New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-03-06


these goods would run the risk Of e,ai'ci;iOa. Tle
ia Russ quite indignant at the inpa''i)n this east
mon bis Government, and perfectly web ae4laln'sI
viii tie Official phraseology according which Rl'sa
i the great CHAMPION OF order, property family ana
RELIGION in contrast the revolutionary and socialist
countries Of the West, retOrts that Here 10 Russia
God be praised TIE Distinction between "'Hs AM
r, Is yet in full force and your property here is as
81. ,,f as anywhere. | would even advise. you 10 seal
over as much OF your property as you can Tor u VIII
q. perbaps be safer here than where It is now hs@
Tour eOuHryea yoa may perhaps haze reason I" Jea''
az 20 your property not at al
In the meantime the ornaments pre- pared IN Ing
land and France are upon most extensive scale. Inc
French ocean squadron has been ordered iron bres'
10 Touon in order 70 transport troops 20 the Le'ai
Forty or sixty thousand according 70 different s'ae
rents. are 70 be sent large portion OF them 70 De
drafted from the African army; the expedition VIII De
yer, strong in riemen, AID De com nihdet either oy
R,r,susy dIhuiers or by St Arnaud. The British
Government will send abou. H. 900 men, y regiments
Of go each snd at the date OF our ltstad'ce' Po'
ton ofthem had already embarked for Malta, where
the general rendezvous is 10 be- The infantry 60 IN
steamers and sailing vessels are employed Tor the con
voyarce OF cavalry The Baltic fleet which is 10 be
concentrated off Sheernes in the Thames by the 9th
Of March will consist OF fifteen ships OF the line. eisAt
f-cstes and seventeen smaller vessels. Il 10 the
largest feet the British have got oyeher since tue
last war ard as one haf OF twill consist OF paddle OF
screw steamers and as the rating aud weight OF metal
i, nres4nt sbout 81 Per cent higher than fifty yoar'
ego this Baltic feet may prove TO be the sronses'
armament ever turned out by any country cr Chaf1es
Naper is 10 command il; il there Is TO De war nc Is
the man to bri lis guns to bear at once upon The de-
csiye point.
On the Danube the battle OF Tshetate has evidently
lad the effect of delaying the Russian attack upon
Kalsfat The Russians have been convinced by thi'
five DAYS struggle that ii viii be no easy matter 70
tske an ntreucbed camp which can send out such
ssllie. Il seems that even the positive command oi
tie Autocrat himself is not sufficient after snch
foretsste TO drive his troops to rash attempt IAe
presence of Gen Schilder Chief OF the Engineers,
WHO was sent from Warsaw purpose, seems even to
have had result contrary TO the Imperial order Tor
instead of hurryiug on the attack, an inspection OF
the Notifications from distance sufficient to con-
vince him that more troops and more heavy guns were
needed than could at once be broughtup Accordingly
the Russians have been concentrating whatever forces
guns of which it seers, they brought seventy two lao
Walachia The London Times estimates their forces
At G. 900 MEN which is rather high If we consider tne
strength of the whole Russian army iii the Ff'nc'Pa
ties This army now consists OF six divisions Oi III
sntry, three divisions Of cavalry, and about three
hundre dfeld guns besides COssacks, rlemen
sreeisl corps of total nominal strength before the
beginning of the war of 10000 men. Assuming their
losses By sickness and on the battlefield to be 5J0Jo
men, there remain about 10000 cOmbatants of these
at least coo are required TO guard the line oil the
Danube, 10 garrison the principal towns, and to MAN
tain the communications. There would remain, theo
at the very outside 5000 men for an attack upon
Kaaiat
Now look at tie respective positions of the two ar
mics The Russians peglect'Dg the whole line OF the
Danube disregardiDg the position Of Omer Pasha az
Shumla direct heT main body, AMI even their hea'y
artillery to point their extreme right where they
are further from Bucharest, their immediate base oil
operations than the Turks are. Their rear IS there
fore as much exposed as il possibly can be- Wnit -
worse still is that in order to gee some slight pr)tee
ton for their rear they are obliged TO divide their
forces and to appear before Kalaat with force w4ch
BY 10 means has that evident superiority which BY Ia
surirg success might justify such maneuver Ihey
leave from thirty TO forty per cent of their army sca'
tered behind tie main body and these troops are GER
aiply not capable Of repelng resolute attack mus
neither is the conquest Of Kaatst assured nor the
communications of the besegiDg army placed out OF
the reach OF danger The blunder is 80 evident, 50
colossal that nothing short of absolute certainty of the
fact can make military man believe that 1t has been
committed.
If Omer Pasha who still has superior force dis.
posable passes the Danube at any point between Rust
cLuk and Hrsoya, with say seventy thousand men,
the Russisn army must either be annihaied to the last
man or take refuge In Austria. He has hada full month
for concentrating such Why does henOt cross
river which Is now no longer DISTRACTED by losng
ice Why does he not even retake his tie de p0nt
at Oltenitza, in order to be able to move at any
moment! That Omer Pasha is ignorant of the chances
the Russians have given him by their unheardOf blum
der is impossible He must it would seem, be tied by
diplomatic action His inactivity must be intended to
form sfset against the naval promenade Of the
bined fleets in the Black Sea. The Russian army must
rot be snnihilated driven to take refuge in Austria
because then peace would be endangered by fresh
complications. And in order to suit the intrgues AMI
the sham action Of diplomatic jobbers, Omer Pasha
must allow the Russians to lombard Kalafat to place
their whole army oil their siege artillery at his mercy
without his being allowed TO profit the occasion. 1t
would indeed seem that if the Russian commander had
not had material positive guarantee that his TANKS
and rear would not be attacked be would never have
attempted to march upon Kalaat. Other wise 10 spite
e Iii l., L