The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1853-10-24
Ger man Thoughts on War between Rus
Sla and Turkey.


Even though France were 10 decline joining Great
Britain in her refusal to force The scceptatoA Of the
Vienna note on the Divan, yet that refusal on the
part Of Great Britain aone sufices to change the
aspect of the Oriental question: IL u not now likely
that Turkey will be induced 10 retract her modhca
tions Of the note. This being the case, war be-
tween Russia and Turkey ia by no means improba-
ble Though in its decline still the Moslem ia
strong enough to produce a ianaticism which thu
government will find it diicalt to resist, for thi
fanaticism holds forth promises of rapne and murder
The question is what the result II hOstlitie6 w0uu
be for Europe. partial answer to that question
may be suggested by review OF the armies Of tn
two Powers.
The Hungarian campaign has enabled us to judd
of the condition of the Russian army and ascertain
it's fitness for the purposes OF war That army has
made much progress since The Polish campaign
The various corps are completely manned and
mounted; the materials are excellent. Their would
famed stubberLness is undmln'shed They are now
more able in manOeuvring The Don CoHsaeks alone
are not what they used to be.
The faults of the Rus sian army may be enumerated
under the following heads They are awkward in
the cOmmissarat and victualiing departments; they
have an objection to quick and daring movements
their outpost service is stall neglected; and they keep
their troops too much concentrated.
To Judge Of the Turkish army is much more diff
cult The regular troops OF tue two corps which are
usually quartere in aud around Constantin1ple, con-
sist Of fine men, well dressed ana armed the ar0ne
nv has good marksmen and drivers; the infantry
nianeuvre tslerably well but the cavalry consists q
the worst hcrsemen that can he found. The provin-
cial c0rps-of which two are stationed ct tho Danube
or Balkan while two are in Syrie and Mesopotami2-
are said to be far worse Suce tue battle Of Nisib
they have Fever taken the field, except against the
Druses and the Hontcnegps aud in either case their
| conduct was not very creoitable.
No one has ever thought Of pra'sing the Egyptian
auXilares. 1t is difficult 70 say whether the Re66
are regular or irregular troops. They want d'sci.
pline The corps Of rreguars arc chiefly composed Of
/ Albanians-bold fellows, inceed but robbers.
OF the Turkish generals the world knows nothing
! Omar Pasha's name clone is known beyond the con-
fines Of Turkey, ana even be has never done any
thing to warrant his military reputation He appears,
however to be aware Of the fact that since the Days
| of Belgrade and Salankemen, the Turks hSht well
only when protected by walls, He IS prepared %
act on the defensive and relics on his ortresses And
entrenched camps.
the Tgrkish army is not fit to fight pitched battles
The regulars might pOssib defend fortresses ana
entertainments and the irreguars, II allowed TO plum
der would do for short ex pcdtions. VI course, 90
not saw that their army is not uch better now than
It WAS in 1928 and 1929. But pA,hed, battles can
only be fought by armies that bave IN ene
officers and in themselves; and how Is IT possible
that the battaons can have Confidence In their ON
GERS since those officers are mere drilling masters
The regulars are, moreover, prone to commit excess
es, and such troops are never so DO rehed on Id
battle. 49,. -.
est difficulties to the provisioning Of troops an1 tn'
communication, between the various corpa Wals
acha and Bulgaria in deed, are toeraoy cai'sA, ss
but their stores suffice only for 40 oSs arc had
weeks. Thraca is des at. The "~uS s.V - ~
the best Of seasons; from the commenc, NJ Nh
tumn to the end Of spring they are impassa. m,
itary operations are possible ouy bet VI en- May
October The remainder OF the year it is impossibis
to march troops, especially artillery. The carriage
of provisions by land is imp ,ssble by sea II is d
cult and dangerous.
II Ia mere nonsense to say that Russia protractsd
the negotiations to the commencement Of winter foY
the purpose Of oeiDg safe from the operations of the
fleets. In those provinces there Is no making war in
winter. Even the siege Of tie fortresses on the Dan
ube would present enormous diff culties.
The Danube separates the two armies. The GROSS
ing 1t at any one point pra~ens the great difficult
ties to the Russians. The Turks have the advantage
OF on the Danube, sud the of cross
ing the river at Wlddin.
war on large scale is impossible before May
The Russian army is not equal 10 the exigencies d
war by means Of flying columns and detached eorps
(kfeincr krCig) Attacks upon the fortresses and
short expeditions, might possibly give the Turks an
opportunity OF Developing thtir military advantages.
The pecuartes of the Two armies make it the inter
est OF the Russians 10 make in grand style.
Bat, since such war Is Impossible in win er, what
on earth can induce them to commence h,stlites be-
fore the proper tine arrives IL is In their interest
TO wait aDo their troops lose nothing by waiting;
while the Turkish army, the other hand, suffers
from proorastinatior irregular troops and troops
prone TO commit excuses eannot bear She trials of
inactivity even when pun tually paid, which il not
| likely to be the case in the present iostancc. The
Russians therefore, will De quiet enough during the
But there can be doubt that it would be 10 the
advantage Of the Turks to commence she war at
once, hey could but do SO Il n, indeed easier
for them TO cross the Danioe than tor the Russians
but they cannot engage in pitched battles; and in
they entered Wallscbia the Russians choosing their
owo field, would meet them with large concentrated
masses Besides, what wi the badness Of the TO Ids
and the want OF provisions for the army the Turks
can as little advance into Walachit rs the Russians
into Bulgaria AUD rhracis.
II, therefore, war he declared, if events equal 10
| declaration of war should occur, the winter viii
| probably pass without aty serious engagement. A
few skimishes may possibly bske place on the out
| posts the Russ ans viii take of themselves ia
the princpalties md the Turkish troops may posi-
bly, pass The time in killing pluuderng the pea.
SAINT population When tie time for making war ar
rves the Turkish srmy VIII be Ia state OF thorough
insubordnation, and the Dvsn will he glad 70 nave
peace at any price; and since tie Russians are al
ways moderate III their conditions It y but TOO pro
bable that peace will be concluded, OF winch the
French scribes of Rescbd P,sha will say that II is
triumph of the unconquerable perseverance OF the
viituous and heroic OsrDablis.
| ---.-------------------
| Property AND Taxes IN BosToN.-The assessed
valuation of the property Boston, for taxation, In 1862