Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1853-07-16

OF having him taken before the Commission
| er, that the right OF the claimant to his SER
vices might be investigated. While the al
legged fugitive was in the Deputy Marshnl's
hands by virtue of that warrant, and before
investigation was had before the Commits
sioner, Freeman was brought before me on
a writ of hdbeds corpus, to which tho Deputy
| Marshal made his return, alleging that he
had him in custody by virtue of said war
rant issued by said Commissioner. Free
inan answered the return by controverting
it-by setting up his freedom, and contro-
verting Elingtons right to claim him as his
slave.
Freeman's counsel contends that Judge
of the circuit court of Indiana had jurisdic-
ton to go beyond the warrant of the Com
missioner, and hear the evidence aud in
quire whether he owed service to Ellington
or not In other words, that | can s,ibsti-
tnte myself in the place of Commissioner
Sullivan, and proceed to hear the evidence
as to whether Freeman was Ellingtou's slave
or not, which had prevented him from
hearing by virtue Of this writ of hdJeds cor
pus. II is contended that circuit judges
possess this power, not by virtue of any net
of Congress, not 10y virtue of nny act of the
General Assembly of this State, but by vir-
tue of the State sovereignty OF ludiana, and
her duty and power, as such, to project her
citizens from improper and illegal restraints;
aud il was compared to the right of the
United States, to resist British aggression in
impressing our senmen and 2d. Upon the
following clause in the 72:}d sec. of X. s. of
Ia, y. l9S, relating 10 wriis of hdbeds corpus,
viz; "The plaintiff may accept to the suili-
cheney OF, or cOntrovcrt the return or any
part thereof or allege any new matter in
avoidance"
These positions are untenable for the fol-
lowing reasons;
]. The Stute of Indiana has surrendered
this attribute Of her sovereignty, as shown
ny portion of the second section of the
fourth article of tic constitution, namely;
Z" No person held to service or labor in ono
State under the laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in consequence of nny law or
regulation therein he discharged from such
service or labor; but shall be delivered up
on claim of the party TO whom such service
or labor may be due"
9. The case of Prigg .. The Common
wealth of Pennsylvania, l6, Peters r. 5. e.
U. s., Rep, p. $50, settles aud puts at rest
the question OF jurisdiction over fugitives
from labor, in favor of the exclusive juris-
diction in the United States, aud that no
State Legislation can control II, and conse-
quently no Stnte officer, unless he is vested
with authority, 10y act of Congress, can ex-
ercise amy jurisdiction over the question of
freedom or slavery. In the case OF Wright
.. Deacon, 5 5. aud Rawle, go, il was held,
that the writ of homine repiegidndo did not
lie to try the right of the fugitive TO freedom,
though Oh the return Of the fugitive TO the
State from which lle fled, his right to free
dom might he tried. In relation to the case
of Prgg .. The Commonwealth of Penn.
sylynnia, there is the following language IN
n note to Kenl's Com, p. AS: alt was
there declared, that the national government,
in the absence of all positive provisions to
the contrary, was bound through its proper
department, legislative, executive or judic-
iary, as the case might require, to carry into
effect all tile rights aud duties imposed upon
it by the constitution. Any Legislation by
Congress, in case within its jurisdiction,
supersedes all State Legislation, aud i'm
pledly prohibits H."
"The Constitution and laws of the United
States secure the right 10 the owner to re-
! claim fugitive slaves against State Legisla-
tion." kents Com, p. 273, note.
There is another well established princi-
| pic, which bears OH the question under con-
sideration, namely; that no State can control
the exercise of any authority under the fed
eral government. l Kent's Com. 46l.-
This question is settled by several decisions
of controlling authority. "No State lribu-
nnl can Interfere with seizures of property
made by revenue officers, under the laws of
the United Stntes; nor interrupt, 10y process
of replevn, Injunction or otherwise, the ex-
ercise of the authority OF the federal officers"
| 4 Kaniis Com. 1SO la .,flinar Of no
United States who seizes, or the court which
awards the process to seize, has jurisdiction
of the subject matter, then the inquiry into
the validity of the seizure belongs exclusive
ly to the federal courts" ID.
The General Assembly Of Indiana, so far
from intending TO confer power on her Off
GERS TO interfere by habeas corpus with fugi-
tive slav IS, by the clause of the hdbeds corpus
act above referred TO, at sec. 725, on y. 1876,
2 II. s., provides as follows: "No court or
Judge shall inquire inio The Legality Of any
Judgment or process, whereby the party is in
custody, or discharge him where the term ol
commitment has not expired in either of the
cases following: |. Upon process issued by
any court or judge of the United States
where the court or judge has exclusive ju-
risdiction."
The Commissioner, so far as he exercises
jurisdiction over fugitive slaves, is court
and therefore will fall within the expires:
exemption Of the Statute. As to the ques
ton in hand, il is imnaterial whether the
Commissioner is court or not, as i only
refer to il to show that the Legislature o.
Indiana, did not intend by any provision o
the habeas corpus act, to confer any sucl
power, and thus bring her officers in coils
ion with the authority of the United States
But have already shown that if the Gene
raj Assembly of Indiana has passed law IL
express terms, authorizing her tribunals ol
officers to exercise Jurisdiction in determin
ing whether fugitive from labor is free
man or a slave, that such act Of the Genera
Assembly would be void, aud no judicia