Wheeling times and advertiser. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1839-1849, 1848-07-13
LIFE AND CHARACTER OF
Z0CAgs'ss E'tsys0r.


wounded and missing, IA taking Monterey
was SIS Killed, 392 wounded. J missing
The capture Of Monterey found the army re.
dnced d that place 10 an effective force Of a
bout five thousand five hundred men. Thi,
small number was soon further diminished by
sickness. oceasioned by the climate, the sea.
son, aud hardship, to which more than two
thirds OF the men were wholly unused. Its
true that large body Of volunteers was at
different points on the Rio Grande, but the
difficulty OF subsistence on a line already ex-
tended one hundred and h.ty miles. forbade
the immediate advance OF the army. This
was difficulty opprshenjel by Taylor from
the FIRST, and for which he was in 10 sense re-
sponsibe.
No sooner was Monterey in our possession
aud the name of Gen Taylor heard in every
section Of the country, than executive jeal-
ousy manifested itself otherwise than in the
votes Of Congress, and the eensure Of the
Secretary of war That fdneiionary informed
Gen Taylor that he designed him to push on
ward to San Luis Potosi, and at the same
time designed to withdraw from him 1000 Of
his regular force. 70 this Gen Taylor replies;
Head Quarter,. Army of Occupation.
Ca mp near Monterey. Oct. Is, 1916.
"The Mexican army under General Ampu-
dia has lett SaltiIo. and fallen back on san
Luis potosi-the last detachment. as / un-
derstand. being uuderorlers 20 march to-day.
s. .F14 So | ftis
9Th Instant and is engaged ia concentrating
and organizing theanmy al HAT point. Wheth-
er the Withdrawal Of the forces 10 San Luis
be intended to draw MS into the country, far
from supplies and support, or whether it be
political movement. connected with Santa
Anna return 10 power, il is impossible to
say; il is sufficient for ne present argument
70 know that heavy force is assembling 10
eur 'front.' Slltiilo, The capital Of Coahui'a.
is virtually in our possession, and can be oc-
cuped. if necessary, the moment the conven-
ton isa an end. ths occupation OF Stltilio
will lengthrn outline ,s,euty-fve miles but,
on the other baud, nsy enabie Us TO draw at
least a portion oi our brtddstuif, from the
county. San Luis is about three hundred
miles from Saliillo, perhaps more.
"San LUIS Is city OF some 60 600 inhab
tants, III country abundant in resources. aud
at no great distance from the heart OF the
Republic whence munitions OF war and re
inducements can readily be drawn. ii is al
the same Time nearly six hundred miles ir IN
HE Rio Grande, which must continue to be
the base OF our operation, at least until we
reach San LUIS.
.In view OF the above facts, hazard moth
ing in saying, that column to move on San
LUIS from Saltillo, should, 10 ensure success,
be at least 10000 strong; OF which 10000
should be regular troops. After much re-
aectIon, | consider the above as the smallest
number OF effective troops that could be en-
pIoyed on this service without mourning the
hazard OF disaster and perhaps defeat. There
would be required, besides to keep open our
long line, protect The dtpols, and secure the
county already gIiaed, force Of 5000 men
this. without including the force necessary
10 send 10 Iampico to take or hold that place.
The above estimate may seem large. when
it is remembered that important results have
been gained with a much smaller force. Bat
we have hitherto operated near our own base,
and the McXicaus at great distance from
theirs. Saltlllo may be considered about e.
quidistanl from the Rio Graude and San Luis.
Every days march beyond il lengihens our
already long line aud curidils theirs-weak-
ems Us, and gives them strength. Hence the
should not be undertaken except
with loree 50 ldfse as 70 render success GER
TAIN.
In the above calculation have supposed
the Mexieans able concentrate at San Luis
d lorce OF 10000 to $4,000 men. With toll
cradle stability 10 the goveramen | doubt
not their ability to de this, and it is not sale
to assume any less nomber as basis.
"Ihe'iorce ot twelve months volunteers
has suffered greatly from disease. Many have
died, and d great number have been dIscharg
ed for disability So much has their effective
strength been reduced by this cause and pres
cnt sickness that, in the absence OF official re-
turns, am satisfied that i've hundred men
per regiment would be large average OF e.
tccllUes among the volunteers. This would
give, Including the cavalry, force little
short OF 9Q0J men, OF, adding 1000 regulars,
(our present strength is not 3000.) total
force OF $4,000. Leaving the very moderate
number oi 1000 10 secure our rear, | shonld
not be able 10 march from S1ltIlo, with pres
entand expected means, at the head OF more
than 10000 men--a number, which, from
considerations above stated, | deem to be en-
tirely inadequate.
In conclusion, feel it my duty TO make
some remarks, which would gladly have
beee spared tie necessity OF submitting.
ieei 1t due to my position, and to the service,
10 record my protest against the MAJ ner in
which The Department has sought TO make an
important detachment from my comma nd ,
specifically indicating not only the general of
hcers. but, TO considerable extent The troops
that were 10 compose it. While remain in
command OF the army against Mexico, aud
am therefore justly held responsible by the
Government and the country for the conduct
OF lis operations, must claim the right of
organizing all detachmeGls from il, and regu-
Idung the ume and manner OF their service
Above ali do consider 1t important that the
Department OF War should refrain from cor
responding directly with my aubofdinates,
and Communicating orders aud Instructions
ON points Which, by all military precept and
practice, pertain exclusively to the gene raj
m-Cblei command, Confusion and disaster
alone can result irom such ID course. The
reasou alleged, VIZ. the loss Of lime IN com
munCatlag NI,h General Pdtteraun, has no
applications; tor the Secretary ) despatch came
from that officer To my headquarters in sixty
! hours, aud he could not move, at any rate,
without drawing largely upon this column Tor
artillery aud regular troops.
Il beg il may be understood that my re-
marks have no personal application, 1t is
quite prcbtb,e that in The event of making
such d detachment, | would have placed II
under Major General Patterson; but conceive
that tins mode OF regulating details, and or
dertng det1chmen,s Greet from the Depart
lnent ol War, Is Violation OF The integrity
OF the chief command la the field, pregnant
with HE worst evils, and against v iClI