New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-02-13

are cor red strictly 70 the exercise OF the powers
conferred upon them, and the facts necessary 10 give
face Of heir proceedings, and cannot be presumed.
Ii is not denied that this principle applies 20 all
mere inferior tn brnats but that extends TO the Cir
cult and District Courts of the United States has been
frequently denied BY the Supreme Court Of the United
States.
In Ksnpes Lessee vs. Kennedy, s Crsnch, 1851
that Court he Id that the Courts OF the United States
are all OF limited jurisdiction, and these proceedings
are erroneous II the jurisdiction be not snoFn upon
"them. Judgments rendered IN such csses may Ger,
tainly be reversed but this Court Is not prepared
10 saw that they are absolutely utilities which msy
"be totally disrtgarded." So also in heCormickvs.
Sullivan 10 Wheat 1879 the same Court, IN speak
ing OF the izfrrior Courts of the United states say
They are all of limited jurisdiction, but they are
" that account interior Courts IN the teconicA
sense OF thos words whose judgments taken alone,
are to be dsregaided' The same doctrine IL Illus
trafed AID acted upon IN ex pdTte Ioolas WsAhs,
70 Peter, 1884, and in Kennedy ct al. Vs. Georgia
State Bank et al Is How, $50 and the basis OF
the rule must be found in that presumption Of jurs
dc;ion which the Law rsises-hat the solemn a1Judi'
cstiors Of Court of Record have been given in cases
only in which it had power 10 set This presumption
certainly applies 10 all Courts Of general jurisdiction,
and for the purposes of the present case and in ODE
dence to the decisions OF the Supreme Court ready
cited we may apply il 10 the District Court OF the
United States for This District; but II the record OF
uc GIN. 1T CT proceeding in that any other Court
whatever. should come before US cousferally, and
upon the face Of the record was apparent hs' the
Cour, had 70 jurisdiction TO render any Judgment in
the premses we would not and could not hesitate to
disregard it, there the presumption 10 favor OF the
yaliciy of the proceedings would be destroyed ana
the judg ment would have no force Suppose, for 10
stance that Judgment record coming from Court
OF general jurisdiction, sboad disclose the fact tnat
without afforuirg the defendant an opportunity TO
make a defense, and without in any manner citing
him TO appear either by service Of process or
othereise the Court had proceeded or pdre snd rem
deied Judgment against the defendant, surely we
would be justified in treating the proceedings as CO.
non Jndice.
Now. the return made by the Sheriff o. Milwaukee
County in this case contains record Of the proceed
ine in the District Court in which thi, reia'or was con-
yct.d and sentenced which not only takes away mere
presumption but shows, IN u the Dlsfc.
Court had no jurisdiction of the subject complained
OF In the counts Of the Indictment upon which be was
convicted; and if this position be true we may sp
propriaiey the lar gusge OF Judge Evans IN the
case of Hill We. Robertson, Il StrobhaTts Law r.
"It would be waste OF words TO attempt 70 prove
THAT the proceedings Of Court of limited ar'de-
"tion in case clearly withoutits jurisdiction are
"sb outely void and may be 80 declared whenever
"ihe question is presented, whether directly or col
"laterslly.'
The Indictment upon which this reator wss tried
and convicted in the District Court contsined three
counts the first of which may be considered ~ prop
erly charging an offense within the seventh section OF
the Act OF Congress of Sept. IL, $780, known as the
".
however, do not in my opinion, set forth or charge
an offense punishable by any statute OF the United
States or Of which the District Court has any Jurs-
diction whatever.
The relator was found guilty charged IN the sec
ond and n ird counts Of the Indictment out was NOT
convicted of the ofenss charged In tue hrst cVuu "
that If the counts on which the CONVICTION TOOK place
do rot show q case within the jurisdiction Oh tne
Cont the conviction and sentence are not only u'
authorized by law, but are cordm no" Jhd'ce'
The second count charges that John Rycratt, OIL,
csc. at & c., on sc knowingly and wilfdlly dtd ad
a6t and assist Joshua Glorer 10 escape from me
"custOdy Of Chos: e. Cotton then ana there oelpg
deputy of the Marshal of the United States for the
District of Wisconsin, he, the said Joshua Glover,
Having been heretofore apprehended by ana then
and there being in the custody OF, the SAID lotion
sc The count then proceeds to recte the warrant
nv virtue of sbich said Glover was apprehended,
and which had been fsued by the Hon. Andrew ":
Miller, Judge of the District Court OF the United
States From the recials contained IN the warrant
set forth in the indictment, we find that complaint
bad b. en- made before Judge Miller, by person
claiming that said Glover owed service and labor TO
him. the claimant according to the laws OF the State
of Missouri, and that upon that co npalnt the war
rant had Issued against Glover as fugitive slave.
The third count is substantially the same as the sec
ond the principal dife being that It recites the
attic avt Of the claimant as well as the warrant Issued
by the District Judge.
these counts an oense within the seventh section Of
the Act Of 1850; but in my view of them they merely
charge an aiding, a6ettHg and assisting a person
namtd Gl0rer to escape from the custody o. M.
Lottsn a DeDuty of The Marsh0io Of the United States.
Who is this Glover thus aided or, in other words,
fIom the sverments and finding Of the Grand Jury,
at forth in these counts and not from the rectas
of the affidavit and warrant therein, what is the kind
Of person alleged to have been aided For If II be not
shown that he is within the description Of person. the
aiding in the escape of whom declared to be an of
f.nse, then so far as the Act of 1850 is concerned
these counts change no offense
he Duliahm0Qt
any person who shall kno6ngly and wilfully aid,
abet and assist such person. ouing serrsce and Ia
"bor as aforesaid directly or indirectly, to escape,
&c"
Now it is not the aiding any person to escape which
is here provided for but it s the aiding Of person
of specified status or condition. to wit, one who
owes service or labor 0toresdid and these words
most evidently refer back to the commencement Of
the sixth section, where find the person described
as one held TO service or labor in any State Ter
"ritory Of the United States This is the only
sonabe construction which can place upon the Ian
guage Of this section for certainly the assisting of
person not owing service labor In any State or
Territory would net come within this section. Sup
pose person, undoubtedly free man, were in Gus
tody claim under this law, and without the use Of
any force violence he wss assisted to escape, how
could il be sald that the aid had been rendered to
person 40 oring serrice and lab0ri To constitute
offense under this under any statute every cir
cumstance necessary TO an exact description of the
ofense, as defined by the statute, must be critically
se' l anu Inc dpPication oi ths RUE 10 tue counts
OF this Indictment would require that the man Glover
should have been described a. person owing service
or labor in some State or Territory. BY no principle
oflaw infer from the words used in these counts
that Glover owed service or Iaboron the contrary,
We are bound TO suppose that Joshua Glover was
equally as free as any other person. II be had been
in the custody OF the officer for the violation Of some
other law of Congress than the Act of $780, the aid
irg him to escape would not be an ofense within
that Act. But from the legitimate averments of
these counts, cannot find description Of any Of
feLse for which Glover was in custody-snd the