Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-11-18
From the Journal de ST. Petersburg.
The Russian Account Of Operations ia til
Crimea.


The Anglo French conducted their united forces
before Sebastopol from the north of that town 10
the SOUTH thus entirely changing the basis Of OPP
erations They attained this object by flank
march round the town. The organs of the foreign
press cannot find expressions TO praise sufficiently
the sklfulness of this man9uvre. Without wish
ing 10 detract from the merit of il, at least it is
just to mention also and to explain the operations
OF Prince Menschikof in reference to the enemy.
After the battle upon the Alma the prince, not
finding position strong enough upon the Katcha
and the Belbek 10 give fresh battle TO the ene-
my, passed the Tchernaya, and concentrated his
forces in position TO the east Of the town. after
hpving garrisoned the forts Of the north with a
sufficient number Of troops.
The enemy advanced, passed the Katcha and
the Bebek, and reached the heights which sur
round the northern forts.
The position OF Prince MenschikoG was dsad-
vantageous, nasmuch as il enabled the enemy to
occupy the direct communications with the interior
of the empire. Ii was therefore necessary 10
abandon that position, and the prince achieved the
object by luminous idea, carried into effect in
the most daring manner. He marched during the
night Of the 9th TO the 25th Of September towards
Bakshiserai, after having crossed the Thernaya
by simple bridge. He executed his march in
flank in the course of the night, and in the morn
ing Of the 25th found himself in the valley OF Bak
shisera paced in the flank and the rear Of the
enemy, having his communication free with the
interior of the empire, and with the reinforce
ments which he expected.
The new position of the Prince would have
been annoying TO the enemy if the latter had been
DESTROYS Of attempting an attack against the forts
of the north. For this reason the enemy did not
make the attempt TO attack the forts Of the north.
On the contrary, he adopted tho resolution of
changing the point of attack from the north 10 the
south of Sebastopo, by turning the town to the
east. Let il be permitted TO us here TO throw a
light upon some circumstances, which will enable
an impartial judgment 10 be formed respecting the
operations off the two parties
Prince Menschikof had to march across noun
tains and by one road, which from the point where
Mackcnzie's Farm is situated was only at dis
lance Of four wersts from the advanced posts of
the enemy. Indeed, the bivouack fires were seen
thence. The prince could not attempt 10 cover
his march by means which are usually adopted in
such cases, for il was necessary above all things,
not TO attract the attention Of the enemy. In his
position II was necessary 10 avoid battle, which
would have hindered the movements of his col
umn. The prince marched with his train and
park Of artillery. All these difficulties were sur
mounted, and our troops had, on the morning OF
the 18th, reached point where the enemy did
not suppose them 10 be.
Our adversaries also executed, and almost at
the same time, a flank march, but under much
more advantageous circumstances, From Belbek,
and the plateau which they occupied on the Oath,
they had only 10 gain Mackenzie's farm, in order
TO attain the route leading by descent 10 the
without being perceived by US, for this point
where Mackenzie's Farm is situated is at a dis
lance of sixteen wersts from the spot where
forces were stationed; and, besides, il is also
covered by woody mountains.
If Prince Menschikof had been DESTROYS OF at
lacking the enemy during the march, he could
only have done so by one route, which, for dis
lance OF 10 wersts, is upon an ascent from the
Belbek 10 Mackenzie Farm. II would only have
been necessary for the enemy TO place a few bat
ferries in good position upon the heights TO en-
able him TO check our attack for so long time
that the movement Of the column could not be
completed without danger. The enemy had the
great advantage Of marching without guns and
artillery, which, in the meantime had been quietly
transported by sea 10 Balaklava. Whoever has
marched with troop, whether an army or bat
talion, will appreciate the difference between ad-
vancing with and without train OF artillery.
II was requisite that Prince Menschikof should
avoid a combat during his movement, because the
enemy was placed in an advantageous position for
il. Our adversaries, on the contrary, marched in
such manner that they would not have been in
convcnienced by an attack upon their flank, an at
tack which the prince, from the nature Of the ter
ritory, could not bring about without engaging in
IL under unavoidable Circumstance