Daily American organ. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1856, 1855-07-23
From the London Times, July 8.
What the Allies Must Do.

What the Allies Must Do.
II is now universally admitted by all the engi-
neers English and French, before the place, that
the Maakoif Tower and the works about it are the
key of the whole position; and that against this
point the main operations of the attack must be
directed The chief Importance of the Mamelon,
which was captured by the French on the 7th Of
June, and is now called by them the Brancon Re-
doubt, il, that it ut enabled the besiegers to
advance their lines and works about TOO yards
nearer to the Malakoff than they were before, and
consequently, to drive on their approaches with
great energy against the main position. The sur
prise we have already expressed on previous occa-
sons that the measures We're not instantaneously
| taken on the 7th to secure this advantage was
equally felt by the army and by the Russians them
| selves; for in the course of the armistice which
was SO strangely granted, as if to enable the enc
my to repair his works, some of the Russians asked
Uhether the Generals were drunk when they ac-
coded to such request? General Pelissier says
that after the capture Of the outer works. they had
been rapidly converted into the basis of an attack
| against the Karabelnaia suburb itself But no
works by sap or otherwise had been driven beyond
them, and the artillery placed in them was still
| $50 yards from the Malakof Tower.
| Nevertheless, an assault under these extraor-
bombardment of the nth, and it was to be d.
rected almost at the same time by the French
| against the Malakof works. and by the English
against the Redan. Upon this arrangement an
other remark of great Importance presents itself
1t should be borne in mind that the Redan is
work which projects or advances considerably i'm
front of the Malakhoff, and that the fire even
from the Mamelon takes the Redan in flank. The
Redan is, moreover, lower than these works, and
| is commanded by them. The double operation of
the 18th Of June is therefore reduced to this di-
lemma If the French attack ON the Malakhof
works proved unsuccessful it was totally mpossi-
BILE for the English any other troops to occupy
the Redan, or to hold it even if they had crossed
the abattish and the ditch but if the French at
tack on the Malakhof works had succeeded, then
neither could the Russians have continued to hold
the Redan; they must inevitably have been driven
out of it in few hours by the fire of the Malak-
hotf and the Mameon directed against themselves,
and this result would have been obtained with GER
tainty, and without any assault of the Redan at
ALL Or, to express the same proposition In fewer
words, if the Malakhoff works were not taken, the
Redan could not be held by us and if they were
taken, the Redan could not be held by the Rus
slams.
In no case could the capture ofthe Redan have con-
tributed to the fall of the Malakhoff works, because
the latter in therear ofthe former and complete
ly enflade it, If this argument be sound as we be-
lieve it to be, the result is that attack on the
Redan ought to have been made at all, or at most
false attack to divert the attention of the enemy
from the main point. The real English attack
would have produced far more serious effect if
1t had been directed against the Barrack Battery,
the point assailed by General Eyre; and if a pow
erful body of troops had penetrated there they
might even have caught the Russians in the Redan
on their flank and rear. A Redan is redoubt not
closed behind but to attack il by assault in front
is to attack it precisely where it IS strongest The
cross fire Of such work from the faces of the bas-
ton and the thanking batteries is perfectly irressti
Bile, and the consequence was that no man got
within so yards of the ditch alive. Nothing in
short could justify such an attempt except the
moral obligation Lord Raglan might feel to share
the peril of our allies. But there was this differ
ence in our position-if tile French had carried the
Malakhoff, they would have decided the fate of the
siege if the English had carried the Redan only,
they would have decided nothing.
This being the unfortunate but inevitable result
Of premature attempt TO carry by assault works
still retaining the superiority of their fire, the
course TO be pursued by the engineers Is clear.
They have il in their power TO push forward by
regular approaches from the position of the Name
Ion against the Malakoff Tower, and eventually to
establish in these advanced works batteries of suf
fcient weight TO subdue the fire OF the enemy,
and we have reason 10 believe that this regular
operation has now been commenced. Indeed,
General Pessier states In his teegraphic despatch
Of the Sd instant that our works are progressing
satisfactorily and Il Il probably to this operation
that he refers. Hitherto, In spite Of the prodi-
gous resources which have been brought TO bear
against Sebastopol, the fire OF the besicgers has
been too distant, and too diffnse 10 produce de-
cisive effect on any one point The siege has now
assumed more precise direction aud with an ade-
quate amount of time, of labor, and OF artillery,
the approaches against tho Malakotf Tower will
acquire more Of that certainty which has hitherto
been the boast Of the science Of military engineer
ing.
But, while the allied armies are obviously en-
deavoring 70 concentrate their attacks upon the
place, we persevere In the opinion that there are
many points In the adjacent districts Of the Crimes
against which the large bodies Of effective troops
not employed In the siege works might with adj
vantage be directed The recent excursions con.
Quoted with judgment and success by Omar Pasha
and by General La Marmora, at the head Of the
Turkish aud Sandman corps d arniee, have pene-
trsted TO considerable distance into the lateral
valleys Of the Tchernaya Nearly the whole coun-
try on the left bank Of the Bebek has been visited
by these troops as far as the pass Of Atodor and
without encountering any serious resistance, re-
copnoisances have been made half way from Bal
aklsva TO Bsksbiserai. IL Is still extremely uncer.
tain what amount Of forces the Russians have in
reserve in the interior, aud there are strong rea-
sons for believing that the main body OF the Rus
sian army has been withdrawn to the garrison Of
Sebastopol
All appearances Of an aggressive movement ON
the part of the enemy from the North, have for
the present, seased and, though the country be-
yond the Belbek Is exceedingly uRfavorable to field
operations General Bosquets army Of observation,
assisted by the means OF transport at our COM
mand, may in few hours menace any part Of the
coast IL i, Of course impossible for us TO enter
with more detail on the possibility of such opera
tions but while the allied forces, amounting TO 200
600 men, remain confined within the plateau. which
extends from the Tchernaya to the sea, as If they
were blockaded by superior force it is more than
doubtful whether any such force exists. We dis
covered by experience the weakness OF the Rus
slams at Kertsch, at Yenikale, at Anapa, and on
every point we have attacked, except Sebastopol,
and we cordially hope that advantage win be taken
of the delay in the siege operations to make at
least another diversion against the enemy, on some
other point Of the theatre Of war.
COURT OF CLAIMS,