The Sumter banner. [volume] (Sumterville, S.C.) 1846-1855, 1851-11-11
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5nnallly Intended cd 3 e lbc, a blessing 70
all. g
atSuchg lis the discase4-and such
the character ofSthc only remedy
which can reach it. In conclusion,
tllcro remains to be considered, The
practical question. ~ Shall Fit be an.
I3p.icd 2 Shall the only. power which
can can app. .s,it be invoked. for the pur.
pose? !. 5 ,s{;.s
"The responsibility Of answering
this solemn question, regtsf on the
States composing the stronger sec
ton. These of the weaker are III d
minority, both Of the, States, and of
population: and, of5ccnseauence, in
every department of The government
They then. cannot be responsible for
nm net Which requires The concur
rence of twosthirds of both houses of
Congress, or two.thirls of the States
to originate, and three.fourths Of the
latter to consnmmatc, With such
difficulties in, their way, The States OF;
the weaker section can do nothing,
however disposed, to save the Union.
and the government, without The aid
co-operation2of the Stntes composing
the stronger section: but With their
aid and colopcratiohfh both may be.
saved. On-thc latter therefore, rests
tho responsibility ofinyoking the
high power which alone can apply.
the remcdy;i and, if to sla SO, of all
the consequences which may follow
The EsGsssltins sassfiisS Carolina.
q We have looked Nth some atten.
ton attic speculation Of Northern
papers on the recentelectioni in in South
Carolina. We find that they gelter..
ally regard it as Tie end Of Southern
tcsistancefto Tie gSD prsmisc, ana, !,
III fact, MS a final of the
right secession DO HE practical
resistance to Fed Satiiosi il
this is a nlistaS
' III ls:assl sa4ss sESSs
a very Bsobasss yeres ssse
eyer satisfied tliat5it was Wisc Ms, sisl.ilc8.
Indeed, wo have at no time expected
a dissolution of the Union 10 resoli
from the Compromise, although NC
think that measure would have iusti
! fed it. We supposed that il two
more Southern States had declared
their determination to sccedo unless
the Compromise was abandoned, and
the territorial rights Of the South re.
spec,ed, that the Federal Govern
ment would have rcceded. And we
think the South has committed an ir.
rctricvcablc blnnder in not making
that Issue. As for South Carolina.
her position remains widely difrercn,
from !ha. Of the other Southern
States, She is still pledged to Sc
cession whilst the Compromise en-
durcs, but reserves to herself the de
termination Of the time and mode ir
future, but is ready to act whencve,
the cooperation Of another State is
obtained.
Thus, one State of the Union la:
been thoroughly alinca.ed, and very
| powerful! minorities in several others
And many of the Southern State.
profess TO be ready for disruption
on the occurrence C further aggres
slons, which probably will occur
It's needless to repeat what NC have
,ftcn said, particularly now, afte,
what has transpircd,) that we have
very little confidence in these disrup
tive pledges. Certainly, if the, Com
promise can be not only endured, hu
accepted gracefully" honorablv
chcerfully, Loyalty, there is little rea
son to expect resistance in half n do
zen supposable Cases Of far inferio,
cnormity.
But the most important result q
the late discussions is, the develonc
ment of largo and powerful body O
men who have tho sagacity and indie
pcndcnce TO calculate tho value cl
the Union, not only financially, bu
politically, socially, and morally; ana
who arc ready ito net according tc
their convictions. This party is moi
predominant in any State but South
Carolina. But it is much more pow
orful than any of the parties was or
iginally that asserted what arc nov
the settled doctrines Of the country
on its most important interests. Tho
present systems of currency and tax
alton wore at the beginning (and
that only about eighteen or twenty
years ago. much less supported b
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