The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-11-01
From the New York Evening Post
NUT OR TWO FOR JUDGE KANE TO CRACK

We trust the following communication, which
ia from the pen of one of the ablest lawyers ir
the United States, will have the effect at least
of diminishing Judge Kane's confidence in his
own Judgment, if it does not satisfy him, as il
will any impartial reader, that upon his owl
showing, the Imprisonment of Williamson foI
his return to the writ of habeas corpus directed
to him was an absurdity as well as an outrage
We commend it particularly to the attention Of
members of the bar:
To the Editors of the Ecening Post:
In common with every American citizen,
have taken deep interest in the action Of
Judge Kane in regard to Passmore Williamson
and am unwilling to admit the imputations, too
freely made against him, of prostituting his
judicial Office to curry favor with any particu.
lar section of the Union.
Inasmuch as his action has placed him on
trial before the bar of public opinion, all he
says in justification Of such action is entitled to
grave consideration. l am therefore much OBJ
liged by the insertion in your paper of the ex-
tracts from his opinion, for the reasons of the
decision he arrived at for the discharge of Mr.
Williamson. And after carefully reading it, I
confess myself somewhat at fault in compre-
hending the logical consistency of the Judge in
several particulars, which, with your permission,
l will point out.
1 find no difficulty in understanding that
every court must have the inherent right of pro-
tecting itself against insult and aggression and
of furnishing, by attachment, any violation OF
such right. The right of the courts, also, to
compel, by habeas corpus, person or persons
having the custody of a human being, alleged
to be unlawfully restrained of his liberty, TO
bring such human being before the court, and
to show cause, if any exist, why such being
should not be restored to his liberty, fully
comprehend. But l have never understood
that the process of habeas corpus could be is
sued by court to bring chattel before it, for
the purpose of adjudicating upon its ownership ;
or to bring person to be trird for any cause
whatever, much less condemned by original
sentence to any punishment of loss of liberty,
or pecuniary fine, or otherwise. And this brings
me to the trouble I6nd in the logical consist
ency of the Judges positions as justifcations
of his acts.
First. The Judge assumes and decides, that,
for the purposes of the proceeding before him,
the slave was to be considered as chattel as
much so as if she were a bale of cotton-that
such property belonged to Mr.. Wheeler, who
had been deprived of it by the act of Mr. Will
hanson.
If this be so, will you please inform me by
what authority or precedent the court could
bring the property before it by haJeas corpus
for adjudication.
Second. In subsequent part of the opinion,
the Judge seems to abandon the ground of the
slave being a chattel-admits her to be hu-
man being, and, as alleged, deprived of her
liberty by Mr.. Williamson, That, therefore,
Mr.. Wheeler, as friend, DESTROYS of having
her restored to liberty, of which she was unjust
ly deprived, applied to the court for habeas
corpus.
The habeas corpus, upon this hypothesis,
seems reasonable enough.
But | don't see what force Mr.. Wheelers
property, in the person whom Williamson was
then unjustly depriving of her liberty, can have
to do with the master. The only questions on
the hd6eds corpus were, whether the human
being was illegally deprived of her liberty, and
if so, by whom; not whether Mr.. Williamson
had wrongfully taken Mr.. Wheeler's chattels.
The Judge seems to deny that the slave has
any standing in court. l confess this greatly
perplexes and surprises me. The application
was made on her behalf, by her next friend
she, as the Judge supposes, By reason of hel
confinement, being unable to make the applica
ton in person.
The wrongs or injuries to her rights, and no,
to Mr.. Wheelers, set the court in motion. And
1t appears to me strange indeed, that party
whose private rights court is engaged in pro.
tecting, has no voice in the proceeding, but
must, contrary to his wishes, and when he in
slsts no wrong has been done, submit to any
action which the court, before whom he was
brought through the intervention of a person
calling himself a friend, but who, in fact. the
party considers his worst enemy, may, in the
plenitude of its benevolence, or it's stern deter
mination to right all wrongs, think proper to
take.
1t appears to me, the application, if approved
by the woman, became her application alb initio
and If her first action in court was a repudia.
ton of the application, such reputation must
have the same retroactive effect.
The right of repudiating the impertinent in.
reference IN ones affairs of a person who,
though actuated by benevolent motives. shall
assume to be ones friend, and in the same
forum where such interference took place, /
should think, must be clear. Let me suppose
q case. Suppose some honest but mistaken
lover OF Freedom should imagine that Franklin
Pierce was unjustly deprived Of liberty of action
by Jefferson Davis and others, and should apply
tor hdbeds corpus to have the President
brought before the court that the court should
issue the writ, as it would be bound to do: that
Davis should return, on oath, that the President
was not in his custody, which the court, as well
as many others, should believe to be false, and
should therefore commit Davis for contempt,
IN not Swearing to the truth. As this proceed.