Des Moines courier. ([Ottumwa] Iowa) 1848-1854, 1851-12-25
From the Keokuk Dispatch.
DES MONIES RIVER IMPROVEMENTS
OPINION OF HON. A. w. BUEL,
OF MICHIGAN.

OF MICHIGAN.
WAsmINaroN Cry, Sept. l3, 1851.
v. p. VAN ANTWERP, Commits sioner, SIC.
SIR:-I acknowledge the receipt Of
your letter of this date, wherein you ask
for my opinioif as to the extent of the
graut made Ly the General Government
to the Territory Of Iowa, in 1916, for
the purpose Of improving the navigation
of the Desmoines river. / do not hesi-
tate, in the answer / should make, but as
Lam about to leave the City, I must offer
you rather statement OF my opinion,
than an argument in its support.
The first section Of the act Of Sth Au-
gust, l846, creates the grant, and in these
words:
The words Of the act are, 'sBe it en-
acted, that there be, and hereby is, grant
ed to the Territory of Iowa, &c., &c., for
the purpose of aiding said Territory TO
improve the navigation of the Desmoines
river from its mouth TO the Raccoon Fork,
ESQ called in said Territory, one equal
moiety in alternate sections Of the public
lands, (remaining unsold, and not other
wise disposed OF, encountered or appro-
priated) in strip FIVE miles in width on
each side Of said river, to be selected
within said Territory by an agent or
agents TO be appointed by the Governor
thereof, subject to the approval Of the
Secretary Of the Treasury Of the United
States"
Upon this the question arises whether
the five mile strip on each SIDE Of the riv-
er is limited to the mouth and Raccoon
Fork, or 10 SO much of the river as lies
within tho then Territory of Iowa. l
think the grant is clearly co-extensive
with the river, from its mouth to the
northern boundary Of the Territory.
What is the language Of the grant? As
to what or how much is granted, that is
one thing, while the object is another
They are distinct subjects. One natural
| ly follows the other. Congress makes
the grant, and then applies it to such use
as il may see fit. That is the natural or
der of Legislative provisions in like cases.
Ii, then, the grant be separated from the
object, the first section Of the law may be
divided so as to read as follows:
"Src. /. BE it enacted, &c., that there
be and is hereby granted to the Territory
Of Iowa, &c., in strip tve miles in ,cidth
on ench side Of said rirer; to be selected
Dithin said Territory, &c.
SEC. 2. THE above grant shall bel
"for the purpose of aiding said Territory
to improve the navigation Of the Desmoin-
es river from its mouth TO the Raccoon
Fork ESQ called) in said Territory"
Is not the language, which fixes the
ertent OF the grant, just as clear as that
which fixes its pawposel sin strip of
five miles in width on each side of said
river" This language is free from am
biguity. ! see, therefore, no room for
construction in such q case. understand
that words can be neither stricken out
nor inserted, so as TO make the language
in question mean anything more, less or
different, from what il imports, according
10 its evident Specification and accepta-
| lion.
do Ia, mean to say, that the letter of
law is to control, where it would lead
10 anything impossible, grossly absurd or
unreasonable, or evidently beyond the in
tention Of the act. In the present case,
the view take leads to no such results.
On the other hand, il is consistent with all
the provisions Of the law, and especially
viii accomplishing the objects Of the
grant.
There is nothing unreasonable, or unu-
sual in granting lands for local improve
ments, situated elsewhere than on the inn
mediate line thereof, and especially where
as understand TO be the fact in this case,
those lying within the five mile strip con-
tiguous to the lire Of Improvement, would
be insufficient to complete the work.
Nor, do mean TO say, that The letter Of
law is to prevail over its manifest inten-
lion, where that intention appears on its
face. But, in this case, there being no
ambiguity in the terms Of the grant, we
can not travel out of the law to find an in
tention, which would destroy or impair
| the force Of its terms. The Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case Of
the U. S. vs. Fisher, has settled, think,
the true construction in this case. If,
from view Of the whole law. the evil
dent intention is different from the literal
import of the terms employed to express
il, that evident intention shall prevail
But, when the language is plain and un-
ambiguous, the Legislature shall be re-
garded as intending to mean, what it has
plainly expressed, and in such case there
can be no question Of construction.
The above ar my views on the question
submitted, briefly and hastily expressed.
! am, very respectfully,
your obdt serv't,
| ALEX. w. BUEL.
OPINION OFJUDGE (LATE CHIEF