Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1855-01-25
GOODRICH VS.. GUTHRIE-THE POWER
OF REMOVAL.

sss tON EB
OF REMOVAL.
In complicated system like our own, it i.
frequently a matter Of great difficulty to deter
mine the exact limits to the powers of the CO
ordinate branches of the government. 1t often
happens that the powers of the executive, the
judiciary and the legislative departments are
found to clash, and much contention arises in
reconclling their conflicting claims. When such
IS the case, our sympathies, as republicans, lean
toward strengthening the legislative depart
ment, and diminishing the power of the other
two branches. The executive and the judiciary
are the representatives Of power, the ministers
OF centralism. The Legislative branch of gov
eminent on the other hand, springs directly
from the States and the people; its tendencies
are all conservative; its sympathies are for the
protection and preservation Of liberty. 1t is
peculiar quality Of power that it ever seeks
to aggrandize ITSELF Hence, in republican
government that department of power should
be strengthened and upheld which represents
more Immediately the interests, and speaks
more clearly the sentiments of the people.
This view, we believe, was entertained and
cherished by the founders Of the Government
in the formation Of the Constitution-the magma
charta Of its powers. 1t is therein provided
that the executive should be, for the most part.
as its name imports, but the agent to carry into
effect the laws Of Congress. In the appoint
ment Of all officers, in the distribution of pa
tronage, THAT most dangerous feature in execu.
tive power,) the President must act with the
concurrence of one of the branches of the Lee
glslature. Even in the appointment of the
most subordinate officer of Government, he
cannot act alone, except the power be ex.
pressly vested in him by a law of Congress
SO, too, the exercise of his power of veto, is
qualified, and the Congress may still reverse
his will in the prohibition of a law. The same
safeguards are thrown around the exercise of
the other central element-the judicial power.
First in the creation of the office ITSELF which
Except in the ease Of the Supreme Court, whose
establishment is provided for in the Constitu-
tlonl exists only in virtue Of law of Congress.
Then, in the appointment of the judges which
can only be made by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. And lastly, in the iu.
risdiction of the court which extends TO all
cases of law and equity arising under the laws
and treaties of the United States.
We think that no one can fail to see that the
trainers of the Constitution designed, by these
guarded provisions, to strengthen the Legislative
department Of the government, and to vest in
the two other departments only SO much power
as was necessary for proper and efficient ad
ministration of the government The execu-
live and Judiciary departments have, indeed,
their uses, in many respects, apart from their
connection with the legislature; the first, by
the exercise Of the veto power, in preventing
hasty legislation, and, above all, in securing
protection TO minority from the viii OF a Fixed
and tyrannical majority; the second, in restrain.
ing Congress within the limits Of the Constitu-
ton, and thus acting as check to the excuses
into which the popular branch of government
is often carried. But for the most part, these
two departments are but the ministers to carry
into effect the DEGREES of the legislative branch.
Each Of the three has its separate sphere
of action; but while the Legislature is creative,
positive, and active, the other two are restrain
ing, negative, and protective. They are indeed
trinity of powers, distinct in their respective
spheres, but one in their general design; but the
creative power must FIRST exist before the ex-
pounding or restraining influences are brough,
TO bear. There is no need Of the check. TIL
the machine is in action, and the Legislative
department is the motive power to call it into
action.
Taking this view Of the subject, which We
hope is clearly understood and generally I'D
mitted, we wish to apply it to case of much
interest, which has recently engaged the atten-
don Of the Supreme Court. We refer to the
case Of Goodrich rs. Guthrie, which was argued
on the 18th instant by A. II. Lawrence. esq.
Of this city, on behalf of Judge Goodrich, the
Chief Justice of the Territory of Minnesota
and the Attorney General on behalf Of the Ex
ecutive. The main question involved in the
controversy is the right Of the Executive to
remove an officer, where appointment is made
under a law Of Congress for term of years.
Mr.. Lawrence, in speech Of marked ability,
contended with great force that the power OF
removal was not an incident TO the power OF
appointment; that the Executive having been
invested by a law Of Congress with this power
OF appointment, could only exercise il under
the provisions Of that law that whatever his
own opinion might be in regard to the correct.
ness Of the decision, it had long since been a
recognized principle, founded upon an early
decision Of the Supreme Court, that a terrific
rial judge was not appointed in virtue Of the
judicial clause Of the Constitution, which pro-
yides life, or good behaviour tenure to the
Judge; that, therefore, the law providing for
the appointment Of a judge for term Of years
was in strict accordance with the Constitution ;