The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1848-05-31

ellis ms in this very message that it is TO be permitted
IN any event mat any foreign power should occupy luca
TAN Nat Is language for TO hold, not Tor the Chie
Magistrate And in conformity with that he sends in
message without giving particle OF evidence as &c
nose great political considerations which Influenced the
caonet decisions stated this floor, In declaring
whetber we shall occupy the country or not. speak il
not IN Inc way OF censue. state IT only matter OF
UNDOUBTEDLY great and dangerous msconcepon of these
celebrated declarations But that is not all He tells you
n the same message that these declarations have become
the seued policy of this country. What, the decara-
tons declarations not policy, and cannot become
settled pohcy He must that it has become the set
lied pocy OF tins country TO resist what these decara-
10 arms Is this the fact! Has there been one in.
stance IN which these declarations have been carried
INTO effect by resistance II there be, let il be pointed
out: Have there not been innumerable instances in
which they have not been applied Certainly Still
stronger declarations, under this bread Interpretation,
were dlsavowed entirely three years afterwards by
isralion OF Nr. Adams endeavored to apply them by
sending ministers to the Congress at Panama. will be
seen by reading the debates and the proceedings on the
subject And sayfor proper that should make
the declaration this occason-tht there has been
entire revolution between the two PARTIES in this country
IN reference to our foreign relations AT the commence
ment OF our government and down to late period-l
VIII marx 1.-THE commencement OF Jackson's admins,
raton, the policy of the republican party was to avoid
war as long as could be avoided, and to resort to
every means to avert it's calamtes. The opposite party,
without being war party, had not so decided an aver
sion to The thing is now reversed and hence |,
who endeavored to maintain the old ground OF the party,
have tor years, all questions connected with our for
egn relations been compelled to operate with gentle
men on the opposite sde and to resist those in the midst
OF whom stand Mo- il is not, and never has been, the
established policy of the country And if it should
become So to the wide extent to which these declara
IONS have been interpreted to CO. our peace would ever
be disturbed; the gates OF our Janus would stand
open; wars would never cease
What the President has asserted in this case is not a
principle belonging to these declarations; it is principle
which, IN his misconcepton, he attempts to engrat upon
them but which has entirely different meaning and
tendency The principle which lies at the bottom OF his
recommendation Is, that when any power on this CONT
nent becomes involved in internal warfare and the weak
er side chooses to make application to for support
are bound to give them support for fear the offer OF the
sovereignty OF the country maybe made to some other
beyond Mr. Monroe s-declaraton Ii puts it in the pow
er OF other countries this continent TO make us party
to all their wars; and hence say if this broad inerpre
aon be gwen to these declarations, we shall forever be
involved in wars.
But, in disavowng principle which will compel us to
resist every case OF teposon OF European powers
lending the opposite that should never resist their
terposltlon. That is position which would be nearly
dangerous and absurd the other But general rule
can be LAID down to guide US on such question Every
case must speak Tor ltselfevery must be decided
on It's own merits Whether you will resist not and
the measure OF your Observation-Disclosures il shall be by
or by resort to arms all this must be determined and
decided on the merits OF the question itself That is the
only wise course. We are not TO have quoted on on
every occasion general declarations to which any and
every meaning may be attached There of in
lepositon where would resort to the hazard of war
with all its caames. Am 1 asked for onc' will an.
swer. designate the of Cuba. So long Cuba
mains in the hands of Spain-a friendly power power
OF which we have no dTead-it should continue to be,
il has been the policy of al! administrations since
have been connected with the government, TO let Cuba
remain there; but with the fixed determination which
hope never will be relinquished, that if Cuba pass
from her. shall not be into any other hands but
not n n n uInhI mt a 0aSIr
for the extension of dominion, but because that island is
Indispensable the safety of the United States rather
because it is Indispensable to the safety OF the United
States that this island should be certain hands If
WERE our coastng trade between the Gulf and the AT
anc would. In case of war, be cut in twain, to be fol-
lowed by convusive effects In the category will
reterto case in which we might most righttully have
resisted had it become necessary, foreign powers and
that is the OF Texas 1t has been greatly misunder
stood 1t sprung up in the midst of party excitement
whena large portion of both parties opposed to
nexaton, and when it difficult il not impossible
get fair hearing never supposed, as has been stated
this floor that Great Britain intended to subject Texas
to her power. That was not my dread. What was
dreaded this: Texas being small power, and Great
Britain having free and large commercial intercourse
with her, and we almost none, although "bone Of our
bone and flesh of our esh, she would gradually have
been weaned OF her affection for Kindness for Eng
land and aversion for us would have been the result
That is the inevitable tendency between nations having
|colerminous limits AT that very time there several
questions between this country and Texas which, had it
not been for the most amcabe feelings which subslsed
line of more than thousand miles lily defined the boun
Diary between and Texas exposed to the hazard of
becoming involved constantly in with her, sup
ported by Great Britain and Mexico her allies | saw
lal this; saw clearly that it to resist nerpo
son and that there other mode by which resis-
lance could be made except by annexation; and there
fore, was in favor of annexation, at the hazard of
But asked by one of the members OF the Commit
tee on Foreign Relations if would be in favor of resist
ing Great Britain if she should assert sovereignty and do
mlnon over Iucaan ? | answer, would not. And
for irresistible reasons | would not because the coun-
try is, to great extent most worthless one, Nearly
hall destitute of sing streamrocky and barren
throughout the greater part; and 1t is only BY means OF
the artificial reservoirs water that they enabled to
live through the dry season. would not because the
possession of Yucaan would contribute nothing to the
defence OF the passage between 1T and Cuba, which is
represented to be important to our commerce 1t is
moi without ITS Importance; 1t is important to the inward
trade but not at all to the outward trade of the Gulf
There is current of wind and water setting in
that direction of which vessels going to New Orleans OF
other port on the Gulf, may avail themselves But
on coming from those ports, they almost invariably take
their way between Florida and Cuba and thus the pass
age between Yucaan and Cuba is the inlet to limited
extent INTO the Gulf but not the outlet from 1t; while
the passage between Cuba and Florida is almost the
elusive outlet and the principal inlet | speak IN refer
to coasng vessels In voyages IRON Europe, they
pass south Of Cuba into the Gulf.
| But take higher grounds. II it were mpor
tan not only inlet, but an outlet, the occupation
Yucatan by England would add nothing to her power
cutting oil our trade Yucatan very destitute of ports
there is not irigate port laid down in the charts ht
whole peninsula unless that at the Belize be But
with or without Iucatan Great Britain possesses
comfortable power the passage whenever she chooses
to exert IT. II ever should be engaged in witt
her, thefe is not single vessel of If wer
tI,faA ANITA into thn mi