Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1854-10-14

cd range Of argument the Independence and duties OF
that Department but which, according the view taken
by the Court Of the case is entirely misappied We do
not think the proceeding in this case nterferes in any
respect whatever with the rights or duties Of the Execu
tive that it involves any conflict Of powers between
the Executive and Judicial Departments of the Govern
ent The Mandamus does not seek direct or control
the Postmaster General in the discharge Of any official
duty partakng in any respect Of Executive character
but to enforce the performance of merely ministerial
act which neither he the President had any authors
ty to deny CONTROL
We shall not therefore, enter into any particular ex
animation Of the line to be drawn between the powers Of
the Executive and Judicial Departments of the Govern
ment The theory Of the Constitution undoubtedly is
that the great powers Of the Government are divided into
separate departments; and 80 far these powers are
derived from the Constitution the departments may be
regarded as independent Of each other. But beyond
that all are subject to regulation by law, touching the
discharge of the duties required to be performed
g The Executive power is vested in President and
far his powers derived from the Constitution
he is beyond the reach of any other department. except
in the mode prescribed by the Constitution through the
mpeachng power. But it by follows that every
officer in every branch of that department is under the
exclusive direction of the President Such principle
apprehend is not and certainly cannot be claimed by
the President There certain political duties imposed
upon many officers in the Executive Department, the
discharge Of which is under the direction of the Presi
dent But it would be alarming doctrine that Con-
gress cannot impose upon Executive officer any duty
they may think proper which is not repugnant any
rights secured and protected by the Constitution And
in such the duty and responsibility grow out Of and
subject the control of the law and not to the d.
- tboD Ard Sc ;o Al
when the duty enjoined is of mere ministerial
character"
Hw as urged at the bar that the Postmaster General as
alone subject to the direction and control Of the President Nth
respect to the execution of the duties imposed upon him By this
law and this right Of the President is claimed growng out
Of the obligation imposed upon him By the Constitution take
that tie laws be faithfully executed THIS Doc
TRINE THAT CANNOT RECEIVE THE SANCTION Court.
IT WOULD NESTING THE PRESIDENT DISPENSING
POWER WHICH CoUNTENANcE SUPPORT IN ANY
THE CONSTITUTION, ASSERTING PRINCIPLE
WHICH, TO ALL CASES FALL
ING WITHIN IT, WOULD DE CLOTHING PRESIDENT
POWER ENTIRELY CONTROL THE LEGISLATION OF Con-
aREss AND PARALYzE THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JUSTICE"
The Opinion Of which the foregoing extract is the
conclusion was the production of that excellent
Judge and most estimable man, Mr.. Justice THoMP-
SON, by whom it was read to the Court, under cir
cumstances which we shall now relate as they have
never before Chat know of found their way into
print but which can be corroborated by the testi-
mony Of all who were present to witness them.
After the Opinion had been pronounced, Mr..
Attorney General BUTLER addressed the Court.
He said that in that Opinion it had been stated
that the obligation imposed the President to see
the laws faithfully executed implied power to
forbid their execution. For himself he disclaimed
such doctrine. It was possible that in the ex-
element Of the argument he might have been
inadvertently betrayed into the employment Of the
language imputed to counsel; it was possible that
the Court conceiving this to be the legitimate and
logical consequence of the argument he had adj
vanced, might have attributed to him the actual
enumeration Of such a conclusion. But he felt it
duty which he owed to himself and the station
he occupied to repudiate such doctrine as contrary
to his ngestablished opinions, and he hoped that
the Court would either expunge this part Of the
Opinion or so modify it as to exonerate him from
the imputation Of having asserted such principle
Mr.. Justice THOMPSON observed that he had
endeavored faithfully and impartialy to state the
arguments Of counsel, but if he had fallen into
error in this respect he always willing to rectfy
it. In this case the opinion delivered had been
submitted to all the Judges in conference, and no
one had intimated that the argument had been mis-
apprehended. Several Of the members of the Court
had left the city and the only difficulty he felt was
as to the propriety Of changing any thing to which
they had given their concurrence.
Mr.. Justice BALDWIN said that, having differed
from majority of his brethren on what he deemed
very important question which had been raised at
an early stage Of the argument, he had taken no
part in the residue Of the case, and designed to
maintain silence unless the Court should arrive at q
different conclusion from that which had been ad-
judged. He had, however, paid much attention to
the argument, and said there was no mistake or
misrepresentation whatever in the statement of that
argument.
Mr. Justice MCKINLEY remarked that he had
listened with attention to the argument, and had no
hesitation in saying that, according to his under
standing of it, not only was the doctrine attributed
to counsel distinctly enunciated but it constituted
the entire drift of the whole argument.
Mr.. Justice WAYNE said there was neither mis-
take nor Misrepresentation in the matter. He had
heard the doctrine, stated in the Opinion advanc
ed by counsel with equal astonishment and indig-
nation. He had not supposed there was any intel
lgent man in the country so ignorant of the prin-
ciples of our Government and institutions to en-
terrain such principle; much less could he have
anticipated that it would ever be advanced before