The miners' express. (Dubuque, Iowa) 1849-1854, 1853-01-26
The Cuban Question

I As M sht uaftsriisy be expected, the receip
and rcrua 4 in Elr,pa of the American ex
tchangcs containing III correspondence letweel
his and the Spanish government; on the Cuba,
question, has produced profrund sensation il
he public mind there. II viii be recollecte
that this correspondence was made known
the world by President Fillmore, ON a call fron
the House, requesting the receipt of such pa
pcrs, relating 10 Cuban affairs, as were in pos
session of tho Government, the publication o
which might not be pr judicial 10 the public in
terest Under this general call, Mr.. Flllmor
sent down to the House QH the papers end doc
urnents that had passed between. the ,~o goY
ernments, on the Cuban question, from its in
cipiency down to the present moment, includln!
amongst these papers private letter rom Mr.
Buchanan, Secretary of State under Mr.. Polk
to Mr. Saunders, the then Minister at the cour
of Spain The publication by Mr.. Fillmore o
this private letter, has been received by tn;
wise and prudent portion of the whole country
irrespective Of party, as the most startling dl-
plomatic blunder that has heretofore marked the
annals of our political career. Indeed, there
are those-and their number and character are b.
10 Means contemptlble-wbo think with mucl
reason, that the design of Mr.. Fillmore in th.
publication of this correspondence, was TO so fa
embarrass the in-coming administration, as tc
render the acquisition Of the Island of Cuba,
during its term, an impossibllity. Let Mr. fIil
more's intenton have been what 1T might, ne
certainly could not have adopted any more eff.
fective means, by which, 10 sever for all time to
come, the most remote hope OF an amlcable ar
rangement Of the difficulties existing between
this government aud Spain, growing out of the
troubled condition of the relationship existing
between Cuba and the parent power. AT first
view, we could not believe that MIR. Fillmore
would lend himself TO any such design; but 4
perusal of Mr.. Buchanans letter to MIR. Saun.
ders, left us no alte ternative. This letter, we re
gret to say, some one has taken from our Office,
or we nave so far misaid it, as not to be able to
,lace our hand on it just now Our regret is th :
greater, from the fact that We has. not concluded
It's perusal Suffice it to say, ho gevcr, that 1t
emanating fron Mr.. Buchanan as Secretary of
State, vet it was intended to be purely private
document and as such, it very naturally cor,
tained a great deal that it would not have done.
strictly private and confidential was it, that MIR.
Buchanan gave directions 10 Mr. Saunders not
to trust his reply to it TO the mails, but to send
by hand, with some person of undoubed re-
liability, to Liverpool, and from thence to him al
Washingtnns
having Proceeded thus Lar, we suppose the
reader who has never seen this correspondence,
will begin to enquire, what was the object Of
this letter? It's object was to get Mr.. Saunders
to sound the Spanish government in relation to
the probable feeling with which they would re
c i've a proposition from our government, for
the purchase of the island of Cuba. Aware of
the exceeding delicacy of such step, Mr..
Buchanan's letter contains instructions to our
Minister, as to the exact m inner of proceeding.
so as not to arouse the least suspicion in the
Spanish mind until it would be fully ascertain
ed how the proposition would be received. He
warns our minister to proceed with the create,
caution; and under no consideration to place
anything in writing, short of fuI! and final
close of the desired contract. He impresses up.
on him the pre-eminent Importance Of so con
ducting tie whole affair, that, in the event of
failure, no vestige, no trace OF It will remain to
arouse the apprehensions of European powers,
or in the least endanger the amioabe relations
existing between the government at Washing
ton and that at Madrid. and thereby, possibly
sorcclose all hope of the friendly acquisition of
tie Island.
MIR. buchanan starts out with recountng the
inestlmabe advantages that must flow from its
acquisition, as great military point, and the
dangers of its acquisition by any foreign power.
He goes into an elaborate calculation of the prob
lbe value OF the Island, taking as its basis its
exports and imports, the area under cultivation,
aud the character Of the force employed ia the
development of its resources, and then draws
the comparison between these and the great
change which must come over them, under the
the restless energy of American industry and
enterprise From these, and other considera-
,ions, such as public lands, DC, Mr.. buchanan
estimates the value of the Island at $50, 100000
covers, to offer that sum therefor, with the
privilege of going as high as SlOo,00o ,00o, rath
er than fail in the negotiation after entered up
on. All this was conveyed to our minister un-
over and over again, warned and sought to-
be impressed with the momentus magnitude of
the trust reposed in him, and the dangers Of per
mittinp single word or sentence to escape his
lips, that might have the least tendency to ava
ken undue apprehension in the minds of the
Spanish ministry, or any of its members, by
Which he might endanger the future hopes of
his government in regard to Cuba, either nl
exciting the mistrust of Spain, or kindEs the
ealouses of foreign powers. So guarded was
Mr. b. in this letter of instructions to our min
ster that he even warned him against putin =
his pen to paper, in any shape or form, either by
way oil taklEp notes, Wiltiil5 ietleis of oticE'
wise, until he had attained undoubted evidence
Of full and final understanding between himself
md the Spanish Coyesnmcnt, and It's desire to
enter upon the imii ,diatc consumnation of the
contract BY way Of policy he recommended to-
Mr. Saunders to fail in nothing that would have
, tendency to convince Spanish ministers of the
otal absence of every sinister motive or design
On the part of this government, in all that Per
.ained to Cuban affairs, and especially to impress
,pon them the absence Of everything in the
shape even of couniyance, at the then dlsturbe d
condition Of aiItiys in Cuba, ant. as potent ar
rument on this point, to direct attention to the
lispatch Of the S, ,cetary Of State to certain off
,ers of the army IN Mexico, to the feet tha
,pon no consideration should they land any of
he u S troops at the Island of Cuba. or even
ouch at that point, during the troubled state of
.fiars in thai quarter, lest the most trivial cir
,un stance should occur, from which blame
night attach 10 this government, on the grounds
# want of proper regard fer the obligations OF