New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-05-23

ated from diplomatic ldom INTO piAn Iusnsh 'nean''
1.-The Gar does not either for Nienns protocols
" or iptrenchments al GaIlipoli ne does not yield
..thoush We treat him with the utmost respect; but
be de6es our diplomacy and~ur army sent to the OAR
.dspelles and to CoustantirOple and carries on the
mv.rip bis own way in spite Of Dundas and Napier -
The homes thsf the war viii be Of short duration are
dying away
I'm. If il il 4 serious war which rs to be wsged
AGAINST Russia thin let consider what the allied
sos,s and armies can do under the most favorable cir
stanees and whether their victories can force the
Gar 70 make peace upon terms barring his further
proeress and territorial sggrandizement
The English public has the greatest faith IN the
,sntrv of Sir Charles Napier and there is no reason
70 doub, that the celebrated Admiral will surely
be- as good as his words at the Reform Club Dinner
But after all. what can be dol He can take the
Isle Of Aland, which commands the Bay Of Bothnia
but IL 70, hires garrison of at least eight thou
sand men TO keep it after it is taken He can like
wise take the Islands of Dagoe and Oese in the Bay
of Finland and lombard and destroy Revel and Rlga
but to keep these islands will require about ten thou
sand soldiers more He may likewise take, but only at
an enormous sacrifice the forts of Cronstadt he may
DESTROY the wenyseyen Russian vessels Of the line
B y.
boats and small steamers and batter down the Winter
Palace of the Car. But should he succeed so far
and even the most sanguine expectations cannot go
beyond this-who that is conversant with the Russian
character. would dare to affirm that the Car will
then make peace just as in 1872, when Moscow
the metropolis of Holy Russia fell o prey to the
French such event would only STIR up all the ener
cies of the nation. The Car and his army, and all
the population of st. Petersburg would retire to
moderate distance from the coast, and wait until the
ntruding foreigners should leave the places they had
occupied for want of an army to garrison them perma
nently whilst the Russian hat-bottomed gun-boats
would continue to nflict damage on the combined
feet in sort of naval guerilla warfare, attacking the
large vessels unawares and disappearing Immediately
after the attack by the wndings of the shallow chan
nes along the shores of the Baltic.
A similar game may be played in the Black Sea-
the Russian feet and perhaps SevastopOl may be
destroyed BY Admiral Dundas,-a serious blow indeed
for the Gar whose prestige must be lost by any deter
mined action of the allies but this will not force Rus
sa to make peace. The Cars cling to theprnclPie OF
the Romans never to seek peace when defeated, and
at once to put stake their empire rather than allow
their power to be crippled and their influence In
the Eastto be curailed. The combined armies OF En-
gland France and Turkey may easily expe the Rus-
slams from the Princpalties; they may even conquer
Transcaucass and the Crimea but they have not the
means of keeping those provinces. England and
France have openly declared and pledged themselves
not to make any territorial acquisitions, and the
Christian feeling of Europe would scarcely permit
them to place the populations of Georgia, Mingrella
and Inertia under Mussulman dominion. But it is
equally impracticable to reconstruct their ancient in
dependence since from the time of Peter the Great
their kings were only nominally independent and re-
ally vassals of the Car. The steppes of Southern
Russia prevent any serious military operations beyond
the Pruth; and the Gar, well acquainted with the
invulnerable nature of his empire, may safely put his
trust in the financial difficulties in which England and
France must soon be involved by protracted strug
gle, while an agricultural country, such as Russia is,
feels less sharply the caamties of Wharf.-The exports
of Russia to Europe having always been Insignificant.
Nicholas may, therefore, bide his time, well aware
that even in the worst the damage done by the
war to England and France must be serious than
the losses of Russia. The Fabian policy of evading
the enemy must in the long run, give him all the ad
vantages Of victory.
But if such is indeed the case, what course have
England and France TO pursuel Must they, after ALL
submit to the arrogance of Russia Must they give
up the game without having crippled the encroachng
power of the Northeastern Colossus Must they be
satisfied to restore the status quo, leaving to Russia
the possibility of renewing her attack on Turkey as
soon as they have withdrawn
The answer is plain to all these questions. The al
lied powers must finally yield to Russia eren they are
victorious unless they can find and employ differ
ent policy. What that policy should be- we do not
attempt positively to say, for we are not entirely
convinced that Russia is now really vulnerable at any
point. But if she can be permanently crippled at ALL
there is no difficulty in seeing where. Give Finland
back to Sweden, and reconstruct Poland an indie
pendent nation. and you have set up an impossible
barrier To Muscoyite encroachment for the future.
There is reason to believe that the British Gov
eminent d. not consider either of these measures
as impractcable in ITSELF But it would seem that
Lord Aberdeen, and Lord Pamer&on, and Lord
Clarendon and Lord John Russell, and all the Eng
ish Peers and Commoners in Parliament would rather
submit to Russia than to support national movement
Democracy is the bugbear which frightens them.
They GEEK the alliance Of bankrupt Austria, and try
every of coming to terms with Russia only to
avoid the necessity Of siding with an instruction
They are proud of their revolutionary sres Of the
seventeenth century but they rail at those who in the
nineteenth century initiate the Hampdens and BUS
sells and Argyes. Their speeches all in praise
Of liberty and se@f-government but their actions con-
solidste despotsm abroad, and introduce centralzs
ton at home The present ministry is not able either
TO carry on war effectively or to conclude peace honor
shv. and the result of all their nresent eorts can he