The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-11-15

an offence? We think not. We think that
the Governor would insist that the sale of spirits
is not felony by the laws of South Carolina,
or by the laws of civilized nations; and on this
ground the demand for the fugitive would be
refused, the peculiar institution" of the Maine
Law and the constitutional provision to the
contrary notwithstanding.
The principle involved in this requisition
upon Governor Wright is identical with those
which sprung up between Virginia and New
York, and Georgia and New York, during the
gubernatorial administration of Mr.. Seward.
Those who wish to see the subject most ably
and thoroughly discussed, are referred to the
second volume of Mr.. Stewards Works. We
take the following admirable and just statement
of the constitutional obligation from his first
letter to the Governor of Virginia:
But it is by no means my wish to protract
unnecessarily the correspondence on this sub
ject, or to avoid decision upon the important
principle it involves. i beg leave, therefore, to
state most respectfully that even were | to adj
NIT that the affidavit was sufficient in form and
substance to charge the defendants with the
crime of stealing a negro slave from his master
in the State of Virginia, as defined by the laws
of that State yet in my opinion the offence is
not within the meaning Of the Constitution of
the United States. The words employed in the
Constitution, treason, felony or other crime,
are indeed very comprehensive. 1t has long
been conceded that citizens of the State upon
which the requisition is made, are liable to be
surrendered, as well as citizens of the State
making the demand; and it is further regarded
o, .o..1a1 thot 81 no Exa
in making the demand is unlimited, while the
Executive upon whom it is made has no legal
right to refuse compliance, if the offence charg-
ed is an act of treason, felony or other crime,
within the meaning of the Constitution. Can
any State at its pleasure declare an act to be
treason, felony, crime, and thus bring 1T with
in the constitutional provision? l confess that
does not seem to me to be the proper construc-
ton of the Constitution. After due considera-
ton, am of opinion that the provision applies
only to those acts which, if committed within
the jurisdiction of the State in which the per-
son accused is found, would be reasonable, fe
lonious, or criminal, by the laws of that State. "
81 believe the right to demand and
the reciprocal obligation to surrender fugitives
from Justice between sovereign and independent
nations, as defined by the law of nations, include
only those cases in which the acts constituting
CldfScu dic IcCOpHlScu
by the universal laws of all civilized countries.
/ think it is also we'll understood that the object
of the constitutional provision in question was
to recognise and establish this principle in the
mutual relations of the States, as independent,
equal, and sovereign communities AS they
could form no treaties between themselves, it
was necessarily engrafted in the Constitution.
| cannot doubt that this construction is Just.
Civil liberty would be very imperiecty secured
in any country whose Government was bound
to surrender its citizens to be tried and con-
demned in foreign jurisdiction, for acts not
prohibited by its own laws. The principle, il
adopted, would virtually extend the Legislation
Of State beyond its own territory and over the
citizens of another State; and acts which the
policy and habits of one State might lead its
legislation to punish as felonious, must be con-
sidered of that heinous character in another
State, for certain purposes, while for all other
purposes they would be regarded as mere vio-
lations of moral law