New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-04
FROM THE CRNIEA.

FROM THE CRIMEA.
Contrary to our expectation, the Pacihc brings
no confirmation of that rumor which the previous
steamer had reported from Paris, according to
which the allied commanders had no sooner occu
pied the abandoned Russian works at Sevastopoi
than they began to send an army to Eupatoria to
take the Russians in the flank, and compel them to
fight battle in the field, or at once abandon the
Crimea If any such movement has taken place,
it is carefully concealed not only from the Eu-
ropean public, but from the Russian Commander
in Chief, whose dispatches come down to the 18th
ult., and who states that no change had taken
place at sevastopol As far asall our advices from
the allied camp 60, ii would seem that the generals
were so overwhelmed with their sudden and unex-
pected success, that they had not the slightest idea
Of following it up; while the important business
of chasing the cannon and counting the shot found
in SevastOpol would appear to leave them no time
for Interior operations in fact Pelissier seems to
have nothing better to do than to initiate Marius
on the ruins of Carthage
1t is possible, however, but not probable, that
under this silence of the telegraph, and in
spite of the ignorance Of GorchakOf, one of the
two mOveme hts which alone seem to promise
rapid termination of the campaign may have
been set forward In that case the next steamer
must bring the report of a sudden attack upon
the line of communications on which the Rus
sian army in the North Fort and on Mackenzie's
flights depends for its supplies But as we say,
such demonstration is not probable. Had it
reoily been undertaken, We could hardly have
failed to be informed Of it. 1t may well be called
impossible to move SO, 900 or 10000 troops
without the knowledge of an opposing general
epcamped upon commanding hight within
eyeshot of one port of enbsrkation, and with
his outposts in view Of the other 1t is then
reasonable conclusion that entire inaction pre-
vailed in the allied lines from the 9th to the
18th ult and this 10 a great military error on
the part Of the generals
Here is an army Of some 100000 men, amply
provided with cavalry and field artillery. flushed
by victory, having obtained success which they
had no right whatever to expect so suddenly, op.
posed to an army six times beaten inferior in num-
bers, moral character, and tactical mobility-and
yet this superior and victorious army confines it.
self to the small spot Of ground to which it clung
when it was the weaker party True enough, the
late Crimean correspondent of Tie London Herald
gives us a formidable description of the Russian
position on the Mackenzie Nights and maintains
that there 10 no way of turning ii, on account
of the want of roads, but even if that were the case
Eupatoria is there, bridge-head by which the
Allies can debOuch with 60, 600 or even 100000
men on the Russian rear. Besides, what is alleged
hon L. e kha H.
Yalta is all derived from hearsay, as no allied
officer reconnoitered that ground, and the eI-
listing maps show plenty Of foot paths and sheep
tracks. Besides, the Crimean chalk hills are
nothing like the Alps or Pyrenees with respect
to impracticability. The long, lazy, drowsy siege
seems to have produced, particularly in the
English camp, a sort of sleepinem and i'm
mobility, which would make generals and sub
alterns almost lOsthe campaign in the field
Whenever an advance is spoken Of hundreds Of
difficulties are raised and the plainest movement
is made to look almost impossible. The slow
coach system, so inherent in the British army,
seems to have got the upper hand completely,
and even to have infected the French The cour-
age spent in the attack of Sevsstopol seems to
have drawn 90 largely on the moral resources Of
the Allies that the instructive sense which to
everybody suggests an immediate following up of
the victory, appears to have been completely want
ing in their councils Of war L. it the case that
they have 30 long and so stubbornly stuck to one
object that, this object once attained, they
have lost all power of initiative, and do not sppre
cate their own positioni
Meanwhile the Car declares in a letter to the
King ofPrussia-sf which We elsewhere publish
summary-that Russia will not make peace
Siter defeat; and all the remainder Of her dis
possible troops are ordered to the South The
first army-corps will very likely continue to
occupy Poland; but the Guards are by this time
on the mSrch, and i. is even said that the EN-.
peror Alexander and his two brothers will now
60 to the seat Of war. But on the other hand,
the French are busy embarking troops at Mar.
settles and Toulon; regiment after regiment is
sent of as soon as the steamers arrive, and the
hurry 10 such that they are ordered to 60 straight
TO Kamiesh without touching at Constaatinopls
There 10, besides, great French cavalry reserve
to be formed ct that capital, while the English