The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-04-27


pared at that moment.
In breaking with Russa she wished to BIS certain
Germany, and have 500 600 men under arms. Her dit
nifty, her interests the example OF the Western Power
urged her TO pronounce herself and act prudence bad
her wait and collect her military forces strengthen he
political alliances before joining in the struggle
But what could the united Generals do ut Varna aft
the retreat of the Russian army We're they remai
In an inactivity which would have led to discourage
evtsbly have suteredS Neither military hooor nor po
htcaj interests allowed the Commander in Chief to take
such a position.
Once this great theatre, inaction was out of the
question: necessary to act, to object
tbe troops to compel the enemy 10 fear as excite the
tion and respect
1t was then only that landing in The Crimea was
mooted.
An expedition agaioit sebastopol might hasten the
denouoeat Of Ii 1t had determined and limte ed
object; IT might place in the hands OF the allies pro-
vince and stronghold which, conquered would be
pledge and means Of exchange 10 obtain pence. II
was under the influence OF those considerations that the
Comm andern Chief conceived the idea and decreed the
execution OF the plan.
This expedition having been examined at Paris and
London as an eventuaity, the Marshal st. Arnaud
ceived then, rot the intrucions-thsy couli not be
given at uch distsncebut the following advice
To obtain exact information of the strength of the
Russian forces in ts CriGee IL to
land at spot which misht serve basis for opera
tens gbeodosia (now Kaffs appeared the most el,gi
advantage Of being distant forty leagues from Ssbasto.
pol it nevertheless offers great advantages.
irst its bay is vast and safe; it wsud hold all the
Tor the troops. Secondly, once established that
point, it might be made real basis for operations.
the renforcetents coming by the Sea OF Azo ana the
Caucaaus could be cut or gradual advance coald be
made towards the centre of the country taking adsaa
tage OF all It's resources Smpheropol the strategic
centre of the peninsula, would be occupied
An sdvance would then be made on Sc oastopol, and
probably great battle fought that road Ii lost
retreat in good order kaa, and nothing is compro
missed il gained TO besiegs Sebastopol to invest it
plstey, and its surrender would follow as matterof
But scarcely Nctors they per ,eivei they bad port
TO serve them az bass fr operations. Then urged by
ceve in all haste they advanced south of Sebastopal
towards Baiakiava. 1t moreover, clear that the
army could not maintain itself and live in ensmy8
country unless in direct communication with the fleet.
Unhsppily, those counseis not followed Be it
that the Chief had not sucient troops
to take long journey in the Crimea be it that they
expected speedy result by a bold and sudd "a
coup de mdin they resolved as ia known to land at
few leasaes only from sebastopo The glorious bstte
OF Alma at 6rst justified their decision
But this compulsory and necessary return towards the
led to the abandonment of the northern heights of
Sebastopo the occupation of which alone allowed the
iDves,H ent OF the place The Anglo French army was
not in fact numerous enough to make complete in
ves,ment 1t therefore, necessary to limit it to
attack on the eouth side.
To accomplish this operation the English took posses
sion of the port of Baaklava; the French, seeking
point dappui on the shore to land their provisions
end artillery provide nta found the port Of Ksmeson.
The soloers who are never deceived call it, IN fast, the
pert of Providence.
sebastopol as is Known is not surrounded by battle
ments 1t is rather great nren shed camp containing
generally army of from to 600 men, already
protected at the nceDent OF the sege by
earth batteries and especially by the Russian fleet
which well placed in the inner port could bear all
the avenues by which the allies could advance upon the
place.
At this period that is to say when the Anglo French
army arrived before Sebastopol tie assault might
hpps, have been attempted but it already hszar
eous enterprise, without sufficient artillery to sence
that OF the enemy.
Ueubtless nothing was i'm possible to an Anglo French
Med
have given such proofs daring the last six months n
the danger faigues and suerpgs OF this long siege;
but success alone couc justify so daring attempt.
The first duty imposed by the responsibilities of
papa Is prudence and pru1ence prescribed 70 the Com
manders in Chef rot 10 ATTEMPT to assault with, 1T
most army of &C, 900 men, pa ed rock deficient
Ct artlery ammunition reserves, without being de
fenced hy in the rear aad with other
refuge but the ships
II would bave teen risbing cast the fortune and
fate OF the expedition, and nothing must be risked at
distance of 500 leagues from the mother country.
The coup de main shch the Generals thought possible
after the battle Of the Alma having escaped the there
remained for them regular siege according the rules
OF military art. At the very onset tbs Russians took
two ost ncacious measures very regrettabe for
The first Prince Menchisons stratsgi move, who
mpheropcl kept The field aud free communica
with be besiegsd city, the second the energetic
rendered the en.my's porr inaccessible to our fleets,
and gave some 500 eco guns vita their sailors, as
gupners, to assist IN tie defence of the town;
Thus although the town already presented form:da
be of guns, batteries rose, as ii by enchiut
meD and feeble siege artillery could not master the
From this moment 1t became evident to all That Sebas
ttpol could only be taken after long struggle, with
powerful at the cost perhaps of fangu
Iary battles This situation grave. II looked
upon by the Commander in Chief with that calraness
which eevates characters to the height of tie greatest
This s the place speak Of General Canrobert and Of
Lord Raglan, history will speak of them Their part
whose swords they bear. Opposed TO immense obsta
cls they measured hem only TO trutoph over them by
courage, perseverance, and devotion.
1he army, supported 0y their example, suffered with
out complaint exposed all the rigors of terrible
winter having only poles 10 the earth and small tents
to shield Il EN- Geld and of rain they
nade every sacdce to the honor Of their flag and to
their country and to the confidence they had their
cbef whom they learnt love and honor on the field
Of battle.
TO appreciate fully the immense difficulties Of the
terprise conceived and executed by the commanders
it net be out OF place, perhaps to explain in what
The siege of sesastopal has scarcely any ana
loey in our military teats Of arms. To attack
superior in number, be revictualled and rein
forced in men, provisions and munitions o:
udacitp which could be seriously attempted only by
England and France united fer object necessary for
EuTepe. The siege Of Dsntzg has been much cited and
admired OF those in which herosm, united with
science triumpbed the greatest difficulties OF for
nidsbe and obstinate defence. Dantzig, protecei by
the vistuls, whose mouth the Baltic is shut by the
tort Of veicbselmande placed equally in conditions
little favorable for plee investment; but 1t was
Itssbe however, to take position on the river
the fort whch shut its mouth AID the CITY, thus TO in
tercept the Communications with the and to invest
the place.aS
T,s is what took place under the command of Marshal
Ielebvre Nevert eless although this place 10 clos
ed within lnes Of attack the vicin
ty Of Emperor fspoeop who the siege with
a numerous army, and paraysea the attempts at reief
OF Prussia and Russia the resistance o. Danzig pro-
lopeed for hy one days OF open trenches. Subsequent
y after the retreat from Moscow, this city, occupad by
tie Frer eh cspuated only after defence OF one year.
and combined attack by land and sea- We might null
tipy examples but these will suffice to prove than the
Anglo French army bss done the C,mea all that could
he expected from its courage aud the skill OF its chiefs
II lost retreat Ia good order may be made Kaa,
rpd rothiDg compromised II it is gained siege slad
to Sebsstopo which may be completely Invested aDd
its surrender obtained at the end OF short period Un
happily, tbefe couLsels were not followed. Whether
was that the in hef had not troops sucioat
for making this long in the Crmsa, that they
anticipated a speedy res ut from . hardy and un
expected coup de oin the resolution was taken as
iDovp, TO dsembark at Foms leagues only from Sehas
topol
U.nuula Nm