The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1852-11-25

citizens in the several States The case in
Indiana, on the other hand, says expressly that
the right does not depend upon any positive
law.
think this remark must have found its way
into the opinion of the Judge who decided the
Illinois case. without due consideration | have
always understood that provision of the Consti-
tuition to mean lat least so far as this case is
concerned) that citizen who was absent from
his own State, and in some other State, was
entitled. while there, to all the privileges of
the citizens of that State And have never
heard of any other or different meaning being
given 10 it, 1t would be absurd to say that
while in the sister State he is entitled to all the
privileges secured to citizens by the laws of all
the several States, OF even of his own State
for that would be to confound all TERRITORIAL
limits, and give to the States not only an entire
community, but perfect confusion of laws.
If am right in this view of the matter, the
clause of the Constitution relied upon cannot
help the respondent; for if he is entitled, while
here to those privileges only which the citizens
of this State possess he cannot hold his slaves.
| must also here notice some other similar
grounds insisted upon by the respondents
counsel
He cites Vattel (B. 2, CHI. 8, s 81 to prove
that the goods of an individual, as regards
other States are the goods of his State. ] have
already shown that by the law of Nature, about
which alone Vattel is always speaking slaves
are not goods and | may add, that what Vat
sci says in the passage TO which he refers, has
no connection with tho right of transit through
a foreign country. Besides, in the case from
Illinois, referred to by respondents counsel the
Court distinctly declare Willard Us. People, 4
Scammon's Rep, 47l) that they cannot see
the application of this case of the law Of ma
tons IN relation to the domicil of the owner,
fixing the condition of and securing the right
of property in this slave, and regarding the
slave ~ a part of the wealth of Louisiana, and
our obligation of comfy 10 respect and enforce
that right"
The respondents counsel also refers to those
provisions of the Constitution of the United
States which relate to fugitive slaves and to
the regulation Of commerce among the several
States With regard to the first of these pro-
visions, which the counsel insists recognises and
gives property in slaves; it is sufficient to say,
that although the supreme law of the land in
respect to fugitive slaves and as such entitled
to unquestioning obedience from all, it is, so far
as everything else is concerned, the same as if
ton. This has been so held in cases almost
without number, and is held in each of the
three cases cited by the respondents counsel,
and upon which have before commented
As for the provision of the Constitution in
relation to commerce among the States, it has
been often held, that Notwithstanding this pro-
vision, the States have the power implicitly re-
served to them of passing all such laws as may
be necessary for the preservation, within the
State, of health, order, and the well-being of
society or laws which are usually called sana-
tive and police regulations. Passenger cases,
Howard, s. c. r., 2S3. License cases, ID,
5O4. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, ? Pc
ters $50. New York Us. Min, IL Peters, l3O
Brown Us. State of Maryland, 10 Wheat, 4l9
Groves Us. Slaughter, Is Peters, SID Laws
regulating or entirely abolishing slavery or
forbidding the bringing of slaves into State,
belong to this class of laws, and a right to pass
those laws is not affected by the Constitution
of the United States. This view of the subject
is taken by the three cases upon which the
counsel mainly relies. And even if all this
were not 80, apprehend that the Constitution,
having undertaken to regulate both external
and internal commerce in slaves by certain
distinct and specific provisions, wis those in
relation to the importation of slaves from
abroad, and the return of fugitive slaves) has
thereby taken the element of slavery out of
these general provisions in relation to com
merce, and having legislated separately upon
the subject of slavery to very limited extent,
and there stopped, has thereby shown its in
tention to dispose separately and completely of
that subject so far a. it was to be disposed of,
and has not left to Congress any power over it
under the general provisions relating to COM
MERGE. For under any other view of the subject,
the provisions in relation to the importation of
slaves and to fugitive slaves would be entirely
superhuous. If the Constitution had intended
to give Congress power over slavery by the gen
eral provision in relation to commerce, that
provision is of itself quite sufficient by it's letter
are specially empowered to do by the clauses
expressly relating to slavery and as an express
power takes away power which might other
wise be tacitly implied, think it is clearly
done SO in this instance.
Ii remains for me to consider how far the
local law of New York affects this case, and
distinguishes it from the GASES in Indiana and
Illinois.
To go back first, to the right of transit with
slaves, as it is claimed to exist by the natural
law IL hIIthIr w Ds htltItu III Tile INV vi Ud-
tons that a right to transit with property not
only exists, but that, where such right grows
out of necessity created by the rts MAJOR, it
is Il perfect right and cannot be lawfully re-
fused to stranger (Vattel b. 2. CHI 9, g. 1873
h. Prelmlnares, E. Z. Putendorf, b. 3, Oh.
g. g. In this case it is insisted that the re-
spondent came here with his slaves from neces-
sity the return having SO stated and the de-
H. a.. Al 1.
fectly true that the demurrer admits whatever
is well pleaded in the reuarn But if the re-
turn intended to state necessity created by
the r's MAJOR, it has pleaded it badly for it
only alleges necessity, without saying what
kind of necessity and, as it does not allege a
necessity created by the vis MAJOR. the demur-
rer has not admitted any such necessity Where
the right of transit does not spring from the
ms mayor, the same writers agree that it may
be lawfully refused Qb.)
But however this may be- it is well settled
in this country, and so far as know has not
heretofore been disputed, that State may
rightfuly pass laws, if it chooses to do so, for
bidding the entrance or bringing of slaves into
its territory This is 20 held even by each of the
three cases upon which the respondents coun-
sci relies. Commonwealth w. Ayres, lS Pick
r. 22l. Willard vs. the People, 4 Scammon's
Rep, AL Case of Sewall's Slaves, Am. Ju-
rst, I04
The laws Of the State of New York upon
this subject appear to me to be entirely free
from any uncertainty In my opinion, they not
only do not uphold or legaze property in
slaves within the limits Of the State, but they
render it impossible that such property should
exist within those limits, except in the single
instance of fugitives from labor under the Con-
stituton of the United States
The Revised Statutes, vol /, Csc. lst Ed
re-enactng the law of 1917, provide that :" No
person held as a slave shall be imported, in
troduced, or brought into this State, on any
pretencc whatever, except in the cases herein
nllnr snecifad Eyarv such nerson shall hn