Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1855-11-21
BY REQUEST.
EXPLANATION OF THE REPULSE AT THE RE-
To The Editor of the Edingburg Couram.


DAN.
To The Editor of the Edingburg Couram.
S1R,-When l returned To Paris from q visi
to London about week ago hardly felt cour
are to face my French;friends. Sebastopol hat
been taken; the English had failed in .thei
assault upon the Redan, while the French hat
captured and retained.:the Malakof; the posses
sion of which by the Allies had forced the Rus
slams To abandon the town
Such being the. state Of things ], of course
expected that my French ncquaintances, with the
rood humoured raerv of their character
would chuckle over our failure and their sue
cess But, to my agreeable surprise, found
that everywhere in Paris the highest praise was
not only given to the determination and bravery
of our soldiers, but that the French public at-
tributed 10 the heroic resistance of our soldiers
the success of the day as much rs to those em.
ployed directly in the taking Of the Malakoff.
In France, such are the number of old officers
and soldiers spread everywhere over the soil
and such is the military turn given TO the militia.
~ mind, by the constant perusal Of the Cam.
paigns of the Empire, that strategic operations
are better understood in Paris by all classes
even to the lowest, than by the generality OF
wel-informed people in London. And when
the Times and the other journals, and their cor.
respondents, 90 blundering on, blaming this
person and that, and throwing chill upon our
poor soldiers, the French people, with justness
Of view, and frank generosity, allow TO our
troops as much merit as their own.
have the advantage of a pretty numerous
acquaintance in Paris, amongst whom are a num-
her of military men. As matter of course,
the conversation since the capture Of Sebasto-
pol has been almost exclusively upon that sub
! ect. have heard The question discussed over
and over again, and will now give you the
almost universal opinion of Frenchmen as to
that action This will be certainly more inter-
esting to your readers than any opinion of my
own.
The Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol.-
When that was taken the town was ours. 1t
was, therefore, necessary that everything else
should be directed to this end, and that every
thing else should be subordinate to the capture
of that fort. Bus in order to reduce the Mala-
koff, it was absolutely necessary 10 make diver.
sions in other places; because, if the Malakoff
was attacked alone, the whole Russian army
would be concentrated for its defence, and all
the men the allies could bring against it would
not be sufficient to secure its capture.
Hence the besiegins Of the Rednn and the
other forts all important it is true, but of which
the capture could not take place until the Mala-
koff was in possession Of the allies, the attack
of which, however, forced the Russians to with
draw considerable part Of their force from the
defence Of The Malakof.
On the 9Th of September the approaches 10
the Malakof were quite sufficiently close to
warrant the assault. The French were at less
than twenty-five yards from The fortification,
nearly every gun was silenced, the walls around
the fort had been nearly lcvecd by the play Of
the artillery, and the French had nothing to do
but to walk into the fortfcation, fighting their
way, of course, but without the necessity of an
escalade.
But the Great Redan was not in any way
prepared for an assault. The English trenches
were at more than two hundred yards distance
from the walls. The batteries OF the fort, both
in front and in flank, were in full activity; and
the taking and retention of the Redan under
these circumstances was physically impossible,
supposing the Russians comported themselves
with their usual obs,nary and courage.
Such was the state of things on the 9Th Sep
tember. The Allied Generals thought that the
propitious moment was arrived for taking Sebas-
iopol. General Pelissier said to General Simp-
son, 81 can easily, from the position occupy,
take the Malakoff; but The difficulty is to hold
it, before can bring my reserves and artillery
into action, and prepare it for defence. If sur
prise the Russians, which hope to do, and take
the fort by coup de main, they will return in
such force that the small number Of men who
mount to the assault will be overwhelmed and
driven back MS on the 18th of June. l do not
expect that the Redan can be taken by you
You are not in condition to do so but it il
absolutely necessary that diversion should be
made in our favour after our first success, to
give US time to breathe, and to bring up our ar
tlery and reserves. All ask for this is one
hour and will undertake to keep possession
of the Malakoff Make your assault, and give
US, if possible that length of respite. Throw
away as few men as existing circumstances will
admi. of, but engage the Russians for nt least
an hour, and Se6astopol is ours" Such is
the conversation supposed to have taken place
betwixt Pelissier and Simpson; and am in-
formed upon good authority that private letters
from French officers in The Crimea fully confirm
that the purport of whnt have stated was real.
ly said by General Pelissler.
Such was the plan adopted. It was exactly
in accordance with the tactics of the great Ma.
poleop, who was in the habit Of sacrificing GER
tain number of men, in order to secure the OBJ
ject in view. Napoleon was in the habit OF say
ing to colenel Of regiment, without mlncng
the matter, sAller vous faire tuer, uous et potre
regiment" when ne sent devoted corps to the
attack of redoubt Or position, which, he was
we'll aware, there were mot the slightest chance
of taking, and that in order to facilitate the sue.
cess of another part Of the army. And the
rorps of General de Sales, who attacked the
Central Bas,ion, and was repused, was placed
in the same position as the English, except that
the work it had to do was not quite so desper-
ate. This is the real state of the case fully nd
mitted at Paris, but which, of course, could not
be openly declared in the dispatches, although
it is hinted at sufficiently clear to military men
in the report of General Mel. The devoted
band which attacked the Redan, as well as the
French under de Sale, were in II manner saeritl-
ced to the success Of the great object IN view,
the retention of the Malakott. They were the
forlorn hope-les enfans perelus-of the allied
armies. This the laundering correspondent OF
the Times has not had the sagacity to discover,
and he has expressed himself as if the sole OBJ
iect of the English had been to take the Redan.
Nor has the Times itself, with all its laundering
articles against General Simpson, seen clearer.
The explanation which have just given, and
which is recognised by everybody in Paris, is
the real one, and clears up the apparently mex
plicable conduct of General Simpson. Why, it
is said, did not he send reinforcements? Be-
cause he knew that no reinforcement which the
English army could have sent could have secur-
ed the capture of the fort, and would have been
| = ,3a,;a,,, on1 ,,oolaaa loss of life Hi5 oh.