Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1848-08-19

(InlStGlOn OF our EHglisH dIctstoIs has iN niisAy
,ower of the Veto came into our own That
is abundantly proved by the Debates in the Fedra
Convention, by the argument in the federalist' nc
every other contemporary exposition 70 which II
a law, where the text is OF dlsputaoe meaning, We
must resort in order to fix its legal lntention-whcf
is, according to all law and sense, that which binds
and must prevail.
lnthe arguments for or against the Constitution
whether in the Convention itself, or in that great
and authorized apology for its project (the Fet.
.ralist'') or in the subsequent discussions in tie
State Conventions-all the motives for the Veto
provision are obviously drawn from British exam
pie only the British King was possessed IN point
Of form, OF an absolute Veto upon legislative acts
qualified one seemed not dangerous, therefore !:
the Hing had not them for just ninety-five years,
ventured to exercise it and hence it was urged as
certain that our Presdent-being much less than a
king-would seldom think Of employing it. In
short the /" Federalist" (which but embodies, on
this point the general in which the friends Of
the adoption of the Constitution had proposed or
were vindicang the provision) distinctly maintains
not only that the Veto, if given, will be exercised
likely to be used less frequently than it will need
10 be, because the Executive power, as feeble will
be afraid of the Legislative, which will be strong
The idea Of Mr. MADISON and his great coadjutors
was, then, (see Federast, No. 73,) that the chief
necessity for this royal prerogative NOW dsused in
Executive, under our new scheme of Government.
They thought that a Chief Magistrate, not heredi-
tary but elective not for life but for four years. not
chosen by mobiles or Legislators but by the multi
tude; without court, palace, privy-purse no hon
ors or emoluments in his gift, and welding all pat
ronage only under the jealous supervision Of the
Senate would be unable to defend against Congress
siona encroachment his own distributive share of
the coordinate powers designed to be given him.
They were right, as long as Presidents did not, by
an arbitrary use of the power of removal from
Office, SEIZE in effect upon the entire Federal pat
ronage. and thus build up vast influence; right
until the President, becoming the demagogue head
of the Party which had elected him, began to be
the managing head of the majority in power, who
will protect all his acts because all his 10
enure to only the advantage of the faction, at large
or individually. Their error lay in not guarding
against this usurpation and its consequences. Had
they foreseen it; had they not unhappilv imagined,
in spite of every warning of PATRICK HENRY and
others, that the People could never fail because
they had their choice) TO choose the most eminent
and trustworthy man in the country, they never
would have dreamt of arming the Executive witt
that control over legislation into which the Jack
sonian system Of power has turned the Veto.
We have said that the chief reason which they
gave for creating this prerogative was simply thai
the Executive might be able to check with it those
legislative invasions of his own independent facu
ties, which they thought alas for the foresight
even the wisest how strongly opposite the event! !
certain 10 happen. Certainly the "Federalist >
also suggests-but as of" secondary importance
the need of some check on Congress, I" calculated
to guard the community against the effects of fac
ton, preciptancy, of any impulse unfriendly Il
the public good, which may happen to influence
majority of that body."-(See Federaiist, al
above In word, the former motive is urged as
necessity. lest one Of the separate branches of III,
Government should absorb another the seconC
motive is held out as merely convenience, an ex
pediency, useful at times as a temporary corrective
No more than this is argued no more could b.
argued for as TO unconstitutional Legislation
wha, need Of protecting Veto, when there stoo
the Judiciary, every where the proper and sure re
sort against unconstitutional laws So, too, OF law
corrupHu enacted the courts afford remed,
where corruption can be shown. And, lastly, as t
any precipitancy" of legislation, i is plain thu
the power of early repeal is cure enough for tina
except in cases where vested rights have been gver
In all these cases, there is responsibility to the Pee
pie, TO serve as preventive; there is change {
Representatives to stand as sure remedy. Wit
both the Judicial and the Popular corrective, VIII;
need of more And why make the law-giyer re
sponsble in addition TO the Executive It's cles
that such able men as Mr.. MADISON and his CON
peers did not intend to urge weighty the secor
Diary" reasons which they mention in favor Of
Presidential Veto the chief the substantial on
which they intended was the necessity Of giving
the Executive merely sef-protectng, conservati'
power 10 stand sentry against legislation whls
was attempting to take away or trench upon III
peculiar functions Of the Executive. Even her
let it be remembered, too, they were proposing Il
gift of prerogatve of which the British crow
must now be considered as strpped-since it is no
just one hundred and ffty.sx years since il h;