New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-09-14

uence that the Russians instantly sarnc'' q"
crossed The river under . murdcross ire. and,
il We may believe Pcliss'er. that Vth d"i''a
never showed itself again during the battle
In the center. the l2tA division succeeded
IN scaling the nights and driving ia several
French regiments. The fate OF the battle ap-
nesr,d uncertain for a moment when dHerbd-
lon ordered brirace from Eau ID ux's division
10 attack The left 4. nk of the Russian columns,
and after q short struggle, the Russians were
driven down the deciiyity, followed BY the
Fr,pch. who for moment retook the bridge.
Gorehalof. however, had prepared fresh At
tack. Theremainder Of the 18th division and the
18th division had descended into tie valley, where
they sheltered the fugitives who reformed;
and now the whole Of the 18th aud 5th divisions
moved forward for second charge. They
passed by the bridge, and close to the right and
left of il, AID advanced with great vivscity
against the allied center, (d'Herblllon's and Eau
cheuxs divisiors). But by this time the French
bad got all their artillery into position; it fred
in froLt agaiss. the Russian columns, while the
Sandman artillery took them in flank. In spite
Of this murderous FIRE they advanced steadily
and rapidly, and sgain reached the nights.
There they found the French collected, deployed
ia lire little behind the edge Of the hill. As
soou az the heads Of the columns were fairly on
III edge. the French gave them a vOll-y, sad
charged them with the bsyoret in front aid
hsrk. TIE struggle was as short as before.
TIE Russians gave way and fed in disorder
across the river, pursued by the musketry and
artillery fire of the Allies. This second de-
fest Of the Russians virtually decided the
battle They had three-hfths Of their infsnsry
engaged, and could not hope to see any fresh
reenforcements arrive on the field; the Allies,
too, had three divisions out Of FIVE engaged, bat
fre.h troops were hurrying to support them
from the camp before Sevsstopol. Pelissier
had sent for two more divisions Of the line and
one of the Guards, and they were coming up.
1t was now about 8 o'clock in the morning.
Gorchakof, in spite of these odds, resolved
upon another attack. The 18th division now
had TO come forward and TO form nucleus
for such part Of the beaten troops as
were still ct to be brought against
the enemy. The line of attack was agsin
shifted to the left; il was Faucheuxs d.
vision upon viii; h the Russians fell this time.
Bat in vain. The cross FIRE Of the French and
Sandman artillery decimated them before they
could reach the summit Of the hills, and again
the French lines broke their columns and drove
them back to the other side of the river, while
the PiedmOntese (Trottls diyision) took them
in flank and completed the victory. There
remained but the troops of the 4th and n
divisions intact, amounting to the effective
strength of about one division. To launch these
would have served no purpose whatever. The
defeat was uDmistaksble; and accordingly the
Russians, bringing forward their artillery, COM
menced the retreat. Their own position was so
stror that Pelissier deemed an attack upon it
out of the question:; ard therefore they were
moles ted by the artillery and rifles only. The
oss Of the Russians in this affair was enor-
NOUS in comparison with that OF the Allies.
The former lost about 5000 in killed, wounded
and prisoners; the latter about 800 ony. Inc
re ason of this was that the Russians had to make
all their charges Ter the most effective fire OF
the allied artillery, especially the Piedmon'e'e,
whose 10 Founders, though slow to move, are OF
= be highest effect when once in position.
The Russian attack was here made exclusively
in front To turn the French left BY lnkermann
appeared impossible from the command exercised
by the French batteries the spur of the ridge OPP
posi,e that place To turn the Allies By their right
would have necessitated that the main body OF the
Russians should descend into the valley Of Baidar
where the ground is evidently too intricate for
such clumsy troops. Thus the front attack was
chosen, and very properly surprise attempted
The surprise partially succeeded, but was not car
red out with the necessary energy When the
Russians were once masters Of the passages of the
Chernsya, they should have pushed forward their
masses just az they happened to be At hand In order
to follow up their advantage before the French could
recover from the frst blow. Instead OF that, they
allowed their opponents the time necessary to
bring their troops and artillery into position, and
tie effect Of the surprise which might have brought
into their hands the nights occupied by the French
ceayed almost as soon az the Russians had reached
the ChernAya This Ia another proof Of the din.
Guilty Of moving Russian troops under circum-
stances where they should DO expected to act rap.
idly and where inferior commanders must ure their
own judgment.
The French have always been notorious for
. certain contempt Of ou'pos, duty. Even In
their beat estate al active -nsmy could any
night lurpriss their outposts aud alarm thsir
camps without any great fisi. On This occasion
the, showed Tat even tbs slowly moving iu.'
si.Is might do a. Thait main position was o.
tisss IN The fLetrsya thai thsif advanced
,,.,,., .L.uia have Lssn sithsi pushsa mash