Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1852-11-27

1919 IL was an indictment for scctoting n
woman of color owing service to u resident I
Of Louisiana, Tic Indictment was under /
the 10th section ur tie Criminal Code,
which provides that, "lf any person shall
harbor Or secretc any negro, mululto or per-
son OF cOin:, the same being slave or n
servant owing service or labor to any other
persons, whether they reside in this State or
IN any other State, or Territory, or District,
within the Limits aud under the jurisdiction
of the United States, or shall III any wise
hinder or prevent the lawful owner or own
ers Of such slaves or servants from retaking
them in lawful manner, every such person
90 offending shall he deemed guilty of n
rnsdemeanor, aud fined not exceeding five
hundred dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding
six months"
1t appeared that the woman Of color was
n slave, owned hy n resident of Louisiana,
and that, while passing with her mistress
from Kentucky to Louisiana through the
State of Illinois she made her escape in tie
latter State, aud was secreted ny the defend
ant.
There we're several questions raised in
the case which il is unnecessary now to mo-
iice. The Indictment, which was temured
TO, was sustained by the Court. The main
objection to II was that the section of the
code under which it was found was n viola
ton Of the sixth article Of the Constitution
of the State Of Illinois, which declares that
"Neither slavery nor involuntary scrvitudc
shall hereafter he introduced into tlIis State,
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly con-
yicied."
The Court in answering this objection say
"The only question, therefore, is the right
n. q.
entering our territory, although for n mere
transit to another State, become free under
the Constitution, then the defendant in error
is not guilty Of conccning such person MS
is described in the law aud in the inlet
mcnt. The lf9ih section of the criminal
code for the violation of which the plaintiff
is indicted, does most distinctly recognize
the existence of the institution of Slavery in
some of these UuiiCd Stuics aud whether
the Constitution and laws of this State have
or have not provided adequate remedies TO
enforce within It's jurisdiction llInt obligation
of service, il has provided by this penal
sanction, that none shall lnrbOr or conceal
snve within this State, who owes such ser
vice out of il. Every State or Government
may or may not, us il chooses, recognize
and enforce this law of comfy. Aud TO
this extent this State has expressly done so.
~ VIC slOulu, liltItluIf, tfEuIu bNlStNtH US
a distinct and separate nation from Our sister
States still, MS hy the law of nations, (Natel,
B. 9. ch. 10, 9. 1872, l33 l34,) the citizens OF
one Government lnvc n right TO passage
through the territory of another peacnbly,
for business or pleasure, and that too without
the lntter's acquiring any right over the per-
son or property, (Nnllel, B. ., :. I07, lO9,)
we could not deny them this international
right without u violation OF our duty. Much
less could we disregard their constitutional
right, MS citizens of one of the States, to all
the rights, immuniics and privileges of ciii
zens of the several States. IL would bc
startling indeed ii We should deny our
neighbors and kindred that common right of
free and safe passage which foreign nations
would hardly dare deny. Tie recognition
of this right is no violation of our Cousiiiu-
tion. 1t is not nn introduction Of slavery into
ihis State ns was coniended in argument, aud
the slave does not become free 10y the Con
stiulion Of Illinois by coming into the State
for the mere purpose OF passage through it,
Another case cited by the respondents
counsel was the Commonwealth VI. .4reS us
Pickering's Rep. 1881 In this case, the
owner brought her slave with her from
New Orleans TO Boston, on visit 10 her
father, with whom she intended 10 spend
five or six months, and tlcu return with llr
slave to New Orleans. The slave being
brought up on habeOs corpus, the Court or
dered her discharge. The rnse was fully
nigued, aud Chief Justice Shaw closes I
very elaborate opinion with these words
"Nor do we give any opinion on tic case
where nm owner of slave in one State il
bona fde removing to another State whcr,
Slavery is allowed, and in doing 30 necessa
rily passes through free State or where by
accident or necessity hc is compelled to t0lIcl
or land therein, remaining 10 longer thai
necessary"
have quoted largely from the opinions il
these cases, ia order that il may he under
stood clearly what is presented by them n
their governing principle. The respondent
counsel insists IL is this; That by the law q
nations, M owner of n slave may, either irGn
necessity or IN the absence of all intention
10 remain, pass with such slave through
State, where Slavery is not leguZed on lii
wny from one Slave State 10 another, AM
that during such transit through the Fre
Stnle the slave cannot assert lis freedom.
/ admit that this is the principle of thcs
Eases, aud now propose to consider it,
Each case denies that tile right of trhnsi
cnn be derived from the provision of iii,
Constitution Of the United States respecting
fugitive slaves, and, where an opinion wn'
expressed, places the right upon the law o
nations.
Writers OF the highest authority on ihc lar
OF nations, agree That strangers have rigll
TO pass with their property through the ter
riiories of uniion. (VHitel u. 2, ch o, IS
1913 to 1876. Puiendori u. 3, ch, 3, So. 5 4
l0.) And this rigllr, which exists ly nalmr
between States wholly foreign to each other
undoubtedly exists, NJ lenst us natural righ
between the States which compose our Tn
ION.
but we are to look further than this, m,
to see wlrut tie law of nations is When Ir
property which stranger wishes Iu TAX
with him is slave.
The property which she writers on the la'
of nntiOns speak of is merchandise or man
l.. Al. I....t - IN