The Sumter banner. [volume] (Sumterville, S.C.) 1846-1855, 1851-09-16

The Northwestern States, from their
local position, will have, in the event
Of tho disruption Of the Union, more
affinity for their ncighbors of the
South, than for the Eastern States.
see no reason, therefore, why We
should fear to postpone tho issue be-
tween the two sections. The other
Southern States have no fear of the
North i'll the futurc-but this State
has, and this occasions, in grca. dc.
gree, their difference from us in the
present policy. In this State VIC arc
under panic which is urging us to
separate nationality, regardless Of
consequences. The Southern States
have the courage of power, We the
courage OF despair. Let us recover
from this unworthy alarm; let our &C.
ton be dictated by policy, and not by
rtpidation.
l repeat, the pressure from the
North can alone unite the South
this pressure is at work; let it 20 on.
When the fruit is ripe We will gothcr
it; let us not commit the folly of try.
ing to gather it too soon. If We do
we shall be necessarily disappointed.
Twill briefly consider the araumcn.
for secession.
l. That it will produce Il Southern
Union.
2: That, failing i'll that, it is a
good measure in itself.
Let US see how this is.
Secession will be followed by peace
Or by war.
Suppose it is followed by peace
Then take it for granted it could
not produce Southern Union, for
reasons so obvious that it is not ncccs.
sary to mention them.
Suppose secession is followed by
war, or rather by quasi war, a
blockade, the only war which would
take place. Would this unto the
South? | cannot see on what ground.
We take a step, secession, against
their wishes and contrary to their aud
our interests, as they suppose. will
they not be willing to see us foilcd in
this movement ? Will they not en-.
durc, with philosophy, the spectacle
Of our pecuniary losses, the only way
i'll which a blockade would operate
upon US? 1t certainly seems so to
INC. The Southern States arc more
interested in our continuing in the
Union than the Northern States are.
and under the feelings of aversion to
our policy, which they have, it is not
unnatural that they should be willing
to sec commercial restraint cxcrcis-
ed upon us, to prevent US from doing
an act injurious to them.
think, then, in view of all the
circumstances, coercion by CONNER
cial restrictions, tho only kind IF CO.
crcion which would be, and would not
bring about Southern Union.
Secession, then, whether attended
with peace or war, not causing Il
Union of the South, is no, in further.
ance Of our great policy Of bringing
about a Southern Union, and there
fore should not be adopted.
AS to tho second purpose of scccs-
sion-that it is a good measure in it.
self, the nationality Of South Carroll,
ma hardly know What to say, i,
seems to me to be 50 diamc,lmctric.
ally antaSonistic to every principle Of
our policy.
The first great Fundamental unan-
swcrablc objection to it is, that it Is
the asunion IF the .SouM. Words
Of such fearful import that | will not
weaken them by claborotion.
Second. South Carolina cannot be
come Il nation. God makes nations,
not man. You cannot cxtcmporisc a
nation ont of South, Carolina. 1t is
simply impossible, VIC have not the
resources. We would exist by tolcr-
ance, and what that tolerance would
be, when we consider the present
hostile spirit Of the age to the il.stitu-
ton Of slavery, Of which we would be
looked upon as the peculiar exponent,
all may readily imagine. | trust we
may never have to look upon the
painful and humiliatins spectacle.
| Third. From the weakness Of our
national government, a feeling Of in.
rccurity would arise, and capital
would take the alarm and leave us.
But it may be said, let capital 20.
10 this | reply, that capital is the
lifc-blood of modern community,
and in losing it you lose the vitality
Of the State.
Fourth. This national government
would be very, rcy costly
machine. The cost of govcrnnen,
is in inverse proportion to its numbers.
n small national government is
necessarily far more expensive than
4 large one. Look at the small
German States, ground down with
l