New-York daily tribune., 1855-08-25
+ u X o = E
THE COMMANDMENT OF swEABoRG.
From TIE London Times, .fug. IL.

IHE BOMBAhDMENl VT oNEhDOhOs
From The London Times, 4ug. II.
We learn by telegraph that on the 9TH inst. the
united fleets OF England and France had arrived OIL
Sweabofg, and that an Immediate bombardment was
expected Some such measure had been for some time
anticipated, nor this at all unnatural for we have
sent the Baltic of the most powerful fleets which
ever f0ated upon the ocean, our offensive means are
apparently enormous and the valor of sailors is
incontestabe. We hope and believe thst the expected
operation WILL if attempted be entirely successful but
we do not consider that any sound reason would exist
5or public disappointment If none such took place.
Ii is perfectly true that our naval armament in the
Baltic Is exceedingly strong, and equally 80 that
certain amount of positive performance Is naturally
looked for at first sight from force large, but
would, we think, be msconcephon OF circumstances
TO expect desire, for their own immediate results,
the mere bOmbardment Of any of the enemys ports.
Tie primary object Of the Baltic expedition is the
maintenance Of the blockade and the assertion in
those waters of the supremacy of the Allies up TO
the very coasts of their foe We offer battle to
tie Russian feet, aud, if this much vaunted squad
ron dares not venture out TO face us, we seal it
up in its own ports and shut the flag Of the Car
from the seas. After obtaining this complete aud
bloodless triumph over the navy OF the enemy, we
sf stToy his commerce by depriviDg him of ali
means Of maritime intercourse, aud making prize of
every vessel under Ruseisn colors. All that Peter
the Great aimed at in transferring the seat of Rus
sian government TO st. Petersburg, all that the
Czars struggled for in graspng the seaboart
of the Baltic, is lost to them. For all practical
purposes that IA now cl0sed TO RussIa, ana more
sffectuay indeed than even by the Winter ice itself,
for Armies have before been transported across
ice where's nothing can penetrate the cham OF British
cruisers Meantime the whole ocean is insured TO the
Alice without danger of a hostile hay. We are at
war with country considering itself q maritime
power and actually claiming TO possess according TO
recent statements, fewer than 90 ships OF the line
81 fgaies, 20 smaller vessels, and 40 steamers. Yet
notwithstanding all this our shores preserved in
perfect immunity from any hostile attack, and our
merchantmen traverse every sea with as much iodif
ference and safety if peace had never been broken
he'd aol shi Of fu,ar
TO this the humiliation inflicted on Russia along her
own coasts and the service performed by the Baltic
heet will appear, we think, by no means unsubstan-
tial negative, even II It Is not illustrated by any
brilliaQt feat of arms.
Mt may be urged, however, that beside all this,
which is compiished, as il were, by the mere pres
erce of the feet the powers Of oeI Sc possessed by
20 formidable armada might as well be exerted for
fhe positive destruction of any forts ships stores
Of the enemy within reach No doubt they might,
for nothing less than such terrible work is the vertabe
mission of war, but nasmueh ss our chief objects arc
already secured II bohoVts US well, before engaging
IN any such operations, TO strike very carefully
balance of profit ard loss, and to consider what s to
be gained by pitiing our ships IN regular or con-
eerted attack against the granite batteries of the
enemy We might, perhaps, prove that these bat
feres lees eectual defenses than they have been
considered, ami If We cou d, in Iced, establish the
superiority our broadsides conclusively 20 de-
n.oiish one fort after another, the impression made
nDOn the enemy might be most important Bat as
have land forces 6; hand By which any success
could be followed up against such garnsOns as the
Russisbs keep IN tbese foT7reeses, VIII would be the
gain IN destroying front Of sea-defenses at the risk
TeThsps, Of Ehip or t~o by the chances Of shot
fre BE il observed that tbese forInc. ons not
Ike hose Of Sew s;oi olmaIked for destruction
their own specisl account, and the calculation,
therefore, is simply Of relative profit and lOss-
Perhaps in the course Of the cannonadc bOmbari-
mept we nigh. demolish Il certain amour, OF prop
erty, or blow up magazine or two; but If our own
casualties happened to be in proportion, where would
be the gain
1t sppears to u.s. we must say that the struggle in
the Baltic greatly resembles the fight between the dog
and the feb, but with this material advantage the
aide Of the sh that the standing results OF the con-
best largely in its favor. We have not been
able to get at the Russians, nor can the Russians
get al us, but the dead lock which is produced
answers our purpose without answering theirs. We
simply send feet to their Shores and BY this pro-
essding We pfiict upon them iLcessant loss trou-
be ard humiliation. They are )oed 10 fDrtify
their coasts with the utmost care to maintain large
forces a. various ponis TO submit TO q blockai en-.
taalnc r1inous ombarassmenis, aud TO be uncertain
ali ;he whie whether, IN spite of thei deienses We
may 10, e. any moment accomplish some hing more.
Every day els against them for every day carries It's
own account Of Ioss. We il Is true, have not succeed
ed IN proving batteries st0oger than shore batter
as aJd have been apparently, therefore, reduced to
n ttancstil far active operations are concerned
but ths naciiOr includes ia reality the work of war
while The cost 20 us nothing but The maintenance Of
the feet, and that with no great wear aud tear
We Of opinion therefore that our Baltic expedi-
tons ought 10 be regarded substantially successful,
even though little may appear to be done. The real
work OF the Baltic feet IL the block sSe and II that
blockade IA thoroughly maintained til cruisers are
relieved by the ice we shall have large balance Of
gain in our favor. 10 the Black Sea work Is OF
different character There are unremitungly
prosecuting particular operation. We wish 10 take
Sevas'opol, and we measure success by oar prog
ress toward this special object In the Baltic there is
no purpose before as 20 materially deineated. Our
object there IL compound. We have fn. to assert
our command Of the sea, and then 10 pullfy the oen-
sive power of the enemy, destroying meanwhile bis
resources by shutting out bis vessels from the water
These ends we have ehectualy accomplished, aud the
success we think "a Of small Importance even al
though Admiral Dundas may not destroy either Swea.
borg Cronstadt. We have, however great reliance
on that officers ability and discretion and believe
ths. be will engage in operation which does not
hold ont fair prospect Of success. OF that he must
~ tho beet judge ouT object s only 20 warn our read