Southern standard. [volume] (Columbus, Miss.) 1851-1856, 1851-03-01

tro;ned and consequently in relation to these the
autbortv Of State is complete, unquol.fed ana
exclusive
The Court quotes approyingly from the Federa-
list, as follows
:. Now we hold that both the end and the means
ora ,,ssd are within the competency OF the States,
since a portion of their powers were sur a1,.,
to the federal government. Let US see "haI P''
ers are left with the States. Inc feoeiae' -
the 45th number speaking of this subject says
The powers reserved to the several STATES WIN %
tend to all the Objects which in the ordinary course
of affairs concern the lives liberties, properties OIL
the neonle and the internal order, Improvement
and prosperity of the State.
And then cites Gibbons as. Ogden, 9th Wheat
2O3 as follows:
And this Court, in the case of Gibbons u.s.
OGDEN. Wheat. eos, which will hereafter be
more particularly noticed, in speaking OF the IN
snecton laws of the States, say they form por-
ton of that immense mass of legislation Whlch
embraces every thing within the territory Oh
State. not surrendered to the general government
all of which can be most advantageously exercised
by the states themselves. Inspection laws guar
antine laws, health laws of every descnptoh' DIS
well as laws for regulating the internal commerce
of a State and those which respect turnpike ROADS,
These principles are asserted by Justice BALDWIN
in very able and elaborate opinion delivered by
him in the case of Groves VS.. Slaughter, 18th Pc
tiers, r. So In which he also establishes beyond
cavil, the recognition by the Federal government
of property in slaves, by its treaties, laws and pub
lie acts.
We come now to very late and interesting set of
cases, decided in 1847, IS How'd. U. S K. P. 5O4
known as the License cases." Stimulated no
doubt by the temperance reform, some ofthe States
passed laws to discourage the use of ardent spirits
within their respective territories by prohibiting
their sale in small quantities and without license
previously obtained from the State authorities
The cases were very thoroughly investigated and
argued-all the previous cases cited and reviewed
by both the Court and Counsel, and the power of
the States thus to tax imported spirits fully sus-
tanned.
We will furnish a few extracts from the opinions
of the Judges delivered on the occasion, exhibit
ing the grounds of their judgment.
Chief Justice fancy, (who has distinguished
himself in several of his opinions for his fearless
advocacy and able defence of the rights of the
States, after citing the clause of the Constitution
declaring that the constitutions and laws of the
U. States, wAich shall be passed IN pursuance
thereof and all treaties &c, shall be the su-
preme laws of the land, and referring to the pow
er to regulate commerce acih foreign nations and
among the States, as exclusive in Congress when
the State and national laws conflict, in relation
thereto proceeds as follows:
Il = IL IL, A.
gress this subject does not extend further than
the regulation of commerce with foreign nations
and among the several States and that beyond
these limits the States have never surrendered
their power over trade and commerce. and may
still exercise it, free from any controlling power on
the part of the general government. Every State,
therefore, may regulate It's internal traffic ac-
cording to its own judgment and upon its own
views of the interest and we-being Of its citizens
81 am not aware that these principles have ever
been questioned The difficulty has always arisen
on their application and that difficulty is now
presented in the Rhode Island and Massachusetts
cases, where the question is how far State NAV
regulate prohibit the sale of ardent spirits, the
importation of which from foreign countries has
been authorized by Congress. Is such law a
regulation of foreign commerce, of the internal
traffic of the State?
cit is unquestionably no easy task to mark by
eign and domestic commerce, and to fix the pre-
else point, in relation to every imported article,
where the paramount power of Congress terminates
and that of the State begins. The constitution
itself does not attempt to define these limits
They cannot be determined by the laws of Con-
gress or the States, neither can by its own leg
islation enlarge its powers, or restrict those
of the other. And as the constitution itself does
not draw the line, the question is necessarily one
for judicial decision, and depending altogether
upon the words of the constitution.
''This question came directly before the court for
the first time in the case of Brown as The State
of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. And the court
there held that an article authorized by a law of
Congress to be imported continued to be part of
the foreign commerce of the country while it re-
manned in the hands of the importer for sale, in
the original bale, package, or vessel in which it
was imported; that the authority given to mport
necessarily carried with it the right to sell the i'm
ported article in the form and shape in which it
was imported, and that no State, either bv direct
assessment or by requiring license from the i'm
porter before he was permitted to sell, could i'm
pose any burden upon him or the property impor-
ted beyond what, the law of Congress had itself
imposed; but that when the original package was
broken up for for retail by the importer and
also when the commodity had passed from his
hands into the hands of purchaser, it ceased to
be an import, or part of foreign commerce. and
become subject to the laws of the State and
might be taxed for State purposes, and the sale
regulated by the State, like any other pronertv -
Ih1s understand to be substantially the decision
IN the case of Brown as The State of MARYLAND
drawing the line between foreign commerce. which