Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-12-21
.forlipn SnttlIiaemsr.
From the New York Herald OF the 18th instant.
IMPORTANT PRIVATE INTELLI
GENCE FROM RUSSIA.
Return of MIR. Shansr from Petersburg
What the Russians think of the War.

j elegrapn company, recently returneu Ioh
Russia, has favored us with some interesting
information on public opinion there in relation
TO the Crimean campaign and the prospects OF
the war. Mr.. Shaffer left the capital after the
battle of the 18th of October
When the report reached st. Petersburg that
the allied forces had actually sailed from
Varna, it was scarcely credited that an inva,
sion Of the Crimea was seriously contemplated.
Tie events which have subsequently taken
place in that Peninsula have sufficiently proved
this. Nicholas never fancied that the expe-
diton would be undertaken in the face of q
severe winter. He gave the allied comman-
ders more credit than to suppose that they
would risk the defeat, and, perhaps, the total
annihilation Of their army. The climate Of
the country and the tempestuous season Of the
year, so near at hand, were as hostile to the
English and French as they were favorable to
the Russians. In the middle of October, the
storms which have already wrecked so many
vessels Of the invading feet, begin to sweep
with resistless fury over the Black Sea, and
render the transport Of troops often i'm
possible, and always attended with more or less
danger. The regular supply of provisions and
ammunition is then precarious, and in coun-
try where no food can be obtained, the situa-
ton of hostile army under the most favorable
circumstances must be critical in the extreme.
Hence the Crimea was the last point in his
dominions where Nicholas anticipated an at.
tack. The danger as he conceived lay in
Poland and along the Austrian frontiers, and
there three hundred thousand men were under
arms ready to meet it.
When, therefore, the allied forces landed at
Eupatoria, the Russian commander was almost
taken by surprise. His whole available forces
in the Crimea amounted only to some q, 900
men, including the garrison of Sebastopol.
Reinforcements, however, could be brought up
within fortnight's time, and, provided suhi.
cient delay could be obtained Sebastopol and
the Crimea were safe. In Prince Menschikoff's
dispatch, sent to st. Petersburg before the bat
tie Of the Alma, the plan Of the campaign was
distinctly laid down. He was to hold the allies
IN check by series Of engagements, retreating,
if unsuccessful, on the city. There he expected
to receive the powerful aid Of Liprandi's d.
vision. But if this, from any unforeseen acct
dent did not arrive, and he found it impossible
to defend Sebastopol with the force under his
command, he intended 10 blow up the forts,
sink the ships, and hold off until, with an In
creased army, he could offer the enemy battle,
with hopes of success. Pursuant to this plan,
a skirmish first took place near Eupatoria, in
which the Russians lost 500 men, occasioned
chiefly by the guns Of the allied vessels. This
affair has been scarcely noticed in the reports
we have received. At Alma, the Russians de
clared they had but p, 900 men, and that after
the battle they were enabled to retreat in good
order TO the city. They expected that the al
hes would speedily follow. Menschkof even
declared in his dispatches to the Car that, by
vigorous assault, the stronghold might at this
time have been captured. For such result
be seems TO have been fully prepared. But
when he saw that the allies hesitated to advance
his hopes of defending the place were strength
ened. Couriers, morning and evening, were
sent to st. Petersburg with the intelligence
that the enemy had not altered his position.
And when at last the enemy did press forward,
and invested portion of the city, the anxiousy
expected reinforcements under Liprandi had
arrived, and Menschikof felt certain Of ultimate
success.
With hundreds Of thousands Of men at his
command, and communication to the Crimea
open during the winter, by means Of sledges,
the battle Of the Alma, Balaklava, and mixer
mann have been as good as so many victories
10 the Car. But the allied troops-decimated
by war and disease, with their supplies Of am.
muuition and food cut off or delayed by the
storms on the Black Sea--must be considered
a lost army though every man should display
the courage and endurance Of a hero. 1t is
serious question now whether even a retreat is
possible. 1t was considered miraculous when
cavalry, infantry and artillery were all safely
landed at Eupatoria in calm summer weather;
but how would they fare now, when 1t has been
found impossible to land the wounded, who
were obliged TO remain in the ships, tossing
for days upon those stormy waves? What
wonld become Of the remnant Of that magni6-
cent armament in such tempest as that which
destroyed thirty-two vessels Of the fleet? To
yiufa IN ha Crip he L., 4.
disastrous. The severity of the climate, and
the unceasing hostilities Of relentless perse.
vering enemy would fearfully lessen their mum.
bers. 1t is barely possible that they could
maintain their present position. The Russian
has already profted by the experience OF the
campaign. He has learned that his own mus
ket is very inferior weapon TO the MIME rife,
and II is expected that this disadvantage under
which he now labors will shortly be removed.
Under every aspect Of the case fortune seems
TO frown upon the allies. Bravery can do much
in most cases, but in this even the dauntless
courage and impetuous bearing displayed at
Inkermann can only prolong the struggle.
A defeat before the walls Of Sebastopol viii
entail results upon which it would be vain to
speculate. Dissatisfied with the failure Of the
ill.planned expedition, the French people NAV
wreak their vengeance on Napoleon. The al
lance between England and France will then
be blown to the winds The policy Of Austria
and Prussia will vacilate no longer, for self
preservation will force them to side with Rus
STA. The revolutionary spirit now smoudering
in the German States will then no longer be
controlled, and the legions Of republican and
despotic Europe will once more be brought
face to face.
But Russia will continue 70 struggle for
that political ascendency, which is the end and
aim Of her monarehs ambition. Mark the
elements OF her strength. Throughout all her
vast dominions, from st. Petersburg 10 the
Caucasus one feelng--induced by firm be
lief in The justice Of the warts predominant
Emperor, noble, peasant and serf seem ami
mated by the same intense enthusiasm. The
ostensible object of the struggle is to secure
religious federation TO the Greek subjects OF
the Porte, and il territorial aggrandizement be
the real design, it is for The present thrust into
the background aud remains where it was en-.
gendered, in the subtle brain Of the Car. The
taonla ara told that thav arrn In defiance NJ