New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-11-30
Pro-, m Lon17. Tinss Of No-. II.


tending our present operations before Sevsstopol IL
Dot likely 10 be fully appreciated without some In
Sly hi into the nature Of siege undertakings IN gen
eral In the present age il is received rs maxim %
military engineer that the means Of attack are su
peror 10 the means of Defense in other words that
il any fortified place. however strong IL attacked ac
cordiDg to rule, by proper force of men aud guns,
il must inevitably fall within certain time u MT
pre- erved by some rare and singular advantage Now,
az the allied armies were disemb rked on the shorsa
of the Crmea 10 strength sufficient TO luer the
envy in pitched battle, and as they have now for
come weeks been besieging Sevastopol with most
powerful force Of artillery directed by Of the
best engineer in the world il may be asked what cir
eumstances have retarded their success, why the
place was not sooner taken To this inquiry SUP
Join explanatory reoiy.
When siege is undertaken, the first operation Is
what's called the investment" of the tOwn-tbst ia
10 say the tow is surrounded on all sides by posts OF
the besieging army, that no iDgress or egress s
any longer practicable. This is not only the first
step but II is that which all succeeding steps more
or less depend for the superiority of the attack % the
defense arises from the fact that whereas the meaos
are knitted in the former case, they are hmi'ef 10
the latter. When town has been invested, aud
thus cut OF from ii communication win the adj accent
country its resources in men, munitions, and proVi-
sioDs become at confined to the stocks tnen sc-
tualy within It's walls, while the besiegers, on the
other hand being presumptvely masters OF tue cons-
try can make exactly sucn dispositions a. they think
proper II they cease TO be masters of the country
that il 10 ssy if superior force Of the enemy ap-
proaches from without the siege must, IN Ordinary
cases be raised, and the town Ia relieved accordingly
SuppOsiDg, however, the Necessary superiority 70 re-
ride at all events for the time with the besegers,
they then select that point in the deienses OF the place
which appears most favorable for their operations,
ard here the advantage Of the attack over the te-
Tense becomes instantly apparent. Whatever may
be the strength of the place IN respect Of artl-
lery, il is obvious that only certain num-
Der of guns can be brought TO the defe 81
OF certain PORTION the rsmp parts whereas the at
lacking force concentrate upon this one point all
tie gus at their disposal. The detenses Of e TO Fn
may mount 800 guns; but, n any particular ffolt
mounts only So and The Desegers can attack ts1s
front with twice the number, they have the superiority
OF FIRE at the only point where such superiority Is re-
CURED 1t is this condition of operations Jolned
to the necessary limitation of resources 10 place en-
trely excluded from all external communications that
the asceDdsDcy Of the esiegers depends Awaiting
themselves OF the protection d5rlvaOe from treGcheS
and covered ways, they gradually push their bat
teries close to the place that breach made 10
its ais and, they are always presumed 10 exceed
the garrison greatly In numerical strength, they rush
in aud carry the town by storm as soon as us de-
fer SIS have been beaten down II is cOns Tered that
a town containing garrison Of Is 900 men requires
an army sf IS 600 men 10 besege IT, and when, there
fore the smaller force has lost the artificial protection
of it, ramparts the contest seldom remains douotful
If these observations applied to the case OF Sc
vastopol, it will 1t appear that none OF the as
sume vaDtages of besleging force are there to be
found Sevastopol is not invested The peculiar po-
son of the to wD combined With the limited strength
of the allied armies, rendered 1t Impossible so 10 sur
round the place 10 cut off its communications " IN
the interior ard the north eide Is left completely
open The consequence IL that there has been no
limitation of the part OF The bosleged on
the contrary rather the besegng army which has
stood in this predicdment, for, whereas tue allied
forces have been gradually dlmlnlshed by tue casual
ties incidental TO their operations the garrison has re-
cey ed repeated accesslons Of strength from without
Provisions too, ard munitions of war, have beea n
ported with equal facility though so extraordinary, m
This respect the resources OF Seydst0pol iseli
that few additions could have been required.
Ii is next 10 be remarked that tue Russians at Sc
vastopo by means ia the position OF garrison
inferior in numbers 10 the attacking force, but relying
upon the protection of artificial defenses, against
which the besie gers advance They are encamPed 10
the south of the town IL very strong intrenchments,
which are armed, as Lord Raglan dispatch observes,
"wiih an apparently uniimnef number OF heavy guns,
"auply provided with gunners anu ammunition
They have raised batteries against cur batteries, aud
earthwoIks against our earth sorks they return shot
for shot, and tar were we from establishing an ad-
vantage this respect that on the second day oil the
cannon ace their rre superior to our e"n lhelr
front of defense I'D OF representing confined
space exposed to all the concentrated fire of the at
tgcs is actually, LORD Ragla describes IT, more
extended" then our own, ana they, the besieged
force are thus the possession of the advantages Or
din arly enjoy ed by the beslegers
In point Of fact, there would really be little exag
geraton in saying that one OF the armies In the
u
Both have their communications open, the Russians
by land and the allies by sea both have their strong
positions the Russians before Sc vastOpo the allies
| the nights of Balaklsva and, as far as operations
/ have hitherto proceeded, il would be hard TO say
which party seemed TO be the assailsnts aud which
| the defenders. We are batterDg the works of the
| Russians, but they also batiering ours, and
| whereas we have not yet regularly assaulted their
lines they have attacked ours IN such force as TO 0c-
CASTOR most tanguinary conflicts. The enterprise, IN
| short is not a siege, but campaign. We have et-
L.
encounieripg the armies which the Russians orng
successfully against US. One army representing the
garrison of Sevastopol encamptd under Its walls
behind ea thworks like own, ana is stronger than
We are in artillery. Another Is posIsd on our
flank or rear and has made at leas. one attempt
on our position. Fortunately, although We wsut
many Of the advantages of besiegers, are not
without some Of the advantages Of the opposite
kind, for such is the strength of our position in
this angle of the Russian territory that enabled
to repulse the attacks of enemy numerically supe
nor 10 ourselves. So far therefore, although the
tual siege Of SevastopOl may have advanced but
slowly, the events OF the campaign are favorable 10
US. As besiegers we have been retarded in pro-
gress by the investment OF the town, by the in
,renchments thrown up before It's walls, by the con-
slant reeBiorcemen hts received by the garrison, and
! by the presence OF strong relieving army IN the
field. But we have maintained our foosg on Russian
| ground, we have beaten the Russians thoroughly
! whenever they have attacked us, We have already
hall ruined the feet and arsenals which gave Ssvas-
topol its Importance and have fairly established
our superiority in all respects but that of numbers
! What remains, therefore, but to approximate
can do to an equality with antagonist in this
spect also, TO dispatch those reenforcemenis
which our victorious, though over tasked army, re-
ouresl This zone, the advantages, a. well the
| honors of the campaign will belong, We may conf
IDENTIFY hope, 10 the allied powers.
The siege continues. Omt,ing the doubtful report
Of another great battle the llth, We have
teeersphic bulletins Of the siege up TO the th and
9Th and il is evoent that at those dates the incTess
ing numbers and boldness OF the enemy made no diff
Ict..