New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-12-29
THE AsIATIC CAMPAIGN.

4
movement in this war which bad district stra'
'cgcJl character, Iy leaving III minor points out 81
confederation, aud directing Itself straight at the
fountain head Of Ill Russian power south of the
Caucasus. That ia its merit but in crdsr to re-
lieve Ksrs its decisive effects must develop them
selves tbil the period thAt Kars would be able
to hold out and that sgain must depend entirely
upon the state of provisions st Kars, OF which we
had bat little knowledge.
Thus il was th.t We expressed ourselves upon
lis subject, at the time the British pTcss. over.
f, loved at being able to recount = mspeuver based
upon correct srategcal idea, were busy in
forming the public that no better or faier plan
could h.7e been found 10 relieve Kars than this
movement that to march from Batoum ION kars
would Lave been TO give the Russians the certainty
of safe retreat; but that Omer Pasha, BY march
ing straight on Tihis, had made sure OF capturing
alive General Murayef, all his army aud every
other Russian who might still be south Of the
Caucasus. For, indeed, would not Murayief
abandon the siege of KaIs and return By forced
marches TO Ths as soon as he should hear Of this
daring maneuyer7 And who Of course, was to
have tie credit of this Ingenious and bold march,
DUt iCI. >ldfDtnOLCs buu luc VI tue
British Officers at Omer Pasha's headquarters, snd
consequently above all, John Ball, whom they
Represented.
However in spite Ct the strategy of the British
newspapers, Murayieif did rsise the blockade OF
Kays for siege there was noae. On the contrary.
be made every preparation to pass the Winter be-
fore the town, never mindiHg the operations Of
Oner Pasbs in Mngrelis and the terrible English
Nspoleons of his staff And that be was perfectly
justified in doing 70, we showed few days since
by our appro1imatye statement of the folces at
the disposal Of Prince Bebutotf, the commander
in Georgia and MiDgrelis. A General having at
his disposal two Russian divisions of the line, at
least one Of the reserve, and from twenty to
thirty battaons Of militia, has no reason of Oner
Pasha b.iDg able to endaDger 1i1is with an army
numbering at the outset but 80 900 to 900 Turks;
and Gen Murayef might well be Tranquil in his
camp before Kars. From that moment, then,
the fate of Kars was decided, unless the weather
should drive of the blockadiDg army; or relief
should come from Erzeroum, Now, as to the first,
the underground huts constructed by the Russians
we're proof that they intended to risk the chances
Of the weather; and as 70 the second egentuslity,
Selim Pasha at Erzeroum never could concentrate
more than some 6 600 regular and 000 irregular
troops, with which body he would never have had
the courage to undertake even q reconnaissance.
The Russians too intent to ipsulate Kars from all
chances of supply did not venture to establish
them elves west of the Soghanly Dagh, "a range
Of hills separating the Valley of the KarS Chat
from that of the Araxes,) except by the detscb-
ment advancing from the Valley Of the Murad
Chat to Deli Bahia. The British officers at En-
zeroum, seeing that this detachment was posted
some thirty miles in advance Of the Russian posi-
ton at the Soghaply Dagh, and badly connected
with it, proposed to attack it and IS this detach
ment could not muster more than 200 men, with
perhaps $500 more in reserve, the matter WAS
feasible enough. But Selim Pasha would not do
anything OF the kind no move was made, and
the conveys of proyisionss COLLECTED at Efzeroum,
AID destined ostensibly for Ksrs, were not even
sent off, Thus, it was but question of prOvs
ions As soon as the supply should fail st Kars
the town would have to surrender; and THE is said
to have taken place. The garrison had for long
time been on short rations first one half, after
ward one third Of the normal daily quantity of
food at last everything was exhausted. Under
these circumstances the capituaton Of the town
appears at least very probable Gen, Kmetty
Ismail Pashs) with few officers is reported to
have made his way through the Russian lines
how, is not yet explained-and brought the news
TO Erzercm that the commander had sent flag of
tiuce to Muravieff to treat for a cspitulation.
Authentic news on the subject, however, we have
not yet received.
The defense of the place deserves great credit.
Not only did the garrison, though charged with
the defense of extended and faulty constructed
lines. cheerfully stand by its arms day and night
and when the assault came, repealed it with
glory; it also endured the pangs of hunger with
an obstinacy worthy the greatest praise. On the
other hand, Gen. Muravieff deserves equal credit
for his tenacity of purpose After the attack Of
Sept 90, ending go disastrously for the Russians,
their retreat from Kars wss expected on all
hands But, instead Of retreating, Murayieff re-
established the blockade far more severely than
before, cent away bis unnecessary baggage, and
made himself and his army at home all around the
town. Three enemies menaced him, the strength
of none of which he could easily calculate
with any degree Of accuracy. Selim Pasha
at Erzerom, Omer Pasha in Ming ELLA and the
Winter Of the Arsunian Hills. But he appears to
have kept steadily before his eyes the real state of
the case. The danger from selim Pashas, as well
as from Omer Pashas armies was distant and IN
certain, while the fall Of Kars was near and GER
tain, if the blockade could only be kept up. He was
therefore, perfectly hight to disregard his military
enemies. As to the effects of Winter, his army,
three times as strong as the garrison of Kars, was