New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-06-21

II ros irferded TO abandon Knfrh, and no dorH ra
m, game rth Berdiossk Dnd ofh<r Placer ~ rae oee
.sr0eTaiisn with regard this expedition 10 the Ses
Of IEoG II there YVES really anything in IL, rsa' w"
NM b. The r,feetron Of those Dh0 had he shpfiohider
tok, n lone Ggo7 Were we sure that the ex ehitioh
vas not occaSoned by the same which took our
troops from Galpoli TO Wanna ard from Warns TO ne
Crimea-the CRY of DO something Hear hear.
IL ever n Government or commander did somethng
because they were told to do something und Tor no
other reason the chances were hundred 10 one tnst
thew would do sonnet hing wrong Hear, hearl. lie
vss not sure that the expedition was caused by any
thing but because the Government called on 10 DO
'somethirg and he would now record hs deliberate
opinion that while the proceedings IN the Sea OF AEON
were destroying private properly and would not adi
n The luster of our arms he believed that they could
have no better effect on the war than The marauding
expeditions lest year in the Gulf OF Finland nal on
Cronstadt. He believed that the supplies 81 SeVoao-
DO come entirely from Perekop, and that hot place
andSEmpA ropoi ere strongly IKE Serdst2pof,
and that both must BE- taken before you could intercept
Ire food of the Russian army and take Seu10op0i
AS to the intercepton OF supplies into the Sf;mea
across the seppes beyond Peresop, he was told by
gentleman that every Syringe 600 carts were obtained
10 90 from Odessa and other places on the coast over
the seppes with produce TO the Cnea, and that all ths
commerce was now suspended. The consequence was
that the Russian Government would avail it-elf OF al
III means of conveyance while go far from the teppeS
being an obstacle, journeys were made over seppes
FIVE or six times greater in extent than those was II
better that should look al al tEere uluEs III
this light and calmly consider them without giving
way 10 an effervercence OF feeling winch preventea
our Judging Of the consequences OF what we were
about 10 dol We had recommended the war with
determination to take Seyastopo When he SAID thar
the united strength of England aud France could not
be resisted by any human power he made one excep-
ton in favor of greater power than eiher. ne AZ
uded to pestence and disease. lie had reah ia'ey
some exiracts from Spencers work with reference To
the climate Of the Crmea, which hal reference To the
Summer. lie never dreamed Of applying those obser.
yatious 10 the Winter for if well housed and ted and
not overworked in the trenches, there was noang In
the constitution of Englshman to prevent hs hyny
and being in health in the Winter IN the Crmea But
in the Summer, according TO the best authorities
wac hardly possible for Englshman III the Crmea'
unless the most careful precauon was oOselVel 10
escape the intermittent fever which prevailed in July
August and half of September. Those were the iaal
months. II any one snned against the most careful
was exposed to the night dews II he took cold water
when heated or ate or fru-all these things
brought on the intermittent fever, and all these PR
cautions soldiers, Of ell other men, disregarded. ne
dreaded the fate of the army IN July August and
September.
We have no desire to give to the observations
Of an advocate pleading cause-even if 1t be
the cause Of Peace-a weight which ought not
TO belong to them; but common sense seems
to accord with most of what Mr.. Golden here
advances. 1t is not to be supposed that Russia
would leave the main channel for supplies 10
her Crimean Army without defense. She has
made blunders enough in the conduct OF the
war, as even her special advocates will not
deny; but nothing to lead us to suppose her
Government capable of such faulty as this. Ii
Kertcb, or Arabat, or Genitchi were necessary
to her as depots Of provisions, she would have
had them fortified and defended by troops,
especially as she must long ago have expected
naval attack on those places-whereas the
allied Commanders found neither forts nor SOL
diers in their way. Mr.. Golden is undoubtedly
right in saying that Perekop is the great chan
mel for her supplies.
There can be no doubt that if men and NUM-
tons enough are sent to the Crimea by the Al
lies they can conquer and hold that peninsula.
SO far, however, they seem to have added only
Omer Psshas $1,000 men, the Piedmontese
Is OOO and IS, 900 of the French reserves in Tur-
kew, or in all rs, coo men TO their armies since
the beginning of the second campaign. Their
entire efficient force now in the trlmea cannot
be reck oned at above 175, 900 men, These troops
are however weakened by being scattered,
IS, 600 at Eupatoria, and 90 900 at Kertch, leav-
ing I2O, 600 before Sevastopol OF these $4,000
would be required to keep up the siege, which
leaves $4,000 for feld operations. Now this
army is not strong enough for the peculiar move
ments it must undertake in order to turn the
enemy's intrenchments, since the Russians can
oppose it with a stronger force in more adyan-
tsgeous position. We say stronger, because
5000 new troops have just entered the PENN
sula. Under these circumstances it is barely
possible that the allied Generals may attempt
the assault, notwithstanding the fearful slaugh-
ter it involves. But we shall believe this only
when we hear that it has been done.