The Nevada journal., 1852-12-17
NEVADA JOURNAL.
Marlborough and Wellington.

cessity under which both labored of
outstanding the blood Of their soldiers,
the military qualities of Enaland's two
chiefs were essentially different, and
each possessed some points in which he
was superior to the other. BY nature
Wellington was more daring than
Marlborough, and though soon con-
strained by necessity to adopt eau
tious system, he continued, throughout
all his career, TO incline more to haz-
ardous policy than his great predeces-
sor. The intrepid advance and fight
at Assaye, the crossing of the Douro
and movement on Talavera in 1909,
the advance TO Madrid and Burgos in
1912, the actions before Bayonne in
1918, the desperate stand made at
Waterloo in 1915, place this beyond a
doubt. Marlborough never hazarded
so much on the success of single en-
terprise; he ever aimed at comprising
his objects by skill and combination,
rather than risking them on the chance
of arms. Wellington was mixture
of Turenne and Eugene Marbor-
ough was the perfe, ton Of the Turcnne
school alone. No man could fight
more ably and gallantly than Marlbor
ough; his talent and rapidity Of eye
in tactics were at least equal to his
skill in strategy and previous combi
nation. But he was not partial to
such desperate passages-at- arms, and
never resorted to hem but from neces-
sity, or when encouraged by a happy
opportunity for striking blow. The
proof of this is decisive. Marlborough,
during ten campaigns, fought only five
pitched battles; Wellington, in seven,
fought fifteen, in every one of which
he proved victorious. Marlborough's
consummato generalship, throughout
his whole career, kept him out OF dis
aster. 1t was said with justice, that
he never fought battle which he did
not gain, nor laid siege to a town which
he did not take. He took about twen-
ty fortified places of the first order,
generally in presence of an enemy's
army superior to his own. yelling,
tons more desperate circumstances
frequently involved him in peril, and
ON some occasions caused serious loss
es to his armo; but they were the
price at which he purchased his trans
scendent successes. ellington's bold
er strategy gained for him advantages
which the more circumspect measures
of his predecessor never could have at
tanned. Marlborough would never,
with scarcely any artillery, have haz-
arded the attack on Burgos, nor incur
red the perilous chances Of the retreat
from that town but he never would
have delivered the south Of the Pen
insula in a single campaign, by throw
ing himself, with forty thousand men
upon the communications, in the north,
of hundred and fifty thousand 1t
is hard to say which was the greatest
general, if their merits in the field a.
lone are considered but Wellington s
successes were the more vital to his
country, for they delivered it from the
greater peril and they were more
honorable to himself, fer they we've
achieved against greater odds. And
his fame in future times will be pro-
portionally brighter; for the final over
throw of Napoleon, and the destruc-
tion of the revolutionary power, in a
single battle, presents an object of sur
passing interest, to which there is
nothing in history perhaps parallel,
and which, to the latest generation, will
fascinate the minds of men.
Marlborough laid great stress on
cavalry in war; his chief successes in
the field were owing to the sklful use
made oil powerful reserve body of
horse in the decisive point, and at the
decisive moment 1t was thus that he
overthrew the French centre at Blen-
helm, by the charge Of six thousand
cavalry, headed by himself in person,
in the interval between that village
and Oberglan; struck the decisive blow
at Families by the charge of a reserve
OF twenty squadrons drawn from the
rear of the right; and broke through
the formidable intrenchments at Nal,
plaquet, by instantly following up the
irruption of Lord Orkney into the CEN
tro of the lines by vigorous charge of
thirty squadrons of cavalry in at the
opening. The proportion of horse to
infantry was much greater in his ar
mics tnan it has since been in the Brit
ish service it was never under eighty,
and at last as high as a hundred and
sixty squadrons; which, at the usual
rate of hundred and fifty to squad
ron, must, when complete, have mus
tered twelve and twenty four thousand