, 1855-02-17

=
able article, considered semi-offcial, which
appeared in the Paris ConstilWtionci of De-
cember LIST. The following is continue
ton Of that article AS SebnstopOl could
not be invested its communication with the
country outside is open, and it has an un-
limited garrison at its disposal The Rus
sian troops who come to-day to recommence
the fire are not those which yesterday de-
dccimnated by assault Of the assailant AS
one corps becomes demoralized, Prince
MenChicoif can relieve it by another The
defenders of Sebastopol have to struggle
neither against discouragement nor against
superiority Of numbers, as in sieges gener-
ally. On the day after the battle of H.
hermann, the European troops encamped
before the town amounted, according to
some calculations to $1,000 men, and to
others, to $4,000 Adding to them the
Turks and Egyptian troops, it is impossible
to reckon them at more than $4,000. The
column of assault which the Allied Gener-
ais ordered for the 4th consisted of 5000
men, and it was necessary to have two col
umns, each Of equal force to support them
1t therefore required 10000 men, or almost
half the effective strength Of the army, to
attempt serious assault. At the first
shot, however, neither Liprandi nor Dan
ncnburg would have remained inactive with
their respective corps. A powerful diver
sion would have been undertaken along the
whole line, which extends, from Balaklava
to Inkermaun. A battle would have been
fought on four leagues Of ground, that is to
say all the forces on both sides would have
engaged. In reality, it was not an assault,
but battle that would have taken place,
giving TO the enemy what he has hitherto
had against him-the advantage of position.
Under the fire of grape, and at the cost Of
enormous losses, our best troops would have
purchased, within the walls of Sebastopol,
advantages, which the slightest failure in
the great battle might render useless. 1t
would not be sufficient 10 conquer under
the ramparts of Sebastopol it would be
necessary to conquer also along the whole
line. Would it have been proper for pru-
dent generals to stake SO much ? All the
art Of siege operations could do against a
place has been effected all the advantages
conferred by consummate skill, united to
the most striking bravery, have been OBJ
tanned. In the present advanced state of
the works, Sebastopol, if ifreduced to its own
forces, could not hold out more than three
or four days. OF what advantage would
it be to enter with irreparable sacrifices,
into place which it would be necessary to
defend on the following day against an ar
myY The strength of Sebastopol is no
longer in its walls in ruins, in its dsman-
tied bastions, aud in the barricades which
defend its streets, but which would not long
stop the progress Of our victorious columns
it is in the army Of Dannenberg. For these
reasons, the Constitutional not only urges
that the Allies should suspend the siege
for the present, and disperse the Russian
army on the outside Of the walls, but it as
serts that they are about to do so.- San
Fra1eiSeO Herald.
VIsn OF LORD PALMERsroN TO LOUIS Ma
POLEoN-THE ALLIES VERY ANXIOUS FOR
PEACE AFTER ALL.-The Paris correspon-
dent of the London ChrORiele, writing on
November 25th, says In political circles
here a great deal is said Of a conversation
which has taken place between the Empe-
ror of the French and Lord Palmcrston,
on the subject Of the end which France and
England ought to propose to themselves in
the present war. The opinion here is that
if the four guarantees could be obtained,
both Powers would be satisfied but it is
difficult to sec how they can agree to ac-
cept terms which, though fair and equitable
at the period they were proposed, would at
the present day certainly not satisfy either
the one country or the other. 1t is be-
lieved here, however, that peace, or, at all
events, serious negotiations for the conclu-
sion Of peace, would be possible If Russia
would accept, and accept sincerely, the four
guarantees. But Russia has no intentions
Of the kind. The Western Powers now
know and are able to appreciate NJ. de Nes-
selrode's despatch to the Prussian Govern
ment, by which Russia appears to adhere
to the four guarantees. They know that
the adhesion is merely apparent. NJ. de
Nesselrode acts with regard to the four
points as he did with regard to the proto-
col of the 9th April He put such an in-
depreciation upon them that they in fact re-
viyed all the pretensions Of Russia-pre-
| bChoAOho "hiSh dAO buO 0liBlu vi buO pEtS-
ent war. With the four guarantees, as in
terpreted by NJ. de Nesselrode, Russia
would find herself precisely in the stair quo
ante beLtum. But neither at Vienna nor at
Paris or London has that despatch, much
as it has been commented on, been consid-
cred as the basis of a negotiation which
could lead to favorable result. At last ac-
counts, his Lordship had been clOseted with
the Emperor one or two days Some very
important negotiations are doubtless on the
tapis. Some say that the object is to dis
cuss the terms of a subsidy; others that a
grand financial operation is contemplated,
in which England and France should mu-
tually guarantee loan on an extraordina-
rily large scale.
The NEeorIAToNs.-It has been stated
that the emperor of Russia has expressed
bis willingness to negotiate on the basis OF