New-York daily tribune., 1854-05-16

| Tr,ti.b ftriressee commanded within comfortable
dismourtipg AID trcGebirs range by hghts which hsV
nct that We sre aware, been fortified since the AS
W.. But tLis same s,listra. which fell in 80 aite
four dsvs attack sustained in 1888 two blocssle
of ten months duration and held cut thirty five day
| sncr tic opening Of regular siege and nine dag
alter tie completion o. practicable breach N tat
main wall. A fortress which hss undergone such
ysryng fate. msy well be sid to be beyond any
irg as 20 its strength and de:-nsibility.
But supposing Sistria to be carried BY storm Dy
III overwhelming superiority OF force, il by no msAns
follows that the road to Const'ntinopie Is e"ar 'o'
them In order 20 advance on shunln and Yarns they
ust leave IF least coo behind at slllsra "hch
,rouId then have 70 serve them as bEidge-head for
,rotber and more conveniently situated bridge.
shumls they coals hardly attack for even if they took
hi. famous ntre,Aaed camp, they would simply de-
priye the enemy of good position without gaining ono
for Themselves shum!= shuts against the Russians
the passage of the Balkan. but if taken it does not open
that passage to them.
The Importance OF sbuma consists in the fact that
yarna is the key TO the Lower Balkan and Stumla is
tie key to yarna Whatever may be the defects of
tie fortifcstiOns of Varna-snd they are many-if
fully garIsoned it requires siegecorps of 2)OO0 20
$1,000 men: and unless there remain troops enough
after deductng these to cover the siege against any
salies IOm the iIrenched camp OF >humla where the
Turks can concentrate all their forces. the siege
rot be carried on successfully. Narna held out, in
I-2c three reeks after two practicable breaches had
been made in its rsmparts and that at time when
the Russian feet commanded the Black Sea, and the
Turks had hardly the shadow ot army TO attempt
attack upon the beegers. Now supposng Slllstrla
taken the various and very difficult rverlines before
Varna and Shumla, forced and Narna blockaded. is
there chance that enough Russian troops would re-
main TO neutralize Shumla For the Turks at Shrmla
could act not only against the besegers of Narna but
in the direction of the Danube and least OF the
lines OF communication of the Russians, TO force
them to deach more aud more troops from their main
body which ultimately might he weakened to dan
gerous extent.
And if Varna should fall what would Pashkiew 5ch
do if Omer Pasba sulenly remained in his stronghold
Of shuma ready profit by the very first mistaAethe
Russians made Would be dare TO push on toward
Constantinope with but single line of communlca-
ton which at the same tame would be hemmed in and
nenaced by the shumla army Oh one side, and by the
allied heets in the. Black On the other Net he'
indeed if we are to Judge frcm his exploits in Asia
A sort of military slow coach. with nothing cf the
Radetzky in him. And if he had he would hnd that
naneuyer extremely hazardous for he knows very
veil what plight his predecessor Debtch vas IN
\ hen he arrived, in ls29, at Adranople. Thus,
even without taking into account the Anglo French
roops landing in TArace, AMI making no mo-e OF the
llIed fleets than what they have justified US in,
namely, supposing they will DO next to nothing we
ind that it il not such easy thing for the Russians
70 march streght ahead to Constantinope with ban
lers displayed aud bands playing. That against Tur-
Key unaded they were ultimately to get there no
me ever denied except those new-tansled military
writer's who form their Judgment not from facts but
rom conviction that right against might is ne
,essarily 5ictorious and that in good cause no
,lundera can possibly be committed
we may add thai the British force. in the Baltic
AVE done even less far than those "a the Black Sea-