The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1848-09-08

upon the city would be to the right Chasutepec,
its own weight. Gen Scott's instructions this
point as well as his approval on Others were duly
battle fought the next morning. with such results
as shall hereafter show.
The official report of Gen. Worth explains the de-
tails Of the BATTLE and it is believed that under the
circumstances 1t will stand the test of the severest
scrutiny
suits. and therefore, the sacrifice of life
sary and culpabe. Admitting this to be true for a
moment, how far was Gen. Worth responsible for it ,
True 1t is, there foundry at Moline del Rey
destroy; but was Gen. Worth responsible for that
or was Gen Scott. under whose orders Worth fought
the battle, responsible for it?
If a commanding general allows himself to be de-
ceived by erroneous information, mistakes the
movements of the enemy. and bases his operation
upon false data the mist AXE is his own; and to hold
his subordinates accountable for it, would be to intro
duce principle Of military responsibility novel
Beides, the battle Of Moline del Rey was far from
being barren of results 1t Is not the number of
constitutes the Importance of battle; and this i'm
portan fact ought never to be lost sight OF in military
discussions.
The battles of Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo were
fought at Buena Vista nearly two months before, and
over eight hundred miles distant
The direct results OF the battle of MOlino del Rey
were, first in tie morale The that three thou
sand men assaulted than four times their num-
her strongly ntrenched and, after desperate strug
ge forced this almost impregnabe position at every
point with immense loss to the enemy, set back the
morale of the Mexican army to Churubusco, point
armistice.
All the enemy's artillery taken, together with
hundred prisoners, including fifty officers the best
troops Of the Mexican army. These direct re-
suits. Tie collateral First-It proved to Gen.
Scott that the fire from Chapultepec upon the plain
below not destructiven he had anticipated,
as not one man killed or wounded by it during
the entire day. What influence this may have had in
determining Gen. Scott to attack Chapultepec in.
stead Of ua San Antonio it is impossible to say but
the influence it was entitled to exercise is apparent
mt hat Sonfv i,,pn rta 10 70
attack upon Chapultepec being determined upon the
battle of Moline del Rey had to be fought. General
Scott decided to attack via Chapultepec the lth
The preliminary battle had been fought three days
before mt Moline del Rey.
On the 18th, General Pillow took possession of the
ground Of Moline del Rey and planted his batteries
against Chapultepec without firing shot, the loss
Of single man. Could this have been done on the
stb. or could 1t have been done the 18TH but for
the battle Of the Sth The answer is plain any mill
tary man having even q snattering of the principles
Others contend, that had Worth attacked in the
night as General Scott designed and ordered the loss
would have been less 1t has been before shown that
it is well he did for, had the attack been made in the
night, forces must have been defeated beyond a
possibility of doubt.
Others, again, contend that Worth did not make
sufficient use of his artillery; indeed, Col Hitchcock
in letter published in the Courier T. Enquirer of the
lst of March, 1S4S attributes the loss at Moline del
Rey to the circumstance that Worth did not employ
more artillery, when he had a"superabundancs' at
his dispoal "A more wicked perversion of fact than
is here deliberately forth is difficult to conceive
Colonel Hitchcock was prese mt at the interview with
General Scott before alluded to- and must have heard
General Scott say to the officer who waited him.
that whatever work to be done, must be done by
Worth with the he had placed at his disposai
foolish thing There, 1T is believed, were his very
words and know that Colonel Hitchcock heard
them and whether he did hear Gen Scott make this
declaration or not Col Hitchcock must have known
that there never was superabundance of artillery
with the American army from the time it left the beach
at Vera Cruz till entered the Garitas of the city of
Mexico 1t must be borne in mind that this was IN
derstood by Gen Scott to be patial operation. ex-
pected to exercise on the fall of the
city. The only guns that could have been used with
effect against Moline del Rey. were guns of heavy
cabre, and the critical position of the army at that
time, fully warranted the belief that all the heavy
metal we had would be necessary to reduce the city
These considerations were duly weighed in deter min
battle.
1t is easy task to critcise military movements
and operations after the campaign over nd often
happens that those who have the cearest heads and
stoutest hearts after the crisis had passed. the
very men who had the dullest intellects and the
whitest lips the day of battle He who undertakes
to discuss military operations with honesty of purpose
ought to surround himself with the circumstances
which, at the time, surrounded the actors whose
achievements he criticses Apply this rule to the
battle Of Moline del Rey, and what is the result The
reconnaissance Of the position was made by Captain
Mason, Of the Engineers than whom officer Of the
army was hetter qualified to execute the work tho
roughly The reconnaissance industriousy prose-
cuted from the moment Gen. Scott determined to
assault the position 1t made in open day and in
sight of both armies, and ncomparsbly the closet
nation was obtained that under the circunstanc es
could have been obtained the number and caibre of
the enemy's guns were accurately ascertained. The
number of troops displayed correctly estimated
and the strength Of the position determined nearly
possible, and this information seemed to be con-
frmed by that which Gen. Scott had eceived through
other channels. With these lights before him-all
that could be obtained-Genersl Worth made his
dispositions for battle, The enemy, after night
fall, reinforced his position, and instead of meet
ing three thousand men the hext morning, he met
twelve thousand, posted in the strongest position
that has been assaulted since the war began.
The desperate character of the contest may be es-
tmsted from the fact that out force of little more
than one half the numerical strength more men
killed or wounded in forty minules than in the two
glorious days of Buena VISTA No battle that has
been fought upon the American continent is at all
equal to 1t in severity; whole, does any in
Europe surpass It, That the loss great all must
deplore but that under the circumsta was
cessary, none can honestly deny.
The battle once begun, had to be lost won it
might have been lost at less sacrifice; but Ame-
rcan would not have preferred victory at double
the cost least such know the feeling Of those
engaged in the struggle and their opinion is entitled
to some consideration.
The new combinations upon the field rendered
cessary by change of circumstances, udciousy
made with the rapidty of thought, and as promptly
exeeuted; all that human effort could accomplish
done. Seldom, if ever, has comma nd found itself in
mere imminenty critical position, and did
troops under equally trying circumstances bear them
selves more galgnty.
The facts which have detailed were in my possess
sion, and all of them were in possession of nobody
else. have given them publicity of justice,
due alike to the reputation Of the living and the
Of the Dead and trust they may be received by
those who may take the trouble to read Them in the
same spirit in which the5 written
Sporting Intelligence.
CRICKET MATcH-The second game of the match
between the first elevens of the New York and st.
Georges Cricket Clubs played ON the ground Of
the first named club, at Hoboken on the 9th inst,
and was won by the ST. Georges Club, the New York
ers giving up the game little after shutdown, with
one wicket to go down. The following is the -
New YoRK CLup.
=, frsf innings. Second Innings.
ssms hit wicket Gro0m IL Pdcock, b. Wright. IL
eut.oh, Ducshy o. wright Wright ............
SpJer,o WpBIt W creom out U
Esnney run out 9. wheatcroft b. Wright 0
Apoob .. W nght... b. Groom. .
Elliot, b. Wright y. .......6 O. Pidcock B. Groom ~ 1
SuyP, .. groom =. U bWrght .......... 0
.Jamcs, c. Wright b. Groom c. blackburn, b. Wright 0
MON .. er9tm Whcatcroft, b. Wright 8
NGlehtofex, D. eioom not out ly
Wheaton, not out ....,, l not out ' 1
WI ue.'......... ....H Wide 4