Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1853-1862, 1854-01-07

ousy, another division effected the passage at Nice
poll, and column of 1000 men descended nearly to
Giurgewo but subsequently retreated to their orig
mat position at Turmul This the column
whose sudden appearance caused such inexplicable
confusion in the Geographic dispatches About the
same time strong demonstrations were made, low
er down, against Giurgewo and Oitenitza, an ac-
count of which we will defer moment for the
purpose of presenting plan of the campaign, and
explaining the reasons which led the Turkish Gen
eral to the adoption of so extensive base of ope-
rations.
1t has been almost universally proclaimed both
by friends and enemies that OMAR committed a
radical fault in attacking from three points so dis
tant from each other but this criticism is scarcely
lust when we consider the relative positions and
necessities of the two armies. The questionable
faith Of Austria, and the threatened insubordina-
ton of Servia required absolutely the presence of
strong force in the Northwest, which might over
awe, particularly the former power, by playing up
on her fears Tor Hungary in case of an open decla-
ration of war This consideration alone is sufficient
to explain why the "a 900 men, who crossed to
Calaat, never penetrated beyond Crajowa, and the
best possible use to which they could be put, was
by operating diversion on the extreme right to
withdraw GoRTscHAKoFF attention from the de-
sign on his centre; had OMAR obtained foothcld at
Giurgewo and 0.tenitza, the combined divisions
could have marched upon Bucharest aud accom-
J,
Walachia, inasmuch as the corpse at Crajowa could
never dare peril its communication with the main
BODY. This is the plan suggested and explained by
us in Our articles OF the 18th, 22d and December
lst, and considering that OMARs object was to ac-
complsh the retreat of the Russians from the pro-
vinces, and at the same time hold Austria in check
while his inst uctions forbid him to provoke a
pitched battle we do not know any plan which held
out frer hopes Of success 1t is true, that he ex-
posed himself to the possibility of being defeated
in detail, a Ia Napoleon but he we'll aware of
the weakness Of the Russian army that it was not
capable of executing brilliant manouvres, and he
moreover counted very strongly upon the disafec-
ton of the Nallachan peasantry, while his own
troops were ready to accomplish all that could be
expected from hardhood, valor and enthusiasm
In pursuance Of the plan, repeated attacks were
made upon the central point Giurgewo but as we
reiterated the natural decnces of the place afford
it such complete protection, that the Turks have
not once succeeding Ii taking possession of the
village.
The struggle which took place at Oltenitza was
of much greater Importance. On the lst Nov the
Turks seized the island in the Danube, ard spent
the night in erecting Notifications. On the ID,
landing effected at the eastern side of the con-
huence Of the Argis and the Danube, by body Of
1000 infantry, q battalons a battery of 3 guns
and 100 sharp shooters, armed on the model OF the
7ir7IRenrs de VincenneS, This operation was aided
by the cannon Of Turtukai, which enflade the bat
tle-ield, and quickly caused the dispersion of the
Russian force The Turks having captured a num-
Der of boats, completed their bridge on the night
CT the Sd, and transported some heavy artillery in
to the LaZzaretto, massive stone building, which
played very important part in the contest About
o'clock, the Russian army put in notion and
Omar Immediately ordered another battalion of in
iantry into the Lazzaretto. The Turkish field
work extended from one river to the other their
right resting on the Danube, and supported by the
% guns in Turtukai their left on the Argis aided
by the battery on the Island, the Lazzaretto form
ing centre; the number of troops NAV be put
down at 1000 300, to wit, four battalions in
fantry (3,2O0,) two companies of the guard QGO)
two companies Of sharp-shooters, C2OO) with the
artillerymen. kahid Pacha commanded the Lag
zaretto, Ahmed Pacha the battery on the Island
while Omar remained in Turtuka The Russian
centre consisted of II battalions infantry and IA
guns their right, on the Args, of battalions with
: guns Their lett was very strong battalonS,
cannon and ; regiments of cavalry. The battle
commenced about II O'Clock by a charge from the
Russian centre, which was initiated by the wings;
but it was impossible for the left to withstand the
canonnade from Turtukai; it broke quickly and
compelled the centre also to retreat, while the bat
terry on the island proved amply sufficient for the
Russian right. The charge was twice repeated
with great desperation, but without success and at
p ~, the battle was won; eight hundred dead
were left on the field and it is thought that twice
the nlmber were removed during the contest
Omar states the Russian force to have consisted of
20 battalions infantry, regiments cavalry. l of
Cossacks, 80 field pieces, which has been variously
estimated at from 900 to &c, 600 men As will be
remarked the victory was owing mainly to the ar
tlery, which discharged 1900 balls; the bale fige
also did very effective service
Matters remained quiet till about the 9th. when |
the winter rains set n causing the Danube to over
liz ms of tbai lands -.
cation with the Southern shore by boat bridges, ex-
ceedlngly precariOus and quite uniting the marshy
country OF Wailachia TO- the transportation of ar
tlery or military operations in general these con- |
sderations, in connection with the advces from |
Constantlnopis, prevailed upon Omar to withdraw |
his forces to Bulgaria, retaining only the position
OF halatat, which has been strongly fortified and |
proved to be of the greatest service in separating
the army Of Gorschakoff from the Servian NAL. con-
tents. With the exception Of their having secured |
a future entrance into the enemys territory the
Turkish army is physically in the same situation
as before the advance Of the 9th Oct its repeated
however, have greatly elevated its morale
while the Russians have suffered a corresponding
depression; the subjects Of the Porte feel conf
dence in their capacity of resistance, which for
many long year, has been alien to their bosom.
We fear very gr6aty, lest a suspension of arms
I)r even the winter months, may not cause a bank
rupt treasury, which has none of those grand re-
sources so necessary and useful to more civilized ma
lions IN times Of emergency. The successes on
he Danube had caused the Western Powers to
'etre, in measure, from the position of defiance
o Russia, which they had once appeared disposed
o assume; but human nature is at heart always
generous, and with the reception of the disastrous
lews from Smope, the of christian sympa-
Ines throughout the world Except Russia) has
eered and points steadily to the differing nina
cts of Byzantum, We have always beeI of the
pmion, which we expressed so long ago as the
9th Nov, that conflict at sea would inevitably
esut IN the discontinue of the Turks but there
re grounds for discreditng the extent of the mis-
'1tune, which, we sincerely hope, may be sane
oned by the next arrival; should the loss prove
be as great as at first reported there is so much
ne more reason for expecting that the next steamer
'I bring advlces of decisive action on the part of
ne four Powers.