The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-10-26
The War In the Crimea-Prospects Of tue
CamuolQu.

The War In the Cflmca-Proepec0 OF tue
Campaign.
The Intelligence received from the seat OF
war by the Simultaneous arrival OF the Wish
ington and the Niagara, although one week
later in date than our previous advices, alters
in no material respect the position OF uie belli-
gerents. The occupation Of Balakllva Is ON.
.c;ally confirmed and the investiture of Scbas-
tepol by the allies is also placed beyond doubt.
The bombardment of the town and fortress is
stated to have commenced onshe 5th, but up
to the date of the latest dispatches, after an
interval of two days energetic operations, no
impression seems TO have been made on the
Russian defences Owing to some difficulties
that had not been forseen the original plan Of
attack has been altered, snd instead of its being
directed from the north and south, as at first
contemplated, the besisgers have invested the
town ON its southern and eastern sides. The
motive of this alteration is perhaps to be found
| in the fact that Prince Menschikoff still keeps
the field to the north of Sebastopol, in expecta-
| ton of the arrival of the promised reinforce
ments from Anapa. and of the large force which
is on it's way from. Odessa under Generals Luz
ders and Osten. Secken, and which, by private
advices received by some Of the Greek houses,
| is stated to have already entered the Crimea.
| The fate Of Sebastopol, and indeed of the
campaign itself as far as the present season Is
conc rned, may therefore he considered in q
great degree to rest upon the timely arrival of
these forces From present appearances the
capture Of the Russian stronghold does not
seem likely to prove work of as easy accom-
plishment.es the previous successes of the al
lies had led people to expect The preparations
made for the defence of the harbor indicate that
desperate and protracted resistance is con-
templated by the garrison. Vice Admiral
Dundas reports to his government that the Rus
slams had sunk eight line of battle ships across
the entrance to the harbor. Eight sail Of the
line have been moored east and west inside the
booms and three of the ships have beer heeled
over SO as to give their guns sufficient eleva-
ton to sweep the land to the northward When,
in addition to these facts, we take into account
that twenty thousand of the troops that took
the field under Prince Menschikoff had been
detached to reinforce the garrison previous to
the arrival of the allies, there are strong
grounds FOR believing that the place may hold
| out until the forces from Odessa end Anapa
| have had time to jein the Russian commander
in-chief. Everything, therefore, hinges upon
this possibility, over which, it is true, some
| doubts are thrown by the ignorance which
seems to prevail as to the movements
| of the auxiliary forces. If the statement at
tributed to Omer Pacha, that the Russian rein
| forcemeLts from Bessarabia could not reach
Perekop before the 18th of October be correct,
| they may arrive too late to prevent the sur
render of the fortress. We can hardly believe
however, that in presence of the dangers that
menaced this, the most important of his fort
resses the Gar could have made such q mis-
take in his calculations as to have ellowed such
long interval to elapse without giving orders
to put these troops in movement for the Crimea-
The magnitude Of the expedition fitted out by
the allies, and its point of operations, were
known to him sufficiently long to provide
| against the results of Prince Menschikofrs de-
| feat in the feld-a contingency which he must
| have had some reason to apprehepd. The pre-
sumption is, therefore, in favor of the statement
that the expected achievements are already in
| the Crimea, and that they will soon be able to
4
Menschikof7s command.
Admitting, however, the hypothesis that Sc
bastopol is taken, and the Russian feet ami
hiated, will it bring US any nearer to the
solution of the difficulties that have given rise
to this murderous war? We apprehend not
There lie only one state of things under which
| the allies can hope to hold possession Of the
| Crimea during the ensuing winter, and that is
| in the event of the native population being
favorably disposed towards them 1t 10 true
| that the Western journals have been indus
triously circulating reports confrmatory of
this assumption; but we daily see how little re-
lance is to be placed in their statements. From
the descriptions given of the country, all bear
| ing testimony to its prosperous and comfortable
| condition the inhabitants of the Crimea do not
seem to have such reason to complain of Rus
sian rule Notwithstanding the assertions that
are made to the contrary, they may have sense
enough to question whether they would better
themselves by change of masters. Their con-
tentment with their formidable visitors may be,
and very probably is, merely the hypocrisy Of
fear and the Encouragement arising from the
consciousness of weakness. Let the Gear throw
su Eicient forces into the Crimea to hold the
allied armies in check, and we may see this al
legged sympathy for these invaders converted
into active hostility.
Should this prove to be the case, any long
tenure Of the Crimean peninsula would become
impossible to the allies With the compare
lively small army which they at present pos
sess in that country, and the obstacles which
the navigation of the Black Sea would present
to their receiving reinforcements during the
winter, they would soon be overwhelmed by the
forces which the Russians would pour into the
Crimea. Under these circumstances the only
alternative left for them, after the destruction
of the town and fortress of Sensational would no