Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1855-10-02

Z" NoTEs ON THE PRESENT OCCUPATION OF
ALLIED ARMY.--Fr0Da the Pen of Colonel 50.
Aage.-It has been asked if Sevastopol is
tenable so long as the Russians remain mas
tiers of all the forts on the north side which
line the sea in front of the town. Undoubt-
eddy it may be held in spite of this
We received balls and bombs in our roofess
trenches, sheltered merely by parapets thrown
up in haste under the fire even of grape and
musketry, and we did not on that account
abandon the trenches. In Sevastopol we
shall be sheltered from the balls by the walls
of the houses, indeed of several houses at
once. No fire of grape or musketry need be
feared at the distance the enemy is now-I200
to 1400 yards. As for the bombs, we may
screen ourselves from them as the Russians
Themselves did against ours, by constructing
strong hurdles, with earth upon them. We
cannot want the materials, since the Russians
had not time to burn and destroy everything
in this great city. 1t is true that the occupa-
ton of the North by the Russians prevents
our entering the roadside and the port. Yet,
what need have we of them when we already
possess the excellent harbors Of Cape Cherso-
neses Have not our fleets already passed
the winter without mourning any danger in
these waters 1t has also been ask ed If the
allies will have to undertake now, or later,
the siege of the north side. There appears
no absolute necessity for SC doing; that would
be binding ourselves down again to labors as
slow and painful as those which have occu-
pied us so long, and cost us so many efforts,
SO many men, and so much money. The kew
to those forts is in fact victory over the Rus.
SLAMS in the Crimea then they would fall of
themselves, seeing that they must be Instant
ly abandoned, or if the Russians choose to
retain them still, blockade and famine will
compel them to surrender, and this is hui
initiation that Russias pride breads more than
all the rest.
The forts of the north side can consequent
ly neither prevent our occupation of Sevasto-
pol, nor can they thwart our operations in the
interior of the Crimea, ON account Of their
eccentric situation. We should not be sur
prised at their being blown up so soon as the
Russian army Is compelled to retreat from the
neighborhood of Seyastopol. The respective
position Of the two armies remains the same,
and will do so until one Of the two shall take
the initiative of movement that will force
the other to man9uvre in its turn. For the
present, the allied army holds its strong posi-
ton until the occupation Of the town shall
have been properly arranged, and its chief de-
fences thoroughly repaired 1t does not APP
pear to have anything else at present to do
The Russian army, for its part, occupies the
excellent positions Of Mackenzies, strongly
intrenched and lined with redoubts like our
own. On both sides the capability exists in
receiving the attack with chances tolerably
equal Of serious resistance and success, and
with equal risk Of losing great many men,
The Russians will probably continue in OBJ.
seryation before us within their strong posi-
tons until the allied army gives signs OF some
movement. But what will that movement
bef Shall we venture to attack in front tho
Mackenzie heights, where the road from SIM.
pheropol winds alongi Shall we penetrate
into the heart Of the Crimea by another routei
If so, by what route, and where All these
are premature questions. Let us avoid trac.
ing out imaginary plans Of campaign. Rather
lot as permit time to develop the events or
II our Imagination must needs outstrip facts,
the field OF conjecture is OPEN Paris De5ats.
assault on TIE MaIakoG.-Par Sept. H.
The Frankfort Journal states that n officers
and 600 men were taken prisoners at the
storming Of the Malakoff.
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