Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1848-09-16

The General returned to Matamoros as quietly and
as unostentatiously as he came. twas there that
he received the deputation from Louisiana to con.
graduate him upon the battles he had won. But
no gratulations seemed in the slightest degree to
same ZACHARY TAYLOR"
| We find that we must abridge.
I After the victories of Palo Alto and Resaca, the
Administration, elated by their military exploits
determined to penetrate the vitals OF Mexico by
taking Monterey, calculating perhaps thereby to
bring about Peace upon such terms as they should
dictate. After the capture oftha city, however, find
ing that the Mexcans were yet no. disposed to sue
for peace, stroke at the capital, through San Luis
Potos, was medtated. Had this design been carried
out it would have made the line Of operations from
the mouth of the Rio Grande to Camargo, thence
to San Luis Potosi, and on to the city of Mex
leo, not less than fifteen or eighteen hundred
miles; would have required hundred thou
sand men to keep it open; and would have cost US
ten times as many men as it subsequently, did to
effect the same operation through Vera Cruz; whilst
it would have given credit, at the same time, for
the most stupendous military blunder. How fortu-
nate was it not that our Military Cabinet paused
midway in their career, and, after reflection, con-
suited the able General at the head of the army
Major Gen. ScoTr--as to further proceedings in the
war, and then adopted the wiser plan Of approach
ing the capital through Vera Cruz
With the details of the battle of Buena Vista
every reader is too familiar to leave us any excuse
for here reciting them. No one is ignorant under
what odds and disadvantages it was fought, and how
a host of twenty thousand men were beaten in fair
fight by army of less than five thousand, four.
ff,hs of that number being volunteers. The result
OF that unequal engagement, which electrified the
whole Nation, surprised our own Government, and
astoashed even Europe, her statesmen and her gen.
erals of a hundred battle-feds, was due yet more
to the confidence which the army had in its COM
mander, founded upon knowledge of his charac-
ter, than the skill of his dispositions and the ma
tive valor OF the comparatively raw troops of which
his army was composed. Instead Of narrating the
incidents of that memorable conflict, let us, in or
der to form some idea of its transcendent import
ance, recur for moment to, the circumstances in
which Gen. TAYLOR was placed, and under which
the battle was fought
When, under the advice of the General-in-chief
of the Army, the plans of the Administration were
changed, the attempt to reach the city of Mexico
by the inland route abandoned, the route by Vera
Cruz determined upon, and the regulartroops, whom
Gen. TAYLOR had accustomed to conquest, were
necessarily almost all withdrawn from his COM
mand to strengthen Gen. SCOTT, the whole country
saw at once the peril in which the former was
placed. No one saw it more clearly than himself.
" While almost every man of my regular force and
half the volunteers NOW in respectable disciplne)
are Withdrawn for distant service said he in an
official letter of January 10, lS47, to the Com
mander-n-C Chief, ait seems that | am expected,
9 with less than thousand Regulars and Volun-
teer force partly of new levies, to hold defen-
sive line, while large army of more than twen-
ty thousand men is in my 'front.' a feel that
have lost the confidence of the Government or it
would not have suffered me to remain, up TO this
time, ignorant of its intentions, with so vitality
affected interests committed to my charge. But,
{ (he added,) however much ! feel mortified and
outraged By the course pursued, unprecedented,
at least in our own history, will carry out in
good faith, while | remain in Mexico, the views
of the Government though Imay be sacrificed
in the EFFORT" A brighter example of Fidelity to
trust reposed in man is not to be found in the re-
cords of than in this declaration, followed
up, as it was, with such sternness of decision and
vgor of action as proved its writer's sincerity.
The responsibilities, difficulties, and dangers by
which Gen. TAYLOR was now beset may be well
conceived, when we bear in mind that at the mo-
ment when the General found himself with body
of troops, nearly all raw, scarcely sufficient to keep
up his communication with his depot of supplies
at Camargo, he knew that large supplies, then on
the Rio Grande and at the Brasos, must be drawn
out by Gen. ScoTT, and that on these supplies de-
pended the success Of his (Gen. SIS command,
and his advance from Vera Cruz In the midst of
all the anxiety naturally attending his position, he
found that SANTA ANNA was advancing upon his
line Of communication with Camargo and Brasos,
and that, if he avaed himself of the discretion left
to him by instructions from his Government to con-
fine himself to Monterey, he would be cut off
from his supplies at those points; that they would
fall into the hands Of the enemy, depriving
General ScoTT of the portion Of them that
he required; and that then, if he could do such
thing, he himself would be forced for want Of sup
plies, at last to surrender He then had to choose
Lo,.- al a;thar of which xvnuld