The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1854-11-17

For some time, 1t viii be remembered, one division
Of the Engliah army WAS enoamped close to Bala
klava, and another at no great distance; and, so
long rs the Guards and the Highlanders were In the
immediate vicinity, there WAS little necessity for
throwing up defensive works. But when II became
desirable to extend the beeiegers lines 10 the Cher
Laya the protection OF Balakavs was left to body
OF marines who were tntrenched at that place, and
to the Turkish infantry occupying the 70 doubts
which had been constructed in the neighbornood.
Such being the post Of matters on the 18th the al
lied commanders can have had no difficulty In dis
posing Of any reiIforcements which may have
to the north Of Se5sstopo. Had they it prac'
ticsbe TO detach Gen. B0squet with 80 600 men, as
they areTepIesented In some accounts TO have done,
and at the same time to maintain an adequate forH
in the Chersonese il is certain that the anxieties
felt ct st. Petersburg would not have been relieved
by the guar arrival Of dispatches from 6eba5topol
at intervals Of two days. The fact Of the enemy's
cOmmuncstions having remained s;e open dseisivsiy
vanced beyond the Chernaya; and we may feel sure
that the generals would not by sending . small
force, have exposed themselves to the danger of
reverse IN that quarter such ss sn.s described In
But, however improbable may be the tactics rs
cribed by inventive Germans to the allied comman-
ders, must be Acknowledged that the truth which
Gas a. 81
central Europe are 70 prolific Surely n3thing ever
appeared more wonderful than the description OF
the movements of Prince MenschikoR, which has
been given in the Journal de ST. Pstersbourg. We
the battle Of the Alma, his army crossed success
sively the Katchs, the Belbek. and the Chernsya,
and that it took up the identical position
occupied on the 18th ult by the principal part
ing that the faces Of the Russians were turned
from, instead Of towards, Sebastopol In all
the recorded strategy OF ancient aad modern
times, it would, perhaps be impossible to fad
1v an whit md
less we are favored with further revelation from
the same quarter, the question why Prince Menschi-
kof led his army over the Chernaya will go down to
posterity as standing puzzle for tactcians. he
had suspected the allies Of intending to march to
Balaklaya, and had resolved to prevent them from
executing any such PLAN the course whis he adop.
ed would have been suitable to mis- purpose,
although fraught with danger to his own troops.
But there is no reason to believe that he had any
such design in view; and we can only suppose that
be withdrew beyond the Chernsya in order to find
quiet ont-ofthewsy place, where he might COM
pose his perturbed faculties alter his defeat on
the Alma, and take counsel as to what was
to be done next. In this object he seams,
indeed, to have succeeded; for 1t was here
that he was visited by what his official apollo
gist styles the luminous thought" Of marching up
on Bakchi Sarai. We readily admit the wisd I'm of
this determination, and We had hitherto sup posed
that it was adopted directly after the battle; but,
owing to the ofdciousness Of the ST. Petersburg
journalist, in letting out the whole truth, Prince
OF general, and we now learn that he only escaped
tie consequences of his bIunder by having fortu-
nately almost reached Bakchi-Sara before the Eag.
lish columns arrived upon his line Of march. Had
hours later, the 25th Of September would have wit
messed second rreparable defeat and route OF the
Russian army.
whether Prince Menschikoff's ideas have really
Enlightened or whether he Is now assisted by Offices
Of more capacity than himself, il is certain that the
enenys affairs haze been much better managed since
the march of the Allies to Baiokiapa than they had
bern previously The report Of the recapture Of Eu-
premature; but there appears to be no doubt that
the Russi0ns hare sent into the neiRhb0rhood Of that
place cavalry force sufficient to conne the garri
son ,csthin their defences, and to preuent them from
lice cattle and ether neesssoriss for the army. In
the n,eonuhile, the position of the allies in the Cher
:onese has not enoNed them to procure provisions
fom any considerable tract Of country, and they
Jiscsa from the fleet. We also hear Of attempts
themselves upon the Cherna,a a, 1t Tchorguna
and they probably hoped that, we had cot of the
in divsrting the stream at higher point, and thus
deprive Us Of the resources which Il affords They
would also have acted judicously in occupying tie
entrance to the fertile and beautiful BadAr valley,
which runs for about ten miles from the neighbor-
hood Of BslAklava to the coast, aad which is ira.
versed by the road leading to Yalta and Alushta.
ibis productive region, had it been left open to the
allies, might, to great extent, provided for the
policy on the part of the enemy, to endeavor TO
close it. But 1t By no means follcws that any at
tempts to accomplish that object ,uould hare proved
ing consequent npon he sors 81 Ire enemyto establish
himself in positions important to the beseging army
In the absence of further intelligence, we are war
Trent steamer left for varna, the siege operations
were proceeding steadily and satisfactorily. It is
certainly possible that that vessel may have left
Bslaklava before intelligence had reached the place
Of what had occurred the same morning, or the
night before, at few miles distance; and con-
eequently, the report which SHE brings-admitting
as it does frequent conflicts between the opposing
armies at Inkerman, and, to that extent confirming
Prince Menschikof7s despatch-does not, so far as
ace yet knou, absolutely dspyore the statement Of
rerse horing been sustained BY the English caralry.
II, however, We make q reasonable deduction for
the exagge. alton which We may always Look for in
Russian accounts Of successes, there viii remain
even supposing the story to be not unfounded-
only one Of the ordinary incidents of cam ,aign,
involving NO more loss than we must be prepared
to expect in an enterprise of such vast magnitude
and importance. We may add that, il the enemy
were in condition to prove that he had gained any
material advantage, we should certainly, by this
time have heard more on the sube;t; but, whatever
may be the nature and result Of the outpost con.
fcts which are reported TO be going on we are con-
WINGED that nothing is likely to occur to diminish
tee certainty Of the early and decisive success Of the
allies In the great object OF the expedition.
RUSSIAN ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS IN THE
CRlMEA.
From the Journal dc st. Petersburg, Oct Gal
The Anglo French conducted their united forces
before sebastopol from the north Of that town to
the SOUTH thus entirely changing the basis of opera
tons. They attained this object by flank march
round the town. The organs Of the foreign press
cannot find expressions to praise sufficiently the
skilfulnees Of this manGuvre. Without wishing to
detrat from the merit Of it, at least 1t Is just TO
mentioh also, and to explain the operations of
Prince Menschikoff In reference to the enemy.
After the battle upon the Alma, the Prince not
finding position strong enough upon the Kat,ha
aid the Belbek to give fresh battle to the enemy,
passed the Tchernaya, and concentrated his forces
Ia portion to the east Of the town, after having
CARR soned the forts of the north with sufficient
number Of troops.
The enemy advanced, passed the Katcha ard the
Belbek, and reached the heights which surround
the northern forts.
The position Of Prinse Menschikoff was disadvan-
tageeus nasnnnoh as it enabled the enemyto occupy