Herald of the times, and Rhode Islander. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1846-1849, 1847-01-28

circumstances which dictated mo doubt justified
the change" Although the terms of capitu.
lation may be considered too liberal on our
part by the President and his advisers, as well
as by many others at II distance, particularly
by those who do not understand the position
which we occupied, otherwise they might
come to different conclusion in regard To the
matter,) yet, on due reflection, | see nothing
to induce me 10 regret the course | pursued
The proposition on the part Of General Ampu-
dia, which had much to do in determining my
course in the matter, was based on the ground
that our government had proposed to him to
settle the existing difficulties by negotiation,
(Which knew was the case, without knowing
the result,) which was then under consdera.
ton by the proper authorities, and which he
Gen. Ampudia,) had no doubt would result
favorably, as the whole of his people were in
favor Of peace. IL so, | considered the further
effuson of blood not only unnecessary, but
improper Their force was also considerably
larger than ours and from the size and posi-
ton of the place, we could not completely in
vest il so that the greater portion of their
troops, if not the whole, had they been dis
posed to do 40, could, any night, have aban.
doned the city, at once entered the mountain
passes, and effected their retreat, do what we
could Had we been put to the alternative
Of taking the place by storm, (Which there is
no doubt we should have succeeded in doing)
we should, in all probability, have lost fifty or
one hundred men in killed, besides the wound
ed,-whch wished to avoid, as there appear
ed to be prospect of peace, even If distant
one. also wished to avoid the destruction of
women and children, which must have been
very great, had the storming process been re-
sorted TO. Besides, they had very large and
strong fortification, a short distance from the
city, which, if carried with the bayonet, must
have been taken at great sacrifice of life ; and
with our limited train of heavy or batterng ar
tillery, it would have required twenty-five
days to take it by regular approaches.
That they should have surrendered place
nearly as strong as Quebec, well fortified un-
der the direction OF o skilful engineer their
works garnshed with forty 1.-two pieces of ar
tillery, abundantly supplied with ammunition,
garrisoned by 1000 regular and 2O00 irregular
troops, in addition to some thousand citizens
capable of, (and no doubt actually,) bearing
arms, and aiding in its defence, to an oppos-
ing force Of half their number, scantily sup.
piled with provisions, and with light train Of
artllery,-is among the unaccountable occur
rences of the times.
am decidedly opposed to carrying the war
beyond Saltilo in this direction, which place
has been entirely abandoned by the Mexican
forces, all of whom have been concentrated at
San Luis Potosi and 1 shall lose no time in
taking possession of the former, as soon as the
cessation of hostilities referred to expires,-
which have notified the Mexican authorities
will be the case on the 18th inst, by direction
Of the President of the United States.
five are lin the language of Mr.. Polk and
General ScotD under the necessity of soon
quering peace, and that by taking the capi-
tai of the country,-we must go to Vera Cruz,
take that place, and then march on the city of
Mexico. To do so in any other direction,
consider out of the question. But, admitting
that We conquer peace by doing so,-say, at
the end of the next twelve months-will the
amount of blood and treasure, which must be
expended in doing so, be compensated by the
same think not, especially, if the coun-
try we subdue is to be given up and | imag-
inc there are but few individuals in our coun-
try who think of annexing Mexico to the Uni
ted States.
DO not intend to carry on my operations
(as previously stately beyond Saltillo, deem
ing it next to impracticable to do so. 1t then
becomes question to what is best TO be
done. 1t seems to me, the most judicous
course to be pursued on our part, would be to
take possession, at once, Of the line we would
accept by negotiation, extending from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and occupy the
same, or keep what we already have posses
sion Of and that with Tampico, (Which hope
to take in the course of the next month, or as
soon as | can get the means of trans nsportation, }
will give US all on this side of the Sierra Madre
and, as soon as occupy Saltilo, will include
six or seven States or Provinces, thus holding
Tampico, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Mon
clova, Chihuahua, (Which presume General
Wool has possession of by this time,) Santa
Fe and the CALIFORNIA;, and say to Mexico,
'Drive us from the country !''-throwng on
her the responsibility and expense of carrying
on offensive war,--at the same time closely
blockading all her ports on the Pacific and the
Gulf A course of this kind, if persevered in
for a short time, would soon bring her to her
proper senses, and compel her to sue for peace,
provided there is government in the coun-
try sufficiently stable for us to treat with,
which, fear, will hardly be the case for many
years to come Without large reinforcem me nts
Of volunteers from the United States,-say, =,
ten or fifteen thousand, (those previously sent
out having already been greatly reduced by
sickness and other casualties) do not believe
it would be advisable to march beyond Satillo,
which is more than 300 miles beyond our de-
pots on the Rio Grande,-a very long line on
which to keep up supplies (over a land route,
in a country like this) for a large force, and
certain to be attended with an expense which
will be frightful to contemplate, when closely
looked into.
From Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, the next
place of importance on the road to the city
of Mexico, is three hundred milestone hun
dred and forty badly watered, where no sup
plies of any kind could be procured for men or
horses. have informed the War Department
that 10000 efficient men would be necessary
to insure success if we move on that place.
"a city containing a population of 60, 900,
where the enemy could bring together and
sustain, besides the citizens, an army of 5O,-
00O force which, apprehend, will hardly
be collected by US with the train necessary to
feed it, as well as to transport various other
supplies, particularly ordnance and munitions
Of war.
In regard to the armistce, which would
have expired, by limitation, in a few days, we
lost nothing by it, as we could not move even
now, had the enemy continued to occupy Sal
tillo ; for, strange to say, the first wagon
which has reached me since the declaration
of war was on the Cd inst, the same day on
which | received from Washington an ac-
acknowledgement of my despatch announcing the
taking Of Monterey; and then | received only
1876, 50 that have been since May last, COM
p)etely crippled, and am still so, for want Of
transportation.
After raking and scraping the country for
Ill .a,t,