Portage sentinel. [volume] (Ravenna, Ohio) 1845-1854, 1847-02-24

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But, sif, there we're other difficulties beyond /,
these which presented themselves to the gov
ernme0t. We were comparatively ignorant
of the true state of the country we were a.
bout to enter. We had almost no knowledge
of its interior, its passes, its natural or arts
fetal supplies Of water. its means of trans>
portalion and subsistence, the condition of its
iortresses, and ofmany other important facts,
aud statistical, connected with
the movements ofan invading army. Where
we should first strike, and how we should do
it, were difficult and delicate subjects of en-
quiry. There is in every country line of
eperatrons, along which hostile army easi-
ly move, and where its movements will pro-
duce the greatest effect upon the people who
are invaded, and upon their government. 1t
may be that a strong fortress should be the
object of attack; or the commercial metrop-
oils, the principal place of trade and popula>
ton; or the political capital, the seat of gov>
ernment, and the central point Of influence
ard authority. Now, in Europe, all these
facts are well known. Contiguity of posi-.
tion, continued intercommunicatioD, and ever
renewing wars have revealed the internal
condition Of the countries in that quarter of
tho globe. Each knows it's strong and weak
points, and these are equally known 10 other
powers. Extensive Typographical bureaus
make part Of the military organization of all
the larger States Of Europe.
No reasonable expense IS spared to collect
and deposite in them all the information
which future cxigencies may render neccesa-
ry. Lines Of communication, the direction
and condition of roads, the crossing ofstreams
the passage of mountains, the state of for.
tresses, whether isolated or making part of
the defences otla CITY,, the means of trans.
portation, the extent of supplies, all these OBJ
ljects, so essential to an army in the progress
Of It's operations, are examined and studied;
and the result is ready whenever the time for
action arrives. And, beside this, experi-
ence has shown the most vulnerable points;
where the severest blow can be inflicted, and
where the moral effect Of military disasters
will he most sensibly felt, and most likely to
render campaign decisive. 1t was infor-
nation like this, spread before him, which
enabled Carnot, in his cabinet at Paris, to
mark out with almost mathematical precision
The operation of the French armies, and to
direct plans of INVASION, in which the genius
ofthe great generals Of that day, in combna-
ton. and execution was brought into admira-
Bile co-operailon with the genius of the min
lister who had matured and prescribed them.
There was lamentabe deficiency in
our country Of all this kind of knowledge
respecting the condition of Mexico, at the
time she attacked our forces upon the Rio
Grande; and the government was sudden
ly called upon to direct the operations of
campaign in a region which was almost
ezra incognita. a
: So much for the difficulties. Now for
he results. Let me remark in the first in
stance, sir, that not movement, as un-
ierstand, relating to operations on the
northeast frontier Of Mexico has been di.
ected from the seat of government, which
las not met the appreciation Of the distin-
uished officer who has connected his own
anne with the history of his country by
is victories in the valley of the Rio
1rande. So much is due to himself and to
he administration. His own movements ,
e was free to direct and control. Imme.
lately after the declaration of war, he was
equested to communicate to the govern
lent his views as to what should be the
lture operations on the Rio Grande, and
le movement he proposed to make before
le rainy season. .....
! have applied to the War Department for /,
formation upon This subject; and have been
to look at that part of the correspon. A
snce with Gen. Taylor which relates to past
rents, and has thus became matter of history.
will state its bearing upon the last campaign.
In aletter from the War Department of g
Inc 8, 1916, to Gen. Taylor, tho Secretary S
War, after informing him Of the proposed tt
'gmentation OF his force, and making some a
dlcious suggestions, remarks that, sIn q
king positions, need scarcely observe that h
e means of getting supplies, Transporting
unilions of war, as we'll as the ability to
sp open the channels by which these
pplies and munitions are 10 be furnished,
g points to be well considered" &c. 1.-The
esident is desirous of receiving your views
ID suggestions IN relation to the fall cam, y
igns His determinations is to have the war
osecuted with vigor, and to embrace in the
jects 10 be compassed in that campaign,
ch as will dispose the enemy to desire an
d of the war. Shall the campaign be
nducted with view of striking at the city 6
Mexico, or confined, SO far as regards the
tces under your immediate command to the y
rhern provinces of Mexico? Your views =
this point will doubtless have an important s
luence on the determination of the govern :" !"
mt here. Should an sa my penetrate far W
o the interior Of Mexico, how are supplies al
beobtainedf Can they be, to any consider
le extent, drawn from The enemy's country,
must they be obtained from The United n
atesl These arc very important questions, 4
the answers TO them will have an impor-
1t bearing in settling the plan and objects =
the campaign &c. 4
'Itis important to know YOUR opinion of the Y
cription OF troops best adapted to operations in
interior of Mexice; what portion should be in. :
Try, artillery, cavalry. &c. A peace must be ri
iquered in the shortest space of time practi> j
lie; your views Of the manner Of doing it arc y
uested. II is not doubted thatyou viii push =
ir advantages to the utmost extent il can be II
% withsthe means at your command" u
Son. Taylor, in answer, stated vert clearly the mi
ure ofthe operation which should take place, lam
1.-The difficulties attending them, resulting prin ruI
ally from deficient means of transportation, ria
from want Of bread stuffs. Considering the = =
ancc from Camargoto Mexico, and The nature 4
Tho country, and its want Of resources, he Z
ked upon that line of operations as an -