Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1851-11-07

guarantees for the salvation and security of the
South. The precise nature of the amendment is de-
veloped in his work government, vol. l, page
392 as follows:
How the constitution could be best modified so
as to effect the object. only be authorltatlyey
determined by the amending power. 1T may be done
in various ways. Among others, it might be effect
ed through recognition of the executive depart
ment so that its powers instead of being vested as
they now are in single officer. should be vested In
tw0;-to be so elected, that the two should be con-
stituted the special organs and representatives OF the
respective sections, in the executive department OF
the government: and requiring each to approve all
the acts of Congress before they shall become laws
One might be charged with the administration of
matters connected with the foreign relations of the
country and the other. of such as were connected
with it's domestic institutions the selection to be
decided by lot. 1t would thus effect, more simply,
what was intended by the original provisions OF the
constitution IN giving to one OF the maoritles com
posing the government, decided preponderance in
the electoral college-and to the other majority
still more decided influence in the eventual choice
in case the college failed to elect President 1t was
intended to effect an equilibrium between the larger
and smaller States in this department-but which,
in practice has entirely failed and, by It's failure,
done much to disturb the whole system and to bring
about the present dangerous state of things
Indeed, it may be doubted. whether the trainers
of the constitution did not commit great mistake
in constituting single. instead of plural execn-
tive. Nay. it may be doubted whether single
chief magistra te-invested with ali the powers pro-
perly appertaining to the executive department OF
the government, as is the President-s Incompatible
with the permanence of popular government; es-
pecially in wealthy and populous community. with
a large revenue and numerous body OF officers and
employees Certain it is, that there is instance of
popular government constituted. which has long
endured. Even ours thus far. furnishes no evidence
in its favor. and not little against it. for. to it.
the present disturbed and dangerous state of things
which threatens the country with monarchy. or dis
union, may be justly attributed. On the other hand
the two most distinguished constitutional govern
ments of antiquity both in respect to permanence
and power had dual executive. | refer to those
of Sparta and of Rome. The former had two he
reditary. and the latter two elective chief magis-
trates it is true. that England, from which ours
in this respect, is copied. has single hereditary
head of the executive department of her govern
ment but it is not less true that she has had many
and arduous struggles. to prevent her chief magis
trate from becoming absolute: and that, to guard
it efectually, she was finally compelled to diyest
him, substantially, of the power Of administering
the government. by transferring it, practically. to
cabinet of responsible ministers. who. by establish
ed custom. cannot hold Office. unless supported by
majority of the two houses of Parliament. She has
thus avoided the danger of the chief magistrate be-
coming absolute: and cOntrived to unite. substan-
stantiay. single with plural executive. in con-
shutting that department of her government. We
have such guard and can have none such. with
out an eHlfe CuiiSe III CllafdCteF vi govern
ment; and her example of course. furnishes ev-
idence in favor of single chief magistrate in a
popular form of government like ours-while the
examples Of former times and our own, thus far.
| furnish strong evidence against it.
But it is objected that plural executive neces-
sarily leads to intrigue and discard among its
bers and that it is inconsistent with prompt and eft
fcien action. This may be true, when they are all
elected by the constituency; and may be u
good reason, where this is the for preferrng
executive But the is very different where they
are elected by different misunderstanding con-
fictng and hostile interests would be the fact
in the case under consideration. Here the two
would have to act concurringly, in approving the
acts of Congress-and separately, in the sphere OF
their respective departments. The effect in the lat
ter case. would be- to retain all the advantages OF
single executive, far the administration of the
laws were concerned: and in the former. to insure
harmony and concord between the two sections and
through them. in the government. For as no act Of
Congress could become law without the assent OF
the chief magistrates representing both sections
each, in the elections would choose the candidate
who in addition to being faithful to its interests
would best command the esteem and confidence Of
the other section. And thus the presidential eec
ton. instead of dividing the Union into hostile geo
graphical parties the stronger struggling to enlarge
it's powers and the weaker to defend its rights il
now the case-would become the means of restoring
harmony and concord to the country and the gov
eminent 1t would make the Union union in truth
"a bond of mutual affection and brotherhood anC
not mere connection used by the stronger as the
instrument Of dominion and aggrandizement-anc
submitted to by the weaker only from the lingering
remains of former attachment and the fading hope
of being able to restore the government to what
was originally intended to be- a blessing to all
Such is the diSease-and such the character o
the only remedy which reach it. In conclusion
there remains TO be considered the practical ques
= tion,-Shall it be applied? Shall the only powe
# which can apply it be invoked for the purpose!
. THE responsibility of answering this solemn ques
ton rests the States composing the stronger
ton. Those of the weaker in minority. both o
l. the States and of population and, of consequence
~ cannot be responsible for act which requires tn
concurrence of thirds of both houses of Congress
: or two-thirds of the States to originate, and three
fourths of the latter to consummate With such dlf
II fcutes in their way, the States OF the weaker sec
ton can do nothing. however disposed, to save tn
Union and the government, without the aid and &C
operation of the States composing the stronger sec
o ton but with their aid and corporation both ma
be saved On the latter therefore rests the respor
= sbilty of invoking the high power which alone ca
apply the remedy and. if they fail to do of a
the consequences which may follow
To BE KNIGHTED.-The Queen of England ha
it signiied her intention of comforting the honor
is Knighthood upon Mr. Fox, the Contractor MIR. Pa,
% ton, the designer, and MIR. Cubitt, the Engineer
70 the Crystal Palace.
- Rag~ When a steamboat gets aground in any
the western rivers she waits until she gets the few
and ague, and then shakes herself off. A wester
Steamboat with n GOOD stort ague is something