Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-11-27
EXTRACT FROM Mn. KENDALL'S LETTERS.

CRY OF MEXICO, OCTOBER Is, ls47.
see that some of the journals of the United States
lacking Gen. Scott for his dlatoness in advancing upn this
city, conending that his long delay Puebla
ny and that instead Of remaining there to suck oranges"
he should have advanced at once Without being the apollo
gist all the of Gen. s. of justice induces
to say that he chose the right march from Pueba and
that had he moved directly his arrival there upon this
place. consequences would have been disastrous
Grant that in the early part of June he might have marched
upon and captured the city of Mexico with comparatively
little loss what would have been Santa Annals course 1t
requires but very little foresight say that with the force he
then had he would have left the capital to its fate taken up
positions in the neghborhood, shut up every of
mucaton and leaving hostile population to take charge Of
the 600 Amercans-for Gen. Scott could not at that time
have brought morehe would have fallen back upon Pueba,
else upon the bgades of Gems Cadwaader and Pierce
their way up and have crushed them in detail from the very
superiority of the numbers he could have brought upon
them II should be recoected that Gen. Scott had
5000 men, all told his arrival at Pueba, and that many
Of them recruits while Santa Anna already had in
considerable force organized although perhaps the capital
not fortified all points Alvarez with 1000 5000 men,
at that time within striking distance of Pueba ready at
all times pounce upon any small force. The guerrilla par
ties, then the road below Peroe were sufficiently
strong to annoy not check the advance of the reinforce
ments and the signal Of Gen. SCOTS advance upon the
pa could not but have induced Santa Anna to concentrate
his forces With those already in the and by succession
Of easy blows Tor at that time he would have had none
but recruits contend WITH his victories would have
been cheapy and complete Gen. Scott would have been
shut in the capital with this Insignificant force and the past
action of our Government in the way Of aordng ample
cor shows what he might have expected from home in the
way Of assistance. Exulng under the influence of victory
Santa Anna himself would have been the attacking party
would have assaulted the capital already filled with enc
miles, and would be asking much OF the vaor even OF
the American to suppose that they could do more than
their way the succession Of events resembling
those above enumerated have followed upon
the capital in the early part of summer and another noche
rsc another disastrous evacuation Of the capital would have
been added to the annals Of Mexican history.
But what did Gen. Scott do Chafng under the delay
ia sending renforcements he still waited their arrival Nor
he idle the while The divisions of Generals Worth,
Twiggs, and Quitman were being constantly drilled on the
plains bordering Pueba until their discipline complete,
while the hundreds of sick were allowed time TO and
the well to become hardened apd Injured to climate to
them The brigade of Gen. Pierce the last of the reinforce
expected arrived at Pueba on the 9Th August and
the 9TH General Twiggs commenced the march upon the
pita the other divisions following in succession The battle
Of Mexico had be fought here and although General
SCOTS force August too weak for the dangerous
enterprise still his skill and that of his officers, combined
with the obstinate vaor of the soldiers oil obsta
cles The proud capital of Mexico herocaly entered,
her army dispersed and demoraized, and all fears Of
cessu descent upon weak and partially unprotected rear
thus done away with Any other course than that pursued
by Gen. Scott with the exceedingly limited at his dis
posa would have brought ruin and defeat and i'll becomes
writers at home snugy and safely ensconced in their
tums 10 criticize and movements they have
of understanding.