New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1852-04-09

generosity OF a ntwly-Heeu Fs'S'~, 80"
= cause which, though Intimately iher own
SO IN the first instance and above all, that oil
a.. Huusarisns Rather than suffer the Aus
t,iaa troops to march upon Hungary, they would
draw their first and most terrific onslaught upon
themselves And while they thus nobly came
forward for the support Of their allies, the Hun
sarisns, successful against Jellachlch, drove
hin upon Vienna, and by their victory strength
eped the force that was TO attack THAI to"h'
Under these circumstances, il was the clear
duty of Hungary to support, without deiay
= and with all disposable forces, not the Die' az
Vienna, not the Committee of Safety or any
other official body at Vienna, but the V,e"7e's
Resolution And if Hungary should even have ier-
rot that Vienna had fought the first battle OF Hun
gary, she owed it to her own safety not TO forget
that Vienna was the only outpost of Hungarian
INDEPENDENCE, and that after the fall Of Vienna,
nothing could meet the advance Of the Imperial
troops against herself Now, we know very
well all the Hungaiians can say and have said
m defense Of their inactivity during the BLOCK
ade and storming Of Vienna; the insufficient
state OF their own force, the refusal OF the Diet
or sny other official body in Vienna to call them
in. the necessity TO keep on constitutional
ground, and to avoid complications with the Ger
man Central Power. But the fact is, as to the
insufficient state of the Hungarian army, that IN
the first days after the Viennese revolution and
the arrival Of Jellachch. nothing was wanted In
the shape Of regular troops, as the Austrian
regulars were very far from being concentrates
and that a courageous, unrelentlng following up
of the the first advantage over Jellachich, even
with nothing but the Land stwm that had fought
NJ Stuhlweisse nburg, would have sutbced TO Ell
feet a junction with the Viennese, and TO adjourn
to that day six months every concentration OF
an Austrian army. In war, and particularly
in revolutionary warfare, rspdity OF action until
some decided advantage is gained is the first rule,
and we have no hesitation IN saying that upon
merely military grounds Perczel ought not to have
stopped until his junction with the VIennese was
effected There was certainly some risk, but
who ever won a battle without risking some
thing And did the people of Vienna risk
nothing when they drew upon themselves
they, a population Of four hundred thousand
the forces that were to march to the conquest
of twelve millions Of Hungarlans The mill
tary fault committed by waiting until the Aus
trians had united and by making the feeble
demonstration at Schwechat which ended, as it
deserved to do, in an ingorious defeat-this mil
tary fault certainly incurred more risks than
sesolute march upon Vienna, against the dis
banded brigands of Jellachich would have done.
But. il is said, such an advance Of the Hun
garians, unless authorized by some official
body, would have been violation of the Ger
man territory, would have brought on somplica-
tions with the Central Power at Frankfort, and
would have been, above all, an abandonment OF
the legal and constitutional policy which
formed the strength of the Hungarian cause.
Why, the official bodies in Vienna were non
entities Was it the Diet, was it the popular
Committees, who had risen for Hungary, or was
it the people of Vienna, and they alone, who
had taken to the musket TO stand the lsunt OF
the first battle for Hungsps independence II
was not this nor that official body in Viennan
which il was important TO uphold--ail these
ks-iis- -. -=5 -~c''id have been, upset very
soen 20 .s,s progress or the revolutionary de-
yxxiopme.t ~asovnuuncy or tne
Revolutionary movement, the unbroken progress
OF popular action itself, which alone was in
question, and which alone could save Hungary
from invasion. What forms this revolutionary
rovd.aent afterward might take, was the bust
ness of the Viennese, not OF the Hungarians,
20 long as Vienna and German Austria at large
continued their allies against the common enc
my. But the question is, whether In this stick
hing Of the Hungarian Government for some
euasilegal authorization, we are not TO see the
first clear symptom of that pretense to rather
doubtful legality of proceeding, which, If it did
not save Hungary, at least told very we'll, at
later period, before the English middle-class
audiences.
As to the pretexs of possible conflicts with the
Central Power of Germany at Frankfort, 1t is
cutie futile. The Frankfort authorities were
de faoto upset by the victory of the counter-revo-
luton at Vienna they would have been equally
upset had the revolution, there, found the sup
port necessary TO defeat its enemies. And last
", the great argument, that Hungary could not
leave legal and constitutional ground may do
very we'll for British free-traders, but it will
never be deemed sufficient In the eyes OF history.
Suppose the people Of Vienna had stuck TO
illegal and constitutional" means on the 18th
Of March and on the 9th OF October, what then
Of the illegal and constitutional" movement,
and Of all the glorious battles which. for the
first time, brought, Hungary to the notice of the
civilized world The very legal and constitu-
tionai ground upon which it is asserted the Hun
garians moved in lsis and 40, was conquered
for them by the exceedingly illegal and unconstl-
tutional rising OF the people OF Vienna on the
18th OF March. II is not to our purpose here to
discuss the revolutionary history of Hungary,
but il may be deemed proper if We observe that
it is utterly useless to professedly use merely
LEGAL means of resistance az ainst an enemy Who