Mississippi palladium. [volume] (Holly Springs, Miss.) 1851-1852, 1851-12-05


What toague is able to unfold
Tleialsehoods that in women d2eIl;
The worth in women We behold,
Is almost ia'Psrcepdble
Down with the foolish man say.
Nae changes fro,a bis siagslessezs:
z how'll net yield to womaa's sway
Is sure Of peEfeet blesseeiless.
hzr. Calhoun's View n Relation 70 a
renaing the Constitution.
We transfer to our columns from the
Southern Standard Dir. Calhoun's
views, as given in his recently publish
Ell work, on the important subject Of
changing the Constitution, with view
to tie permanent preservation of the
balance of political power between the
North and the South:
The first Volume of Mr. CalhoGn's
work on Government (says the Stan
dard),is now before the public. 1t is
an octave of four hundred pages, well
bound, il fine large type, and on good
paper. All the booksellers have it foc
sale at two dollars.
The subject IN this work for which
we looked most eagerly was the amend
ment of The Constitution. 1t sgener-
ally known that this was Mr.. Cal
houn's last proposition for the saliva
ton OF the Union and the security of
the South.
As many Of our readers who may
never see Mr.. CaIhoun's work are no
doubt anxious to know Il precise ma
ture OF the amendment to the Consti-
tuition which he had in view, we lay il
before them in his own words, from
page 1872 of his work just published:
''Iow the Constitution could best
/ be modified, so as to effect the object,
can only be authoritaiively determin-
ed by the amending power. It may
be done in various ways. Among O.
thers, it might be effected through q
reorganization of the Executive de-
partment; SO that its powers, instead
of being vested, as they now are, IN q
single officer, should be vested in two
to be so elected as that the two should
be constituted the special organs and
/ representatives OF the respective sec
tons in the Executive department of
the Government, and requiring each
20 approve all the acts of Congress be-
fore they shall become laws One might
be charged with the admin tration
of matters connected with the foreign
relations of the country; and the other
of such as were connected with its do
nestle institutions; the election to be
decided by lot. Ii would thus effect
more simply, what was intended by
the original provisions of the Constitu-
ton, in giving to one of the maiorities
composing the Government decided
preponderance in the Electoral Col
lege, and to the other majority still
more decided influence IN the eventual
choice--in case the College failed to e
/ lect President. 1t was intended to
effect an equilibrium between the lar
ger and smaller States in this depart.
ment but which, in practice, has en-
tirelv failed, and, by its failure, done
much TO disturb the whole system. and
to bring about the present dangerous
state Of things.
s.lndeed, it may be doubted whether
the trainers of the Constitution did no
commit great mistake in constituting
a single instead OF plural Executive
Nay, it may even be doubted whethel
a single Chief Executive, invested wifi
al the powers properly appertaining
to the Executive Department of the
Government, as is the President. i.
j compatible with the permanence Of a
popular Government especially in {
/ wealthy and popolous community
with large revenue, and nnmerou.
body Of officers and employers. Ger.
! tain ii is, that there IS 40 instance o
a popular Government, so constituted
which has long endured. Even, thu.
! far, furnishes no evidence in lis favor,
and nota little against it; xor 10 it tie
present disturbed and dangerous state
Of things, which threatens the country
with monarchy or disunion, may bs
Justly attributed. On the other hand,
the two most distinguished censtitu
tionai governments 81 antiquity, both
IN respect to pecmaaencs and power
had dual Executive. / refer 10 those
OF Sparta aud of Rome. The formel
had two hereditary and the latter tse
elective chief magistrates. It is trus
that England, from which ours IN thil
respect Is copied, has single here.
i ditary head OF the executive depart.
ment of her government, but It's no
! less true that She has had many an ar
duoiis Struggle to prevent her chic
magistrate from becoming absolute
and that to guard against il efIectuai
Ely, she was finally compelled to divesl
him substantially Of the power of ad.
ministering the Government, By trans.
] ferring il practically TO cabinent d
,lher responsible ministers, who, by es-
i tablished custom, cannot hold Office
unless Supported by. majority Of th<
i two houses OF Parliament. She has
/ thus avoided the danger Of the CHE
magistrate becoming absolute. and
|contriyel to unite. substantially, sin.