The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-09-01

corps Of Russian skAters who should venture vifh-
Sot sIs,s. eur SulsH must Be snow .eoes-saA
nen wno have bot the free use Of their feet ava
hite chaace..vhatever be their numbers~ou IT,
,J0 aesnns o,ue green, or red coated soIdis, b.
and with ground under them which Will not hin
them down on their noses after every shot whscb
they have balanced themselves to achieve Bymsr-
sund and the Aland islands be held all tina viu-
ter II 1t be wise and desirable to mold them.
SITUATION OF THE ALAND ISLANDS
CHANCES OF WINTER OCCUPATION
The group Of Islands lying about twenty-five
miles from the coast Of Sweden and fifteen from
that OF Finland In the Guf Of Bothnis, Ia known
TO the Firms by the name Of Ahvennanmaa. 1t con-
siss Of less than eighty inhabited and two hua-
dred upinhabited islets, the largest Of which y
about eighteen miles in length by fourteen In
breadth. On this island thu fortress Of Bomarsund
has been constructed by the Russians within tbs
last twenty years, and 1t is here that the Fren,h
army Of the Baltic, supported by the marines a
the British feet, IL now engaged in the first i'm
Is said to be large enough to shelter an army
OF 10000 men within the range Of its Runs
AMI we are assured that 900 laborsrs were
emplo, es in the construction Of the works during
that portion Of the year when 1t Is possible 10 build
In so severe climate. We cannot, no wever, veuch
for the accuracy OF these numbers; but 1t Is Ger
tain that the place is Of consider able extent
son, and not likely to be- taken without tue opera
tons Of regular siege. The principal fortress Goa
sists Of double tier OF semisrculsr cssemated bat
teries fronting the sea, mounting at least eighty
heavy guns; but this fort does not appear to be
armed on the side of the land At distance Of
about 900 yards from the principal fortress and
from the shore three mounds hilio ks, two u
which are fortified as detached works, mounting
about twenty guns each Tnat to the north is called
Fort Nottch and Is 100 feet hign; that to the sout
is called the Tee Fort; the central mound ia used
for telegraph station. These works bear Almost
the same relation to the main fort of Bonn arsun "A
the forts Of Arab Tahaa and Me5jidje b,rs to the
town OF Silisria To attack those works it Ia sup
posed that the land forces viii advance in two d.
visions. The brigade from the north will consst Of
1000 French infantry, 100 sappers and miners, 600
marines, l6 heavy 80 FOUNDERS four field pieces aud
one rocket company, being the force destined to
attack Fort Nottich In the rst instance. The bri-
gade from the south will consist Of 900 Fren h In
fantry and 30 heavy siege guns under the command
Of General paraguay ID Killers in person, and win
attack the Tee Fort. Tne Interest o. the position
Of the enemy and of the siege consists in the reduc
ton Of those detached forts, and in this operation
the ships can take no active part.
This fact establishes two points Of considerable
interest to our maritime operations In the Baltic.
and difficult passes of that inland great three
deckers can hardly b. brought sufficiently near
to the enemys works to bear upon them with effect.
The block ships and heavy frigates are alone able
to go into harbors of this description and IL was not
without reason that on the occasion Of the Baltic
expeditions Of 1900 and 1907 all the ships selected
Tor that service were second or THU d rates. The
use Of such ships as the Duke Of Wellington, the st.
Jean d'Acre and the Neptune in the Baltic is to
keep the Russian feet in check, and the manner In
which these huge vessels have been handled by our
masters and pilots IL such as TO call forth the
varmest eulogiums from the Rassisn ans themselves.
But, secondly Admiral Napier has very wisely ab-
stained from measuring the broadsdes Of any OF biz
ships against the batteries Of granite Fortress and,
in spite of all that has been said this subject the
result of the experiments made in this war is decd
edly favorable to land Notifications against marioe
artillery. The opinion Of the Duke OF Wellington
is thus confirmed, who said in the House Of Lords.
after the successful alta on ST. Jean d'Acre, in
1S40, that ii must not be supposed that ships were
Q match for well defended batteries. The sdmirsh
appear to have resolved to act upon this principle.
and, although hollow shot ard shell will be thrown
against B0maTsund at long range, IL cannot be
their intention to attempt the reduction Of the place
by preaching the front. We have no doubt this
resolution is perfectly consistent with sound judg.
ment and with the rules Of war.
The operation is therefore converted into siess
by land, and that this was the intention OF the
allied governments Is shown by the fact that fr0A
10000 to IL 600 infantry and artilierymen wers
embarked; thAt battcring train sent, and that
two Of the ablest engineer officers of the French
and English armies reserved for this service.
The troops were all landed on the 9th inst, on .
part Of the island distant about three miles froo
the fortress. The Russian garrison, which Is sup
posed to consist Of $500 men, made no attempt to
defend the adjacent coasts but retired within tho
wa ls, having first set fre to the woods, which
timber, and to the villages, which might have
furnished provisions. Tue islands, however, are
said to contain about $4,000 head Of cattle. aAd
fish is most abundant in the creeks or bays. The
surd some days after the troops, and, in addition
to these pie ces Of ordnance, some Of the loWer
deck guns of the ships have been furnished with
platforms, and prepared for use on lani, ss was
done with effect at the siege Of St. Sebastian. We
expect, however, to learn both from Bomarsuod
and from Sebsstopol (when the attack on that
place has commenced) that the nature Of the sou
will in both nstan be found extremely unfsvora
BILE to ordinary siege operations. The Alau1 Islands
are nodues OF granite, barely covered With seaaty
layer Of earth, and 1t is probable that Bomsrsuld
itself is built on foundation Of natural rock, and
the detached forts on rocky mounds. At any rate,
to be easily approached by open trenches or covered
mines; and II that be the case the besiegers must
have recourse to the imperfect shelter Of sand5ags
and sbattis end tie place viii not be taken without
serious loss. we are correct In these data, II may
NC qurs..on for the engineers directing the siege,
and for General paraguay DHilliers, the com
mander in,chief, whether an attack on one Of the
forts by escala 10 Is not more likely to prove sue
cessful than protracted siege.
The popularity Of places In so northern iati-
tude and so cold region is that they cannot be
permanently invested. and the garrison know that
| II they can hold out for certain number Of
the assailsnts TO raise the siege. But, supposing
the place to be taken by tho allied forces oau e
be held during the ensuing winter2 That is .
1t sometimes happens, though not every year.
that the Sound Of Wattuskiftet, which divides the
Alsnd Ises from Finland. Il completely frozen over.
g It was in 1909, when Buxhovden's army or ,ssed
and Lit their bivouac fires on the solid lie. Tho
Russians, moreover, are better prepared than We
can be for winter campaign because they are used
to The climate, and wouli be within few miles
Of their base Of operations. To hold the Aan1
Isles with security during winter, we ought &, b
assured Of the co operation Of Sweden, ct least IN
e far q that possession concerned which 20 near.
capital; for whatever be tie ultimate effect n
this expedition on the policy Of Russa Il is certaia
that The capture and possible destruction OF "a i'm
portant fortress erected at vast exoeuse for vhe
over Finland and the Gulf of Bothnis, but. in mae
ner, over stockholm Itself an event Of tue deoOoet
Interest to the Seeds, nation. We are unwilling