Washington sentinel. [volume] (City of Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1856, 1855-04-07


ANOTHER LETTER WRITTEN BY
GENERAL JESUP-IMPORTANCE OF
OUR MILITARY POSITION ONL LAKE
CHAMPLAIN.
We publish below another letter written by
this distinguished officer in 1912, giving his
opinion concerning the most important point
to be selected for our defences on the NortherR
frontier, bordering on Lake Champlain. II is
one Of the number which will grace the pages
of his forthcoming Memoirs" which we un-
derstand he is now busily engaged in preparing
for the Press. Ronse's Point, the Importance
Of which General Jesup has SO wildly brought
to the attention of the President, in his letter
to the Secretary of War, (Hon. J. c. Spencer,)
was secured to us by the Webster and Ash
burton Treaty." and notifications, on grand
and useful scale, are now being erected there
An appropriation, we believe, of $4,000 was
made for this purpose at the last session of
Congress. II
WASHINGTON CRY, August III, 1872
SIR: In reply to your note Of this morning
requesting my opinion of the calue of Rouse's
Point as a military post, | have the honor to
state that that position is the great strategic
point on the northern frontier. In our hands,
it secures from hostile approach more than two
hundred miles of lake coast in Vermont and
New York; and not only affords a safe base to
an army operating in advance of Lake Cham
plain, but secures to it. free from interruption,
the resources of the whole country bordering
on, or communicating with, that lake. 1t is
the only position within or near our line that
completely commands the entrance into the
lake, and being open to New York, it could be
readily reinforced on the land side, as we'll as
on the water, by the whole disposable force Of
that great State. Any other point on the chan
mel would require fort on both sides, and con-
sequently division of our forces and on the
Vermont side, at Windmill Point, for instance,
there is no approach by land except through
Canada, and fort there, if invested, could be
relieved only through the lake.
Steam, in all future wars, is to be most
powerful agent on narrow seas, rivers, and
lakes. There is as long line of coast Tor
nearly SOY from Rouse's Point to Whitehall,
estimating both sides of the lake, as the line Of
coast Of Lake Ontario from Niagara to the
head of the Saint Lawrence. Rouse's Point in
the possession Of Great Gritain, and single
war steamer on that lake, we should be de.
prived of the most important line of operations
in a contest for the possession of Canada, and
of the whole of the resources Of the country
around and communicating with Lake Cham.
plain and the whole force of Western Yer.
| mont and Northeastern New York would be
checked and thrown out of action.
The direct communication from the river st.
John through Maine, TO the river Saint Law
renee, certainly possesses important military
advantages but those advantages, so far as
Great Britain is concerned, have been in some
measure neutralized by works which we have
already completed, and they may be entirely
neutralized by other works which have been
suggested. That communication in our hands,
its advantages to us would be limited to de-
priving Great Britain Of direct intercourse
between her eastern and western provinces in
her hands, it secures her those facilities in
peace but If we be true to ourselves she would
lose them in war; for, with the military road,
already completed from Bangor to Houlton, in
Maine, we could, whenever desirable, seize the
line of the Saint john and not only cut of the
communication between Canada and the more
eastern British Provinces, but maintain threat.
ening attitude in the rear Of all the military
posts in the latter, and hold them in complete
check.
In estimating the comparative military ad.
vantages of this communication and Rouse's
Point, reference must be had to the probable
operations in the event Of war with Great
Britain. In contest for the Canadas, Quebec
is the decisive point; but Montreal must be
first taken, as well because the fate Of the
whole upper country depends in great mea-
sure on the possession Of that position, as be-
cause il would form new and secure base for
Interior operations, and no army, however
strong, could safely leave il in hostile hands
in its rear. An inspection Of the map will
show that in operations against Montreal,
though portion Of the army would descend
the Saint Lawrence, principal column should
operate from Lake Champlain, as well to secure
the flank Of the column on the Saint Law.
renee as TO check the advance Of reinforce
ments from Quebec, and to bring the greatest
| possible amount of force and resources to bear
upon the object Of attack; besides these mill.
tary reasons, there are high political considera-
tons relating entirely to the population Of
Canada south of the Saint Lawrence, that
would render the movement of such column
OF paramount Importance. There would not,
in any plan Of campaign against Canada, be
single battalion employed east Of the Kenne-
bee and the valley of the Chandiere, and, OF
course, the communication from the Saint
John to the Saint Lawrence would exercise
but feeble influence upon the operations
against that province, whilst the influence of
Rouse's Point would be positive and decisive
| For these reasons consider the latter worth
more in military effect than the whole territory
in Maine north Of the Saint John.
tn. S. JESUP.
The Hon. J. G, SPENCER,
Secretary of War Washington Civ