New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-05-10

the case the mode or attack nj Tor intrencneu
camps might have been employed with good
chance Of success. The whole of the held-
artillery and whatever could be- moved of the
lighter ship and siege-guns should have been
brought up to the front-the latter forming the
supports, the former the movable batteres-to
advance as soon as the Russian FIRE became sub
dued and after four or six hours cannonade
the assault should have been made. Possibly
this might have been done, but the diff
Guilty experienced in bringing up the siege
train and the ammunition proves that it was a
doubtful matter: yet it would have been better
than anything that has been done. The idea
was abandoned and sort of regular-irregular
siege resolved upon, an operation which was at
any given moment to leave the besiegers the
choice of finishing up by methodical advance
or of attempting the forcibe attack and bonn
bardment. But the defenses of Seyastopol
grew up twice as quick as the allied trenches;
and BY the time the batteries of the attack
were ready to open the place was fortress
surrounded by an enceint, thrown up, 1t Is true,
in haste and not properly riyeted, but If the
want of rivetments laid it open to an assault,
the unparalleled profusion of guns with which
the rampant was bristling utterly precluded
such an idea before the enemy's fire was COM
pletely silenced.
The first bOmbardment-l7th October to 9Th
Noyember-was undertaken because the regu-
lar attack proceeded slowly; and the regular
attack proceeded slowly and even Inpercepti-
bly because il was carried on in the contempt
of all rules, embracing the whole of the south
ern lines instead of one or two fronts, and scat
tering the working forces and the effects of the
fire instead of concentrating them. Sevastopol
was no longer place fit for any sort of irregu-
lar attack A concentrated regular attack only
could have succeeded. 1t had no timid inhabl-
tants to be worked upon. 1t was not even proper
ly invested Its extent was such as 10 scatter she
effects of the bombardment over surface
where they appeared but trifling. The houses,
built of solid free-stone, were bad material for
large fires. Accordingly, the first lombard
ment had no lasting effect whatever except to
squander the precious ammunition OF the Allies,
TO deteriOrate their guns, and to disable their
offensive forces for five months.
The second bombardment necessitated im-
mense preparations The old guns, with bores
ruined by firing and of too weak calber, had
TO be replaced by heavier ones. Shot and pow
der had to be brought up in enormous guam
titles. The besiegers suffered tremendously by
sickness, and the return of spring alone enabled
them to work with some degree of activity. If
il is considered that with the present heavy
guns every shot consumes in iron and powder
about fifty pounds on an average, and that thus
there are only forty rounds to a tun weight, the
DELAYS of the Allies will be readily explained.
Now there must be at least 35O-some say 500
guns in the batteries before Seyast0pol. Take
only ten rounds per hour per gun, and fourteen
hours of FIRE per day, and you have, for the tbr-
teen days bombardment, from the 9th to the 22d
April. the enormous mass of 637, 900 projectiles,
weighing, with their charges above li,5OO tuns.
Reduce this number even to 100000 projectiles
weighing 900 tuns-still there remains mass
of iron thrown into the place unparalleled in
history and yet necessitated by the foolish reso-
luton to take place of such extent and de-
Tended BY so numerous guns by an irregular
attack, for this reason only, that the regular at
tack had been carried on upon a wrong principle.
The leading motive in the selection of the
mode of attack was certain confusion OF the
two cases where forcible attack is justified;
that of weakly garrisoned town, and that of an
intrenched camp. Because in the beginning
sevastopol presented all the features of an in
trenched camp it was to be attacked as such,
even after it had changed its character entirely
The only difference admitted was this, that
siege artillery was to take the place of field ar
tilery. But here this plan of attack became
mixed up with notions of siege, with trenches,
regular batteries and bombardment. Seyastopol
was to be bombarded like fortress and can
nonaded like an intrenched camp, and when all
the ammunition was nearly consumed, though
no white flag appeared on the rsmparts, the
army was to march to the assault, as the Rus
SLAMS did at Warsaw in 1881.
The results of such an ill-planned, badly
seen. The effects of the bombardment on the
town must be almost null; those of the cannon
ade against the defenses very trifing There
remained the chance of silencing the enemy's
FIRE. With the number of guns and the skill of
using them nearly equal on both sides that
chance was pretty small, for every nights re-
pairs might make up for every days destruc-
ton. But supposing the FIRE of the Russians to
be actually silenced, what them Could the as
sault be ordered' The storming columns would
har. 70 far tiat. .f II To-