Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1855-01-16
NEW YORK CORRESPONDENCE.

NEW YORK CORRESPONDENCE
The Latest from scbastopoI- Mistakes .
the Allfes--Bad Name cement ofthe Eng
Iish Army.
4 New Y0RK, January Ii, 1855.
The latest confessions, from Sebastopol, ION tn
part Of the Allies, betray Notifying catalogu
Of blunders, oversights, reckless waste of hu
man life and ammunition, and any amount Q
bad management. Let us explain, in the briei
est possible space, what we mean.
/ The Crimea is a peninsula almost entirel
surrounded by the Black Sea and in area j
about equal to the State of Massachusetts. A
the north, at Perekop, it is entered, from tn
continent by a narrow neck Of land only fy,
miles wide, across which navigable canal ha
been made, through which the waters Of thu
Black Sea flow from end to end. This canal il
crossed by draw-bridges. Mark the impor
lance Of this gateway into the Crimea, in wha
| follows
TheAAllies, last summer, resolved at Varni
to cross over and take Sebastopol by a coup d,
main. For this purpose they landed 10000
men at Espatoria, the most available point fol
quick and safe landing, and speedy march
upon the doomed city. They were intercepted
at the river Alma, upon the heights on the south
bank Of which the Russians were posted to ar.
rest their progress. A battle was fought, q
victory gained, and what next?
Napoleon would have instantly followed up
Menschikof with his whole disposable army,
leaving the wounded to be taken care of by the
feet, which was close by. In this way Men
schikoff could have been overhauled before he
reached Sebastopol; and beaten off, or followed
into the town and annihilated. Menschikoff
has confessed it. Thus the battle Of the Alma
might have been made the conquest of Sebas-
topol. We have the authority Of the Russians
to declare it.
But the Allies halted for some days and on
approaching the fortified city, they lost some
days more in determining whether they would
invest the..town on the south side Of the harbor,
or the Notifications on the heights on the north
side The inletat Balaklava Eve or six miles
in their rear, and several other convenient inlets
into the bold rocky cliffs which form the
southern shore of the Black sea, induced them
to invest the town on the south side of the
harbor; because these inlets were indispensa-
BILE as their naval depots, all their reinforce.
scents and supplies having to come by sea.
Beside, these inlets were necessary as places
of shelter for their shipping from the terrible
storms Of the Euxine. Very well. So far so
good. But what was the next step, in COM
mon sense view of the case?.
The moment the Allies had planted them
selves on the south side Of Sebastopol harbor,
and around the town, they left the whole Cri-
mea open to the Russians and the city entirely
open TO the northward for reinforcsments and
munitions of all kinds. The Allies could not
run their feet into the harbor, for the mouth
had been blockaded by line Of eight ships of
war sunk across it. The work was changed
from coup de main TO regular siege-from
an affair of day or two to q campaign. Now;s
what should the Allies have done the instant
they discovered that they were reduced to the
necessity of siege2 They should have in
stantly detailed part Of their feet with twenty
thousand men up to Perekop, to hold that
gateway and those drawbridges against any
further reinforcements to the Russians. Twenty
thousand men could have done it, for Menschi-
koff had drawn off the army stationed at this
point for his defense Of the Alma. This move
ment Of the said twenty Thousand men, would
L. a1 nG he Ia <,f
the Russians; and as their ships mere locked
up in Sebastopol, they could have had no COM
munication with that place by sea. Thus their
twenty thousand men would have arrested the
various detachments of the Russians from the
continent, as they successfully came up, and
oil their provisions and munitions Of war. One
days steaming would have carried up the
troops, and, in FIVE days more, the whole army
Of Omar Pacha might have been brought over
from the valley of the Danube to Perekop.
Thus might have been arrested those reinforce
ments to the Russians at Sebastopol, amount
ing to $4,000 men, the mass Of their provis-
ions and munitions, and two or three hundred
pieces Of heavy artillery.
The failure, then, in discovering that Sebas
'topol was to be siege-the failure, we say, to
block up this gateway Of the Russians at Pere
kop, their only way Of access into the Crimea,
has been the most egregious and enormous
blunder of the whole campaign, utterly dis
graceful to the military genius Of France and
England. II has cost them fifty thousand men.
II has given the Russians re-inforcements
amounting to seventy-fve thousand men, and
left them all the advantages Of free commu.
nication with the whole Russian empire.
What next? No provisions mo precautions
we're made by the Allies to shelter themselves
against the fierce wintry storms Of the Crimea.
They should have erected tents before the
rainy season set in-laid down plank roads
from their ships to their entertainments for the