New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1850-05-23

MS 10 the number engaged in the enterprise which
has been repre- sented az hian 10000 or n Ooo
men, but If any viii for mt reflect ON ali
the extensive arrangements neressary for tan,
sporting such large body Of men. for vessels pro-
Visions water, stores and eqaipnents, and the
enormous outlay, even on the most economical plan
II viii AZ once be seen how my babe i. ia that
sny thing like that number are logged la the nm
dertsking. We wero oGrsriv,s 1lwever, from In
formation or the subject. indu Cd to believe that
there were from 1000 ~ 5000 ai Il is nov stated.
and We believe with correct eos mat the actual
force is less than 5000 men. Tine material, how
ever Of which this force IS 0p sed is probably
equal if not superior 10 any sim 'lr number Of men
that were ever embarked { r. .rspefate military
corp de man. Avery conside IA portion OF them
are the elite OF the volunteer ~ served in Mex
leo, and who OF course, haV 81 much experi-
euce and possess no lt,le de If disc pine and
military knowledge. As - ', the entire body
are probably even much super 1- % the Volunteers
in the Mexican war.
Much speculation, Of course. u exist as 70 the
probable chances OF success a. f = enterprise, bat
10 correct opinion can be iormti without knowl-
edge OF all the circumstance r0nnected with II,
and particularly what will be 'he nature OF their
reception in the Island.
Our own opinion is that too nluch dependence is
placed upon the reported Extensive infdelity
among the Spanish troops AID tie general disaf
lection of the whole popuaton If the invaders
are Joined by any considerable portion Of the Span
ish army and the inhabIiauts morally afford aid
and comfort" they will % don't succeed bat the
troops remain faithful and III ,plston generally
DO not join them, then N are inevitably
doomed The whole quest on as to success or
defeat We think, is narrowed down TO this
Il must also be recolcctet e the expedition
has to incur all the pers and sks OF being able 10
effect landing against the sirong n0r1I force
which the Spaniards have Collected. Aud here
| again, We understand, calcua'i me are made upon
treason Tor It is asserted thai least portion of
the naval force will join the iav sders and assis. ia
their protection and descent on ,he Island.
| We DO not see how any extensive arrangements
could have been made for the Spanish troops 70 oia
| the invaders, without the fact becoming known To
the authorities Of the Island an We therefore PIE.
sumo the belief that they Wi do so must depend
more upon the 0pifion Of pa -riss Than any actual
| arrangements on the subieci artcularly as il is
well known the jealousies Of tie local authorities
have been for a iung tine aroIe "a on the subject.
and they naturally viii have b'en on the qai rice
as to all attempts to corrupt the army. II is true
some of the leading officers may have been tamper.
ed with, but il does not by any means follow that
the rank and Gle would JONI soy reasonable move
of the kind. Beside this, however we have no Ia
stance, at least in modern times WHERE the invad.
ers Of country have been joined by the defending
force and resident population, and we see in the
present instance 10 reason and no Inducements for
the former 10 do So and though the latter may DO
very willing, or even DESTROYS of belonging TO the
United States, we DO not believe they would make
any torcibLe attempt TO accomplish such result,
unless success rdS certain as they too well know
what would DC the consequences to them In case
of failure.
We have heard it urged against the loyalty OF
Spanish troops, that in the wars OF the South
American Republics vast numbers OF them de-
serted and Joined the insurgents, but We think
this rather strengthens our position as there was
no instance in which the PoPEiatsoH took part with
the iRc1ders, though the latter abandoned Msir
standards We must also take into view the dit
ference in religion, which will have a powerful in
huence on the minds of the spanish soldiery,
when the question came up OF Joining with her.
etcs and in what 10 them, would be reasonable
cause.
Even il the invading force succeed in landing,
and seizng a city, We do not see that they would
be any better off, as they would not be in force to
advance into the country or to undertake o0ensire
operations, and their supplies and achievements
would be cut of by blockadIng force. II they
succeed at ALL it must be by coup de man, and un-
der the prestige OF early and great success on land.
ing but il they do not have this and the army re-
mains loyal. their fate cannot be doubtful To "go
ahead" and "keep moving" is their only chance
inaction and delay will be ruin to their hopes.
We close with the opinion which we have pre-
viously expressed-if the troops and residents are
anxious or willing to throw of their present rulers,
and only want foreign force as a nucleus around
which to rally, then every thing will go on prosper
ously with the present attempt bat il not-not
II this body of men, however, once gets into the
Island, we will guarantee that under no clrcam
stances, will they ever be subdued without some
of the tallest' and most desperate kind of fight
ing which the world has ever witnessed. Tney
are lot the kind of stuff which will submit them
selves to the dungeon, the cord the gibbet with
out a struggle which, we have no doubt would be
without precedent or parallel.