The Camden weekly journal. [volume] (Camden, South-Carolina) 1853-1861, 1855-07-17

ETtrdct0f tetter from an iiWeTacdh IN FTdtce
to his triendm Washington.
PARIS; JUNE IA, ls55.-The dispatches from
the Crimeaare considered more favorable; but in
studying them cut cannot see that anything
has been accomplished before Sebaslopol that
has resulted in permanent or material advan-
tagc, and certainly nothing that should be
cause for such great rcjoiciugs. They have car
red no material works of the eueiny, as all those
they have taken were merely advanced positions
erected and held for the purpose OF annoying
the Allies, and in no way connected with the
permanent and regular dcfences Of the place,
none Of which latter have as yet been either
captured nor, so lar rs We know, even injured
by the fire of the Allies. Everything the latter
have effected has been at a fearful and distress.
ing loss Of life and, great as Is the Allied force
now before Sebastopol, it will melt away most
dreadtully if they are to win their way step by
step at n similar cost.
However resultIess may be the operations of
the Allies before the great fortress Of the East,
look in very diff'rent light on thr'' success
in the Sea of Azof. There they arc not only
really secccssful, but the result Of their sue
cess is we'll calculated 10 affect most seriously
and disastrously the efforts Of the Russians to
defend Scbastopol, by cutting Oft their supplies.
1t is truly wonderful that the Allies should so
long have neglected operations in that quarter,
for they hardly could have been ignorant of the
fact Of the vast supplies Of provisions and forage
derived from thence BY the enemy. If they were
ignorant of it then it exhibits an imbecility on
the part ofthose conducting the war and manag
ing the campaign that is still more matter of
astonishmcnt.
The Allies can with great ease keep the whole
coast of the Crimea, both on the Sea of Azof
and on the Black Sea- so blockaded and guarded
as to cut off all supplies, except by land through
the Isthmus of Perekop land even the supplies
through that route must be brought from as far
as Odessa, and for hundreds of miles of country
beyond Perekop. 1t would seem almost i'm.
practicable, and probably is so, to feed such an
army, and not less than 10000 or 10000 horses
by means of transportation in bullock wagons
for such an immense distance and over such
roads. The mere food that would be consumed
by the animals themselves and men employed
in the transportion would soon strip the county
through which they passed, and if they are to
carry their own provender and food, how much
of their load would remain on arrival at the
camp after a Journey of twenty to forty days,
each bullock or horse requiring twelve to four.
teen pounds of forage daily? The bullocks on
arriving in camp, could be slaughtered for food
but that would involve the loss of the thousands
and tens of thousands Of vehicles that w.re used
for the transportation. Viewing the opera.
tions of the Allies in the Sea Of Aft in any
light whatever, their success there and there
occupancy and naval command of that sea must
very seriously aud probably very promptly sflec:
the defence ofSebastopol, and starvation may
bring about fatal crisis for the Russians, even
before they can make new arrangements for sup
plies from elsewhere.
If the allies are convced that such will be the
result, their best policy will Of course be to con-
fine their exertions to cutting off supplies, and
let famine do its work. Under this system OF
tactics it is possible strong force will be sent
to seize and hold the Isthmus Of Perekop, and
thus, with the coasts of the Crimca guarded at
every point by the allied naval force, to cut Oft
efectually supplies from every quarter, except
what could be procured in the Crimea itself,
which it is well known are totally inadequate,
and have already been exhausted to very
great extent. Thirty to fifty thousand men
would by entrenching themselves be able to
hold the Isthmus against any force the Russians
could bring against them, and at any rate force
q sufficient time to solve the problem of starva.
tion to the defenders of Sebastopol. Tho allies
could we'll spare the above force, for tho rein
forccmcuts on the way and still to embark will
be at least equal to that number. Except the
capture of Sebastopol can be made on the pre-
eeding plan, the general opinion still is that It