The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1854-08-17
The TURKo-8UssIAN QUESTION, AND ITS IN.
FLUENCE ON EUROPE.
Especial Correspondence of the National Era
LETTER l.


LETTER 1.
DRESDEN, July IA, 1854.
A great many persons, and especially many
protested philanthropists and men engaged in
extensive commercial pursuits, did, but few
years ago, not hesitate in expressing the opin-
ion that the progress of civilization, the mani
fest blessings of peace, the increased inter-
course between the different nations Of the
globe, and the general fear for the enormous ex-
penses and the deplorabl consequences would
forever prevent the outbreak Of any great war
in Europe. But those who reasoned thus had
forgotten that human nature remains alwaTs
the same, and that the evil passions, no less
than the virtuous prOpensities of men, are
means in the hands Of Providence for accom-
pllshing the destinies of mankind.
Thus the ambition and arrogance of the
most powerful despot Of the present ago he's,
by his invasion Of the Danubian Principalities
under profound peace, kindlcd h8me that
threatens to spread over the whole Of Europe,
and destroy the established order of the politi-
cal affairs of that continent.
The Russian Gar imagined that it would be
an easy task for him to extend his territory to
the Egean Sea, and make himself master Of
COnstantinople. He supposed that the nation
al Jealousy between France and England, and
the friendship which existed between himself
and the rulers Of Austria and Prussia would
prevent two or more of those great Powers
from contracting an alliance in opposition to
his designs But the Supreme Power had des-
tined otherwise and, consequently the Empe-
ror of Russia has met with disappointment
Fear of the increase of the Russian mower
had the effect to suppress the hereditary jcal-
Ousy of the English against the French and to
reconcile Louis Napoleon to the descendants of
the murderers of his great uncle. An alliance
was concluded between France and England,
for tho purpose of protecting tho INDEPENDENCE
of Turkey, and of checking the advance of the
Russians upon Constantinople. The immediate
effect of this step was to elevate the moral
courage of the Turks, and to inspire them with
hope of a successful resistance to their power
full enemies and hence, chiefly, the glorious
deeds which the Turkish forces have performed
in defence of their native country. But, brave
as the Turks have proved themselves, We would
be very much mistaken if we were to suppose
that it is in consequence Of their heroic resist
ance that the Russian forces are now engaged
in retrograde movement The cause Of this is
to be found, neither in the losses which the
Russians suffered before Silistria, nor in their
fear of the advancing French and English aux
iliaries 1t is altogether to be attributed to the
course which Austria is pursuing; which, in
deed, is very different from that the Emperor
of Russia, no doubt expected from her.
Having, by the interference Of his arms,
suppressed the Hungarian revolution, and, per-
haps, saved the very throne of the Hapsburgs,
the Gar expected that the Austrian Court
should, from gratitude, side with him, or at
at least remain neutral. But gratitude is
virtue which never belonged to the Hspsburg
family. Besides, the fear of France and of the
revolutionary elements which still exist within
the Austrian Empire, as well as the friendship
which has for more than one hundred and fifty
wears prevailed between the English and Aus
trian aristocracies, with few interruptions, and
lastly, the true interests of Austria have in
duced the Austrian Emperor and his Cabinet
to assume a position which has compelled the
Gar to stop the execution of his designs against
Turkey and prepare himself for the possibility
of a contest with Austria.
Still, the Emperor of Russia appears yet to
hope to avert, by diplomatic negotiations, such
an event. or, at least, to detach Prussia from
the auadruple alliance, and induce her to side
with him against Austria: lndeed, he has
good reasons for the hope of obtaining such
result: because both the royal family aud the
aristocracy of Prussia, with few exceptions, are
attached to Russia, and not willing to permit
Austria to reap any advantages from her al
lance with France and England. Indeed, it
would be very hazardous undertaking for
Austria to engage in a war with Russia, with,
ont cordial understanding with Prussia; and
still more dangerous and hopeless would be the
nos;tion of Austria. if she should be assailed by
Prussia, while her forces were employed against
Russia, and in watching Italy. Az long there
fore. az Prussia continues, in spite OF her ALI
ance with Austria and the Western Powers, to
act in the interest of Russia, the Gar knows
well that the hostile attitude of Austria Will DO
him not much harm; but he fears that the
popular sentiment in Prussia will prove TOO
strong for the Court and the sristocracy, and,
consequently, that the King of Prussia may at
last be compelled to give his consent to q dec
laration of war; on the part of Austria, against
Russia.
Consequently, the Russian forces which
have hitherto been destined to act solely against
the Turks and their French and English aux
iIiaries, are now disposed and increased in such
a way as to be ready to meet any hostile move
ment on the part of Austria, and, at the same
time, to resist the advance of Omer Pasha, and
the French and English Generals who are
aot;nc in c,ncert with him. The Russian