Indiana American. [volume] (Brookville, Ind.) 1833-1861, 1855-10-12
fsrsisll Asps.
From the New York Times.
Kossuth's Views Of the Effect Of the
Fall ofsebastopol.


Kossuth's Views Of the Effect Of tn,
Fall ofsebastopcl.
VxrSoR, ISLE OF WIeHr, Eng J
land. Thursday. Sept. IS. (
TO fhe Editor offhe Ncy York Dali,
Times Dear Sir:-Grcat news b,
this mail. The South of Sebastopo
has fallen al last. Immense reio,c
ings in England. The feeling is some,
what more mixed in France. Still, il
the first emotions. the tidings Of
brilliant victory cannot fail to Great,
enthusiasm;-with nation like th,
French, the sentiment Of national glo
ry, must Of course predominate.-
Luckily for Louis Napoleon Bonaparts
the surprising interest If the fall O
Sebastopol came in very good time tc
divert public attention from the atientaI
of Dellemare. Of which you will
have got the news by this same mail
l will not trouble you with the de.
tails of the fall Of Scvastopol. We oI
course cannot yet know more Of them
than what the telegraphic dispatches,
published by an official authority, have
announced. The fact at all events il
beyond doubt.
Referring you therefore for the facts
to the public papers. / will restrict
myself to give you my opinion on the
probable bearing of the fact. Whal
influence is it likely to have either OF
for peace or the further
prosecution Of the war?-in a word
What next? Such is the question
that forcibly presents itself.
As to the prospects Of peace-it il
my decided opinion that these are
rather lessened than otherwise by the
fall of the south Of Sebastopol. In ar
absolute point of view l never did mol
do attach any considerable impor'
tance to this enterprise. / always
thought and think that it was a greal
mistake to choose that point for an at
tack on Russia; the professed object o
which is to secure Europe from hel
political preponderance. / have otter
expressed the opinion that nothing te
be achieved in that quarter can either
break Russia's power Of resistance Of
bring her a satisfactory terms. De
strucrion Of Sebastopol and Of th,
Russian Black Sea feet is, in my
opinion, nothing but an insult, tha
does not take away strength; it i
doubly so when we remember thai
the siege Of Sebastopol was undertaken
coupled with the pledge solemnly Civ
en- to Austria, that under no circum
stances is the territorial extension o
the Russian Empire to be impaired
The word was the first to advanc,
has almost become yernacular. that
with a policy pledged TO maintain thu
integrity Of the Russian Empire, {
fortress and fleet destroyed, is but I
fortress and a feet to be built uI
again stronger than ever in fev
years. The case would be somewha
different had the allied powers the in
tention to keep the Crimea. But. OF
one hand, until now at least, this in
tention they had not; on the othe
hand. the Crimea is no barrier tha
defends. il is an acquisition that re
quires defence; and TO make good thi
defence one Of two things is indispcns
able--either the maintenance ofa yer,
large standing army in the Crimea, 0
else the pushing back Of Russia entire
ly from the Black Sea, consequent,
from the immediate neighborhood 0
the Crimea. ~
Without either the one or the othe
Of these alternatives, as soon as Oh
Allies would march out Russia woul
march in again. The first alternatIv
implies the condition Of an arme'
peace, TO the cost OF which neiths
England nor France would choose ;
submit In the long run: besides. Il i'm
plies the tortuous question. Who Is
that will undertake the charge ? Eng
land and France together /? that sup
poses the incredible circumstance Of
perpetual entente cordial between then
No man SO foolish as to build his hous
On such loose sand. England alone
France would not u sree to IL. Franc
alone Z? England would object 4
IL. Turkey alone ? would thank 70
the ruinous gift. Turkey. assisted b
the Allies would suppose these Al
lies always allies and would imply
besides. the opening OF the Dardanel
les, and of the Bosphorus-equivaleu
TO an owe, throw OF the independence
Of Turkey. The second alternativ
THAT Of pushing back Russia from III
Black Sea. implies. in its turn. I'll
necessity - an independent Circassis
and Of Daco. Roumain State wit
Bessarabia and the Territory Of 0cz'
kof up to Cherson combinatio
which would be absolute nonsen.
without the full reconstruction OF Pa
land in its ancient extent (: q thing b,
yound the limits OF the determinalio
Of the Allies. At all events, Of tw
things. one. either the. Allies mske
campaign in Poland. or they make no
in the first case they ought to ha,
done It without sacrificing one huu
dred thousand Of their best troop
and about four thousand Eve hundre
millions Of francs under town, u
capture Of which would have been q
easy work by secondry diversio,
had 1t but been defended by q garrise
instead OF the principal army Of Ru
sia. ms with Polish campaign the ca
would have been undoubtedly &c
the other hand. II the Allies don
mean to make Polish campaign. the
cannot think Of keeping the C,imea
and II they don't keep the Crime
then indeed the fortress and the fle
destroyed there is bat u fortress and
feet TO be built up again. With
great power like Russia Il is but an 4
suit that does not take away strengt
However, under other circumstance
10 might have been u matter Of choi
fr Russia how far TO resent or not
resent that insult /; but under the ci
cumstances, such ~ they arc, 10 =