The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1848-01-04

"Our further operations must, in my opinion, be con-
iucted in one of the three following modes; first 10 take
'nd hold an indemnity lne to recede from all places and
ositons now occupied IN advance of IT, and cease rom
Ill aggressive operations beyond that line second To
oyerun the Whole country, and hold all the principal
plces IN IT by permanent garsons and, third to retain
what we now possess, open the lines of communication
INTO the INTERIOR and extend operations to other i'm
poant places as our means and HE prospect of alyan-
ages shall ndicate-keeping disposable force always
ready within approachable limits, to annoy the enemy,
to seize supplies, enforce contributions, and Illustrate his
pose of protracting the war.
"A full discussion of the comparative merits of these
modes of conducting onr military operations would
tend this communication to an unwanantable lenghi
shall, therefore, conine my remarks to few prominent
considerations relative to each
"With reference to a speedy peace with proper ndem-
nifty and securityhe only object OF the war--he line
policy is regarded objectionable II our present posi-
ion cannot command acceptable terms of pacihcation
from Mexico retiring to an indemnity line would certain
y fail TO produce such result; 1t would weaken the
inducements OF the enemy to put an end 10 hosli'ies
Restored by voluntary surrender to the posse sslon
Of his capital and important departments, and relieved
from the OF our arms, and from all apprehen
SONS OF further conquest and annoyance beyond the
units we might select he would be lett with more album
liant than he possesses 10 prepare al eis
and in security, to strike effective blow with con-
centrated forces ut detached posts To hold these
posts safely to retain OF the seapors we now
have, (f that should fall within the pocy ami to pre-
vent ncursons into the territories which might choose
appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opinion, require
A force as large as would suffice 10 maintain what we
occupy, and 10 carry operations still further IN
the inferior OF the Country make nun leel
The caiamtes of war in way best calculated 10 induce
him 10 seek Tor peace. But il in this am mistaken,
and the lnepolcy should enable Us to reduce the nun
Der OF troops, STILL il will not, as conceive, thereby
effect reduction OF our actual expenditures Tor the wa
In consequence OF the interruption of intercourse be-
the seapors in our possession, and the central
parts OF Mexico the collections imports have hitherto
been nconsiderable If the nepolcy is adopted, this
intercourse will continue to be interrupted, and, conse
quenty the receipts OF revenue from this source Will be
small
Under the operation Of the linepolicy, all expectations
of essenng the burden OF sustaining our troops by der
wing supplies and contributions from the enemy. would
be disappointed. The supplies in the vicinity of our
posts would be Withdrawn from our reach as soon as
design to seize and appropriate them was ascertaned
or suspected But were it otherwise, posts would
be from the wealth and Of the country,
the amount which could be obtained would be incon-
siderable.
$50 far from deriving advantage from the line policy by
wayof obtaining assistance from the resources Of the
enemy towards the support OF our troops, we should,
appehend confer upon portion of the people OF Mex
leo direct benefit, by opening to them at our posts
market, in which should become the purchasers OF
their products at exorbtan price These considera-
tons, without bringing into view Others have led me to
look of the other modes of operation have men-
toned, preferable to that OF occupying an indemnity
line.
In regard to the second mode suggestedhat OF occu
plying the whole Countrywide wide extent OF territory en-
braced in the Mexican republic, the many important
points to be garrisonei and the long lines OF commn'
cation to be kept OPEN present difficulties OF no ordinary
ma5nltude, II occupancy Is to be OF SUCH a clat-
acter as to supersede the Mexican authority, and re-
qure the temporary establishment OF civil government
In carrying this plan into effect it would not b. re'
sonable TO rely upon the favorable disposition, Oh
neutrality OF any considerable part OF the Mexican
people, until assurance OF the stability OF our power
was derived from its continuance Our posts must there
fore be strong and forces in order 70
the many and long lines OF communication, 70 dis
perse and chasse the guerilla bands which would OBJ
sruct Them and to suppress the more powerful uprslngs
of the people wherever they may be attempted cannot
safely estimate the force requisite to carry INTO ful effect
this plan, at less than seventy thousand men, 10 IN
sure the presence of that number the enemys country,
and at places where they would be wanted it would be
necessary to raise much larger force The great ex-
pense Of raising organizing and sending to their remote
destination large body OF troops soon as needed to
give effect to this plan, would apprehend bring very
heavy, and perhaps embarrassing, demand upon the
treasury.
The third mode presented is in my Judgment preiera
BILE to the others Beyond certain limits, admits OF ex
pansion and contraction; but fixed condition, all
held is to be retained, and part surrendered, but
in compliance with treaty stpulations This plan also
contemplaes further acquisitions extending 10 other i'm
poran points, more or less numerous as circumstances
notwithstanding victories have fallen with crush
ing weight upon the assembled armies OF Meyico most OF
those who hold in their hands the decision of the ques
ton OF peace have stood beyond the range of the phys
cal evils inflicted by the war By extending the theatre
of it, and changing the mode of conducting it, they can be
made feel its pressure. In consequence OF our liberal
policy hays sasses n sR the
ico AS the Mexican army has long been to them the
instrument of oppression the hands Of their successive
thes, or alarmed their fears Our army has afforded
them better protection than their own and thus, by our
and orbearanCe, they have, within certain
limits hitherto escaped exactions from either But
successes have opened the way to act upon and
huence those who probably can, if they will put an end
to hostilities By making them suffer the usual caami
| ties of war; they must be made to desire peace.
In addition TO the troops required to garrison places TO
be retained it proposed to have in the HELD competent
force for aggressive opeTatons-to strike the enemy
wherever he may present vulnerable point; to open
from the ports i'll possession into the enemys
country, and and to subject to control some OF
his rich mining districts and product We agricultural
regions Ii is not deemed proper to poi ut out in more
detail the movements and objects contemplated in the
further prosecution of the upon this plant
Mr.. Ca resumed:
Assuming that this plan of operations recommended by
the Secretary of War the true one (and, Tor myself,
have doubt upon that subjec) we have, then, ionr
great objects TO be kept IN view IN estimating Inc lcce
TO be provided for the future conduct of the war
The continued occupation OF the important positions
we hold
| 2 The taking possession of such other commanding
points experience may show TO be proper and as The
circumstances of the may require
| g. The preservation Of the necessary communication
between our positions as well from the coast 70 the
capital in other portions OF the country which may
be brought into subsection to us.
A. A strong force, independent OF what is necessary
for these purposes which shall always he kept upon the
alert and ready whenever there may be any APP
pearance of an outbreak the part Of the Mexican
people
| l,he organization and maintenance of large force
may be the means Of rendering it's employment unnecessa
~ II is much better to render opposition hopeless by
tho o strength than excite into BY