The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-03-15
WASHINGTON, ID. c.
[ooPYRIeHT SECURED BY THE AUTHOR.
For the National Era.
THE LEGAL TENURE OF SLAVERY.
LETTER XVI.

STATE OF THE Observation-Disclosures OF EX-
PosTTION-ul STRICT coNsTRUCTIoN"-t2
SPIRIT AND INTENr~-(3) RULE OF THE So
PREME COURT-EFrIER OF THESE FATAL. TO
SLAVERY.
To The Friends Of american Liberty:
We have already seen that Slavery could not
have been made constitutional in 1889, because
It was, then and previously, illegal. We have
noticed that the Constitution is itself silent on
the subject Of its pretended "recognitions, COM
promises, and guarantees" in favor of Slavery,
and that the pretence is modern one. not
traced farther back than the Missouri Com
promise of 1920, which seems to haxe given
rise to the idea. We have seen, further, that
s Slavery cannot be, constitutional nor the sub
ject of valid constitutional recognition, COM
promise, or guaranty, because the Declaration
Of Independence, the known antagonist of
Slavery, is still fundamental element of
American constitutional law; or lin the words
Of JOHN c. SPENcER) is "the cornerstone OF
our Confederacy, above all Constitutions and
al laws" And, finally, that such recognition,
compromise, guaranty, or tolerance, in favor
OF Slavery, by the Constitution, is impossible,
because Its own declared principles, aims, and
objects, as set forth In It's preamble, are of a
directly opposite character, insomuch that if,
IN It's details, the Constitution should hare en-.
tered into any such alliance with Slavery, or
tolerance or permission Of it, the Constitution
1tseJ would have become, for any purposes OF
protection, a nonentity, a nullity, nothing.
We either have no Constitution, or we have an
Anti-Slavery Constitution. Thus it must be,
in the nature of things, and from the necessi-
ties of the case.
But this argument, PRIOR, was not designed
either to supersede or to forestall an inquiry
concerning the details of the Constitution itself.
On that examination We propose next TO enter.
la order TO do this either intelligiby or salts
factorily, We must first determine, however,
upon what rules of Interpretation our examina!
ton shall proceed.
The courts and the lawyers, unhdppiiy, have
never been able to agree unanimously in respect
TO the proper rules for expounding legal instru-
msnts. But, on the present occasion, rery
happily, we eau afford to take either ono of
their conflicting theories, as may best suit the
advocates of constitutional slaveholding with
only this reasonable condition--that, having So
looted their theory, they shall abide by it, and
not run from the one 10 the other, in the same
argument, as they commonly do, running coun-
ter to their own rules, whenever the ext gencies
Of their canse obliges them to do so.
There are two conflicting principles of inter
probation, each sustained by high authorities, |
10 which may be added a third, intended to
operate as compromise, or reconciliation be- |
tween them.
]. The "strict construction" doctrine insists |
upon abiding by the deadletter of the irords, |
with no other clue to their meaning than that |
furnished by the dictionaries and the common
uses OF language. According to this rule it is |
oct of place to inquire after the general scope,
design, end, aim, and purpose, of the instru-
Inent, or the intentions" of the parties to the
instrument or whether they had any intentions
at all 1t is consequently ont of place, by this |
rule, to construe any disputed or questionable |
parts OF the instrument in the liz ht of its funda-
mental principles, or declared general objects |
Still less allowable it to go oat of the instru-
ment, to look after any historical facts that NAV
be supposed to throw light on the .intestionsr
oil the parties. All supposed, Evolutionary. or
pretended understandings, are, by this rule,
rejected. All dlmly, or vaguely, or ingenously
constructed circumlocutions, that may mean
one thing or another thing, are not allowed, by
Mis rule, to be cited in support of any claims
that can be made under them. They are sim
ply abortions, that fail to convey any certain
meaning, and might we'll be left out of the
instrument entirely. "Strict constructions" by
Its "dead-letter exposition can get no certain
meaning out of them, and, in order TO abide by
tho DOCTRINE they must be ruled out of the in
strument, and out of court. A paragraph
clause, or sentence, that has no certain. deiini
direct, unmistakeaJle meaning. is incapable of
expressing any thing, 10y the principles Of this
theory.
Again: If the strict dictionary meaning of
the words should chance to bring one portion
OF the instrument into direct contradiction to
another, las Is sometimes the case,) this prin
cipe OF construction furnishes no remedy IL
Will not allow the minor details TO be controlled
by the declared object of the instrument nor
the dead letter to be revised by the living
spirit If the declared object be Justice. liberty,
equity, equality, and if the minute details, by
the dssd-etter, could he made to subserve in
justice, despotism, and iniquity, strict con-
struclon would insist that the Constitution is
IN favor OF both; and the inevitable result would
be, that the Constitution is against the Const-
tuition that 1t cannot stand, and is of no bind
ing validity at all, since opposites cannot be
reconciled nor carried into effect. and there is
no umpire between them.
, The Esprit and intent" rule of constsuc-
lion Is the opposite OF this. Ii uses the acords
OF written instrument only for the purpose of
ascertainlng the " Intentions of those who en-
ployed them. And it goes anywhere else, in
search OF those Intentions Northumberland
history, and even tradition, are taken into the
account. Especially does it insist that the de-
clared end, object, AIMS design, and intent, of
The instrument, ITS prevailing spirit, general
scope and tendencies shall control its minor
details, and construc its doubtful and difficult
passages. And if any clause contains pro-
vision, very evidently, by its language, opposed
TO the general scope, design, and declared OBJ
lect OF the instrument, this rule sets it aside
presuming that it must have been an inadver
tency, or mistaken use of the terms employed
Thus IT saves the instrument itself from being
thrown aside, selfsubversve, and abortive
1t is IN harmony with this rule to construe
written legal instruments in accordance with
natural equity and common law, whenever they
can be construed, by any allowable use of Ian
guage, into consistency with them. And when
they cannot be thus construed it sets them
aside, as of no binding or legal force.
LETTER XVI TO BE CONCLUDED NEXT WEEK