New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-11-30

number every year. Nov at Che last date the whole
effective force Of the British army vas more III IN
Is 700 go that TO bring It up TO 80 900 Ee should have
10 send at once li 800. But the instant the new
troops bre ,thed the new atmosphere, slept 90 the
ground, and exposed Themselves 20 the tire OF the
enemy they would become amenable to the
Law of waste as the army they went olt TO
enforce and there wo1ld still be necessity for
more troops. To many young readers this may ap-
pear upreasonsbly exaciIDg, but in the lac war,
when the population the realth, and the means
Of conveyance were very much LEES than they
are now W. maintained armies, not on in one bat
tie field 1900 Eliles of but IN many places all over
the world. We had war everywhere and never for
a moment stopped 10 consider WHISTLER we had not
enough on our hands In fact, Engla ST that tine
could be compared to nothiog so much a. th.f beau
ufu piece of sculpture representing chld carrying
more fruit than it can well manage, and unEthng u
reineuisb any OF lie burden, even a. the risk Of the
whole. We bad wars in eli Europe, in the E4st and
West Indies, and IN Amerca, all at once add seemed
TO think that Will, our hands in IT, we migst as
well go on. Everybody knows that there u d tea
debcy IN all business to accumulate particularly
when it is well done, and when hsbitualy un-
oerrafe its importance. Thus in the late var, while
were undertaking the war in the Peninsula Va
cent an expedition TO Sicily, and picked quarrel
with the United States At his moment, hspPhy,
we are ct peace with all the world, excepting only
Russia, and our military operations are confined 10
SevastopOl. We have our work before us, ana II -
really -hsme II We choose not TO 90 II well All
II
the field to the amount of 80 900 ST point barely
fortDights steamiDg from Portsmouth-thst IL, not
20 far in point OF time trouble, and expense, as
SpaiI wes forty years ago. If we cannot do this
o. rather, if we will not DO ths-we may az wei
piye up at once, and say Good bye TO the British
Empire.
While we urge immediate reenforcements enough
70 Keep up the effective force to the ogsal estimate,
We will not assist purpose by wlliul 9t weakly
e1sgee rating the foe There il remarkable peculi-
In Ruea an he very
before battle and very small sf'er; 20 That It would
seem we Dot only Kill and waund some two or three
thousand men Of mortal mold but phantom multi
tude besices. The formal dc ~. Ps'eCs6Hrg makes
out TO il Own satisfaction that Prince Menchikof I'd
only 80 GOO on the nights Of the Alm4. This - en-
couIeeipg Should Providence 80 favor our cause
that beat the garrison Of Sevastopol and me army
without We have very little donot tna We 81 al near,
on the best authority and VITA much detail tn4t the
garrison was only 2j COO and the army outside no
more Doubtless there has been mu n exlggeration
Oh their side for if We labor under difficulties so also
do they. IL they attempt To brug many more
than they now have il mast be with much fatigue,
with great want Of food aud ammunition, aud with
eve.y Kind of distress Wholly excluded from the
sea- the Russians cannot support large army IN the
Crimea not al le3st 10 the present state OF It's com
nuniCations aud supplies. Should we happily sue
coed in taking Sev7stopo their turn will come, I'D
they will have to besege without the comm and OF
single poit, and, and without even the power Of sp-
preaching their shores Occupying possl)y o II
supplies, either from the remote parts of the Crimes
or from the interior of Russia through the Isthnus of
Perekop. We shall see bow long that state Of things
will endure II it lasts long it will be new chapter
in the history OF war.
From The London Tires Of Not is.
There is great simplicity Ia toe struggle between
the Russians and the allies Ii is purely question OF
supply. Every thing else appears to be knoSn,
proved nOisputabe and capable OF the exictest APP
probation. We may safely assume that the allies
will bod their ground III the peninsula they have &C.
cupied as long as they can muster even one division
Of ibeir armies; that they will stand any amount Of
charges long they form line two deep; that
they will turn out nig Az day, and take their turns
at the trenches long as the blood hogs IN their
veins that long a. it will answer any purpose OF Of
feDse defense they will continue to baer the walls
sDd tarhscrbs before them; and that whenever they
have iar oh snce they will rush to the assault OF the
city. They surpsss the enemy IN courage, IN stub
boinDess and in skill, and not inferior even in
bardihood; otherwise they would not have trunphed
on Every OCCASION whether acting on the offensive or
on the defensive. On the part OF the Russians It
nay equally be assumed that toey will attempt
TO waste and weary out the allies by incets,nt
attacks, by sorties, by diversions, by surprises;
that they will not spare their men, and that their
men will DO their duty quite well a. Russians have
usually done il before. As to the question of skill aud
strategy would be very uoust 10 the allies TO DOUBT
their equality, for if they have made mistakes 80 also
have the enemy, aud II we have occasionally lost
more men than ought to have done still we have
uniformly bet n conquerors When all these ele nents
of the que stion are thus known, and SO 10 speak,
fixed quen in the calculation there only remains
one element undetermined, and that Is toe NUMBERS
of men and quantities OF material We can ,eVerauy
| bring 10 the point Of collision. That point seems
almost intended by Nature for some such mighty
struggle. IL il, toward the MedIterrane an that Is
virtually to the whole world, the most southern and
most accessible point of the great Russian Empire.
II il the salient aDgle of whole continent occupied
by serfs and nomsdc tribes, under Asiatic de,po
ism. Blu, il is washed and almost surrounded by
which belongs 10 the great ocean That surrounds
the whole world. From the coast of Cape ChenOn
you may walk ON 10 Siberia once on the water before
il you may sail 10 every shore, ocean, bay, or navl-
gable stream The Russians masters Of the cont
neDt-we of the sea and the only question Is, which
can bring up supplies TO the battle field the quickest
the Russians, with their continent, we with the
The literature Of war is precouily exemphfed in
the following cool writing from The London Times:
I'VE may suppose,-and il is neither al imfrob-
able nor an agreeable supposition-tha the loss Of
tie two sides in much the sqme ratio as at the
battle Of the Ama,-that is, two 10 one 10 our favor
AT this rate, in about a week we should lose five
thousand 10 ten thousand OF the enemy, and in two
months time should achieve the destruction of 20 900
Russians at the cost of the whole allied army. There
is nothing all out OF the way 10 this calculation
when it is considered that We have TO throw into
Losses the constant drain by sickness. As mat
ter Of fact this is and always has BEEN the Russian
moce of warfare. That power, mdRcip7s bcHyles,
egehs eris always has been lavish OF life and ready
TO pay two of Its for one Of the foe. Tne arhe
rymen who turned their guns the melee of British
and Russian cavalry the 25th acted on the custom.
airy calculation that Russian dragoon couuted for
nothing when there opportunity Of destroying
British one. Whenever, then, the enemy can attack
with reasonable hope of losing only two to our
one, We may depend upon it that he will, aud