The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1847-01-26


The introduction of the Express which is also copied
| threatens more from the same source. We hope not
prom the New York Express, JAM o.
Letter from Major General Taylor
We lay before our readers the following letter, which
tells its own story too well to need any comment 1t is
but JUST however, to its heroic writer, whose courage
and judgment equaled only by his honesty and mod
esty to state that was written to friend and rel
ave now resident in this city, endeared to him by very
many years of personal intimacy to whom he unbosois
| reserve
We have OF this sort to communicate and shall
soon be able to show that i'll his defence against his
secret personal enemies, well against the armed
emies OF his country, the old hero OF the Rio Gande is
| ever "Rough and Ready"
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OccupATIoN, OR INVASION,
Monterey, Mexico, Nov. 8, 1916.
My DEAR ''''.'. Your very kind and acceptable let
ter of the 3lst of August 't's'''' reached me only
short time since, for which beg leave to tender you my
sincere thanks. Ia few confidential remarks certain
public transactions are here omitted
After considerable apparent delay the part of the
luartsmiasers Department, in getting steamboats, into
wards the latter part of August. throwing forward to
Camargo Ga town situated the San Juan river, three
miles from its junction with the Rio Grande, on the west
side, nearly 500 miles from Brazos island by water and
300 by land and 40 from this place. considerable de-
pot OF provisions ordinances ammunition, and forage, and
them having brought together an important portion Of
my command determined on moving on this place. Ac
cordingy, after collecting ZOO pack mules with their
attendants and conductors, the enenys country, 1.-THE
principal means OF transportation for provisions, bag
gage, &c } left, the 9Th of September, TO join my
advance which had preceded me few days Cerralvo
small village rs miles the route which did on the
9th, and after waiting there few days for OF the
corps to get moved and reached here the 10TH
with $50 men2, TOO regulars, the balance volunteers
For what took place afterwards, must refer you to my
s g n a nj to ny detailed one tine
are at all satisfied with my conduct regard to the terms
OF the capituation entered into with the Mexican COM
mander which you no doubt have SEEM as they have
m mIhli off p1eop o1
INTO various other newspapers have this moment re-
celved an answer Ito my despatch announcing the sur
render OF Monterey and the circumstances attending the
same) from the Secretary of War, stating that SIT
regretted BY the President that it not deemed advsa
bic to insist on the terms had proposed in my first COM
mnncation to the Mexican commander in regard to Civ
ing up the cty"-addng that "the circumstances which
dictated, no doubt justified the change" Although the
terms OF captnlahon may be considered too liberal on
our part by the President and his advisers, well by
many others at distance, particularly by those who
do not understand the position which occupied
otherwise they might come to different conclusion in
regard to the matter) yet due reflection, nothing
to induce to regret the course pursued The propo
shon on the part of General Ampudiawhich had much
to 40 IN determining my course in the mattewas based
to settle the existing difficulties by negotiation, (Which
knew was the case, without knowing the resut,) which
was then under consideration BY the proper authorities
and which he General Ampudia) had no, doubt would
result favoraby as the whole of his people in ia
vor Of peace If so, considered the further eusion OF
blood not only unnecessary, but improper Their force
size and position of the place, could not completely
invest SO that the greater portion OF Their troopsl
not the Whole-had they been disposed to 40 so could
mountain passes and effected their retreat do what
could Had we been put to the alternative of taking the
place by storm, (Which there is no doubt should have
succeeded in dong) should in all probability, have
lost fifty one hundred in killed, besides the
wounded which wished to avoid, there appeared to
be prospect OF peace, even if distant one. also
wished to avoid the destruction of women and children
which must have been very great had the stomng pro-
cess been resored to. Besides they had a very large
and strong ortifcation short distance from the city,
which, if carried with the bayonet must have been taken
at great sacrifice of fe and, with our limited train OF
heavy or baering artillery, it would have required
twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular APP
proaches.
That they should have surrendered place nearly as
strong as Quebec, well fortified under the direction of
skilful engnecrstheir works ganished with fortytwo
pieces of artillery abundantly supplied with ammunition
garrsohed by 1000 regular and 1900 irregular troops, in
addition to some thousand citizens capable Of (and
doubt acually bearing arms, and aiding in its defence
TO opposing force OF half their number, scantly sup
piled with provisions, and with light train OF artillery
is among the unaccontabe occurrences of the times.
| am decidedly opposed to carrying the beyond
Satllo in this direction, which place has been entirely
abandoned by the Mexican forces, all of whom have
been concentrated at San Luis Potosi and shall lose
time in taking possession of the former
the cessation of hostites referred to expireswhich
have notified the Mexican authorities will be the on
the 18th instant by direction of the President of the Uni
ted States.
If we are Gin the language of Mr.. Polk and General
Scott under the necessity of conquering peace' and
that by taking the capital of the country must go TO
Vera Cruz take that place. and then march the city
of Mexico. To do so in any other direction consider
out of the question But, admitting that we conquer a
peace by doing sosay, at the end Of the next twelve
months--wi the amount of blood and treasure which
must be expended in doing so be compensated by the
samei think not-especally if the country we subdus
is to be given up and imagine there but few ind i
viduas in country who think Of annexng Mexico to
the United States
do not intend to carry on my operations (as previously
stately beyond Satlo,deeming it next to impractcabe
to do II then becomes question to what is best to
be done II to me- the most udicious to be
pursued on part would be to take possession
Of the line would accept by negotiation, extending
from the Gulf of Mexico TO the Pacific, and occupy tn
same or keep what already have possession of and
that with Tampco (Which hope to take in the
course OF the next month, ] can get the
of ransporataon) will give all this side OF
the Sierra Maire, and, as occupy Salo, viii
include or seven States provinces, thus holding
Tampico Victoria Monterey, Salto, Moncova, Chihua-
bua (Which presume General Wool has possession OF
by this tme,) Santa Fe and the Californasand say TO
Mexico Drive from the country Throwing on her
the responsibility and expense of carrying offensive
warat the time closely blockading all her ports
on the Pacific and the Gulf of this kind i
persevered in for short time, would bring her
to her proper senses, and compel her for peace,
provided there government in the country sufficiently
stable for us TO WITH which fear will hardly be the
ease for many years to Without large reinforce
ments of volunteers from the United States-sa ten OF