The southern press., 1852-05-11

States. So far then from the people of the
United States collectively, as one body, or by
mere majority, having any power TO make Of
alter the Constitution, they can only propose
it to the States as matter for their considera'
ton and decision.
! 1t thus appears quite clear that the Consttu-
ton was the work Of the States, not of the
whole, or a majority of the people Of the United
States, who adopted it as citizens of their re-
spectve States and not of the United States,
and that the States alone in their sovereign
capacity have power to add, alter or diminish
any part of its provisions. Two.thirds of the
representatives of the people in Congress, may,
on the application of two-thirds of the State lie,
gislatures, call convention to amend the Con,
stitution, but the acts of that convention are of
no power or validity, until ratified by three.
fourths of the States by the exercise of their
own separate sovereignty. 1t is not true, there
fore, that the people Of the United States either
made or can unmake the Constitution, or have
any power over it whatever. That instrument
emanated from State sovereignty, and to that
sovereignty alone it appertains to alter, amend
or abolish all or any fits parts.
II follows as a legitimate deduction, that all
controversies involving conflicting interpreta.
tions Of any great fundamental principle of the
Constitution, are above the jurisdiction of Con-
gress. Accordingly the supreme court has been
made the Judge of the constitutonalty of the
laws in particular cases. But there is class Of
cases Of the highest importance to the peace Of
the Union that does not come within its juris
diction which is merely appellative;' and it
would seem that instead Of being decided by
majority, perhaps OF one vote, of Congress, they
should be referred to that power which alone
has the right to make and abrogate constitu-
TONS The assumption of the power to inter
pref the Constitution, added to that of making
laws conformabe to that Interpretation, carries
with it complete control over its provisions,
and Congress may make it just what it pleases
| IL cannot be doubted, however, that denial
| of this power would greatly embarrass legisla-
ton in many cases, by constitutional objections,
which might often be only vexatious or frivol
GUS but in general, the Constitution is so sim
pie, brief and direct in its language and mean
ing, as 10 admit of little diversity of interpreda.
ton. These have, so far ms | recollect at this
moment, been limited to the construction of the
words regulation of commerce" "common de.
fence and general welfare" and Unnecessary and
proper" Would il not be much more condu-
Give to the common defence and general welfare
of the whole confederation, TO abstain from all
legislation founded'on latitudinarian coDstruc-
ton of these phrazes, until the question has
been regularly referred to the States, and the
doctrine sanctioned by the constitutional major
ity, necessary in all cases Of alteration, addition
or amendment This might, it is true, occasion
some delay in the adoption of public measure,
but except in cases involving the immediate
safety Of the country, would be of much less
injury than the passage of laws founded on an
assumption Of doubtful powers, aggravating
sectional interests, and weakening the bonds of
our Union. A minority of the States, or of the
whole people, has no other protection from the
despotism of majority than the Constitution,
and when that is no longer sacred, there is no
security to the rights Of the weak against the
strong. They are brought back to TIE state OF
nature, and there is no other supremacy but that
of numbers; in other words, force. Whether
this force consists of a standing army, or q
standing majority of the people, or their repre-
sentatives, is of little consequence to the minor
ity.