New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1853-03-28

around whose halfcrazed head the noise and
confusion of the hungry crew OF oihce-seekers
| chiefly rapes One President, if not two, has
already fallen a victim to the furious onslaught
made upon him by the competitors for the OH
ces. which he found himself compelled TO dis
| tribute. Another was glad TO escape trom his
dangerous post of power, hsggsrd with care
worn with premature age, bis broken constitu-
! ton the easy prev of the first disease that az
| sailed it, Her, after. none but the old sfagers
| OF politics men hardened by lifelong expert
! ence of State intrigue, can expect 10 0utllye
the trials that compensate for the hOnors OF the
Chief Magistracy.
What is the remedy for this abuse Make the
offices of Postmaster, Collector, Marshal, &c,
elective, say some retOrmers, of democratic ten
denotes. This might indeed relieve the poor
Presidents, and give them chance TO live out
their DAYS But il would not make the discus
sion OF National politics more decent, the test
of Elections more true Ii would only be re-
moving the intrigues of Washington 10 every
schooLhouse and bar room. where caucuses are
wont TO congregate; and make the measures OF
partisans to compass their private ends teniold
/ more Inscriptions than they are now. As bad
as the selection of incumbents 70 Office may
have been at the bureaus OF the capital. they
have been decent and yirtuous. compared with
those which would be forced upon voters by
every packed Committee of every underground
caucus No, let Mr.. Pierce and Mr.. Fillmore
select their several friends; for they have some
reputation to sustain, and will be wary OF dis
grscing themselves by unit representatives
Ninety-nine hundredths N the Government
offices are mere employments. The Govern
ment have certain jobs TO do, ard want men TO
do them. 1t is simple matter ofseryice and CON-
pensatiOn. Let the State employ its agents pre-
cisey men do in their private business that is,
60 into the market with its money, and, among
those who will do the work equally well employ
those who will do it the cheapest.
There are wanted say 10000 persons TO re-
ceive and transmit the mails, and to collect and
account for the postage upon them. Why not
employ the pOstmasters as the mail carriers are
employed The service and the responsibility
OF the two classes ofemploytS are not materially
different. Let the Government once In four
years issue its programme prescribing the obi
cations and regulations of the service, and re-
quiring ample guaranty by bond of fulhllment
on the part of those making bids and let sealed
proposals be received, stating the per centagc OF
revenIe accruing at each office for which the
applicant would undertake the duty of post
master at each place. The Government could IN
no other way procure the carriage of the mails
so cheaply or so efficiently as by the Contract
system with bonds and penalties Why can It
not be applied to other emplOyments, which 1t
is obliged TO delegate TO deputies Why can It
not be applied to the COlectorshps, and 70 all
the offices, whose duties are specifically defined
There is another but much smaller class OF
officers, to which a wide discretion is contided,
to be execute not so mach by implicit adhe-
renee To prescribed rules, as by wise judgment
as to the duties required for each occurring
exgency, demanding rare integrity and quallt-
cations of high and peculiar order. or this
class the Chief Executive should have the
power to appoint and remove at pleasure the
heads of the subordinate Departments, as they
are his confidential advisers and the instruments
of his Administration. And for the rest, having
been once appointed according TO law, there
should be no means of terminating the functions
of these officers, except the expiration of their
term, or impeachment for some misdemeanor,
as prescribed by the Constitution.
The Constitution nowhere gives the President
the power to remove subordinate officers; and,
since he can only appoint by the concurrence OF
the Senate, il seems sufficiently absurd, that
his destTtctire power should be so out OF proper.
ton to his constructive power. The writers OF
The Federalia were of the opinion that the
President could not make removals without the
concurrence of the Senate. The whole usage
has grown out OF construction of the Constr
tuition, OF most lattudinarian character and
that, too, not construction by the Supreme
Court, but mere nferential construction OF an
act of Congress.
at is striking fact" says Kent in his Com
mentaIies, "that power So transcendent as
that is, which places at the disposal OF the Pres
ident alone, the tenure of every executive Off
Ger, appointed by the President aud Senate,
shOulddepend upon inference merely, and should
have been gratuitously declared by the first
Congress in opposition to the high authority of
the FederaiiSt; and should have been supported
or acquesced in by some of those distinguished
men, who questioned or denied the power OF
Congress- even to incorporate National Bank" y
II the COMMISSIONER China, or the Consul
at Rio de Janero represents the person and
dignity of the President, let the President select
the vehicles of bis own dignity; but if these are
officers OF the Government, under its C0nstltu-
ton and laws, then there seems 10 be no more
abstract prOpriety in the Presidents removing
the Commissioner or the Consul, than in the
Commissioners or Consul removing the Pres
ident. T.