New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-26


defined, and their powerful artillery 80 placed
that any heightened diminishing would have MOI
only been useless to the allies but positively dam
aging The French sppear to h,ve had to expose
themselves for while to this CALLING FIRE. the Eng
llsh being the last in line; but, this once carried
out, the French columns and the English e1'
tended line advanced steadily into the difficult
ground before them, dislodged the Russians from
the villages Of Alma and Bourliouk (the latter
of which was burned by the retreating force, 90
Is to prevent its being used as shelter BY the
allies, passed the river and pressed up the nights
without any unnecessary formalities. Here the
combat on many points Of the ground, in the vine
yards, among the rocks and abattis, partook OF
the character Of the battles between Verona aud
Castiglione in lSis. No regular advance wsspos-
sible; thick, irregular cloud Of skirmshers,
mostly acting independently, worked their
way up to the first terrace, where the Russian
lines awaited them. In the meantime, Gen.
Bosquet succeeded in establishing one of his brig
AIDES on the plateau, whence he mensced the
Russian left; brigade of the fourth division
(Foreys) was sent to his assistance, while Foreys
second brigade supported Napoleon's division.
Thus the French made good position by which the
Russian left was seriously compromised. On
the Russian right, Sir George Brown took the
Russian redoubt-the key of that part Of their
position on the terrace; and though an advance
of the Russian reserve from the nights for a mo-
ment dislodged him, an attack of the Highland
ers (Cambridge's division) finally secured the
possession Of this work. Thus the left wing Of
the Russians was turned, and their right wing was
broken. The center, completely engaged along
it's front, could only beat retreat the slope to-
ward the plsteau, which, once reac aed, they found
themselves secure from any serious attack by the
presence of their cavalry and horse-srtillery, in
country eminently adapted for the employment of
these two arms. Nevertheless, some disorder
must have reigned for while on their left when
outfanked by Bosquet; the French reports are
unanimous as to that point, and the fact that Men
chikof7s carriage here fell into the hands Of the
French, fully proves it. On the other hand, the
carrying of of all their artillery even of the
heavy siege guns in the battery on the right, (the
French took no guns, the English but three, and
those probably dsmounted) proves the great
order in which the retreat generally speaking,
was executed, as well as the wise resolution Of
Menchikof, to break of the struggle as soon as
the scales had turned against him.
The bravery of the allied troops appears to
have been very great. There are few examples
Of battle consisting, like this, of an almost un-
interrupted slew but steady advance, and offering
none of the vicissitudes and incidents which give
such dramatic interest to most other great bat
ties. This single fact is sufic ent to prove at
least considerable numerical superiority on the
part of the allies, and to show that the allied
Generals in their reports have far overrated the
strength of the Russians. We shall recur to this
presently.
The generalship Of the allies was good, but
shows more confidence In the valor OF their troops
and the assistance of the feet than in the invent
i've capacities Of the Generals themselves. 1t
was. 80 to say, a plain, homely sort Of battle, Of
purely tactical nature, destitute in rare degree
of all strategical features. The flank maneuyer
of Bosquet was a very natural conception, and
well executed by the African soldiers who had
been taught how to do such work in the defles of
the Atlas The British broke the Russian right
by unsophsticated hard fighting, facilitated, very
likely, by good regimentsl and brigade msneuver-
ing; but the monOtoDy Of the British advance in
two successive long lines was broken by the
obstacles of the ground alone, not by grand ma
neuvers intended to mslead or surprise the
enemy.
Prince Menchikof had well selected his posi-
ton. He does not, however, appear to have
made all the use of bis cavalry he might have
done. Why was there no cavalry on the left, to
precptate Bouquets isolated brigade down the
cliffs sgain as soon as it attempted to formi The
breaking off of the battle, the disengaging his
troops from fire, the carrying off of his artillery,
and the retreat in general. appear to have been
carried out in a highly cpeditable style. and do
more honor to bis generalship than the victory
does to that Of the allied generals.
As to the forces engaged, the allies had under
fire, three French and four English divisions.
beside their artillery, leaving one French and
one English DIVISION and all the cavalry, in re-
serve, besides eight Turkish battalions, which
the close Of the action. Now, the French having
left stronger detachments and suffered greater
losses at Yarna than the British, the divisions
may be considered almort equal on the day of the
bsttle-tde French about 1000, the British about
$500 strong, each. This would give an infantry
force actually engaged Of 40, 900 infantry with a
reserve Of about l6, 900 men, including the Turks,
which appears to agree with the statements as to
the force of theexpediton, deducting for the sick
and for attachments. The Russians are stated by
Marshal st. Arnaud to have mustered two dvis-