Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-09-19
THE EUROPEAN wAR.

non ana man, zee now easily my race can
triumph over yours" "True,p replied the
royal beast but how different the result
would be if we held the pencil, and painted
the picture" So runs the old fable, which ID
familiar to every schoolboy, and what lesson
of truth does it teach. How striking its ap
plication at the present day.
! 1t is a matter of regret that we should de-
rive our information concerning the European
war alone through English and French sources
Thus every statement of the operations at the
seat of war is distorted by prejudice, and we
have no doubt that many facts are wilfully sup
pressed. 1t is another evidence to which Arch
bishop Wheatley might have appealed in his
Historic doubts, for it shows the little reliance
that can be placed in the history Of any cotem-
poraneous event.
1t may be recollected by our readers that in
our former comments upon the probable issue
of the war, we stated that we believed that
Russia would be equal to any emergency, and
fully prepared to resist any European alliances.
Our reputation as prophet is, therefore, deep
ly involved in this contest. We have read
with surprise of the frequent repulses of the
Russians, and the boosted -triumphs Of the al
lies. And yet, when we consider the strength
of the allied powers, when we remember their
extravagant boasts of an early victory, and
when we then refer even to these partisan ac-
counts of what has actually been done, we see
but little which should justify triumph on the
one hand or dependency on the other. The
only decisive achievement which is worthy of
notice, is the taking of the Aland Islands, at
the mouth Of the Gulf of Bothnia, and this was
attended with no great exploits nor will it be
followed by any important results Indeed,
we learn, from reliable source, which, by the
way, is not the English papers, that there had
been an attempt made upon Bomarsund some
months previous to its capture, and that the
allies were repulsed by the Russian forces un-
der General Bodisco. Of this attempt not one
word is said in the English or French papers,
although there can be no doubt about the fact.
This simple statement should warn us to re.
ceiye the narration Of partisan in contest,
with many grains of allowance.
But Of what advantage can this acquisition
be to the allies? Can it be retained? The
season of the year admonishes us that winter
is approaching, and the allied forces must look
out for some winter quarters other than those
afforded by the stern rigors Of Russian eli
mate. We have seen it suggested that Aland
will be well fitted for the winter retreat of the
allies; but moments reflection will con-
vince to the contrary. Unprotected by feet
which cannot maintain its position before b.
marsund during the winter, on account of the
vast accumulation of ice in the Gulf of Bothnia
it will be impossible to retain possession of this
post, and the result must be, that Sir Charles
Napi er and his successful feet will leave this
only fruit of their boosted campaign to the
mercy of their enemies, and quietly retire to
their homes to reap the re ward and to gain the
thanks of their country for t. MS triumphant ex-
petition. The very elements re allied Tor the
protection and ultimate triumph ut Nicholas.
Nor is the position of the allies IN the Black
Sea more desirable than in the Baltic. 1t is the
opinion of some of the most experienceu engl-
neers that Sebastopol is impregnable, anu 1t is
known to all that it cannot be taken except by
a combined attack by land and sea. Such
combination cannot be successfully made. The
Importance Of this fortress is well known to
the Gear, nor will he spare any pains or money
in its defense. The peninsular position of the
Crimea will render it easy for him to supply
trooos for this purpose, which will be amply suf-
cient 10 repel any attack that may be made by
land The Gear has million of soldiers at his
command. The national guard itself is COM
posed of tIuee hundred thousand picked and
tried men. Is it not clear, then, that any at
tempt upon Sebnstopol by land must result in
the entire discontinue and defeat of the al
liesP In the Black Sea, as in the Baltic, the
result of the campaign will be absolutely
nothing.
But the next effect of this unsuccessful ex-
petition will be manifested at home. A war
unattended wi tn any brilliant exploits or deci-
sive results by sea or by land will fail to arouse
the enthusiasm and the zeal of the people Of
either France or England. The vast expense
attending its continued prosecution will be a
source of discomfort among the people and their
representatives. The war will become unpop.
ular---and the opening Of another campaign
| will be marked by the dampened ardor of the
soldiers, and the manifest .restessness Of the
people at home. Meantime Russia will have
the opportunity Of preparing more fully for hel
defense aud for the further prosecution of thu
] war. "Give me but year to prepare y sale
Nicholas when he heard of the unexpected ALI
ance of England and France. That year hi
will have had, when, after the winter. season
bostilities shall be resumed. His policy is a
i should be, to act entirely on the defensive
Secure at home, il is bis best defense and tn
surest guaranty Of ultimate success, 70 exhaus
the patience and resources Of the Allies by
protracted war.
IsI.e. Nnyuc.