The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1852-12-02

army is computed at one hundred and nifty
thousand in the Peninsula fifteen or twenty
thousand for Cuba, and fifteen thousand tor
the other colonies. As matters now stand
when the country is governed by the bayonet
there is little prospect of reduction: =.
The Government places much higher estl'
mate on the revenues of Cuba than you seem &c
calculate. They place it at twelve millions Of
dollars; and, after deducting the expenses OF
the civil and military claim for the treasury
six millions Besides this the orders or rents
on the treasury, pay to the navy, and employ
ment to persons who would be entitled to re-
firing pensions at home, together with the
profits from the flour monopoly, make, accord
ing TO the estimate here, some fifteen or TWEEN
ty millions annually. doubt, therefore, if we
have anything to calculate on from financial
view of the question Hence my conclusion
that nothing short Of necessity, arising from
their fears as to the consequences, will force
them to act.
Allow me now to present the view | ventur-
ed to hint at some short time since. In Mr.
Forsyth's instructions to Mr.. VAIL 18th July
1910, No. 2, is to be found the following very
strong language: "You are authorized to as
sure the Spanish Government that in case OF
any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest
from her this portion of her territory, CUBA
she may securely depend upon the military and
naval resources of the United States to aid her
in preserving or recovering it." This assur.
ance was accordingly given by MIR. Vail, and
again repeated by Mr.. Irving, under his in.
structions from Mr. Webster With this guar.
anty for the safety of the island, the Spanish
Government has rested in perfect security. Al
| the time of Mr. Bulwer's dismissal, when the
| public apprehended rupture with England
! it was common remark at the Pucrta del
| Sol, the great theatre for political discussion
that the United States would aid US in the
protection of Cuba" Now, whilst would not
! formally withdraw this assurance, | suggest
the propriety of changing our tone, by saying
In war between Spain and England, the
United States might feel greatly embarrassed
from her friendly relations with England; that
she is not only our ally, with whom we are al
peace, but with whom at present we have the
most intimate commercial relations; that what
ever we may think Of her colonial policy in the
extension of her commerce, and for the advance
ment Of her manufactures the United States
would feel great reluctance in an open rupture
with her at this time besides, she might claim
from us the same neutrality in war with
Spain, as she had observed in our late contes
with Mexico" This language might do good
and AZ | think, could do us no harm AnC
whatever might be our secret resolution-tha
under no circumstances could we allow Cubs
to come under the control of England-still i
might be as well for us to keep this resolution
to ourselves.
In my interviews hereafter with the Minis
ter, shall venture to present this view of tn,
subject, as reason why we should greatly
prefer the purchase of Cuba to any interfe
renee to prevent its falling into the power o
England
have thus given you full account of wha
has taken place since the reception of your
despatched the difficulties which surround
the subject of my prospects, and of the cours'
design to pursue in regard to this interesting
subject. feel highly fattered in having CON
fded to me trust in whose successful execu
ton | should connect my name with one o
the most important events in our diplomatic
history.
| am, sir, most respectfully your obeden
servant, R. M. SAUNDERS.
James Buchanan, Esq, Secretary of State.