The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1847-12-18


must depend on the future progress OF the wnr ,ant
the course Mexico may think proper hereafter Il
pursue.
With the views I entertain, I cannot favor III,
policy which has been suggested, either to with
draw our army altogether, or to retire to a desig
mated line, and simply hold and defend it. To
withdraw our army altogether from the conquest
they have made, by deeds of unparalleled bravery
and at the expense of so much blood and treasure,
IN a war just on our part, and one which, by the
act OF the enemy, we could not honorably have a.
voided, would be to degrade the nation in its own
estimation, and in that OF the world. To retire 10
a line, and simply hold and defend it, would not
terminate the war. On the contrary, it would ell.
courage Mexico to persevere, and tend to protract
it indefinitely.
1t is not to be expected that Mexico, after refus.
ing TO establish such a line as a permanent boun.
Diary when our victorious armies are in possession
of her capital, and heart ofher country would per-
nit US to hold it without resistance. That she
would continue il, and that in thelmost harrassing
and annoying forms, there can be no doubt. A
border warfare of a most savage character extend
ing over a long line, would be Increasingly waged.
1t would require a large army, to be kept continu.
ally in the field, stationed at posts and garrisons
along such a line, 10 protect and defend it. The
enemy, relieved from the presence Of our armies,
on his coasts, and in the ~populous parts of the in
| kGlio WYNN ~ hS>hy u'N 80 sSNsetN H'sh
for attack, would concentrate his forces upon it.
This would be a condition of affairs which the
Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system of guer-
lila warefare, would probably prefer to any other.
Were we to assume a defensive attitude on such a
line, all the advantages of such q state OF war, would
be on tho side of the enemy. We could levy no
contributions upon him, or in any other way make
him feel the pressure of the war; but must remain
inactive, and await his approach, being in constant
| ,o n ,,hat pntnt IF fl,o linz nr az xphaf
time he may make the assault. He may assemble
and organize an overwhelming force in the Interi-
or, or his own side Of the line; and. conceallng his
purpose, make a sudden assault upon some one of
our posts, so distant from any other as to prevent
the possibility OF timely succor or reinforcement,
and, in this way, our gallant army would be ex-
posed TO the danger of being cut off in detail, or il,
by their unrivalled bravery and prowess, every
| where exhibited during this war. they should re-
pei the enemy, their numbers, stationed at any one
point, may be too small to pursue him. If the en-
envy be repulsed in an attack, he will have nothing
else to do but TO retreat to his own side of the line,
and, being IN no fear of a pursuing enemy, may
reinforce himself at leisure for another attack on
the same, OF some other point. He may, too,
cross the line between our posts, make incursions
into the country which we hold, murder the in.
habitants thereof, and then retreat to the interior,
before a sufficient force can be concentrated to
pursue him.. Such would. probably, be the har-
RAISING character of a mere defensive wal on our
part. If our forces, when attacked, or threatened,
v ith attack, be permitted to cross the line, drive
back the enemy, and conquer him, this would be
again to invade the enemy's country, after having
lost all the advantages of the conquests we have
already made, by having voluntarily abandoned
them. To hold such line successfully. and in Sc
curity it is far from being certain that it would not
require IS large an army as would be necessary to
hold all the conquests we have already made, and
10 continue the prosecution Of the war in the heart
of the enemy's country. 1t is also far from being
certain that the expenses of the war would be di.
minished by such a policy.
am persuaded that the best means of vindica-
ting the nationul honor and interests. and ofbring-
ing the war TO an honorable close, will be to pros.
ecute it, with increased energy and power, IN the
vital part OF the enemy's country. In my annual
message 10 CongressI declared, that the war had
not been waged with a view to conquest; but hav-
ing been commenced by Mexico, it has been car
ried into the enemy's country, and will be vigor-
ously prosecuted there, with a view to obtain an
honorable peace and thereby secure ample indem.
nifty for the expense of the war, as well as to our
much injured citizens, who hold a large pecuniary
demand against Mexico. Such in my judgment,
continues to he our true policy - indeed the only |
policy which will probably secure a permanent
peace.
1t has never been contemplated by me, as an OBJ.
OF the war, to make a permanent conquest OF
the Republic of Mexico; or to annihilate her sepa-
existance as an Independent nation. On the
contrary, ii has ever been my desire that she
maintain her nationality; and under a
good government, adapted to her condition, be a
prosperous and free Republic. The United States
we've the first, among the nations, to recognize
her Independence; and has always desired to be
on terms ofamity and good neighborhood wi,hher.
This she would not suffer. By her own coduct we
have been compelled TO engage in the present war;
add in IFS prosecution we seek only 10 obtain re-
dress for the wrongs she has done Us, and indem-
nifty for our just demands agains her. We demand
an honorable peace;-and that peace must bring
it indemnity for the past, and security for the
Hitherto Mexico has refused ccommo-
by which such a peace could be obtained.
Whilst our armies have advanced from victory
o victory, from the commencement of the war, ii
las always been with the olive branch OF peace in
heir hand; and it has been in the power Of Next
20, at every step to arrest hostilities by accepting
One great objection to the o%btainment Of peace
las undoubtedly arisen from the fact that Mexico
las been SO long held IN subsection by one faction
Il military usurp ers after another; and such has |
'een the condition of insecurity in which their sue
essive governments have been placed, that each
las been deter ed from making peace, lest from
hat very cause, a rival faction might expel itf rum
Such was the fate of President Herrera's ad-
in lS45, for being disposed even to
isten to the overtures of the United States, to 7
revent the war; as is fully confirmed by an Off
ial correspondence which took place in the month
f August last, between him and his government.
"a copy Of which is herewith communicated c
'or this cause alone, a revolution which displaced I
i'm from power, was set on foot by General Pare /
es. Such may be the condition of insecurity of !
he present government. I
There can be no doubt that the peaceable and 7
yell disposed inhabitants of Mexico are convinced !
hat it is the true interest Of their country to con- /
lude an honorable peace with the United States; {
ut the apprehension OF becoming the victims of
military faction or usurper, may have pre- i
ented them from manifesting their feelings by $
ny public act. 70
The removal of any such approximations would .
cause them TO speak their sentiments, and
!, adopt the means necessary for the restoration Of '
GAGE With n neonle disAarted and divided bv