Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1841-1853, 1847-07-08

peillng The attacks Of the federal party upon fe n1
mnsssation, especially that Of the Atlas. that large
portion of the troops composing the army Of theRio
Grande was intenti9hay withdrtvn. N order thar the
rest might be sacrificed to the power and popelariy
Of the Mexican lfaaer, We shall cofneourseses to n
brief detail ST fsct& they are presented in official
documents, preserving. as far as Practicable, the
chronological order, of cycnle
On the 9Th of June. 1876. the Secretly of War
called upon Gen. Taylor for his views in relation to-
The further prosecution of the war; The question is
put to him, "Shall the campaign be conducted with
tho view Of striking at the city of Mexico or confn
ed, far us regards the force under s6ur command
to the Northern PROVINCES of Mexicol" fhis dis
patch Gen. Taylor answered frem b1atamorss, on
the I'd of July and after assigning numerous rea-
sonsin support Of the conclusion to which he has ar
rived. says:
this northern frontier should not look the city OF Mex
leo, but should be confined to cutting of The northern
PROVINCES"
Under date of July 9th. the secretary Of War
writes as follows
No reply has yet been received 10 the inqnirles con-
tanned my letter addressed you The Sh If June
last From your superior opportunities Of acquiring
rect information Of the country 10 be invaded and The
facilities difficulties of conducting successful cam
pasn through it, much reliance will be placed your
opinions IL, from all the information which ron may
communicate 10 the department, well as thai derived
from other Sources should appear that the difficulties
Rio Gande the present base of your operations for
considerable distance into the inerios Mexico will be
very great, the department will consider whether the
main invasion should ultimately take place from
other point the coasi-say Tampico, or some other
point in the vicinity of Vera Cruz. This suggestion
made with view to call your 10 il, and OBJ
tain IRON you such information you may be able to
impart. Should be deternise that the main army
should invade Mexico at other point than the Rio
Gnndc-say the vicinity of Vera Cruz-a large and SUI.
cent number of transport vessels could be placed the
mouth of the Rio Graude by the time the healthy
son sets in-say early in November. The main army, ,
with all its munitions could be transported, leaving
sufficient force behind to hold and occupy the Rio
Grande, aud all the and provinces which you may
have conquered before that time. In the meantime the
department confidently relies you TO press forward
operations vigorously 10 the extent of your
so as to occupy the important points within your reach
on the Rio Grande, and the interior. Ii presumed
that Monterey, chihuahua, and other places in your d.
reclion, Will be taken and held.
To this Gen. Taylor responds on the LIST Of Au-
gust and after referring to his dispatches of the ID
July, presenting his views touching operations up
on the Rio GraDde, he says
"Whether a large force can be subssted beyond Mon
terey must be determined by actual experiment. ard will
depend much upon the disposition of the inhabitants
wards us. IL column (say 1000 men,) be
tanned in provisions Saltillo may advance thence
upon San Luis Potosi, and doubt would speedily
bring proposals for peace. If the other hand, col
be sustained beyond Monterey h will be foi
the government TO determine from considerations Of State
whether simple occupation of the frontier departments
Gncludlng chihuahua and New Mexco,) or IN addition
such occupation expedition against The capital (by
way of Vera CRUZ be most expedcnt. cannot give
positive opinion TO the practlcablity Of expedition
against Vera Cruz the of force that would
badly be required for it, The Department of War must
be much better informed than am that point From
the mpractcable character of the routes from Tanpco
particularly that leading TO Mexico, should judge
pedIon against The capital from that point 10 be out or
the question:
He also speaks of the great difficulty of embarking
the troops at Brazos Santiago, and expresses strong
doubts to the safety Of taking the volunteers upon
this service.
We thus literally extract from these documents Of
an early date in order to show that Gen. Taylor was
only advised of the views of the government but
that his counses were sought the line of pclcy
best adapted to vigorous and successful prosecution
of the war; After the receipt of his dispatch of 1st
August, and following the line Of policy it indicated,
it resolved to change the base of military opera
lions to the Gulf and the Secretary informed Gen.
TAYLOR, under date of September ID, in dispatch
which was intercepted by the enemy, and duplicate
afterwards supplied. In that letter Mr.. Marcy OBJ
that 81" is not intended to weaken the force of
your advancing column, by any movements on the
coast"
Under date of the 22d of September, the Secretary
further informs Gen. Taylor ''that it is proposed to
take possessionof the department of Tamaulipcs or
of the principal places in IT, at the earliest pos
sibe PERIOD" He again repeats sit is not proposed
to withdraw any of that force nth you in your
adrdnce 10 The interior, to divert any of the REIN
forcemens that you may need 10 carry your oper-
atoms an that quarter. If column should advance
beyond that ihe lower Rio Grande) into the in
terror of Tamaulipas, part of the troops now on
that line might, it is presumed. be safely withdrawn
to augment the invading column. IL Is not holrerer,
intended 10 Uedken The force that line any farther
than ii can, in your opinion. be safely DONE"
Il will be observed that throughout all this
pondence, the Department cOntemplates a continuance
of Gen. Taylor upon the line of operations based up
on the Rio Grande and that those TO be commenced
upon the Gulf were be placed under the charge of
other officers. In this last dispatch the movement
upon Tamaulipas is committed to Major General Pat
terson, and a copy of the dispatch is forwarded d-
rectly to him. with instructions proceed at In
his arrangements, in order to save time.
The response of Gen. Taylor under date of Octo-
Der 18th, contains the first open manifestation of dis
satisfaction, his part, with the plans of the War
Department. He rests this upon the designation Of
Gen. Patterson for the movement upon Tamaulipas,
and the correspondence of the Secretary direct with
that officer, which he claims is breach of military
etiquette and q mark of dsrespect to himself II is
in this dispatch, and probably because of the change
of the base of operations from the Rio Grande TO the
Gulf and the assignment of others to active COM
mands, that Gen. Taylor recommends the adoption Of
defensive line-say the Rio Grande -or the Sierra
Madre, including Chihuahua and Santa Fe,-and
military occupation of the conquered territory be
ing the line of policy with regard to the
that was afterwards brought forward and insisted up
on by Mr. Calhoun in the Senate. In the event that
this line Of policy not adopted and the government
instead should determine 10 "sirlke decisive blow
at Mexico" Gen. Taylor Is Of the opinion that the
army should be landed Vera Cruz, and that $4,000
men are necessary for that service Of whom 10000
should be regular troops
The SUBSEQUENT capture of 1ampico by the squad