Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-02-18
fgreiga MistfHanu.


Correspondence OF the Lonuoh Ianon 5sts ts
A1ssrategic View of the War ON the Danube
SIR: While the hostile armies on the banks
of the Danube are retained by the severity q
the weather in state of compulsory inactivity
it may be well to cast brief glance over the
past movements and present situation OF the
bellieerents, and place before your readers an
attempt to estimate the various chances which
exist for the campaign about 10 open on that
theatre, should the present diplomatic efforts
The position Of the Russian forces in Wal
lachia, as long as Austria preserves a real neu-
trality, is, in strategical point OF view, highly
dangerous, provided the Turkish army proves
itself as well fitted for offensive movements in
the field as it has shown that it is for the de-
fence Of entrenched positions. Wallachia forms
a long and comparatively marrow: triangie
thrown in between the Danube on the south
and the Carpatians on the north and west, with
its base resting on the Pruth and the Sereth.
The long northern side Of this triangle is held
by Austria, and consists of the Carpathians;
the long southern side is held by Turkey, and
is formed by the Danube, with its chain Of
strong fortresses the comparatively narrow
eastern base alone rests on the Pruth, and is
in the permanent possession Of Russia. When
Russia, then, seized upon this province, she
ASSUMED position highly menacing to Turkey,
but yet weak against the attack from that
power; for, in military parlance, the Russian
fine of communication and operations was not
only Of great length, but parallel with, not
perpendicular to, the Turkish front Of opera
tions in Bulgaria.
A glance at the military position Of Turkey
on the Danube will show how serious this dan
ger is in the position at present held by that
power and its allies. The Balkan is the main
fine Of defence Of Turkey; the Danube forms an
immense wet ditch in its front, strengthened by
the strong outworks Of Hirsova, Silistria, Rust
chuk, and Widdin; and the plain Of Bulgaria, 2 |,
vast glacis between the two, The entrenched
camp Of Shumla, situated in the northern spurs Of
the Balkan, where they melt into the Bulgarian
plains, is bastion of the greatest strength and
importance thanking the whole eastern part Of
the main line. III
In attacking this position, the Russians must
assan either its right its centre, or its left. To
attack its right, their army must force the pas
sage Of the Lower Danube, capture some OF the
fortresses on that river to secure their connrnu-
nications, and then advance by Bayarik. They
would then have the Black sea, held by the
united squadrons, on their left flank; the strong
fortresses Of Shumla and UArna in their front;
Silistria (ifnot previously reduced and j would,
If well defended, require q long siege) in rear
Of their right; and the main Turkish army con-
centrated round Shumla, ready to operate
against their right flank and communications
in the plain between that point and the Danube.
Nov, to taxa Varna, when supported by the
allied sqnadrons, would be extremely difficult;
to force Shumla, If the Turkish forces were
we'll handled, far more so; and to advance
without the reduction Of one or other Of these
places, an impossibility. Even snpposing Varna
fell, as long as the allied fleets held the Black
sea on the one hand, and the Turks Shumla on
the other, no advance could be made. Now,
the excessive strength of ShumIa the result Of
the campaigns Of 1912, 1928, and 1929, has
clearly demonstrated The right Of the line
may therefore be looked upon as secure.
To attack the centre, the Danube has to be
crossed and the fortress of Rustchuk to be re-
duced. Having then crossed the. Bulgarian
plain, the Russians would find the main road,
by which they had advanced, blocked up by
the entrenched camp Of Shumla, the impreg-
inability Of which, if properlydefended, may, as
above remarked, be taken for granted. Their
only chance, therefore, would be to operate BY
their own right against the passes which ira
verse the Balkan between Osman-Bayar and
Keyanlik. These de6les, however, are Of such
great strength, and the position of the main
would be SO formidable for offence against their
left flank and rear, that tits almost certain that
no force, however strong, would attempt to
force them, more particularly if French aux
iliary corps were waiting on the Adrianople
side ready to receive them.
~ There remains therefore, only to be consid-
cred the attack on the left of the position by
Sophia, and the passes leading on. Tartar Bay
ardjik. This is undoubtedly the weakest point
Of the Turkish line, and may, in fact, be looked
upon as the only one which is likely to be Sc
riously threatened ;and there can be no doubt
that a Russian army of 100000 men, in pos
session of Sophia, covered on its right by and
drawing its supplies Of provisions in a great
measure from the friendly province of Seryia,
and with the plain Of the Danube on its left
flank, and rear well cleared las it would be by
d single defeat Of the Turkish army in the feld)
would he in position to make Constantinople
tremble To prevent this taking place is there
have to solve; and here it is that the inherent
vice Of the Russian position in Wallachia and
the skin Of the Turkish movements in the late
campaign are both brought out. a5s
A Russian army advancing on Sophia would
have its line of communication, connecting it
with its base in Russia, running through Wild
din or Rahova, by Krajova, Slatina, and
Bucharest, on Foktchany and Galatz. In
other words, its line of communication would
require to cross the Danube into Little Wal
lachia. and traverse the whole of that pro-
vince, as we'll as Upper and Lower Wallachia,
in order to reach the confines Of the proper
Russian empire. Now, this long line as q
glance at the map will show, is parallel with
the Turkish line of the central and lower
Danube; and, consequently, exposed during
Its whole length to perpendicular attacks from
their forces held concentrated in the Bulgarian
plains. As long, therefore, as q strong and
efficient Turkish army can maintain itself in
the open country between the Balkan and the
Danube, it would be an operation of the utmost
danger for the Russians to concentrate the
mass Of their forces upon the extreme right Of
their own line, and to attack what IS in itself
the weak point of the Turkish position-yiz.,
Sophia and the passes Of the Balkan leading
through the friendly provinces Of Servia.
In the event Of the Russians forcing the line
Of the Danube, and moving on Sophia, the
~f Al :cL -. ,