New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-07-02

| come, aud the necessity Of minding her own
business will be imposed upon Russia, but by
other enemies than Louis BOnaPaite and Pal
merstOn, and after struggles far more decisive
than the "local" execution put in force on her
Black Sea dominions But let us suppose the
Crimea conquered and gsrrisoned by $4,000 Al
lies-the Caucasus and everything to the South
of it cleared Of Russian troops, and Gil allied
army checking the Russians on the kubsn and
Terek-Odessa taken and converted into an in
trenched camp, holding say 100000 Anglo
French troops; Nikolaief, Cherson, lsmsil, de-
stroyed or occupied by the Allies. We viii
even suppose that beside these "local' ex-
ploits something Of some importance may have
been accomplished in the Baltic, although with
the Information at our command it is hard to
cay what that may be. What them
Will the Allies confine themselves to holding
their positions and firing out the Russians :
Their men ia the Crmea and the Caucasus Will
vanish faster under the effects of disease than
they can be replaced. Their main army, say at
Odessa. will have to be fed by the fleets, for the
country for hundreds of miles around Odessa pro-
duces nothing. The Russian army, surrounded
by Cosssck scOuts-nOwhere more useful than
in these stebpes-will harass them whenever
they show themselves out OF their ntrench-
ments. if it cannot take up permanent POSI-
ton somewhere in the neighborhood OF the
town. 1t is impossible under such clrcum-
stances TO force toe Russians to give battle;
their great advantage will always be to draw
the Allies into the interior of the country. 10
every advance of the Allies, they Will respond
by slow retreat. Yet large army cannot DE
confined for any length of time in an intrenched
camp without giving it something to do. The
graGaal progress of disorder aud decentralization
would force the Allies to some decided move
ment. Sickness, too, would make the place too
hot for them. In a word, to occupy the prncl-
pal points on the coast and there to await the
moment when Russia finds it necessary to give
in is game that will never do at all There
are three chances to one that the Allies would
be tired Of it first, and that the graves OF their
soldiers on the shores of the Black Sea would
soon be counted by hundreds Of thousands.
1t would be a military blum Ter, too. To com
mand coast, it is not sufficient to possess It's
principal points. 1t is the possession OF the
inner country which alone gives the possession
OF the coast. As we have seen, the very clrcum'
stances arising from an establishment on the
coast of South Russia would ali but ierce the
Allies 10 march into the interior. And here it is
that the difficulties begin. Up to the frontiers
of the Governments of Podoia, Kieh. Poltava,
Charkof. the country is an almost uncultivated
IL. 80 flIr IA inc rnfh N
but grass, and not even that after the heats OF
Summer Surprising Odessa, Nikolaiet, Cher
son to be taken for a base of operations, where
would be the object against which the Allies
could direct their etfortsl The towns are lew
and far between, and there are none of sufficient
importance TO give, if occupied, adhesive char
acter to the operation. There is no decisive point
nearer than Moscow, and that is 700 miles off
Five hunored thousand men would be required
for a march on Moscow, and where are they to
come from Surely, the case is such that in
this wsy the "locaI' war can never lead to any
de cisve result; and we defy Louis BOnaparte
With al mis- exuberance of strategic Imagination
70 find another.
All this, however, presupposes not only the
strict neutrality but even the moral support Of
Austria. and where is thatPower atthe present
moment Austria and Prussia have declared
they would consider an advance of the Russian
army towards the Balkan, in 1854, as caSHs
beM against Russia. Where is the guarantee
that in 1856 they will not consider French
advance on Moscow or even Charkof a cause
of war against the Western Powers We need
not forget that every army advancing from the
Black Sea toward the interior ofRussia as much
offers Its flank to Austria a Russian army ad-
vancing into Turkey from the Danube; and at a
given distance, therefore, its communication
with its base Operations, that's TO say its very
existence, is at the mercy Of Austria. To keep
Austria quiet, even for time, she will have to
be bought OFF by the surrender of Bessarabia TO
her troops. Once on the Dnester, her army
commands Odessa as completely as if tina. town
were garrisoned by Austrisns. And under such
circum stances could an allied army venture on
vild-goose chase after the Russians into the in
terror of the country Nonsense! But this
nonsense, let us remember, is the logical con-
sequence of Louis BOnaparte's latest plan of
"local warfare"
The first plan for the campaign was the
"grande guerre, by means of the Aus rian al
lance. Ii would have placed the French army
in the same numerical inferiority and virtual de-
pendence with respect to the Auttrian army as
the English army is now with regard to the
French. 1t would have given the revolutionary
initiative 20 Russia Louis Bonsparte could do
neither. Austria refused to act; the subject