The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1854-10-12

EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENCE.
MINDrN, Sept IL, 1854.
TO the Editor of the Nnlioxai Era.

EUROPEAN CORRESPONDENCE.
MINDES, Sept. II, 1854.
10 the Editor Of the Naiionai Era:
Several European journals have remarked
that, from the experience lately acquired, it
might be considered as decided, that there is
no chance, even for the mightiest fleets, to de-
s.roy or reduce to capitulation, without the
aao OF iand-forces. fortresses as strong as Swea-
Dorg Cronstadt, and Sebastopol; because it
seems not credible that the experienced and
2fave admirals who command the English and
rrench fleets in the Baltic and Black Sea
Moold nave neglected the opportunities, had
.nere oeen any at all at hand, of acquiring
the glory of such conauests. The truth Of
tneee remarks seems to be confirmed by what
has occurred at Bomarsund, which Il was not
even attempted to reduce before the arrival of
the french land troops. There is however q
rumor circulating, that Admiral Napier has
declared 1t possible, with the allied feet under
ms command, to destroy Cronstadt, but at the
sacrince OF at least half The number of the at
tacking ships the loss of which the English
ana French Governments are said to be nm
wiling TO risk, for the advantage thus 10 be
gained Be this as it will, certain it is, that
the great naval armaments which France and
England are employing against Russia, have,
On account OF the strong Notifications by which
the enemy's most vulnerable points are protect
co, not been able to realize the expectations of
eitner friends or enemies-as they indeed have
oone no essential injury to Russia, with the
exception OF capturing q number of its mer-
trade
Tho United States might hence learn the
Importance OF protecting their maritime cities
and towns, by Notifications strong enough to
deter any naval force, how powerful it might
be, from attempting their reduction.
IL Is at least not very prudent to permit New
York, and several other of the large maritime
cities of the United States to remain as ex-
posed, as they are at present, to the attacks
which, in war with England or France,
would most certainly be directed against them,
if left as vulnerable as they are now. Nor is
1T any evidence of statesmenship to assume
that war between the United States and
either OF the States now mentioned, or even
with both of them at once, is among the num-
Der Of events not probable ever to occur. None
supposed, two years ago, an alliance between
France and England, against Russia, as proba-
bic; still it is now a fat accompli. An alli-
ance between these two Powers, against the
United States, is far less improbable The
true statesmanship consists in preparing to
meet every event Of such nature as to inflict
great injury upon ones own country if per-
mitted to OCCUR without proper resistance
The Russian rulers have not been deficient on
this point. Hence it is to their able manage
ment and laudable precautions, that Russia 10
indebted for the little injury which it has as
yet sustained from the mighty fleets of the
Allied Powers. Let it be we'll considered and
long remembered, that the English and French
adYnirala hava not Won turad nv, 30 oL;nrr G,
bastopol, until aided by an army of at least
10000 soldiers, under the command of a mar
shall of France. Whatever the result may be,
the Emperor Nicholas cannot be accused of
having neglected his duty of putting his ooun-
try In the most formidable state of defence,
even against the most powerful enemies.
The subordinate Importance of naval arma-
ments, in offensive warfare, being proved, it
follows that Frame, with its far more numer-
GUS land troops, as compared with those of
England, must consequently exercise o much
greater influence upon the result of the pres
emit war against Russia, than what England
might reasonably be expected to do, at least as
far as the result depends upon physical force
This circumstance cannot be supposed to have
escaped the attention Of the English states
men, ever jealous of France. We are there
fore, perhaps justified in looking upon it as
one OF the motives actuating the English Cab
met, in endeavoriDg with SO much solicitude to
procure the cooperation of Austria; because,
though deprecated by the most liberal portion
of the English nation, it would be the means
OF concealing, ct least in part, from the eyes of
the unrefecting multitude the superior mill
tary power of France, and it's greater share in
the anticipated triumph over Russia
| cannot forbear to make the remark, as
worthy of aaDacial affaptiOu hot IF oil tho
! modern nations of Europe, the French is the
one that has exercised the greatest influence
upon the destinies of that contiaept. This re-
suit has been obtained, not only by diplomatic
skill and military exploits, but even still more
by tho natural politeness of the French, their
elegance of manners, their exquisite taste and
perfection in the arts, which, still more than
royal pomp, have contributed to render Paris
| the capital Of the modern civilization by the
general spreading of the French language and
literature throughout the whole of Europe,
where it is the common property of almost
every refined society; and lastly by the general
consciousness, that the French, as o nation, are
capable of the greatest sacrifices in behalf OF
| ideas without the least prospect of material
advantages; they being, too, almost the only
people on the face of the earth, ready to wage
war solely for the sake of glory something
WuiCu ny buc Uyc buo EuRlou u6V6 ireQueut-
| ly made it their boast to deride.
But, while the French nation is deemed ca
pable of great national sacrifices without dis
| interested motives, the English people, on the
! contrary is looked upon as actuated solely by
self-interest in all its dealings as o nation
| Hence the assistance which France is extend.
| ing to the Turks is viewed as originating, at
| least in part, from generous sympathy with
Turkey, on account of the wrongs inflicted
upon it BY Russia but the aid which England
| is rendering to the Sultan is, on the contrary,
generally attributed to the apprehension which
the English entertain for their East India pos
sessions, from the increase of the power of
Russia. Thus while lsudable sympathy is
considered as one of the motives which acsuate
the French in assisting Turkey, selfinterest is
said to be the sole cause which has induced
the English to engage in the war against the
Gar. Such is the public feeling OF rather
opinion, at least in central and northern Eu-
rope; and, whether right or wrong, it has pro-
duced general sympathy for the French, while
the English are looked upon with indifference
if not something worse, with reference to the
common struggle which both of these nations,
in union with the Turks, are waging against
the Russian Emperor.
Il is also to be observed that the English
Cabinet is suspected of insncerity, and of being
somewhat under the influence of the house of
Hapsburg or rather of the Austrian aristocra-
cy; while the mutual hatred that exists be-
tween the Court of Vienna and the French
Emperor, protects, altogether, the latter from
being suspected of any Austrian sympathies
besides which, it is well known that Louis Ma
poleon is much in favor of conducting the war
against Russia with the greatest vigor, and
that, on that point, there has never been any