The daily Gate City. [volume] (Keokuk, Iowa) 1855-1916, 1855-11-09

slgHRtiAg Vn0 tIme WHen bl ScHcIdi ihNo
should 60 into operation. Such would be
the literal and natural construction of the
act of subnission, inasmuch a. the legisa-
ture has not declared that the law should be
void and imperative in the event a ma iority
voted against it. But giving the act of sub
mission as liberal construction a. its Ian
guage and intention will admit of, stin 1t can
only be regarded in the nature OF q PROPOSE
tion TO accept, not TO legislate. The people
were not authorized to change or modify its
provisions, or substitute some other act TO
suppress incompetence in lieu thereof il SO,
this would be legislation, and not acceptance.
They wssc required simply to express their
assent in the light, perhaps, OF ratification.
They did SO, and the act remained lust as it
was before; but it did not become operative
law for 90 days thereafter, being the
time prescribed BIZ the Legislature.
With what show OF reason can this be call
ed legislation by the people, without a sub
version of oil proper ideas Of Legislative fune-
lions? Had they right to make single
suggestion looking to a change or modifca-
ton Of its provisionss Had they power or
opportunity to exercise their judgment or will
in relation to any of the duties or penalties
it prescribed, or control over the time when
it should go into operation? Certainly none
whatever. 1t had previously passed through
all the forms of legislation, and received the
Governors sanction, and the people after
wards ratified it and this, they say, made it
unconstitutional and void.
Suppose the people Of this State anterior
to the passage Of this law, had by petition,
or majority vote, expressed themselves in
favor of such law, and asked the legislature
to enact the same, and in pursuance of their
known will, they did pass law for the sup
preston OF intemperance; will any one who
understands the genius and theory OF our
popular institutions, say that this primary
movement on the part Of the people, which
was only the occasion OF bringing such q law
into existence, should be regarded as an act
of legislation by the people, invalidating the
law And is the case altered in the least in
principle, if the legislature upon its own move
ment pass such a law, and then say to the
people, if you will accept the law, it shall
take effect at given time? In both instan
ces the legislature would be the efficient cause
OF the enactment, whilst the people would be
SIMPLY the occasion, first of originating its
inception, and secondly of calling it into OPP
eratonpat specified time.
Another reason assigned upon which
great stress was placed, especially by the
judges of Michigan why such law was
the act of the people, and not the legislature,
IL, that It's operation was made TO depend
upon the contingency Of a popular vote,
which involved, as they allege, the exercise
of Legislative will and discretion by others.
Now the fallacy of making distinction
between the contingency of popular vote,
and other future contingencies, il quite trans
parent to my mind. Concede, as all do, that
the Legislature can enact valid statute, to
take effect upon the happening of any future
event certain or contingent, and it seems TO
me It would be exceedingly difficult to show
any essential difference in principle In the
nature of such events or contingencies. All
law is but the expression of the will of the
law making power. A contingent law can
no more be enacted without the exercise of
legislative will and discretion, than can an
unconditional law,--and when such law
does come forth, stamped with the impressed
the law making will, il possesses the essential
attributes Of u valid and binding enactment.
The faliacy of a contrary doctrine consists
IN surprising that popular vote necessarily
ignores the Will and judgment OF the legis-
iature, and substitutes that of the people in
Its place. The truth is, a popular vote ac-
cepting or ratifylng legislative enactment,
Will Of the law maker, and should give IN
creased power and efficiency to the law and
that species of refinement which claims that
such an act on the part Of the people des-
troys the validity Of the law, is opposed to
all our practical ideas of popular govern
ments and cannot commend Itself TO the
acceptance of this Court.
The prohibitory liquor laws Of Vermont and
ntnt l. -. Al
manner and under circumstances not dissimi-
lar to ours, and under which the same question
IN principle was raised. In Vermont the law
Was held constitutional, after ful discussion in
the Supreme Court Of that State; and in Mich
gan the objection to the law fell TO the
ground, and the law continues in force, be-
cause the Supreme Court was equally divided
upon the question Of its validity. In New
York, Pennsylvania and Delaware the de-
cisions of the Courts were made upon laws
submitted to the people under different Cir
cumstances, and involving to greater or less
degree the delegation of power to the people
TO legislate. These decisions, therefore,
ought not to have much weight in determin-
lng the constitutionality Of our law.
In overruling this last objection, | do not
wish to be understood as endorsing or APP
proving this system Of legislation as gener-
al thing. 1t Is liable to great abuse. Be-
sizes, oae branch Of the government has no
rgnt 10 perform It's functions in a manner
to embarrass the action of coordinate de-
apartment. Yet it is adm.tsel that in this
particular instance there was some apology
for doing SO, because the law in question il
novel and in some respects extraordinary
involving the exercise of high Legislative
powers, aiming in its operation to outlaw
commercially, description Of property
which heretofore has entered largely into thu
channels of trade, and which on that account
could not expect to meet with much favor
and therefore it may have been advisable *
have it armed with the authoritative seal o.
tho n.,nnla's will In sendinar IL forth tn do Ii