The Sumter banner. [volume] (Sumterville, S.C.) 1846-1855, 1851-09-09

can, confidently believe. maintain itself
The fact that our population furnishes no
sailors, and that our harbors IRE inferior,
may compel us TO take defensive posi-.
ton, that Of an agricultural people with
strong military organization; but, at least,
under such a government should we want
more room for our slavepopulation, when
the cxigcncy arises, we can take it.
Bnt do not see how the separate Sc.
ccssion of South Carolina, will abate the
settled hostility of The North aud the world
to the institutions Of slavery Our exports
cannot command the market of the world
and conquest s out Of the question. /
suppose, now, that the secession will be
| indeed separate, and that no other State
will join us, which is one of The aItcrna.
tives, propoundcd by the separate action 4
party.
Granting that we could maintain our :
selves, in small way, the spectacle of the
South, broken into fragments, at the first
serious demonstration of our enemies,
would be to them glorious triumph; they
would persuade themselves, either, tha, the
institution is net worth extending, or that
the South is incapable of union, and there
fore of sell. government, their hands g. their
hearts would be strengthened against us.
Much less, can see, how separate seces.
sion, can regain the balance Of power
which we have lost, which was on our
side, when Texas was admitted, with tho
privilege Of making four slave States, but
which is now reversed. Whether it can
be rcgaincd i'll or ont OF the Union, il ia
certain that South Carolina docs nothing to
regain it, by seeding from the line of
Southern States, but in effect restricts the
area, upon which her own slaves, are here
nlter and forever to subsist
So g.ea. an.l nnanswerutc, are the ar
gumcnts, against separate secession, that
the separate action party, no longer con-
template it as an end, though Tiny do not
deny that it is an alternatives; but they
suppose, that by sccedng alone, they will
prcciptatc an issue, which will end in tile
dissolution o! the Union, and in the forma
ton co Instant, Of Southern confederacy.
object to this experiment, because, If
not successful. it leaves us, but one alter
native, TO set up Tor ourselves, as an indc-
pendent nation, thus Withdrawing our
forces, ~ Congress, in tie presidential
election, and III ,hc general politics OF the
country, from thc side OF the South as long
as II remains III the Union, and exposing;
VI, 10 be harasscd, distracted and beaten in
detail, before the South is ready o furm
Cove rnn,cn'. upon stable and permanent
basis, out OF the Union.
| object to the experiment OF Jtreing otfr-
cr States TO JOIN ns. because from the test
lights can gather, anl from the opinions
of men, in whom ! h,ve been taught to 8
soHfiier I think il probable, the experiment.:
viii fad.
| object to the mole, by which, the other
Southern States arc 10 be forced into he
struggle. Il.
This is Government Of opinion, but
finding opinions against VI, we now propose
to resort to arms.
Secession Of itself, will no, | ring ;I,em
10 cooperate with us, in framing South
crn Government. 1t is probable that no
amount OF pccunarv loss, or commercial
and agricultural! distress, vii! bring them to
our side. There must be a conflict of arms,
and It is supposed, tha, the first gun will
bring the Southern chivalry TO is feet.
In my opinion, Gcn,cucn, ,ha, depends,
somewhat, upon srho .f,cs .6rst. AS long AZ
the other Southern States stand aIoof, tho
Government is perfectly competent, with
out firing gun. TO protect their interests,
IN The collection Of rcvenuc, sufficient for
It's due administration, leaving Us to the es-
pertinent OF scplruc nationality, which,
believe, will be immediately fatal TO our
prosperity as people, and remotely, to the.
cause of SoMlhcrn ins nstituions and in that,
position, cabin'd, crbbcd, confined F" we
wall remain, unless we take the initiative
aud commence The ,car.
We are. then, TO point the first gun. no.
TO secure or defend separate nationality,
; which we do not in reality desire, and which
does not restore The balance Of power or ex>
tend our institutions, but on the contrary
restricts them; but we are to shed the first
! blood, TO excite sympathy, 10 secure coop
eraii0n, and, as tho first step, 10 new, firm
and stable Government, without the assur-
ancc, from the authorities OF a single Sia,e,
.ha, they viii sympa,hize in such move.
ment. Truly, we may pause, belnre we
commit ourselves, TO this bloody issue,
which, TO make the best of il, NIGH, proba,
bly, end in separate, and let me add, a
crippled nationality.
Having taken my position, against the
, praclcabiity of separate secession as a
means of restoring the balance of powet
in the Government, before tho election rol
, the Convention. when, supposed was in