Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1854-12-23

arkable instance Of the absurd and the contradictory
am certain did, And yet 1t is in keeping with
his theory that mind acts But is there not wide chasm
between thinking and acting! Conduct you Know means
understanding and conduct that is observable between an
idea and act thought and an action lwould be just
proper for me to say the act OF an as Is ior
Locke to say the conduct Of the understanding. But
whoever heard Of an idea acting? Here again
to the very point in ISSUE say man acts and thinks
say 1t is man considered immaerial principle that
both acts and thinks and that it is action and thinking
that constitutes man. Let me, however, be more pre-
cisely correct hold that is active principle
primarily, and this active principle is inherently lwn
not say naturally empowered to cogtate to conclude 20
weigh evidence, and to determine Intelgently 70 acL
Hence man has no distinct faculties in precise philoso
phical accuracy But language is inhrm and hence
we often soy has mind has hearing has feeling
has sense and faculties &C. But he has lin the sense Of
possesses) none Of these qualities Man thinking
hearing, feeling and willing being or principle.
The reader will observe that whenever he thinks that
has faculty he has to submit to distinction be-
tween the and that faculty Whoever does this viii
inevitably share the fate that attended Reir and
Steward. who held that nan had moral sensefes gy
s Iss5 Sss !sss Ell
soul made immortal by its transfercnce from its material
organization to spiritual life. Contemplate for mo-
ment if you please soul in spiritual state would
be in very dstressful and unenviabe condition. with
out mind Or intelligence or without hearing Or seeing
1t would be perfectly inert This brings you to perceive
the great and striking superiority of my philosophy over
that of Locke.
Endow the win with intelligence and with m ability
hear see feel &c., and then You have something prepared
for the enjoyment Of another state of existence to which
Plato referred and also make the will and the soul den
tical and you have consistent system Of moral PHI
losophy What think you! ft
Will YOU permit me to make short extract bearing
upon the subject under review but taken from work Of
great ability, but rather Of more theological order than
comports with my professed purpose to De purely phio-
sophical refer to Edwards's work on the will The
extract is as follows:
The will is that power BY which the mind chooses any
thing Tho faculty Of the viii is that power principle Of
the mind by which it is capable Of choosing God
has endued the soul with faculties is that by which
it capable of perception and speculation, or by which 1t
discern and views and judges of things which Is called the
understanding the other faculty and it Is to this portion
Of the extract to which wish particularly direct your
enon that by which the soul does not merely perceive
things but is in way Inclined to them or is
disinclined or averse from them"
This latter faculty, that also views and perceyes things
he calls the "will."
Edwards was forced, and very much to the expense
of his theory make the acknowledgment that the will
not only ateisMty chooses, but views and Perceiyes
things in the light Of reason.
1t may appear very paradoxical for any man TO con-
tend at this day. in the face Of the number magnitude,
and weight Of the authorities against it, that the human
will has an inherent capacity to think but if the reader
will carefully peruse the works of the greatest meta
physical philosophers with eye to this precise view he
will be astonished at the extreme number Of instances in
which they are led to the seemingly unavoidable concu
sion that the viii thinks. " BY the will, says David
Hume, " nothing but the internal pewer feel
and conscious of when knowngy give rise to any
motion Of the body perception of the mind "
humbly ask the reader If this does not sustain my
theory that the will thinks Does not Hume cay that
the win kaowngy gives rise to neU perception of the
mind the will knoacigly does it, does it not do il
intelgently and can it do it inteligently without
thought thinking? Locke himself says bnt with whai
consistency let others determine that the will power
in the mind to direct the operative faculties We find
in ourselves power to begin forbear continue or
end several actions of our minds and motions Of our
bodies barely by thought preference of the mind
power in any agent to do forbear any particular
ion according the determination thought of the
mind the power Of the mind to determine its thoughts
to the producing continuing or stopping any action as
far as it depends on us. We must remember that vo-
ton willing is an act of the mind whereby by
thought the mind gives rise, continuation or stop to any
action which it takes to be in its power"
The thought which prompts the will to action must
certainly exercise Ineligible or mental influence upon
the will and this Ineligible influence is necessarily pre-
dicated upon the ability Of the will to be alive to the
weight and influence Of reasons and to comprehend and
perceive
It's impossible for me to disguise from you the i'm
portan consequences which would legmately grow out
Of the substitution Of this theory for the commonly
ceived one to which it is opposed. We would at once
get rid of that troublesome Pandora's box strongly
urged by Hobbies and Clarke and the whole school Of
whole school Of necessitarans that the will is the last
determination Of the mind" Upon this hinges the doc
trne of necessity.
But the most interesting view which can be taken of
my theory presents itself when we come to turn our at
tenon to the affections of the human heart The great
difficulty with Locke and the disciples Of his school is
dispose Of the affections in harmony with their philo-
sophical position that the will is the last act of debe-
ration" the words Of Hobbies. If the viii vo-
on be the dictate of the understanding then love land
under the head Of love include all the aections) must
either be the offspring of the mind be the offspring Of
that which is the dictate Of the mind This makes love
the creature of reason the product of dea the off
shoot Of thought the result Of thinking Every body
knows from their experience that this is false
clusion Although my theory disenchants the affections
of much of that halo thrown around them by poets and
noveists yet it presents consistent philosophy If
be willing principle, endowed with thinking capacity,
then love, the affections, be the state states
Of the human will. Hence would define love to be the
voluntary submission of the will The extent of this
untary submission is the extent force of the feeling of
love- The who submits his will to the obect beloved
but in small degree, loves but in small degree but
he who is voluntarily disposed to make great personal
sacrifices for beloved object loves that object in the pre-
else ratio of the disposition
Fearing that have trespassed already upon your valu
able time and paper at great length beg conclude
in the words of Tupper and say that have given you
thoughts that have tarred in my mind and peoped its
inner chambers the sober children of reason desul
tory train of fancy clear running wine of conviction with
the scum and lees Of speculation" w. s. GRAYSON.
BENTON, MIssIssRPI, NOVEMBER, 1854.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE.
MONDAY, DECEMBER Is, 1854.
Ordinary meeting PETER Force, Esq, President, in