The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1853-03-14

resst the conviction that the disobsdsnce a ths a.
vss MOI hs result Of accident or advsstsnos bat vas
iatsat0sAl deliberate and wtlful- I mean "wkul" In
=; :. % 70 DO .h.. !:
Them 70 gram CERTAIN privilege to Jacob Sharp and
his assosAtss-snA vith3s full knowledge Of the or
he rssoiutioa which Asy adopted ths grant and
hence they could not for have doubted that an
pass the sssoIuoo whether they acted In the Sslisf
that THAR disobsdienee to the order could DO justified
ds,s.t question but such defence !. ITSELF en- ah sa
resolved to violate We desire 70 put IS favorable
construction the conduct OF the defendants ~ can
possibly bear but mind there is escape from
the conclusion that they have Intentionally and know
ingy done the act which the order Of this Court com
handed them not to do Nor let it be said that, in
stating undoubtng conviction disregard and
reject unworthy of credit, the declaration made BY
each of the defendants answer the fourth
rogsory namely that she believed chat the injunction
did not purport to restrain them from voting
in favor Of the resolution making the grant which
prohibited for although forced to regard this
declaration ambiguous and evasive it not necessary
to reject it as wholly untrue. 1t admits of an nterpre
ation which may reconcile 1t with the conviction
have expressed while If understood in the obvious
which the words intended to suggest it be
econciled with the public acts and declarations of the
Board of Aldermen at the very time which this decla
ration in their answers, refers. And
duced to the painful necessity Of an election 1t is to
emporaneous declarations made for the OF
explaining and indicating this act Of disobedience to
the process of the Court, that our confidence
resolutions introduced by Alderman Sturevant, and
voted for by all the Aldermen with exception who
before conclusive evidence that the order
of injunction then understood by them in the very
that we have given to it. and that, thus under
standing they meant to violate it. These resolutions
denounced the order Of injunction illegal restraint
upon the legislative action of the Common Council, and,
upon that ground proclaimed determination utterly to
disregard it. But the injunction then understood
by them neither preventing meaning to restrain
the members of the Common Council from voting fer the
resolution in favor of j. Sharp and his associates with
the intention that the resolution when adopted should
operate grant IL imposed restraint Whatever upon
their legislative action nor by them voting as they did,
1t at all dsregarded Indeed upon this construction
the Common Council SUCH could not disregard it, 1t
is painful but to state the alternative Either
the in cton when served understood by Alderman
Sturevant those who acted with him. restraining
them from voting favor OF the resolution making the
grant prohibited or it was not Ii il was then the
declaration they have made in its obvious sense,
asserts the existence Of belief which they enter
tanned If not then his resolutions vndicating
the rights and dignity Of the Common Council
based upon assertion which he and those who voted
with him then believed 10 be false and consequently
most gratuitous well Incorporate attack upon the
conduct and motives Of the judge by whom the njunc
ton issued. And upon this superstition the passage
of the resolutions malicious and wanton Insult
contempt criminal and aggravated in ito nature as
q court of justice has been bound to notice and
compelled to punish. But this suppostion do not
hesitate reject for although the resolutions of Alder
man Sturtevant may convey imputatons, and be
pressed in terms that render them greatly liable
anmadyerson and censure, yet do not at all doubt
that the in JUNCTION regarded not only by those who
voted for those resolutions but by every member of the
Common Council, restraining their legislative action
by enoning them not to adopt by their the grant
which 1t described and prohibited 1t is manifest how
ever that if Alderm Surtevant the Aldermen who
voted with him. ed in this belief the credit of their
yeracity only be saved by constituting their present
declaration within its Curious though very qualified,
and il is this qualified and charitable interpreta
ton, therefore, that adopt The order Of injunction
commanded the corporation and its members to de-
sist and refrain from making certain grant but did not
command the members of the Common Council not to
vote in favor OF the resolution they about to
consider unless the intended and necessary effect Of its
adoption was to make the grant that forbidden.
Such however not its necessary effect since, when
they voted for the resolution they might Ut the
time have suspended it's effect grant until the in
junction dissolved, until the happening of that
event have forbidden the acceptance of the resolution by
the grantees the filing OF that acceptance by their
clerk and had either of these been followed
there would have been intentional breach Of the in
junction-no conflict between the Common Council and
the judiciary would have ensusd the city would have
been saved from the disgrace of the unseemy spectacle
that witness, and the judges Of this Court have
been relieved from the discharge of most painful duty
Why course OF proceeding by which all these annoy
would have been avoided no. in fac. adopted
it is unnecessary would be irrelevant to inquire
We however. told by the Assistant Aldermen that
they only believed but advised by counsel that
the injunction did not purport to restrain them
from voting for the resolution which they reconsdcred
and adopted but bound to presume that this ad
vice was given or was intended to be given, in
that have indicated would be foowedn other words,
that although the resolution might be passed its effect
grant would be suspended since find it impossible to
believe that any counsel could have advised them that if
they adopted the resolution as to render it eectua
grant the injunction would not be violated No counsel
could have advised them that the injunction would not
be broken if they made the grant which in plain words
it commanded and enjoned them to desist from max
ing While upon this subject deem it necessary to
observe that the advice of counsel when stated gene
raj terms it here is will never be accepted by this
Court excusing paliatng contempt of its orders
process, which is otherwise manifest proved The
advice when thus stated will be permitted to affect
decision. To enable 10 regard it at all the of
the counsel must be given and the information that
laid before them and the import of their advice be
fully stated the advice written the writing must
be produced-if oral fact that il given and its
precise import be inferred BY the adavs of the
counsel who gave it. The proprety Of these rules,
and the necessity o. adhering to them, will be
doubted BY who have any knowledge OF
the difficulties that beset court in the due admins
raon OF its justice and of the means too frequently
employed by suppression Of truth to evade its authority.
The result Of upon that part OF this
which have considered that cannot regard
the declaration of the defendants in their to the
fourth interogatory, that they believed that the in
junction did not purport to restrain them
from voting they did meaning that they were
TO dsobey the positive order Of the Court b. their no
and mistake as to its true import but simply that
the injunction did prohibit the naked act OF voting
for the resolution in favor of Sharp and hi. assoca
fby voting effect given TO the resolution
grant 1t is that the declaration thus construed il
irrelevant and eyasiye but !; - better that we should
il eyasiye than be forcei to reie it
true. We cannot believe that there any Of the de-
PENDANTS Who has been attached, the direct qucs-
ton put to him, whether he believed that the object
Of the injunction 10 prevent them from adopting
grant the resolution they not TO reconsider who
w6d give any other than affirmative reply. II is in
deed manifest that unless such its meaning and OBJ
ect it had none what yer.
The Judge entered fully into the question OF ur scton
and cited various authorities The public disobedence of
Common Council of this ctyto the positive mandate OF
court Of general jurisdiction possessing hitherto trust,
the confidence OF the public act OF no trivial i'm
portance. The history Of oor country, believe af
fords instance Of similar resistance to judicial
thority Viewed in it, possible consequences,
ample OF disre pect and characterization 1t calcula
ted 10 affect widely the peace and good order Of society
and from the conflict which It threatened 10 impair the
confidence Of all rejecting in the permanence Of
Institutions To venture upon such An act was to assume
deep responsibilities responsibility that should
have been assumed unless upon the fullest deberaton
the best advice and the pressure Of an imperous and
stringent necessity Yet this possibility assumed and
the act performed without elaboration without advice
and without necessity. The suppotion that there
ans necessity for immediate action Ia plainly groundles
We have already shown that th resolution which the de-
PENDANTS Notwithstanding the objection Of the Mayor
determined TO adopt might have been adopted had its oper
alton grant been suspended without violating the in
junction but il otherwise what had they to
doubt that the which they believed to be
mended and justified by the strongest OF public