Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1855-10-06

have been made for this emergen-
cy. His centre covers the Bclbek, and is pro-
tecied in front by the feld-works thrown up a
long the ridge Of lnkermann. His let wing
consists Of LIPRANDI's corps, occupying the
ground from Mackenzie's Farm to the heights
of Aitodor on the Bakshiseral road. No at
tempt was made by the relieving army under
LlPRANDI TO effect q diversion during the assault
on the 8th and the severe defeat Of the 10th
August, appears to have satisfied the enemy that
The lines Of The Tehcrnayd mere not 10 be carried
But the result Of the general assault and the oc-
upation Of the southern side by the Allies en-
iirely changes the strategical positions Of the
combaian,s, and also the objects Of the campaign.
The struggle for the possession Of Sebdstopoi is
al an end. That prize is in our hands, and, as
the defence of the fortress and the harbor was
the grand object Of the Russians, they have
nothing ieit on that spot TO contend for. The
mere occupation Of the North side Of tho port is
barren advantage, for, though il might hold
garrison, it cannot shelter defeated army and
it is obvious that, afler the failure Of the main
object, all the ability and generalshp of the
Russians will be required to save the whole
body of their forces in the Crmea from desiruc-
tion. We therefore infer that the Northern
forts pW either b. held for time by limited
garrison, or NOR probably, altogether abandoned
IN The hope Of SAVING The army. Never was an
army in more critical position. They are con-
fined within peninsula which affords them no
other fortified position, no susienance for the
troops and no water beyond certain line.-
The sea, covered with hostile vessels, surrounds
three sides Of this theatre Of war, and the fourth
is separated from the Russian base of opera
lions by steppes and marshes. The allied ar
mics already occupy strong positions at Eupaio-
ria and Yenikale, which can be reinforced in a
few hours by sea, so as TO threaten the Russians
in their flank and rear; and while il is impos-
sible for the enemy to hold his ground in the
South Of the Crimea-for which, indeed, there
is now no further object-io retreat in this sea-
son across the country is a formidable undertake
ing, while the loss Of battle in the open field
would he absolute destruction. The Russians
are in trap, from which the Tchongar road
and the Isthums Of Perekop are the only means
Of escape, and even then their communications
may possibly be intercepted.
No doubt, all these contingencies have been
foreseen Prince GoRTscHAKoFF's plan ofcam-
paign has long since been made judging, there
fore, from The accustomed tactics of the Russian
army, as well as from the extreme difficulty Of
his present position, we incline TO the opinion
that he will adopt the course Of general and
immediate retreat To hold the Crimea with
out Sebas,opol, and even after the harbor Of
Sebastopol itself has been transformed by con-
quest into the base Of operations Of the invading
armies, would be booiess and Improbable
task, and the danger is greatly aggravated by
the fact that the whole body of the Allies,
with unlimited means Of naval transport at their
command, will shortly be at liberty TO advance
upon any part OF the peninsula which, is Access
sible from the coast. These immediate conse-
quences Of their own success in the seige ope-
raiions must have been considered by the Allied
Generals, and the moment is now arrived when
they may proceed 10 open the campaign Of phich
The reduction Of Sebdsiopoi 1as the first preliD,-
mary. That field operations Of this nature have
long been contemplated by The Allied Governments
is obvious from the large cavalry force they
have continued to send to the Crimea. The
British army alone can bring upwards of 5000
sabres and lances into the field, and the French
cavalry /. s,;l moro nurno,o,s and ;r,n,,;on, or
,ho ;n3c,;on 20 ,yhioL !, b,s h;,ho,,o Loa,, o,,,
Damned IT,ho,,o ,ho ooo,os, 4, ,ho -,
h,. Noon oonsnod !, ono s;noIo NJ, al ,s;,L
,bo ovcer,;on or ,ho oc,;on ac ,ba oo,h 81 san,
on The AIr, ,nd ,ho al, ,,,,,o,, - p.I.tI...
!, has hoon ,,,r ,yi,hou, s;nOlo ,,,,;oaI r,,,,o'
mem, General p,t,ss,sp has shawn in our
humble on;n;on very od,,i,.hIe ,D;I;,,rv mali
dos since bo ,.s,n,od Tho cor,,n,n1 ,nJ bo La.
been ahlv SUMMARIZED bv General S,ypsoS. Inn,
Tho nrssent state or On, ,G,;rs d,,crre, \, coU
f,r,L oJ;6,;c, oc ,,;u 6;ob,r ,,,y nor, l,,;,,
order Tho Rnss;,n ,rnv IN ,ho cr;oo. i.
nr,hahlv NO, s,or;or q, ~ e.. ,c a.. .II;a.
in numbers and !, IL ;mno,sur,blv ;oC.r;or 90
them in resources and sunnIies. as we'll a. in
those moral qualities which a, once constitute
and enhance The pye,t;ee of victory On every
occasion on which thew have encopn,e,e5
an enemy in this war-whe,ber Turks
French. English or Sardinians-,6e for,,,n,
or ,ear ho, deserted he Ry,g;on ,ooJcs -
For them 10 advance Is imnossible far tho
whole coas, ia ouardod bv ,bs enemy and No
%: -, nv,