The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-10-08

Dowss There ID an obvious disproportion bet ween
preparations Of such magnitude and the effects pro-
with View to toe more efficient conduct OF tie next
campaign, even more than for the purpose OF una
vailing recrmination II is desirable that the causes
of this DISAPPOINTMENT should be fully considered
and understood. Mistakes have, Of course been
committed, some from want Of knowledge some from
want OF judgment, and some from want Of resoluion
but on the other hand an amount Of experience has
been gained In this peculiar warfare which ought to
render the recurrence OF such blunders impossible
another year. More, we think, might have been ef
fected, but until the operations in the Black Sea
have accomplished the grand object Of the destruc.
ton Of Sebastopol, the campaign in the Baltic
3 matter OF secondary interest, and it is TO be re-
gretted that by far the more powerful Of our two
fleets, especially in steam line. of battle ships has
been employed throughout the summer where there
WAS least work 70 be performed.
The allied powers mad two objects to accomplish
In the Baltic. The first Was to shut up the whole
naval power Of Russia, to prevent every vessel OF
war from leaving her ports, or to give battle to the
Russian feet with success IL her lS line Of bat
tie chips yentured beyond the shelter of her land
batteries. The second was to blockade and threat
en- her coasts and to attack and destroy her for,
tidcations wherever they were thought to be as
objects has been completely, and the second par
italy, effected; but the question is, whether the
Admiralty exercised sound judgment in the
means they employed. For the sole purpose Of OBJ
tanning the mastery Of the Baltic, and of fighting
the Russian feet il it came out the armament ap-
pears to have been considerably greater than was
requisite; and while it contained several rstclass
ships, such az the Duke OF Welln gton the ST. Jean
d'Acre, and the Neptune, which could scarcely be
brought through the Belt from their draft OF water
and were i'll adapted to such navigation, there was
q strange and lamentable deficiency in steamers OF
ed within the last few weeks, when it is too late to
use them. The naval department of the Admit atty
performed its duty to perfection in sending to sea
the vessels which were ordered for commission; but
fuS <hnv I0k~
cal ability shown in the direction and use OF these
gigantic weapons. It is due to Sir Charles Napier
to add, that before the commencement of the
war and before bis own own appointment to the
urged upon the Admiralty the necessity o. pro.
viding steam gunboats in large numbers; and that
upon taking the command he also desired that .
division Of troops should embark with the expedi-
ton. Yet the gunboats were not prepared, and the
French division of troops had to be sent out in sup
Elementary ships in the month Of August. The re.
suit has shown that B0marsund could as well have
been taken by 1000 men and the marines and sea-
men Of the feet as by the Il, 900 who were after
wards sent there ard this was known to be the
opinion of tho most competent persons before the
expedition started. A more serious charge against
the Ministers Of the Crown who are responsible for
the direction OF the war is that they appear to have
sent the feet to sea without any deliberate plan of
campaign. They armed very powerful squadron,
they placed in command of it an officer who had q
gre at reputation for skin and daring, and they left
him to make the best use he could Of his forces. Had
Sir James Graham more accurately considered what
he prop0eedto do, instead Of making registering
speech at the Reform Club, he would have adapted
his means more judiciously to the end he had in
view.
But These remarks are not confined to the naval
administration at home, and, until the attack on
Bomarsund was resolved upon and calamity execu
ted Sir Charles Napier seems to have had as little
notion Of systematic operations as the first Lord Of
the Admiralty. In particular no serious attempt was
made TO bring the Russian fortresses in the Baltic
Ho< kA Ana& 80 l.
attacks on Bomarsund and on Hango Udde or Gus
tefsvarn In the month Of June were bombarjments
by the steamers throwing hollow shot at q long
range, which could produce no effect on the solid
the fire which is harmless at 1000 yards becomes
destructiveist $780, and would be irresistible at l5O
If there be water to float ship within very short
range Of the enemys batteries 1t is probable that
the nearer she approached the less she would suffer-
and the shorter would be the confess AT Swea.
borg, we believe, the batteries are principally hewn
In the lid rock, and therefore unassa,lable in
P, E5 .ne
have shown their own opinion by blowing up Gus
tafsvaIn as soon as the fall Of Bomarsund was
known. combined attack on fortress of the first
class, such as Cronstadt undoubtedly is, demands
extensive preparations and great forehought in the
government at home, to be guided In the hour of
action BY military genius. The attack on C0penha-
gen suceee ded because Nelson refused to see the
signal Of his superior officer ordering him to re-
treat and is in thai dauntless spirit that the tro
plies of the British navy have been won.
The great difficulty our fleet has had to encoun-
ter during this summer is that Of the navigation
Of the Baltic, and it is impossible to speak
too highly Of the manner in which this obstacle has
been surmounted. The lighthouses were extin.
guished, the buoys and landmarks removed, the
charts are imperfect and the channels and currents
scarcely. known. In case ofSrough weather, the
large ships have no port to run to for shelter and
no sea room TO enable them to weather the gale.
Yet up to the present time no serious accident has
occurred. We have NO doubt that we shall be told
that the feet has not done all that was expected
OF it, it was held back by no apprehensions Of the
Russian forts, and still less Of the Russian ships,
but by the difficulty of finding proper soundings
most useful. In former expeditions to the Baltic
all the ships selected for that service were of the
rank Of our old seventy fours, not equal to first
class frigate OF the present day, and we have no
ence are collected it win be found that the second
and third rate ships are better adapted for these
operations than the first rates. In any case we
trust that from the present time the naval depart
ments Of Eng and and Frame viii proceed unremit-
tiDgly to consider and prepare for more regular
operations in the Baltic than those Of the past sea-
son; At Sebastopol we may destroy the influence
OF Russia over the East; but, unless that blow
should reduce the Emperor Nicholas to ask for
terms 1t is only by opening the road to St. Peters.
burg that we can reckon on debating secure and
honorable peace. Cronstadt once taken and de.
stypyed, the capital Of the northern empire s for the
Lutuc WltnOut OcIenCe against the mart1me powers,
an the fear Of such . catastrophe 10 more likely
than any 9th means to secure our triumph.
THE AUSTRIAN OCCUPATION OF THE
PERSONALITIES.
[Frtm the London Globe, Sept 22l
1t ID rather singular that the view respecting the posi-
ton Of Austria which put forth yesterday not with
ont sufficient facts to rest it upon has received distinct
confirmation from two quarters not unnterestjng and
from one whore it might least be expected II stated
that the representatives Of the Allied Powers in Turkey
- well ~ the Ottoman Cover nrnent ITSELF have received
from the Austrian government and formal dot
ton Of the resolution 70 prevent Russia f" st.emntr
~ " essence Of the allies forces bS
resunlog onsnslve measures On the Danube, and the
communication atimated that Austria would sustain
that prevention BY force Of This statement is
said to have been ade just at the time o. the departure
Of the English and French troops thus although
Austria at present abstsins from actual war agntt Rus
alix occunstion LIFT hahnd