The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1850-10-13

none OF It's lncts are available Tor military purposes until
We reach Pensacola close 10 the boundary line between
Florida and Alabama This is decidedly the best naval
station between chesapeake bay and the Rio Grandei
but is more adapted for rehiing vessels than for the
general purposes OF military seaport We then, pass
ing westward, come TO the harbor Of Mobile. in Ala
bama that Of New Orleans. in Louisiana and that Of
commercial than for warlike purposes The mouth Of
the Rio Gande, which, Tor the present. terminates the
American line the Gulf but miserably adapt
ed for trading purposes Along this whole line.
therefore. the only two military stations that we find
those OF Pensacola and Key West, which of but
ondary Importance On the Pacific, the Union now pos
the magnificent bay OF San Francisco, which lies
in about latitude IS deg north But from that south
ward 10 the Mexican line there is military station.
the bay Of Monterey mol being such whilst norhward.
towards the British line there is harbor OF any kind,
until reach the mouth OF the Columbia, the advan-
tages and capabilities of which have been much oveIra
ted But close TO Vancouver island, in latitude 40 deg,
is the spacious and splendid harbor known Admiralty
inlet The military value OF this, however, is much d-
minshed by the extent TO which the inlet is commanded
by the many good harbors OF Vancouver island Which
ever power command the Straits of Fuca controls,
for the time being, Admiralty inlet But it is with the
harbors the Atlantic side that have chiefly TO
deal
So greatly disproporlonea are the naval advantages
possessed by America the extent of its coast that the
possession of the seaboard OF the British provnceshat
Of NOVA Sco pD'G and the Gull Of st. LawpsncewouId
treble her naval powers and yet the whole coastlne OF
these provinces is not than fourth the extent OF
the Atlantic and Gulf coast line of the republic But in
addition the disadvantage OF having the chief naval
stations Of the country clustered together as they are
leaving nearly destitute in this respect great an extent
Of coast to the soHhwad, is the other and stl greater
disadvantage Of having these stations situated as to
be commanded by OF the most important naval out
posts ofthe most formidable maritime power IN the world
From her magnificent station at Halifax, Great Britain
overhangs with her fleets, the whole OF the Atlantic sea
board OF America. From Halifax she is within two
days sail Of soson whn tour O. Msm ha aaS
watch-tower OF England tine deep, which is to the
southern parts OF America what Halifax is to the northern
the Deawareof Cape Henry, the entrance to Chesa
peake bayo Cape Fear, the coast OF North Carolina
Of Charleston, the principal city Of south Carolina
the main outlets Of the commerce OF Geogia-and Of 81
Augustine the Atlantic coast Of Florida, and the chief
entrepo OF that peninsula Thus from Halifax she d.
May and from Bermuda the remainder OF It from Cape
May to St. Augustine. The Halifax squadron could
blockade Boston and New York; while the Bermuda
Chesapeake, might put Philadelphia Baltimore Wash
ngton, and Richmond in state OF blockade.
II under these circumstances that The possession OF
Cuba by any powerful maritime State, particularly by
Great Britain would be- in the last degree, announcement
if not dangerous, TO America for lei us look for "a
moment the position of Cuba in military point OF
view. Situated little within the ropc OF Cancer. it
throws its western moiey, almost like gate, across the
entrance to the Gulf Of Mexico. There, are two
ing one side OF both. The two channels are
about equal in width; that on the Florida and
that on the Yucaan side being less than $50
harbors at its command, makes Cuba the key OF the
Gulf 1t Is in view of this that its importance
such magnitude in the eyes Of the American people For
what is meant by Cuba being The key of the Gulf
Neither more less than thai il can control moiey
OF the OF America and the whole OF the Atlantic
trade of Mexico. In the hands of weak power like
Spain, not in reality what, in the hands of strong
power like England, 1t would inevitably become. Their
recent acquisitions have made the Cult more an Ameri-
than Mexican sea, and their future prospects
sufficiently dazzling TO lead the Americans to believe
that long will be exclusively theirs. II is
der, therefore, that they do not look with complacency
at the bare possibility OF an island falling into the hands
of England the possession of which by England would
put her CONTROL time OF war, the commerce OF some
Of the best co,ongrowng States, large proportion of
valley the Rio Grande and also OF the eastern provinces
of Mexico. 1t would not only enable her to command
the commercial ports OF Mobile, New Orleans, and Vera
Cruz, but also, with Halifax and Bermuda, to encirce
the whole coast from Maine TO Texas with her military
ou,posls. that simple declaration OF war would vir.
ualy put the whole OF the American seaboard in state
OF blockade. But this is not all for, in addition TO the
Gulf Cuba might be made 10 command the whole OF the
Caribbean More important still, II lies in The direct
line from any OF The Atlantic or Gulf ports of the Union
10 the Ishmus oil Panama. section OF the continent rap
idly rising in importance and destined TO be the
greatest highway in the world Ii is in vain TO conceal
from ourselves that the Americans have already Sc, their
hearts upon the possession OF the isthmus II is true
that, by the Nicaragua treaty, the government has de-
barred itself from colonIzng the shmus. But what ri
OF the American people The government did not colo
nize Texas but Americans in their individual capacity
did The result ~ well Known. The treaty does not
preclude Engshmen Americans from taking up their
residence the is,hmus and for settling upon IL the
Americans have greater advantages than have II 30
Americans 30 and reside there, may 200, 1000,
20 900 and when there are 10000 there, the thing ls
done. and Panama is annexed Towards this consum-
nation Cuba would be convenient stepping stone for
ambitious knsmen, if in their possession whereas il IL
in ours would form barrier TO them OF the
formidable kind To this they fully alive and can.
not tolerate the thought OF our getting hold of a
position which would al once Illustrate their de-
signs and install the supremacy the West
Indian seas, which they are ambitious OF acquiring
for themselves highway across the shmus is sought
for the convenience OF the commerce of the world
II is open up track for the trade between Europe
and Asa The possession OF Cuba by either America or
England will put the power holding II in position 10
control the greater part oil the OF the world
particularly when consider that the direction OF the
currents OF the Gulf will throw the greater part of that
going eastward close by the coast and barbors
of Cuba Such the considerations both oi local and
general character which influence the American people
FIRST their determination 10 keep Cuba OF hands
and next, IN their longngs TO get al II with their
Ich Also the considerations which excite the zeal
ousies OF England against any measures which tend to
throw 80 valuable possession INTO the hands OF her
rival Both IN political and commercial point Of view,
Cuba would be most valuable acquisition to Eng land
except at the cost OF a war with America. Nor can
America hope to acquire H. except al the OF rupture
with England for England must first make up her mind
strike her flag in the West Indian seas and 10 put most
of the foreign trade OF the world and much Of her own
trade with the greatest and mos, valuable of her posses
sons, at the command OF her rival before she can con
sent to the transfer Of Cuba TO the United States
Such, then, the circumstances which, 10 political
point OF vew attach such importance to the Cuba ques
m the slpht both of England and Ann