Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-09


iect is to show, not that the Court ought to
lay down any ncic rules, but that they should
carry out those already established, and ac-
cording TO these, he thinks that Court is
bound 10 declare Slavery illegal even within
the several States.
Bearing this in mind let us see what these
rules are, for, OF course, the question is not
to be decided by looking alone at that one
rule of the Court, which Mr.. Spooner has
quoted, and made the cornerstone Of his ar
gument. 10 judge fairly it is necessary to
look over the whole ground. Let us, then,
open the records of the Supreme Court
We shall find that following the example OF
all other Courts, the dictates of good sense,
and of all the authorities, it has Uniformly al
lowed the greatest weight 10 the contempora-
neous Interpretation Of the Constitution, to
the understanding of the nation when it has
been universal according 10 the oft-repeated
maxim OF Lord Coke, " ~CyHtsmp1rdneG erp0-
siiO est Qptima ct Jortissina in iege." Co
temporaneous exposition is Of great weight
and authority in the law.) The reason OF
this rule is very evident. Where the words
of a statute are plain and clear, and admit Of
bat one meaning, there is, Of course, no room
for Interpretation; they speak for themselves.
Where they Will equally well admit Of two
meanings, our object must be to ascertain
which of these the makers intended they
should bear. This is to be discovered by
considering the conteXt-the design Of the
law--lhe situation of the country al
the time. its institutions and circumsian-
ces. l Blacks 50, 60. Ii we can dis.
cover which of the two constructions was
supposed 10 be the true one at the time,
and which has been used and prac-
tised upon from the very making of the law,
this will 90 far TO show which the makers
intended should be affixed to il. Contempt.
raneous practice is one of the most c%onvinc.
ing commentaries on the language of statutes,
No doubt as Marshall, quoted by Spooner
says, we are to discover the intentions of the
lawmdker from the words he uses; but words
when doubtful and ambiguous, are TO be in
t~erpreted by the context, by the object sought
and by contemporaneous usage. The reaGe
may consult on this point Story Comm. vol
/, c. V. Blackstone-R northumberland
c. J. Tindal 8. Scott, 1897. Justice Cole
ridge 6 A. & f.. I. Cokes Inst. .. IL.
No work is ollener quoted by the Suprem,
Court than the "Federalist," as showing III
sense in which the Constitution was adopt
ed in tho words Of Chief Justice Marshall
"Great weight has always been attached
and very rightly attached to contemporary
Gus construction. The opinion of the Fec
e%ralist has always been considered as Of grei
authority. &c, &c. A contemporaneous e!
/, position certainly of not less authority tina
that Just cited is the Judiciary Act"
Wheaton l, 30l, the Court aIiudes at lengt
TO the weight Of eXtemporaneous expos
ton by all parties, the acqaiescence Of Stat
Courts" &c.
0. Wheaton, l.. Chief Justice Marsha
says, speaking Of one Of the powers of Coz
gress:
"lf, as our whole course of Legislation o
this subject shows, the power of Congress
has been universally understood in Americ
to comprehend navigation, 1t is a very pc
s%uasive, if not conclusive argument to prov
that the construction is correct"
Contemporary practice is to be consul
ed" says Rutherforth, a Scottish writer, a
t WAYS quoted with difference on this subjec
:. that which prevailed among the peopI
when the law was made and Immediately a
ter 1.-THE one as showing why it was mad
the other how it was understood by thos
VINO had the best means OF knowing its medl
ing"
To the same effect he is quoted and aprro
ed by Story Comm. l, p. $50.
III Allp " sNtNNNCS oiA 'SN'
laws it is necessary to refer to the histol
E and situation of the country 10 ascertain Il
reason as well as the meaning of their pr
o visions, 10 enable the Court to apply the dl
a fercnt rules for constituting them. l Uhe
ton, ll5.
"In doubtful cases usage may be safely
Cured to, 10 ascertain the meaning OF /
Lerislature."-2 OUertOn, llS.
AS the old legal maxim tells us: "OP
mus iegum interpres conSuetudO." usage
the best Interpreter of !aws.)
The meaning of things spoken and WI
ten must be as hath been constantly used
b -YGugh, l69.
Great regard ought, in constituting a ST
ute, to be paid TO the construction which I
J, sares of the law, who lived about the iii
NJ or soon after it was made, put upon it,
n cause they were best able to judge Of the
%tention of the m~akers.-Loke, cited By Dc,
er riS, ,. G93.
Ie ain constituting a statute the Court "
ls4 look to the public history of the times-w
gather the Intention from the language
1t that is ambiguous, from other laws on
ie same subject, and il necessary refer to
h. history of the period."-Supreme Court
as Sd HOl0ard, "a.
10 Again, we are told by the Fcderalist,
oil the doctrine is confirmed by Judge Story
III Comm. 453, that:
precise legal maxims are inappIica6Ie
70 A Constitution of Government. In relat
a to such a subject the natural and obvi!t
-. sense of its provisions apart from technI
y rules, is the true criterion of It's constr
ii ton"
The same rule is laid down by g..
Of Tilrhman in 8, Sergeant 81 ltaule G9. '
III all know very well that the Constitution
nd peculiar MISUNDERSTANDING wholly a ST
lrt ute nor wholly a contract, hui PatlakihS,
81 the nature of both. The rules applicaI
then to contracts, as distinct from laws, ha
is a place here and the first Of those named
as Blackstone is "VerJa intentioni dedent
10 s~erpiri." (Words must effect the intent
" of the parties.'')
he Mex, in Importance comes Paley's rule
le :" Promises are to be performed in that sci