New-York daily tribune., 1854-07-10
THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

En- peror Of Austria and his orders to bis Generals
include the total evacuation Of Mcldavs as well as
Wallsehia, leaving not Russian soldier Turkish
ground while powerful Austrian force will instant
| " come forward to take their place aud enforce
separation between the recent combat Ints. Bat IL
would lie On TO suppose that the Russians With
draw because of their defeat at Slista to accept
for truth the clustering gshssetions of the English
journals Which give that defeat the character ofa
| rout and would fan make the world believe that
l. OCO or at the utmost 1900 men, sain from the
! fortress could drive away 10000 or at the least
| 9C.CCO. The Russians were repulsed beyond
doult. bloodily and utterly rePulsed again
ard ain rs their precipitate, i'll considered, IN
| scientific confused attacks deserved to be- bravey
as they were executed; the Turks fought with heroic
courage that never surpassed. and with degree
Of military skill that must make this sege memorable
in all ii.tory; tu. have yet to any reason for
believing that iLey compelled the enemy TO raise the
siece. Indeed, our beet in crnstiOn is to the effect
that tie Russian batteries the left bank were still
held and employed against the fortress after that asst
uurderous sorte, in which soMe exaggerated dis
patches afrm that these batteries captured by
the gnrison The truth evidently is thstthe Russians
fLalJ withdrew from before Sili,ri, simply because
dsy lis troops shOsd all BE- out OF the Prncpalities.
BE Lad ordered them 10 take Siisria beforehand, in
order TO leave Turkey with tie prestige Of at
least one victory in that they failed. and had
TO march away under the disgrace OF the
failure; but their march wss not flight with
pursung tntmy in their rear. They might not, and
probably would not have been able to take Sistra
even by regular siege; they probably could not
have gained anything from the campaign and in that
event might have retired upon tie Sereth; but they
were still stronger than the allies, Turks and all aud,
fer def nsive purposes at least far stronger. Be-
sides the allies had not yet been brought against
them and no decisive battle had been fought. 1t is
therefore certain that this retreat to the Pruth is
dictated by diplomatic considerations and not by any
military necessity growing out OF the superior power
or better strategy of Omer Pasha and the allies IN
Turkey.
Rut while it would be mistake to suppose the
Russians were actually driven from before Sstria it
would be equally mistake not to see that the war
generally is going against them, and that the Aus
trian interyt nton oAers the best means Of mendng
their fort,nes We do not here alnde to their sue
ceseiyc rcyerses at Oltenitza Tshetae, Karakal or
siIistIis, comparatively small affairs, in which the
matched " th successes of equal brillianry All Of
these Conflicts together bad no decisive or desperate
results: but in Asia their game has steadily been
losing one, and the IOss threatens to become
fral OF their numerous forts on the Black Sea only
two remains while inland, ShsrDyl and his mountain
GERS have not only freed their immediate hills ana
valleys from the hated Muscovite. bat have cut of
the communications of Prince Wcronzoff with Russia
a.. Il. ,lo. tb
irg upon T,fs with strength which may possibly
compel the surrender Of the Pcnce with oil the hard
got and pain.uy-hed Transcaucasian possessions Of
Russia. To lose these provinces which have cost
such vast amounts of blood and treasure would be- II
possible greater modification to the Car than de-
feat in pitched battle in Turkey; aud there is no
doubt that bis armies are back across the
Prutb, lie will st devote all the forces he can
spare from the defense Of the Crimea and of Sevasto
pol 10 the work Of reganiDg the passes OF the Cau-
casus ard relieving Woronzof. The success of
Shamy has in all probability contributed much to-
ward tie Russian complisnce with the Austrian sum-
mons 10 evacuate the Principa,ies.
In this important transaction which 80 changes and
oonplicates the aspect of the war, Austria holds the
post of honor and of advantage 1t is great triumph
for her diplomacy and testifes to tae respect IN
which her military resources are held by all the con-
tending parties She interyenes as the friend of both
sides; tie Russians 20 quietly out to make room for
ler; and the Porte only follows the advice Of France
and England in signing the treaty which gives the
Principalites TO her occupation. Shes there, thea,as
an armed arbitrator intervening between the combat
ants by their joint consent because each believes the
nterven ntion to be for his benefit. Tie western pow
ers openly proclaim that II is act in their favor
ard tie concert with regard to it, which the facts
prove to have existed between ST. Petersburg and Vi
,nna before it was known to the world tha; such an
event would take place, and before the army under
Faslhiowiich had met with the repulse al Sistria,
rerdes impossible TO doubt that Russia also regards
it as On act in her favor. Which, then, is the dupei
ard to which party will Austria prove treacherousi
OF course, like every other power Austria pursues
her own interest alone. That interest requires on
tie one hand that Russia should hold the Prnci-
palities and control the mouths of the Dsnube and
tie Black Sea- because large and increasing part of
Austrian commerce goes in that direction. Beside
for Russia to annex Turkey or any part of it might
breed disturbance in the Slavonic tribes of the Aus
trisp empire, among whose members Pansavism or
union with Russia already has numerous partisans
1t is therefore plain that Austria consen. TO
the absorption Of Turkey by Russia, unless she re-
ceiyes at tie tine equivalent addition of ter
ritoTy and power elsewhere which is impossible.
But on the other hand, the sympa,hies of Austrian
policy sll with the Car and opposed to France
and Engsnd, and her real lesnngs will always be
sgainst the western powers. That Russia should be