New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-03-17
THE SIEGE OF sEvAsTOPOL.

THE SIEGE OF sEVASTOPOL.
Still DO decisive news from the Crl0ea. Toe
position Of the Allies hiss " some what improved.
The very unpleasant, but unavoidable, step has at
last been taken; the British infantry b." been
withdrawn from the trenches, aud seut to Balak.
lava "for reorganization" after which it will
take its position on the nights round that harbor,
for IFS defense. OF the six div sons sent out be-
side supplementary regiments fully amOuntingto
another division, 10, 500 bayonets are all that re-
main under arms, and one half ofthese, above all
tbipgs, require thorough physical reorganization
before they can do any good in the field. Itmast
have been . hard day for the British infantry
when after losing four ffths of their strength BY
sheer mismsnsgement Of the home Government,
and by the inca pacty and negligence of their own
commanders, they had to march down from the
trenches, leaving tie whole of the siege and the
eventual assault to the French; leaving even
their own artillery aud naval brigade in the bat
teries, to be yirtusly commanded by the French
general. But there was no other means OF saving
the remainder Of the British army. The French
are saii now 10 muster about IS, 600 men, but we
should say 60, 600 weud be nearer the mark; for
they, too, have had serious losses. Thus, in
GLIDING the British artillery and naval brigade,
there msy be from 1900 to $1,000 men concsn-
trated on the Heracleatc Cbersonese; but that is
the very outside. OF these 10000 men are
necessary for the conduct of the siege, at the
very least for the great proximity of the trenches
to TIE Russian works non obGges the besiegersto
keep considerable forcs always concentrated in
the parallels in order to repel sorties, and this
force must be daily relieved. If not, it would
soon share the fate of the British army, which
was especially knocked up by constant trench duty
aud want of rest There remain from 30 600 to
81, 900 men to gusrd the line Of decentralization
from Balaklaea to the lower Chernsya, and to
make such advances in the field as may be prac-
ticabe to such force. tits, however, evident
that while the Russians have superior forces at
band, these 80 900 men cannot venture out very
far from their intre nched position. That even
now they are not able to complete the investment
of the south side of Sevsstopol, is confessed by
Lord Raglan himself, in his last dispatch by the
admission that large conveys Of wagons, laden
with ammunition and other stores, passed into
Sevsstopol in the beginning of February. II they
cannot be prevented from entering the place, how
will it be possible to obstruct the entrance, on
sudden, of reenforcements, enabling the Rnssians
to sally forth in such strength as to drive the
French at least out of the first two parallels,
while a simultaneous attack on Balaklava and the
nights of the Chernsya occupies the covering
army
Hitherto we have been sparing in our criticism
upon the scientific conduct of the siege; the lines
of trench have, Of course, not been put into pub
lshed maps and the maps that professed to show
there lines and the sites of the batteries deserved
no credit. Under such circumstances, it was
impossible to form judgment upon the engineer
ing portion of the operations, until events should
have given some clue which might, to degree,
take the place of knO Wedge of detail impossi-
bic to obtain. Now, however, we may say, that
even taking into account all the difficulties which
have or msy have Obstructed the progress of the
engineers, the conduct of the siege appears to
have been characterized up to the last by the
most thorough mediocrity. SevastOpol is sit.
uated on the lowest point of long and gradual
slope interrupted by rayines and partial eleva-
tons Of ground; accordingly it is in the worst
possible position for a fortress subject to q
land. attack, because it is commanded Mlitarily
speaking, fertilization 10 commando when there
are points of the surrounding ground, within
gun-shot range, whence you can see Into its in
terror, and especially whence you have view OF
the inside, or rear Of some of its lines Higher
ground outside, within gunshct-range, generally
determines command. Now, from the broken
nature Of the ground, both in and out Of Sevas-
topol, tits evident that there is hardly point in
the interior of the place which Is not commanded,
and consequently exposed to the direct horizontal
Ere of the enemy, if be knowshow to place his
batteries. 1t rejects the highest credit upon the
Russian engineers that, under these extremely
advantageous circumstances, they have sue
ceeded in raising Notifications capable of such a
resistance. The disadvantages of situation
commanded from without can only be avoided by
defladiDg (d!flsmext) or rsising the rampsrts to
ground, within gun-range is elevated enough to
afford view at the interior. But not only is
there limit 10 this defladlng; the erection Of
such works, requires so great an amount Of la
Dor that the application of the principle on
large scale becomes impossible. Indeed the re-
ports from the camp show that there are points
within range from which great part Of the in
terror Of the place can be surveyed; and re-
ports, maps and views concur in one thing:
that there is hardly a siege point in Sevasto-
pol which is not commanded BY, and therefore