The daily republic. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1853-1853, 1853-08-02

", consistently with her honor, to deny fhrthss
msterial aid t6 the Turk: sA
But in ease England should withdraw, would
France alone persist in opposing Russia--fght her
single handedl It may be that she would. She
has an old grudge against the Russians She has
not forgotten Moscow, and the terrible winter OF
1912. ailiira ige.
war with Russia would doubtless be popular
with the French, or the mass Of the nation. And
still there many things against 1t. Louis Ma
poleon il none too firmly seated on his throne,
and it is impossible to say what elements would be
called into play to render his position still more
precarious by war. Democracy is not dead in
France; and the old Bourbons are watching, like
SO many harpies for an opportunity to seize upon
what they consider their legitimate prey. And
they have the sympathy and good wishes, and, in
case of any favorable chance, would no doubt have
the aid ofthe legitimate despots ofal Europe Would
not even England--her government, if not her
people--look contentedly on, though they might
not take an active part in restoring the Bourbons?
1t is quite certain that the French Emperor has no
foreign friends to rely upon He is a parrenu--
an audaciOus intruder upon the sacred ground of
legitimacy rebel against the divine right Of
kings. He may therefore look upon discretion,
under present circumstances, the better part Of
valor for his own sake. ,
Besides, though war might be popular with the
masses, it would be very unpopular with numer-
GUS and very influential classes in France. 1t was
the moneyed interest, the property holders, who
were largely instrumental in putting down the
revolution, and in elevatng Louis Napoleon to
the throne, for the sake of domestic peace and the
security Of their possessions. They are even con-
tent to their country enslaved to effect this.
Now the good will of this powerful class is vitality
important to the Emperor, and he would not will
lingly disaffcct them. But war, with its burdens,
It's disorders and uncertainties, would be highly
injurious if not runous to them. There are also
great industrial interests in France as in Eng
land that would be disturbed and ieoparded by
war. a4 @l epfa
Still, it is possible that Louis Napoleon may
decide upon war. The army would like it, and
probably the majority of the French, if only to
crafty their hatred Of Russia, and to avenge their
great Emperor But France is so separated from
Russia, that with her armies she could do but
little against her. We have supposed, however,
that Austria would probably be the ally of Russia
in her crusade against Turkey. In that she
would Of course become the enemy of France; and
France would then have work enough on hand
for herself to do She would be brought in direct
contact with her foes in Italy and beyond the
Rhine. But could Prussia, and the other Ger
man powers, remain neutral in such war? 1t
would seem scarcely possible that they should.
Here, then, we should have general war. But
France, SO far as the governments are concerned,
would be overwhelming. But there are the peo-
ple-the disaffected people-smnrting under the
recollection of their disappointed hopes the ty-
rnnny ofther rulers, and only waiting their chance
once more to rise against them. Here is ele-
ment which France might turn to terrible account.
Awaiting herself Of this, crushing as the coalition
would seem to be against her, she might even turn
the scales in her own favor h4
But would Louis Napoleon, after treading out
the last sparks of freedom in his own country ,con
sent to light the flames Of revolution all around
him. take him to be thoroughly selfish man,
ready to do any thing for his own advantage
that his first and chief principle is, to serve him
self. He has shown that he can be all things to
all men, as suits his ends. Besides, necessity has
no law; and, pressed by the multitude of his enc
mics, he might feel obliged to take advantage Of
everything that would help him. Should he call
the revolutionary spirit to his aid, wake up insur
rection, and let loose upon Europe all the wild
passions, now kept down only by1forcible suppress
sion, who can foresee the result 1t would be
state of things to make lis all stand aghast. I
dare not contemplate it.
But have already extended my spccuations
beyond what had intended. The sum of my be-
lief is this-that the Gar, whatever may be his
professions, intends, if he can, to conquer Euro
pean Turkey, and hold it. That Austria will be
his ally in this war-or, at least, will not oppose
him. That Prussia will be neutral, unless Aus
tra should join Russia, and thereby become the
enemy of France, in which case, with the other
German States, she will side with Austria and
Russia against France. That England is so we'd
ded to peace, by its Importance to her, that she
will, if it be possible, keep at peace, and that she
will probably find means Of doing it. That
France also, or rather Louis Napoleon, has strong
reasons to avoid war, but is more likely than Eng
land to be drawn into it; and that, if he should be
so, all the consequences that we have suggested
of such step will very probably follow.
These are bold speculations, am aware.
make no pretensions to be a prophet in these
matters or in any other We know with GER
tainty but little of the future, and it is we'll, on
many accounts, that we should not. We are all
interested in future events, however, and natu-
rally led to speculate upon them 1t appears to
me that an important crisis in the affairs of the
world is approaching, and have thought some
thing of it, and have endeavored to form the best
opinion that could; still but little of what have
anticipated as probable may take place; and much,
if not most of it, pray may not. 1t is impossible
for us to say what in the present condition OF the
world would eventually be best for it, Its affairs
are certainly in strange state, and cannot, 1t
would seem, remain What changes may take
place we can only conjecture. But God reigneth,
and there is great comfort in knowing this. 'sThe
wrath of man He maketh to praise Him, ana the
remainder of wrath He will restrain. -
There is one thing which, from the present as
pect of affairs, appears probable-and that is,
that the Sultan, deserted by his foreign supporters,
will feel himself compelled to yield, granting sub
stantaly at least all that Nicholas demands, hui
initiating as this would be. Single and alone, it
were vain for him to contend with Russia, and he
knows it. Should he thus yield, the Car would
be left without any ground whatever, other than
his own ambition, for further hostile acts Still,
having entered upon the war, and all his prepare
tons for its vigorous prosecution being made, it
would not be very strange if he should determine
to go on. The very weakness of the Turk, strip
ped of his allies, would be strong temptation
and some justfying pretence, weak and miserable
though it might be, could probably be found. 1t