New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-17

noslav maintains the communication win n.
army Of the center at Kew and covers the po.a..
Moscow.
Yekaterinoslav, az we learn from tru.t~o,,s.
sources, IL now being fortified and provided o;n
the reserve magazines for the southern sruv
Stores of food, equipments, ammunition, arc col
lected there; and if ever the Allies shoud yeatur.
to advance into the interior. they would have "a
force this point before they could proceed an,
further But esen under circumstances yery nm.
favorable 10 the Russians, tie chances are tia,
the forces Of either party would be Of least pref
H equally matched at YekateriRoslsv. Such
an Advance, however. is ont OF the question in
this campaign, and nearly so in that of 1856 10.
deed, any movement of the Allies into the interior
OF Russia would be blunder, unless the Crines
and all the countries south Of the Causasus usy.
even of the Kubsn and Terek, We're freed from
Russian dominion, al, the Russian coasts de asia
ted, lsmail taken, the mouths of the Danube up 10
Gaatch opened TO trade, and, in short, everything
done which could be attempted against the e1treuL
tiles Of Russia on that side. Then even ii would
be mistake to advance into the interior Of the
steppe, until the passive resistance CT Russia ssc-
cessfully maintained, left no other choice. II 10
evident that the probability of such an event occur
ring not very great but if the Russians are already
preparing against it, we have another proof Of that
comprehensive foresight which has of late distia
guished the chief strategcal management Of their
forces. and which apparently due to the command
ing influence of General Jomini.
For the present, the conquest of the Crimea b
still the great task of the Allies. On that head
our latest intelligence was that they had seAta
strong column Of infantry and savalry into the
valley Of the upper Chernaya, threatening to
turn, by Aitodar or the upper Belbek, the Rus-
sian extreme right GOrchakoG had telrgrsphed,
besides that the Allies were daily concentrating
additional troops on the Chernsya. Now, this
movement of the Allies toward the Russian
right has evidently been made With such de-
gree of show, the Russians themselves having
attempt at turning the Russians on that side. II
may serve either to draw away from the camp at
farm portion Of the troops defend
ing that intrcnched position, or else to masks
great expedition to Eupatoria. The first sappo-
sition har lily seems likely, from the concentration
Of the allied troops on the Chernaya, noticed ct
the same time by Gorchakofi; the second suepe
siton is more likely; AM though, as we havek
fore stated, flank movement BY tho south cont
would seem preferable such an expedition. sud
denly transporting large force ON the flank sad
rear Of the Russians cannot but be oil great eject
and must decide the campaign.
As to the actual position OF the Russians 70 the
Crimea we have no clear Information. They are
doing their best to maintain bold front and IL the
state of their stores allows it is certainly the best
they can do Still we remain of opinion that toey
must soon leave the Cdmea unless the Allies
make great mistakes and they, themselves, re-
ceiye provisions more plentifuly than they have
I. right to expect. The great object of the
Allies lie to drive them away from the position
Of Mackenzies nights, for that position once
lost, the north side of Sevastopol, defended By
q small garrison must be abandoned to its fate.
and the Crmea must be evacuated because b.
tween Mackenzie's farm and Sympheropol there 10
not q single tolerable position which cannot be
turned with the greatest ease, and beyond Syn
pheropol the steppe, being untenable for large
armies offers no positions whatever
- One thing however is certain, namely, thai
there can be little delay in the decision Of THE
question. The Atlantic, due here to-day, will most
probably bring us intelligence of battle in TIE
held which, if unfagorable to the Russians, mus
be followed by their prompt retreat from ths