New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-01

! fall Of q fortress which had become untenable.
| He profited by the last chance of saving the
| garrison, and he would seem to have done right;
for according to sll Appearances he would have
had to leave it to its f.te, to collect his field
army, and to retire into the interior Of tho
! Crimes. if not to Perekop. In tais case, the
garrison OF the south side would soon IA re been
compelled either TO cross stealthily to tn, north
eide or t. capitulate; and the north side, too,
once cut of from all chance Of ever being re-
lieyed and earrisoned by denoralzed troops,
would have been 8 arved into submission.
So long as the Russians had chance not only of
keeping their army in the Crimea up to something
like force equaling that Of the Allies but were
even expecting retnforcements which would make
it far outnumber its opponents, the north Side oil
Seyastopol was position of immense importance
To hold the north side by garrison while the
field army stood where it did up to the latest news
We have received was to bring the allied army on
the plateau Of the Hersceatic Chersonese. II
was to exclude their ships from seyastopol Bay
and to deprive them of proper naval base of ops
rations nearer than the Bosphorus, for neither
Kamiesh nor Balsklava can pass for such thing
So long as the Russians able to keep the field in
the Crimea the north side much the key to the
whole of the Crmea and TO what gives the whole
country any military and naval Importance as the
Mslakofr was to the South side. But from the
momcntthe Russians unable to hold the field. the
north side has longer any great Importance 1t is
fortified position of certain strength, but which
if regularly besieged by sufficient forces is doomed
to fall for relief there can then be none.
This may seem astonishing after the great
imsortsnce sscribed, and rightly too, to the
north side. And yet it is quite correct. The
| whole of this war has been, in appearance,
| war Of Publications and seges, and has in the
| eyes of superficial observers completely ami
| hilated the progress made By NapoleOn's rapid
| maneuver, thus carrying back the art of warfare
| TO the days Of the seven years war. But in
reality noihpg is more contrary to fact. For
| tresses and groups Of fOrtresses have no other
importance now a-dsys than as the fixed points
on which an army in the field supports itself in
| its movements Thus the campst kalafat was
| bridge. head SLOWING Omer Pasha to menace
the Russians in flank; thus Siistria, Rustchuk,
| Warns, Shumla were the four salient angles, so
to say, OF large fortified camp into which he
| could always retreat, and where he could not
be followed unless two at least Of those salient
| singles were taken or neutraliz I'd. Thus Sevas-
topol formed the pivot of the Russian army in
the Crimes. and whenever that army was out
numbered or otherwise checked Sevastopol al
lowed il breathing time until fresh reinforce
ments had come Up. To the Allies Sevastspol
was Russian naval center TO be destroyed,
naval base # operations t. be gained; 10 the
Russians it was the possession of the Crimea, be-
cause il was the only position to be held against
far superior numbers until relieved. Thus the
ultimste decision always rested with the armies
in the field aud the importance Of fortresses
depended, not on their natural or artificial
strength or intrinsic value. but on the pro-
lection and support (spPUi) they could give TO
| tie field army. Their value has become rela-
tive. They are no longer independent factors
| in the game Of wSr, but merely valuable posi-
| tions which il may or may not be expedient TO
| defend by every means and 10 the last eX-
tremity. This tie SeysstopOl affair proves
more than say previous occurrence. SevastO-
| pol, like sll really modern fortresses, takes the
| place OF a permanently fortified camp. As long
.s the di.posable force is sufficient to defend
that camp, as long as supplies are plentiful, the
communications with the main base Of opera
tions secure. especially IS long SIS that camp
| held by strong army prevents the enemy from
/ going past it without exposing his own safety
/ so long that camp is Of hrst-rate Importance
/ ard may bsfie the enemy for whole campaign.
| But if such is 10 logger the case; if the de-
! Tending force suffers check after check, runs
short Of provisions, risks having its communics-
lions cut eff snd being reduced 70 the fate Of the
Austrians st Tim in lc05-theA il is high time
10 prefer the safety Of the army to tAe abstract
value Of tie position snd to retreat az once 70
another place Offering greater advantages.
Thissee & be now the situation Of the Rus
sisns. The greater part Of their original sctive
army-fOurteen divisions out of twenty-four-
is engaged, and kss been partly destroyed in
tie Crimes. and what they have OF reserves and
militia. O. cthsr new formations, can stand no
comparison with the troop: they have lost.
Theg Will ceItsuly DO well not to send any more
mer 10 that dangerous peninsula and indeed 10
abandon il Sc soon ss they can The Allies Are
far superior 10 them in numbers and especially
il spirit. With Gorchzkcfs present army 10
risk a bsttle in The field would be TO solicit
Geiest He NAV be tarned either By iae soath
coast and tie valley Of the JIghiT, or By Eupa.
,c-iA Either operation would force him to
give up his communication with the north side,