New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-07-12
FROM sEVAsTOPOL.

Contrary to pubic eSpecta lion the mail OF the
Pacinc, winch arrived yesterday morning, brings
no detailed account OF the repulse of the Allies
at Sevastopol on the 18th of June. We have, it
is true, some bare statements respecting the
number of killed and wounded in that affair, on
which we briefly comment below. But instead
of the expected dispatches, we have at last Gen.
Pelissier's detailed account of the capture of
the Mamelon and Quarries. Even this however
is not of nature to distinctly show the drift of
the military policy of the man who now virtu-
Crimea. We have to trust to negative rather
than positive evidence if we desire to CONS to
a conclusion on that subject. To guess what
Pelissier intends 10 do, we must look not so
much at what he does as at what he refrains
from doing. But let us look again at the cap
tuIe Of the Mameon; it has some features that
repay examination.
The 9th and 7th of June were devoted to q
.cannonade on the whole line of the allied bate
ries. But while on the left attack (fhe Flag.
staff to the Quarantine Bastion) this cannOnade
was mere demonstration, on the right attack
(Redan to Mount Sspun) it was in good earnest
Here the Russian outworks were particularly
subjected to heavy fire. Their fire appearing
to be sufficiently silenced and their defenders
sufficiently weakened, on the evening of the 9TH
the assault was ordered. The French had two
distinct positions to carry, forming two pateaux,
separated from each other by ravine; the En-
glish one plateau, with rayine on either side.
The mode in which the two armies prepared for
the assault was characteristic of their peculiar
qualities and traditions. The French set apart
four divisions two for each separate attack.
Thus, against the MamelOn Vert (Kamtschatka
redoubt) two divisions were collected, and two
more against Mount Sapun; each attack having
two bIigades, in distinct columns, in front for the
charge, and two brigsdes in reserve. Thus
eighteen battalions were to charge and eighteen
10 suppoIt-in all at least IS, 900 to 80 600 men.
This disposition was perfectly in accordance
with the regulations and traditions of the
French army, which in grand charges always
attacks in columns, and sometimes in rather too
unwieidy ones. The English, if formed in the
same way, would have required two divis-
ions for their part OF the business; two
reserve. True to their own system, ho sever,
they told off Tor the charge about 1000 men, or
about two battalions-hardly equal to half
French brigade. They had strong reserves no
doubt; but, nevertheless, where the French
would have employed three men they employed
only one. This is \ consequence partly of the
British system of attacking in line instead Of in
column, and partly Of the great tenacity of the
British soldier in defensive positions. These
l,OC0 British soldiers were not even ls. loose
all at once; at first 200 oh rged aud carried the
Russian works; then 200. more were s-nt as
reinforcement; the remainder followed in the
same way; and then 1000 British soldiers, once
established in the Russian position, held it
against six successive attacks, and under the
continuous fIoat and enfading FIRE of the Rus