The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1854-10-26
For the National Era.
THE FUGITIVE FROM SLAVERY, ARD THE
POWER TO RETURN him 70 BONDAGE


The almost constant pervereions of common
sense and all the rules of legal Interpretation
to which our modern Judges arc driven, In Or
der to support the abominablo system of Amer
lean Slavery, induces me to address to the
public the following remarks:
In the case of Garrett Van Meter as Rob
ert Mitchell, in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the western district Of Pennsylva-
MIA, at the November term, 1858, Judge Irwin,
In delivering the opinion of the Court, used
the language, among other expressions quoted
below. After copying the fugitive clause of
the United States Constitution, as follows
No person held to sorvice or LABOR in one
State, under the laws thereof escaping into an
other State, shsll, in consequence Of any Law
or regulation therein, be discharged from such
service or labor, but shall be delivered ur on
claim of the party to whom such service or Ia
Dor may be due"-the learned Judge proceeds
to say:
"a claim, in judicial sonse, is demand
OF some matter as of right, made by one person
upon another, to DO or to forbear TO DO, some
act or thing, Ga g matter Of dHy And where
an act is required, the means are given to make
eEeotual the 'tgkt, which IS seldom possible by
= mere delivery TO the gunner Of the fugitive.
Before the act OF 1898 as we'll in tbs AZ in
other instances, this injustice has been but too
frequent. The fugitive might have been con-
ceaed, harborCd and assisted to escape into
foreign country, SO that his services might
not only have been partially, but totally lost
to the Ot0ner. | cannot believe that such in
justice could have been without a remedy"
Much more is very fippantly said by the &C.
commodating Judge, painful to the ears of in
telligent and enlightened justice, philanthro-
Pr, ADD Christianity, about the common lar
RIGHTS and remedies of slave-owners, under
the act of 1889; and Judge Baldwin's opinion,
ia the case CT Johnson Us Thompson is cited to
sustain these views; all of which, as conceive
are utterly at war with the facts and history
of common Law adjudicatioDs, and especially
to that famous decision in the Kings Bench
OF England, known az the Somerset case
pronounced by Chief Justice Mansfield in 1772
which finally and forever settled the common
law doctrine upon this question but which
my time and your space will prevent me from
dlscusslng-ny object now being to examine
the above positions, as quoted, III connection
with the fugitive clause Of the Constitution.
But before proceeding further, | shall assume
the following propositions, as axion's, in the
light OF which my argument will be con-
Quoted.
l. That slave of whatever color or cline
is a Person--a human being; aud, as such,
under the Constitution is primo facie entitled,
by the laws Of Nature, to the same rights OF
liberty, justice, and the pursuit Of happiness,
as Judge Irwin.
2. Thst In the Interpretation and judicial
construction OF the Constitution, courts are
bound by the same rules of beneyolence, jus
tics and universal equality and right, as in
regard to my statute or other instrument; and
especially, II possible to make that Instrument
IN Its details harmonic with its professed scope
and object, as developed in its preamble.
Keeping these landmarks in view, let us, in
the first place, ascertain the meaning Of the
fugitive clause, as above quoted.
TO do this, let us apply the cafe test Of per
s0nai use Of terms Were you and myself, CT
the learned Judge Irwin, or any other tao
Anglo-Saxons, who Gre recognized by the Judge
as treem7n, to use the word "dus" in refer
ence to an obligation arising between us, what
meaning should We attach 10 the word
We cannot perhaps answer this inquiry
more appropriately than in the language Of
Noah Webster: "Dao. That which is owed
that which one contracts to pay, do, or per.
form, to another. The money that controct
to pay to another, is his due ,, the service which
| covenant TO perform to another, is his due"
With these definitions, the common law prin-
oiple of indebtedness and obligation is in en-
tire and perfect accordance, as may be seen by
consulting Bouviers Law Dictionary, title
"Debt" and Debtor" See, also, Blackstone,
and every other respectable common law
writer, since the days Of Hale and Bacon, and
especially examine them in regard to those
great common law principles which forbid the
enforcement of even contracts, where there is
fraud, violence, or want of consideration, in
their inception.
And Judge Mclean, as admitted by his
honor Judge Irwin, in the case of Jones Us.
Vanzandt q fugitive slave case, expressly de-
claree, at is clear that the plaintiff has no
common La,O right Of action for the injury COM
planned of"-beipg q prosecution for assisting
slave to escape from his master; thus recog-
nising the great and fundamental principle, that
men could not be bound by any obligation at
common law TO Dhieh they toeTe not parties
and that others, therefore, aiding them to Sc
cure their natural rights of liberty, could not
be punished at common law.
And Judge Irwin has himself clearly shown
that there is no necessity in order to a consist
ent Interpretation of the fugitive clause, to
brand our glorious but perverted Constitution
with the foul absurdity of protesting to estab-
lish justice and secure the blessing of liberty,
while at the same time it is trampling down
both justice and liberty, with reckless disre-
gard of every principle Of righteousness, as we'll
as all the progres sive aspirations of the age,
both in the old as well as new world. For he
says, at cannot be doubted that the words
fu gitives from labor land be might have add
ed the same words in the fugitive clause in
the Constitutional in the act of 1893, extend
to apprentices as well as to slaves" Thus by
Judge Irwin's own showing. there is a class of