Washington sentinel., 1855-03-09
masbingtmn Sentinel.
OsTEND CONFERENCE.

OSTEND CONFEhENSE.
We continue to-day the papers relating to tie
Ostend Conference, from the point at which
orr space compelled us 10 break of yesterday:
M. Marcy 10 Mr.. Sole.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, November l3, 1854.
SIR: The communication of the 18th ultimo,
the views of yourself, Mr.. Buchan''
an, and Mr.. Mason, upon our embarrassing re-
lations with Spain, has been received and sub
mitted to the President. He has given. to that
document the deliberate consideration due
alike to the Importance of the subject therein
discussed and to the experience, wisdom, and
ability of those whose opinions and sugges'
tions it contains. When he first entered upon
the duties of his present station he found our
intercourse with Spain much disturbed by the
conduct of the Spanish authorities at Cuba. 1t
has been his anxious desire and the object OF
his strenuous efforts to preserve peace and re
store cordial good will between that country
and the United States. The source of our past
difficulties with Spain, and of our apprehen,
sions of future danger, is clearly disclosed in
the report of yourself and associates. The
measure therein presented-the purchase Of
Cuba-is probably the only one which would
with certainty place the relations of the two
countries on the sure basis Of enduring friend,
ship.
While the Island Of Cuba remains depend
ency Of Spain, and the character of her rule
over it is not changed, land change for the
better can hardly be anticipated,) annoyances
to our trade and difficulties between our citi-
zens and the local authorities will be of fire.
quent occurrence; and it is scarcely reason
able to expect that peace thus rendered pre-
carious will remain long unbroken.
Conceiving that the transfer of Cuba to the
United States on the honorable conditions you
have been instructed to offer would be as i'm
portant to her as to them, it was hoped that
you would find her Catholic Majesty's Govern
inent disposed to receive and discuss propo
sition for that purpose. The President de-
sires you to keep this important object of your
mission in view, and to enter upon negotiations
in relation to it whenever a favorable opportu-
nifty occurs. 1t is no longer, believe, a secret
in Spain that the United States wish to obtain
the cession, and that you have authority to
treat on the subject. The knowledge of these
facts will be likely to elicit opinions in regard
TO that measure, not only from the Ministers OF
her Catholic Majesty's Government, but from
other influential individuals Of the nation. The
Cortes will soon assemble, and that subject
will undoubtedly be discussed by the members
Of that body in their social circles, if il does
not become subject of public deliberation.
By free and friendly intercourse among off.
cial and influential men, you will be enabled
TO determine the proper course to be pursued in
regard to opening a negotiation for the acqui-
sition of Cuba. Should you find persons of po.
sition or influence disposed to converse on the
subject the considerations in favor Of cession
are so many and so strong that those who can
be brought to listen would very likely become
converts to the measure but should you have
reason to believe that the men in power are
averse to entertaining such proposition, that
the offer Of it would be offensive to the national
pride OF Spain, and that it would find no favor
in any considerable class the people, then it
will be but too evident that the time for open
ing or attempting to open such negotiation
has not arrived. 1t appears TO the President
that nothing could be gained and something
might be lost By an attempt 20 push on ne
gotiation against such general resistance
This view OF the case is taken on the suppos-
tion that you shall have become convinced that
proposition for the cession Of Cuba would
certainly be rejected.
The language of some part Of the report
might, perhaps, be SO construed as to sustain
the inference that you and your associates in
the conference were Of opinion that the propo.
sition should be made though there should be
no chance of its being entertained, and that il
should be accompanied with the open declara-
tion or q significant suggestion that.the United
States were determined TO have the Island, and
would obtain it by other means if their present
advances, so advantageous to Spain, be refused
by her. But other parts Of the report repel
this inference. The remark in that document
.Ln oIo l. II
the United States, then "the question will
arise, What ought to be the course of the Ame-
rican government under such circumstances?
clearly shows that it was not intended by your.
self and colleagues to recommend to the Presi-
dent to offer TO Spain the alternative of cession
or seizure. The conclusion that the members
Of the conference were against such an alter.
native proposition is also drawn from the fol.
lowing passage: "After we shall have offered
Spain price for Cuba far beyond its present
value, and this shall have been refused, it will
then be time to consider the question, Does
Cuba in the possession of Spain seriously eli
danger our internal peace and the existence OF
our cherished Union2r
The President concurs in this view Of the
subject But to conclude that on the rejection
of proposition 10 cede seizure should ensue
would be TO assume that selfpreservation ne
cesstates the acquisition Of Cuba by the United
States; that Spain has refused, and will per.
sist in refusing, our reclamations for injuries
and wrongs inflicted, and that she will make
no arrangement for our future security against
the recurrence Of similar injuries and wrongs.
As TO the first consideration, j will only re.
mark that the acquisition OF Cuba by the Uni.
ted States would be pre-eminently advantage.
ous in itself, and Of the highest importance as
u precautionary measure Of security. However
much we might regret the want of success in
our efforts to obtain the cession oft, that failure
would not, without a material change in the
condition Of the island, involve imminent peril
TO the existence of our Government. But
should the contingency suggested in your re-
port ever arise, there is no reason to doubt that
the case will be promptly met by the deliberate
judgment and decisive action Of the American
people.
In relation TO outrages and injuries, this Coy.
ernment have good grounds to complain Of the
course hitherto pursued by Spain, and, should
that course be persisted in, it would be justified
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