The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1855-10-06
From tlc London Times. sept. II
CONSEQUENCES OF THE VICTORY

The first question which presents itself tt
our consideration. after we have given utter
ance to those feeling Of exultation and of
gratitude whic,. the glorious termination Of
the siege Of S,ba>topo' cxritcs at tits momen'
throughout the empire relates to the militia
~ consequences OF this victory, and to the
s,ratccrtical measures best calculated "a
brin. the campaign and the war TO speedy
ard triumnllant termination. \ tremendous
blow has been struck at the military power
and fame Of Russia, and her naval forces in
the Black Sea have been anni!ilatcI. .
The position Of Prince Gortsrhakof1 : ar
my. after the main body had effected its re-
treat across the harhor was as follows Ills
extreme right, consisting Of the corps most
actively engaged in the defence OF the place.
rests upon the Srvcrnaia work. or Star Fort.
and holds the strongly intrcnchcl positions
en- the north shore. where, no doubt, con>ile-
bic preparations have been made Tor this
and is protected in front by the field works
thrown up along the ridge Of Inkcrmann.
Ills left wing consists of Liprandi's corps
o,rnpying the ground from Mackrnzie's Farm
20 the heights of Aito'lor. on the Bak >h>cra
road No attempt was made by the relieving
army under Lipranli to effect a diversion
during the assault of the sth, and the severe
.'~t-., "a tho lc,h Of August appears to have
satisfied the enemy tina, the lines of the Tch-
ernaya were not 10 be carried Bat the re-
sult Of the General assault and the orcura-
ton of the southern side by the allies entire
~ changes the strategcticaI positions of the
conba,ants and also the objects of the cam
p,ign.
The struggle Cor the possession of Sehss-
topOl is AZ an end. That prize is in our
hands and As the defense Of the fortress and
the harhor was the grand object of the Rus
slams, they have nothing left on that spot to
contend for. The mere occupation of the
north side of the port is barren advantage,
for though it might Loli a garrison. it canuo.
shelter defeated army and it is ohvi"ns
that after the failure of the main object, all
'he ability and Cenrral>hip o, the Russians
Will he required to save the whole body of
their forces in the Crimca from Instruction.
We therefore infer that the northern forts
will either be held for 4 time by limited
garrison. or, more probably, altogether alan
doned, in the hope Of saving the army. New
was an army in more critical position.
They are confined within peninsula which
affords thc... no other fortified position. no
sustenance tor the troops. and no water be-
yond certain line. The sea covered with
hostile vessels, surrounds three sides of this
theatre Of war, and the fourth is separated
from the Russian base of operations by step
vcs and marshes.
The allied armies already occupy stron.
IAN be reinforced in few hours BY sea. 50 a.
to threaten the Russians in their flank and
I,ar: and while it is impossible for the enc
av to hold his ground in the soutl, OF the
trimca-for which. indeed. there is now
10 further o',j'ct-to retreat in this season
a,ro>s the country is a Formidable undertake
~. while the loss of battle in the open
.c,i would be- absolute destruction. The
Hn->an, are i'll trap. from which the Chon-
.,r road and the I>thmus of Pcrekop are the
only means Of escape. and even there their
communications NAV be possibly interrupted
No doubt all Of these contingencies have
t",H !ore>een; Prince Gor'schakoiT"s plan of
,i..liyn has long since been made JUDI
Nc. therefore, from The accustomed tactics of
IT, i'rs>ian army, as well as from the ex-
irtine difficulty of his present position, we
incline to the opinion that he will adopt the
course of general and immediate retreat.
10 hold the Crimea without SebastopoI,
and even after the hal Dor of Seba>topol it.
self has been transformed tv conquest into
the base of operations Of the invading ar
ircS, would III. a bootlcss and improbable
task. and the danger is greatly aggravated
~ the fact that the whole body Of the allies,
,'h unlimited means Of naval transport at
'lcir Command, will shortly tie at liberty to
lance upon any part OF the peninsula
bel! is accessible from the coast
IAese immediate consequences Of their
n sncrcs> in the siege operations must have
.,n considered by the allied generals, and
~ moment is now arrived when they may
ed to open the campaign of which the
'cuc;ion Of Sehastopol was the first prelim-
nary. The field operations of this nature
lave long been contemplated by the allied
Governments is obvious from the large cav
Try force they have continued to send to the
rlmca. The British army alone can bring
lpwards Of 5000 >atres and lances into the
iyld, and the French cavalry is still more
."r,"rons. and impatient Of the inaction to
which it has hitherto been condemned
Hitherto the contest in the rimea has
ten confined to one single object. and with
ne exception Of the action OF the both of
september on the Alma. and the flank march
bilac!ava, it has been war without A
ln"le tactical movement. Gen. Pelissier has
nown. IN our humble opinion, very admira-
by military qualities since he assumed the
onlmand, and he has been ally supported by
'"n. simpson, bat the preSen, state OF our
Hairs deserves 10 call forth abilities Of sill