New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-04-30

.erals"-s circumstance very fortuusse pr
Emperor, % It allows Of his shutting of the re-
sponsibility Of the whole affair, and leaving 1t on
the shoulders Of the generals.
The plan Of landing 60 900 men a. Ksf, and
marching th snce upon Sevsstopo lisudeed original.
Taking as general rule that the offensive strength
Of an Muy In an enemy's country decreases 10 the
same ratio ts its distance from iS base Of opera
tons Increases how many men would the Allies
have brough. to Sevnsopol after march of more
than 100 u LEST How many men wers to be left
ct Kafa7 How mspy to aold and fordy inter ne
date points How many to protect convoJs, and
to tcour TIE country Not 10000 men could
have been collected ulder the walls Of fortress
recurring three times that number barely to invest
il. If Louls Napoleon ever goes to the war hin.
self and conducts IL upon this principle, he may
as we'll order quarters at Mvart's Hotel, London,
q. once, for he will never see Paris again.
Al to the safety Of the anchorage at kada,
every mariner In the Black Sea knows, and every
chart shows that it is an ope, roadstead, with
shelter sgsiDst northerly and westerly winds
alcre, while the most dangerous storms in the
Black Sea are from the south aud southwest.
o. this the storm Of the 14sh of November 10 an
instance. Had the fleets then been at KaAi they
would have been driven upon lee-shore Ia this
way cur hero clear. himself from the RESI- oasibi-
ity thrown upon him by bis cousin; but il would
reytr Go to sacrifice Raglan and Canrobert. Ac-
cordipgIy, to show tie cleveraess Of the said
Gene rails, very decent ske'ch lie given Of siege
operations according to Vanban-a sketch which,
from the total ignorance of the subject 1t sup
pose. IN the reader might have been written for
the benefit Of Marshul st. Arnaud. This sketch,
however, but serves to sh DIV how Sevsstopol WAS
not to be taken, for i. winds up with the assertion
that all these rules were insppica5le to s,vssto-
pol. For Instance, sin q common siege where
I" one front is attacked the length of the last
" parallel would be ABOUT 800 yards. and the
"wbele length of trenches would not excsed
$4,000 yards; here the extent ofpralel is 3 700
yards, and the whole linear length Of all the
" trenches is Al, 009 yards"
This is all true enough, but the question here is
why has this enormous extent Of attack been
adopted, when every circumstance called for the
greatest possible concentration Of fire upon one
or two determined points The answer Is:
" SevastOpo is not like any other fortress. 1t has
"but . shallow ditch, no masonry scsrps, and
there defepses are replaced by abat!is and Ais
ladies'; thus our FIRE could make but little impress
/" sieu on the earth breastwork." # this was no.
written for 81. Arnsud, 1t is surely written for
the French peasantry alone. Every sub lieuten-
ant in the French army must laugh at such nom
sebse. Palisades, unless at the bottom ola ditch,
or at least out of the sight of the enemy, are
very soon knocked over by shots she'll. Abst-
tis may be set on fire, and must be at the foot Of
the elacis, about 60 or so yards from the breast.
work, elfe they would obstruct the ire of the
guns. Moreover, these abastis must bejsrsetrees
laid on the ground the pointed branches toward
the enemy, and the whole firmly connected TO-
getler; bu. where such trees could have come
from, In a woodless country like the Crimes, the
Monihur does not say Tie absence Of masonry
scarps has nothing to do with the protracted
siege, for according 70 the description In the
MoniteHr itself, they only como into play when
the preaching batteries sve been established on
the top Of the glacis-s pokition from which the
Allies are yet far distant. That palisades are
al imprOvementup0n m isOnry s;arps, is certainly
new; for these wooden rampsrts can be very
easily destroyed by enfladiDg fire, even at the
bottom Of the ditch; and thus they allow of al
assault soon as the defending gus are silen ed.
In conclusion, we are told by this ne military
authority, that all the facts shaw that the allied
eenersls have done what they couId-have done
more than, under the circumstances, could have
been expected from them-aud have, indeed, COW
cred Themselves with glory. If they could not
properly invest SUSCEPTIBILITY could not drive
away the Russian army Of Observaion-if they
are not yet in the place-wby, it is because they
are not strong enough. This is also true: bu.
who Is responsible for this creates: Of all faults
Who bat Louis Bouap,rte Such is the final con-
clusion which the whole French public must To-
evitably draw from this wordy, uud.about,
shutting, and ridiculous explanation Of their Z u
per0r.