Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1855-08-25

the earth that had been disturbed during th
day, repaired their embrasures, and replace,
any guns that had been damaged, so as 10 re
new the fight again with undiminishod vigor il
the morning. and the plumbers of killed an,
wounded on either side were insignificant. Ha,
the French succeeded 10 their attack, this fein
Of the English might have been all that was do
sired. Their failure disconcerted the who'll
plan, and il would have been well If the com
manders had seen this, and rc.Dranged thei
plans accordingly, instead Of persevering il
what they must have seen could not succeed.
While this was going on on shore, the AllieS
feet stood in, about noon on the memorabl,
I7th of October, to attack the seaward deiencei
Of the place. This measure, however, doe,
not appear to have been undertaken with the Sc
rious intention, OF even the hope Of destroying
them, but more as fcint 10 take of the alten.
tion Of the besieged from the land attack, and
like most half measures failed and was moi
worth the loss Of men and material that il cost
Had two or three line-of-baite ships gone
straight up to the barrier across tie harbor, and
boldly attacked Fort Constantine or the Bate
ry, within 900 yards, they might possibly have
destroyed both these works, and probably with
out suffering more than they did As il was,
they drew up in long line acrtss the harbor
mouth, outside the reefs, at a disance of 200
to 1000 yards from the shore, ard fred all the
afternoon without doing or receiving much dam
age, and they were thus exposed TO the coast
batteries and the guns in earlhw,fks along the
cliffs, which they could no, touch though their
fire told with dreadful effect on some of our
ships tha, stood in nearer than tie rest.
There was nothing in this sesfght that tend
ed much towards a solution Of ihe long-nooted
dispute Of stone walls against wooden ones
The AgDnonn0n's experience bears perhaps
most directly upon Il she stood in almost
alone ,o .-:.nIn about so yards frVu. r,r, Cnn-
staotine, and continued there firing broadsides
for more than six ho,rs, under the fire proba-
bly, Of larger numb,r Of guns than she her
self bore, and she cane out of the contest nei-
ther crippled nor Debated, and most probably
having done more damage to the fort than the
fort had done 10 her.
BALAKLAvA ASD isKERMAss.
While the useless bombardment Of the town
was going on, the coirse of the siege was di-
yersi6ed by the two important battles Of Bala-
klava and Inkermann, neither Of which, it ap-
pears, would have talen place but for the blum
ders Of our engineering department. II one
thing was from the frs, more evident than an
other, it was that the English army had UNDER
taken task which Was beyond their strength
numerically. !, was almost physically impos-
sible that they should carry on an important
seige with only 25 900 men, and at the same
time defend BalaklNa and the long line Of
heights from that plsce to Inkermann, besides
bringing up all their stores and supplies from
place six or seven miles in their rear. All
this was apparent to every one; but in the face
Of these facts the engineers commenced an i'm
mense en,renched camp in front Of Dalaklaya,
10 defend il. The towh ;ssseirw was already de-
Tended by circle Of lines described with a
mile radius, and therefore as extensive as those
Of Sebas,opol itself; but they commenced on a
two and half mile radius to construct series
OF redoubts in front Of the place, though for
what purpose has never been explained. The
ground offered no faculties for defence, the pro.
file Of the wo rks was such that cavalry could
ride over them; and were too small to contain
any thing like an imposing garrison. With
| 900 men in each, and 10, 900 or 90, 900 in Tho
rear, they might have been Of use. But all WI
conld afford were 200 Turks and few sailors
and artillerymen. The Turks were raw re-
crni,s, fighting in foreign country under ih'
orders Of men who did not understand their
language. and whose every act was an olienc'
to their prejndices. The bait was too tempt
ing TO be resisted. LiPRAsDI crossed the Tch
ernaya. and pounced on these devoted troops
They held their posts longer than they ough
TO have done, but at last fed, and were Gu
down by the Russian cavalry before they coul'
reach their supports.
Immense was the obloquy heaped on thes
poor fellows for their conduct on this occasion
and the prestige Of the Turks for time wa
lost but if blame were fairly appropriated
tho whole Of IL should on this occasion b
thrown on those officers who placed men in
position where their services were useless, an
their destruction inevitable. The attempt ;
reiake the captured guns by sending 700 ligh
cavalry to charge 900 men in position wa
less mistake than the first, and was redeeme
by the heroic brilliancy with which it was exc
cuted. Had half the labor been spent in fort
flying the gorges of Inkermann that had bee
thrown away on these redoubts at Balaklav'
the battle Of the 9Th Of November would prol
ably never have been fought. The Russan'
however, seem always to have been keenl
alive to the deficiencies Of our scientific depar
ments, and they watched their opportunity o
this occasion with consummate skill. The
saw that the very key Of our position was owe
looked and neglected and they planned the
attack with such secrecy, that had it been ex'
cuied as designed nothing could have saved II
As it was, we were completely surprised !
their approach, and at o'clock on that eventfi
morning the fate of the Allied armies hung c
the slenderest thread had the Russians bee
able to penetrate hundred yards further, ar
deploy their superior forces on the plateau, the
could have marched over our thin and decima
ed ranks and If defeated in front, with Il
town in our flank, nothing could have saved Of
being driven into the sea. The lines of Bal
klaya were not closed in the rear, not a sod HI
been turned in front of Kamiesch Bay, al
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