Richmond daily times. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1853, 1851-11-10
MIR. CALHOUN'S WORK.


copy of the first volume of "The Works OF
Calhoun" edited by Mr.. r. X. Crale, of Vir-
GINA The volume contains the foreshadowed
discussions of Mr.. Calhoun, on Government in
general, and the Government OF the United States
in narticuIar. We have not had time to examine
the work, but very partially. The part to which
we have looked with most curiosity is that con-
tanning the authors explanation of the amend
ment of the Federal Constitution to which he al
,uded in his last speech in the Senate. The sxs
tract is made to our hand in the following article
from the National Intelligencer. The reader will
see that it confirms Gen. Foote's assertion that
MIR. Calhoun's idea was to have taoo Presidents
instead of one, each armed a0ith a eto poa0er
In one part of his essay, we observe that Mr..
Calhoun says that our Union is Federal, on the
one hand, as contradstingu from National,
and, on the other, as contradstinguished from a
Conteierzcy. Struck by this strange distinction
between the essential meanings of the words
Federal and C3afsdsracy- ons the sub tantve and
the other the adjective of the same root
looked on to find the writer's exposition and it is,
iusubstance, this I: Confederacy he regards as
a number of States, bound together by compact,
which merely appoints deputies to Congress or
Council; whilst Federal Union, he argues, has
the peculiarly of possessing POSITIVE GOVERN
MENT, divided into the three great departments
of Executive, Legislative and Judiciary. Of this
kind of Union he justly says, ours was the first
example in the world. The distinction he makes
between Federal Union and Confederacy is,
therefore, obvious enough, but certsnly involve $
q very remarkable strainng Of words. 1t occur
+od TO us to notice it. because Mr.. Cahoun's plan
OF TWO vEroING PRESIDENTS would very GER
rainly. to great extent, deprive our Constitution
of that characteristic which he 50 much approved
the establishment of virtual, active gouernmen
From the National Inteljgencer
Mr. CALHOUN'S ULTIMATUM.
It is within the recollection Of all readers that
in his Speech in the Senate of the United States, i'm
medatey before his decease, the great South Carolinan
euoges ed as remedv-the only remedy-the SINE
QUA NON without which nothing would proba :
lily prevent dissolution of the existing Union
an amendment Of the Constitution necessary as
he in imatei TO place the South on footing OF
equa V with the North. the precise character
OF that amendment he did not parlicularze In an
article of the National intelligence OF the 18th o. Jaa
lary last however, it was stated that the general un-
IerstandIng THAT proposed an executive TO be COM
posed of two mem ers, be chosen from the two
great geographical divisions CHI to be check upon
the other, and both OF them to exercise the veto pow
er had been corroborated by authentc evidence
We have length what may be consd red ottlc lal
information on the subject; the evidence OF the Sena
ator himself under his own hand. We copy the sub
Joined expos ltIon OF ittrom the southern STANDARD"
of Monday last:
ernmpnt is now before the public i is of
four hundred pages, well bound, IN fine large type,
and good paper. All the booksellers have 1t Tor
. sale at dollars.
'Fhe subject in this work for which we looked most
eagerly the amendment OF the Constitution. 1t
is g ueralIy known that this was Mr. Caihoun's last
proposition Tor the salvation OF Inc Union ana the
secruty OF the south.
Gas many of our readers who may never Mr.
Cahouns work are no doubt ANXIOUS to know the
prec Sc nature of The Amendment to the Consltutl
which he had III view, we lay 1t before them IN his
own words from page 1872 OF his work just publish
ed
sHtw the Constitution could best be modified
effect the object, only be anthoftavely deter
mined by the amending power. 1t may be done IN
various ways Among Others 1t might be effected
through a reorganization of the Executive depart
nent; that powers, instead OF being vested,
thew now are in a single officer should BIZ vested
1ygo; to be elected that the TWO should be
stitued the special organs and represen atves OF the
respective sections in the Executive department OF
the Government and requiring each oapprove all the
acts of Congress before they shall become laws. One
might be charged with the administration OF matters
connected with the foreign relations OF the country
and the other of such connected W It'll Its do
Inesic Institutions; the selection to be decided by ot
It would thus effect, simply what was intended
by the original provisions of the Constitution, In CIV
ing one of the majoritles composing the Govern
ment a decided preponderence in the ELECTORAL Col
ege and to the other majority still more decided in
hdence in the eventual choice-in case the College
failed to elect President 1t was intended to effect
an equilibrium between the larger and smaller States
in this Department. but which, in practice, has entire
" failed, and by its failure, done much to disturb the
who system, aad to bring about the present dan
gerous state Of things
"Indeed il may be doubted whether the trainers of
the constitution did not commit great mistake in
constituting a single instead OF plural Executive
Nav, it may even be doubted whether single Chief
Magistrate invested with all the powers apperaining
10 tina Executive Department OF the Government,
the President is compatible with the permanence OF is
popular Government, especially in wealthy and pop
uIaus community, with large revenue and a nume
rous body OF officers and employees. Certain 1t Is that
there instance OF popular Government, so con-
suted which has long endured. Even ours, thus far
furnishes evidence in It's favor, and not little
against it; tor to II the present disturbed and danger
Gus state OF things which threatens the country with
rnonarchYor disunon, may be Justly attributed. Oh
the other hand the two most distinguished consttu
1ona Governments of antiquity both in respects per-
manence and power, had dual Executive. | refer to
ehose OF Sparta and OF Rome. The former had Two
hereditary and The latter two elective Chief magistrates
1t true that England from which IN this respect
is copied mas single hereditary head OF the executive
department OF her Government; BUTT is not less true
thai rad many and atduous struggles TO prevent her
chief g.irale from becoming absolute; and that, 10
guard against it efecuaiy she was huallY compelled
10 dvest substantially OF The power OF administer
ing The Government, by transferring it practically 10
cabinet Of responsible ministers, who, by established
custom cannot hold office unless suDoortedbv major
ity OF the houses OF Parliament. She has thus avod
ed The dagger o. the chief magistrate becoming absolute,
and conlrved to unite, substantially, single with
olural executive constituting that department OF her
Government. We have such guard and have
none such without an entire change IN the character
OF oJr Governments and her example OF course furnishes
no evidence 10 favor Of single chief magistrate in
popular form Of Government ike ours, while he exam
PIES Of former tines and our own thus lar, iuFnish
euoag evidence aga nst It.
'Blti. is o5iecIed hsta plural Executive necessarily
lesds TO intrigue and di-cord among its members AID
rs slant
TINS msy BE- true hen they all elected by the same
constituency; and may be good reason, where tins
IS case, ,oE preferring single executive, with all
It's ob-cloas 10 plural execaige. But the case IS
very herelt whsre h-y are elected by different con-