New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-30
prvoLU TY0HARY SPAIN.
fFfhb Arsele

.sr,ntry, because they 'anou y" '"0''
~;..;on. Conscious Of their own weakness OF
~. ,..table tenor Of their power, aui Of their
.,.,eme appropriately, how could they nave AZ
s-.,.a 70 answer the rivslries, jealousies, and
.,.,besripg pretensions Of their generals common
IN revolutionary epochs, but by unworthy
.,d netty intrigues' Kept, as they WERE
....,.nt fear and suspicion of their own mill
.h;ef. we may give full credit to Wellington
sting 10 his brother, the MARQUEE OF Wei
,.,,ev. on Sept. 1, 1909:
iesn'' .unh afraid from what have seen Of
la am I Of The Central Juots, that in the dis
% ,;on az their forces, they did not CONSIDER militia
~ Jsfepse and military operations go mucn as they
a. nolitcal intrigue and the attainment OF "ining Po
htieal objeets. 49,. >,
7, revolutionary times, when all ties Of subord-
nation are loosened, military disciphne can only
herestoredby civil discipline 'terny weighing upon
the generals. As the Central Junta fromits neon
rruous complexion, never succeeded in controlling
a. Generals. the generals always failed in con-
,,o,ling the soldiers, and to the end OF the war
Al. c,s,.b army never reached an average de-
80. Of discipline and subordfnation. This in
Coordination was kept up by the want of food,
.lothpe, and all the other material requisites Of
An army-f0f inc uoiai Va oA army az -''Po'o"A
called il, depends altogether on its material con-
A;tion. Tie Central Junta was unable regularly
N proyide for the army, because the poor poet
on;ntsnas manifestos ~Ould not do in this IN
stance and to add coercion to their decrees they
nust have required I, the same revolutionary
measures which they had condemned in the prov
;,.es Even the general enlistment without res
meet TO privilege and exemptions, and the facility
granted to all Spaniards to obtain every grade In
The army. was the work of the provincial juntas
and not of the Central Junta. If the defeats of
the spanish armies were thus produced by the
counter revolutionary incapacties Of the Central
.Iunta these disasters in their turn still more
depres,ed that Government and by making 1t the
object Unpopular contempt and suspicion, increased
ito dependence upon presumptuous but incapable
military chiefs.
The Spanish standing army, if everywhere de-
feated nevertheless presented itself at all points,
More than twenty times dispersed, it was always
ready again to show front to the enemy, and fire.
quebtly reappeared with increased strength after
defeat 1t was of no use to beat them, because,
quick to fee, their loss in men was generally
small, and as to the loss of the field they did not
care about it. Retiring disorderly to the serras,
they were sure to reassemble and reappear when
least expected, strengthened by new reinforce
ments, and able, if not to resist the French ar
mics, at least to keep them in continual move
ment, and to oblige them to scatter their forces.
More fortunate than the Russians, they did not
even need to die in order to rise from the dead.
The DISASTROUS battle at Ocaha Nov. 10, 1909,
was the last great pitched battle which the Span
iards fought; from that time they confined them
selves to guerilla warfare. The mere fact OF the
abandonment of regular warfare proves the dis
appearance of the national before the local CEN
hrs of Government. When the disasters OF the
standing army became regular, the rising OF the
auerillas became general, and the body of the
people, hardly thinking Of the national defeats,
exultea 10 the local successes of their heroes.
In this point at least the Central Junta shared the
popular delusion. Fuller accounts were given
''in the Gaceta of an affair Of guerllas than Of
"the battle of Ocaha."
As Don Quixotte had protested with his lance
against gunpowder, so the guerillas protested
AGAINST Napoleon, only with different success.
-NThese guerillas," says the Austrian Military
Journal, (Vol. ], 1921, carried their basis II
,.themselves, as it were, and every operation
"seainst them terminated in the disappearance
"of its object"
There are three periods to be distinguished in
the history of the guerrilla warfare. In the mrs
period the population of whole provinces took NJ
arms and made partisan warfare, as in Gaici'
and Asturias. In the second period, guerrilla
bands formed of the wrecks of the Spanish ar
miles, Of Spanish deserters from the French ar
mics, of smugelers, etc, carried on the war
their own cause, independently of all foreigI
influence and sgreeably to their immediate inter
est. Fortunate events and circumstances fire
quently brought whole districts under their col
ers. As long as the guerrillas were thus cOnsti
tuted, thg made no formidable appearance as
body, but were nevertheless extremely dangerou
to the French They formed the basis of al
actual armament of the people. As soon as al
opportunity for capture offered itself, or com
bined enterprise was meditated, the most ACTIVE
and daring among the people came out and JOINED
the guerrillas. They rushed with the utmos
rapidity upon their booty, or placed themselve
in order of battle, according to theobect of the
undertaking. 1t was not uncommon to see then
standing out whole day in sight of yigilan
enemy, in order 10 intercept carrier or to cap
ture supplies. twas in this way thatthe younge
Nina captured the Viceroy of Navarro, appointed
BY Joseph Bonaparte, and that j ulan made prs
oner of the Commandant of Cuidad Rodrigo. A
soon as the enterprise was completed, eveybod!
went his own way, and armed men were seer
=. III l;roct;ons. hut tho assopi