The Democratic pioneer. [volume] (Upper Sandusky, Ohio) 1845-1853, 1847-12-24


thority which is conferred upon a cons
queror by the laws of war. They should
continue to be held as a means of coercng
Mexico to accede to just terms of peace.
quired to conduct such a government
Adequate compensation, TO be drawn from
scontributious levied upon the enemy,
should be fixed by law for such officers as
may be thus employed. What further may
become necessary, aud what inal disposi-
tion il may be proper TO make of them,
must depend on the future progress of the
war, and the, course Mexico, may Thick
proper hereafter pursue.
With the views entertain, cannot
favor the policy which has been suggested,
either to withdraw our army altogether.
or to retire to designated line, aud siu,s
ply bold and defend il. To withdraw our
army altogether from the conquests they
have made, by deeds of unparalleled bra
very, and at the expense of SO muck blood
and treasure, In war just on our part,
and one which, by the act Of the enemy,
we could not honorably have avoided,
would be TO degrade the nation in its own
estimation, and in that Of the world, To
retire to line and simply hold and de-
fend il, would not terminate, the war -
On the contrary, it ould encourage Mex
ico to persevere, and tend 10 protract it
ind definitely.
/ 1t is not to be expected that Mexico,
i,after refusing to establish such q line as
a permanent boundary when our victori-
Gus armies are in possession Of her capitol,
and heart Of her country, would permit us
10 bold il without resistance, That she
would continue il, and that ip the most
harrassing aad anne, ,ipg forms, there Gao
/ be no doubt. A border warfare, of a most
savage character, extending overs a long
line, would be increasingly waged 1t
/ would require large army, to- be kept
continually in tho field, stationed al posts
and garrisons along such line, to protect
aud defend it. The enemy, relleved from
the presence of our armies, on his coasts,
| aud in the populuus parts Of the interior,
would direct, and selecting an isolated
4 post for attack, would concentrate his
4 furces upon it.
T. This would be condition Of atfeirs
which the Mexicans, pursuing their iavor.
lite system of guerrilla warfare, would
probably prefer TO any other. We're we
to assume adefensve ATTITUDE on such a
/ lioe, all tile advantages of such state OF
war, would be on the side of the enemy.
We could levy no contributors upon him,
or in any other way make him feel the
| pressure Of the war; but must remain in-
active, and await his approach, being IN
constant uncertainty at what point Of the
line or at what time he may make the as,
sault, lie may assemble and organize an
overwhelming force in the Interior, or his
own side of the line; and, conceallngs h's
purpose make a sudden assault upon some
one of our posts, so distant from any other
as to prevent the possibility Of timely
succour or reinforcement, and, in this
way, our gallant army would be exposed
ito the danger of being cut. off in detail,
Dor if, by their unrivalled bravery and
/ proves, every where exhibited during
I-this war, they should repel the enemy,
their numbers, stationed at any one point
may be too small to pursue him. i the
enemy be repnlsed in an attack we will
have nothing else to do but retreat.t to his
own side of the line, and, being in nofear
of pursuing enemy, may reinforce hrm-
self al leisure for another attack on the
same, or some other point. He may,too, !,
cross tue line between our posts, make
incursions into the country Witch wehoid, :,
murder the inhabitants thereof, and then
retreat to the interior, before a sufficient
force can be concentrated TO pursue him.
Such would, probably. be the harrassing
character OF a mere defensive war on our
part If our furces, when attacked, or
threatened with attack, be permitted TO
cross the line, drive back the enemy, and
conquer him, this would be again to In,
wade the enemy's country after having
lost all the advantages of the conanests
we have already made, by having voiun
tarily abandoned them. To hold such
line successfully, and in security, His tar
from being certain that ii would not re-
quire as large an army as would be neces-
sary TO hold all the conquests we have al
ready made, aud to continue the prosecu
iion of the war in lie lreartsoi the e nemy 81
country. His alsoafarfrom being certain
that the expenses OF the war would be d.
min ished by such policy.
/ am persuad ed thatthe best means OF
vindioaling The national honor and inter
esis, aud of bringing the warsto an honor
able close. will be to prosecute ii, with |
increased energy aud power, in the vital