon which great
stress was placed, especially by the judges Of
Michigan) why such law was the act of the peo-
pie, and not the legislature, is that its operation
was made to depend upon the contingency Of a
popular vote, which involved as they allege, the
exercise Of legislative will and discretion by 9TH
crs.
Now the fallacy Of making distinction be-
tween the contingency Of popular vote, and
other future contingencies, is quite transparent
to my mind. Concede, as all do, that the legis-
lature can enact valid STATUTE to take effect up
on the happening of any future event, certain or
contingent, and it seems to me it wodld be ex-
ceedingly difficult to show any essential differ
ence in principle in the nature of such events or
contingencies. All law is but the expression of
the will of the law-making power. contin-
gent law can no more be enacted without the ex
ercse of legislative will and discretion, than can
an unconditional law and when such law does
come forth, stamped with the impress of the law
making WILL it possesses the essential attributes
of valid and binding enactment The fallacy
of contrary doctrine consists in supposing that
a popular vote necessarily ignores the will and
judgment of the legislature, and substitutes that
of the people in its place. The truth is, a popu-
lar vote accepting or ratifying legislative en-
actment, is SO much superadded to the authority
and will of the law,maker, and should give in
creased power and efficiency to the law, and that
species of refinement which claims that such an
act on the part of the people destroys the valdi-
ty of the law, is opposed to all practical ideas
of popular government and cannot commend it.
self to the acceptance of this Court. Yys
The prohibitory liquor laws of Vermont and
Michigan were submitted to the people in man
ner and under circumstances dissimilar to ours,
and under which the same question in principle
was raised. In Vermont the law was held con-
stitutional, after full discussion in the Supreme
rf nfth hat afo nd in no Oh;
ton to the law fell to the ground, and the law
continues in force, because the Supreme Court
was equally divided upon the question of its val
idny In New York, Pennsylvania and Delaware
the decisions Of the Courts were made upon laws
submitted to the people under different circunl-
stances and involving to greater or less degree
the delegation of power to the people to legis-
late. These decisions, therefore, ought not to
have much weight in determining the consti-
tuionality of our law. z9s,5, sl.f ll.,i.s}.tF
In overruling this last objection, do not wish
to be understood as endorsing or approving this
system of legislation us a general thing. 1t is
liable to great abuse. Besides, one branch OF
the government has no right to perform its func
tons in a manner to embarTass the action of CO.
ordinate department.. Yet it is admitted that in
this particular instance there was some apolgy
for doing SO, because the law in question is nov
ell and in some respects extraordinary, involving
the exercise of high legislative powers, aiming
in its operations to oatlaw, commercially, des-
cription of property, which heretofore has enter
ed largely into the channels of trade, and which
on that account could not expect to meet with
much favor, and therefore it may have been ad-
visable to have it armed with the authoritative
seal of the peoples win in sending it forth to do
its mission. II 81 az
The decision of the court below is affirmed.
HoRNIsH l. LYNCH for Prosecution.
MARSHALL l. Moss for defence. n
1eiatF R. P. LOWE, Judge