New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-10-17
THE NEWS FROM THE CRIMEA.


stirring news of ssnguinary battles in the Crmea,
including the capture Of Sevastopol, the destruc-
ton of it's principal forts and of great part of
the Russian feet, and the final surrender OF
Prince MenchkofI, and the remains Of his defea ted
and more than decmated forces az prisoners of
war. If these reports are strictly correct, for
nearly forty years the world has witnessed no
such gigantic bloodshed, nor any marital event
pregnant with consequences so momentoHs AZ
10 the correctness Of the news, that is point on
which some light may perhaps be thrown by care
fully separating what we know officially and posi-.
tively from what we have only from vague and
uncertain sources.
We must then distinguish the statements into
two classes-those relating to the battle of the
Alma fought On Sept. 20, and those announcing
the capture of Seva,topol itself. According to
the DISPATCHES of Lord Raglan and Marshal st.
Arpaud. the allied armies on the Goth stormed
the Russian intrenched camp on the nights to the
south of the river Alma, and forced the Russians
10 retreat. The British took two guns. The
French, in their dispatch, mention no trophies at
all. The French loss was about ! 400; British
the same The Russians were estimated at
As coo to so 600 men, their loss at 1000 to 5000.
These dispatches are evidently written in the
full Hush of maiden victory. The so, 600 Rus
slams present on the Alma contrast very strongly
with the $4,000 troops which were sad to be the
maximum Of what was spread over the length
and breadth of the Crmea. The two guns taken
in an intrenched camp, defended by a numerous
"heavy artillery" look like very insignificant
trophies when it is considered that it Is almost
impossible to save guns out of feld-fortfca.ions
when once carried. Still more ominous is Mar
shall st. Arnaud's silence about the taking OF guns
by the French. Supposipg Menchikof had ac-
tualy concentrated d. 200 to 1900 men in the in
trenched camp on the Alma, what would it prove 7
Either that he had far more troops than was
expected, being able to bring so many to the open
field, OF that the Notifications OF Sevastopol were
so weak on the land side that he could not hold
the place, except by defeating the allies in the
open field; or, thirdly that he made a tremen-
dOus mistake in exposing his troops to an open
battle and to tsc Generalization consequentupon
deceive defeat.
If we are to trust the earlier reports the Rus
10. 600 men. These might have been REINFORCED,
but to bring them up even to $4,000 or 10000
men the Russians must have made considerable
effort With $4,000 men within easy reach of
the Alma, or within fifteen miles Of the place of
landing, how are we to account for their not hav-
ing pounced upon the allies in the very act of de-
barkatiOnl
The country between the Old Fort, where the
allies landed and Sevlstopol is intersected by
three water-courses, forming, by their deep
rayires, as many military positions. The one
nearest to Sevastopol is the Tshornays, emptying
tselfinto the eastern end of the bay of Sevastopo
While Fort Sievernsys defends the northern
shore of this bay, that rivulet, or rather its
deeply-cut valley forms sort of natural ditch on
the east Of the town. There, then, is naturally
the las. important position for the defense. The
next river is the Katsha, running east and west a
few miles to the north of Sievernays; and again
about twelve miles to the northward runs the
Alma. OF the three lines of defense, in spite of
tactical advantages which may exist, and which
cannot be judged at this distance il is hardly TO
be supposed that the Russians should have
batte in which the fate of SesastopOl could have
been decided. The absence of the main body of
the allied cavalry however, might have encour-
aged the Russians to send strong corps into the
intrenchments of the Alma, as their own moment
ary superiority in that arm would secure them
against flank movements of the hostile horse
The impossibiity of making use of this arm
when once cooped up in Sevastopol may have
acted as an inducemeDt.
The Russian defeat on the Alma becomes still
more reduced in its tactical extent when more
closely examined. The Russians are not fond Of
entrepcbing themselves in open walls. They
prefer, wherever they have time and intend furi-
Gus resistance, closed square redoubts To save
the artillery from such redoubs is impossible, as
soon as the assault is actually carried through.
But even from that class of works technically
known as hnnets, open at the gorge, there is al
most no chance of saving artillery in the face of
stormlng enemy For il the guas be with
drawn at the very moment Of the assault the de-
tense depriyes itself of it's own weapon; the
ditch once crossed, who is to drag the gun from
the entertainments or the platform. who % re-lim-
Der them and drive of under the close FIRE of the
enemy "Guns in entrenchments must he
considered as lost when the entrenchmepts
=" themselves can no longer be held; the
"only thing you can do is to sell them
"as dearly as possible says General Du-
four in his Manual of Field Fortifcations.
TIE fact that the Russian lost but two guns is 4