Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1848-03-18

were 10 continue aoccupy her country with our
troops, taking the full measure of indemnity into
our own hands" &c.--language which meant the
entire conquest of Mexico, or il meant nothing at
all, and has been so understood by the country.
This policy and these ferocous purposes, before
this Treaty reached Washington the President
and his advisers had already learned, were
distaseiul. TO both Houses OF Congress and
sufficient indications had been afforded by success
sive votes in the popular branch OF Congress that
not all the power of party, aided BY the patronage
of the Executive, augmented by the proposed adj
dition 10 the Regular Army which would place five
hundred. lucrative commissions at the disposal Of
the President, would enable him to prosecute his
career Of conquest in the spirit by which he had
shown himself to be animated. AT that precise point
Of time this Treaty, this fortuitous Treaty, arrived
in this city. AT another moment, in different
frame OF mind-certainy at the time and in the
temper in which the Annual Message was con-
ceved-there is every reason to believe that this
Treaty would have been contumeliously rejected
by the Executive, if only because it was concluded
by an Agent from whom the President had with
drawn his authority, and even, if report speaks
true, taken extreme measures TO discredit and dis
grace. But, coming when it did, the Treaty re-
lieyed the President from the dilemma, which he
saw not how TO, escape, of war upon his hands
from which Congress was POSSIBLY at least, if
not probably 10 withdraw the means Of prose-
cutting further or prolongng; and he lost no time
in placing it before the Senate. In so doing, he
acted for once in the spirit of the Constitution for,
oil a. L. ;ub
rejecting Treaty without submitting it to the wis
dom OF the Senate, it is precedent to be at all
times rather avoided than followed. Referring
the question TO the Senate, moreover, required no
great sacrifice on the part of the President, who
must have reasoned TO himself somewhat thus 81
am in predicament, with one House of Congress
openly averse to my war, and passing votes on
the subject each Of which is equivalent to an In
parchment; and the other House, though have
majority Of party friends in it, disabled from eff
Gent action by the constitutional independence of
that inconvenent drag upon my authority. will
send this Treaty to the Senate bitter pill as it is
10 me. If the Senate approve it, am lei off for
the fright have had. If the Senate reject it, the
responsibility of continuing this war, and Of defn
ing its objects, will no longer rest upon me. Let
who wW take the responsibility, shall have cast it
off, and shall stand redeemed and disenthralled'
Reasoning after some such fashion, as beyond
question the President must have done, the oppor-
tunity was afforded TO body more directly than
he representing the public opinion, to determine
whether this war should or should not be brought
TO an end, even though the terms of the Treaty
unless as inseparable from any peace which
could by possibility have received the assent
of the Senate) were far from being unexcep-
tionable I" The course of the Senate upon the
Oregon question:" says a New Orleans paper,
(the .' Commercial Times = of the Sd instantly is
pregnant Illustration of the vast Conservative in
fuence exercised OH patriotic and intelligent states
men by the force of Public Opinion; and this
great lever is swayed too decidedly toward Peace
TO escape the observation of the Senate" To this
observation, remarkably corroborating our view of
the greater accessibility of the Senate than the Pre-
sldent to Public Opinion, may be added the sensi-
Bile, and, as the event has proved entirely Just re-
mark Of the same print upon the supposton that,
on It's first presentation, the Treaty might not be
acceptable to a sufficient number of Senators to Sc
cure for it the consent Of that body In that event
the Times expresses itself as being sangune in
its hopes of the approval and adoption of the Trea-
y, because, /" out of twenty-one the supposed num-
Der of adversaries in question involving the
highest considerations of public welfare, and not
blind obedience to POLITICAL doctrines and party
WILL il is but reasonable to expect that the convic-
tons of some may be modified and that individual
views may be measurably abandoned for the sake
Of obtaining an object Of undoubted magnitude, and
one that is all but universally desired"
This foresight and prediction by persons at more
than thousand miles from the scene Of action, in
a newspaper published on the fifth day of the Sc
mates deliberations on the Treaty, was but antci-
patton Of what is believed actually to have occurred
IN that body. From the decision at which il arrived
upon the Treaty, we too hope to realize that re.
establishment Of Peace, which, says the same paper,
" will carry JOY throughout the land enhance con-
hdencc dissipate distrust, and exert healing in
liuence on the great commercial interests OF the
I country"
\ Thirdly. With the rooted aversion which we
have ever entertained to the war with Mexico
win our contempt Of its pretences, and our abhor
renee OF its real ohiect-which M ono oan o,,