Weekly hawk-eye and telegraph. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa) 1855-1857, 1855-08-29
Seat Of Government Question.

o03t 0I OoVefumous 0ueStlou%
We have just read with much satisfac-
tion printed opinion Of Hon. j. G. HALL,
of this city, as to the true intent and le-
gal effect of the act of the last legislature
providing for the location of the Capital of
the State at Fort Des Moines.
The case is stated thus: The act of Jan.
25, 1855, provides for the appointment Of
five commissioners, a majority Of whom are
to relocate the seat of Govern
ment within the district fixed by law. The
second section provides that "the commits
sloners shall meet on the first Monday in
April next, or within thirtyadays thereaf-
ter, at Iowa City, or such other place as a
majority may agree upon"
Under a,recent decision of the Supreme
Court, this law did not take effect until the
first day Of July, 1855. The first day of
April, next after the passage of the act,
had passed before the law had force.
The question now is, can the Cover
nor appoint the Commissioners, and can
the commissioners legally meet aud dis
charge their duties, before the first Mon
day OF April, 1856, that being "the first
Monday of April" AFTER THE ACT TOOK
EFFECT?
Judge Hall takes the position that the
Governor had no authority to make an ap-
pointment unit! the law was in force, and
that consequently the commissioners could
not meet on the first Monday of April,
1855, or within thirty days thereafter, as
they could have no legal existence. The
first Monday Of. April, after the PASSAGE
of the act, was in 1855. The first Mon
day Of April after the TAKING EFFECT of
the act, will be in 1856. Which April
was meant?
Judge II. here brings forward what he
calls "a cotemporaneous history" in which
he alludes to the fact that the people of
the State have never regarded the capital
as permanently fixed at Iowa city-that
the constitution of 1874, which was voted
down, fixed it'at that place for twenty year,
that our present constitution, adopted
in 1916, is silent-that the subject has at
all times elected public interest, and leg
islative inquiry-and that the last legisla-
ture was virtually instructed by the people
to take action in the premises.
He then goes on to argue that the law
fixes the true intention Of the Legislature, the
second section, requiring the commissioners
to meet onthe 1st Mondayof April '55, be-
ing,in hisopinion,a mere security and guard
that no unnecessary delay should follow.
1t was simply legislative instructions and
directions t. the commissioners, when ap-
pointed, and material only to the main
purpose Of the law, and only intended to
secure the earliest action on the part of the
commissioners. As further proof of the
intention of the legislature Gin providing
for an early relocation, so that buildings
might be erected, and the pubic offices re-
moved, preparatory to the meeting of the
legislature at the new capital in Dec.
1855 Judge H. quotes from section IL of
the act, "That the act shall be in force and
take effect from and after its passage.
True, under the decision of the Supreme
Court, this section does not have the effect
of giving force to. the act, but it shows con-
clusively the intention of the legislature as
to the time when the law should be execu-
ted. The legislature certainly did not in
tend that action should be postponed until
April 1856.
The intention of the legislature being
conceded, the question is, shall state of
facts not anticipated by the law makers,
be followed out to the letter, and thus de-
feat the clear intention of the legislature?
The conflict, says Judge Hall, is truly
between intention and accident miscon-
ception on the part Of the legislature as to
the true construction of the 9th section of
the third article of the Constitution. We do
not go to the Constitution to ascertain the
true intention of the legislature. The
constitution is mere barrier to the ex-
crcise of pow.r giving force to the act
from and after its passage.
Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, Vol.
l, p. 462, says: ssIt is an established rule,
in the exposition of statutes, that the inten-
ton of the law giver is to be deduced from
a view of the whole, and every part of a
statue, taken ard compared together. The
real intention, when accurately ascertained,
will always prevail over the literal sense of
the terms. Where the words are not
explicit, the intention is to be collected from
the context, from the occasion and necessity
of the law, from the mischief felt and the
remedy in view, and tho intention is to be
taken as presumed according to what is con-
sistent to reason and good discretion"
The Supreme Court of the State of Iowa,
in Nobleus. the State, 10 Green R. $50, says:
ssThe intention Of the Legislature is the lead
ing, and indeed the only object to be inquired
into by court, in constituting legislative en-
and it must be conceded, that the
first and most direct means of arriving at
that intention is in the application and mean
ing of the language used. 1t fre-
quently becomes the duty of Courts, in Civ
ing effect to the manifest intention Of stat
ue, to restrain, enlarge or qualify the ordi-
nary and literal meaning of words used"
These authorities are considered by
Judge H. as sufficient and unanswerable,
and every intelligent and unprejudiced
reader will readily concur with him. BY
a decision ofthe Supreme Court, the law
is now in force, and its requirements ought
to be at once fulfilled. Evidently the
month of April 1856 was intended by the
legislature as the time at which the COM
missioners should act-and it is equally
evident that although tLat time was. fixed
for the purpose of ensuring early action, it