The true Democrat., 1855-06-05
From the London Tmes May > The BombardIncnt-Thc Hero of the Rus. SianS.

The E0mDaiuincRt-IhC Hero Of the KuS.
 sians.
 At length there is geam of hope from the | Crimea. We have once more assumed the ag- gresive we have been successful, and the sue cess has been such as to induce our war minis ter to publish it. The data from which we have to learn the precise amount of our advan- tages, are slight. We are given to understand, however, thas there has been a serious engage ment on the front and left barracks, and that the result has been the possession of the Rus sian rifle pits, we presume before those particu- lar parts of our line.
 The only rifle pits marked in the best and latest maps of the seige, are those that have grown up in the unfortunately very wide inter- val which we were obliged to leave from the beginning between our batteries and the Rus sian Notifications Owing to our want of men for the immense and multfarious work to be done, and to the nature of the ground, we did not advance our parallels nearer than about 1,2OO yards. As is we'll known, the result has been that the Russians, besides constructing immense redoubts before some of their strongest existing works, have also established success sivey rife pits and smaller redoubts at four principal points, viz: The Ovens, before the Flagstaff and Garden batteries; an extensive line of pits before the Redan, those actually in advance of the Mamelon, which in its turn is in advance of the Malakoff Tower; and rifle pits upon the Mount Sapoune. Most probably we have carried the rifle pits before the Rcdan and the Mamelon. five have done this, and if, as IS further reported, we have beaten the Rus slans ln their attempt to recover the pits on the following day, Chat is Wednesday,, we have at length been able to make up the chief dcf- cicncy of first operations, and pushed our VI attack within o 6iSta,,cn bn,a with more effect upon the Russian fortifcations The capture of eight mortals and two hundred prisoners shows how much the enemy had es- tabllshed themselves in the position we have now made our own, and the amount of protec" ton they had made for their men.
 1t Is evident that these advanced positions made fer us by the Russians are not to be re- talned without great and continued efforts on our part. The whole of the surface Is exposed to every kind of fire and, as 1t appears. the Russians could lot hold their ground there without large daily average of losses, so nei- ther can we. It may be assumed, therefore, that we have not made this advance; which, like the affair of the 18th utimo, has probably cost us many valuable lives, without determ- nation to push forward With the enemy, it Was ot course a necessity Cf their position to defend themselves as well as they could and
 
 pits, as at that price they could make us keep our distance from their principal line. An ad. vance to these posts of danger and honor is more voluntary on our part, and doubtless also proceeds on more settled plan. Indeed, every thlng indicates that We are on the point of en- ergetc OpcratlOns Whether we are about to attempt an assault, or to concentrate our forces suddenly for an attack on the Russian army in the held, IS not vet known. The rcconnois- ance Ill force of Omar Pasha on the 18th. cer. talnly points to the latter, and it's result might go some way to decide the allies iii that direc ton.
 It appears that, as many sagacious people have long suspected, the Russian force in our nel9hborhood IS very small - probably that force has always been exaggerated. A few Cossacks, occupying mound, or patrolng a hlll, collection of hutS, and an occasional line ot camp fires, have often deceived our generals into the belief that large Russian army was hoverng in our rear. Every sound calculation pointed the other way, and it is BOW questioned by competent authorities whether the Russians have ever had hundred thousand men at once ID the Crlmea. The story reported the other day. of sixty thousand fresh troops arrived in Sebastopol, and one hundred thousand more in reserve at Smpheropol, Was on the questiona- ble authority ot a Russian deserter, who seemed to De dressed up for the occasion, being evil dently superor to his assumed character of a 'hoh-commssoned ofhcer and who had been allowed to pass from the Russian line to our own With suspicious facility. When the histo- rv O1 thls great selge comes to be related bv the Russian pens, and its miracles described in their churches, no doubt the fact most insisted on will be the very small number of men who kept us so long at defiance, and inflicted on Us such serious loss.
 We are now more alive to the arts by which the enemy have multiplied their numbers. We shall now push our reconnaissance further into the held, and our parallel nearer to the walls the lmposture, for such we believe 1t, will soon be better understood, and we shall take that bolder line that belongs to our superiority in numbers, as Tn courage, endurance and strength We observed that thus far there was nothino to show whether the allies would deal first with the city or with the army in the field. What. ever may be intended, if indeed any decision has been come to, the present line of operations would be the same in either case For the pres ent we have to compel the enemy to divide his forces, and weaken him as much as possible at each point; unless indeed, we could hope to seduce hlm into such a mistake of our inten- tons as to neglect the point we had already marked for attack
 While we are ready to appreciate the cour- age exhibited in the advance of this week, un der the actual circumstances, and while we can- not but think it promises much more, vet we remember, with feeling akin to humiliation. that in this the eighth month of seige, con- ducted without stint of life or treasure, we are only just taking up the position we ought to have arrived at by the 17th of last October if not still earlier. Just at this moment, when we are slowly making up for lost time, and actu ally learning seize operations from foe we have been taught to despise, an opportunity occurs for comparing the spirit that directs the operations of the besegers and the beseiged. A letter from Sir John E. Burgoyne gives us once more the familiar picture of the veteran military sovont, who views siege principally as school for teaching the silence of forti6ca. tlOn
 The gallant old general is still of the opinion that every thing was none right, though it led of necessity to disastrous conclusion; and that in theory we have achieved splendid per- formance, though in fact we have suffered dis aster. Thus far Sir John is ready to excIaim