Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1854-02-18
NATIONAL INYELLIGENCER.
FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT
PARIS, JANUARY 26, 1854.


PARIS, JANUARY 26, 1854.
We have in this mornings papers telegraphic
despasch dated Vienna, January %, (yesterday,)
which cansen . glimpse VI sunshine 10 giadden for
. mome at our sombre political sky. The despatch
states that official intelligence had been received in
that capital from st. Petersburgh up to as late a
date Dis the 10th instant, and that the Gar had
distinctly evinced his intention not to accept the
ce,a.s 5ei offered to him by the occupation of the
Black Sea by the fleets Of England and France.
The despatch adds, however, that such was the
Czars intention upon the supposition that the allies
proposed placing himself and the Sultan upon the
sdme footing respecting the liberty of operations
left to the beigerents in the Black Sea- This con-
dition, stipulated by the Czar, would prevent much
confidence in the preservation peace being ground
ed upon his professed moderation, if it were not
known that on the 18th Of January the Emperor
received from Prince Menschikof despatch com
municating the fact of the actual entrance of the
allied fleets into the Black Sea, and also the rather
minatory written notice given by the Admras to the
Governor Of Sebastopol. If the Emperor of Rus
sia had really received such late intelligence from
the Black Sea at the date of the official intelligence
from st. Petersburgh. mentioned in the Vienna
despatch published this morning, this latter may be
considered as strongly confrmatory of the views
presented in my letter of last week, which, in op
position to the universally expressed opinion over
all Western Europe, regarded the general war as
by no means so inevitable, or even probable,
believed. And, in fact, though the occupation Of
the Black Sea by the allies, and the exercise by
them of the strict patrolc therein which they have
announced their intention to maintain, must be es-
pecialy unacceptable to the Czar the stronger of
the belgerents, and provoking to his pride as the
naughty and powerful Emperor of all the Russias,
yet, if he is really the sagacous and prudent sove
reign have presumed him to be, and is really in
clined to the discretion and moderation which cir
cumstances prescribe to him, he may well hold,
even with full knowledge of the French diplomatic
circular Of the 3Oth Of December, and Of the orders
given to the Admirals in the Black Sea by their
spectiye Governments, that the allies, in the exer
else of their armed patrole, do not mean to place
himself and the Sultan upon other than 6 the same
footing" The object of the allies, he may argue,
is to prevent hostile collision between the Russian
and Turkish ships, and attack by the part Of
either of the belgerents upon the territory Of the
other. "The allies" he may say, !" are doubtless
better disposed towards the Sultan than towards
myself; but SO long as they prevent his ships from
attacking mine and his fleets from bombarding my
ports and rayaging my coasts, cannot complain
that they do not put US upon the same footing.
Why, then, do the allied fleets sail in company with
the Turkish feet, and serve Us escort to Turkish
transport ships? Because the allies know that
Russia can protect herself upon the Black Sea
against Turkey and has the ability and the dispo-
stion to act Extensively there both against the terri
tory and the fleets of Turkey; whereas nothing but
the Injunction of the allies is necessary to prevent
hostile operations on the part of Turkey against
Russia. If the intentions of the allies are really
thus impartial, the condition affixed to the modera-
ton Of the views Of the Gar with regard to the oc
cupaon Of the Black Sea need not be looked upon as
yery ominous for the peace of Europe. l need not
saw that the latest intelligence confirms my opinion
of the discretion which will mark the Cars con-
duct in the present crisis and which, paradoxca as
this view is will, think, yet while longer save
Europe from the convulsons Of general war.
There is danger, however, in another quarter
The Gar may with some reason argue that this
armed restrictive surveillance of the allies in the
Black Sea, provoked by the disaster Of Sinope, in
which so large portion of the Turkish feet was
DESTROYED relieves him from the obligation Of his
promise to remain on the defensive and not to cross
the Danube. Say what they will of it in Western
Europe, the attack on the Turkish feet in the Bay
of Sinope was regular act Of war, perfectly legal,
and not violatve of the letter or the spirit of the
Cars promise to content himself with the occupa-
ton of the Prncpalities to attempt no invasion Of
the Turkish territories beyond them, and to remain
on the defensive. Was not the feet destroyed at
Sinope VIGOROUSLY conveying large bodies Of troops
provisions and munitions of war destined to rein
force the Turkish armies which had invaded the
Cars Asiatic territory? No attack was made or
intended to be made upon the Ottoman territory.
1t would have been perfectly easy for the Russian
admiral to occupy Sinope and to maintain posses
sion against any power the Turks could lead against
him; but he abstained from doing so, and confined
his operations to the destruction of force which,
without any violently strained construction, may be
considered as having been on the march to invade
the Russian territory and reinforce Turkish troops
which had already established themselves in Rus
sian territory Can the Sinope affair, therefore, be
fairly considered any thing more than an act of
selfdefence on the part of Russia perfectly regular
in state of fagrant war, and not violatiye of any
promise Of the Gar given to allay the alarm Of
Western Europe touching his present designs upon
Turkey? I think not. Aud the danger now is
that the Gar, thinking too, may deem the occu.
patton Of the Black Sea by the allies to be an act &C
hostile, distrustful, and insulting as to relieve him
from the obligation of his promise to remain on the
defensive, and to content himself with the occupa-
. ton of the Principalities He may wish to respond
to the restriction imposed upon him in the Black
Sea by expansion in another quarter. There are in
fact evidences Of preparation BY his Generals upon
avery formidable SCALE for crossing the Danube and
driving the Turks back to their line of entrench-
ments at the very foot of the Balkans 1t to be
even well authenticated that small corps of two
thousand men has already crossed the river The