New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-01
CnIMEAN PROSPECTS,.


previous knowledge Of the circumstances al
tending the capture Of the southern side of Sc
vastopol;, Ii is true that there is plenty of
speculation "a to both the causes aud the con-
,eouences of GorchakoG's sudden abandonment
of place so long and so desperately de-
Tended; and among such speculations those Of
our correspondents at London and Paris are
eminently worthy of attention. But there are
some points of view and some considerations
which neither of these writer's, opposite as are
their views, seems to have dwelt upon with the
necessary care or to have given the due s1oant
of importance.
Precisely what turn matters now will take in
the Crimea depends to great extent on the
causes which induced the Russians to give up
the south side. That purely tactical and strste-
cic.l motives were completely foreign to this
sudden resolution, is evident. Had GorchaSof
considered the south side, and even the Kara
belnsys, uutensble as soon as the Mslakoff should
have fallen, be would not haze thrown up so
many internal defenses in that suburb Though
the ultimate success of the siege might be con-
sijered assured by the taking Of that command
ing point, yet from four to six weeks breathing
time might have been gained by stubborn de-
Tense, first of the inner rocks OF the suburb,
and then of the town proper. To judge RON
the best maps, plans and models, there was no
necessity whatever in mere tactical or strategi-
cal light to abandon so hastily what had been
Tended with such tenacity. Military science
alone osnuos account for step which can yet
scarcely be attributed 10 she confusion and
fright caused by an unexpected aud decisive
defeat. Necessities of different nature must
have been active to force Gorchakof TO s step
which compromises his military position and
career SO seriously as tins.
There are two possibilities only. Either the
morale Of the Russian soldiers was so completely
broken up tina; il would have been impossible TO
rally them in any thing like order behind the inner
lines of defense so as TO continue the struggle, or
else they had begun to run short Of provisions not
only within Seyastopol but in the camp without.
The all but uninterrupted series of defeats 10
which the Russian army had been exposed, from
0ltentza and Tshetste TO the Chernays, and ia.
assault OF Sept :, must certainly have completely
destroyed the spirit of the defenders Of SevastopOl
and all the more, as they consisted principally of
the same troops who were beaten on the Danube
and later a. Inkermann. The Russians have rather
dull moral feelings, and can stand defeats longer
thsn most troops but no army in the world can
hold together forever when it is beaten by every
enemy il meets. and when to long list Of defeats
il can oppose nothing except the negative sstisfac
ton of its tenacious and heightened resistance, and
Q solitary example Of successful sctive defense
like that of the 18th June. But such q resistance
in besieced place is of itself demoraizing in the
long run Ii implies hardships want OF rest, sick
ness, and tie presence, not of thar scute danger
which braces but of that chronic danger which
must ultimately relax the mind. The rapidly
succeeding defeats on the CherDsya and as the
Malakof must have completed the demoraliss-
tion, and II is more than likely ths. Gorchs-
koff s troops in the town were no longer TT 70 be
led against the enemy. And IS the Mslskof COM
manded the bridge 10 the ether side. aud the
French guns might any day have destroyed IT, re.
lief became impossible while retrest might 81 less;
save the troops. II is not astonishing that this
decentralization should at lsst seize the garrison
il is astonishing that il had not done SO long
before
There are also some very strong symptoms
that want of provisions fer he army generally
had grest deal 70 90 with Prince Gorchakoffs
sudden retreat. The interruption of Russian
navigation in the SEES Of Azof, though il lad lot
that immediate efec. which the British aud
French Press, then 50 much in want Of some
success, expected il to hsve, must nevertheless
in the long run prove troublesome 30 the Rus
slams SIS II eoniiei them 10 one air lie iEe ofepe
rstiOns, and thereby limited their supplies. The
immense difficulty Of transporting victgslng
stores, ammunition and forage from Kherssn
through thinly, populated steppe country nus:
have been sTesiy increased when this rosi be-
came tie only oEe BY which the Amy eoaii be
provided. The neSns Of transport. brought to-
geiher BY n QUESTION from the Ukraine AMI Don
Provinces, mas; Szsly have teen usei NJ:
horses and drzft-OGen EusI have been sacrificed
IL great numbers, bOtA by overwe.k sna scsuii-
LEES OF proyenGeI ard tie rssrest provinces
onee beng exhausted, : became more md more
si6eslt 70 reP,aes tie Necessary stsci. I'll.
| sto1tAess Of SUPPLIES ~egli show Itself 81 s-sL
noi SO EueA IN SeFsstopol, where reserve
stores must Esve been kept up for the event Of
tie place being invested o. tie lorth side tee.
As II tie camp above Inksrmznn. Il BAk.hi-
serAl and or ne h1e Of march Of tie resaforee-
Eerts. Tie reports Of tie allied commanders
tse more TIA. once sGverted . this bein, tie
l Gaze; tui otter'eIrc1astznces TOO Indicate tat
sSeh nus, have beer the fact By Us impes.i-
RI L.