Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1854-10-04
From The London Times. Sept. IL.

We have receniy endeavored To convey read
els some idea Of the magnitude Of the Crmea exped-
ton Of the difficulties il has had surmUunt and
the enemy it may have encounter and it is proba e
that before these lines printed the blow which will
commence this enterprise will have been struck I'm
der these circumstances feel at liberty tn discus
fully than have hitherto done the operations
in which the combined forces may already De engaged
and to call the attention Of readers of the
leading top graphical features Of tie remarkable
country which becumeS for the first time tue the
are OF war between three OF the grea, European Pow
ers. The south Of the Peninsula is tha,
porion Of the country which the expedition will pro.
badly I've directed and Mr.. Auowsmith's excellent
map Of this region rom Eupaora to Cape Chersonese
includes those paris winch our attention 1t present
directed. The pIumontOry ridge Of land ntersecled
with deep bays the south ut SebasiopO is prky
mountainous. aud nl-pruvidri with water. The rug
gedneSS of the soil would he favourable the enemy
who naturally have possession Of all the strongest
positions and unflynurabe the landing and advance
Ui numerous army. IL is therefore unlikely that any
attempt Will be made up this pert 0f the south
uf the harbour To the north ~ Sehasopol The caIn-
try becomes more open, the plains covered with
grass and three small rlyrrs h"wng from the eist 10
rieate the The first u these streams
called by lhe Russians the CZernava falls ntu The har
our OF SebasupOl ITSELF The second called the Belbeck
nvcr reaches the about four miles the north
and the third which is the kacha river, flows in a par.
alle miles to the north Of Cape Con
stanrinr the Sehastopo inlet According To the Adj
miry charts. Published from surveys made by order Of
the Russian Government. point OF this cast
there is less than 10 fathom depth OF close in
shore THIS would cuErrspOnd with the observations
made by Genells Brown and Caurobrrt upon their Te-
cruise. and II We may hazard conJeSture 10 the
point which landing will be msy have been ef,
iected should place the mouth Of the
River kaichi. II be thai the ships appfoach
within short range ni the Shore the facility and safe
" of the operation greatly increased ior the field
Tiillery which may he brought down to harrssS the
troops landng quite incapable NJ resisting the fire
Of heavy ships guns throwing hollow shot nland To
range vi 300 yards. triangle may thus be formed
by the ire vi lhr vessels ablve and below the actual
landing place. within which The enemy could hold
his ground and The resistance Offered the dSeEbarcr-
Of troops chiefly formidable in proportion the
proximity Of the enemy's fire. Once shore, the
troops will proceed iureRc their position with great
fapdity i'm order tn cover the landing uf the stores and
will brave fellows and their gallant allies
to drive in the point OF the bayOne the rst Russian
corps that opposes them. Per'lOus and uncertain as
the fate Of such landing would be, it matter
If eOmmOn historical observation that attacks Of this
kind are almost invariably successful when the invading
forces have undspuied command Of the sea, The
means transport collected this occasion far exceed
anything Of the Kind that was ever attempted before,
and the transport service has been well arranged by
Admiral Boxer that areai, in the various
of our tToops upwards Of 20 600 and horses have
been embarked and landed without an accident.
Assuming the lsning OF the army 10 bo accomplished;
two important, operations would present themselves
-.he first. defeat the Russln forces which may
ssi the advance oG troops n tho field; and the
ond To draw round Sebastop, TO invest the place
by getting possession Of the gs which surround IT,
Upon the fist point 1t is extremely difficult to form any
conjecture n the absence positive inf rmltiuu b. size
strength aud positions OF e Russian army IN the Cri
nea. In uncertainty To the point selected for attack
the Russian troops present be considerably dis
pesed along te coast, but Preparations have dpuh,
1een made Tor rapid movement Uf concentration on
some important point o the Interior the line Of
operations Of the allied armies De asceTsined. Such
point, for example, would bo oimphefopO. at which
all the principal roads IN the sgutheTn districts ui the
Crmea converge II would be perfectly consistent
with Russian tactics II their army at first TO throw
itself the defensive and retreat laying waste the
country behind IT, in the hope that our forces might be
distressed by the want U supplies, and eventually cut
on by the return uf Russas best ally-the winter But
the climate Of the Crmea Is not that Of Moscow On
the contrary. the southern coast which is most sccessi
be tu ships, is the sunniest and most productive
spot IN the Russian empire while the region u the Cr
mea north OF the River Salghr consists of vast salt
marshes and plains, unwhOleSome n SUMNER uniuhab-
table in winter aud at all times ihny peoped by man
II the Russsns driven abandon the southern coast
they abandon all that's miSt valuable IN the cOunlfy
bu II they attempt to hold the range OF mountains IN
the SOUTH they run great fsk OF being cut OIL IRON heif
base Of operations.
" the allied forces succeed in e1ectng their landing,
and in repell,ng the troops which the Russians may
bring into the field. their step will be to invest Se-
bastopo ltis no, improbable that the Russian engi
noers sye succeeded in the Of the last few months
in throwing up lines II considerable strength round the
place hy ayaing themselves Of the mountainous ridges
which encompass ard command the town. lfthe Rus
sans hSd like the Duke at Torres Vedras. the COM
nand OF the sea- position OF this kind may bo held
io' many months but when the sea, which surrounds
three sides OF Cape Chersonese snd the adjacent cuun
try is entirely commanded by the enemy's fleets. the
fate Of large army pent M in such position, without
possibility OF escape, must, sooner OF later, be capt.
ulson. Moreover, frum several points not contained
withnthe circuit Of Sebas,opol. the arsenal aud the
harbour in which the fleet IS lying vulnerable
Even before the town be taken, the harbours ia
whcn the Russsn fleet now lies in hncied security
would be enfaded by the fire Of the beseging army;
and this naval afmsmeot would have choUse be
tween he alternatives Uf being burnt port OF Of fight
ing naval action outside. II Fort Constantine. on
the north side Of the hatbonr be reduced by regd