Washington telegraph., 1855-01-03
From the London Times, of Nor. II.
Condition Of the Besiesed and Be.
SiegerS,


Condition Of the Besieged and Be.
| siegers.
/ The siege continues. Omitting the doubt
ful report of another great battle on the
/ 1llh. we have no photographic bulletins of
/ the siege up to the Sth and 9th, and it is
evident that at those dates the increasing
+ numbers and boldness of the enemy made
: no difference in the operations before the
+ walls. 1t is only said that the ailies-are ior-
tifying their position ON the left bank of the
! Tchernaya. as might be expected. seeing
that the right bank is occupied by the
Russians. The belligerents may. there
fore, easily keep their positions for the pre-
! sent
What we have to deplore is the steady
drain. By continued sickness and now and
then victory The prospect IS sufficiently
! serious, but there is no immediate cause for
anxiety All the letters from the army
show feelings of perfec. confidence and
composure as 10 the present state of af-
/ fairs, but some little solicitude as to the fu-
! ture.
Reinforcements are wanted even for pre-
sent effect Every man in the army is over
worked Officers Of the highest rank are
dying. not only by the usual casualties Of
war and by exposure to the cold. but By
sheer hard work None of the proper pro-
portions are maintained The besiegne
army is not in the proper proportion to the
besieged; the number OF artillery men is not
in proper proportion to the guns; the men
/ in camp are not in proper proportion to
those in the trenches: the hours of rest are
not in proportion to the hours of labor
Everything is stretched. The army is ex-
tending itself. as it were, to dimensions not
its own. Such violation of the laws of
health and strength is sure to revenge it.
self
What the supply should be has been al
ready fixed at time when the difficulties
of the siege and the number of the forces
Russia could bring upon us from without
were certainly not over-estimated. We
started with the idea of 10000 as our con-
tribution, and il was distinctly explained by
all military authorities that an army requir-
ed recruiting to the extent of third of its
number every year. Now at the last date,
the whole effective force of the British ar
my was not more than Is. 700; so that to
| bring it up 10 10000 we would have to send
at once Il 300 But the instant The troops
| breathed the new atmosphere, slept on the
ground and exposed themselves to the FIRE
of the enemy, they would become amena-
| bic to the same law Of waste as the army
they went out to reinforce, and there would
still be necessity for more troops. All
that is wanted at present is to keep up the
/ force in the field to the amount of thirty
| thousand.
Wholly excluded from the sea. the Rus
| slams cannot support a large army in the
! Crimea not at least in the present state of
/ Its communication and supplies. Should
we happily succeed in taking Sevastopol,
! their turn will coma, and they will have to
! beSiege US without even the power of ap-
/ preaching their own shores Occupying
possibly our own deserted camp. they will
have to draw all their supplies either from
the remote parts of TIE Crimea, or from the
| interior of Russia, through the isihmus of
Perekop. We shall see how long that state
of things will endure. If it lasts long it
Will be new chapter in the history of the
/ war.
! The extraordinary character of the diff
culties attending our present operations be-
( fore Sevastopol is not likely to be fully ap-
/ preciated without some insight into the na-
ture cf siege undertakings in general
| In the present age it is received as maxim
! by military engineers. that the means of at
tack are superior 10 the means of defence,
or in other words that if any fortified place.
however strong. is attacked according to
rule by proper force of men and guns. it
must inevitably fall within certain time.
unless preserved by some rare and singular
/ advantage Now, as the allied armies were
/ disembarked on the shores of the Crimea
! in strength sufficient TO conquer the enemy
in pitched battle and as they have now
I been for some weeks beSiegiug Sevastopol
! with most powerful force of artillery. d.
rected by some of the best engineers in the
world, it NAV be asked what circumstances
/ have retarded their success. or why the
place was not sooner taken To this III
quiry We suhjoin an explanatory reply.
| 4
Sevastopol is not invested The peculiar
position of the town, combined with the
limited strength of the allied armies. render
ed it impossible to surround the place so as
| to cut off its communication with the interi-
or. and the north side is left completely
open. The consequence is that there has
/ been no limitation of resources on the part
of the besieged on the contrary. it is rath-
er the be<ieging army which has stood in
this predicament, for. whereas. the allied
forces have been gradually diminished by
the casualties incidental to their operations,
the garrison has received repeated accessions
of strength from without Provisions. too,
and munitions of war may have been i'm
ported with equal facility. though so extraor-
binary. in this respect, were the resources
of Sevastopol itself that few additions could