Republican vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1857, 1850-05-27
POLITICAL.
SPEECH OF MIR. BRENT.
(Concluded.)

1
| Again, Sir, while the people have the deep
est interest in the selection of good Judge,
| they are decidedly the most competent to make
that selection. The Governor, as | have before
remarked, is generally forced to depend npon
the representation OF Others. The people have
personal and direct knowledge ct the eandi-
date. There is nothing SO purely local as the
reputation ola lawyer, unless he possesses high
and striking qualities, which are not always the
best qualities for a Judge. There are good law
yers in THIS city, every way qualified for a ju-
dicia station, who have no general reputation
| throughout the State. There are excellent law
yers IN the country who would make tae best of
judges, who are not known even by name to
men practicing the same profession in this city.
Now you take from the people OF each locality,
who have perfect knowledge of the capacity
and qualifications of the candidates, the power Of
eleeting their Judges, to vest it in rnan who
has no knowledge whatever dpon the subject,
and who if he has any desire to be right can
only guess as TO the selection of good Officer
In doing this you violate the plainest dictates OF
common sense and you do not display even
that ordinary prudence which regulates the con-
duct OF men In the everyday transactions of life.
You are taking from the people who have the
deepest interest and the best knowledge on the
subject, the power OF selecting their Judge, to
give it to an Individual without personal inter-
est in the matter, and wholly devoid of the
knowledge required fer the proper discharge of
that duty. With such system as this in opera.
ton, who can wonder that bad appointments
has been unsettled in the administration OF our
lawse
Wken hard pressed upon that point, honora
Bile gentlemen had been forced to admit that the
chances are decidedly the greatest for the selec-
ton of a good Judge, when elected by the peo-
pie. But they say the desire fer reelection on
the part of the Judge, will THROW temptations in
his path, that canno. possibly be resisted. They
urge that if a case arises between popular indi-
vdual and one of less note, that the Judge will
so shape his decisions as to secure the greatest
number ofwotes at the approaching electSon; or
that if a case originates between one who pro-
noted his election and one who opposed it, that
he will be strongly tempted to decide in favor
OF his friend and AGAR st his enemy. This Ia an
argument most relied upon by those who can
not lock in the eye the true principle Of a popu.
lar government, and yet endeavour 10 skulk be-
hind some subtertuge that will excuse them for
Withholding from the people the exercise of the
rights WHICH justly belong to tkem Sir, OF all
the arguments, urged against an elective judi
ciary, this is the most shallow s, the most east.
ly exposed. Suppose that the Judge does de-
Sire a reelection, do gentlasaen mean 10 saw
that dishonesty is a passport to popular ap.
plause? The greatbody Of the people are under
the control Of 10 one individual j; and that Judge
miscalculates the force of public sentiment, who
can expect to stand up against it by the aid of
any individual, no matter how popular or how
influential. But, what, alter all, is this obiec-
ton, but to charge moral corruption upon the
Judge who is elected by the people! if 1t be
| Judge, the great probability is that he will be
best able to resist the temptations that bese his
path. Ii the election by the people will give
you better man than the appointment by the
executive, you have better guaranty for the
| faithful and honest discharge of the judicial
functions. The particular mode in which a
man is elected or appointed, does not alter his
nature. Ii the Judge desires reelection, he would
desire re-appolntmem and according to TIE
same logic, it u case SHOULD originate between
an obscure individual, and one who had the ear
of the executive, he would so decide as to secure
his disappointment. Again, if the Judge is in.
cined to decide in favor of his friends and a
gainst his enemies, why can't he crafty his in
clinations as we'll when appointed by the execu-
/ tive, as when elected by the people? Is there
any peculiar virtue in holding Office from the
hands of rhe governara Does an executive ap.
pointnent freeze the nature ef men to stone, or
strike with torpor and paralysis, the affections
and passions OF the human heart! The great
object is to obtain capable and honest judges
That system is best which SECURES the best men
upon the bench. Let gentlemen prove to me
that he people will not elect the best Judges
and will cheerfaly acknowledge nay error
And now, sir, would here ask, whether any
objection can be nrged against an election by
the people, that cannot be made to apply with
tentoid ialeeto an appointment by the executive?
Again say, that gentlemen can see danger but
in one ulrection their vision is keen to detect
any objection that may be urged against popu-
lar election, but they can see no objection to an
executive appointment, though it stood full in
their sight, as high Atlas, and as ins'lrmount.
able as the Apprentices.
I But have gentlemen never heard Of the lean.
| ing Of these executive Judges in behalf Of the