New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-07-12
.i.n xort. When The morning d.wued. Of

which 70 900 Frenchmen could have achieved.
Bot the passive endurance Of the British solder
under IRE knows hardly any bounds; and when,
a. in that night, the hsnd-to-hsnd combat takes
the form of his favorite amusement, tee street
row, then he is in his own element, aud will
fight six to one with all the reckless delight in
the world.
AS to the French attack, Gen. Pelissier gives
us long account Of the brigades and regiments
engaged, and has q complimentary word for
each Of them; but bis statements as to the re-
spective positions and lines of attack Of each
column are very indistiDct, while his narrative
Of the Development OF the action IL almost In
comprehensive, and an indication of the losses
is entirely wanting. By comparing this official
bulletin with other accounts, We are enabled to
make out that the French took the Maneon in
the first onset, followed the retiring Russians
up to the Mslakof bastion, entered it hsre and
there, were repulsed by the Russians, again
lost the Msmelon, drew up in a semi-circle be-
hind il, and By another advance fuilly took
possession Of it, On the other side OF the Ca
Ieening Bay raviDe the Volhynsk redcuot was
taken with little loss; the struggle at the
Selipphiusk redoubt, which is situated to ts
rear, was more severe, but nothing like that
at the Mamelon. Owing to the exaggerated
number of troops which Pelissier brought 20
bear upon the points attacked, and to the I'M
wieldy columns they must have formed, tn
French loss must have been very great. The
fact that no official statement of it has been
made, is sufficient to prove this. We should
say from l,5OO to 1900 would Lot be exag-
gerated.
As to the Russians, they were placed IN Pc
culiar circumstances. Thy could not garrison
these outvorks with eat Numbers OF msD, a.
this would have been to expose them to certain
destruction by the eremy's artillery, even be-
fore the assault was attempted. Thus, they
could only keep a minimum of defenders 10
these Iedoubts, and had to trust to the con-
manding fire oftheir artillery in the Maakof and
the Redan, as well as to the action of theit re-
serves in the place. They had two bsttallons-
about 500 men--in the Msmelon. Bat the re-
doubts once taken, they never got int them
again 80 as to establish themselves properly.
They discovered that beseged army may very
quickly loose position. but cannot easily re-
gain it. Beside this, the Mamel"n red0ubt
wss so complicated in it's construction, by ira
yersts and bin dsges, forming sort OF inn
promptu casemates, that although excee .ingiy
well .vered against artillery, its garrison was
almost helpless against an assault-sach COM
pariment being scarcely capable of holding quo
H.. f..o Az fbar a
the guns were dismOunted, the infantry who
had to defend the work against an assault, had
10 space for position from which they could
act upon the assaulting columns by simultaneous
fire in masses. Broken up into small detach-
ments they succumbed to the impetuosity of the
assalaDts, and again proved that where thsy
cannot fight in large masses, the Russian infan-
try neither equals the intelligence and quick
ness of glance of the French, no the desperate
bulldog valor of the English.
The engagement of the 9TH was followed by
ten days repose, during which trenches were
finished and connected, batteries traced, aud
gun and ammun Don brought up. At the same
time two "Reminiscences were pushed into the
interior of he country. The first, to Baidar, IL
miles from Baiaklava, on the road which leads
down to the south coast, was merely prslmn-
airy; the second, toward ATtodOr, six miles be-
yond ClOrguD, on the Chernaya, was made IN the
right direction. AItodor is situated on the high
gro nd leading toward the valley Of the Upper
Bebek, by which alone, as we have stated long
ago, the Russian position at Inkermann can be
effectually turned. But then, to send recon
noitering column thither, and not to follow it
up by occupying the ground in force and com
mencipg operations at once, is nothing but put
ting the enemy on his guard by pointing out 10
him from which side he is menaced. Now, it
may be that the country about Aitodor was
found impracticable, but We doubt it; and even
in that case, the intention Of flank march TO
turn the enemy is too plainly indicated in this
maneuyer. If this flask march could be used
as mere feint, well and good; but we are con.
WINGED that it must be made the chief move
ment, and therefore it should not be limited at
before the Allies really mean to undertake it.
Instead, however of following up these weak
demonstrations in the field, General Pelissier
attempted something very different. Tae 18th
of June, Waterloo day saw the English and
French troops marching abreast TO storm the
Russian lines on the right attack. The English
attacked the Redan, the French Malakof.
Waterloo was to be thus ayenged but unfor-
tunstely the affair went wrong. They we're
both reptlsed with terrific slaughter. The
official lists state their loss at about 5000, but
from the kEosn want of veracity In the French
accounts we are induced to calculate il about
so per cent higher. AS no particulars have