Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1852-1859, 1853-02-21
NUMBER $50
THE INT EBLl[GENCER ELL,
From the London Economist. 'i'
The French Emperor--His Character, In
..a-' tentions. and Necessities.

the French Emperor--His Character, In
tentions. and Necessities.
(coNcLUDED.)
But i his character such as TO satisfy us that his
poicy and conduct will be guided by regard TO
MS own interests or his own view of them? AS
Suredly not This can be safely predicted of few
men-ieast OF all of hGl. Men are governed by
their passions and their imagination quite as often
as by their interests; and we must remember what
we have already shown to be the nature and i,li-
uSyncrasy OF the man. He is not only shrewd
selfish and Sagacious calculator he is eouallvand
pre- eminent a fanatic, dreamer and fataiist-
OF wild and gigHntesque fancy-pertinacious and
nflexible in his ideas, the very brink of monoma-
nla-Secret and iInpenetrable in his designs-ana
above all, utterly demoraZed by his almost miracn
louS success. He never abanIons an idea m a
project; he recoiIs from no raShness; he believes
in no impossibility. Why should he? After the
marvellous past, why should he doubt the future?
he succeeded III the coup d' d'etdt-why should he
iall in coup de main erterieur? Four yea1s ago
he was a pauper, an exile, supposed imbeciie
whom every body laughed at; he is now Emperor
OF france by twice as many Suffrages as his uncle
ever obtained. Wha after this, need he dispar
OF doing! He believed himself destined to restore
the Empire; he has restored il. He believes him
sell Destined to recover the imperial boundary line
ana 10 wip1 out the memory of Waterloo. Is he
| iiKely 10 SHRINK from the adventure? 1t is said
that he admlreS England and her institutions, ana
mat h. IS grateful for the kindness and protection
| he met with while among us. Both we believe to
De uue' out when did considerations of this sort
ever restrain a politician who believes in This
Star''? --9 rl 1870 3 80 :. =
Bnt we must take into consideration not only
| Louis NapoleOn's Imagination, but his PASSIONS
Now, 1t IS notorious that his anger Is vehemently
excited against both England and Belgium, and
Tor the same reasons Both countries harbor his
personal enemies and the refugees from his tyran-
ny; and the Press in both countries has been un-
measured and unceaSing in its abuse of him.
Both countries he believes to be centres of perpetu-
al plots against his Government; and if he sun
posed that he could seize the conspirators by n
sudden lnruad, Ike that by which his uncle OBJ
famed possession of the Duke d'Enghien we
greatly question whether any motive Of decency
or prudence could restrain him from making the
attempt. In the case Of Belgium, too, his irrata-
| non Is shared by great number OF persons in
france; and with the French nation the strongest
motive for an attack on Belgium would not be the
territorial aggrandlSement, but Ihe hunting out of
what they regard as nest Of calumniators and
ConSpiratorS. Co.,.
Now let us cast hasty glance at those pecuIi-
arities of Louis Napoleon's position, which NAV
leave him no free choice as to the line of action
he shall adopt, but may compel him to be guided
| neither ny his Judgment his imagination, nor his
passions, but his necessities. The present pros-
perity of France is great and the revenue is i'm
proving, but the deficit is large, and the public ex-
pendltuTe on most eXtTavagant scale. The un-
landed debts more extensive than is at all SAFE and
1t is scarcely likely that loan could be easily nego-
| tl1ted-at least, in the open market of the world
| Embarrassed finances, though in one point of view
| they may make war difficult, may, on the other
hand, drive the Emperor into some rash and despe-
rate step to rehabilitate them. war in an enc
| nyS country can be made TO support itself; and
triumpha mt army abroad besides the possibility of
levylng tribute and indemnity, it might be hoped,
would cost lest than an unemployed but fully
equipped army at home. This may not be vetv
wise or sound specul9 lion; but we know that men
IN pecuaiary difficulties are notoriously adyentur-
Gus and wild, and something must he done soon
| to bring expenditure and revenue to a balance
! But the real difficulty lies vii he Rae
durd ct regni nOuitGS may compel tile Emperor tu
do what, If left TO himself and if omnipOient IL
would most desire to avoid. Though it is not true
that he relies solely on the army, though his hole
over the affections and wishes of the natio is gen.
eral and strong, ,yett is unquestionaby the amy
! in the first instance that he OWES his elevation
the army is now the Gctiue agent in all political
movements, and he must content the army il he
wishes to retain his power. II is exceedingly ru-
merous, reaching to nearly 400, 900 OF all arms
| OF these Algeria employs at The outside $4,000,
and Rome 10000. The remainder are either en-
| pluyed as policeman, not employed at all. Now
the members of every profession wish for occupa-
lion; no man likes to rust away; and the members
OF the military profession long, in addition, for
| prize money and promotion and adventure. Only
Il very limited number of them can be satisfied and
kept quiet with decorations and pecuniaTy advan-
| tageS; the others become only the more restless,
envious and ambitious. If we excepta few of the
older and wiser Generals, the army whole de
SlTeS war. 1t cannot be otherwise; 1t Is natural;
it is notorious. Part of the army is already dSaf-
fected, and can only be restored 10 retained in
its allegiance by the lucrative and tempting pros
! poets which war holds out. If the President re-
| ducef the army to such number could be fully
| employedin Algeria. Italy, and at home, he might
keep his hold upon it without war, but would
make irreconcilable enemies of the disbanded
| troops; and he dare not and could not afford tn
make enemies of 100, 900 trained, organized, and
oficered men. If he retains the army at its pres
ent, or nearly its present magnitude, he must in
orderto sastyit and to regain and enforce his hold
upon its affections or adherence, employ it. He
must engage i'll war, whatever be its dangers at
home abroad. When placed, as he must soon
be, between the alternatives of disgusting the
people by war, or disgusting the amy by peace,
he must choose the former, for the army might de-
1end him against the people; the people could
never defend him against the army. The people
would be passive; the amy would be active
The army is even now notoriously restless and
dissatisfied. The Algerine regiments are inclined
| to the Orleans family; many of those at home are
strongly infected with Republican or Socialist
opinions. A war, especially sudden, dashing,
and successful war, would at once rally them all
TO the Imperial regime. Louis Napoleon knows
all this well. lie will not like to be forced or
hurried; and war may probably be his last card,
| but it is one which sooner or later he must play
His only security, and ours, would be in dIsband-
ing of 10000 of the most 6isaffectej troops and
the suspension Of the consumption for the next two
years. If he does not do this, we may look out
for the only other resource.
But Louis Napoleon may not My be driven to
war a matter of necessary policy, which if sue
ceSSful would consolidate his throne, and, if
not Immediately or brilliantly so, would p stpone
his dangers-he may be driven TO it, If his fortunes
become gloomy, and failure and obstruction threat
! en- him at home. .lfh he sees his power slipping
from under him, he is exactly the man to make a
| desperate, abSurdly wild attempt to recov
crit, by sudden attackupon England. If such
an attempt should be temporarily successful, or
even brilliant in its failure, it would give hun
tnew lease of power, if otheIwis it would, as he
! h he and iealnuS fancipS oF