The southern press., 1851-09-03

n t3IuH6 Ftvt(t UhGOuFts 4tu NrU0F0QX, O6U30D8
Herar. The hrst viii bs under the superiutsn
donce Of Capt Taylor, the seeOnd under EApt.
Bullock, an.l the last under Mr Dightcn, who once
managed tie Warrungal districts. Should ths
Nizam not pay down the money, which, il il
said, be has the means Of doing. We may take II
for granted that the districts mentioned will be
held for some time at least; and in the mean
time there, no doubt, Will be somc very active
employment for part Of the cavalry and in-
faniry branches OF the service I"
This is treating the absorption Of the Nizam's
territory with considerable cooiness, as though
il were a matter of course that the British troops
in India were To find their principal employment
in taking aud keeping possession Of those dis
ricts of country, the native princes or soveresus
Of which do not pay up their indebtedness
when the government at Calcutta" chooses 10
believe they have the means. The London
Times remarks that although from the lsnxtl,
Of time this threat has been held over the head
Of the court Of Hderabid, the information thus
communicated exctes little interest, II is never
theess difficult to predict what will be the re-
suit of a movement in dominions like this Of the
East India Company. st
The obligations OF the Nizam, or "administra-
tor Of the Deccan portion OF southern country
lying between the rivers Nerbudda and Kstnnh,
are the accumulation of tribute TO the East In-
dia government for its "proiection" during the
protracted conflicts and changes of dynasty
which at one time were 80 frequent in the East
Indies. Those dangers removed, the Nizam BE-
gan to feel the payment of tribute rksome. lila
payments fell into arrears, and are reported now
to amount to E850,O0O The result is told in
few words--"the British government have at
length resolved on exercising a power reserved
10 fhap Of ..f
his dominions, and applying the revenues to
liquidation of the debt"
The excuse or plea that the Nizam is able 10
pay is thus disproved by the London Times, in
an article the design Of which is apparently to
justify the " absorbing" process put IL operation
by the East India company, while indicating
other and grave results from the measure iil I
The f" Nizam's army" 80 termed, is COM
manded by British officers, and under the OK
elusive authority Of the resident, so that his
highness has been compelled to levy and main
tain distinct force for such occasions Of state and
government were still recognised by his pro
tectors. This double drain upon his treasury,
while it has contributed in no small degree to
be present embarrassment of his financ q, has
filled the country with CROW DIS of iilpaid and
ungoverabe mercenaries First. the sovereign
himself, and then his mobiles and favorites, are
severaly supporting large bands of retainers,
whose wages are always in arrear, and whose
pecuniary claims and military strength give
them great practical influence on the measures
of the government.
To dismiss these troops is impossible, for
there are no means of satisfying their demands,
nor is it probable indeed that they would con-
sent to be dislodged from a settlement so con-
genial to their habits so that Sikhs from the
punioh to fro,, fI,a E,,lf
Scinde, Rajpoots from the North west, and Pa
taus from Afghanistan-al the fercest foes, IL,
short, Of all our Eastern wars-are now mus.
tered for mischief in the Deccan.
At this moment the revenues Of the Nizam
amount, we believe, to about I'll 100000 sterling
"A sum so inadequate to the exigences thus in
duced, that deficit Of some 100000 was an
annual event. From this income the British
government proposes TO intercept some f350,-
O00 so that the deficit will be more than doubled.
and the question which disturbs Indian observers
is, how state which was barely kept together
as it stood, can maintain even semblance Of
su ubstantive power when more than third of it's
revenues is taken away 1t is believed that the
Nzam could, if he pleased, meet the demands Of
his creditors from his private purse, but it is not
that he will so incline. Another
method lies in the resumption of sjaghires," or
crown revenues, from the favorites on whom
they have besn profusely bestowed but these
tavorites retain small armies Of Arabs, who will
fight to the death, il not for their
masters at least for their pay.
In fact the whole revenues Of the Nixam and
his followers may be described as pleaged to
powerful and extorlionate bar Of military credi-
tors, holding actual possession, and likely to sur
render their advantages only with their lives
We are not of course insinuating that the pro-
dgious strength of our Indian government is
likely to fail against such antagonists a. these.
but their desperate ferocty has been proved in
many field, and we may anticipate isolated con
tests of extreme severity before the Deccan can
be rid of its invaders Coupled, too, with this
contingency is the indefinite peril with which
warfare in India is always attended The risk
is, perhaps, less than usual in territories 30 long
peaceful and so well under command as those Of
the Madras Presidency, but it still exists, and
may at any moment evoke an enemy into being
Neither is it probable, all circumstances consid-
cred, that our proposed intervention will actually
with the recovery of our dues, so that
what appears the simple execution OF a compact
may not only lead to hard fighting, but may in
troduce new epoch in our relations with the
PRINCES and people of India.