Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1854-03-28
coMnITIoNAL LEGISLATION.

Oh. ,,,.,tcs now become quite prevalent, OF submitting
laws 10 the people, 10 an invocation OF modern t"cs' anu u
"a base In It's origin as it Is vicious In is tendency oo'o'
nj public men began TO lore tho virtues OF manl'ness anu
,ndsoeudence, they did not attempt 10 evude the responsible
tic. of duty. But the spiri, Of demagogulsm 10 as lala' 10
personal courage as 10 genuins patriotism, and ~nen men
began TO make the interests of the State subordinate !"
schemes of individual aggrandizemen', they lost !he o,Rn"'
and the man,!ness OF character which shrink not from u e
snons;b,,ir,es Of public duty. Then did they begin 10 in
vent devices for evsdiug The just responsibility Oh "aen p''
,ition, and then for the first time was introduced Inc expo
diem, OF conditional legislation. This supplemental piece 10
the machinery of government, owes its paternity 10 the ~
ventive genius whence sprung the idea OF wooden nulmegs
and liouor laws and however effective In accomplishing
The purposes of it's origin, 1t canrot escape the ccnsure OF
be,no inconsistent with the theory of representative govern.
nent.
A pure democracy, wherein all the powers of government
are exercised directly and Immediately b. the people them.
ssIyes. IL scarcely less inimical TO the idea OF RepuoNcanism,
than AN absolute monarchy. The exieencies OF society and
the progress Of civiliz alton developed the theory OF representa-
tive government, by which the powers inherent IN inc people
aro delegated to responsible agents. Thus. BY the constitution
OF Virginia the legislative powers OF government are Fcs''
IN the TWO houses of the General Assembly; the Executive
povers in a Governor, and the Judiciary powers in The va
xious courts. This delegation Of powers implies Tue idea OIL
duty, and ihese particular agencies are constituted Tor Ihese
special purposes. IThe exercise Of the powers imposed upon
the several departments Of the government, Is not a matter
OF discretion but OF absolute obligations nor can they be ne
elected or transferred to other agencies. Thus inc Execu'
tive can neither refuse 10 discharge its duties, nor enHust
them 10 another. This Judiciary Is bound by q similar oh
cation and restriction; and the General Assembly can no
more transfer the power of legislation to the people, man
can the Governor transfer the power Of pardon, or the courts
tbs power of judicial decision. What should we think OF an
Executive reprieys or a judicial decree made subject to the
approval of the people, Noless absurd 10 the idea OF a con-
ditlonal legislation, which 10 void or valid according 10 the
,esul, of a popular vote. AS an individual legislator cannot
vote by proxy, 10 neither can the legislative body enact laws
by proxy. Each possesses a delegated power, which, by its
nature, 10 incapable OF transfer. The action of the Legisla-
,uro within ito legitimate sphere, is complete and final. The
Constitution makes 1t so, and the Legislature cannot defeat
tho purpose and provisions OF the Constitution.
The people reserve . control over legislation, by means Of
Tho courts, and by the agency of instruetioH and repeal
They may demonstrate against the enactment OF any mea
sure; they may elect a Legislature with a view 10 the rePeai
OF an obnoxious statute, and the courts may pronounce a
law unconstitutional This modern %expedient OF condition
al legislation, 10, therefore, as useless as II 10 absurd and lille.
gal. II Is neither necessary 10 give efficiency 10 The popular
will, nor essential ns q restraint on legislation. Lie only pur.
pose 10 10 furnish tlm!d aud unworthy legislators with a
means of escape from ,hs responsibility Implied 10 the very
idea OF representative government, and Imposed upon them
by tho provisions of the Constitution and the election oil The
people.
The policy derives no countenance from the practice Of
submitting plans OF constitution TO the judgment Of the peo'
pe. There IL 40 analogy between ordinary and sonstaution-
O., legislation 10 this regard. A constitution is a delegation
of sovereign power and must therefore have the sanction Of
the sovereign people. Ordinary legislation Implies simply
an exercise OF power already granted BY act OF The people,
The Constitution prescribes the mode of it's exercise, and
every act of legislation IL complete and valid II done In pur-
suance of The Constitution.
We have said the practice Is vicious md ~corrup'ing In us
influence. II is incapable of limitation. II one enactment
may DO made conditional on tho result OF a popular vote, 30
may every other enactment. An s%xpedient which 30 happily
relieves the skulkiug politician from responsibility 10 one n.
s,pes. SMI ne, ypst Ley sy0selm To 10 the ultimate subrer.
sion OF tho theory of representative government. The lie,
zislsturs will cease to be an independent and perfect depart
msnt of government" and will become simply an agency fol-
suggesting measures Of legislation TO tho people. The effect
upon the character Of public men will be not less d~eplorable.
As the Roman Senate degeneratcd under the overshadowine
influence OF imperial power into a seryilo instrument Of q
despo,ie will, SO must the Legislative body, 10 a representa-
tive government become an assembly of tlmid, corrupt and
compliant dsmaeocues,i If their only duty be 10 consult III.
passions OF tho multitude, and their only power 10 sugges,
measures for popular approval.