The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-01-07
NOTICES OF NEW PUBLICATIONS.

beea spoken and written BY non professional critcs,
fren Kossuth down TO the amateur Jominis and
Vaubsns Of the press, respecting what ought and
Whist ought not to have been done by the bellige
rents In the Crmea that it Is q satisfaction to meet
With work which subs titutes for crude aud vague
speculstions the results Of scientific observation
nad thorough practical acquaintance with the sub
ject. Captain vandt velde, the author Of this In
terestng brochure, has already distinguished him
self by the publication of several valuable military
treatises, and his pressn. pamphlet arrives oppor-
tunely to assist US in piercing the clouds of preu
dice and Misrepresentation in which everything
connected with the events in the Crimea is sys
tematically involved by the European press. Being
written in purely professional spirit and without
any apparent polite leaniogs, its criticisms upon
the campaign may be received as the first contr-
buttons TO the stock Of impartial mem ,rials which
win make up the future history Of these eveots.
Before We proceed to notice the structures of the
writer on what he considers the principal errors
committed both Sides up to the present stage of
the cam sagn we think it but fair to quote the incl
deatsl compliment which he pays to the general
accuracy Of the Russian official military reports
the more particularly ss we have had occasion our
selves to call attention to tie fact more than once
referring to some opinions expressed by him in q
i1eyicus publication. in regard to the operations Of
DE descent in the Criues, the hotly infested en-
ngenent of the Alma, and the wheel movement of
he allies towards Bslaklava, he says" The Off
s reports OF the Russian General relative to these
operations were not then known. These docu-
ments, which have only lately been published, and
which appear to have been written in a more i'm
partial style than usual in army bulletins, have
thrown fresh light upon those events, and compel
me to revert to them" Without folio wing him
Through these explanations, we win condns our
selves 10 giving few Of his criticisms on the sketch
of the military operations which accompanied the
official report of the Russian General on the affair
Of Balaklava:-
After reading this sketch, we are forced to ask
ourselves how is il possible that tails chasse croiss
(cross marcb) could have been effected ia twenty
four hours BY one am the same road, aud through
q narrow and difficult defe, withou. either
Of the belligerents having the least intmation
81 to the movements OF the other? The Two armies
it would appear, reel rocaly began their march
without taking the precauton Of sending out scouts
and without having the least idea Of the where
ab0uts OF the enemy; and IL Is operation of this
sort that is termed skilfuly conduc Ted nOvement
II is pretended that Menschikoff had oire,s in
terest In not obtaining information on this point, in
asmuch a. any attempt to seek it would oaly have
given the alarm to the enemy; but he should at least
have taken meas urts TO guard against Gurprise, in
order TO prevent feeble ADVANCE guard OF tue allies
carrying of portion OF the baggage Of his army.
The alies certainly did right TO execute this wheel
movement; Menschikoff on his side should have en-.
deavored to hold % open country, and Bakschissrd
was IN fact his pivot OF manuvre; why then, did not
the Russian General alter the battle of Alma bear
Immediately on that point? In operating as We
have just described, or in other words In taking
posi- ion lateral to the line Of inv 4sion, not only
would he have found himself placed 10 posi- i IN to
Ia a
bim-the march Of the allies on B.laklaya- but he
would also have avoioed useless fatigue to his sol.
diers, and that flank march during viii III he was
60 near being crushed BY tue English; for,
in fact, if Lord Raglan had fallen on
the head Of Mentcuikonrs column, a. he
fell on its rear, the Russian army, still
nder the impression OF ttc defeat ut the Alma. and
snrPrised On its march through narrow dedle,
you'd In all probability ave been roughly handled.
It is so stated IN the ske'cl which &C panies
ylepschikc's report that tlis General having been
informed Of the movemsn's OF the enemy, FASTENED.
D0 the 2Sth, 10 the b lbeek-that on the folio wing
day (sbe 29sh) he established himself bet wcen that
river and the bay OF Ssbastopo, with his advanced
guard towards lnkermann, and that the same day
he sent back part Of his troops into the town.
Thus, fron the 18th to the 18th Sebas.opol had
no other garrison tnan eight bsnalions OF reserve
destined for the defence OF the forts the northern
bank, and eight battalions Of the marines OF the
fleet, which had been landed to defend the south Of
the town.
I0c eueb were not alOgeLn6r lRuOrant OF Ln0
undermined conditi of the fortress, for in the
jourrals Of the sic &c kept by their own officers, 1t
Is stated by one that they knew that Prince Mems
chikoff kept the field az the head OF his ar ny; by
another that he he'd been driven to distance with
the wreck Of this army; and by third, that re-
C0nnaissance OF the 2Iih, which had approached to
within distance Of about four kilometres
from the city, only observed weak wall
Of encetnte without q DITCH and OF the strength
merely Of one of the octro walls Of Pads bat toat
the Russians we're engaged in raising ca tn works,
especially reCdns to cover the southern fanbourgs.
Hsw, with such fac.s before them. could the al
resolution 10 be taken bet sudden assault and
q regusr siege In the first place, tho prepara
tions for o siege demsnd considerable time, aud
every day OF respite that the besieger. granted to
the bsieged enabled the latter to increase the OBJ
stacies that covered the place, anc to summon 70.
sources from the interior of the empire And then,
against what were the former 70 direct Q regular
siege Against en- octro wall, as IL was described
in the reconnaissance Of the 9th, against earth
works, which, according eveo TO the acknowedg-
ments CT the officers of the allied armies. were far
from bling completed or armed when the latter
arrived before the place. Aud, 10 fine, one must
have bestowed little study on great military q1es
tions, or be very simple, not to com Jreheud that a
sudden assault against an entrenched position of
large developemeDt defended by q garrison only,
offers many more chances OF success than regular
siege would ever present az iinst the same
position defended by the same garrison, with the
advantage OF having an army a. hand for its
relief for the allies, being unable to invest the
whole position, ought TO have seen that, as as
they made show of openirg . regular siege, the
Russian army would hasten ~ the relief Of SebAsto
pol, which Is precisely what has happened
In our opinion there Is but one saus Of succeed
ing In an attack fortress OF extensive develope-
bent, and which Is properly defended, and that Ia,
- We have before observed, to st,emB; under the
moral asoendancy of victory, Sudden assault. If
he allies ever had iavo able chance Of succeeding
p such an assault, u was when they arrived before
yebastopol. They hs,. then everything for them
fne hnsaisn army ssd retired from the town, leav.
Ing Afttr them out feeble garrison the forti6cs
tons were inr omplete and, generally speaking, un.
PROVIDES 9th Sal non and, In fne, in consequence
OF tnevrctory OF the Alma the besieged were under
he preston Of defeat, whilst the besiegers we're
exsy ed BY success
~ re win even 90 further. II sudden assault Of
Mred 70 the allies no chance OF anccaea whcn they