New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-10

In The sword 10 bfict greater wound IA An would
have been made by simple stab. But eseo If such
was not the II does not make the act esg m1ly
paIt in law. cum up by beginning with the word
lie" Rogers heard the tick, then turned and Jaw
the sword being drawnibe tick wa probably press
ure on the spring and for wha, purpose sprung
tTbe Di.tnci-Auorney repeated the positions as he
bad previously coD,euded.I As to what Dr. Gr.h.m
said after stabbing Col. L. DO not attach much i'm.
poraDee-f was not any expression Of SURPRISE he
walked up and looked at Loring drew the sword
through his bend, tIen walked Gown stars-the sword
in biz hand DO Dot mean to say that be intended To
conceal The sword By throwing il into the closet.
1t is said that no person heard the bell bat Mrs.
Lorlbg; but witness distinctly stated that she
answered the hell, and saw a man standing At the
door lie Dhtrict-AttorDey, after some other
e1plat ations, said it with pain he was obliged
to come to such conclusion, but It was his real
opinion that it Of wlliful aud deliberate
murder. The counsel said the Ds,rict-Attorney
would refer to Mrs LorDg but he had no such inien
ton This prisoner is not to be sacrificed account
Of that lad,, but here, and the Jury Is here, Ia
vibdicate the Law and TO prot-c, the law. He felt
saiisfed the Jury would honestly ard faithfully
perform iis duty.
by saying that bis labors would be greatly relieved
from the mantle attention the Jury had paid to the
ease. He had found them generally correct upon the
evidence aid therefore be considered it would be
waste of time to review it. He deemed it only
sary to inform them upon the law defining murder and
granddaughter.
The definition of murder was given in the Statute,
and did not differ, if at all, from what the common
law definition Ii began by saying thp "tne
"kilng Of human being, AZ defined in the Statute,
(so far il can be applicable to this case when it
1T is not naDslaughter excusable or justifsble
homicide, is murder when perpetra,ed from pre-
"meda,ed design to effect the death OF the person
"ked."
1t If not necessary that the design should have been
mediiated before the ARRAY commenced it may be
formed in the midst of the atfry a1d still Is pre-
meditaied within the meaning OF the statute; or it
may have been FORMED when the act was about to be
begun that caused the deaih-wben the fatal blow
stab was about TO be given, or any deadly act was
about to be perpetrated.
Still from the definition necessary inquiry is was
the killing ustifable excusabe, or mlnslaughter,
and il it was not either, then it is not murder.
So far as ii be applicable to this case, killing is
ustifsble in self defense il committed by in
" the careful defense Of his person, when there is
reasonable ground TO apprehend design to do him
"some great personal injury and there shall be mml-
" nent oaDger of such Design being accomplished
is enough il there had been reasonable ground to
apprehsnd design to do great personal Injury,
and a reasonable ground to apprehend that there is
imminent danger OF such being accomplished Al
though in fact such desgn did not exist if the ap-
pearance Of things were such as to Justify An appre'
hepsion on the mind Of a reasonable person. that such
design and imminent danger both existed.
is not enough that the design only exs;ed there
was not danger or if that danger was not imminent.
The design and the immne mt danger must both exist
or reasonable grounds TO apprehend both 1t IS the
duty of him who would call to his aid this defense, to
retreat if he safely retreat. The old law ex pres
sion was that "if driven to the wall he might then
"6efend himself" The fgurative application OF these
words is also correct and he 10 driven to the wall IN
a legal sense who cannot retreat without Imminent
danger Of some great personal injury. But he VINO
retreats merely that he may strike more efectual
blow is in no sense acting in self-defense.
In the case Of Shorter, spoken of, Judge Bronson
Gays, "When a man is struck with the naked hand,
:" Ia hand without weapon,) and has no reason to
"apprebeDd a design to do him any great bodily
charm he must not return the blow with dangerous
weapon. After a conflict has commenced he mast
quit if he can do with safety, before he kills his
adversary and if his adversary try to escape he
"must not pursue and give him fatal blows with a
deadly weapon" This is correct, with the qusitl-
cation before stated that the defense is not lost IT, in
fact there was the ability to quit in safety, provided
the SLAYER had reasonable grounds to believe that he
could not quit in safety, aud that the danger was I'm
miDent.
The danger to amount TO justification, is TO be
imminent-tbat is then impending or hanging over
him-then about TO fall upon him; not danger that
on some other occasion would fall upon bin.
The defense is also 10 be lawful defense OF his
person. The plea of self-defense cannot avail when
The reasonable grounds for the apprehension oil
danger rs before explained do not exist and the ia
tai blow is given because the party was struck and
determined to resent the insult, and the ujury by the
death of the one who offended him. Neither can he
be said to be in danger Of great personal INJURY VINO
has received one blow, and only in danger OF the
blows, if he stands still or ressts Insults anu ,ne
mains and bruises of mere blows received in fight,
are not great personal injury Personal injuries not
great are TO be borne without taking the life OF the
aggressor. A., c
IL the adversary were endeavoring to take from
the stage his weapoD,-not to use, but merely 70 pre-
vent the other from using it, and he had reason 10 De
leve tbs-it il not a case of sefdefense; but II he
have reason TO believe that his adversary was endeav
orpg to get the weapon that he might innlct great
81. al mi
personal injury upon HIM, ana tha' uere was iiii-
nent danger Of this then is case OF self defense
Now gentlemen, come 10 a less honorable state OF
cases where by the law, killing Is not held Jusha-
"ble" but "excusable." Killing is excusable,
when committed:
l. BY accident or misfortune
pen sudden and sufficient provocston upon sudden
4 Without any undue advantage being taken
s. And without any dangerous weapon being used.
g. And when done cruel or unusual MAJ nef' .
The law as TO nanslaughter in the first degree II IA
not necessary 10 notice. .
Killing another unless committed under such cir
cums,ances as to constitute excusabe or Justlhabe
homicide, is manslaughter i'll the second degree, II
committed
let Without design to effect death
I'd. In the heat Of passion
Sd But in a cruel and unusual manner -
IL committed without design to effect DEATH or IN
the heat of passion, by dangerous weapon, then
il is manslaughter in the third degree.
The involuntary killing of another, III not Justna-
BILE or eacusable by any weapon, by means neither
cruel nor unusual, in the heat Of passion, is man
slaughter in the fourth degree.
Every other killing of human being, by the act,
procurement or culPabe negligence of another, when
such killing is not ustifable excusable or is not
murder or manslaugher, comes under the head OF
manslau yhter in the fourth degree.
In relation to the evidence, it may be well to say
that witnesses not 10 be considered contradict
ing each other because states that he did not see
what the other declared himself to have seen The
inference if the witnesses both credible and both
capable of observation generally is that he thing
occurred which one said he saw. II there we're sew
h. had Of nQrfie