The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-05-17
THE REFUSAL OF GOVERNOR GARDNER TO
REMOVE JUDGE LORING.

to the request of the Legislature for the reno
sage sent to the House of Representatives, May
| 10th
The first reason is a constitutional one The
power of removing judge, on address from
| the Legislature, is conferred in the proviso to
art. chap. 3d. of the Constitution of the State,
in the following words:
provided, nevertheless, that the Governor,
with the consent of the Council, may remove
them, upon address of both Houses of the Legis-
lature."
The power is conferred in unqualified terms
1t is not required that the Legislature or Gov
ernor should act from any particular reason.
Had the trainers Of the Constitution intended
| to specify the cases in which removal, by ad-
dress, should be effected, they understood the
English language, and would have embodied
| their intention in words. They did not do so,
| but conferred the power, without qualification,
| and in terms so. clear and unambguous, that
| to cOnstrue them, so as to add to or take from
their obvious meaning, to set aside the provis.
| ion itself. Such construction Governor Gard
ner is hardy enough to venture upon, for, as in
his opinion, the trainers of the Constitution
could not have purposed to confer this power
of removal scithOa Limitation, therefore, he in
terpolates the precise limitation which he thinks
ought to restrain it, assuming that the provis-
ion is applicable "only to those cases where a
judge is incapacitated by the providence of
God, and having committed no crime cannot
be reached by impeachment an assumption
which substitutes for the Constitution of the
State the opinion of its Governor
But, admitting that he has the power of re-
moval, ought he to exercise it in the case of
Judge Loring? He answers, No, and for these
! reasons:
| He cannot consent to set an example of re-
moving Judge, on account of mere differ
ence of opinion with the reigning party.
| No crime is alleged against that functionary,
in Office or out and no intimation is given that
he has not satisfactorily performed his duties
as Judge of Probate.
If the Judge, as is alleged, has done an act
which, without being overt crime" renders
him so obnoxious and Objectionable as to make
his removal desirable let the Legislature pro-
vide by law hereafter for such cases.
AS to the allegation that he has shocked
the popular sentiment of Massachusetts," the
duty of Judge is, not to conform to such sen.
timent, but to obey his convictions of right.
Suppose, as is charged, he decided erroneous.
ly in the case of Bnrns, his decision was a mis-.
take-does not involve his integrity.
1 I'm 10 he
harshly and partially in the case, there is con.
fiicting testimony, and he is entitled to the ben
eft Of doubt.
As to the objection that Judge Loring did
not act up to the convictions of the people of
Massachusetts, concerning the constitutionalitv
OF the law he was led to enforce, regard must
be had to the constitution of the human mind.
and the historical succession and position Of
events touching this enactment"
The Governor then proceeds to trace this
succession and position of events" in relation
to the Fugitive Slave Act, for the purpose, if he
has any purpose at all, of extenuating the con.
duct of Judge Loring, and showing that, in
recognising the cOnstitutionality of the Act, and
administering it, he had the highest, most i'm.
posing authorities on his side.
Such is the reasoning by which Governor
Gardner attempts to justify his refusal to re.
move Judge Loring.
AS to his constitutional argument, it does
not deserve the notice already bestowed upon it.
His argument against the exercise of the
fpower, admitting that he possesses it, will con-
vince the people of Massachusetts,, not of the
proprety of his decision, but of the general
coincidence of his views on the Fugitive Slave
Act, with those Of Judge Loring. Regarding
1t IN this light, his conduct, although it may
fail to satisfy their demands, will appear con
sistent lie believes that the Fugitive Slave
Act is constitutional; and, as we infer from
the tone OF his argument, that it is not so re
: pugnant to justice, to the principles of the
Common Law, to Humanity, to State Sover
eighty, and to the Civilization of the Age
, as the People of Massachusetts and thei,
E Legislature regard it. With such opinions, hi.
, refusal to remove the Judge is not surprising
Did ne concur with the People and the Legis
!, lature IN their views of the act, he would fine
e no constitutional pretext for declining to ac
cede to the request of the latter; for, he is wei
t aware of what in his whole argument he stu
diously keeps out of sight, that Judge Loring
s as Judge of Probate, is not obliged to hold tn
!? appointment of United States Commissioner
!, that his acceptance of the appointment wa
d entirely voluntary, and that he might at an
e time have resigned it, so as to avoid the ad
d ninistration of the Fugitive Act, without VIC
e lating single conscientious scruple. All tn
. talk OF the Governor, therefore, about the ii