New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-07-17
speeial corresponaencc Of Tbe London palIy Newa

HIGBTs BEFORE SEyAsTOPoL, June q, 1855.
The original plan of attack, as | mentioned in the
letter of Monday contemplated joint English and
French assault Of the Malakoh which, command
ing the Re dan and forming the grand key to the whole
network of redoubts and batteries in front of the place
would if taken, have at once rendered the former I'M
tenable and placed the whole town and harbor at the
mercy Of the captors. For reasons, however which
nobody understand, this very sensible and appa
renty most practicable design was abandoned and the
plan was changed into of simultaneous attack of
the two great works-the Malakofl being undertaken
BY the French and the Redan by ourselves. The frs
manifest disadvantage of this arrangement wa
the spreading Of forces field OF difficulties
nearly double in extent aud enabling the enemy to
bring vast number OF guns into play against us,
which. in the former case, could hot have Injured
To vastly enhance the chances OF failure Iu-
voved in this plan 10 ourselves cur whole attacking
force, including supports and every body Csc, was
limited to some four thousand men; while the French,
with much ulster appreciation OF the dfhcrlty that
f, to their share, t,ld off twenty-five thousand. OF
handful again, large proportion cons sted OF raw
recruits recently arrived 10 fill up the gaps IN the regl-
ments selected for the service-regiments which, with
one or two exceptions, have borne the whole brun OF
our tTench-fghling, and suffered accordingly. Ihs
was done through DO want OF old soldiers, OF whom
the third and fourth divisions could have furnished
abundance-men who have been kept comparatively
idle while their comrades of the Light and Second
Divisions have been worked like galley-slaves. Sir
George Brown believe Is TO be thanked for thus Sc
lection anxious he to gain fresh laures tor his
own command though he well knew the untried ma
ferle of which large proportion OF Its strength is
composed. | have already mentioned that the 23d
REGIMENT had been chosen 10 lead the attack and that,
through similar motive of mistaken desire 70 bring
glory TO his fayorte corps Gen. Arey was, at the
eleventh hour permitted 20 assign this place OF honor
TO the 34th-a regiment which, whether justly or not,
enjoys only moderate reputation among the others
now in camp. Later still in the evening preceding the
assault, Sir George discovered that the MAJOR COM
handing the Esd was still laid up with wound re-
ceived in the attack the QuarIles, and that the
senior captan-an officer, b. the way, OF some IS
wears seryce-would have charge of the corps during
the stoiming. Impossible this will never do said
the friend OF apopectc neck furniture, another regi-
ment with feld-O1icer IN command, must be sun
sttuitd." A message 10 this effect was telegraphed
TO Headquarters but Lord Raglan, with degree OF
common sense which was quite unmitary, oyeTuled
lis seconds objection and replied that an officer OF
Captain Is length of service, be his rank what II
might should be quite as fit TO lead his regiment into
action as any field officer in the service, aud accord
iIgy that 40 substitution should be made. merely
mention The sc tries TO show the state OF uncertainty
ard confusion in which preparations were TIL al
most within an hour before the assauting force
marched down toward the scene OF its struggle and
ceieat. Then another deviation from the original
plan of attack was made, also at the eleventh
hopr l,v General Pelissier TO which both mill
tarv sense and common sense agree IN aurouung
no small share of both the French and our own
failure. Though the DoniDdfuhitht udl DcNA
kept up vigorously the whole OF Sunday night neees
saTily compelled sackening OF The allied ire ana
during this respite there reason 10 expect tha me
Russisns would employ themselves in making good the
II iurs done 70 their batteries during the day II was
Therefore arranged that at day break on Monday ter
rife fine of shot ana shell should be poured into the
Redan and Maakof TO render rs many OF their guns a.
POSSIBLE incapable of mischief. An hour or So now
ever before the combined forces marched trOm the
camp the French Commandcrin-Chief rode over to
our own headquarters and declared that be could not
wait for this preliminary assault OF artillery, as he
would have so many men III his tenches before the
Mslakof that there would BE- cover for them and,
conseouenty they land we must attack al daybreak,
M ali hazards and take tie chance OF finding the
eren,y's guns in the favorable condition in which
our bombardment and their owners subsequent idle
ness might have left them. OF course Lord Raglan
compied though ory.uine out Of fifty OF the subal'
TENS p his camp would have foretold the eonseq aences
o be expected: and accordingly, soon after the init
.rees of sunlight broke the horizon the doomed
thousands rushed 10 defeat and death.
So little is ever known Of the details OF French ope
rations here that | can give you few particulars o.
their attack on the Malakof but Their plan OF Assault
arnears 10 have consisted IN assailng the work on
ho,b TANKS and tie front simultaneously ana WIZ
overwhemipp numbers-tweaty-hye thousand are salu
20 have been actually engaged. In just retnouton fol
The DISREGARD Of their General to the good TO be ex-
nected from short mornings bombardment, they
found the redoubt swarmng with defenders aua uns
bristling from every embrasure. On tnem as On oui
own men, showers Of grape and canister were Pouleu
out lite ally moving down whole baftsnons o. llis
while from along the whole semiclrcuar Inc u psa