The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1853-10-13

denied in the Senate But this does not shake
the decision of the Supreme Court above re
ferred to. Usage, Of great antiquity, acquires
the force Of law. The denial, therefore, that
Slavery existed by virtue Of an express law, or
by statute law, which was intended to be de-
MED, was no denial at ALL But no usage can
acquire the force Of law, except il has been
long recognised as the basis of action, and as
the principle on which the rights of property
are maintained.
There is no slave State where the existence
of Slavery is not recognised and maintained by
numerous statutes and judicial decisions. The
statute books of the South are full of such en-
actments. The relation of master and slave is
fully recognised, and, to some extent, regulated.
The decision Of the Supreme Court above re-
ferred to, settles most important principle !;
and have no regrets that was the means Of
inducing that decision.
Ii gives the proper limitation 10 Slavery. IL
cannot be extended beyond the jurisdiction Of
the States sanctioning it, and cannot legally
be affected by the legislative action of any free
State. The principle, believe, was sanctioned
by the Southern States and was not contro-
verted by any non-slaveholding State. On the
question Of Slavery in our Territories, this doc
trihe was FIRST departed from.
The Supreme Court has long since held that
that court and its judges recognise without
proof, the laws of the several States aad Terri
tories The jurisdiction of that court and of
its members, extends throughout the Union
In the respective States they administer the
local laws, 80 that the laws of the States come
under their special cognzance in acting upon
individual rights.
Kentucky is a slave State. Except in regard
to land titles, no other subject has been more
productive of legal controversy than contracts
arising out of Slavery.
IL Is commended that the law authorizing the
reclamation of fugitives from labor is unconsti-
tutional; that the Constitution left the power
| with the States, and vested no power on the
subject in the Federal Government.
This argument has been sometimes advanced,
and it may have been introduced into one or
more political platforms In regard to the
| soundness Of this position, | will first refer to
judicial decisions in the case of Prigg Us. The
State of Pennsylvania, l6 Peters's r., 539 the
Judges of the Supreme Court of the U. States,
without dissenting voice, affirmed the doc
| trine that this power was in the Federal Gov
eminent A majority of them held that it was
exclusively in the General Government Some
of the Judges thought that State might legis-
late in aid Of the act Of Congress but it was
held by no one of them that the power could
be exercised by State, except in subordina-
ton of the Federal power.
Every State court which has decided the
question, has decided it in accordance with the
view of the Supreme Court. No respectable
court it is believed, has sustained tho view that
the power is with the State Such an array Of
authority can scarcely be found in favor of the
construction of any part Of the Constitution
| which has ever been doubted But this con-
struction, sanctioned as it is by the entire ju-
dicial power-State as we'll as Federal-has
also the sanction Of the legislative power.
The Constitution of the United States, it will
be observed, was formed in 1887. Afterward
it was submitted to the respective States, for
their ratification. The subject was not only
largely disou ssed in the Federal Convention,
but also in every State Convention. No ques-
ton has ever arisen, in regard to our Federal
relations, which was of equal Importance to
that Of the adoption of the Constitution none
in our political history was more thoroughly
discussed The men of that day may be en-
phatically said to have understood the Consti-
tuition.
In very few years after the Constitution
was adopted by the States, the Fugitive Act Of
|
except where the act Of 1850 contains repug
nant provisions. In the Congress which enact
ed the act of 1893, it is believed that some Of
the members had been members of the Con.
vention. They could not have been ignorant
of the provisions of that instrument; and by
the passage Of that act they exercised the power
as one that belonged to the Federal Govern
ment Here is force Of authority, judicial
and Legislative, which cannot be found on any
other seriously ltigated point in the Constitu-
| ton
Such weight Of authority is not to be shs-
ken. IL the question is not to be considered
authoritatively settled, what part Of that in.
strument can ever be settled The surrender
of fugitive slaves WAS matter deeply interest
ing to the slave States. Under the Confedera-
| ton there was no provision for their surrender.
On the principles Of comfy amongst the States,
the fugitives were delivered up; at other times
they were protected and defended. This state
of things produced uneasiness and discomfort in
the slave States. A remedy Of this evil, as it
was called was provided in the Constitution.
An individual who puts hs opinion, as to the
exercise of this power, against the authority of
the nation in its legislative and Judicial action
must have no small degree Of confidence in his
own judgment. A few individuals in Massa-
chusetts may have maintained, at one time,
that the power was with the States but such
views were, it is believed, long since abandoned,
but they are reasserted now, more as a matter
Of expediency than Of principle.
But whether VIC look ut the weight Of au-
thority against State power, as asserted, or at
the constitutional provision, We are led to the
same result. The provision reads "No per-
son held TO service or labor in one State, under
the laws thereof escaping into another, shall,
in consequence Of any law or regulation there.
in, be discharged from such service or labor,
but shall be delivered up on claim Of the party
to whom such service may be due"
This, in the first place. is Federal measure.
1t was adopted by the National Convention,
and was sanctioned as Federal law by the re.
spective States. 1t is the supreme law OF the
land. Now, q provision which cannot be en-
forced, and which has no penalty for its viola
ton, is no law. The highly respectable gon.
tleman who read an ingenious argument in
support of these views, is too good theologian
TO contend that any rule Of action which may
be dlsregarded without mourning a penalty,
can be law. IL may be recommendation,
but it cannot be law. This was the great OBJ
lection TO the Articles Of Confederation. There
was no power to enforce its provisions. They
were recommendatory, and without sanctions.
There is no regulation, divine or human
which can be called law, without sanction
Oar first parents, in the garden, felt the truth
Of this and it has been iclt by violators Of the
divine or human laws throughout the history
of our race.
The provision in the Constitution is prohibit.
DRY and positive. II prohibits the States from
libersting slaves which escape into them, and
il epjoins duty To deliver up such fugitiyes, on
claim being made. The Constitution vests no
special power in Congress to prohibit the first
or to enforce tho observance Of the second
Does it, therefore, follow that effect can be
given TO neither, IL State shall disregard it,
Suppose State declare slave who escapes
into it, shall DO liberated, or that any one who
shall assist in delivering him up shall be pun.