The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1853-02-07


and il is exclusively upon its truth that its members
in the first instance, elected to place their own
justification OF their conduct. The question which
It involves has been perplexed by much ex,
with many considerations that do not at all belong
20 il; yet, II mistake not, it is simple in its own
nature, and by no means difficult OF solution. The
true aud only question is, whether from the total
want Of Jurisdiction in this Court over the subject
matter to which the order of injunction related the
order void, upon its face for 1t is this defect of
Jurisdiction and this alone, that has been can be
pretended to exist and when it exists it must in all
cases be thus apparent. The injunction commanded
the Corporation and its members to desist abso
lutely from the performance of certain specified acts
be nghtfllly addressed by a court of equity to
municipal corporation, the Common Council and its
members, in the just maintenance of their own
rights were bound to disregard it; but II it was
command that under any circumstances and upon
any grounds, for any reason whatever, this Court
might impose upon the Common Council and
its members, it was at their own peril that
they refused to obey it. They had no right to
the opinion Of their counsel to the truth or su
cheney Of the allegations in the complaint, upon
which the order addressed to them was founded.
For the purpose of determining whether they would
obey disregard the injunction, they had no right
TO look into the complaint at all and this for the
plain reason that the jurisdiction of the Court may
be certain and undoubted, and yet the facts and ale
cations set forth in the complaint be wholly INSULT
Gent to warantits exercise. When this insuiicency
exists there is want of equity in the complaint for
which the injunction will be dissolved; but this want
OF equity is no evidence OF want of jurisdiction,
that rendering the process void ustifes dsobedience
A party before whom an Injunction is served (they
are the words of Chancellor Walworth that quote)
is not permitted to speculate upon the future decision
of the Court as to the equity Of the BILL and disobey
the injunction, upon the ground that upon the merits
it ought not to have issued. people vs. Spaldng 2
Paige. 500; Sullivan vs. Judah, 4 Paige, 1869
add, that ii there any valid grounds in law upon
in II rfi rbf hav
Issued, although not one OF the grounds may be
stated in the complaint, the court has jurisdiction,
and its order must be obeyed. 1t is erroneous but
certainly not void; and 1t is only certain manifest
inyaldity that excuse and protect dsobedience.
Although the want of equity and the want of jursdc-
ton (as was justly observed by the experienced and
learned counsel who last addressed are frequently
confounded not only by textwriters but by Judges,
yet the distinction which separates them is very
s0nabe and Ineligible, well certain and estab
lished. This distinction, however, l cannot but
think was, to considerable extent lost sight of in
the arguments that were addressed to us on the part
OF the DEFENDANTS and it is this circumstance that
rendered q large portion of the observations that
were made. and authorities cited, wholly inappcable
however that question alone, as shall again state
it, that mean to consider and discuss Was the
order Of this court which, illegal exercise of
power, was disregarded by the Common Council,
void upon its facet The order commanded the Com
mon Council not to grant to Jacob Sharp and others,
or to any other person. the right liberty and privilege
of laying down double or any other track, fora
railway in Broadway. At the time this injunction
was obtained, q resolution, making such grant to
Jacob Sharp and others, was about to be reconsi-
Iered by the Common Council and as the terms Of
the injunction embrace this resolution and were, I'M
oubtedly meant to restrain its adoption it is rea-
s0naSie to construe the order exactly as it would
be necessary to c0nstrue it had it referred to and
recited the resolution, and by express words had
forbidden the Common Council to reconsider and
adopt it. It is this construction, therefore, that
aud nT rSvyn To1oI
treat the resolution as an ordinance by law and its
reconsideration and adoption as properly acts of
legislation in the fullest sense In which the term
Legislation can be justly applied to the acts of cor
Of the jurisdiction Of this court amounts to this
that court of equity, Of general jurisdiction, has
power, in any case, or for any purpose to restrain
the legislative action of municipal corporation nor
in any manner to Interfere with control its esla
tive discretion, matter to what subject the action
may be directed, nor how manifest and gross the
violation OF law, even Of the provisions Of its
charter that it may involve and no matter by what
motives OF fear Partially, or corruption, its discre
tion may be governed, nor how extensive and ire
parable the mischiefthat in the particular case may
be certain to result to individuals the public, from
its threatened exercise If this be true as PROPOSE
lion of law then the injunction order of this Court
from the want Of jurisdiction manifest its face was
wholly void. II the proposition be not true, the
order was valid, and should have been obeyed. In
justice tothe counsel for the defendants it must DO
admitted that they shrank not from maintaining the
truth OF the proposition in all its extent well DER.
Ceiving that the necessity of their argument admit
ted no alternative. In reply to question put by
the Court it was expressly affirmed that, should the
Common Council attempt by an ordinance, and
from motives manfesty corrupt, to convey, for a
grossly inadequate or merely nominal consdera-
ton all the corporate property Of the city, neither
press, by an injunction, the meditated fraud, or
when consummated, to recind the grant, or pun
1sh it's authors or divest them of its fruits; there
Ala
Of public opinion and the action Of the people at
an ensuing election*, and all this upon the
ground that neither the proprety nor the honesty
Of the proceedings Of legislative body, nor, while
made subject Of judicial inquiry. This, it must be
confessed, is startling doctrine. We all felt it to
be so when announced, and rejoice that we now
able to say, with an entire conviction that applied to
municipal corporation it Is just as groundless in
Law as it seems to US it is immoral in its principle,
and certainly would be pernicious in its effects. The
doctrine just stated may be true when applied to the
legislature Of the State which, as coordinate
branch of the government, representing and exer
cising in its sphere the sovereignty of the people,
is for political reasons of manifest force wholly ex
Empt in all it's proceedings from any legal process
judicial control but the doctrine is not nor il any
portion Of it, true, when applied to subordinate
municipal body which, although clothed, to some
extent with legislative and political powers is
yet, in the exercise of all its powers just subject
TO the authority and control Of courts of Justice to
legal process, legal restraint and legal correction as
bny other body or person, natural or artificial.
Ihe supposition that there exists an important
distinction, or any dis inction whatever, between
municipal corporation and any other cor
poration, aggregate in respect to the powers
bf courts OF justice over its proceedings, is en-
irely gratuitous, and it seems to me, is as des-
tute Of reason as 1t certainly is of authority. The
counsel could refer us to case, nor have we found
ny, in which the judgment of the court has proceed
I'd upon such a distinction, nor, in our re-
earches, which have not been limited, have we
been able to discover that, by any judge or ju-
ist, the existence Of such a distinction has ever
peen asserted or intimated Were it other
visc-had such decisions been found in the
English report, or in those of sister States-had
been proved that in England or in other States
he supposed distinction Is the established law, we
hould still be compelled to say that it is a law
hich we must refuse to follow for the plain rcaaop