Lynchburg daily Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1852-1861, 1855-10-05
Kaesuth en- the ra1 Of ssbas opel.

K5sauth en- tho Ia Of Ssbas opel.
The last Nfw York rints contains n letter from
kossonll, from which we take the the following
extract, giving hi views of the efrci Of the fall of
seb1-topal :
A. 10 the prospects Of peace-it ismy decided
opiui ~ HAT those nre rather irssened tflnn oiier-
WIS., by the fall OF thp So ia Of Soin-tapol. IN m
absolute pint af view | never did nor do attach
any considerable importance to this enterprise.
! always thought and think that it was Il gleat
mistake Ia clioose that point for an atiaek on
Russia, the profe--od object of which Is Ia secure
Europe frem her political prep0nderaeee. / have
often expressed the opinion thai nothing 10 be
achieved in that quarter can either break linssia's
power of resistance OF bring her to satisfactory
terms. Destruction "f Srbastopol aud ot the
Russian Black Sea ilectls, IN my "pinion.noihing
but nn insult. that does not take away strength
it J. dbullv ~ when we remember that the seIge
of Sebastopel was undertaken, coupled with the
pledge -olelnnly given 10 Austria, TINT under 10
circumstance j. The territorial extension oi the
Russian llmpirr Ia be impaired. The word was
first 10 advance has almost become yernacniar.
that. with "A palicyplcdged - maintaintlie integrity
ol the Russian Empire, IA fortress aud "A iert drs-
tra,ed j. but "A fortress and n lett TO be built up
again stronger tllan ever IN II few yrars. The case
wault be somewhat different had the allied pow
ers the intention Ia keep the Crlmea. Bui, on
the one hand. until new nj least, this intention
they had not. on the other hand. the Crimca Is no
barrier that defends, it Is an acquisition that re-
quircs defence; and Ia make good this defence,
one Of two things is indispensable-cltllcr the
maintenance OF II very large Standing army IN
the Crimea, or else the pushing back ot iiassla
entirely from HE Black sea, consequently from
the immediate ncighborliood of the Crinea. With
out either the one az the other ot these altrrna-
urr,. us snon ~ the Allies would march out,
Russia would march N ngRin. The first utter
native implies the condition of an armed peace,
to he cost of which, neither England nor France
would choose 10 submit in the long run; besides,
it implies the %iortuoas question, Who Is 1t TINT
will undertake the charged England and France
together! that supposes the incredible cife1nl-
stance OLA perpetual entente eordia{ bctN cen
them. No man - fooli~ ia rs 10 build his house
on such loose sand. England alone! France
would not agree 10 it. France nlone! England
would object toit. Turkey alone2 would thank 10
one tor the ruinoas gift. Turkey. assisted by tte
Allirsi would suppose these Allies niwnys nlirs;
aud would imply, brsidrs,lh opening ot the Oar
danelle-, and Of the Br-phorns-cqliyalrnt II
the oytrthrow of the independence of Turkey
The second alternative tthat of pushing back
Russia from the Black sea- implies, in II. turn
the necessity of un independent Circas-ia, and OF
"A Dnco lioumain State with Brssnrabia and the
Territory of OczakoiE up TO Cherson, a cor,bina-
tioi which would be absolute nonsense without
tho full reconstruction" Pollard in its alteirnt
extept;-a thing beyond he limits uf the deter
mlnatian Of the nllir-. A NIL e~rcnts,ol two lungs
one, eitherthc Allies MAKE ~ campaign IN Poland
or they mako not; in the first en-e they onght To
haze done it without yaerilicing one hundred
thousand Of their best troops, and about iuur
thousand live hundred millions Of francs upon u
town, the capture of which would have been ua
easY work IVA secondary diversion, had it been
but defended by Il gnrrison instead of the prlnci
pal aruE II Ru>siH, ns with Il i lisl campaign
the ease would haYe hcru unlpubtcdly.-on the
other hau1. il lie u3lios don't moan to mike II Po-
li-h cnnpa IN they cuanlt tdtak If keeping the
Crinra; aud if ,hrg don't keep the Cltmra,
then Indeed the fortress aud the fleet destroyed
there i hut - fortress aud Il fleet IL be bHiit up
again, AN4ll II great power Ike Russia is hut
an insult That does not Take away strength. How
ever. uadrr utlrr circumstances, 1t might have
been a natirr ot choiee for l}u--ia how far 10
resent or not l., resent TINT insult, but ul-
dcr ihr circumstances, such ~ they are, to
resent it 10 the utmost il an imprsttivc ne
cessity for the Gar. sr1ri-topol is the field on
which the cnntepding Parties have measured their
power lnr n year. Ih' eyes uf the wnIld-of
Asia. speeiuily-have been riyited on that spot.
The long protraetcd Struggle there identified
the prestige If the Cars invincihiity with the
name Of Sehfstopol. -Sehastopol fallen shakes
that prestige II its very foundation, the CzaI's
submitting To that fnll would ruin that prestige
irretrievnhly. Whatever be the personal ncliiTl
tons OF fears ALEXANDER, Ia dtboaaare yoang
man he Is we are told, he hadn no choice, he would
not live ono week il he dared 10 sigu the
ruin of the prestige OF Russia power. He eau.
not sue Cor peace he cannot accept any condi-
tions-wcre even, some offered him-un1er this
pressure; he must fight; until either the strength
of his empire be broken N the prestige of his pow
er redressed.