The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-08-16
The News from. Euror,e.

sgcsted that 1t evaporates Very h.Aely.
The News FROM Eurore.
The news received al,nost simultaneously by
the America and the Lebanon is made up of
rumors, most Of them evidently without any
serious foundation. With the exception of q
statement put forth by a London
weekly newspaper, that the siege Of Sebastopol
was about to be abandoned, and that the Al
lies had received news from Germany which
was likely to lead to momentous results,
there is but little to comment upen in
these advices. The fact is, in England as
at Sebastopol, matters are pretty nearly
as they were before. OF course It is not
to be expected that the allied generals stand
in the position of theatrical managers who are
bound to furnish never ending list of novel
ties to amase and stsrtle the public. Provided
the end of the war be gained, it matters little
o7the Powers engaged wheth er the campaigns
have been exciting or monetono0s. At the
same time there are crises in every great
work when not TO advance 10 to lose ground.
And it does appear, from the best information
ttet can be had on the sslisst ~ the Allies
Aave reached that crisis.
Let us recall the events of the summer. At
'the approach of spring, the Allies were en-
i camped on the ground they occupied after the
battle of Mkerman. Parallels had been ad-
vanced on the British side to within six hun
dred yards Of the Russian works. and on the
French side to within two hundred yards.
But the batteries were no nearer than on 18th
October, 1854. From these, bombardment
was commenced which lasted ten days Ns
net result, by the admission of the English
themselves was to exhaust the material Of the
besiegers, and to leave the Russian works
stronger than before. For six weeks after this
nothing was done. At last the Russians weary
ing of inactivity, made a sortie on goth May,
on the west side of the city and threw up small
offensive works near the head of Quarantine
Bay. These Pelissier took on the nights of
the 22d and 23d May. A fortnight's quiet fol-
lowed. Then, on 9th June, the bombarament
was renewed from something like AGO guns
1t seems to have been the intention of the be-
| siegers to proceed in this instance according
to established rule by bombardment heavy
enough to silence the Russian batteries, land
| then by assault. For on the evening Of the
| 7th, assaulting parties from both armies at
| tackled the advanced Russian works of attack
| which stretched in line parallel to the city
walls, on the east side, from opposite the great
| Redan to the head of Careening Bay. The
! assault was successful on the whSle line. The
English were found by daylight on the 9Th in
undisturbed possession of the Russian rife
pits opposite the Redan: the French held the
Mamelon, the browning work of the line, and
the White Works and redoubts on Mount Sa-
| ponne had Of course been evacuated. With
this success the Allies seem to have contented
he fS aaS t seeoas Sn a
was made-the English advancing on the
Redan from the rifle pits, the French on the
Malakoff from the Mamelon. The story of It's
failure, and the grounds which have been a.
signed for the fact by the allied officers are
familiar in every ones memory. After the
repulse Of the 18th the allied armies confined
their exertions to strengthening their position
in the line of the works taken from the Rus
slams on the 7th On the other hand the
Russians with equal ardor applied themselves
to strengthening the Redan and Malakoff
| Our latest accounts represent the French
works on the Mamelon as being very strong
indeed; but they likewise acknowledge that
the strength Of the Russian defences has been
increased to still greater extent; and hint
plainly that if they were strong enough to
repel the assault Of 18th June, they are much
better able to resist any similar attempt now
A leading quarterly British periodical,
| which is understood to speak the sentiments of
the British government in sketching the events
| IF tho campoiuu fho xuho al su <ho
propositions that "whcn the guns of fort are
equal in number to those Of the attack, they
cannot be silenced by the besieger; y that
every fort can easily be made to mount twice
the number of guns that can be brought
! against it, and that "hitherto fortified places
could not be taken without silencng the fire
OF the place as preliminary measure to an
assault" 1t follows pretty plainly from this
| that the writer does not believe that Sebasto-
| pol car be taken unless some new system of
attack be invented for the purpose; not very
likely thing There are in short reasons for
supposing that such is the opinion of the lead
ing minds Of the British government. That
opinion is based upon the philosophical theo-
RIGS Of such men as Howard Douglas and Fer
guson; and upon the practical experience of
twelve months campaign, waged upon a scale
both as regards men and material, wholly I'M
parallcled in history. After this it is to be
hoped that Americans will be allowed to
question the probability of the fall of Sebas-
topol without being accused of entertaining
Russian sympathics
AT any rate, whatever becomes Of the siege,
il the Allies wish to accomplish anything at
all, they should overcome one enemy that has
done them more mischief than the Russians,
but which is of their own creation. That ene-
my is divided command. Until recently
there have been four indepen dent commanders
in-chef Of the Allied armies before Sebasto-