Grand River times. [volume] (Grand Haven, Mich.) 1851-18??, 1851-10-29

Tribunal, the court OF sessions might equally en-
join the parties from proceeding in chancery,
and thus they would be unable to proceed in any
court. The fact, therefore, that an injunction
issues only to the parties before the court and
not to the court, is no evasion of the difficulties,
that are the necessary result of an attempt to
exercise that power over party who is iti-
giant in another and Independent forum" The
district court was not permitted to oust the stste
court OF its Jurisdiction and custody ofthe prop
erty attached.
In the case of Slocum Us. Maybery, 2 Wheat.
l, "a Cond, Rep, y replevin was sustained in
the State court against revenue officer, by the
owner OF goods that were seized without pro-,
cess. and were not such goods as were author
lied by law to be seized; as the common law
tribunals Of the United States were closed by
law against such remedies, they being cogniza-
BILE alone in the admiralty. But in this case and
in Gelston ct al vs Hoyt, 3 Wheat, GAG, tits de-
termined that an action will not lie against the
sezing officer in any common law tribunal un-
til a final decree is pronounced in the Admiralty
upon the proceeding an rem. In the former
case, Marshall, G. D., remarks that" The ju-
dietary act gives to the federal courts exclusive
cognizance Of all seizures made on land or wat
ter Any Intervention of State authority,
which by taking the thing seized out Of the pos
session OF the United States, might obstruct
the exercise of this jurisdiction, would unques-
tionably be violation of the act; and the fed
eral court having cognizancc of the seizure,
might enforce redelvery of the thing, by at
tachment or other summary process against the
parties, who should direct such possession.
The party supposing himself agrieved by sell
zure, cannot, because he considered it tortious,
replevy the property out of the seizing officer,
or Of the court having cognizance of the cause"
This being an action which takes the thing it.
self out of the possession of the officer, could
not be maintained in State court, if, by the
act Of Congress, it was seized for the purpose
of being proceeded against in the federal cours.
Goods or vessels attached or levied on,in pursu.
ance of process issued from a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, are thereby reduced into the
custody of the court for the purpose of be-
ing proceeded against in satisfaction of the pro-
cess, or of the debt or demand of the plaintiff
or libelant and cannot be taken from the pos
session of the officer making such attachment
or levy, upon process emanating from another
and different tribunal.
In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the
court which first has possession of the subject
must determine it conclusively, Smith us. Nc
Iver 9 Wheat 532 Is Cond. Rep. 662) The
party at whose suit property is attached, has a
constitutional and legal right to the law of the
court issuing the process. the officer legally
claims the same, and also the protection of the
court in serving its process. If, according to
the law OF the court issuing the process, the
property attached is found to belong to the de-
fendant; the plaintiff claims from that court,
through its officer, satisfaction of his demand,
out of that property. A court Of another gov.
ernment and different jurisdiction cannot inter-
pose between that plaintiff and the property at
tached and transfer the legal possession, or vest
the legal title in n third person, or assume the
exclusive custody or disposition of the property.
When party issues his process and attaches
property, he is presumed to know his right to
do so, according to the law fthe court, in which
he becomes suitor and that court is bound
to dispose of his cause according to its law.
But to compel suitor in one court to follow
the property attached into the forum Of differ
ent government and there contend for satisfac-
ton of his demand according to its law and ru-
lings, would be grievance and abuse not to be
tolerated; would create a serious conflict of
jurisdiction, which should always be avoided by
we'll regulated courts and all good citizens.
Goods and chattels in the possession of de-
fendant are liable to attachment or levy, and
Wnen aLlacneu OF leVleu Iney are III CUSTODY Vi
the law, and control Of the court; and must
there remain either in substance, or by the sub
stitution Of bond or security according to the
law and practice of the court, until the subject
be conclusively determined
A court may allow subsequent and addition
al attachments and levies on the same property
by its own officer; and may permit goods attach
ed or levied by one officer to be replevined by
another officer, for it still retains control of the
several writs, and the custody Of the goods, ell
ther in kind or by the substitution of bond in
replevin, upon the service of the writ But
this cannot be done by different and independ-
ent courts. Either one or the other must have
custody for the goods-both courts cannot have
it nor can the officers Of both have the pos
session Of them. 1t is altogether mistake to
suppose, that party may claim goods III the
custody of the law, and transfer them into the
custody of another court, on the plea that ne
has demand against them, or that they have
been wrongfuly taken and detained from him.
He must submit his case to the consideration OF
the court having custody of the goods, or wait
until a final disposition be made Of them, as in
the case of conflicting execution. In De Wolf
Us. Harris, Masons c. C. Reports 5l5, replev-
in was maintained, in the Circuit Court of the
United States. against the Marshal for goods
seized by him.
A State Court has no authority to enjoin u
judgment or execution, or restrain party IN