New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-05-28


1t Is plain that the Allies have conducted thi.
upon the worst possible plan Notwithstanding
The disappointment in the minds of the allied
generals when they first beheld the place. not.
withstsnding the errors committed last Autumn.
during what we may call the frst siege. they
might yet have made greater progress. We
leave the north side of the town entirely out of
tie question as the allied generals did so them
selves. They had once for all made up their
minds to attack the south side separately and
to run the risk Of getting into place comm lndeJ
bv fortress TO them inaccessible. But here
an alternative arises: either the allied gen.
erals felt themselves strong enough to take the
south side, and then they must now admit that
they were unpardonably mistaken; or they felt
themselves too weak. and then why did they not
procure retniorcements' The fact is now be-
yond denial that blunder has succeeded blum Ter
in this memorable and unparalleled" siege.
The hsrdships Of the Winter.quarters appear to
have impaired spirit OF unconquerable drows-
ness, apathy and languor to both army and
generals. when the Russians, in February.
boldly came out of their lines aud formed
fresh ones in advance, it should have
been a sufficient incentive to them to muster up
their energies; yet Canrobert could use this
very serious adlnonition to no other purpose than
TO cool the zeal of the Zouayes by an attack
which he knew beforehand could lead to no good.
The work in the trenches was resumed, but mono
in order To form covered roads for storming
columns than 10 push the batteries nearer TO
the enemy. Even after six months spent before
the place, every act shows that no definite plan
had been settled, no point of chief attack
singled out. nav, that the old fixed idea of taking
Seyastopol by coup de man still reigned
supreme in the heads of the Allies, crossing
every sensible proposal, frustrating every at
tempt at systematic progress. And what little
WAS done was executed with three times ths
slowne IS of regular siege operations, while the
inconsistency and want of plan charseterizing
the whole, did not even impart to 1t the GER
tainty of success inherent in such regular opera
tions.
But everything was expected from the late
opening of the fire. That WAS the great excuse
for all delays and do-nothingisms. Though it is
difficult to say what was expected from this
grand eyent-from batteries at from GOO to 1000
Yards from their object, at last the fire did
open. About $50 rounds per gun the first two
or three days, then 100 rounds, then 80, then %,
finally 30 were fred; after which the cannonado
was suspended. The effect was hardly visible,
except in the used-up guns aud emPted maya
zines of the Allies. Five days cannonading with
full force would have done more harm to the
Russians and opened more chances OF advantage
10 m. Allies than fifteen days Of fire beginning
with great fury and sackoning down as inst
az il WAS begun. But with their ammunition
spent and their guns rendered unserviceable,
would the Allies have been in a position to seize
these favorable chances Quite a. much as
now, while the Russians, from witnessing the
slackenng Of the fire and from being spared the
infection of o hail Of $4,000 projectiles por day
during five successive doys, are in a far better
position than they would have been. This pro-
longation Of the capuoaade, by reducing it, IN
tensity is so great and unaccouutable deyiation
from all military rules that political reasons
must be at the bottom Of il. When the first
and second days fire had disappointed the ex-
peotations of the Allies, the necessity al keep
ing up q semblance of 4 csnnonade during the
Vienna Conferences must have led to this useless
waste of ammunition
Ne cannonade ends, the Vienna Conferences
are suspended, the telegraph is completed. AT
once the scene changes. Orders arrive from
Paris to act promptly and decisiyely. The old
system Of attack is given up; partial assaults,
Judgments by mining explosions, struggle
of rifles and bayoneta, succeed the result
less roar of artillery. Advanced points arc
gained and even maintained against first sally
of the besieged. But unless it Is fOusd prscti-
cable to construct batteries within short dis
tances from the Russian lines, and to make these
lines too hot for the besieged, nothing is gained.
The advanced points cannot be held without
great and daily repeated losses, and without re-
gularly recurring cOmbats Of doubtful and
wayering issue. And supposng even that these
batteries of the second and third parallel are to
be constructed, and that it was necessary for
their opening first to dislodge the Russians from
their rifle -trenches-how long will it be before
these fresh batteries will have guns enough to re-
ply successfully to that Russian fire which, in
two cannonades has proved equal 10 that Of the
Allies The nearer the batteries are placed to
the enemy's works, the more destructive q
crosshre can be concentrated upon them, and
the more confined becomes the space for placing
guns; in other words, the more equal becomes
the fire Of the attack to that Of the defense, I'M
lest the latter has been previously subdued BY
the more distant batteries, which here is not the
case.