The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-11-17


ST. Petersburg that sweaborg ana Cronstadt were u
attacked before the close OF the campaign while AM
that conviction which occasoned the counter orderi
the despatch Of the troops that Prince MenschkohN
manded so far back as June last.
TIE CAMPAIGN IN THE BALTIC.
fFrom the London Times, Nov.
While the siege Of Sebasropol Ia keeping all /
rope in suspense, and the fate Of tho Cdmea d
be eny morning announced In teegaphic
spatch, the return Of the eet from the Baltic shq
that the operations Of the allies against the north&
proyir ces Of Russia are terminated for the seaA
As November has now set in, aud the fogs and Cd .
Of the winter have already commenced. Il ID imA |
sble to dispute the propriety OF this honsw4
movement; but the general results Of the csmpaS
when comparedwith the magnitude Of the me&
employed, and tho opportunities apparently inA
ca ed by che successful experiment, will proba4
be criticised with some discomfort. II would I
gether unnatural should be attended BY any injf
tice towards those engaged In the expedition.
An idea seems to be current that the Baltic az
wholly true; for. as we have before observed, Il \
done as much as most reasonable people expecu
when it sailed from 6pithead 1t has boOks4
every outlet Of Russia in the northern gufs, q
utterly destroyed the maritime commerce Of tb
empire in those parts Of its territory. 1t has redn
the bcasted feet OF the Gear to absolute impoten{
and has imprisoned behind store walls every ves
bearing the Russian flag. The ''twenty.seven q
Of the line" to which the Emneror Nicholas
arrogsntly pointed, were insulted and deled By
force Of less than half their number, and a
convictions Of the officers in command We
show shown BY refusal Of the challenge q
been efectualy secured, and it may be furthl
stated that such results have been accomplishe
Without single casualty. Notwithstanding W
o,mcuiues OF an intricate navigation, rendered ST.
more perilous BY the devices Of toe enemy, not
vessel Of the British squadron has been lost d
damaged. The Baltic feet therefore has, At an
rate, rendered the power Of Russia in these pary
hovrrp la~o fnH nv L..
disputed command over the northern seas.
The important omission IL this, that mo- "a
fective blow has been struck against the axms
ments Of the enemy, II was very we'll know
tfcations OF ne design, and, as it was supposed
Of extraordinary strength. Large structures q,
granite were mounted with numerous guns Of greas
caibre, and behind these bastiops skulked the Rus
sian feet with artillery Of its own. The Car
therefore had prepared double array against tho
squadrons of the allies. Our first battle was TO b
fought against stone walls, and, If this were lost %
only gaired at the cost of temporary ineffcienoy
the ships Of the enemy were to sally out and turn
the opportunity to good account. Against yielding
to these temptations our commanders had express
precautions to take; but they also stood charged
With the obvious duty OF ascertaining. by ju
relative strength. II the enemy possessed extraor.
binary resources In its Notifications, 50 did We in
our feete for never had force been sent to 90
the strength Of the Russians had been overrated.
perhaps otherwise. In the latter case rigorous
blockade and standing. defiance were all we could
accomplish, but in the former event we could look
for more substantial success.
Now, il happened that test was applied with
very remarkable effect in the first, and indeed the
only active operation, Of the campaign. Bonner
sund,. fort Of the new order, strongly built
armed, and garrisoned, was attacked by tho allied
fleets and literally blown to pieces, without injury
received on our part. Although, moreover tbs
aid Of considerable land force was prepared for
the occasion, it became perfectly evident in ths
been dispensed with, and that the capture Of b.
marsund might have been accomplished by tho feets
alone. Here, therefore, was the conclusion eppar-
emily established on which so much depended. The
sbips' batteries could dem0ish granite walls, that
our artillery was superior In range and power to
that OF the enemy, and that the escendancy In this
lies. As if to place the result beyond Doubt, the
Russians forthwith ferso0k the defence Of Hango,
another specimen of these Notifications, and hew
the works up themselves, without waiting for -
attack.
Toe mpleteness of this exploit and tbs facility
which attended II suggested two natural inquiries.
As the feet entered the Baltic in April. whereas
BomersuId was not attacked till August. how waa
1t that so long time was spent In making what
proved to be 80 successful an experiment. And,
after this experiment had been made, why should
it not have been followed up By other operations Of
similar character? AS things turned ont, Bonner
tuId might certainly have been taken Withina week
or two after the arrival Of the feet ia those parts,
or, at any rate, after the junction Of the French
squadron, and II we had ascertaite ed a. early a.
the month OF May the real power Of our own srtil-
lery, and the weakness Of the euemys defences, Il
seems reasonable to presume that the three months
of the campaign still remaining might have been
made productive of material advantage. Even as il
WAS some few weeks were left available for sction.
attempted. These were the consi aerations arising
out of the event.
It seems little hard that an exploit SO rsmsrka.
bly, successful a. the attack upon Bomarsund should
tell against The credit Of those who achieved it. but
it has been this, we imagine, which has pruclpassy
affected the current Of opinion. This, by proving
that our original estimate of Russian strength was
overrated, ar that the formidable armameats AZ
the shore defsnces might be thumphantly enc,un-
tered by the heavy artillery of our ships, induced
species OF discomfort at any less substantial sue
cess. We are bound, however, TO observe. thst
though ether Notifications may have resemhled
Bomersund in their structure, they may have been
differently situated a. regards their acc essibity At
Bomersund our steamers werc enabled to take up
of the fort and this in point Of fact, was the secret Of
our blo0dess victory But in such opp0z-
tunities might not exist, nor is it to be disguised
that we have yetto learn what may be the result
when the fire from fort upon vessel tells as ascu-
present, IL our success In the Baltic has not been II
very positive character so neither is our disap-
Pointment. We have lost nothing, in the least IA
Pouls Vl0Wy tAccpt tlmcy NOR u3s su6 EM.
peror Nicholas gained the advantage in single r.
spect. We have defisd him in his own ports; ws
have shown that we can sweep his flag from tho
seas; We have proved tina: his defences are not i'm
pfeenabie to the guns OF our sdips and, with al
these conditions in cur favor, We shall be pre-
pared to recommence the struggle with better pros
poets In the el suing spring.
TRADE FROM THE NEUTRAL pogvs-raH
EFFECTS OF THE WAR-THE G AIMS AND
LOSSES OF ENGLAND BY RESTRICTION.
[From the London Times, Nov. 81
we have devoted our most aleful attention - the
confederation Of the question whether it is possible.
and expedient to adopt further restrictive measures
for tie purpose Of checking the trade Of Rassia
through the neutral ports and whether amp se ,sual
be used to indict additional pressure noon
the commercial resources Of the Russian empire
without causing still greater injury to ourselves,
ard without surrenderfng those broad principles Il
maritime policy which the allied overs are pied nd
in this war to respect and to maintain. We yielA
to none in our desire to appiy with tina utnost rSC