The Athens post. [volume] (Athens, Tenn.) 1848-1917, 1855-02-23
owARp DOUGLAS Of TIE WAR.

en-. Sir II. Douglas, (than whom there is
higher military authority liying,) in a sup.
Elementary chapter to the new edition of his
work on Naval Gunnery, reviews the whole
campaign up to the present date, and on
"strictly scientific principles" condemns the
operations in the Crmea:
He says that Alma was worthless victory
nav, a mischievOus one; and ne shows the
reason why, namely: Ia laying siege To Sc
vastopol, it may safely be asserted that the
most advantageous point of attack was the
northern side; there the ground is most ele-
waited, and the large octagonal work on its
submit is It's citadel aud the key OF the place
This taken, the Telegraph and Wasp bate
ries on the northern heights, Fort Constan-
tine and the forts below being commanded
and attacked in reverse, must have soon talen
while the town, docks, arsenal, and barracks
% on the south side of the harbor would be ut
the mercy of the allies, who, by the fire of
their batteries, might have entirely destroyed
them all; whereas, by attacking the place from
the south, the enemy holding the northern
heights, although the works on the crest of
the southern heights should be preached and
taken, the town, the body of the place, with
its docks and arsenas, will not be tenable by
the besegers till the great work on the
northern side, and all its defensive depcn-
denotes shall be taken; and these, no doubt,
will be greatly Strengthened before the allies
are in condition to direct their attacks
against them.
The flank march Of the whole army to the
south abandoned at once to the enemy per-
fectly free communication between the place
to the besicged and his arms Of observation
in the field, and left open their line Of opera
ton from their base of Perekop; it disclosed
the alarming fact that from want Of sufficient
force Sevast0pol could not be invested on
every side; that the most advantageous point
of attack was not to be attacked but turned;
that the enemy's communication with the
strongest portion of the town-ts citadel, It's
keep, and the key Of the whole position-was
to be left open to him, and that, instead Of
besirging SevastopOl, the allied army was
only to attack m entrenched position on the
southern heights, supported in its rear by the
strongest feature and the most formidable
works of the place, ard open to receive sue
cor or achievements to any extent also, that
the attack of the place was to be carried on
without u covering army, distinct from inc
besIcging force, to protect 1t from beng as
turbed in Its operations 10y the enemy in the
field, who was thus left in direct cOmmunl
cation with toto which he might support
with all his force. The flank march of the
whole army to the south was, therefore, an
error in strategetical science, imposed OF ne
cessity upon the allied commanders by want
of numerical strength to render the attack OF
SevastOpol safe and successful; and such an
error can only be justified by the absolute
inability of the army to fulfl the conditions
on which the siege Of Il fortress, with large
army of observation in the field, can he sue
cesstul Such Il place need not and will not
capitulate, attacked as it is, however success
full that attack may be. The garrison cannot
be captured, since after making the most de-
termined resistance, it may retire to the
northern heights, or it may evacuate the
place altogether, and unite itself with the
army already in the field, after having render
ed the town uninhabtable, and destroyed all
the wurike stores it contains"