New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-02-08

w have more than once had occasion 70 direct
the attention of our readers We aiiuie
to their sending separate army to kHefit In order TO
hut Nd the road TO Seryia, while the presence OF
strong and concentrated force near Rustchak and
Kirsoya would have been the best guarantee against
tie Russians veuturing into that province Such
force would have mensced the communications Of any
Russian army marching westward, while bridge AMI
brideehead at Oltenitza or somewhere thereabosts
fortified Ike that Of Kaleiat could have maintained
footing for them Cd the left bank of the Danube But
even without that tie Russians could not cross the Up
rer Danube and march into Seria without leaving the
Turks 10 cross the Lower Danube and march upon Bu
ebsrest OF course in saying this, reckon the rels
tive strength of the parties to be what it is in reality
and ascrbe decided superiority of numbers to the
Turkish army Of Roumea, over the Russian army of
Wallacha.
Now TIE fact is flat the Turks have used their supe-
roIty in tie very way to nulify it aud provide for
being fndly beaten They did not concentrate their
forces on the Lower Danube. but divided them. While
30 Geo to 81 OO0 men occupied Wddin and Kaeia the
rest OF the army remained On the Middle and Lower
Danube They occupy the arc Of q circle while the
Russians occupy the chord Of this Thus the lat
ter have lees space to traverse in order to cOucen
tate al their troops on given spot Moreover the
shorter roads Of the Russians through level cOun
while the longer ones of the Turks pass over hills
and cross many mountain torrents. The Turkish posi-
ton is then as disadyantagtous be- aud yet it
has been taken in order satisfy the old prejudice that
there is 70 better way of barring road against an
enemy than by placing yourself across it.
On the 2Oh of December Omer Pasta knew at
Sluma, that the Russians were preparing general
attack upon Kaefat ior the 18th of January He had
twenty-five days time; yet such is the position of
kaleat with regard to the other stations of the Turk
sh army that It does not appear that he could bring
on any re.enforcements except few reserves from
Sofia On the other hand, that the Russians without
having received any considerable endorsements from
Lome-on January 3. Osten-Sacheus ubiquitous corps
vas not yet at Buc6arest-shoull venture upon a
concentration far west shows that either the state
of tie weather and the Of Danube did not allow the
Turks 10 cross the river OHer down. or that GOrcha-
ko had other reasons to be assured Of their inactivity
IN that quarter The Turks at Kslefat were or.
dered to attack the Russians while yet IN the
act of demonstrating Themselves The best wa! to do
this was to repeat the experiment of Oltenitza. Why
WIS NOT this done The bridge at Kaleat stands, in
spite of winter aud floating ice, aud there was no posi-
ton lower down where a similar bridge and bridge
head could be erected. Or had Omer Pasha been
ordered to keep on the right bank OF the river There
is go much of a contradictory nature in the Turkish
proceedings bold and ceycrmcasures are regularly
followed by the most papabe sins of omission and
commission that diplomatic agency must be at the bot
ton OF it. At oil events, GorchakOF would not have
stirred an in toward Kaleat had he not been certain
Il. 4 to- fftA~
meut
Altogether some 10000 Russians must have been
sent against Kalelat for with lesser force they would
hardly have yentured attack a fortified position de-
Tended by garrison of 10000 men with at least lOOOO
more for purposes of reserve or sally. At least one
lalf then. OF the Russian active army in Wdlachla
was concentrated there Where and how could the
other half, spread long line have resisted
Iulkish force crossing at Otenitza, Sstria or kr-
eova And if the communication between Wddln
end Kaeiat could be kept up without difficulty, then
there was q possibility OF crossing at other points.
thus The Russians by their position on the chord of
TIE arc the periphery Of which held by the Turks
enabled to bring a superior force to the field Of
battle 1T Tshetale while the Turks could not enforce
their corps at Kaleat though aware of the intended
attack 10, beforehand The Turks deprived Of that
movement OF diversion which would have prevented
the whole battle, deprived of the chance Of succor
were reducedtO their bravery and to the hope of cut
ting up lie enemy in detail before his concentration
was completed But this hope was slight, for they
could not move very far from Kaefat, and every hos
tile corps of inferior strength could retire ont OF the
circle of their operations Thus they fought for i've
DAYS generally with success but at last had to retire
again 10 their entertainments in the villages around
Kaleat the Russian forces being decidedly superior
in strength At the end when new reenforcements ar
rived Tie result is that the Russian attack upon
Kalefat is most probably averted delayed and that
Turks have shewn that in the open field no less than
behind ramparts and bitches, they can fight well The
nurderous character of the encounters msy be In
fered from the statement of letter from Bucharest
to the eject that in the engagements one whole reg-
neut of Russian rifles and all but l65 men OF reg
ment Of lapcers, were completely annihilated
At Oltenitza the Turks attacked in their en-
trercled positions by the Russians at Tshetale the Rus
slams were attacked in their entrenched positions by
the TURKS On both occasions the Turks have proved
Victorious but without reaping any positive results
from their victory. The battle of 0tenitza happened
Just when the proclamation of armisce was on its
way from Constantnope to the Danube. And the
LATHE of Tshetae curously comedies with the news
of the Diyan having accepted the last proposals OF
peace imposed upon them by their Western allies.
In the one instance the Vaccinations of diplomacy are
nullifed in the clash Of arms, while, in the other
the bloody work of war s simultaneously frustrated
by some secret diplomatic agency.