The State guard., 1848-08-22


 scriptlon of persons. It does not weaken the force of the argument to say that it C. qually applies to apprentices. Even if that be true, the relation that subsists be- tween master and apprintice based up. on contract, and, in poi~' Nt as we'll as presumption of la cN htary. That between master and s.,.se is lvdRntarily, an idea of absolute property $ necessarily implied from the very natul of the rela- tioh. In this light was it I, ssilded by the framers of the Constitution, sso that when a master reca ptures his fugitive slave, 1t is not because he is merely entitled to his service or labor, but because he has an ab. solutc title to his person.
 But, again, although it is insisted that the slave is property only by the laws of the State in which he is held to service, it is most apparent from the very terms of the Constitution that the title of the master is not devised by reason of his escape into I non-slaveholding State. The fugitive slave is still property, although within the jurisdiction of State which forbids pro- perty in slaves, as is unanswerablr estab- lished by the fact, that he "shall be deli vered upon claim" of the owner. Not as one bound by contract, but as slave, whose service is involuntary, and the right ful due of his master. But, sir, 10 illus tratc this practlcally: suppose slave to escape from the State of Alabama, where that spe, ies of property is recognised, into the State of Massachusetts, where accor- ding to the terms of the Constitution. In what character is he rctakenl Not as a freeman. The law of Massachusetts woltld D ot permit it, if such were the fact Not as all apprentice, lo, the ''clalm" would not be founded on ahy considera. ton based upon contract. In what other character, then, than that of slave, the property of the claimant, would he be surrendered up? But by authority of what law could the owner regain his lost pro- pertyl Not by inc law of Massachusetts, for that does not recognise property in slave. Not by the law of Alabama, for that cannot operate beyond her jurisdic- tional limits. By what law, then, is it that this condition of property in slave is established within the limits of non- slaveholding State, and the ability of the owner to assert that right of property re- cognised The reply is obvious. The fundamental law alonc--the Constitution of the United States.
 But let us go step further. Canada is British soil, and DOT excellence the nation of freedom. The moment slave plants his feet upon her shores his manacles fall from his limbs, and he stands forth re- deemed from the dominion of his master. Now, if q horse should escape from the United States into Canada, the owner could follow and reclaim il. Whyl Be- cause a horse is property at common law, and the common law is the law of Cana da. But, if a slave should escape from Alabama into Canada, his owner would have no right to rctakc him, and would De compelled % trust to national comfy alone for his restoration. siud whyl Because by the law of Britain no slavery can exist within her borders, or in her provinces mo slave can breath her atmosphere and live" Bat the laws of Massachusetts do just IS cnectually pro. hibit slavery within her own limits as do those of Canada. Then, why is it that, while the owner cannot retakc his figi- tive slave when found in Canada, he has the perfect right to do so when found in Massachusetts Tho plain and unanswer- able reason is, that while your Consti'u- ton, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof, cannot by possibility extend to the one, they are paramount and supreme in their operation over the other. How strangely absurd, then, Mr. Chairman, must every rcnccting and intelligent man regard the position, so pcrtinaciously ur- ged here day a6cr day, that the Constitu- ton contains no sanction for slavery, and that it is the creature of the municipal law alone of the State where it exists.
 But, sir, the slave is regarded by tho Constitution not mere y theoretically as property, but tue Government, in all its practical dealings with him, treats him as such. He is the subject of direct taxa ton for all national purposes; as the legis- lative history of the Government shows. Up to as early as the year 1928, Congress, in providing for the assessment of lands, &c., and slarcs for direct farcs, had pas. scd as many as eighteen distinct .*-. By the acts the slave is io be assessed &C., cording to his value and may be proceed ed against and sold for tarcs wherever hc is found to he the property of delinquent. 2d Peters, L. U. S., 302. These, sir, were the acts of the Congress of the Uni ted States, legislating under the Constiiu- ton of the United States. And, if that Constitution did not regard the slave as property, by what authority has Congress assumed so to declare him, and so to legis- late with reference to him ! It is doubt less the case, that there are citizens of the South who now own slaves; or the decen- dants of slaves, that were sold under the acts passed by Congress for collecting taxes, and who derive their title to them through the United States marshall, acting under the laws of Congress. And can it be that Congress, or any other department of the Government, may call in question this right of property in slaves so repea- tcdly recognised, and thus virtually guaran- q. L.. l...... C 1- l..