The Athens post. [volume] (Athens, Tenn.) 1848-1917, 1855-10-19
KOSSUTH ON THE FALL OF SEBAS-
TOpOI

TOPOL.
The New York Times contains letter
from kossuth, from which we make the fol-
lowing extract, giving his views of the effect
of the fall of Sebastopol:
As to the prospects of peace-it is my de-
eided opinion that these a.e rather lessened
than otherwise by the fall of the South u:
Sebas,opol. III an absolute point of view |
never dad nor do attach any considerable i'm
Portanee to this enterprise. | always thought
and think that it was great mistake to
choose that point for an attack on Russia,
the protessed object of which is TO secure
Europe from her political prepOnderanee. |
have often expressed the opinion that moth
ing TO be achieved in that quarter can either
break Russa's power of resistance, or bring
her to satisfactory terms. Destruction of
SebastopOl and of the Russian Black Sea
fleet is, IN my opinion, nothing but an insult,
that does not take away strength; it is doub-
~ so when we remember that the seige of
Sebastopol was undertaken, coupled with
the pledge solennly given TO Austria, that
under no circumstances is the territorial ex-
istence of the Russian Empire to be impair
ed. The word was first to advance has al
most become vernacular. that, with policy
pledged to maintain the integrity of the Rus
sian Empire, fortress and fleet DESTROYED
is but fortress and feet to be built up
again stronger than ever in few years. The
case would be somewhat different had the
allied powers the intention to keep the Cr-
mea. But, on the one hand, until now at
least, this intention they had not; on the 9TH
e. hand, the Crmea is no barrier that defends
it is an acquisition that requires defence; and
to make good this defence, one of two things
is indspensable-ei the maintainance of
a very large standing army in the Crimea, or
else the pushing back Of Russia entirely
from the Black Sea, consequently from the
immediate neighboIhood of the Crimea-
Without either the one or the other of these
alternatives, as soon as the Allies would
march out, Russia would march in again.
The first alternative implies the condition of
I'm armed peace, to the cost of which neither
England nor France would choose TO submit
in the long run; besides, it implies the tortu-
Gus question: Who is it that will undertake
the charge! England and France together!
that supposes the incredible circumstance Of
a perpetual entente cordial between them. No
man so foolish rs to build his house on such
loose sand. England alone! France would
not agree to it. Turkey alone! would thank
for the ruinous gift. Turkey, assisted by the
Allies! would suppose these Allies always
allies; and would imply, besides, the opening
of the Dardaneles, and of the Bosphorus-
equivalent to an overthrow of the independ-
ence Of Turkey. The second alternative
Chat of pushing back Russia from the Black
Sea- implies, in ifs turn, the necessity of an
independent Circassia and of a Daco Rou-
main State with Bessarabia and the Territory
OF Oczakoff up to Cherson; combination
which would be absolute nonsense without
the full reconstruction of Poland in its an
cient extent;-a thing beyond the limits Of
the determination of the Allies. At all events,
OF two things, one either the Allies make n
campaign in Poland, or they make not; in the
first case, they ought to have done it without
sacrificing one hundred thousand of their
best troops, and about four thousand five
hundred millions of francs under u town,
the capture Of which would have been an
easy work by n secondary diversion, had it
bnt been defended by garrison instead of
the principal army of Russia, rs with Po-
lish campaign the ease would have been un-
doubleday -on the other hand, if the Allies
don't mean to make Polish campaign they
cannot think of keeping the Crimea; and if
they don't keep the Crimea, then indeed the
fortress and the fleet destroyed there is but Il
fortress and fleet to be built up again.-
With great power like Russia il is but an
insult that does not take away strength
However, under other circumstances, it might
have been matter of choice for Russia how
far to resent or not to resent that insult, but
under the circumstances, such as they are, 10
resent it to the utmost is an imperative me-
cessity for the Gar Sebastopol is the field
on which the conteDding parties have meas
ured their power for year. The eyes of
the world-of Asia, especially-have been
rivted on that spot. The long protracted
struggle there Unidentified the prestige of the
Cars nvincibility with the name of Seb,s-
tspel. Sebastopo fallen shakes that pres
tige to its very foundation, the Cars sub
hitting to that fall would ruin that prestige
irretrievably. Whatever be the personal in
clinatons of Car Alexander, a debonnare]
young man he is we are told, he had no
choice, he would not live one week if he
dared to sign the ruin of the prestige of Rus
sas power. lie cannot sue for peace; he
cannot accept any conditions-were even
some Offered him-under this pressure; he
must fight, until either the strength of his
empire be broken or the prestige OF his pow
err redressed.