New-York daily tribune., 1854-03-30
THE RUSSIAN RETREAT.

Ttis is the glorious end o. tue e1orts and rsAe oI
tbres months campaign, during which the lssi re-
sources Of Wallschis 5sge been completely exhausted
THE il the fruit that nconceivsble march into Lesser
WAIlseiiA which appeared 10 hsTe been undertaken
in utter contempt OF the simplest rule. Of strategy
In order TO take Kalafar siupe bridge head held by
the Turk, on he left bank Of tie DsnGbe the OF
the Rss:iaa army vas concentrated on its extreme
riett N a position where the weakened center aud
lett appeared completely abandoned to any attack that
the enemy might chance to undertake, and where s
decree cfiudderesce vas shown 70 the lines ofcomG1
nicstoa ard retreat which is without parallel in he
history 0! warfare How it happened that Oner
Pssbs Aas rot profted by this blueder we have al
read; had occasion to show lOgit is that after all the
Rus ans have 70 retreat disgracefuy, without hayay
effected their purpose, We shall nov demonstrate.
We ssy they have TO retreat dsgrscefully, because
or adg9nce PRECEDED by clustering crowned by taking
up merely threatening position and ending 10 quie.
and modest retreat without even sn attempt a! ssri-
Gus 6ghti1g-bec a movement composed Of an uu-
interrupted series of mistakes and errors resulting 10
nothing but the Generals conviction that he has made
complete fool Of himself-is 10 the very highest de-
cree disSraceiul Now to the state OF the case:
troops in Wallachia Moldsyia and Bessarabia:
ith srny<o-p,, (Dszneabsis) divisions infantry. a.
yion essslr bhsaas silsTy i0si After ooasetiHs io'
II OF hs 81 corr, aee., $,,I'oa Of iA'atry Division
III "a oOp nsAatry division e.,
ally, b'iss lee .rt,.leryi say Ks CSo omsn..,,., msn
ofLi5fs ooff, is ael5IcfIood q ode.., which o'ns
vented rsrsou jsy cannot be taken into the .ccount
TIE troops under Dannenberg aud Lhders were the
only forces in the Principaites up to the beginning of
December. The approach Of Osten Ssekens corps
was to BE ths signal for the grand concentration aud
fhe attack on Kslsfat His place IN the Bug and the
Pruth was 10 be filed by the Sixth Corps 'Tsheo-
oayel1 then on The road from Moscow. After the
iurctiOn Of this latter corps the Danubian army would
haye consisted Of about 10 000 men bat might have
turned out to be stronger if the new eyes OF recruits
frcm the prov wore a once directed
TO 4 tbeater Of var. However, 10000 10 I2D 900
men appeared to tie Russian commander sufficient
force 70 defeud the whole line Of the Danube from
Brailow TO NcopOiis and to spare sufficient number
from the extreme Tight TO se concentrated for at
tack On Ka!aiat When this movement was com
mepced, toward the end of December, Kalaf,t
could hardly shelter more than 10000 70 1900
defenders, with 5000 more at Wildin, whose sup
port might bo considered dubious, as they would,
The slowness Of the Russian movements, however the
indecsion of Prince Gorshako and above all, the ac
tiiiy end boldnesS OF Ismal Pasha the commander at
Kaafa permitted the Turks TO concentrate some for
ty thoussud the menaced point. and 10 change
kasfat from simple bridge-head stOrnable by force
the double OF is defenders into fertilization which
could shelter at leas 300o0 men aud Withstand auy
fut regular siege attack II has been Justly said that
the highest triumph in the construction Of field forti
fcston is the necessity for the enemy to open his
trenches against it; il the Russians did not actually
open their trenches was merely because, even with
that extreme mean,, they way Of taking kala-
fat in the time they could set apart for the operation
Khafat will Lencefcrth rank with Frederic lis camp
q; Bunzelwtz, with The lines of Torres-Vedras and
with the Archelke Charles's intrenchments behind
Verona as one OF those efforts Of field fortiicstion to
be uamed ss classical applications OF the art in warlke
history.
Now let lOOk at tie Russian means OF attack
That they meant in good earnest to take Kslaat is
,hoSn By their parks of siege artillery having been
brought forward as far as Krsjova That Omer Pasha
we may state BY the way allowed these guns to go and
return Freely Is one of the many military inconceiv
abilities Of this war to be explained only by diplomatic
Influence The only thing necessary then for the Rus
SLAMS sufficient oftroops drive in tie Turks
20 protect the trenches and batteries and storm the
breaches IS soon as they could have been opened
Here again lsmsel Pasha acted like sn energetic and
clever commander His sally towards Tshetate on the
9th OF January bis gorou attack ending in the defeat
Of superior Russian force and the continued ATTACKS OF
similar nature which Ia executed, while the Russisn
concentration vas still going on and until he was fairly
bocAaded on his sr sl Danubian peninsula by supe
ror oIce-in short his system of defending himself by
concentrated offensive blows against single points Of
the Russsn lLer ana thereby destroying his enemy as
fsr as he could u detail was exactly what com.
maDdtr under his circumstances should have done and
forms cheering contrast with Oner Pashs previous
defense at 0teIiiza hislazy ps.'yity all this while
on the lower Danube. For the petty attacks carried
by him here and there which sppesr never to have
been broken Of at the proper moment, but continued
for days ard days the point with blind obst.
racy eyeE when 10 result could be expected fcom
:lem-tbese petty attacks DO no; count when a move
nent the Danube with forty TO sixty thousand
men was what was wanted.
After sll, the Russians completed by the latter eni
OF January their concentration sround Kaafa,. Tney
were evidently superior in the open field, sud must
therefore have had there some 5000 or 10000 men.
Now deduct these from 900, AID then deduct. say
20C00 or 30 600 for the defence of the line
from B.aow to the sea, and there remained for tie
whole of Greser Wallichis inclusive of gsrrsons from
50,oO0 10 65o0o men-an army far from sufficient to
deftud such loDg line of sttsck and line of com
muniesiiOn rrnSing paral nth tie lse Of sitae. E.
short distance behind it. vigorous ss.aal, on any
point. even with force inferior to tie whole of these
n LII L.. i ! IL