Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-10-18
THE WAR I'm THE EAsT-THE FALL
OF sEBASTOPOL.

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THE WAR IN THE EAsT-THE FALL
OF sEBASTOPOL.
We published yesterday the telegraphic ac-
count of the capture of Sebastopol by the
allied armies. The particulars of that event
and of the military operations preceding it are
extremely meagre, and Of course very unsatis-
factory. 1t viii be sometime before we can
expect to receive, at this distance from the
scene Of action, any very accurate accounts Of
the numbers engaged and the losses sustained,
in the battles which have taken place in the
Crimea.
The vast cost of the ornaments fitted out by
England and France-the failure Of the Baltic
feet to accomplish anything worth mentioning,
and the dilatory movements of the land and
naval forces sent to the East excited a degree
of dissatisfaction in England and France which
threatened to become troublesome to the two
governments. This made it absolutely neces-
sary that some important enterprise should be
accomplished, in order to restore confidence
and repay in glory, the cost of the vast armies
and ornaments of the allies. The knowledge
of this necessity would naturally induce the
English and htoexaggerate their achieve
ments in the Crimea; unless, indeed, their
triumph was perfect. We must, therefore, re-
member the accounts given of the lombard
rnent of Odessa, and make allowances for the
fact that we receive our information through
British sources.
Sebastopol has been taken by the allied ar.
mics, and that is about all we can say Ger.
tainly with our present information. The mum.
Der of troops engaged on either side, the losses
sustained, and the spirit exhibited by the bill
gerent forces, are important matters of which
We have no definite knowledge. 1t is import
ant also to see whether the English and French
officers, and their respective governments, can
succeed in dividing the glory and apportioning
the laurels in a satisfactory manner, before we
can estimate properly the future course of the
war. We have, however, nothing but the naked
fact that Sebastopol has been taken, to guide us
anticipating the future. The capture of that
place is of itself matter Of vast importance.
It confirms the English and French in the
the Russian fleet has escaped, it must be soon
taken or destroyed, for it has no place of re-,
fuge strong enough to afford it protection.
The combined powers have but little to en-
counter beyond the inclemency of the weather
in completing the conquest of the Crimea and
relieving the Circossians and Georgians from
the pressure under which they have struggled
manfully for nearly a quarter OF a century.
When we first received the news of the battle OF
Silistria, we expressed the opinion that true
policy required the Allies to conquer the Cri
mea as soon as possible, and insist upon its
passing finally from the possession of Russia
That empire obtained the Crimea by force,
and cannot complain if the fortune of war
wrests it from her. The Allies would be JUS
tilted in such a policy, because they have
the right to protect themselves from the pro-
liability of a Russian expedition to the East.
The next steamer will bring further and
more accurate particulars Of the capture Of
Sebastapol, and probably some reliable data
by which we may form an opinion as to the
effect which that event will exert on the ope.
rations on the Pruth. 1t is hardly probable
that the fall of Sebastopol was entirely un-
expected at st. Petersburg, and it would not
be reasonable to suppose that the Gar has
made no arrangements, in anticipation OF that
event, to continue the struggle. The winter will
soon set in, and the allied fleets must retire to
the South, or be completely blockaded by the
ice During the winter they must remain in
active, without the ability to carry reinforce
ments TO the allied armies !. and if the Rus
sian forces can maintain themselves on the
Pruth, the English and French generals will
End themselves entirely isolated until the
spring. Then the Car will hsve the whole
winter TO organize another army and if his
resources are sufficient, he may assail Sebasto-
pol with overwhelming forces before the return
Of warm weather will enable his enemies to re-
store their communications, and prepare for
mother campaign. In view of these possible
results we cannot regard the fall of Sebastopol
as decisive OF the contest, or even indicative OF
a speedy peace, unless it should cause revolu-
tionary movements in the Russian empire itself
Indeed, we expect 70 see tne spirto rePuph-
canism come into action before the conclusion
of the Eastern war. That war is the growth OF
many years, and great events must transpiie
before solid, permanent peace can be made.
osr sympathies have been enlisted in behalf
of the Turks, because we believe that they are
getting in self defence but we do not look upon
the English and French alliance with favor or
satisfaction. We admit that those nations have
a vast interest in protecting the Ottoman EN-.
pire and in strengthening the Circassians, SC
as to secure their possessions from Russian en-
,croachments. When they have done that, they
have no right to proceed further, and they can
not proceed further, unless under compulsion
without arraying the public sentiment of Amer
lea at least in favor Of the Russians. On thi,
point we would repeat what we said last spring