New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-11-15
THE SIEGE OF sEvAsropoL.

ject Of the campaign from the capture and occu-
patton Of SeyastopOl to = coup de main against
portion, and the weaker portion, too,-of the
fortfcstions, including. Of course, the dcstruc-
ton Of the Russian feet dockyaids and arsenas,
but involving the Withdrawal Of the allied forces
as soon a. this object should be attained. That
such must be the case, was plain, from the entire
movement in question. 1t was an Abandonment
of the idea OF attacking the northern trout OF the
fortress, which is the commanding front, where
alone an attack could really be decisive aud thus
it was q patent confession of incompetence
on the part Of the expedition 10 accomplish what
was laiG down in its progrsmme,-the complete
capture and occupation of the place. Neverthe-
less, as we said this very march has been glorifed
az most brilliant stroke Of generaship through
columns on colun nj of high-sounding phrases and
rhetorical gbberish and even the great journals
of London with their correspondents on the spot,
did not discover the truth till a month ater~ard,
when the Government seems to have given them
hint Of It, Thus, The London Times Of Oct p, for
the first time opening its eyes to the true state OF
the case, gently indicates that the minor object Of
Inc campaign ulut 10 tuo ouiy ohC otNVhsPh'H'"f
and that the forts on the north side Of the bay.
if they do not voluntarily surrender, can hardly
be taken. But The Times hopes they will behave
respectfully, and surrender, inasmuch as all de-
pendent Notifications ought to give in when once
the main body Of the place is taken. But the
truth is, that il is not the North Fort which de-
ponds upon the to wn Of Sevastopol, but the town
of sevastopol which depends upon the North Fort,
and We fear the argument Of our contemporary
will hardly suffice 10 take so strong fortress.
1t is true that since the " glorious march" in
question nothing has been done by the Allies OF
which anybody could boast much aud, therefore,
our transatlantic contemporaries are not to blame
for making the most of Il. As for the siege itself
so far as 1t has proceeded, II isone ofthose things
Of which they may well think that the less said
the better But as we are bound to nothing but
imparsality in the premises We shall not be 80
delicate. The truth is that the war in general
being an exceedingly curious war, this siege Is
one of its most curious points. The great fea-
ture Of the wa appears to be belief that field
works are impregnable. First at Oltenitzs, the
old fashioned way of cannonading was employed
for couple Of hours and then the works were
stormed but without success. At Kalafat the
Russians did not even dare to make an attack
At Silistra mere earth-work bore the brunt OF
the battle, andheldout even when almost leyeied,
against the frantic onslaught Of the enemy. Now
at Sevsstopol simple line Of field works is hon
cred with more extensive preaching batteries,
and with far heavier artillery, than were ever
brought to bear against the most regular fortress.
This siege is striking proof OF the fact that in
the same proportion as the materie OF warfare
has by industrial progress, advanced during the
long peace, in the same proportion has the art of
war degenerated. A Napoleon, on seeing the bat
teries before sevastopo, bristling with eight and
ten-Ich guns would burst out in fit Of irresisti-
bic laughter But this is not the whole story by
a great deal.
About the LIST Of October, the allies were in
position, but it was not till the sth or 9th that the
FIRST ground was broken, and FIRE was not opened
till the Eth. The reason Of this delay was, that
the guns could not be brought up sooner. There
were only four or Eve miles Of ground to go over
all good, hard soil, with little undulation, and
part of it a passable road. But they had no
draueht cattle. No draught cattle in the Crimea
the richest country for cattle in the whole
world Why, there were more bullocks in the
valley of Baidsr, within sight from the nights Of
the Cherpays, than would have been required to
drag all the united feet ACROSS the hills. BN
the valley of Baidar was open to the Cossacks,
and the allied cavalry, in protecting razzia,
might be exposed to these formidable opponents.
Besides, the allies msst keep on good terms with
the inhabitants, and not seize their property.
With such excuses, our English cotemporaries seek
to hide the truth that Raglan and Cahrobert, while
blockadiDg SeyastOpol on the south, are them
selves blockaded BY MencbikOff's outposts on the
Clernsya. And yet, that they are SO, is proved
by the simple fact that the allied soldiers up TO
the latest report, were compelled to live upon salt
meat, no fresh meat being at hand.
On the % Of October FIVE Russian battalions
crossed the Chenaya near Inkermsn, and were
allowed TO enter the fortress from the south, as
"tLis could but be favorable to the Allies" An
original mode of making war The enemy, repre-
se1ted as beaten, demoralized, detected, sends
1900 men into Seyastopol, under the very nose Of
the Allies He must have had 8 reason for doing
so. But if he has reasons for sending them,
Raglan has his reasons for bowling them in. He
supposes the place to be Oyercrowded, though upon
what grounds, is not clear At all events, be-
side the four square miles inclosed within the
Russian lines, there is the whole of the north
shore and all the country lying behind it, to which
any excess of troops may be sent in ten minutes
To represent place IS overcrowded, which is