Jeffersonian Republican. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1840-1853, 1847-12-16
rcoNrrsuEp FROM FIRST pxeE.]

are Other mexican provinces "hi@ ""'S 80"
reduced to our possession bv conquest. 1nese
other Mexican provinces are now goveIneo ny
,ur military and naval commanders under the
general authority which is conferred upon con-
0ueror Inv the laws of war. They should contin-
ne 10 he held as a means of coerclng Mexico to
eccede tn lust terms of peace. Civil as well as
military officers are required to conduct such
government Adequate compensation to be drawn
from contributions levied on the enemy should be
fixed by law for such officers as may be thus EN-
uloyed. What further provision may become
necessary, and what final disposition it may be
proper to make of them, must depend on the fu-
ture progress of the war, and the course mexico
may think proper hereafter to pursue.
With the views entertain, cannot favor the
policy which has been suggested, either to with
draw our army altogether, or to retire TO desig-
mated line, and simply hold and defend 1t. 10
withdraw our army altogether from the conquests
they have made by deeds of unparalleled bravery,
aud at the expense Of so much blood and trea-
sure, in Just war on our part ana one WHICH,
by the act of the enemy we could not honerably
have avoided, would be to degrade the nation in
its own estimation and in that of the world.
To retire to line, and simply hold and defend
il, would not terminate the war. On the contra.
ry, it would encourage Mexico to perseyere, and
tend to protract it indefinitely.
Il
fusing to establish such line as permanent
boundary, when our victorious army are In possess
sion of her capital, and in the heart of her coun-
try, would permit us to hold it without resistance.
That she would continue the war, and IN the
most harrassing and annoying forms, there can
be no doubt A border warfare OF the most saw
age character, extending over long line, would
be increasingly waged. 1t would require large
army to be Kept constantly in the field, stationed
at posts and garrisons along. such line, to pro-
tect and defend it.
The enemy, relieved from the pressure of our
arms on his coasts and in the populous parts of
the Interior would direct his attention to this line,
and, selecting an insulated post for attack,
would concentrate his forces upon it. This would
be condition of affairs which the Mexicans,
pursuing their favorite system of guerilla war
fare, would probably prefer to any other. Were
we to assume defensive attitude on such line,
all the advantages of such state of war would
be on the side of the enemy. We could levy no
contributions upon him, or in any other way make
him feel the pressure of the war, but must remain
inactive and await his approach, being IN constant
uncertainty at what point on the line, or at what
time, he might make an assault.
He may assemble and organize an ovefwhelm-
ing force in the interior, on his own side OF the
line, and, coneealing his purpose, make sudden
any other as to prevent the possibility of timely
succor or reinforcements and lin this way our
gallant army would be exposed to the danger of
being cut off in detail or if by their unequalled
bravery and prowess, every where exhibited du-
ring this war, they should repulse the enenlys
their numbers stationed at one post may be too
small to pursue him.
If the enemy be repul.ed in one attack, he
would have nothing to do but to retreat to his own
side of the line and, being in no fear of pursu-
ing army, may reinforce himself at leisure, for
another attack on the same some other post
He may, too, cross the line between our posts,
make rapid incursons into the country which we
hold, murder the inhabitants, commit depreda:ions
on them, and then retreat to the interior before
sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue him.
Such would probably be the harrassing character
of mere defensive war on our part.
If our forces, when attacked, or threatened
with attack, be permitted to cross the line, drive
back the enemy and conquer him, this would be
again to invade the enemy's conntry after having
lost all the advantages of the conquests we have
already made, by having voluntarily abandoned
them. To hold such line successfully and in
security ii is far from being certain that it would
not require as large an army as would be Heces-
sary to hold all the conquests we have already |
made, and to continue the prosecution of the war
frj from being certain that the expenses of the
war would be diminished by such policy.
/ am persuaded that the best means of vindica-
ting the national honor and interest, and of bring
ing the war to an honorable close, viii be to pros
ecute it with increased energy and power In the
vital parts of the enemy's country.
In my annual message to Congress of Decem-
Der last, declared that the war has not been
wuged with view to conquest but having been
commenced by Mexico, it has been carried into
the enemy's country, and will be vigorously pros
ecuted there, with view to obtain an honorable
peace, and thereby secure ample indemnify for
the expenses of the war, as well as to our much
injured citizens, who hold pecuniary demands
against Mexico" Such, in my judgment, con-
rinues 10 be our true policy-indeed, the only
policy which will secure permanent peace.
1t has never been contemplated by me, as an
object Of the war, to make q permanent conquest
OF the republic of Mexico, or to annihilate her
separate existence as an.independert nation. On
the contrary, it has ever been my desire that she
should maintain her nationality, and, under a
good government adapted to her condition, be
free, independent and prosperous republic. The /
United States were the first among the nations to
recognize her independence, and have ALWAYS de-
sired to be on terms Of amity and good neiehbor-
hood with her. This she would not suffer
BY her own conduct we have been. compelled |.
70 engage in the present war In its prosecnton |