Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1854-02-11
FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT.

FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENCE
PARIS, JANUARY 10, 1854.
1t is now some time since / touched at any length
upon the allengrossng topic of the day, the war IN
the East In the mean time affairs have assumed
mush graver aspect. 1t grieyes me to say that
general European war for the opening of spring
must now be classed among the probabilities of the
future In EnglaAi, here, and all over the conti-
nent the journals speak of it less doubtfully as
being an almost inevitable event That the Gov
ernments themselves think war as at least probable
is evinced by the preparation in which most OF them
are engaged. The hum of this preparation is
coming to us from all quarters. For myself, while
| admit that the danger is imminent, very immi-
nent, do not think that the calamity OF general
war is inevitable; even yet believe it will be
avoided. There are SO many and SO important rea-
sons constraining the nations to peace In 1904 the
nations are SO few to whom general war under ac-
tual circumstances would promise even distant and
uncertain advantages, that despite the covering
aspect Of the cloud which now hoyers over Europe
I hope and believe that ths clead viii be dispersed
before it ponrs upon Europe its Sssolsting storm
& The prominent facts which so darken the pros
pects at present are first the more active and hos
tile interference in favor of Turkey to which the
destruction of the Turkish squadron in the harbor
Of Sinope has induced the Governments of France
and England The first official announcement of
this more energetic intervention was thus made IN
the Moniter of the 9th instant, by the publication
Of circular dated 30th Of December, forwarded by
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the i'm
perial legations at foreign Courts The Minister
says:
ave think sir, that it has become indispensable for
in turn to the extent Of he compensation
to which our character as Power interested in the
+ln
taken by the Russian army entitle We must have .
guaranty which will the reesabshment Of peace
in the East upon conditions that shall not modify the dis
rbution of the respective forces Of the great States of
Europe Consequently, the Government Of his Imperial
Majesty and the Government of her Britannia Majesty
have determined that their squadrons should enter the
Black Sea- and should combine their movements in such
manner to prevent the Ottoman territory or flag
from becoming the object of attack the part of
| the naval forces of Russia"
You will receive by this steamer, in the English
papers, the text of the official warning sent to the
Governor of the Russian seaport Sebasopol, on the
Black Sea, by the Admirals in command of the allied
heets preparatory to their departure from the Bos-
phorus on their minatory cruise in the Black Sea.
The communication in question formally notifies the
Russian Governor that the object of this occupa-
ton of the Black Sea by the fleets Of the two West
attack by the Russian fleets, and the Russian func-
tionary is politely invited to give to the Russian
Admiral such instructions will render impossible
collision between the Russian and allied fleets,
which might endanger the peace of Europe. We
have since received intelligence to the effect that
the allied fleets have actually entered the Black Sea-
escorting FIVE Turkish ships of war end feet OF
transports conveying ten thousand men, arms, and
stores intended for the reinforcement Of the Turk
ish army in Asia, These are the especially aggra-
waiting circumstances of the present crisis. VIII
the Emperor of Russia consider them, as he un-
ouestionably has a right to do, casus belli, and
| formally declare war against England and France
Or will he, in imitation Of the prudence (Which
will continue automatically to style moderation
shown by Turkey and the allies upon occasion Of
the occupation of the Danubian provinces, declare
this occupation Of the Black Sea, and the overt
armed protection and resistance extended to of
the belligerents, as affording just and sufficient
ground for war, and yet refrain from proclaimng it
at present All the world nearly assume as most
likely the former alternative, and therefore as
sert general war to be inevitable |, on the other
hand cannot but hope, and almost believe, that the
Czar will take the latter view of the case, and will
not therefore at present incur the responsibility of
| involving all Europe in which no one can tell
the results Of, but which would assuredly cause
every throne in Europe, except perhaps his own, to
totter if not to fall Upon what is this hope OF mine
founded Not certes, upon the justice and modera-
ton Of the Gar; not upon the tardy but sincere
abandonment by him of the traditional Russian
Lpolicy of encroachment upon Turkey and advance
ment toward the Mediterranean; but simply upon
his prudence; upon the natural indisposition OF
any sovereign, however great, however naughty,
however powerful, to engage in war which cannot,
unless in the course of it its original conditions be
fundamentally altered, result otherwise than in his
own discontinue
Why did Turkey, with the advice and consent of
England and France, agree that the occupation OF
the Danubian provinces should not be considered as
SUCH and actually refrain for several months from
declaring war against Russia? Was it moderation ?
Only in the sense that it has pleased modern diplo
macy to attach to that word In plain language, it
was prudence it was clear case of the exercise of
that discretion which is the better part of valor.
Turkey, and England, and France knew that, do all
they could, they would find themselves unable to
drive the Gar out of the provinces. 1t was there
fore prudently resolved not to attempt to do so,
but to devour their wrath and try to coax him out
Now it must be admitted, a case has arisen in which
the roles, just stated, seem to be inverted The
Gar is rs utterly unable to drive the English and
| French fleets from the Black Sea, which they have
occupied against him, as the allies lately were and
still are to drive him from the banks of the Danabe
| What immediate and certain good could the Gar
hope for by accepting the belii and declaring
/ yyar AGAINST France and England? None. What