Thibodaux minerva. [volume] (Thibodaux, La.) 18??-1858, 1854-07-08
From the National Inelligeneer.
Insalar Possessions.

ginia, on the then incredible idea that this
American Union would ever seek to possess or
annex to it the islands of any sea, how amazed
would that statesman have been had the curtain
of the future been suddenly raised and had he
seen how cooly and tiippantly the politicians
and newspapers of the country would in thirty
years discuss the propriety, not of having insu-
lar territories at all, but of forthwith entering
upon the island territories of Power in amity
with us to which we had taken fancy; as if,
in the language of Spanish representative,
| the world of Columbus were our own exclusive
property" Yet so it is; and Congress Hall
and the public journals are busy in settling the
question whether it is time for us to acquire
Cuba in the Atlantic, porto Rico is not yet
mentioned,) and the Sandwich Islands in the
Pacific ocean! These brief remarks were
prompted at this moment by the annexed letter,
which we find in the Journal of Commerce.
letter too full of good and grave suggestions to
be passed by, but which could not be inserted
without word two of explanation. The
special mission referred to by the writer is an
allusion to n statement lately circulated in the
public papers, and generally credited, that the
American Government proposes to send to Spain
two Commissioners (Messrs Dallas, of Phla-
delphia, and Howell Cobb, of Georga) to treat
for a transfer of Cuba to the United States:
WASHINGTON, Thursday, June g. 1854.
We may expect great debate upon the sub
ject of the special mission to Spain, when it
shall be brought before Congress. The object
of the commission is well understood, but still
an explanation of it will be demanded by Con-
gress, and it cannot be refused. 1t is under
stood that the object is olay before the Spanish
Government, in plain and explicit manner,
the views and policy of the United States in re-
gard to Cuba; to show that its acquisition by
the United States is political and commercial
necessity; and that it is necessary for the well
fare both of Spain and the United States, for
the preservation Of peace be,ceen the teco countries,
and for the suppression of lawless enterprises of
our own citizens, in connexion with Spanish
Subjects against Cuba. Il
With the United States there is no other
question on the subject than in regard to time
and conditions. IT might be deferred almost
indefinitely, with advantage to the United States
if the Spanish Government was so far progress
sive in its policy as to adapt itself to the con-
gladly suffer Cuba to remain she is, Span
ish slave colony, SO long as it can be done with
safety to their own domestic interests. The
Southern States are not to be benefited by the
acquisition; for it will destroy the value Of the
sugar lands in Texas, Florida and Louisiana,
and also drain off, by superior advantages of
soil and climate, the slave labor the capital,
and the enterprise from the Southern States.
1t will be question with Congress phether
L. sd
necessary for our interests to acquire Cuba.
This would be question, even independently of
any national feeling in regard to slavery in the
island, and even if the question were left to the
sole decision of the slaveholding States of the
Union.
The condition of the Cuban population is of
itself matter to be considered by the South
as well as the North, if annexation is to follow
acquisition. The white population is five hun
1red thousand; the number of free negroes two
hundred thousand; the number of Bozales, (Af-
ricans held illegally in a condition of slavery,
and who, under the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Amistad case,
would be free, and will be made free under the
recent Spanish edicts) is one hundred and eighty
thousand; the number of slaves is two hundred
md fifty thousand. Thus, if we annex the
Stand, we take it with two hundred and fifty
thousand slaves and four hundred and eighty
thousand free blacks. Of the Bozales most are
males in middle life, and very ferocious and
savage, being native Africans. They will be
as fellow-citizens, and rather out
# place in this enlightened republic Of the
rec negroes, some have been free for a long
ime, were born free, and have accumulated
and are intelligent and civilized, and
o some extent educated. These men would be
dangerous associates for their compatriots, the
%bopo |
means and prompt them to action. Surprising
hat we annexed Cuba as a slave State, what
hall be done with nearly half million of free
egroes? Shall we appeal to the principle of
quatter sovereignty for the settlement of this
uestion? If so, the Creoes will be the only i.
cknowledged citizens; and they will vote out
very one else from citizenship, and especially I
he old Royalist Spaniards, and by simple 3
ecree constitute the half million of free ne v
roes their Stare property, and call upon the I
United States Government to maintain their a
ight to property in these men, and to furnish 4
rmies and navies and munitions of war and
loney, to the extent of millions not to be
ounted, to subject these negroes to their quiet :
ossession.
Again, shall it be provision of the treaty of
urchase that the free negroes shall remain A
zee? Nothing but war of races, added to !,
ervile instructions, will be the consequence of
ur acquisition of the island and the removal of o
,e restraint of Spanish rule. d
There is still another question. Shall we 4
rovide in the treaty of session or otherwise for s.
le deportation of the half million of free blacks
Africa? Will they 60 peaceably? How U
uch would it cost? Are they to be there pro-
ded for by the bounty of this Union, or left to
arvation, in their own quarrels? Suppose the
urchase of the island, and the deportation of
lie free negroes, and adequate provision for fl
lem should amount to only four hundred mil a
ons, (which is much within the mark, } will
Of the amount be an incumbrance upon the III
reasury quite enough to bankrupt it and des T
oy the credit of the Federal Government? tt
In fine, would the acquisition and annexation 4
Cuba, at the expense of war, and the ex
ense of costly purchase, at the hazard of civil
nd servile war in Cuba, be advantageous to the !
Mon, even if we could accomplish the object
ithout any sectional agitation and trouble at
ome? a
These are only few of the considerations e
lat are commended to Congress when the 4
uban question shall come up. Fl
BT. Morning relief train" soliloquized 2
RS. Darlington, as she sat in one of the rail-
Dad cars and gazed upon the ticket which she
i'd purchased at the depot. Morning relief
ain; s'pose that must be the train that starts
yorv uoorpinr o,clock RI ,,;cE Ia x,oor Z