The southern press. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1850-1852, 1852-05-29

vlctloDs and his intentions from the time OF hls
entrance into the army captain. to the
events which immediately followed his sur
render. As a matter OF courss, the events
more Immediately connected with the latter act
are those most particularly treated of, and it is
Impossible TO present these briefly, and, at tho
same time to do justice To them. AS general
characteristic OF the book, my say that the
author claims TO have acted throughout the war
| from motives of the most disinterested patriot
isni. entirely apart from any feelings of personal
Interest. ard he mentions a consultation where,
from motives Of the general good, he dissuaded
from various promotions in which he would have
been included. or Kossuth, during the early
part Of the war, he speaks fnvorably, AS man
and governor, but thinks he often erred because
ne was not soldier, and did not properly es,i
mate the condition and state of efficiency Of the
army. Benz he saw but little, but he did not
Impress him favorably, being too much of an
advenlurer He favored Kossuth's elevation to
the dictatorship hoping by his personal in
fiuence to intuse into him more correct ideas of
military matters, but was soon obliged to protest
| against various measures especially against the
want of foresight and consideration with which
officers were promoted; among whom his
| (Gorgey's) own brother, who, from some un
known cause, was promOted with great rapdty.
| Soon, he became so Disguised that he thought
seriously OF laying down his command, but con-
siderations of the general good convinced him
that no ought not to do so, and he then takes
occasion to show that he never sought the die
tatorship for the simple reason that he was con-
vinced it was "an impossbty" and ian absur-
dity." With reference TO the transfer Of the
government to Debreczin ia January, 1849,
Gorgey formally accuses Kossuih of cowardce,
''fear for his skin" which led him to adopt con
Trajectory and inconsiderate measures In the
latter part of January, the author received a
proposition, noninaly from Windischgratz, that
he should betray the Hungarian army and Sc
cure to himself pardon and provision for life,
which, however, he unhestatngly repulsed
Dembinskls appointment as commander in chief
excited great discomfort in Gorgeys army,
which the latter, though feeling himself person.
ally injured, put an end to by a proclamation
but on their first interview, the former acted
very much like mailman, and soon showed his
ncompentency for the Office, for he was irreso-
lutte and wanting in foresight Kossuth's pre-
possession for the Poles was the cause of much
misfortune to Hungary, leading him to de-
sire to transform "the Hungarian constitutional
army translate pery literally into "Polo-
Hungarian revolutionary army" in order "that
Octovianus'- Kossuth could, untroubled, play
the triumvirate en- miniature with 'Antonius,
too obstinate in carrying out his personal views,
and was DESTROYS of being himself the active
commander-in- chief Of the army. The declara-
ton of the total independence of Hungary, from
Austrian rule, injured the cause of the country
irretrievably, by exciting great opposition in
the army and elsewhere, and putting those who
| were in the right before, in the wrong now.
Gorgey 'oas opposed 10 This measure from he
Uery beginning, and after it was suddenly
complished. he endcavored, in consultation with
friends, 10 find some aoay Of repeating IL but the
only available one was "coup d. etai," and
from that, his friends, if not Gorgey himself,
shrank back.
lie then determined 10 attempt 10 effect this re-
peal indirectly, and, as preliminary to this, to
bring about the recall from their commands of
Benz Perczel and Dembinski. After Russian
Intervention became certain, Gorgey looked
upon the cause as nearly hopeless, but demand
ed that Kossuth and the whole government
should attach themselves to the army, and share
its fate. This was agreed to in word, but not
carried out in fact. This done, the Russian
troops were to be left to themselves for time
and the Austrians vigorously attacked. At this
| point the account becomes detailed, aud the
disagreement between Gorgey and Kossuth
breaks out more openly. On June, the 30th
The former notified The latter, that he fought fer
The people, not for the men composing the GOO
ernn,ent, Or in other words, he declared that his
uncondl onaL obedience ceased from that time
Kossuth is here accused Of incapacity to appre-
ciate what the nation desired, or of incapacity
to sacrifice his personal interests in behalf of
that object. He, and all others, should have
shared the fate of Hungary, and rushed forward
against the Austrans, determined to die in de-
fence of their country, instead of seeking to
| rf ntp a.,
July Goth, two Russian officers appear with
proposals for truce, preparatory to treating for
surrender, but Gorgey suspects them of only
seeking to gain time, and no result followed
| Gorgey felt at once that the presence of these
| officers would cause him to be accused of treach-
cry to his country, as Kossuth's personal enmity
would lead him to seize upon this as a good OPP
portunity to calumnilte him; but to avoid this,
as much AZ possible, he determined to lay open
to his officers the whole of the transaction,
which he did.
On July "a, Gorgey received formal invita-
ton to which he replied with a refusal. Ga
Aug. 10, Gorgey and Kossuth had their last
interviews, when the former declared that in
case a report of victory gained by the Hanga
rians at Teme,var should not be true, he was
determined to lay down his arms. At this time
he was in Kossuths power, and had the latter
out his intention, he had only to detain him /; but
on the contrary he let him depart, and soon sent
message to him that dispatches showed the
report to be in reality untrue, thereby putting
him (Gorgey)in possession Conformation which
he (Kossuth) knew would lead him to lay down
his arms. On August i ,Kossuth and the govern
ment resigned in Gorgey's favor, and the former
departed, carrying with him the insignia of the
government. At this point, the author asserts
that Kossuth had contributed as far as possible
to the surrender of the army, that he had writ
ten, or caused to be written, as early as August
9, letter to the Russian general, in which
he offered to the Emperor of Russia the crown
of Hungary but this seems not to have been
transmitted.
From this point to the close the book is oc-
cupied with the details of the surrender, which
the author declares was necessary, and acknow-
lodged to be so, even by Kossuth, was made
al