The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1855-05-17


will be no longer passport to honor and office,
nor will its advocates venture upon deeds of
violence and anarchy.
THE REFUSAL OF GOVERNOR GARDNER TO
REMOVE JUDGE L0RING.
Governor Gardner has declined to accede
to the request of the Legislature for the remo-
val of Judge Loring, for reasons stated in a mes
sage sent to the House of Representatives, May
10th.
The first reason is constitutional one. The
power Of removing a judge, on address from
the Legislature, is conferred in the proviso to
art. l, chap Sd, of the Constitution of the State,
in the following words:
provided, nevertheless, that the Governor,
with the consent of the Council, may remove
them, upon address of both Houses of the Legis-
lature"
The power is conferred in unqualified terms.
1t is not required that the Legislature or Gov
ernor should act from any particular reason.
Had the trainers Of the Constitution intended
to specify the cases in which removal, by ad-
dress, should be effected, they understood the
English language, and would have embodied
their intention in words. They did not do so,
but conferred the power, without qualification,
and in terms so. clear and unambguous, that
to cOnstrue them, so as to add to or take from
their obvious meaning, is to set aside the provis-
ion itself. Such construction Governor Gard
ner is hardy enough to venture upon, for, as in
his opinion, the trainers of the Constitution
could not have purposed to confer this power
Of removal aoittot Limitation, therefore, he in
terpolates the precise limitation which he thinks
ought to restrain it, assuming that the provis-
ion is applicable "only to those cases where
Judge is incapacitated by the providence of
God, and having committed no crime, cannot
be reached by impeachment an assumption
which substitutes for the Constitution of the
State the opinion of its Governor.
But, admitting that he has the power of re-
mova, ought he to exercise it in the case of
Judge LorinS? He answers No, and for these
reasons
He cannot consent TO set an example Of re.
moving Judge, on account of a mere differ
ence of opinion with the reigning party.
No crime is alleged against that functionary,
in Office or out, and no intimation is given that
he has not satisfactorily performed his duties
as Judge of Probate.
If the Judge, as is alleged, has done an act
which, without being overt crime" renders
him so obnoxious and Objectionable as to make
his removal desirable, let the Legislature pro-
vid hv lo c. G. L
| AS to the allegation that 90 he has shocked
the popular sentiment Of Massachusetts" the
duty of Judge is, not to conform to such SEN
timent, but to obey his convictions of right.
Suppose, as is charged, he decided erroneous
ly IN the case of Bnrns, his decision was a mis-.
take-does not involve his integrity.
In regard to the accusation that he acted
harshly and partially in the case, there is con.
fiictng testimony, and he is entitled to the ben
eft of a doubt.
"As to the objection that Judge Lorino did
not act up to the convictions of the people of
| Massachusetts,, concerning the constitutionality
| OF the law he was led to enforce regard must
be had to the constitution of the human mind.
| and the historical succession and position of
events touching this enactment"
The Governor then proceeds to trace this
succession and position of events" in relation
to the Fugitive Slave Act, for the purpose, if he
has any purpose at all, of extenuating the con-
duct of Judge Loring, and showing that, in
recognising the constitutionality of the Act, and
| administering it, he had the highest most i'm
posing authorities on his side.
| Sunb tho
Gardner attempts to justify his refusal to re-
move Judge Loring
| as to his constitutional argument it does
not deserve the notice already bestowed upon it.
His argument against the exercise of the
fpower, admitting that he possesses it, will con.
vince the people of Massachusetts, not of the
propriety of his decision, but of the general
coincidence of his views on the Fugitive Slave
Act, with those of Judge Loring. Regarding
it in this light, his conduct, although it may
fail to satisfy their demands, will appear con-
sistent. He believes that the Fugitive Slave
Act is constitutional; and, as we infer from
the tone OF his argument that it is not so re-
pugnant to justice, to the principles of the
Common Law, to Humanity, to State Sover-
eighty, and to the Civilization of the Age
as the People of Massachusetts and their
Legislature regard it. With such opinions, his
refusal to remove the Judge is not surprising
Did he concur with the People and the Legis
lature in their views of the act, he would fint
no constitutional pretext for declining to &C
cede to the request of the latter; for, he is wei
aware of what in his whole argument he stu
diously keeps out of sight, that Judge Loring
as Judge of Probate, is not obliged to hold tn,
appointment of United States Commissioner
that his acceptance of the appointment wa
entirely voluntary, and that he might at an
, time have resigned il, so as to avoid the ad
ministration of the Fugitive Act, without VIC
e lating single conscientious scruple. All tn
talk Of the Governor, therefore, about the ii