The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-05-08

continued until two years after the war should b.
ended. Jefferson, sure of the popular support with
out which he was the last man to move hair
breadtl-for the popular breath was all the potica
ANIMATION he ever possessed, active thinker as h'
wasthus assured plainly and decidedly rejected th,
overture. That was more dangerous step than il
y oud nave been for Washington to reject it, origi
ash Y, for Is harder to get out Of false position
ONE your foot Is in than to leap out before you ara
tbera But had Jefferson not repudated the mistake
of WasA 'gton he would have merely left the act 10
some other, as overheard, eventually, it would have
IN Anr;l. 1906, Jefferson despatched Mr. pinckney
ne coIleag ne with Monroe, the Minister resident IN
England in be ATTEMPT to settle the difficulties by
negotiation, 3, vpending meanwhile the authorized
act of non-inter, curse.
In NAV. the Bi itish order III council was issued
declaring the on, ire coast, from Brest to the
river Elbe, in a i'tate Of blockade. slight
privilege was allowed to neutrals, of continue
ing their trade at particular point Of the in
terdicted coast, if not coming from or return
ing to an enemy. Napoleon, having hunbled Prus-
STA by the battle of Jena, issssS from her capital
the famous Berlin decree, the first in the series of
his continental system retaliatcry of the above
order. II declared the entire kingdom of Great
Britain in blockade and prohibited an trade, by any
parties, thither. No vessel from England or her
colonies direct should be admitted to the continent
This decree to exist in force until England should
acknowledge the same restrictions to govern the
rights of war upon land and sea, and withhold war
from private property and persons not military and
until her blockades were limited to fortified places
ard invested with proper force. This measure Of
Napoleon was indeed, abstracty as extraordinary
q violation of the rights OF nations that Of Eng
land But, If not justified absolutely il was at least
greatly pAated, by the fact that England had be-
gun tliAThost barbarous departure from the prac-
tees Ofcfdinary warfare, and that law of nations
she highly respected, but like others obeyed only
when il was convenient. She had attacked the
universal liberties of mankind and the cause Of
Napoleon became, therefore, to the extent of resist
infrf hytann 70 fhn At
On that ground he based his acts, as not vioatve
of previous treaties between France and other
powers and solicited the united support of the civil.
lized world. Several allied powers at adopted
his scheme, and he was finally supported in his
effort by France, Spain, Holland, Italy, Austria,
Prussia, Russia-by the force of the Continent in
fact Some of them, it is true, came into the sys-
TEN through fear, and felt anything but sympathy
for its author; yet, apart from the overshad0wng
terror Of the name of Napoleon, there could not
have been power upon the Continent which would
not have heartily wished his effort success. TO have
desired its defeat, as against the assumptions of
England merely, would have been an act of national
suicide. The people OF the United States, except
that many believed it would be Intellectual, could
have at first little to say against it, it was not
put In force against them, in the expectation that
Their government would cause its neutral rights to
be respected by England. Jefferson himself SYM
pathized most fully with the effort Solicitors in
the extreme for peace with England, but determined
yet to sacrifice none OF our rights while sensible of
~,
cess of Napoleon's policy of distressing England
into terms, the grand and only means of accom-
plshing his own object. His whole course was
aterward shaped to the affording such indirect aid
to Napoleon, on this point, might yet not involve
us in the war of material forces. In case where
the interests involved were such, and the antagonist
such, we cannot see that there was impropriety or
bad policy in seeking to gain our end through the
extent in which our interest was invov-
ed, an alliance, direct or indirect, with the
party whose success would have been our own, was
not entirely justifiabe. To have thrown the force
exercised by Napoleon in our favor, whatever we
thought of his Interior objects, out Of account,
would have been egregious folly. The pinion of
Englands bonds by Napoleon was, in fact, the only
leverage by which we could raise claim Of ours even
to the attention Of England. We seemed indeed, to
do some things apart from France: we sent ambas-
sailors to arrange the form of treaty between us
and England. But what was the real basis of that
negotiation NapOleons armies on the Continent.
England, finally, drove us to war. Nobody can
imagine, though some talked Of including both
France and England in the manifesto of hostilities;
and we had abundant reason, too, to complain OF
the injuries Of the fomer-that we would ever
have ventured upon that contest, except that the
broad shield Of the giant was sure to catch nearly
all OF the blows dealt by the common antagonist
The strength of Napoleon was own marrow,
and We but talked of doing things in opposition to
or in distinction from him. The fall of Napoleon
made this fact sensible to our government, that,
in spite of all the achievements of our army and
particularly Of our pet navy-which were, indeed,
most crediiabe-it set about in trembling anxiety,
to secure any sort Of peace which should not sur
render more than England had claimed before.
But Mr. Jefferson, though disposed to make use oil
The atural aid derived against our enemy, through
our enemy's other enemy, was by no means one Of
NapOleon's "tools," as the English party dubbed
him, unless they were natural tools. Self was too
much the object of Tom Jefferson, in every act of
his political fe for him to play second part to any
man. Why, though he dared not array himself
n ainst WQabiDOf0n nnrgOnQI1v bo nfriu IN
start party in opposition to his policy, at the very
outset Of his administration Where there was
another road he would not even follow in the track
OF another man. lest the other should lessen his own
credit. He used Napoleon, or attempted to do. so,
as much az Napoleon wished to use him, and went
just far in seconding the aims of the despOt as
deemed safe on the one hand and necessary to Sc
cure his particular regard for our interests on the
other. He understood well, and abhorred, the ulti
mate objects of Napoleon. Every instinct Of his
democratic nature revolted from the idea Of uni
versal monarchy; and the contempt with which he
regarded the fame of the warrior extended to, the
French Emperor as the chief murderer ON the
bloody list Of heroes.
Meanwhile, the negotiation was dragging its slow
length along, embarrassed with all manner of diff
culties. The demands made by Jefferson were
broad and in a really national spirit. The right OF
search and impressment must be expressly renounc-
ed, the new theory of blockades abandoned, and
no restrictions left upon our commerce. except as re-
CARDS the usual contraband of war. Our flag would
garded the ensign ofevery nation on the ssa-an ex
tension Of its territory, procaiming wherever hoat
ing, the authority supreme over all. beneath II.
While the negotiators were sweating through their
embarrassmcnts the Secretary Of State, Mr. Madison,
in the summer of 1906 wrote examination Of the
British doctrines relating to neutral trade. No man
was better able to refute the sophstres of the an
tagonist cabinet than this great and pure states
man. OF the work, his admirer, Quincy Adams,
says: " 1t will hereafter be considered standard
treatise on the law oil nations, not inferior to the
works of any writer upon those subjects since the
days of Grotius There is, indeed, in all the dplo
matte papers Of American statesmen, Justly cele-
brated they have been, nothing superior to this
dis sertation.
Ike Monroe treaty finally completed and sign
ed, December &c., 1906. So far il went it was
mainly satisfactory, though not what we had
a right to demand. But its provisions generally
we're infinitely superior to the terms Of the
Jay treaty. 2he vessels Of the United States
we're allowed to carry European goods, if bona
Edc properte OF the citizens of the United
States, indirectly to the colony Of any enemy Of
Great Brtaa the net duty paid in the United States
after the drawback, to amount to at least one pei