New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-29
construct detached works. They were com
PEELED to act upon the old method of fortifying
.l.oa Thor erected n main ram mart "a first

construct detached works. They were com
PEELED to act upon the old method Of fortifyIng
place. They erected main rampant as first
defense; it was indeed the thing most required
for the moment. Behind this they made
secor and q third line of defense, and sll the
while went ON Strengthening the first. Thea
gradually feeling their superiority, even at a
certain distar CO from the main wall, they adj
yarctd. constructed the Selinghinsk and Vol
byusk redoubts, and finally the work 90 the
Nsmelou, and long line Of rife pits, while on
the western 'front.' where the main body of the
French was placed, they could merely construct
few lunettes close 10 the main ditch, and
series of rife trenches not much further in adj
vance Thus from the moment the Mamelon was
fortified BY the Russians, the eastern front was
comparatively safe; while on the western front,
where such protecting outworks did not exist,
the besiegers gradually advanced to the very brick
of The main ditch. TIE approach on the right
attack the commanding and decisive position Of
Nalakofl bastion the besiegers had therefore
first to take the Mamelon; but the Mamelon
while il defended the MalakOf was again de-
Tended by all the works in its own rear; and how
they d, Tended it, was shown In the second
bombsrdment, when CanrObert dared not seri-
ously assault it. Even now there can be no
doubt that the loss of the French in carrying
III work must have been very great.
The reOpeniDg of the fire by tie Allies and the
energy with which General Pelissier, needless Of
the lives OF Ills soldiers follows up every favorable
chance to gain on the defense, are accompanied
by o complete stagnation Of operations on the
Cbernaya. This mode of proceeding at once
gives us an insight into the character of Pelis-
ser coDfirmatory of his former reputation for
tenacity, Obstinacy and recklessness. There
we're two ways open to him; to take the field,
inclOse SeyastopOl on the north side also, and
then t,ke up the siege again with redoubled en-
ergy and quadrupled chance of speedy sue
cess, OF else 70 go on in the faulty way of the
last eight months to cling doggedly to the south
side, destroy every stone of 1T and drive the
Russians out of place which after all, if re-
ducfd, could not be Occupied BY his own troops on
account of the batteries on the north side.
There is not military man of sense in either
hemisphere who, on the news of Pelissier's
pomil stion to the command, and of the great
reenforcementsr received BY the Allies, did not
expect that he would at once take the first
cOUrse. Most particularly when Oner Pasha
with %, 600 TURKS came round to Balaklaya, there
was no doubt that the Allies were strong enough
to carry on the siege, to send $1,000 men to
Kertcb and still to advance into the field with
more men than the Russians could spare to OPP
pose them. Why have they not done so Are
they still in want of means of transport Have
they no confidence in their ability to carry on
campaign 10 the Crimea We do not know. But
this is certain: unless Pelissier has rery cogent
reasons to abstain from taking the field, he is
purs uiDg out of sheer obstiOacy and self-will,
an extremely faulty coursei for with loss
equal to that be is now continually subjecting
his army to, in assaults, he might obtain results
in the field of far greater magnitude, and OF
far more decisive effect. To take the south
side without having even invested the north
side, which completely commands it, is to pro-
coed in utter defiance of all rules of warfare,
and If Pelissier is sent upon that, he may yet ruin
the great amy he commands.
We will, however, give the new commander
the benefit of every doubtful circumstance. 1t
II ay be that the struggles on the left attack
were Inevitable and provoked by the counter
approaches of the Russians. 1t may be that it
was necessary to cobfne the Russians to the
limits of their original lines-to convince them,
by few hard, irresistible blows, OF the supe-
riority of the besiegers-before separation of
the army into siege corps and feld-corps
could be ventured on. But allowing even this,
we now must say that the utmost limit has been
reached and that any further serious attempt
upon the body of the place will be a downright
blunder, unless the strength of the Russian army
in the field has been first tried with all the
forces that can be made available for the purpose.