The weekly Portage sentinel. [volume] (Ravenna, Ohio) 1854-1861, 1855-10-27

~ nc 80 - - "A
LOUIS KossUTH In letter 20 the New
York Times, received BY the America, ex-
presses his views, with reference 70 the pros |
poets of peace, ss affected by the fall Of Sc
vRstopol, as follows:
As to the prospects Of peace-itis il mysde.
cided opinion that these are rather lessened
than otherwise by the fall OF the south OF
Sevastop0l. In an absolute point Of view
never did nor do attach any considerable
Importance to this enterprise. always
thought, and think that il was great mis-
take to choose that point for an attack on
Russia, the professed object oil which 70 10
secnre Europe from her preponderance. 1
have often expressed the opinion that moth
! ing to be achieved in that quarter, can ell
ther break Russia's power of resistance, or
bring her to satisfactory terms. Destruction
of Sevastopol und of the Russian Black Sea
feet is, in my opinion, nothing butan insult,
that does not take away strength; it is dou-
bly, SO when we remember that the siege OF
Sevastopol was undertaken, coupled with
the pledge solemnly given TO Austria, that
under no circumstances il the territorial ex-
tension of the Russian Empire to be i'm
puired. The word was the first to advance
has almost become vernacular, that, with a
policy pledged 10 maintain the integrity OF
the Russian Empire, fortress and fleet
DESTROYED, is but a fortress and fleet to be
built up again stronger than ever in lew
wears. The case would be somewhat dif-
ferent had the allied powers the intention to
keep the Crimea. But on the one hand, un-
til now at least, this intention they had not;
on the other hand the Crimea, is not bar
rier that defends; it is an acquisition that
requires defence, and to make good this de-
fence one of two things is Indispensable
either the maintenance Of very large
standing army in the Crimea, or else the
pushing back OF Russia from the Black Sea
consequently from the immediate neighbor.
hood Of the Criuea. Without either one
or the other of these alternatives, as soon
as the Allies would march out Russia would
march in again. The first alternative i'm
} plies the condition Of an armed peace, tc
the cost of which neither England mol
France would choose to submit in the
long run; besides, it implies the tortuou'
uuestion, who is it that will undertake the
I charge; England and France together; tina
supposes the incredible circumstance of I
perpetual entente cordial between them. M
men SO foolish as to build his house on suci
loose sand. England alone: France woul'
not agree to it. France alone! Englant
would object to it. Turkey alone woult
thank for the ruinous gift. Turkey, assist
ed by the Allies, would suppose these AL
, lies always allies; and would imply, besides
the opening of the Dardanelles, and OF In
Bosphorus-equivalent to an overthrow o
the Independence Of Turkey. The secont
alternative, (that Of pushing back Russi
from the Black Sea- implies, in its turn
the necessity of an indeoendent Circassiar
and OF Daco Roumain State with Bessal
e abba and the Territory of Oczakoff up
Cherso; combination which would be at
\, solute nonsence without the full reconstrut
ton of Poland in its ancient extent; thin
e beyond the limits OF the determination OF tn
# Allies. At all events, of two things, ont
J. either the Allies make campaign in Pc
q land or they may not; in the first case the
:, ought to have done it without sacriticin
II 900 of their best troops, and about fou
thousand five hundred millions Of francs ur
der town, the capture of which woul
have been an easy work by a secondary d
y version, had it been but defended by gal
: hrison instead Of the principal army Of Rus
u :, sia, us with Polish campaign the cas-
would have been undoubtedly;--on the otl
> er hand, if the Allies don't mean to make
T. Polish campaign, they cannot think Of kee!
!. ing the Crimea; and if they don't keep th
y Crmea, then Indeed the fortress and th
q feet destroyed there is but fortress and
fleet to be built up again. With gre'
, power like Russia, it is bnt au insult th
e does not take away strength. However. VI
- der other circumstances, it might have bee
% a matter of choice for Russia how far to r.
y" sent or not to resent that insult; but Nndt
II the circumstances, such as they are, to n
sent it to the utmost is an imperative me-
y essity for the Gear. Sevastopol is the iel
= 70 on which the contending parties have mea
. ured their power for year. The eyes {
the world-of Asia, especially-have bee
% rivited on that spot The long protracte
struggle there identified the prestige of Il
Czar's invincibility with the name Of Seva
D. topol. Sevastopol falling shakes that pre-
u tige to its very foundation; the Gear submi
r ting to that fall would ruin that prestige
u retrievuby. Whatever be the personal il
e clinations of Gar Alexander, "a deb0nnGi
70 young man he is, we are toldO he has I
choice; he would not live one week If
" :, dared to sign the ruin of the prestige of Ru
~ sia's power He cannot sue for peace, !
u cannot accept any condtions--were eve
some offered him-under this pressure;
= must fight, until either the strength of h
. empire be broken, or the prestige OF h
power redressed.