The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1855-02-18


doubt We could 10 this way but at great cost o
money and men The Spanish troops would make some
resis'ahce, the climate cannot forget too that
ifRe oron OF the treasure expended would be wrung
rom the hard earnings of the southern people and mnc
Of the blood shed would be the best blood of the South
Tor our system OF tanon Is unequal and this being look
81 upon as southern measure the gallant young men OF
the south would volunteer With aacry But OF all modes
which could Be devised for the acquisition of Cuba for the
benc'lt OF the South, is the fatal for
who has any knowledge Of the Spanish character It's pride
onsuhaeY and revenge, for moment imagine that
spain would stop al any steps blast the acquisition in
our hands The policy Of Spain is obvious she would
cns 20 Cuba with the tenacy Of dying oonvulson and
whsn she could hold longer she woald decree uni
Ferssl emancipation But, ID may be said would re-
verse thus state Of things in Territory Of Cuba But
Just a hs unctnre the people OF the North, who have The
control of the federal government would by unanimons
yotc hid US stay hands that non-interVention
their doctrine that by the Spanish law there
slaves IA cuha The result would be that the South after
All her sacrifices would have acquired freenego colony,
the greatest curse imaginable This result would be very
amusing TO the aboitionsts but have there
fore no idea OF blindy travelling road which leads no
wheft Out over a precipice.
Another motive which makes still more determined
not % go 10 with Spain for Cuba is that Of the
Sontsfe upon the Of great straagie with hostile
majority OF the North and viii need all resources
not to make foreign conquests but TO defend the very
ground upon which stand | am, therefore unwilling
TO weaken our resources or eomplcac position by
attack Cuba others who hear only the songs Of peace
in the future, may take different course.
As to the third modereaty with Cuhahs implies thar
Cuba has thrown of the Spanish yoke and established in
dependence. III it were desirable 10 acquire Cuba this
seems to me to be the only mode 1t could be done bene
fcaly to the South. By this mode would escape the
agitation OF the slavery question in the territorial cond
ton OF Cuba. The question would be in nut-shel-an-
nexaton or no annexation The Wilmot proriso might
precede and prevent annexation il could succeed
nexaton and mar it. Cuba would have organized her in
sttuons. We would be enabled to Judge with de
gree of confidence to her capabty for segovernment
and her reliability upon the slavery issue. We would
know what we were getting, and less risk Of getting
haf ant NO. Lara laftl,
embarrassing questions arising of the treaties ord
nances, and DEGREES of Spain And then nationally
speaking, she would cost us nothing, neither
money.
1t may be supposed from these considerations that fa
fibusterng Not An impossible gulf inervenes
between and this pocyduty. cannot interfere with
the domestic institutions Of other people for wish other
people to interfere with the domestic institutions of
people. On the other hand, shut my eyes
the inevitable future see the world is in transition state
and feel that the independence of Cuba is only question
of time The final decision of this great question of
nexaon belongs appropriately to the future say take
step in that direction; wait and watch the
of events and profit by them do not wish sbackle
the ultimate action of the country When the future rolls
round, and Cuba emerges independent from its BOSOM
when the fruit is ripe then let this great question be de
cded under the light of all the surrounding circumstances
might stop here but several hypothetical be
disposed of to manifest myself truly.
II may be said suppose England France seize Cuba
what then 2 There things improbable they
need hardly be considered, and this is After Eng
land and France done with Russia they will not be in
mood to disturb anybody much less win they want
the United States But neither England France
Cuba in their hands would be necessarily free
negro colony and therefore, worthless but if either Of
them should want it their mutual jealousy would prevent
either from taking it, But it, in violation of all possibility
they should make the attempt say at once would draw
the sword and drive them into the sea.
Again: it may be said suppose Spain refuses to satisfy
Would not mnge up tnese Claims Win me uesa or
Cuba. would act towards Spain with extreme forbear
for she is weak and strong The truet great
in dane thu
in this light towards Spain would towards her with
generosity and mngnanimy. would urge our claims in
the most respectful manner IT. after reasonable time,
they still disregarded, would propose arbitration
II this failed then after assuring myself that claims
well founded, and after sufficient and final notice,
would send out fleet of steamers seize some Spanish
ships, pay the claims, and give receipt in full.
But, it may be said suppose Spain should attempt TO
Africanze Cuba--what then For my part | am clear
that should every possible means to
prevent this. would stop at nothing, not even war.
There is however old saying, and true one, that
of prevention is worth pound of cure would act
upon this maxim would remove the causes leading
Spain to this They two-the fear Of our de-
signs upon Cuba, and the pressure of England Let us
take such line of conduct will remove the first
the Russians removing the second cause in which OPP
Grafton government could cooperate efficiently by
couaging Spain. That in my opinion is the true line of
diplomacy II is the interest of Spain to preserve sa
very in Cuba--her interest and our policy concur We
would be bungler indeed if under such circumstances,
could produce the desired result The policy of the
South is much have slaves to have
people interested in slavery. Spain is interested
should let her continue thus
glad to be able TO fortify my opinions upon this
subject by the authority of Mr. Calhoun As late May,
1913 he said in his speech upon the proposed occupation
OF Yucatan3 ~
So long Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, friendly
powera power of which have dreadit should
be- it has been the policy of all administrations
have been connected with the government to let
Cuba remain there
assume what he says an axiom. deduce from il a
coroary that not to buy Cuba go to for
because If policy is for Cuba to remain with SPAIN il
against policy to change that possession, with
without the consent of Spain.
This dsposes of every mode of acquisition except by
treaty with Cuba independent power This is from
its very nature question for the future When the
tngency arises then and not till then should render
definite Judgment
Mr. Chairman the acquisition Of Cuba will open new
volume in history. Former acquisitions the ne
cesstes of location Of circumstance This is not BY
this fairly launched in the career Of conquest
from which there is outlet but TO storm the future
sword ia hand. From this have nothing to
hope and everything to fear for greatest success
would be our greatest disaster
The history of nations has been the history Of their inn
agnatons The pomp Of power, the thirst for dominion
the glare OF glory have been the empty bauble for which
they have exhausted their energies and slaughtered each
other These have been the dim lights by which poor hui
manity has hitherto advanced Who estimate the in
finite miseries the muudnous saughters these barren
vantes have enaled upon the human race The book OF
time is bloody every page with the horrid recital Shall
learn nothing from 1t Shall the past turn its
ing features upon in vain Shall be nsensble 10
the tears and agones of history shall furnish
other instance of stupendous folly by embarking in the
insane eareer2 l trust not trust shall turn
with aversion from the deceil seducions of false glory
and be instructed By the disasters of universal humanity
Wfo pnvsr tIe atnle unnt