New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1855-05-10
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. TO BE RAISED.


22d, for thirteen successive days, with the ener-
~ and yyacity of what the Russians themselves
call an "nfernsl fire." And what was the re-
suit "That," so says the telegraph, "the SUI
"periority of the FIRE of the Allies was estab-
"lished beyond doubt" Thirteen days
violent. almost ineessant csnnonsde, and no
better result than this patry satisfaction-how
is this possible'
A boubardment or cannonade Of this sort
always forms part Of an irregular attack, that is
an attack where the enemy's Notifications are
not approached by the slow but steady and sure
method discovered first by Vauban and brought
TO perfection BY his successors. The regular
attack proceeds from parallel to parallel by the
well-known zig-zag trenches; erecting fresh
batteries at every new point gained in advance,
protected by the fire Of the more rearward Bat
teries: extending the third or fourth parallel at
the foot of the glacis creeping up the glacis BY
the double sap; forming sort of last parallel
at the very edge Of the ditch, called the crown
ing of the placis: constructing in il the breach
ing and counter batteries; opening the breach;
forming Il subterraneous descent into the ditchi
and finally rsking the assault under the most
favorable circumstances possible. In this
method every step is gained by using all the
positions secured beforehand as base of opera
tions to every fresh advance. Every set isregu-
lar and well supported, and though it may be con-
tested for d moment, must ultimately attain Its
end if no mistakes are made.
There are cases where this systematic way OF
proceeding would be out of place. Wherever
fortified town is of but little intrinsic strength,
where the Notifications are dilapidated, the gar
rson weak, the arsenals ill-proyded, the ground
before the works broken so as to allow the be-
segers to proceed unseen by the garrison to
close proximity with the town; where the Tor
tress is town containing some thousands or
tens of thousands of inhabitants whose terror
once excited may be brought to bear upon the
moral firmness of the garrison and commander;
there the forcibe or irregular attack, undertaken
BY force of sufficient superiority, will be less
tedious, less expensive, and yet secure the same
result. Or where the fortified position to be
carried is of the nature of an entrenched camp,
defended by works the bitches of which have no
masonry scarps, are of little breadth and depth,
and consequently do not require breaking to
make an assault possible, then regular attack
would be equally misplaced.
All the cases where the forcble attack may
be successfully carried out nay be reduced to
one of the above two. Either the object of at
tack is a weak fortress with numerous inhabt-
ants and little resorces, or it is an intrenched
camp.
In the first case the production of a great
moral impression is the decisive thing. A forci-
BILE attack upon even the smallest fortress, with
out decisive battle gained beforehand, com
plete investment established, vast superiority
of force displayed, every hope of relief en-
tirely DESTROYED, never did nor will lead TO sue
cess. The campaign Of 1915 in France, there
fore furnishes us with the model examples of
successful irregular attacks. The French army
was annihilated, the north of France was inun
dated by the invading troops that marched from
town TO town without any resistance. Large
masses of troops surrounded the smaller fort
resses on the north frontier, and one after
another they fell after few days resistance.
The mode of attack in such case is very simple.
The natural dependency Of the garrison must
be worked upon. For this purpose the besieg
ers open their trenches close to the
fortress, say at from 300 to 400 yards,
which they are enabled to do BY
the superior number of troops they can bring to
protect the works. In this parallel they con-
struct number of mortar and howtzer bate
ries TO lombard the town, while few enfilab
ing or dismounting batteries directly engage the
guns of the enemy. The bombardment must do
the main work. The destruction of part of the
town and the burning effects of shells thrown at
all hours of the night, will soon bring the inhab-
itants down upon the garrison, itself harrassed
BY night-alarms and want of rest. If a few guns
on the ramparts are dismounted, if powder
magazine OF two are blown up, the inutility of
further resistance will sOon though wrongly, be
acquiesced in by the commander, and few
hours more bombardment will bring about
capitulation. Thus, in this case the principal
thing required is an imposing force and ammuni-
ton enough to tire out the garrison.
In the second case, that of an intrenched
camp, the theory of regular trenches is out of
the question, as il would give the enemy time to
strengthen his works in the same proportion.
Even single detached batteries are erected in
such cases only where the ground fayors natural
approaches; they always must be made in sin
gle night and therefore are generally merely cut
into the solid earth to the depth of three feet or
SO. The principal cover for the artillery, which
can seldom or never be got in heavier calibre
than l2-pouuders. must be found in the natural