The republic., 1851-04-16
the surrender of fugitive from service have passed

character and effect of this proceeding, in regard
to which differ entirely from the learned counsel
for the prisoner. He maintains that this IL trial
Of the right Of Thomas Sims his liberty, and that
10 na trial that it is ministerial or auxiliary
to nothing whatever but that, If the certificate is
granted, Thomas Sims 10 consigned to perpetual
| slavery. Many Of the arguments employed by the
learned counsel to sustain his position consist Of
conjcctures or suggestions to what the claimant
into hiI possession If the learned counsel expects
that, in settling question of constitutional law.
! and in determining on the character and effect Of
this proceeding. am to look out of the statute,
away from what It authorizes the claimant 70 do,
| and TO indulge my imagination az TO what he may
do aside from II. am afraid that cannot satisfy
that the claimant may tear up the certificate tho
moment be receives it that he may carry the prs-
oncr TO any other State, 10 Cubs or Brazil, and
sell him. or that, if he takes him 70 Georgia.
he may hurry him into tho interior, upon . plan
tation, and break down his spirit. and refuse him
AL opportunity ~ obtain trial OF the question Of
| his freedom. These things, which it is said the
erations upon which I am to determine what it is
that hs United STATES undertakes TO do, when il
surrenders this man for removal to the State of
Georgia. am of opinion that this question IL to be
determined by the provisions of the Constitution
and the act in question.
In the fret place, then, hold that the rendition
OF fugitives from service, under the Constitution,
is an act analogous to the rendition Of fuxitives
from justice, and that the two cases, 90 far the
powers and dutios Of thc General Government are
concerned, are Of the same general character. and
may appropriately be provided for by the same
general means. 1t has indeed been declared at the
bar that the two cases wide from each other
as possible and that they were made 20 by the Con-
say more than respoctable-authority for the posi-
ton, that they not only analogous but that the
Constitution contemplated similar proceedings in
BOTH Mr. Justice Story, in his commentaries on
sons, holds the following language:
"It is obvious that these provisions for the arrest
and removal Of fugitives Of both classes conte,n-
plate summary ministerial proceedings, and not
the ordinary course of judicial Investigations, to
ascertain whether the complaint be we'll founded,
or the claim of ownership be established beyond all
the guilt or innocence Of the party il to be made
out at his trial; and not upon the preliminary In
quiry, whether be shall be delivered up. All that
there should be sria Jaes evidence e. before tho @ es
ecutive authority 10 satisfy is Judgment that there
probable cause to believe the party guilty. such
as upon an ordinary warrant would justify his
tive slaves, there would seem to be the same necCs
sty Of requiring only primo facie proofs of owner
ship, without putting the party 70 formal asser-
ton OF his rights by . suit at the common law.
Congress appear to have acted upon this opinion;
and accordingly, in the statute upon this subject,
have authorized summary proceedings before .
for q removal''-( g Story's Com. on the Consttu-
ton, 1,6O6.)
| The Commentaries were written and published
nearly ten years before the Of Prigg Penn
| sylvania occurred. When the learned Judge came
to deliver the opinion Of the court in that case, he
said '.There are two clauses in the Constitution
the subject Of fugtives which stand in juxtaposi-
tually to illustrate each other" (l6 Peters, 6ll)
Lot me ask, by whom have they been supposed!
Maniicstly by the Congress who enacted the law
of 1893, which provided for carrying both these
clauses into effect in the same statute and by sim
liar proceedings, with the single difference that in
the one case the appropriate proof was To- be pre-
the fugitive to the agent Of the State demanding
him; and in the other tho appropriate proof is to be
to judge Of the circuit district court
Of the United States or any magistrate Of county
cate to the claimant, authorizing him to remove
the fugitive to the State Territory from which
he fled. (Act Of February y. 1882 Itis obvious.
try, practised under for nearly sixty years, can
have any tendency 10 establish an analogy between
these cases, this legislation warrants the position
that they are analogous. In addition to this, the
declaration of the Supreme Court of the United
States. in Prigg's case carefully and industrousy
made, that they regarded the act of 1898, relative
to fugitive slaves, "as clearly constitutional in all
its leading provisions, and with the exception Of
that part which confers authority State magis-
trates, a. free from reasonable doubt or difficulty"
to my mind clearly authorizes the inference, that
it IL AZ lawful for Congress to authorize summary
ministerial proceedings in the case of class of
fugitives, it is in the of the other, for it is
quite plain that they had authorized such proceed
| ings in both.
In addition to the authorities already cited to this
point may also rely on that Of the supreme court
Of nnsyvania, who, in the year 18l9 said Of the
o. lass that nit plainly apPsa from the
of Congress, that the fugitive to be delivered
up, on a summary proceeding, without the delay
of . formal trial In court Of common law. But
If he had really right to freedom, that right soGs
not impaired by this proceeding; he was placed just
in the situation in which he stood before he fled,
and might prosecute his right in the State TO which
| 1o Inl<, -
Roicis, 81.
II would seem, therefore, that il only remains to
inquire whether the act Of 1850 authorizes
quircs any thing moro than summary ministerial
proceeding, in aid Of the right secured by the Con-
stitution-namely, the right of removal. In order
to determine this, Is necessary TO look at the pro-
ceedings which have been authorized. The statute,
like the act Of l79s requires the claimant to pre-
| sent to the Commissioner proof that the person
whom he demands owes him service in another
State; and, when the Commissioner 10 satisfied of
this, he 10 to grant certificate, which will author
Ire the removal. Now, it secms to me to have very
little tendency to show that this 10 full and final
trial the question Of servtude, to say that the
proof required to be offered il, that tho party il
held to service. The force and effect Of tho evil
dence required by the statute must be limited to the
object for which il 10 requirod and il that object be-
a. 1t clearly 10, to establish the right of removal
only 1t cannot be extended to another and ulterior
object-namely, the right to continue to hold the
| party after he has been removed In the case Of
fugitive from justice. il must be proved that he has
committed a crime. But proved for what purposes
Clearly to establish the right Of removal This hav
ing been established, the warrant that authorizes
his removal has effect TO authorize his imprson
mcnt or punishment in the State ~ which he 10 re
moved; but the right Of that State 90 to hold and
punish him must be established, just as If he had
never left its jurisdiction.
am equally unable also to feel the force of the
objection, that in the Of fugitive from SER
vice he IL surrendered to his owner, whereas fu-
gitive from justice il surrendered to State; for the
fact seems to me 10 have tendency to show that
the proceedings here are, in either case trial Of
any thing more than tho right of removal. In both
cases the Government Of the United States sur
renders the fugitive provides for his surrender
to the party to whom il has stipulated that he shall
bo delivered up That party, in the case, is the
owncr, who claims right to hold tho fugitive
after he has received him. In the other il Z the
State. which claims to hold and punish the fugi-
tive after IL has received him. In both cases the
Government Of the United States does nothing
cauae bic snrrendnx II II at.xi