The Athens post. [volume] (Athens, Tenn.) 1848-1917, 1855-10-19
KOSSUTH ON THE FALL OF SEBAS-
TOpOI

lowing extract, giving his views Of the effect
of the fall Of SebastopoI
AS to the prospects of pencc--it is my de.
cidcd opinion that these are rather lcsscred
than otherwise by the fall of the South Of
Sebastopol. In an absolute point of view |
never did nor do attach any considerable i'm.
portanre to this enterprise. always thought
and think that it was u great mistake to
choose that point for m attack on Russia,
the prOtessed object of which is to secure
Europe from her political prcpondcrance. |
have often expressed the opinion that Moth
ing to be achieved in that quarter can either
break Russia's power of resistance, or bring
her to satisfactory terms. Destruction of
Sebastopol and of the Russian Black Sea
fleet is, in my opinion, nothing but an insult,
that does not take away strength: it is doub.
" so when we remember that the seige of
Sc5astopol was undertaken, coupled with
the pledge solemny given to Austria, that
under no circumstances is the territorial ex.
istencc of the Russian Empire to be impair.
ed. The word was first to advance has al
most become vernacular, that, with u policy
pledged to maintain the integrity of the Rus.
sian Empire, fortress and Il fleet DESTROYED
is but n fortress ana fleet to be built up
again stronger than ever in few years. The
case would be somewhat different had the
allied powers the intention to keep the Cri-
mea. But, on the one hand, until now at
least, this intention they had not; on tho 9th
e. hand, the Crimpa is no barrier that defends
it is an acquisition tina. requires defence: and
to make good this defence, one Of two things
is indispensablc-et the maintenance of
a very large standing army in the Crimea, or
else the pushing back of Russia entirely
from the Black Sea, consequently from the
immediate ncighboihood of the Crimca.-
| Without either the one or the other of these
alternatives, ms soon MS the Allies would
march out, Russia would march in arain.-
The first alternative implies the condition of
I'm armed peace, to the cost of which neither
England nor France would choose to submit
in the long iun: besides, it implies the tortu.
Gus question: Who is it that will undertake
the charge! England and France together!
that supposes the incredible circumstance of
perpetual entente cordial between them. No
man so foolish as to build his house on such
loose sand. England alone! France would
not agree to it. Turkey alone? would thank
for the ruinous gift. Turkey assisted by the
! Allies! would suppose these Allies always
allies; and would imply, besides, the opening
OF the Dardanellcs, and of the Bosphorus-
equivalent to an overthrow of the independ
encc of Turkey. The second alternative
| Chat OF pushing back Russia from The Black
Sea,) implies, in its turn, the necessity of an
independent Circassin, and Of II Daco Rou-
main State with Bessaraba and the Territory
of Orzakoif up to Chcrson; Il combination
which would be absolute nonsense without
| the full reconstruction of Poland in its an
cent extcnt;-a thing beyond the limits of
! The hptprminntinnn Of tl,n IIine all
of two things, one either the Allies make n
campaign in Poland, or they make not; in the
first case, they ought to have done it without
sacrificing one hundred Thousand of their
best troops, and about four Thousand five
hundred millions of francs under Il town,
the capture of which would have been an
easy work by II secondary diversion, had it
bnt been defended by II garrison instead of
the principal army of Russia, us with Pc.
lish campaign the ease would have been un-
| dOubtedly-c the other hand, if the Allies
don't mean to make II Polish campaign they
cannot think Of keeping the Crmca and if
they don't keep the Crimca, then indeed the
fortress and the fleet destroyed there is but IL
| fortress and Il fleet to be built up again.
With Il great power like Russia il is but IN
insult that does not take away strength
However, under other circumstances, it might
| have been matter of choice for RUSSIA how
FAR to resent or not to resent that insult, but
under the circumstances, such rs they are, to
resent it to the utmost is IN imperative ne
cessity for the Car. Scbustopo is the field
on which the contending parties have meas
nrcd their power for u year. The eyes of
the w"rld-of Asia, especial y-have been
rivited On that spot. The long protracted
struggle there Unidentified the prestige of the
Cars invincibilty with the name of Scbls-
tspel Sebastopoi fallen shakes that pres.
tigc to its very foundation, the Cars sub
hitting to that fall would ruin that prestige
irretrievabIy. Whatever be the personal in.
clinations of Car Alexander, ia debonnare]
young man he is we are told, he had nc
choice, he would not live one week if he
dared to sign the ruin Of the prestige of Rus
sia's power. lie cannot sue for peace; he
cannot accept any conditions--werc even
some offered him-under this pressure; he
must fight, until either the strength of hi.
empire be broken or the prestige of his pow
er redressed.