Ypsilanti sentinel. [volume] (Ypsilanti, Washtenaw Co., Mich.) 1843-1900, 1847-03-03

| SSJSS1 Vi tillo Wal W ODldlIs lie Wdrs dS L
had already said, had been prosecuted for ii
purpose of obtaining the establishment of
boundary which this Government desired shouI
be formed by this Rio del Norte. This wa
one of its objects. The object, then, was
compel Mexico to acknowledge that to
ours which we could hold without her consent
Twist it and turn it as they pleased,t they coul
make no more of it than this. This vigorou
and offensive war, he repeated, was to compe
Mexico 10 acknowledge that to be ours whic
we could easily hold in spite of all that sh
could do.
Now, CONTINUED Mr.. CO. under this aspec
of the question, put 1t home to the Senate. j
1T worth while to pursue war Of this descrip
ton, an offensive war, even if you assured tina
you could reach the city of Mexico during thi
campaign and dictate such treaty Sir, wha
1t to be the strength of the army which vol
propose to raise in order to accomplish this Dur
pose And what is the amount of money which
will be required to carry on your military op-
erations with that army You propose to raise
upwards of seventy thousand men, and to ex
pend thirty five or forty millions of dollars Nay
we will suppose that you have an effective wal
establishment in the field of but fifty thousand
| troops. Now, what will be the end of the cam
paignt Suppose, bya concurrence of favora-
BILE circumstance, you have effected, the whole
that you contemplated by the employment oil
this force and the expenditure of this money.
what then is the state of the case Why, you
| will have sacrificed in the first place thirty
millions OF dollars to get to the city of Mexico
to dictate this peace: and what the sacrifice of
life will be, may be judged by looking at the
past. One third must be put down as certain
to perish, not by the sword, but by dis
| ease; fifteen thousand lives, then, must
be sacrificed. And l now put this question:
1t Is worth while that these sacrifices should be
made in order to get that which is within YOUR
reach without any sacrifice at all? Sir, put
a higher question, thirty millions of dollars to
beexpended in pushing your war which must
result In obtaining flor us no more than we
have alreadya Is there any man here who
would give for California fifteen millions of mon
ey! We propose to prosecute war at an ex-
pense of thirty millions, which is to produce
this result. Sir, am but touching the shell of
this matter as yet. Is there any certainty that
you will reach the city of Mexico, or if YOU
reach it, is there any certainty that you can
dictate peace there, even if in possession of
the city, These are considerations which
command our attention. They are considers
tons of the utmost magnitude. But there are
others which are not to be overlooked. An
offensive war looks ultimately to subdung the
the country against which it is waged, and ia
king this to be the object of it, we have scarce
ly commenced an offensive war. 1t is true we
have acquired two thirds of the Mexican terri
tory by this war in that part of Mexico that is
adjacent to Us, and let it be remembered further
that this acquisition gives US larger extent of
country than the whole valley of the Mississ-
lppl, and In this immense space we have not
more than five or six thousand inhabitants.
Now we have overrun this adjacent country
to this vast extent, and with this thin popula-
ton hardly man of whom had joined the for
ces oft the enemy, and what has been the result |
OF thus getting possession? Have we conci- |
lated the Mexicans who occupy that vast coun-
trya Not at all. They are more hostile to
us than they were at first, and more ready to |
take advantage of any opportunity to do US in
jury. Can we hold these possessions then with |
out large force Not at all. 1t must re-
quire several thousand of our best troops What |
then have we accomplished 2 We have hard
ly approached the confines of populated Mexico:
we have but entered her Interior Provinces
Mexico proper consists of that remarkable high
land of which the city may be said to occupy
the centre; vast region extending down to the
southern side of the Gulf of California, contain
ing seven millions of population-a population
ten times as numerous as that of the country
which we have captured. Here is the seat of
ler wealth and of her power: of her strength in
iefence, In resistance to our arms. What des-
,rlptlon of country is it 1t is mountainous
is any region in the world. 1t may we'll be com
pared with Atlas in Africa, and with the eau
;asus IN Europe. These mountains are inter-
'ersed with enormous defles, rendering the ap-
'roach of an army work of the utmost difficult
y. This Is the character of the country we
re about to conquer. How are we to overcome {
hese difficulties The plan is first, as | I'M {
erstand it, to take Vera Cruz. Now, what is {
ne description of country in that region The {
ountry about Vera Cruz like the province of {
lucatdn, is hot and sckly region, the home
t the yellow fever for eight months in the a
ear, and, during the months that it is exempt I
'om this scourge, it is subject to the most vo- t
mt storms, which endanger navigation and ?
lake it difficult for ships to land April is J
cry sickly month March not so sickly. We b
re now near the middle of February. We
ay have force enough to take Vera Cruz; but Il
appeal to Senators on all sides, shall we have p
rec enough to march to the city of Mexico Il
If, will not say that we have not, but l will t.
~ this, there is no certainty that we have "
IS altogether contingency. We may not "a
) able to reach the city of Mexico before the I
ckly season commences and, if we do not, all a
lost for this campaign. Mexico will be en- y
'uraged, and we discouraged, before we can tt
medy the disastrous effects of this result oil "
II Intellectual attempts to reach the CITY. Z
But suppose we do reach the city of Mexico, IL
m we dictate peace? Whom have we dealt al
IT'D A people, race above all others re- tn
'wned In history for obstinate resistance when br
salled-a people held out, when their indie W
ndence was refused to be recognised, for ell
'enty years. These are the peopie we have hs
deal with, and is there any certainty that we m
m bring them to consent to propositions for ca
ace, provided we get there Well, if there ha
no certainty, but on the contrary there is h;
cry probability that another campaign will
inevitable, (and it must be so, il either of II
csc contingencies happen,) we must then W
We second campaign. va
NOV, solemn question comes up. Can we io
se the means And we must remember that N
VIII be necessarilya much more costly cam pa
Ign than the first, at great distance from III