The daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1848-1851, 1848-07-07

pounded Riley Cadwalader and Morgan went there first
Scott, to support Riley
Gen SCOTS testimony as to the order is completely over
nTned by several witnesses fully as credible far DIS
capt ker, Lieut.. Bennett, Lieut.. Hodge, Lieut. Ripley
an TESTIFY 70 the same point that Morgans regiment had
moved and well in the pedregal when General Scott
REACHED the mound where was standing.
Capt Hooker who bore the order TO Morgan, (and this
point not only proven by several witnesses but not
t9yeed testeS that he received the order from and
delivered to Morgan TO the pedegal before General
the route it TO take he returned my position and was
then sent by me 10 and conduct Gen Scott to my posi-
both armies.
The attention of the Couit is particularly requested 10 the
testimony of Capt Hooker Not only fully sustained by
circumstances and other testimony but ism itself infinitely
crcumstantia that it IS impossible he could have eTea
RF0Hgh 9Stake and even the prosecutor will hardly ven
tqTe to entertain thought that this gallant and epoach
aDie officer has erred through design.
Vol Morgan's testimony sustains Capt HOokers as to
VINO bore the order the character OF the ORDER the guiding of
the regiment to the route Though the pedgai and 10 lie
mPossblly that Gen. Scott could have given the order
Coi Morgan says he saw Gen. Scott aDDroachiRg the
mound about the time his regiment was put in notion II
might have been few minutes BEFORE or few minutes af
ter but his impression is that at the very moment his
regiment moved hence the order could not have from
Gen Scott lie further states that Capt Hooker gave him
theOder as coming from me- and that it to support Cad
Half dozen witnesses have testified that soon after he
got upon the mound they heard Gen Scott inquire point
ing TO some troops in the pedrega What bayOnets
are thOse! and that the answer was, Morgan regiment "
Now, If he had lust put this regiment in notion as he
claims to have DONE why this inquiry He had the
opportunities OF Knowing that those who answered him had
will dwell longer this point-not that the subject
eNhausedbut because it Is unnecessary. If the fact that
Morgan regiment ordered by to support CadWala
der Is not established no fact can be established by human
testimony.
Cen has pursued the point with more than ordinary
pertnacy-that did minute instructions the
several corps placed in position This unnecessary
nature Of the case would have been improper if it had
been possible to have done The precise character of the
ground the troops TO operate not known
could the particular tactical movements rendered necessary
by circumstances be anticipated. The commanders them
q OISgp rs tn
details necessarily deyoved upon them. Gen. Cadwalader
testes that seemed to be my object not to trammel him
with minute instructions but that he must be governed by
circumstances No body better than Cen Scott knows that
this was JudlcOus and proper.
The mound from which the orders reissued is mile and
three quarters from the village of Ensada, and but little less
from the entenched camp OF the enemy At this distance
only striking points in the position apparent My in
structons 10 the commanders regulated accordingly
Cen scott seems to assume that, because did not give
the them detailed Instructions there could have been OBJ
ect in dispositions. The record proves that explained
to nm the objects OF the dispositions that were made and
that he approved them His order Gen Shields Shields
esties, to cross the pedegal and support Riley who
had already ne understood made one or two nnsuccesSu
assaults upon the in of the camp These orders
and impressions he (Shieds) got from Gen. Scott.
The plan OF attack designed TO be carried the 18th
was to assault the enemy IN front at the time that his
left be turned, and the position assaulted in the rear
Inc plan tat was executed on the morning OF the zUh,
was deRtcGLy the same. The troops put in position in the
village Of EnSalda the 18TH by my ORDER were disposed
on the morning OF the 18th by Gen Smith, for the final as
saUt that was then made. Smiths report did not pass
through my hands; and as the movement on the zOth DID
carry out what had distinctly ordered :he day before had
night 10 believe he understood and whether he did
Gen. Smith proves that when he reached the village he
found Riley CadwaIader and Morgan already there budd
not learn from any body what they there for Accord
ing to his testimony from point the pedrega (nO the
most favorable for observing the relative value of different
OF EnSaida, and determined to occupy it. When he got
there lie found this position already occupied by force
than trtce large has yet he did not know
how these troops happened to get there or what they came
mere Ior ne aatner inclneS 70 1eet howeve that tney
Their command have heard Of that hunted unsuccessfuy
several months for Chihuahua and finally gave up the chase
Smiths acknowledged good and dscemment should
understood the object of movements so significant
According TO his account he knew what TO do with
them after he found them there and the results OF the follow
ing morning fully sustain his statement vel! own
now to the second branch of this SubIec-namely
What effect the fall of Contreas had the dispositions that
were made on the 18th of August, by myself!
The camp Of COntreas is situated the decliyty of
ridge that begins to ashOr distance in front OF the camp,
Cooking towards San Agnstn from the PLAN OF lava OF
pedrega and slopes gradually and quite regularly SIX or
eight hundred yards to the rear.
The ridge bounded on the night and lett by deep
that lmpractcabe at every point for artillery The only
road lending tothe camp one which, commencing at the
city OF meAicO passes I0agh the villages oil san Anger anu
EHSaaG Immediately along the front OF the camp, to the
factory OF Magdalena This road practicable Tor wheel
carriages short distance beyond Magdaena, say league
from the camp-lt then narrOws TO mere mule path that
leads into the mountains
cult and only approach the lava field in 'front.' and the
site selected with that view.
lis weakness military position consists mainly in this
accessible only in dlrectOn-namey. by the road
before mentioned which once blocked the camp perfectly
isolated
The village of Ensalda situated Immediately this
was no obstacle opposed to the occupation OF II by
save the mpacucabe character Of the approach over the
field Of lava, for anything but infantry
The village and its immediate environs, constitute an I'M
commonly strong deensbe position for infantry, being out
against artillery and the broken character OF the ground rem
derlng absolutely impossible for cavalry to act effectively
while opened the the of the entrenched camp
The military importance of this position in reference tot
camp OF ConeIas must De obvious. Ohfe seGey VoGu
certainly fall that heavy body thrown into the ar
to the ground the laws of gayation are not
certain.
All the advantages that this village was found to posses
upon reaching it, could be known the ped
regal; but quite enough could be- anfwas seen from the
mound so often mentioned to show was the keV OF the
poson and that It's occupation was an OBJECT OIL the INST
Gen Scott his official report before quoted on this sub
iect It's value the moment he upon the held
beng persuaded 4 occupied It would arrest me enemy
reiniOrcementS and ultimately decide the battle.'
Generals Smith and Cadwaader both concur in the mill
taLy importance of the position:
my and well defended it would have been difficult if
not impossible, to nave dislodged him,
Cadwaader tesies that ii he had not checked the rein
iocements, would have been occupied by the enemy be-
lore Smith could have got there.
Every member OF this Court has been upon the ground
and they all are therefore well qualified estimate at their
proper value, these opinions =.
Santa Anna speaks this subject in two different DIS
patces one manuest9 as PROVISIONAL ieslnS'lt anu
mandern Chief OF the Mexican amythe other ms official
The former, dated city of Mexico 23d of August the
latter Tehuacan l9t Of November 847 from these papers
extract follows Speaking OF Valencia dnobeylHg his
orders and taking up this false position on ms own respon
The result was as fatal as had foeseen he advanced,
of his accord than league, and selected posi-
ton TO meet the enemy without giving notice Of his
movement ntententionsthe refusal he gave to my adj
vice was the first had OF his temery and soon after
the roar of showed his position and
tee that an action had commenced, although Ore0heted
with pre5eptimeRt Of what oas to happen" &c Tile
went to his Telefl
" arrived at the moment when the enemy had cat off 5v
tie rear the position of the i'll ated General it respect
4JLe force and hardly able to check his operations
the night was already setting IN
But perceived with the position ISOLATED
deep rayine wood occupied by the enemy inerposed
between US it impossible for the troops under my imme
diate command TO advance by the GpY road there uds
without exposing themselves &c, &c.
had ordered my ad-de-camp, Col Romro to pass the
terrific rGgiRe that in fonto reach the camp OF
the General and TO advise him ,gdrau that 0erg might
San Angel with hls infantry and cavalry by the only
road that was left to him, SDiRg the artillery, UAieh =
10es impossible to sGUe"
The other dispatch of the character extract
runs as follows
And although endeayoed to form junction with is
Naenca,J Il was found impossible, being ct ~ Oy use
cHelRy-and by the ground which he had EFT n Ms real
there was only one passable road from San Anger 70
lCont'eTasl which narrow, and commenced Ig
and lett By positions Of which Of nc Dah0tt0RS ~ re
enemy raj already takeR pOsessi0H;s -,
sought passage by the ianks but became convinced
by those well acquainted with the LOCALITY, and also by my
own observation that not easy 70 undertake any
more operations that evening as on e nsli was rendered
unavoidable b deeD ra0te, which extended for
than heights situated 10 the southeast