New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-12-07
THR WAR IN ASIA.

port yesterday morning, preceding by a few hOurs
the u all of the America which reached us last
night at midnight, puts US in possession of docu-
ments that render it possible to form judgment
upon Omer Pashs's recent brilliant exploit at the
River Ineour, where be forced passage in face Of
the enemy Our readers have already beea in
formed of the fact IT, after landing part of his
troops at Batoum, the Turkish general had singled
out the valley Of the river RiOni for his line of
operations This determination was mMitestedb BY
the transfer of bis base Of operations from Bstoun
to sukum Raleh The Rioni flows into the Black
Sea about half way between these two towns; aud
as there is no bsrbOr theintervening Omer
Pssha wss Obliged to choose between the two, if
he intended to march up the RiOni There are
no very practicable roads between Batoum and the
plain Of that river, while from Sukum- Ksleh not
only the Russian military road along the coast to
Redot aleh, and thence up the river, the Tihis
high road was available, bat also cross-road
which leaves the coast at Shemsaerrai, near the
fort and town of Iori, and joins the Tihis road
near Khop about nine miles above Redut Kaleh.
It appears that these reasons decided Omer Psshas
choice, and made him prefer Sukum-Kaleh.
Ilor is the frontier town between Abkssia and
Mingrelia-the former q narrow strip OF mountain
land formed by the steep slopes Of the Caucasus
toward the seattle latter pa ;tly similar noun
tain country in the southern slope Of the Caucasus
but partly, too, rich alluval plain formed BY the
de oosits of the Caucasian rivers between the noun
tains and the sea- OF these rivers there are but
- fha uh0a
forms Mingrelia, and the Rioni, whose valley is
called Imeretis Imeretia, the larger and south.
srnmost of the two provinces, is bOrdered by the
Caucasus to the north, and by the highlands con-
n, citing that range with the Armenian group to the
east Across these highlands runs the road into
Georgia, straight to THis.
Thus the first object for Omer Pashs to accom-
tlish was the conquest of the valleys Of the Ingour
and Rioni-in other words, of the provinces Of
Mingrelia and Imeretia. This accomplished, bis
land communication with BatOum and Asiatic Tur.
key would be restored to leave him the choice
of retreat in case of necessity, either toward Ba
toum or Sukum- Kaleh. At the same time, cou
siderable mountains, passable at certain points
only, would protect him against any sudden at
tack in fact, be might consider himself as occu-
pyipg the salient angle of vast bastion one face
of which, formed BY the Caucasus, is completely
impregnable; while the other, formed by the Ar
menap and Georgian mountains, is assalsble at
two or three points only In the present state
of affairs, il once established in this bastion,
he might consider himself safe against any eventu-
atty At the same time, this position was sure to
rouse to active hOsttes against Russia the tribes
Of the northern slope of the Caucasus, in Osssti.
and the Kabardas, while it was q constant and
direct menace against Tifis and Akalzik. And
if the time during which Kars could hold out
against the Russian blockade was correctly calcu-
lated this maneuver of Omer Pasha's would to-
deed be the very first correct and great strstegcal
move made during all this war. Tihis being the
center of Russian resistance, the chief Russian
base of operations south Of the Caucasus, march
on TiAis is the simplest and most decisive move
not OILY to relieve Kars but to force the Russians
to abandon the greater part of Transcaucasia for
the protection of this single town. Tifis once
attacked by q sufficient force and taken tho
whole of Trahscaucasia would be lost to Rus
sia, the remnant of the army there would be with
out retreat except BY the Caspian Sea, and the
military and political limit to Russian power would
at once recoil, from Akalzik and Erigan to Ros-
toff and Stavropol, from the Araxes to the Kuban
and Terek. Russia would be reduced on this
side TO her frontier Of 1882 and the fruits of sey
enty years labor would be lost.
Now, it is not TO be expected that such can be
the result of Omer Pashas operations at least for
this season. A march on Tifis would require ct
least 49, 600 men, as it would be met by the con-
centraticn of all the Russian forces in Transcsu.
casia and while the Turkish army of Erzeroum
aid Kars would have enough 10 do to follow up
the Russians on its own eide, the occupation of
Ineretia and MiDpelia would require 20 900 men
more. Omer Pasha would then require about
go 900 men in all, independent of the army of Ere
rou a and such an army he Is very far from having
at present. But what Omer Pasha may accomplish
before Winter is the conquest of Mingrelia and
Imeretis, Of that mountain bsstion which will
secure him comfortable and safe quarters till
Spring, and the occupation of which must at all
events oblige the Russians about Kars and Gumri
to fall back toward Tifis before Winter has
made the Armenian table land impractical
As far as our news 60, Omer Pashs had collected
about $4,000 men at Sukum- Kaleh with tho
greater portion of which he marched down tho
coast to Iori and then took the cross rosd toward
Khopi This road crosses several mountain
tire ans, the passage of most of which might be
disputed, but none of which is of such importance
- the 1neour. IL was behind this river, conse-
lueDtly, that the Russians had taken up defens.
We position. Their number is stated In various |