Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1853-10-08
THE EASTERN QUESTION.


those who have uniformly believed in the mainte-
nance Of the peace of Europe. The news from the
East is undoubtedly very warlike still we do not
ticipate immediate war. We have never shared in
the confidence that has so often announced the adj
justment of the numerous difficulties contained in
the question; nor do we now apprehend with many
that 1t IS Immediately to set Europe in blaze. A
grand European war, for the partition of the Otto
man Empire, is among the probable events of the
future The storm may be even now gathering,
but it is not yet ready to burst. Neither of the
three great powers, Russia, France, and England,
who will be the principals in that struggle are will
ing at the present moment, and under present cir
cumstances, to plaee its issues upon the lannon's
final arbitrament. Russia, in presence Of the mo-
mentary alliance of England and France, and Of
the unexpected vitality which decrepit Turkey ex-
hbits, would rather decline the conflict which per-
haIs it was at first not unwilling to provoke content
to wait awhile longer the development of her
manifest destiny" and her traditional policy in
regard to Turkey France is not ready to provoke
or even accept that struggle. The new Emperor
would not at present, we presume, have his atten-
ton withdrawn from important matters which he
would first settle at home. England, in her strong
and dominant disinclination for war, would perhaps
never provoke that for the partition of the wreck of
the Ottoman Empire She will only accept it when
it is inevitable, and because it is 50. Perhaps it
will never offer itself to her on conditions more
favorable than she would find to-day When
forced in it, however, by her policy her fate she
will play her part in it strongly for her stake in
the result will be equal to that Of either Of her
rivals.
Persuaded that we have truly suggested the pre-
sent intentions of these controlling Powers, we feel
confident, notwithstanding the alarmingly warlike
aspect which the Eastern question has suddenly
sumed, that the winter win pass, as the summer has
passed, in a state which cannot be called assured
peace, and which is not fragrant war. It is certain
y within the limits of possibility, if not probabili
ty that during the winter events may occur in the
west of Europe which, in the spring, may induce
the Gar to think the moment opportune to proceed
to the consummation of the ambitious ends attri-
buted to him. if he in truth, entertains such but
we believe that till then his policy will be that of
absolute inaction--the resting on his arms in his
present position, not advancing not retreating-in
sisting on the pure and simple acceptance of his
ultimatam, rhe Vienna note,) and holding on to
the principalites as security.
Contrary to the general expectation, contrary to
our own, we admit the Sultan has refused to sign
the note that was prepared for his signature by the
representatives of the mediating Powers at Vienna
and he has just confirmed his first refusal in Sc
cond published memorandum, more firm, positive
and warlike than the former. The tone Of the Sui
TAM the earlier stages of the discussion had beer
so different, SO submissive 10 the Gar, and marked
by such Difference TO his allies and protectors thai
it was not reasonably be anticipated that be would
assert his independence by rejecting at the last mo-
ment, and upon his own responsibility terms Of set
Element which those allies and protectors had united
in presenting to him as acceptable. To be sure
those terms were in substance, the with those
which the Powers had some months before support
ed him in rejecting. But peace is precious, and
the Gar is obdurate, and what could the dependant
protected Sultan DO but accept the terms at their
hands This was apparently safe reasoning, and it
was really not 90 only because it took no notice Of
two important facts. One Of these facts was that
the exertons Of the previous six months had reveal
ed TO the surprised Sultan much larger amount Of
efficient vitality in the Mussulman Empire than had
been supposed to remain in it. A consciousness Of
some independent substantive force has returned to
him: the ancient chivalry of the Crescent seems to
have sprung up from its death-like sleep. His en-.
pire and authority were not so exhausted and life
less as had been asserted He finds himself at the
head Of large and powerful army, well armed in
spired fully with the old-time terrible fanaticism
which made the former Mussulman armies 50 ire
sstible for the defence propagation Of the faith
This army, whose numbers are daily sweled by vol
untcers from all the turbaned tribes from the Nile
and the Tigrs to the Bosphorus, burning with the
same zeal, is clamorous for war, and demands only
to be led against the Russians The Sultan feels
that be could well maintain himself for a campaign,
if not longer, even against the immense force Of the
Russian Empire. This is one fact The other is
that he has acquired the moral certainty that Eng
land and France will not, in any event. allow the
Gar to come to Constantinope. They arc wiling he
secs, to allow him to suffer humiliation rather than
90 to war in his defence. Being satisfied that Rus.
sa is not pushing the Ottoman Empire 10 utter over
throw, they counsel submission to the Gar to the
extent Of his present demands The Sultan counts
on drawing the allies into war for his defence, not
outstanding their unwillipgness, and in protection
Of their interests The Sultan therefore refuses it
now seems and probably will continue to refuse, to
sign the Vienna note. Russia refuses and will con-