New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1852-03-15

nan he was sware that Gorsey was the only man
Who could become his rival and yet he raised him
10 the most important station But he did NOT sus-
nest him Of laeh Of patriotism he did not believe
him traitor. Though suspicion IL republican viz
the. VET generous heart is not easily ready TO sus-
peet even the rival OF treason against ais own coun-
tyv. But Count Batthianyi asks, " Who sanctioned
the mutiny of Gorgey, when he set himself up
.g.inst Dembinsk, the Conmanter-m-Chief" We
snsver dispas sionaely, who else than the able and
ACCOMPLISHED friend" of the Count, Mr.. szemere,
the Extraordinary Commissioner of the Govern
msnt. lie sanctioned the mstiny in the name but
without the instructions of the Committee Of Ma
tional Defense.
The Count asks further: "Who shrank from the
duty Of confronting Gorgsy at the head OF his troops
who, although naturally attached to their leader
would there is every to believe have DESERT
ed him had the man who had called these troops 10
arms, but who had never known how to WELD the
masses he had created, fearlessly shown them that
their leader was traitor ~ But Kossuth had at tnas
time no proofs of Gorgeys treason in his hands
many of his ambition and when Gorgey reiuseoIo
obey his order OF coming down to Pesth, kos'utn de-
posed him from his command and sent the Generals
Messaros and Dembinsk to the army In order TO
take tho command from him Klspka relates the
q battle had been won and they failed in moral
courage to fulfill their mission So much the worse,
as all the Generals Of Gorgeys army, in council as
ssmbled, resolved to send Klapka to the Govern
ment with the demand to maintain Gorgey In his
command Does the Count think that these Gen.
erals (who were 30 blindly attached 10 GorSey
that many Of them would not believe him traitor
even when delivered up by him to the Austrian
hansman) would have lad more respect for kossun
tho e,,alian than for the Lieut. Generals Meszaros
and Dembinsk7
The Count continues: who suffered the execu-
tive power to be wrested from his hands by this very
man, whose treachery was 80 well kno wn to him
Who, I demand, but Kossuth 7" Now, as to this
point, Count Batthanyi and Mr.. Szemere are at va
rance Mr.. Szemere says that Governor Kossuth
had cOwardly delegated his power 70 G5rgey, while
he had yet three fortresses, and 10000 men at his
command. The statement of N. Vukovics is again
different. All of them have been published by the
papers, let US therefore consider the events of Arad
in an impartial way.
On the Ilth OF August, an army Of a hundred
thousand Russians was approaching at two days
distance from Arad. At three days distance there
was another army of eighty thousand Austrians and
Russians and around the fortress there Gorgey
with al army of thirty thousand Hungariaps, of.
fcered by his friends. The tidings had just arrived
that BEN had been defeated at Temesvax on the 9th
and his forces, on which the Governor could rely,
were dispersed. Such were the circumstances, un-
der which Gorgey insisted that the Governor should
delegate his power to him. Sixty OF the Represcn-
tatves had under the leadership of Mar Hertelendy,
declared themselves for the General five out ofthe
eight ministers, (Csanyi, B. Perenyi,' Gen. Auch,
vukovics and Bishop Horvath,) advised the Governor
to yield to Gogey, who pretended that the Russians
were ready to grant terms upon the basis of the
autonomy of the country, and Of general amnesty.
In the negotiation should succeed, the way
across the Thesis and the Danube to the fortresses
Of Peterwardeh and of Comorn was yet open.
Gorgey might have rallied all the different portions
Of The Hungarian army and reinforced by the $4,000
men Of Comorn, recommended again the struggle at
the head of lO0 900 mon beyond the Danube, ia por
hon OF the country which had not yet suffered from
the disasters of the and whose not
yet drained. Gorgey, the rival OF Kossuth had yet
the power to maintain the struggle his ambition
was known to the Governor, not HE neachery Five
Ministers rendered their isnaton to Kossuth the
sixth, Duschek, was not present, and WAS business
man, not politician, who always voted with the
majority. The remaining two, Szemere and Batth-
anyi were adverse, then, as well to Gorgey TO the
Governor. What should he now have done il he
refused to delegate his power to his rival! Should
he make an appeal TO the army Of Gorgey, against
their officers and their chief Should he destroy
the discipline of the army and excite mutiny in tho
face Of the enemy and this during ministerial
crisis, and against the advice OF majority of his
Minister'S Would the nation not have accused him
of having sacrificed the country TO his ambition
He yielded, therefore, under such pressure OF cir
cumstances he delegated his power to his rival
but he did IT, as it is proved by Count Bathanyi him
Y Rerald, Feb 2s, only under condition that Cor
gey would maintain the autonomy OF the country
and get general amnesty. But BEN, the daring
Pole, requested him once more, after the surrender
of Gorgey to renew the struggle at the head OF the
small army on the banks of the Danube, at the mo.
ment when the example of Gorgsy had blinded most
OF the other generals, who, seeing the traitor and his
unfortunate dupes the hOnored guests of the Russian
generals, FASTENED TO surrender under tae same con-
diOns as GOrgey, because they did not surmss thst
he bad surrendered Internationally. To accept
Bem's proposal would have been the act of despe-
RADIO, not of a statesman. Kossuth refused, there
fore, aud he is now accused OF imbecty by the
szemeres and Batthianyis. We do not proceed fur
ther, aud submit the case to the verdict of public
opinion. FRASoIs PuLszKy.
Louisville, by, March 5, 1881
WASHINGTON.