The national era. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1847-1860, 1851-11-20


The sovereignty over them if possessed by the
United States, would supply Il very essential
desideratum to the commercial supremacy of
the Pacific
MR.. CALHOUN HIS PosTHUMoUs WORK.
volume of the expected work of Mr.. Cal
houn has made its appearance. The following
is an extract from it, in which he develops his
plan of amending the Constitution in order to
secure additional guarantees to the South
GLOW the Constitution could best be modi-
fed, so as to effect the object can only be au-
thoritatively determined by the amending pow
er. 1t may be done in various ways. Among
others, it might be effected through reorgan-
isation Of the Executive department : so that IT.
porers, instead Of being rested as they nor are,
IN SINGLE officer, should be rested an tro TO be-
~ elected ~ that the two should be constituted
the special organs and representatives. of the re-
spectre sections IA The EIecutire department of
the Government and requiring each 10 oPprOre
IN tee' e'co' r pc ~, --s -
-it-yf' -'f,e't-'S. ''-"~;,A3 mift, -, rs9ipn
relations Of the country and the other OF such
aswere connected with it, domestic institutions
the selection to be decided by lot 1t would
thus effect more simply, what was intended by
the original provisions of the Constitution, in
giving to one of the majorties composing the
Government Il decided preponderance in the
Electoral College, and to the other majority "A
still more decided influence in the eventual
cholce-in case the College failed to elect
President Ii was intended to effect an equi-
librium between the larger and smaller States
IN this department but which, in practice, has
entirely failed. and, by its failure done much
to disturb the whole system, and to bring about
the present dangerous state of things.
Indeed, it may be doubted whether the
trainers of the Constitution did not commit
great mistake in constituting single instead
of plural Executive. Nay, it may even be
doubted whether n single Chief Magistrate, in
vested with all the powers properly appcrta,n-
ing to the Executive department of the Gov
ernment as is the President is compatible with
the permanence of II popular Government, es-
pecially in wealthy and populous community,
with a large revenue and numerous body of
officers and employees Certain it is that there
is no instance Of n popular Government, so con-
stituted, which has long endured Even ours,
thus far, furnishes no evidence irfsits favor and
not little against it for to it the present DIS
tmbance and dangerous state of things. (which
threatens the country with monarchy or dis
union, may be Justly attributed On the other
l L~-~l 49, .'ssssi s..-ssrl
pernanence and power, had II dual Executive.
| refer to those of Sparta and of Rome. The
former had two hereditary, and the latter two
elective chief magistrates. 10 IL true that Eng
land from which ours in this respect Is copied,
has II single hereditary head of the Executive
department of her Government; but it is not
less true that she has had many and arduous
struggles to prevent her Chief Magistrate from
becoming absolute and that TO guard against
it cfiectualy, she was finally compelled to di-
vest him substantially of the power of admins
tering the Government by transferring it prac-
tically TO a cabinet of responsible minister's,
who by established custom, cannot hold Office
unless supported by majority of the two
Houses of Parliament She has thusSkyoided
the danger of the Chief Magistrate Becoming
absolute, and contrived 10 unite substantially,
"a single with apllral Executive, in constituting
that department of her Government. We have
no such guard. and can have none such with
out an entire change in the character of our
Government and her example of course fur
nishcs no evidence in favor of a single Chief
Magistrate in popular form of Government
like ours while the examples of former times
and our own thus far, furnish strong evidence
against it,
:" But it is objected that plural Executive
necessarily leads to intrigue and discord among
its members and that it is inconsistent with
prompt and efficient action. This may be true
when they are all elected by the same constitu-
ency and may be a good reason, where this IN
the case, for preicrring single Executive, with
all its objections To plural Executive. But
the case is very different where they are elected
by different constituencies, having conflicting
and hostile interests rs would be the fact in
the case under consideration. Here the two
would have TO act concurringly in approving
the acts Of Congress, and separately in tho
sphere Of their respective departments. The
effect in the latter case, would be to retain all
the advantages of single Executive rs far as
the administration OF the laws were concerned
and, in the former, 10 insure harmony and con-
cord between the two sections, and, through
Them in the Government. For, IA no act of
Congress could become law without the as
sent Of the Chief Magistrates representing both
sections each, in the elections, would choose tn
candidate who, in addition to being faithful to
ts interests, would best command the esteem
and confidence Of the other section And thus
the Presidential elections, instead of dividing
the Union into hostile geographical parties the
stronger struggling to enlarge its powers and the
weaker TO defend its ghts-as is now the case
would become the means of restoring harmony
and concord to the country and the Government.
Ii would make the Union Union in truth u
bond Of mutual affection and brotherhood; and
not n mere connection used by the stronger as the
instrument Of dominion and aggrandizcment,
and submitted to by the weaker only from the
lingering remains of former attachment, and
the fading hope Of being able TO restore the
Government to what it was originally intended
to be- blessing to all
"Such is the disease, and such the cha1ncter
of the only remedy rhich can reach Il. In
conclusion, there remains to be considered
the practical question, Shall il be applied
Shall the only power which can apply it be in
vokcd for tho purpose!
"1bc responsibility of answering this solemn
question rests ON the States composing the
stronger section y &c