The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-08-07
THE POSITION AND IMPORTANCE OF
SEBASTOPOL.

from the London Times, July 261
We are now approaching the sixth month Of &C.
tual h0stilties, and yet not shot has been fired
by the land forces Of England The troops despatched
on the expedition to the East" took up positions
successfully on the Dardaneles, on the Bosphorus,
and at Varna; but, though the enemy lay within q
few days march, they have never hitherto been
brought face TO face with Russian soldiers. By our
intelligence from the seat Of war; the public will
have been circumstantially appraised Of the actual
stations last occupied by the several divisions Of the
BIitih army, and will have learnt that the advanced
force is at or about Devno, and the remainder en-.
csmped in different positions between that place and
varna. For the information however, Of these read.
ers who possess no detailed maps Of the locality
we may state that the several points of Devno Ala
dyp, Kojuk, &C., all SO close to one another and
to the coast that the entire army may almost be
far easier to embark it at that port for transport
to the Crimea than to conduct it forward to the
Danube.
This, it must be confessed, after all our exertons
performances, and anticpa'i0ns is not very salts
factory announcement, but the facts admit Of much
explanation, and the general result, II short of our
desires, Is still by no means unfortunate. II the war
had been undertaken for the single purpose Of ex-
the plain course would have been carry the allied
forces across the Danube with all the expedition
attainable. But such movement, though calcuia,
teS Perhaps to RrGdqSs ~. a. brilliant would
The utmost success Of such an advance could only
have accomplished little earlier, and with what
more completeness, what the determined valor Of
the Turks has almost accomplished as it il, while
the flower Of the British army would have found It.
self IN desolase country, under destructive sun,
and in face OF an enemy which, however discom6t-
ed, was approaching its own resources exactly In
proportion a. we were drawn away from ours. An
immediate advance into Wallachia, therefore, would
with reference to the broad policy Of the war, have
been mistake. This policy consists in striking at
the very heart Of Russian power in the East, and
that heart s at Sebastopol The forts and arsenals
OF 6ebastOpol constitute the source the secret and
the symbol Of Russian encroachment upon Turkish
rights. 1t Is from this redoubtable stronghold that
the Gar necessarily threatens the Ottoman capital
commands the mouth Of the Danube, dommeers over
the Black Sea- and spreads the terrors attractions
Of his name over the shores Of Asia Minor. To des-
troy Sebastopo is nothing less than % dsmolish the
entire fabric Of Russian ambition in those very re-
gions where 1t Is most dangerous to Europe.
This feat, and this only, would have really pro-
NOTED the solid and durable objects Of che war;
Then, why was such an achievement not immediate
landed at the Crmea, instead OF being detained on
the other side Of the Straits? The repIy is Obvious
When the expedition first sailed, the strs Myth, or
rather the W akness, Of Russia could not be accu-
might CROSS both the Danube and the Balkan, or
even carry CoDstsntinople by coup de main. More
over, the first attachments OF the allied forces were
comparatively weak, the state Of affairs was very
imperfeoly ,ertained aud it would have been the
height Of folly to expose our battalions to attack
and disaster without protection or support. II the
British execution Of rs, 900 men had been thrown
upon the Crmea-that is TO say. upon Russian terri
tory-ih March last, It might at have been as.
sailed by twice its numbers, and possibly cut to
pieces.
The first position, therefore, was the isthmus OF
the seas rendered impregnable, and nom which an
army marching on Constantinople could be taken in
flank. From this point, as the truth began to clear
and as 1t became evident that neither ConstantoO-
pie nor the Balkan was likely TO be visited by Rus
sian soldiers, advanced successively to Scu,ari
and Vsrna-the latter place being the most favora.
BILE point Of departure for Sebastopol. But why,
when at varna, was not the army employed either
on one duty or the other-eitner carried on to the
Danube, or across 70 the Crimea3 Why have we
halted bet veen these two attractions, and 80 &C
oomoiished nothing ct all The result, we suspect,
Though undoubtedly due in great degree to the
oecison naturally arising from the vicissitudes aud
uncertainty Of events. The problem before the al.
nea commanders was not simple.
:, was true that the occupation Of the Cimea was
the chief object but II Was NOT the sole one and in
npte mischief might have ensued II the absence of
all the allied forces had exposed Omer Pacha to de-
c.,'e asrs. ana opened the road to Constantno
is still but single army; there are no reserves IN
its rear, and 1t might ct any time be outnumbered.
If reports are true. BY concentration OF the Rusap
DIVISIONS. wnhe tne aned troops were known to
pie, such an onslaught was highly i'm probable. and
this species Of moral support, while 1t deferred the
Russians from aRv sudden advance, encourage the
Turks to redoubled exertions by the assurance of
ultimate safety. Until, therefore, tvs particular
duty could be assumed by some other power,
the allied commanders seem to have hesitated and
their hesitation has been unfortunately prolonged
by the delays Of that Power whose action was ex-
pected.
Austria by movements extremely easy to herself,
can most efrsctnallv clear Tho line Of the Dtnnbe
and inns dsengage the forces OF England and France
or operations against 5enastspoL This service she