New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-10-13
THE GREAT EVENT OF THE WAR.

Sensational on the sth uls., are now fully known
10 u.s. through the official reports OF the allied con-
manders and the correspondence OF the European
journals, the most important of which have a.
r. adv occupied place in our paper or course
these interesting statements have been read quite
universally, and it is not necessary that we should
recapitulate the facts they contain. sWhat we de-
sire to do is to give readers clear idea OF the
conditions under which the assault took place, and
TO explain why, on that occasion, the Allies met
with such opposite results at different points Of
the attack.
According to Cen Mel, the French had pushed
their trenches at all points quite close to the hus
sian works Opposite the Little Redan of the Ca
reepipp bay (Bastion No. ~ and the Maakof (Bas-
ton No. q, the head of the sap was no more than
twenty. five yards distant from the Russian ditch
AT the Flagstaff, (Baston No a. the distance was
thirty at the Central, (Bastion No. 81 forty
wards On all these points, therefore, the storm
ing columns we're close to the works to be stormed
The English on the other hand, had given up sap
ping as soon as they had arrived at s4o yards from
the Great Redan (BastiOn No. 81. This was due
70 the spirit Of routine still predominant in the
English army. As soon as they had pushed their
trenches to that distance, they found that on
going any further they would be en6laded from
the Flagstaff has ton, which projects a good deal
beyond the other Russian works. Now, there is a
general rule in the theory of seges not to trace any
portion of the trenches so that its prolongation
will meet any point occupied by the enemy, as
this would lay it open to enhladng fire.
This is of course right enough when one can do
without such faulty tracing. But here, where this
en6ladpg fire could not be avoided (the general
plan of the siege and the nature of the ground
precluding the idea of taking the Flagstaff bastion
separately beforehand), it was evidently better to
make faulty trenches than none at all. The theo-
ret;ca rules in fact provide plenty of remedies for
sucb An unavoidable evil Trayerses and the COM
pound sorts of sap are prescribed in such case.
The French engineer officers, it seems, remon'
strated with their English comrades, telling them
that, although they might lose many men in push
inc their trenches under such adverse circum-
stances, yet it was better to lose them now in
completing work which would all but secure the
success of an assault than to lose them during an
assault, the result of which might be very doubt.
full from the want of covered approaches. But the
British engineers knew better. The result shows
them to have been grossly in the wrong
The French general distributed his forces as fol-
lows: Against the key Of the whole position, the
Malakoff, MAlahon's division to its right, against
the curtain connecting it with Bastion No. l, the
division of La Motterouge; on the extreme right,
against Ba.tion No itself Dulacs division The
Malakoif being the only point which, in case OF
serious resistance it was necessary to force at all
risks, M'Mabon had for his reserve division Of
Guards under Mellinet. So much for the French at
tack on the Karabelnaya side On the town-side the
Flagstaff bastion forming sort OF advanced citadel
on very strong ground and having interior works OF
conside rable strength, not to be Immediately
attacked in front but the Central bastion was to
be assaulted by LIE Vaillants division, which, in
case of success, was to be followed up by d'Aute-
mares division, ordered to turn the gorge Of the
Flagstaff baston, to assail which in front at that
moment Cialdini's PiedmOntese brigade was con-
centrated in the trenches. The position between
the Malakofi and the Flagstaff bastion was held
BY the English. They were to attack the Redan.
The Maiakoff was to be assailed first, and after
its capture, the remaining columns were to advance
on their respective objects Of attack. The Mala'
koif was large redoubt on the top Of the CON-
handing hill of that name, closed on all sides, but
having wide apertures to the for admitting re-
endorsements 1t was connected by curtain with
the Great and Little Redans to its right and left
they too were closed redoubts, containing smaller
works, intended for reduits; while the rear
faces, the embrasures of which looked into the
interior of the redoubts, formed a coupure. The
gorges of these coupures were again connected
with the Malakoff by second or interior curtain,
forming second line of defense. The interior Of
the Great and Little Redans was pretty free from
distractions. and therefore completely COM
manded by the artillery Of the cOupures and re-
Quits. But the Malakoff redoubt, on which the
fire of the enemy had been concentrated ever
since the Mamelon was taken, was crammed,
alongside the ramparts, with hollow traverses,
aaording bomb.proof shelter to the gunners and
troops on duty, while the interior was filed with
large blockhouses, rooted bomb proof, serving as
barracks, and completely unfit for defense. When
fret the news Of the taking Of the MalakOf ar
rived we stated that undoubtedly the Russians
had committed the same error az in the construc
ton Of the Kamtchatka redOubt on the Mamelon
enemys fire, they evidently had made the interior
of the fort unfit for defense against an assault
by cutting it up into small compartments. Our
opinion il now fully borne out. The labyrinth of
the Malakof, like that of the Mamelon proved
quite indefensible in ten minutes it was taken,
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