New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-01-09

cot three pere three-deckers. which, By themselves
should have been quite sufficient perform the exploit
With tLs dproportiona;e superiority be protested 70
tie a.ssult A fog or az some say, the use OF tAe
British flag. enabled him to approach Unmoested 20
distance Of 500 yards Then the fight began The
Russsp Dot liking stand under canvas on lee shore
dropped their anchors. Then the firing from the two
nOored feets without any naval maneuVers and having
rather the character Of csnnOnade on shore, went on
for four hours The possibility of doing away with al
naval tactics with all movements was very favorable
to the RussiAss. whose Black Sea aes manned almost
exclusively with "lsndIubbers," and especially with
Polish Jsws night have had very poor success II OPP
posed to The well manned Turkish ships N deep water
-Four hours we're required by the Russians before
they could silence the feeble ships OF their opponents
They had besdes this advantage, that any stray shot
Oh their part would do harm either IN the batteries or
in the town. and what number Of misses, in eompari-
son to the hits they must hare made appears from the
almost total destruction Of the place accomplished long
before the hostile feet silenced The Russian re-
Port says only the Turkish quarter burnt down,
and that the Greek quarter escaped if by mira
Gle This is however contradicted by better author
ty. which states that the whole town is in ruins.
Three Turkish frigates were burnt during the action.
four were run ashore and burnt afterwards along with
one steamer and the smaller vessels. The steamer
Taft however cut her cables, boldly steamed through
the Russian lines, and escaped to ConstAntinoPle al
though chased by Admiral KOrnilef with three Rus
sian steamers. Considering the clumsness of Russian
naval uaneuves the bad position of the Turkish fleet
n front and in tie line Of FIRE, Of their batteries,
and above all the absolute certainty destruction, it would
have perhaps been better il the whole Turkish squadron
had got under weigh and borne down far as the wind
permitted upon the enemy. The ruin of some, which
could by no means be avoided might have saved at least
portion Of the squadron OF the direction OF
the wind must have decided as to such maneuver but
il seems doubtful whether Osnan Pasha thought
of such step at all.
The victory Of SinOpe has glory for the Russians,
while the Turks fought with almost unheard of bravey
not single ship having struck its flag during the whole
action And this loss of valuable portion of their naval
force, the momenary conquest of the Black Sea- and
tie detecting moral consequences of such an event upon
the Turkish population army and navy is entirely due
to tie good Offices " of Western diplomacy, which
prevented the Turkish feet from standing out and pro-
tectng or fetching home the Sinope squadron. And
ia equally due to the secret information given to the
Russians enabling them to strike the blow with GER
tanty and safety.
The second victory of which the Russians boast,
came off at Akhsltzik in Armenia. The Turks have
! for some time past been checked in the offensive
movements which they had effected on the Georgian
frontier Since the taking of Shefkat or 81. Nicolas,
not place Of any importance has been taken, nor any
victory gained of more than ephemeral effect And
this country where the Russians must fight under
all imaginable disadvantages, where their land COM
munications with Russia reduced to two roads in
tested by nsurgent Circassans, where thr sea CON-
municatiOns might very easily be cut of or endangered,
and where the Transcaucasian country occupied by
them, with Tifis for its centre, might be considered
more as independent State than part and parcel
Of a mighty empire. How is this check of
the Turkish advance to be explained The
Turks accuse Abd Pasha of treason and have recalled
him. and certainly il is very curious that ADD Pasha
is the only Turkish General in Asia, who has been al
lowed by the Russians to gain local aud partial victories
But there are two misekes the part OF the Turks
which explain the want Of success in the beginning
and the actual defeat in due course afterward.
They have spread and divided their army upon all the
long line from Batun TO Bayezd their masses are no
where strong enough for a concentric attack upon
Ths though part Of them at the present moment,
enjoying the undsputed and useless possession of the
city of Erivan. The country is barren and rocky, and
may be difficult to feed large army there but quick
concentration ofall resources and rapid movements
tie best against famine in army Two corps,
one for covering Batun and attacking on the coasne,
another for direct march upon Tifis through the
valley of the Kur would have been sufficient But the
Turkish forces have been divided and subdyided with
out any necessity whatever and to the almost entire
disabling Of every one of the different corps.
In the second place, the inactivity in which diplO-
macy held the Turkish feet allowed the Russians TO
land two divisions of infantry (of the 9TH corps in
in Mingrea and thus to reinforce Prince WoronzOGs
Caucasian army by nearly 10000 men, Thus strength
ened he not only arrested the Turks on the coast but
has had the satisfaction of seeing corps under
Gen. Andronkof deliver the beleaguered fortress of
Akhalzik, and beat the enemy Oh the open field
that town The Russians pretend that with about
10000 men they have routed $4,000 Turks of course
cannot rely upon such statements but must confess
that the great number of rregulars in the Turkish
AnatOisn army and the almost total absence of Euro
pean officers particularly in the higher commands and
on the staff must make them but poor match for an
/ equal number Of Russians. The Russians pretend
they have taken ten or twelve pieces of cannon,
which may be true, in that impossible country the
vanqushed party must necessarily abandon most Of its
guns attbe time they confess they have made only
100 prisoners This amounts to confession that they
have massacred almost all the wounded on the field
of battle they being necessarily left in their hands
Besides they prove that their for pursuit
and inteTceptDg the retreat OF at least part Of the
enemy, must have been wretchedly planned. They