The republic. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1849-1853, 1850-11-15
Local Matters.

| upon several lots owned by him, appears 10 have
been a mooed point in city; and although il
| was finally determined, nearly year ago, by
| decision Of the Supreme Court, general under
standing of the import Of that decision appears not
yet TO be fully attained. We have, therefore, in
compliance with the wishes OF some of our city
readers, procured copy of the following opinion
of the learned judge in the case, in which the qucs
| ton was tested:
SUPREME CoUnr THE UNITED STATES.
No. 73-D December Term. 1919.
| Anna nj. Mason, widow, and John Mason, James M.
Mason, Eilbeck Mason, hurry Mason, Magma
der Mason Barlow Mason, Samuel Cooper, and
| Sarah NJ, his wife, Sidney s. Lee and -, his
wife, Cecelius G. Jamison, and Catharine, his
| wife, heirs and devisees of John Mason, de-
| ceased plaintiffs in error,
Joseph NJ Pearson.
In to the circuit court OF the United States
for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the
| county OF w Washington.
| MIR. Justice Woodbury. delivered the opinion of
! the court:
| Several reasons have been assigned for the re-
versa of the judgment in this case; but,
think one OF them ia well founded II ID not neces-
sary to examine the others That one is the sale of
each of the twenty lots, assessed to the Wash
ington Iontinc Company, instead OF selling the
first two lots only, they having been bid oil for
more than enough to pay the taxes on the whole.
The sale Of all OF them therefore, unnecessary to
insure the collection Of all the taxes; and as they
brought but little beyond one fourth of their APP
praised value, the sale of all not only unneces
sary, but great sacrifice of property.
1t is admitted by the city, which defends this
ton, that the law authorized the sale of many
| lots assessed to the same proprietor as would be
sufficient to pay the taxes all; and there to stop.
But at the time il is contended that the law
allowed discretion to the city to sell each lot for
the tax each and that in the exercise OF this dis
cretion the sale of all can be indicated legal
We think otherwise. After careful examina
| ton, satisfied that no such discretion
meant to be conferred under the circumstances of
| the present case Though the ancestor of the plain
tts in became entitled to eleven of the twenty
! lots sold, as early 1927, and paid the on
them for two or three years; yet he never Caused
his name to be entered in the city books proprie
tor OF them, nor obtained any deed Of them execu
| ted and recorded, 50 that the city might the
change of title to him the records, and tax them
| to him, till November 18th, ASIA Hence in 1861,
when the taxes now i'll controversy were assessed,
the city rghtfully taxed all these lots to the Ton
tine Company, and could sell any of them to pay
| the taxes imposed on all against that company
The ancestor of the plaintiffs could not complain
\ Of that course under his own neglect not to per-
feet his title so as to have his name rather than the
/ name of the company entered on the tax list as
owner of eleven of the lots. Much less does it COM
| port with reason that the city should, on this
ground object to its power to sell any Of those
lots to pay the taxes assessed on all, when its Off
| cers had claimed them all to belong to the COM
| pany, and had assessed and sold them all as the
| property Of the company.
|
is claimed under the act of Congress of 1924. In
order to judge correctly whether there is good
foundation for this discretion it will be necessary
to examine briefly the history OF the legal provisions
on this point, and the provisions themselves.
| Under the city charter, us amended May 4th,
| 1872, e Stat ut l.. 72l p, sec Sth,) "unimmored
lots" or so much thereof as may be necessary to
| pay such taIes may be sold' for their payment
On the 18th of May, 1920, new charter was
given 10 the city, which provided that 'roal prop
erty, whether improved or unmprovcd," "or SO
| much thereof not less than lot, (when the prop
| erty upon which the tax has accrued is not less
| than that quantity,) as may be necessary to pay
any such taxes, "may be sod," &c. e Stat. at
L., $50, sec. l0)
case OF the Corporation of Washington Us. Pratt,
| s Wheat, so7, settling the construction Of the
laws existing in 1872 several points in rela
ton to the assessment and sale Of lots for taxes,
and, among other things, holding on this particu-
lar point as follows "But If taxes be due by one
and the individual in small sums upon many
lots, and one lot being set up for sale producesa
sum adequate to the payment OF all the whole ar
rcars become paid of, and no excuse can then ex-
list for making further sales" The act of May
10th, 1924, wac then passed, which, IN some re-
| spects, provided anew, concerning part Of the
points settled in 1923, where the act charter OF
| 1920 was similar to that OF 1872.
! But on the point now under consideration IL
made a special provision in these words
''dnd be IL further enacted, That il shall be law
| full for the said corporation, where there shall be
number Of lots assessed 10 the same person or per
Sons, TO sell one more of such lots for the taxes
and expenses due the whole; and also 70 provide
for the sale of any part of lot for the taxes and
expenses due said lot other lots assessed TO
the same person. as may appear expedient accord
ing 10 such rules and regulations as the said cor
poration may prescribe" (See sec, act Of May
| 10th, 1924
The city contends that this changed the con-
struction given 10 the law of 1912 by this court IN
1928, rather changed the law OF 1920, which was
the same in substance that of sl2, and conferred
discretion TO sell each lot for its tax, or only
| 80 many Of several assessed TO the same person as
might be necessary to pay all the taxes due from
| him
But 1t will be seen that the language used in
| the last act Of 1924 substantially the same
| on this subject that in 1912 and 1920. The
words used in the former acts to sale Of
all or portion of the lots for the taxes on all,
had been recently adudgedb by this court to require
absolutely that the latter course be pursued when
| a part sold for enough. And Congress, 80 FAR
| from appearing TO wish alteration Of the law
| in this particular, as just construed, seem to
| sanction 1t by declaring explicitly, as before,
the existence OF the power 10 sell a part OF the
ots, and which power this court had, under oil the
circumstances, decided was imperative on the city
The chief difference in this respect between the acts
oflsl2, 1870, and 1924 wac that in the last Congress
used more clear and positive terms than before,
when authorizing the sale Of part OF the lots for
| all the taxes, and added material change, au-
thorizing them 10 eel, when appearing expedient,
even part Of one lot. Evidently, by the sense and
the locality in tho sentence Of the expression cas-
1
discretion or expodenoy thus conferred 10 the new
| provision for the sale OF part OF lot.
was there any reason existing why VIC should
| infer that Congress meant TO make any other
| change than this Last in respect 10 such sales?
The former provisions for selling only one or
more loe when enough TO pay the taos on ali be-
| longing to the same owner had existed 40 long,
had been 80 positively adudgcd by this court to DC
imperative, and were so obviously just and neces.
sary TO prevent sacrifices and speculation, that Con
gree " 50 might we'll entertain 90 disposition
to alter them, but rather to adopt aud confirm the
| construction given by this court in the previous
| year.
With the knowledge of our construction. like
words being again repeated by Congress, it may
well be considered that like construction in
tended and was expected 10 be gwen 10 those words
Inc only plausible argument which remains TO he
considered against the dcsgn to make this power
to sell only enough to pay all the taxes mandatory
as IT had before been construed by this court, rests
on the supposed incorcctncss Of the general rule OF
construction applied to the facts here which holds
the expression may" sell or " IL is lawful TO cell
| IN particular way TO be imperative. but II we
look TO the true test Of the principle involved in the
question, great doubt can remain Jhis general