The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1851-01-02
T6E VERMONT Law.

The Washington Union does not attempt to
show that our exposition Of this ssg is u0tSair OF
incorrect, but it seems to think it ridiculous that
any editor, especially an anti-slavery editor,
should presume to entertain opinions of the Con-
stituton, differing from those of the authors and
supporters of the Fugitive act Of the last session
The editor has wonderful reverence for author
ity, when he imagines its weight to be on his side
of the question, but one is more ready to ques-
ton its claims, when it is against him. Now, he
appears to believe that the Supreme Court Of the
United States is an nfallible Tribunal, before
whose decisions all must bow in prompt, unques-
tioning submission.
We have great respect for the laws of Congress,
and for judicial decisions; but we regard them
neither as infallibe nor irreversible. A law is
binding until repealed and the decisions of the
Supreme Court are law in the particular case de-
cided--but the humblest American citizen may
question the wisdom of the law and seek its re-
peal as he may deny the soundness of the deci-
sion and seek its reversal. Granville Sharpe did
not succeed in procuring final opinion against the
possibility of slavery existing in England, un-
til several opinions to the contrary had first been
pronounced by the highest courts of the realm.
Members of Congress in this country are sworn
to support the Constitution and this Constitu-
tion and the laws passed in pursuance thereof,
not the decisions Of the Supreme Court, are de-
clared to be the Supreme Law of the Land
Every member lie bound by what he believes to be
the obligations imposed by ths Constitution, not
by what any court has affirmed them to be. He
will vote in accordance with his belief, and, il
there be q majority concurrng with him, their
acts will be law, creating certain rights or impos-
ing certain obligations Its validity may be ques-
toned before the Supreme Court, and its deci.
sion may be adverse, but, we repeat, that deci-
sion is final only in the particular case decided
Other cases may be made under the law, for the
purpose Of obtaining reversal of the decision,
and Congress- if it choose, 10 the exercise Of its
independent right, as the Law Making Power,
may enact another law, embracing the same prin-
ciple which the court has pronounced invalid
The decision Of the Court Is final in the particu-
lar case decided, binding upon the parties to it,
is to be enforced by the executive officers of the
United States, and constitutes an authoritative
precedent but it is not The Constitution or q part
of the Constitution it does not limit the power
of Congress, or deprive the constituency of the
right to think speak, and vote against it, with q
view to induce renewed action by Congress in IA
vor of what the Court has pronounced against
If we understand anything this is the Demo-
cratic platform; to claim supremacy, final and
universal, for the Supreme Court, is of the es-
sence of Federalism.
Itisnow evident that the Union, and the journals
which have been declsming against the Yer
mont law, had never understood it.
The first three sections, we said, provided for
more effectually securing the writ Of habeas cor
pus. We should like to see the editor audacious
enough to question the right to make such pro-
vision. Ii the Fugitive law denies or impairs the
habeds corpus, everybody knows that to that ex.
tent it is null and void and, il it does neither
then the sections of the Vermont law, more ef
fectualy securing the writ, are not in conflict
with it, About this part Of the law, therefore
there cln be no ground for discussion.
In relation to the closing sections which pro-
vide a mode of trial for fugitive cases, there IL
room for difference of opinion-and here We dc
not attempt to dogmatize. We said Vermont as
a sovereign State, had the right to judge Of hei
duties under the Constitution-that in the exer
else of her independent judgment, she decided thai
the right to make provision for fulfilling the stir
ulstion of the Constitution relating to fusitives
belonged to the States, and not to Congress
and thereupon proceeded to make the requisite
provison-that the form Of trial she had pre-
scribei was not repugnant to the stipulation, an'
was the very form MIR. Webster had propose,
that Congress should prescribe--that, while Their
could be no question as to the constitutionslty o
this, there might be question in regard TO he
right to legislate in the premiscs--but that, fol
our part, here, as in other cases Of questionable
power inclined to the side of State sovereignty
In other words, we took the Democratic side, anc
our " Democratic" neighbor Of the Uaioa took tn,
Federal side.
We were not aware that there was anythin,
novel in all this, or that We were guilty Of pre-
sumption in suggesting our opinion, especially a
there was high authority to sustain u.s. Sine
then, the following paragraph has caught our eye
1t is from an editorial in the CINCINNATI Eaquus,
one Of the leading Democratic papers Of tn
West, and, we need not add, as Hunkersh as tn
Union itself:
"Our own opinion is, that the General Govern
ment Of the United States has nothing whatever q
do Nth enforelag that agreemea, the constitutions
clause relating to fugitves from service IL as
matter lf smutly nth the States. w
do not think the General Government has an
rign to send its officers into the States TO carr.
out what good faith requires the States alone :
doD
But there is much higher authority in favor o
the Vermont view OF State rights under the Con
stitution. DANIEL WEBSTER, now an oracle witt
tho Union, in his famous speech in the Senate
delivered with great emphasis the following opin