Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1854-08-17
LATEST OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE.

LATEST OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE.
Our own correspondence from the seat OF war'
unfortunately too often retarded by the tedious
and imperfect arrangements of our post-oice,
affords the only authentic means possessed by
The British public and by ourselves of correcting
the numerous mis-statcments circulated by the
continental press, and transmitted to this country
by the tecgraphic lines. Thus, we now learn
with certainly that on the Stl Of July the Light
Division was still at Devna, the lst Divisions ut
Aladyn, and the Cd and Sd Division between
that place and Varna. The advance of The army
upon Giurgevo was thing only talked oft in
the camp, and even the visit Of Omar Pacha 10
the British headquarters on the 4ll WAS not
followed by any decided movement. We are
less accurately informed is TO the position of our
French allies but il is clear, from the intelligence
now before us, that tile statement OF The Mori-
tcur, that $4,000 allied troops had reached Giur-
gevo OH the 7ll July was cnlire Inaccurate,
and the honor of the exploits recently performed
on the left bank of the Danube belongs eXclu-
sscly to the Turkish army. We approve as
much rs any body can Go The caution OF the
allied commanders in not exposing their fresh
and highly conditioned armies to the uncertain
accidents or certain evils OF campaign amongst
deserts and marshes, and of preserving their
forces intact until they are certain rs to the point
upon which they can be used with the best eitcct.
At the same time, we cannot wonder. that this
DELAY has occasOned the surprise and suspicion
of our Turkish allies, who may not unrrasona-
bly, couclude that rough and ready army, which
moves wilhout baggage, aud often lights without
food or pay, is sometimes preferable for the
rude and more dcsnltory purposes OF war, to The
elaborate organization and equipment OF Europe.
an tronps 1t is moi, however, TO Tie dlifcu LIS of
loculnulion and far less to any indiSposiIion to
face The enemy, that the inactivity OF The British
army must bc attributed. On The contrary, the
impulse of every man in that gallant host would
have been 10 rush forward to The scene of action
wilhou; delay. But 4 moments reflection con-
vincrS us that to plunge into extended operations
on the banks of The Danube would have been 10
abandon or to deIcr inc chief exploit Of the
campaign, and we confidently believe that the
regret felt an apparent want of alacriiy in march
ing to the relief of Silisira, or in joining the at
tack on Gurgryu will be citctualIy removed by
orders 10 the whole iurcc 10 proceed against
Subas!opol That is the real point for us TO
;sSail, aud on the Danube the Turks have stood
I in little need of our MD.
Acting unqucslionably upon this independent
principle, Omar Pac!,l threw forward the bulk
of his army from Shuna to the Danube carl y in
the present month, and there is no reason ~ sup
pose that the accounts we have aircad received OF
his success are 1T ali overstalcd. Even the
Russian organs admit The evacuation of Glnrga-
70 in language similar 10 that in which they de-
scribcd the abandonment OF The siege Of Ssiria
| Ii appears That The Russian forces in and about
| GinrgcvO must have amounted to nearly 10000
men, while the Turks had not more than $4,000
men. but The result Of the battle WAS, that the
whole Russian corps WAS driven back behind the
Argish, md the left bank OF the Danube, from
Tunu 10 OltenilZa is in possession OF the Turks
We trust that Omar Pacha will not be led 20
risk this important advantage and the fate OF his
gallant army by prcmalurcly accepting The c'lal-
Icngc of the Russians TO fight Il general action
for il is clear that several considerations OF i'm
pur.ancc mast be wcig g.ed be!urcthe allied gene
rails could take the step Of marching nortward
with view to Il passage OF the Danube and Il
campa@n in Waachia. 1t WIS, i'll the first
place. highly improbable that such Il step should
be taken until The allied commanders were sails
fed hat the river itself WAS under their command
both because it is Indispensable 10 have entire
security us to The communications OF the army
in It's rear, and BECAUSE the navigation OF The
| Danube would powerfully assist the movements
of The forces, by afording water carriage Iu the
stores and supplies. In other words, ii The army
is to engage in Il campaign in the Prncipaliiics
having It's operations in Bulgaria, the command
Of the Danube is naturally to be regarded as an
indispensable preliminary: anil, whether the
allied forces actually advance in that direction or
not. it is of The greatest Importance 10 secure
The free navigation Of the great stream OF whose
banks the struggle must be conducted.-London
Times, July 81.