New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1853-10-17

take both Of these foriresses and then 20 pass the
B,kan In ISIS TIE Turks risked their main strength
in this position They were defeated az Ku5oska
ysrus snd shumls were taken the defense of the Bal
Kan but feeble and the Russians arrived at Aira-
nope, very much enfeebled it is true but yet having
encountered no resistance as the Turkish army was
completely dissolved and lot brigade at hand for the
defense Of COnstaHtinople. The Turks committed on
that occasion, great mistake range Of mountains
Is every officer understands must not be defended by
defensive position in front of il nor by dividing tie
defending armies as TO block up all the passes bat
by taking up central position behind IT, by observing
all the passes, and when the enemys intentions are
clearly deveoped. by falling with concentrated forces
upon the heads of his columns as they emerge from the
various raynes OF the mountain range. The strong
position the Russian line OF operations between
yarna and Shuma led the Turks make that decisive
stand there. which with more concentrated strength
and against enemy necessarily weakened by sickness
and detschments they ought 10 have made in the plain
of Adrianople
Thus We see that in the defense OF the line
from Silistria TO Adranople the passage OF the
Danube ought 10 be defended without risking a
decisive action. The second stand should be made
behipd, not bciireeH, Sbumla and Warns and no
decisive action risked unless the chances of victory
are ttry graf Retreat across the Balkan ia the next
step leaving the passes defended by detachmens capa
bic Of as much resistance as may appear advisable
without bringing on a decisive engagement. In the
mean time the Russians will weaken themselves By
blockadng the fortresses and if they follow their
erorpractce they will again take these ortressesb by
storm and lose great many men by the operation;
4 nd oh of tho
sian army that up to the present time it has unaded
Herr been able TO idya regular siege The want of skill
full engineers and arersts the impossbility of ere
ating in barbarous country large magazines Of war
material for seges or even to carry across immense
tracts Of country whatever material may exist, have
always driven the Russians TO the necessity Of carry
ing every fortified place by assault after short viO
lent but seldom very effective cannonade. Thus Su-
wsrrow took Isnail and OchakOf; thus in 152S and
1929 the Turkish fortresses in Europe and Asia were
stOrmed and thus they carried Warsaw in 1891. In
either the Russian army will arrive at the passes
of the Balkan in weakened condition, while the
Turks have had time to concentrate their detachments
from all sides If the invaders not repealed while
attempting to the Balkan, by dash of the whole
Turkish army the decisive battle may be fought
under the walls of Adranople and then, if the Turks
defeated they will at least have exhausted all the
chances left them.
But Russian victory at Adrianople 3n, under
present circumstances, decide very little The British
and French fleets are at Constantnople and in their
teeth Russian General march upon that capital
The Russians arrested at Adrianope, unable to rely
on the support of their fleet which itself would be
menaced would soon fall victims by thousands to dis
and have retrace their steps beyond the Balkan
Thus even in victory, they would be defeated as re-
CARDS their great object in the war There is, how
ever another line of operations which they may
perhaps, adyanageously take. Ii is indicated by
the route which leads FROM Widdn and NikOpols, by
way of Sofia, to Adrianople Apart from political con-
sderations il would never enter the head of any
sensible Russian General 10 follow this route But
long as Russia can depend on Austra-sO long as the
approach of Russian army to the Seryian frontier
combined with Russian intrigues in Serya, may excite
movements in that country, in Mon
tenegro, and among the predominant GrecO-Slayic
population of Bosnia, Macedonia, and BulgariasO long
as the browning operation of strictly military
pagn, the taking of ConstantinOple is out of the
question, from the presence of Europe@n fleet-so
long this plan of campaign will be the only which
and without forcing England and France to deter
mined hostile action by too direct march upon Con
stantinOple.
1t appears indeed, from the present position of the
Russian army that something OF this sort is projected
Its right wing has been extended to Kraowa, near the
western frontier of Wallacha, and general shifting Of
It's array toward the upper Danube has taken place.
this maLeuver is entirely Of the line of operations
by Silistra and Shuma it only have for its object
to put the Russians in communication with Serya the
center OF Selayie nationality and Greek Catholicism in
Turkey. defensive position on the lower Danube
combined with advance across the upper Danube
toward Sofa, would be perfectly safe if supported by
Austria, combined with a movement of the Turkish .
slavonans in favor of national independence and .
uch movement could not be more forcbly provoked .
han by march of the Russian army into the very
leart OF the Slovenian population OF Turkey. Thus,
he Car will obtain far easily and in far less
,fensiyc what he has claimed throughout the
controversy This is the organization of all the Turkish
'lavOnians in distinct prineipaes, such MOldsyia,
Nallacha and Serya now are. With Bulgaria, Monte
egro and Macedonia under the nominal sovereignty OF
be Sultan and the real protection of the Car Turkey
Europe would be CO mined TO the enyirons Of Con-
tantinople and deprived of its nursery of soldiers
ltana. This would be far better result for Russia
ban decisive victory at AdrianOple followed by a
cad stand Of her armies Ii is result which appear
noes Indicate that she is about to try for WEsther
lie Is not mistaken in relying the SlavOnians of
turkey is doubtful question, though there viii be no
ause OF astonshment should they all declare against