New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-11-26

and marines (hvc equlpages or os' 'ahoue) NN'
fourteenth reserve civi,ioa eight reserve Sa'-
tslious). stimating these bodies at ever 30 10"
a figure we still mu-t put them down az rom u'o
thousand to seven thousand in all, 80 that the he'
numerical ipcrene will amount - about h''eeu
thousand The total Russ IN infantry ofthe line ana
crepadier. now in the CriDea c,nn's exceed cne
hundred and forty thousand men. to which per
h,pstsenty.six thousand reserves, Chorn"hor Cos
sacks. sailors, marines, militia and volunteers may
be added; the cavalry of the line may NUMBER teu
thousand. the COssack cavalry another ten th'us'
and, the artillery in all fifteen thousand max NJ
total of one hundred and sevepty'nTe thousand
men. which st rough guess We think Is the very
outside of what the Russians now have IN the
Crimea.
The Allies are Lot much superior in numbers
The fourteen division. Of French ofantry will not
muster above 100 900. their three divisions cavalry
900. their artillery etc, l2000-in all ll7.0OJ
men. The English, according to semotliclal
statements, are SO 600 strOug-feom which nun
Der the re are, however to b. deducted some 3,OOO
sick and wounded, and soue 5000 of those para
.itcal non. cOmbatans whom the British always
carry about with themselves over and above other
armies. go that their actual force cannot be put
down at more than $1,000 men. The Sardnlans
muster rather less than 10000, aod thc Turks at
Tup.toria certainly do not exceed 10000 men.
| The grand total TOR the Allies is thus about
10000 men Considering that the Russians oc-
cupy a central position while the Allies are scat
tired over three distinct positions without any
direct land commu cstion between each other
Of Fupatoria. SevastopOl and kertch-the Rus
slams are. after the arrival of the grcnaders, fully
eousl to the Allies in physical strength bit NOR
,lly they mu,t be infinitely inferior. In spite Of
this moral inferiority it is likely enough that Cor
cbakoff may risk an attack upon cupatora. The
terror caused among his troops by the loss OF
south SeVastOpol must have worn oil long since
through the ncapacity of the Allies in following
nm that success; and the arrival OF etae troops
like tn, grenadiers must have still more elated
them with renewed hopes of saccess. Bat unless
the Allies allow themselves to be caught unagares,
which with their recent cautious proceeding ls
not very likely GorcbakOf will most probably
ONLY send his grenadiers to the same fate to which
the Third and Fourth corps were sent at lnker-
mann the Second corps at The Chernaya, and the
Caucasian troops at Kars. And he will have to
mind what be does; for one More defeat. If in
Cured after an obstinate struggle, and well fol
lowed up by the victors may necessitate that dis
sstrous retreat through the steppes, of which we
have spoken on former occasions.
Before the arrival of the grenadiers, according
to the statements given above, the Allies mustered
100 eco against 100000 Russians-a far more IA
yorable proportion for active operations. The
Uer,cleatic Chersonese and the Baidar valley
could bave been held by force fully equal to
what the Russians could bring against them, while
of the surplus Of 10000 at least 10000 might have
been sent to EupatOria; that by the inactivity
Of the Allies not OILY the favorable season but even
the favorable proportion of numbers has been lost.
And as EupatOra menaced the Russian communl-
cations, every increase of the allied forces there
was sure to draw off more Russians from the front
opposite the allied main army, and thereby again
to berate fresh troops for Eupatorla, or to rem
der feasible an attack upon some point Of that
Russian front But nothing was done, and now
Winter sets ia and leaves everything to chance
and accident.
We have previously alluded to the disastrous
couseoueuces severe Winter may bring On this
large Russian army in the Cri nea, with most Of
the regiments bivouackng and short of fresood.
But it seems John Bull ia determined to give the
Russians fair play. If they have to biyOuac, his
own troops must do the same. The British army
ia expected, as matter of course to lose from
sickness proportOnate number with the Rus
si,1s. About one third of the Britons are going
IN have hut accommodations. The remainder
must look out for themselves We had BalaAlava
last winter, we may have something worse nov.
Tn the me .ntime the British army diyerts itself
from all unpleasant thoughts by getting tipsy. The
soldiers get I'D day in cash out of their pay,
then the Queens sixpence' or daily allowance
to troops before the enemy, and eight pence are
allowed for work done on the roads and the like.
This makes one shilling nine pence halfPenny
day, sum on which man can get as drunk as
fiddler in any part of her Britannia Ma ssty's do
minons but especially at Baaklaya where spirits
are as cheap as they strong, and where nothing
else beside spirits is to be bought. Consequently
the soldiers get drunk fast AID as often as they
can. Drunkenness is the rule, sobriety the excep
tion and this The London Times admits. What
the ee ct of this is upon the discipline efficiency
and health of the army, may we'll be imagined.
The officers are pOwerless. The cat niue works
day and night to no purpose. tlog British sol
der once for drunkenness, and next time he is
tipsy he will report himself and request to be put
down for another dozen. In fact, as disciplined,
organized body, the British army mS be said not