The daily union., 1852-10-08


sending DAILY subscribers, with $50
SEMI WEEKLY subscribers with enclosed WkRkIY
$40 enclosed will be enuned of ths
edition furnish subscribers TOT, svatts.
doing WE'LL and who. quite and his ii,.s s,my
would .e occasion offered, themselves with 1oty
My prediction in this has been fully
After this special pleading. this version Of his attack
upon the President and Secretary. he tries 10 make al
go smooth by pouring out this JUNCTION IN conclus,on
+" fon speak of my interview with the President on the
subject OF The intended formidable invasion o. AeEAeo.
wish had time 10 do justice 10 my recollection al TIE
Presidents excellent sense military comprehension.
tence and couresies in these interviews have once
spoken OF the admirable qualities he displayed tAese
occasions. with honor tar my power TO do
him honor" And then he turns TO Mr.. Marcy: "And to
you, SIR. allow me TO say that have not accosed you.
and that do not mean to accuse OF set puFpoee to
discredit the commander at first designed for the
new army that is to invade Mexico. bear in mind
with pleasure the many personal coar'ssss that have
for long years received at your hands. But have for
many days believed that you have allowed yon!ss 70 BE-
influenced against by the camor Of some Of the ends
All this after thought. putting his nsnuatons assns
the government TO the accoua OF several leading Anas
and supposed confdants OF the Psssidsa& onanA
OF Congress- conadcted not only by the whole scope
Of the first letter. bur by its words He says expressly.
after alluding "to the condemnation OF all other per
sons. that the person in command have "n0 other
reliance Tin his absence) than the active, candid and
steady support OF his government" And it was simply
because he had confidence in the support OF his gov
eminent ,ha, he refused to 90 to Mexico until be had
Mexico. II is apparent then, that il not the
demnaon OF leading friends and supposed con6dants'
that he cared for was because he would have no re-
lance the support of government. The departments,
the high quarters, where the power resided 10 support
him, that he felt himself at liberty 10 say am too old
soldier, and have too much special experience. not TO
feel the infinite importance Of securing myself agains,
danger ( will pre- condemnaon) IN my rear, before
advancing upon the public enemy" With this explicit
declaration to the Secretary, that he meant TO secure him
self and not trust the administration, how poor il the
come off, that he alluded to friends and confdants, but
did not mean to insinuaie that from such high
quarters headquarters itself that be expected the Ore
IN his rear from Washington and yet with its support
he feared nothing lsii
Mr. Marcy answered this letter Of adua.ion a. cooliy
as the Olhcr and in effect says without saying il,
admit what the gentleman says of compliment; how
ever, do not believe him"
Gen Scott has another elaborate reply this note OF
MIR. Marcy, in which is this begging passage: MI
81 still hope when President shall have read that
anatoy letter Uhe hasy plate of soup ctte) and the
his original purpose and award 10 my senior
rank the preference have ceased to entertain.
for the apprehensons hereoiore expressed and which
your letter has nearly, If not quite, removed thersfoN
may deem it proper give the assignment, whether
today or at other better time he may be pleased to
To this Mr. Marcy answered briefly:
"Your communications have all been laid before the
President but have received instructions change OF
modify the directions contained in The closing paragraph Of
my letter of the 18th ult" t
General Tayors movement on Monterey rendered
General Scott dstressngly resve and he addressed he
Secretary OF War in Plantive mssive. showing that he
no longer insisted on having his own time or his own
way and that he had been some three months in that
obedient mood. e4 et9fEr
On the l2h OF September 1885, he reminds the Sscpe-
ay that the 9th OF May last he had requested thai be
might be take the immediate OF the psiaci
pal army against Mexico either day, ANY better
time the President may choose 70 designate" And be
adds; :" Should the President yield TO my wishes, few
hours in New York and Philadelphia will enable me 10
make certain arrangements, and save the necessity Of
would be easy for reach the Rio Grande BY the end
OF the month." To this solicitation the Secretary
replies that the President requests 10 inform you
that within the for conducting The
campaign supersede General Taylor in his present
command by assigning you 10 H." gH56
On The 18th OF November the President. supposng
pair Mexico take the command OF the forces there
assembled, and particularly 10 organize and foot
an expedition on the Gull coast" stt
scoTTs MANnuvREs AGAINST GENERAL TAYLOR s1
Alter getting the plenary authority over the forces in
Mexico General Scott knowing tina, General Taylor had
taken Monterey, and had advanced 10 Sao while SAN
ia Anna gathering his army at San Luis, perceived
al that the position occupied by each OF the beee
rents presented strong temptation to bring struggle
between them al one poin, or the other Ii lay.
lor could deiea, Santa Anna and take San Luis the
way 10 the city Of Mexico would be opened to him II
Santa Anna could yanqoish Taylor at Satlo. il would
put his line the Rio Grande his power Scott fore.
saw that the weakening OF Taylors force At Saltilio
must bring down upon that point the army which hnd
been drawn together 10 oppose him. and which, before
Wool joined bim, hal already threatened him with an
attack TO lei Taylor remain strength receive and
defeat his antagonist and to pursue his victory, Sc0u
10 give his rival Taylor the power 10 enter the
city OF Mexico, and put end to the war This had
been the route which IT at first contemplated to
march 10 the conquest of The city of Mexico The din.
Guilty of crossing the desert and after being out By
the march, 10 defeat Santa Anna with superior army
alone restrained Taylor from pursuing that pan which.
he wrote 10 the Secretary, he only wanted adequate
means to execute This the posture OF things when
Scott arrived at the Rio Grande
General Taylor had been consulted several times BY the
Secretary of War abont the Gulf expedition; al hrst
il il wond be committed TO him and was inquired
wba, force could be spared from that which he carried
up the Rio Grande for that purpose, while maintaining
letter Of October 10. 1876, from Monterey. he gives this
account OF his strength " / satisfied 500 men per
regiment would be large average OF electives among
the volunteers This would give, including the cavalry
force little short of 1000 men, or adding 1000 texs-
lars, (ou present strength not 3o00) total force OF
10000 Leaving the very moderate number Of 1000 to
rear could not be abe march from Salio
with present and expected means the head OF more
than 10000 men" Au
This was Taylor's army, and the question was how
much of this force could be safely taken to on the
Gulf (say Tampco Vera Cfuz) giving up the plan OF
moving upon the city OF Mexico by San LUIS On this
point, General Taylor says. " la the latter case the
general line Of the Sierra Madre might very well be
taken, but even then, with the enemy force my
front, might be imprudent to deach Tampico this
the point of embarkaton for Vera CRUZ 30 large
force as 5000 or 1000 particularly Of the description
required for that operation"
Again recurring to !be projected expedition to Vera