Weekly Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1853-1861, 1855-06-21

Among the other immediate advantages
resulting from the occupation of the Straits
may be reckoned the interruption of the sup
plies which the Russian army in the Crimea
has hitherto drawn from the Sea of Azolf-
Very large quantities of wheat, flour and oats
were found Mt Kertch and upward of GO
vessels engaged IN this service, of which
about half were burned by the enemy and
half were taken The maintenance of a large
army in the interior of the Crimea will be-
come a task of insuperable difficulty, if the
whole of its supplies and food have to be
brought by land across the steppes north of
the Salghir The Crimea itself does not pro
duce corn enough to feed its own sparce pop
ulation, and it was by communication with
the ineXhaustible granaries of the Sea of
Azoff that the Russian magazines were sup
piled This circumstance may serve to ac-
count in part for the fact that the Russians
have apparently not attempted to throw very
large re6nforcements into the Crimea. The
strength Of their army must be regulated not
only by the numbers they may I've able to
convey there but by the means of supporting
them. When people talked loosely about
Russia's power to throw two hundred thou
sand men into the Crimea, we contented our
selves with replying that it is easer to find
the men than the food necessary to theil
subsistence. We now venture to assers that
it is easier for the Allied. Powers, having
command of the sea and the coast, to main
tain 100000 men i'm the Crimea than fOl
Russia to maintain 100000 men in the inte-
rior There are very strong reasons for be-
lieving that the strength of that Russian army
which at one time threatened Balaklava and
held our brave but suffering forces besieged
in our own lines, will turn out to be very
much below what il was at one time sup
posed to be- A thin line of Cossaks perpctu-
ally threatened our outposts, and even led
the allied Generals to contract their position
within the narrowest defensible compass
But what was there behind thisr screeni
Whenever partial reconnaissance has beer
made our troops have come in contact Will
no enemy capable of holding a position, anC
it is by 40 means improbable that the innu
merable hOrdes of Russians supposed to b'
wintering in nnpregnable quarters behind the
low range of hills north of the Chernaya wert
as much reduced in strength and numbers a
the besiegers of Sebastopol.
The last dispatch received from Genera
PeliSsier announces that the allied force
have now occupied the whole line Of tn,
Chernaya, and that this operation met Will
no serious resistance, the Russians havin,
speedily retired behind the hills. This freSl
success confirms us in the opinion that tn
unseen strength of the enemy in the Crime
/ has been overrated, and that he is by n,
means in a condition to oppose simultaneous
/ ly the combined movements of the tire
armies at Enpatora, at Kertch, and befor
SebastOpol. The greater probability now ap
| pears to be- that on the advance of the Allies
/ in whatever direction they may assume tn
offensive, the Russians will find themselve
compelled to retreat, from inferioritv of mum
bers and want of supplies, and the more so q
the Sea of Azoff teing navigable for our stean
gun boats, their base of operations may b
threatened in the rear.
These circumstances confirm and encour
age the hopes we have never ceased to en-
terrain of speedy and triumphant tennina
ton to the new campaign in the Crimea, bu
they do not lessen our enthusiastic admire
ton of those heroic soldiers who by thei
endurance and their valor have at last wo
a portion of that glorious reward for whic
they have contended so long and suffered s
much The people of England and the mos
intelligent nations of the continent of Europ
will hail with enthusiasm these indication
of renewed and increasing success. The de
Tense of the Russians though obstinate is CIV
identity fainter, and the surrender of Kertc
without resistance is proof of the moral de
feat of the hostile army. Let us procee
with boldness and with imness, for victor
is already in our grasp. The ground we no.
occupy in the Crimea gives us the comman
of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azoff, fror
which Russia will not dislodge us until tn
termination of the war-nOt upon her term
but on our own and the time is probabl
not distant when she will regret far mor
than we need do the failure of the late negC
tiations for peace Our hopes of peace lie i
victory, our negotiations and conditions n
in the camp before Sebastopol, and Kertch
another material guarantee of our ultimai
success.