Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1855-08-25

inner delences Of the town had so far been com
pie1ed that il was evident that an assault wa
becoming daily less practicable. Il was, il
fact, certain that we had not tho means OF TAX
ing the town then, and there was no reasonabl,
prospect Of our being able To do 80 during III,
Winter months. Ii was, indeed, admitted tina
we must winter on the spot, and wal, the re
turn OF fine weather TO resume active opera
tions.
Under these circumstances the obvious poll
cy was TO remain on the defensive. The more
advanced parallel Of attack ought at once ic
have been turned into a defensive parallel by
putting its ditch outside aud providing il with
fanks ; and shelter ought to have been con.
siructed in its immediate rear for the guard of
the trenches. The lines of Balaklava ouph, 10
have been closed in the rear, and Kamesch Bay
fortified. If these precautions had been taken,
not an inch Of ground would have boen lost
and the army might have wintered in security,
and guarded their position without fatigue or
exposure. This would also have left leisure
for tho repair Of roads, the construction Of huis,
the establishment Of depois, and ali those indis.
pensable measures which were necessarily neg
lecied from the want Of men and more than
this, 1t would have allowed time for the re organ
lzation of departments and the reformation Of
deiails-all Of which were impossible while
every man in the camp, from the chief Of the
staff to the drummer-boys, were worked beyond
the power of human endurance. A different
policy was adopted, and one half the army sac
rifced to the obstinacy with which it was per-
severed in Tho front Of our trenches was al
ways left open to the garrison, and guards were
reqaissi .iiiO IL '-' ''vy.-'s' ss's Sss0'gss'
Of our army 10 supply while the works were
pusned Torwa,d with Il rvoklessnOss which was
fatal 10 the men employed in them. Had it
been that our engineers had discovered that the
distance of 200 yards, at which their first
batteries were placed. was too far of to do any
damage, there might be some excuse for seeking
a more advanced position in which to place
them before attempting further operations
against the place. But when the fire opened
again on the 9th of April, it was from the iden-
iical batteries from which it was thrown on the
l7,h Of October. All We had gained, a, the
expense Of such suffering and misery, and by
the loss Of so many brave men, was, that on
our leit the saps had been pushed forward to
within GOO yards Of the enemies works, but at
the edge Of a ravine, beyond which further
progress in that direction was impossible. On
our right very little progress had been made I;
and although in the centre we had advanced
some 400 or 500 yards, we could not preven,
the Russians from occupying the Mamelon, $50
yards in advance Of their original lines, and
within about 400 Of our most advanced trench
es.
THE SECOND BomBARDsESr.
During the Winter the French had converted
sRe Kkhf6RtI har derG8Ys SI pa tparAisIsiA sd sae
vanced them to within about 200 yards Of the
Russian works. But il is still questionable
whether il was worth their while to do this
II they could subdue the fire Of the place, they
could as easily have done this in three weeks
as six months and if they cannot subdue the
FIRE of the place, they are hardly more advanc-
cd towards taking the place than they were.
Such was nearly the position Of matters,
when, on the 9th Of April, the second great
bombardment of Sebasiopol took place. On
this occasion the armament, Of our batteries was
as nearly as can be 'asceriained, "a guns and AZ
mUrtars.
Il is not known what the armament of the
French batteries consisted of; but, assuming II
10 be about the same, we may assert that IL
round numbers the fire commenced from 20(
guns and 100 mortars-throwing a heavier
weigh, of metal than ever was thrown by /;
siege train since the invention of gunpowder
The batteries opened at daybreak, each guI
throwing about 1870 to iiO rounds per day, an'
was continued without interruption for about tel
days, though at the end Of that time it was re
duced To about 100 rounds per day Il; il after
wards fell of to 30, and at last ceased almos
entirely.
The Russians were at first taken by surprise
but souu replied ,igurouslyi and continued 4
fight us on at least equal terms during tn
whole time. Sometimes they did not fire
gun for hours together, and then again thei
FIRE nared up as if they had suddenly awakene
from trance. But they did us as little dam
age as we did them; and it is by no mean
clear that the better policy for them would nc
have been TO close their embrasures, TO with
draw all their guns, except those for defensiv
purposes, and let MS waste our shot and she
on their invulnetable ramparts:
THE RESULT.
The result of this stupendous operation wa
absolutely nothing. Ii is true we occasionall
gained superiority of fire over the Redar
the Mamelon and the Flagstaff batteries, fo
the simple and obvious reason that these work
partook more or less of the bastion trace, an
though they could not be exactly eufaded, the
were opposed TO a cross raking FIRE which wa
very destructive. The truth is, they ougl
never to have been armed for offence, but use
merely for defensive purposes still we neyt
silenced even these, and at the end Of the con
bat they were repaired and re-armed, and wei
as efficient as before. On the other hand, "
never silenced nor gained any superiority of fiji
over those works which directly faced ours, an
whose guns could only be attacked by dire
FIRE.
It was an experiment on the largest seal
and proved beyond all cayil the proposition f
which Mr. Ferguson contended so earnestly
a his published works, and at the United Servi'
Institution in ls53--that when the guns of
fort are equal in number to those of the atisc
0 Lhey cannot be siIenoed bv the besieger and