New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-02-06
SIR HOWARD DOUGLAS ON THE WAR.

General Sir III. Douglas than whom there is no
higher military authority living in supplementary
chapter to the new edition Of his work Naval Gun
merry, reviews the whole campaign up to the present
date, and on stri lily scientific principles, condemns
the operations in the Crimes:
He saws tina. Alma was worthless victory-nay, a
miscbievous one; and he shows the reason why,
namely In laying siege to Sevastopo, may safely
be asserted that the most advantageous point OF at
tack was the northern side there the ground is most
elevated and the large ocag ons work on It's summit
ia its citadel and the key Of the place. This TAKEN
the Telegraph and Wasp batteries on the northern
nights Fort Constantine and the forts below being
ano ed and attacked in reverse, must have soon
fallen; while the town, docks, arsenal, and barracks
on the south eide of the harbor would be at tue mercy
of The Allies, who, by tie fire of their batteries, might
have entirely destroy them ALL whereas, by attack
ing the place from the SOUTH the enemy holding the
northern lights, although the works on the crest OF
the outhern Nights should be preached and taken,
The town, the body of the place, with its docks
and srseIas, will not be tenable by the beslegers
till the great work en- the northern side, and all its
defensive dependencies shall be taken; and these,
no doubt, will be greatly strengthened before the
Allies are in condition TO direct their attacks
seajnst them. The flank march Of the whole army
10 The south abandoned at once to the enemy per-
fectly free communicate between the place to be
b. seged and bis arms of observation in the field, and
left open their line of operation from their base OF
PerekOp; il disclosed the alarming TACT tnat IRON
wait OF Sufficient force Sevast)pol could not Do IN
vested CD every side that the most advantageous
PORT Of attack not to be attacked, but turned
that the epemy's communication with the strongest
norton of the town-its CITADEL its keep, and the Key
Of the whole positon-was TO be LETT open to hin aud
that irstead Of besiegog Sevasopol tae alliei army
Was only 10 attack an entrenched position on the
bight- supported in its rear by the strongest
feature and the moot formidable works OF the place,
and open to receive OF reeniorcenens to any
extent also that the attack OF the place was to be
carried on without covering army distinct from the
b.segDg force TO protect il from being disturbed IN
its operations by the enemy in the field who wa, thus
left IN a direct communication with tete which hs
might support with all his force The tank march OF
the whole army to the south was, therefore, an error
in gcsl science, imposed Of necessity upon the
allied commanders by want Of numerical strength to
render the attack of Sevastopo cafe and successfal
and such On error only be justided by the sbso
Lutte inability Of the army to fafll the conditions on
which the siege of a fortress. with large army OF ob
servaton in the field can be successful Such place
need not and will not captuate, attacked az 1t Is,
however successful that attack may be. The garrison
caI not be captured since after making the most de-
termned resistance, it may retire to the northern
bgbts or il may acuate the place altogether, aud
iiself with the army already in the field after
having rendered the town unlnhabtable and de-
stroy cd all the Warlike stores IL contains"