Glasgow weekly times. (Glasgow, Mo.) 1848-1861, 1854-08-31


needs confess our belief that the most in
fluental strokes Of the war must be deliv-
cred elsewhere. Russia has no vital part
in the north. Even the capture Of St. Pc
tersburgh would hardly terrify govern
ment which survived the capture of Mos
COW; whereas, whatever destruction might
be accomplished, these would be accomplish
ed for no purposes but those of terror
There is no object of the war TO be answer
ed by the mere demolition of St. Peters,
bureh itself. Nobody is damaged by the
existence of the Russian capital on that
spot, or even by the Notifications which de-
fend the approaches to it, nor is it in the
least degree likely that the terms of a peace
would forbid the reconstruction of the Cron-
stadt batteries, supposing them to have been
destroyed. As no means of injuring the
enemy can be omitted in war, the Baltic
fleets will Of course be actively engaged in
their proper duties, and successful blow
against any Of these redoubtable Notifications
might convince the Gar Of his weakness,
and operate with great effect on the opinion
Of Europe. The chief object, however, of
this expedition is answered already. Tho
allied squadron in the Baltic is sealing UP
every port and outlet of the Russian domin-
ions, is defying the whole power ofthe Czar
within cannon shot Of his own coasts, is ex-
posing the utter helplessness OF his nsvy,
and imprisoning his soldiers md ships so Sc
curely, that Europe has nothing to fear from
their doings. The Baltic fleets relieve Eng
land and France from the trouble of deren-
sive preparations, and enable them to pros
ecute the war with no duties beyond those
of attack.
But the case is entirely different in the
Black Sea. There all the aggressive acts
of Russia are symboized and exposed
Sebastopol is the material expression of that
very policy which, after keeping the powers
of Europe so long in alarm, has at length
driven them to war. The main object of
this war, as now plainly stated, is security
for the future. Security for the future can
only be obtained by the reduction Of Rus
sian power within its proper limits, and it
is in the Black Sea, most especially, that
these proper limits have been conceded.-
Seb0stopol is the type as well as the ins.ru-
ment Of Russian aggression. The capture
of this fortress would put the Ottoman En-
pirc, the Asiatic coasts, and the Meditera-
mean sea out of all danger for many years,
perhaps forever. It's results would be al
most instantaneous. As soon as Sebastopoi
and its fleets had fallen into the hands ofthe
allies, the whole Black Sea squadron would
be disposed of for other operations. The
Turkish capital, the Circassian shore, and
the mouths of the Danube, would then all be
safe without any further protection. The
Principalites would become the battle field
and the Gar might be deprived of his "ma-
terial guarantee" without much risk of his
renewing the seizure. Such success, too,
besides conducting directly 10 the termna-
ton of the war, would in itself secure one
of its principal objects. Nobody has ever
ascertained that the retirement of the Rus
SLAMS from ST. Petersbugh is necessary con-
dition of European tranquility. But the de-
molition of Sebastopol is plainly lndispensa-
| BILE, and if the Gar were this moment tc,
offer the evacuation of the Principalties and
the Withdrawal of his demands upon the
Porte, the peace conceded on such terms
would be illusory and insufficient as long ns
the strong hold of the Crimea remained in
tact. We cannot say that the capture Of
Sebastopol would at once terminate the war;
but..it would be more likely than any other
operation to produce this effect, and apart
| from such an achievement there can be no
prospect of any true peace.
! For these reasons we should rejoice to
see that the chief efforts of the allies had ta-
ken the direction of the Crimea in prefence
to operations on the other side Of the Dan
ube. In that quarter no power can act with
such effect as Austria, and single straight
forward resolution on her part, would ter.
inmate the present state of Inactivity and
suspense, would give each of the beligerent
powers its fitting duty, and would at once
bring the war to tosomething like final issue.
FRrD DouGLAss.--The N. Y. Tribune
thinks it quite probable that Fred Douglass
/ .,sll L. II -