Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1854-07-12

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eoo'' efs IL no donbs IL the former POLICY Of IN. r.
press Catherine bad been pursued a great sco,,.,,,
80. s,,Nors would have been made, and could not han,
oeen resisted under the relative position of III, ,o p
es q, that time; but instead Of this privileges. .,.
a, ueh were important for Russia receive ana in
pnos ~ .ne Porte To grant and in tho mission OF
ee ~ hensehikon knssia had quarrel with the Ports
W "n'eh believe she had some reason hut I.s.d ~
lS.y aNytning Ike territorial indemnity she at once
", sn increase OF privilcges-sddiuouai prvi-
niu sue acquired these privileges for he, rs
Iycus hierarchy-for her coteginnists in ts,, Fmni
nV 'ouo, that Then the Invasion tn. Priuciosli
-, NO, nave taken place, or would have imme.
-a'ey ceased on the acquisition Of those rights Eus ar
course We tet-Europc FELT tha, the iudepen3,ncs I'D
80 w 'hc iofte might have been much eniaueer-
~ - u' oothhhI the possession Of such rgh,s a
sue "au sought Tor M eulaFgensnt Of t.rri,ory md
therefore Il was that these prerpsop, v,r. ,...;,
haVe also been supposed, my lords to have said that
desired or that did object TO return IN bs -
Adrianoplc, because said that il va coud oh,,, = "
~hich should tha, 25 years should no, have don.
anSs-nor shoGli we; but Inever mean, to ma, th.t
pce ior It, hcar hear and .ai was tb,, az h,
at uea'y iere mad oe,n 25 OF peace-if by .uy
treaty which the fortune OF might enable u, o ,Ls
we could secure peace for 20 yearsT said then and
sly nov thaf considering tho instability Of human a.rs
we shoud not have done amiSs My lords am quite ar
loss to conceive what grounds-frs, that anv ona
should dare to say that claimed the honor OF that
treaty, anJ thea, that indifferent to its conJi,;ons
Anu 'na' vas ready 10 and renew it
without reference TO ts chsiacter which I have
"esc'oeu. sm at loss to conceive bow ouch as
sertoni couli have heen made ID have e,rI,;r.d
nov 'ha uehs Wss limited to territorial ACQUISITION
ifisng as have s'id from the change OF Russian polcv
a. that time therefore feel have nothing mora ~
say about IT, understand. also that it is assers h,t
nave recommended return the status quo or that 40
not object to the stdHs quo. This surtr se mo moro
than anything else, because thought tha. had taken .s
peeiai care TO explain noble friend the c,pss f h
ippareat ambiguity in the expressions used by Aur. and
Prussia "a compared with applicable to ourselves
sau tha Austria and Prussia might be bound by their
nese o' coming to the "atas quo, aud specifically de-
cared that that had application to us-tI EI-and and
TO tsance. ieIr hear. Nov, my lo-ds YOU are .waro
'nat before n" declaration OF the quo was all
that ne hoped for sired and all that We attepted 10
attain, aad it vas that which the Turkish Government
consented 10 give, and this to the Con-
ference at Vienna, and the Four Powers communicated
to the Emperor OF ussa that the Turkish Government had
oHeeu torenew the status quo which thought quite
as much as could be offered and much moro than we
mad right to expect; bat proposed with the hope of
PeservnSa state OF peace and the Emperor had listen.
ed TO anything but the voice OF those by which ne
At that tine was moved should spared the CA
iamfies of the which now fallen upon us Rpt
ths instant that var was declared tic whole question
was changed entirely. (Coeers) From that moment
everything depended upon the itself as TO what
hereafter in judgment suitable to our policy and
interests, We might be content with OF peace
rom tnet nonent the stdtas quo end ior US.
also said AZ that time, as TO the terms OF peace. that
whatever might be desirable whatever might be ne
eessl'y il still unwisc for in the prescat state OF
tn, war 10 lag down conditions (cheers) the nature of
which must depend the events of the war recol
lect IN the Of that debate which am ma king
reference sAying that the conditions be different
Constantine.
pie ourselves aiSt. Petersburg and within the yboe
Of that scope lies the variation the status quo for
how lar We may um.tely teviate from the status quo
say, it will depend on events that IL ia
no! in power absolutely to control This we can
say that the independence and integrity of the Ottoman
empire must be secured, eectually secured [Cheers
How this shall be done agaa depend very much on
the progress OF events and the of negotiation at
the moment but that security be taken for the per-
mauencc of that Independence and integrity far de-
pends Russs clearly be the object from which
We | Ruf ~;
10 be obtained neither any this House can
pretend 10 say. We know what object main OBJ
jec is and that We must by mode the other
lain, for without t peace would be impossible. think
also has been said that expressed doubt or dis
belief the danger of Russian aggression wish il
clearly TO be unders ood that have the greatest alarm of
Russian aggression Turkey, and il Is aganst that as.
gresson any shape whether be by influence or con-
quest any other mode, that 10 protect Turkey
Bot, with respect to the danger of Russian aggression on
Europe Independently OF Turkey, did not feel great
alarm-l do not and Inclined feel less so every day
Hear" and laugh;er II Russia could be supposed to
be in Constaunoplc, have made good her aggression
indeed, should be alarmed for Europe because then
think, she would have acquired the Of becoming
most formidable and dangerous Europe but without
having acquired such means, pretend TO FAY
that | entertain any great alarm this point
consider France be more powerful than Russia
Austria put together. L. is impossible therefore,
to look at Russia with any great alarm out OF her
own territories, or in such light to make it
matter for me to ener into state Of repress dan
gers which do not believe to exist. The danger OF
Russia, regards Europe, appears mainly and entirely to
depend on her power Turkey aud il succeed
hope that shall in keeping her entirely free from
exciting further alarm the Turkish ritory then
cannot be possible that need be in alarm what
she do against Austria, Prussia France or Engand
have been misuu uderstood this it has been sup.
posed that have expressed general increduty as to
the danger OF Russian aggression aud have now shown
ordshps the aggression Of which am afraid and
that OF which am afraid Ny lords, am not aware
that there s any other part the observations which
addressed to otdshps the other night which requires
further explanation have, l believe, explained that
which understood has been objected to- | shall how
be ready TO explain anything which any one nav
think still requires explanation Ny lords / wished 10
conhne myself TO this explanation, aud the develop
of those sentiments which entertained and vhicht
appeared to be necessary explain to this House
but certainly could have wished say something about
the extraordinary absurdy and maguy Of those person
al imputations TO which l have been exposed. Hear
hear cannot suppose that auy Of ordshps are 40
dull 10 comprehend the motives which have led TO
these uputatous, but they ludcrous should
iee-inognsnt though AMI should feel that IL
not worthy Of the position which I now occupy
1T would no; be worthy Of my character IL
condescen1sd 70 enter into details accusations ab.
surd aud Improbable. Cheers. IL ia true, my lords
that have perhaps, than any other mau in this
country, struggled preserve state OF peace have
done so because thought it duty to the people Of this
country-a duy TO God aud man-drst to exhaust every
possible measure TO obtain peace before engaged 10
war Cheers l may own-though l trust my
conscience scquits OF having done the
ulmost-that I ony regret lest I have not done
OF aserting what consider the greatest cas-
amity that beisll country. II has been said that
my desire for peace uuhs " make war; but how
aad why 10 w.-L ~ make war! wish TO make war
in order attain peace aud weapon that DO used
10 make that aDd speedy, and attain
peace, to make that with the utmost yigor aud
determination. tCheeis This my lords have no.
shruuk from the contrary have been ready 10
operate With my colleagues, aud most urgent our
hostile aud whrke preparations, and they will admit that
personally have been urgent than perhaps any
other 10 eGhortng speedy advance and concens.
ton Of the allied forces beyond the Bakans In order 10
support the gallant army OF Omar Pashs and to extend
hand TO Austria In order 70 enable her 10 take
tive part in the operations Of the war. [Cheers With
the feelings uudcr which speak, know not whether
ought have said this but ii Is the ruh-hst this s
the course which have invariably urged Cheers
have more TO say. wish to eoohne myself
without entering into the topics connected less
With the general policy OF the war; the events which
have led to which may follow ito Impressions which
lelt TO be erroneous TO what bad said 10 this house.
declare that fa from my desire to preserve peace
disqualifying mel may be Wfong-from using what i
think the efficient the most probable and the most
successful means TO carry war, maintain and assert