Thibodaux minerva., 1855-09-01


who pretends to give the substance of con-
versation with Louis Napoleon, represents the
Emperor as saying, in regard to the campaign
in the Crmea:
"I acknowledge the tactics of the Crimean
campaign to be my own projection, and | con-
fess myself satisfied mainly in the results. The
people of France and England want feat of
arms, and perhaps the people of America would
applaud another Smolenski, and Moskowa.
No France in 1918 crossed the arid steppes
and deadly SHOWS of Russia. l will now make
Russia traverse her own wilderness to meet us
on her frontier. There is not a man who enters
the Crimea that has not undergone all We
suffered in the retreat from Moscow. There is
not q regiment that arrives at Perekop that is
not decimated. Whole battalions have been
engulphed. The Russian loss according to
their own estimate rendered to the Emperor
Nicholas last December amounted to two hun
dred and seventy thousand. The Alliei troops
at that time had not lost one-tenth of that
figure. | am content to protract the struggle
in the Crimea on these terms"
On another occasion he observed:
GA Russian army is not recruited with fac-
lity. Men can be had, but not soldiers. The
Russian peasantry require from two to three
ranks. We have nearly extirpated the elite of
their forces,-those which the Car has taken so
many years to create. England and France, on
the contrary, grow stronger as the struggle
proceeds; our peasantry in a few weeks be-
come staunch troops. and the fire of war, which
burns slowly at first among our population, in
creases with reverse"
This sounds Napoleonic, whether it is in the
of tho Emneror h;msoIf or not Rut
we quote it merely to show how strikingly con-
frmatory it is of the opinion of private soldier
in the Allied Army at Sebastopol, as expressed
in letter to his brother in this city. We
quote:-
81 am glad to say that, in my opinion,
Sebastopol will fall ere long,-and am certain
that no one here ever doubted of our ability to
take it. And now that Lord Raglan is dead,
things will be made known to show how little
the Generals of the Allied armies wanted to
take it,-for they only used it as cloak to
cover their real intentions, which have been to
draw rs many Russian troops into the Crimea
as possible so that we might cripple them on
this ground, without advancing into the interior
Of Russia, which would have to be done if we
had Sebastopol now and it. would be sheer
madness to follow Russian army after having
such precedent as Napoleon's Campaign of
1872, where he lost the finest army the world
ever saw through the effects of climate"
"You again ask, if think we will conquer
The Russians?' My answer is, yes, we viii;
and we would have done so long ago, if the
Russians had ever tried a second experiment
ike that of the 5th of November at Inkermann.
They would have been crippled at once; and |
though they never attempt regular battle,
hey think they will beat us by simple 'oc-
,upation.' But their generals never made a |
greater mistake-for the Russian resources are |
,ow entirely stopped in the Crimea, and the
great losses they have sustained in the trans
bort Of troops and provisions from the interior |
o the Crimea must have greatly reduced their |
Internal supplies. And their ports being now
'lockaded, must create stagnation in their |
rade; and want of supplies from foreign ports
must, in the end, force them to accept of any
erms the Western Powers may degn to offer
hem"
These views of the Emperor and the soldier
confirm each other in manner so striking, as
o give color to the supposition, that the
'rimean tactics, which appeared to be blunder
rom the beginning, are, after all, nothing but
deep-laid game of Napoleon to exhaust the
esources of Russia. 1t will doubtless take |
ome time to do it,