The republic. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1849-1853, 1851-09-19

enlist American aid in Cuban struggles at any IA.
ture time.
The expedition which has just failed under such
wretched circumstances of mistake, not 10 say de-
cephon, is probably the last for many years which
will ind any extensive encouragement in the feel
ing OF this country II ID not to be denied that this
did have strong sympathy arising out of pre-
sumed state Of facts in the island which the events
have sadly contradicted The calculations on the
Creole exertions were so high, the disasters have
been 30 complete and overwhelming, the dsap
pointlnents 30 deep, and the resentments 50 keen,
that long time must clapse, and a severe proba-
ton be undergone, before faith will be given again
to any indications from Cuba of any desire for
independence, or trust reposed in promises which
have been lavished SO profusey without the means,
if there were the intent to redeem them.
For conquest of Cuba by foreign arms there
never has been, will be, any thought in the
United States worth considering element in
calculations. Bot very many have supposed that,
in the event OF such manifestation by the people
of Cuba of desire of change in their government,
aid OPPORTUNITY given would enable them TO work
out their own liberation. There was no moral
wrong in giving them encouraging words, or in
encountering the risks of personally taking share
in the struggle. The effort to persuade us that this
ought to have been the character of the Cuban
movement ia too late for the consultation OF those
who risked and lost much in believing that il
was, and that they might peril life and fortunes,
and more than either, ON that faith.
From the first moment we heard Of the depar
ture Of the Pampero-an expedition which always
seemed to precipitated without sufficient
knowledge OF facts, or military combinations, or
concert such as an enterprise auxiliary TO island
revolution ought TO have had--we had our mis-
givings to the reception ii would meet with,
only hoping that those who led IL had moro in
formation than had reached us. We credited the
strength and extent of the movement, and had
hopes for the capacity and courage of the natives;
but nothing had given US the assurances upon
which any action, in behalf of Cuban rovolu-
ton, gould be wisely based, and we contented our
selves with expressing hopes that it mi ght be
justified by clearer advces. AS ii was with us,
II was with many whose interests were engaged as
well wishers TO the cause of real Cuban revou.
ton, and who watched with intense anxiety to
learn, by every arrival, whether our countrymen
had not made grievous mistake, and been led into
perious position to be there forsaken. The first
intelligence of the disaster to Crittendens party
increased anxiety for the fate of these men, al
most TO forgetfulness of all other considerations,
and from that moment lost confidence in the
revolution We published, indeed, all the accounts
which we received from men more sanguine than
ourselves; but we invariably accompanied them
with such comments of our own as marked our APP
prehensions or our incredulity. The end came too
soon in the bloody sacrifice of these mistaken men,
who had staked and lost every thing the errors,
crcdulity, the promises, and undertakings of
people who now explain that it was never possible
for them to accomplish what they undertook.
We do not however, mean to discuss this mat
ter at length, but only state the train of our
reflections on the explanation thus afforded of the
state OF the Cuban mind, and the capacity Of the
Cuban Creoles for maintaining revolution. But
the publication of we'll ccnsidered and appa-
rently we'll authenticated apology for the Creole
inacton at time when, II ever, something was
expected from them, because much had been
promised and SO much lost, seems proper time
simply to put on record the conclusions TO which
have arrived, and the considerations which have
influenced US.