The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1853-01-20

made an incursion upon the Pregel, gained
one battle, and returned more rapidly than if
il had been beaten. During the tour hrst
months, as the year before, the King OF Prussia
had only Austria to contend with.
In175S the Russian army made second In
curgion, similar 10 that Of The year before. On
the 2lst Of August it lost battle on the ODER
aad returnedto Poland. Frederic, during the
first four months Of the campaign, and during
the autumn, had o enemy before him but Aus
t.a. Yet he lost all his advantages by his badly
conceived and badly executed operations IN
Moravis, and by the battle of Hockhlrchen.
The campaign of 1859 was literal copy of
that of 1853. The Russian army made third
incursion in the month of August, defeated
Frederic at Kunersdorf, and true TO its SYSTEM
returned amongst its frosts. During the first
four months, and during the autumn, the king
of Prussia had it in his power to have crushed
Austria yet he not only did not make the most
of that precious time, but he lost corps of
Is 900 men by the rashness of his maneuvres
which caused the capitulation of alaxen.
1t was the same thing in 1850. During the
first four months oflhe year Frederic might have
crushed the Austrians, and yet Laudon sur
rounded and took corps IF II, 900 men in
sight Of Prince Henry, who was cautioned in
Silesa. The Russians arrived too late upon
the Oder. They delivered no battle, but tar
ried rather longer than usual. NothwithstanG-
ing, they finally returned among their SHOWS
to winter.
In 176l and 1862, the population of Prussia
began to diminish sensbly; the Austrians took
Schweidnitz and the Russians Goldberg, Dres-
den had already been taken in a preceding
campaign; Frederic's situation was apparent
ly desperate; when the Empress Elizabeth, of
Russia, died, and her successor, who was an
ardent admirer OF the Prussian king, not only
withdrew the Russian army, but formed an al
lance offensive and defensive, With Prussia.
The immense subsidies which Frederic re-
ceived from England, gave him the means of
| raising soldiers and officers throughout Ger
| many. This single advantage did more for
| him than did the FIVE incursions of the Rus
SLAMS for Austria.
Such were the circumstances under which
| Frederic emerged with safety from the seven
years war. His adversares acted on differ
ent lines, with separate objects, and were unit
| ed by no common motive, military or political.
A comb ination of their forces, and the exer-
| else Of their full strength, must have crushed
| him but they made no combined movements
and, with the exception of Austria, put forth
| but very small portion of their actual power.
| In the campaign of 1756, Frederic brought into
the field 100 600 troops. completely organized,
differed and drilled-veter ans, in fact, all of
them. Austria, just recovering from the eff
fects of the Turkish war, in which the greater
| part of her veterans had been destroyed, could
not set on foot more than one-t third of this num-
| Der, while the Saxon forces were only $4,000
strong. In 1857 he had 5000 troops, while
those opposed to him were 10000 of different
nations, acting without the slightest concert. In
the campaign of 1853, he had 100000 men
against 1000. In 1859, he operated with
10000 against 10000. In 1850, his estates
having been greatly exhausted, he operated
with only 100000 men, while his enemies
brought 10000 against him. In l761 his force
was Ito 600, while that of the allies was reck-
oned at 100000. At the commencement of
the year l762, the situation of Frederic was
considered desperate, for the armies of Austria
were stronger than ever, and those of France
had been considerably reinforced, while Rus
STA was ready TO join in the projected operations
as soon as the campaign should be opened
But on The Oath of January Elizabeth died.
and the Russian army marching against the
Prussian King, had orders from their new mo-
| march to join him. Their assistance turned
the scale, and in February, 1863 peace was
concluded with Austria.
We think we have said enough TO show that
there was nothing miraculous in the deeds of
the great Frederic. Nominally, the contest
stood 100000, against S.000,0 really the
king OF Prussia was never opposed to dou.
BILE his number. With consummate military
skill, he ayailed himself of the advantag es
| which the dsjointed operations of his enemy
offered, and attacked them separately. His
operations, in spite OF s ome grave errors which
more than once brought him TO the brink OF
destruction, were those of great commander,
| but there was nothing of the marvellous in
| them. The difficulties with which he strug-
gled were as nothing compared to those which
| beset Napoleon in hisfrst Italian campaien +. and
IN the campaign of 1914. la the first be cut
to pieces FIVE different armies, and killed
wounded, or made prisoners OF a number of
men ten times as great as any force he was
ever able, al any one time, to o pose to them,
and in the latter, with 10000 men, he kept the
whole forces of the Holy Alliance, nearly a
half million actually present, and nearly dou-
Bile as many on The march TO join them, at bay
for weeks, often defeating them in great bnt
useless battles. He would have succeeded in
compelling them 10 evacuate France. but for
the ueachery of Marmont and Augereau.
The splendor OF Frederick military ach;svs.
mems bear no comparison with those of an,
little Navy, the odds, alone, being taken into
consideration. We had at the beginning If ,ha
war three frga,es rated Il, and CARVING 90
guns. We had several Others of sc. and ,wo
OF 81. We had about half dozen sloo,s or
10 or Is guns, aud about as many more h,;r,
OF nearly the same strength. The feeling IF
Inc Administration and of the country was
against the Navy, not because the vslor of q;