The southern press. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1850-1852, 1851-10-22
rAe Effects in spain Of the cuban Invasion.
OPINIONS OF THE MADRID PRESS.
From Ell Hsraldo of Madrid, Sept. IA.

b
relative to the invasion Of the island Of Cuba
the demonstration in New Orleans in favor OF
the pirates who fell into the hands OF our troops
the insult to our flag in the person OF our con
sui show us that which we cannot conceal, that
war with the United States is inv itable. We
will not fix the time when it will begin, because
it depends on a thousand circumstances which
may happen--we will not say, either, if it is near
at hand, because it is to be presumed that the
satisfactions of the Washington government may
avert it; but what we are able to prognostcate,
without fearing a mistake, is that the govern
ment Of the Union, weak in the organization OF
its citizens, will be submitted, by will or by force,
to the almost revolutionary excitations OF the
most unteachable portion of the Southern
States, and that in taking an attitude contrary
to what is required by the rights of the people
of all nations it will force us not only to useless
reclamations, but to hostile demonstrations. The
reason of our representation is in the condition
of democratic governments, and especially in the
condition Of the United States government, the
| impotence of which has been offered as an ex.
cuse for the federation with which they have
looked at the expedition against the island OF
| Cuba 1t ia the condition of democratic govern
ments, that the true public opinion, formed by
persons of intellect, position, and fortune, dis
appears before that public opinion which clam
ora and procaims itself in the streets with cries
of sedition, and arrays itself against all senti-
ments of Justice when its tendencies to anarchy
and plumber find formidable obstacle. And
as this false public opinion is powerful, because
it threatens governments, we believe that 1t Will
prevail later or sooner, in the United States, and
the government Of that country will follow the
way thus indicated, although at the end they find
an abyss into which they run the risk Of being
precipitated. We fatter ourselves that there are
in the United States sensible persons, and news
papers of fame, not associated with the criminal
projects of the annexionists, and condemning as
we do ourselves the inaction of their govern.
ment; but the sentiment of these persons, and
the fame of these papers, represent only reason,
and reason is not listened to before the coarse
voice Of the crowds. The crowds, we repeat,
will be victorious, and the war inevitable, though
we do not believe that the government of the
| Union will approve the ideas Of the crowd
But war does not intinidate US. How can it
frighten US, when we are able to gain very much
by it, and have nothing to lose? We do not
apprehend, either that the provocation will be
given by US. The only thing to which we pre-
tend, il to give the alarm, in order that the
Spanish government should at once make some
preparations for the events which threaten it.
Increase our squadron, especially the steamers
|
ships of war and send, if it is opportune more
soldiers to Cuba; it is for these objects that we
would recommend preparations. 1t is. possible
however, that We cannot posses a navy equal to
that of the United States but we shall not
offer formal naval battles No; the priyateers
will make the war, and our vessels will serve TO
protect and guard the fortified ports, and leave
| the coasts when the success Of an expedition
will be secure. In warfare we have an immense
advantage over the U. States; in such a man
ner that we shall offer letters of marque, with
| great profits, to those who will ask for them.
We will frd privateers, not only amongst the
Galatians and MayOr3 ulcers, who are the best in
the world, but in England and in the Philippine
archipelago, and in great abundance amongst
the Jolvanos, who, in consequence OF cur last
expedition to their islands, have been deprived
1 Of the profession ofcorsairs And thus We will
encounter the people of the United States for
the rivalry OF commerce; covetousness is a bad
adviser and will cause certain sentiments, which
are mixed with their interests, 10 be forgotten.
And then, what will the government of the
United States dol What will become Of the
commerce of that county? Its vessels will Ell
counter danger in the indian and Chinese seas
and will be pursued even to the coasts OF the
Uniop--lbeir commercial interests will be en-
dangered And what can they oppose to II
Nothing, absolutely nothing. They will man.
ago 10 escort their merchant yesselsj besides
their military navy is not very numerous. IL l.
completely impossible TO preserve their CONNER
cial trade, when it 10 necessary to protect it by
these heroic auxiliaries.
| But this is not the only damage that we can
cause the United States for if our privateers
deprive them Of their trade with India, we will
possess the key Of the Mediterranean, and then
be able to prevent their vessels from trading In
t e waters Of Madrid and Ceuta. In fact, the
United States will find blockade, the result OF
wi ich will be their submission or their iuin.
And ourselves, what should we lose! Now,
! in place Of counting what we shall lose, we
mast consider what We can gain. Our com.
merce cannot suffer, as that OF the United
States, for two powerful reasons-hrst, because
We shall not have to fear so many enemies
corsars; because our commerce Is not so
much extended as that Of their country, but in
exchange. We will make a show Of our force,
which will make US strong, thus repairing so
many years Of delay, and we will revenge the
LOSSES that we have sssisined by the late IN
fortunate events, with the prizes Of our pri.
vateers. Yes, the war will be profitable 70 US,
and by o war we shall gain riches and fame,
which we need. Thps, we have nothing TO
fear from the results of ths var; and the only
thing We have to think Of is, to be careful, in all
cases, that the proyocation shall not como from
US.
For, if on the seas we have all these adyan-
tages against nation which is represented ms
being more powerful than ourselves, upon the
land our advantages are greater, because we
are not inferior in force 10 any nation.
French paper has expressed the same sentiment,
on the same subject: "The Spaniards are rs
strong in the war Of cruize as in the war gueril-
las" What force could be able to penetrate
into the island Of Cuba without beipR exposed
TO the same punishment that was inflicted on
the piratical companions Of Lopez! Thirty
thousand men would not be sufficient We
can raise fifty thousand and with that force,
composed of disciplined and well trained sol.
diers, who are headed by chiefs, of whom Il is
enough 70 say that they are Spaniards, in
order 10 know that they are b-aye and bold, we
need not fear the hordes ofadventurers from the
United States, or the troops Of any European
country. The anneKauopjsts Ut The Union may
Al Lat nf