Grand River times. [volume] (Grand Haven, Mich.) 1851-18??, 1851-10-22
THE CHRISTlANA OUTRAGE.

THE CHRISTlANA OUTRAGE.
CHARGE OF JUEGE KANE-THE LAW OF TREASON.
Gentlemen of the Grand Jury-It has been
represented to me, that since we met last, cir
cumstances have occurred in one of the neigh
boring counties of our District, which should
call for your prompt scrutiny, and perhaps for
the energetic action of the Court.
1t is said, that citizen of the State of Mary
land who had come into Pennsylvania to reclaim
fugitive from labor, was forcbiy obstructed in
the attempt by body of men-assaulted, beat
en-, and murdered-that some members of his
family, who had accompanied him in the pursuit
were at the same time and by the same party
matreated and grievOusly wounded and that
an officer of justice, constituted under the au-
thority Of this Court, who sought to arrest the
fugitive, was impeded and repeled by menaces
and violence, while proclaiming his character
and exhibiting his warrant. 1t is said too, that
the time and manner Of this outrage is an assert
ed object, the denunciations by which they were
preceded, and the simultaneous action of most
Of the guilty parties, evinced n combined pur-
pose forcibly to resist and make nugatory con-
situtional provision, and the statutes enacted
in pursuance Of it and it is added, in confirm
alton of this, that for some months back, gath
erings of people, strangers as well as citizens,
have been held from time TO time in the vicinity
of the recent outbreak, at which exhortations
were made and pledges interchanged to hold the
law for the recovery of fugitive slaves as of no
validity, and to defy its execution.
If the circumstances to which have adverted
have in fact taken place, they involve the high
est crime known to our laws. Treason against
the United States is defined by the Constitution
Art. 3, sect 3, Cl. l, to consist in levying war
against them, or in adherng to their enemies,
giving them aid and comfort" This definition
is borrowed from the ancient law of England,
Stat. 25. Edw. 3, stat 5, chap. 2, and its terms
must be understood of course in the sense which
they bore in that law, and which obtained here
when the Constitution was adopted. The ex-
preston "levying war;" SO regarded, embraces
not merely the act of formal or declared war,
but any combination forciblv to prevent or OPP
pose the execution or enforcement of provis-
ion of the Constitution or of public Statute, if
accompanied or followed by an act of forcible
opposition in pursuance of such combination
This in substance has been the Interpretation
given to these words by the English Judges and
it has been uniformly and fully recognized and
adopted in the courts of the United States. See
Foster, Hale and Hawkins, and the opinions OF
Iredell, Patterson, Chase, Marshall, and Wash
ington, J. j., of the Supreme Court, and of Pc
ters ID. J. in u. S. VS. Mitchell, u s. VS.. Fries
u. S. VS.. Bollman and Swartwout, and u s. VS.
Burr.
The definition, as you will observe, includes
two particulars, both of them indispensable ee.
ments of the offence There must have been q
combination or conspiring together to oppose
the law by force,and some actual force must have
been exerted,or the crime Of treason is not con.
sumated
The highest, or at least the direct proof of the
combining may be found in the declared pur
poses of the individual party before the actual
outbreak; or it may be derived from the pro.
ceedings of meetings,in which he took part open
y, and where he either prompted or made effec
tive by his countenancee or sanction, commend
ing counseling and instigatng forcble resist
ance, to the law. speak, of course, OF n con.
spring to resist a law, not the more limited pur
pose to violate it, or to prevent its application
and enforcement in particular case, or against
particular individual. The combination must
be directed against the law itself.
But such direct proof Of this element of the
offence is not legally necessary to establish its
existence. The concert of purpose may be dedu
ced from the concerted action ITSELF or it may
be inferred from facts occurring at the time, OF
afterwards, as well as before.
Besides this, there must be some act of vio
lence, as the result or consequence of the com
bining. But here again, it is not necessary tc
prove that the individual accused was direct
personal actor in the violence. If he was pres
ent, directing, aiding, abetting, counseling it, hi
is in law guilty of the forcihle act. Nor is ever
his personal presence indispensable. Though
he be absent at the time of its actual perpetra
tion, yet il he directed the act, devised or know
ingly furnished the means of carrying it into
effect, instigated others to perform it, he shares
their guilt. In treason there are no accessories
There has been, ! fear, an erroneous impres
sion on this subject among portion of our peo
pie. If it has been thought safe, to counsel ant
instigate others to acts of forcibe opposition t,
the provisions ofa statute-to inhame the mind
of the ignorant by appeals TO passion and de
nunciations of the law as oppressive, unjust, re
voting to the conscience, and not binding OF
the actions of men-to represent the constitu
tien'of the land as compact of iniquity, whic
it were meritorious to violate or subvert-th
] Ill. II