Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1853-10-22
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.
FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT.

Russia, and that all the ships of the allied squad
rons IN Besika bay have at the request of the Sui
tan, entered the Dardanelles, and lie moored off
Constantnople That these are or soon will be
facts it is believed there are few if any, who doubt
The semi-oficial journals of the French capital
all inclined to this opinion They have ceased to
maintain as some of them did at first that the en-
trance of the four ships two or three weeks since,
and that of the rest of the fleets now, acts that
should give no umbrage to Russia, as having been
dictated solely by desire to protect the Sultan
against his own subjects, and extend succor to
foreigners in Constantnople who would be in danger
IN case of rebellion. All now admit, what was true
from the beginning, that the main motive of this
advance is the same sentiment of distrust towards
the Gar which dictated the advance some months
ago to Besika bay from the more western ports of
the Mediterranean. Then, ignorant of the nature
and exact extent of the Cars designs, they adj
yanced to the mouth of the Dardanelles to prevent
by intimidation if possible by force of arms in ALI
ance with the Sultan if necessary the territorial dis
membernient of the Ottoman Empire. Now they
advance to Consantinope ITSELF and wait with hand
upon the hilt of their swords, ready to draw if in
the conflict which is now imminent and probably
inevitable between the Sultan and the Gar the lat
ter should allow his ambition to be tempted by the
possible success of his to proceed at once to
permanent territorial conquests, of which he still
discaims the intention England and France, being
both sincerely DESTROYS that general European war
should not grow out of this Eastern question, will
not, it is believed, join Turkey in active hostties
except in the above contingency. Russia will pro-
badly avoid giving to the allied maritime Powers
this ground of interference, convinced that by
little longer observance of dilaory policy ulerior
ends may be more certainly and less extensively
reached At present, the allied Powers standing
by in armed neutrality, she will engage in this little
war with Turkey to impose upon the latter by force
the protectorate which she claims. In this war the
advantage must be all on the side of the Car Not
seeking to advance upon Constantinople, which
would give offence to England and France, and
them to abandon their position ncutrals, he
viii conhne himself simply to the defence of his
posts in the enemys country on the Danube, OF
which he is already in strong possession, and from
which it is not likely that the Turkish troops nu.
as they are represented TO be, and anxious
for war, will be able to drive him. A war OF
this sort may last year two, at the end of which
Turkey, absolutely exhausted, will accept even
harder terms of protectorate than she is now resist
ing, and will be utterly unable to oppose any effec-
tive resistance if the Gar shall deem it expedent
to advance upon Consantinople. If, with the aid
of Austria the Gar supposed he could now, in face
of the Turks who would yalorously oppose him. cross
the Danube and the Balkan, and seize and keep
Constantinopte, he would if he entertain the am
bilious views attributed to him, do it. dividing the
Turkish provinces between the Emperor Of Austria
and himself But Nicholas knows that, with Eng
land and France united to oppose him, with their
fleets in the Black Sea- it would be impossible even
with the aid Of Austria, to seize and much less to
keep Constantinope. The inevitable result of push
ing his policy to the extreme Of dissolvng the
Ottoman Empire would be to throw Constantinople,
with the OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES is to saw the command
of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean-int the
hands of England or Of France, either Of which
could keep Il against Russid, to the ruin Of her nc
tual power in the Black Sea and Of her coveted in
Huence naval Power in the Mediterranean. II
may therefore, think, be most fairly and logical,
argued that the Car does not mean to give England
and France prctext to draw the sword in actiy
hostilities against him upon the present occasion
He will be content to impose upon the Porte tn
protectorate embraced in his ultimatum, and pro
woke exhaustive efforts which will leave Turkey
utterly inefficient for the final struggle reasonably
calculating that events must arise in the West be
fore this policy be pursued for two campaigns tc
sever France and England. These two Powers enc
mics, (as they will assuredly be ere three years have
rolled away Nicholas may well hope to be able to
seize and keep Constantinope. For these reasons
do not think that Western Europe need be disquet-
ed by the apprehension Of war this winter | have
little doubt but that in my next letter | shall have
to report the formal declaration Of war. by Turkey
against Russia. But it will probably not extend Il
open hostilities between any other Powers, and
owing TO the deliberate and polite lnactlon Of Russia
no very important and decisive measures may b.
anticipated between the belligerents themselves
You will learn by news of this steamer that the
conference of Vienna is about to resume its effort
to bring about diplomatic adjustment of the diff
culties 1t really seems to me that no reasonable
hopes whatever can be grounded upon the labors Of
this conference. The Gar is too conscious of hi.
power too naughty, and too confident in the future
of his Empire to recede from the stand he has
taken. He will, rely upon it, insist upon the pure
and simple acceptance of the original Vienna note
with his own Interpretation of that note. He in
terpreted it as the Divan itself instantly interpreted
1t. That Interpretation is all, intelligent impartial
persons must admit fair, logical, enforced 50 obvi-
Gus IN truth that one with difficulty credit the
tardy assertion that its announcement took the con-
ference by surprise. One can hardly resist the per
suasion that the Powers were 80 DESTROYS to main
tain the peace Of Europe that they were willing 10
settle the quarrel upon any terms Of sacrifice and
humiliation to the Sultan that did not involve the
actual ACKNOWLEDGMENT of his territory But the
Sultan himself was found most unexpectedly found
to be scrupuous and less easily satisfied than
were his kind friends upon the question Of his own
honor, dignity and independence as a sovereign
lie refused to accept the note except with such mo
difcations and guaranty as would foreclose the un
favorable construction which its phrascoogy woul,
clearly admit. lie will, rely upon il, at eas
for campaign or two, persist in this refusal; for
beside the conviction which he has acquired that TIA
fvCo ne will M