The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1852-06-05

all, was indignant ut the manner 10 which he con.
| siderod himself to have boon deceived. What vas
now to DC done! Why did no not at once lead
| the constitutional army against the tratoreus
| government? IL was too distant, and too weak
| Austria was still powerful in the Geld. Before
anything else could be dono, this nearest danger
Kossuth's act From this moment oompromse haa
become hopeless BY declaring the crown Of Hum
gary forfeited, he had provoked struggle for lifo
and death Resolved to reconquer by the army, if
possible, the true constitutional ground of the war,
Georgei was, under these circumstances constrained
to tenpoIixo with the government, hoping, mean
while to sustain the spirit Of the troops ny new sue
ceases.
This is the substance Of Ceorgeis version of Kos.
suth's policy and of his own conduct at this critical
momeht. II is however, yisbly defective as re-
CARDS the former in virtually passing over the pre-
yious act by which the Court ofyienna had annulled
the constitution of Hungary. Nor does it appear,
either, that tho adherence by Kossuth's government
to the original basis OF the war would have led to
the revocation Of the Austrian edict, that tho
prsais taken by declaring the crown forfeited prac-
ticaliy lamed the hungarian defence. la Georgei's
army, however i'll affected it might be to tho now or
der OF things, 1t does not by his own report,
to have caused any actual mischief The charge
would be graver were il shown that the revolution
airy step induced Russia to take part in tho fray.
But this Georgei does not positively assert 1t may
be added. that tho result of his narrative clearly
leaves an impression that against Austria alone the
hope OF maintaining the struggle was by means
such as has been commonly represented From
what ho says of the neglected state Of the troops
OF the want Of able officers OF tho weakness Of the
ing when sacrifices were demanded, it would seem
| that, with tho power which Austria's Italian sue
cesses had set at liberty, and with any leader
able than Wndischgratz, the issue might indeed have
| been deferred, but would in the end have been
| the same as that which came more suddenly with
! the Russians
| The news of their entry was first heard in the
| camp of Comom Georgei at once felt the sgniG-
of tli. event His only hopa w Ia gain
ing, before the Russians drew near, some great
| cess against Austria, which might dispose her to
grant terms to Hungary. This was not the view of
| Kossuth, who is described ulng himself for
| some time, and still longer trying to cheat his
countymen, with hopes that Rlssias intrusion
| would be the signal for intervention in Hungarys
favor by England France, the United States, and
Turkey The Russians, however, advanced with
| out any such check, and affairs became hourly
and more critical. Gcorgei, by great exertions,
partly carried his plan into effect, but not enough
for the end he proposed. He advances from Comorn,
| besieges and takes Ofen, to which the government
returns, kossuth at its head, now as "Governor Of
| Hungary Atthis stage occurs tho most damaging
| Of Georges confessions. Hitherto he had done
nothing that actually committed him to the opinions
| which he now dcnounces He had openly identi-
fled himself by the Waizen address to the army in
January. 1873 with the cause of constitutional mon
| archy. The decorations offered him. in reward Of
his late successes he refused to receive from the
| evolutionary government, and altogether might be
said to have kept his place as its antagonist rather
IMAM az ltS OuccT, hossuiu, uIlleT tHtoc
stances, plainly allowing him to remain in command
only because he could not help it. No other Gene
raj had had equal success; and his officers, and
all. showed, on various occasions, both now, and to
the very end OF the war, that they determined
to keep him at their head.
Late in April, we say, i. e. after the declaration,
Georgei assumed. in addition to his military
| mand, the Office Of War Minister, for which he had
been named some time earlier, but had at first got
Klapla to act his substitute. This Office cnjoined
an oath of allegiance to the revolutionary govern
men. an overt adoption Of its principles that cannot
be gansaid, nor well rcconciled with the position al
| ready described. Gcorgei unreseryedy admits that
it was an insincerity -and thus justfes it, To the
rescue OF the country in any way the preservation Of
the army was indspcnsable-and Of this, an eliceat
war ministry was the first condition. No one else
appeared fit for the post Klapka, brave and skilful
in the field, had shown himself weak in the cabinet,
mere tool of Kossuth's AS an instance of this
George cites his consenting against his bettcrjudg
! ment, to the extraordinary appointment of sister
| of the Governor as "Guardian mother and Sick
| Nurse in general to all Hungary" an. appointment
| bringing the whole hospital system, including the
military branch under woman's control, and this,
| fagrGate bdlo, 10 prevent absurdities like this,
and otl err Threatened by Kossuths itch for military
| sway, both capacity aud frmness were wanted
Kossuh bad purposcly deceived him as to the rcvo-
lutionary scheme before the 18th of April; to de-
cciye kossuth in turn was more than fair STRAIT
| agem, indispensable to the ultimate purpose of vital
moment 70 the future Of Hungary. OF overthrowng
| kossuth altogether. This is Gcorgeis own account
/ Of bis motive. He adds, that kossuth really
/ blinded by the act-and this, from having imagined
that Georgei's hostility arising from personal
btion only. would he appcascd by lucrative post
Such, in substance. is tie explanation, which evil
IDENTIFY looks awkward enough, even as given by the
| party concerned.
We hasten 10 the closing scenes. Already, in
| AIIil. klopsa. on giving up the Ministry Of War,
| had declared the defence of Hungary impossible,
| without foreign MD. The remaining operations in
the field were, in fact but series Of Intellectual at
empts at resistance against superior forces Russia
IA on 1ur INIT
interval had made trial Of the disposition Of
party IN the Diet opposed to Kossuth but found
that they would not hear Of "a government Of the
sabre;'' yet lie succeeds in getting Pcrczel, Benz,
| Gnyon, and DcmbinsLi dcposed from their COM
mands. lie still keeps the army together as he can,
but despairs for the result. Haynau appears on the
scene, announcing himself by an act Of cruel Sc
vcIity-the precursor Of long SERIES which history
| will not forget Tho hope Of decided stroke
against Austria must be given up. The battle of
| Raab is lost--the army is in retreat-the Russians
| arc near. The only question is, when and in
| what manner the contest shall be ended.
| An important interview had already taken place
| with kossuth on the 10Th Of June. Georgei then
advised him to tell Hungary, hitherto deceived by
| last desperate effort. ''Let the government join
the army, ana all live die together" Kossuth,
seeming to approve, follows part only Of this
sell A proclamation. announcing the fatal crisis is
issued; but the plan is laid at the same time of
passing into Turkey with reserved division of the
army. in order to this, Dcmbnsk is again called
| to light, and put at its head in the eastern pro-
vinces. This was the force which he led to final
and utter defeat at Temeswar.
The Russian general Rudgor, had already more
than once-but in van-summoned George to sur
ronder, unable TO resist, before he repaired to his
last conference with Kossuth, who had retroatcd,
with the government, TO Arad The latter, since
foreign intervention was not forthcoming,
revolving an offer Of Hungary, ms an Independent
kingdom, to q Russian prince, but was doubtful il
Russia would like to deal personally with him. To
tho plan, however conducted Georgei refused his
At this moctjng too, the issue Of the battle
of Tomeswar, not yet known, discussed and
gel was expressly asked 6y Kossuth what he would
do, % commander-in-Chicf, surprising Dcmbinski
beaten I'm that case" was the reply, should
Mt once lay down arms" "And - said Kossuth
"will shoot myself'-a promise, no doubt, more
easily uttered than pleasant to act on.
On this conference Georgei founds his defiance