Southern shield., 1855-01-06
Abridged from the London Times, Nov. l7. Condition of the Beseiged and
 Beseigers.

Abridged from the London Times. Nov. IT. Condition of the Beseiged and
 Beseigers.
 The siege continues. Omitting the doubtful report of ano her great battle on the 11th, we have now telegraphic bulletins of the seige up to the 8th and 9th, and 1t is evident that at those dates the increasing numbers and bol2- ness of the enemy made no difference in the operations before the walls. It is only said that the Allies are fortify- ing their position on the left bank of Tchernaya, as might be expected, sec ing that the right bank is occupied by the Russians. The beligerents may therefore easily keep their several po- sitions for the present.
 What we have to deplore is the steady drain, by continued sickness and now and then victory. The prospect is sufficiently serious, but there is no inn mediate cause for anxiety. All the letters from the army show the feeling of perfect confidence and composure as to the present state of affairs, but some little solicitude as to the future.
 Reinforcements are wanted even for present effect. Every man in the army is overworked. Officers of the highest rank are dying, not only by the usual casualties of war and by exposure to cold, but by sheer hard work. None of the proper proportions are main tained. The besieging army is not in the proper proportion to the besieged; the number of artillerymen is not in proper proportion to the guns; the men in camp are not in proper proportion to those in the trenches; the hours of rest are not in proportion to the hours of work. Every thing is stretched. The army is extending itself, as it were, to dimensions not its own. Such viola tion of the laws of strength and health is sure to revenge itself.
 What the supply should be has been already fixed at a time when the diff culties of the seige and the number of the forces Russia could bring upon us Il from without were certainly not ovnr- estimated. We started with the idea of 30, ,000 as our contribution, and Ii was distinctly explained by all military authorities that an army required re- cruiting to the extent of third of itt number every year. Now, at the last date the whole effective force of the British army was no more than 5,700
 so that to bring 1t up to 30,000 we should have to send at once IA, ,300.- But the instant the new troops breath ed the new atmosphere, slept on the ground, and exposed themselves to the to the fire of the enemy they would be- come amenable to the same law of waste as the army they went out to re- inforce, and there would still be ne- cessity for more troops. All that is wanted at present is to keep up the force in the field to the amount of 30,000.
 Wholly excluded from the sea, the Russians cannot support very large army in the Crimea; not at least in the present state of its communication anC supplies. Should we happily succeed in taking Sebastopol their turn will come, and they will have to besiege u' without even the power of approaching their own shores. Occupying possibly our own deserted camp, they will have to draw all their supplies either iron the remote parts of the Crimea, O
 from the interior of Russia, througl the Isthmus of Perekop. We shall SC, how long that state of things will en
 dure. If it lasts long 1t will be ney chapter in the history of the war. {, The extraordinary character of tn
 difficulties attending our present oper ations before Sebastopol is not hkel, to be fully appreciated without som insight into the nature of siege under takings in general. In the present az 1t is received as maxim by militar, t engineers that the means of attack ar ; superior to the means of defence, or i l other words, that if any fortified place 5 however strong, is attacked accordin
 to rule by proper force of men an
 guns, it must inevitable fall within ; certain time, unless preserved by som . rare and singular advantage. = q Now, as the Allied armies were disem l parked on the shores of the Crimea ! e strength sufficient to conquer the enem : in pitched battle, and as they hay now for some weeks heen besiegin t Sebastopol with 9 most powerful fore 3 of artillery, directed by some of tn best engineers in the world, it may asked what circumstances have retard s ed their success, or why the place wa 5 not sooner taken? To this inquiry " : subjoin an explanatory reply.
 Sebastopol is not invested. Tn peculiar position of the town, combin T ed with the limited strength of the A]