The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1850-09-14

taslrVhr thnuphf- oi many kind- came into
nuftl J. lhi- surrender" said !, "ihr only
means oi rest"unp peace IN Hungary Wa
no other way open 20 the General than this
sudden aud ihgloriou- capiuilaiiop2"
Al that moment, coming a. did from the
camp nf the soutltero army under Dcmhinski
The surrender appeared almost like an act
commanded hy necessity had seen ibc
profound decentralization of those armies,
which wa produced much mor' by the cN-
trumo prlyatous and cAhlu-tinu marches of
the la-t two weeks than by dsspair ia cusc.
qurncr oi the loot batilcs Of Szorrg aud Tenn
cswaF Accordingly Il was temporary Ia its
character arti ly iHran- ni l,.tisr Zeal a,,d
rest might probably have been removed IN q
few days, Much more threatening appeared
% me lir fatal disagreement ol DE Grucmls;
while Bcm and Guyon, endowed with greater
energy aud resolution, insisted on the prose
cutidu Of rhc war and the taking q strong I,ot
-iliou nrar Dubn, up rh. Tnu.yhauia FROM
tier, whore B,m wauifd to feed the soldiers
with M Ia sort ofrrain resembling In
dian CORN two measure. iu the mornug,thrrr
AZ noon, and three at night until be- hil col
lccted an rlIi,irUt arms, Narss'y, pcu,l.,,,-
Xxi anl the others would not hear Oh con-
. tnuancc of the war with such fi01. in fact,
at the siege u Tcmc.war, General V,c,cy'.
army was i.,r frum imposing such pnyations
upon itself III, officers slept in comfortable
cabins, dincd u Ia cnrf,, played billiards, and
7 passed their time with music aud daucing a.
mong pretty women; while Bcm. mcn aud
officer. fought daily, four or five time. their
own number, ate bread aud drank water, aud
Wada Immense marches, .-..... ..
Thi. difference between the Generals Of
licm'- and NcU,oy's parties seemed theroiorc
much more dangerous for the welfare ofthc
7 ISnnthcrn army than The momcntap DONOR
alizaton orthc troops. Orthc state OF the
army in Tmu,y,ania W. had no information
( whatever. Bch'g sHt5icn appearance wlrhaur
/ troops ~ the hattlo of Temcs war. could thcrc-
/ fore Ice explained either a, a very favorable
I Indicator cor n. flight, and the reports We
had hearl in Iugo,, wcrr ofa sort to dash
our hopes very greatly. In eucha position
Of things, withdi,i.iou and decentralization ia
the Southern army, aud defeat IN rran,ylva-
mia, there was for the only remaining army.
/ that OF Gorpoy onl, the choice between a dr.-
pcatc resolution to break through toward
/ the North, or toward Tnu.yl,ania. 'aud a
capiulaiion
( have already said that Gorpcy'. resolution
! then appeared "a mc almost IKE an a,t ,ifia-
/ ted 10y necessity The impression made ou me
hy the appearance Of the Southern army, the
ir-s. i,';,,siy, ~; ,=i=,,,y ;y; :, .;;,=;T
personal detection which the hard .l,irni.hc-
and collisions OF the past few week, had IN
creased, contributed 10 render my views
+ gloomy t'w mouths later as more and
moro'dr tail, OF the true stale of The ca-o canlc
. to my ku"~ledec, apd we coulF gtn, a fr...r
point Of observation my oruior,,r The cata,.
truphc became altered. Thrncet,aih have
I regarded Gorg,y's decision as 10y no means
/ the net n an ambitious traitor, who. for
gold or honor, -urrcnirrcl his country to
The Russians; but a- the act of a man in
! whom our.shing disasters, crovdiug mi,ior-
tunes. the presslrc s hostile superiority. and
the sense of unaccustomcd, though greatly de-
sired dictatorship, With it, immense rcsponsi,
hility, had obscurcd and blinded the else So
clear and strong mind And thus, accustom.
cd as he was tuhasty& firm decsions.he adur-
ted this one, so pregnant with fate, without
having reflected upon the consequences. \
proof of this ia found in the fact of the SUR
/ render n the Rusvi7uy instead ut the Austri
ans, to which ne was doubtless impetled NOR,
Nv tticling than hv reason \ passage of th,
letter TO General Rudigcr, in which Gorge,
announced his determination to capitulntc
: strowy cychomcnyc OF ttt7 TotiriCHt t5TpiiuE.
What advantage had the iTuhgarian arm.
from the fact that Gorgey capitulatcd to,tb
Russians instead OF directly TO the Austrian
! lcadcrs? Could Prince Paskewich in spit
$ OF his cxcrtIons save the lives of the thirtec
hungarian Generals aud the many officer
- of the staff and civil authorities? Could h
r procure clemcucy for the nation and the Al
e my, which was almost bodily mustered int
4 the Austrian r-lttin,aat- Mas it. oxen Ilnss
+ bic for him'to protect Gorgcys own brother
e from chains and iorcihc enrolment? | yer
/ ture to say that the fate Of Hungary and +
n been worse, but in all probability better, ha
G the Hungarian General negotiated with til
a Imperial instead of the Russian commander
5, This is a proof of Gorgey's confusion an
z haste, a result ofthc loss Of his former calm
y clear, control of circumstances.
a When he capitulntcd, the General con
d manded an army of more than 10000 men
. chosen veteran troops-with IA pieces o
k Cannon = man lrhn stands atSThe head O
t. such force ,cnioying it's full confidence, ,mirl
n though opposed 10 an enemy of fourfo
T. strength dictate his own terms of captulatio
Ig since in the worst case, a decision 10y resort
IS arms was left open to him. How did GorE'
70 act i? Admitting that the allied armies nur
n -bcrcd 100000 men, with $50 to 800 piece
" there must be deducted $4,000 meu,w VT
-l were kept busy by Benz, Gorgcy had on