The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-07-08

guarantees against the excessive deve,opemsnt
o, the naval force Of Russia Ia the Back
Ses9 What was, Ia tact. the object Of thoss
siipuDa,ions?
TAXING ~ u starting point the force aaoat q the
RussisD navy. we beein by opposing % II countst.
PoiSe OF Fix frisate+ permanently on the watld.
LdepeDcsnt OF tire nsvsl fofcs OF Turkey. For
esob treeh vessel that Rossis might construct, we
sIipulstS favor oil the allies tor tie power Of pro
postionatly adding 10 their sQuadrons Ia the
Euxire Lastly, In the contingency that the SUB
lime Porte should conceive itself rnena ed, We
ress rye 10 The liberty Of ealing for the allied
fleets, Can 1t be possbs TO msconcelve the weight
sfin, dad I, Turkey Let il not DO objected
81 us thar this system will impose onerous ex.
psnses on the maritime Powers. The expenses
WI. scarcelJ on'atep these Of tho naval force
trey bsbitoally maintain in tue Mediterranean.
Bssidts, let us not deceive Ourselves. Is
Europe desires not TO leave her vork incom ,etoii
she really attaches serious interest TO the oons,i'
ds,iou # our eyes, iosepara ,le from tie
real amen deneh, Of tae Lei Of the Chrsasn po,ula
too OF that empire-the guarantee Powers will
hnd Themselves under the necessity for very long
time OF, ~ IL ~ers, proving their presence In tnose
qusits by at least few ehps OF war.
Ho~tver that NAV be, u it likely that Russis will
be hssy in building frcsh ships of war In the Rack
Sea- when she knows thst II win provoke the dts
play OF the coanterpose stipulated by this bypohe-
Lastly. in the suppositiou that she was neverths.
hE tempted 70 do 70. would not the mutual en-
esgement Of the Powers TO consider the deveIope
ID
MT az casns trN. suffice beforehand 70 nip such
teDdt ncts in tho bud
Taking this into confederation can II be pretend.
ed with any eemblancc cffouodation that the peace
would be god for Russia alone apesce that would
tske from fer, with the protection OF the Princi
pahti,s, the irnit Of q ser.a OF W ,oessfn wars;
peace thar would open the Danube. and would place
Turkey under the guarantee Of Europe; that would
obbgn Rursis. ~ der pain Of rupture with Earops
TO ferornte the excessive Development OF her a.
val force ,n the ack Sea, aud would anuihi,sto
the Principe and the pretex, Of her interference in
the sflsus CT the Christian subjects 81 the Sultan;
that, lastly. would aivs birth 20 new political
systsm fruitful III coneeqWnc es and that. perpstu.
s'ipg the ALLIANCE o! the three C,uits in Opposition
to the is lasion OF Russia would naturally eriog her
to Pronunciation forever Of the pursuit Ct protests
Of ambition difqnietiDg TO the East.
But let us quit the groutd Of general c,nsi 9cra
htDs and CT ter into a spacial examination Of the
fect nd part Of tbs Third Point, since that the
stone that tripped up our propositions Referring
this point 20 the text OF the protoc OF the 2stn
Of December. To which Count Walewsky also refers,
we ir the text does but indicate the princ ole OF
the cessation OF Russisn peponderance in the Bsck
Bee, laying down that tho arrangements to be taken
In tba. respect depend too Immediately tho
events OF the war for 1t to be posso then 70 settle
their fa#s.
Time has gone on, but the events OF tho war not
having modified tnc situation 10 far as 10 fur.
nish popitive elements OF solution, We have only
BEEN able TO adapt them 10 u series OF ideas, EN-
brsciDg not only The complication Of the day. but
"
attention to TIE general inters x Of Europe.
Let 10 not BE- forgotten, moreover, that the al
'ipstum to be presented TO Russa left her the
choice Of two moaes Of solution. We hold IL ~ not
lmptssible that, With psremptory alternative
before her, and nxious to withdraw herself from
the dangers of the political isolation with which
she would be threatened by the second d our husl
propositions, the Cabinet Of s.. Petersburg would
tava made i's option In favor Of the first-of
French origin as the bottom tnat took . start
ing point an equal iimits;ion Of the naval force Of
both the riyerine Powers. C,ant Walewsky, on bis
| part, makes 10 doub. but that Russia would have
eagerly adhered "a the second proposition Of the ul
t,matur 10 evident "a him are .he advantages that
Power would have drawn from IT,
We are far, admit, from partakGg In this
respect the feeling Of eecuiity possessed by the
Minister fer Foreign Affairs. For whilst ttuslirg
| good cal to the impicsaion that would have ben
| produced on the Cabinet Of ~, Petersburg by the
certain ~ that On absolute ~ lection ts part of
both combinations would have tna immediate re.
OF war with Aus'rii, we cannot help pa ing In the
other fcale CT the balance The amount OF pressure
exercised On the Court Of Russis by the national
feeling, strongly excited by the obstinate resistance
OF us mics IN the CTmea
Lastly, supposing the anticiDa.ions OF Count
Raewrky 70 be veIihed-we have no data, BY the
by, for testing them-we consider we Rave show
ourselves 10 have been perfectly authorized In
honestly considering the solution that would then
have been in rec AZ serious and efilcscious.
Let me add an observation that win serve still
more To aincidate my idea. What Is tao object Of
the present wori To put an end TO the prepon-
asrsnos of Russia. replies the despatch Of Count
Walewtky.
political power Of Rn,sla in general. On the other
band, TO wish 10 c0Lhlc the termination OF Rns an
piepoLdersnce 10 the Black Sea would be TO exat
one Of tire mears 10 the dignity Of the main pur
allies should aim at the limitation Of tho political
power OF Rassia 20 the degree OF rendering any
abue Of her material resources, IL not imp sibe as
east eminentIy difficult The dininusion even 70
m n fsas pf ha ian Hat In ~.
Black SEA would not suffice, by itself, 20 deprive
Russia OF the adv intsges her geographical position
affords her In references 70 Turkey.
To oppose 10 this mass OF moral guarantee AMI
material counter poise the ruling idea of our
plan, the execution Of which, joined to aeyelopc-
nent OF the defensive % vera Of the Priu;pal,es,
the germ OF which was already lad down In thr
principles eEtsbIlsbed ~ the conferences, would,
am convinced, have offered both 10 tbs Ottoman
empire and 10 Europe those pledges OF security they
70 ipsily demand.
We esfnestiy desire that these reflections may bs
Of q nature 20 set our plan IN a more favourable
light before the eyes Of the French government.
IL, however, this should not be 80, wat remains
for ~ 10 do, since other modes of solution liky 10
lead 10 pacific solution 40 - present themselves
- our mindst
As our allies think they ought 10 Walt more
complete dtytopement Of the T9ird Guarantee from
The chances Of war, We can bat express oar wishes
That tboHe may turn Out 81 ss promptly 10 bring
about solntion that NAV stsm 10 too beigerents
more Oh footing with their "a hfces thar thai ne
proposed.
DECIDED, equally with Frame. 10 remain faithful
30 The icrms and the spirit Of the alliance Austria
sots not look the cernani Tor m n,erDst.oDa
engagement 10 be imposed en- Hnsss, With
fe;eitbce to q permanent Limitation oi her naya
force In the Eaxire, A. entering Into the
still ulai ona Of the Tca,y q the ~ Of December
Presented TO tie exclusion 81 every other mode "
solution that might lie equally a. ctcions. tails
condition OF peace belonga according TO us, = The
class of guestors whore decision, oy TIE sery
terms OF the protocol ~ the goth Of December, Ia
reserved for the ecurse q military operations.
We are firmly awaiting, then, ,hs course
Of event., And the moment propitons for renewing
nfg0.iatiations for peace, Ia which, fot our part
whatsoever may happen, we shall unite with an ire.
vocsble nsoiution 10 bring them 10 resnl, la the
honest, efcscous and complete realization Of the
Fopr GusfsItssa
Tro sane spirit will be very decidedly Impressed
the cyerturcs shall make 70 lie Cabinet o. st.
Petersburg; and which. n necessary, we shall. 20,
oonrss, not fat fully u communicate ~ tse Trn.s
eoy1pneIt.