The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1851-05-08
Eectss N1.i27sl srs.
APPOINTMENT OF PUSTMASTERS.

APPOINTMENT OF PUSTMASTERS.
In the Prospectus for the Era, you state that
one of your objects will be to advocate the cleo
ton Of postmssters by the people. l do not see
all your issues, nor have seen any distinct ad-
vocacy of this principle, save Ia your annual
prospectus, for two or three years past. But as
yours is the only paper know that even proposes
to advocate this reform, and as Congress is off
your hands for a season, it may be you will give
it little space now
There are in the United States more than seven
teen thousand postmasters. They are all appoint
ed at Washington, most Of them by the Postmas-
ter General, few by the President, and all with
out consulting the people interested Suppose,
what is perhaps never the case, that the appoint
ing power honestly aimed to place in each office
the person best fitted for its duties how often
would he be deceived OF course he cannot pre-
tend to know the qualifications Of the applicants
The whole matter must be determined by the rec
ommendation Of others, and those others often
as nearly strangers to the appointor as the sppli.
cants themselves. am told there is an average
of five applicants for each Office. How can he
inteligently judge who of the eighty-fue thousand
should be selected, and who rejected He c,n-
not do it, 1t is natural impossibiity. Let him
be as just as AriHides, and he must of necessity
Oftenest appointed
Add to this necessary difficulty, THAI this ap-
pointing power is always and avowedly used for
party purposes-to reward friends, to punish en-
emies, and TO promote political schemes; that the
questions asked are not, Is he competent is he
honest is he the choice Of the citizens but is he
a good party drudge2 has he worked well 2 will he
work we'll in the party.l And, then, what is the
prospect of good appointments Judge ye.
am not now asking for or stating the facts
but what it is likely they will be under existing
arrangements.
The people in each town are competent to vote
Through Instructed and pledged electors) for Pres
dents and Vice Presidents, and directly for Rep
resentatives to Congress for Governors, for State
Legislators, and other State officers, for county
and town officers. Who would consent that one
of all these should be appointed at Washington,
as postmasters now sre2 But when it comes to
postmaster, a citizen whom we all per-
sonally know, with whom we must all daily deal,
10 whom we must intrust our correspond
ence, and often large sums Of money, then
forsooth we are not competent TO elect, but the
choice must be made for US at Washington, by
those who know all about our wants and all about
the fitness of the candidates This would be
supremely ridiculous, were it not supremely
wicked
Yet again when n man is elected by the peo-
pie, and is aware that his reelection depends upon
| the people, he will take reasonable pains to &C.
commodate his constituents, both in the hours he
shall keep his Office open and in his official inter-
course But when he is appointed by foreign
| power, and knows that he has no one to please
but that foreign power, he will very naturally be
Indifferent to his daily customers. And when,
as is often the case he is not only not their choice,
but appointed over their heads, he will be posi-
lively accommodating and oppressive. Thus,
| when postmaster was recently told that the peo-
pie were very much dissatisfied at his closing his
office 30 many Of the business hours, "Well let
them help themselves il they CAM was his spon-
taneous and gruf reply. And that is perfectly
natural The officer appointed comes to feel that
he will do as he chooses. And he will not COM
monty choose TO be particularly accommodating.
Every one knows that man may do q thousand
things which shall not endanger his office while
that Office depends upon foreign power, but
which are real and constant sources Of vexation
to the people and which he would not really avoid
| if that office depended upon the peoples favor
Add to all this, that neither the postmaster nor
the Government who appoints him will be re-
sponsible for the safe delivery Of letters nor es-
pecally of remittances-that they choose the
agents, and compel us to run oil the risks-and it
comes very near to downright oppression II
would be no more than fair that the Government
should be responsible for the blunders or the
vices Of its appointees. IL they would let the
people choose the postmasters they would be re-
sponsibe both for their competency and their
honesty. But the people do object to taking all
the risk, as now, when they have no voice in the
appointment.
When postmaster Is appointed, the Depart
ment makes him give bonds that he will faithfully
pay over the revenue TO the Government but
nothing more. He may lose or use our letters or
remittances, and there is no restoration or remu.
neraton provided by the Government All that
we must risk. To be sure, if we can prove that
particular man has robbed the mail, the Gov.
eminent will remove him. But they will not pay
us the money back. IL We can get il of him, we'll
il not we lose II. And how seldom Is it that
among the many, the right one c,n be found. Oh
the loss and delay Of common letters no notice il
ever taken, even when the wrong doer is pointed
out IL the Government were responsible as are
their common carriers, these losses and delays
would be remedied
Finally, the Government oompels the people tc
They attach penalty to the employment or use
OF other means Expresses for carrying and dis
tributing the mails are prosecuted, and made tc
desist They monopolire the whole business
Were II left free to private enterprise and com
petition, loss or failure would be as rare N
now IL Is among forwarding and commission mer
chants. II one did occur, 1t would be paid for
and no noise would occur.
Some facts will illustrate these principles here
after. IA. Z. TAYLOR.
Ohio, Apnl, 1851.