Daily national era. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1854, 1854-05-26

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it. With these advantages, and those which
the attacking force always has of choice, OF
time and place, an enemy possessing consid.
cradle military marine could, with compare.
lively little cost to himself, subject us to en-
| ormous expenses In giving to our Pacific from.
tier that protection which it is the duty Of the
General Government to afford.
| In the first years of war with any great
maritime power the communication by sea
could not be relied upon for the transportation
of supplies from the Atlantic TO the Pacific
States. Our naval peace establishment would
not furnish adequate conveys for the number of
storeships which it would be necessary to EN-.
ploy, and storeships alone laden with supplies
could not undertake voyage OF twenty thous-
and miles, passing numerous neutral ports,
where an enemy's armed vessels even of the
smallest size, might lie in wait TO intercept
| them.
| The only line Of communication then would
be overland, and by this it would be imprac-
ticable, with any means heretofore used, to
furnish the amount of supplies required for the
defence of the Pacific frontier. At The present
prices over the best part of this route the ex-
pense of land transportation alone for the an
nual supplies of provisions, clothing, camp
| equip page, and ammunition for such an army
| as it would be necessary to maintain there,
would exceed $4,000 ,000 the land transpor-
tation Of each field l2.pounder, with due
supply of ammunition for one year, would cost
| $4,000; of each 24pounder and ammunition,
| $4,000 and Of u sea.coast gun and ammun-
| ton, $4,000. The transportation Of ammu
milton for year for 1000 sea-coast guns would
cost 100000. But the expense of trans
poration would be vastly increased by war;
and at the rates that were paid on the northern
frontier during the last war with Great Britain
the above estimates would be trebled. The
time required for the overland Journey would
be from four to six months. In point of fact
however, supplies for such an army could not
be transported across the continent. On the
arid and barren belts to be crossed, the limited
quantities of water and grass would soon be
exhausted by the numerous draught animals
required for heavy trains, and over such dis
tances forage could not be carried for their SUBJ
sstence
On the other hand, the enemy would send
out his supplies at from oneseventh to one
twentieth the above rates, and in less time,
perhaps in one-fourth the time, if he should
obtain command of the isthmus routes.
Any reliance, therefore, upon furnishing that
part Of our frontier with means of defence from
the Atlantic and interior States after the com
mencement of hostilies would be vain; and
the next resource would be to accumulate
there such amount of stores and supplies as
would suffice during the continuance of the
| contest or until we could obtain COMMAND of
the Assigning but moderate limit to
| this period the expense would yet be enormous
The Notifications, depots, and storehouses
would necessarily be on the largest scale, and
the cost of placing supplies there for FIVE years
would amount to nearly Sl00,000,000. In
many respects the cost during peace would be
equivalent to that during war. The perishable
character of many articles would render it per-
haps impracticable to put provisions in depot
for such length of time, and in any case
there would be deterioration amounting to
some millions of dollars per year.
These considerations, and others of strictly
military character, cause the department to ex-
anime with interest all projects promising the
accomplishment of railroad communication
between the navgabe waters Of the Missis
sppi and those of the Pacific ocean. AS mill
tary operations depend in n greater degree
npon rapidity and certainty of movement than
upon any other circumstance, the introdnc-
ton of railway transportation has greatly
improved the means of defending our At.
lantc and inland frontiers; and, to give
US sense of security from attack upon the
most exposed portion Of our territory, it is re-
tation should be extended to the Pacific coast
Were such a road completed, our Pacific coast
instead of being further removed in time and
less accessible TO US than to an enemy, would
be brought within few days Of easy commu
nication, and the cost Of supplying army
there, instead Of being many times greater TO
us than to him, would be about equal. We
would be relieved Of the necessity OF accumu
lating large supplies on that coast, to waste
perhaps, through long years Of peace and we
could feel entire confidence that, let war come,
when and with whom it may, before a hostile
expedition could reach that exposed frontier an
ample force could be placed there to repcl any
attempt ut invasion.
From the results Of the SURVEYS authorized
by Congress, we derive ut least the assurance
that the work is practicable, and may dismiss
the apprehensions which, previously, we could
not but entertain as 10 the possibility Of defend
ing our Pacific territory through long war
with powerful maritime enemy.
The judgment which may be formed ms TO
the prospect Of It's completion must control our
future plans for the military defence Of that
frontier, and any plan for the purpose which
should leave that consideration out Of view
would be rs imperfect as il it should disregard
all those other resources with which commerce
and art aid the operations Of armies.
Whether we shall depend on private capital |
and enterprise alone for The early establish.
ment Of railroad communication, or shall pro
mote its construction by such aid MS the gene.
raj government may conslilutionally give
whether we shall rely on. the continuance OF
peace until the increase Of the population and
resources OF The Pacific States shall render
them independent Of aid from those Of the At.
lantic slope and Mississippi valley; or whether
we shall adopt the extensive system Of defence
above referred TO, are questions Of public policy
which belongs to Congress 10 decide.
Beyond the direct employment Of such
road for military purposes, it has other rela.
tons to all the great interests Of our confede.
racy, political, commercial, and social, the
prosperity OF which essentially contributes to
the common defence. or these it is not my
purpose TO treat further than TO point to the
additional resources which it would develop.
and the increase Of population which must
attend upon giving such facility Of COMMUNE |
cation TO country so tempting 10 enterprise, |
much OF which having most valuable products |
is beyond reach Of market.
refer TO the reports Of the officer in charge |
of fho Cup auI A.