The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-11-03

The carnpaiga IN the Baltic may now we presume bs
considered at an end, and some variety of opinion will
probably be formed with respect to the result OF our
operations in those waters The British squadron has
undoubtedly excluded the fleets Of the Gar from the
the Russian cruisers in the Pacific conrive to elude
frgates and tho disturbance occasoned by their known
in those parts we shall be better able to appre
blcsomo visitors from the highways Of the and the
coasts of our own islands. Every maritime outlet of
the Russian empire has been sealed up by our ships
our flag has been carried up to the shores of the
enemy, and he has been insulted by open challenge
and aSsy At the mouth. his ,,, o
Notifications which his reliance Is placed actu
ally asaled by the allies, and in this trial Of strength
was found wholly side that Bomarsund was
taken not only without loss but comparatively speaking
without effort. Finally the entire feet despatched on
standing the notorious difficulties Of the navigation all
casualties have been escaped is there much as
side of the account Looking broadly at the matter and
speaking candidly we think we might say that such
% the
son OF course there were persons who thought that
Cronstadt onght to be taken and tho Russian fleets
brought to Spithead within five weeks or so, but
the great body Of Englishmen knew and felt that
the first duty of Admirals was to maintain .
thorough and eectua blockade without exposing their
ships to unnecessary danger Against the feet Of the
enemy feet would of course have proceeded once
and il will be remembered that the first division Of
sells despatched to the Baltic inferior In number
to the Russian squadron that nothing could have been
more defiant than the challenge thrown out But such
fighting as this vas not in the Cars designs What he
wished was to allure ships into engagement with
his shore Notifications, that after walls of wood
had got the worst against his walls Of rock his fleets
work with our shattered and discounted squadrons.
This the risk to be escaped and this rsk has indeed
been escaped while the fleets of the enemy have been
confined within their fortified harbors.
Nevertheless we shall probably not be wrong In sur.
missing that the prsponderant feeling on this question
will be one Of dissatisfaction and that this conclusion
justification NJ
those described however desirable in Themselves
certainly not commensurate with the magnitude of the
means employed. OF such feet as We despatched to
the Baltic more might naturally be expected than
that it should come homo safe again. naval force
ed left the shores of this any other kingdom
Its equipment in regard to strength and resources
perfect beyond example Every ship was stupendous
OF offence and engines Of destruction unheard
of in past times were at the command of men and off,
GERS inferior to none who ever sailed Surely, some
achieved with such squadron X would be unfair to
shape conclusions BY any contrast with the opera
tons in the Crimea Each campaign should be estimat
leave much TO be desired. Undoubtedly 1t wise to
avoid the trap which the Gar had laid for in front Of
pertinent II natural to inquire both why that
eminent could not have beon tried earlier and why
The attack upon the Aland Isles taught the fleet and tie
world that granite ramparts not mprcgnnble to can
nonshot did all the boasted at the command
OF the beeged such as red hot balls 6c produce the de-
structon the jeopardy off single vessel at
lacking force true that large body of land troops
enforcement proved TO Be quite unnecessary and If
among the marines Of the allied fleets there 500
600 who could the MIME rife with effect the whole
affair might have been accomplished at any moment by
the unaided forces Of the squadrons themselves Al
though, moreover, we have bearded the enemy in his
strongholds is hardly to be conceived but what
our indspositon to close with his artillery must have
given him increased confidence in his defences The
very Representations to- which we made in the way Of
accommodating and sounding may have had the effect Of
showing him his weak points and OF enabling him to
strengthen them against future attack.
It cannot however, be denied that these disappolnt
ments in measure traceable to Of judg
ment the part Of those who were charged with the
equipment Of the fleet The truth Is that our attention
had been directed to this species Of warfare The
contingencies which had in contemplation were those
Of ordinary with its regular sea fights maintain
ed by great lne-obattle ships new element except
that OF steam power being into made
ready to engage the Russian feet yararm to yardar,
at any Odds and despatched threedcckers
dinghy But when It came to practice, found that
such trial Of this sort to be anticipated and that
the Russian squadrons had ntrenched themselves the
expression be allowable, behind Notifications which
could not be reached like those OF the Aa BY an
daunted advance Our 6rstrates especially those unpro
vided with screws turned out to be useless, and We
believe that not of theui up to the present moment
has fired single shottcd gun On the other hand the
vessels most particularly needed not forthcoming
mark to the enemys shot but armed with very heavy
guns, and movable at great speed with Light draught
Of water Such, in fact, are the gunboats recently
full floating batteries had been attached to the feet we
should have had better title to look for substantial
results. Even then, however, would always be
sary to keep division of battle ships In
otherwise the Russians seeing only gunboats before
them, might take heart Of grace, sally out surround
some small craft with their threedeckers, and repeat
their performances at Sinope.
Putting recrimnation aside We cannot do better now
that the campaign has ended than turn its lessons
good account for advantage in the ensuing spring By
that time the allies will probably have their Black Sea
fleets dsengage that large endorsements might be
despa tched TO the Baltic II does not SEEM however
that renorcements Of this kind really called for Our
squadrons, already constituted, have proved quite
strong enough to scare the Russians from the seas
while as to attacks upon shore Notifications it is clear
that large vessels unless moved and handled like the
Agamemnon, cannot easily be brought into action. We
have learned that shot destroy granite walls
or at least such granite walls built by Russian
engineers, and the object is to provide such class Of
floating batteries will carry guns up to their work
The excrtions now made in this direction offer sure
guarantee that the end will be secured and So
cond campaign undertaken with better appreciation
OF our relative power and conducted with enter
prise, will speedily produce, have little doubt re-
suits considerably more positive than those at present