New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-03-07
THE osTESD CoYFERENCE-MARcYs
RELY TO SOULE.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,


-, ouy embarrassing relations with Spain, has been
rsceived and submitted to the President He has
ven 10 that document the deliberate consideration
due Alike to the Importance Of the subject therein
discussed and to the experience, wisdom and aonty
OF those whore opinions and suggestions it contains.
When he first entered upon the duties OF his present
station be found our intercourse with SPAN nuch
disturbed by the Spanish authorities Of Cuba IL mas
beep his anxious desire and the object Of hs strenuous
efforts 10 preserve peace and restore coroal go'd VIII
between that country and the United States The
source Of our past difficulties with Spain end OF our
appreLensons Of future danger Is disclosed IN the
report Of yourself and associs.es. The messure
therein presenied-the purchase Of Cuba-is prob
ABLY the only one which woId, with certainty,
place the relations Of the two countries on the basis OF
endrrire friendship While tho Island OF Cuba re-
nair a dependency Of Spsir, and the character OF
her rule over il s not changed,-and change for the
better con barely be anticipated, annoyance TO our
trade and difficulties between our citizens and the To-
cal authorities will be Of frequent occurrence and 1t
Is scarcely reasonable TO expect that peace thus rem
dtred precarious will remain long unbroken. Con-
ceyipg that the transfer Of Cuba 10 the United STATES
on the honorable conditions you have been instructed
10 Offer would be ~ important TO her as to them II
was hoped that you would find her Catholic Majestys
Government disposed to receive and discuss propo-
ston for that purpose The President desires you to
keep this important object of your mission in view,
and 10 enter upon negotiations in relation to when
ever favorable opportunity occurs. 1t ia no
longer believe n secret in Spain that the United
States wish 10 obtain the cesson, and that you
have authority to treat on the subject. The
knowledge of these facts will be likely to elicit
opniols in regard TO that not only from the
L n..oa no,,a k,,t
from other influential individuals of the nation. The
Cores will soon assemble, and that subject will I'M
doubtedly be discussed by the members OF thst body
In their social circles, IT u does not become SUBJECT
of public deberatiop. BY q free and friendly inter-
course among official and Influential nen, you will be
enabled to determine the proper course TO DO pursued
in ard to opening negotiation for the acquisition
of Cuba. Should you find persons of position or in.
fuence disposed 10 on the subject the con.
sderstor in favor of a cession' are go many and 50
strong that those who can be brought TO sten would
be very likely to become converts 10 the measure But
should you have reason to believe that the men IN
power are averse 10 entertaining such proposition;
that the offer of 1t would be offensive to the national
bride of Spain and that il would fad no favor IN any
considerable class of the people, then II VIII be TOO
evident that the time for opening or attempting to
open such negotiation, hss rot arrived. IL appears
TO the President that nothing could be gained, and
something might be lost, by an attempt TO push ne
yotiaticns against such a general resistance. This
view Of the s taken on the suPposition that you
rboil6 become Convinced that such proposition for
the cession of Cuba would certainly be rejected.
The language of part of TIE report might, per-
hama be 80 construed TO sustain the inference tnst
Won and YOUR associates in the conference were Of
opinion that the proposition should be made, though
there should he chance OF ts being entea'ne1 aud
TIA, il should be accomp he'd with the open decla-
ration Of a significant suggestion that the United
States were deermiI ed to have the Island and would
obtain it by other means If their present advances go
advart ageous be refused by Spsin-hut other parts
of the report repel this inference. The remark in
Tint document, that il Spain should refuse these
proposals of the United states the question wln
" arise what ought TO be the course OF the American
g Covernment under such circumstances clearly
shows that il was Intended by yourself and colleagues
40 recommend 10 the President TO offer to SPAN the
alternative Of cession or seizure Inc conclusion
that The members OF the Conference were against
such an alternative proposition, Is also drawn from
tba following passage: After we shall have offered
Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present
value and this shall have bean refused, II WIZ then
be time TO consider the question Does Cuoe, IN
the possession Of Spain seriously endanser
our internal pesce and inc existence oi
" our cherished UnionP" The President ooncurs
in this view of the subject. but TO conclude thN on
the rejection Of proposition TO cede seizure should
epme would be 10 assume that self-preseivatlon
necessitates the acquisition OF Cuba by the United
Ststes: that Spain has refused and VIII persist IN
refusing our reeamatons for injuries and wrongs
inflicted and thsf she will make no arrangement tor
or future security against the recurrence OF similar
injuries and wrongs. As to the trst CONSIDER ATOMS
Twill only remark that the acquisition OF Cuba by the
Tinted Seates would be prominently advantageous
In itself and OF the highest Importance as precaut1on
measure of security. However much We might regret
the want of success in efforts TO OBTAIN tue session
of II that failure would not, without materia
change in the condition of the island, involve imminent
peril 10 the existence OF our Goyernment-Du' shoua
the contngen suggested in your report ever arise
tbar, ;s no reason 10 doubt that the case will be
promptly met by the deliberate judgment and deei'
sivs action Of the American people la re'auon 10
outrages and injuries, this Government have good
grounds to complain OF the course hitherto pursued
by Spain and should that course be persisted IN,
Would be justified in resortng TO coercive means 10
obtain REDRESS; but the aspect OF TINS brsnch oil ne
subject has however, lately somewhat changed the
present Cabinet Of Spain having indicated more
favorable disposition in regard to demands for salts
faction and indemnity than that which preceded II.
do not attach much Importance TO the recent oner,
on the part of Spain TO institute commission 10 set
tie all existing claims such as Nv exist oetween 'ne
United States and Crest Britain, because some OF these
claims are of such a character as seirespec' would
not ne,mjt us TO submit 10 arbitrament |, any FORM
You are therefore, instructed TO oechhe tha' oner'
Bnt As 10 the most aggravated well as the mostre
cent case of outrage AMI injury thar OF tne biach
Warrior, the door Of adjustment csn haroIy oe cou
sdered as closed. Although the late Minister OF sor
eign Relations rejected demands IN that case the
present Minister has clearly indicated Willingness
to reeede from the position of his predecessor. ne
asked Tor our views in writing upon the reply WHICH
his Government had made 20 our demands, and ae-
comp panied his request with an assurance thst he
would take 1t into tue serious consideration and
act upon IL Amer refusal to comply with that re-
quest this Government would not be in a situation 10
maintain that Span persists IN denying a satisfaction
in the case Of the Rack Warrior. With his present
lights upon the subject the Presidents opinion as 10
tbe expediency OF presenting to thu Spanish Gov.
ernmeut his views contained 10 my dispstch
10 Won tf the cd Of June lsst, in snswer
20 TIA, reply. remain unchanged. Ii doesnot appesr
10 him thai the knowledge OF those views in say
- L. nronsly affect the negotiations for the cession