The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-08-16

London, Baron Brunow, chiefly conducted the
negotiations relative to this affair, while the
diplomatic transactions of France in England
were contded to NJ. Guizct-whO, with all his
eminent abilities, is not a very subtle diploma
tist, and was certainly not capable, in that ca
pacity, to cope with Baron Brunow.
have already mentioned that the French
Government had promised Mehemet Ali to as
SiSt him in maintaining his possession Of Syria.
or, at least, the chief part Of it. The Soult
Ministry, that had given this promise, had
meanwhile resigned; but NJ. Theirs and his
colleagues, who had succeeded to the manage
ment OF the affairs of France, considered them
selves bound to keep the promise which their
predecessors in Office had given to the Pasha
of Egypt. As the negotiations relative to the
mediation which the Sultan had required OF
the FIVE great European Powers were transact
ed in London, NJ. Theirs FASTENED to instruct
Guizot not to neglect any opportunity Of dis
suading Lord Palmerztou and his colleagues
IRON entering into any engagements which
would be contrary to the promise given by
France to Mehemet Ali.
But NJ. GuiZnt appears not TO have paid due
attention TO this important affair, nor even 10
have imagined that the English Cabinet might
possibly be induced TO enter into g secret treaty
with the Governments of Russia, Austria, and
Prussia, in order TO wrest Syria from Mehemet
Ali. 1t is also possible that he believed that
Count Pontois, the French Ambassador at
Constantinople, would succeed in countcract-
ing the influence of Lord Ponsonby, and induce
the Turkish Government to cede at least a
great part of Syria to the victorious Pasha OF
Egypt, IN lieu of his continuing to acknowledge
the supremacy Of the Sultan. and to pay a
yearly tribute. But however this may be- It is
enough to know that the celebrated treaty of
the 10th OF July, lS4O, was concluded without
NJ. dulzots hearing or even knowing OF the
intention of the British Government relative
to this matter.
Inc following causes appear 70 have actuated
Lord Paimerston In taking that step the con
slant instigations of Lord Ponsonby had pre-.
possessed him very much against the aspiring
Pasha OF Egypt, whom he suspected of being
secret enemy of England, and a warm friend Of
France. Lord Palmerston as well as his col.
leagues, appear to have hoped that they might
relieve the distressed state of the English trade
by opening new commercial way through
Syria, which they apprehendcd that Mehemet
Ali, II remaining its possessor, might shut to
English notwithstanding thus that trade
was not much likely to flourish in that province,
under the rule of the disorderly and weak Gov
eminent OF Turkey. The peaceful sentiments
OF Louis Philippe made the English Ministers,
and especially Lord Palmerston, confident that
the French Cabinet would most certainly follow
in whatever direction he might choose to lead.
1t is also possible that he was, to some extent,
actuated by the desire Of thwarting the plans OF
NJ. Theirs, OF whom he was-at least at that
tlme-no friend. He seems also not to have
been quite insensble to the batteries with
which Baron Brunow undoubtedly seasoned
his negotiations, in order to induce him to
l., Nh l. Il.
TRAN and Prussan Ambassadors Jointly set
forth for the pacifcation of Turkey, and the
preservation of the throne Of Sultan Mahmoud.
1t is to be observed, that the Russian Empe-
TOR was then represented as very anxious to
preserve Turkey entire, though We might be
justified IN supposing that he was already then
meditating how to swallow the whole of it him
SELF
Baron Brunow at last carried the double Oh.
Jects which the Governments of Russia, Austria,
and Prussia, had in view, viz: to gain the CO
operation of England in Furnishing Mehemet
All tor having drawn his sword against his L.
gitimate master, and to SOW the seed Of discord
between France and England.
Lord Palmerston Jointly with the Ambassa.
doris OF the three great despotic Powers, signed
the aforementioned treaty, without informing
NJ. Guizot Of this intended step, because it was
feared that he might then oppose it, and thus
render 1t more difficult to induce the French
Government to acquiesce in it. There can be
no doubt that Lord Palmerston hoped, when
the treaty was once concluded, that the French
Cabinet would at least not oppose its execution.
But though his calculations were correct, as
far as they concerned the King of France. thew
proved, nevertheless, very fallacious with regard
to M. Theirs. This able statesman perceived
at once the real intentions of the Despotic
Cabinets, and he did not conceal the interp-e-
tation he put on the treaty of the 18th of July,
1910.
1t has been asserted, that he would have
frustrated the designs of the enemies of France,
and preserved the friendship of the English
Government, by acceding to, or at least not
opposing, that treaty. 1t may be true; and
NJ. Guizot was of that opinion. But NJ Theirs
justly deemed that the friendship of England
was too dear, if it was to be bought by dishon-
orably breaking the promise which his prede-
cessor had, in behalf of France, given to Me-
hemet Ali.
Berlin, Prussia.