The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-10-07

nation IN man. The Lieutenant, after all,
IL, we suspect, the real questiol at issue.
Nothin like New York politics
The Crime an r. pedftson and ia Prospects.
The unop osed Decentralization Of the expedi-
tiolary arms Of the allies in the Crinea, has,
as might be expected, excited great exultation
both i, Z gland AM France. Those unac-
quaiDted with The natural difficulties OF the
country ard the elements Of resistance that have
been quietly accommodating on tn scene of ope-
rations for the last few months are naturally in
ouced TO look u on this ia t as dec sive of the
success o. tue campaign. We are, therefore
not surprised to find the Constantinop.e agents
Of the London and Paris stock xchange specu-
lators anticipating the wished for result by the
propagation Of rum that bear upon the face
of them the stamp OF absurdity. TWAS reported,
and very generally believed in that city, that
after all his energetic declarations and pTepara-
tons for resistance, the Gar had, at the eleventh
hour, displa ed the Vote fea her, and, terrified
By the dangers that nlenaced his shores sigai-
fed bis acceptance of the four propositions laid
down by the coalition as the basis of neg gotta
have found temporary credit in the joyful ex-
element caused BY an apparent success. We
make use OF the term apparent" adyisediy, for
ii is far from Gear to us that the uunoiested
landing OF the allies ia to be taken either ~ an
indication of weakness or Of bad generalship on
the part of the Russians.
With an extensive coast TO wa'ch, and one
oil NJ, J.fa
both by sea and land, it seems to Us that the
Gar has exercised wise discretion 10 not d.
viding and weakening his strength by seeking
to protect the whole line of the Crimean sea-
board against the uncertain operations of
feet possessed Of the most powerful war mate
riel that has as yet been employed for the pnr-
pose Of invasion, and manned by the most skill
full sailors and troops in the world. Had he
attempted to do so, he might owing to the IA
cilities possessed by the allies of transporting
their forces by sea from point to point have been
taken at disadvantage which would have Sc
rously affected the ultimate fate Of the cam
paign. The Russian plan of operations seems,
from what we can learn to be that to which Ma
poleon owed much of his success, namely: that
Of bringing empowering masses of troops to
bear upon the weak points of the enemy. To eff
feet this object it is in this case necessary to
draw the invaders into the interior Of the coun-
try, to separate them as far as possible from the
moral as well as material support afforded by
the proximity Of the feet, and then to fall upon
reason to believe, is the system Of tactics which
has been decided upon by the Gear and his
generals; and in order to carry it out effective
ly, the mos energetic exertions have been for
some time past making to concentrate the ne
cessary number Of troops in such positions as
will be likely to ensure its success.
Although we have regularly been kept inform
ed Of all the movements of the allies in connexon
with this expedition, we have learned but little
until lately of the extraordinary preparations
made by the Russians to defeat it. For some
time past the Emperor has been pouring i'm
mense levies of men into the Crimea, and en-
trenchipg and Certifying all the approaches to
Sehastopoa. In the uncertainty in which we
are placed by the cautious reserve of the Rus
sian press and the partial admissions of the
Western journals, il Is of course impossible to
form any any thing like an exact estimate OF the
means of resistance assembled by the Russians
in the Crimea. 1t will be seen by letter in
this day Is paper from one Of our correspondents
whose statements are in general characterized
by great caution, and who has access to the
most reliable sources of information, that there
are grounds for believing that the Russians
have at present about ITO, 900 troops in the
Crimea, Independent of the garrison of Sebas.
topol. Considering the disproportionate mum.
bers of the army of the expedition, and
he heterogeneous materials of which it
is composed, we confess that we are far
from sharing in the confidence which I
been expressed as to the results of this at
no troops in the world are Of course equal to
the English and French troops ;but courage aud
discipline will not always supply the balance of
such empowering odds.
The previous disasters which have attended
the Russian armies in the Danube must not be
too securely relied upon as set-of against
their chances in the present campaign. They
are now fighting in their own territories, re-
moved Fl ON the influences that paralysed their
former Efforts and they have the consciousness
that if they are beaten, they will be shorn of
much OF their importance as a nation Under
such circumstances, we have had enough Of his
tcrcal examples to show what even greatly In
ferior numbers may effect. With most of the
advantages upon their side, the Russians will
be forever disgraced if in this instance they
succomb to the Iower of their invaders.
On the other hand, should the allies be de-
feated. the consequences win be disastrous to
the peace Of Europe, although we are far from
regarding such result as inimical to the
liberties Of mankind. 1t is out of such convul-
siops that the democratic spirit usually gathers
together the elements Of its progress and
STRENGTHENS itself in each ard-earned nositinn |