Martinsburg gazette. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1833-1855, 1851-05-06
VOL. 52.-N0. 10.

one naS nau tae DOtuneSS 10 ADVANCE II
since. Sir. il well becomes them 10 pour
their fercest artillery upon il; for il il,
with The other Limitations upon the tax.
ing and appropIiaiing powers are adopted,
i al once sweeps from under them every
pFelexi upon which they can no longer
make an aErcal to the alarms Of Jealous
and distrusiiGl constituency,
Sir, see 40 objection 10 such limi,a.
ton on the constitution, upon the grounds
either Of principle or Of expediency.--
None upon the ground Of principle what
ever, and none upon The ground Of expe.
dieney II ell the reforms now asked bv
me people are accorded TO them. Bat il
is said Is not this limiia;ion upon the pow
er Of the General .7ssem5ig to call con-
vention, except BY the concurrence O.
two.ihirds in conflict with the principle
which declares that majority Of the yeo-
pie have power TO alter aud abolish their
government whenever found inconsistent
with their happiness. BY no me ms
The agents Of the people must not be
confounded with the people themselves;
and limitations upon the trustees Of gov
eminent must not be mistaken for res
trainss upon those great rights which be-
leng TO the people. TO be exercised bv
them whenever the emergency demands
il.
There are but two modes under the
principles Of government which prevail
10 this country, by which any existing
constitution can be changed.
First. IN the mode which the existing
constitution prescribcs, or the actual gov.
ernmeut consents to.
Second By that great right Of revolu-
ton which is inalienablc aud indcfcasible
which can only be exercised by the pco-
pie themselves, in their sovereign capaci.
ty, and Of Which they can never, by any
compact, diyest themselves.
In framing government, it is perfectly
competent fer the people TO impose upon
that government any limitation which they
may deem expedient; aud whether these
limitations result from desire to insure
greater stability and pormanency to the
established government, or from q compro-
mise OF conflicting interests in any State,
it is perfectly competent. and often wise
and expedient, 70 take from the legislature
The power Of calling convention Of the
people without the concurrence Of more
than a mere majority of that body. This
has become as fixed and thoroughly an es-
tablished principle Of our political system
as that other great maxim, that all power
cmanates from, aud belongs TO- the people.
Look at the constitution of The United
States. No change can take place in that
instrument, unless initiated By two-thirds
OF both houses OF Congress, or by the leg
islaiures of two thirds of the several
States, and TO be afterwards ratified by
three-tourths Of the States SO that if the
small States should combine against any
proposed amendment, one twelfth part Of
the people of the United States could de-
feat it, Aud no State, without its own
consent. can be deprived Of its equal suf-
ffage in the Senate.
But ] admit that the federal constitution
does not afford fair precedent for the
construction of domestic State govern
mcnt. Look. then, TO the constitutions Of
the several States, and you will find that
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi Alabama,
Missonfi, Florida, Arkansas, Texas--all
slaves Statcs-and Illinois, Michigan, Cal
ifornia, and Ohio, BY her constitution
adopted on the 10th Of this MONTH all
prohibit the call Of Convention, or any
change in their organic law, except by d
vote Of two thirds of both branches Of their
legislature. Here, then, are fifteen States
eleven Southern and four Western
which contain this provision All these
States except, perhaps. two Of them. have
planted their constitutions upon the broad
platform Of popular sovereignty and polti-
cal equality; and yet they fnd no difficult
ty in opposing these restraints upon the
legislative body; for in fact they are but
limitations upon the power Of their own
agents. These limitations are at all times
questions Of expediency, merely, 10 be de-
termined wholly in reference to the charac-
ter of the instrument itself; so that, If the
constitution which we are now framing
shall meet the demands for popular reform
now made upon US, and make this govern
ment in all matters in which the people
have a general concern, government Of
the people, shall feel no difficulty in
withdrawing from the action Of the general
assembly, except by two thirds vote tho
power Of disturbing. in any degree. that
compact which may be agreed upon ere.
Then, sir, with constitution so framed
as to secure perfect equality in all the bur-
dcns Of taxation with The debt-creating
and revenuc-appropriatipg power of the
government so regulated and controlled as
to be protected from abuse; with a power
reserved to yourself to check Any changes
in the system, without your own consent
and concurrence, what justification have
you for seeking to concentrate the whole
power OF this government in the hands Of
a sectional minority of its people? 1t il
protection alone you ask 2 Here Is pro-
lection, ample and sufficient In the event
Of the rejection OF such propositions, can
you satisfy US that it is not power alone
which you are seeking to retain Can
you justify yourselves before the people
Of this Conmonwealth-be! the world
in clingiog to your offensive scheme Of gov
eminent, when all the protection which
you need aud all which you have any
right TO demand, can be extended to YOU
upon principles, consistent with the estab-
lished usages Of popular goyernmontg No,
SIR, there IS nothing To justify it. There