Weekly Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1853-1861, 1855-03-29

| HlLlfS III tie LOhlNd Cdac- AS IOiAsiN'''
news is scanty we give the article entire.
JUDGE LoRING AND THE MASSACHUSETTS
LEaIsLATURE - ARGUMENT OF WENDELL
| PHmIHs.--We have received in pamphlet
form the speech of Wendell Philips before
the committee on foreign relations of the
Massachusetts, Legislature, in support OF the
petitons for the removal of Edward GreelJ
Loring from the Office of Judge of Probate.
The ability of Mr. Philips as a sOnnd lawyer
and an eloquent advocate is well established
and generally recognized, but the argument
contained in this pamphlet adds another to
the many instances on record, of the inability
of genius, eloqunce, orsophistry to cary con
viction to the mind when they ale opposed
to truth and justice
The legal argument of Mr.. Philips, which
makes forty-three pages of printed matter,
is confined to the discussion of two PROPOSE
tions.
1st. Can we remove judge who Is not
guilty of any official misconduct, or or OF any
violation of statute law in any capacity
2d. If we have the power, ought we to ex-
ercise it in the present case ?
The constitution of the State of Massachu-
setts provides two ways by which a judge
may be removed The first is by impeach-
Inent, andthe secord by addresses of the Leg
islature to the Governor and Council.
These petitions we are seeking to have
Mr. Lsring removed do not ak for his inn
parchment, because they admit that he has
not been guilty of any o6i>ial misconduct. TO
render Judge liable to impeachment (says
Mr.. PhilipS) he must be proved to have mis-
conduct is his official capacity. In another
place Mr.. Philips says:
As the constitution confLes the process
of impeachment TO cases of official misconduct
ard as we do not pretend that Mr.. Loring
sitting as a Judge Of Probate, has been guilty
of any such, pass from this point. "
"But the constitution provide another form,
which is, that Judge may be removed from
office by the address of both llou"es to his
Excellencv, the Governor. In the first place,
gentlemen, let me read to you the source of
this power. 'All judicial officers, duly APP
| pointed, commissioned, and sworn, shall hold
their offices during good behavior, excepting
such concerning whom there is different
provision made in this constitution provided
nevertheless, the Governor, with consent of
the Council, may remove them upon address
of both Houses of Legislature"' - ICONS. Of
Mass, chap. III, art. L.
The constitution is plain enough, that the
Legislature has no right to address the Gov
ernor and counsel for the removal of Judge
that, after all, mag or may not remove him. -
Notwithstanding the apparent plainness Of
this proposition, MIR. Philips occupies eleven
printed page to prove it. All the instances
and illustrations of the rise and intention of
the right of address show that it was intend
ed to provide for cases where the public good
requires that the Judge should be removed al
though he has not committed any crime ; and II
must be obvious that it never was designed to
be used either for punishment or for cersure.
Mr.. Philips admits this to be so when he
says:
/ have not time for historical details, but
the power of address, whenever it has been
used in this Common wealth, has been used to
remove Judges who had not violated any law.
Judge Bradbury was removed, | think, for
mental incapacity resulting from advancing
age. OF course, intellectual nefficiency is not
/ impeachable it is not such misconduct or
NAL administration rs renders a man liable
! to impeachment; but the Constitution, in or
/ der to cover the whole ground, has left with
the Legislature the power to remove an ineffi-
cient Judge-a Judge who has grown too old
D
to perform his duties
Mr.. Philips cites the views of the members
Of the Massachusetts, convention who framed
/ the Constitution.
They all seem TO have regarded this right
Of removal by address as just and proper
one fused discreetly, and is intended to guard
/ against the evils that might arise from infrm
ty, incompetency, or from such improprieties
of official conduct as impeachment could not
reach.
The first proposition of Mr. Philips assert
/ ing the naked power to remove a Judge with
! out official, misconduct may be considered as
established. But he not only fails to make
ont the second point in the case but he fails
/ to treat it in a clear, logical, and fair manner
The question then is, does Judge Loring's
present proper case for the exercis of this
power?
Ioring was Judge Of Probate ander the
laws Of Massachusetts,, and also a Commis-
siOner for the United States under the provi-
sions of the fugitive slave law 1t is for his
conduct as a United States Commissioner tn at
these petitioners pray to have him addressed
out of his judeeship held under the State of
Massachusetts,. 1t is not even insinuated that
as Judge of Probate, he is either imbecile or
incompetent, or has been guilty of any Off
cial misconduct, and if he were not u. S.
Commissioner there could be no excuse offered
for the proposition to address him out Of of
fi-e Neither IS his conduct as Commissioner
impeached on the contrary, Mr. Dana, one OF
the counsel Of Byrnes, admitted that Judge
Loring's course in the trial while acting as
Commissioner was right and proper. If any
offense has been committed by Loring it is in
accepting the office of U. S. Commissioner
In Massachusetts, there is neithr statute law
nor constitutional provision which makes the
holding of the two offices incompatible. Mr..
Lorng, in his letter to the Massachusetts Leg
slaturc, asserts this fact, but Mr.. Philips says
that it is not so and is an evasion and to prove
that it is quotes the law of 1843, which pro-
vides that
SEC. l. No Judge cf any Court Of Recoro
Of this Commonwealth, and no justice of the
peace. shall hereafter take cognizance or grant
"A certificate in cases that may arise under the
third section of an act Of Congress passed
February 10Th, 1898, and entitled "An act
respecting fugitives from justice, and person.
escaping from the service of their masters, ,
to any person who claims any other person
as a fugitive slave within the jurisdiction o
the Commonwealth.
1t IS very evident that this enactment wa,
intended to prohibit the State courts from be
ing used as the agents in executing the pro
visions Of the fugitive slave law passed by
Congress in 1898. The probate court of Mas
sachusetts, over which Mr.. Loring was pre-
siding Judge, could not under the law take
cognizance of fugitive slave.
Mr.. Philips perceived this weak uoint il
: his case and tried to get out of the difficulty
by an unworthy quibble. Thus he says:
: Technically construed, it may be said onl]
J to forbid that judge, acting as ajudge, shoulC
issue slave warrant; and it may be claimeC
that Mr.. Loring did not transgress it, since h.
issued his warrant, not as a Judge, but as
slave commissioner. Technically speaking
this may be so, and an inferior court Of jus
! tice would be bound so to regard it. Rut yov
are not sitting rs nisi irius lawyers, bound b.
quibbling techncalties you are statesmen
{ looking with plain, manly sense at the es