Washington sentinel., 1855-07-19

ing and suffered accordingly. This was done
through no want of old soldiers, of whom the
third and fourth divisions could have furnished
abundance-men who have been kept compare
lively idle, whilst the comrades of the Light and
Second Divisions have been worked like galley
slaves. Sir George Brown, believe, is TO be
thanked for this selection; anxious as he was to
gain fresh laurels for his own command though
he well knew the materieL of which so large a
proportion of its strength is composed. have
already mentioned that the 23d regiment had
been chosen TO lead TIE attack, and that, through
a similar motive of mistaken desire to bring glory
TO his own favorte corps, General Airey was
at the eleventh hour, permitted To assign this
place of honor to the 34th--a regiment which,
whether justly or not, enjoys only a moderate
reputation amongst the others now in camp.
Further Mistakes.
Later still in the evening preceding the assault,
Sir George discovered that the ma ority com
mandng the 23d was still laid up with wound
received in the attack ON the Quarries, and that
the senior captain--an officer, by the way, OF
some 10 years service-would have charge of the
corps during the storming, g Impossible; this
will never do, - said the friend ofapopectic neck
furniture, "another regiment, with field officer
in command, must be substituted.
A message to this effect was telegraphed to
headquarters, but Lord Raglan, with degree of
common sense which was quite unmilitary, over
ruled his seconds objection, and replied that
officer of Captain ----'s length Of service, be
his rank what il might, should be quite as fit to
lead his regiment into action any field officer
in the service, and accordingly, that no substitu-
tion should be made. | merely mention these
trifies to show the state of uncertainty and con-
fusion in which our preparations were till almost
within an hour before the assauting force march
ed down towards the scene of its struggle and
defeat.
REFLECTION ON PELIssIER.
Then another deviation from the original plan
of the attack was made also at the eleventh hour,
by General Pelissier to which both military sense
and common sense agree in attributing no small
share of both the French and our own failure.
Though the bombardment had been kept up vigo-
rously the whole of Sunday, night necessarily
compelled n slackening of the allied fire, and
during this respite there was reason to expect
that the Russians would employ themselves in
making good the injuries done to their batteries
during the day. 1t was therefore arranged that
at day break on Monday terrific fire of shot and
shell should be poured into the Redan and Mala-
koff, to render as many of their guns as possible
incapable of mischief. An hour or SO, however,
before the combined forces marched from the
camp, the French commander-in-chief rode over
to our own headquarters and declared that he
could not wait for this preliminary assault of ar
tllery, as he would have many raen in his
trenches before the Malakoff that there would be
no cover for them; and, consequently, they (and
we) must attack at daybreak, at all hazards, and
take the chance of finding the enemy's guns in
the most favorable condition in which our bonn
bardment and their owners subsequent idleness
might have left them.
Defeat Predicted.
OF course Lord Raglan complied, though forty
nine out of fifty of the subalterns in his camp
would have foretold the consequences to be ex-
pected; and accordingly, after the first
streaks of sunlight broke over the horizon, the
doomed thousands rushed to defeat and death.
So little is ever known of the details of French
operations here, that can give you few particu-
lars of the attack the Malakoff; but their plan
of assault appears to have consisted in assault
ing the work on both fanks and the front sim
ultaneously and with overwhelming numbers
twenty-five thousand are said TO have been en-
gagged
The Bombardment Begun.
In Just retribntion for the disregard of their
general to the good to be expected from short
bombardment they found the redoubts
swarming with defenders, and guns bristling
from every embrasure. On them, as on our own
men, shorers Of grape and canister rere poured
out, literally molcing dorm irhole baitaiionS at
a time; whilst from along the whole sem-crcu-
lar line of parapet the crowd Of rfemen sent vol
ley after voley into their disordered ranks, that
passed through them like sheet of moulten lead.
Three times they gave way, and as often rallied;
but were finally driven back after struggle of
some three hours and half, leaving the space
between the Mamelon and Malakof' literally COW
cred with the dead and dying.
An Awful Scene.
With our own men, the space to be passed over
from our most advanced trenches to the Redan
was somewhere about seven hundred yards, and
from the first moment Of their rushing over the
parapet towards the point of attack, they were
met by the same awful and annihlating Storm of
canister and grape. Many fell within the first
dozen yards, and thence on to some broken
ground about midway, in which the remainder
sought cover, the field was strewed with the slain
and wounded. An officer present in the affair,
and who was one Of the few who escaped unn-
iured, described the fire to me as being perfectly
awful-much more severe, he assured me, than
that which greeted our men at Alma, where he
also fought, and received wound. Few Of them
ever reached the abaftis in front Of the work
none. believe, ever even saw the deep ditch
which protects its approaches
The Repulse Complete.
have already mentioned the confusion which
the first commencement Of our
and coupling this with the murde-
rous preparations made by the enemy, you will be
at no loss to understand that success was most
impossible. ] shall presently mention what the
Russians thought of our generalshp, as repeated
in my own hearing by one Of themselves. During
the whole affair Lord Raglan and Sir G.. Brown
were esconced within our eight-gun battery; but,
though this afforded good view Of the scene oil
the struggle and the disorder which marked il,
for some reasons unknown TO animated specta-
tors, they appeared unable 10 give an efficient
directions for the correction Of multiplied blum
ders. When the sad scene was ended our men
struggled back by every safe avenue TO the camp,
in state Of dspirited confusion well in keeping
with the mobilize disorder in which they had
been throughout the assault.
Indignation against the Generals.
know not what may have been the feelings Of
your home people on reading the telcgraphic
news Of our defeat--for presume the scribes at
headquarters made no attempt TO conceal the
naked fact that repulse was neither more nor
less than defeat but here mingled shame and
Indignation were general throughout the camp.
Officers and men alike selt that disgrace had been
incurred, and that in consequence solely Of the
unredecmed msmanagement of their generals
From drum-boys 10 coloncs a sense Of huma-
tion filled every breast, the deeper that everybody
was sensible that neither man nor regimental Of
fcers had shown themselves deficient in what,
under proper guidance, would have commanded
success.
The CRnnonade Resumed.
About midnight of Monday was reused up by