The southern press. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1850-1852, 1852-04-06

will be able to dispute that we were actuateC
by those high Considerations. Let US not d.
just so much, AVID such sort Of things, as viii
make il manifest to the world that we abstained
from doing moe only because we were afraid
Let the State ,secede or not secede do what
will touch the hearts of men, or what will chal
lenge the approval of statesmen. No irresolute
experimenting with political quackeries
Anxious that the movement in the South
should not prove fruitless one, | endeavored
for long time to hope that circumstances
might Justify the convention in propounding to
the other States, an amendment OF the consti-
tuition, such as was suggested by Mr.. Calhoun.
Upon that proposition know that Mr. Calhoun
looked to protracted and ample discussion, in
volving, as it would. all the relations between
the North and the South comprehending every
form OF injustice and danger from the Union,
present and future, and displacing the insidions
policy of our enemies; which is that of well
timed periodical assaults, with intervals, more
or less extended, of cal olery, fattery, and Pied
ges-of platforms, election,jubilees, and in
trigues with Southern ambition. But the con-
vention is near at hand, and the state of public
opinion is fully known, and | am satisfied that
the proposition would be most inopportune, and
worse than useless. Our friends are not suf-
fciently strong to institute discussion upon it.,
and it would find in every State overwhelming
majorities committed, and in many instances or
ganized and embittered, againstit know that
Mr.. Calhoun meant to practice more than usual
caution, both as to opportunity, and as to the
source from which the proposition should come.
cannot, however, in state of things not fore
seen by him, assume to make affirmations as to
what his advice would be, but | have an opinion
perfectly satisfactory to myself.
1t appears to me that the course proper for
the convention is plain. A mere numerical ma
jorty, cannot, consistently with sound policy or
the doctrines of the State, undertake to secede
The supremacy Of the numerical majority was
the object of adherence and detestation with
Mr.. Calhoun His great work, the greatest Of
works, on government, is almost exclusively
devoted to the exposure of the enormity of this
ides, and the maintenance ofthe proposition, that
upon the opposite idea depends nearly everything
great or valuable in human society His grand
idea is, that government should be that Of the
whole, and not of part" To the adjustment
OF power between the low and the up country
in South Carolina, making the government in
sore degree one OF concurrent majorities, he
ascribed mainly those social peculiarites, which
are undeniably the subject Recommendation and
eulogy throughout the Union. This principle
he would have applied to every, even the least
considerable act of the legislation; for instance,
an act to charter ferry, or incorporate read.
ing club; and Judge what he would think of an
attempt by numerical majority, to sweep from
existence, at single blow whole system of
government; to ordain a new order of things,
and to take under its control, vast and eompi
Gated social question, extending immensely be-
yond the limits of the State, and in relation to
which there are in sister States fifty-nine times
as many people directly and equally interested,
as there are persons in South Carolina in favor
of isolated secession. Why, let us soc what
process the State has thought il wise to adopt
to make the smallest modification OF the State
constitution. Two-thirds of the legislature,
elected upon the principles of concurrent major
lies, are required to vote for the change The
question is then submitted to the people, and
new legislature elected with special reference
to the question, and two-thirds of the new legis.
lature must also vote for the change. But
shall not dwell upon this point
The convention has before il the very simple
task OF setting forth the true reasons why il
ought not to secede, under the existing state of
opinion at home, and in the other Southern
States. There win be no need of resortine TO
hcti on. II can do more than this: Il can sub
NIT to the people Of the South the reasons why
we think they ought 10 provide for their sepa-
rate existence and Independence. The other
States will never secede, except upon their own
convictions Of what is sound policy. They
will never admit that South Carolina is the de-
Lucrative and legislative department Of the
South, and the other States the executive. We
do not arrogate this to ourselves, and LET us spare
no pains 10 show that we do not We only
deny TO other States superiority over ourselves
But the convention can do still more; Il can
do what greatly needs TO be done, and what
none other can do: it can place the people
OF the State where the legislature found
them in 1852. From the time the conven-
ton was first called, considering the circum
stances and terms Of the call, IL was manifest
that without some new aggression the State
would be isolated, and the Southern Rights
party, yet In its infancy in the other States,
would be repressed and suffocated. But the
idea soon sugg sted itself that the convention
might be useful in restoring harmony 10 the
State. In my first public communication in
Dictated this AZ the proper Office OF the conven-
ton. Had the last Legislature refused 20 fix
day for the convention 10 meet, Il would have
done violence 20 the sentime { Of reverence
habitually felt for the recognised sovereign an
thoity-to The legal opinions Of the most emf
nent men Of the State, living and dead. Such
course would have laid the foundation for
strife and contention. and the reign OF faction.
for the NEXT ten years. And in this contesL
what would have been the predicament Of those
who, having advised or acquiesced ia the clll Of
the convention, should have turned about 70
dishonor or stranele it7 WHAT
There Is no danger Of the convention doing
an absurd act, with such responsibilities resting
upon H. There never was any danger. When
in May, in 1851, both parties found Il necessary
70 dsavow immediate secession" II was plain
70 me that secession was dead. This was the
true, the only reliable test The proposition Of
future speculative secession was &c only 20
produce delusion. Put off the day as long az
You might, Il would have 10 come at last and
when il should come, The question would still
be immediate secession" And those who re.
pudiaied IL in May, 1851, could not reasonably
be expected, after = cooling process Of twelve
months, 70 be 10 favor Of IL in May, 1852.
In my opinion, the convention was called
under a misrepresentation Of tbe views and
wishes Of our friends 10 other States. II was
supposed by many concerned, that they desired
IA 10 act promptly and decisivelv IA ,vas fea,ad