The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1848-03-02

war for the probability is that the shadow OF govern
men with which might treat, would be overthrown
the moment our troops were wnarawa and there is an
war in name, though probably not IN reality, we
should be any territorial line which should
occupy But, Mr. President there is yet another strong
consideration in favor OF occupying such line II peace
should not speedily come should save great amount
OF human suffering and diminish largely ud peeulafy
expenses The losses amongst our troops from disease
along such line would be comparatively small for most
OF the posts would be in healthy country; and think
hazard little in saying thai thus placed, their losses
battle would be almost nothing In pecuniary point of
view, the advantages OF this policy equally striking
10 pursue the present plan Of campaign according the
best estimates which have been able to obtain, would
require al least 900 effective men under SCOTS
mand, and 10000 probably $4,000 troops Tay
oPs ine and north and west OF It, Sixty thousand eff
cent the least that be estimated sufficient
for the purpose, and have heard from high authority
that 10, 600 would be nearer the mark Now sir the
senator from Mississippi estimates 10000 as the
proper number TO be raised, 10 give 10000 efficient
men for the occupation of his line and, according
TO that proportion, should have TO raise 90 900
men to furnish 10000 electives for the other plan
OF campaign. But, in point OF fact, a much smaller
proportion OF the army would be efficient when dispersed
throughout Mexico, and exposed to all the casualties of
disease and the sword than amongst men PERFORMING
for the most part, garrison duty line running through
comparatively healthy country. The difference be-
the numbers to be raised for the two pans instead
of being $4,000, would probably be nearly $4,000 But
let us take the smaller number and suppose that we
save the expense OF preparing and maintaining $4,000
men in that distant country we shall find the difference
striking enough There is no fair estimate OF the cost OF
war in that country, founded on our past experience,
which can make it under $500 per man. | exclude the
bountes and the pensions incident the greater casual
ties OF active operations and still have saving Of
$25 900 in the army alone In the navy should
save some two or three millions more-makng a differ
ence OF expense of between twenty-five and thirty mil
lions per annum, you act upon the the other
plan believe, sir, that this is small estimate But 1t
may be sad that overlook the item OF revenue which
should raise from the Mexicans the plan, and
to extent, lose the other fear that hopes,
IN this respect. are far too sangulne When we
to the mere military government OF that country, from
what we by contributions from them, fear the
plus will be smallnot much more than could raise,
with better means OF collection and fewer sources of ex
pendture from the country north OF the proposed military
line. But suppose this fear to be unounded and that
we could raise six eight millions by forced con-
trbuons the difference IN the expense of the two plans
would still be 20000O 900. more Is not this matter
worthy of consideration will not say in the present, but
in any state of our finances? Sir, the time was, when
the reduction of Executive patronage, which this change
of policy would produce, would have been considered as
great recommendation of II TO our people: That time
trust has not yet passed away do not believe that il
has But there is yet another consideration which weighs
with great force upon my mind, in favor of the occupa-
ton OF this line. 1t would disentange from all
nexiOn with Mexican politics. and afford that people
early opportunity to reconstruct their government and
cial organization according to their own wishes and ne
cessies. 1t would save us from all fear of those terrible
duced by temptation and incline to the permanent subu
CATION and annexation of Mexico | believe there is
large majority OF them opposed to such scheme
at present; but who say where the current of
events may carry us, If break up the entire
clal system in Mexico, and become involved in the
dangerous attempt 10 sustain government for them?
state OF things may arise which might them strong
claims upon sympathies, in their demand for our
protection against the evils of horrible anarchy and the
effort to relieve them may involve us in consequences
of the deepest hazard to prosperity and
institutions. In every point OF view, it seems to
desirable that should withdraw to such
line as have Indicated unless peace is speedily made
hoV hppa nrrpt IN VIII shall
deavor to meet The senator from New York says, that
if withdraw to such line, there is danger of foreign
interposition He appIehends that the English and
French governments might interPose to re-organze
Mexican institutions, according to their views and policy
Sir, listen to everything which falls from that dstn
guished senator with great respect The weight Of
his authority upon military matters is much with me but
am bound 10 say, that be did not make good his pro-
position, by which satisfactory TO my mind
much greater if the present system of policy should
be pursued, than if we take the which have
suggested A system of operations, which is calculated
to destroy the entire fabric of Mexican society, and
awaken the fear that we should make permanent seizure
would be much more likely TO provoke foreign inter-
ference, than policy whose objects were proclaimed to
territory of Mexico and the restoration of quiet and the
means of reconstrucng their government by the Mexi-
people, far this could be done without sacri
fcing own legitimate claims But if these govern
ments entertain such views, what prevents them from
interfering now? The senator from New York would
probably the knowledge that such interference would
have the results occupied such military line
have suggested II their desire to interpose should
be strong enough to induce them to hazard war; would
not the temptation be far greater, when army was
compromised in the heart of Mexico than if post
ed on such line as have described, convenient to our
resources and strong for purposes of defence offence
At which line would they be most tempted to strlke-a
base line from Vera Cruz to Mexico. depending for its
support upon naval superory or the nearer to
resources, and much more difficult TOR them to
reach | think there could scarcely be two opinions
upon the subject But, in point OF fact do much
danger of the interference of those powers present. and
especially if we were posted | have recommended.
France is engaged just now, if may use a word made
classic by the distinguished chairman of Military Affairs,
elsewhere to extent fully equal TO her powers of d.
gestion. But, Mr.. President, the withdrawal OF our
troops has been deprecated because it might lead to the
establishment of monarchy in Mexico. Sir, trust no
man entertains the idea OF maintaining an army in
Mexico to sustain and guarantee government in that
country and ii this is not proposed the danger of the
establishment OF monarchy by the Mexlcans themselves
is Tar greater under the present system of operations
than if at to withdraw to military line.
between the elements of Mexican society Ii dsperses
their army, weakens the property who not
members OF the PRIESTHOOD bears hardest upon the white
and portion OF the mixed races, and is breaking down
the republican element, which has heretofore scarcely
been strong enough to resist the central and monarchca
tendencies of the priests The priesthood are but little
weakened absolutely by the present policy, and relatively
history and tendency, to perceive that it element in
Mexican society eminently favorable to monarchy
They were of the party OF centrastas and their nau-
raj tendencies TO absolute form of government.
If the republican element is much further weakened
they will have the most favorable opportunity for in