Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1854-06-10
NOTES ON NEW BOOKS.

BAILEY. Boston: Ticknor Fields. 1854. 49,
This is new edition, revised and enlarged
of work already familiar, we doubt not to many
of our readers 1t first appeared anonymously In
England little more than twenty years ago. and
enjoyed for considerable period greater currency
and popularity than are usually awarded to books Of
abstract and metaphysical speculation. We do not
care in this connexon to indicate any of the second
causes which, apart from the merits of the work
may have contributed very materially to promote
its circulation There is enough Of talent and Just
sentiment in the volume to be adduced as anxade-3
quate explanation of whatever favor and considers
tion it has received and this republication ia our
country Of new edition, which xhaskr eived the,
author last additions and final revison would seem
to indicate that this favor and consideration not
yet exhausted. An the work, therefore, appears
destined to attain perpetuity rarely conceded IN
these days Of ephemeral literature, it may not be
improper to estimate little more accurately than
usual the value Of a production which the public,
or the author at least, does not seem disposed to
/" willingly let die"
We may say, then, that the work seems to be writ
ten in singularly calm and candid spirit The wri-
ter every where evinces sincere love of TRUTH and
seeks to inculcate just principles to guide the in
quirer in its pursuit. In the volume before us we
find pleasing attestaton to the authors candorr
and honesty in the fact that he has omitted from
the work as at present published an essay which
formed an important part and occupied q conspicu-
GUS place in his writings as originally submitted to
the scrutiny of the public. The discreet writer
seems to have been convinced that his essay on the
Fundamental Principle of all Evidence and Elk.
pectatien demands deliberate revisal before
it shall again receive his imprinaatur In this he
has doubtless given proof of wisdom equal to his can
ior for the radical allaoy which vtiaed the argumen
tha IF
the injurious criticism. While attacking it did
Of the vital truths Of dsputatous theology it
compelled to bear the brunt of assaults the most vgor
GUS and well directed But if in this omission find
proof of the authors prudence and caution must
cede whatever he has retained the weight of his
knoweged ability evnced in his most deliberate udg-
mens From the work in its present form we must sup
pose he has abatements to make And yet it seems
that the work might profit by still further and
thorough revision though the writer presume,
would consider such revision we shall advocate
quite antamount to the destroying of all that is most
distinctive and characteristic in his book.
The great leading idea to which Mr. BAILEY evidently
gives the first prominence his specuaonsi is this that
responsible for the opinions they entertain,
or as he phrases it, that belief and opinion
justly be considered the proper objects Of moral
probation and disapprobation, and consequently Of
wards or punishments."
This we are aware is no idea Of Mr.. Baileys. 1t
has been formally stated and defended by dstin
guished If not abler menas, for example, by Lord
rougham and Sir James Macintosh As we not dis
posed altogether to accept this proposition final and
decisive might be constrained to admit that the weight
of authority clearly adverse to views, if
cid not think could safely appeal for their confrma
ton the general of mankind quite sufficient to
countsrbaance the single Of few among the
nro Last into As Mr. is Dar
haps the first who has made this dogma the theme OF
formal and ddactic dissertation probably may owe it
readers to lay before them his statement Of
the doctrine before proceed to make any anmadver
sions upon its tenability
In section H. Of the Essay the Formation Of Opn
ions we find the following assertion to the ndepen
dence of our beliefs the will
"We come, then, to the conclusion that since the
to the mind must produce
the same belief doubt disbelief and since voton
neither introduce any additional considerations, dis
miss what already present. the will can have no in
fucnce belief or, in other words belief doubt, and
disbelief involuntary states of the intellect"
Section Wis 1t follows that those states Of the under
standing which we term belief, doubt, and disbelief in
asmuch they not voluntary the result of any
exertion Of the will imply neither merit demert in
him who is the subject Of them Whatever be the state
of mans understanding in relation any possible pro-
position it is state of affection devoid equally of desert
and culpabilty The nature Of opinion cannot make
Ii criminal In relation to the subject may be-
ieve another doubt and third dsbelieve and all with
equal innocence"
/" There may it is true, be considerable merit or de-
merit attached to the in which inquiry pro-
secuted. \ 1t is reprehensble for any to
be swayed in his conduct by interest passion to reject
opportunities Of information to be designedy partial in
examining evidence to be deaf to whatever is urged
one side of question and lend all his attention to the
other. Our appreciation and disapprobaton,
they fail any where should be directed to the conduct
of men their researches the which they make
.nrs srr~u
ty and impartiality visible in their actions"
We do not profess in these fragmentary extracts to
have presented any adequate summary Of the authors
argumsnts design merely to exhibit the nature of
his conclusions. If rightly apprehend these, they
amount to this We responsible only for volun
tary acts those states Of the mind which term be-
lief doubt and disbelief though the results of voluntary
acts are themselves wholly involuntary; hence it is
neither accurate just to predicate Of them that they
are either laudable cupabe that when exercised
on the subject they are equally innocent because
equally independent Of the will.
II these conclusions correct the author justly
observes they necessarily lead to some important de-
ducton," It shall be aim to show that they
sary lead besides those enumerated which the
essayst has lacked either the courage the sagacy to
draw.
We venture then in the first place broadly to assert
that if not morally responsible for their opinions
there can Of course be no such thing moral responsibility
for their actions for surely cannot be morally wrong
for them to do what in their opinion is right According
IN of author. the doctrine Of