The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1854-03-16
BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIANCE
In THE WEST.


In THE WEST.
The idea seems to be gaining ground tha1
the British and French Governments i''t
some hand in prompting the outrage upo" ''''
Black Warrior. We should think TINS very
doubtful. We can see no good when Eng
land and France can propose by raising tnem,
selves up a fresh and powerful enemy IN tue
West. nj the very moment they are embark
ing in war with Russia Nevertheless, IL Is
well enough to remember the announcement
of Lord Clarendon that the British and
French alliance had reference to affairs 10
the West as well as the East and that Great
Britain and France are engaged to secure
Spain in the possession of Cuba. Still whilst
they might be ready to unite in defending
Cuba against any actual act of aggression ny
the United States, an alliance in ltseii hish,,
offensive to the honor and dignity oi ,his
country, they would scarcely Violate every
dictate of policy and common sense ny pro
vok;no collision which il is the interest OF
all parties to avoid.
That Great Britain, however, Is still keep
ing an eve on Western affairs, and that the
Eastern contest has not monopolized all her
energies, is evident from the significant fact,
that, at the time of the outrage upon the
American steamer, there were three British
ships of war in the harbor of Havana. More
over, il cannot be denied that the extent of
military preparations in Great Britain and
France correspond with the magnit ude
of the purposes of the alliance, as an
nsunced by Lord Clarendon. The necessity
of such vast re-inforcements to the Ottoman
power, which has already proved itself very
nearly strong enough for its own defence, IS
not obvious, except upon the supposition
that Russia is to be invaded, and forced to
terms which will render her no longer formi-
dable to the weakest State of Europe. But
why so large Navy to assail an adversary,
whose Naval power is SO inconsiderable
One cannot expel the thought that it would
be very easy should a contingency arise to
require it, to divert large part of the allied
Naval force to the American coast, without
impairing the efficiency of Naval operations
in the Eastern waters.
This reflection is not rendered agreeable by
the fact, that our whole coast and our whole
commerce lie naked and exposed to the as
saults of an enemy. Our entire Navy could
be easily swallowed up by squadron of line
of battle propellers, anG, within two weeks
from the commencement of hostilities, every
city on the Atlantic seaboard might be burn
ed to the ground. Instead of acting upon the
maxim, sin peace prepare for war; we never
dream of preparing for battle till the enemy
is at our gates. Ii is true that in the end, we
shall triumph that British commerce will
suffer as much from war as our own, and
her manufactures much more that, after
year or two of defeat and adversely, we can
equip Navy which will re-enact with new
glory the deeds of Paul Jones, Truxton
Hull, Perry and Decatur that, within the
same time, we can raise an army of half a
million of well drilled and well disciplined
volunteers, combining the flower of Ameri
can, Irish and German valor, which will
sweep the last vestige of allied domination
from the continent, All this can be accom-
plished, in spite Of the disadvantages under
which we are left b v the failure of Congress
to put the nation in a state OF defence But
would it not be wiser, safer and more eco
nomical to expend money at once in the con-
struction and equipment OF Navy large
enough to protect our con merce and our
sea-coast, rather than to expose our whole
mercantile marine and our citi es to destruc
ton, because we have the prosp ect of being
able to avenge their ruin at a future time?