The examiner. [volume] (Louisville, Ky.) 1847-1849, 1848-02-05
From ,he N..ien.I InlenIseneer.


auence on the particular matter TO which II was
confined, than the subloined lettsr from dis
lingushed citizen Of South Carolina, eminently
qualified by his personal knowledge, gathered
during travel in foreign parts, and public ser
vice q nd experience both abroad and at home, TO
form a sound judgment on the subject of which
his letter treats, and who, being friend OF the
cannot be suspected OF being
under any possible party bias against its proPo-
sed measures.
The nnme of the writer is familiar TO all our
readers of mature age. To some of the young
er class Of them, IL may be proper 10 state that
Mr.. Poinseti was, after returning from foreign
travel, for several years Representative IN
Congress, aud there distinguished Tor his liberal
and enlightened views, that he was the Minister Of
the United States TO Mexico for several years;
was, after his return from that mission, for sew
eral years Secretary of War, To which Office
he was called by Mr.. Van BuTen; and therefore
had every possible opportunity Of acquiring the
information which authorizes him TO express 10
the respected Senator from his own State the
opinions contained in the following letter;
Letter from ,. %. Pei.ssss.
STArEsBusGH, Is. c. Dec. II, ls47.
Mr. DEAR SIK:-ln compliance with your re-
quest and in conformity with my promise,
nave determined to give you very briefly IN!
views on the all-engrossing topic Of the day. i
was detained later than expected in Col umbia,
and have only this moment seen the Presidents
Message and the Report Of the Secretary of War,
and am surprised to perceive that they persist In
recommending a course OF policy which will
lead to still further useless expenditure Of booc
and treasure, and will finally have 10 be aban
doned. With the reasoning on the subject OF
the acquisition Of territory have nothing to
do, especially the President seems to think
Congress pledged TO the conquest. can only
express my regret and my firm conviction thai
these territorial acquisitions will net add TO ouI
strength and prosperity.
The recommendation that most seriously
alarms me Is contained in the paragraph wher,
the president says there can be no doubt tina
there exists peace party in Mexico, and that j
may become exPedient for our commanding
generals TO give assurance Of protection TO suci
a party; in short, TO create a party; make psac'
| with it, and guaranty it in the possession o
power. Nothing can be more chimerical; moth
| ing can be more insecure than the execution
OF such project, were it practicable. Such
party would bear no proportion to the nation
aud the members off would require to be pro
tected from public Indignation and vengeanc
for long years to come, BY force not less for
midable than that now in the country, withou
the chance Of any indemnity or the power Q
levying contributions Of any sort. IL the peac
government should agree to pay and subsst thei
protectors, they must, from the nature of thing,
fail to do either. Pray save US the disgrace Of al
tempting such an intervention. The attemp
might lead TO an Intervention of different sor
that would possibly prove more successful. Tn
President is apprehensive Of foreign interference
first in California, and next In the establishment
of a monarchy in Mexico. There is not IN
| slirhtsst risk If the farmer and IL the Msxica
people are left 10 themselves, no chance of III
latter. They were so entirely republican il
| 1872, that did not hesitate confidently to fore
| tell the downfall of lturbide. They are niue
more 90 now; and no scheme Of that sort coul
have even momentary success, unless the leader
considered it as the only chance Of opposing IA
There exists a strong monsrchical party, stron
| in wealth and station--the Priests, the forms
arstocracy and the adherents OF Spain. W
may drive the numbers under their banner
Still the President is wrong; our armed interveI
ton might bring a powerful foreign To-
but could not prevent the evil; where's, if v
hold back, my life for il, a monarchy would nj
exist in Mexico three years, with fifty thOusan
foreign bayonets to sustain il. The people Al
republican.
The President SAYS he is convinced that th
best means Of bringing the war to an honorab
close will be to prosecute 1t with increased en-
ergy and power in the vital parts Of the enemy
country. Now, am persuaded that SO long
we continue TO prosecute the war in the intsriC
of Mexico, we shall have peace with the ms
ton, and all attempts TO make peace with
faction will place in a worse position tina
open war. speak with the authority of pei
feet knowledge of the nature of the country an
the character Of the people.
/ was glad TO find that the Secretary reject
Il ,ha rlau ,f fha uhoIa couutrx, .
too expensive; but / was surprised to perceiy
that he only estimates the number Of men
would require 10 do this, or to maintain GU
present conquests, at seventy thousand me
for the first, and some thirty-five forty thou
sand for the second. He says nothing Of IN
annual consumption Of men during this pre-
longed contest. During the most favorable 10
riod of the peninsular war, carried on in a cour
try friendly 10 them, the British forces lost al
nually sixteen per cent of volunteers. rs
i marked in the isihmus between the Caspia
and Black Seas that the Russian forces r,
quired to be recruited entirely in three year,
that is to say, they required a renewal Of ons
third every year.
The conquest Of that country by Russia a
fords us lessons we ought to profit by. tn
| Russian forces overrun the Caucasian countr
| in lI96, and received the submission Of n
people. They conquered a peace. Well,
1907, passed through the heart Of the countr,
which had been garrisoned with twenty thou
sand men for eleven years, at a cost Of beiwee
sixty and seventy thousand men, or six
seven thousand men a year. At that time
was necessary to wait the departure Of trai
from post to post, as 1t was unsafe to mo,
With less than two pieces Of artillery and fu
company Of infantry.
This state Of things continued until Is4
i - han he 4 a Siaus 1a1 II
position TO their conquerors, aud up to the pre-
ent day have COMMENDED against them with a.
vantage. The Caucasus does not contain mol
than million and half Of inhabitants; n
Russian empire not less than sixty million
The Caucassians have no regular army; n
Emperor six hundred thousand we'll discipline
troops.
n But the President and the Secretary built u
system Of defence, as 1t is called, which the
easily overthrow, because military ma
would suggest such an anomaly. They sur
pose frontier can only be defended by a chat
Of posts bordering on the line, whereas il
best secured by strong interior defences. But
do not intend to inirude my opinion ON militar
matters. Settle what territory you intend
cleim,an tell Mexico you intend to keep it. 81
willblustsr and protest, but never attack yo
Her leaders will have too much at stake to vei
ture so far from the capital. She will have n
means to equip armies and maintain them @
long marches and distant campaigns; and
hazard nothing. in saying that two or thr,
strong places in the interior of our line wou
keep them in check for half century, and
less time We might buy a title, II though
necessary. By adopting this plan peace wsu
come at last with present indemnity, and, in
stead of raising thirty thousand men, yo
would have troops enough to keep peaceab
possession Of our new territory, and might di
miss the volunteer force.
To succeed in levying the military eontribr