The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1854-08-01
KOSSUTH AND THE MANNER OF
CARRYING ON THE WAR.

CARRYING ON THE WAR.
We have no respect, as general thing, fos
the opinion Of civilians upon military matters.
They are quite as likely to blunder in such .
Geld IS military men arein politics and diplo-
macy. II seems to US. however. that Kos
snth, civilian though he be, speaks the Ian
guAge6 manifest common sense, when. he
asserts that the true mode Of making war
upon Russia is not to attack her by sea, but
by land, and that through Polish insurrec-
ton. The question of the expediency Of an
Austrian alliance is one clearly within the
province of civilian, and upon which no
man is more competent to form correct
Judgment than Kossuth. England has com.
mitted fatal blunder in allying herself with
the despots, instead of the people of Europe.
II must be clear enough now, even to the
self complacent pride of John Bull, that the
great Baltic squadron, the most magnificent
feet that ever floated on the sea. has entirely
failed in fulfilling the public expectations
II has not made the slightest impression upon
the great strongholds of the Gar on the Bal
tic. nor has it affected in least the physical
or moral strength of Russia. The prestige of
Russian military power has not suffered more
from the reverses of her armies on the Dan
ube than has that of the naval power of Great
Britain from the impotency of her fleets In
the Baltic. 1t is useless to pretend that the
great allied squadron was sent to the Baltic
merely to have q fight with the Russian ships
of war Any ordinary British squadron
would have been more than sufficient to an
initiate the unpractised and inefficient feet
of the Gear. They were fitted out at enor-
NOUS expense and with every appliance OF
modern warfare to reduce Cronstadt, and
other great fortresses on the Baltic, and such
was the general expectation and boast Of all
England when they sailed
And they have done nothing, except burn
ing few merchant ships, and ravishing help
less women. They have feared even to at
tack single one of the Cars strongholds.
The fact that the French are about to send
an army to the Baltic, proves that the feet is
q failure.
In the Black Sea, old Dundas shuns Sebas-
topol as he would the plague. Now let us see
whether Kossuth, if he does not speak very
good English in the following extract, does
not speak more excellent sense than the En-
glish have yet spoken themselves:
al don't think you can take Sebastopol by the
sea. The opportune moment of coup de main be.
Ing lost, 1t would afford sacrifices which you neither
can afford norrisk And to taking by land to take
q fortress accessible by trenches, and having but
garrison to defend it, that is but matter of art and
Comparative sacrifices. 1t can be calculated to the
hour. But to take retrenched camp linked by
terrible fortresses and an army for garrison In it,
and new armies pouring upon your flank and rear,
and you in the plains Of Crimea, with also no
airy to resist the Is undertaking to succeed in
which more forces are necessary than England and
France ever can unite in that quarter for such an
aim. Ask about 1t whichever staff officer who has
learned something about tactics and strategy. And
in that position is Sebastopol thanks to your Aus
TRAN alliance, which, having interposed herself be-
tween you and your enemy in Wallachia, made the
Gear free to send such numbers to Sebsstopol he
likes.
."You will be beaten, remember my word Your
braves will fall in vain under Russian bullets and
Crimean air-as the Russians fell under Turkish
bullets and Danubian fever. Not one out OF five OF
your braves, inundated in vain, shall see Albion
Gsllia again But will tell you in what manner Sc
bastopol isto be taken. 1t Ii at Warsaw that you
can take Sebastopol. Napier landing at Tamoglia,
and brave Poland rising at his gallant call will at
the very first moment engage 100 600 Russians The
first report of Poland insurr ection, can but spread
dissolution In the Polish ranks of the Russian
my in three weeks the Gar shall have 300 900 men
less and shall want 800 600 men more. His bravest
PROVINCES 100000 of Poles, will have not only
slipped from his grasp, but fight against him-l2,-
100000 left by your impolicy to be the source of
his power and the tools Of his ambition Was there
a truth ever evident if this is not And that's not
Poland. mr.
aid in arms will assure King Oscar of Sweden that
he is not to be left sacrifice Ia the hands of
powerful Russia. Poland in arms gives you Swe-
den for an ally, and Sweden, again, occupies at
least 100 900 Russians in Finland-and seconded by
your feet, pushes on toward St. Petersburg. Thus
you may take Scbastopol under these conditions,
1t will be but fortress with garrison. Your 30
600 braves will do the work"