Washington sentinel. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1853-1855, 1854-07-02

i
where the, have that restricted mean z by the
SPECIFIC enumeration Of powers which would
otherwise be largely superseded and, finally, by
the general character OF the instrument ITSELF as
containing the distribution of powers between the
federal and Stale governments.
| Mr.. President there is no better test of an alb
stract principle than by reducing il 10 PRACTICE II
Is undoubtedly for the general welfare, ia. the
largest sense, that the poor OF the States their
roads and canals, their colleges and schools their
| charitable institutions, should be supported; but
| would federal tax for either of these objects be
valid II is undoubtedly for the general welfare,
and, indeed, indispensable TO the very existence
oil THIS government that the State governments
should be supported. But would federal tax
for that object be valid I? The answer is plain.
oittese objects is committed TO the jursdic-
lion oil this government-neither is within its pro-
vnce--neither is within the scope of its powers.
Such is the condition of the INDECENT insane of the
| States. The power of taxation furnishes an in.
fallible test. There is no object outside of the
Constitution to which il can be applied, and there
Is no object within il requiring money 10 which IL
| may not be applied.
The power OF appropriating the public moneys
is commensurate with the power OF taxation. One
is the counterpart of the other You may appro-
pirate money TO every object for which you may
| TAX. The restriction upon the revenue power Is
necessarily restriction upon the power TO APP
| propriae. You can neither tax nor appropriate
| Tor an object not committed TO your jurisdiction.
Il would be the height Of absurdity 10 suppose
that, when the tax has been levied, and the money
placed IN the treasury, the jurisdiction OF this gov
eminent is thereby enlarged, so that the money
can now be appropriated TO an object for which il
| could not be raised.
| The Constitution provides that 60 no money shall
be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of
appropriations made by Laio.' The only clause
Except one which shall presently consder) that
can be supposed 10 authorize an appropriation, Is
that comforting on Congress the power " to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and
all other powers vested by this Constitution in the
| government Of the United States, or any depart
! ment officer thereof" Here the power of ap-
preparation is restricted TO such laws neces-
sary to carry into execution the granted powers
| precisely the restriction which is found necessa-
| rily 10 attach 10 the revenue power. Here, then,
| We may argue back from the power Of appropria-
| ting TO The power OF taxing; and the argument
may thus be stated You cannot take the money
from the treasury except 10 carry into execution
1 the granted powers therefore you cannot collect
the money and place il there for any other pur-
pose.
Thus the power of Congress TO raise money,
and the power Of Congress 10 dispose of it, are
both limited to the constitutional purposes of the
government; and these are necessarily limited TO
the sole and only object Of carrying into execution
its granted powers. When the means have been
raised and appropriated TO accomplish this object,
the funcsion of the money power has been full
filed
Thus the money power of the government is
guarded with degree of care bearing some propo.
sition 10 its Importance. 1t is hedged in on all
sides, from first TO last, from the moment incpent
steps taken 10 draw the money from the pocktes
OF the people, while il is passing into the Treas.
ury, and is locked up there, and until it ceases 10
be public property. II is guarded with jealous
caution, because the money power is the most
formidable power of government, most subtle in
It's action, most liable TO abuse, the most danger
Gus source Of corruption, the most common instru-
ment Of oppression, and most frequently the oc
casion Of civil commotion The principal ques-
ton now is, whether by any artfce or device
which the wit Of man can invent, il can escape
from the restraints which the Constitution has
| imposed upon It, and by slight change of form
become an absolute power, subject TO the discre-
ton, the caprice, or the passions of majority in
Congress.
This is the great question more immedat ely
presented by this bill Are the public moneys,
| which have passed into other forms of public
property, now, in their new forms, except from the
restraints of the Constitution? Has Congress a
| strictly limited power over the public moneys, but
| power to convert them into other property, and
then unlimited power over that property The
question is, indeed, broader, and, if possible, OF
more extravagant import. Have the trainers OF
| the Constitution, after thus restricting with the
| most seduous care, the money power OF this gov
| ernment, al once, themselves, thrown down every
| barrier, and, in an unguarded moment, introduced
one little clause, by which they have unwittingly
| repealed every restrictions and conferred upon
| Congress unlimited power not only to dispose of
the public lands, but Of the public moneys, and
| every species of public property, at their sover-
| eign will and pleasure! Have they given TO Con-
grcss unlimited power in the selection of objects
upon which TO bestow il, without any regard to
the constitutional objects of this limited govern
menta Ifthey have, the power Of taxation is IN
limited; the power of appropriation is unlimited ;
| the money power of this government is as unlm-
lied as the despotism of Russia or of Turkey.
Before you reach any such conclusion, with
| the slightest degree Of pausiblty il would be
necessary TO take the course Of shutting your eyes
/ to every other part of the Constitution, and linn
ting your vision this little isolated clause in the
third section of the fourth article, which will now
| read:
Congress shall have power TO dispose Of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
property belonging United States and nothing
In this Constitution shall be construed prejudice
sas claims Of the United States or Of any
This clause, in the hands ofliberal constitution.
| lists, threatens 10 becomethe Pandoras box of the
Constitution, and il contains, according TO their
| views, constructive powers, which would shake
this government TO its foundation. lfthere be any
one which requires the application or the rule OF
strict construction, aud OF the great truth that this
| is a government Of a few strictly limited powers
| over sovereign States, with uncompromising Sc
verify, il is this little misunderstood and much per-
verted clause. 1t has already been the source of
some of the worst evils that can infest any govern
looks TO this clause. IL be wishes 10 undermine
| the independence Of the States, he looks here.
If he wishes TO foment dissenions and discomfort
and 10 set the north at variance with the south
and TO shake the Union 10 its center he turns his
eyes 10 ibis clause, and forthwith begins his treach-
| erous work.
But, it is said, there are prccedents for exer-
| csing unlimited power in disposing of the public
| domain. There is, doubtless, a great number of
acts Of Congress making grants Of public lands
! But these grants, with two or three exceptions,
are NOT presidents for the purpose for which they
| are cited.
| II is undoubtedly one Of the constitutional OBJ
| jects Of this government to take of the pub
| lie lands. II is much OF the delegated
| powers the power TO regulate commerce, or
| the war power, or the revenue power. The only
| question il, what laws necessary and proper
10 carry into execution The power granted, with
| view TO their preservation and management until
| they finally sold and disposed of When'that
is determined you have the limit of your authority.
| i is necessary they should be surveyed. When
in the survey you leave road, and dedicate il 10
public use, you do not give IL away, but sell il 10
| those who become the adjoining proprietors. In