New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-14
LIE A1vrACIx on sEYAsTOPOL.

movement against SevastOpO, the latest inte,li-
gence from which is detailed in another column.
As matter Of course, the British AMI French
journals make a great parade about this uuier-
taking. snd if we can believe them, nothing
ersnder was ever heard Of in military history;
but those who look al the facts in the case-at
the inexplicsble delays and senseless apologies
attending the setting out of the ypedton, AMI all
The circumstances preceding ali attending it
viii refuse to be impOsedupou. The termination
of tie enterprise may be glorious, but Ito origin
would rather seem TO be disgraceful.
Look at ttc pas: history of the alliei armies
in Turkey. A. first these very heroic, bat also
exceedingly cautious warriors intended ID land at
Enos. On this side of the Dardanelles, and t. ap-
prosch that peninsula only after everything should
have turned out to quite safe. Before this daring
feat, however, vas accomplished, they stretched
their courage 10 an unexpected extent, aad risked
slsn3ipe on the Threcian Cbersonesus at G ali.
poll. But this was merely done in order to haze
tie defensive works across the peninsula con-
ple.ed in less time, thus securing to Themselves
that mott essential of all requisites base OF OF
erstions. All the while the Turks Oh the Danube
were facing those formidable opponents whose
presence in Ws.4 LA was tie pretext for these
learned maneuyeri 81 me allies: aud they were
fncpg them, too, with considerable success
But az more ships and more troops arrived, it
was found out that the Dar1aLecs and peninsula
cannot harbor them ell. Thus another hole il
made in the scientific arrangements agreed upon
between Paris and London. 4 portion of the
troops had actually 10 endure the dangers aej risks
of landing at that very exposed spot. COnstln-
tinople To remedy this. the lortifcation of this
town was OF once taken in hand. Fortunately, a
good deal Of time was spent in all these opera
tions, and thus the msia object was secutei-aOt
TO gain time, hut to lose it. Then it was ascer-
tsiI I'd that division might with little risk, be
cent 70 Wanna TO garrison that important place,
for surely the Turks who so glOrJusly defended
it in lc2S, had since ten made such progress ia
European discipline, that the defense of such a
post could no longer be entrusted to them. Tne
division was sent accordingly, and one or two d.
visions more. When finely every pretext for
keeping the troops in tie Bosphorus was fairly
hulu tukt Ant anu NVAhbahoh al was WY
leisurely concentrated at Ysrna. This was done
at the same time when az Austrian army APP
peared like q mensciDg thunder cloud on the
flank and rear OF the Russians and when thus,
by political combinations, the base Of the allied
operations was al once transferred, for the mo-
mont from ConstaBtinOpe to Transylvania AMI
Callicia. Without this, there is every reason
to believe there would never have been an allied
army IN Bulgaria. The proof Of il is in their be-
hayior during the siege of Silistria. Everybody
knows that there was the turning point Of the
campaign, and that on such an emergency, when
both parties have been straihing their powers t.
the utmost, the smallest extra weight added on
one side, viii in nine cases out of ten, turn the
balance in It's favor. Yet, DUNG this decisive
siege, there were 10000 English and 30, coo
French soldiers, " the flower Of the two armies"
smoking their pipes and very quietly getting
themselves in trim for the cholera at very few
Days march from the fortress. And but for the
havoc made by disease among the Russians, aud
for the unaccountablc bravery of handful Of
Arnauts ensccnsed in ditch plowed by shells ia
every direction, SilistTa would have fallen into
the hands of the enemy. There is no instance in
the history of war of an army within easy reach,
thus cOwardly leaving its allies to shift for them
selves. No expedition to the Ctmea, and no
victory will ever clear away that stain from the
honor Of the French ard English commanders.
Where would the British have been a. Waterloo
if old Butcher after his defeat at Ligny, two
days before, had thus conscentously acted 10 the
manner Of Raglan snd St. Arnaudl
The handful of Arnauts in the skirmshiaz
ditch of Arab Tabisss proved match for the
skill, intellect and military strength of Russia
No relieving army drove the Russians across the
DaDube their own fOolishness, the y-lor of the
defenders, the marsh fever the passive weight
Of the Austrians on the Dnester and of .he allies
on the Devna, for who could think they would
act as they did y made them finally abandon the
siege, aud give up both the campaign, the Princi-
Paii1es and the DObrOdja. After this grea. sue
cess the allied generals Of eOurse thought Of fol-
lowing it up-slwsys according to the rules Of
that strstegetic system which they had hitherto
applied with SO much feet Consequently, Lord
Cardigan led tie British cavalry to the Danube,
on reeonnOi,erirg expedition, in which they
saw no Russians, lost many horses, and earned
nothing but sickness and ridicule; while Gen.
LEspinasse, mainly known BY his betrayal of
the National Assembly On December ,, ISL, led
bis division into the DOb.Odjs for no other pur-
pose than having couple Of fue regiments half
destroyed by cholera and bringing the germ of
that epidemic into the allied camp. The great
invasion OF cholera which ensued among the
allies st Wanna wss thus the well earned result Of
their fne strategic combinations The soldiers