New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-11-28
NETWORK DAILY TRIB,

cavalry toward his left 30 {. to threaten torn
the Ru,sisns by the head Of the rsvins, sw
miles higher up Bot the Russians did notr, I
aud his cavalry, on advancing further ial,ndp- !
pear from the Russian report To have met yh
str, nq bodies Of Russisa horse msneuverng m
it's flank, go Is to prevent il from penetratingo
far This maneuserng lasted about a day "a.
half, when d'AIlon, lille, seeing no possoiIityf
doing any good Tetreated toward Eupatoha. unG
the pre'ext Of q scarcity Of water.
There is however another road of an infsrf
description il is true, but not inhr.ech
by any military obstacle Of importance, with
runs little north Of Sax t. yard the rod
from Ferekop to sympheropos, leaving the srst me
toned bigh-road about six or eight mil.s TO re
south This road the Russians appear to hold y
cavalry only. II it were possible to gain the big
road from Perekop by this cute, the post at CD
botar would be useless TO the Russians, the saus
object would be attained the communication win
Perekop being cut of and even that with Cbourr
mtIaced In such case, the Russians would b.
obliged 70 send strong orces against the corps ron
Eupstoria but this corps would always have I,
safe retreat either north or south Of Lake S..il,
unless provided with an insufficient force of cs5-
airy and acting iDcautiously. After the Eupstofa
CORPS had retreated, the Russian reenfor,e men g
would very likely march back, particularly if Pei.
issier as would be his duty, had made their Sd
feDce the signal OF some threatening maieuyers
As soor a. they had commenced their r-tlrn. the
Eupatoria corps might again advance, and thus thi
hsrrassiDg game, by which the Russians would b,
sure to suffer most, might be played until either
fit Of impatiepce or mistake on the part of th'
Russions opened fair opportunity for decisive
blow In this way aJoleOn was harnesses b.
tbe allied armies 10 1873 in his central position Al
Dresden, until bic strength had suffered by re
y. ated defeats of single corps, aud the superiority
gained by bis opponents justified the concentIc at
tack on LEIPZIG The season is now, as we have
said, too far advar ced to carry out such phn Of
campaign but why it was not done as soon a. Sc
vsstopol was taken, it is difficult to understand
General d'Allonville has indeed made so ne over
lures toward Q movement on this road; bit be
seems too weak, especially in cavalry, to g Tar
from bis base Of operations. At least this IL the
best explanation for the extreme canton oil hl'
movements Eighteen thousand infantry and hVe
thousand cavalry are not enough for the purpose
He should have had double these numbers and
above all more than one solitary division OF Fenc'
Infantry for it must not be forgotten that anon:
the dir posable force under his command there ART
but nine bsttaliOns aud twelve squadrons Of French
soldiers, with some ten squadrons of Engli'hi tn
rest, sixteen bsttaons and sixteen sqaadro,s, con
sst of Turks, whose aptness for feld-ser'ics hal
not yet been tried. At all events, the lateness o
the season all but precludes every chance of hi
gaining important sdv antages in this direction ant
five are to Judge from last years experience, w
shall probably soon hear Of the troops going int
their Winter quarters.