New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-11-26

trated-the one BY Koluluz to Yenissla the otner
b, Uzuriu toward Marku and then TO fen''sli
Piedmonte,s column attempted to force passage
from the Upper Chulin and Adm ChoSras toward
EsrIu. In other words, three parallel columns
marched across the hills concentrcally toward
toti.Ssla ON the Upper Bebek. The Piedmontess
column. which formed the left OF the mo'eneo1
was stopped ct once before II could cross the NUS;
il vss 50 near the Russian front that it' advance
vould have amounted to flank march along aud
within reach of that front, and it had TO halt The
two French columns occupied NeDisaia Without
.riOus resistance and gained the line OF tne DEF
bek They even penetrated beyond IT, OccuP'eu
Foti-Sala and attempted 10 scale the nights Id i's
rear. But here, towsrd AirCul, they saw the
Russian columns drawn up on the plateau ana iei'
back seaiu to Fotl.Sala Meantime the Russians
bad not been idle While their troops from Alrgul
demonstrated against the French front, strong de-
t,chnents from kutshuk and Biuk- SEren, where
the Belbek enters the Russian front, assembled that
river toward Albat thence marching mp SIDE va
lev 10 their right By which they turn, the leu oil
the French sdgauce At the same time, other
columns from Ulusala, on the Upper Katsha,
cros..d over toward Tatar 0.mankoi, near the
source of the Belbek, from which point they men
sced the French right Finally the Russian lrreg
ular troops still occupied the psteaa OF Mount
Ya,ls. which Overhangs 10 the south the valley o
the Upper Chernaya. ami thereby menicsd 10
some extent the French rear-at all events con
fnirg their lines of operation to very narrow
ha.n fhn
around ,hew, the French Withdrew TO the Nights
shove Urkusta where they still are, unless they
have retired still further.
The whole of these maneuvers were undertaken
by the French with force amounting to no less
than four divisions of infantry or st least 20 OOOto
- OOO men. From the particulars given in the
Russian reports we should judge that two divisions
acted while the other go remained IN reserve.
Now such force, in mountain warfare: Is very
considerable and about the maximum OF what can
he usefully employed on two converglng roads, or
N the narrow valley Of an Alpine river. The
force. them was amply sufficient Tor any work TO
be cut out for il but the whole OF the maneuyers
of this corps. commanded we believe, by General
De SALES. bear an unmistakable character OF
oropipg hesitation, and of complete absence Of
any definite purpose to be pursued resolutely. In
all maintain warfare it is of the highest importance
70 begin. if possible, by mastering the main ridge
from which the chief valleys descend. This ridge
WAS. here. the Yaila. The Yala could be easily
cleared of Russians as it parallel and close to
the south coast which again under the fire Of the
allied ships of war. Ths Yala, besides, is not q
mere rocky ledge, but plateau aiiordiog good
pasturage for sheep and therefore, FOR some time at
least. for moderate number OF horses also The
Russians. indeed have occupied it with Cossack
cavalry and if we are to Judge by the maps, the
Ground is very well adapted for light cavalry ma
neuyers. though 1000 feet above the level of the
sea. Before any attempts were made to descend
into the valley of the Upper Beleek that valley
might have been turned completely by al few squad
rons taking possession of the Yaila plateau, and
opepipp the road for a column Of infantry which
might have descended partly by the Biuk
partly by the Uzen Bash (the two rivers forming,
by their junction, the Belbek). The longest march
TO be made, from UZunyut TO Tatar Osmankol, does
NOT exceed "a niles The whole could be easily
done in two days, and troops carrying four days
safety. The Yals plateau once secured, the march
of this turning column would, of course, have to
be supported BY columns advancing on the ground
where De Sales actually did advance But then,
what a different position would the corps have
been in! Instead of being threatened by Tatar
Osmankoi that important position would De in its
hands. and along with the possession of the YaIla
wonld afford TO it the means of threatening the
RIGHT of the Russians on the Upper Katsha. Then
the Russian columns above FOt-Sals, near Airgul,
would themselves have been Out1anked, and the
thanking march now made by the Russians toward
the French lett would have been isolated and with
out any Importance whatever. by such com
bination the French might not 0aly have gained
far more extensive information and reconnotered
a greater extent Of ground than they now have
done by pushing two isolated columns right into
narrow valley in front Of the enemy's center; they
might even have gained some actual success, and
compelled the Russians TO abandon many square
mile of valuable territory. Wewill not at present
say that General De Sales might not have had rea-
sons ,unknov to us, which would justify him in pre-
ftrrDg the mode of operation he adopted but the
surprising slOWness Win WHICH nc oAocu'ou MS
reconnaissance Of about four miles of ground lit
took him nearly week and the irresolution and
over caution manifest in every step he made, III
duce US TO believe that there was such On original
vice as we have tried to explain in this last field
operation of the main army Of the Allies.
AID VALOhEM DUTIES.
We have before us transcript of the valuation