The Kalida venture. [volume] (Kalida, Ohio) 1841-1865, 1851-01-03

| tlOn SUOulu IdN6 DGGu iOiUOd. -aru &.
t., The provisions | believe TO be biadin
on the State and the people Of the States
and every public eunctIonary is under III
solemn obligations of'au oath 10 obey il
mandates. by means OF this, Congress
has the discretionary power to legislate
to carry on. The design OF the provision
not infringing onany other article orscc
lion in that instrument, and the Consitu
l,lion and the laws Of Congress, and trea
ties made in pursuance Of il, are declared
to he the supreme law Of the land. 3"
Ifthe late act violates this instrument
in what does such violation exist? Notir
establishing new nor unusual rules o
evidence, for where the Constitution il
silent, they are within the Legislative ds
crelon. Not in denying jury trial, fol
| il does not differ, in this respect, from
the law of 1893, which has remained fol
ffiy-seven years in force, and been sane
toned, both by state and national decis'
ion, with but little, if any, complaint.
OPINIONS OF TIE FEDERAL JUDGES, &c.
One of our mos, able elementary writer's
is fll,e same opinion. Judge Story, in
his commentaries on the Constitution
uses this language:-"lt is obvious that
these provisions for ethe ares, and reno.
val Of fugiives ofboih classes from labor
and justice contemplate summary minis
terial proceedings, aud not the ordinary
judicial investigations. And in the case
of fugitive slaves, there would seem to be
The same necessity Of requiring only
prima facia proofs Of ownership, vithou,
putting The party to formal assertion of
his rights, by suit at the common law"
Judge Grier denies in any case Of extra.
diiion, that a jury trial is warranted by the
Constitution or authorised by usage.
p l think no case Of mere preliminary
examination can be found, Of trial by
Jury, in any of the United States.
The 9th article refers to final cri-
minal judicial trial, to establish or acquit,
and the 7lh to civil trials, at common
law, meaning final Judicial trials.
These are the only provisions in the
Constitution, of the Uni ed States on the
subject, and neither reaches any case Of
preliminary examination, and especially
where the proceedings are ministerial
rather than judicial.
Is the law unconstitutional because i,
suspends the writ Of Habeas Corpusl
Suppose 1t is, what is the consequence?
Merely that the provision suspeuding the
writ would be void, and The writ issue
MS in other cases. lam, however, Of the
opinion, the language used does not sus
pend the writ. II is no more than the
language which the law applies TO every
court of exclusive competent Jurisdiction
The writ is to discharge from illegal
restraint, if the imprisonment be legal,
the writ itself is discharged. These have
been SO far as | have observed, the main
objections 10 the consiitutionality OF the
law, neither of which, in my opinion, is
we'll taken. .: ... ...s- .
It's void because IT opposes the law
of God7 Here | will quote the language
of one of our most distinguished men,
whose great experience and extensive
requirements, are his best commentator.
In case lately tried before Judge Nc
Lean in the State of Indiana, this iden-
tical question was presented, and he uses
this identical language in his charge 10
the jury.
"No earthly power has right to inter.
pose between mans conscience and
his Maker. He has right, an inalienable
right, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience. For
this, he alone must answer, and he is
entirely free from all human restraint,
to think and act for himself. But this is
not the case when his acts effect the
rights of others. Society has a claim
upon all its citizens. General rules hsye
been adopted in the form oflaws for the
protection Of the rights Of persons and
things. These laws lie at the foundation
of the social compact, and their obser-
vance is essential to the maintenance OF
civilization. In these matters the law,
and not conscience, constitutes the rule
Of action"
| think the view thus expressed, is
unauswerabIe, and the result therefore,
to which have arrived, in my own mind,
is, that the law is binding and obligatory,
and should advise against its opposition
by any act of violence.
By this law. the slave is deprived OF
no right which he enjoyed before, under
the law of 1898, or under the CoDstitu-
ton CT the United States, as explained
by the Supreme National tribunal, in the
case Of Prigg vs.. the Commonwealth Of
Pennsylvania.
1t was there held that, although Con
gress might legislate, Legislation was
unnecessary for the capture of fugitive
slaves: that the Constitution executed
itself and the owner might eize and
return them, where found, in any other
state by virtue of his authority alone.
THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW UNJUST AND
'' INExPEpIENT. As
must not, by any means, be under,
stood, however, as attempting 10 dc.
fend the propfiety and expedicncy
of This law. 1t il macceptable to