New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-21

have bean psssed and that these communications
are intercepted. There q reason 70 believe, ron
dsnseh received from Odessa, and dated the 10Th OF
September, that saocs eve actions lave
pprohsbly correspond 70 the days which the allies
foreed tie lines Of the Belbsk sndrhe nights above
Balsklaya. The movement Of the armies hss thas
preei...iy realized the plan we had Indicated some
saxs before when we said that they might sivsace
sero.. the whole premonfory 70 the southern coast
and 30 entirely invest the fortress Prince Meach-
lof has meanwhile been driven 10 the eet Of this
line Of operations and u worthy OF observation tha,
hi, srmy which consisted of SO, 900 men 90 the Ams,
ia now said TO be reduced b 20 900. Indeed, 80 &C.
yerey il the want Of men felt by the Russsn gene:
ras that they said To have burned and abandoned
Anapa which is the key OF the Crcassian cOast, IN
order march the garrison into the Crnea but this
part OF Lord Suatfords dispatch appears at least
questionable.
Thus far, then, we are arrived at a clear and we
believe correct conception of there operations down
10 the 2etb, which mast have been trumphanuy sue
cessful TO enable the allied armies in one week to de-
feat the enemy in series Of actions and 70 drive hin
from several eoncentrc positions Of great natural
strength, cutting of Prince Menschlkod and his army
altogether from The fortress 1t remains to con-
sder the nature Of the movements which would ne
cessarily follow nssmueh as we are told that the
"srmies were preparing to march without delay upon
Sew asOpol" IL was already known 10 Us that coo.
siderable difference Of opinion existed as TO the proper
ode of attacking this fortress and that at east one
engineer officer clearly in favor Of an attack from
the S0rh eide. The Chief argument IN favor OF tue
north tide was that the landing was TO be effected
there il seemed more easy TO open the attack on
that quarter; but this difficulty has been sur
mounted by landing the troops to the north Of
the place and the siege artillery TO the south some
days later Neither does the mode Of proceeding now
adopted exclude the portability Of attack on both
SIDES of the harbor For the present, it sufficient
10 know tbst there is obstacle between the forres.
AID the armies about to sssail it, for, the armies
have crossed the ridge between Sevastopo and Baa-
klavs and driven the chief body Of the enemy into the
interior it may be assumed that the high ground in
the rear ofbe place itself will not be occupied by any
large body of Russian Troops. Sevatopol in reality
an open town in the rear except in 90 far this d,n
cheney in its defenses has been supplied by external
fireworks or detached forts but il has certainly no ~
lions or wall OF such constitute reg
uary fortified place whch oppose certain resist
anceto al army for given number Ofdsys. The whole
strength of Seyastopo lies in its forts and these forts
have undoubtedly been calculated for defense by sea
rather than by land. Under the'e circumstances, the
proverbial military expires on, that place invested
lis place taken may probably be applied with
great justice. SevastopOl must now be etfectually
nvestsd by land and sea, and much more effecually
than the attack had been begun on the north side
Of the barbor leaving the south coast open for rein
forcemenis for retreat The plan Of the campaign
as we now more clearly understand IT, indicates the
hand of a master; and, although the pablo have been
disappointed in that sudden and unlocked for triumph
which they had been led TO hope for, they will fnd
that the end will be accomplished with equal certainty
by the mora patient operations of regular warfare.