Republican vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1857, 1850-01-28

ysszSs1ssSaxzzeazsst;
mine preys upon his vitals, and sweeps his
hearthstone with desolation, that it is vastly more
10 his interest that the powers of the govern
ment should be wresed from his hands where
they properly belong, and placed in the hands
Of ty.auts Whether he believes in the prlncl'
pie which dooms him to perpetual slavery IS a
problem most easy Of solution. Remove Tor a
single day the military power OF that govern.
ment, and the setting sun would sheo IT'S I9ii'
upon the ruins of that stupendotrs tyranny, which
strides above the fortunes and liberties OF her
people.
And now the very argument whichis employ
ed by the monarchist, is the very argument
which is employed by the opponent of an cleo
tive judiciary. AS the people are told in one
ease, that it is for their benefit that all the pow
ers of the government should be conhded to the
sovereign. so are they informed, in the other
case that it is for their interest that the governor
or the legislature should be permitted to appoint
the judiciary Can it be that they will consider
that it is for their interest that the most impor-
tant functonares of the State who are daily call
ed upon to decide questions involving their lives,
and their property should hold their appoint
rnent from, and be responsible to, some authority
in the State than that of the people themselves
Education and habit can teach many things, but
rightly presented, they can hardly teach so
fnOnStrouS proposition DIS tlllS.
The advocate of a judiciary elective by the
people, is fortified by arguments which can be
neither resisted nor refuted. In defending the
acknowledged political right Of the people to
choose their own officers iii all the departments
of government, he stands upon position which
can be carried neither by siege nor storm. lie
may be sneered at and tainted, and denounced
as a destructive and radical, but his cause is
fast anchored in the affections of the people, and
1 j i
In the organization of our government, lfthere
is one leading principle which is recognized as
essential it is that OF the separation and division
of its powers. III pure despotisn, all power
centres in the monarch. Just in proportion
as you divide and separate these powers,
YOU advance from monarchy to republican
ism In most of the constitutions adopted by the
States, the powers of government have been dl-
vided into three parts, Legislative, executive, and
judicial each OF which have been contded to
separate and distinct body of the magistracy.-
The importance of keeping them separate and
distinct has been fully acknowledged and the
possibility of ain union between them has been
guarded against by prohibiting any one of the
departments from exercising any OF the powers
Justly belonging to either of the others. The
trainers OF these constitutions have sketched
with bold hand the true outlines of a republic
can government, and they have recognized the
fullest extent OF the principle, that as the CEN
tralization Of power constitutes dcspotsm, its
separation and division constitutes the vilsl
principle Of republic, but they have failed to
carry out in practice What they so Justly announe-
cd in theory. ntfuth, our safety consists in
keeping each of the departments separate from;
and independent of the rest. Any other organi-
cation of the government would be destructive
of OUR liberties, and would lead to the most disas-
trons consequences. If the legislature be sub
ordinate to the judiciary, or if the Judiciary be
subordinate to the legislature or executive, what
guaranty have we for the preservation and i'll
tegrity of our constitution? That branch OF
the government which controls either Of the de-
partments will soon absorb TO itself all the pow
ers of the State, and the rights and liberties OF
the people will be engulphed in the whirlpool OF
its power. One single illustration will satisfy
every one of the vast danger to be incurred by
subecting the judiciary to the control OF the leg
islature or the executive. The constitution of
most of the States declare that the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in case of
war or actual invasion of the country. Suppose
that the legislature should order this writ 10 be
suspended in a time of profound peace, and a
citizen being deprived illegally Of his liberty,
should seek to avail himself Of the benefit OF that
writ, thus solemnly guaranteed 10 him by the
constitution of his country do you think that a
Judge who was a candidate for reelection before
that same legislature would have the manly in
dependence 10 tell the arbters of his destiny,
that they had trampled upon that law which
they had sworn to support, and thus their act
was nugatory, and should be therefore annulled
and set at nausht! 1t is possible that he might
thus rebuke from his seat the lawless spirit which
had leaped over the bounds affixed to the legisa-
tive power but it is certain that no second OPP
portunity would be afforded 10 the heroic
Judge to disregard the will of his masters. The
vote of the legislature would teach him the pow
er of the body he lad thus de1ed and his place
would be occupied by some one more suppliant.
''Who would bend the pregnant hinges
OF the knee, that thrift might
Follow fawning."
But it is proposed now 10 examine, somew hat
at large, the various plans which have been sug-
gested for the appointment OF the judiciary. 1t
is evident that the choice must be made between
three powers in the State-the Legislature, the
governor or the people. The question is shall
The judiciary be subordinate to the legislature or
the executive, or shall it be responsible direct
ly to the people?
If there is any system calculated to introduce
corruption into our government, it is that which
gives to the legislature the power of appointment
Of the judiciary. In vain have the barriers of the
constitution been erected around the rights ofthe
citizens, if the Judiciary is to spring from the
same source which controls and creates the egls-
ton of the country. The enactments of the con-
stitution-the solemn provisions of the organic
law will weigh but as feathers in a balance,
when brought into collision with the bench of
that power TO which the judiciary has been rem
dered subordinate yet this is only one of the
evils that would flow from the adoption of this
system. To destroy the principle ofthe separa-
ton of powers; to break down the usefulnsss OF
the judiciary, by merging it IN the Legislature,
would OF itself be attended with disastrous con-
sequences to the operatonso of the government !;
yet the mischief would not be altogether COMM
footstoo ofanother. The Legislature itself would
suffer equally with the judiciary; it's integrity
would be sapped by the temptations of the pat
ronage conferred upon it, and the streams OF
arr LEGISLATION would be poisoned at their follu-