New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-03-17

British Engineers. the IN AKIN is quite worthy OF
the Engineers Of the French Lever Empire.
Give them 9 regular Vauban front to attack. aud
they may msnsge to carry it; but anything out Of
the way. though offering points of glazing weak
ness, will not do for them. It is not th.t the
French Engineer Corps does not count IN any first.
rate offcers on the contrary, it is, perhaps, the
fr,t in the world. But professional merit has
nothing ts do with appointment to commands In
the age of Louis Bonaparte, Saint Arnaud. Mag
nan, Persgny, Fould & Co.
I.may be said, the difficulties presented by the
rocky ground were so great as to prevent the
Allies from erecting batteries on the most COM
maDding points. But the ground inside the to- n
! is a. rocky 90 outside and yet the Russians have
managed on far smaller space, and with ue-
ceseity for deal of de6ladlng and traverse work,
to erect batteries which compel the admiration
! Of the besiegers themselves. Besides, have the
French already forgotten how the Prussans, in
couple of days, and on ground at least quite az
rocky, took Meziere from them by ssnd-bag bat
teries And is not the railway now constructing
a hasrsnt contradiction to all such statements
But the engineering department is not alone to
blame. The general conduct Of the operations
has been nOwise better; and We shall heuceforth
have to put down Canrobert well as Raglan as
pure mediocrity in generalsbp. There is now
no denying that those who, on the first
appearance of the Allies on the lights above Sc.
vsstopol on the 2Sth September, pronounced for
an immediate assault of the incomplete aud badly
armed works, have been fully justified by the
event. At that time, the Allies could have
brought some IS, OOO infantry to the assault; they
were in the frat flush of victory; they found the
Russians surprised, shaken, unprepared; hardly
more than l5 600 infantry could be opposed by the
beseged, and what is more one single successful
rush would have carried the place. Under such
circumstances, We, too, are of opinion that the
assault should have been attempted, even if the
chances of success were. to those of defest, as
forty to sixty only. Bat the generals allowed
this opportunity to slip away, and resolved upon
the siege; though if too weak for an immediate
assault they we're in far greater proportion too
weak for SIEGE IL was not, however, to be
regular siege; 1t was to be an accelerated, SUM-
mary proceeding; few days engineering, a few
days cannonadisg, and then the storm. This
roceedng failed entirely; the Russian works
proceeded far more quickly, far more system
atically than those Of the Allies three
weeks elapsed before the fire could be
opened, and when the day for unuasking the
batteries came, the Russians could unmask two
gums to the Allies one. However, the fire WAS
opened; the French fire was silenced in half
day; the English guns silenced some few Russian
bate ries, but could NOT subdue the fire from the
town in any way 10 couple of days the Allies
had fred away all their ammunition, without any
result; they were reduced to few rounds per
day, fred for no purpose unless as pretexs for
official statements that the batteries were still
active. This useless waste of Ammunition
which it took months to replace, was another
egree ious blunder; the aspect Of the Russian
works, the number of their guns, ADD the distance
of the allied batteries from 200 to 500 ysrds,)
must have shown at once 10 any sensible otfcer
that there was no chance Of such distant and
short lived fire having any effect upon the ram
parts, OF being capable Of protecting the advance
of stormiDg columns But the allied Generals
acted like Tarquin when the SybIlline books were
offered to him. They allowed the first set to be
burned when they resolved not to storm Sevasto-
pol on the 2sth September; they had the second
set burned when they destroyed all Their stock Of
ammunition in q caDnonade, the uselessness Of
which must have been evident to every gunner;
and, less fortunate than Tarquin, they will not
only not get the third set at the original price
a.ked for the whole lot-they will not get it at ALL
The fact lie, we cannot doubt, that the allied
Generals are by this time perfectly convinced of
the impracticabity Of any assault, with their
present means both of artillery aud infantry.
Three, and in some instances, four successive
lines Of Notifications, cannot be taken at one on
set nothing is clearer than that. They require as
many successive seges, which may become shorter
with every successive line carried; but they re-
qure time renewed trenches, renewed cannon.
AIDES, renewed assaults, and, of course, renewed
reenforcements. All this under the suppostion
that the covering army remains in possession Of
it's ground and that the forts on the north side Of
the haIbor will not make the place too hot for the
Allies within twelve hours after its being ulti.
mately carried. AZ to the covering army va
shall return to that presently; as to the north
brts, their action must begin to tell terribly the
moment the south side is in possession Of the Al
lies. But what with the restricted means at
their command, with the difficulties Of the task,
with the enormous sacrifice Of men necessarily
connected with every assault, with the very small
chance of large resnforcements arriving, with
the extraordinary wear and tear caused to the
besieesrs by the climate, there are at least ten
chances 10 ono thar fha sonth aide of Saua mil