Washington sentinel., 1854-06-20

compound ratio of geographical area and re-
presentation IN the House of Representatives.
Then, say, if you desire to carry out the
terms Of the cession to the United States, pre-
cisely and exactly, you must apply the pro-
ceeds OF the lands to the ordinary expenses Of
| government, and diminish the taxation by.that
amount. In, this way you accomplish the OBJ
Ject ana there is no other practicable mode by
1 which you can pretend to approximate even
towards 1t. 30 much, then, for that view of the
question; so much, too, for the constitutional
assumptions upon which rests the argument in
favor of the power claimed here. | think |
have shown that such construction as that
which has been given to this clause of the Con-
stitution would vest in this government powers
as unlimited as any which are possessed by the
Russian autocracy, or an oriental despotism
and that it would utterly destroy the great
| scheme of that instrument itself, which was to
distribute, powers between the States and the
! federal government, and to limit those Of the
! latter.
! But sir, suppose the power did exist permit
| me for short lime TO ask your attention TO the
probable effects of its exercise, and let us see 10
what results and consequences it would lead us.
II we admit that this power 10 distribute the pro.
/
they must either be distributed in sums in gross
10 the States, and disposed OF as they choose, or
else they must he appropriated certain purposes
! which are 10 be defined by this government and
the money is TO be applied in a manner TO be pre-
scribed by il. Suppose you take the first alter
native; suppose this government undertakes TO
! distribute the lands among the States, 10 be ap-
| propriated as they choose. What motives OF
economy will exist either in the State or in the
| general government? The States will certainly
thnxtl DTs
| sibiliiies of taxation. They will spend as much
as they can, in order that they may make an ex-
cuse 10 demand something more. The general
| government will have motive for economy,
! because all the efforts of American politicians
would then be concentrated here in an endeavor
! 10 form such combinations would enable their
particular sections to pay less TO, and receive more
out of the federal treasury Than their equitable
] shares.
1 The Constitution was founded upon the idea Of
/ equality. That was its fundamental principle,
and IN proportion as we have adhered to il we have
! been prosperous and successful. But, sir, if we
were TO adopt this system, The very end and object
| of your Legislation would be inequality and in
! Justice, and we should thus have waged through
the ordinary forms of Legislation sort of civil war
whose Object would be the plunder ofthe treasury
| Of the United States. How long would il be be-
| fore ambitious men would arise who would seek
10 raise up bands of followers and maintain them
by distributing among them the property Of The
| United States? How long before they would offer
! farms to the landless homes 10 the homeless. and
money 10 the poor2 Have we seen nothing Of
| this sort? well recollect that in the debate upon
the distribution scheme in lS4l, il was predicted
| that the day would come when under thar claim
| Of power, there would be attempt 10 distribute
| properly directly amongst persons and indvdu-
| ais; and the idea was rejected as a vagary as a
| mere excess Of the human imagination. Have we
| witnessed nothing like il?
Sir, well might Mr.. Calhoun saw, in reference 10
that very bill and this very policy that its whole
tendency would be towards disintegration and
dissolution Of the Union, because il is nantes,
that the ends of legislation under the claim ofsuch
| powers would be directed towards inequality and
injustice; that it would become the effort of legis.
alors here to secure for their sections much as
possible and so TO provide schemes of taxation
that they should pay as little as possible. II is
manifest that there Is nothing which would tend
so much, or soon, TO break up this confederacy
or else 10 change our free representative form Of
government, as such system Of legislation.
But, suppose, SIR that instead of that-and
believe il is pr bable if enter into it, we shall
take the other form of distrbution-we should
undertake here ourselves to designate the objects
Of appropriation and the manner in which il is 10
be applied Suppose we should undertake here
I elves to say that we will apply these lands 10
internal improvements, or schools, or certain OBJ
jects which we choose 10 designate within the
States. Is il not plain, that the moment we do so,
the States would abandon the care of them
Clearly so; because each State would be afraid
that, ifit applied It's own money to endow an in
sane asylum, or a college, or TO make road, il
would disable itsefto that extent from obtaining
the money of the United States TO be applied 10
those objects, and therefore would fail to do it.
The Stale would withdraw its care; because il
would be clearly impossible 10 carry il on under
the direction of two heads. The State would es-
tablish its system OF roads in reference TO the COM
merce of one place, and the general government
might establish another system, which would not
only be hostile but destructive 10 IT, The conse-
quence would be, that the States would abandon
| the care and the charge of these subjects. Would
this be better for those great interests themselves
Woald il be better for the great interests Of pub
lie charity, or the local and municipal interests Of
the States themselves, if they should abandon them
and leave them to the care of the general govern
Inenl? 2.
Why, sir, look at the system as it now exists,
under the care of the State governments Thou
sands and thousands of miles Of railroad and of
telegraph already present us such system Of
| !ntercommuncation the world cannot rival,
and all of it brought into operation and executed
! through the instrumentay of the Stale govern
ments, without shock, without jar, without
collision serious difference between them. Look
al the systems of education which the State gov
ernments are carrying out. in spite Of the diff
cuities which surround them adapting their legis-
ation 10 the varied circumstances of their condi-
| lion, and always doing what seems to be best in
the actual position in which they are placed Look
al the institutions of learning look at the estab-
lishmenls for public charity whi, h they have
, called into exstence and executed in manner 10
I challenge and claim the admiration Of mankind.
Would it he better, ask, for these interests, that
the States, by such interference as this, should be
induced TO abstain from extending their care over
them, and that these objects should be consigned
TO the general government Why sir, how long
would It be, if this government undertook TO med
die with the system of internal improvements in
the States, before we should have most danger
GUS collisions and differences between them
How long would it be before this government
would be found interfering partially and nnjustly
and unequaliy And, instead of that great sys.
TEN which springs up according to the laws of
trade and the legitimate wants of the States, we
should have them coming here in actual collision
and conflict in regard 10 their interests, which
they would complain had not been Justly and
equally dealt with by this government If this
government undertook 10 Interfere with the
schemes of education, and TO draw 10 itself such
powers these, ask, how long would it he be-
fore the people Of the States would seek to con-
solidate all power in one man, so as TO get the
unity and efficiency of single WILL instead Of be-
ing subjected TO the caprcious interference of
machinery inadequate 10 attend TO all the wants
of all the ates local and genera9 say that il