New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-11-06
the Good Csuie through your s,pineasss or
apathy
sEYAsTOPOL.


interesting from its admission of the tremendous
Losses sustained by the Russians during the
last DAYS of the siege. On the 18th OF August
the bombsrdment began. That day they lost one
tboussnd f "a hundred men on the four following
days. four thousand: then, in fifteen days 70 the
eth Of September, eight thousand and nnaily'
from the 9Th TO the 5th, four thousand-maklng a
total of seventeen thousand five hundred huAea
and wounded during the bombardment. ALen
came the assault, and during this the Russians 1851
two thousand six hundred aud elghty'ioar hiied,
ak thousand and fifty-eight wounded one tnou'and
one hundred and eighty-fve contused' ana one
thousand seven hundred and sixty-three missing
total nearly twelve thousand men; so that the
entire loss during the last twenty.three days OF
the defense of SevastopOl amounted TO thirty tnou
sand men, to which we may add loss from SICK
ness Of about ten thousand more. Such diminu'
ton of the fighting forces on one side while on the
opposite side the losses during the bombardment
were about one fifth, or one-sixth, and during the
assault about three fourths only Of these NUMBERS
might well induce Gorchakof to give up the at
teupt TO make second Sarsgossa Of Sevastopol,
and 10 deIenc III, uouse aitci H'"'0 ~" W. WV
street.
A defense like that of saragossa might be possi'
bic during siege where the besegers had scarcely
sny mortars for vertical fire 1.-THE French soldiers
before Sarapossa knew this well enough, and asked
for mortars in 9 very clamorous manner ami where
the massiyely built houses-each fortress IN itsei
could only be attacked BY the slow process ofmn-
Ing But where the besiegiDg army is plentltully
provided with mortars of the heaviest callber, and
has no occasion to spare its ammunition, SUCH
shoE Of herosm would be completely thrown
awsv. During the last days of the siege, the Rus
ssns had from thirty thousand to forty thousand
men in the place a great number of these must
have been loca' ed within the most elective range
of the siege. batteries as an assault might De ex
pected any day, aud reserves for such acise had
to be at hand That the effect of concentric lire
upon such mass Of men concentrated on COM
psrstiyely small space, must have been sufficient
TO make the place too not for them Is quite clear
ard even if il be not correct that Gorchskoh did
intend abandoning the south side before the assault
was attempted, yet be would have been fully Jus
tilted in coming to that resolution.
Thus the effect of the bombardment is acknowl-
edged by the Russians themselves to have been
immense; and the more so, as vertical nre on tue
interior of the town and horizontal fire upon the
outer defepses were carried on simultaneously for
q considerable time Whenever in former siegcs,
q bombar5ment has decided the fall Of place, the
terror OF the non military inhabitants and the con-
fusion created thereby have been one oil the main
agents in procuring a surrender lie re at sevas-
topol for the first time, we learn to appreciate
the effect % vigorous bOmbardment upon
purely military city. At the same time, however,
il must Re acknowledged that such a bombardment
could never be carried on against large inland
fortress, where the ammunition and siege train
would have to be- transported overland. Seven
hundred guns Of the heayiest caiber, and from six
TO seven thousand tons Of ammunition (tor 80
much was consumed during the last lombard
ment aone) can never be conveyed to given spot
by mere land carriage, even with the present
railway system. Ia this respect, as in many others,
the siege of Sevastopol cannot be considered as
specimen of what might or might not be done In
ordinary sieges with the means OF destruction
available at the present time.
On the assault Usel UOICuahou uOce NV s'C
us much new information. We learn, however,
from his report, in which eighteen Russian regi-
ments are mentioned by name az having partlcl-
pated in the combat, that at least seventy-two
battalions or from thirty five thousand to forty
thousand men defended the place when the
Allies assaulted it, As we have shown in
preyious article, the allied forces actually
engaged in the assault were scarcely su-
perior in numbers, although Prince Gorchakof
actuslly has the impudence to maintain that the
salient angle Of the Maakoff alone was attacked by
thirty thousand men at once A glance at any pass
able plan of Sevastopol will show that the front OF
attack was about as long as the front OF defense,
as is generally the case and how five French
divisions lin reality there was but one, with another
in reserye) could contrve simultaneously to attack
position for the defense of which GOrchakOf
had thought one single Russian regimen: (the
Praga infantry to be quite sufficient we have yet
to learn. The manner in which the Nalakof was
lost by the Russians is altogether hushed up IN
this report but when we compare 1t with Pehs-
sier's and Nels dispatches We come to the con-
clusion that this key of the whole fortress was
indeed very much neglected by the Russians who
thought the four weak battailons OF the Praga
regiment sufficient to hold it, while the regiment
of Ladoga, its nearest support, was far too weak
10 recover that commanding position after the
French division Of MacMahOn Lad once surprised
and taken it, Both on the right and left of the
MslakoA enormous masses Of Russian troops were
&C. han I'D