New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-12-27
THE CRINEAy CAMPAIGN.


but the advent of winter without TIE capture OF
Sevsstopol having given new character to the
enterprise, it becomes proper to review the
course of events since the landing Of the Expedi-
ton, in order to determine what are the circum-
stances and chances amid which it enters upon
the new Developments that now await it. Fret
however, we must add few words TO our former
observations upon the last memorable battle
With regard TO this event extraordinary confu-
sion and want of perspicacity characterize the
official reports all Of which we have published.
Lord Raelsn's dispatch was evidently written 10
great hurry. COnfoundDg that front Ofhs Amy
toward the Chenaya with that toward Sevasto-
pol, be cJls the same flank Of his position some
times the right, sometimes the left, In the sane
Dispatch, SO that it is impossible to get clear
idea Of the events from this source. CAnrober!s
dispatch is as diTuse and indefinite as it is short,
and therefore quite useless; AMI whoever com
pares the socaed Menchkof dispatch Of the
Russian MrGld with the former reports OF Prince
Mencbiko6, must see at q glance that this was
not peIned by the same man. Nicholas, evident
~, mas found that lie has allowed quite enough of
the liberty of the press and since telling the truth
Ike gentienG Les not preyent bis troops from
getting beaten, he considers it quite as we'll to
return to the old system of lying. By his Impe-
rial WILL the ordinary course of events is altered
after the fact aud defeated attack from his re-
lieying army against the besiegers is changed to
a victorious sally from within the town. The
ia Iapt. ha oGltxiuo faro pacassarilv
retiree into its Notifications soon as the object
Of the sally is obtained: the retreat, thus is ex-
plsined and made matter Of course; while, if
the facts were stated as they actually occurred,
the disgrace of the defeat could not be hidden.
And well might Nicholas do his best to hide
the circumstances Of this battle from his people
Never since the battle OF Narya has such dIsgtace
been besped upon the Russian arms. Aud, con
siderng the tremendous difference between tue
Russians of Narva and the Russians of Inkermann
the updrled hordes OF 200, and the well.drilled
army of 1854, the day OF Nara must, 10 cOmpsr-
icon, be considered bright one in Russian mill
taIy history. Narva was the trst grand disaster
Of rsiug nation whose determined spirit learnt
how TO conquer by defeat itself. IDkermsnn al
that hot house development which Russia has ex-
perenced since Peter the Great. The artificial
growth ard the mere effort TO keep up, with q
barbarian material, spendids show of civilization.
appears already to have exhausted the nation, aad
inflicted sort Of pulmonary consumption upon
it. In sll the battles Of the present century from
Austerlitz and Eylsu down to Silistris, the Rus
slams had shown themselves excellent soldiers.
Their defeats, wherever they occurred, could be
explained; they left no stain upon the honor of
the army if they did upon the reputation of its
generals. But now the matter is completely
changed. IL Balaklaya showed the superiority of
the allied cavalry if the whole of the siege of
Sevastopol shows the enormous superiority of the
allied artillery over the Russian still the
Russian iDfao'Iy remained ia possession of
IFS high reputation. iukermana has sealed
this point too. Strange to say the Russian in.
fsntIy has forfeited its renown in bate,
in which, perhaps, the individual Russian foot.
soldier fought more bravely than ever. The
sovereign mediocrity which has been the chief
characteristic of all military operations in this
war, both on the Russian and the allied side, has
never been made more apparent. Every move
Dent, and every step taken, has produced 8
result exactly the opposite of what was intended.
a coup de main is undertaken, and il turns out to
involve q csmpaign-a winter IN even.
battle is fought, bat its gain is only momenz ry
vanishing in less than a week from the hands Of
the yictors. An open town is assailed with
heayy siege artillery; but before the siege train
is brought up, the open town is changed into
fortified camp of the FIRST order. A siege is IN
dertaken; and, when at the point of being sue
cessful, it hes TO be given up, because a relieving
army comes up. and is-1ot victorious but de-
feated strong position taken up again st the
relieving army becomes, by the very shortness Of
its front, the means in the hands of the relieving
army to turn the besiegers into the besiered
Thus ten weeks are occupied with q series of
efforts, combats, trenchworks, plans and con-
tez-pkns; winter sets in, and finds both armies
but especially the allies-quite unprepared for
the season: and all this with no result bu. the
mendous loss on both sides leaving decision of
the campaign as remote aud unlikely as ever.
The forces which the allies brought into the
Crimea, from the FIRST invasion to the 5th Of No
vember, did no. exceed $4,000 British, $4,000
French and TO- 900 to Is, 900 Turks or from 20 900
to 5000 altogether. When the expedition was
undertaken, no more reenforcements from Eng.
land or France were expected; few battalions and
squsdrons were on the road, but they are com.
pnsed in the above estimate. ALI the additional
forces Aey might have been able to bring up, at
s'AOrt notice, must have beea TURKS end, in spite