New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1854-03-15
Louis Napoleon's Letter to the Gar.

Sire-The difference which has arisen between
your Majesty and the Ottoman Porte has as
sumed such grave aspect, that / think itright
myself to explain directly to your Majssty the
part which France has taken in this question
and the means which suggest themselves to me
in order to avoid the dangers which menace the
tranquility Of Europe.
The note which your Majesty has Just sent to
my Government, and to that of Queen Victoria,
endeavors to prove that it was the system of
pressure adopted from the commencement of the
two maritime powers which alone involved the
question in bitterness. On the contrary, ae-
eofding to my view, the matter would have con-
tlnued q Cabinet question, if the occupation of
the two Prineipalities had not suddenly trans
ferred it from the region of discussion to that of
fact. Nevertheless, although your Majesty's
troops had entered Wallachla, we advised the
Porte not to consider that occupation as a
warlike act, thus proving cur extreme desire for
Cancellation. After | had consulted with En-
gland, Austria and Prussia, proposed to your
Majesty note, designed to give satisfaction to
all. Your Majesty accepted it. We had nard-
", however, been informed Of this good news
when your Minister, by explanatory eommen-
taries, destroyed all the coneiliatory effects of
it, and thus prevented us from insisting at Con-
stantinople upon its pure and simple adoption
The Porte, for its own part, suggested some mod
ihcations in the note to which the Representa-
tiyes of the Four Powers at Vienna were not
disposed to agree, They were not, however,
agreed to by your Majesty. 1t was then that
the Porte wounded in his dignity, its independ-
ence threatened. and being compelled to raise
an army to oppose that of your Majesty, pre-
terred to declare war rather than remain in q
state of uncertainty and humility. The Porte
had claimed our support; the cause of the Porte
appeared to US to be a just one and the English
and French squadrons were therefore ordered to
the Bosphorus.
Our attitude in reference to Turkey was that
OF protector, but it was passive. We did not
incite her to war. We increasingly addressed
to the ears of the Sultan the advice of peace and
moderation, persuaded that this was the best
mode of coming to an agreement, and the Four
Powers consulted together again, and submitted
to your Majesty some other propositions Your
Majesty, on your part, hibiting the calmness
which arises from the consciousness of strength,
contented yourself with repulsing from the left
bank of the Danube, as in ASIA the attacks of
the Turks; and, with the moderation worthy of
the chief of great Empire, your Majesty de-
1lared that you would act on tine defensive Up
to that period, then, we were, | may say, in
terested spectators, but simply spectators of the
dispute, when the affair of Sinope compelled us
TO take more decisive part. France and
England had not thought it nee, ssary TO send
troops to the assistance OF Turkey. Their flag,
thereioFet WAS NOT engaged IN the CONNECTS Pblcn
took place nrnu land But at sea it was very
different. There were at the entrance of the
Bosphorus three thousand guns, the existence
of which proclaimed loudly enough 70 Turkey
that the two leading maritime powers would not
allow her to be attacked by The affair at
inope was for US as painful as it was unexpect-
ed for it matters little to us whether or not
the Turks wished to convey munitions of war
to the Russian territory.
In fact, Russian ships attacked Turkish YES
sells in the waters of Turkey, while these vessels
were riding quietly at anchor in Turkish port.
The Turkish vessels were destroyed, in spite of
the assurance that there was no wish 10 COM
mence an aggressive war, and in spite of the
vicinity Of our squadrons. II was no longer
our policy which received check, it was our
military honor. The sound OF the cannon shot
at Slnope reverherated painfully in the hearts
OF all those who in England and France respect
national dignity There was n general parIici-
patton In the sentiment that wherever our can
non can reach our allies ought TO be respected.
Out of this feeling arose the order to squad
rons to enter the Black Sea, ami to prevent by
force, if necessary, the recurrence of a similar
event. Thence arose the collective notification
sent to the Cabinet of St Petersburg, annoane-
ing that if we prevented the Turks from making
an aggressive war upon the coast of Russia, we
would also protect the Turks on their. own terri
tory. As to the Russian fleet, in prohibiting its
navigation of the Black Sea, we placed it upon
different condition, because it was important
during the war to preserve q guarantee sanisa-
lent in force to the occupation of the Turkish
territory, and thus facilitate the conclusion Of