The North-Carolina standard., 1849-08-01

trustees and that In carrying into execuLon ltS
ers it cannot ghully exercise any 1nconsIst6nt with
the nature and object Of the trust, with the char
acter the party who created the trus or for whose
benefit itswas created. finally hold, that instead OF
having the absolute power over the territories OF DO
ing it pleases, that Congress Is restrained by all
these limitations and that its power to exclude you
frcm emigating with your slaves into them, cannot
be maintained without denying that ours is govern
ment of which States and not individuals are the con-
stuents and that Congress holds Its powers as del
egated and trust powers. Nor can it be maintained,
without assuming that is consolidated Govern
ment, and holds its powers absolutely in Its own
sovereign right of doing as it pleases.
also deny the truth of the assertion, that it
has exercised the power the territories, 1t
pleased. without being questioned until introduced
my resolutions. I maintain, on the contrary, that
such power never was exercised by Congress, until
he and his associates passed the Oregon territorial
BILL That was the first bill containing the Wilmot
provso, that passed, as has been statedpassed
solely to assert the absolute right of doing as plea
-ses All others, including the ordinances OF I707
were passed as compromises which waived the ques
tion of power, as has been frequently shown. Nor
is his assertion more correct, that the power never
questioned, until the introduction of my resou
tions. 1t was questioned from the start beginning
with the ordinance of 1857. Mr.. Madison pronounc-
ed that it was adopted without shadow of right
Since then, it has been acquiesced IN not right
but as compromise until the North refused all
compromise, and forced the South to stand on its
rights, where it should have stood from the first.
Fhe next assertion, that slavery is local in its char
acter that it be enacted by law, and cannot be
carried inch beyond the limits of the State that
enacted it, is equally unmaintanabe. 1t is clear that
in making it. he intended to affirm, that in these
pects property in slaves stands on very different
ground from every other description of property.
deny the fact, and maintain that there is no dis
tncon between it and other property, in that respect
1t requires to be enacted by law, to express
it NOR, specifcay-to have positive enactment for
its origin, than property in land any thing else.
The relation of master and slave was one of the first
and most universal forms in which property existed.
1t is ancient that there is record of its origin
1t is probably ancient than separate and distinct
property in lands, and quite easily defended on
abstract principles So far from being created by
positive enactment, / know of no instance In which
it was express it accurately, In which
it had its origin acts of legislatures. 1t is always
older than the laws which undertake to regulate i,
and such is the with slavery, as it exists with
They were for1he most part slaves in Africa,
they bought slaves, brought here slaves,
sold here as slaves and held slaves, long before
any enactment made them slaves. | even doubt,
whether there is single State in the South, that
ever enacted them to be slaves. There hundreds
of acts that recognize and regulate them such, but
none, | apprehend, that undertake to create them
slaves. Master and slaves are constantly regarded
pre-existing relations.
Nor is it any local in its character, than any
other property The laws of all countries, in refer
ence every thing including property of every kind
local. and cannot go inch beyond the limits to
which the authority of the country extends. In case
Of property of every description, if passes beyond
the authority of the country where is another
where the description of things regarded as
property, it continues to be so there, but becomes
subject the laws and regulations of the place in
reference to such property. But, if 1t be prohibited
as property in the country into which it passes, it
ceases be so, unless it has been forced in, under
circumstances which placed thunder the protection
of international laws. Thus, and the same prn
cple apply In this respect to all property; In things
animate niInate and rational irrational There
ho onfin vYGyhp 0f
every kind Is subject to the control OF the authority
of the country. Thus far, hold, that there be
reasonable doubt. 1.-.
Nor can there be any that the same principle APP
plies between the several States in system of
government. Slaves any other property carried
into State where it is also property, continues still
to be so; but if into where ii is prohibited, 1t
to be property. This is admitted too, by ALL
1t is also admitted by all that the General Govern
ment cannot overrule the laws of State, to what
shall ersha not be property, withip the limits of its
an thoTity. The only question then Is, what is the
power of the General Government where Its authori
ty extends beyond the limits of the authority of the
States, regarded in their separate and individual char
acter, or to make it more specific, can it determine
what shall or shall not be property in the territories
or wherever else its authority extends, beyond that
of the States separately to make it still So
can it absh slavery in the territories it
act law providing that any negro mulatto found
in the territories of the United States shall be slave,
and be liable to be seized, and treated such by
Bentons doctrine that Congress may legislate as it
peases upon the subject of slavery in the territories
it would have the power, but doubt whether there
is another individual who would agree with him. But
1t 1t has not the power to establish slavery in the
how it have the power abolish it
The is the Counterpart Of the other, and where
is the provision of the constitution to be found which
authorizes the one and forbids the other 7?
The same question may be propounded as to
public and private vessels belonging to the United
States and their citizens the high ;-for the
prncPle which applies to the territories equally ap
plies to hem and to all places which the authority
regarded separately.
1t Is indeed great misconception of the character
and object of the general government suppose that
i has the power either to establish or abolish slave
~ or any other property, where its authority extends
beyond the limits of the States regarded individually.
It's authority is but the united and joint authority of
he several States, conferred upon it by constitution
adopted on mutual agreement, but by the separate
lct of each State, IN like manner in every respect as
Zach adopted Its own separate constitution, with the
single exception, that adopted without, and
he other on mutual agreement with all the States.
then, in fact, the constitution of each State
much so as its own separate constitution, and is only
he constitution of all the States because it is that of
each: AS the constitution made the general govern
nent, that too IS, in like manner, much the gov
'rnment OF each State as Its own separate govern
nent and only the government of all because it is
he government of each. So likewise are its laws
md for the same reason. Its authority then is but
he united and common authority ofthe several States
delegated by each to be exercised for the mutual bene
1t OF each and ALL and for the greater security of the
lghts and interests of each and ALL 1t was for that
purpose, the States united in a federal union, and