New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1853-05-27

the United States, in cases where they apply"
What is this but adopting, as the laws of the
United States, all the constitutional laws of the
several States Are they not, by this section,
incorporated into, and made part OF, the lurls-
prudence of the Union s. Carolina, by SINH
lar enactment, has made of force as much OF the
common law of England, as is consistent with
| her Constitution Now, is not that common law
| of England made, by that enactment, as much q
part of the code of s. Carolina as her legislative
statutes This proposition cannot be doubted
The lalcS Of the several States, adopted by the
Federal Courts, are as much then the laws of
the United States as the act Of Congress. In
which light, then, have the courts of the United
States considered slaves Precisely as those of
S. Carolina-as mere personal chattes-as legal
ly, nothing more than goods, wares, and merch-
andise, and liable to all the rules which govern
the possession and alienation of inanmate chat
tells, To prove this, let us refer to case origi-
mating in the Circuit Court of Georgia, but
finally decided in the Supreme Court of the Uni
ted States [See the case of Williamson u.s.
Daniel, reported in the 18th vol. of Wheaton. p.
SOS The substance of this case is rs follows
A testator left by will sundry slaves to A and
B, with provision, if either should die without
lawful heirs of his body, the survivor should
have the estate The following was the decree
of the court pronounced by Chief Justice Mar
shall g We think these words convert the alb
solute estate previously given into an estate tail;
and if so, since sidUes are personal property,
the limitation over them is too remote" 1t is
an old maxim of the common law, that an estate
tail cannot be created in personal chattel; for
if it be, the previous estate becomes absolute in
the first taker. This rule applies to all proper
ty Of a movable nature-to money, goods, wares
and merchandise - to domestic animals, etc.
Do not the above points establish the principle,
that the Supreme Court of the United States
view the slaves precisely in the same light as
the State Courts-that it considered the slave
no more than a personal ehattel in which an
absolute property may vest, and liable to all tile
rules which attend chattels of that description
The same principles have been decided in ano-
Their case brought up from the Circuit Court of
Tennessee to the Supreme Court of the United
States [See Shelby rs. Grey, 11th Wheaton,
page 36ll To understand this case it is only
necessary to give the preliminary statement Of
Judge johnson, who pronounced the decree of
the Court. :" The plaintiffs here were defend
ants below in action Of detinue, brought by
Thomas Grey to recover sundry slaves. The
defendants filed non detinet, and the act of lin
itations of the State of Tennessee, which was the
act Of detinue, is three years. Can it be CON
tended, that slaves are not viewed by the courts
of the United States as private property, as no.
thing but personal ehattels, by these two cases
In the first they are disposed Of by will, liable
to become the property of the first owner when
the limitation over is after an indefinite period
and in the second case, they are recoverable by
action of detinue, and become the absolute prop
erty by the holder after possession of three
years. 1t is thus we find that the highest Judi
sial authority known to the people of the United
States have decided, that slave is a legitimate
ohattel. So much for the decisions of the Uni
ted States Courts on this subject In these
opinions every member on the bench concurred.
[See Lee rs. Lee, s Peters's Rep, Groves rs.
Slaughter, Is Peters, and the case Of Prigg rS.
Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania, Is Peters, 625 7