The southern press., 1850-09-07

, With tho aqlal right or anqther, and thai paWo
must he SO used and compromised as TO do thu
most good and the least injury; and thlt in
conflict of this sort it would be more for the ad
vantage OF society that the States should pass
such regulations as We're necessary to preserve
the health of the people, and to provide for the
protection Of production, under inspection law 5
tnan to deny them that power for the purpose
of enabling Congress to exercise the whole Of
its power to regulate commerce.
1t is true that in the exercise of these power,
the two jurisdictions touch upon the same sub
jects, and trench upon each other; but the con
tlict must be diusted upon the principle OF
which | have spoken. Each must exercise its
own control, but is not to interfere with the
equal right Of the other. That is the only way
in which it can be explained; because it concur
rent powers, according to the opinion Of all law
yers, the laws of the United States would be
supreme. They would be supreme, because it
is so provided in the Constitution. But in the
case of these conflicting powers, there Is no pi0-
vision of the Constitution, and we regulate it
according to principles of reason, equity, and
justice. 1t is, then, upon the supposition OF diff
ferent and conflicting powers that the court de-
cided that State might pass laws prohibiting
the slave trade, in the exercise OF its power over
the police and internal organization of its so
ciety, although these very laws touched the sub
ect of trade between the States, OF which Con
gress had the exclusive power Of regulation.
AS Il proof that these were the conflicting
rights of separate and independent jurisdictions,
Judge Mclean PIT the case, and put it correctly,
that where it was necessary for sef-prescrvatlon,
that necessity was II law to the State higher
than the Constitution itself; and that when self
preservation came in conflict with the Consttn
ton, they would be justified in legislating for
that in defiance of the Constitution
But, sir, does any such authority as that exist
here! Does Congress possess in this District
these conflicting rights, and separate and inde-
pendent Jurisdictions Is it known here in any
other capacity than rs representative of the
conitderacy, or has it any other authority than
that of the Constitution 1t has more power
in this District than it has in the States. 1t can
do things here which il cannot do in the States !:
but it has no power anywhere in it's legislation
over this District which would enable it to do
things in conflict with the Constitution of the
Unite States or with the rights Of the con-
teder'cy. When this District was selected MS
the seat of government for the contederacy, Con-
gresS was to govern it as the representative Of
the confederacy. There is. therefore, not the
separate and distinct police power, not the
separate organization in the District, which en-
lists in the State governments. The States are
distinct political entitirs-not so with the Dis
trict. Congres, cannot exercise any power here
in relation TO trade, except under the limit uions
exclusive legislation here, it is true but that is
not grant of absolute power. The power
given it over commerce must be exercised for
the purposes for which it was given, and under
the limitations of the Constitution.
But what, sir, arc the limitations upon that
power That it must be exercised in relation
to trade, equally and uniformly. The history
of the convention which led to the formation Of
the Constitution, AS we'll rs the spirit of the
Constitution itself, shows that such was the
end for which this power was given; that
Congress must 80 govern the subject OF trade
us to produce regulations uniform and equal in
relation to the people of the different States of
this confrdcracy. AS 4 proof of that. | take
the very illustration given by Mr. Webster in
this scase of Grover rsSlaughter. Could Congress
prohibit the sale of cotton fabrics made in any
of the States within this District! Does amy
man believe that this would be constitutional
And if we cannot prohibit the sale Of cotton
fabrics for the purpose of protecting industry
here, can we prohibit the sale of slaves, so long
as they are recognized rs property here! Can
we prohibit the sale of slaves here from the
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principle between the two cases? How car
a distinction be made between slaves, il
recognized as property, and cotton fabric OF
ANY other species of property! Yet presume
th"r' is not y man here who would assert that
Congress has power in the District to prohibit
! the sale of cotton fabrics not made within the
! District.
| Let us push this thing little further If
Congress has n right to prohibit the sale of a
slave by the inllabitant Of State to an inhabi-
tant of the District of Columbia, it has the right
to prohibit the sale of slave from one citizen
of the District to another citizen of the District
| and who does not see that such law would
ut once abolish slavery in effect Pass a law
that slaves shall he inalienabe that they shall not
be subject to sale and transfer like other pro-
pcrty, and slavery is at once abolished.
| believe there are n majority here who hold
the opinion that there is a power in Congress to
abolish slavery within the District. But then
know there is Al large number here who believe
that Congress has no such power and there
are some of that number who favor this particu
lar bill appeal to them, if they can vote for
this bill without being prepared 10 admit that
there is power upon the part ofCongress to
abolish slavery within the District of Columbia {?
OF course do not mean to enter into the pc wer
of Congress to abolish slavery here refer to
hc opinion, not the grounds upon which it rests.
That, sir, is a sepcrate branch of the argument
4 separate chain of rcas oning belongs to it the
subject has been so fully and so often discussed
| bv others that do not choose now to 60 into
it, for really it is not my object to waste time
and prolong this discussion. rose only to say
what believed to be due to the case, and to be
due to the rights of the State which represent
wish to deal fairly and fully with the question.
do not wish to blink it; desire to meet it
fuIy and fairly; and say now that, even if it
were proved to me that it would be constitution
al to prohibit the slave trade between the States
and the District, would still be against it, for
reasons of cxpediency. ] think it would be
scarcely just to say that while the people of the
District may sell their slaves to the people Of the
slave States, the people Of those States may not
sell them to the people of the District. But
put aside all those considerations for the pre-
sent. and come now to another branch Of my
argument
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