New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-08

vance from Balakiavs, the best thing for then
would be to transfer (as they wero some time
since reported to have done, day or two be-
fore the actual attack, some %, 900 Turks to NE
Chersoncse, where they would be worth twice
their number in Eupatoris. Tli1 would allow
them to attack the Russians with nssrly 10000
men, including about 6, 900 cavalry. to which
force the Russians could oppose about 5000 o.
1900 infantry (ncluding 1900 to 10000 men
from the garrison Of the north side) and 10000
cavalry. But as soon az the turning corps
should begin to tell upon the lefs flank and rear
of the Russians, the force to DO opposed to It
would be comparatively weak, as tho drafts
from the north side could not expose themselves
to be cut of from their intrenched camp around
the citadel; and therefore the Allies, being en-
abled to employ the whole Of their svaJabls
field-army wherever they like, woald have .
great superiority. In this case then they
might with certainty count upon success; bat
if they attack the Russians single-h snded, and
the numerical proportions Of both armies ~
stated by the most Trustworthy authorities be
correct, they stand but little chance. Their
thanking corps would be too weak, and might DO
entirely neglected by the Russians. who By
bold sally from their lines could drive the weak
ened Allies down the procpices into the Cher
maya.
Another movement on the part Of the Allies
has been suggested-an immediate assault on
the south side of SevsstopJl. We are oven
told that peremptory order to undertake this
assault had been telegraphed from Paris, and
that Canrobert resigned because he did not
feel warranted in executing movement which
in his opinion would imply loss of 10000 msa-
Now, from what we have seen of the military no
tons of Louis Bonaparte as displayed in hts in
terforence with the present campaign, 1t IL nss
at all incredible that such an order should have
been given But what is less probable Is that
even reckless sabrer like Pelissier should lend
himself to execute such an order. The lsst
month must have given the French soldiers
pretty good idea of what the resistance is like
which they are to meet with on storming. And
an operation which cannot BIO carried out with
out the loss of some 10000 men-above one
third of the whole army available for the assault
has certainly very few favorable chances Of
success. Pclissier may eagerly wish to pick up
the Marshals baton which has slipped from the
hands of Canrobert, but we very much doubt
whether no is enough of Bonapartist to stake
his fortune and reputation against such odds.
For supposing even that the assault was sus-
cessful; that not only the first line Of defense
but also the second line was taken; that even
tho barricades, crenellatod houses and defensive
barracks forbidding the approach to the shore
forts--that these shore forts too were carried
and the whole of the south side in tho hands Of
the Allies, at loss we will say of only $4,000
to a Russian loss of 20,000-what then1 The
Allies would have lost 10000 men more than
the Russians, tho place would instantly have
to be abandoned; and tho campaign In the field
would become even more difficult than before.
Bat there is one fact which at once prscludes
the idea of an immediate general assault. From
some half.offcisl reports we were induced In .
former article on the siege to admit, merely for
arguments sake, that the Russians had boon
driven out Of their new ontworks in front Of the
place. We stated at the same time that Wa had
every reason to doubt the correctness Of such
reports, as any such advantage gained would
have been loudly and distinctly announced BY
The Allies. Now We are indeed positively In
formed by che Russians that the Kamtsohstka
(rhe Mamelon), selenghinsk and VOlyosk re-
doubts are still in their possession, while evil
deDce from the allied camp not only goes to
confirm this, but also acknowledges that further
outworks have been thrown up by tho besieged.
Thus the advantage gained by the Allies in push
ing their advanced approaches nearer to the
fortress has been fully made up for by the ooun-
ter-approaches of the Russians, and tho line
where both parties can meet each other in equal
strength is very distant yet from the main ditch.
Now, an assault becomes advisable only when
the line, where the force Of the attack for COM
mon siege operations is equal to that Of the de-
Tense, lies in the main ditch itself; otherwise
it is clear that the storming columns would be
broken down and shattered before they could
reach the top of the breastwork. Thus as long
as the Russians cannot be driven back across
the main ditch, it will be impossible to assault
the man rampant situated behind this main
ditch. As to carrying the second line con-
structed behind that ditch, it is entirely out
of the question at the present time.
There may be a chance for partial assaults
on the left or town side from the Quarantine
to the Flagstaff Bastion where the main French
attack is carried ON. But here the policy Of tho
French Government keeps US in utter darkness
as to the extent and strength of the Russian out
works, and the recent Russian dispatches, oflste