The republic. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1849-1853, 1849-07-16
miscellaneous.
From the Boston Times.

Ii needed not the nefarlous intervention OF Russia
IN the Austro-H hungarian contest 10 render the sub
ect of that great empires military strength one OF
interest. From the time that the IN
iaIuatlon of Napoleon enabled Russia to take
eading part in stemming for a while the tide of re-
yolutionary opinion, the world has stood staring at
that bar baresque power, and preparing itself, as
were, TO be devoured. A most exaggerated idea OF
Russian military ability has prevailed for genera
ton, and the impression has become very general
that the Hungarans must fall before potent |
manifestation oft has been made during the last
two months. That the Hungarians may be CO.
creed into submission 10 the House OF Austria, by
the efforts of the Russian army is far from being
an imposslbllty; but II would be very illogical TO
infer from such result of the contest now gong on
that the power of Russia, for offensive purposes Is
out of proportion to that of other European states
if indeed Russia can, strictly speaking, be counted |
a European empire. Certainly there is nothing |
in Russian history that should convey the impress |
sion that she can long keep up contest against |
any determined opponent
Several accounts of the numerical strength of the
Russian army have lately been published, in New
York journals of responsibility, supposed to have
access to good sources Of information They make
that army amount, in gross, million OF men, OF
which number third part is put down as being
available for service In the Hungarian war. We
have very little confidence in either this estimate of
the strength of the Russian force gross In the
deduction that is made that more than three hum
bred thousand men can be permanently employed
against the Hungarians. The population OF Rus
sia may be safely estimated at 60 100000, and, if
her army be million in number, il contains SIX
teth part of the whole people of the empire not TO
speak of her naval force. This would be out OF all
proportion TO the armies that have been kept up by
states quite powerful as Russia is at the present
moment though to maintain II in any thing like
efficient state, time Of peace, would no, be much
beyond The present means of Russia The average
pay of the Russian troops of the line may be put
down at twenty-four roubles, or about hve dollars
per year; that the pay ofthe privates would
amount 10 some FIVE millions per annum, the guards
receiving about fifty per cent higher pay than the
troops of the line The pay fthe soldier, however,
is but the smallest item in the of the Russian
military establishment. The average cost of the
Russian soldier is about twenty five dollars per an
num- which would make the cost of the army pro-
per, exclusive of officers, upwards of twenty mil
lions of our money, every year. It's probable that
the entire cost of the establishment, every item IN
Guided, amounts to fifty millions of dollars yearly.
In speaking of the pay of the Russian soldier, we
allude 10 the paper roube but for that is substituted
the silver rouble when he serves beyond the boun-
daries of the empire. As the silver roube is worth
four times much as the paper rouble, the cost OF
maintaining great army IN Hungary Will enor-
snousy increase the military expenditure OF the
empire, TO say nothing OF the other sources OF ex-
pense that are created by war.
Some twelve or fifteen years ago, Marechal Mar
mont pretty good authority IN all matters OF
military character, placed the numbers OF the Rus
alan army at S3s 800 men. Other authorities rated
It's effective strength al 900 men, In 1874, and
we believe this last estimate 10 be nearest the truth;
for even If the proper estImatfs put II at million,
we must deduct largely therefrom to get at the eff
fective strength. This IS more particularly neces-
Sary when considering the condition OF a Russian
army than with reference TO force belonging 10
any other nation. One OF the results of the small
pay of the Russian officers has been the making
them the most corrupt set OF rascals on earth.
They often report larger number of men as serv-
ing under them than have existence, they draw
ing the pay, and pocketing the difference. Cases
have been known in which general officers have APP
propriated TO themselves large sums OF money that
had been furnished them for the remounung of
cavalry regiments Ii is obvious that calculations,
based upon returns made by such men, must be
very Detective and II must often happen that reg-
ment or even q division, which the government
NAV suppose TO be equal 10 the footlng IN point
of numbers, is really unfit for service. OF the
masses that have been poured into Hungary, II
would not surprise learn that al least one halt
have no existence out of the Interested magma
lions of their officers.
The efficiency of an army depends greatly upon
the condition of its commlssar1at- In this respect
Russian armies have always been very deficient
When Napoleon in 1906 and 1907, was carrying
on a war against Russia, ms army, though con-
tending at the distance Of thousand miles from the
base OF his operations suffered but lttle being well
supplied with food, clothing, medical attendance
&c. while the Russians, though on their own soil
had neither the one nor the other TO any reasonable
amount This deficiency in the economy OF the
Russian army explains why that IN all the wars
40 which 1t has been engaged IT'S mortality has beer
40 great The last war Of Russia against Turkey
was marked by the death Of two hundred thousand
of the conquerors, the half Of whom died IN th'
first campaign In the last Polish war, almost
fourth part OF the Russian invading force fe'l IN lest
than a month after IT commenced IL was not TN
Turkish scimeter in the one instance, nor The 70
lish bayonet in the other, that caused this lrlsi
defamation Of the Russians but the bad arrange
ments Of the details Of the service We see
Stated already, and by way OF apology Tor the ltt'
that the Russians have thus far even attempted t.
accomplish in Hungary, that their commlssarla
was found to be IN so wretched a state, when III
several columns composing The invading army wer
concentrated as to cause a suspension OF operation
until IL could be reorganized-a very promising stat
oftbings. il must be confessed, at the outset OF
var into which all Europe may yet be drawn.
The amount Of force that Russia, at different pc
RODS Of her history has been able to concentrate o.
important battle-helds, does not promise much 10
the success Of her arms IN Hungary. Al the tim
OF the second coalition against France, she coul
send only some fifty or sixty thousand men, nnde
Suvarof, to aid the Ausrisns in Italy and she ha
been compelled 70 apologize for such terrible defeat
as Austerlitz and Friedand, on the ground that he
armies were outDumbered by those Of France
This excuse might answer very well for Ausiei
litz. which was fought at some distance from he
frontier; bot that IL should be brought up to paai
the scarcely less terrible disaster OF Fnedland,
more disgraceful than that defeat itself. j
1912, out Of army Of less than half million {
regular troops Russia could assemble not aboy
100 900 men on the field Of Borodno, few marche
from the old capital Of the empire. When, tweni
years since, Diebich found himself on the plains
Adranople his whole army did not exceed $500
men and but for the ignorance Of the Turks
would have been driven back beyond the Balkan
few weeks. To reduce the Poles, in 1892, Russ
could never assemble above 20, 900 men, near ~ W.
the scene OF war TO the empire proper. We are NJ
aware Of any thing in her present condition til
should lead us to believe that she can DO mut
beuer now than she could then, except II be III
she il said 10 be better supplied with money no
thsn at any previous period Of her history
which more hereafter
Al one time Russia had a very respectable for