Weekly national intelligencer., 1851-01-04
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

In the editorial artcles Of several respectable con-
temporaries, written with ability and in the mos
laudable spirit upon the queston-thank God
no longer THE Eyn-of the day, we have observed
one error, as we think. Whether from want Of
reflection, or from looseness of language, the idea
may gain hold in the minds of the readers OF those
journals that certain things commanded by law are to
TO be done, and certain things prohibited by law are
be left undone, because violation of its mandates
will be followed by punishment, and not because it
is right to do or refrain from certain acts
From this doctrine we dissent. We do not deem
it an argument worthy to be addressed to an nelli-
gent people, each one of whom is directly interest
ed in upholding the Law for the sake Of the Law,
for the sake of the general welfare, and even for the
sake of his own more secure, rational liberty, to
hold up the penalties of an enactment as the sole
reason for submission to its terms to say that when
law has been made we must either obey it or lat
our dscreton) pay fine, for instance. We far
prefer such an idea of citizens obligations as is
implied by this definition of punishments "They
are that degree of pain or Inconvenience which are
supposed to be sufficient to deter men from intro
ducng that greater degree of inconvenience which
would result to the community from the general
permission of that act which the law prohibits. It
is no recompense to mans country for the con-
sequences of an illegal act, that he should after
wards be whipped, or should stand in the pory, or
lie in a jail. " ..
Penalties and punishmens cannot be regarded as
an equivalent or composition for the commission OF
the offence. Blackstone, indeed, speaks of cases
"where the thing forbidden or enjoined is wholly
matter of indifference, and where the penalty in
cted is an adequate compensation for the civil in
convenience supposed to arise from the offence.
But he presumes state of things which can never
arise, and his presumption is founded on fallacy
for though, if man be injured in property by
another, his loss may often be repaired by resttu-
ton in the shape of damages, still the laW is rio-
lated, and its majesty is infringed upon, according
to the erossness of the offence done to the indi-
vidual. This in single case, may not perhaps be
matter Of much importance; but each such act
tends to diminish the reverence for the laws SUI
premacy, and gradually to infuse into the commu-
nifty disregard for its nunctions, when there is
chance that such obliquity. of judgment may be
with impunity INDUCED in. .
Every man should scrupulously observe the
provisions of every law as long as it is in force, not
because it benefits him individually, nor because
he fears the consequences of disobedience, when
acquiescence in its behests works hardly with him,
but because it is the will of the majority expressed
for the good of all, and because the voice of that
majority, thus embodied in an enactment, is much
more likely to be wise and good than his own
opinion, biased by interest, party, or prejudice.
This brings us to the view which we desire to
enforce. Suppose that those -advised or malicious
persons at the North, who have been disposed to
interfere with the due execution of the Fugitive
Slave Law, could be quite sure that they are be-
yond the reach or danger Of actual punishment for
grave an infraction of the duties OF citizen, still
they are bound, in opinion, to obey the Law,
and would be SO in foro conscierstia, if no penalty
we're attached to its Infringement or evasion.
one man objects TO one law and resists its perfect
fulflment, his neighbor may object to another and
resist it, and thus all the laws may be set at naught
although unquestionaby beneficial on the whole to
society, and indispensable to its existence