New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-12-10


1870. batteries wherever q gun might enflade
-, nos,ible approach Of the enemy. The number
- troops dspossble for the defense Of these CON-
yhcsted and extensive works does not seem to
lsye ever entered into their calculations and when
The DAY Of the action came, Gen Williams had, asa
natter Of cour,e, to confess that his lines were
~updermanned" Ifhe bad not forgotten bis quail
Nv Of chef Of the staff and virtual commander-in'
chief IN his other quality Of srterst, be would
not have had to mpain of this circumstance.
The system of heldworks which formed the main
Inc Of defense appears to have been that OF
lunettes or redOubts, behind the intervals Of which
epaulments for infantry, and in some places for
artillery, too, formed sort Of curtains, so as to
establish species of loosely connected, Fashioned
fronts, with openings large enough to admit of
columns sallyDg forth from the lines to attack the
enemy at favorable moment. This rather
sldfashioned method would not enter into the
head Of sny engineer who had to construct
an intrenched camp for European army; re-
doubts, closed at the gorge, would be considered
sufficient, and epaulments would be thrown up for
no other purpose than to shelter the reserves from
artillery FIRE. But here these epauleuents were to
be defended as part and parcel of the system their
IRE in fact bad to support the redoubts. The con.
sequence was great squandering of combatants
n the beginning Of the action, which must have
contributed it's part TO the undermining of
the whole Of the liner aud which must have weak
eAtd the reserves to a considerable degree But
Gen. Williams had very good reason for adopting
this unusual method at Kars He had good
many LsziaD and Kurdish mO1ntaneers, Bashi-
Bazouks, beside about one thousand volunteers
from the town all troops completely useless in
the open field and not reliable enough to be trusted
with the defense even of an important intrenched
post; but for a tenacious defeuse of parapets,
they were very useful. particularly if those para
pets were not directly exposed to the first onset Of
the enemy. Consequently, it was for these rreg
ulars that Williams threw up his long lines; and
IN this case we believe he was perfectly right,
though he might evidently have managed a great
deal better in the lay ling ont of these woris what
we consider, however, objectionable is the throw
ing up of 90 many small redans or 6eches in front
Of his redoubts, by which he vas obliged still
more to weaken his really disposable reserve force.
He appears to feel his mistake for he says as little
about them as he possibly can, aud if it were not
for the Russian report we should to this day be
ignorant even of the existence of these feches
IN trent of the Tasmah redoubts. which the Rus
slams took on the first onset
On the goth Sept, before daybreak, Mutavief
launched four columns against the Tasmah front.
General Maidel with the 21st division, attacked the
Tasnah redoubt with one column, while the other
attempted to pass between that work and the river
flowing to its left, Russian right. At the same
II NIT tha Aivisi
attacked Yuksh Tabia with one column, and the
ReDnison lines with another The Russians are
acknowledged on all hands to have advanced with
the greatest steadiness and bravery. They pene-
trated without difficulty into the outlying heches
Of the Turks, and attempted the salient angles of
the rtdoubts Bot here they met with desper-
ate resistance. General Kmety, Qsmail Pasha,)
commanding the Tahmas front, had taken his
measures so WELL and inspired his soldiers with
such confdence-he was in the Yuksh redeubt
hipself-that whenever the head of a Russian
column had penetrated into the bitches, or even
the works themselves, il was Immediately cut up.
Each of the Russian columns advanced in three
successive bodies; the second or main body was
10 secure the advantages gained by its advanced
guard, while the third or reserve was to bring the
FINAL decision, and to guard against any unforeseen
accidents But when the main body arrived, the
advanced guard vas generally in disorder, and this
disorder was sOon communicated to all the fresh
troops coming up. At the Rennison lines, the Rus
sisns had to run the gauntlet of the crossfre of
Fort Lake to the right, and Of couple Of bat
teries to the left rear of the Rennson lines beside
being crushed by the telling front fire of battalion
Of rife in the works before them. Here General
Kovalevski all his staff and most of the chiefs of
regiments and battslions, fell and the column was
broken before il reached the ditch of the work
The attack degenerated, as usual, into desul-
tory fusilade and cannonade, during which the Rus
sian commanders sought to restore order and to
attempt fresh manuevers. But too many troops
had been engaged at once by them. To bring them
nt0 fire was easy enough, to withdraw or even
control them was more than could be done. Indeed
this obstinate firing, interrupted no y and then by
weak attempts at q renewed charge, filled up
the long space of six hours succeeding to the first
hour Of actual decisive fighting, and this ex-
plains the tremendous disproportiOn between the
Of the Russians who exposed themselves reckless
ly to the eneny's shots
In the midst of this struggle the extreme right
column of the Russians appears to the rear of
Tsbmas Tsbia on the plateau 1t has brought
battery along with (which opens on Tahmss Tabia.
erfladDg two of its faces and taking in rear the
third The moment is decisive. II that column