The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1852-11-25

pcdCt vi tut OnlOu %" ~
rage upon the feelings of the South ana 'ne
spirit of the Constitution that it menaces
4" the peace of the Union" that " 1t is a most
grievous injury and fragrant outrage upon the
South and the bond of. the Union )" that the
law of New York, prohibiting person held as
slave from being imported, introduced or
brought into the State, on any pretence what
ever 81 is in conflict if not with the letter, with
the spirit of the Constitution of the United
States and ia at war with the object and intent
of the Federal Union" The verbose declama-
ton of the Union is an outrage upon language
and logic Amidst all this protuslon OF angry
words, there is but a single idea-and that rs
that the decision of Judge Paine and the local
law of New York are vioatiye OF the rights OF
the South, of the guarantees OF the Federal
Constitution and of the intent of the Union
This single proposition is amplifed and repeat
ed in every variety of form, throughout col
umr, without a single argument or attempt at
argument, in its support, except the following
"The Constitution of the United States
which is the supreme law OF the lana, recog
nises and guarantees the right OF property IN
slaves, and makes common country OF tine
different States"
The idle clamor of the Union we dismiss :
its one proposition and its one argument we
shall examine briefly.
The Constitution of the United States guar
antics the right Of property IN SlGreS" II there
be such guaranty it can be pointed out VIII
the Union put its finger upon it Will it favor
us with the clause, the section the article, con-
tanning it! We have often heard of it, never
seen or read it, A publication of it in black
and white would be more satisfactory than
vague assertion of its existence. There IS no
such guaranty express or implied. The Federal
Constitution never speaks of slaves, never refers
to them, never makes any provision in relation
/ to them, as property. In the basis of represent
alton they are named and treated as persons
In the provision forbidding the prohibition of
their importation into the country till after the
year 1908, they are named and regarded as
persons. and classed with "oTHER PERSONS"
In the clause providing for their reclamation
when fugitive, they are named and treated as
persons. Whenever it became necessary to
refer to them in the Constitution, the COnven-
ton that framed it deliberately and intention
ally used such words as would exclude the idea
of PROPERTY Mr. Madison, in his Papers" ex-
pressly bears witness on this point He object
ed to the phraseology in which the clause re-
latng to fugitives from service was first report
ed because it implied the idea of men being
property-he could not bear that the Constitu-
ton they were about forming should tolerate
the idea that there could Je property IN man.
And the phraseology was accordingly so
changed as to exclude this idea. Mr.. Madison
is the witness-his evidence is conclusive. The
Union dares not contradict it-no Southern
man, careful of his reputation, will contradict
it. We have the book, the page, the words,
before us. The Constitution simply guarantees
the right of a master, in certain cases, to re-
claim fugitive from service or labor-and
that fugitive may be an apprentice, an indent-
ured servant or a slave. That is the sum and
substance of the whole guaranty which the
Union falsely represents as "a guaranty of the
right of property in slaves"
Now, the law by which man is held as
property is local--it is brute force, under the
form of legal enactment; it has no effect be-
yond the jurisdiction of the enacting power.
When man held as u slave under the laws of
Virginia passes beyond her jurisdiction, he be-
comes free, for her laws have no extra-territo-
rial force. To this there is single exception
if he pass beyond her jurisdiction against the
consent of his master, in other words escape the
Constitution interposes to secure to the master
the right to recapture and reconvey him to
Virginia. This is the sole exception. The
if a man held as property under the laws of
Virginia be carried beyond her limits, by his
MASTER for sale, for use, for any other purpose
Nature claims her own-the local law has
spent its force-the man is free.
The freedom of the eight slaves of Lennon
was the necessary effect, even had there been
no law of New York on the subject of their
transfer beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of
Virginia The law of New York only recog-
Missed an eristing fact, and provided for the Sc
curity of rights already er,St'ng. The freedom
of the eight slaves was the act of Lennon him
SELF Consequently the law of New York and
the act of Judge Paine were not an outrage
upon the rights of the South for it had none
in the premises; or upon the Constitution of
the United States for it has provided no guar
anty for the stakeholder in such cases Nor
were they repugnant to the intent of the
Union for its intent is to be learned from the
Constitution itself-and what is in harmony
with this cannot be in conflict with that
But we shall argue the question on other
grounds, which the Union must admit or deny
its own faith, and assail as an outrage on
Southern People their own legislation
What is the Principle which the Union has
labored to establish as a fundamental rule of
action for the Democracy That every State,
in the exercise of its sovereign power has an
absolute right to admit or exclude Slavery, to
tolerate, or to prohibit it.
Virginia toleraes Slavery New York pro,
hibits it. But she has no right to prohibit IT
in the case of slaves brought by their masters
temporarily within her limits" Why not
The right of prohibition is absolute except ~
limited or qualified by the Federal Constitution
If she has right in virtue of her sovereign
ty, to prohibit it in one case, she has the same
right in all cases, except forbidden by the Fed
eral Constitution But il is a matter of fact