Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1847-02-13
LETTER FROM GEN. TAYLOR.

The following letter, addressed by its
distinguished author to friend in New
York city, was published in the Express of
the 23d ult.
The Express says that the friend to
whom il was addressed would not have
taken the liberty of making it public, had
not the recent manifestations of the ma.
Lightly of the Administration towards Gen.
T. demanded this step.
We have, adds the Express, more of this
sort to communicate, and shall soon be able
to show that, in his defence against his
own personal enemies and selfish detrac-
tors, as well as against the armed enemies
of his country, the old hero of the Rio
Grande is ever Rough and Ready"
MONTEREY, Mexico, Nov. 9, 1916.
do not believe the authorities at Washington
are at all satisfied with my conduct in regard to
the terms OF the capitulatlon entered into with
the Mexican commander, which you no doubt
have seen, as they have been made public through
the official organ, and copied into varons other
newspapers. have this moment received an
answer TO my despatch announcing the surren
der of Monterey, and the circumstances atten.
ding the same) from the Secretary Of War. sta.
ting that ''it was regretted by the President that
it was not deemed advisable to insist on the
terms had proposed in my first communication
10 the Mexican commander, in regard TO giving
up the city," adding that "the circumstances
which dictated, no doubt justified the change
Although the terms Of capituaton may be con.
sidered too liberal on our part by the President
and his advisers, as well as by many others at a
distance, particularly by those who do not under.
stand the position which we occupied, otherwise
they might come 10 different conclusion in
regard to the matter,) yet, on due reflection,
see nothing 10 induce me to regret the course
pursued.
The proposition on the part Of Gen. Ampuda
, which had much to do in determining my course
in the matter. was based on the ground that oul
Government had proposed 10 his to settle the ex
listing difficulties by negotiation, (Which knew
, was the case without knowing the result) which
was then under consideration by the proper anhor
, ites and which he (Gen. Ampudia) had nc
doubt would result favorable, as the whole Of bis
people were in favor OF peace. If so, | consid
cred the further effusion Of blood not only un
/. considerably larger than ours; and from the size
and position Of the place, we could not com
y pleteIy invest it; so that the greater portion o
their troops, if not the whole, had they been dis
posed TO do so, could, any night, have abandoned
h the city, at once entered the mountain passes
n and effected their retreat-do what we could!
:, Had we been put to the alternative OF takinl
r the place by storm, (Which there is no doubt W
:. should have succeeded in doing,) we should, il
9 all probability have lost fifty or one hundred mel
d in killed, besides the wounded-which wishe
TO avoid, as there appeared to be prospect Q
e peace, even If distant one. | also wished [
0 avoid the destruction OF women and children
It which must have been very great, had the storm
is ing process been resorted 10. Besides, they hav
s a very large and strong ratification, short :di
). lance from the city, which, if carried with tn
o bayonet, must have been taken with great sacr
a flee OF life; and with our limited train of heav
,. or battering artillery, it would have require
n twenty or twenty five days 10 take it by regula
n approaches. .....
e That they should have surrendered a plac
It nearly as strong as Quebec, we'll fortified und
the direction Of skil(ul engineers--their worl
n garnshed with forty.two pieces of artillery, abu
1t dainty supplied with ammunition, garrisoned t
e 1000 regular and 1000 irregular troops, in ado
ID ton 10 some thousand citizens capable of, and
lie doubt actually bearing arms, and aiding in
t. defence-to an opposing force OF half their nun
IT Der, scantily supplied with provisions, and with
IS light train of artilIery-is among the unaccount
ii BILE occurrences of the times.
ct am decidedly opposed to carrying the W
OF beyond Sa,tilio in this direction, which place ha
10 been entirely Abandoned by The Mexican force
e, all Of whom have been concentrated at S;
At Luis Potos; and shall lose no time in TAXI
le possession Of the former as soon as the cessatit
~ Of hostilities referred to expires-which ha'
e- notified the Mexican authorities will be the ca
u. on the 18th inst, by direction Of the Preside
- of the United States.
Ter If we are lin the language of Mr.. Polk q,
Gen. Scot) under the necessity of "conquering
peace" and that, by taking the capital OF L
er country, we must go to Vera Cruz, take tn
de place, and then march on to the city Of Mexic
= To do so in any other direction, consider out
-, the question But, admitting that we conquer
nd peace by doing so-say, at the end OF the ne
re twelve months-will the amount OF blood a
m. treasure which must be expended in doing So
= compensated by the same? | think not; especi
ol " if the country we subdue is to be given L
e, and imagine there are but few individuals in o
Me country who think OF annexing Mexico to
- United States. ..
-, do not intend to carry on my operations
TX previously stately beyond Saltillo-deeming
er next to impracticable to do So 1t then becom
of question as 10 what is best to be done.
seems TO me the most udcious course TO be p
sued on our part would be TO take possession,
IN once, of the line would accept by negotiate
for extending from the Gulf OF Mexico to the Pacii
np and occupy the same, or keep what we alrea
have possession of; and that, with Tamp
VI (which hone to take in the course OF the n,