The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1855-08-20
WILL sEBAsToPoL BE TAKEN9
The Russian View OF tho Question.

The Russian View Of the Question.
We translate the following interesting article from
a recent number Of the InvaIide Russo, the organ
Of the Russian government. 1t has attracted much
attention in Europe
Will Sebastopol be taken? Such is the question
which, for the last nine months, the whole world
has been asking diplomats well as merchants,
and which is repeated by millions Of families whose
fathers sons have been carried or to die on land
and on sea, before and within the walls of this city
"Sebastopo win be taken say the allies for other
wise would the seige be continued with 80 much
obstinacy. Sebastopol win lot be taken" answer
the Russians, convincedly. i" The moment of
taking has not yet come cry out the beseigers.
. The possibility Of taking it is past, reply the
beseiged
SebastopOl might have been taken in the first
days Of the appearance of the Anglo-French beside
the city when simple wall Of circumference whose
salient angles were protected only by bastions Of
weak profile, formed its sole defence-when within
that inclosure was contained a scanty garrison,
composed principally Of seamen who had sunk their
vessels at the entry Of the bay to intercept its pas
sage, and who found themselves, with their guns,
placed upon the ramparts Of Notifications in sphere
of action entirely new to them when, in conse-
great celebrity with which the preparation for the
listed either order unity in the defence Of line Of
several thousand yards.
Certainly there could have been no doubt Of the
intrepid courage of those defenders still animated
by their recent victory of Sinope, and who were
fighting for their homes and their families; but is it
probable that these few thousand braves would have
ALL bsrl N
closure not even then provided with fosse against
q combined attack made by numerous and well dis
ciplined troops it, instead Of opening trenches at
eight hundred fathoms from the shadow Of for
tress the allies had marched to the assault the first
day. or the day after their installation on the south
ern side of SebastopOl? The sailors OF the Black
Sea would have had no other alternative than DEATH
an alternative which from first to last they would
have adopted the ruins Of their native city. But
still Sebastopol would inevitably have been taken.
On the other hand, after the allies remaining some
days-fatal ones for them-in Iaction, the posi-
bty of taking Sebastopol disappeared.
Within these five to seven days immense entrench-
ments were raised, as it were, by enchanment, on
all the weaker portions Of the line of defence. and
hundreds of guns appeared with their large muzzes
at each of the embrasures From this moment
while the enemy was still at a great distance from
the city the deiences OF Sebastopol grew visbly
1arged and the conviction of the beseged that they
could not be forced to surrender the city was still
more strengthened. And thus Sebastopol became
on the land side as the allies themselves said, lone
OF the strongest places in the world
1'Will sebastopol then be taken?' It is difficult
TO prejudge the future; time will answer the ques
ton, for sometimes circumstances which escape
human foresight give things such an unlocked for
turn, that the best calculations disappear with the
rspidity of smoke We will not, therefore, stop to
decide the question in advance, but We will expose
to the reader all the data which may enable him 70
draw his own conclusion.
The European journals have recalled these words
d Napoleon l., that " fortresses are made to be
taken.t' That may be trne, but only when the for.
tress is built with the object Of arresting, for a
longer or shorter time, and with small garrison,
ahe advances OF considerable forces Of the enemy
on their line OF operations Then shut in on all sides
by tke investment and the attack, deprived Of re-
nforcemen.s and Of the Of being provisioned,
decimated day and night by murderoas fire, the
garrison must necessarily after the destruction of
their defensive works either surrender or perish IN
offending the breach and the interior intrenchments,
under the bayoncs OF the beseiging force, greater
IN number.
But Sebastopol is only militi Try port for the
Black Sea feet, defended the side of the sea by
forts mutually commanding each other, and defend
ing the entry of the bay. On the land side. where
the cventuality of an attack had never been fore
seen, SebastopOl was provided with only weak de-
fence which by the force OF circumstances and in the
very sight Of the enemy, was suddenly changed
into an improvised fortress, or rather into fortified
position Owing TO its very structure. that fortress
could not be, and In fact has not been surrounded
on the northwest side it has remained open for the
arrival of ieinforcements OF provisions and Of muni
tio0s OF It, therefore, forms, 40 to speak, an
exception among all the fortresses OF the world. on
account Of its ncxhaustbe material resources Of de-
fence. II is in fact quite as easy for it to replace
in one night hundred diemounted guns as TO ex-
change 80 600 men OF the garrison by fresh troops.
On the line of communication with Russia, by Pere
kop, there strong detachments from Enpatoria to
Perekop, disposed as TO be able in short time to
concentrate themselves ~ . strong army on no mat
ter what point. And even though the allies had
forces twice as considerable those which they can
now bring into the fied it Is 70 be doubted whether
they could succeed in cutting of these cummunica
tons, because, everywhere the crcsts Of the noun
tains along the shore would permit even small de-
tachmcnts to oppose successfully great masses
Obliged to dele in the plain OF the Crimea by small
roads and between lakes.
Such are the importance and the position OF
Sebastopoi. Let us now examine the respective
forces and means Of the two parties with reference
to the attack and defence Of this point. Let s com
mence by the side OF the sea.
The bombardment Of Sebastopol of the 9TH and
18th October in which the AngloFrench fleet threw
40 many as 10000 projectles, shows plainly that
that immense feet OF the two maritime powers and
Of Turkey cannot OF themselves sieze welldefended
place, even take an active part in s reductions
but that il must CONTEXT itsef with blockading the
roadstead. Transporting provisions and munitions,
and attac ckng the dcfenceless coasts of the Black
Sea and the Sea Of Azof. On the side Of the Rus
slams the other hand, the vesecls. though few in
successfully sustain the defence Of the left portion of
the city, and, what il still more important, they
offer at need sklful artillerists-cOmmanders pos
sessng skill and cooincss-oficers used to combat,
and great quantity OF guns of large calibre. on
the contrary, the allied feet can give no assistance
to the besegers; il remains in open sea, and cannot
opcraie disarmament.
After having examined the position OF Sebastopol,
and OF the allies on the sca side, let proceed TO
examine their respective positions on tho land side
Let even admit that the numerical force OF both
parties IL equal. Bur the moral forces so too
The equilibrium of moral force is very i'm
portant element towards the success OF military
actions. The allied camp is composed Of hete-
rroge neous masses aniied among themselves
, a3y by the force OF will Of the chiefs in command,
and consequently they form opiy temporary and
apparent unity. But these masses are not animated
by q common idea, common sentiment and com
mon interest. This army which has supported the
horrors OF a winter siege which knows wei! Tor what
and for whom it has suffered al these mistortunes,
which knows how TO rrason, and which does, IN
IA a. H.. In Ifa IN