Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1851-04-01
if.,atin4ed from FIRST Paga.

s..s,ed IN naper would equally, and as egitinatey
Isad to the sad result just depicted by me AND thus
has almost invariably been In thus debate thal' a.
means of refuting the views and principles OF
aDhs eastern gentlemen have resorted to the device
~ nnsbno their views and principles to tha' eau
hsre +bay must necessarily result III ev anu 'o'4
as already explained This is course o. "suMen
universally rejected by sound logcaGs as tNe ~ te
to be relied by those IN pursuit otlsmen have beer
sn,ts of practical wisdom. But geh,iele nA bes.L
suies " -; own, snare as humbly conceive naV'
eaus1 Laontlv manifest and III endea'of1nS mus &c
I.rnu ma have involved themselves anu ueh wv
csnse in monstrous absurai'S
sense. ost scheme by which they say
But gea.iIe ~ e6uaty might be worked out, anc
.ue the adoption Of the general ticket system IL
Ina! i, regard to the election OF memoers ol th'
.nsral assembly My friends certainly torgst tne .iu'
Object for which we we're sent nei lno1rn mt onIy
beys to devise form of government nnkioN,, w.
~ .h;s old Commonwealth but to the whoie eSeis y
W MON the continent of North America anu al
~ Jay indeed unknown i'll the ciflhzeo "9iiu :
far "a a nnre democracy, understooo anu P.' 80
among the ancients. or even 10 r.i .ns baro r.
&c s,cb thing can exist. But We came mere -
ctae! ~n.ontativc republic, one OF the great Gle
one of the essential fcatuies-oi "nlch Is lhI
as.rasontot;on of the minority IN the sense III "iie
h.re already explained that ana locu
bs rsn-ssent.d-not as to give inc i'uoii' 'e ~"
20. r tha LEGISLATIVE power-not so AS 10 give 10 any
,ro VI 3he control Of Legislative power, put so a
local interest VI. weight in the scale of egsla
80 nd 70 insure to each far consideration III tns
ieo;satire body-that umpire which, sc'otns :"
.heorv shonld always hold the scales OF lu7'oo
nosed between conteuding pa',ies, , H wonIJ most
interests and arrive at those results wiz" ,'
the greatest good upon the greatest num-
ber Then, the argument ,.or, !; wholly inap
III, ;daa of the general ticket system. - 49, l
Gn.hs ,o tbe present sub ect ingenious tl'ous :. ue'
aMoIlv MS it may have been urged, IT Is ehlreiy
AZ, ION
teIr H. committee because II proposes 10 GO titt
h:a I'D he wholly unsuited 10 Virginia, and which
would nrove utterly futile il attempted I" oc establish
cd in any portion OF this country. :" "'
sort can only dispense benehts wl.''' r.g;n ri
ond under peculiar circumstance over ego" u
oon,try Ear less extended than tins STATE ana over
nonrlat;on however great il numbers c"hll"" "i''
very narrow space. ;rformed tbc commit
tee that the principal ., t% ,n~bt have ad
- .h.t tbe ;nd;cary too principally occuf'eu III e
tlino Questions for the protection OF ProPe'' rn
fnrt5er that three -fourths OF the expense, Iao.
,nant are incurred for the beneht OF proper o".
= therefore follow either that property Sh"u'' NV N'
~ 80 dna share Of those expenses or, ceause IL
aas ~ contribute that therefore its owner" s'uo 'I
= orao,er amount of political power IMAM Tue ti'io VI
tbs;r numbers would enttle them 10 "'eio = p.?p
v TINS occupies YOUR legislature thus ou ~
dcial department it follows us nrs
consaonence that in that proportion It's ""ueis az nv
;Jhfed IN government than those who own II" P'oPe,
tv and therefore they ought to contribute NV;
defraving it's expenses than the le,er Ius' :" e
ton ~ the value OF their wealth. ana 'lu:, as'l'
the gentlemans argument proves any haT tb because
total faacy of the pretenslon set up mere 'n
ty contributes more its support that therefore
propsrty ahould control the government why pro-
artv contributes only in proportion t" the dement,
ece;ves md il should contribute III no reSS ues
Tbers rras another idea which fell from my friend
~ e I've had not expressed it better should have
sJvanced myself 1t this, that III virginia 'hete
can never be any controversy between ,e uu ~.
oor for the reason stated BY him. which IS most true
H., =; VIRGINIA there is such an equal distribution Oh
that il will be the interest Of large majority
I.rpvs r. srotect it. Well if this be true does not my
fsna ace that YOU need not bring to the protection Oh
nronsrty the fictitious aid Of political power:
il IS so widely diused as to interest IN It's Protec
ton large majority Of the people OF H.igna Iny Huu
ltcal influences The gentleman must see thaI IL 10
wholly unnecessary, that the existence OF the state OF
things which he has depicted must always furnish ue
heat most permanent and most e1cent security "hcn
can nossiby be afforded to property But the gentle
hassd another argument and very ingenously too,
mon the peculiar feature of the federal constitution
in refarenca to the threeths principle OF representa-
ton The gentleman argued because OF tne eHis'
tence of that priocple in the federal constitution that
therefore, the principle contendeo lor mere " Iat
and Others was right proper and necessary Now let
me ace how this is If it be 60 then as between the
two and the subjects to which they respec
tiyey apply there is not merely an analogy, but they
are parallel throughout Is this SOL Who are the par
tas to tha federal constitution Let first examine
il in that light Why the states OF the Union constr
tutine seperate and independent sovereigntes From
what process of operation did the federal government
sprinei It sprsng from negotiations between sover-
sten and independent powers, the result OF which was
4 compact providing government unique ana peculiar
in itsef the object Of which not to operate upon
to any great extent but to operate upon inter-
ests and especially to watch and guard the foreign
relations of these sovereign powers, and only III
yery slight degree have bearing upon their internal
concerns Then who the parties to the constitution
which we are making. Are these parties sovereign
and independent powers No; they are the members
of the Body polite of Virginia as mere individuals
They have not negotiated as sovereign powers. Inc
same Of negotiation has not gone on ana cannot
o. an This compact does not consist as that does,
Of GRANT of mutual equivalents But inter Sc
Sc ia to be contract between indiN iduas and not
bstwsen sovereign powers Then, what are the func'
tions Of the government which they design creating 1t
eminently to watch protect and advance the IN
terna interests and affairs and personal rights OF the
individuals constituting this community body polite
One in its action is exterior the other in its action is in
taror The one acts upon subjects the other upon per-
sons The one emanates from compact between SOW
eregn powers the other enanates from IN ordinary
contract Of government entered into between lnaiSia
uals The one looks external results, the other to
internal affairs rights of persons and the obligations
Of individuals Now, cannot conceive two cases more
utterly dissimilar. Why when sovereiyns negotiate
each looks to his interest and each seeks to guard aud
advance that interest; and that is The great motive
which controls and directs all negotiations between
ereign powers When the southern states agreed to
become parties to the federal compact they agreed
do 80 as soveregns and agreed to do pon the
which gave them the three-hfths principe AS sover-
eigns they considered that provision essential the
protection of their interests and therefore they proper
" made its adoption sine qtanon to their entering into
the Union And what did the northern states dos They
agreed to give this ths principle in considera-
ton that the ratio and basis Of taxation should be extend
ed, in the same degree. Here then, there mutual
equivalents given and received precisely upon the prn
cps that soveregns negotiate in reference to prnc
bic but always and exclusively in reference to interest
But does thatdea apply toa simple republican assembly
of the representatives of the people, whose duty it is
to form constitution of republican character which
is to watch internal affairs and protect the personal
rights of the citizen No two could be more dis
similar But that is not ALL The agent constituted BY
the federal compact is agent of limited and speci-
fc powers. But the agent to be constituted BY the
instrument which making is not to be agent of
limited but of general powers which are to be
exercised for the purposes which have already stated
That will be simple operation, to be performed COM
paratively upon limited sphere The general govern
otbar hon aytends