New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-12-21


must conclude that Russia ia preparing. not for
peace, but for new campaign on the very grand
est scale
And indeed il cannot be denied that the military
position held by the Russians is BY far more favor
sbe than they had right to expect after their re
pea'ed disasters In Asia they maintain the block
ade of Ksrs in spite of their recent severe deiea'
end oil the Turkish troops in Asia Minor are nos
sufficient to drive them back. Nay, they even
cary out unresisted, offensive movements in the
valley of the Murad Chat Is. Z. Euphratis), men
acng the upper valleys Of the Ksrs Chai, the Ara'
(Arsxe.), and the Frat On w. Euphratis) Omer
Pssbs bsr indeed invaded Mipgres, but the sue
cess of bis further movements is now seen to be-
ut the least very doubtful, even though Mnravied
should remain where be is In the Caucasus there
has not been, up to the present time, any serious
insurrection of the mountain tribes, much less a
general one, and it wOald seem they are even more
tranquil than before the war broke out. In the
Grim ca, there can Low be scarcely any doubt that
they intend holding their ground, that is the Thole
of the PeDnt ua with the exception of few square
miles ard if they intend by this time, to hold it
during the Winter, they must have found means
to arrange the greatest difficulty the supply Of
provisions. For that their position, in merely
tactical and strategical sense is folly tenable there
can be no doubt the allied Generals have ief, them
the time to fortify the accessible points and to
march up their reeDforcements. We do not at
present propose to inquire how much Of all this is
due to the skill Of the Russians and how much to
the neglect, timidiy and errors of the allied Gen
erals; but the fact is that the Russians after the
loss of the Sea of AzoG, the interruption Of their
communication by the spit of Arabst, the defeat Of
the Cbenays, and the storming of South Sevasto-
pol, still believe themselves in position to hold
the Crimes during the Winter. And not only that
there are very strong indications Of an attack
being pr, pared on Kertch and Yenikale as soon as
the frost .bs,, have driven the allied vessels from
the Sea of AzoH ard the Straits. Thus, the actual
ground lost by the Russians during two campaigns
amounts to this: the Dobrodja, the Circsssian
coast, South Sevtstopol EupatOria and Kertch ;
while the Dcentrated efforts of the Allies have
been unable thus far to drive them out of Asatc
Turkey, or to wrench the Crimea from their
gap.
True, all these are negative results, and what
sacrifices Russia has had to suffer in order to
secure even these! Out Of 29t divisions of TO-
fantry at the disposal of Russia 19t have been
actively engaged some for three, most for two
campaigns, aud but a small portion for one cam
rsign only. All of these 191 division, have suf-
fered severely 40 much go that in many the
third and fourth battalOps have been or are being
-ood IN, he Grak .n1 md fhis in on;to
of constant arrivals of fresh recruits. OF the re-
naming ten divisions, not one can for the moment
be spared. Myrisds of men have been lost during
the long forced marches, especially in Winter
The reserve brigades are either incorporated with
the line or disposed Of as separate bodies Even
the regmeD'al depots have had TO march leves four
times az heavy as in time Of peace-re peated now
for three consecutive years-and yet have not
been able TO keep up the ranks of the army. The
militia, recruited by another levy requiring at
once az many men 81 the regular army in eight
years of peace, is now being incorporated with the
line A fresh levy, going on at this moment, calls
ont four times the number wanted in ordinary cir
cumstsnces All this is true enough. 1t is even
true Il at with the exception Of the ten untouched
divisions end about the same number of reserve
brgades, the regular Russian army, as it existed
before the war, belongs to bygone things. The
same regiments are there, and with cadres
pretty we'll filled after the incorporation Of
the militia, but they are no longer the
same soldiers. The vast majority are raw,
badly drilled recruits, and the Russian is a slow
hard at lear aing the soldiers trade. We repeat
it, oil this is perfectly true; but with such tre-
meDdous efforts. there cannot be the slightest
doubt that the number Of armed men no in the pay
OF Russia must exceed whatever she may have kept
up at sny previous period. The very fear of the
alice GeDel as-absurd as it is-Of being attacked
on the CberDsya, proves III the results of all the
recon- oisssnces from Eup.toria or Kertch prove
that at short distance from these places the Rus
slams were Always in petition to draw up supe
Iior forces. Whatever exsggeration there may be
in TIE ORDERS of the day of the Emperor Alexander
(aId these cannot be so very great such appeals
are intended to act a. much upon the army itself
as upon Europe it still remains trne that the Cri
me an army is strong enough to resist any attack
upon it, main po,itions that it is fully prepared to
Winter in the Crimes thaS during October and
November an uniI erupted tide of reenforcements
has flowed toward Perekop, partly to strengthen
the Crimesn army, and partly to form, as it were
IN army ofreserve intrusted at the same time with
the defer re of Nikolae and Cherson; that, unlike
lsst Autumn, the Necessary Coz centrations OF
troops have taken place before the bad season set
10; that therefore, the disastrous marches across
the snow-clad steppe need not be repeated; aud
thar, finally, the Russians can open the next cam
psign with marked superiority, unless they suffer
Disfortunes, (such as tbs British
asst Winter or unless tie Allies display the great
est sctiyity in bringing up fresh troops before