Washington sentinel., 1854-03-25
,foreian Sntslligents.
NEWS By THE PACIFIC.
The Cars Reply to the emperor Napoleon.

NEWS BY THE PACIFIC.
The Cars Reply to the Emperor Napoleon.
The Paris Monitsur, in its official part, gives
the following as the reply of the Emperor OF Rus
sia 10 the recent letter Of the Emperor Napoleon
The Enapero's Reply
Sr. PETERSBURG, JAM Is, (Fsb. % 1854
SIRE cannot better reply your majesty than
by repeating as they belong 10 me, the words with
which your letter terminates: Our relations
ought 10 be sincerely amicable, anu should be
based upon the same intentions; the maintenance
of order, the love of peace, respect Tor treailes
and reciprocal good feeling Your majesty, in
accepting this programme as had traced il, says
that you remain faithful 10 il. dare believe, and
my conscience tells me so,s that l have not ex-
ceeded itsln,its for in the affair which has excited
division between US, the origin OF winch Is not
TO be attributed to me- have always soughtto
maintain friendly relations with France, and
have always endeavored to avoid anything which
might clash with the religion proiessed by your
majesty. | have made for the maintenance OF
peace all the concessions, both Of form aad sub
stance, compatible with my honor, and in claim
ing for my co-religionists in Turkey the confrma-
ton Of the rights and privileges which they have
long acquired at the price OF Russian blood,
claimed nothing which was not confirmed, by
treaties lfthe Porte had been left TO herself the
difference which has 80 long kept Europe in sus-
pensc would have been solved fatal influence
has thrown everything into confusion. By pro-
voking gratuitous suspicious, by exciting the IA
naticism of the Turks, and by deceiving their
government as to my intention, and the real scope
Of my demands, il has exaggerated the extent
of the question, that the probable result seems 10
be war.
Your majesty must allow me not 10 enter too
much in detail in the circumstances as they pre-
sent themselves 10 you in your letter, in which
those circumstances are marked out. Several
acts on my part, appreciated with little accuracy
according TO my opinion, and more than one fact
perverted would require, in order 10 be properly
rectfed, at least as I conceive, long deyelope
ments, into which it would not be proper TO enter
in correspondence between sovereign and SOW
eregn. For instance your majesty attributes 10
the occupation Of the principalites the e7il of
having suddenly transported that question from
the region of discussion TO that of fact; but your
majesty leaves out OF view the circumstance that
this occupation, still purely conditional was pre-
cejed and in great measure caused, by very
important previous fact, the appearance of the
combined fleet in the vicinity OF the Dardanelles !;
and beside this, much before that period when Eng
land hesitatedto assume hostile attitude your ma
jesty took the initiative in sending your fleet as
far as Salamis. This wounding demonstration
certainly exhibited little confidence in me. 1t
was calculated to encourage the Turks, and 10
paralyze beforehand the success OF negotiations
by giving them the idea that France and England
were ready TO support their cause under all cir
cumstances I'm the same way your majesty
makes it appear that the explanatory commen-
tafies Of my cabinet upon the Vienna note rem
dered il impossible for France and England To
recommend its adoption by the Porte but your
majesty may recoect that our commentaries fol-
lowed, and did not precede the pure and simple
non-acceptance of the note, and believe that the
powers were so little seriously desirons of peace.
that they confined themselves 10 the claims of the
pure and simple adoption of that note, instead Of
allowing the Porte TO modify what it had previ.
ously adopted without change.
Besides, if any point Of our commentaries bad
given rise TO difficulties, offered satisfactory
luton 10 them at Olmut., end such was il consid-
cred by Austria and Prussia. Unfortunately, in
this interval, part OF the Anglo-French fleet had
already entered the Dardaneles, under the pre-
text of there protecting the lives and properties of
English and French subjects; and in order 10 al.
low the whole TO enter, without violating the treaty
of 1Sil il was necessary that the Ottoman govern
ment should declare war against us. My opinion
is, that if France and England had desired peace
as much as |, they would at any cost have pre-
vented that declaration OF war, or, when war was
once declared, have taken care that il should have
been restrained within the narrow limits TO which
wished to confine it on the Danube, SO that
might not be compelled by force 10 abandon the
purely defensive system which wish 10 adopt.
But from the moment when the Turks We're al
lowed TO attack our Asiatic territory, to carry
term fixed for the commencement OF hostilitles) 10
blockade AkhattZik, and 10 ravage the province
Of Arm enia-from the moment when the Turkish
fleet were allowed 10 transport troops, arms, and
munitions of war to our coast, could il be reason
ably hoped that we should wait patiently the re-
suit of such an attempt? Was il not TO be sup
posed that we should do all we could TO prevent
it i? The affair of Sinope was the result OF IT, That
was the forced consequence ofthe attitude adopted
by the two powers, and the result certainly could
l.o.l Il.
wish TO remain upon the defensive, but before war
broke out, as far as my honor and my interest
could permit me 10 do so, and so long as the war
was restrained within certain limits. Has all
been done which ought 10 have been done TO pre-
vent these limits being exceeded?
Ii the character Of spectator or even that OF me
diator was not sufficient for your majesty, and if
your majesty wished to become the armed auxili-
ary Of my enemies, then, sire, il would have been
more honorable and more worthy of you 10 have
told me so frankly beforehand, by declaring war
against me. Each of US would than have known
the part he had 10 play But is it equitable pro-
ceeding for those 10 make a crime of that event,
after Il has happened which they did nothing 10
prevent z. If the cannon-shot of Sinope reverber-
ated painfully on the hearts of all those who in
France and in England appreciate the national dig
nifty, does your majesty think that the menaclng
presence at the entrance of the Bosphorus, of
the three thousand pieces of cannon of which yon
speak and the report their entry into the Black
sea. remain without echo in the hearts of the ma
ton whose honor have to defenda learn from
your majesty for the first time, Qor the verbal dec
iaraiions made tome up tothis period have made no
such alusion that, while protecting the reinforce
ment of Turkish troops upon their own territory,
the two powers have resolved 10 prohibit to US the
navigation Of the Black sea; that is TO say, appa-
reuty, to take from us the right of strengthening
our own coasts. leave ii TO your majesty to con-
slider fihat be, as you say, the why to facilitate
the conclusion of peace; and if, in the alternative
which is placed before me, ! am permitted 10 dis
cuss, or even to examine for a moment, your pro-
posal for an armistce the immediate evacuation
OF the principates, and the negotiation with the
Porte of convention TO be submitted to the four
powcrsa Would you, YOURSELF sire, i you were
in my place, accept such position? Would your
national feeling allow you 10 do so? Iboldly an
swer no. Allow me, then. in my turn, the right
of thinking as you.woud think yourself,
Whatever your majesty may decide, menaces
will not induce me to recede. My confidence is
in God and in my right and Russia, as can guar-
anty, will prove herself in 1854 what she was in
1912 IT. however, your majesty, less indifferent
TO nv honor, should frankly return to our pro-
gramme-if you should profler me cordial hand,
as now offer it 10 you at this last moment-Iwill
willingly forget whatever has wounded my feel