New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1847-03-23
carresnandence Of Con. ra,lor.

the portions Of the correspondence NuuiO1''S '-f
pressed
IN The first letter OF this series the Secretary OF
War advise. Gen. Taylor not to extend bis forces
beyond sslrillo, with view Of taking and holding
a permanent position.
He tells him Of the intended attack upon era
craz. and thinks that four thousand troops CO.
operating with the Naval force, VIII be sufficient
for the reduction Of city and citadel In boxing
he says, al the present disposition Of the troops
il appears TO be scarcely possible TO get the requi
ate number Of regulars without drawing some
Of those now with you at Monterey foa
will therefore, unless it materially intehefes win
YOUR own plan Of operations or weaken' you 700
much in your present position make toe neoes
.arv Arrangements for having iovr thousand men
Of whom caeen hundred or two thousand should De
regular troops-resdy to embark tor Vera Cruz, or
such other destination as may be given hem' al
the earliest practicable period
Prudent and humane Secretary Of War! fod
withdraw four thousand Of Gen Tayors best
troops from him while exposed to an enemy
nearly treble that number and order them to a
service where they shall be sure TO be ont Of bis
reach. though in imminent danger VIII not the
tropbies that Gen Taylor has won, suffer your mas
tsf 70 sleep bat he needs must subject that dsr-
i-g ofhcer 70 situation as unprorisins as Tor
Iorn hopel II the news Of Saltllos massacre DC
true. will not the country impose upon this IN
beetle. false-hearted strocious administration an
abundant punishment
Gen Taylor. with all a soldiers exaggerated sense
Of honor could not hesitate to detail the ioree re-
auired, suPgested, 70 use Mr. Secretary Marcy
softer phrase he would face the foe before him
though with quadruple dis own number, rather
than suhui, his motives 70 the eager oensure Of an
enemy in the reay. That expression Of Scott IS
destined yet 10 have prophetic character
Tae Secretary farther suggests that MAJOR Gen
Patterson should command the expedition against
Tamaulipas, and tina. Il xould meet the views Of
the Government if Brevet Bngadier Gen Worth
should bs appointed IN command Of the regular
force.
The next letter-ssve one o. little Consequence
is communication IN sr,srSo from Gen. Taylor 70
the Adjutant General nj the Army at Washington
and REQUIRES more than an ordinary confederation
In speaking Of toe force necessary TO take San
Lui.-a city Of 5000 inhabitants and 600 miles
from the Rio Grande--he says
aIn view Of the above facts hazard nothing In say
log that q column, move on san Luis from SaluLo
should 10 insure success be at least 10000 strong OF
which 10000 should Be regular troops Alter much 70,
hecton, consider the above as the smallest number OF
,-ztrs Troops ihst could Re employed ths service
Without mourning tie hazard Of disaster and perhaps
dsfoit There would be required beside 70 keep open
our long line protect the dspos and secure the country
already gained. force OF 5000 men-this, without 10
cudps the force necessary 70 send to Tampeo TO take
! or hold that place.
"The shove estimate may seem large when il is re.
embersd that important results have been gained with
much smaller force. But have hitherto operated
near our base and the Mexicans at great distance
from theirs sslto rnsy be considered about equdis
tsnt from the Rio Grsnds and Fan LUIS. Every days
march beyond IL lengthens already long line and
curtais theirs-weskens and gives them strength.
Hence the movement should not be undertaken except
with force so large as to render success certain
The volunteers for twelve months. he says. have
suffered greatly from disease. The regiments
could not average 500 eTectire men.
He thus speaks Of defensive line for occuPs-
ton, and estimates the force, in his opinion neoes
sary to strike decisive blow at Mexico
@Itmsy be expected that should give my views as to
the policy Of occupying defensive line 10 which have
above alluded am free 10 confess that IN view oil the
difficulties and expense attending movement into the
heart of the country and particularly In view of the
unsettled and revolutionary character OF the Mexican
Government the occupation OF such line seems TO me
might either be that which propose 10 insist As the
| boundary between the Rspubics-ssy the Rio Grande-
or the line 10 which have advanced viz the Sierra
Madre including Chin ushua and santa re The former
line could De held with much smaller force than the
latter but even the line OF the Sierra Madre could De
held with force greatly less than would be required
for scuve campaign. Monterey controls the gresi
outlet from the interior strong garrison at this point
with advance Ssltllo and small corps at MoncloVa
Lnsres Victoria and Tsmpico, would efectualy cover
! the line
on this frontier and the requirements for campaign
against San Luis Poos the suggestions IN Inc oecre
tarys letter being confined TO this general theatre OF
operations should the Government determine 10 81 kt
decisive blow at Mexico It Is my opinion that ire force
should lard near Vera Cruz Alvsrado, and after es
tsbshns secure depot march thence on TIE csptSl
The amount OF troops required for this service ~oule
not fall short in my judgment OF 2oVOO men oil "hoi
at least 10000 10 be regular troops
And it is thus that the gallant veteran gives voice
to his lust indignation at the conduct of the Score
tary, undertaking to make important detachment
from his force, and assuming TO judge IN bis easy
chair at Washington. without knowledge OF men o
officers Of the proper qualifications Tor command
The Major General Pattersons and the Brigadie
General Pllows-men created officers by the Sresil
a the President though unqualified perhaps TO
rank and Gle ,ervice-hsve been throughout th'
campaign ordered 10 separate aud high command
by the Secretary without the least regard to Oh
Rough and Readys feelings or opinions You
Brig Gen Pillows the epheme.al excreseenee
that thi. war ha, brought out from the lower part
of society
In conclusion feel Tiny duty 70 make some remark
which would gladly have been spared The necessity
submitting feoi Il due 10 my position and 10 the eel
vice 70 record my protest against he manner 10 whie
the Department has sought to make an important detact
ruent from my command specifically indicating not onl
tbs general ocer but considerable extent the troop
that were 10 compose u While remain 10 command
the army against Mexico. and therefore justly he'll
rssponsoe by the Government and the country for u
eonduet OF iis operations must claim tie nsni OF o.
gsnirng ~ 6e.Aohrnents .-cs IT, and regulating the am
and OF their service. Above al DO consider
important that the Department Of War should reiTN
fgoa corresponding directly with my saoordinA,es an
communicating orders and Instructions on points bic
~ al military preeept and practice pertain exclusivel
10 the General IN ehif command Confusion Ane oiss
TER alone can result from such a course. The reAso
alleged viz TIE lOss OF tine in communicating VII
Gen Pauesscn has Application, for the Secretary
dispatch from that CG1eer 70 my headquarters
sixty hours and De could move al any rate wihoS
drawing largely upon this colann for artillery snd reg
Jar troops
oes il may be understood thaf ny remark have
personal Application. ! . autc PROBABLE mat ia II
event OF making sGeh detachment would have pace
IL under Major. General Patterson, but conceive "a