The southern press. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1850-1852, 1852-04-05

not yet awhile secede from her Southern sisters.
And let US pursue such course, rs that none
will be able to dispute that we were actuated
by those high considerations. Let us not d.
just much, and such sort Of things, as will
make it manifest to the world that we abstained
from doing more only because we were afraid.
Let the State secede or not secede; do what
will touch the hearts of men, or what will chal.
lenge the approval of statesmen. Noirresolute
experimenting with political quackeries.
Anxious that the movement in the South
should not prove fruitess one, endeavored
for a long time to hope that circumstances
might justify the convention in propounding to
the other States an amendment of the consti-
tuition, such suggested by Mr.. Calhoun.
Upon that proposition know that Mr.. Calhoun
looked to prolracted and ample discussion, in
volving, as it would. all the relations between
the North and the South, comprehendng every
form OF Injustice and danger from the Union,
present and future, and displacing the insidious
policy of our enemies which is that Of well
timed periodical assaults, with intervals, more
or less extended, of cajollery, lattery, and pied
ges-of platforms, election jubilees, and in
trigues with Southern ambition. But the con-
vention is near at hand and the state Of public
opinion is fully known and | am satisfied that
the proposition would be most nopportune, aud
worse than useless. Our friends are not suf
ticiently strong to institute a discussion upon it,
and it would find in every State overwhelming
maJorities committed, and in many instances or
ganlzed and embitlered, against it. know that
Mr.. Calhoun meant to practice more than usual
caution, both as to opportunity, and as to the
source from which the proposition should come.
cannot however, in state Of things not fore
seen by him, assume to make affrmations as to
what his advice would be, but have an opinion
perfectly satisfactory to myself
1t appears to me that the course proper for
the convention is plain. A mere numerical una
Jority, cannot, consistently with sound policy or
the doctrines OF the State, undertake to secede.
The supremacy of the numerical majority was
the object of adherence and detestation with
Mr. Calhoun. His great work, the greatest of
/ works, ON government, is almost exclusively
devoted to the exposure Of the enormity of this
idep, and the N ntainance ofthe proposition, that
upon the oppositeidea deIen nearly everything
great or valuable in human society. His grand
idea is, that government should be "that of the
whole, and not of a part" TO the adju stment
OF power between the low and the up country
in South Carolina, making the government in
SO ne degree Que Of concurrent majorities, he
ascrbed mainly those social peculiari,ies, which
are undeDlably the subject of commentator and
eulogy throughout the Union. This principle
he would have applied to every, even the least
considerable act of the legislation; for instance,
!, an act to charter ferry, or incorporate read
ing clubs and Judge what he would think of an
attempt by numerical majority, to sweep from
existence, at single blow a whole system of
government; to o,dan new order of things,
and to take under its control, a vast and compi-
Gated social question, extending immensely be
yond the limits Of the State, and in relation to
which there are in sister States fifty nine times
as many people directly and equally interested,
AZ there are persons in South Carolina in favor
of isolated secession. Why, let us see what
process the State has thought it wise to adopt
to make the smallest modification of the State
constitution. Two-thirds of the legislature
elected upon the principles of concurrent major
les, are required to vote for the change. The
question is then submitted to the people, and Il
new legislature elected with special reference
to the question, and two-thirds of the new legs.
lature must also vote for the change. But
l shall not dwell upon this point
The convention has before it the very simple
task of setting forth the true reasons why it
ought not to secede under the existing state of
opinion at home, and in the other Southern
States. There will be no need of rrsortng to
| fGt on. 1t can do more than this 1t can sub.
NIT to the people of the South the reasons why
we think they ought to provide for their sepa
rate existence and independence The other
States will never secede, except upon their own
convictions of what is sound policy. They
will never admit that South Carolina is the de-
Lucrative and legislative department Of the
South, and the other States the executive We
do not arrogate this to ourselves, and let us spare
no pains to show that we do not We only
deny to other States superiority over ourselves
But the convention can do still more; it can
| n bof 1y tp h. Il.
none other can do: it can place the people
of the State where the legislature found
them in 1859. From the time the conven-
ton was first called, considering the circum
stances and terms of the CALL 1t was manifest
that without some new aggression the State
would be isolated, and the Southern Rights
party, yet in its infancy in the other States,
would be repressed and snffocated But the
idea soon sugg sted itself that the convention
might be useful in restoring harmony to the
State. In my first public communication in
dicated this as the proper office of the conven-
| ton. Had the last legislature refused to fix
day for the convention to meet, it would have
done violence to the sentme of reverence
habituay felt for the recognised sovereign au
thority-to the legal opinions of the most emf
nent men of the State living and dead. Such
course would have laid the foundation for
|
| for the next ten years. And in this contest,
what would have been the predicarnent of those
who, having advised or acquiesced in the ell of
the convention, should have turned about to
dishonor or strange it? What!
| There is no danger of the convention doing
an absurd act, with such responsibilities resting
upon it. There never was any danger. When
in May, in 1851, both parties found it necessary
to disavow immediate secession" it was plain
to me that secession was dead. This was the
true, the only reliable test. The proposition Of
future speculative secession was fit only to
produce delnsion. Put off the day as long as
you might il would have to come at last and
when it should come; the question would still
be Immediate ecession" And those WHO re-
pudiatcd it in May, 1851, could not reasonably
be expected, after a cooling process of twelve
months, to be in favor of it in May, 1852
In my opinion, the convention was called