The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-07-09


mended return to the status quo or that ,io not
object 70 the staius quo. This does surprise me
more than anytting else, because thought that
had taken eslecial care to explain to my noble friend
the cause OF the apparent ambiguity in the express
soDs used by Austria and Prussia as c0mOared with
those applicable to ourselves. l said that Austria
and Prussia might be bound by their desire OF
cemipg TO the status quo, and specifically declared
that that had no application to us-t0 England and
to France. 1Hear, hear.) Now. my lords. you
are aware that before the declaration of war the
status quo was all that hoped for or desired and
all that we attempted to attain and it wssthat which
the Turkish government consented to give and this
communicated to the conference at Vienna and the
four Powers communicated to the Emperor of Russia
that the Turkish government had offered to renew
the status quo, which we thought quite as much
as conld be dntied, anc was much more than we
bad right 10 expect; but We proposed it with the
hope Of preserving ttate Of peace, and IL the En-
peI0r bad listened to anything but the voice ofthose
passions by which he at that time was moved, We
should have teen spared the calAmities OF the war
which has now fallen on us. But the instant that
war was declared, tho whole question was changed
entirely. (Cheers.) Fiom that moment everything
depended upon the war itself as to what hereafter
in our Judgment, ~ suitable to policy aud in.
terests we might be content with terms of peace;
from that moment the status quo WAS at an end for
us. also said at that time, as to the terms OF peace
that, whatever might be desirable or whatever nigh
be nece sary It was still unwse for u.s. In the pre-
sent state OF the war, to lay down conditions,
(cheers) tie nature OF which must depend on the
events Of the war. ! recolIect, In the course Of
that debate 10 which I am making refer
ence, saying that the conditions must be DIFF
ferent, according to whether we found Russia
at ConstantiDople or ourselves at st. Petersburg;
and within the whole Of that scope lies the
variation of the status quo; for how far we may
ultimately teviste from she status guo no man can
say, as 1t will depend events that it is not In our
power absolutely 10 control. This can say--that
the independence and integrity OF the Ottoman en-
How this shall be done again must depend very
much on the progress of events and the course Of
negotiation at the moment but Insecurity must
be taken for the permanence of that independence
clearly Be the object rom which we cannot depa1t.
(Cheers.) But l say, a. to how this Ia to be oh
tanned neither nor any man in this house can pre-
tend to say. We know what our object, our main
other, attain, for without peace would be impos-
sible. think also it has been said that had ex-
pressed some doubt or disbelief a. to the danger of
Russian aggression. wish It clearly to be under
aggression on Turkey, and it Is against that
aggression in any shape. whether IL be BY influence
or conquest, or any other mode, that we are to
protect Turkey. But with respect to the danger
Of Russian aggression on Europe, independently
Of Turkey. did not feel great atar-I do not. and
am inclined to feel leas 10 every day. {" Hear"
and iaughter.) Il Russia could be supposed to be
In Constantinople, 70 have made good her sggres.
sion, indeed = should be, alarmed for Europe, be-
cause then, think, she would have acquired the
means Of becoming most formidable and dangerous
to Europe; but, without having acquired such
great slaIm on t6is point. Consider France to BE-
more powerful than Russia and Austria put to-
gether 1t Is impossible, therefore, to look at Russia
with any great alarm out Of her own territories or
into . state Of war to repreas dangers which do
mot believe to exist. The danger a Ruasis, O. re-
CARDS Europe, appears mainly. and entirely 20 de-
pend ON her power over Turkey; and ss she has
shall in keeping her entirely free from exciting any
further alarm TO the Turkish territory, then Il can
not be possible that We need be In alarm as to what
she can do sgstnst Austri. Prussia, France, or Eog
been supposed that have axpFessed general inCre
duhty as TO the danger Of Russian aggression, and
have now shown your lordships the aggression of
nnn % i@ nos
other part Of the observations which addressed to
your lordships the other night which requires fur
tber explanation. have, believe, explained that
rssdy so' to eTpu Spyus nbs any
one may think still requires explanation. Ny lords,
wished to confne myself to this explanation, and
to the development of those sentiments which en-
to explain to this House; but certainly could have
wished to say something about the extraordinary
absurdity and melignity Of those personal imputa-
tions to which have been exposed. (Hear, hear.)
1 % not sPR to s mosps which
have led to these mputations but they are 50 ludi
crous that should feel-indignant though AMI
should feel that It was not worthy Of the position
memory Of those 1h whom have s % scted " would sS
not be worthy ofmy own character II condescended
to enter into details on accusations 30 absurd And
improbable. (Cheers( Its true, my lords. that i
country struggled to preserve state Of or peace &C
have done 30 because thought II duty to the peo
pie Of this country-a duty to. God and man-hnt
to exhaust every possible measure TO obtain peace
though / trust my Coincidence aquits me Of having
done the utmost-that only regret lest have not
done enough, or lest may have lost some possible
means Of averting what consider the greatest ca
that my desire for peace units me 70 make war; but
how and why do l wish to make war; / wish to
make war In order to obtain peace, and no weapon
that can be used In war can make that war 80 sure
with The utmost vigor and determination (Cheers.)
This, my lords, have not shrunk FROM on the con-
tIary, have been ready to operate with my col
leagues and most urgent as to our hostile and war
like preparations and theywi admit that personally
In exhorting speedy advance and concentration Of
the allied forces beyond the Balkans in order 70 sup
port the gallant army Of Omer Pacha, and to
take more active part in the operations Of the war
(Cheers.) With the feelings under which speak,
know not whether ought to have said this but 1t
is the truth-that this Is the course which have
invariably urged. (Cheers.) have now no more
ing into the topics connected more or less With the
general policy of the war, the events which have
led to which may follow ito impressions, which
felt to be erroneous a. TO what had said in this
house. declare that 80 far from my desire 70 pre-
serve peace disqualifying mel may be wrong
from using what think the most efficient, the most
probable and the most successful means TO carry on
war, maintain and assert that that very love Of
peace will, therefore, induce me, now that we have
entered upon war--which deem TO be, most un-
questonably, perfectly Just war--to use, 30 long
a. have anything TO do with ite conduct, those
means best calculAsed TO bring il 10 . conclusion
and TO maintain safe and honorable peace (Cheers)
The Marquis Of CLANRrCARDE had the misfortune
to differ from Lord Aberdeen - to the principles
upon which the foreign policy OF the country ought
TO be conducted and, while he was willing 70 give
him credit for consistency, he asserted his own
yxhich hia