Southern shield., 1855-01-06


  rather the besieging army which has stood in this predicament, for, whereas the Allied forces have been gradually diminished by the casualties incidental to their operations, the garrison has re- ceived repeated accessions of strength from without. Provisions, too, and munitions of war may have been inn ported with equal facility, though so extranrdinary in thic rocrant nn,,o 4hn resources of Sebastopol itself that few additions could have been required.
 The Russians at Sebastopol are by no means in the position of garrison Inferior in numbers to the attacking force, but relying upon the protection of artificial defences, against which the besiegers advance. They are encamp- ed to the south of the town in a very strong entrenchments, which are arm ed, as Lord Raglan's despatch observes, "with an apparently unlimited number of heavy guns, amply provided with gunners and ammunition" They have raised batteries against our batteries and earthworks against our earthworks; they return shot for shot, and so far were we from establishing an advan- tage in this respect that on the second day of the cannonade their fire was su- nerior to our own. Their front of de- fence, instead of representing con- fined space, exposed to all the concen- trated fire of the attack, is actually, as Lord Raglan describes it, ''more ex- tended'' than our own, and they, the besieged force, are thus in the posses sion of the advantages ordinarily en- ljoyed by the besiegers.
 In point of fact there would really
 belittle exaggeration in saying that one of the armies in the Crimea is as effec- ltually "besieged'' as the other. Both have their communications open, the
 Russians by land and the Allies by sea;
 both have their strong positions, the
 Russians before Sebastopol, the Allies
 on the heights of Balaklava; and, so
 far as operations have hitherto pro- . ceeded, it would be hard to say which party seemed to be the assailants and which the defenders We are hattnr- ling the works of the Russians, but they t are also battering ours, and whereas , we have not yet regularly assaulted their lines they have attacked ours in 5 such force as to occasion most sangui- ; nary conflicts. The enterprise, in short, is not siege, but campaign. We : have effected Judgement on Russian , territory, and we are encountering the
 armies which the Russians bring suc-
 cessively against us. One army, rep resenting the garrison of Sebastopol, is encamped under its walls behind earth
 works like our own, and IS stronger
 than we are in artillery; another is post
 ed on our flank or rear, and has made
 at least one attempt on our position.
 Fortunately, although we want many
 of the advantages of besiegers, we are not without some of the advantages of
 the opposite kind; for such is the strength of our position in this angle of the Russian territory that we are en- } abled to repulse the attacks of an en- l emy numerically superior to ourselves. So far, therefore, although the actual siege of Sebastopol may have advanced 5 but slowly, the events of the campaign , are favorable to us. As besiegers we 7 have been retarded in our progress by 3 the non-investment of the town, by the q entrenchments thrown up before it's I walls, by the constant endorsements received by the garrison, and by the e presence of a strong relieving army in : the field. But we have maintained our V footing on Russian ground; we have
 beaten the Russians thoroughly when Q ever they have attacked us; we have al- . ready half ruined the fleets and arse- y nals which gave Sebastopol its impor- e tance; and we have fairly established : our superiority in all respects but that e of numbers. What remains, therefore, y but to approximate, as we can do, to C Ian equality with our antagonists in this n respect also, and to dispatch those re- ;, Inducements which our victorious tho 2 overtasked army requires? This done d the advantages as well as honors oi a the campaign will belong, we may con c hdently hope to the Allied Powers.