The primitive Republican. (Columbus, Miss.) 18??-1852, 1851-06-05

q will be 10 defend them. lIe NoIthHesleIi
etafes from their local position, W. have y
lfhe event ola iarupion.of tie Union, more
,Aaffnitv for Their neig lboI 81 the South than
I For ne Eastern States. see 40 reason
sI,a,sefore. why ne mould feal g poatpone
tbe ,ssne between The tWo sections Tic
s4bes sonthern States have 10 fear q the
North n the future; brit thls ase ilas !
and this occasions, in great degrees tlelr
difference from us in present policy. ~ ms
le under panic Wlieli g ns9lllg
is eparate nationality regaI 3 q con
SEQ noes The Southern States nave sne
courage Of power, We the courage OF desphr.
.lIet Us recover from this unworthy alarm !;
let our action be dictated by policy and not
by trepidation
i repeat. the pressure from the North can
alone unite the South-this pressure IS at
.8worl: let it 90 on. When the fruit IS ripe
d we will gather it let us not commit the fol-
IIy Of trying to gather 1.-two soon. If we do
i've shall be necessarily disappointed.
7 i will now briefly consider the argument
for secession Secession is recommended on
two grounds:
1. That it will produce Southern I'm
ion.
2. That, failing in that, it is a good meas
ure in itself.
Il Let US see how this is.
Il Secession will be followed by peace or by
wsr
suppose il is followed bypeaee Then |
take it for granted it could not produce a
] Southern Union, for reasons so obvious that
lit is unnecessary to mention them.
Suppose secession is followed by war, or
rather 10y a quasi war, bloeade, the only
war which would take place. Would this
unite the South /? cannot see upon what
grouud. We take a step, secession, against
their wishes and contrary to their and our
interests as they suppose, viii they not be
willing to see us foiled in this movement p
Win they not endure, with philosophy, the
Ispectacle of our peenniary losses, the only
way in which blockade would opearte up
on US? 1t certainly seems so tome. The
Southern States are more interested In our
continuing in the Union than Che Northern
States are, and under feelings of aversion to
our policy, which they have, it is unnatu-
raj that they should be unwilling to see
commercial restraint exercised upon US, to
prevent US from doing an act injurious to
them.
think then, in view of all the circumstan-
ees, coercion by commercial restrictions
and the only'kind ofcoercion which would
/ be, would not bring about a Southern I'm
ion.
Secession then, whether attended with peace
or war, not causing Union of the South
is not in kcepin with our great policy
Of bringing about Southern Union, and
therefore should not be adopted.
As to the second purpose of Secession
that it is a good measure in itself, the nation
atty ofSouth Carolina-E hardly know what
/ to say, it seems to be so diametrically antago-
nistic toeyery principle Of our policy.
The first great Fundamental, unanswerable
objec ton to tits, that it is the disunion Of
tie South. Words of such fearful import
that I will not weaken them by elaboration
2. South Carolina cannot become anation.
/ God makes nations, not man. You cannot
extemporise a nation out of South Carolina
/ It's simply impossible we have not there
sources We could exist by tolerance, and
what that tolerence would be, when we con
sider the present hostile spirit Of the age to
the instution Of Slavery, Of which we would
be lookcdupon as the peculiar opponent, all
may readily imagine. trust we may
never have to look upon the painful and hu-
initiating spectacle.
8. From the weakness Of our National
government, a feeling of insecurity would
arise. capital would take The alarm and leave
Jus But it may be said let capital go 70
1 this Ireply, that capital is the life-blood Of
a modern community, and in losing it you
lose the vitality of the State
Fourth. This national government would
be a very, rcry costly machine The cost
of government is in inverse proportion to It's
numbers. A small national government j.
necessarily far more expensive than a large
one. Look at the small German States,
ground down with taxation. So it would be
with us The federal fleets would cut off
all import duties, and the immense burthon
of the government would have to be raised
by direct taxation.
Fifth. The feeling of insecurity arising
from the weakness of our national govern
ment, together with the burthen of increased
taxation, would cause, or rather continue
an immense emigration. Emigration is nat
urally going on all the time from the old
States to the fertile FL Dorados of the West
put any further burthens on the citizens Of
the old States, and you add Immensely to
this stream Of emigration. Unfortunately
this emigration in the event of your becom-
ing a separate nation would be only from
f the white race, and you would, therefore, be
going down the declivity of ruin with fearful
, velocity.
Sixth. Following emigration and a natu
) raj effect oft, would be an immense depre
/ citation of property, lands first, more land
J being thrown into market than the demand
required, then negroes, as they would be GU
t off from the Western market Million:
would be lost to the State in this way.
t Eighth. The separate nationality of Soutl
f Carolina would be the Wilmot proviso.
I If the North should seek to apply thi
8 Proyiso in our State, every man would ris
sword in. hand to. prevent il, yet this is tn
very thing We propose to do ourselves. ca
we conceive of a more magnificent folly
7 To redress the grievance of the Wilmot Pro
yiso being applied to California we apply
to South Carolina.
Ninth. Our secession would weaken til
! South in the Union, it wonld be the desel
I ton of our friends, "gigingaid and comfort t
our enemies" But it is said our secessio
50 weakening the South would enable til
North sooner to press its abolition designs: o
> the contrary our secession would alarm Ii
Al, - 4. Il -