New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1854-11-27

Of plunder increases. Besides, tue campaign oil
the Crimea seems to prove that the Repatriation
Of the Ccssacks, which hs, been gradually carried
out for the las. thirty years. has broken their in
dividual spirit Of enterprise, and reduced them to
subdued condition, in which they are spoiled for
irregular and not yet fit for regular service.
They teem incapable now either Of outpost and
detached duty, or Of charging an enemy in line.
The Russians, then, were quite right in reserving
every sabre and bAyonet for the battle Of the Aims,
On the banks Of this river, the g, 900 Rassiaus
were attacked by $1,000 allies. The proportion
was almost one to two. When about $1,000
allies had been engaged, Menchikof ordered the
retreat. OF the Russians, up to then. not more
than 20, 600 were engaged; further attempt to
held the position, would have converted the Rus
sian retreat into a complete route, for it would
have required the engaging of the whole Russian
reserve in the battle. The success Of the ale',
with theirtremendou; symmetrical superiority, being
established beyond doubt, Menchikofbrokeo the
battle covered lis retreat BY his reserves, and after
overcoming the first disorder created on his lei'
by Botauet's flank movement retired uDpursued
and uhnolested. "in proud order from the field.
The allies say they had no cavaryfor the pursuit;
but since we know that tie Russians had but two
regiments of Hussars-less, ii anything, taan
The aJlies-tbis excuse falls TO the ground. AZ at
Zorudorf. at EJlau. 1T Borodino, the Russian ln-
faptry though beaten, behaved up to the character
given them by General Cathcars, whocomnanded
. division against them and who pronounced
them incapable Ofpanic"
But if the Russian nfsntry remained cool aud
inter :ifed, MencbikOff Himself was pani;-s:ruck.
The great numerical force Of the allies,
coupled with their unexpected decision
and impetuosiy in the attack, deraDge1,
for moment, his plans. He abandoned the idea
of retreatipg into the interior Of the Crimes, aud
marched to the south of Sevastopol, 10 order TO
hold the line of the Chernays. This was greai
and objectionable mistake. Overlooking, fro
the nights of the Alma, the whole allied position,
he must have been able 10 make out the strength
of his opponents within 5000 men. He must
have known that whatever was their relative SUI
periority over his own forces, they were not
strong enough TO leave an army to observe Sc
yastopol while following him into the interior.
He must have known that if the al les were two
10 one against him on the sea.shOre he could
bring two against their one at SImpheropol. Aad
yet lie marched as he himself confesses, to the
south side of Sevastopol. But, after this retreat
bad been effected without any molessation from
the allies, and his troops had rested day or tao
on the hills behind the Chernaya, then Menchi-
koff resolved TO redress his mistake. He dldthis
BY perous flank movement from the Chernaya
to Bakshi-Serai. 1t was contrary to one Of the
first rules Of strategy; yet it promised great re-
suits When blunder is once committed In STRAIT
egy, you csn seldom get over its consequences.
The question then merely is, whether it is less
Instantaneous to abide by them or to get over
them by second, but intentional, erroneous
movement In this case we think Menchikof
was perfectly right in riskiDg fank-march with
in reach of the enemy, in order to get out of his
absurdly concentrated " position around Sc
yastOpOl.
But in this contest between strategici medi-
ocrities and routine generals, the move nents OF
hostile armies assumed forms hitherto unknown
10 xatf1re. The fancy for 1ank-marches, like
the cholt IA, was epidemic in both camps. AT the
same time that Menchikof resolved on faak
march from SevastOpol to Bikshi- Serai, Saint Ar
Daud and RAJ Ian took it into their heads to move
from the Ksicba to Balaklava. The rear Of the
Run SLAMS and the van Of the British met at Mac
kenzie's FARM $50 called from ScOtchman, late
an admiral in the Russian service, and, as q mat
ter of course, the van bea. the rear. Tae general
stIategical character Of the flank march Of the
allies having already been criticised in The
TRIBUNE, We need not now revert to it.
On the Cd or Sd of October SevastOpol was in.
from which Menchikoff had just extricatei him
self From that moment the memorable siege OF
sevsstOpol began, and at the same time new
era in the campaign. Hitherto the allies, by
their uneontssted superiority, had it all their
own way. Their fleets, commanding the sea, in
cured their landing. Once landed, their supe-
rior numbers, and certainly also their superior
sterming qualities, insured the victory a. the
Alma. But now the equilibrium Of forces, waich
sooner or later is sure to be brought ab0u. ia
operations distant from their base and in an enc
mys country began to develop itself. Menchi-
koff's army, il is true, did not show itself ye.;
but it made necessary the placing of reserve on
the Chernsya. fronting to the east. Thus the
sctusl besiegipg army was seriously weakened,
snd reduced to numbers not much superior 10
those of the garrison.
Want Of energy, want Of system, especially in
TIE cooperation OF the different departments Of
the BIitsh land and sea forces, difficulties OF
ground, and, above all, al inyincible spirit OF