The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-12-19

expected ~ danIex, VIII DEln8 ue IuFther news
from the Crimea- Her arrival would hardly
be looked for with more intense interest II our
own troops were engaged in the struggle
When our last sdv.ces left, the condition Of the
allied army was such as to arouse the most
lively apprehensi0ns not for its success but for
its safety, and to awaken, in England, for the
first time, doubts a. to the propriety Of the
expedition against Sebastopol. Reduced by
Losses in battle and from disease to one-third its
former strength, the achievements which have
been cent from England will not place it on
anything like footing of equality with its op-
ponents while, on the other hand, the de-
fences Of Sebastopol are not materially in
jured, and the garrison is receiving daily fresh
accessions Of strength. The British officers
who were told on the morning of the fatal day
Of Inkermann that the rumbling Of wagons had
been heard in the valley below, Gained their
apprehensions by making up their minds that
it was merely fresh reinforcements arriving in
the city by the Perekop road: formidable as
was the reality, the mistaken superstition indi-
dicates state Of things yet more perilous.
With free access from the north to the city aud
the forts, and q garrison already double if not
treble the number Of assailants, the Russians
we'll may feel secure at st. Petersburg, and
look forward With confidence to the anuihila-
tion of the enemy. Should the allies remain
in their lines fresh sorties with increased force
will decimatc their numbers Should al
assault be made it is certain that the
loss they will suffer win render the
success Of the movement extremely doubt
full. Even should they take the city by
storm, they will be unable to hold it against the
northern forts; and win run some appprecia-
BILE risk Of being blown into the air by mine
Thus, if the allies succeed in all they project
success may involve destruction: and il they
fail, the wintry gales Of the Black Sea teach al
ready tina. the feet will afford most insecure
refuge. A more gloomy prospect never At
tended military expedition.
There is . singular and portenteus analogy
between the invasion of Russia in 1872 by Ma
poleon l. and the expedition Of the present year
against the Crimea by the troops OF his nephew
and Great Britain. Both expeditions started
under bright auspices, and with high hopes. So
gallant an army as that which crossed the
Niemen to conquer Russia in 1912 was never
mustered in modern times: so splendid feet
as that which sailed from varna in 1854 was
never seen before Alexander, in 1912, babe
his soldiers allow the invaders to enter tae
country: Nicholas, in 1854, directed that no
opposition should be made at the landing at
Eupatoria. Spite of checks, Napoleon marched
ckn II ~ IN al;
every obstacle on their way to Seoastopol. If
Trey drove the enemy from the heights Of AL
ma, Napoleon forced the passage Of the Dnieper
at SmoleDski under very similar circumstances.
If they resisted the attack of superior force
and retained their ground at Inkermann, Ma.
poleon proved the proves Of his troops with
equal eelat at Borodino: and though the slaugh-
ter of the Russians at the former battle was
prodigious, it was not by at least third as
great as that which signalized the latter. The
last scenes in the drama have yet to be played.
But there are many indications leading to the be-
lief that Sebastopol will prove second Mos
cow. 1t is possible that fair weather and good
ships may keep open aconstant communication
during the winter between the allied camp and
Constantinople; that supplies may reach them
in sufficient quantity, and men in sufficient
force to enable them to hold their ground that
the valor they have hitherto displayed may
make up for deficiency In numbers; that some
unforeseen contingency may weaken the strong
position Of the enemy. But these are mere
chances, resting on remote possibilities. The
probability is that the Crimean expedition will
be destroyed.
Whatever Of horror there may be in the
mere contemplation Of such . catastrophe AMI
however the world might deplore the loss Of so
gallant an army as that now encamped before
Sebastopol, it is by no means certain that
humanity would be sufferer by this issue of
the struggle. 1t IL sad to hear Of the death Of
brave men; but it's the trade OF the soldier;
and to the world at large, the destruction Of
few regiments more or less can only be q sub
ject Of abiding sorrow when their loss involves
sacrifices Of national security or popular we'll
being. If the Crimeau expedition is successful,
nothing will be gained for the allies bat q
pernicious increase Of selfesteem and SELF
confidence; certain to lead, in the end, to far
greater disaster than the destruction Of the
Crimean army. Nothing tangible will be
gained, for not even Sebastopol can be held;
and it is quite clear that reverse would call
forth Russia's strength with far greater
effect than hitherto. At the same time, 1t
is more than probable that the cap
ture Of Sebastopol would induce Austria
to lean TO the side Of the allies, and would thus
commit the allies to the maintenance Of her
despotism in Italy and Hungary. In this case
it is likely that the success Of this fresh Holy
Alliance would be an injury to the cause Of hu-
manity and civilization. On the other hand II
the allies are beaten back with loss from the
Crimea, the German powers will be thrown in
to the arms Of Russia, and the Austrian army
now in the Principalites, win move in the d.
rection of the Turkish frontier. France and