The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1854-12-23
Kos,u.h ON III, Invasion of the Crimea.


kossu;h six months ago predicted, in 4
speech at GLASGOW, when the invasion Of
the Crimca was first suggested, all the dis
astcrs whi:h have since belsllen the English
and French in that region. Instead OF sem
ding their armies to Scbastopol, his advice
to the allies was 10 assert the national indG-
pcndencc Of Poland, Italy, and Hungary
and march their armies to Warsaw. In a
recent speech in London, of marked power,
Kossuth alluded to this prediction as fulfill
ed, and thus commented on the Crimea in
vasion:
70 begin war agsinst Russia (says Kos
sulh) with n landing expedition to the Cri'
inca Is an ides 50 supremacy absurd, that the
Gar, giving more credit for perSplcagIty to
his enemies than they deserved, did not be-
believe it until you actually landed off Eupa.
toiia, and chiefly, you are indebted to PO-
land for not having to meet 100, 900 Russians
more at Sebastopc'. II England did darc-
gard the fact that Poland is the vulnerable
part Of Russia, the Car was prudent
enough 70 mind it. In the Crimea proud
England and France attack hiin-he is con
tent to oppose 100, 600 men t1 lhc'n On the
Danube the flower Of tie Turkish array,
clsted by victory, defeg and menaccs him
he is content to oppose them with 10000
But to Poland, where there is not one man
in arms, but where the unqucstionablc lire
Of a heroic nations hatred is smouldeling,
he sent an army Of 300, 600 men, to be pre-.
pared for any emergencies. Some may tell
you that this is due chiefly to a prccauton
against Austria. But it is clear to demon
s,raton, that the Car feels perfectly easy
about the Submissive obedience Of his Pro
consul in Vienna, or else he certainly would
not have left the very existence Of his So
900 on the other side Of the pruth at the
mercy Of his good friend the Hapsburg
Yes, it is the name Of Poland you have to
thank for the fact, that your army in the
Crimca, all heroes as they are, have not
fallen a victim to oyergrowing numbers.
consider It an unaccountaLle mistake to
have engaged in the siege Of SeJaStopol with.
out taking previous hold Of the straits Of
Pcrchop ii the north and taking command
By sea Of the bay Of Keotsch in the east, 50
as to prevent, or, at least, retard the rein.
forccmcuts, which il was easy TO fOrsce that
Russia will send And that neglect, once
committed, ! certainly cannot understand
the logic Of shifting the basis of operations
down 10 the southernmost corner Of the Pc
ninsula, thus leaving the whole Of the land
free TO draw land supplies to ScbastOpol;
and leaving the Russians not only entirely
at liberty to send reniorcements TO the
Crimea, but leaving to them, besides, per-
4 ~. i E.l.
pol in large or small numbers, just as they
please Ny opinion is. that yours being
what is called a movable basis, the feet, you
could choose that point all along the coast
which was the best to rest upon The bulk
Of vour allied squadron is actually not south
Of Scbastopol, at Balaklava, but north Of Sc
bastopo', of the Katscha River Why not
remain with the army there likewise? Why
not draw your lines bearing on the na5sc
River, aiiOrdng more or less protection
against cavalry There, with wei pro
ydcd rcdoubt, at the point whore the only
road from the interior splits in two towards
Sebastopol and Balaklaya, YOU, by your pos
| tiVn, already had restricted the conmunica-
| tions Of Sebastopol to that narrow corner,
where it is now your misfortune to be pont
| up. You would have cut off all the supplies
from the interior. and no reinforcemcnts
could have entered sebastopol, without hav-
/ ing had TO fight first separately on open field
| battle wherein the Russians are, certainly,
, no match for your heroes. Instead of that,
your army has been established so as to
leave Sebastopoi perfectly free TO commun-
cate with the empire Of Russia That is a
strategrtical error, in my humble opinion,
not even justified by tactical considerations.