Indiana American. [volume] (Brookville, Ind.) 1833-1861, 1855-10-12

Sebastopol. Sebastopol fallen shakes
that prestige to its very foundation,
the Gear submitting to that fall would
ruin that prestige irretrievably. What
ever be the personal inclinations oi
Gar Alexander, debonnaire young
man he is, we are told. he has no
choice be would not live one week il
he dared to sign the ruin Of the pres
tige of Russians power. He cannot
sue for peace; he cannot accept any
conditions-were even some offered
him-under this pressure he must
fight. until either the strength Of his
empire be broken or the prestige of his
power redressed.
That the Crimea enterprise has been
dreadful mistake was all the while
SO evident that the Allied Governments
were Obliged TO plead the excuse OF
considerations for Austria however
this excuse was of a nature so hnmili.
ating that Lord Palmerston saw him.
self under the obligation Of pleading
something else besides. He therefore
always insisted emphatically on the
fact that at Sebastopol is the key OF
Russia's prepondersnce--there is the
seat Of danger;-that key taken. that
danger removed the object of the
war is accomplished, and the war is
virtually brought to an end. always
maintained the contrary opinion
said the taking of Sebastopol decides
nothing solves no question. and brings
nothing to an end Quite the reverse.
Success at Sebastopol will make peace
impossible-will rather inauguraie a
real and protracted war. That will be
the veritable beginning Of the war. but
not the beginning Of the end.
The moment has come to know
which Of US has been right in the esti-
nation Of the nature of events.
say the fall of the south of Sebastopol
puts speedy termination of the war
entirely out Of question.
What. then is next to come? In my
opinion. for the next Winter the cam
paign will probably be restricted to the
Crimea. and next year it will still con-
tinue there; while on the other hand,
the naval operations in the Baltic
will beresrmed with augmented forces,
and on more effective scale. These
operations. being. at this advanced
season, out Of question, for The time
being. only the crimea remains. Well,
as to the Crimea, two circumstances
must be borne in mind. The first is,
that the north side of Sebastopol,
with Sevsrnaya and It's thousand guns,
is not yet so much us besieged or inves-
ted. The second is, that the south
Of Sebastopol is destroyed, but not the
army that defenned IL. Hence the
double problem for the Allies--to take
the fortress. and overcome the army,
II the Russians were such fools as to
crowd their army in and around sebas.
topol, the task Of the Allies would be
easier, and in case Of success would
yield richer results. BY investing the
fortress. they would become the mas.
ters Of the line Of communication Of the
Russisns--the only one that Is left to
them-the line Of Penckoff. In such
a case. the fortress once taken, the ar.
my had to capitulate. But such fol-
ly on tho part ofthe Russians is out o.
question, of course. They will leave
a proper garrison to defend the fort
ress; and take stand with the mair
power outside. somewhere about Sim
pheropol at oil events. so as to have
their line Of communication open ant
secured. II the Allies restrict them
solves to regular seige Of the poril
Of fSebastopol. the task is not an easy
one: because II will be difficult foI
them now, to establish a new basis O
operation. and with the old basis o
Balaklava and Kamiches, the north o
Sebas.opol can scarcely be properly
invested. At all events, if they d.
that. they will watch the movement
Of the Russian army on their flank
and the Russians in their turn will
harass them in their siege opera
tions. Things are likely TO have I
long run, in that case. II on the con
trary the Allies. leaving proper fore
In the proper place. near Sebastopoi
follow the main army Of the enemy u
the interior. provided they arc wei
enough provided with means Of trans
portI then il the Russians think them
selves capable Of accepting pitches
battle. well. they will fight; II not the,
will decline the battle. and retrea
towards Perekop. Things may agai
have a long run. But should the AL
lies. leaving proper force 10 their for
tilted camp, shift their basis Of opera
ton rapidly. and transfer their mai
force to Eupatoris. the condition Of III
Russians would become rather diff
cult. They at once have to abando
all the positions they may have selec
ted in the interior. and are forced {
retreat. The most desperate woul
become their situation. in case the Al
lies should decide on taking Odessa
Mlolagew Cherson, then the lines Q
Perekop. would no longer be Of an
avail to the Russians. Which Of thes
alternatives the Allies will decide ny
on. !, OF course. cannot anticipate.
is also due to own, that the choice ma
much depend on the local aud topc
, graphical circumstances; roads. wate
transports, DC. |, therefore, do NJ
pretend to augur more than 80 mucl
that for some months yet the Crime
an campaign is likely to 90 on.
, In the meanwhile, Austria will d
all in her power either to bring abo,
a Cancellation. or 10 induce the Allie
I Powers TO give to the war after tb
\ Crimean campaign sham charactel
! which would endanger the strength ,
: Russia. upon which she looks as upo
/. the last anchor Of her hope in time I
|, need. I do not think conciliatic
9 now possible; but the second fact.