The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1852-05-20

itself, and insists that merchant steam-vesses
cannot be constructed so as to be practically
useful for warlike purposes. reply, first, that
having on such careful examination and with
such weighty example, adopted the principle,
we could not now wisely abandon it. without
proof, by practical trial, long hope to be de-
layed, that it is erroneous Secondly No ship
of war, however constructed, is adapted to all
the exigeneies of naval service, while these
steamships are certainly adapted to some oil
them. Commodore Perry. on the l5th OF Feb
ruary, 1852, reports TO the Secretary OF the
Navy that these steamships lof the Collins
line) may be converted at an expense OF
$4,000 each, into war-steamers OF the first
class; and that each of them could carry four
l0-inch Paixhan guns on pivots, fore and aft,
OF the weight of those in the model ship Mis-
slssippi, and ten 8-inch Paixhan guns on the
sides, and that this armament would not IN
commode the vessel and that in the general
| operations of maritime war, they would rem
der good service and especially that from their
great speed, they would be useful rs despatch
vessels, and for the transportation of troops.
being always capable of attack and defence,
and OF oyerhauling and escaping from an en-
emyn
The Secretary of War reports to the Senate,
on the goth of March, 1852 that A" the readi-
ness OF the steamers to be used at the shortest
notice, their capacity of being used as trans
ports for goods and munitions of war, and
their great CELEBRITY Of motion. enabling them TO
overhaul merchantmen and at the same time
escape cruisers, would render them terrible as
guerrillas Of the ocean"
Thirdly. Great Britain has already more
than two hundred and fifty steamers armed
and capable of armament. What would be our
situation, in the emergency of u war; if we
fence and aggression!
| But, fourthly. The warike adaptation Of the
steamers is a collateral and contingent feature
of the enterprise, which will stand safely On the
accomplishment of its postal and mercantile
| ends, even ii that feature should prove value
| less These steamers, at least are built and
in use, and accomplish their important civic
purposes. We may correct our system, not in
| this, but in future operations.
| Thus, Mr.. President, it appears that the en-
terprise was wisely adopted. And now pray
| you take notice that it has not been rendered
unwise or impracticable by amy change of CIR
cumStanceS or Of public Interests Everything
| in these respects remains as it was except that
| we have increased ability and increased need TO
| put it forth in the struggle for the freedom Of
commerce and the command of the seas.
Nor does the expense complained of affect
the question of perseverance. The excess OF
| expense above the estimates results from the
wise policy of building larger and better ships
than were at first contemplated whereby in
achievement we have not merely equalled but
surpassed Great Britain.
| Nor is the expense of the American steamers
disprOportionate to that of the British. Although
we all know that for a time it might well be
80, because the rate of interest, and the cost OF
labor and of skill, are higher ON this side of the
Atlantic than on the other, and because higher
insurance must be paid on more valuable YES
sells. Nevertheless, the Cunard steamers, seven
IN number, have an aggregate capacity OF
1882 tons, averaging $50 tons for each, and
they cross the Atlantic eighty-fve times annu-
| ally; thus the whole tonnage worked by them
across the Atlantic is-i4S, $50 tons.
The Collins steamers have an aggregate ton
mage OF 1900, averaging 3,425 tons for each
| and the aggregate tonnage worked by them
across the ocean is 17S, 100 tons; the cost to
| the Government is $3.50, not exceeding, in
| proportion to their work, the expense of the
| Cunard line At the same time they excel the
| Cunard steamers in speed. The shortest west
ward passage of the Cunard steamers was ten
days and twenty-five hours, and the shortest
eastward passage ten days and twelve hours !;
while the quickest westward passage of the
Collins steamers was nine days and twelve
hours, and the quickest eastward passage was
nine days and eight hours.
Nor is the expense disproportioned to the
benefits received. The first effect of the enter
prise was a postal treaty with Great Britain ;
and under that treaty, in lieu of receiving no
steam ocean hostages, as before, we now re-
ceive hostages amounting in round numbers
to $4OO, 900; and this revenue must swell, and
is actually swelling at the rate of 5000, 900 an
nually Thus, in the first place, it is clear
| that in two years the postal revenue alone
| will deiray the expense; and secondly, there
| lies very near to MS IN the future what my
| friend from Massachusetts, Mr.. SUMNERl so
Justly denominates, and what every patriot and
philanthropist so earnestly seeks the great
boon Of cheap ocean postage,
And now, while we maintain postal commu-
ncation to every part of our country, at no
matter how great expense, provided that the
revenue of the whole system shall equal the
cost of all its parts, | desire to know why we
should depart from a principle 80 enlightened
in foreign postal conventions, which are ancil-
larry to commerce. to immigration, and to polit-
ical influence and power But if we change
the terms of the question, it will be more easily
solved. What then, shall we lose by arresting
the enterprise! We shall lose all the hostages
on steam mails and all the hopes Of cheap
postage, and all the profits on passengers and
freight transported by steam. It is not easy to
estimate these losses but we have some knowl-
edge of the profits of Great Britain arising
from the monopoly she enjoyed before our COM
| petition The duties received into the treasury
from the Cunard steamers rose in six years from
S73,SO9 to $1,054,7Sl. She paid the steamers
for carrying the mails six years SO, $50, 900,
and received hostages in return amounting at
| 1886, 800; giving her clear profit, on the
postal revenue, of IS 2S6, 800 or little less than
a million year. We have gained at least one
half of what benefits Great Britain has lost by
reason of our enterprise Let that monopoly be
restored and re-established we shall then lose
all that gain, and with it we shall see the post
ages and freights and rates Of passage, raised
to their ancient standards and continually nd
justed equally to injure our prosperity and pro-
mote the interests and crafty the caprice Of
Great Britain. What shall we then look for
but decline of trade and industry, with o long
train of commercial embarrassments and ma
tional humiliations!
At most, we can save by abandoning this en-
terprise only about 100000 in two years.
Could we not now easily retrench to that extent
in some other quarter! We can save as much,
and more, by laying up one of our frigates in
ordinary during the same time, and twice as
much by burning it down to the waters edge
No one wond advise this, and yet it would be
far less disastrous than the rctrenchment now
proposed
Still, sir, the argument that the expense OK
ceeds the estimates is pressed. Well, there is
nothing new in that This is deficiency bill
1t makes appropriations of some millions to
supply Deficiencies in the customs service in the