The daily republic. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1853-1853, 1853-08-02

nal condition of tho country TO nave any SERIOUS
operation in preventing war nussia mas gloa.
material resources within herself She is not
largely dependent for essential things upon other
nations
Nothing, among oil the speculations upon this
subject, has more surprised me than the opinion
apparently entertained by many that Austria VIII
take side with France and England on this ques-
tion She dare not DO it-at least SO believe
She is too much indebted to Russia. Without
her aid, Hungary had been lost to her, and might
still be lost, for the revolutionary spirit may at
any time again break out there, to say nothing OF
her other provinces. She is too dependent upon
Russia to quarrel with her. She is lar more
likely, | think, actively to cooperate with her,
in which she would receive share of the
spoil though by no means the lions share. She
lis no friend either to France or England. The
most that can be expected of her is neutrality;
and, in MY estimation, there are but slight hopes
even Of this. She has her part to act, about which
the Czar and that is to cajole the governments of
France aud England, play u double game, and
gain time. 1910. 800
Prussia may be expected to remain neutral.
From her position she has no very direct interest
at stake. So far as her political sympathies are
concerned, they are with Russia, to say nothing
of family alliance, the present Empress of Russia
being Prussan princess. Revolution has once
driven the king from his capital, and may do it
again. Like Austria, therefore, she in such an
emergency would look to Russia.
We have then but France and England left to
oppose the designs of the Czar--two great powers,
certainly and truly formidable if cordially united
But are they so? And is it to be expected they
can be so' To say nothing of the ancient rival
ship and enmity betwixt them, is the present po-
iitical state of France such would be likely to
lead to cordial alliance? Have the English
government and people confidence in the stability
of the French government. Do they even wish
lt' Is Louis Napoleon favorably thought Of by
them? Would any Bonaparte-that hated name
be acceptable to them? Would they not-espe-
cially the aristocracy prefer seeing the Bourbons
again upon the throne?
And the French Emperor, and people, have
GEOGRAPHICALLY the former--any special love
for England Has Louis Napoleon forgotten the
abuse, the scurrility, the lampoons and jests, SO
freely launched by the English press against him?
Why, it is but few months since that all Eng
land was frightened from her propriety by the
apprehension of French invasion, in revenge for
her abuse of the Emperor. know that nations
which have no great love for each other are
sometimes brought to unite for what they con-
slider common interest-but such unions are not
very efficient, and are easily broken have no
doubt the Gar has taken all this into considera
ton, and hopes in some way to divide what is so
discordantly joined together.
But suppose he is disappointed in this, and the
two powers not only combine, but with good
will determine to put forth their united efforts to
the utmost to oppos him, can they prevent him
| from effecting what he aims aE On their part it
must be almost entirely naval warfare England
has no troops to spare, and France can only send
troops by water, and these must be comparatively
few in number from the difficulty of transporting
n great military force in this manner. Could ten,
or fifteen, or even twenty thousand Frenchmen
stop the victorious advance of one hundred or one
hundred and fifty Thousand Russians, and these,
most probably, backed by half the number of Aus
triana' not how, with all the aid Of the
Turks, they could possibly do it. The Englibs
and French fleets might lombard Odessy, Sebas-
tapol, and Cronstadt, and perhaps lay them in
ashes, and apnihilate the Russian navy. But this
would not arrest the march of the Russian armies
| 1t could not reach them. Their road to Constan-
| tinople would be unobstructed as ever and the
possession Of that capital would abundantly COM
pcnsate for the loss of their ships, and the de-
sruction of their naval arsenals, which they could
easily rebuild.
But it appears to me that England or the Eng
lish government has great heart in this business
after all. They vacillate, and hesitate, and hang
back, and seem to be but half in earnest. They
are not like John Bull in former times. There
was a time when John would as soon fight MS eat
'sfnd quarrel in straw if honor were at stake,
or interest either. Happily it is net SO now.
Vast changes have been wrought in the policy
and concerns of England within the last thirty
years. Once she almost monopolized the trade
Of the world, and she did it by war. Her naval
supremacy enabled her to shut all other ma
tions up, and keep the ocean to herself She
cannot do it now. All her interests are changed
from what they were. She is still, by means
|of her great wealth, the leading industrial
power; but she has formidable rivals, and can
hope to maintain her superiority only by free
and unobstructed access to the markets of the
world. There must be nothing to curtail and de-
/ press her manufactures endanger her COM
merce. She has, too, by her system of free trade,
which she felt herself compelled to adopt, that by
cheapening food, she might keep down the price
of labor; and thus continue to manufacture cheap,
and undersell her manufacturing rivals. She has
by this new system made herself dependent upon
other countries for very large proportion of her
food. Much that she once produced within her
self now comes to her from abroad. She cannot
afford to quarrel with the hands that feed her.
i Then her enormous debt--which peace and unex-
ampled prosperity for nearly forty years have
i done little or nothing to reduce-what fearful ad-
ditons would be made to it by state of war.
The burden is already as much Us she can bear,
and she cannot but be most reluctant to make it
heavier. What inevitable ruin would war bring
upon her capitalists and fund-holders. Consols
sinking from one hundred to fifty would beggar
/ half the nation. All her pursuits and interests
are, in fact, shaped for state of peace; and
war; a protracted and general war, would be
y the greatest possible calamity to her. And
war once begun, who could set limits to its
extent or duration, in the present condition of
| Europe, where there is much jealousy and dis
content--so many elements Of confusion fostering
and gathering for outbreak My opinion IS
that England will, if it be possible, avoid war.
81 She is making demonstrations parading her
ships before Constantinople, and talking loud and
large but is she altogether serious in it, will she
follow it up with blows' will she spass the Rubi-
CON- if the Gar should be so audacous as to pass
the Danube? That is the question. The Russians
have already crossed the Pruth, and she deems it
wise not to make it casus behi. Why? Do not
Moldavia and Walachia as much belong to the
Sultan as Scrvia, or Rumslia, or Constantnople
itself? Certainly they do; but it is convenient for
present purposes not to consider ittbat is, for
the purpose, if it be possible, of avoiding war.
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