Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1853-07-02

iUe HTONlSlOn ITOlfi ub tHHKuoECl "hN ''ON
from history or any contemporaneouse events,
and I should like to have n pro-slayery
champion tell the why, if the trainers OF The
Constitution meant slnves, they didn't say
so? He may answer me whichever way he
will before get through, II will be seen
that | shall confute him on his own answer.
Instead of saying slaves, the Constitution
uses words which, in their natural significa-
ton, exclude the idea of a slave. Listen:
Person held to SERVICE shall be delivered
up ON claim Of the party to whom such SER
vice or labor may be due' Now, the terms
held and due are technical law terms, per-
hnps rs old as the common law ITSELF AT
any rite, for hundreds of years, they have
been invested with specific legal meaning,
and for millions of times, they have been
used for specific legal purpose. ln law
books aud in judicinl proceedings, they have
been used in their special technical sense,
and one might as well try TO conjure up
doubt about the meaning of the word ten,
or the word radius or the word nZote,' as
about them. A debtor is held TO bail; that
is, he has come under civil obligation to
appear, &c. An obligor is held and firmly
bound; that is, he has covenanted, by an
instrument under seal, TO pny something or
do something. The jury finds that such a
sum is due from the defendant TO the plain
tiff The court decides tina, the services of
All indented apprentice are due to the mas
ter, &c. &c. But the very definition OF a
slave is, that he is incapable Of contracting
with any mortal whc;iIsoever, not even with
woman to make her his wife, nor with n
physiclun TO save him from death. lie can
no more make a promise, than stone or
log. He cannot oice. Men hind themselves
BY consent, by an erereise Of The i0iH. But n
slaves will is in his masters bosom. Talk
of his making a contract, by virtue of which
his services are due to another; he has not
even the instrument to contract with. To
say, then, that slave is chattel, aud thHt
service is due or oiOing from him to his owner,
is TO say that chattel, which, civilly, is de-
void of will, is om,ipotent over its own ma
ture, aud eau lie n dead chnttcl and live
debtor at the same time.
But we lnve heen looking, exclusively, at
the language of the Constitution. Is there
not some principle of Interpretation, accom-.
panied also 10y facts fulfilling the conditions
of the principle, which eau modify the words
in question, and impose upon them u mean
Jog different from their accustomed, plain,
English, legal sense?
All will understand that here refer to the
principle o! contempornneolisi Interpretation,
or construction by historical fhcts. Now,
acknow ledge the validity of this principle.
Ii seems TO me sound, aud, therefore, wher-
ever il fairly carries me, must go. ! cannot
deny n principle because of its supposed
ndyeise hearing upon the point in issue. IL
] deny il now, by aud 10y, when | have &C.
cnsion to use il, my adversary will cite my
denial against me. The rule TO do as we
would be done by, belongs to logic as well
MS to every rliiug else.
But suppose il could be demonstrated
from coniemporaneous records, or historical
evidence of any kind, that the trainers of tue
Constitution meant 10 allow the case of fh-
gitive slaves TO he included in the second
section Of the fourth article, the question
will still remain, whether they have used
language sufficiently plain aud comprclen-
sive TO efleciuatc their purpose. II they
huve not, then their plirl ose, like that oi ten
thousand other contracting parties, becomes
ubortiye. As the clause stands, il is unex-
ceptionable. Neither humanity nor the
higher law has ought to alege ugninst it,
But it au attempt is made TO force the idea
of slavery into il, by virtue OF an outside
rule of construction, then another rule OF
construction, as old, and far more sacred
aud binding, aiises, which explains the ex-
PLANTATION and construes the cOnstruer. THIS
sacred aud authoritative rule Is, that, IN
whatever pertains to human life and liberty,
every thing is TO be construed most strictly
in favor Of these natural rights. The law
books overflow with precedents on this sub
jrct and they are all on one side. No mat-
ter how dire the intent Of the legislator was I;
he may have been very Herod; he may
have Intended to murder infants or TO ensave
a race still, IL words have not been used
which command and coerce such meaning.
they nre not TO be so executed. Had the ~
rant legislator meant to kill another by a
blow, but had missed his aim, the object of
his wrath would not be dead; so if he meant
TO enact n law which would enslave a race,
but failed to use the sufficient words, that
race is not enslaved. This is not like the
case Of a common contract between A and
B, Though il is olien so argued,) in which,
no matter il the parties only say Fee fdiC.t fun,
and subscribe their names TO il, each know
ing perfectly we'll what the other understands
it to mean, then each, by the clearea laws
of morality, is bound to execute il as his
CO. contractor expected. But here, the rights
of third persons ure concerned, and there
fore the original compact, when subjected TO
all the well-established rules of interpreta-
ton, is our only guide. The first rule is, TO
ascertain the meaning Of the law from the
words used. The second is to view it in the
light shed upon it by history. The third,
which overreaches both these, is to construe
every thing most strictly in favor of life and
liberty. need not cite authorities to sup
port these well-known principles. Tie
books abound in them. In recent discus
sions. on this subject, they have been made
accessible to oil.
'As Judge Story's version of the Constitu-
ton, in the Prigg case, is so often cited, will
give the general principle of Interpretation, as
afte, tOGyds laid down by him. on the same sub
iaot In his ron, axina