The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1854-10-05

fate of arms, it is trne is always uncertain
but, although the season is advanced, and the
necessity of preventing the arrival of import
ant reinforcements which the Russian Govern
ment is sending to the Crimea, renders it ne
cessary to give to the attack on Sebastopol the
proportions of a formidable coup de main-the
hope of terminating tho war in the East by o
single effort, or at least of reducing it to mar
row limits, is worth the risk of such an enter
prise. 1t was necessary to postpone to next
year the campaign of the Crimea, or to hasten
it; the latter plan best suited the policy which
was DESTROYS, that the struggle between Russia
and tho Western Powers should have denoue-
ment free from all ambiguity for the future; it
also better suited the ardor of the chiefs of the
combined armies, and the impotence of the
soldiers, who were fatigued with war with
out combats, and after undergoing sickness
found themselves in presence of the empty en-
campments Of an enemy too prudent to wait
their approach 1t must not be concealed that
the enterprise of the Crimea is one of the bold
est of which history makes mention, since the
attack is made with equal and perhaps inferior
numbers, on an enemy intrepched behind an
enclosure of walls and fortresses
But it is in attempting such great exploits
that armies maintain and increase their re-
nown; and, moreover, may there not be mill
tary miracle expected from this elite Of three
armies, who will rival each other in ardor and
bravery-from this combined fleet, where the
spirits of old struggles will revive under the
form OF a rivalry of bolduess and heroism
The greater part of the Anglo French troops,
and 10000 picked Turkish troops, will be con-
veyed In two trips Of the fleets to the shores of
the Crimea, at short distance from Sebasto-
pol. As soon as the troops shall have been
landed, they will be led on to battle either
against the Russian troops, if they should en-
deavor to defend the positions which surround
Sebastopol, or against the place itself, if the
Russians content themselves with waiting for
their formidable visiters under shelter of the
walls. If Sebastopol be taken, the combined
armies will have accomplished striking feat
OF arms which will complete the demoraliza-
ton OF Russia, and materially facilitate the re-
establishment of peace. IT, on the contrary,
the number of Russians present in the Crimea
should be more considerable than was sup
posed-if the town should prolong its defence,
and If obstacles should arise, In few weeks,
from the season-if In short, q strong Russian
army should succeed in reinforcing the Crimea,
the troops would have to reembark, and the
attack on Sebastopol would have to be resumed
at the commencement of next spring. Under
different conditions. To attack the Crmes is
on the part of France and England, to take an
engagement to conquer, and no one can doubt
but that the engagement will be kept. To
conquer the Crimea at any cost, or to abandon
to the Russians the empire of the East-such
is the alternative In which Russia has placed
the Western Powers. Whatever may be the
obstacles to be overcome, the defiuitiVc result
cannot be doubtful"