Lynchburg daily Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1852-1861, 1854-10-04
THE WAR
From the IoodoD y'jueg of Sc

II is reported and seems to be believed, that !
Admiral Sir CHARLES NAPIEI; may be shortlye N-
peced IN this country on his retain from the
Baltic. His arrival would of course, Imply dat
operations in that quarter an at an end for the
year, and that our fleet will soon lind its way to
England for the winter. We must need express |
an anxious hope that the rumor III question may
not be true, for such resolution ON the part Of
our authorities would, we think. be Unnecessary,
illtimed, and calculated both 10 damage the cause
of the Allies and serve that of the Russians.
The only reason which could compel the return Of
the fleet from the waters vi lch II now commands,
would be the approach of the winter As
the Baltic ports at such times sealed up By
ice, and the blockade of the Russian cuffs Ctftc-
tuay maintained by the natural ~. ration of the
climate, it would be clearly supertluuu- 10 add
any artificial barriers to those already provided,
even if it were possible for "A squadron to keep the
sea ut such periods of the year. Exactly, in
short, rs there was time before which it was
unnecessary that the Baltic should be guarded by
an allied squadron, there is a time beyond,
which it will be Unnecessary that tins guard should
be continued; but that time has certainly not yet
arrived. The period at which.npon an average,
the closure of the Ncya may be expected, Is, as
recently explained, two months Instant and,
EVENT. preparations for the fleet were commenced
somewhat earlier,it is clear that four or five weeks
must still remain available for active operations.
How, indeed, are 10 reconcile the two facts
that, while m the Black Sea the work of war -
Just commencing, in the iialte il should Just be
terminated If enough remains of the Autumn
to permit the siege oI Scbastopol to he attempted,
must not enough remain to allow of some further
enterprise in the north!
We consider that this cessation of operations
would be i'll timed because everything al pre-
sent suggests contrary course. We have Just
learnt our strength, and the enemy his weakness;
the Allies have been encouraged. and the Rus
sjuns dishcartened. After believing somewhat
too implicitly in the imputed strength Of granite
| notifications, we have just seen this persuasion
| demolished by the test of experiment.. The
! stone forts on which Russia relies have be shown
to he no match for the floating batteries which
! represent the power of England and France. If
! the Edinburgh ut 800 yards IN seven broadsidcs
| can knock Il breach III the towers of l}umarSuUd,
! why should not Admiral Chads have au opportu-
nifty Of performing the same feat mt Fort AtXon-
! der. on the north side, or Fort Constantine
J the south side Of the island of Constadt III
contest which was a trial of strength between Of
fcnsre and defensive systems, that of the de
! fence proved the weaker and nothing,
| therefore, could seem more impotic than that
the assailuntS should at this very conianctgrc
rclinquish the advantages obtained. The fail of
! Bomarsnd appeared to open II the Allied squad.
rons all the stronghods of the Russian CULTS,
aud it is clear frohl the despatch of General
/
tually regarded in this light. Where then, can
be the wisdom of foregoing a superiority thus
! tahlished ut the moment when il might be turned
to good account Surely, if il had been found
! TINT we can destroy granite forts without risk of
getting our ships aNkwardly crippled we might
as we'll pursue tie advantage as long Is the sea
son will permit.
That our fleets will have done good work by
blockading the Russian sqaadrons, pnral} ling
Russian trade, and bringing themselves safe
home again, is certainly true, but this Is all the
more reason for dcprving the enemy of the
smallest pretext for dsparaging the results of
the campaign. Sweaborg Gronstadt, and not
! Spithead, should now be the destination of Sir
| CHARLES NAPIER,
The Paris Moaiteur publishes the following
in the form of n letter from Constantnople =
The expedition to the Crimea is at length de
cided ON, aud Sehastopo will be attacked. Sc
bnStopol is the citadel which shelters IL fleet al
ways ready to threaten the Bosphorus, hoating
| bridge which, in the idea OF the Gar, has long
united st. Petersburg to Constnntinople 1t j.
necessary that this fleet should be taken from
| Russia, in order that that Power shall no longer
have anything but impossibilities in the East,and
that the chances even of treason shall be dotini.
| lively taken from her. 1t is after long and ma
ture delihcration that of all the attacks possible
against the Russian possessions in the Black Sea
| the most formidable has been chosen for the de-
| but The greater part Of the Anglo French troops
and 10000 picked Turkish troops, will be con
veved in two trips of the fleets 10 the shores of
! thc Crimea, ut a short distance from Scbasopol.
| As soon as troops shall have been landed, they
will be led on TO battle either against the Rus
sian troops,if they should endeayor TO defend the
positions which surround Sebastopol. or against
the place itselfftho Russians content themselves
with waiting for their formidable visitors under
shelter of the walls. If Ssbastopo be taken. the
combined armies will have accomplished str-
king feat of arms, which will complete the demon
alizaton If Russia, and materially facilitate the
ro-establ shment of peace If, on the contrary.
the number of Russians present in the Cia,a
should be more considerable than was supposed
if the town should prulongits defence, andi Obj
staces should arise in a few weeks from the sea
son-if, in short, a strong Russian army should
Slcceed in reinforcing the Grimea, the troops
would have to TT embark, and the attack on Sc
bnstopol would be resumed at the commencement
of next spring under different conditions. To
attack the Crimea is, on the part of France and
England, to take an engagement 10 conquer. and
no can doubt but TINT the engagement will
be kept. To conquer the Crimea at any cost, or
to abandon to the Russians the empire of the
East-such is the alternative in which Rus ia has
placed the Western Powers Whatever may he
the obstacles TO be overcome, the definite result
cannot be doubtful
In relation to Il . harvest aud Corn trade. the
Mark Lane Express, the organ of the Fnfsli.h
Agricultural interest, takes :he view thnf Will.