The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1848-09-23

The answer is plain to any military man having even
smaering of the principles O., his profession.
Others contend that had Worth attacked in the night,
as Gen Scott designed and ordered the loss would have
been less Ii has been before shown that Gen Scott APP
proved of Worths dsposluons and II is well he did ior
had the attack been made IN The night, forces must
have been defeated, beyond a possibility OF doubt
Others again, contend that Worth did not make sulh
Gent use OF his artillery indeed, Col Hitchcock let
ter published in the Courier and Enquirer of The LIST OF
March, 1885, attributes the loss at Moline del Rey 10 the
circumstance that Worth did not employ more artillery,
when he had "superabundance" at his disposal
wicked perversion of fact than is here deliberately set
forth, il is difficult to conceive
Colonel Hitchcock was present at the interview with
General Scott before alluded to- and must have heard
General Scott say 10 the officer who waited on him, hat
whatever work was TO be done, must be done by Worth
with the means he had placed at his disposal and il he
called upon him for more, he would do very foolish
thing" These it is believed, were his very words, and
know that Colonel Hitchcock heard them and wheth
he did hear General Scott make this declaration not
Col Hitchcock must have known that there never was
"superabundance" OF artillery with the American army
from the time il left the beach AT Vera Cruz, till il en-
tered the gariias OF the city OF Mexico 1t must be borne
in mind that this understood by General Scott TO be
partial OPERATION expected 10 exercise direct nfu
ence on the fall OF the city The only guns that could
have been used with effect against Moline del Rey were
guns of heavy calbre, and the critical position OF the
army that time fully warranted the belief that all the
heavy metal we had would be necessary to reduce the
city These considerations duly weighed in deter
mining the amount OF artillery that employed in this
battle
1t is an easy task to crcse military movements and
ailer the Is ana II
pens that those who have the ceaes heads and stouiest
hearts after the crisis had passed, were the very men
who had the duest ntellects and the whtes lips the
day of battle He who undertakes 10 discuss military
operations with honesty OF purpose, ought to surround
himself with the circumstances which, at the tme sur
rounded the whose achievements he crltcises.
Apply this rule TO the battle OF Moline del Rey and what
is the RESULT The reconnossance~of the position was
made by Captain Mason, OF the engineers, than whom
no officer Of the army better qualified to execute the
work thoroughly. The reconnaissance was industrious
" prosecuted from the moment Cen Scott determined to
assault the position II was made IN open day. and IN
sight OF both armies, and was me closest
and boldest reconnaissance of the All the lnfor-
nation was obtained that under the circumstances could
have been obtained the number and cabre OF the enc
troops displayed correctly estimated, and the strength
of the position determined nearly as possible and this
information seemed to be confirmed by that which Gen.
Scott had received through other channels With these
lights before hm-al that could be obtained-General
Worth made his dispositions for battle. The enemy,
after night fall reinforced his position, and instead OF
meeting three thousand the next morning. he met
twelve thousand posted in the strongest position that has
been assaulted since the war began
The desperate character of the contest may be estma
ted from the fact that out OF force OF little more than
one half the numerca! strength men were killed
or wounded in forty minutes than in the Two glorious
days of Buena Vista. No battle that has ever been
fought the American continent Is at all equal to IN
severity; nor whole, does any in Europe surpass IT,
That the loss great, all must depore but that under
the circumstances IT was necessary none can honestly
deny.
The battle once begun, had TO be lost it might
have been lost at less sacrifice; but American would
not have preferred victory, at double the cosat
least know such the feeling of those engaged in
the struggle, and their opinion is entitled to some consd
Grafton.
The new combinations upon the field. rendered neces-
sary by change Of circumstances, were iudciousy
made, with the rapidly of thought and promptly
cuted all that human effort could accomplish done.
Seldom, If ever, has a command found itself in more
immneny critical position and did troops under
equally trying circumstances bear themselves more gal
lantly.
The facts which have detailed were in my possession,
and all of them in possession OF nobody else.
have given them publicity act of Justice DE alike
to the reputation of the living and the memory OF the
dead and | trust they may be received by those who
may take the trouble to read them, in the spirit in
which they written.