Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1848-12-08

the senators from these States constitute MAORI
~ OF the Senate. So thdt the President may re.
commend measure to Congress, and it ftiay re.
celVe the sanction and approval of ff1ore than
three-fourths OF the House of Representatives and
of all the senators from the large States contain.
ing more than three-fourths of the whole popula-
ton of the United States; and yet The measure
may be defeated by the votes of the senators from
the smaller States. None, it is presumed. can be |
found ready to change the organization of the Sem
ate on this account, to strike that body pract-
caiy out of existence. by requiring that its action
shat be eonfo med to the will of the more numer-
Gus branch.
upon the same principle that The veto of the
President should he prar,jrsllv abolished. the
power the Vice PresGeu, ,o olive The casting
vote upon an equal division of the Senate should
be abolished also The Vice Presidcn, exercises
the veto power as efectually by REJECTING hill nv
his casting vote, the President does by rcfns;ne
to approve and sign it. This power has been ex.
ercised by the Vice President in few instances
the most important of which was the rejection of
the bill to recharter the the bank of the United
States in 1911. 1t may happen that bill may
be passed by large majority of the House of
Representatives, and may be supported by the
senators from the larger States and the Vice Pres
ident may reject it by giving his vote with the
senators from the smaller States; ard yet none,
it is presumed, arc prepared to deny to him the
exercise of this power under the constitution.
But it is, in point of fact, untrue that an act
passed by Congress is conclusive evidence that it
is an emanation of the popular will. A ma lorty
OF the whole number elected to each House Of
Congress constitutes a quorum, and majority Of
that quorum IS competent to pass laws. 1t might
happen that quorum of the House of Represcn-
tatlves, consisting of single member more than
half of the whole humber elected to that House.
might pass bill by ma jority Of single vote
and in that case fraction more than one-fburth
OF the people of the United States would he repre-
scented by those who voted for it, II might hap
pen that the same bill might be passed hy a ma
jOrlty OF one, of quorum of the Senate composed
OF Senators from the fifteen smaller States and
single Senator from sixteenth State, and if the
Senators voting for it hapI ened be rom the eight
ofthe smallest ofthese States, it would he pass
dby the votes of Senators from States having
but fourteen representatives. in the House OF
Representatives., and containing less than one
sixteenth OF the whole population Of the United
States. This extreme case is stated to illustrate
the tact, that mere passage of bill by Congress
is no conclusive evidence that those who passed
1t represent the majority Of the people of the Il
ted States, or truly lefect their will. If such an
extreme case is not likely to happen cases that ap-
proxlmate it are of constant occurrence II is be.
lIeved that nOta single law has been passed since
| the adoption oil the constitution, upon which all
the members elected to both houses have been pre-
sent and voted. Many of the most important acts
which have passed Congress have been carried
| by close vote in thin houses. Many instances
| OF this might be given. Indeed, our experience
proves that many of the most important acts of
Congress are postponed to The last days, and often
the last hours of a session, when they are dis
posed OF III haste, and 10y houses but little exceed
Ing the member necessary to form quorum.
| Besides, in most Ofthe States the members of
the House of Representatives are chosen by plu-
ralltIes. and not by maOrties of all the voters in
their respective DISTRICTS and it may happen that
majority OF that House may he returned by less
aggregate vote of the people than that received by
the minority.
If the principle insisted on lie sound, then the
Constitution should be changed that no bill shall
become law u-.less it is voted for by members
representing in each House majority OF the whole
people of the United States. We must remodel
our whole system, strike down and abolish not
only the salutary checks lodged in the executive
branch, hut must strike out and abolish those
lodged LII the Senate ALSO and thus practically in
vest the whole power of the government in a ma
tjorlty of a single assembly, majority uncon-
troled and absolute, and which may become des-
potic To conform to this doctrine of the right OF
majorltles to rule, Independent ofthe checks and
limitations ofthe constitution, must revolution
lZe our whole system. We must destroy the
constitutional compact by which the seveal States
solida:ion, which must end in monarchy or DIES.
potism. No one advocates such proposition
and yet the doctrine maintained, if carried out
must lead to this result.
One great object of the constitution in confer
ring upon the President qualified negative upon
the legislation Of Congress, to protect minor
tiles from injustice and oppression hy ma orties
The equality OF their representation in the Senate
and the veto power of the President, are the con-
stitutional guarantees which the smaller States
have, that their rights will be respected. Without
these guarantees, all their interests would he al
the mercy of majorities in Congress representing
the larger States. To the smaller and weaker
States, therefore, the preservation of this .,owcr
and Its exercise upon proper occasions demanding
it; is of vital importance. They ratified the con
stitution, and entered into the Union securing tc
themselves an equal representation with the larger
States in the Senate; and they agreed to be bound
by all laws passed by Congress upon the express
condition, and none other, that they should be ap-
proved Ivy the President, or passed. his objections
to the contrary Notwithstanding, by vote of two
thirds OF both houses Upon this condition they
have a ri ht to insist, part of the compact to
which they gave their assent
A bill might be passed by Congress against the
will of the whole people OF particular State, and
against the votes of its Senators and all its repre-
rentatives. However Preudcial it might be to
The interest of such State, it would he bound by il
; if the President shall approve it, or it should be
passed by vote of two-thlrds Of both houses; but
} it has right to demand that the President shall
exercise his constitutional power and arrest it, il
his judgment is against If he surrender this
power, or fail to exercise it in case where he
cannot approve, it would make his formal appro
val mere mockery, and would be itself viola
ton of the constitution, and the Dissenting State
would become bound by law which had not oeer
passed according to the sanctions of the constitC
ton.
The objection to the exercise Of the reto pow
er is founded upon an idea respecting the popula
will, which. if carried out would anhifiIate STATE
sovereignty, and substitute for the present fedora
government a consolidation, directed I}y a sup
posed numerical majority. A revolution of tn
government would he silently effected, and tn
States would be subjected to laws to which the,
, had never given their constitutional consent.
The Supreme Court of the United States Is in
vested with the pewer to declare, and has declar
ed, acts of Congress passed with the concurrenc
of the Sen tie, the House of Representatives. an
the approval ofthc President, to he unconstutior
al and void; and yet none, it is presumed, can b
found, who will lie disposed to strip this highc'
judicial tribunal under the constitution OF this al
fO