The daily union., 1854-11-28

deaken in which success was left mainly to depend upon
the combined action OF an army and feet
II all the strongholds of Russia including her naval de-
fences be taken by troops unaided by the guns OF
our fleet the know it the better That
muncatons with Balakava have been of appears ol
ernby certain from the report Of fleet having selected
port further SOUTH and Sebastopol This if
deed necessary by the movements of the enemy after the
2oh has changed the base Of operations bat with
what advantage beyond being the actual siege OPP
eraons, it is impossible to say Such change, however,
indicates certain degree Of weakness and may have been
attended with considerable loss of stores and other
niuons OF war; STILL all these losses may be repaired
that the allied governments have been reused of
danger and taking steps pour troops into the Cr
TO the OF the heroic little armies that they have
but too long neglected The French government are
making preparations for the departure of troops aarge
scale and government preparing despatch both
cavalry and infantry regiments to the Of action But
the entire force we can command at present is totally mad
equae TO the emergency before 10000 10000 Brit
ish and many French troops least required 10
clear the Crimea of the Russian force at present in that
country
From the Paris Constitutional, semi-of offeiai
SURPRISE
Russian despatch received few days ago, announced
that the 25h and Goth Gen Liprand had combats
with the allied troops No details of these two engage
ments were known; ii not very certain what
point they took place. accounts placed the of
them at Balakaya others at the north of Sebnsopo in the
environs of Eupatora and if in the latter place it became
difficult to understand how French division could have
taken part in them. The dispatches published by the
English government and private letters have thrown
complete light on the two combas and dssipated the
dsqnetude which may have been conceived. The Rus
sans after ng success have lost the last chance of de-
lverng Sebastopol.
1t is known that the allied army forms semi-circle
around Sebasopo the French extend from Cape Cherso
and the TO the rivulet which flows into the mill
ary port of Sebastopo and the English from that rvuet
to the river Tchernaa AT about two and half leagues
from the lines OF the besegers is Baakava, where the
English artillery disembarked where the magazines of
the allies established and where the latter cOmmuni-
cate with the fleet The protection of Baaklava
ElaA htn
of cavalry and artillery At two kilometres Zone and
quarter me above Balakava the road which leads to
Sebastopo and al the point at which second road lead
ing to SimerOpo and into the interior of the Crimea
strikes Off meet the first heights of the Tauric chain
These heights which dominate the hand Balakava
and the other the barren sppe in which the aes are
encamped defended by redoubs the guard of which
contded to the Turkish troops Finally at the foot
of these heights and in the Of the beegers the
des ned to cover the siege for the French the d
vision of General Bosquet supported the for the
English the division Of the Duke OF Cambridge and final
y brgades of English cavalry, under the orders of
Lord Lucan, protecting the Tchernaia
After receiving Gen. Liprands reinorcements Prince
Menschiko resolved to turn the right Of the allied army
in order to place the besiegers between two fires and
make bold attack Balaklava. II this coup dc man
had succeeded the allies could only have communicated
with the fleets by Cape Ohersonesus would longer have
had open road to the and would have been de-
prved of their magazines and yet they would have been
obliged reply to the fire of Sebasopol and to defend
themselves in their entertainments They would conse-
guently have become besieged in their turn
achkof could SPARE entered the mountain from which
the Tcherraia flows, and which the allied army had
crossed in its turning movement from the Belbek to Ba-
akaya He does not appear to have taken with him any
artillery, cavalry which explains the rapidy and
precision of his operations. He succeeded completely
in Disgusting his march from the allies, is proved by
the arrival of the English despatch and the ignorance
in which General Canrobert in his report says he
to the position of the enemy That however need cause
surprise in such mountainous country, cut through
by rghul raynes and covered with forests almost inn
penerable, in which, consequently it is impossible for
the cavalry to be on the lookout All that the allies
could do to be on their guard Ia their entertainments
and that is why they had thrown up many points of
resistance from Tchernain to Balakava. The difficulty
Of the ground appears TO have permitted General Lii
complete abaence of beaten paths obliged him no doubt
to take the road from Simteropo TO Balakava and the
25h Of October the Russians appeared the heights in
face Of the redoubts OF the allies Whether the Turks
according to their CUSTOM not on their guard
not in sufficient numbers to defend themselves is
not known but it is certain that they abandoned their
redoubts after spikng their cannon, threw themselves
in complete disorder into the plain, and went to give
alarm to the crpg which covered the siege These corps
Immediately marched ou.. yhe division of light cavalry
under the command of Lord Cardigan arrived the first
and Immediately charged the Russians who descended in
good order into the plain in pursuit of the Turks In spite
Of their conrage ie ree regiments which composed this
brigade in vain endeavored 10 check the march of the
emy The Dragon Guards went to their aid and
first more Fortunately bn their ranks broken by the
artillery of the edoub of which the Russians had turned
the cannon after unspikng them, against the allies Il
the time the British infantry arrived in line 1t held
firm under the fire of the Russian infantry aud under that
of the redoubs and thus gave time to the division Of Gen
Bosquet the hrhcs from the of action come up
and to form The allies then took the offensive and drove
back the Russians to the heights. There the latter
ceeded in maintaining themselves In possession of Of
the redoubts which they had carried Thus ended the first
day, which extremely sanguinary and undecided.
On what took place the following day we have only
few details lh6 bold movement of General Lprandi had
partly failed since Ealaklaya remained in the power of
the allies and the latter preserved their comnpcatons
with the il had partly succeeded, since the Russians
in possession Of the sole beaten road which leads
from Baaklava Sebasoppl and had taken position in
the Of the besiegers Accordingly the 26h Prince
Menschko made strong sorie against the English lines
in order to place them between two fires If he had
ceeded in carrying them and in efecting junction with
General Lprandi in the midst of the besegng army the
operations of the allies would have been almost rreparabl
compromised Eui the 26th put end the hopes of
the Russian generqlisspo Aisf very sharp engage
men he driven back into Sebasopol by the division
of General Sir De Lacy Evans, with loss OF than
thousand men. At the time the allies attacked
in front the heights occupied by General Lprandi took
the redGubts which the Russians had captured the previous
evening and drove back the latter completely broken and
beyond the Tchernaa in the ravines of the
mountains
The fortunate issue of these two combas appears to ms
decide the fate of Sebastopo The attack of Gen Lii
pand the last chance which the Russians possessed of
compelling the allies to raise the siege Unless the Rus
slams recevewhich nothing shows TO be likey-sufjci-
ent rcniorcements to give second battle they
such desperate effort and the siege will henceforh
follow its regular The resat the less doubtful
as of the of the Tchernaa the allies are
equally possession of the great aqueduct parallel that
river, which alone conveys potable water to the military
ana all the part of Sebastopo BY
duce the garrison and the inhabitants to the water In the
cisterns As the rainy has vet commenced al