Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1848-05-19

ralS office, the number was much less than
you imagine, and did not probably exceed one
thousand. AS the refutaton of your charge
against the department for diverting these
troops is in nowise impaired by the number,
be 1t more or less, it is not import to inquire
into that matter. But there is a question of
serious import, to which think the country
will expect you to answer.
Ii these new lHves, which had Just entered
the service, would have enabled YOU to cap
ture the city of Mexico in June, with COM
paratlvely small loss, why did you, at the We
ry time you discovered that they were so much
needed, and would have been so useful, send
away from your army three times as many
volunteers, who had been many months in
service, and were, as you acknowledge. "res-
pectable In discipline and efficiency" and who
had distinguished themselves at Vera Cruz
and Cerro Gordo, and, in the hour of peril,
had fought by the side of your veteran troops,
and merlted an honorable share in the glory of
those memorable conflicts? The period of
their engagement had not expired. When
thus, sent away, but one of the seven regi-
ments had less than thirty, andsmost of them
had more than foty-fve days TO serve. Ac-
cordlng to your own opinion, conquered in by
the department, they could have been legally
retained on your line of operations till the
last hour of their engagement. If not deemed
eXpedlent to take them on towards Mexico
with you, their services, at that critical period.
would have been of inestimable value in hol-
ding the post at Jalapa-so Important, and so
unexpectedly abandoned-and in keeping o.
pen a communication between Vera Cruz and
your headquarters, whereby supplies, NUM-
lions, and recruits could be safely and eXpe-
dltiously forwarded to you. Had this been
done, you would have been spared the trouble
of inditing many items of grievance and COM
plants against the War Department for hav-
ing failed to furnish them. If you had retain
ed the twelve months volunteers until the
end of their agreement-and no sufficient rea-
son has yet been shown for their premature
discharge-you might, for a season at least,
have received, without much obstruction, sup
plies from the main depot on the Gulf the
army might have been strengthened by REIN
forcements at an earlier period and many of
the revolving scenes of barbarity on the road
from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, in which so many
lives of our fellow citizens have been sacrif
ced by the ruthless guerilleros, would not have
occurred.
Another and still more lamentable calamity
is, think, fairly to be ascribed to the early
obstruction of this important line of commuEl-
cation. The brave and patriotic men who
were hurried on to Mexico, in small detach-
ments, in order to reinforce your army, were
unexpecte lily, but necessarily detained at We
"a Cruz until the numbers there collected were
sufficient to force their way through the strong
guerrilla bands which held the difficult passes
on the Jalapa road. While thus detained on
that inhosptable coast, in the slckly sea-
son, they were exposed to the attacks of a
wasting pestllence, more formidable, and, as
1t unfortunately proved, more destructive, than
the Mexican army.
When the unwecome news of the prema-
ture discharge of this large body of volunteers
was received here, unaccompaned by any eX-
PLANTATION to show the necessity of the act, it
excited very general surprise and regret lis
consequences were al once foreseen; but the step
had been taken, and could not be retraced 1t
was loudly condemned. Many did not believe
that measure which appeared to be so I'M
wise and so injurious to the operations of the
army, could have emanated from yourself; but
they were less charitable towards the Presi-
dent and Secretary of War. Both were de-
nounced for what you had done; they were
unscrupulously charged with weakness and
lncapacity; with being actuated by hostility
to you, and desire to secure popularity with
the volunteers. Nor were these bitter assaults
lntermitted, until it began to be suspected that
they were misdirected
If you really regarded, on the 9th OF May,
the augmentation of your forces as being OF
such vital importance, it is almost as difficult
to account for the course taken 10 re-engage
the volunteers, as for their premature dis
charge. am misled by information, on which
] ought to rely, if many of these volunteers
would not have continued in the service, il
proper measures had been taken Jalapa,
while they were induIging the hope of partl-
clpatlng in further triumphs, and of being a.
mong those who would enjoy the enviahe
distinction of first entering as vlctors the proud
capital of the Mexican republic. Though the
subject was there presented TO their conslde-
ration, no vigorous efforts seem to have been
made-no attempt to form new companies-or
to muster them into service, until this power
full inducement was weakened or Withdrawn
until they had been detached from a victorious
army, as if no longer deemed worthy to be a
part of it-sent sixty miles towards their
homes into a Presidential region, and there
brought within the systematic influence OF the
sentiments which was natural that many
| embarking to return to their families and
friends. Considering the manner in which
the Presidents order on this subject was at
tempted to be executed, it is not strange that,
among more than three thousand potrlotc
volunteers, sent away by your order OF the
4th of May, only about g fifteen individuals
were found willing to re-engage.
You seem to have suddenly conceived the
notion of converting the army, like Cortez,
Unto seLfsustainlng machine; > and, t0
make the resemblance between yourself and
the Spanish hero more complete, You INDUCED
dream of fancy, until you seem TO have a
dopted it as matter of belief that you were
doomed at Washington: and YOU became
like him, always afraid that the next ship
cor messenger might recall or further cripple .
you. 1t should not be forgotten, that the de-
| sign of this unaccountable military movement
was first communicated to Mr.. Trst, before
you hal given any intiInation of it TO your
government, and while under the perturbation
of mind which his unwelcome presence ii
Mexico had produced. Had you con6ded thi:
extraordinary plan of campaign to him after
| the happy change" in your relations aftel
you had digested his "farrago of lnsoIence
conceit, and arrogance "-and after he, too
mistaking notoriety for fame, had sought tc
win it by disobeying the orders OF his govern
ment, defying its authority, and assaillng It's
conduct-this distinguishing mark of your
confidence in him would have caused much
| less surprise This novel conception, so sud
denly adopted, was as suddenly carried out
your army was, indeed, converted ''into self
sustaining machine;'' youdischarged the twelve
months volunteers, and broke up your posts