The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1850-02-15

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which appears here in your executive department in your
supreme Judicial tribunal which peryades your whole
nsttutontbe inquiry Is, whether these constitutional
provisions make part Of the eoa lag OF the United States
intended merely to regulate the conduct OF and man
The transactions between citizen and citizen for unless
this IS 80, then the laws OF the United States whether
organic secondary. which relate slavery are public
and political laws and then. unguesonably Mexican
laws on The same subject with whatever authority they
may have been enacted while California and New Mex.
leo part OF the Mexican republic, ceased instantly
upon their transfer 10 the United States to have any ope
ration or effect
Mr. President. invite the attention Of senators the
consideration OF another question III Congress had the
power to do what is proposed TO do. would il bel do
not say expedient, but take higher ground and ask
would Il be right proper and consistent with good faith
To exercise that powerl In the discussion OF the resou
ton particularly applicable the District OF Columbia,
struck the other day with the very strong view pre-
scented by the senator from Kentucky MT CLAyl OF the
in the District oil Columbia While be asserted The power,
he still maintained that Congress could not IN conscience
and good faith exert ii that its exercise was forbidden
BY the honorable obligation Incurred by the acceptance
the cession was not necessary TO the tuhlment OF the
purpose Tor which the power conferred and was IN
consistent with the intent OF the parties who coded the
territory, and who could have expected the abo
on OF slavery there while It existed within their own
limits.
sion against such violation OF good faith under the in
uence OF feelings which natural 10 him from has
own personal adherence Of any violation Of conscience,
soGSa s
without being able 10 with him TO the existence
ofthe power But felt that the argument Of my friend
power considering From the rich sorehouse Of
his mind propose to draw The argument on which
shall now rely, and from his own ample. .armory 70
furnish myself with the weapon which will WELD in
this friendly strife.
Mr. President recognised in the full force which the
senator from Kentucky gave to the annuncation OF II
honorable motives which he urged to abstain from the
exercise OF the power which he thought the constitution
conferred upon us in relation to the District OF Columbia
differed with him the effect OF that obligation He
thought i proved the inexpedency Of exercising the
power. To me il seemed to dsprove its existence He
applied il e the mode Of carrying the contract into exc
culion thought il part OF the contract self-tha
the spirit and intent OF contract constitute ITS essence
and that the great object Of proof the OF
these could not bring my mind to believe that Con-
gess could derive power under the constitution to
ter into contract to do that which contrary to
science to good faith, to honorable obligation, and the
intent Of the pae, 10 whose dement i would operate
Mr. CLAY. dnierposing) Mr.. President, if my friend
Mr.. BERRiEN. Certainly. sir.
Mr.. CLAY. was perfectly oil that inference
which might be drawn from the assertion OF implied
faith arising out OF the nature OF the transaction, which
that OF cedng this territory b, Maryland and Virginia
But sir, my friend will recoect that this implication OF
good faith restraining the OF power in conse
quence OF Its being contrary TO what mus have been ex
pected and could not possibly have been ioeseen and APP
pretended by the ceding States, limited H. for ex
ample, the only ceding State now existing should con-
sent and. moreover ii the people of the District should
be no implication resulting from the implied faith and
therefore, is not oil the nature OF an inherent portion OF
the power; il is thing temporary in Ills existence lasting
only while slavery lasts in Maryland, and terminating
when given II ia therefore. its nature not an
inherent portion intrinsic portion OF the power but
general restraining OF the exercise oil consider
alton OF the peculiar circumstances OF the cedng States al
the time when the cession made That is the view
intended 10 take
| Mr. BERRIEN MIR. President, in the statement just
made the honorable senator from Kentucky mir CLAY
not hmm IN mi any m
He offers an argument against the inference which mad
drawn from It.
Sir the proposition is this that the power TO abolish
slavery in the District OF Columbia exists but that The cir
cumsances under which the cession was made urged and
implied obligations not TO exercise 1t, without the consent
OF Maryland and Virginia heretofore and since the retro
OF Alexandria OF Maryland alone hsve said that
if this obligation, dictated by conscience and necessary TO
the observance OF good faith could be implied IRON the
circumstances under which the contract was entered
into and was enoned BY the spirit and intent OF the
ties. il formed part OF the contract ITSELF and did
not merely control the manner in which the rights ac-
quired under il should be exercised Now, the senator
from Kentucky desires TO quality his argument by sta
ting that the obligation OF which ne spoke was Temporal
~ In its nature that has ceased as to Virginia. and only
operates now to restrain the exercise OF the power with
out the consent Of Maryland That is the proposition
now.
Mr. CLAY, Tin his seai) And that the proposition
the other day
admission of an implied obligation, not TO exercise
the power but with the assent OF the cedng States, by
ing that IL in It's nature temporary by eassertng
that only restrained the mode of exercising the power
restraint which the OF Maryland would now re-
move; but this, in my judgment, does not affect the
between US, which is, whether this implied
obligation resulting from the circumstances stated, was
or was not part OF the contract OF cesson whether
merely affected the mode In which the power derived
from Il was 10 be exercised Now have supposed that
what is done under contract, and in conformity
TO H. must be done virtue OF the contract Itself, sieT
preed according 10 it, spirit and inicntwhich const-
tuie the ofthe con,acand that the competency
OF Maryland 10 assent 10 particular mode oil exercising
proves nothing; because IL as contend, II was part
OF the contract itself, equally competent 10 Mary
land 10 release any right acquired under H. Qadcrmgue
via data therefore whether this implied obligation op
crates 10 the humiliation Of the power, gently,
10 control It's exercise. the Argument equally subseryes
my purpose for here the question IT, whether the exef
else Of power 10 prohibit slavery in the Territories
would be consistent with the pledge, mutually given and
received by fathers, OF equality OF right 10 The &C
tua possessions and future acquisitions OF the United
States, forbddng a distinction Gin the language OF Vat
tell to The disadvantage OF any portion OF The community
You may have the power II you will acknowledge and
conform TO the obligation oil conscience and good faith
which forbids its exercise.
DESIRE then, PROFOUND the question which that ar
gument affords II would be contrary 10 conscience. TO
good faith and TO the implied litigation thence resulting
to abolish slavery in The District OF Columbia, without
the convent Of The State of Maryland, the only remain
ing one OF the ceding States, upon what does that
obligation resti Why, certainly, upon the assump
ton that il would be in violation OF the spirit and
intent OF the parties at the tine when the cesson was
made. Now. sir, revert 10 the period when this con-
situ,ion was entered intowhen thirteen conederaed
States, loosely connected together, mutually grasping