The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-09-20


with each other would be coming in constant
collislon. The inferior Courts would revise all
the decisions of the Judges placed over and
above them. A party unwilling to be tried in
this Court need only defy our authority, and if
we commit him, take out his ha6eas corpus be-
tore an associate Judge of his own choosing,
and II that Judge is of opinion that we ought
not 10 try HIM, there is an end of the case.
Tins doctrine is so plainly against the reason
OF the thing, that it would be wonderful indeed
II any authority for it could be found in the
books, except the overruled decision of Mr.. JUS
tlce Spencer, of New York, already referred to,
aud some efforts of the same kind to control
the other Courts, made by Sir Edward Cole, in
the Kings Bench, which are now universally
admitted to have been illegal, as well as rude
and Incorporate. On the other hand, we have
all the English Judges, and all our own, declar-
ing their power to interfere with or control
one another in this way. | will content myself
by simply referring to some of the books in
which 1t IS established that the conviction of
contempt Is separate proceeding, and is con-
elusive OF every fact which might have been
urged on the trial for contempt, and, among
others, want of jurisdiction to try the cause
IN which the contempt was committed. The
opinion of Oh. j. Kent, PIP. 370-375; Johns.
r., 325, ct seq; Johns, SOB; 9 Johns, 423
| Hill, 10; Iredell, 1879; ib., 1873; 2 Sandf.,
IA; Carter, 164; l Blackf, l66; % Miss,
1856; Wheeler's Criminal Gases, p. /; IA AID.
and Ellis, 55S. These cases will speak for
themselves, but | may remark, as to the last
one, that the very same objection was made
there and here. The party was convicted of
| contempt in not obeying decree. He claimed
his discharge on habeas corpus, because the
Chancellor had no jurisdiction to make the de-
cree, being interested in the cause himself.
But the Court of Queens Bench held, that if
that was a defence, it should have been made
on the trial for contempt, and the conviction
was conclusive. We cannot choose but hold
the same rule here. Any other would be a vi
olation of the law which is established and sus-
tanned by all authority and all reason.
But certainly the want of jurisdiction alleged
in this case would not even have been defence
on the trial. The proposition, that Court is
powerless to punish for uiSorderly conduct, or
disobedience of its process in q case which it
ought utterly to dismiss for want of urisdic-
ton, is not only unsupported by judicial au-
thority, but we think it is new an argu-
ment at the bar. We ourselves have heard
many cases through and through before we
became convinced that it was our duty to remit
the parties to another tribunal. But we never
thought that our process could be de6ed in
such cases more than in others.
There are some proceedings in which the
want of jurisdiction would be seen at the first
blush; but there are others in which the Court
must inquire into all the facts before it can
possibly know whether it has jurisdiction or
not. Any one who obstructs or battles iu-
dcial investigation for that purpose is unques-
tionably guilty of a crime for which he may and
ought to be tried, convicted, and punished.
Suppose local action to be brought in the
wrong county; this is defence to the action,
but defence which must be made out like any
other While II &c pap6ipp pai+Ior q
an officer, nor any other person, can safely in
suit the Court, or resist its order. The Court
may not have power to decide upon the merits
| of the case, but it has undoubted power to try
whether the wrong was done within its iurisdic-
| ton or not. Suppose Mr.. Williamson to be
| called before the Circuit Court of the United
| States, as witness, III trial for murder, al
| legged to be committed on the high seas. Can
he refuse to be sworn, and, at his trial for
tempt, justify himself on the ground that the
murder in fact committed within the limits
of State, and therefore triable only in State
| Court? If he can, he can Justify perjury for
the same reason. But such defence for either
crime has never been heard Of since the begin
ming of the world much less can it be shown,
after conviction, as u ground for declaring the
sentence void.
The writ of which the petitioner is convicted
of disObeying, was legal on its face 1t enj DIN
ed upon him simple duty, which he ought to
have understood and performed without hesita-
ton. That he did not do so is fact conclu-
sively established by the ad Indication which the
Court made upon it. | say the writ was legal,
because the act of Congress gives to all Courts
of the United States the power to issue writs
OF ha6eaS corpus, when necessary for the exer-
else of their jurisdiction, and agreeable to the
| principles and usages Of law" Chief Justice
| Marshall decided, in Bu,T's trial, that the
! principles and usages referred to in this act
were those of the common law. a part of the
jurisdiction of the District Court consists in
storing fugitive slaves and the haJeas corpus
may be used in aid of it when necessary. 1t
was awarded here upon the application of
| person who complained that his slaves were de-
tanned from him. Unless they were fugitive
slaves, they could not be slaves at all, according
to the petitioners own doctrine; and ifhte Judge
took thGt cielo Of the subject, he was bound to
award the writ 1T the persons mentioned on it
had turned out, on the hearing, to be fugitives
from labor, the duty of the District Judge to re-
store them, or his power to bring them before
him on h06eGS corpus, would have been dis
| puted by none except the very few who think
that the Constitution and law on that subject
ought not to be obeyed. The duty of the Court
to inquire into the facts on which its iurisdic-
| ton depends is as plain as its duty not to ex-
coed it when it is ascertained. But Mr.. William
son stopped the investigation IN limine; and
the consequence is, that everything in the case
remains unsettled, whether the persons named
| IN the writ were slaves or free.
| Whether Mr.. Wheeler was the owner of
| them-whether they were unlawfnlly taken from
| hlm-whether the Court had jurisdiction to
| restore them-all these points are left open,
| tor want OF proper return. 1t is not our bust
| ness to say how they ought to be decided but
| We do not doubt that the learned and upright
magistrate who presides in the District Court
would have decided them as rightly as any
| Judge in all the country. Mr. Williamson had
no right TO arrest the inquiry, because he sup
| posed that an error would be committed on the
/ question Of jurisdiction, or any other question
If the assertions which his counsel now make
on the law and the facts be correct he pre-
vented an adjudication in favor of his prote-
| ges, and thus did them a wrong, which is prob
| ably greater offence in his own eyes than any
thing he could do against Mr.. Wheeler's rights.
| There is no reason to believe that any trouble
whatever would have come out of the case, if
he had made true, full, and special return of
all the facts; for then the rights of all parties,
black and white, could have been settled, or
| the matter dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
| if the law so required.
1t is argued that the Court had no iurisdic-
ton, because 1t was not averred that the slaves
were fugitives, but merely that they owed SER
| vice to the laws of Virginia. Conceding, for
the arguments sake, that this was the only
|. ground on which the Court could have inter
| fered-conceding also that it is not substan-
italy alleged in the petition of Mr.. Wheeler
the proceeding was, nevertheless, not void for
| that reason. The Federal tribunals. though
Cnurts of limited Jurisdiction ora ,,o+ IA c,.;o.