The republic. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1849-1853, 1852-02-16

d0mts would weigh. he says, II 900 tons, and The
whole OF them would require either 400 trains and
900 locomotives or 1873 trains, with 3ii locomo-
ives, or some number between these figures, ac'
cordng as the amount TO be conveyed at once was
was not sacrificed to speed. Allowing them
time for the assembly of the troops and the distr
button Of the battaIions, and computing the per
Torrance Of the locomotives by the usual data he
says that the several armies OF relief could only
reach Bristol, Plymouth, and Rye in nine. ten,
and nine days respectively; but these days, we
should observe, are reckoned at only twelve hours
each. Hence he inf.rs that, in any case, an adj
vanced guard of the invading army could discm-
bark the coast before the army Of defence could
arrive, and either take up the rails prepare at
leisure a masked battery to play upon the trains as
they arrived, destroy the engines, and make the
whole cargo prisoners. As to what might come oil
the actual shock OF war, Captain Maurice contents
himself with observing, that each OF the English
corps would be inferior in numbers to its opponent
and that we could scarcely bring into the held the
necessary force of artillery" Scarcely" indeed.
Now let US coolly examine these several conclu-
eions. In the first place, have the resources or
chances of the invader been overrated! Up to
certain point, evidently not Captain Maurice
brngs his invading army, without the smallest err
ror, to the waters edge. That France could march
to the coasts OF the channel l5l 500 fighting men,
with all their munitions in few weeks or days, is
what nobody will dispute. Neither could there be
the slightest difficulty about ombarcation, if yes
sells only in readiness. What can he per-
formed by 10000 men can bs performed just ca
silly by 100 900; in fact, the whole thing done
once al Boulogne under Soults eye in less than
thirty minutes But could vessels be in readiness
for this enormous mass of passengers! We very
much doubt it. Captain Maurice, it is true, pro-
vide in his scheme the desired means OF transport
but to do he assumes that eosry single vsssel in
the entire French navy steamer or sailcr, and eve
ry single merchant steamer belonging to the coun-
try over and above 500 trading ships, pressed
into this service. There 10 not to be in any port or
on any station, home or foreign, one solitary man
Of war loft for any purpose whatever On this
point we think we need say no more.
N.,uy ihp crit ~ nj a
these squadrons any such succeed III crossing the
Channel without material damage, In despite of the
English cruisers? The inquiry clearly admits OF
no absolute reply, but the chances seem to be Iess
in favor than we have been uscd TO think. As
to positive surprise. such an event is surely impos-
sible with ornaments of such magnitude as those
have been describing. Granted that ten or
twelve steam irigatcs, each carrying 1000 men,
might slip across unseen under favor OF fogs or
night; how different in all respects is the of
three expeditions averaging three hundred and
thirty vessels EACH ne-third Of which is in tow,
and all heavily laden Suppose, however, that one
more of them were actually encountered, could
the main body Of the transports be prevented from
etIecting landing? Captain Maurice thinks not.
In giving the benefit of every doubt, he assumes,
surely with some touch of satire at our arrange
inents, that "the Rye squadron" might be met by
''the home service squadron, which, In 1915, con
sisted OF Six battle ships, Six frgates, and
several war-steamers and against this he fairly
sets off the ten line of battle ships, nine frigatcs,
and seven large worsteamers OF the invading
u
war; couldn't make rather better show in the
channel On the whole question, he ia of opinion,
and in this he is confirmed by the almost uniform
testimony OF officers that considering the great
extent permitted by steam to the practicable base
of operations, and the concert which might be made
10 pervade every portion of the plan, it would not
be possible for very strong Channel fleet to
prevent, with any thing like certainty, either by
bockades cruising, the passage OF hostile arma-
ments.
But if Captain Maurice has favored our oppo
nenis in estimating their chances at he has, at
least been equally liberal to ourselves upon land
lie gives Us, after deductng guards and garri-
soma three armies for Great Britain only, of 81 All
men each, trained soldiers, which computation
will only remark, that the last estimate laid be-
fore Parliament showed grand total OF 3D. ca
valry and infantry stationed throughout Great
Britain, guards, garrisons, depots and recruiting
companies all included. Neither can we well see
how "pensioncr," If fairly such, can be rcckoned
an defective soldier" too AS 10 the eighty four
guns" which each of our divisions is to carry into
the field. only say that the present artillery
resources Of the whole united Kingdom together
could not furnish the guns for single one OF the
corps, nor do we conceive that moro than twenty
could be inmsdaifly despatched from all the avail
able strength at Woolwich. Nay, il is point, VIC
believe, on which military men protess no doubt,
that far as any edeciual opposition on our side
Ia concerned, body of 10 900 or 0.000 men could
be thrown on our coasts, could establish them
selves. throw up entertainments, and keep Va at a
respectful distance with their guns, until a second
third reinforcement had been fcrried across
The Channel.