Staunton spectator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1896, 1855-07-25
Effects OF the Defeat.

The correspondent of the London Times, speak
ING of the repulse of the Allies on the 18th ut.,
says:
| Although the army has been disappointed by
the result of The attack on the Redan and Malak-
off, it has not despared-i does not despair ofthe
result of this very siege. venture 10 say that
the expectation of nearly every officer and soldier
in the camp on the day of the 18th of June was,
that the assault would be renewed that evening
or on the following morning, but we are now, it
is said going to attack the Redan and Malakoff
| by sap; we are about to undergo the tedious pro-
cess of mines and countermineS, globes and COM
preston, eonnoirs, fougasses, and all the appara
tus of scientific engineering, in which the Rus
slams are at least our equals. 1t is not too much
to say that General Jones, our chief engineer,
expects nothing ofimportance to be achieved for
several, many, weeks to come--that Sir George
Brown is wiser and more discreet. and Lord Rag
Ian less sangune and more perturbed than they
have been for some time past Cries of "Murder"
from the lips of expiring officers have been echo
ed through the camp, but they have now died a
way in silence or in the noise of active argument
and discussion. Oppressed by the news of deaths
doings among many dear friends, and by the in
telligence of the loss of one who was valued by
all who knew how to appreciate rare scholarships
quaint humor, pure heart, and lively fancy, l
can scarcely be supposed competent to view our
position in its natural aspect, or to escape the in
huence of the gloomy atmosphere with which
am just now surrounded
Lord Ragan's amiable disposition is acutely
touched by the loss of so many gallant men, For
myself, admit that knowing nothing of the war,
and merely chronicling, as far as possible the re-
suits of It's operations, do not see any possibility
| l. .k,, IL,
on the south side of Sevastopol or to make gen
eral attack on the Russian armies which are en-
camped before US. Every ravine has been made
another Sevastopol by their engineers. Oar Land
Transport Crops is so hardly pressed by the SER
vice of the Siege Artillery that, as am informed,
the ration of fuel has been, on several occasions
recently not forthcoming for the troops to the full
amount 1t is to be presumed that the allied gen
erals are acquainted with some facts respecting
the strength and position of the Russian army,
which induce them to think it would be unadvisa-
BILE to break up our camp and try to force the pas
ses o. fthe Belbek. They may distrust their own
strength OF the efficiency of their means of trans
port, or they may be deferred by the force and at
titude of the enemy They may be influenced
by considerations, and may act on information OF
which we are ignorant, but the belief Of many Of
6cers, of inferior rank and great intelligence is,
that the proper way to attack Sevastopol is to put
finger and thumb on its windpipe, no matter how
far the place may be removed from the great or
gan itself and let it starye.
We are not strong enough it is said to invest
the place Immediately outside, for we are only
2l0,O00 men, and it would require an army OF
25O,0OO or 260 ,0C0 men to occupy the lines,
which would enable them to resist at all points
the attempts of the enemy, whether from within
or without the Gordon of investment. The allied
generals. perhaps, feel that their only chance OF
cohesion exists in their being together and that it
would be unsafe to divide and split up this army
of English, French, Sardinians and Turks. not
only on strategica grounds, but on others affect
ing the morale of the force. 1t must be remem-
bered this great army is no flying corps. tits en-
numbered with huge apparatus of war, with an
immense amount of Ynaierial, with siege trains
and heavy ordnance, and warlike stores which
could not be left in the hands of the enemy, and
which, having taxed the energies oftwo great ma
tions in their transport and accumulation. cannot
now be carried away in few weeks. We have
converted the plateau into great fortress COM
manding Kamesch and Balaklava. If we aban-
doned it tomorrow the Russians would be in ii
the same evening; if we left small force to &C.
cupy it, the enemy would soon discover our weak
ness, and either carry the plateau by grand move
ment OF weary out the troops and defeat them In
| detail by constant sortles.