Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1848-05-19
The course pursued by the War Department

different 10 the alarming condition of General
layloTs army, and forborhe to use, at the ear
Hest moment, the most energetic measures 10
guard against the fatal consequences of its
defeat, then too probable, it would have de-
served an arraignment as severe as that whch
you have made against it for having done its
duty in that critical emergency. When you
hrst received the reasons assigned for the course
adopted here, they appear to have been salts
factory. In your despatch of the 28th of
April, you say: Yesterday learned, by
" your letter of the 22d, and the Adiutant
" Generals of the 26th ult, that all the re-
" crults of the regiment-some 3,OOC-raised
" or likely TO be raised in time for this army,
&c have been ordered to the Rio Grande." You
did not then intimate the slightest dissatisfac.
tlon-not even premonItory symptom of that
deep distress with which, Instantly on Mr.
Irlsrs arrival in Mexico, you represent your
self TO have been seized 1t is coincidence
not unworthy of notice, that the letter contain
ing your first condemnatory remark on this
subject was written on the day of the date of
MIR. Trst's first note to you, and only the day
before your cautious reply to it; and in both
you assall the War Department Your with
erlng disappointment seems to have slumbered
for Ten days, and then to have been aroused
by the appearance of Mr. Trist in Mexico and
your quarrel with him. If the order from the
War Department had IN fact " diverted" the
forces with Gen'l Cadwalader, still it was full
ly justified by the threatening aspect of affairs
on the Rio Grande but am quite sure it did
not divert them No previous order from the
Department had designated any other place of
rendezvous than the Brazos for the troops that
were TO join your column. 1t was we'll I'M
derstood, before you left Washington, that all
the troops for both armies were to be sent to
that place, and there to fall under your COM
smand.
This arrangement was not nor was it eX-
pected that it would be here changed, until
you had penetrated so far into the enemy's
country as TO render your communications
with that place of general rendezvous difficult
and dangerous.
You also complain that the order was not
countermanded. If there had been such an
order, and it had been countermanded, what
would have been the consequence? The troops
would have gone forward from the United
States under the former orders of the depart
ment, which would have taken them 10 the
same place.
You allege that "the news of the victory
" of Buena Vista reached Washington in time
-" to cOuntermand Cadwalader's orders for the
6 Rio Grande before his departure from New
" Orleans" notice this specification of neg
lect OF duty, 10 show the extent to which you
have carried your fault-finding, and the indus
try with which you have searched for occa-
sions 10 indulge it.
Your assumption is, that the news of the
victory of Buena Vista should have satisfied
the War Department that Cadwalader's forces
were not needed on the Rio Grande; and the
omission to cOuntermand, as soon as that news
was received, the orders to send them there,
was neg ect deserving severe anmadverson.
How did you act under similar circumstances
With better means of information as to the
actual condition of the Rio Grande frontier,
after the victory of Buena Vista, you did not
deem it prudent, after being forty-one days In
possession of the news of that victory, to is
sue positive orders to remove single man from
that frontier; yet you venture to censure me
for not having sent the troops away the mo-
ment the news reached Washington.
You received information of that victory on
or before the 14th of March, for on that day
you proclaimed it in orders to your army. On
the 25th of April, more than forty days there
after, you issued an order to the commanding
officer at the BraZos to embark for Vera Cruz
&c such attachments of the new regiments as
may have been ordered by the War Depart
ment to Point Isabel;' but you made it cor
ditional with reference to the safety of the line
of the Rio Grandc; and said to that officer,
that you relied upon his "sound judgment to
determine on the spot whether that line
would not be too much exposed by the with
drawal of the troops in question" Thus it
appears that you do not hesitate to impute
| 81 ,,(x, 10 nd tod
aud acted on the conclusion that the line OF
the Rio Grande was safe the moment heard
of the victory of Buena Vista; but, when act
ing on the same subject, you dared not adopt
that conclusion, although you had been In pos
session of the same information forty-one days.
Your own conduct in this matter completely
refutes this charge of yours against the War
! Department. 1t does more; it shows how
rash and inconsderate you have been in Sc
lecting topics for attack.
But the most serious consequences are at
tributed TO the long delay of these troops at
the Brazos. For your sake, sincerely hope
these consequences are much exaggerated, be-
cause am quite confident it will be shown
that you alone are responsible for the delay.
The War Department did not-and it was pro-
per that it should not-issue any order in re-
gard to the movement of the troops after their
arrival in Mexico. The order from the de-
partment of the 3Oth of April, making divi-
sion of the new levies between the two col
umns, does not contradict this assertion, for
these Ievies were then mostly within the Uni
ted States Only portions of them had then
reached Mexico. Until this order took effect,
the troops at the Brazos, and, indeed, on the
| Rio Grande and with Gen'l Taylor, were I'M
der your entire and unrestricted command. AS
to this matter, you were under no misappre-
hensior; for on the 25th of April, before you
were Informed what had been done here to Sc
cure the Rio Grande line, you issued an order
in relation to the troops at the BraZos This
place, YOU well knew, was the general rem
devious of the new leyies from the United
States, and before you sailed on your expedi-
ton to Vera Cruz you were notified that the
Mexican army were advancing upon General
TAYLOR. To have assumed that you had moi
| left at the Brazos, with view to meet any
probable contingency, orders for the proper
disposition of the troops which were, or NIGH
be sent there, would have implied All opinion
that YOU wanted suitable qualifications for the
high station which had been assigned to you
These troops were part of your command
and subject to your orders and if they re-
manned one day at the Brazos after it was
there known that they were not needed on the
Rio Grande line, and would be servlceable
with YOUR column, the fault was entirely YOU
own. and in nowise imputable to the War De.
| partment. If your opinion be not extravagan
and YOU say it is not-that but for the d.
version of Gent Cadwalader's forces from you
"a A. sc ,o,,ob DraciouS tIme' lost at thf