New-York daily tribune., 1853-12-16

Guns ia the fort on the nights of rartuSa whose range
cepsequen upon this elevated position and the narrow
ness of the river at that point extended at least half
mile teyond the bridge head.
The bridgehead occupied BY three battalions OF
the Iine q 400 mem two companies o. guards (l6)
mem two of sharp shooters eco men) 100 cavalry and
some artillery, Who attended to the - heavy guns
placed in the Lazsretto. The right wing of the en-
trepchment was enfladed and hanked by the guns Of
Turtukai which besides IcOuld sweep the whole of the
plain In front Of the center OF the bridge-head The
left wing resting on the River Ardgsh aanked by
the battery on the island but part of this ground was
thicky studded with brush-wood so as to offer con-
siderable shelter to the Russians in approaching.
When On Nov. 4, the Russians attacked the Turkish
lines they had. according to Omer Pashs 20 battaons,
4regiments Of cavalry and 32 guns, altogether about
"a eco men. 1t appears they formed in the following
order: twelve battalions and IA guns opposite the
center of the brdgehesd two battaliOns and two
guns in the wood to the left Russian right on the
river Ardgish six battaons, enkeloa with four guns
against the Turkish right, toward the Danube, their
line being proo1gated and outfanked By the cavalry
The center first formed column OF attack. after the
fire of the Russian guns had been kept up for time
the two wings followed then the artillery, which bad
frat fred at distance Of some 1900 yards from the
rarapets came up to effective grape range 900 to 100
yards) and tie columns of attack were hurried for
ward AS may be anticipated, the column Of the Rus
sian left nearest the Danube) was shattered by the
fire of the Turtukai guns that OF the center very soon
shared the same fate that Of the right (on the Ard
pish) was crushed b. the fire from the Island and ap
pears to have been far too weak to do any good The
attack was once or twice repeated but without the
enarUe of the first assault and then the Russians hai
enough Of IT, Theyhad marched resolutey-up to the
brink of the ditch (Which must no. be too literally
Understood but the Turkish fire proved overwhelming
before they came to a hand-tohand fight.
During the fight Omer Pashs sent battalion OF reg
ulars across the river to sct as reserve Thus the
Turks engaged may be estimated at 5000 infantry with
"A heavy guns.
The forces Of the Russians are less easily sscer-
tained While Omer Pasha speaks of twenty batal-
lions, two British officers in his camp agree in reducing
the force actually engaged to some 5000 men, These
two statements are not exactly contradictory. The
Russians might have some two hundred batallons IN
order of battle and yet from the nature OF the ground
or from contempt of their opponents the actual mass
of the attacking columns might not exceed eight bat
talions at q time and q circumstance which the
British officers do not mention, but which Omer Pasha
reports shows that the Russians had ample reserves
1t is this that every fresh attack headed by fresh
battalion drawn from the reserves for the purpose.
Besides the reports of the two "oficers of her Ma
"iestys guards bear in every line the stamp OF that
ignorant and inexperienced sefsuficiency which be-
longs TO subalterns Of the privileged corps of all
armies.
Upon the whole, therefore, We think Omer Pasha's
statement entitled to credit. There may have been
eighteen or twenty Russian battaOns present during
the action, of which ten or twelve may successvey
have been brought to act, although from six to eight
thousand may be the number of those who at given
time advanced simultaneously and Intellectually upon
the Turkish entreDchments The loss Of the Russians,
which must have amounted at least to 1900 or 1000,
also proves what numbers they must have brought into
the field. They finally repulsed leaving 500
muskets, plenty of baggage aud ammunition and 800
killed and wounded in the hands of the Turks, and
retreated partially in disorder.
Ii we look at the tactics of this conflict either
side, surprised to find gross blunder commit
ted by the Russians which was deseryedly expiate1
by their signal defeat. They showed contempt of
their adversaries which has been seldom equaed They
had to attack pretty strong lines, with capital rebuilt
hanked by ten heavy guns the island nmanded by
TWENTY-FIVE guns at Turtuka which also commanded the
ground in front the lines altogether, foryfour at
least hirty-eight guns all mostly of heavy metal
Now every officer knows that in attacking field forti
catiOn you have first by your artillery to silence its
guns and the batteries that may support it then to de-
stroy, much possible, the parapets palisades and
other defenses then, by approaching your batteries
still closer to the attacked works, to sweep the
parapets with continued hailstorm of grape.shOt,
until at last you can risk launching your
columns of attack upon the halfdemolished
all this, you must have decided superiority in the
number and cslber of your artillery. But what do
we see the Russians attempt To storm bridge
head defended by artillery superior to their own in
number, superior in calber and still more superior in
practice after a short cannonade from twelve 12
Founders and twenty 6-pounders This Russian can
nonade can only be considered as mere formality,
sortof civlty offered to the Turks for it could have
10 serious purpose and it, as all reports agree, the
Russian batteries advanced up to within 650 yards of
the brdgehesd it is wonder that we do not hear OF
a number of dismounted guns. At the same time we
must acknowledge tie bravery of the Russian troops
who very likely for the first time exposed TO
FIRE, and that under such adverse circumstances yet
advanced TO within fifty yards Of the Turkish lines be-
fore they crushed by the superior FIRE poured in
upon them.
AS 10 the Turks we cannot say much in favor of
their tactics either II was very well that Omer Pasha
during tie assaults did not crowd together more
troops in the brdgehead than necessary for its