Richmond daily times. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1853, 1851-04-14
I'he Fugihre SZnre Case in Boston.

! The Fugihue Slave Case in Boston,
Our readers are already apprised that the Su-
preme Court of Massachusetts,, on Monday last
| refused second application on behalf of the flu
gitive Sims, for writ of habeas corpus; and
that, on Tuesday, the argument of his case before
Commissioner Curtis closed, and Friday appointed
as the day on which his decision would be an
nounced. Some sketch of the proceedings of
Monday and Tuesday is important to proper I'M
Outstanding Of the whole matter. We have ouly
room this morning, however, for the proceedings
before the Supreme Court.
Petition fer Habeas lorpus.-Upon the opening of
the Supreme Judicial Court yesterday morning, Chief
Justice Shaw and Judges Metcaf Fletcher and Bee.
low being on the bench, R. H. Dana, Jr, Esq, pre-.
sened second petition of Thomas Sims for a writ of
habeas corpus and the Chief Justice after brief con-
ply that was made on Friday to the first application,
VIZ that where it appeared by the petition itself that
the party held under due process OF law, the court
! would grant the writ prayed for.
The court then informed the counsel that they were
OF opinion that the petition not, under the crcum
Stances EMIT led to the writ matter of right but
they were willing to hear an argument on that point
After the reading of the petition and the warrant,
| and some incidental explanation, Mr. Raptoul pro-
ceeded with his argument, the chief point in which
was that the act of 1850 was unconstitutional in Civ
|
who are not judges within the meaning OF the eonstu
| ton.
| Ee concludedbis argument at half past twelve, and
the court appointed three in the afternoon for
cling the decision AT that hour the four judges came
in and the chief justice proceeded deliver the opn-
ion OF the court against the application. He again
reiterated the objection 10 granting the writ that
by the provisions of the habeas corpus act the
was warranted in refusing the writ where appeared
from the petition that he would not be entitled to his
discharge if the writ issued and the practice of the
| had hpe W hat al.
lowance OF the writ in where it must be unavail
ing TO the party would be superuous actin the first
place and be necessarily followed by expense when no
benefit could be derived from it.
Alter touching upon the decacy oftaking case out of
the jurisdiction OF another tribunal, and stating the pecu
liar relations of the and general governments to
other and the history and organization of general
government, whose legislation within the limits OF its
constitutional powers was the supreme law of the land
he referred to the of congress to make laws tor
carrying into effect the powers of the constitution
Those who were familiar with the history OF the
try and the independent rights OF the states under the
confederation, could easily understand why the prov
sons in relation to fugitive slaves inserted in the
| constitution. BY those who framed il the provision
was deemed absolutely necessary. But the question Of
such necessity was not to be discussed now. 1t
enough, that it exists. The court agreed with the
counsel that the provisions in relation to fugitive slaves
to be construed strictly 1t had been the practice
of courts to construe strictly, and distinguish strictly
between fugitive slaves and slaves who might into
| free states otherwise than as tugitives.
The had held thatnone fugitves but those
| who escaped by their own act. Ii owner brought
his slave into free state, then he was not fugitive,
! and would be discharged on habeas corpus. Or if an
officer of the navy allowed to take on board OF
u S. ship his slave servant at port ina slave state
and the government should order the ship to northern
port. the slave would moi be here as fugitive. He
not here by his act but by the act OF his
in the first place, and by that OF the government in
the second. Hence he would not be fugitive, and
would be entitled to his discharge on habeas corpus
| This was what TO be understood by strict con-
structon ofthe fugitive slave provision.
| His honor now proceeded to consider the fugitive
law OF 1850 The court did not ind that it differed
from the act OF 1893 in any OF its provisions consttu
ionally considered. That state magistrates
the power grant certificates tor returning such slaves,
| and in great variety extending period
| of nearly fifty years. that law had been held to be
constitutional least had never been held to be
constitutional The powers conferred on magistrates
OF the several states by that act had been ransferredo
the commissioners OF the U. s. courts by The act of
1893 The powers given in the acts the same; but
the officers authorised to exercise them were changed
The cause of this change 10 be found in the le
esaon of some OF The States, arising probably out of
the decision in the Prgg case. While the court there
held the law TO be constitutional, it also held that
it was optional with State magistrate to take COM
pa mt under it, to refuse to act he not holding his
commission from the United States; and, Also that the
Legislature ola State might prohibit its magistrates from
| acting under the law. nder this decision some of
the States did pass laws fobddng their strates' tic
take cognznnce OF complaints under the fugitive of
1898. 1t Therefore became necessary, order to carry
out the provision in relation to fugitive slaves for Con-
gress transfer the powers given in the act of 1898
| officer commissioned under its own laws The United
States commissioners are certainly not Judges within
the meaning OF the provision in the const tuition OF the
| United States, quoted by the counsel Neither
the magistrates under the of 1898 such Judges yet
the act giving them their powers in relation to tugves
had never been held to be unconstitutional il related
to matterin which the national legislature was within
| the limits OF the U. S. constitution, supreme.
Again, advering to the constitutional relations exist
ing between the general and state governments, he
said that judges had almost without exception always
| approached questions OF conflict of Jurisdiction with
great decacy, aud he referred the Olmstead case
where the state and national authorities made prepara
| tons for hostile action
In relation to the term judicial power, it not in
all cases easy to decide whether given power was jul
dcia or administrative. in general the two kinds of
power sufficiently distinct, but it not so in
laton to some subjects over which power given
and il might be difficult 10 determine whether power
was judicial or administrative in its nature In of
administrative power, some discretion vested in the
officer authorized to exercise the power. And there
| was another consideration OF some importance. The
government OF the United States divided uto three
branches-the executive, legislative, and Judicial To
come extent each branch must be the Judge of its own
powers, and unless the contrary clearly and manesy
appeared, II was TO be presumed that their acts
| Wthn Their constitutional powers And Congress may
TO some extent decide what administrative and what
are Judicial powers in eeislang for the purpose of car
| rying out the provisions of the constitution
The court did not see any special necessity for pre-
senng the petillon 10 hem the subject appeared to
come more particularly within the iursd ction of the
u. States courts, which were The practice OF
| considering and acting upon the laws passed by CEN
was to bring the state judiciary into conflict with the
| national judiciary, which it was always desirable to
avoid for the purpose Of maintaining that harmony