The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1848-07-26
BEFORE THE COURT OF INQUIRY, JUNE, 1913.
IrnNrfNnrn

Defence OF Msj Gen. Pillow
| BEFORE INQUIRY, JUNE 1913
| CONTINUED
| l now to the second branch of this subject
namely What effect on the fall OF Contreras had the dis
positions that were made on the 10th OF August by my
self
The camp of Contreras is situated on the decyitv of
ridge that begins to rise short distance in front of thu
camp Cooking towards San Augusne) from the plain
lava or pedrga and slopes gradually and quite REGULAR,
SIX or eight hundred yards to the rear
The ridge is bounded on the right and left by deer
Iavnes that are mPaceable al every point for artillery
The only road leading TO the camp is one which com
mencing at the city OF Mexico passes through the vii
lagos OF San Angel and Ansalda Immediately along the
front OF the camp, to the factory OF Magdalena This
road is practicable tor wheel carriages short distance
beyond Magdalena- league from the camp then
narrows TO mere mule-pah that leads into the noun
tans
| The position of the camp completely commands the
difficult and only approach over the lava field in front
and the site was selected with that view
us weakness as a military position consists mainly in
tnls; II is accessible only IN directon-namely by
the road before mentioned, which, blocked the camp
! is perfectly isolated.
The village of Ansalda is situated mediately on this
road and as the enemy had elected to occupy it, there
was no obstacle opposed to the occupation of it by our
troops save the mpractcabe character of the approach
over Owe, the field OF lava, for anything bat infantry.
Inc village and It's immediate environs constitute an
uncommonly strongly deiensble position for infantry
being out of reach of small arms from the camp afford
ing good shelter against artillery and the broken chaac
Ter OF the ground rendering 1t absolutely impossible for
cavalry to act effectively, while it opened the way to the
rear OF the enrenched camp.
The military importance of this position in reference to
the camp OF Contreras must be obvious. Once securely
occupied even without firing shot the camp of Contre
ras must as certainly fall that heavy body thrown
INTO the AIR must come to the groundthe laws of grav-
tatlOn are not more certain.
All the advantages that this village was found to pos
sess upon reaching it, could be seen or known across
the pedrlgal but quite enough could be- and was
from the mound SO often mentioned, to show it the
key OF the POSITION, and that its OCCUPATION was an OBJ
Ject OF the first Importance.
Gen Scott, in his official report before quoted on this
subject, saw Its value the moment he upon the
fed-being persuaded, if occupied, it would arrest the
enenys reinorcements, and ultimately decide the battle"
Generals Smith and Cadwaader both concur in the
military importance of the position
The former proves that If II had been occupied by the
enemy and well defended it would have been very diff
cult if not impossible, to have dslodged him.
Cadwalader teses that if he had not checked the re-
Inducements, it would have been occupied BY the enemy
before Smith could have got there
Every member of this court has been upon the ground
and they all therefore well qualified to estimate al
their proper value these opinions.
Santa Anna speaks this subject in two different de-
spatches-one manifesto provisional President and
Commander in chief of the Mexican army; the other his
official report of the battle.
The former, dated city of Mexico 23d of August the
latter Tehuacan, 10Th of November 1s47-from these
papers extract as follows Speaking of Valencas dis
obeyng his orders, and taking up this false position on
his own responsibility, he says:
''The result fatal as had foreseen he advanced
OF his own accord, more than league and selected po
son TO meet the enemy without giving me notice OF hi
IN icp
the first had of his emeriy and soon after the
roar OF cannon showed me his position and gave notice
that an action had commenced, although operwheied with
a Wescnfment OF what "as to happen, &c Gle went to
his relei)
me rear the position OF the i'll ated General ch espcta
be force; and hardly able check his operations
the night was already setting in
"Bu perceived, with sor.ow the position isolated
deep ravne and wood occupied by the enemy inter
my immediate command advance by the only road there
tcas, without exposing themselves" Nc, &c,
terrible rapime that Was in our 'front.' to reach the camp of
the General and to advise him ,cithdra thai rey night
Impossible TO save"
The other despatch is of the same character One ex
tract runs as follows
''And although endeavored to form junction, with
Valenca) it found ble-bsing cut of by the
There was only passable road San Angel Pa
oierna, (Contreras) which was very narrow, and com
enemy S had "eaSy taken Wsa S
81 sought passage by the Hanks; but became con
by my observation, that easy undertake
any operations that evening the tight
rendered iyacticabe By deep rdpne which extended
more than league towards some he'll hts situated the
southeast of San Angel and by broken ground and rocks
on the lett
These are the opinions of military menthe best quail
fed to Judge of the value OF the position of Ansada and
the effect OF the operations of the 10Th of August the
fall of the camp of Contreras, including those of the
Commanding Generals of the two opposing armies
What the Tower Castle Hill was to Cero Gordo,
the Bishops Palace TO Monterey, Ansalda was to the
the camp of Contreras.
Much credit is, no doubt, due to the gallant officers
who successfully stormed the heights but, certainly
they are not entitled to all the credit for the battles of
Cerro Gordo and Monterey and it would be equally
lust TO award all the credit the officer who disposed the
forces for the final assault the camp of Coneras.
never have had, nor have now, any desire to pluck
one leaf from the wreath of any military which he
has fairly
| have adherence not surpassed by that even OF
the prosecutor himself, for prurency OF fame not earn
ed" "Render unto Caesar the things that Casars" is
sound military maxim, to which subscribe with all
my heart.
If have been unjust to any officer in my official report
of this action, it Is to Brig Gen Cadwalader He may
with justice complain that did not give the necessary
prominence to the advantage to subsequent operations
resulting from his Selling and holding the village OF
Ansada, and the able dispositions he made for that pur
pose but if have erred in this nsance, have not done
so designedy. AT the time my official report writ
particular attention. endeavored to do ample justice 10
the valuable services OF this gallant and accomplished OF
fcer, my report shows and am happy TO have the
opportunity at this late day, of supplying the I'm
portan omission in my official report OF that battle, so far
as relates to the services of that officer
Capt Taylor who is called upon to testify TO another
part of the three specifications under I'd charge says mat
on my way to San Augusn the night OF the isih OF
August, he had short conversation with me; that he
inquired how things looked, and that replied badly y
that thought the position too strong TO be carried and
| that was my to San Augustn 10 ADVISE zen.
Scott to withdraw the forces.
Capt Hooker, who also present and heard the
conversations understood it differently. He understood
ME TO say thought the position could not be carried by
front assault, but heard nothing about my advice to
Gen Scott to withdraw the forces.
| fling any mot tn Cant