The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1853-11-28

Danube by march northward, and the capture
Q, Bucharest We need hardly say that such
events could not perceptibly affect the ultimate
issue Of the war. All the advantages gained by
the Turks would be more than couuterhaiancea
by the Increased rancor and determination
they would infuse into the breast Of the Car.
II Is probable that every victory Of Omer
Pasha is, in reality driving Turkey nearer to
ruin.
We have as yet no evidence that England or
France intend to play any other part than that
OF spectators II is true that variety Of ru-.
mors are aaoat imputng designs Of interven--
ton to the two governments: that 2, 900 meR
at Paris are reported to be held in readiness 10
sail for Constanrinople that the, British fleet
ar Spithead has likewise been ordered to pre-
pare for sea. The Baltic is said to be its dec
tination in the event of England joining in tie
ARRAY But none of these facts would justly
the assertion that either England or France has
abandoned its neutral position as yet. 1t seems,
however, difficult to believe how such contest
could &C on in Europe without the two mari
time powers sharing in it in some way Austria,
Prussia and Germany, standing midway be-
tween them on the one side, and Russia On
the other, will naturally remain aloof as loag
as possible, for fear of Slle injury which an es
pousal Of either side wonll involve. France and
England have no such considerations to influence
them. If the reported alliance between Dost
1iahomed and the Gar should prove true, and
he object O. the concentration of large forces
Fl Khiva should really turn QUITO be an at
lack upon the British possessions in India
there cannot be doubt that England would at
anee be forced into the field. Even if, as seems
| pr3hable, the story about Dost Mahomed is
without foundation. there is yet enough like
lihaod in the rumors OF Russian movements
in tie East to compel Great Britain to stand
| openly on the defensive Req rons ola different
nature though equally imperative. might very
| possibly impose a similar policy on France.
One thing is certain whatever is done, now,
win bo.done suddenly The time hes passed
for negotiation; and whatever action nay be
taken by the Western Powers, viii, in oil pro-
liability, be characterised by decision, promp-
titude, and energy.
1t is 4 mistake to suppose that il the war be-
| comes general the revolutonaries Of Europe
| viii embrace the opportunity to effect gene
! raj rising against the established governments.
Nothing would be more unlikely. Kossuta,
Mazzini. and . few other restless dcmagogues
might possibly make fresh attempts TO gain
notoriety by creating Disturbances; bat they
could secure no general audience. and would
socn be swept away by the adverse torrent. A
general European war would divert mems
minds into another channel All the energies
Of Ike men who effect revolutions would
lie absorbed in the contest going on before
their eyes. Public attention would be CT.
crossed by the war. and people would
lot have time to think Of internal grievances.
France would glow with military ardor-
rot with lose OF liberty; and if Napoleon only
shows spark Of his uncle's genius. he would
probably become as popular with the masses as
he is now unpopular. So with Germany. All
thoughts Of civil rights and personal freedom
" ould be merged in the desire to fight the Rns
an or the Turk Popular revolutions seldom
~ never occur III tiaIc Of war. The elements Of
iscontent are then subzervient to other pas
siOns and the bald Of government Is too strong
10 invite attempts at insHrcction. 1t is in time
Of peace, after long periods of tranquility when
Ieople are prosperous and haze no foreign wars
10 .ccupy their attention that revolutions break
cat never, or so seldom as to DE clearly coa- !
sdered exceptional cases. when the national |
feeling is thoroughly aroused by conflict with
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