New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-12-15

But Abe susuon 10 SD enough eccn d IL -. 10
be sure, there may have been some s'rategcal and
tscscsa mistakes in the operations, such a. they
Sir have not the pr. tension TO say tia; my past
could impar authority to my remarks nut military
matters. I have not been brought up soldier, nei.
tber can claim the honor Of having hid to at the
part vi q sod,er in our glorious war. My duties
were high ana greet, but somewhat Of dferen, M
tuTe. They were just WHEAT the duties Of your Gov
eminent are now only thai mine were great deal
more difficult. We had TO fight two great powers
alone you three great powers united 10 ght only
one Of them. And / hsd no ready army. no rich
treasury, and sbuDdsDiy stored arsenals, and
no free coz nunicson with all the world |
had to create everything with nothing, ont Of
notbbg-money and armies and arms, and all
military implements. secluded, were, from
all the world and in the interior, with the deluied
oIetbird part Of our popuistion armed with fire and
murder in condition worse than the Vendee was TO
France, or Ireland sometimes to you. These were my
duties; and besides my duty hes been 10 designate the
object Of military operations, and 10 direct the in
general, Just the duties of your Government
Yet soldier NOT at that time; could not draw
the plan Of battle or drec; it myself But, the fsc
is, bad been able TO add the skill OF soldier to
patriotic devotion, no treason would have crept in
our ranks and Hungary were now free. Not all the
Cars Of the world would have defeated US. And who
tell whether may not yet be called upon to serve
ny country Therefore, | thought the time OF my
exile may be best employee IN preparing tor poss ole
emerl encies, by learning what unfortunately, have
not known before And, modest be my humble
abilities certainly dsre say, II assiduous application
and discretion guided by experience may sster the
mysteries Of an art soldier now, and feel COM
pefent TO Judge Of military matters.
With this consciousness, say there have certainly
been some very serious mistakes connected with the
operations IN the Crimea consider 1t an unac count
able mistake 10 have engaged IN the siege OF Sevas
top0 without taking preyiously hold OF the Strait of
PeTekop ia the forth and tar ng command, by sea,
of the Bay of Kercb in the east Ia prevent Or
at least reard the reenforcements which II was easy
TO foresialI, that Russia will send.
And that neglect once CON nltted, certainly can
not understand the logic of shifting the basis of oper
alton down TO the southernmost corner OF The penR
sula thus leaving the whole OF the land ree 10 draw
hence supplies 70 SevastOpo!, aad leaving the Rus
slams not only entirely at liberty TO send reinforce
mepts TO the Crimsa but leaving to them besides,
the road perfectly open and uDImpeied 10 enter Sc
vas'OpOl III small or large numbers, inst a. they
please. Ny opinion If, that yours being what Is
called a movable basis-the heet-you could
choose tina, point all along the coast, which
the beer 10 rest upon the bulk OF
your allied squadron is actually not south of
Sevas,opol at Baaklava, but north OF Sevastopol,
Of the Raess River. Why not remain To IRE with the
army likewise Why not draw up your lines, lean
ing ON the Bebek River, aording more or less pro-
lection against cavalry There, with q veil provided
re60ubt the point where the only road from the In
terror splits IN two toward Sevastopol AID BAlskaya
YOU by your position, already mad restricted the CON.
munEatOn Of Sevastopol 10 that narrow corner wheIS
il is n,w Your misfortune 10 be pent up. You would
have cut of oil the supplies from the Interior and no
reeDfCTcenens could have entered Sevds3pol With
out having first to fight separstey an open Iedi bat
tie wherein, certainly the Russians are no match for
your heroes there. Instead OF that, your army has
been established 10 leave Sevastopol perfectly
flee to communicate with the whole Empire Of Rus
STA. This il strategical error in my humble opin
ion. not even justified by tactical considerations
by besiegng the north instead of the south OF Segas
topol you would have encountered more of perms-
nent Notifications, which s no difficulty for engoeers,
but would have encountered less of an intrenched
camp, with less numerous a garrison, which make
your al difficulty; and at as once the north side
fortifc atoms taken you would AZ once have become
masters of the town alike whereas, on the contrary,
the taking Of the town will not make you
masters Of the northern forts. You would
have TO return for beseging them TO where YOU
had better begun; wac il lot more likely that all in
taking the town you shall either have but to do what
you did at BomarsuBd, and Fail off, and swiftly TOO,
or sba have in your turn, TO stand siege with the
difference that while you were the besIegers, Russia
had TO stand the siege in fortified place you,
the trary, would have TO stand i amid ruins,
yawDng. shattered and smonlderiDg. Even as to the
battle of the Alma glorious as II has been IN personal
callaniy, from the Commander-inC Chief down TO last
in rank and files, | can't help thinking that ii has
been wanton sacrifice in vausble life, and very de-
fectiye in plan. strong position never should be
attacked when il can be carried by turning it, and
this evidently the case, march of two English miles
up the Alma would have forced the Russians either
to retreat TO change their point with the loss of all
the advantages of the position. Not the wings but
the position had TO be turned And a. to the battle
ittelf why the turning of both the wings Of line OF
battle is certainly the worst plan which can be in'
agDed 1t is condemned by theory as well as by all
the history Of modern warfare. Also, IT did not sue
coed at the right wing of the enemy, where it would
have been Of importance still. the impetuous
daring Of the French soldier, AID the stern cour-
age Of the English soldier, have carried the
day. The French have elorou-ly maintained
their military renown, and the English soldier de-
served the more praise, as your shilling Nd pound
fashioned military regulations give him very scsnty
share IN the impulses OF noble ambition, weich the
French soldier draws from the consciousnes that he
carrts the materials 10 marehals staff In his KNAPP
sack, IA neglect on your part, bythe-by which is
dim spot on the shining orb of English civilization
They have gained the day, al honor to them; but
the 900 wounded and dead, laid down on that day
could have been rpared. forsoOth.
However all these and alike mistakes enter only
for secondary considerations in the estimation of the
situation such As II n
The chief error liz not more) on the part Of the
western, is in the very idea OF beginning war
against Russia by an expedition to the Crmea.
Not that were of the opinion that this war should
have been brought to an end without wrestling the
Crmea from the CzU, and destroying his Black Sea
feet, but am decidedly Of the opinion that this
ought TO have been one Of the last strokes, and by
no means the first in case, which l would
have undertaken 10 deal before had, by successful
victories in Bessarabia and around Odesss driven
the Russians back from the Black Sea, and
PeHtcuy isolhttd the CnInea from the rest OF
the Russian Empire. Then, taking my aand
with the main body of my forces in conve-
ME mt loo atty somewhere about Odessa which,
member, might have been accomplished, as circuu.
stances were up to the half of September certainly
would have sent some 30 900 men to take Sevastopo
who heroes they are, with gallant experienced in
telleent chief at their head Lord Raglan s would
hsve done the work up to this day, and would have
found Menchikof cut of from every hope Of relief
fighting at the best but for military reputation a.
Gen, Chase ole at Antwerp. But in the mean while
] would have been perfectly content vi knowing
the Russian feet parslyz by the very presence OF
your vastly superior squadron in the Black Sea.
would have been rather glad TO know that the neces