New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-12-18

cODuery, me return OF the division Of French
guards to France, whittier il is to be followed BY
another division, with the gradu, transfer of all
the cavalry, both French and English, from So
yastopol TO the BOsphorus looks a. if all idea of
any offensive Advance toward Mackenzie. aud the
Upper Belbek had been abandoned for this season.
The guards have BEEN replaced, is is true, by the
freshly arrived division under Ch.sseloup- Laubs.
but had Marshal Pelissier intended an attack, the
presence Of an extra division, while the Guards
were still there, would have offered him a chance
which he certainly would not have lost In the
same manner the British fresh arrivals-s German
and Swiss brigade, with the large drafts from
the depots Of regiments whose service bahaiions
sre in the Crimea, and several regiments from
the Mediterranean statons-are being concen
tIated at Malta, scutari and Smyrna. Thus the
campaign may be said to be over so far as the al
lied comma, ders at Seyastopol are concerned
but these gentlemen do not appear to be convinced
that it is over for the Russians also. Up to the
latest dates the fear of q Russian night attack,
repetition of Inkerman and Trak!ir was so lively
at headquarters that an intended expedition to
Ksfia had been Iut of. Gen Spencer's brigade,
returned from Kinburn and destined TO form part
of th Is expedition was retained on account OF this
expected Russian attack; but with a wisdom
peculiar, as il seems, to British commanders, it
was kept on board ship at Kamiesh, so that in
case the attack should happen, it might be IS
useless as if it had been sent to Kafia.
This latter expedition would certainly have been
accompanied by important results, If undertaken
IA. =. IaEan Ia
on the seaside than Kertch was, if indeed il is not
Lees So There is no more doubt that the allied
feet can take Kafa than that the allied troops
can hold it when once established thsre Kafa
once taken, the troops at Kertch, now reinforced
By - OOO men of the Anglo-Turkish contingent,
would be in position to advance with safety; for
all the troops which Gen. Wrangel, who commands
the Russians there, may have ia the peninsula OF
Kertcb between tina: 10 gn, Kafa aad Arabat),
would have to withdraw or be cut oil. Now,
while the allied fleets can sail in single night from
Kamiesh and Balaklaya to Kafa, the Russians
have seventy miles to march from their nearest
point, Sympheropol-say fully three days march
through a difficult country, aud at least another
day must pass before the troops intended for the
relief of KaGa could receive the necessary orders.
Thus the Allies would have four clear days start,
if the secret we're kept and if nothing but the
course of the steamers, when once under weigh,
betrayed their intention. In such q case, it is
scarcely to be doubted that Gen Wrangel must
suffer a defeat before hs supports could como up,
and that this defeat would decide the fate Of the
little fort Of ARABIA also. But with Kafa, Arabst
and Kertch, the whole of the peninsula of Kertch
would belong to the Allies and new base of oper-
atous would be gained, as important in many re-
spects as that at EupatOria. Before the cam
paign On the Chernaya and the Upper Belbek was
over, there was this to be said against such an ex-
petition, that it would have taken valuable force
away for minor object from the place where it
was most wanted but tho defensive on the Cher.
maya being once resolved upon this reason eatrely
disappears.
The Russians have now In the Crimea fourteen
divisions of regular infantry NO Of the grenaders,
three of the second three of the third two of the
fourth, two OF the fifth, two of the sixth army
corps), forming grand total, az the very out'de,
of l25, 600 infantry. To these We must add some
10000 militia, by this time probably incorporated
with the line, body Of cavalry certainly not above
- coo men, and say $1,000 artillery aud sapperS-
in all say l65, 900 to rs 900 men. The Allies now
have in tie Crmea, in all, about $780, 900 infantry,
$4,000 artillery, and force Of cavalry diminishing
evsry cay by the transfer of this arm to the Bos.
pAazus, but which, during the Winter, may aver
age 1900, including Basbi- Bazouks in all say
10000 men. Thus, the forces on both sides ap
pear pretty equal in numbers, but the Russians
have the central position and may therefore at any
time concentrate the main body Of their troops to-
ward any given point while the Allies occupy three
uDconr eced points on the periphery Of large cir
cle In this particular case, however, these theo-
retical advantages amount 20 less than nothing. The
central position, in field operations carried on by
two armies of about equal strength, is certainly
the more favorable because it secures the shortest
distances from point to point, and thereby the
greatest rapdity Of movement. Ii secures the
advantage of attacking one portion Of the
enemy with superior force, and thereby two thitds
of the chances Of victory But where strong fort-
fed points, as Eupatoia, and positions of great
natural aires 9Th as the CheInaya, offer tho means
to even greatly Inferior fore. Of holding out
considerable time against powerful attack these
advantages are temporarily nulliGed. And, espe-
cially when strong feet of steamers as in this
case, enables the Alies, on the periphery Of the
circle to move their troops quicker by sea than
the Russians can by land, then the tables are
turned. The Allies, though apparently on the
periphery, in reality hold the center; while the
Russians, though apparently placed centrally, are
suffering all the disadvantages Of the opposite stu
alton. At present, the allied Generals, having
given up all idea of offensive movements, cannot
much avail themselves of these advantages. But
this consideration shows how much they neglected