The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1851-01-16
THE NATIONAL ERA.
WASHINGTON, JANUARY 10, 1851.
ANOTHER IMPORTANT DECISION By TIE ST.
PREME COrRT OF THE United STATES.


ersl action, as much as to any other cause, was
attributable the extinction Of Slavery in that
country The Administrators Of Justice, from
the nature Of their functions, should incline more
to fundamental rights than to corrupt precedents
and it has been held, time out of mind, that pro-
visions against liberty ought to be rigidly con-
strued
The Supreme Court Of the United States rec
ognising The Federal Constitution as It's higher
law appears to be under the impression that its
8 g'1SS rT- ,,f"g7Try, for in constituting ths
provisions respecting that subject, its leaning is
uniformly to the side of Slavery, and against Lib
erty. So far from regarding the constitutional
provisions relating to Slavery as exceptions to
natural right, and therefore to be construed
strictly, it seems to consider them the rule, and
that its duty is to give them liberal construc-
ton, extending beyond the letter, embracing more
than the strict terms include.
The Daily papers in Washington, impressed
rs they are with the notion that the only way to
preserve the Union is, by recognising Slavery as
the great National Interest for the protection of
which the Constitution was formed, are rejoicing
frming the right of Kentucky Court to reduce
to slavery certain coored persons who, having
been permitted by their former master TO visit
Ohio repeatedly, on professional tours, had ac-
quired their freedom and also anuullng the Or
dinance of 1887 They evidently consider this
decision a triumph over the Ant-Slavery Senti-
ment Of the country, gain to Slavery, an honor
% "a
the perfect trustworthness of the Court upon the
questions at issue between Freedom and Slavery.
We publish the decision in another column.
The evidence shows that certain colored per-
sons, musicians, had been taken on one occa-
sion or more to Ohio, with the express permission
Of their master, for the purpose Of performing at
public entertainments that they had returned to
Kentucky, and subsequently departed from that
State, on board steamboat owned by German q
their master brought suit against these men, in
the Louisville Chanoery Court, for their value
and that the Court finally decided that the color
ed persons were slaves, and their master was en-
titled to three thousand dollars damages This
decision was afterwards confirmed by the Court
of Appeals Of Kentucky and the case was brought
before the United States Supreme Court by writ
Of error. Chief Justice fancy delivered the
opinion of this Court, declaring that the opinion
of the Court of Appeals was conclusive, as fol-
lows:
Much of the argument on the part Of the
plaintiffs in error has been offered for the pur-
pose of showing that the judgment Of the State
Court was erroneous in deciding that the negroes
were slaves And it is insisted that their previous
employment in Ohio had made them free when
they returned to Kentucky
But this question is not before U.S. Every
State has an undoubted right to determine the
StatS or domestic and social condition Of the per-
sons domiciled within its territory except in so far
the powers Of the States in this respect are re-
strained, or duties and obligations imposed upon
them by the Constitution of the United States
There is nothing in the Constitution of the
United States that can in any degree control the
law Of Kentucky upon this subject And the con-
dtion Of the negroes therefore as to freedom or
slavery, after their return, depended altogether
upon the laws of that State, and could not be in
huenced by the laws of Ohio. IL was exclusively
in the power Of Kentucky to determine for itself
whether their employment, in another State should
or should not make them free on their return
The Court Of Appeals have determined that by
the laws Of the State they continued to be slaves
And their judgment upon this point is upon this
writ Of error, conclusive upon this Court, and we
have no jurisdiction over itp
We are not aware that there are any laws in
Kentucky determining the condition of persons
in that State who have been brought back to it,,
after having been permitted by their master to
20 into free State, business or for other pur-
poses We do not believe that the Staten has
determined the status or domestic and social
condition of such persons
Has the Judiciary, whose function is to admin
lister the laws regulating the relations of the sew
eral members Of a community, the right to make
laws fixing these relations The Courts of Lou
isiana have decided very differently from those Of
Kentucky. There il has been held that when
slave is carried out of the State into free terri
tory, by the act or consent Of the master, he be-
comes free, and, if returned to Louisiana he can
not again be reduced to bondage
Ii seems TO as unlearned in the law, that the
Supreme Court, in recognising the validity of
the decision Of the Court of Appeals in Ken
lucky, and refusing TO go behind that to ascer-
tain the real condition of the persons claimed MS
slaves, has paved the way for the preparation Of
great abuses under the law regulating the deliv
cry Of fugitycs from service or labor.
For example-we will suppose Henry Long to
have been sent by his master, living in Kentucky,
on an occasional tour in Ohio, as a musician. By
the laws Of the free States, and on the we-estab-
lished principles Of the common law, he becomes
free The Constitution Of the United States in
terposes no bar, for it continues the relation of
master and slave, beyond the slave States, only in
the case of escaping slaves. Henry Long free
man, ignorant Of his rights, is carried back to
Kentucky, and subsequently, leaves for Ohio,
where he is arrested as fugitive slave, and car
ried before Judge Mclean The decision of the
Court Of Appeals of Kentucky is produced, that
persons held TO service, carried out Of the State
into free one, by the consent of the MASTER and
returned, are still regarded as slaves under the
laws Of Kentucky. Would the Judge recognise
the eOnclusiveness Of this decision, or would he
feel it his duty to go behind it. and decide, in
view Of the evidence that Long had been permit
ted by his master TO spend some time in free
We speak OF the Court collectively and Of It's action
not Of the individual members, or " their motives.
Isya