The independent press. (Abbeville C.H., S.C.) 1853-1860, 1855-02-23
sir Howard Douglass on the War.

sir Howard Douglass on the War.
Gen. Sir II. Douglass, (tI,an whom there
is no higher military authority living) in a
supplementary chapter TO the new edition
OF his work on Naval Gunncry, reviews the
whole campaign up to the present date, and
on strictly scientific principles, condemns
the operations in the Crinca:
lie says that Alma was a worthless yi,.-
tory, nay, a miscllievous one; and he slows
the Il reason why. namely namely, "in laying siege to
:c'astopol, ii may safely be asserted that
the most advantageous point of attack was
tho northern side; there the ground is most
elevated, and the large octagonal work on
its summit is its citndcl and the kew of the
place. This taken, the Telegraph and
Wasp batteries on the northern heights.
Forts Constantine and tile forts below be-
ing commanded and attacked in reverse,
must have soon fallen; while the town.
docks, and barracks on the south side of the
l';'b Dor would bc ut the mercy of the allies,
who by the fire of their batteries might
have entirely destroyed them all; whereas,
by attacking the place from the south. the
enemy holding tho northern heights, al
though the works OH the cres. of lie south
crn> heights, should b. brcached and taken,
the town the body of the place with. its
docks and arsenals, will not be tenabIe- by
the beslegers till the great work on the
northern side, and all its defensive depend
cncies shall he taken; and these no doubt
will be greatly strengthened before the allies
are IN condition to direct their attacks
against them.
The flank march of the whole army to
the south abandoned at once to the enemy
a perfectly free communication between the
place to bo besiegcI and his arms of OBJ
servatlon in the field, and left opc, their
line OF operation from :lieir base of Pere-
kop; it disclosed the alarming fact that
from want of sufficient force Sevastop.l
could not he invested on every side: ,hnt
the most advantageous point Of attack was
not to be attacked, but turned that the en-
emy's communication with the strongest
portion of the town-its citadel, its keep
and the key Of the whole position was to be
left open to him, and that, instead of be.
s'eg'ng ScvastopoI, the allied army were on
~ to attack an entrenched position on the
southern heights, supported in its rear by
the strongest feature and the most formi,la-
Ole works of the place, and open to receive
succor or achievements TO any extent; also,
that the aitark Of the place was to he car.
ried on without covering army. distinct
from the besieging f5sre, to protect it from
being disturbed in lis operations by the enc.
my in the field, who was thus left il, d.
rect communication with tete which he
might support with all his force. The flank
march of the. whole army to the south was,
therefore, an error in strategetical science.
imposed Of necessity upon Tie allied com
,nanders by want of numerical strength to
render the attack Of Sevastopol safe and
successful; and such an error ear, only be
justified by the; absolute inatilty IL the
army to fulfil the conditions on whict, the
siege Of a fortress, with large army Of Oh.
seryation in The field can, be-. successful.
sueira place need not and win not capitn.
late, attacked as it is, however successful that
attack may be: The garrison cannot be cap.
,tured since after making the most deter.
mined resistance, it may retire 10 the north.
ern heights, or It may evacunte tia pi.:ce
aitogethef, and mite i,setf With the arn'v Il.
ready in: the field. after having rendered. rI;a
town snninhatitabie, and DESTROYED ali liz
3,sarike: stores It contains g /, - IS W
|Ss.,;,5 london Examiner. "a
;SuDpsE lDEATH:1 Iiste. was : Rusaian|
on one, knee. n;tlle act osl taking aim: ma
tnrzzle sof tiiis frslock rested a. 81 fatksa
He WIS desd; ; b sofs ba hesa
had been knoc 6 otfF by canton shot
Hiss sieath VA: % sudden and Quick THAT ha
Nas not ksoc down; ana & n Ternai ih;as
pat 1 isis Ess,s st;li boxed dIfeinlS sias,