The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-08-20

into the plan Of the campaign adopted By Marshal
st. Armand and Lord Raglan 70 occupy either the
valley Of the Danube on the DobrudschG 0mcr Pa
cha had asked 81 the first coniersn,e Of the allied
generals for the moral support Of . European de-
tachment at Varna and the allied commanders gave
him more than he asked-not, as the result has
proved, without effect. But the chief adv antage OF
this movement to ourselves was to gain time for the
arrival Of the heavy guns from Wool witch and Tou-
Ion, and in some degree to sccustom the trooos 70
the climate. II was also desirable that the hottest
period Of the year should be over before active ope
/ rations began. All these considerations must now
render our meaning perfectly clear, when we dlspu-
ted the plan OF operations which most OF our con-
| Temperatures were directing towards the Danube,
and steadiy pointed in tie direction OF Sebastopo
Il now becomes expcdent to consider with great.
! er detail the nature Of the proceedings to which
this remarkable expedition may give rise. the nrss
Crfnea and the siege Of Sebastopo as for any great
maritime invasion, is to effect LAM ing Of the
troops in such manner and in such position that
they may be able to hold their ground against the
has reached the shore, and is prepared TO take the
field. For this purpose the spot selected for the
LANDING must unite several favorable con.
ps Of was9 to ass se hs approach ss ' #
the ships or at least Of the steamfrgstes 80 as to
give the boats and the troops the shelter Of the
ships guns. 1t is indispensable that fresh water
be found On the spot in sufficient abundance to sup
ply the immediate wants of the army, and that some
natural facilities should exist for throwing mp field
works to protect the first landing from attack by
the superior forces of the enemy. 1t is also neces
sary and desirable that the enemy should, as far
possible be deceived as to the exact point on which
the attempt is to be made. Surprising these c0nd
tons to be realized, it is calculated that In about
three hours sufficient number Of men and guns
may be landed to enable the detachment to hold its
position against any force that the enemy IL able to
| bring against il; and in the meantime, from the
enormous number Of vessels Of war and transports
at the disposal ofthe allied forces every half hour
would add considerably to the strength Of the In,
| vading army. !
| The south western promontory Of the Crimsa on
which Sebastopol stands undoubtedly combinesmaRy
tween the port Of Sebastopol and Cape Chersonese,
within distance Of about seven miles there are no
less than three inlets harborsthe bay Of Street
ska, the bay Of Peschana, and the bay Of Kameesch
which ore not fortified the land, and q, more or
less accessible to vessels Of war. To the south Of
Cape Chersonese the shore below the Monastery
OF st. George might be eligible, and tho deep
haven of Balaklava would be most important
sion. Some such port must Of course, form the
very. first measures of the allied generals
! fordlng them safe communication with the fleet.
glance at the map will show that, il such posi-
ton can be found, Sabastopcl may be alta ,ked in
/ the rear with remarkable facility. We may here
observe that, until about two years ago. Ssbestopol
was scarcely fortified at all on the land side, aud
was commanded by hills adjacent to the town.
Since 1852 regular wall has been erected from the
in length but Is probable that this wall is stu un
supported BY the outworks required to give it
strength and edty, and tho heights outside these
lines still give the bcsiesing army formidable
From the best formation we have been able to
collect. the Russian forces now in the Crimea con-
sist principally Of two divisions of the 9Th corps
d'armee, under General TcheodsiofI which NAV
a ~ oI,1
Hve OF the marines and dockyard battalons exist
ing in Ssbastopo Il is probable great edjrts have
been, and VIII be made, to increase this force but
in the abs nee Of communication BY sea, vast ex
tent of steppes and marshes has to be traveysed be-
fore the marrow isthmus Of the Crimea can be
reached at all from the interior Of Russia It is,
charged with the defence Of this important posses
sion win adopt double system Of operation. Leav-
ing in Sebastopol such garrison Is the extent Of
the works TO be defended may require, the rest Of
probably occupy position in the country; and It
will be necessary for the allied armies to be
equally prepared for twofold operation namely,
to invest sebastopol on the one hand and TO guard
felo on the other. Ia fact, II the landing Of the
allied forces is once accomplished in safety, it is
solely on the possibility Of relieving the fortress
the siege. that the safety Of the place depends.
Left to itself and attacked by regular approaches
the fall Of Sehassopol would be matter Of certainty.
The problem to be solved is, whether the allied
armies will have the power, during a siege which
may be protractel for considerable time. to re-
pulse all the troops which the Emperor of Russia
may or can send against them. For this purpose
may become extremely Difficult: to carryon the
attack on Ssbastopol without extending the opera
lions OF the allied armies throughout great part
o. the pei Ursula. The southern pat Of the Crimes,
which is by far the m7st accessible to our fleets
country which can be called salubrious or fruitful.
Twothirds of the peninsula to the north of the hills
along the coast are abandoned to salt marshes and
sandy plains, ble only for their breed Of cat.
have considerable diff uly in maintaining Itself in
such Q country, while all the more productive dis
tricts are held by tie enemy We ave still unavoid
eD % many th resng :" conn
though It has been very little visited by European
travellers; but in the foregoing remarks We have
pointed out some Of the general .poinciples which
we trust that from the magnitude on which they
have now been unde, taken. and the spirit which
animates the allied armies they win be brought TO
successful teri nation before the close Of the pre-
sent campaign.
AUSTRIA.
WAR COMPLICATIONS OF THE ExPIRK-POLICY or
THE CABINET.
Vienna DULY cs) Correspondence of the london Tmes
In some of the North German papers we read that
In its last note the Austrian government had re-
commended to the Western Powers to make the
recent proposals. Of Russia the basis Of negotiations
for peace but this IL dire lily contrary t. what is
Petersburg are likely to be taken into serious con-
sideration by this government until the Russian
army bias re-crossed the Pruth, and most con-
vincing proof can be given thst voluntary evacQa-
armies in Gslicis and Transylvsnia are already
very powerful but the King Of Prussia has recently
given many instances Of irresoluaion that further
military preparations are considered necessary.
Ia yTuv IN NJ
in Trsnsylyanis Of 10000 men. The reserve
army PLACED IN echeion, In two corps, will be
about 20 ,0C0 strong. Thus the whole army concen-
trsted for the purpose Of maintaining the integrity
consists Of 400 900 men, but has above been said.
the support Of Prussia cannot be fully depended on,
and therefore another 100000 men will be raised.
The army in Italy and In garrison in the other parts