Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1849-04-20

ueht ny inc consutuuoni which IN any case re- |
quires him TO refuse his assent to n law Of Con-
grcs, then the power given him to approve or
not approve must clearly relate, and be limited
TO- this exercise Of il, because in that way only,
can the two sections be made consistent and OPP |
crdiirc.
His oath Of Office requires him TO "preserre,
protect and defend The Constitution Of he United
States" This is his frst duty, and imposed up
on him by the solemnity of an oath.
If Congress pass bill which, in The opinion
of the President, is Unconstitutional, and the
question Of consiitutionaiiy has not been settled
by the tribunal created for that purpose, to wit,
the U. s. Supreme Court, he is bound by his
ooh to reio il. The President in such case
has no discretion, and TO afiix bis signature to
such bill would be perjury.
Here, then, is the exception and the specif-
cation, which makes these seemingly conflicting
provisions not only effective, but harmonious and
consistent.
Tho seventh section, considered alone, not
only gives the President legislative powers equal
with Congress in all cases, but centres in his sin
gle opinion and will, legislative power equal to
f,ro-thirds Of both Houses Of Congress
An exception, Il is said, prove, the general
rule, and 20 il does in this case. "dA legislative
powers are vested in Congess'-ihis is the gen.
era rule, and therefore j, is the Presidents duty
to assent TO all legislative measures of Congress,
unless Tin the absence Of Judicial decisions) he
believes them 10 be unconstitutional This is the
exception, aud made 30 by his oflicinl oath, and
this explains, qualities and limits his veto power,
and makes !, consistent with the grant Of all leg
isiaiire power TO Congress.
But upon the doctrine eoniended for, the er-
csp,ion is ss broad as the general rule, and sb-
soluiely nnliGes It, and instead Of possessing all
legislative powers, Congress shares them equally
with the President. In no case (says the Re
public) can Congress enact Law, independent
Of the Executive, unless two-ihirds vote for IT,
], follows that the construction given by the Re
public will not allow US to consider one section
as the general rude, and the other as the ezcsp-
non TO it, but makes them absolutely repugnonf
and irreeOneiiable with each other, and both
equally broad and comprehensive.
by constituting these two sections separately
and independently, they arc at war with and
destroy each other; while by constituting them
with reference to other parts Of the sane instru-
nent, they work harmoniously together. Which
is the true reading?
II is singular enough, that while the Republic
exclaims against this restriction upon the veto
power, because il renders the President pow
ericss machine-a mere Auiomaion--he also de-
clares that without any legislative power, he can
do more by the exercise Of his influence than
any ten or twenty members Of Congress" If
this is the case. he would no, be 80 much of 40
auiomaion, after all. II he does IN truth land
We admit he does) possess this great influence
over members Of Congress, and holds in addition
equal legislative powers what is he, less than an
absolute deTot? Does he not, in fact. centre
in hissseifs al" Legislative as well As Executive
powers7 With such an influence, and the strong
party feeling that always will exist, is it proba-
bic that two-ihirds Of Congress will ever be
found voting against I'LL obnoxious to. the
PRESIDENT
There il not, we undertake 10 say, a constitu-
tional sovereign in Europe that possesses the
absolute power now claimed for the President Of
the United States. In England, the application
Of veto to law Of Parliament would cost the
sovereign her throne. Here, according to the
Republic, j. must be applied whenever the Ex-
ecuiiye differs in opinion with Congress as to the
policy, expedieney and utility Of any measure,
however trivial or unimportani, that may be
passed by them. II, in adjusting the tariff, the
President thinks the duty on cotton, or sugar, or
other article is either TOO high or too low, as fixed
by Congress, be must veto the bill, for the Re-
public holds that he is legislator in the pass
age Of every act that becomes law" that he
must take into account their e1pediency as well
as their cons,itutionaty," and either veto or ap-
prove them, according to his opinion of them,
and that by refusing to do so, he rioldies The
constitution"
This is republicanism, with vengeance. If
this doctrine be true, the President ought not
only to express bis opinion upon all matters Of
legislation to Congress, but he ought to instruct
them what laws to pass, and tell them that time
spent in framing different laws is thrown away !;
or, what is better, and taniamount to this, let US
dispense altogether with those cumbersome, ex.
pensive and useless Congressional bodies, which
are the mere puppets of the Executive, and let
the President, in name, as in fact, make our
laws, as well as execute them.
The Republic also asserts that il is the consti-
tutonal duty of the President to recommend
measures to Congress, and he calls this origin
ating government measures"
This duty Of the President is not stated quite
accurately. He is required " to recommend to
their consideration such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient;" and this is
very different from recommending measures
To recommend a tariff, would be 10 spread
out, in form and details, such law as he desir-
ed. To recommend 10 the consideration" Of
Congress, the subject of Tariff, would be mere
ly drawing their attention to it, and this is evil
IDENTITY the design Of the clause of the constitution.
No fair reading can construe it to require the
President to advise Congress to iehai laws they
should pass. The clause is carefully worded to
repel such a conclusion.
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