Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1855-10-05

Cubas To Spain would not compensate for tie loss
! ;hrM profitable trnde with the Western world. Th.
| deprivation Of our markets and supplies would be
NOR. Formidable enemy 10 Thrones than the best dis
cIplI"cd and most numerous armies Our present
crap is not only essential 10 their wellbeng, but e
their very existence. If ihcy have cause tn be thank
n! t." :hc Almighty for blessing more than ano
tier, il; Is that. lie created All America for their bcnr
it, when their fields ceased to yield all abundance ant
| their Srannrlcs were empty.
! KOSSUTH On THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL
| The following letter from Kossuth, to the y. Y
Times, discusses with ability the probable influence
the cupture Of Scbasopol likely to have either on
negotiations for peace the further prosecution
Of tho war. His views seem reasonable, and are
iorcibly put:
| As 10 the prospects OF pencc-it is my decided
opinion that hrse rather lessnned than otherwise
by the fall of the S,uh "t Srbas0poi. In an nbso.
lutte point Of view never did nor do attach any con.
! Siderable Importance 10 this enterprise. | Away
Thought and think that il was a great mistake TO
chouse that point for attack Oh Russia, the pro-
tc-ard object Of which is 10 secure Europe from her
political prepondcraEce have often expressed the
opinion that nothing :" be achieved i'll that quarter
can either break Ra>sas power of resistance or bring
| her 10 satisfactory terms. Destruction uf SebGsto-
pol, and of the Russian Black Sea fleet j., in my
! opinion, nothing la, IN insult, that does not tax
! away strengths; il is duubiy when remember
that the siege n Snbasopo! undertaken, coupled
with the pledge solcnly given 10 Austria thai under
no circumstances ia the territorial extension -! th"
Russian Empire To be impaired. The word vas the
first 20 advance Inns almost become vcrmacular that,
with policy pledged n ma;ain the integrity " the
Russian Empire, fortress and iicct destroyed,
~ bat n fortress and fleet to hn built up
again stronger than ever III Il few years.
The case wnu.d tc somewhat different had the
nrl powers Tie intention 10 keep the Crimea. Bu;
on the hand, until now at least, this intention they
i.l not: tho other hand the Criica - no barrier
that defends, il is an acquisition that requires de!ece
and, make good this defence, one ot two things Is
Indispensable the maintenance of very large
standing army in the CrnIea or else the pushing
back Of Russin entirely from the Black Sen, conse
qucnily from the Immediate neighborhood Of the Cri-
,ncr. Without either the or the other nf these
alternatives, soor the Allies would march ont,
Russia would march in a.Lin. The first alternative
implies the condition Ui an armed peace To the cost
nt rhch ucher England nor France won! choose
tn subm; in IN" long run; besides, Il imp"s the tor
tIo,.s question, Who il il that will undertake the
clnrsc! England anL France together! That sup
poses the Incredible circumstance Of Il perpetual 60
tair c0cddic between them. No man Il 40 foolish a.
tn build his hou-.. such loose sa, England aloGe'
France would not agree Ia il. France alone, Eng
intd would object to it. Turkey alone! would think
| for lc ruinoIs gift Turkey assisted by the hllies!
| would suppose these Allie. always allies: and woah!
imp!y besides, th. opening al the Dardanci!cs, and
ot III" Bosplioru,-rquivacnt 10 M overthrow "i the
|
| llai rr pishng hack Russia from the Black Sea-,
implies, in its turn, the nrrcSs: ot an independent
Crra-,ia, nnd of Daco- Roumain State with Bes-
sarabia aui the Territory of OcZakON up to Chers"i
combination which wond be absolute nonsense with
out the fall reconstruction of Poland init anc"nteI
tcn-a thing beyond the limits Of the determination NJ
the Allies.
A. all events, Of tw" things, one, either the Allies
make n campaign in Poland, ~ they max" not III me
tr, case ,hry ought To have done II without sa"r
b,n MI th.ir
about four thousand five hundred millions oi fraacs
under town, the capture Of which would have been
an easy work by u secondary diversion had II but
been defended by garrison instead OF the principhl
army ui Russia, ~ with Polish campaign the cast
! would have bceu uudoub;cdiy;-on the other hnnd,
il the HES don't ~ make Puils! campaign.
they cannot think ui keeping. the trimca; anu II me-
don't keep the CrInea then indeed the fortress and
the fleet destroyed there is but fortress and hect T."
be built up again. With great power like Russia II
is but an nsu, that does not take away strength -
hpdeG eG ether et e'JsumSE"Gs'' M It msh nave
or not 10 resent that insult; but under the clrcun-
stances such as they are, tn resent II To the nnosl Is
um imperative necessity for tho Car Seb"s,"p"i ~
the field on which the concnlIng parties have niea,
-ur,i their power for venr The eyes "! the world
of A,n esrrciay--lIavc been rvr,ed on that spot
rh. ony.prntrartcl struggle there identified the pres
iigc ul the Cars invincbty With the name o Sc
bastopnI. Scbesopul allen shakes that prestige 10
its very foundations the Car submitting I'D tha' il
1
IN, personal nclnatons OF Car Alexander Ia dfho"'
mare Young man he IT, are told he has no choice
he would not live one week ii he dared to sign the
ruin of the prestige of Rus1in's power lie cannot
sue for peace; he cannot accept any c"nutiohs-"erc
even some offered him-uHdcr this pressure he mls'
tgh until either the strength of h:s empire ho bro
ken or the prestige Of his power redr'"s"i
That the Crimean enterprise has been dreadful
mistake was all the while 40 evident that the aied
Governments (vou remcmbcrl were obliged to pleai
ipu ar
thi. excuse was of nature Illuminating that Lore
palmcrston himself under the obGalioh o! pleel-
nc something else besides lie, therefore, nlwayH m
sisted cnphaticaIIy nn the fact that nj Aco"st"pol Is
the KEY nf Russns prcpondrrance-thcr' IA the seat
nf ,lniircr-;ha key taken that danger renovei-th'
object nf the war is accomplished, AMI the war -
virtually brought 10 al end. ] always maintained
the contrary opinio said the taking OF Senast"p"l
decides nothing, solves no question: ana brings no.
thing To M end Quite the reverse. Success NJ Sc
hastopo will make peace mp"ssiblc-wl rhther IN
augurate n real and proractcd war. lnnt VIII oe
the vcrtable beginning Of the war, but not the De-
| ginning Of the end. -,
The moment has come TO know which OF us hns
been right in the estimation ni the nature of evcntt
suv the fall at the South Of Scbasopol put speedy
termination of the war entirely ont OF the question:
What then, is next 10 come In my, opinion tor
the next Winter the campaign will probably be re-
sricted to the Crmeu and next yenr 1t VIII sun con-
tnue there: while on the other hand the naval opc
rations in the Baltic will be resumed with augmented
forces and on n more effective scale. lhese opcr"
tom. being at thi, advanced scason outothc question
| for the time being, only the crime" Tc'hahT' "rn
H. to the Crimen. two circumstances must be borne
in mind The first is this that tine north sdc Oh H
bnstvpol with Scvcrnaya ai. its thousand guns S '
vet 80 much ~ invested or b"si"Scd. Inc SecohI ~
! thnt th. souih OF Srbns;"pn Is DESTROYED Du'
| 49,, ,;o army that dcfrn,rd il. Hence tile double
nrphI,,n for tie allirs-;O take the iortrcsS' '''
10 overcome the army. Ii tho RUSSIANS "e',
such fools as to crow'l their army III ",I'
around lhe norlh of Scbnstopu, tie task "i Inc Al
! I;os wu,d be ea-i.r, aud in Gaze -; Success would
yi.I ricbc- results. By investing the fortress, ;h"y
| would become the masters at the lne ni commune
,u;ion ni :hs Russi"us-tic only ON. that Is hit -
;h.,,-- the line uC Pench"i. III -ucm case '!Ie Tor
tr.s- rncr taken, the army Ini I" ca!h:uiaic. Du'
.urh u f,v on the part uf the Russ!Gns IL out o fhe
! uu.st;nn nf cour,e. They will leave proper gar
ri-ou to ,clc. the fortress: and take statd WIZ
their man power outsiie somewhere anout Siphcr"
,ul NJ Nil events ~ IL have thrr line "' c"ih'H
! nirntion Open and secured. IL the 'll!tr re'T'
themselves tu regular siege OF the north % HtDa'
,nuI ,h ,n.k j. not an r,..y one; because II Will b.
Iitiicrlt for them now. ~ establish new basis I"
npcration, and with the old hn-i' oi BH'nH'aVa aIt
| kamichcs the north of Scba-t"pol cna ec:Tceiy bt
properly invested. A. MI e'e's' IL thry 40 'Aat
nv on their flank and ihr Russians in their turE
will hnrra.s them in their r.;-c operations. lE!hS
are likely 10 have 4 lung rum III thnt case. II oI
the contrary the Allies, leaving proper i"rc'
in III" proper place. nent S"o"s'op"I oLn" ',e il',.
nrrv nf tho enemy To the Interior provded they mr.
we'll enough provided with the me"Is Of transport
ijn i ,;e Russian. think themselves capable OF ne
ceptimr pitched battle, well, they will tSni; It NOT
thav will decline the battle anu retreat towards frrc
! tn,, Th;ng. NAV again have long run. But sbou.o
thr AIlia. I-avng n proper force in their ort'H"'
canp. shift their basis Of operation rapidly and trans
Sr their main force TO Eupatora the conlitI"n of tn
I;ussnns would become rather difficult. lhey AZ once
have. to abandon nil The positions tnsy may i'o ~
| ,L - ,I. pt.ro- md AZ. forced 10 retreat. HE
most desperate would become their situation ~ ca''
the Allies should decide IN taking Odessa. M,"i"
y.w Chcrsou then the lines ot P"r.k"p, would M
longer be of nay avail 10 the Rn.s'nn'. "n'h
.h... alternative, the Allie will decade upon, L.
,nnr.e cnnuo anticipate. |, is also due to owm, tha
the choce much mnyl-pend on local nnh Typographical
circumstances; ron- water. Transports &c'i l. there
fore, do not pretend TO ausur more than So MUCH ina
| - -. -. ..t lin, l'rim.ln cnmnnign IL likely