The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-11-26

get up their supplies 1t al In the same proportion
a. We On ours Certainly, the consu npaon OF
speak Of the men-mnst be tremendous; but tbs
supply ct home, only fortnight from the scene Of
action, Is inexhaustibls; whereas the Russians can
get no applies whatever. Every day is day sub
given up all hope Of the sea. As to the land,
though We have not been able to cut OF their COM
munication with the interior, and though they are
in force In our neighborho0d, their army In the
field can hardly maintain itself, much less con-
tribute to the support Of the city with either food
or other materials. We a.e told that. unable any
longer to live in the neighborhood Of Ssbas.
topol, they have ravaged the country so far aud
SO utterly, that the irri:atei natives are flock
ing under the protection Of our guns at Eupa.oria,
to escape the further extorons and cruelty Of their
own masters. Thus it would seem that the army
IN the Held Is worse on tnsn me garrison S o.
case In the history of all wars. People are 80 accus
toned to associate the idea Of famine with SIEGE aud
30 familiar with stories OF population and garrsons
never think Of the besiegers. These are however,
just az liable to famine as the bssieged and in this
case is the Russian army which is in the position
usually filled BY besiegers. Toe besieged, il proper
good food in good condition, Immediately at hand.
The army In the field have either brought their
stock from great distance. or trust to the country
resource which Is sure to fail large army before
long. II was found 30 when Wallenstein lay about
Nuremberg, thinking to starve on. Gustavus Adol.
plus, and, more recently when Maseens attempted
to maintain himself In the front Of the British lines
in Portugal. The latter case is singularly in point,
as the French had command of the interior, and We
of the sea, a. in the present instance.
II the force Of the enemy in the Cnmea was very
oveapowering, IL would have been brought to bear
with oveIpowering effect II has tried its worst,
and failed The attack on the 25th was as skilful,
determined, and fortunate, as could be. The Turks
encountered by the enemy were two or three thou.
sand raw recruits fresh from the Bo.phorus, and it
No wonSE that they wax 1s nssa9s
Of the calamity by which our cavalry was exposed
for any considerable time to the fire Of the Russian
artillery; but such disasters must be expected when
atts.k. The loss. We believe has been greatly ex.
aggerated Instead of the almost complete destruc-
ton OF three regiments, It appears that we only lost
ia men. With this exception the affair was sig
honor Of beating off the foe, who was compelled at
last to relinqush the ground he had gained. The
renewed attack the next dav, combined with
soitie from the garrison, cost him thousand man
left dead in the trenches or on the field. We now
know the utmost danger in tn 1t direction, and may
rest on the line of defences from the rchernaya
TO Bslaklava as securely as the British army
reposed on the lines OF Torres vedras. The
that is question OF time, or rather of money, to
brig it to the Cars own estimate of war. Toe
Russians have not irexdaussib!e supplies. They
cannot admit more men, even though their CON-
muDications are open to the north, than they can
feed. They cannct expect any more ammunition.
They are said to be suffering from want of water,
for which they have no remedy. Against these
even despair, has resource. Stores must dimln-
ish ard courage is but i'll displayed in using them
up faster than need he. But a few months since
the Black Sea itself was virtually Rnssia-now
it is England and France These $4,000 Rus.
slams in Sebastopol might as well be on some
ore of our own rocky promontories in Cornwall or
Wales, holding cut from mere oostina,y, but EVIL
IDENTIFY doomed, as being entirely shut out from
their supplies.
Sach was the state Of aairs at the last date, and
it may be summed up ia few words:--The attack
was being vigorously pushed on, and tae defencss
within 800 metres Of the walls, aud we were on the
point Of mounting Lancaster gun, where it would
command the dockyard. Other works we're nearly
compile ted, and the Russians had been pelled TO
harms way, and where, consequently, they would
be useless for defence. We ara evidently making .
great and sure step when we cease tospend onr pow
der and shot upon earthwosks, and can attack the
d0ckyads, the arsenals the shipping apd the FORTS
We labor, indeed, under one great deficiency. We
want men, not for Ultimate success, but to sive
time, which in war is equivalent to life as well ~
4 money. Had we Hore cavalry we, could keep the
right flank and from Balaklava. As it is, our
cavalry is obliged to man9uvre at disad-
vantage, and the loss Of bundled men becomes
great disaster, even though the Russians lose, as
TREY have lost, man for man. How far the want
Ct men will further tell when ii comes to the
assault, and when we may expect an attack from
the Russian army outside, we will not venture to
say. Though We have not enough, however,
for active operations in the field, and not enough
for repeling attacks without loss, we have enough
for defence. OF this the Russians are so vel.
aware that they do not venture to attack Balakia-
va, in which case they would certainly bs taken in
the flank and rear and destroyed made prisoners.
Our position is the best that could have been
selected, and, though some critics now assure rs
that We should have done better on the north side,
1t is clear we should not have ha position 50
entirely our own, and 90 impregnable against the
enemy in the field. The work is indeed long-thst
il, longer than We at distance choose to wish it;
at which handful Of Dutchmen defended few
grsssy mounds against large army, the best engi-
neers, and abundance Of nsot0is for seven or eight
weeks. People thought that tedious, chiefly be-
cause they knew all the time that the citadel must
fall % 1t did at last, and they ~ impatient a.
an audience at the length of . play, the end OF
which they know too well. Sebastopol still held
out on the first of this month"; may until the first
standing the undenable skill and courage of Its de-
Tenders, and the many difficulties Of the allies.
RUSSIAN FORCES IN THE cRIMEA.
from the German Journal o. FRANKFORT
Tie following, according to Russian accounts Of
Nov. 3, is an exact statement Of the nber of Rus
antroops atpreseut In the Crimea, In the proximity
OF SebsstOpol, independently Of those which at
heftcn ana PereKOp, anu Tue surrounding countries.
After the battle Of Alma, Prince Menschikofs army
was reinforced by the arrival of the troops Of Gene
rails ChotumoY Lipraudi and Kori, and fresh troops
are constantly coningup. Besides the men belong
ing to the ships there are at present at Sebastopo
and in the ,neighborhood, the following regular
troops under the orders Of the Commander
in Chief OF the 9th corps of infantry, Gan.
Gortschakof, ILL.,; the 10th division Of Infantry
manded by General Kneznski, and com posed Of l6
battalions; the 18th division of infantry, COM
posed likewise of 16 battalions, and COM
manded by Gen. Kriakoff: as the 18th division of
the 9Th corps of infantry is at present in the eau
casus, Prince Gortschakof Ill. has received in its
commanded by Gen. Schobobrieski, and the 13sh
brigade, composed CT four battalions with the 9th
corps Of itfany. to which belong also battalion Of
sharpshooters and another Of chasssurs, who at
Sebastopol These troops, which form 46 battalions,
would be $4,000 men strong, If each battalion had
its full complement of 900 men. But as portion
of them have been on the Danube, and a. war and