The Middlebury galaxy. [volume] (Middlebury, Vt.) 1848-1850, 1848-12-12


e New York, and yet the one represents sta
/ containing, according TO the existing Apo
G tionment Of representatives in the House
1 Representatives, but one thirty-fourth part
r the population Of the other. BY the constitl
b tiona composition OF the Senate, a majority
] that body from the smaller states represe1
S less than one-fourth of the people of the JJ1
D ion. There are thirty states and, under tb
I existing apportionment Of representative
/ there are two hundred and thirty members i
: the House of Representatives. Sixteen of tn
smaller states are represented in that Hous
: by but fifty members and yet the senator
, from these states constitute majority of III
Senate. So that the President may recon
mend measure to Congress, and it may re
ceive the sanction and approval of more thai
three-tourlhs of the House of Representatives
and Of all the senators from the large states
containing more than three-fourths of til,
whole population Of the United States; ant
yet the measure may be defeated BY the vote.
lof the senators from the smaller states.
Upon the same principle that the veto Of
the President should be practically abolished
the power of the Vice President to give the
casting vote upon an equal division Of the sen,
ate should be abolished also. The Vice Pres.
ident exercises the veto poweras effectually
by rejecting oil by his casting vote, as the
President does by refusing to approve and sign
IT. This power has been exercised by the
Vice President in a few instances,the most I'M
portant Of which was the rejection of The bill
to recharter the bank of the United States in
1911. 1t may happen that a bill may be pass
ed by large majority of the House of Reu-
resentatives, and may be supported by the
senators from the larger states, and the Vice
President may reject it by giving his vote with
the senators from the smaller states and vet
none it is presumed are prepared to deny to
him the exercise of this power under the con-
stitution.
But it is, in point of fact, untrue that an
act passed By Congress is conclusive evidence
that 1t is an emanasion of the popular will
A majority of the whole number elected 10
each house Of Congress constitutes quorum
and majority Of that quorum is competent
to pass laws. 1t might happen that quorum
of the House Of Representatives, consisting of
single member more than half of the whole
number elected to that House, might pass
Dill by majority of Il single vote, and in that
case fraction more than one-fourth Of the
people OF the United States would be repre-
scented by those who voted for it. 1t might
happen that the same bill might be passed by
a majority of one, by a quorum of the Senate,
composed Of senators from the fifteen smaller
States and single Senator from a sixteenth
State, and if the senators voting for it happen
ed to be from the eight of the smallest of these
States, it would be passed by the votes of SEN
ators of states having but fourteen represent
tives in the House of Representatives, and
containing less than one sixteenth of the whole
population of the United States.
Besides, in most of the States the members
Of the House Of Representatives arc chosen
by pluralities, and not by majoritics Of all The
voters in their respective districts; and it may
happen that majority Of that House may be
returned by less aggregate vote of the peo-
pie than that received by the minority. .'
The great object of the constitution in con-
ferring upon the President n qualified mega
tive upon the legislation of Congress, was to
protect minorites from injustice and oppres-
sion by maiorities. The equality of their rep
resentation in the Senate, and the veto power
of the President, are the constitutional guar
antics which the smaller states have that their
rights will be respected. " thout these CHAR
antics, all their interests would be at the mer-
cy of malorities in Congress, Representing the
larger states. To the smaller and weaker
states, therefore, the preservation of this pow
er, and the exercise upon proper occasions de-
handing it, is of vital importance. They rat
flied the constitution, and entered into the IN
ion, securing to themselves an equal represen-
tation with the larger states in the Senate
and they agreed 10 be bound bt all laws pass
ed by Congress urOn the express condition,
and none other, that they should be approved
by the President, or passed. his. objections to
the contrary notwithstanding, by vote of
two-thirds Of both houses. Upon this condi-
ton they have right to insist, as part of the
compact to which they gave their assent.
A bill might be passed by Congress against
the will of the whole people of particular
State, and against thesvoices of It's Senators
and all its Representatives. However preiu-
dicial it might be to the interest of such State,
it would be bound by it if the President shall
approve it, or if it should be passed by a vote
of two-thirds of both houses; but it has a right
to demand that the President shall exercise
his constitutional power, and arrest it, if
his judgment is against it. If he surrenders
this power, or fails to exercise it in a case
where he cannot approve, it would make his
formal approval n mere mockery. and would
be itself violation of the constitution aud he
dissenting state would become bound by
law which had not been passed according to
the sanctions of the constitution.
The Supreme Court Of The United States
is invested with the power TO declare. and
has declared, acts Of Congress passed with
The concurrence of The Senate, the House of
Representatives. and the approval Of the
President, 10 be unconstitutional and void
and yet none. it is presumed, can he found,
who will be disposed TO strip this highest ju-
dicial tribunal under the constitution Of this
acknowledged power-a power necessary a
like TO its independence and the rights Of i'll
dyiduals.
For the same reasons that the Executive
veto should according TO the doctrine main
tanned, ba rendered nugaIory. and be prac-
iically expunget from the constitution, this
power of The court should also be rendered
nugatory and be expunged, because it re-
strains The legislative aud executive will,
and because the exercise of such power by
the court may be regarded as being in con-
flict with the capacity OF the people 10 gov
ern themselves. Indeed, there IS more Tea>
son for striking this power OF the court from
the constitution than there is that Of the
qualified veto OF the President; because the
IF the co,irf IA final and ran never