The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1853-09-01

fourth article of the Constitution, OF whic
D the slave rendition clause makes the fourth
. which, as we think, have no constitutions
q PENALTIES annexed, that the Federal Govern
ment can any way execute; and II we or
right, the fugitive slave provision may, IN hk
manner, stand at the mercy of the State SOY
eregnties, and be referred to their discretion
and yet be a very good proUis'o'I, though no
r in any proper sense tdw.
In this view of the matter it is not absur'
or impossible that the Constitution should b
held to vest the power of surrendering slave
in the States in which they may be foun(
truant
But the Constitution is full of provision
which the Federal power cannot enforce, Ell
Their directly or indirectly. How is it to com
pei the election of United States Senators
How did it enforce the judgment of the United
States Supreme Court against Georgia in the
Cherokee case How could it have done so
The Judges argument on this point is, we
apprehend, good for nothing.
The Judge continues: The Legislatures oil
the States are prohibited from passing law
obstructing the master in pursuit OF his es-
capped servant. 4 Suppose State to
pass a law directly opposed to this clause, and
inficting penalty" Well, then, Judge, we
answer each law would be void. But the
other branch of the provision-the fugitive
"shall be delivered up on claim of the party
to whom such service or labor may be due"
The prohibitOry part of the provision is clear,
beyond dispute; but where is the conclusive
ness of the allegation that had the power to
enforce the requirement of the last sentence
been left with the States, the kidnapping act
of Pennsylvania would not have been void"
as it was declared in the Prigg case That
law was pronounced invalid and unconstitu-
tional, because it forbade the masters right of
reception without legal process not because
it provided for the rendition of the fugitive
under forms and conditions of its own. That
decision did not settle nor undertake to settle
the right of the States to legiState for the rem
dition of fugtives under the Constitution, but
it did declare that no legislation, either by
Congress Or by the States, is necessary to the
reclamation of an escaping slave, any more
than of stray horse. And when little more
disturbance, and few more unexpected cross
accidents intervene, the Slave Power will fall
back upon the naked right of grab-law-put-
ting the whole business of slave catching here
Just where it began in Alphabetically outside
of all law, and independent Of it.
Under this branch of the Judges opinion
he contents himself with saying that Congress
undoubtedly may legislote upon" the provi-
sons of those other clauses of the fourth art-
Gle which we have mentioned, but he does not
pretend to say how such legislation may be
enforced. For the plain reason, that he does
not know how it can be DONE and this, for the
reason that in fact it cannot be done at ALL
The argument here is exceedingly inconse-
quent.
To the objection that the Fugitive Law of
1850 takes away the right of trial by jury he
answers that, in his opinion, "a trial by jury
would not decrease the number of renditioDs
of persons escaped from service or labor"
What an answer is this for a Judge of the law !!
Suppose it should even increase the renditions :;
would this be a sound, judicial answer to the
point of right?
After getting rid of these difficulties as if
he had met and disposed of them, he volun-
teers an apology or justification Of that Sec
ton of the act of 1880 which awards ten dol
lars to the Commissioner in case the certificate
is made out to the master, and only five dollars,
if no certificate is given This other five dol
lars, he thinks, "was intended merely to COM
pensate that officer for the extra writing" But
how stand the probabilities of this guess
When a slave is remanded, there may be no
trouble in the hearing and determining the
case but when the certificate is refused there
always is an investigation, and probably
protracted one. If probable trouble was pro-
! vided for, the double fee would Just go the
other way. But those who are claiming the
labor and service" of one man for nothing
have not the ldbor and service of another 30
much in view AZ his serviceableness in the
particular matter in which they employ him.
The explanation is another failure in this
learned opinion
Allow us also to state an opinion II is
this Our Judges generally are too laxative.
They have the vice of I'D captandum eloquence
in most malignant form. 1t is never 80
much out of place as in explaining and defend.
ing the slave laws of this Union; for of them
it is pre-eminently true that I" the least said is
soonest mended." The Bench will keep expo
sing this scandal of ours until we shall die OF
shame. Especially do those gentlemen whose
circuits traverse Mason and Dixon indulge
themselves in rhetorical fourishes about duty,
compromises, constitutions, reluctant necessi-
ties, and patriotic alacrties, to the full measure
of their license We would as lief hear lady
talk all the time about her chastity it would
prove the thing itself as we'll And their ten
derness of conscience does take the oldest sort
of turns Hear Judge Mclean on the digni-
ties and dclicacies of his position Occupy
ing the sacred Office of Judge, have no right
here to indulge my sympathics. 1t would have
been gratifying to have found that this defend
ant was free man, instead Of slave, because
such result is gratifying to those whose feel
ings are opposed to Slavery in the abstract. In
such case it is the stern duty Of the Judge to
use more than ordinary caution"
That is the way to stiffen heart none of
the softest to duty of doubtful obligation
and worse reputation. If the Judge suspects
himself of leaning to the side of liberty and
mercy, he must give himself decided tilt the
other way. And it would be gratifying, be-
cause it would be gratifying to abstractionist
Abolitionists to find the prisoner free man.
What a sccond-handed qualification
The Union, the other day, rcmarking on