The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-05-23


he would make good one. The next move
win probably be in behalf of the man who COM
handed the Grapeshot in the pursuit Of Baker
Who comes next?
What VIII the Western Powers Dos
According to the best accounts, the siege of
Sebastopol appears to be a failure. Thirteen
days bombardment had effected no practicable
breach, and inflicted no injury on the Russian
detences which was not instantly and etfectual
ly repaired. The net result of the operation,
in fact, had been merely to disable the siege
artillery OF the besiegers, and to cause some
slight loss Of life. Strategically speaking, the
hostile forces are in the same relative position
as before. It therefore appears that the siege
is thus far, o failure; that two bombardmeats
produce, and all the skill and science that
France and England could dispose Of have
been failures; that an assault, under present
circumstances, would be certain to involve so
enormous loss of life with 30 slender pros
pect Of success, that no general would venture
to attempt it: In fine, that it has become abso-
lutely necessary for the allies to adopt some
fresh plan and follow it out.
The difficulty is one Of double nature Not
only must some exit be found out of the cut de-
sac in which the allies are encamped, but means
must be provided for satisfying and calming
the people of the two Western Powers. OF the
two the latter is by far the greater difficulty.
twill not be easy for the allies to strike
their tents and leave their encampment. OF
course it would be wholly impossible for them
to embark on board ship, as some have naively
expected them to do; second Inkermann would
begin the moment the furthest trenches were
vacated. An army Of 10000 men emcamped
over q line of nearly twenty miles, is not to be
shipped like a regiment in night, or under
cover of fog. They cannot re.embark.
Therefore, if they move, they must move in
land, under circumstances Of great incon-
venience, in the direction Of the Tchorgoun
Tchernsy a-either towards Baktchiserai and
Simpheropol, or towards Eupatoria, where the
Turks hold their entertainments still. They
will probably choose the latter, in order to
maintain their connection with the feet. And
on the issue of battle, which must be fought,
in country which the Russians have spent the
whole winter in fortifying and studding with
works of defence-with an enemy already re-
inforced to full their own numbers hourly
awaiting fresh levies, and, moreover, flushed
with it's successful defence of Sebastopol, the
fate Of the French and English armies will be
staked. If they win it, they may hold other
points as they have held Cherson. If they lose
it, the Russians may have their Saratoga and
Yorktown.
It is, however, the popular difficulty which
presents the most formidable difficulty. Every
boy in England and France is taught to con-
slider his nation invincble in the field. Teachers
of youth, from time immemorial, have gone
upon the plan Of concealing, palliating, or
denying national reverses. Historians Of
the highest character have pandered to
the popular vanity by similar condescen-
sions. Hence it is that Frenchman or
an Epg lishman only laughs contemptuously
at the bare notion that his countrymen could
be beaten. This has been true of both peoples
for over q century at least ; and the alliance
between the two Powers is certain to have
given fresh strength to the delusion. At the
time the allied armies sailed from yarna there
was not a man in England, or France, from the
editor of the Times to the apple sessrs In the
streets, who was not thoroughly convinced that
the Russians would be beaten everywhere, and
that whatever the allied generals wanted-was
it Moscow or was it Sebastopol-they would
have. The point is, now, can this delusion be
these two highly sensitive and
turbulent peoples be told bluntly that their
army has failed, that over sixty thousand men
have perished to no purpose whatever, and that
the Western governments are only solicitous
about q way Of getting the remnant safe home
Above all, can they lie told this after the dis
closures made by the committee before Sebas.
tOpol, and the pamphlet ascribed to Prince Ma
poleon, have clearly traced most Of the disas'
tiers and failures of the campaign to the handi-
work of the two governments
The question is a tough one to answer. A
few years ago, it might have been safely an
swered in the affirmative, so far as Great Britain
was concerned: it might have been said that
change of ministry would satisfy the people.
That caunot be said or hoped now for it
has been tried, and the popular fermen-
tation continues. 1t is indeed not to be dis
guised that, at this moment England stands
on the brink Of revolution and that
any disgrace in the feld--such as disastrous
Dictator humiliating peace-would be likely
to precipitate an explosion. 1t is the settled
conviction of the British masses that the country
was dragged into this war by the aristocracy,
when there was no real necessity for it; that
The war was ineficiently prosecuted by that
same aristocracy; and that the time has come
to overthrow that aristocracy by peaceable or
violent means, as they choose. In this state of
public feeling who could venture to propose
fresh humiliations, or even to narrate fresh dis
asters?
The government of France has one advan-