The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-12-10


Of the French name stands
Yet, in admitting this to be the probable
view of the allied governments, persons have
not been wanting to assert that their oblec-
tions to peace could be overcome by large con-
cessions on the part of Russia. 1t bas been
said that II the Gar were to offer as gaaran-
tee to England a remuneration of his present
power around and beyond the Caspian, and to
concede to France the military occupation OF
Sea, neither Power would be able to justify
continuation Of hostilities, and peace would
be made. That some such offer might be made
by Russia has been inferred from her supposed
exhaustion, from her enormous losses In the
Crimea, from the moral effect of the defeat at
Sebastopol.
It is this suppostion which the reflections
suggested by the article in the Times are calcu-
lated to demolish, by knocking away the basis
of conjecture on which it is founded. Russia
is not exhausted; her army has not been des-
troyed; her material resources are not i'm
paired; her morale is not Slapped. Therefore
she is not likely to make such concessions as
would alone, in the view we have taken, 10
duce the Allies to suspend operations, and con-
clude peace.
1t is now abundantly demonstrated by the
war that under ordinary circumstances, and
with equal forces, the Allies will beat the
Russians in the field. 1t appears also that
though the preponderance Of military skill is
obviously on the side of the Russians, the
chances are that the Allies can concentrate
more military and mechanical power on any
given point than their enemy can; and there
fore that, all other things being equal the
capture by the Allies of any given point Of de-
fence appears to be matter OF time and ex-
pense only. 1t is also rational to suppose that
the war will 60 on as 1t has begun--that is to
say, will be q war of defence on the part Of
the Russians, a war of offence on the part Of
the Allies; and therefore that the injury in
ficted by blockades, sieges, and commandments
will be wholly confined to Russia.
Thus far, all is favorable for the Allies. But
success in war does not depend altogether on
the issue of particular military operations, or
battles won, or forts captured. 1t depends on
the strength that is left to the defeated CON-
blatant. 1t was his victories which ruined
Pyrrhus in Italy, and his victories which
destroyed Napoleon in 1872; simply because
the Romans In the one case, the Russians in
the other, were left after their defeats still
stronger than their enemy The question in
this war is simply Misunderstanding matters
in the best light for the Allies-after they
shall have taken North Sebastopol, Perekop,
and even Helsingfors and Cronstadt, they
will be stronger than the Russians? Whether,
after four or five years of successful warfare,
they will be better able to bring an army into
the field than the Gear? Whether, after they
have shut the Russians up for years within
their own borders, and benumbed all their ex-
tremities, England and France will be better
able to spend two hundred and fifty millions Of
dollars year in the luxury of fighting than
Russia
For, if all these questions cannot be un-
hesitatingly answered in the affirmative, it is
waste Of time to speculate on the consequences
of local triumphs, and perfectly idle to indulge
hopes of peace.