New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-08-16

all the Eastern Dalmatan Coast Of the Adretic-vas
undoubtful, cheap victory. But Trieste vas forbid.
cen by diplomacy the Tyrol, do DO; bnow by what
old absurd rie hts Of the German Coneaeracyi to arm
the population out of the question; for people
who fights its own battles is vry dangerous ele-
M nj to rsng monarchies; 10 protect the venetian
military roads was 20 sreng then the Republican Cow
emu ent which had been proclaimed at Venice. And
how could Government bent not on the crealon OF
italian nation, but on the formation of a Pied
moLtese kingdom of the North ralse war OF nation
aiesl Thus all the truly strategic operations being
excluded, the emsncipaDg war found itself forcedly
narrowed down the regular siege OF the iortresse-
The PiedmOD arRy fingered before hantua AMI
Verona until 8 scorchng sun, disease, irreguarty Of
con missariat supplies and the demoralizing dscour
sgement always attending troops kept IN comparative
immobiity, pointed out 10 freely REINFORCED enemy
al opportunity for overpowering II. wrong policy
had destroyed all the chances OF the war Such must
be the case in every war It, method rests mainly
the policy which rules the councils OF the nation such
IL, and most strikingly, IN your Own.
Had the policy of your Government been liberal
! one YOU would be now firmly established IN the heart
of your enemy land backed by the insurrecion OF a
whole brave nation and with powerful germ OF dis
organization, through desertion and revolt al work IN
the adverse army. stroke OF energy az the service
Of principle would have given you allies on every
point OF Europe; and despotlc power would dare
or be able TO support Russia against YOU We could
pledge word tor that
BY your declaring yourselves hostile to any national
moveinent-by your counting during sixteen months
the vile.t OF the despouc Powers, Austrla-by your
TenOuncing every moral aim, every noble aspiration
for pairy and hateful programme OF expedency and
status quo YOU have deprived yourselves of the syn
pafhies Of all the good aud brave throughout EOrOpe
YOU have prevented Polish rising You have lost the
alliance Of Sweden; you have allowed free space and
,ccufity 10 all German mtrgues against you ana re-
norr ,inr all freedom of action all free choice of
tlnc,s means and military plans. you have, Ike
Charles Albert in 1913, narrowed the war to siege
Oh SPOT witch will be, fear, henceiorward named
tie grave of England's honor and Englands sons.
Tie rave OF EnglaIds honor and Engands sons:
the Crimea, at this period, can be but this.
confess cannot understand the silent, obstinate
apsthy with which your press your meetings, your
parliamentary men, are witnessing the sacrifice OF
ouands without erdreaming of asking themselves:
Can victory-a decisive and permanent one-be Ob-
iaiL ed Hcre | sbudder when | read such words as
tbo-e with which Lord PalmerstOn c0Oly assur.s the
House OF Commons that oil losses will be met by new
supplies Of meB. You had better decree at once that
tie youth OF England shail be periodically decmated
for 10 other purpose than that OF crafty ing the mill
tary ignorance of Lous Napo con- and Withdrawing
eviry source of alarm from the Austrian Government.
4 Crimeap expedition could in case | believe,
lead by Itself 10 a decisive success or 20 houoraDe
t.rrns Of peace. Odessa if YOU wanted to act from
the Black Sea, was the point Tor YOU Stl, had you
chosen the favorable moment and worked with ade-
ouafe means-had you landed al once 100000 men
somewl ere above SevastopOl, and marched 10 Pere'
kop while your feet would have got possession OF the
SrIai's of Ktrcb Cope Of Kazantp, and other points
on the Sea of AzOff the Crimea might have been
youIs and YOU would have then fallen back on Sevas-
ioIo'-thus deprived OF all il communications with The
continent. IL was no doubt an important deed. But
now what IL your hope What Il your aim IN avs
tematically sacrificing Your les under the walls
Of a to~n which, in all probability, you will not
taxi 9, and which if taken cannot give YOU what YOU
want
II is HIGH time for you think TO look carr esty into
the after ard 10 see that England forces, which Ea
gland may eed at a not very distant period for her
own protection against allies-arc not lost in hope
less contest.
A, IaoL no Nou uuht i'm he
beeii nng-and il was the frst fatal msakethat you
would Tighten the Gar cut of the contest with some
50 600 or 60 600 men placed az tonstantnopie, Cal
lipoi, or Adrianople. When you began to perceive
that a real earnest unavoidable, you turned
TO the Danube; there was your natural basis tor Of
fnsive operations Austra-it IL now an established
fact-iorbade your acting there. You bowed TO Aus
tina difmisscd the thought at once and gave up to
Ausiriu-fhe second fatal misGkc-the Pnncipaltles.
Forbidden the Danube, apd not wanting TO arouse,
through Poland the dreaded question of the naonall-
ties, you decided upon adopting the Bonapartist
eel enc Of a Crimean expedition. You landed, with
uooIs material and knowledge of the localities aud
of the enemys forces utterly unequal TO the object,
rear Sevastopol. You wanted 10 try the North, but
found unort seen and ain insumountabe obstacles,
and through the most dangerous flank march posi-
BILE YOU turn to the South. You could not, for want
of troops invest the place you did not dream OF pre-
VtItI the accumulation OF military stores ana Wet
uals which were coming from the interior of Russia
and Siberia down the Nolga and the Dom through
Rostcfi and Kertch TO Soyastopol. But you SIMPLY
established yourselves there, trusting 20 chance and
desli Using the enemy, and there you sim are. Since
the n yOu have been IN imminent danger-averted only
through want Of holiness in the Russian leaders and
heroic yalor in your soldiers az lukermGnn and Baa-
klavG-of being driven back 20 the sea Since then
YOU have lost the hope of active alliance with Aus
Ia lost the confidence of Europe lost considerable
an cunt of money, lost Il speak OF England alone
sou G O,OCO men; and won-some counter approach
ing ouiposts erected since your arrival.
This is the summary Of the past for the future.
Seyasforol-tie le.leged southern part strong
ever; the Rus'i ian army in the Crlmea more strong
than ever; and, owing TO the conduct OF AUSTRIA
numerous fresh rCeniorcemcnts are coming from the
interior of Russia. You cannot dream OF starving the
enemy: your expedition 20 the Sea OF Azof has
five or SIX months too late; military stores and pro-
visions equal to the wants of many months were al
ready accumulated in Sevastopol And the military
road OF the ShlyBgh the road across the Bthmus the
road leading from Sympheropol 10 seyastopOl through
Bah shseI the road from the same town to the north
ern part of the besiegod place are all IN the bands OF
the Russians. You mus. then take the town by force
How many will you have 10 lose IN getting pos
session of the MsGko Of the Redan, and OF the nrs
lire Of defense How many in conquering The second
linel
Suppose you DO gain possession of the whole town
how are You keep il the IRE OF the northern
forts Tie ground there il much higher than on the
southern eide. The Octagon fortress, called the Sic
valus tie key of SeyestOpOl according 10 Sir How
ard Douglas commands town, bay and docks. It's
liz bit projects II from the Ie OF your shlDs It's shores
are precipous. You must therefore attack It by land,
thus finding YOU self ai nine months Of e1ertons and
sacrifices, lust before the obstacle from which you
shrank at tie beginning. How much time, how much
English blood will be required 20 overcome It Can
you feel sang uine after the experiments the south
Ard, then The Russian forces outside SevastOpoll
Thinner in number; exhausted BY victories which
would undoubtedly prove ike those Of PyTThus, you
will then have 10 begin the true war, tue Crimean
camp aigD. There Russian forces, strong enough
now and which will be stronger still in short wnie,
OIL tie right at the two eXfPmites Of the Chernayai
tia D.fl. faronz In fNn