Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1841-1853, 1848-01-06
Report Of the Secretary of war.

tIepOfL 10
ness-ke document, written in plain and extremely
appropriate manner, and is emnenty Characteristic
of the mind of Gov. Marcy. II gives brief expo
stion of military affairs in Mexico at the COM
mencement of the present campaign after the battles
of Monterey; describes the expedition destined to
move FIRST Vera Cruz and then on the city Of Mex
leo. 1t then describes the movements Of General
Taylor, which resulted in the battle of Buena Vista,
and the triumphant march of Gen. Scott to the Ma
tional Palace of Mexico.
The expeditions against chihuahua, Santa Fe, and
California, next described in a summary manner
! in the order in which they took place.
The following extract from the report will be read
with great interest The three modes of bringing the
to a close, spoken Of by the Secretary, and the
objections urged against the FIRST, together with
the reasons for adopting the latter ably discussed:
Our career of success, SO disastrous to Mexico
conquest of many of her States and territories
the subJugatIon and occupation of her capital the de-
feat aud dispersion Of her armies the capture of
her dteriei of war, and the humiliation of her TO-
reign commerce, have not yet brought peace, the
offer of such terms as could be accepted by the United
States without national degradation. The war still
continues; and it is proper present sugges-
tons IN regard to its further prosecution. In making
these suggestions, pass. without remark the propo-
ston that we should abandon all acquisitions, and
withdraw our troops from the enemy's country. Such
proposition could only be seriously entertained if
we were in reality the vanquished party, and were
convinced of our inability to prolong the contest with
reasonable hopes of success.
Our further operations must, in my opinion, be
Quoted in of the three following modes First, TO
take and hold indemnity line; to recede from all
places and positions now occupied in advance of it,
and from all aggressive operations beyond that
line Second, to overrun the whole country, and hold
| n i'm n nv
and Third, to retain what we now possess, open the
lines of communication into the interior, and extend
| our operations 10 other important places, as our
means and the prospect of advantages shall indicate
keeping disposable force always ready, within ap-
proachable limits, to annoy the enemy, to seize sup
plies, enforce contributions and Illustrate his efforts
to collect means and assemble troops for the purpose
OF protTactlng the war.
full discussion of the comparative merits Of these
modes of conducting military operations would
extend this communication to unwarrantable
length; shall, therefore, confne my remarks to
few prominent considerations relative to EACH
With reference to a speedy peace. with proper in
demnity and security-the only object of the war
the line policy is regarded Objectionable III our
present position cannot nd acceptable terms of
paclhcahoR from Mexico, retiring TO an indemnity
line would certainly fail to produce such result; it
would weaken the inducements of the enemy to put
an end to hostllities. Restored, by voluntary
render, to the possession of his capital and important
departments, and relieved from the pressure of our
arms and from all apprehensions of further conquest
and annoyance, beyond the limits we might select, he
would be left with abundant resources than lie
now possesses 10 prepare, at leisure and in security
TO strike effective blow with concentrated forces at
our detached posts. To hold these posts safely.
tain possession of the seapors we have (if that
should fall within the p,cy,) and to prevent incur
sions into the territories which might choose
appropriate TO ourselves would, in my opinion, re-
quire force large would suffice to maintain
what we now occupy, and TO carry our operations
still further In the interior of the enemy's country,
and make him feel the calamities of war in a way
best calculated to induce him to seek ,or peace But
if in this am mistaken, and the line policy should
enable to reduce the number of troops, STILL it
will not. conceive, thereby effect a reduction of
our actual expenditures for the war.
In consequence of the interruption of intercourse
between the seaporis in possession, and the GEN.
trail parts of Mexico, the collections on imports have
hitherto been inconsiderable. If the line policy is
adopted this intercourse will continue TO be interrupt
ed, and, consequently, the receipts of from
this source will be small.
Under the operation of the line policy, all expecta-
ton of essening the burden of sustaining troops
by deriving supplies and contributions from the enc
my, would be disappointed. The supplies in the vi
cinity of posts would be withdrawn from our
reach, as design to seize and appropriate
them was ascertained or suspected. But, were it
otherwise, as our posts would be remote from the
wealth and resources of the country, the amount
which could be obtained would be inconsiderabe.
So far from deriving advantage from the line poll
cy by way of obtaining assistance from the resources
of the enemy, towards the support of troops we
should, apprehend, confer upon a portion of the
people of Mexico direct benefit, by opening to them
at our posts market, in which we should become
the purchasers of their products at an exorbitant
price. These considerations, without bringing into
view others, have led to look to one of the other
modes of operation | have mentioned, as preferable
to that of occupying indemnity Ire
In regard to the second mode suggested-that of
occupying the whole country-the wide extent of ter
ritory embraced In the Mexican republic, the many
important points to be garrlsoned, and the long Lives
of communication be kept open, present difficulties
of no ordinary magnitude if our occupancy is to be
of such character to supersede the Mexican au-
hority, and require the temporary establishment of
civil government. In carrying this plan into effect,
it would not be reasonable to rely upon the favorable
disposition, neutrality of any considerable
part of the Mexican people, until some assurance of
the stability of our power derived from It's con-
tinuance. Our posts must therefore be strong, and
our forces numerous, in order the many and
long lines of communication, TO dsperse and cbastlse
the guerrilla bands which would obstruct them, and
to suppress the powerful uprisngs of the people
wherever they may be attempted cannot safely es-
innate the force requisite to into full effect this
plan, at less than seventy thousand To insure
the presence of that number in the enemys country,
and at places where they would be wanted, it would
be necessary TO raise a much larger force. The
great expense of raising, organizing and sending 10
their remote destination so large body of troops as
soon needed to give effect to this plan, would ap-
prehend bring very heavy, and perhaps, embarrass-
ing demand upon the treasury.
The third mode presented is in my Judgment pre-
In the others Ravond rial imits adj