The Hillsdale standard. [volume] (Hillsdale, Mich.) 1851-1909, 1854-06-13
OUR SPANISH RELATIONS.

OUR SPANISH RELATIONS.
| Among our foreign extracts will be found
some interesting paragraphs concerning our
relations with Spain. 1t seems from tho state
mcnts of the Madrid correspondent of tho Lon
don Times, that the Spanish Government had
consented, under the circumstances of the case
to pay $4,000 demanded MS indemnity TO the
owners of the Black Warrior although it holds
the authorities Of Cuba to have been fully JUS
tilted in all they did;-but it rejects percmpto-
rily all tho additional reclamations Of the Uni-
ted States Government. Tho refusal is per-
emptory that, in the opinion of tho Times cor
respondent, our Government must eithe- back
out or declare war Tie Spanish Government
also regards the affair as decidedly tbrcotnng
since il has taken measures 10 increase the Gu
ban army very considerably. It is about 10
send 5000 "a Ell as reinforcement which will
raise the whole military of tho island to about
10000 troops.
We have reason TO know that the impression
is very strong among the best informed men
at Washington, that the Administration has
purposely arranged matters so rs TO render
war with Spain almost inevitable. A very
distinguished member, not long since cabi-
net officer and likely to be well informed on
tho subject, has expressed the belief, that we
days. The Washington correspondent of tho
Journal Of Commerce thinks war improbable
because tho President cannot declare war with
out tho concurrence of Congress. But past ex-
porienco shows that it is very easy for the Ex-
ecutivo to commence war, and that Congress
is then driven, with equal ease, to legaizo the
act. The last war with Mexico was brought
about by the Executive. Whatever may be
the disposition of Congress- n reckless Prcsi-
dent can plunge the country in war, with littlo
difficulty. Wo trust Congress will not ad-
iourn for the Sunmcr, until our relations with
Spain arc placed on better footing
IN. Y. Times, Juno 2d.
Spanish Preparations for The deJfnce Of Cuba
-Estimatrs Of The Results.
Corrcsp spcndencc of the London Times.
MADRID, Wednesday, May 10. 1854
The 5000 men ordered to tho West Indies
will sail in three divisions of 1000 each, un-
der their rcgimcntal officers, and without anv
General in command, as they arc merely TO
reinforce the gariisons of colonies already am
ply provided with officers of high rank Their
destination is Porto Rico He garrison of that
island proceeding 10 Cuba, probably because
the men, Injured To the climate. will be less Tia
bic to disease and consequently moro immed
ately efficient than tho new corners. They
are in hopes, If not of coming victorious out of
the struggle. at least Of intlicting severe pun
ishment on the aggressor. and Of rendering the
conquest. when achieved, loss profitable to him
than he anticipates. Tho reinforcement about
10 be dispatched will raise tho strength of tho
army of Cuba to nearly 10000 men Under
the ministry of General Lersund a very largo
number of Paxham guns wcro sent out to
strengthen tho dcfenccs of tho island, and
great .eforms were introduced in the arms of
fk... f... =
unsiryiccablo description. am assured that
some of the best troops in tho Spanish army
are now in the Island of Cuha. io.l
am far from ovcrrating the value of Span
ish troops, having seen enough of them both in
the field and in quarters To estimate them at
what they arc worth, and do not believe that
they could cope, on anything like equal terms
with English or French armies, nor do think
they wouid hare much chance in he long run a
gainst The W disciplined but ,ceH armed utterly
fearless, Intelligent, seifreiying roluntecrs ,cith
ichom the United States are icont TO operate
trhen at tcar pih their Spanish american nei
ghbors. But it was erroneous to confound
Spanish troops with Mexicans--tho most cow
ardly and worthless Of so6icrs--or to do.sbt
that the former will light well upon occasion,
and would always 90 so if properly trained
and ofiiccrod. 1t is my belief that throughout
present century, the officers arc and have been
inferior to the men in the qualities required TO
fill their respective stations. Nor is this sur
prising. since tho higher you ascend i'm the OBJ
servaton OF the social scale in Spain, tho gre-
ater is the moral and physical dcgcneracy un-
til,upon arriving at the grandees--I mean those |
of the Old stock, aud not those of modern cre- |
alton, although some Of thcsc have little 10 bo-
ast of--you witness a really ?itablc degradation
both of mind and body. l am quite convinced |
that among the officers are to be found mon |
who would acquit themselves creditably, and |
oven achieve distinction 10 any service. but
these, fear, compose but the small minority,
insufficient to leaven tho mass, which is def |
cent in military knowledge, and in the qualiti-
cs essential to inspire confidence in soldiers,
and efficiently to command them. But to re-
turn TO Cuba, Think 10 extremely iikefy that a |
stout defence ioould be made, and that The pos
So ssion fthc forts especially icouid cost Me a.
mericdns rcry dear "A good deal would depond
on tho artillery practice of the Spaniards, Of
tho excellence of which ttoy oxpross them
selves. coniident-a confidence by no means
unlikely to be wcl-foundod, since artillery is an
arm to which great attention is paid in Spain.
and much pains arc taken with tho education
Of its officers. Tho chief defence must be made
by tho land army; as to tho naval squadron, al
though in numbcrsit appears respectable, aud
i is to be reinforced by portion ofthc vessels
now in tho Mcditci anean, and although some
people here expect great things from Il, most
Of its vessels arc email, and the Americans CO.
nld quickly mustrc aforcc that would sweep il
from the seas if ii vcnturcd from under tho
guns of tho land batteries. Admitting, howcy-
nr that tho garrison Of the island does It's duty
calamity. but finds itself ovcrmatchcd. IL is not
improbable that the spapiards wosId arm FIRST