The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1847-03-25
GORE PoNDENCE
BETWEEN THE
WAR DEPARTMENT AND GEN. TAYLOR

HEADauARrERs Amy OF OCCUPATION,
Camp noar Monterev Nov, II. l647

Camp near Monterey, Nov. IL, ls47:
Sra The communication of the Secretary Of War, of
McLsne, was received this morning. You will have
seen by my orders and ny despatch Of the 9th, what
to occupy sslto. Being advised by special express
frsm Matamoras of Major McLane's approach, had
S a TO-
that position. for reasons to be explained below shall
march thher to morrow, according to my first inter.
probably be able to inform the department more fully
certain important points connected with our operations
to Warrington, to state briefly my views some Of the
topics embraced in the secretarys communication
hs ousT deem bs occupon Of sao
important for three reasons:-
First Az necessary outpost of the main force at
Monterey, covering as 1t does, tho important dehle
which leads from the low country the table land and
also the route to Monclova
expect considerable supplies Of breadstus and cattle
viz the fertile country around Parra:; and thirdly a.
in political point Of view have already Represented
to the department the difficulties to be encountered in
forward movement upon San Luis and the amount of
force which would be necessary to insure success
Those reasons only apply to the country beyond salo
consider the occupation Of that point as necessary
ing defensive line as the Sierra Madrs and tru, the
department will concur with me in this view.
clova having found no practicable route to Chihushu
the well known but very circuitous by Parras
fully agree with the department that commensurate
benefit likely to result from the march on Chin
Of Gen. wools column and shall accordingly direct him
to suspend his movemsnin that direction. The occupa
ton Of satllo inorce renders still less necessary that
chihuahua should be occupied. cannot yet Determine
specifically what disposition to make of Gen woos
lumn. Meanwhile have directed him to remain in his
present position until further orders
regard TO the expedition against Vera Cruz after
eEprsas my conviction that 1000 men will be- force
quite toe small for the purpose contemplated In my
despatch Of October 18th, stated 2oooo troops. q
make descent In that quarter with the view OF march
ing the capital Inow consider that simply to invest
should have 900 troops Of which 1000 IL possible
Should be regulars II quite probable that smaller
v Castle
OF 8 Juan do Ulds should be reduced by aminai The
country lying between Vera Cruz and the city Of Mexico
to be very loyal Would not force be brought against
before the castle could be reduced cieny strong
corr when 10 these contradictions, we add the uncer.
tainy Of weather during the winter season. rendering
our communications with the feet liable to
think il will be that the force should be large
enough, not only to land and invest the town but also
to hold itself against any attack from the interiors
and Tor such purpos:,,l CONSIDER ioooo men qu"e !"
force Of 900 men cannot DO spared from the occu
vsrtsd from that object and II to those, 5000 fresh
troops from tbs United States sdted at the proper
time, the expedition might be undertaken with promise
preparation for movement fsmp,co, and sfssr
complaining everything that 10 be done In that quarter
which, perhaps 5000 regulars ready TO embark at
point the coast and effect junction with the addi
ional force from the States. The movement towards
Tampico will not produce any delay, II my views
adopted, and consider quite important TO occupy Vic
toria and the lower portion Of Tamaupas after securing
properly the line to be held in this quarter.
conceive 1t all important, HAVING in view the Mex.
character that little should be loft TO accident as
possible, and that should DO careful, far human
foresight provide. to avoid the smallest liability to
disaster descent upon hostile coast notorously dan
Eerous and In nclement OF the year, IL an ope
ration requiring the most careful preparations and exact
circumstances, more less elements Of failure. II
seems the part Of prudence, therefore, to take sufficient
force to meet any contingency that may arise.
Being pressed for time have given my views brio
and perhaps somewhat crudey, the most important
points presented In the despatch Of the Secretary There
but which mast be now passed over would only sug
geN hst IN the event Of an expedition 70 ve Cruz, the
direct hon " SsfSk 7ts sAlkiSnal 6srSe itsnsihs