The Hillsborough recorder. [volume] (Hillsborough, N.C.) 1820-1879, 1847-12-23

pursue.
Nilh die Eiews ! entertain. cannot
lsraT the paliry which has hstn suggest
cd, riihrT 10 Withdraw our army sllogrih-
eT, or 20 retire 10 designated line. and
simply hold and dsfend il. 10 withdraw
our army altogether from the ronqnesis
they have made by deeds Of unparalleled
braery, and al the eKpenSe Of 50 mneh
blood and lrsasaie. in \ just wsr an our
pan, and one xhirh. by The ari Of the en-
envy, we could mol h0n0Eably have avoid
ed. would hr 10 degrade The nation IN lls
own estimation and in that Of The world.
70 retire 10 a line. and simply hold and
defend il. would moi terminate the war.
On the contrary. Il would encourage Mex
/, iro 10 perseyrTe, and tend 10 prolraeI u
Indefinitely. II il not 10 be expected Thai
Mexico, after refusing 10 establish Furh
line as 4 permanent boundary, when
our victorious armies are in possession ri
, her capital. and in the heart OF her eoun-
! Try, would permit Ms 10 hold il without
i, resistance. That she would continue the
! war. and in IlIe most lrarassing and an
! MOVING fnims. there can he no doubt. A
border warfare Of the most savage cha
! racler. extending over long line. would
be increasingly waged. IL would require
large army 10 be kept constantly in the
lield, stationed al Posts and garTisOns along
such a line to protect and defend IL. The
enemy, relieved from the pressure Of our
arms on his coasts aud in the pOpulons
paris or the interior, would direct his al
lenlion TO this line. and. selecting an lso-
lated post for attack, would concentrate
|, his forces upon il. This would be Il con-
! dilion of affairs which she Mexicans, pnr'
. suing their fa.oriie system OF guerrIll;
y warfare, would probably prefer 10 any
/ .otfier. Wsss ws- IN assume defensive
attitude on such line, all the advantage:
!. Of such state OF war would he on the
eide Of the enemy. We cOuhi levy nc
contributions upon him, or in any Other
way make him feel the pressure Of sht
. war, but must remain inactive and avail
, his approach, being in constant uncertain
10y at what point on the line, or at wha
time, he might make an assault. He MAJ
assemble and organize an Overwhelming
, force in the interior, on his own side o
the line, and, toncesling his purpose, max,
q sudden assault upon some one OF on
posts so distant from any other as 10 pre-
, vent the possibility of timely succor o
.ieinforcemenis and in this way our gal
liant army would I've exposed 10 the DANCE
Of being cut of in detail; or il, by ihei
q unequalled bravery aud prowess ever,
where exhibited during this WAT, the,
!. should repulse the enemy, their number
: stationed at any one post may he too sma
!, 10 pursue him. IL the enemy be repulsc
. in one attack, he would have nothing .
!. do but to retreat to his own side Of ih
. line, and, being in no fear Of pursuin
. army, may reinforce himself al leisure. "a
: another attack on the same or some otht
post. He may, too, cross the line betwee
our posts, make rapid incursions into I'll
country which We hold, murder the inh;
:, bitants, commit depreda,ions on Them, an
then retreat TO the interior before sufl
; cient force can be concentrated 10 pursl
:, him. Such would probably he the hara
= sing character of mere defensive war O
- our part. IL our forces, when attacke,
. or threatened with attack, be permitted
= cross the line, drive back the enemy, an
- conquer him, this would be again TO il
:, wade the enemy's country, after havir
" lost all the advantages of the conquesis "
y have already made, by having voluntaril
= abandoned them. TO hold such liz
= =, successfully and in security, ii is far fro
" being certain that il would not require ;
= large an army as would be necessary
- hold all the conquests we have alread
;" made, and TO continue the prosecution
, the war in the heart Of the enemy's cou
;" try. Ii is also far from being certain III
~ the expenses of the war would be dimi
-, ished by such policy.
"a am persuaded that the best means
70 vindicating the national honor and intere.
r.. aud Of bringing the war to an honorah
n. CLOSE, will be to prosecute it with inrrea
III ed energy and power in the vital parts
he the enemy's country.
IN In my annual message 10 Congress
in December last, declared tia, "the w
| has not been waged with view 10 CO
a. quest; bu, having been commenced
b. Mexico, il has been carried into the Ell
my's country, and will be vigorously pl
,r. secuted there, with a view 10 obtain
es honorable peace, and thereby secure a
IS pie indemnity for the expenses of the W
an as we'll as 10 our much-iniured citize
in. who hold large pecuniary demands agai
re-. Mexico" Such, in my judgment, CO
/ a inues to be our tue policy-indeed,
ey only policy which will probably secur
of permanent peace.
of 1t has never been contemplated by n
ers SIS an object Of the war, To make a peru
rn. nent conquest of the republic of Mexi
wn or to annlhila,e her separate existence
ny an Independent, nation. On the contra
as it has ever been my desire that she sho
her maintain her nationality. and, under
hat good government adapted TO her condili