Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1847-02-05

stead of the idle groups of ragged leperos hang
ing about, and the general stagnation and in
activity which prevailed, now all is hustle and
life PuffS OF steam are heard instead of the
trumpet, the shrill whistle of the hardy team
ster instead of the fife, and every thing denotes
q new and better order Of things
HsAD QUARTERS Army OF OCCUPATION o. INvAsroN,1
Monterey, Mexico. Nov ., 1876
My dear ''*""".:
Your very kind and acceptable letter of the
3lst of August, =" - = reached me on
" short time since, for which beg leave to
tender you my sincere thanks. [ A few con-
fdential remarks on certain public transactions
are here omitted.l
After considerable apparent delay on the
part of the Or Masters Department, in getting
steam boats into the Rio Grande adapted to its
navigation, succeeded, towards the latter
part of August, in throwing forward to Ca
MARCO, "a town situated on the San Juan Riv-
CT, three miles from its junction with the Rio
Grande, on the west side, nearly 500 miles
from BrazOs Island by water, and 200 by land,
and 140 from this place. a considerable depot
OF provisions, ordnance, ammunition and for
age, and then, having brought together an i'm
portant portion of my command, determined
on moving on this place. Accordingly, after
dants and conductors, in the enemys country,
(the principal means of transportation for our
provisions, baggage, &C., | left, on the 5th
of September, to join my advance, which had
preceded me a few days to Seralvo, small
village IS miles on the route, which did on
the 9Th, and, after waiting there a few days
for some OF the corps to get up, moved on and
reached here on the 10Th, with $3.50 men
27O0 regulars, the balance volunteers. For
what took place afterwards, must refer you
TO my several cpOrtS-particularly to my de-
tailed one OF the 9th ult. lido not believe the
authorities at Washington are at all satisfied
with my conduct in regard TO the terms of the
capitulation entered into with the Mexican
commander, which you no doubt have seem
as they have been made public through the Off
Cial organ, & copied into various other newspa-
pers | have this moment received an answer
Ito my despatch announcing the surrender of
Monterey, and the circumstances attending the
same,) fro the Secretary CT War, stating that
:" it was regretted by the President that it was
not deemed advisable to insist on the terms
had proposed in my first communication to the
Mexican commander, in regard to giving up
the city"-adding that :" the circumstances
which dictated, no doubt justified the change :"
Although the terms of captulation may be
considered too liberal on our part by the Pre-
Sldent and his advisers, as we'll as by many
others at distance, particularly by those who
do not understand the position which we oc-
cupied, otherwise they might come to a differ
ent conclusion in regard to the matter,) yet on
due reflection, see nothing to induce me to
regret the course pursued. The proposition
on the part of Gen. Ampudia, which had much
to do in determining my course in the matter,
was based on the ground that our government
had proposed to his to settle the existing diff
culties by negotiation, (Which | knew was the
case, without knowing the result,) which was
then under consideration by the proper author
tiles, & which he Gen. Ampudia,) had no doubt
would result favorably, as the whole of his
people were in favor OF peace. If SO | con-
sidered the effusion of blood not only unneces-
sary, but improper. Their force was also
considerably larger than ours and from the
size and position of the place, we could not
completely invest it so that the greater por-
ton of their troops, if not the whole, had they
been disposed to do so, could, any night have
abandoned the city, at once, entered the noun
tain passes, and effected their retreat, do
what we would Had we been put to the
alternative of taking the place by storm
(Which there is no doubt we should have sue
ceeded in doing,) we should in all probability
have lost fifty or hundred men in killed, be.
sides the wounded, which wished to avoid
as there appeared to be prospect of peace
even If distant one. | also wished to avoid
the destruction of women and children, which
must have been very great, had the stOrmlng
process been resorted to. Besides, they hac
a very large and strong fertilization, a shor
distance from the city, which if carried with
the bayonet, must have been taken at grea
sacrifice of life; and, with our limited train o
heavy or battery artillery, it would have re
quired twenty or twenty-five days to take j
by regular approaches.
That they should have surrendered place
nearly as strong Quebec, we'll fortified un
der the direction of skilful engineers,-thei
works garnished with forty-two pieces of ar
tiiery, abundantly supplied with ammunition
garrsoned by 1000 regular and 1000 irregu
lar troops, IN addition 10 some thousand cit
zens capable of, (and no doubt actually, bear
ing arms, and aiding in its defence, TO an op
posing force of half their number scantily sup
piled with provisions, and with light trair
OF artlllery,-is among the unaccountable oc
'currences of the times.
am decidedly opposed to carrying the wa
beyond Saltillo in this direction, which place
has been entirely abandoned by the Mexican
FORCES, all OF whom have been concentrated a
San LUIS PotOsl; and | shall lose no time in
taking possession of the former as soon as the
cessation OF hostllities referred to expires
which have notified the Mexican authorities
will be the case on the 9th inst, by direction
Of the President OF the United States.
If we are lin the language of Mr.. Polk and
General ScotD under the necessity of ICON.
quering a peace, and that by taking the
capital of the country,--we must go to Vera
Cruz, take that place, and then march on to
the city OF Mexico To do so in any othe
direction, consider out of the question. Blu
admitting that we conquer peace by dom!
So'-say, at the end of the next twelve months
VIII the amount of blood and treasure
winch must he expended in doing so, be com
pensated by the same think not,-espe
clally' II the country we subdue is TO be giver
up; and imagine there are but few individu
ais IN our country who think of annexine
Mexico to the United States.
do not intend to carry on nv operation.
tas previously stated) beyond Saltillo-deem
ing it next to impracticable to do so. 1t ther
becomes question as to what is best TO b.
done. 1t seems to me the most ludiciou.
course to be pursued on our part, would be tc
FsEr possession, a'cace, Of the Enewe voulf