The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1852-08-07
OTTAWA ILL.,, SATURDAY, AUGUST 7, 1852.

ty to me for not having adopted and acted Oh the
, conclusion that the line al the Rio Grane was
, safe the moment heard Of the victory Of Bue-
ma Istai but, wien acting on the same subject,
you dared not adopt that conclusion, although
, you had been IN possession OF the same iniorna-
ton forty one days Your own conduc. IN this
matter completely ref,I,es this charge Of yours u
, gninst the War Department. 1t does more: it
/ shews how rash and lncousderate you have been
in selecting topics for attack.
But the most serious consequcdccs are attribu.
ted to the long delay Of these troops at the Bra
zos. For your sake sincerely hopesthat these
Consequences are much eEags Grated, becalse !
am quite confident it will be shown that you a
lone are responsible for the delay. Tie War
Department did not-and it was proper that 1t
should not-issue any order in regard to he
the movement Of their troops after their arrival
in Mexico. The order from the department Of
the 30th OF April making division Of the new
! levies between ihe two columns, does not contra
dict thus assertion, for these le,ies were then
mostly within the United States only portions
oi them had then reached Mexico Until THIS or
der took effect the troops at the Brazos, and. IN
deed, on he Rio Grsnde and with Gen. lay lor,
we're under your entire and unrestricted com
mand. As to this matter, You were under no
msappreheuslon; for on the 2jth OF April, be
fore You were informed what had been done here
to secure the Rio Grande line YOU issued an
der IN relation To tie troops at he Brazns This
! place, You well knew, was the general rcndez
yous of the new evies from the United States,
and, before you sailed on your expedition to We
ra Cruz, you were notified that the Mexican ar
my was advancing upon Gen Taylor. To have
assumed that you had not left at the Brazos with
a view to meet any -bable contingency, orders
iOr the proper disposition Of the troops which
were or might be sent there, would have implied
an opinion that you wanted suitable quallhcati ions
for the high station which had been assigned TO
YOU
These troops were as part Of your command
and subject 10 yOur order aud If they remain, d
one day at the Brazos after it was there known
that they were not needed on the Rio Graude line,
and would be serylceable with our column, the
fault was entirely your own and IN no wise inlpu-
table to the War Department If your opinion
be not eXtrayagant-and you 1t is not-that but
for the diversion Of Gen. Csdwalader's forces from
you, aud the much precious time" lost at the
Brazo7, YOU might easily have taken this city
Mexico IN the month Of June, and at one nth
of the loss sustained in August and September -
you have. indeed, most .earful account to settle
with your country.
cannot however butregard your speculative
opinions on this subject as fancful and wild.
lon greatly over estimate the force which landed
at the Bruzns and subsequently joinedyou. From
the best calculation that can be made from data IN
the Adjutant Generals office, the number was
much less than you imagine, and did not probably
exceed one thousand. A. the refutation Of your
charge against the department to? diyerting these
troops is in no wise impaired by the number be
II more OF less it is not important to inquire into
that matter But there is question OF serious
tn ,yIi,h | tl.,,,l will
you to answer
If these new levies, which had just entered ;he
servioe would have .naLl.d YOU TO capture tho
city of Mexico in June, with comparatively
small loss, why did you, at the very time youdis,
covered that they were much needed, aud
would have been so useful send away from yoGr
army three times as many volunteers, who had
been many month in service. and were, as You aC-
knowledge, respectable in Discipline and fifteen
cy and who had distinguished themselves at We.
IA Cruz and Ctrro GOrdo. and, III the hour OF
peril, had fought by the side Of your veteran
troops and merited AN honorable share in the glo
ry Of those memorable confcts' The period ol
their engagement had not expired. When thus
sent away but one of the seven regiments had
less than tirty and most Of them had more than
Iiorty-fve days to serve. According to your own
Iopih N, conclrred IN by the department, they
cou d have been legally retained on your line OF
operations till the last hour of their engagement
II not deemed eXpedient to take them on TO
wards Mexico with you, their services, at that
critical period would have been of inestimable
value in holding the post at Jalapa-so impor
tant, and 20 uneypectly abandoncd-and in keep
ing open the communication between Vera Cruz
and your headquarters. whereby supplies, mum.
tions, and recruits could be safely and expeditions
ly forwarded to you. Had this been DONE you
would have been spared the trouble Of ndtiug
many items of grievance and complaints against
the War Department for having failed to furnish
them. Ii You had retained the twelve months
volunteers until the end of their agreement-Snd
no sufficient reason has yet been shown for tier
premature dischmge-you night, for season at
least, have received, without much obstruction,
supplies from the main depot on the gulf the ar
my might have been strengthened by reinforce
nlents at an earlier period; and many of the re.
Ivuling scenes Of barbarty on the road from Ne
ra Cruz to Jalapn, IN which So many lives OF our
fellow citizens have been sacrificed by The ruth
less gueros, would not have occurred.
l Another and sti'l more lamentable calamity is,
| think, fairly To be asCrbed to the early obsrUc
tion of this important line of communication.
The brave and patriotic men who were hurried On
10 Mexico IN small detachments, in order to rein
force your army We're unexpectedly, bu, neces
sarlly, detained ut Vera Cruz until the numbers
there collected were sufficient to force their way
through the strong guerrilla bands which held
the difficult passes on the Jalnpa road. While
thus detained on that inhospitable coast, in the
sickly season, they Were exposed to the attacks
OF wasting pestllence, more formidable, aud
as It unfortunately proved more destructive than
the Mexican army.
When the unwccomc news Of the premature
Discharge of this large body OF volunteers was
received here unSccompanlcd 10y ANY eEpana
I ton TO show the necessity of the act, II excited
very general surpris" and regret lts consequcn'
ces were nj once foreseen: but the step had been
taken, and could not be re,raced. It was loudly
condemned. Many did not believe that u meas.
ure whlch appeared to be so unwi,e aud so injuri
Gus to the operations Of the army could have EN-.
anated from Yourself, but they were less charia
BILE towards the President aud Secretary Of War.
Both were denounced for what you had done ,
they we're unscrupulously charged with weakness
and ncapacliy; with being attuated by hostility
T. YOU aud desire tg secure popularity with
tie voluneers, Nor were these bitter assaults IN.
telmItsed until 1t began to be suspected that they
/ were misdreced.
II you real regarded, on the 9Th Of May the
augmentation of your forces as being of such vi.
tai importance, it is almost os difficult 90 accoun,
for the course taken to re.engage the volunteers,
a. for their premature discharge am mised by
Information ON which ought TO rely, il many Of
| fh.y ,v,n1l ho, ,.l