Carroll free press. [volume] (Carrollton [Ohio]) 1834-1861, 1848-10-20

I, NOR. clearly Than himself awhile almost
.,erv man Of my regular force and half the
y..Iup,sers lnow in respectable discipline) are
~;,hamwn Coz distant service" said he in an Of 4
kriul Ie,,cs Of January IS. l947, TO the Com
p,spder.io.ChIer ait seems that | am expected,
,,i,h less than a thousand Regulars aud NoltS-
teer fore par,iy Of new leyies, 10 hold delen'
awe line, whilea large urmy Of more man wen,
~ thousand men in my front" Il ieeI 'h''
have los, he con6dance ol the Government, or
!, would not have suffered me to remain, up 10
his tme. ignorant Of is intentions, with so vi
t,lIv eic.c,,d interests commued 10 nay charge.
Bn,. ths oddsd,) however much feel mortified
and outraged by the course pursued, unprece.
Jen,ed. n, leas, in our own hislory,l will carry
ouIip good faith, whie remain in Mexico, the
vi,ws Of he Government, though ] may be
sacrificed in the effort" A brighter example ei
Fidelity to trust reposed in man IS not TO be
found in The records OF our race lhon ID this de-
earaliop, followed up, as il vas with such stern,
ness Of decision and 'igcr Of acuon as proved
lis writer's sincerity.
The responsibilities, difficulties, and dangers
bv which Gen. Taylor vas now besel may be
we'll conceived. when we lear IN mind that at
The moment when the General found himself
Nnh body Of troops, nearly all raw, scarcely
sufficient 10 keep up his communication wl'h hls
depot Of his supplies al Cumargo, he knew mat
larpe supplies, then on the Rio Grando ana al
The Rrss,s, must be drawn oul by Gen. ScOu'
aud tho, on these supplies depended ne success
ul his (Gen. S's) command, aud his ADVANCE
from Vera Cruz. In The midst Of all the anx-
Iciy naturally attending bis POSITION he lounu
that Santa Anna was advancing upon MS line ol
communication with Camargo and Brasos' ana
thu,. if he availed himself Of the discretion Iel'
IN him by instructions from bis Government TO
confne himself 10 Monterey, he would be cut
oF from his supplies AT those points; and lhcy
would TALL into the hands OF the enemy dePti'
wing Gen. Scott Of the portion oI them mat ne
required; and that then, if he could do such
thing. he himself would be forced, Tor want OF
suppGes, at last TO surrender! lie then had 10
choose between two alternatives, either oiwhIch
would have been sufficiently appalling to most
men; he must advance with a body OF troops, ol
which lour.hlths were volunteers who had no'
Tong been embodied, to oppose five times Their
number Of the best Mexican troops under SANTA
Anna: or he must retreat 10 Monterey lie
knew that, if the first course was taken ana nc
proyed successful. he would preserve his line ol
cnmmunica,ion with tho Rio Grcnde aud save
his nrmy from inevitable disaster; and that III
which he would have found himself after re-
treat Monterey, would be, that IN the one case
he was delt ated in battle, whIS IN The olhGr ne
was starved into a surrender. That Gen. lay
Ior perfectly understood and appreciated the
ucrl of his position, aud the yasIness ol the re
s,I,s dependant on the choice which he nigh
make between these alternatives, there exist
documentary proof. But he made his choice
He adraacsd 10 meet the coming blow. III
iourh, and won tho BalIle Of Bucna Vista.
With what solcmnily Of feeling, mngun
with his high sense Of imperative duty, he en-
gagged in that conflict, evidence Is afforded b
ietlcrs written by himselrlo relatives andIrcnd
on the evening before the battle camo oil. !
those letters, The substance of which has trans
pired, he stated the reasons that had determine
him to give battle 10 the enemy. These wef'
that. ,hat the Mexican army having just cross
ed meat desert, their forces both in mon nn
horses must be in condition so exhausted d
much 10 impair their cupurly for physical eN
cv,ior: thu,, on the othor hand, he himself hel
9 strong position, we'll adapted To enable hlr
20 rcpcl a superior force, in which alone h
could hope successfully to contend with tn
immeny, odds against him. that, should he gu
his aosi,ion and fall back upon Monterey, as h
h,d been advised TO do, Santa Anna nigh
with 50 superior force, hem him up in Monte
yey. while he swept every post from thence /
she month of the Rio Grands. Thus would b
wres.ed rromu all the advantages we hud ga
ned. our country injured, and her honor lsrnisl
Ell. Such, he believed, would be the disaslrol
al n /
therefore resolved to maintain his position
all hazards. with determination to die ralI
er than 10 suffer the flag OF his country 10
dispraccd while under his care. In order
make successful defence with force such
his, woud be necessary that he should be e
posed throughout the engagement 10 the M
,mmnen, peril. The chances (he sald) we
nsten 10 one that he should not be living M
Nj the sitling of the sun on the following dayl
In ann,hor, Leurr on the eve OF the baule.
EXPRESSED himself in even more romarkal
terms:
"Ths nav" SAID he, "be tho last commul
co,ion yeu will receive from me. have be
stripped by the Government of regular roo
and reduced in volunteers, and thus Stripe
and at the mercy Of the foe, have been cXpC
,cd by my eountrymen TO retreat or resign.
Bur SHALL DO NEITHER. | care not for n
self, but feel deeply for the noble soldiers "
nre nbout to be sacrificed by their country. \
shall stand still and give them battle, relying
n us Providence for a rig result
And Just Providence did take care Of h
and those noble soldiers, and saved them lr
the snare which, desgnedIy or not, their o
Government had set for them!
hier the baule of Buena Vista, Gen. II
lor passed through Monterey, but only stopI
ia the town long enough 10 dine; for he Gu
no. for the honors which oil were ready
nav 10 him. Though absolutely worn out
fatigue, he after dinner remounted his old ch
ger and proceeded most quietly - the ropos'
sod camp.
The interval between the battles Of Monte