The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1849-07-13

is deserving OF Tie highest commentator.
Our trade and commercial relations in that quar-
ter Of the world have been steadily increasing for
the last fifty years; and from the character which
our traders have established for honesty, and
prompiness in all their relations it is PLAIN to see
that still larger share of this profitable business
must eventually come into our possession. At no
time has this trade received that attention from
our government that its importance entitled it to.
The thousand taxations it is forced to encounter
on the ground of national prejudice, in the form
partial and onerous guarantees, particularly in
Gibraltar and the ports of Spain, and In the alb
sence OF an efficient naval representation, would
have been sufficient, with almost any people of less
energy than our own, to have rendered it scarcely
worth the trouble of prosecuting. We know OF
cases where vessels coming from Boston and New
York, with clean bills of health, have been
compelled by the Board of Quarantine of Gil
braltar to seek foul lazarette at Marseilles,
when the object for this additional labor and ex-
pense was ascerained to be an act of favoritsm to
some merchants in the garrison, who had vess Is
In port with like cargoes of goods, which it was
their interest to have first disposed of. Innumer-
able instances of like oppression have been the
subject of communication to our government-tbe
foreign powers--but at no time has restitution
been made, or the abuses discontinued. With the
very limited power possessed by our Consuls, and
the marked indifference to their complaints, as
shown by our own government, the means for
our eflectng favorable change by the agent, have
been few, and wholly inefficient. There are two
causes which have hitherto contributed to the
continuance of this abuse. The first is the total
indifference of the government to our foreign in.
terest and secondly, the absence of an available
naval force, without which no trade for any period
of time can hope TO support itself.
The force designed for the Mediterranean can
be made to answer many valuable ends, by pro-
per and judicous disposition of the same. The
practice of sailing the Mediterranean in squadrons
or fleets, should be discontinued, and n cruising
ground appointed for each vessel, and the
amount of duty clearly specified. This would
afford to our shipping interest proper and
efficient protection, either against port exac-
tons or piracy, which at all times exists
in the Mediterranean, but which would be
increased by general war in Europe. AT all
times it Is important that udicious person should
be selected as commander for either a squadron or
fleet but at so critical period as the present, the
government, in the exercise of this power, cannot
observe too great caution. Nice points of inter-
national law, requiring keen perception, ability,
caution, and firmness, may arise in the disputes
and changes daily occurring between the govern.
mens of Europe, in which a commander of our
squadron may be called upon to decide A false
step may involve this country, if not IN war, at
least in an Improbable controversy, and wholly
destroy the efficiency of our squadron in those
seas. 1t is but just to presume that In the selection
Of Commodore Morgan to this important post, the
government at Washington could not have been
apprised of this officers total unness for so dis
tinguished and responsible a station. 1t is also
presumed that the controversy in which Commo-
dore Morgan was engaged with his officers during
his last command, and the unhappy results attend
ing the same, rejecting so deeply on the Ameri-
can character, could not have been examined
into, or their particulars known to the proper
authorities at Washington. An examination of
these papers would show axity of discipline I'M
known before in this country, absence in the
person Of Commodore Morgan of becoming cour-
tesy and respect, of excessive haughtness Of man.
ner, and of unofficerlike conduct. These are not
traits of character calculated to advance our inte-
rests at this moment at home or abroad; but yet
they are the properties belonging to the command
er now in charge Of the Mediterranean squadron.
We have no interest in thus matter, beyond the
public good, and it gives us no pleasure TO speak
thus of an American officer. The high-handed
authority assumed by Commodore Morgan, in
stripping Captain Tatnall Of his command, and de-
patching him to the United States, without cause,
but simply to CRAFTY a personal feeling, was a
dangerous stretch Of power During the season
that the squadron was at Mahon, it is well known
that the Commodore seldom, if ever, visited his
ships, or permitted Of any verbal intercourse be-
tween himself and Captain, now Commodore,
Geisnger, or Tntnall. lie took up his quarters on
shore, giving balls and dnnsss to the residents OF
the place, but excluded from these entertainments
a majority Of his own officers, with whom he
was not on speaking terms. 1t il not very
surprising that the Commodore's conduct should
have found ready imitsiors-that the squad
ron should have been left without officers or men,
at times, for necessary protection, or that general
characterization should have followed, as a conse-
quence. We speak adyisedly upon this subject.
when we assert that the want Of a wholesome dis
cipline milamed the passions Of the people Of Ma
hon 10 such extent, that two three Of our sal
lors were buichercd in street fight, and the re-
msinder forced 90 seek safety b. a timely flight TO
their boats. Between the people Of slahon and
Americans the most kindly feengs. Jntil this fatal
afIrsy, had existed; but TO such an extent were
their passions aroused, that Commodore Morgan
deemed It expedent TO put TO sea. Should he de-
eide upon pursuing the same policy during his pre-
cent command in the Mediterranean, il will be a
fair inference that material benefit will be de-
nved from it, either to the country or our CONNER
cal interests. The injurious effects Of this com
mand were more than removed by the conduct Of
Commodore Smith, who succeeded to the Medi-
tersnean station Every port was visited by his
ships, business was promptly attended to, and the
utmost harmony existed between himself and all of
his officers. throughout the whole cruise. Why
was not this officer, or Commodore Stewart, en-
trusted with this important command
II efficiency is the object Of the government, in
this expedition, it might be well for it to think how