New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-04-28


defensive force Of Turkey, and overrAtsd the
offensive power Of Russia; and after lesgsa.
eped eru9erstion Of oil the ress,ns Why tho
expedition was originally intended to be only de-
fensive, the article proceeds:
. Events did not reszs these provisions. The
courage Fl ne Turkish o,my and the Ssesenc Of tie
bH,es speeo 10 make the kussans rase t< stege and
rabdrow TO the ofh,r ,id~ Of he Danube
1t 10 Temsrf sbie that the Msnvesr does not
mention the Austrian Treaty of Jdoe IA, TO which
she English papers attributed the retreat of the
RussisbL 1t seems, indeed, az il the omission
were Intentional Explained BY the growing dis:rass
Of Asstris's policy 'ioce the death Of the Emperor
Nicholas. The article continues:
"Wtenever an enemy retires, it eTsrs a greet
temptation to the army before ~hich il rstres-
namely, TO purus bat when such pursuit may con.
promise army there il more glory in re nauing
stiil tbsn in sdyal clog The love of glory
cutsiiio the bidoiIgs of " SOON. Whist could the
ADslo-FJsr cb srUy have done by entering devss-
tsfed country without roads, Inundated by water snd
infected with pestentsl oisessesI They you'd h.ve
found Lot victory. but destruction without snug-
gle-destb without compet sstiop."
1T has been fsid that after the retreat Of the Ras-
sisps operations shoui hsve been com men ,ed on the
Danube, snd Bes.sr-bia entered. Let as say II at
ozct -rihort the consent Of Au,t't0 our army rzs
toyJiddta under penoity Of The most freId6r catrs
t,ophe, TO aerance the Danube Let Us not 10 fact
fOrt Ct that for Dc point that COR basis Of ops
the sea- 10 lose tina, to risk and con.
premise all " not only mt-ry sciencs bat CON-
mon fepse which forbids 60 900 Anglo Fferch sad
% COO Turks to adventure into 40 unhealthy imorac
.icsbe eountIy not A1usM1 e<at means of trsrs-
cvtplry nor 1sge Ddece, nor dtpo,s OF p'o1u,oHs al
Shasla, or Hayna or Ssisstvia Al saeserssoarcss,
indispensable 10 campagn, cen o bot be copjared
I'D in a ay 1t eco lea, ues from home. We shontd
have cen totslly In want Of them We shoqld nave
been in presence of Russian army o. 2oO 0OO meo
vnjch would have cited u, on firm footing On its
own ground in refrea;ing before us would ave
led us into sill more dangerous position leaving
L o other alternative ibsn on unequal bs,ue eu
impossible retreat. timpe two days reeonnois-
tance in the Dobfo0j4, which cost lie more than
the most sappuinary combat, is rio,f Of what We
cay. Gel erals not Undertaking ,he danger Of such
sn enterprise might have committed an irrepaable
error, end wono hare com oro nised-we do not hest
teie TO say so--tbe respons billty of command.
I" To make a campaiga beyond the Danube and on
he Pyrth p0ssibie, yepsat IT, The cooperation Of
Aastrta necessary. Now, Government never
goes to war niles compelled u do SO by unavoidable
circumstances. Ii only goes 70 war If 1t can do 30.
Ausiris wss not prepared az tina. moment la break
ire with Russs she wished TO be certain Of Ger many,
and hsve 500 000 men under arms Her digoity her
int. resis the example Of the Western Powers Urged
her TO prof. our CT herself and 8c prudence bsds hr
wait and collect Der military forces s.rens then her
political alliances before joining in the struggle.
1t lie evident from these passages tia. Napo-
leon does not wi,b TO show that he is aware Of
the resources OF tee Principalities, where, be-
yond the Danube, be might have found sufficient
means of transport at his disposal, and depots of
provisions at Gslatch ard Glurgevo, more than
were required for bis 60 600 men. The Austrian
Amy OF Occupation is feeding upon the Psiaci-
palities, snd the surplus of wheat and maize il
now in the course of expectation, sod unless de-
tain ID by the Rutsisn fotila end the works at
REM, it will soon reduce the price Of corn even
in the port Of London. Still, the real cause of
tran sferiiDg the teat of war to anosher quarter
than the Danube, IL clearly enough indlcstet-it
was Austria and the Austrian alliance, which be
couIted.
The M0nitear does not explain why, under such
the decent upon Odessa was not
Q Ute mpted, but we know sufic'ent,y-ths war
would room have reached the ancient dependencies
of Poland, Volbynia and Podolia, aud Austria
protested seainst aoy movement which might
have reused Poland. The expedition to the
CriHes was, therefore, mooted. The Aonitcv
says:
AN expedition sganst Sevastopo might hasten
fhe dknouerent II the war IL had deter. cd and
limited object; it might place 10 the haJds OF the AL
les a province ana q stronghold which. once Con-
querec, would be pledge AM means Of exchange
to obIsin peace II was unoer tbe influence Of those
const rations that the Commanders in Chief con.
ceived Il idea decreed the execution OF the plan
"Tbis s1le COTTON hsving been examined q. Paris
and Lop0Cn as al eventually, the MIstalSt Anaud
n ived then net the nstfUcuonsthey could not b5
civ Oh at such a distaJce-bu the following advice
ITO obtain exact information OF The etreagti of
the Rutsian forces in tbs Cimee; if not too consider
sble TO land at spot which might serve as basis
for operations. Tbeodosia NOV Kafsl appeared the
most eligible spot; although that point Of t1e coast
has the disadvantage of being distant forty leagues
from Sevattopol il nevertheless Offers great sdvanta
gee First, tie boy is vast and saie 1t woalc hold al
the vessels Of The squadron aDo the vessels WIN pro-
visions for tbs troops. Secondly, once established on
that point it might be made real basis for opera-
tons
"'In thus occupying the eastern point Of the Cri
nea, all the reelfcrcemeBts coming by The Sea OF
AzoG and the Caucasus, could be en-: off. A gradual
adv az &C could be tbs center OF the
try taking advantage of all ts resources Synphero
pol the strategic center of the penns ula would DC &C.
cupied. An advance would theb be IN ade 90 Sevas
ttpol and probably great battle fought Oh that road
II lcst, retreat in good order Oh Kaa, and nothing
is compromised if gained, TO besiege Ssvastopol 10
invest 1t completely, and its surrenoer woull follow
as q matter OF couIte, in short interval.
" Unhoppiiy those counsfIs rere not tollooed. Be
it that TIE Commandersn Chief had not sufficient
troops to take 80 long journey in the Cfme,, Be Il
that thy expteted more speedy result by a bold fsf
sudden coup man, hey resolrsd, as IS knOwa, 10
land at ftp leagues only from Ssrastopol. The go-
iious battle OF the Alma al first justified their decision.
But scarcely vicors they perceived they had port
10 hem as basis for operations. Then urged
by that insincJ!e instinct q presercatien rhch
dtcere, in al haste they advanced south of Seyasto
pol toward BslskIaVa. II was m 1reover clear inst
lie amy could not maintain itself aud live ia sn enc
nys country unless in direct communication with the
feet