Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1848-05-27

principle which lies the bottom Of his Recommendation is
that when any Power this continent becomes involved in
internal warfare and the weaker side chooses 10 make aPp
cation TO US Tor support bound to give them support
for fear the offer Of the sovereignty Of the country may be made
other Power and accepted goes infinitely and dam
geronsy beyond Mr. Monroes declaration II puts il in the
power OF other countries on this continent to make party
all their and hence il this broad nlepreaon be
given these declarations shaorever be involved in
But. in disavowng principle which will compel
ss every Of inerposon Of European Powers this
continents would not wish TO be understood defending the
opposite that we should resist their inerposon Tint
position which would be nearly dangerous and absurd
the other But general rule be laid down guide
such question Every speak for ITSELF
every must be decided its merits Whether you
will resist not and the measure OF your resistancewhe
her il shall be by negotiation remonstrancc inter-
mediate measure by resort to all this be de-
ernined and decided the merits Of the question itself That
is the only wise course. Weae not TO have quoted
every occasion general declarations to which any and every
meaning may be attached There of inerposcn
where would the hazard Of with all its calam
ties. Am asked for one I will designate the
case of Cuba So. long Cuba remains in the hands Of
SPana friendly Power, Power OF which have dread
should continue be- has been the policy Of all Adj
minsraons since have been connected with the Gov
ernment TO let Cuba remain there but with the fixed deter
minaton which hope will be relinqushed, that, if
Cuba pass from her shall not be into any other hands but
this not from feeling of ambition, from desire
for the extension Of dominion, but because that island ns
pensable the safety Of the United States rather because
Is Indispensable 10 the safety OF the United States that tns
island should not be in certain hands, If were,
ing trade between the Gulf and the Atlantic would Of
war; be twain be followed by convuIsive effects In
the category will refer which might most
rghtfuy have resisted had been necessary foreign Pow
and that is the Of Texas II has greatly misuu-
derstood. 1t sprung up in the midst Of party excitement
when large portion Of both parties opposed
ton and when difficult, If impossible get fair
hearing. supposed has been stated this floor
that Great Britain intended subject Texas her power
That my dread. What dreaded this Texas
being small Power, and Great Britain having free and
large commercial intercourse with her and almost none
although bonef bone and flesh Of esh she would
gradually have been weaned of her affection for Kindness
for England and aversion for would have been the result
That the inevitable tendency between nations having
ninous limits At that very time there several ques
tons between this country and Texas which, had it not
been for the amcabe feelings which subsisted be-
tween us would have ended in hosties. long line of
than thousand miles lily defined the boundary between
and Texas exposed TO the hazard of becoming involved
constantly in with her. supported by Great Britain and
Mexico her allies all this clearly that it
resist nerposon and that there other mode
by which resistance could be made except by annexation and
therefore in favor of annexaton at the hazard
of war
But asked by Of the members Of the Committee
Foreign Relations if would be in Of resisting Great
Britain if she should sovereignty and dominion
Yucatan answer, would And for irresistible
would not because the country great extent
worthless Nearly half destitute Of single
seamrocky and barren throughout the greater part and
only by of the artificial reservoirs of water that they
enabled live through the dry season. would not be-
the possession Of Yucaan would contribute nothing
the defence Of the passage between and Cuba, which
presented to be important 1t is not with
out its imporance-t is important the inward trade, but
not at all to the outward trade of the Gulf There
of wind and setting in that direction, of
which vessels going New Orleans or any other port the
Gulf avail themselves But coming from those ports
they almost invariably take their way between Florida and
Cuba and thus the between Yucatan and Cuba the
inlet limited the Gulf but the outlet from
il while the passage between Cuba and Foridas the almost
exclusive outlet and the principal inlet speak in reference
coasng vessels In voyages from Europe they pass south
of Cuba into The Gulf.
But take higher grounds. II il important
not only inlet, but outlet the occupation Of Yucaan
by England would add nothing her power in cutting of
trade. Yucatsn is very destitute of ports-hee is
frgae port laid down in the charts the whole Peninsula
unless that The Belize be But with without Yucatan
Great Britain possesses uncomfortable power the pas
sage whenever she chooses it. If should be
engaged in with her. there not single vessel OF ours
possession of YucataD that could enter into
the Gulf by that PASSAGE depart out of it. The passage
from the Gulf between Yucatan and Cuba does not
be supposed lead directly into the Atlantic but into the
Caribbean sea- which is that portion of the Atlantic ocean,
having its north and west side Yucatan and Cuba the
the Windwad Islands and the south all that portion
Of South America extending nearly from Oronoco to Yucaan
Great Britain has the complete command Of that the
island Of Jamaica being in the midst of it. Jamaica abounds
with the finest ports and the commodous naval stations
In 10 the Belize which
point of Yucatan than Laguna Carmen the opposite side
Of the Peninsula the Gulf and which is the only port
that side which soop Of enter and ocourse
the Belize sbeer calculated to command the passage In
addition, she possesses many the Wndward Islands to the
east and hence the complete command Of the Caribbean
and she will continue to possess il long she retains her
ascendency the II would be thus locked up ecc
tualy against in time Of In time Of peace do
need it. But would not take military possession Of Yucatan,
if certain Great Britain would for another
Not only because is worthless bu because would impose
very heavy Of both and moneyfrst 10 take
possession and then keep it. The which
pendit,nes would go estimate have data
which act. The population is between five SIX
hundred thousand Of which only fifty thousand said be
whites and mixed blood. The Indians originally a very
peaceful and quiet people, unaccusomed from being
frequently called into the contest between the factions and the
with Mexico have become accustomed them, and
sessed Of military knowledge They represented
very active, capable Of marching rapidly and in the habit Of
flying to the mountains to escape from their pusue In that
climate, among the most arid upon earth, if these people fly
before u.s. how when will this end IL
may prove another Seminole affair Who what
will be the sacrifice Of men and money
But Indian would be the greatest danger to
which would be exposed To attempt to take military
possession, with view to prevent England from asserting
sovereignty and dominion the countyf that indeed be
her intention bring into conflict with her, and,
may be- with SPAIN too. They, well we implored
accept the sovereignty condition Of defending the
ising Government against the Indians Suppose they
well we should accept the Offer and that should find
them with aimed force prepared to take possession Must
not lead to direct conflict Of arms unless the other