The Evansville daily journal. [volume] (Evansville, Ia. [i.e. Ind.]) 1848-1862, 1854-12-25
WHAT THE russians THINK OF THE WAR.


Mr. T. p. Shaffner Secretary of the Amer
lean Telegraph Company, recently returned
from Rus sis, has favored US with some inter-
esiing information on public opinion there
in relation to the Crimean campaign and the
prospects of the war. Mr.. Shaffner left the
capital after the 25ih of October.
When the report reached ST. Petersburgh
that the Allied forces had actually sailed
from Varna, it was scarcely credited that an
invasion of the Crimea was seriously con-
templated. The events which have subse-
quently taken place in that Peninsula have
sufficiently proved this. Nicholal never fan
ced that the expedition would be undertaken
in the face OF severe winter. He gave the
allied commanders more credit than to sup
pose that they would risk the defeat, and per.
haps, the total humiliation of their army
The climate of the country and the tempes.
tuous season Of the year, SO near at hand,
were as hostile to the English and French as
they were favorable to the Russirns.
In the middle OF October, the storms which
have already wrecked SO many vessels of the
invading feet, begin to sweep with resistless
fury over the Black Sea, q nd render the trans
port OF troops often impossible, and always
"
reg ular supply of provisions and ammunition
is then precarious, and, in country, where
no food can be obtained, the situation of a
hostile army under the most favorable cir
cumstanc es must be critical in the extreme
Hence the Crimea was the last point in his
dominons W here Nicholas anticipated a at
tack. The danger as he conceived lay in
Poland and alo7g the Australian frontiers,
under arms to meet i.
When, therefore, the allied forces landed
at Eupatoria, the Russi an commander was
almost taken by surprise. His whole avail
able forces in the Crimea amounted only to
some 25 900 men, including :he garrison of
SebastUpol. Reinforce nents, h owever, could
be brought up within fortnight's time, and,
provided sufficient delay could be obtained,
Sebastopol and the Crimea were safe. In
Prince Menschikoff's despatch sent 10 st.
Petersburg, before the battle OF the a Ina,
the plan OF the campaign was distinctly la 10
down. He was TO hold the allies in check
by series of engagements, retreating, il IN.
successful, On the city. There he expected
to receive the powerful aid OF Liprandi's di-
vision. But il this, from any unforeseen ac-
cdent, did not arrive, and he found it impos-
sible to defend Sebastopol with the force un-
der his command, he intended to blow up the
forts, sink the ships, and hold eff until, with
an increased army, he could offer the enemy
battle with hopes of success.
Pursuant TO this plan skirmish first took
place near Eupatoria, in which the Russians
los, 500 men, occasioned chiefly by the
guns OF the allied vessels. This affair has
been scarcely noticed in the reports we have
lrereived. At Alma the Russians declared
they had but % 900 men, and that after The
bttle they were enabled TO retreat in good
order to she city. They expected that the
allies would speedily follow. Menschko!f
even declared in his dispatches TO the Gear
that, by vigorous assault the stronghold
might at this time have been captured. For
such result he seems TO have been fully
+ prepared. But when he that the allies
hesitated 20 advance, his hopes of defending
the place we're strengthened. Couriers,
morning and evening, were sent to st.
Petersburgh with the intelligence that the
enemy had not altered his position. And
when at last the enemy did press forward,
and invested a portion of the city, the anx-
iously expected reinforcements, under Lip
randi, had arrived, and Menschikoff felt GER
tain OF ultimate success.
command, and a communication to the Cri-
mea open during the winter, by means OF
sletges, the battle of the Alm,, BaIaklava,
and lnkermann have been as good as so many
victories to Gar. But the allied troops
, declimated by war and disease, with their
supplies OF ammunition and food cut off OF
delayed by the storms on the Black Sea-
must be considered lost army, though e, cry
| mi sh nj fha I'D a,I,
ance Of hero. 1t is serious question now
whether even a retreat is possible. 1t was
; considered miroculous when cavalry, Infantry
+ and artillery were all safely landed at Eup-
atoria, in calm summer weather; but how
would they fare now when it has been found
impossible to land the wounded, who were
obliged to remain in the ships, tossing fol
days upon those stormy waves3 What
= would become OF the remnant of that ma o.
nificent armament is such tempest as that
! which destroyed thirty.two vessels of the
fleet! To winter in the Crimea would be
scarcely less disastrous.
' The severity of the climate aud the unceas
ing hostilities of a relentless, persevering
enemy, would fearfully lessen their numbers
a 1t is barely possible that they could maintain
\ their present position. The Russian has al.
ready prohted by the experience Of the cam.
paign. He has lehrned that his own muskeI
Is u very inferior weapon to the MIME rifle
and it is expected that this disadvantage, un.
der which he now abors, will shortly be re-
< moved. Under every aspect of the case for
b tune seems to frow upon the alice. Bra
very can do much in most cases, but in this
even the dauntless couaage and impetuou,
=, bearing displayed at Inkermann can only
u prolong the struggle.
A defeat before the walls of Sevastopo
will entail result upon which It would b.
y vain to speculate. Dssatisfied with the
). failure of the i!l-pianued expedition, tn,
q French people may wreak their vengence or
Nan Itt,p hot