The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1853-02-24


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JUDICIAL DECISION ON QUESTION OF PER-
s0NAL FREEDOM
In the spring of 1888, Clarissa, slave in
Kentucky, was permitted by her mistress, Mrs
Triggs, to accompany Mrs. Alexander to Phil
adelphia, and to continue with her there for
more than six months, although she was APP
priced that by a statute of Pennsylvania
passed in 1880, any slave brought into the
State would be entitled to freedom, after a
residence there Of six months.
Clarissa returned to Kentucky with Mrs.
Alexander. Mrs Triggs having occasion to
borrow money from Mrs. Thompson, latter
wards Mrs Ferry,) her adopted daughter, ex-
ecuted to her an absolute bill of sale for Cla-
rissa Clarissa lately instituted suit before the
Circuit Court for her freedom, on the ground
of having resided, by the will of her mistress,
decision was given in her favor an appeal
was taken, and on the 2lst of January the
Court of Appeals, through Judge Crenshaw,
delivered an elaborate opinion, published in
! the Frankfort Commonwealth Of the 24th,)
affirming the decree of the lower Court, and
liberating Clarissa.
The material part of the opinion is as fol-
! lows
Notwithstanding the many suits which
have been brought TO this Court, prosecuted by
persons of color to obtain their freedom, the
precise question involved in this controversy
has not been decided 1t has been repeatedly
held by this Court, that a slave sent or per-
mitted to 20 to State where slavery is not
/ tolerated for temporary purpose only does
not thereby acquire right to freedom in Ken.
lucky but that, whatever might be his status
I
been sent, or carried, not for residence, but for
merely temporary purpose, his condition as
a slave, upon his return to Kentucky, would
not be changed. Rankin Us. Lydia. ID Mar,
476-Bush's representatives Us White, Sd
Mon, 1O4-Graham Us. Strader, 5th B. NJ,
l79-Tom Davis us. Tingle 9Th B. NJ, 546-'7--
Collins, &c, u.s. America, 9th B. NJ, 565-Ma-
ria u.s. Kirby, 10 B. NJ, SAP. In these cases,
the effect OF the laws of other States where
slavery is not recognised at all not even fer
moment. was discussed and considered and
the consequence of temporary or transient
sojourn merely in such States, by the consent
| or appreciation of the owner, was declared to
be- not that the slave thereby became entitled
to freedom in this State, but that, upon his
return here his condition should be as it was
before such temporary sojourn-that of slave.
"But the question whether slave taken
to State where, although the inhabitants,
whether black or white, are free, a privilege
is extended to sOjourners who come from slave
States, to hold their servants ~ slaves, until
a particular period, beyond which they are not
allowed to do So has not been decided. Or, in
other words, if State, into which slave is
voluntarily sent or carried by the owner, though
for a temporary purpose only, has declared
by statute that slave remaining there Ger.
tain length of time shall be Free this Court
has not decided what shall be the effect or
operation of such law upon the condition Of
a person of color, who may in our courts
claim to be free by virtue Of such a statute
This question has been expressly left open
This Court, in the case of Maria Us. Kirby, su
prd, say If any State were to enact that
any slave brought within its limits by the an
thority of the owner, and permitted by him t.
remain there six months, or three, or even one
should be free, there might be some reason for
saying that such a law should operate perma
nently, even upon the rights of strangers be-
cause they would have an opportunity of know.
ing its provisions and avoiding its consequen
ces' And in the case of Collins U.s. America
supra, this Court used this language: These
remarks and the reasoning of this opinion, are
made without reference to case in which
the foreign law may directly prohibit the in
PRODUCTION Of slave, or the retaining OF him
within the state for a certain period, and de-
clare the consequences OF either OF these, and
we decide no question as to the effect of such
law
Sin this case, the owner of Clarissa was ap-
priced of what the law of Pennsylvania was,
when she sent her slave there, and determined
to risk the consequences. That law was, that
the slave might be brought there, and her con-
dition be unchanged for the period of six
months but that, If she remained there longer
than that period Of time, she should be deemed
a free woman. Mrs. Trigg was informed that
such was the law of Pennsylva and she re.
solved to hazard the consequences And we
think that in such a state Of case, the cOndi.
ton Of Clarissa in that State, after remaining
in that State longer than six months, should
follow her to Kentucky, and be her condition
here. Under the circumstances, she was free
there, and should be free here.
Wherefore the decree is affirmed
"Reed for appellant; Harlan and Calender
for appellee"
The Courts of Kentucky have held that a
slave permitted by his master to go for some
temporary purpose into State not tolerating
Slavery, and returning to his master, is not
entitled TO his freedom. Until the decision OF
Judge Crenshaw, they expressly reserved the
question, whether slave going with the con.
sent of his master into q State whose laws de
clare him to be free after q certain length o!
time, and returning after that period, is emit.
tied to his freedom. This question, thus re.
vived, is now decided by the highest court Of
the State of Kentucky, in the affirmative
Clarissa is declared to be free, because she re-
manned, by the consent of her mistress, in
Pennsylvania longer than the laws Of that
State allowed. Now, it is clear, that If there
be any principle in this decision, it is this that
State has a right by statute to say how long
a slave, with the consent of his master, shall
be permitted to continue as siape within
its limits-that beyond the prescribed time,
If he remain with the consent of his master,
he shall be free-and that the status thus
conferred ought to be recognised by the State
from. which he went, and to which he may re-