The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1853-07-29
Arrival q tAe Asaa-rAs B4eces - . Daro-
mean War On the United otates-

mean War t0o UnAGe0 wGNSeU
The Asia il in; and political affairs are in statu
ouo. What If there be war; What. II England.
pioued beyond endurance by the taunts Of Rus
STA. and resolutely determining to carry out the
July treaty to the letter, should sail through the
Dardanelles and place the ports on the Black
Sea under anembargo? What If Russia, blind
to the sage counsels Of Nesselrode and led by
the nose by the fiery advocates of the national
party, should refuse to take back the gauntlet
she has thrown down and cross the Danube as
she crossed the Pruth? What if France, al
WAYS ready for war should overrun Belgium,
while her feet co-operates with England at
Odessa? What, in short, if all Europe tired Of
ronotonous tranquility. and wearied Of the
prosaic blessings Of peace, should plunge
headlong into the vortex Of war? There
is nothing chimerical or even speculative
in the enquiry. We put the question az
we would ask whether -four is on the
decline, whether the cotton crop will be short,
whether .freights are likely to rise-all of them
occurrences fairly possible if not probable, and
| legitimate topics of inquiry We see the ma
tional equilibrium of Europe already overturned;
| we hear direct defiance of its two greatest
| Powers by third we behold an unequivocal
attempt to upset existing treaties, and a clear
menace Of a fresh Cossack occupation. With
| these facts staring us in the face, and toler-
| ably sure confidence that France and England
are not so utterly fallen as to resign without
struggle their beasted supremacy on the CONT
| nent we look upon war as probable if not
] an inevitable contingency. and we ask: What
| effect would it have upon u.s. How would the
| United States be affected by general burst Of
hostilities in Europe?
A similar enquiry, addressed to any other
| nation than this, would require two-fold an
| swer European Powers would be affected po-
| litically as well as commercially by a general
war. Incapable of remaining neutral. their ma
| tional existence would involve participation,
| more or less active either with the victors or
the vanquished. Fortunately for us, the fun
| damental principles of our foreign policy pro-
| tect US from the perilous consequences OF :" en-
| tangling alliances We have no concern poll
tically, with the internal disputes of Europeans,
| and could look with indifference on any modif-
| cation of their present territorial divisions. II
| Turkey were absorbed tomorrow, it is doubtful
whether our interest in the operation could be
appreciated in words or figures. A division of
the county of Middlesex or Lancashire would
affect us as materially.
But, as one of the greatest commercial ma
tions of the globe-as the greatest producer of
the staples of life-as the great purveyor and
one of the greatest customers of Europe-our
commercial interests would be deeply involved
in European war. Our trade would feel its
effects as directly as if we were ranked among
the belligerents. Just as merchant participates
in the fluctuations of trade which affect the
| firms with which he does business, we, who
| deal with England, France, and other CONT
mental nations. would share in the net results
OF a war by which their commerce would be in
jured Our share would, Of course, be widely
different from theirs. 1t is difficult to perceive
what immediate benefit either England or
France would derive from a war. Their in
| terest lies obviously on the side Of peace. and
/ though they may be forced into hostilites these
could only be, at best, but lesser calamity, vo-
UNFAIRLY incurred in order to avoid greater.
| With us the case is different. A European
| war would come to us freighted with adyan-
! tage as well as injury. We do not mean to as
sert that the one would equipose the other but
merely that On the face of it, one branch-and
a most important one-of our export trade
would be directly benefited by a European war.
We need not say that we allude to the trade in
breadstuffs. The movement which took place
a month ago in the corn market in London, is
fair symptom of what might be expected from
| distinct declaration Of war. On that occa-
sion, the news of short crop in France caused
rise in -four of from one shilling to two shil-
lings per barrel We can easily infer from this
what would be the consequence Of the closing
Of Odessa and the Levant and Baltic ports. 1t
may be worth while. if the crisis becomes more
imminent hereafter, to turn to the trade and
navigation tables, and calculate what pro-
portion of the corn consumed in Great
Britain is derived from Riga, Peters
burg, Archangel and Odessa. For the pre-
sent, it will suffice to remind the reader
that the quantity imported from thence is SO
large as to exercise very considerable influence
over the market. The source stopped. this
amount would require to be drawn from Us
and it would not be surprising it, under the in
fuence Of the increased demand, our exports of
wheat and -four to Great Britain amounted TO ten
millions Of dollars or about double their value
as given in the last tables. This would, ofcourse
afford powerful incentive to our agriculture.
| But il is obvious that this benefit would be
accompanied by injuries to our trade, Of more
general and lasting nature. In the first place
cotton would receive q severe blow: and all
those concerned in the growth or traffic of the
| staple would suffer heavy loss. Our Mediter-
ranean trade would be crippled. The panic
which would reign on the London Change and
the Paris Bourse would react upon US. Money
would rise in price and financial operations
would be stratened. English and French mer-