Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1855-07-27
Furrigl Nrm5.
The Repulse at Sch astopol.

Of the 18TH ut, rs well as upon tue met
dents Of the attack itself, are interesting and
suggestive. Viewed carefully and deliber-
ntey, although there are revelations OF grave
errors Of judgment in several quarters, and
q severe loss of life to the ALLEN forces, the
check can hardly be regarded with truth as
SO serious an affair in its effects upon the fl.
nal result at Sebastopol, as was at first APP
pretended. The defeat was in consequence
of a mislpprehension at the first, and OF sub
sequent errors Of judgment, which led to
mure serious consequences, nnd winch might
have been easily avoided The despatch of
Gen. Pclissier is regarded by the Tunes as a
candid perspicuous, and highly creditable
narrative of the proceedings Of that unioitu-
nate day. 1t makes no attempt to conceal the
magnitude Of losses sustained by the allied
armies OF the keenness of the disappoint-
ment which rapidly succeeded the immoder-
ate confidence of the troops, and it leaves us
to award the responsibility of this disaster to
those upon which the chief burden falls.
The same journal adds -" There we're
errors Of Judgment, there was want of nc
ouracy aud combination in the movements,
there was an incorrect estimate of the re.
sources of the Russians IN the fortress in
tins plan of attack all this is fully acknowl.
edged by the Generals themselves but the
consummate intrcpidny shown by the troops
and by the gallant leaders who fell at the
head OF their men, bids US abstain from say
ing single word which may aggravate the
pain of our loss or Of their untlmely fate"
In a subsequent part of the same article
the Times gives the following synopsis of the
objects proposed by the attack OF the Isth,
which is Interesting, on account vi tie nght
d, throws upon the relative positions ni the
two works against which the efforts Of the
allies were directed:
"The double operation Of the 18th June
is reduced TO this dilemma IF the French
attack on the Malakof works had proved
unsuccessful, It was totally impossible for
the English or any other troops 10 occupy
the Redah, or to hold II even if they had
crossed the abatis aud the dltch but If the
French attack on the Maakofl works had
succeeded, then neither could the Russians
have confined to hold the Rcdan they
must inevitably have been driven out of II
IN few hours bv the fire of che Malakoli
and the Mamclon directed against them
selves and this result would have been OBJ
tanned with certainty, aud without any as
sault Of the Redan at all. Or, to express
the same proposition IN fewer words, If the
Mlhkof works we're not taken, the Redan
could not be held by us and if they were
TAKEN the Redan could not be held by the
Russians. In no case could the capture OF
the Rcdan have contributed to the fail OF the
MalakoT WORKS, because the latter are IN tie
rear Of the former, and completely entladed
a.. If this argument he sound, as we be-
live it 10 be, the result Is thar no attack on
toe Rclan ought 20 have been made at all,
or, at most, false attack to divert the atten-
ton Of the enemy from the main point. The
real English attack wonid have produced a
far more serious effect il It had been direc-
ted against the Barrack Battery, the point
assaulted by General Eyre aud % a powerful
body OF troops had penetrated there they
might even have caught the Russians in the
Redtn on theur funk and rear. A redan is
redoubt not closed behind but to attack
1t by assault in front is 10 attack It precisely
where il is the strongest The cross fire Of
such a work from the faces of the basiiou
and the fianking batteries Is perfectly ire
sistible, aud the consequence was that no
man got within 30 yards OF the ditch alive
Nothing, 10 short, could justify such an at
tempt, except the moral oblg ition Lord RAJ
CLAN might feel to share the peril Of our al
lies. But there was this difference in our
pas,iun-f the French had carried the Nal
akOf, they would have decided the fate Of
the siege if the English had carried the
Rcdan only, they would have decided moth
ing.
his being the unfortunate, bu, inevitable
-~--is 80 r-----s..~ .uciupt to carry by
assault works still retaining the superiority
of their FIRE, the course now 10 be pursued
by the engineers is clear They have It 10
their power 10 push forward by regular ap-
prolches from the position Of the Mamcor
against the Malakoif Tower and eventually
To- establish IN these advanced works bate
rles OF sufficient weight to subdue the fire Of
the enemy, and We have reason To believe
that this regular operation has now been
commenced"
The despatch Of the French General We
publish IN another column. From this II Is
clear that the misconccptlon on tho part o
General Mayran paved the way for the se'
ncs Of disasters which followed. The daT
ing exploit Of General Eyre is dwclt upoI
with much satisfaction by the English press
as one deserving to become memorable /;
the annals of this war. With his mca h
Florned a suburb, and maintained hmsel
there for seventeen hours, unaidcd, unu
night ems bled them to evacuale what, from
failures elsewhere, had become a useless ac
quiston.
The following sketch Of this attack, witt
the comments Of the Times we find IN ,h
issue Of the 9th. 1t Is worthy of SPECIAL no
tee:
BY far the most extraordinary part Of III
events of the day was the successful, AM
We must add astonishing, attack on the Bar
rack battery, made by the second Brigade o
the third division, under the command q
General Eyre. This corps consist ed of tn
nh. lsth, 25th, 3Sth and 4ith regiments, Il
which was added the 18th royal Irish as III
storming party. These six regiments mus
tered ia all scarcely 1000 men. They vert
to occupy the Cemetery and barrack Bate
nes upon the Backyard Creek, a work be
tween the Rsdan and the South liarb r. an
slightly in the rear of the Reden. Agains
tins point the attack Of General Eyre and hi
brigade was directed. They rushed upo
the churchyard and drove out the enemy, bu
heavy fire Immediately opened on our mcr
irons the adjacent batteries. Nothing daun
ted, however, 4 companies Of the 18th dashe
on towards the town, and literally entere
the suburb, where they occupied some fur
nshed houses, apparently Just deserted b.
their inhabitants. In this singular position
they were secure from the fire Of the Rus
sian heavy guns, but they could neither ad
vance nor Icfeati anu want u hioat 'Nu "N'
binary. no attempt appears 20 have beef
made to relieve them, or to strengthen TIN
attack, although they remained IN The ptac
II hours, from o'clock in the morning un
no at night when the return of darkness
enabled them TO retire. Nor was this an eX
ceptonal circumstance. The 9th regimen
also effected Judgment in some houses
sergean;'s party drove dozen Russian ar
tillerymen ont of a small battery; an Office
with men and about Is French soldier
reached part Of the flagstaff battery; an
other officer with II men took one of th
Russian rife pits, and held it throughout tn
day. 1t is scarcely possible to doubt that !
upon the failure OF the attack on tse Redar
which, fatal as il was, did not last half a
hour, the strength of the columns OF aitac
had been thrown on the left, one part at leas
Of the place would have been carried. 1t
indaad tnconcatvahla that knowin,r tho q rit