New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-12
THE NEW FRENCH COMMANDER.

Crimea did not take place moment too soon.
The morale of the army was already in very
unsatisfactory and doubtful state. After they
had been made to undergo the hardships and
dangers of an unparalleled Winter campaign,
the soldiers had been kept in something Ike or
der and good spirits by the return of Spring and
by ever-repeated promises of speedy aud glo-
rious termination of the siege. But day
after day passed away without making any pro-
eress, while the Russians actually advanced out
of their lines and constructed redoubts on the
disputed ground between the two parties. This
reused the spirit of the French soldiers, the
Zouaves mutinied, and the consequence was that
ON March 90 they were led to the butchery on
Mount Sapup. A little more bustling-it can
hardly be called activity-was then shown on
the part of the allied commanders; but there
was evidently no distinct aim, and no definite
plan was followed up consistently.
Again, the spirit of mutny among the French
was kept down by the continued saliies OF the
Russians and by the opening Of the second bonn
bardment which was-pOsitively forthe last time
to nd in the grand spectacle of the assault But
the fire went on, slackened, and slackened still
more. and at last ceased without any attempt at
an assault Then came engineering operations
slow. difficult and barren of those results which
keen up the spirits of soldiers. Soon they
get tired again of Nightly trench-fghting, where
hundreds fell to no visible purpose Again the
assault was demanded and again Canrobert had
70 make promises which he knew he could not
ui6ll Then Pelisser saved him from q renewal
of disorderly scenes by the night attack of the
1si Of NAV; it is stated that not only did Pels-
sier plan this attack, but even executeit in spite
of counter order from Csnrobert arriving the
moment the troops were put in motion. Ihs
affair is said to have revived the courage Of the
soldiers.
Meantime the reserve and the Piedmontese ar
rived. The Chersonese became crowded. The
soldiers considered that these reenforcements
enabled them to do anything. Why was nothing
done7 The expedition to Kertch was resolved
upop. and sailed. But before it had reached the
offng of that town dispatch from Paris induced
Caprobert to recall it. Raglan of course gave
in at once. Brown and Lyons, the commanders
of the British land and sea forces on this expe-
dition, besought their French colleagues to at
tack the place in dsobedence to the order; IN
yan-the expedition had to sail back, and
it is even stated that Canrobert had IN his
hurry misread the order, which was merely
conditional Now the evaporation of the
troops was no longer to be mastered. Even
the English spoke in unmlstakable terms;
the French were in a state borderiDgOn mutiny.
Accordingly there was nothing left for Canrobert
but to resign the command of an army over
which he had lost all control and influence.
The only possible successor was Pelissier. The
soldiers we're sick Of these young generals, adj
vanced to the highest honOrs in the quick hot
bed of BOnapartism. They had all the while been
camoring for leader of long standing OF the
old African sch0Ol-a man who had held re-
sponsbe command in the Algerian wars, and
held it with credit. Pelisser was almost the
only man of the sort at the command of the En-
peror; he had been sent there with the evident
intention of being, sooner or later, made the
successor of Canrobert. Whatever else his
qualifications might be, he had the confidence OF
the troops, and that is a great deal.
But he takes his command under difficult
circumstances He must act and speedily too,
before the men lose the freshness of the en-
thusiasm which the certainty of immediate
action must have inspired them with. The
assault being impossible, nothing remains but
to take the field, and that can be done
only by turning the Russian position in
the manner we have previously described.
Indeed, we find our views on this subject con-
fImed by British officer in The London Morn
ing Herald, who says that it is the general opinion
among competent men that there is no other
way to take the field with success.
There is however one very serious difficulty
in carrying out this plan. The French with all
their army have no more means of transport
than will supply 10000 men for a very short
distance from the coast. AS to the English,
their means of transport would be exhausted if
they had to supply one single division no further
off than Chorgun on the Chernaya. How then
is the field to be taken, in case Of success the
north side of Sevastopol invested, the enemy
pursued to Bakshiserai and junction effected
with Omer Pasha2 OF course the Russians will
take very good care to leave nothing but ruins
behind them, and supply of carts, horses or
camels can only be obtained after the Allies
have completely routed their enemy. We shall
see how Pelissier will extricate himself from
this difficulty.