Weekly national intelligencer., 1851-11-08
Mn. CALHoUNs ULTIMAruM


dy-the sine qua non, without which noth, "a would
probably prevent dissolution of the exis1.I .ITnion
-an amendment of the Constitution, necessay as
equality with the North. The precise charact~
of that amendment he did not particularze. In
an article of the National Intelgencer of the 25h
of January last however, was stated that the gen.
eral understanding that proposed an Executive
|" to be composed of two members, to be chosen
from the two great geographical divisions, each
to be check upon the other, and both Of them
" TO exercise the veto power, had been corrobora-
ted by authentic evidence" We have at length
what may be considered official information on the
subject; the evidence of the Senator himself, un-
der his own hand. We copy the subjoined expo.
siton Of it from the !" Southern Standard" OF
Monday last:
''The first volume of Mr.. Calhoun's work on
Government is now before the public. II is an oc-
tavo offour hundred pages, well bound, in fine large
type, and on good paper. ALI the booksellers have
it for sale at two dollars.
g The subject in this work for which we looked
most eagerly was the amendment of the Constitu-
tion. Il is generally known that this was Mr..
Calhoun's last proposition for the salvation of the
GAS many of our readers who may never see
Mr. Calhoun's work are no doubt anxious to know
the precise nature of the Amendment to the Con-
stitution which ne had in view, we lay it before
them in his own words. from page 392 of his work
Juss f-,i:-Lal.
How the Constitution could bes, be modified so as to
effect the object only be authoriaivey determined by
the amending power 1t may be done in various ways.
Among Others mghtb effected through reorganization
of the Erecre department; that its po,oers, instead Of
being vested, they are, single officer, should be
rested too TO be elected that the two should be
constituted the special organs and representatives of the
spective sections the E1eetiue department of The Gou
ement, and requiring each approve all the acts of Con-
gvess before they shall become acs. One might be charged
with the administration Of matters connected with the foreign
Ieati Of the country and the other of such
neced with its domestic institutions the selection be de-
cded by lot 1t would thus effect, simply, what
intended by the original provisions Of the Constitution in
giving TO Of the msorties composing the Government
decided preponderance in the Electoral College, and to the
other majority still decided influence in the eventual
choce-in the College failed elect President. 1t
intended effect equilibrium between the larger and
smaller States in this departments but which, in practice has
entirely failed and, by its failure, done much disturb the
whole SYSTEM ard bring about the present dangerous
of things
Indeed it may be doubted whether the trainers of the
Constitution did commit great mistake in constituting
single instead of plural Executive. Nay, may be
doubted whether single Chief Magistrate invested with all
the powers properly appeanng the Executive Department
of the Government ass the President compatible with the
permanence of popular Government especially wealthy
and populous community with large revenue and
rous body Of officers and employees Certain it is that there
oa popular Government constituted which has
lie
favor, and little against it for the present disturb
ed and dangerous of things which threatens the
try with monarchy disunon, may be justly attributed On
the other hand, the two most distinguished constitutional
Governments Of antiquity, both in respect permanence and
power had dual Executive refer those of Sparta and
of Rome The former had hereditary ard the latter
elective chief magistrates 1t is that England, from
which in this respect is copied has single hereditary
head Of the executive department of her Government but
not less true that she has had many and aduous struggles
prevent her chief magistrate from becoming absolute and
that, guard against eectualy, she finally compelled
to dve him substantially Of the power Of administering the
Government by transferring il practically to cabinet Of
sponsble minister's who, by established CUSTOM hold
Office unless supported by majority Of the two houses of
Parliament She has thus avoided the danger Of the chief
magistrate becoming absolute and contrived unite, sub
santiay, single with plural executive, in constituting
that department Of her Government We have such
guard and have such, without entire change in
the character of our Government and her example of
furnishes evidence in favor Of single chief mags
ate in popular form of Government like ours while the
examples Of former times, and thus far furnish
strong evidence against it.
"But it is objected that a plural Executive necessarily
leads TO intrigue and discord among its members and that
il is inconsistent with prompt and efficient action. This may
be true when they all elected by the constituency
ring single executive, with all its objections plural
ecutive But the is very different where they elect
ed by different constituencies, having conflicting and hos
tile interests would be the fact in the under
sideraton Here the two would have to concuningy
in approving the acts of Congress- and separately in the
sphere of their respective departments The effect in the lat
ter would be retain all the advantages of single
cened and in the former harmony and concord
between the two sections and, through them, in the Gov
eminent. For, act Of Congress could become law
without the assent of the chief magistrates representing both
sections each, in the elections would choose the candidate
who in addition to being faithful its interests would best
command the and confidence of the other section
And thus the Presidential elections instead of dividing the
Union into hostile geographical par,ies the stronger sug
cling - -nsro- ~ ~na the defend
rghtsas the case-would become the means Of re-
storing harmony and concord the country and the Govern
ment II would make the UIion union in truth a bond of
mutual affection and brotherhood and not connexon
used by the stronger the instrument of dominion and ag
grandzemen, and submitted to by he weaker only from
the lingering remains Of former attachment and the fading