New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-08


From Balaklava to Alushts there are four
marches. from Alushta to Sympheropol farce
together about IS English miles. But as no
side-roads exist allowing the troops to march In
several parallel columns, the whole army would
have to advance on this one road in one enor-
mously extended column, requiring them
to march at least for four or FIVE days in
one continuous defle. Near Alushta and on the
pass there are some old forti6ostions, and we
may be sure that the pass itself will be found
strongly intrenched. Instead Of seven days the
army would perhaps require twelve before even
the pass of Chatyr Dagh could be crossed-sime
enough for the Russians to make an attempt on
the corps remaining to protect the siege, or to
march with the greater part Of their forces
against the enemy and meet him with superior
numbers on debouching from the hills, while
light, movable columns sent along the footpaths
of the Upper Kntshs and Alma would fall upon
his flank and rear. The greatest fault Of flank
movement by way of Alushta would, however,
be its utter want of base of operations. The
open roadstsad Of Alushta forbids the idea OF
turning that place even into temporary base;
so that even before Alushta is passed, Russian
light infantry descending by the foot-paths across
the bills, may interrupt the communication with
Balaklava quite effectually.
The march BY Alushta, therefore, can hardly
be undertaken. It's risks far outweigh its posi-
bic advantages. There is, however, another
way of turning the Russians. If in the march
By Alushta all the advantages offered to the
Allies by the high road are far outweighed by
the means of attack given to the Russians by
the foot paths cannot these same foot paths be
turned to the same advantage by the Allies
This would imply an entirely different operation.
In this case the Allies would place the main
body of their feld-troOps, including the corps
destined to invest the north side of Seyastopol,
directly opposite the Russian camp above lnker-
mann, forcing their opponents thereby to keep
the great body of their troops concentrated
in the intrenchments. Meantime, Zouayes,
Cbasseurs, Light Infantry, British Rifles, and
even the mounted Chasseurs d'Afrique, and
what can be got together of mOuntain-artll-
lery, would BIO formed into as many COL
umns as there are foot-paths leading from
the valley of Baidar and from the South
Coast near Alupka, 30 miles from Balakaya, into
the valleys of the Belbek and Katcha. night
march would conveniently bring the troops des-
tined to turn the extreme Russian left across the
valley of Baidar to the South Coast, whore the
enemy could no longer perceive them. Another
march would bring them to Alupka Above
Alupka ia the steep range OF the fala noun
tains, forming on their northern slope an elevo-
ted plain about 900 feet above the sea, aitordng
good pasturage for sheep, and descends by rocky
precipices into the glens of the rivulets Biuk
Uzen and Uzen Bash, which by their junction
from the Belbek river. Three foot-paths lead
up to this plain near Aupka, and pass into the
glens of the two Uzens. All this ground is per-
fcctly practicable for infantry such as the Zou-
ayes and Chasseurs, who in Africa have got ac-
customed TO mountain warfare of q far more diff
fcult character. Then, from the valley of the
Upper Chernaya, better known as the Baidar
Valley, at least two footpa lead to the valley
of the Upper Belbek and finally one branches
off from the Balaklava and Sympheropol road
just before the mountain pass and traverses the
ridge three miles southeast of Mackenzie's farm,
leading Immediately to the left of the Rus
sian intrenched position. Now if these paths
be ever 80 difficult they must be practi-
cable for the French light troops from
Africa. where a goat passes, man can
:" pass; where O man whole battalion; where
"a battalion, a horse or so may get through with
little trouble; and finally, you will perhaps
" manage even to pass feld-gun." In TACT
we should not be at all astOnished If these
sheep tracks and foot paths marked on the maps
shoald even turn out to be country roads,
bad enough, but quite practicable for thanking
movement, in which even artillery might accom-
pany the columns. In that case the turning
should be carried out with as large force as
possible, and then the Russians will soon have
to give up their intrenchments, even without
a serious front attack. But if these paths should
be impracticable for 6eld-guns (rockets and
mountain howitzers can go anywhere), the tufn-
ing parties will take the character of mere NOV
able columns, drive back the Russian troops as
far as they can from the upper valleys of the
Belbek, pass into that Of the Katsha, menace
the Russian rear, intercept their communica-
tions, destroy their conveys, collect trustworthy
information, reconnoiter the country, draw upon
themselves as many Russian detachments as
possible, until that road which offers the least
difficulties is made SO far practicable as to admit
of the passage of artillery. Then strong force
may be sent after them and the Russian rear be
SO seriously menaced as to force an evacuation
Of the intrenchments. That an advance Of mere
infantry and light cavalry across these noun
tains on the left flank and rear Of tho Russians