New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-05-29

/ oi men Omer has brought - kdGikOl az hl-ner
figure than we have estimated it, but he allots
corresp ondng English force to make up the
garrison at EupatOria, so that on the whole his
estimates do not vary from ours With
these forces we must take into our account 1000
men Of the French army Of reserve who may
be expected to arrive By the time Canrobert
intends to take the field, and the 1900 Pied
moutese landed on the 9th of May. The allied
strength in the Chersonese will then be as fol-
lows:
Fr,neh llfay and Artillery. $50 csvuy...".l5oo
Enr.sh e" oecfO ............2,eoo
Piesmoa,ese" " 400
q.,.,.................r155o 100
Whether the French reserves have any cavalry
with them we DO not know, or if they have,
whether it will arrive in season for the COM
moncement Of operations il uncertain; how
ever, to make as liberal calculation as possible
for the Allies, let US add 3 900 horse to the above
figures, which would give total cavalry force
Of $3.50.
part of the plan is TO continue to carry on
the siege, and for this at least as many troops
viii be required as are now engaged in that
service-that is TO say:
foar French dionsa at 100 each......3 p CO.. men
Totsl.........................f6oJ 0 men
To this number must be added the sailors and
the troops intrusted with guarding Ballklaya
and the line of intrenchments to lnkermann,
and who at the same time serve as an army of
reserve TO the besieging corps. We put these
down at low estimate at 1900 Estimating
the sailors and marines at 1000, We shall there
fore have to deduct Sc, coo men from the above
I43,OOO, leaving available for field operations
q, eco infantry aud artillery and $500 cavalry
or altogether about &c, 500 men. And this, as
We have said is very liberal computation.
Now, according to Russian military CORE
spondent of the ApgSbnrg Ga-oite, who has always
put down the Russian forces at very low esti-
mates, the Russians have now in the Crimea of
Regular nrn'ry...... 5000 Regular and egu ar Cav
Chosutrnorki Coaacss 900
Artillery, Ensincers,Sc 1890
Total Infsniry.......I9o0oo Total Csvry.......2oooo
The distribution of this force may be approx
imat,ely stated as follows:
Tor the d. fersc Of tho aouth side II sevasopo TN
Gls TO- he So Tort .rd Intended Cam. 1000
5000
This leaves as available for the field, 10000
infantry and artillery and 1900 cavalry.
In point of infantry the Allies will thus have
a striking superiority, their numbers exceeding
those ofther antagonists by %, 500 men. As to the
relative strength in artillery we are in the dark;
but from the difficulty the Allies have always
found in procuring horses, and from the large
proportion Of guns accompanying every Russian
army, it is probable that the Russians will be
superior to their opponents. In cavalry they
will certainly have the advantage. Even if
from their %, 900 horse we must subtract 5000
Cossacks, who would at all events come in for
patrolling, outpost and orderly duties, they still
retain Il, 900 cavalry intact from detachment
service, against $500 of the Allies, of which
number, on q day of battle, no more than 1000
can be brought forward in line.
The advance of the Allies toward the interior
can hardly be made otherwise than on the road
toward Mackenzics's farm and the space be-
tween this road and the head Of SevastopOl Bay
or Inkermann; because east of Maekenze's
farln the steep ridge encirclng the Badar Valley
extends souh-eastward until it joins the southern
ridge of the Crimea near Yalta, forming a rocky
barrier impossible for cavalry and artillery, and
practicable for infantry by few fcotpaths only.
From Yalta there is indeed road crossing the
hills. but this can be defended By very few
troops, and has 10 doubt been fortified by the
Russians long since, as well as the foOtPath
Masses Besides the direction OF this road the
distance of Yalta from Balaklava, and the chance
it offers to the Russians 70 cut off any corps
operating on this line, will hardly admit Of It's
being used by the Allies as their main line Of
operations
The road By Mackenzie's farm 70 the Alma and
Sympherepol is defended by double row of in
trenchments: first on the ridge oyerhanging the
Chernsya. and secondly on the north side Of a
rayine running down RON the edge Of the rocky
range, near Msckenzie's farm, TO the head Of Se-
vastopol Bay. This second and main line of de-
Tense, which is not more than two English miles
in extent, is said To be very strongly intrenched
and here the FIRST decisive action Will have 70 be
fought--an action deciding whether the Allies
ere 10 continue imprisoned on the Heraceatic
Chersonese or 10 gain the interior of the coun-
Try. This position viii cost harder struggle
TO carry than the Alma, for the forces will
more equally balanced, nnless the Russians
commit the mistake OF dispensing their troops.
They can easily concentrate 1900 men for the
defense of these intrenehments, and il the Allies
attsck with from q, coo to 10000 men, this SUI
L