The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-11-26


10 public Opinion was the 6rst success Of the
expeditio IN, followed IS il WAS, b. most extfaord
nary ann0unoenent o. successes greater still. For
the Crimea had been conquered in . ten dsys' cam
paign. A great part OF this story was undoubtedly
true. We bad traversed the dangerous waters OF
the Euxlne In safety; we had landed our army with
out oss; We had encountered the Russians IN their
own chosen position, and driven them from 1t by
glorious victory. IL was added that panic had COM
pieted the work for u.s. and that Sebastop0l was al
ready ours. This proved untrue; but the actual
truth was little less marvellous. without any mo-
lestation from the enemy We had executed flank
march across . most difficult country had made the
circuit Of Sebastopo aud had established ourselves
In Q secure and commanding position, which placed
the town at the mercy Of our batteries. Such were
LIE advantages Of our situation and such the artl
leIy force at our disposal that the place, it was
said must either surrender at discretion or bs ruin
ed under the fire Of our guns.
II we nov contrast the event with the prediction,
we do rot that our disappointment need be very
serious. Sufficient allowance had not been made for
the difficulty Of bringing up our siege artillery to
the heights occupied by the army, and twenty days
elapsed before the batteries were opened upon the
town. These three weeks eraolea the garrison to
strengthen their defences very considerably; their
fleet, sacrificed as useless, supplied hundreds Of
add onal guns the arsenas Of the place were stored
with munitions Of war, and large reintorcemcnts Of
men appear to have been poured In. What were
the actual numbers Of the troops thus brought up
to the scene Of action it is hard to say but Prince
despstches represent the succors from
Kertch and Perekop as arriving within eight days
Of the battle Of the Alma, and those from Odes-
50 and Bessarabia as entering the Crmes about .
week later. Altogether, it seems clear that the
original garrison must have been joined BY forces
rendering it greatly superior to the besieglng Ar
my, according to the principles Of calculation in
such cases established: the proportion Of the
8 to l; whereas it seems not improbable that the
force disposable by Prince Menscnikof for the de-
fence Of 6ebastopol 10 equal to that under the COM
mand Of the allied Generals. The consequence il
that We are not merely conducting . great siege,
but engaged with an army as powerful Is our own.
In many respects, indeed, the operations Of this
aIkable enterprise resemble those Of field service
generally rather than those Of ordinary sieges The
place is not completely invested; on the north side
It is perfectly open, and the garrison enjoys there
fore, the extraordinary privilege Of free communi.
cation with the adjacent country. It il not pro.
te ted on the side OF the attack by regular fortca
tons, q breach in which might consum mate the
struggle, but is defended by large earthworks
armed with heavy guns. There is relieving army
at band in addition to the garrison, and the forces
of both, owing to the ncompleteness OF the iavest-
ment, may be combined for any operation either Of
attack or defence. we may be called upon at any
moment to encounter the ,uhoe Russian army in the
Csimea, either under Prince Nenschikof in one
quarter, or General Liprdndi IN another.
If these circumstanS es are taken into considera-
ton, we do not think that any conclusions at all
discoulaging need be drawn from the reports now
received. The fire Of the Russians has been main.
tanned with unex pected energy, but our own bate
ries have been equally well served, and the relative
advantages of our position are shown by the small
amoun. of our casualties as compared with those
Of the enemy. From all we can learn, their losses
must have been more than six times as great as
ours. Our position itself too, has proved 80 cure
4 al 1~rO nt1 lad h.
the chances Of a surprise, failed of any material
success. Meantime, by the very nature Of such
operation g. every day improves our prospects and
Injuries those Of the Russians. II our camp cannot
ball must eventually do their work. and Ssbastopol
will fall. In every fortress, however strong. the
of defence must necessarily be finite, and the
incessant crash Of tie bullet and explosion of the
shell must, in the end, spread destruction around
them. We may win nothing beyond q heap OF ruins
but ruin must come.
It results, however, from this peculiarly of cir
cumstances that our work, even after the fall OF
Sebastopol, may still be left incomplete. Even if
we batter the place to pieces, the garrison may
pose, whatever may be the execution done by
our fire, but that . very large force of the
enemy will survive the capture OF the town. We
may sill have TO deal with General Lprand and
Prince Menschikof, even after Sebastopol is our
own, and it is fortunate that our command Of the
seas will enable US to meet the contingency With
such facility. We are nearer our res0ur ,es than
the Russians, even on Russian ground, and within
few hours sail Of the scene Of action Is the
Ottoman capital, with its large supplies Of men,
needing only discipline and command to become
excellent soldiers. 1t is certainly possible that the
capture Of Sebastopo following close on tho victo
paign without single turn Of success on the side
Of the Russians, may 80 0ishearten the enemy, or
even alarm the Gear, as to hasten the termination
Of the war. It's more reasonable, however, t, an.
fin "a ~vrGx ~k~.~ I.~k
least VIC may assure ourselves that the capture Of
such place as Sebast0p0l viii not be found d,a7-
pointing in its results The Czar may dissembe his
convictions and prolong his resistance but his power
the Ottoman empire totally ruined.
STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN PARIS.
Paris Nov Evening" &c, Correspondence of London
The depression caused by the absence Of good
news from the Crimea increases, and II the siege
should last many days longer, without some marked
progress against the enemy, we may expect gene
today at the Bourse. The Three per Cents for ash
Used at 7Sk 25c, and Four-andaH per CentA ct
96f. 90c.
The Parisians, with their usual versatility, are
the bombardment OF Sebastopol 70 want Of skill
ON tie part Of General Canrobert. Three weeks
ago he was spoken Of rs hero, and man Of
extraordinary military talent. Now, the Parisisns
10 uOL uueeO utny tudL nc ii v8OTJu6 6OlOlct, Dub
they ask what experience he has had In strategy,
and express wonder that he should have been ap.
pointed as chief Of an army having to lay siege to
one Of The strongest places in the world. The
military men tere do not join in this outcry, but
many Of them express rsgiet that the operations
Of the siege were not conflded TO General Neil, in
stead Of General Bizot. They acquit General Can.
robert Of the blunders which have been committed,
and Of the unprecedented imprudence Of exposing
magazines Of powder to tie fire of the enemy; but
they say that the General has not sufficient viii Of
his own and is too apt toilet other men have their
way. AS to General Bizot, there is q rumor ia the
military circles that misunderstanding as to the
siege operations has at length taken place between
him and the commanGer.in-chie aud that one or
the other must be changed.
The only private Geographic dispatch to-day is
from Hamburg; it brings the official Russian bull
etin of the last affair at Balaklaya. The Russians
ADMIT their loss to have been six officers killed. one
general and nineteen officers wounded and $50
men put hoss de combat.
AUSTRIA. RUSSIA, AND TURKEY.