New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1853-03-12
nit 10 its navigation "a boon. Here Is Mr..
D.'s summing up Of the advantages We should

have secured by prefcrring the Hise project
III The United ststS~ had q exclusively and opened
n b. he world they could annrS 10 u any condition
thouslf proper They could thea hold rod 20 force
The natOna Of the world ~ keep the peaoe tosnd "a
n any volasps OF treaties or seizures Of Islands TOOK
place tho United atAias coad clOs- the Canal 10 her
commerce. the Pacific. We would then be the sroi
TER OF tho work and could compel peace among ne ma
tons Of the earth Instead Of leading 20 war, would
place Ia thr power Of this nation, whose policy vi"
peace the authority % command peace. Tae pps'spn
Of thu nation us,iod the assumption on ~ part OF thn
sathOriy Had thls exclusive night been obtuned ne
would have been willing 70 have opened ms Canal 20
the world the mos; hbersl trims for legitimate uc-
But then We could have fortified IL at both ends, and IN
time Of war could have closed II 10 enemies"
Now We take issue with the Giant on the
state of the case presented by him, and insist
that the squier Treaty is immensely more
favorable 20 US than its Hse counterpart
would have been That the construction OF
the Canal under the latter would have subject
ed US 20 Jealousy and Ill will on the part OF
Nations so rudely excluded, is very plain but
We do not suppose they would have resorted to
hostilities On the contrary, We presume
they would have allowed US to go on aud make
the Canal, provided the money could have been
obtained with full understanding that our
Government should exclude from the Canal
whomsocvcr il would-a verJ serious drawback
on the prospective revenues of the work. We
will admit too that Nicaragua would have per-
mitted and other Nations tsctly assented to
the erection Of gigantic Notifications at either
end Of the Canal, and that Congress would
have voted the money required. Now says
Mr. Douglas the privilege oftransit would have
been entirely in our hands-we could grant or
refuse Il az pleasure, and in time Of war could
have closed il 20 our enemies
To our mind, there never was a grayet mis-
take True, we might, so long as We should
hold those Notifications, prevent other Nations
navigating the Canal; but we could not, after
the breaking out Of hostilities, be secure in
It's use ourselves The practical control and
use Of the Canal would rest in the bellgerent
who should be strongest at sea, whose feet,
riding OIL the port Of San Juan. would laugh
at our imposing but harmless forts and capture
every vessel emerging from that port or seek
ing 20 enter t.
Nor would that be all. Our Qualifications
however formidable, could easily be seea-
guered and their garrisons starved out, no
matter how strong aud well appointed. Their
reduction would % tho worst be merely
question of time Unless We are willing 70
spend One Hundred Millions on the creation
III q Navy like the British. and Forty Millions
year to maintain it. We could not nationally
hope to control the Isthmus ship Canal when
its control would be important-we could not
even hope under the lIise srrangement) TO
Keep il out OF the hands of our great maritime
rival.
Now look at this provision OF the Squier
Treaty preferred and accepted by Mr.. Clay
ton
AEr II Ve~scls Of the aitcd States Of Great Brit
ain trsvcrsine the sad Canal shall 81 rar -
isss 40 eessaffss rs,', y sr-slSas trea Neetsis
fCsfes oTssrs - siiA = ~ b<HIsuvsfs and this
provision shA extend 60 such distance frvm the two
cnds Of the sAd Canal As may hcrcter be found eSPo-
dent to csiahiishs
we believe the neutral ground Wa, by subse-
gurut stipulation aSed sixty mhes in every direc
ton from either terminus Of the Canal
We hold this one stipulation worth more
70 the United States than all that is contained
in the Hise treaty, even had the parties who
signed il in behalf af Nicaragua been author
lied 70 bind her by Treaty. which We are as
sured they were not The neutrality Of the
Canal in case Of war. with sufficient area Of
blue water az either end OF it. was real and
practical concession by Great Britain, in view
OF her vast Naval superiority, OF the greatest
practical advantage 90 US and 20 al other Ma
tons. With this stipulation, We should be
morally sure Of the use ofthe Canal st all times,
While the neutral waters around It's Western ter
minus. would form 4 ready and safe refuge for our
Whaling ard other Pacific vessels in case Of
hostilties with any great maritime power but
without such stipulation. the Canal would in
time Of war with Great Britain. would be
either hers or nohoiy's, no matter who may
have made it. We have nov the best possible
Treaty arrangement for the proposed and
greatly needed Ship Canal. and We trust the
Nicaragua Trsnsi, Company win promptly pro-
iced With rs construction; OF. Il not, that
sOne other Company viii