The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1847-03-20

dered to proceed to the Rio Grande, and report TO the
commander of the expedition.
have the honor TO be- very respectfully your ODE
dent servant, VIM l. MARCY,
Secretary of War.
Major Gen. z. TAYLOR, commanding United States army
in Mexico
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATIONS
Camp near Monterey, Oct. IL, 1916.
SIR: have the honor to acknowledge the commune
cation OF the Secretary OF War; with enclosures, dated
the 22d ultimo also one from your office of September
2l relative to the designations of volunteer officers, and
General Orders No A. all of which were delivered by
Lieut. Armstead on the 10th instant
1t will be seen at once that under the terms of the capt.
ulaton of Monterey, cannot detach force south of
line from Lnares to San Fernando and cannot there
fore, even were there no other obstacles, comply at
present with the instructions OF the Secretary.
doubt that receiving the intelligence OF the capture Of
Monterey modified instructions were issued by the de-
partment
SHALL with little delay as possible reply at length
to the Secretarys communication and present my views
IN ertenso all topics connected with the campaign.
am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant
Major General U. S. army, commanding
The ADJuTANT GENERAL of the army, Washington ID. c.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OccupAr1oN
Camp near Monterey, Oct Is, 1916
SIR: In my acknowledgement, dated the 10th instant
Of the instructions OF the Secretary Of War OF Septem-
Der 22d briefly stated that the detachment to Tampco
could not be made without contravening the convention
of Monterey. Other reasons and more detailed views on
this point, and the general question Of the campaign,
left to subsequent communication, which have now
the honor submit for the information Of the general
chief and Secretary of War. Such point has been
reached in the conduct of the and the progress OF
arms as to make il proper to place my impressions and
convictions very fully before the government
wish 70 remark, first Of all, that have considered
Brigadier General Wool though formally under my Or
ders yet charged by the government with distinct
operation, with which was not at liberty to interfere
Though greatly in doubt as to the paccability of hts
reaching Chihuahua with artillery and deeming the inn
nT he a
mensurae with its difficulty and expense have accord
ingly refraned from controlling his movements IN any
way His force, therefore, forms no element IN my cal
culatons, particularly it is now or soon will be, en-
tirey beyond my reach. .ftltag sztc1 1852
The Mexican army under General Ampudia has left
Saltillo and fallen back on San Luis Potosiihe last
detachment as understand being under orders march
to-day. General Santa Anna reached San Luis on the
sth instant, and is engaged in concentrating and organ
iZing the army at that point Whether the withdrawal
of the forces San Luis be intended to draw into the
country far from supplies and support or whether be
political movement, connected with Santa Anna return
to power it impossible to says it is sufficient Tor my
present argument to know that heavy force is assem-
bling in front Sallo, the capital OF Coahuila, is
virtually in possession and can be occupied if neces-
sary the moment the convention is at an end The oc
cupation of Salo will lenghen line rs miles, but,
the other hand may enable to draw at least por
toa of our breadstuds from the country. San Luis is
about 300 miles from Satllo, perhaps more.
San Luis is a city of 10000 inhabitants, in
country abundant in resources, and at great distance
from the heart of the republic whence munitions of war
time nearly 600 miles from the Rio Grande, which must
continue to be the base OF our operations at least until
reach San Luis.
In view OF the above facts hazard nothing in saying
that column, to San Luis from Sato. should,
to insure success be at least 10000 strong OF which
10000 should be regular troops After much reflection,
consider the above Ms the smallest number OF eectire
troops that could be employed this service without in
curing the hazard of disaster and perhaps defeat There
would be required, besides to keep open long line,
project the depos and secure the country already gam
ed a force of 5000 men-this, without including the
force necessary send to Tampco to take hold that
place.
bered that important results have been gained with
much smaller force But we have hitherto operated
our own base and the Mexcans at great distance from
theirs Sato may be considered about equdisant from
the Rio Grande and San Luis. Every days march be-
yond it engthens our already long line and curta,is
theirs-weakens and gives them strength Hence the
movement should not be undertaken except with force
SO large TO render success certain.
In the above calculation have supposed the Mexcans
able to concentrate San Luis force of 900 TO $4,000
men With toerable stability in the government doubt
not their ability do this and is not safe to
any less number a basis.
The force of twelve months volunteers has suffered
greatly from disease Many have died. and great nam
Der have been discharged for disability. So much has
their effective strength been reduced by this cause and
present sickness, that the absence of official returns
am satisfied that 500 per regiment would be large
average of e6ectiecs among the volunteers This would
give, including the cavalry, force little short of 1900
men, adding 4O)O regulars, Jour present strength Is
not 10000 total force OF 1900 Leaving the very
moderate number OF 5000 to rear, should
not be able TO march from Salllo with present and ex-
peced means, at the head of than 10000 slena
number which, from considerations above stated deem
to be entirely inadequate u
And now come TO the point presented the Secreta.
rvs letter; simultaneous movement on San LUIS ana
lampico is there suggested but IT Will readily be seen
that with only half the force which consider necessary
to march on one point is quite Impossible 10 march on