The southern press., 1850-09-07
SREEcH or r.
Mr., HuNYHR, Of Virginia,


The Senate having under consideration the
bill to suppress the slave trade in the District of
Columbia, Mr.. FooTE moved to strike out all
after the enactng clause, and insert substitute
which was published in the Union on Wedacs
day morning
Mr.. HUNTER Mr.. President, regret very
mnch that this bill has been called up at this
time. had hoped that at this period of the
session. and in the present state of public opinion
in relation to this agitating subject, we might
escape this bill, and the discussion and excite
m,nt to which it must lead. But, sir, the sena-
tor from Kentucky has felt it to be his duty to
rall up the bill for consideration and feel my
self bound by sense of obligation equally
strong to oppose it, and give the reasons which
suggest themselves to me against its passage.
| knew it was not so designed, but fear it is
hut the beginning of series Of measures which
must end in the nj olition Of slavery in the Dis.
lrct of Columbia. 1t is said that it is the first
step that costs and if this bill should pass with
out opposition, fear that the r st will but too
easily follow IT connects itself with one of
the most delicate, dangerous, aud to my State
Vital questions of all that have grown out Of
this anti-savery agitation-I mean what is called
the abolition Of the domestic slave trade.
This is bill which proposes to abolish the
SidNe tTduc DclWcCh WIG AotttSS Viz hloptbt
of Columbia This, sir, is the real nature and
tendency of this bill 1t has been decided By
the Supreme Court of the United States. and it
has been maintained in every Southern State
with which am acquainted, that the power to
prohibit this domestic slave trade between the
States of this Union is not in Congress, and
thai it would be unconstitutional to attempt it.
! think | can show that the same or similar
course Of reasoning, which would establish the
proposition that it would be unconstitutional to
prohibit the sla trade between the States.
would also establish the fact that it would be
unconstitutional to prohibit it between the States
and the District Of Columbia think that even
if should fail in that. will be able to show
lha, it would be expedient uadcr the crrum-
st1ln.es to attempt it.
In the case Of Groves and Slaughter, which
came up from the State of Mississippi, the memo.
rube decision was given that Congress had no
constitutional power to prohibit the slave trade
between the States. In that ease it was argued
with grta: ability by Mr.. Clay, (who was coun-
scl for the defendant in error,) in the hrst place,
lh.it under the power to regulate commerce.
Congress- had no right to prohibit any branch Of
it that the power to regulate commerce was
power given for the purpose OF making uniform
and equal rcguations-a power given for pre-
did he stop there, sir but laid down the further
proposition that the provision in the constitution
"f Mississippi, which provided for the prohibition
Of the sale of slaves from other States in the
State Of Mississippi, was unconstitutional be-
cause, he said, it had been decided in the case
Of Gibbon rs. Ogden, that the power to cg,!latr
commerce was vested exclusively i'll Congress.
and not in the State, and therefore they had no
right to prohibit this trade in any article Of
merchandise Take these two propositions to.
gcther, laid down by the senator from keAtucky.
tnen counsel in the ease, that Congress could
not prohibit the slave trade between the States,
because the power to regulate CONNIE cr did
not extend to its destruction, and tlat the Strtc
itself could net prohibit it. on account of the
i:!c that the power to which have alluded was
in Congress, and exclusively in Congress- and
what followed! That Congress and the State
Of Mississippi united could not prevent the sll"
of slaves from other States within the State of
Mississippi. If that argument be true, ask YOU
how can Congress, supposing it to unite the
powers Of the general and st te governments,
prohibit the sale in the District of Columbia!
But, sir. he was not the only eminent coun-
sci in that case. Mr.. Webster, the former Sell
aor from Massachusetts, maintained upon that
occasion that the provision in the constitution
of the United State lie said that the Consli-
tuition oc the United States had recognized pro-
perty in slaves: that the State OF Mississippi to-
rated slavery, and in so doing acknowledged
that there might be merchandise in slaves. He
said. while it tolerated slavery, it was forever
concluded from prohibiting the sale of slaves
from other States, by the decision in the case of
IiDbon rs. Ogdcn-a decision which. as we all
know ruled that this power was exclusively
vested in Congress, and that the States could
exercise no power upon that subject. Hay
iny recognized the fact that there could be
property in slaves, and tolerating slavery, it had
no more right to prevent the sale of slaves there
than it had the right to prevent the sale of cotton
fabrics.
Judge Baldwin, il, that ease, delivered dis
sentng opinion, il is true; but he affirmed this
,,ronnd taken ny Mr.. Webster | maintain that
if the argument of the senator from Kentucky
in that case was right, this bill is unconstitution-
al: and if the argument Of Mr. Webster is
right. so long as Congress permits slavery in
this District the bill is unconstitutional; and of
coarse. if Judge Baldwin is right, the bill is un-
constitutional,
1t may be said that the arguments both of
Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster in that case, were
"vcrrned by the court itself. If they were over
ruled, think ! ain prepared to show that they
We're o?crruled upon no ground which would
allow to Congress right to prohibit the slave
trade in the District of Columbia. 1t is true
that the majority of that court did decide that
ihi. provision in the constitution of Mississippi
was not contrary to the Constitution of tile
United States but, sir the only Judge Of those
who so decided, who gave reason for his opn-
ion was Judge Mclean, and to these reasons
shall presently refer.
Upon what ground was it that they decided n
State might thus interfere with this provision ia
relation to the regulation of commerce! 1t was
upon the ground so often maintained by the
Supreme Court, that the States, under their
power over the internal organization of their
society, and the power over matters of police
and the subject of inspection laws, &c, which
are separate and distinct powers, might pass
~,aetnents which, in carrying out these ri hts
did Interfere, to some extent, with the power to
regulate commerce. Judge Mclean went Sc
far as to say that, in n matter touching the in.
t..rnnl orunniz otiop of Stnte there w ls a MOVE,