The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1852-06-29
I1MARTrNEs HISTORY OF THE RE-
STORATION.

indebted for the copy to Messrs. Nash & Wood
house.
OF all the queer historians whose WORKS
have fallen under our observation, NJ. de La
marine is surely the queerest. There Is
boldness in his disregard of facts which is ao'
solutely startling. Even when incidents are SO
,,o,o,;ous as that nobody else is ignorant Oh
,.s,, he seems to take a peculiar pleasure 10
.how;ng that he forms an exception to the MIL
lion. In fiction alone does he retain his cha
racter of poet, for his images are grotesque'
and his style execrable. We have neither the
time nor the space to enter into heightened
review of his second volume. We shall con-
,sn, ourselves with few remarks upon that
norton of i: which We are sure attracts most
of every readers attention. We allude to the
campaign Of Waterloo.
AT the very onset, tie author manifests that
love of self-conuadiction, in which ne In
duIges so often thati il seems to have become
habitual. Hetells US that Napoleon entered the
campaign with 10000 men. Thus far, he was
nearly right the actual number having been
100 400. But he does not 60 far before he finds oc
casion to contradict himself. These l2O, QUO men
he saws crossed the Sambre on the 18th, and 4O,-
600 of them proceeded on the 10th to attack the
Anglo. Dutch forces at Quatre Bras, under Ney'
The other $4,000, under Napoleon himself,
proceeded TO Ligney to attack the Prusslans.
The battle OF Lgney takes place, and M. de
Lamartine tells US that Napoleon, though VIC
torious, lost 900 men. Ney, at the same time,
fought very severe battle with Wellington at
Quatre Bras, and, of course, lost heavily; we
will nut him down at 5000. The French army,
then, on the 10Th, was reduced to 105,Ooo. Yet
M Lamartine tells US that on the 18th, Napo-
leon, with lis or 1000 men, from 80 to 40,O00
under the command of Grouchy, advanced in
pursuit of the English and Prusslans. 1t is to
be observed, that he entirely overlooks the fact
that the whole division OF General Girard mot
Gerard) was left on the field of Ligney. Napo
leon says to guard the field of battle, Captain
Siborne says because it was forgotten, its &c
neral having been killed in the battle. 1t was
5000 strong, and, according to Lamartine's
own estimate. would leave the forces which
moved upon Brussels only 81 600 strong, in
stead of lis or 10000. Again, out of these
81 600 Grouchy, he says, had $4,000, and yet
upon the field of battle at Waterloo, he makes
Napoleon $4,000 strong! Take $4,000 from
81 900, and we have left but $4,000. here M.
Lamartine got the other Is, 900 from we cannot
conceive. These contradictions are SO plain
that the most casual observer can detect them.
They are absolutely disgraceful in historian.
Napoleon, himself, says he had at the battle
of Waterloo $3.50 men, and his statement was
no doubt correct. Lamartine grossly exagge.
rates the loss at Ligney, and seeing that he
would thereby, reduce the number too low, he
draws on his Imagination for $4,000 fresh troops
that existed no where else. To sum up the
whole matter in few words, if the French
were originally 100. 900 strong, if they lost -,
600 at Ligney, and 5000 at Quatre Bras, if SGO(
were left behind at Ligney, how could they pos
sibly have advanced with lis or 10000 mel
upon the retreating English and Prussians7 l
Grouchy still further weakened Napoleon by
taking from him $4,000 men, how could h
have had 80 900 men upon the field of battle a
Waterloo.
The remarks of NJ. de Lamsrtine relative tt
the treacheryof Bourmont, who commanding
division in Girard's corps, which was in thu
advance in pursuit of the Prussians on the 10th
took advantage Of his proximity to ride init
Blucher's camp and deliver himself up, mus
be highly edifying to these Frenchmen VIII
once thought him worthy to WELD the destinie
of France. This act, he says cannot be calle
treason-it was simply desertion! What tn
difference is, he does not take the pains to il
form US, and we certainly are unable to di
Germ. We see one thing, however, that M.
Lamartine does not regard the deserlion of g
officer, entrusted with very important cor
mand, on the very eve of battle, a very he
nous offence. We hardly think he will be e.
abled to convince many honorable men that
takes just view ofthe matter. Even Bluche
different opinion, for he refused TO see Bon
mont, and denounced him as q mean-spirils
- scoundrel.''
In one point we agree with NJ. de Lamartin
Napoleon, after crossing the Sambre, does q
appear to have been himself. He would,
etaSa SaiPoiSuss tofC utuSbCO tue iSUi6u
Prussian corps at Gidny before the two othe
he'd come up. He was within eight miles of
at Eharleryi at ten O'Clock on the morning
the 18th. The nearest of the two Prussis
coaps was fifteen miles of, and the farthe
more than twenty. They arrived, the one
twelve, on the 10th, and the other at three. H
thus had ample time to destroy all three in d
sail. The same remark mi ght be made of Ne
who commanded 10000 men on the left. q
wasbu ut twelve miles from the left of the En-,
iish army At Quatre Bras, on the morning
the 18th, and it was but $4,000 strong. I
should have surrounded and desroyed it Ii
day. On the 10th, the English regiments VIZ
coming up separately all day, and he did no,
gin the attack until in the evening, thus LOST
an opportunity to attack each separate DO