The southern press. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1850-1852, 1851-11-11
From the Southern Standard.
Mr.. Calhoun On the Amendment Of the Cen.
sfirmtlNu.

type, and on good paper. All the booksellers
have it for sale, at $500.
The subject in this work for which we looked
most eagerly, was the amendment OF the Consti-
tuition 1t was gener ly known that this was
Mr.. c lhoun's last proposition for the salvation
of the Union, and the security of the South lie
considered that the South might yet be secure
in the Union under new constitutional guaran-
tees. The hope of obtaining these was, and
now is, very faiat, but this was perseverance,
which disregarded present appearances, and had
he lived, we cannot doubt but that he would be
found still struggling for these new guarantees,
in the hope that they, being obtained, the South
would be secure, or being rejected, she would
then be aroused, alarmed, and united
AS many of our readers who may never see
Mr. Calhoun's work, are no doubt anxious to
know the precise nature Of the amendment to
the Constitution which he had in view, we lay
it before them in his own words, from page 1892
of his work just published
How the Constitution could best be modi-
fled, 80 as to effect the object, can only be au-
tlloritatvely determined by the amending power.
1t may be done in various ways Among Others
it might be effected through reorganization of
the executive department. 80 that its powers,
instead Of being vested, as they now are, in a
single officer, should be vested in two ito be
80 elected, as that the two should be constituted
the special organs and representatives of the re-
spective sections, in the executive department OF
the government; and requiring each to approve
all the acts of Congress before they shall be-
come laws. One might be charged with the nd
minstration of matters connected with the for
eign relations of the country; and the other, of
such as were connected with its domestic insti-
tutions; the selections to be decided by lot. 1t
would thus effect more simply, what was in
tended by the original provisions of the Consti-
tuition, in giving to one of the majorities com.
posing the government a decided preponder-
ance in the electoral colege,-and to the 9th
majority still more decided influence in the
eventual choice,--in case the college failed to
elect President. 1t was intended to affect an
equilibrium between the larger and smaller
States in this experimentation which, in prac-
tice, has entirely failed; and, by its failure, done
much to disturb the whole system, and to bring
about the present dangerous state of things.
"Indeed, it may be doubted, whether the
trainers of the Constitution did not commit a
great mistake, in constituting a single, instead
of plural executive Nay, it may even be
doubted whether single chief magistrate in
vested with all the powers properly appertain-
ing to the executive department of the govern
ment, as is the Presidents compatible with
the permanence of a popular government; es-
pecially in wealthy and populous community,
with large revenue and numerous body Of
officers and employees. Certain it i, that
there is no instance of popular government so
constituted which has long endured. Even
ours, thus far, furnished no evidence in its favor
and not little against it; for, to it, the present
disturbed and dangerous state of things, which
threatens the country with monarchy, or disu-
Mon, may be justly attributed. On the other
hand, the two most distinguished constitutional
governments of antiquity, both in respect to
permanence and power, had dual executive.
| refer to those of Sparta and of Rome. The
former had two hereditary, and the later two
elective chief magistrates 1t is true, that Eng
land, from which ours, in this respect, is copied,
has single hereditary head of the executive
department Of her government; bit it is not
! ess true, that she has had many and arduous
struggles, to prevent the chief magistrate from
becoming absolute; and that, to guard against
it effectualy, she was finally compelled to divest
him, substantially, of the power Of administering
the government, by transferring it, practically,
to a cabinet of responsible ministers, who, by
established custom, cannot hold office, unless
supported by a majority of the two houses of
a
of the chief magistrate becoming absolute; and
contrved to unite, substantially, single with
plural executive, in constituting ut depart
ment Of her government. We have no such
guard, and can have none such, without an en-
tire change in the character of our government
and her example, of course, furnishes no evil
dence in favor of single chief magistrate in
popular form of government like ours-whe
the examples of former times, and our own thus
far, furnish strong evidence against it.
aBut it is objected that a plural executive
necessarily leads to intrigue and discord among
its members; and that it is inconsistent with
prompt and efficient action. This may be true,
when they are all elected by the same coustitu-
ency; and may be a good reason, where this is
the case, for preferring a single executive, with
all its objections, to plural executive But the
case is very different where they are elected by
different constituencies having conflicting and
hostile interests as would be the fact in the case
under consideration. Here the two would have
to act, concurringy, in approving the acts of
separately, in the sphere of their
respective departments. The effect, in the latter
case, would be- to retain all the advantages of q
single executive, as far as the administration of
the laws were concerned; and in the former, TO
insure harmony and concord between the two
sections, and, through them, in the government
For as no act of Congress could become a law
without the assent of the chief magistrates rep.
resenting both sections, each, in the elections,
would choose the candidate, who, in addition to
being faithful to its interests, would best COM
mand the esteem and confidence of the other
section. And thus, the Presidential election, in
stead of dividing the Union into hostile geo.
graphical PARTIES the stronger struggling to en-
large its powers, and the weaker 10 defend its
rights--as is now the case-would become the
means Of restoring harmony and concord to the
country and the government 1t would make
the Union union in truth--a bond of mutual
affection and brotherhood; and not mere con-
necton used by the stronger as the instrument
of dominion and aggrandizement-and submit
ted to by the weaker only from the lingering re-
mains Of former attachment, and the fading hope
of being able to restore the government TO what
It was originally intended to be-, blessing TO all
"Such is the disease-and such the character
of the only remedy which can reach it. In con-
clusion, there remains to be considered the prac-
teal queston-shall it be applied? Shall the
only power which can apply it, be invoked for