The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-03-29

having previously communicated 1t TO q ma w'tnCu,
valiant would not have failed to PROF which hsrsh "a
would have listened to on'y with ,snr,tes ~ ;ndr
msnt. 's"eo :" jung
at the s1 camp at varna, and on ST. Arnaud arrived
war held which decided am ~. tna. eopnca u
W. os an IA csnsrsl. - had previously made Prince
auainted with the par. agreed apoa between him and
The Marsha. CO. Amuncatsd to the court the idea Of
sges tnersS' % the Anglo French policy he Analysed
the pan Oh it. such he had received IL from Paris
s anay xsctcsly sxpounded. They TO select
anong point to effect that landing under the protsc.
ton II the artillery Of the squadrons 20 and meet
Kusisns who would certainly try the fate Of arms 70
march direct, after victory. towards Sebastopo and
storm 1t by bold stroke. He had positive data
concerning the works OF defence Of Sebasopo by land
but information derived from various entirely
eoncurred to establish that there neither
BILE very important obstacles.
The power OF Russia had just experienced serious
check on the Danubs It must needs have been less diff
centrated any forces and did mot there expect any
attack. The DEMONSTRATION in the Crimea, and the
world the defeat Of Russa and would force peace out
of heran object which their Maestes, Queen Victoria
and the Emperor Napoleon, had in view.
There was, besides, longer anything to do on the
Danube; Austria having also become the ally OF the
Ottoman Porte, and having thus compelled Gortsohsho
All eyes were turned towards General Raglan His
forehead bore the mpres7 OF his oppressed
for few minutes previous, al the indecsion Of his
Lord Raglan put forth As an objection the want Of
knowledge respecting the Russian forces and respecting
the state of the place the land side. The maps az
forded indication The roads, rivers and natural ob
staces were unknown 1t advantageous battle
field The English General specially demonstrated,
tho score that the army In want Of cavalry while
the Russians were very we'll provided with excellent
horses. That was not war on equal terms.
Vice-Admiral hamelin treated the matter with
sninus. According to his opinion, the expedition,
dertaken under such circumstances looked very much
like adventure. The allied forces seemed to him in
sufficient The squadrons might doubtless protect the
landing OF the army; but 1t not certain that they
could lend their assistance for sny heightened period
Of the near approach OF the return Of the eu
They might be co npeed to seek an anchorage by the
end Of September in order to escape the destructive
tmpests OF the Black Sea- In this the land army
would be abandoned to its resources. This was
untowsrd eventualty. The climate was not analogous
taken into account the eonguty 81 the sea, and the
scattered position OF the chains Of mountains The Cr
mea, situate quite in the south Of Russia the
mon reservoir OF all the nclemencies Of that vast empire
Such thing had even been the bottom Of the
bay Of sebastopo frozen during certain winters. II the
bold stroke did not succeed It would become necessary
for the honor Of France and England TO besiegs the
place. and then who could foresee the the
eitions Lord Rasans objection concerning the want Of
knowledge respecting the Russian field forces and the
land defences Of Sebasopol, very serious one and
all these reasons forbade the Admiral to give his
Marshal dc st. Arnaud gave brief answer and one
full Of energy, to those observations. lie reproduced
bis arguments with pth than the first time and
concluded BY supporting himself the very competent
authority Of the emperor.
Prince Napoleon then spoke for nearly
Of hour. We must state here that he Expressed at
tie time his opinion andthat Of General Bosquet and
the Duke Of Cambridge, whom he had the day be.
FORE and with whom he had consulted and agreed.
The Prince disapproved Of the expedition prnc
pie, in it's execution, in absolute manner. The En-
Perors authority was doubtless very great in the mat
to understand the practical dcutea o. the enterprise
The great distance at which he was placed from the the
atse of events might produce mirage before his mind
tinue glorious military traditions to replace France in
her rank among nations and to ayenge her former sas
irons times. But he ought net to have begun where
Napoleon had ended. An invasion Of Russia was TO
throw ones self into the unknoAn; the Marshal owned
The Admirals felt some hesitation in presenting them
selves before six hundred cantons which defended the
bay and the port 1t was therefore reasonable not to rely
ao Of 10 on
against vessels, and not aganst walls. (Adnnirals Hs
meln, Dundas, Lyons, and Charnier, made sign Of
The real battlefield Of the allied armies was the Da
nube, and after the Danube it was the Pruth. They
found themselves there In rich and fertile country In
the midst Of sympathetic population, backed BY
large liver protected oy series OF iupregnable for
aggressive as well as for defensive warfare. The
Turkish army victorious, afforded powerful assistance
the Russian army having lost all courage account of
generals, could with difficulty avoid complete rout
The execution Of that plan had another advantage,
nsmeiy at Of proving to Austria that the allies could
do without her The presence Of the allies the from
tiers of Hungary at six leagues distances from Poland
rendered them masters Of the whole situation
ording 1t over diplomacy and debating at Vienna and
1t was still time to put that plan into execution. The
slowness which the Russsns exhibited in evaeuatng the
Principalities last opportunity which the allies
And IL The expedition into the Crmea was consum
mated in spite Of the grave obecton already raised by
men whose opinion also an authority, there
complete plan TO establish and up to that time. the
discussions which had taken place had not revealed
particle Of IT, Those discussions wandered in details;
plan of ensemble not presented; and II Was, how
ever this point that the Court dicoct their
attention.
To land in the Crimea, in the north or in the SOUTH
10 beat the Russians and march towards Sebastspol
this was not seriously considered plan Of campaign
was to clote to the Russians the Crimean peninsula; II
to cut off the communication Of 5ebassopol with the
from the reserves which could furnish him With
troops Of the Danube To thateect It necessary to
proceed fret to the occupation of the Ishmus OF Pore
kop; TO forify there two divisions in pregnable post
tops protected by the artillery Of the steamers,
NECESSARY afterwards to occupy Smpherop the seat Of
the government Of the province whose administration
would find itself. upset, and to secure thereby all
points Of the country, in victuals clothing
shelter, and forage which the army much in want
Of They could, after that, msrch towards Sebastoso
Without these preliminary operations tbs expedition
into the Crimea was as the French vice admiral had
said merely adventure at the end Of which there
winter campaign on the Russian soil-u other words
an insane idea.
Marshal 81. Arnaud was very sharp in his reply to
Prince Napoleon and made few cuttirg illusions TO his
ideas, and to his well known connections. The Prince
interrupted him to tel hin that he chose be
thought proper his personal friends and that to his
IDEAS he derived them from his sympathy With the in
teress cf France and from the naonal tradition Of the
first empire No ona had right 70 sit in Judgment upon
them but himself.
General Canrobert supported the protest Of the ex
petition. lie described, detail, the rsconnoi ,sAnce
which had been made Of the southwest coast of the
Crimea. II practicable to dssmbark 70 the south
Of Sebastopol; but the heights fortified and pre-
scented serious difficulties, From the deck of the
Furious he and his brother officers had distinctly
the Russian encampments which be could not calculate
at higher figure than %, 000 effective men. Imme.
diately to the north of the place, between rather
tensive strong place, garrsoned by about g. 900 men
landing might be effected on the western coast, near