Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1847-01-05
f'O@ the M Pssyuse. Des "a
TIN WAR.
The Last Campssgn--Future Opera

an meAeo u iroG the pen o. gentleman who ia every
men soldier Its temper is and It's rea
soning is deserving of tho most sc,,oo snntJar,,n
whatever oFin'ons may be rrUec,ng the con-
ens'ons 10 which the writer has arrived .il he eonee
ded that he serutnzes the past with military pr
diets the future with tho bOldness OF mind eonsced Of
the accuracy OF its deductions.
In regard to the advance Of Gen Wool upon Chihuabp,
the views the writer accordance with opinions we
hes time aud again expressed. The useessncss OF i'm
W. L'E OF that expedition became apparent Gen.
- he abandoned 1t without accomplishing
Sys; no eo.'N-aaenees OF this military mistake are
",. Sy ", Tdont. Whether all the results
eonended Tor would have beon attained had m, doo.
ton suggested by him been made OF Cen woors ,,,, l.
IN some measure matter of speculation nut no yiyes GOOD
reasons Tor his opinions, whilst the failure Of Cen Wool 10
achieve the objects contemplated in tho formaon Of ,h,,
| army shows that its destination was a military rnor
Hs very pooaole aat the opionions OF coresPon-
dent as TO the tuute begin 10 prevail in high
His views to what should be done are given with tbs,
same dsnetnesS his upon what has already
ransPued IL IS TO be hoped that the Government wI
not be deferred, by fear OF cost from putny The next
campaign upon the most ample basis in regard 10 all the
appointments necessary to Its efficiency Whatever lie
qaircd in this behalf will be conceded by and the
couniry with aacity The earping OF those who count
tho cost ony" in considering military events should
DC heeded, as they would make same ado n the
cost fifty cents fifty millions. In nothing is il so true
as ~ miay operations, that ParsimOuy the kind
| OF exravagancc.
TO the su5oned letter. which deserves the more considera
ton as rs hm and &C ldio in without particle Of
tue complaining Siabity which often mpar, to wri-
lungs upon THIS SUBJECT the character of fault finding
lures against the Government.
! MONTEREY, Mexico, Dec. O. 1916.
In writing OF the operation. of the canpa,p bey tb,,
may not DC elassed among the "scrbbers from tho Ar
my, who write only trumpet their own fame and
that OF their ccTps-doing justice none injustice ma
nyand binding the people the operations Army
Such letters read with deep regret for they are dspar
aging 10 the reputation and good OF the American
sod'ery. suppose the people and indeed ought
be, satisfied with the achievements the Army We have
accomplished great deal under many difficulties and
mels, and having done much claim the priyi-
| lcge OF pointing those difficulties and uammcs Of
| showing why they should have nd
proving that had the existed should be much
ther advanced in attaining obJectan advantageous
| peace.
The Fundamental principle in operate with
superior forces, combined movement decis Tont"
sad no plan OF campaign be promptly successful
less framed this principle, particularly where the
Intention TO act enuroy the offensive. Unfortunately
for our Government his principle did ele
meni IN the present plan OF compsgn, aud all operations
growing out of it necessarily directly opposed TO it
Had we met eneTpr sing enemy, this defect the pre-
scat PLAZA of campaign would have been rendered much
more apparent, and its failure much signal by defect
in detail. Suppose Gen. Wool, with his force and
nous supply OF transportation and subsistence had been
concentrated Gen Taylor, would tie latter have march,
ed On Monterey with only 5000 no; having than
enough trunspor carry subsistence for that number
and having t. leave behind him his battery train ih-i
account Gen. Taylor had sufficient
with depot Cerrayo ms rear, II transport
with his army OF 5000 supply subsst it longer
than days after the 2ih he day Of the cspiulaton
and had durng the engagement 10 despatch his
10 CerraNO. Had Tins concentration been effected Gen.
Taylor would have hsd with hs before Monterey one
months supplies, when lie could have enforced
diuonal surrender OF 'e town and forces, or followed on
their in and eventually have captured or
sacred Ampuda's entire army
Had the Chihuahua expedition been planned and had
the force sppes of that army been promptly
t.scd Gen. Taylor, would have been before Mon
eight weeks when might have been taken
without firing gun. And why this Chihuahua e1pe-
don portion Of the plan OF clmpaign1 Was not rea-
s0nabe suppose that after victories before Maamn-
would occupy and hold, strategic points,
Monterey ana Sauo covering the strongest IN the
Sierra Madrc and having San Luis Poosi Of ope-
raous1 San Luis should then have been, the plan OF
campaign The Oecre point aud all Of our energies sbop
have been eNerted this line. A turns out Gen. Kear
ncy takes New Mexico without firing gum chihuahua is
taken by small detachment from his command wiihou,
firing gun, and after the battle Of Monterey Gen. Wool
arrives Moneoya, and reports his advance chihuahua
as useless, whilst our enemy, whipped Monterey, aban-
uos Sauna ana concentrates at San LUIS which he
could have done had Gen Woos army been promptly uni
ted with Gen. Taylors Owing this error in the plan OF
campaign cur enemy not only gained time oriify and
hghi al Monterey, but natural consequence from it, he
gained time again concentrate at San Luis With
the combined material OF the armies the objective point
san LUIS might have been gained and by decisive ac-
ton with Ampuda's forces alone, that point the cam
paign might have been ended, and probably the war
These some OF the difficulties under which we have Ia
bored, and but for which Army could have done much
more Tor the county by these Gen Taylor has tram
meled IN his operations and has had opportunity 10
display to the world what he could have DONE had the plan
Of campaign been framed military principles
But Jet look little further into the difficulties growing
OUT Of ard caused by the plan Of campaign What
me fea'e position Of and the enemy's forces Ct
. |
o. san Luis $1,000 ods central position which
with his force cannot be approached from Tho drec
even by superior forces owing TO the scarcy of water
"h'h on afge portion Of the route held IN tanks and
entirely the disposal Of tue enemy He holds himself
nWnei1le al ihai point, rely the strength OF Vera
Cruz TO resist attack, which taken before we can
approach him By gaininR hs
The number Of Taylor's army is very far overra
ted even by the Union, which seems estimate il at the
actual volunteer force into the field and the regular
force prescribed b. law without any allowance for he
dimnuion OF hs force rom casualties and sckeess which
has i7r exceeded what might have been reasonably ant-
Paicd under tue most unisv7 rable circumstances. What
be thought OF the strength ou force in Mexico
at this date. assert and without fear Of contradiction hat
not more than fourteen thousand rScfirs men coud ne
army IN the field. Now what disposition OF this inferior
force necessarily results from the plan OF the campaign
san Luis cannot be approached from this direction and
70 se' a. our enemy we must approach him another
line But the al-imporlant passes the Sierra Madre
must be held, TO prevent enemy from gaining our
rear ana our orces although inferior TO the enemy in
numte are necessarily scattered, whilst Santa ana can
operate en- masse on any point Thus end ourselves
compelled opeTa:e multiple lines on an extended
front, with an inferior force, whilst enemy holds sin
gle ne Operations and interior one. This immense
advantage 70 the enemy results entirely from the deec
tive plans Of campaign and the only remedy is to form
new one by which al increased force Of 10000 must
b. concentrated decisive point. Vera Cruz and
san Juan de Ua must be taken; then, and not all then
will Mexican generals and soldiers begin think that their
arms are not nynciblo and l then will the No .ean
people mistust the proves their army The fall Of We
"a Cruz and san Juan dc Ulua be strong -men
TO cause them to Tor peace but confidently believe
that will the have advance and fight the eno-
my whatever point he msy selsci The MeEcans have
idea o. nas.1R petce,ven tho private families Ia this
town leach their children hate Americans and TO lisp
tho OF Sana AIMS the Of heir country
who u IN Whip the Americans Whenever he meets hem
Is absurd 10 think Of poaoo uness our Government III
tke prompt nnd efficient strike some decisive
bow Dur mus, be increased the necsssa-y subo-
anaon u military operations the measure oi Supplies
must 90 bette. considered and tho plans campaign must
be in sire' accordance With military science Then viii
our general IN the field show the that he is not the
man TO win b'ius aud lcrc its advantages.
Yours truly,
, FEog It's PLAWs-Au Express tram arrived al licking
tor, from tho company Of BuIurd, HpOko & Co. traders
o. santa Re, who .Bt Leave lndepend nee this
sc1son They had crossed the ansas and we're camped
Tor tho night south Of the sand hills Toe Semrone when
I u.oU f Llar