New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-08
THE CRIyIEAN WAR.

As we write, the field operations in the
Crimcs, to which we alluded some days since as
in preparation, must have commenced. With
these operations, the war, so far as it is confined
TO the peninsula, enters into a new and proba-
bly, decisive stage Of development. The rapid
arrival of the Piedmontese and French reserves,
and particularly the sudden change by which
Cnnrobert left his command for that of single
corps, while Pelissier takes the command in
chief, are sure indications that the time for
change in the tactics Of the Allies is at hand.
For a general description of the ground to
which the thester of operations is to be trans
ferred and general statement of the forces
about to be engaged refer to our former ar
tisle. 1t will be recollected that the Russian
army of observation in communication with the
north side of Sevastopol has its main position
on the plateau between Inkermann and the point
where the road from Balaklaya to Sympheropol
crosses the mountain-ridge, separating the val
leys Of the Chernaya and the Belbek. This p)-
sition, Of great natural strength, has been CON-
pletey intrenched by the Russians. 1t extends
for about four miles between the head of the
bay of Sevastopol and the impossible range of
mountains, and the Russians will be able to con-
centrate there at least So 600 or 60, 900 men, of
infantry and artillery, which number is fully
sufficient for the defense.
To attack this position in front would require
a great numerical superiority and involve terri.
bic sacrifices, while the Allies cannot afford
either Even if they succeeded in carrying the
utrenchments, their losses would be so severe
as to disable them from an energetic continuance
Of the campaign. They mast therefore attempt
to draw a number of Russians away from it and
TO find means to turn it. For this purpose the
mysterious expedition to Kertch was sent out.
About 1900 allied troops embarked, were
seen by the Russians to pass Yalta, sailed to
Kertch, and returned again. Why they did not
attempt landing is sought to be explained by
telegrapbic order from Paris. At all events,
this mere apology for demonstration must be
pronounced an utter failure; 10 General in his
senses would be induced to divide his troops by
an expedition which does not venture to show
even a semblance Of fight. An attempt on
Kaffa, if even IT was under contemplation at
headquarters, seems also to have been finally
abandoned. To transport troops 70 Eupatora
and sally forth from that place cannot be under
consideration, else the Piedmontese and French
reserves would have been sent thither at once.
And, as there is no other harbor or good road
stead en- the coast between Bslaklava aud Kafa,
nor between seyastopOl and Eupatoria, the idea
Of turning the Russians by sea seems to have
been finally given up, and nothing remains but
to turn them By land. which, as We have al
ready stated, must prove an exceedingly difficult
operation.
There is. beside the road occupied BY the Rus
SLAMS above Inkermann, but one other high road
leading from Balaklsva to Sympheropol. Itruas
along the south coast as far as Alushta, where
1t turns to the interior. passes tho mountains
east OF Chstyr Dsgh or Tent Mountain. the