The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-03-29
CUBAN ANNEXATION THE ADMINIsTRA-
TON, AND MR. s0ULEs MISSION TO
sPAIE-THE osTEND CONFERENCE.
AN ANALYSIS AND A RESUME.

published, relating to Cuban annexation, Mr..
Soule's mission, and the Ostend Conference
correspondence so voluminous and compli-
Gated, that few, even Of those having access to
1t, will find time or courage to examine it with
the thoroughness and care requisite to proper
understanding of it.. And yet it is one of the
most curious, instructive, and important docu-
ments ever submitted to Congress; and We
entreat our readers to make themselves masters
of the analysis which we have taken the trouble
to prepare for their benefit. 1t is long, but it
could not be more condensed, without doing
injustice to the subject.
AS to the printed correspondence between
Mr.. Perry, Secretary of Legation, and Mr..
Marcy, during the absence of Mr.. Soule, touch
ing the proposal of joint commission for the
settlement of the mutual claims of both coun-
tries, proposition declined by our Govern
ment, there is nothing in it deserving extended
notice. Some newspapers, not approaching the
| really important themes of the general cores
pondence, have run off into Insignificant side
issues, instead of fastening public attention on
the criminal conduct of the Administration,
and the grave responsibilities it assumed.
Mr. Soule was appointed Minister to Madrid
in the spring of 1854, received his instruc-
tons from Mr.. Marcy, July 18th, of the same
year. and resigned his commission December
18th, 1854, with the request to be relieved
from duty by the end of the following month.
boJ baa, arro:,4ol
prominent object, the acquisition of Cuba
This was not formally written down in his in
structions, but they all relate to this object,
and Mr.. Soule himself assumes that it was his
mission-that to which he was appointed.
For example, acknowledging the dispatches of
Mr.. Marcy, recommending him to confer with
the American Ministers at Paris and London,
he remarks
"They informed me of the course which it
was the wish Of the President | should pursue
in the ascertainment of the best mode through
which could be accomplished tie main object
o T my mission, viz: the acquisition Of the island
Of Cuba from SPAN"
This mission, the instructions under which
it was commenced, the manner in which it was
prosecuted by the Minister the obstacles which
he encountered, the cooperation of Messrs.
Buchanan and Mason, the participation of the
Administration, and the utter failure of all,
constitute the topics of one of the most remark
able executive communications ever laid before
Congress.
Before examining this document, one or two
preliminary questions demand attention How
happens it that single man, chosen by the
People Of the United States to execute the
laws for four years, should undertake, on his
own responsibility, to accomplish a measure,
involving a vast increase of Territory, a large
accession of population, of alien races,
sudden and radical change in the relative
representative power of the two sections of
the Union, decided preponderance of slave
labor over free-labor interests, and an immense
debt, or a wasteful war? Had that measure
been made an issue in the canvass which
resulted in his election? Did the Convention
that put him in nomination, pronounce upon
it? Did the Press that supported him, rest his
claims upon any such policy? Has a majority
Of the People Of the United States, at any time,
under any form, expressed an opinion in ia
vor Of it? Have we ever had any intimation
from Congress, or the Senate, Of the expedi-
ency of undertaking such policy? How hap
pens il, then, that the Chief Executive Officer
Of the People has dared to venture upon
measure of such magnitude, and involving con-
sequences so momentous2 But one answer
can be given-the Stare Pooer acilled ii, and
its mill is the la,C Of this Administration, as IL
has been Of the preceding ones.
We understand, then, the mission of Mr..
Soule, and the reason for it.
But, why was he selected as the fit agent?
He had secuted, in his place in the Senate, the
idea Of purchasing Cuba Castilian pride, he
said, would be revolted. Why, then, send him
on mission to acquire Cuba, when it might
become expedient to proffer money? Besides
he had denounced the severity of Mr.. Fill
more's proclamation against flibustering, and
announced that Cuba, the jewel of the Spanish
Crown, must be ours. Was all this calculated
to secure him access to the ear and heart of
the Spanish Government? Why, then, was he
selected? We presume the President must
have thought him better qualified by his famil-
iarity with the language of Spain, with the
usages Of European Courts, with the arts of
European diplomacy, to fulfil such a mission,
than any native-born American In fact the
Administration seemed TO repose a child-hke
confidence in the skill of the new diplomat.
trusting that he might hit upon some method
of Cuban acquisition, not yet revealed The
result shows that the President and his advisers
are as laundering and unfortunate in foreign
as in domestic affairs Cuba is as far off as
ever; Spain is disguised; Mr.. SoulG is disgust
ed; Messrs. Mason and Buchanan are disgust
ed; Young America is Disguised; and the
United States stand before the world, in the
light of grasping adventurer, covetng his
neighbours property, but afraid to seize it.
The document before us makes 1872 pages
and the majority of readers will better under
stand its nature and drift, by general view of
its main points, than by reading it in detail.
Mr.. Marcy, in his letter Of instruction to Mr..
Soule, July 23d, 1853, commences by enlarging
upon the Importance of Cuba; assuming that
without such change of policy as can scarce
ly be expected, Spain cannot long sustain, I'M
aided, her present connection with the island"
The course Of the United States, in any contin-
gency calling for their interposition, cannot be
precisely indicated, but some general positions
are announced. Our Government will not dis
turb the connection, unless its character should
be so changed as to affect our present or pros
pective security 1t would resist at every haz-
ard the transference of Cuba to any European