Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1855-10-05

within one little year from the sailing of the expe-
dition the leading objects of the campaign are accom-
plished, and Sebastopol is in our power.
The military and political results of this event
open new chapter in the history of these transac-
tons 10 which shall shortly take occasion to re-
vert but be they what they may, the grand fact
before us justifes the confidence we have
ed 10 feel and reward our hopes for within twelve
months from the commencement of this enterprise
Sebastopol has fallen, and the power of Russia in
the waters of the Euxine is at an end.
THE PRESENT POSITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE CRI.
MEA-From the leading article in the London Times
of the 12h we make the following extract
The position of Prince Gortschak0h's army, after
the main body had effected its retreat the har
bor was therefore, as follows: His extreme right,
consisting of the corps most actively engaged IN the
defence of the place, rests upon the Severnai work,
or Star Fort, and holds the strongly lntrenched po-
sitions on the north shore, where, no doubt consider
able preparations have been made for this emergency
His centre covers the Belbek, and is protected IN
front by the fedworks thrown up along the ridge of
Tnkermann His left wing consists of Liprandi's
corps, occupying the ground from Mackenzie's Farm
to the heights of Aitodor, on the Bakshiserai road
No attempt made by the relieving army under
Lprandi to effect diversion during the assault of the
9Th, and the defeat of the 10th of August ap
pears 10 have satisfied the enemy that the lines t the
Tchernaya were not to be carried But the result OF
the general assault and the occupation of the south
ern side by the allies entirely changes the strategcal
the campaign. The struggle for the possession of
Sebastopol is at end That prize is in our hands,
and the defence of the fortress and the harbor
the grand object of the Russians, they have nothing
left on that spot TO contend for The mere occupation
of the north side of the port is barren advantage
for though it might hold garrison, it cannot shell
ter defeated army and it IS obvious that, after the
failure of the main object, all the ability and gener
alship of the Russians will be required to the
whole body of their forces in the Crimea from de-
sucton. We therefore infer that the northern forts
will either be held for time by limited garrison,
or, probably altogether abandoned, in the hope
of saving the army. Never was army in more
critical position. They are confined within PENN
sua which affords their no other fortified position,
no sustenance for the troops and water beyond
certain line. The sea, covered with hostile vessels
surrounds three sides of this theatre of war and the
fourth is separated from the Russian base of opera
tons by steppes and marshes. The allied armies
already occupy strorg positions at Eupatora and
Yenikale, which be reinforced in few hours by
sea, so as 10 threaten the Russians in their flank and
rear; and while it is impossible for the enemy TO
hold his ground the south of the Crmea-for
which, indeed, there is further obect-to re-
treat in this the country formidable
undertaking, while the loss of battle in the open
field would be absolute destruction. The Russians
are in trap. from which the Tchongar road and the
lsthmus OF Perekop are the only means of escape
and even there their communications may possibly be