Staunton spectator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1896, 1850-03-06

the cOnlO OF inc LEGISLATURE or Inc executive The
constitutions of most Of the States declare that the
writ of hebeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in case of war or actual invasion of the country
Suppose that the legislature should order this writ
TO be suspended in time of profound peace and c-
izen being illegally deprived of his liberty, should
seek TO avail himselfof the benefit of that writ thus
solemnly guaranteed to him by the constitution Of
his country do you think that the Judge who was
a candidate for election before the same legisa-
ture, would have the manly independence to tel
the arbiters of his destiny, that they had rampled
upon that law which they had sworn to support,
and thus their act was nugatory, and should there
fore be annued and set at nought? 1t is possible
that he might thus rebuke from bis seat The awIess
spirit which had leaped over the bounds affixed to
the legislative power; but it is certain that no Sc
copd opportunity would be afforded to the heroic
judge 10 disregard The will of his masters. The
vote Of :he Legislature would teach him the power
Of the body he had thus deied. and his place would
be occupied BY some one more suPpliant.
."Who would bend the pregnant hinges
Of the knee, that thrift might
Follow fawning."
But it is proposed now 10 examine, somewhat at
large, the various plans which have been suggested
for the appointment Of the Judiciary. 1t is evident
that the choice must be made between three pow
ers in the State-he Legislature, the Governor or
the People The question is, shall the judiciary be
subordinate TO the legislature or the executive, or
shall it be responsible directly TO the peope2
Ifthere is any system calculated to introduce cor
rupon into our government, it is that which gives
to the legislature the power Of appointment Of the
judiciary. In vain have the barriers Of the corsiu
On been erected around the rights of the citizens,
if the judiciary is TO spring from the same source
which controls and creates the legislation Of the
IS, ~
solemn provisions Of the. organic law, will weigh
but as feathers in balance, when brought into col
lision with the branch of that power 10 which the
judiciary has been rendered subordinate yet this is
only one of the evils that woa!d flow from the a.
doptfon Of this system. To destroy the principle
of the separation of powers 10 break down the use
fulness of the judiciary, by merging it In the egis-
lature, would of itself be attended with disastrous
consequences TO the operations Of the government;
yet the mischief would not be altogether confined 10
the prostration of one department at the oosioo Of
another. The legislature itself would suffer equal
y with the judiciary its integrity would be saPPed
by the temptations Of the patronage conferred upon
it, and the streams Of our legislation would be poi
soned at their fountain head; the legislative hall
would be made an arena in which hungry Office
seekers would be pied against each other. and the
passage or Wholesome laws. would be obstrusied,
balls which such system would necessarily engendI
er. The candidate for one iudgeship would need
the assistance fthe candidate for another udgeshp
and he who would intrigue deepest and spread his
webs widest. would carry off the judicial ermine as
trophy of his skill and the reward Of his manage
ment Ajudiciary thus constituted-,hnss springRg
from the hot and boiling cauldron of legislative in
| trgue, would be i'll qualified to discharge The high
and responsible duties dsvOlYed upon it by the CON-
sttution. In purity, in caimness, in elevation OF
character, in freedom from political bias and preju
dice it would be lamentably deficient, and there is
reason to fear that it would pervert and prostitute
It's high powers 10 the promotion Of its own base aRd
unworthy ends. ~,
The great object is to adopt some system which
will ensue the attainment Of honest and capable
judges. But it is evident that this cannot be accom-
plished, unless the power which is with the appoint
ment has knowledge ofthe qualifications Of a cnn-
didate. The legislature is composed Of persons COM
ing from all sections and quarters ofthe State; out
Of a hundred delegates, perhaps but three or four
wirepresent that section ofthe country from which
the Judge is to be chosen. Nine-tenths Of the num-
Der will know nothing ofthe various candidates pro-
posed for nomination, and will care as little upon
whom the choice, may fall. The representative
from one section Of the State will feel but little in.
erest for himself his constituents as regards the
appointment OF Judge in The other sections Of the
State. Thus the appointment will be made by men
nine e-tenths Of whom have neither knowledge nor
interest to regulate their decision. But, it may be
4 said that the legislature may be governed by the
opinion of the immediate representative Of the peo
pie concerned. This, however, it will be remark
ed, is optional with each member composing tbe
body of electors but whether they do SO or not the
objection to this mode of appointment is equally
strong If the opinion ofhe representatives ote
district is to prevail, where the necessity OF calling
in the residue of the legislature to assist in the O.
lection, when ii is in their power to disregard the
wishes ofhm whoaone has Knowledge orinterest in
the subject? Why not give at oncs, to the repre-
sentative of each district, the right ofapponng ils
Judge? But fit is designed that the whole legisla-
ture should be check upon the local representatives,
then il is probable that in every case where the leg
sIature undertakes TO ACT in opposition 10 their VIII
that an incompetent or obnoxious judge would he
foisted upon the people, The whole tendency OF
such system is to lead inevitably tolog rolling and
barter of votes. Except as regards the election of
the Supreme Judiciary, whose jurisdiction is cock
tensve with the limits of the State,l is evident that
a vast majority Of the legislature would have no
personal and direct interest in the selection of good
Judge for each of the districts. =,
Each member of that district, however, will havo
some ulterior object gain, Of more interest 10 h
self and constituents than the appointment of par,
ticular man to the office Of Judge in ssme OF The
neighboring or more remote districts OF the State:
Whatever that otec! may be, his vote will be the he
chief capital upon which he is to rely for his attain
ment; and can it be doubted that that vote would
be cast not SO much with reference to the choice Of
a good Judge as to the accomplishment VI his own
purposes7 The ptriry Of the legislature, the dig;
nifty of the judiciary, and the proper working Yf on,
system, require that these two departments should
not be SO blended as to lead 10 the corruption OF the
one, and The degradation OF The other.
To confer the power Of appointment upon the ex.
ecutive is equally Objectionable line same reason reason
not be subordinate to the Legislature applies equal
ary to bring the acts Of the executive 10 the test
of the constitution and to keep this depart.
ment within the sphere allotted to il by law
By holding in his hands the power ,ofre,appolAi
ment. you give to the executive absolute dominion
oyef the judges, and fdlsposed to do violent thing
he would Soon Eli The bench with lifting Ins,ru,
mens TO sanction and sanctfy The deed. Give hinI