New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1851-11-10

NETWORK AND NEW HAVEN RAILROAD
SUPERISrINDBST'S OFFICE.
NBw-HAyEs, Oct -, 1851
To NJ Robert Schuyler, President. SC.
SIR have delayed until this morning writing
you In relation 70 the late catastrophe near Williams
Bridge. tor II not unH. last evening that naf
all the facts IN the case.
The freight train to New Haven leaves Ne WORK
after the I So p VI. Communication, and ahead % the
80 Port Chester tram. They should leave Thirty
seconos: respectively, commutatlon at 20, FIRE yat
al IS, and Port Chester S., PM From the teSti-
mony II appear that the freight train leR Thirty
seccndst 80 minutes past s. (Englneman Of freight
train say 6.27. Eneineman OF Port Chester trdln
say $40 The freIghttTaln ran 10 Williams Bridge.
and arrived according To zorro poratng evidence ~
49, aud passed on az great speed, meeting the 40
passenger tram from New Haven within tSO miles
Of Williams Bridge, at which time the EagInemsn
and Conductor of the passenger tram say they had
six minutes 10 run 10 Williams Bridge 20 pass the
Port Chester tram. The Port Chester train hsd
right 10 leave that station for Rochelle At %.
The conductor of the freight train injured sHd
could not give his evidence The englneman says
he though he passed the $50 train in the Tunnel and
that as the swltchman al Williams Bridge did not
give him the signals agreed upon between them, he
was confirmed In his belief that the train he passed
was the 20 passenger train The SwItchman at
Williams BnCge says the switch was set for the
down passenger tram. that he heard the to) tram
coming from New York and ran out with his signal
light and had Just time 10 turn the switch over for the
up train, when II passed at express tram speed by
him He made the signal to stop, but IN all prootbIl-
ity the time short between turning the Witch
when he could not swing light and the passage
of the train, that the engneman did not. could not
or would not lee a signal made, The SWll 'hn4h
heard tram and thought It must be the Port hester
tram, for the freight train he did not suppose "ohd
pass
These seem to be the facts as proven by witnesses.
The englneman ION the stand) and the conductor TO
myself) justify themselves. In the first place by sup
posing they had passed the passenger tram IN the'
Tunnel, and next, that they dd not see signal TO
stop At Williams Bridge.
l. Why they should have supposed that they had
passed the down passenger tram IN the Tunnel, when
that tram could not by any possibility nave been
khefe, cannot say. They had time tables, and II
they had referred TO them when they supposed such
an impossibillty. II would have corrected that i'm
preston at The Port Chester train, which was
proved to have been IN time from Thirty second st
20 Williams Bridge and which train ran behind the
freight train passes the down passenger train as per
tine table regularly at Mott Haven station east
from Harlem. Now the freight tram was fifteen 70
twenty minutes advance of the Port Chester tram,
and If the engineer conductor had looked at their
time table, they would have seen that they could not
pas the down passenger tram AZ any point between
Harlem Bridge aud Thirty ecoud ST, but must pass
II nearer Williams Bridge than the Port Chester tra.n
would, fOt they were IN advance OF the Port thes-
ter train The englI emae OF the Port chester tr AIN
kaec before he hal arrived at Williams Bridge, that
the 400 tram down had not passed him. for no Hsr
lem which he passed could, by any possibility.
have been mistaken for our down tram.
= In regard 10 mistakes about signals by switch
men. at Williams Bridge, have Only to say that !
never did authorize or know Of any arrangements
by v hlch the eng,nemau or conductor were 10 De
informed OF their night TO enter upon the single track
by a sWtchman had thought Of this matter In ref
erence to the possibility OF mistake, and knew no"
great the risk would be IN leaving TO swrtchman
what | consider mist be known beyond a doubt BY
the conductor AID enginemgn TO insure safety, aud
have considered It their DUTY alone 10 know, that the
proper trains have been passed on the double track
before they shall have rign, 20 enter upon the SIN
gle track
II il my op mon that this misfortune has occurred
by the entire reliance Of those charge Of the tram
on signals agreed upon with the sTitchman at VIII
hams Bridge. and that the rules aud Tegulati ons
were entirely lsregarOed That they passed tram
IN the Tunnel IS quite possible but that they looked
to see what rain Il was have great doubts. have
ouesoned many me before and since this accident IN
regard identity Of trains and have alv aysrecelyet
such answers as satlsned me that II any one looked
to kno,r, he could not be mistaken. II IS my belief
that they never looked for tram, but ran enlrey
By signals To be gwen them Al Williams Bridge ana
the swltchman there was 20 much hurried 10 change
the switch prevent the tram al gTea, speed running
off the track, that before ne could get ms lantern 10
SWING. the train had passed.
1t does not seem reasonable 10 suppose talt me
men Ia charge OF the freight tram were recklessly
regardless OF their own lives aud the lives and prop
erty moving on the Road-but that they we're led
into All arrangement with the swltchman at VIII
ilaIns Bridge TO save themselves trouble, and we're
therefore thOuehtleSs Of 'crs thing they passed on
the double track.
The conductor and eugneman were, believe As
Tie conductor had great experience, he mad been
broue ht up on the Western Railroad Of Massachu-
sets, aud cane highly recommended TO ne. | adj
abundance Of opportunity 70 Judge 0f hin myself
before he took charge of freight tram, and have
hesitation in saying that very few lnieed could De
found more attentive and careful. The tngnman
came from one Of the MASSACHUSETTS, roads ne had
been IN the employ Of the Fltchburg Railroad Com.
panv sx or eight years and OF the Vermont and Mas
sachu seits one year and more he vas recommend
Cd also BY one Of our very best ensLemeh VINO mad
AZ and .rr,..
road silh him | was sati>heI also about the man
Ter N which his connection with these Companies
had terminated.
am aware that / IS ntliher wholesome nOr prl-
dent 10 ALLOW. this misconduct o. the suoOrclnatos 20
be received Is the sole cause OF accidents. unless
stnct inquiry INTO The general management 81 me
ROAD shall show that there mas been Wan; OF care
or the pan Of Tie higher officers 20 quart against the
many casualties attendant Oh Railway management
crTt-rI 3 90 not profess 10 know every thlag thar
can be Known about Railways nor can | guaIt
against every possible accident that may happen uDcn
one. Unfortunately: many valuable lessons are
leaned by sad accidents, and We see a renely
though We could not a cause for the occurrence.
Now, that II may hare occurred 20 the MINDS of NE
men ruUIlrg the FIRE ghi tram, that they had passed
she train ~ the double track where 50 many trains
passing AZ all hours IS quite possible gadT ne
rslafs Of the dSe (they depended upon
a swItchman) but they were not ghtfdl men. for
they had the means of showing ine fac, beyond It
doubt. Their line table would ave informed them,
and CORE city but thew had relieved Their minds anl
trusted 70 something lhey shOuld see d. " LLAlt.,
Bridge. which would give them less trouble. We
Just such things every day, Nth certain classes
Of men, aIc even though their o"n lives are At
stake. yet they Soon learn O. become ihcuga.e-S Of
thai
During Tie past >ualile! sc have ha1 mu % SICK
mes Win cur men, and many changes were neces-
saIiy mare. some engInemel ana one freight con
cucIor lett the road and leir PLACES had 70 De sup
Piled With others These changes are d, ali time
ATTENDED with some risk. but how far ms may have
contributed 20 the late casualty cannot sly-,er.
taInly not more than was necessary. change D.
time on the 2Oth Of the month may have confused
or mlsled them. How, though. ! cannot zee Or
think. ! only know tha, such changes are neces-
sary and not without some ross be chance Of ms
hap
In making tie winter arrangements had been
careful 20 conform nearly Is possible 10 last WIZ
ters times looking TO tie bes hours tOT The ousl-
- the road the harmony OF trains WIKI the ar
rangeneits the Harlem Railroad, and 70 sate-y Of
travel.
Though cannot believe that the wanl Of dl>tla-
gushing signals on The New Haven tram was IN any