Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-03-27

THE relative numbers and positions of the enemy your knowl
edge OF the country supplies and OF anspora-
aton is the wish and expectation Of President that,
with your accustomed energy take lines OF march be-
You'd the Rio Gande, and press your operations toward the
heart OF the enemys country thatis upon such important
points you NAV deem necessary 10 and To hold
The high road 10 the capital of Mexico WILL of course be
OF those lines and if successful your advances the
adjustment of posts in your rear well guarded according to
their distances from each other and the dangers of re-
capture, will be objects demanding your How far II
may be necessary for penetrate if at least TO the
capital and what has you may find proper to make short
OF that mark, will OF depend upon the events OF the
Should continued attend operations, you
may time before be by the proposition TO treat for
peace with intermediate armistce No such proposition
will be entertained by YOU without your being first satisfied
that il is made in good faith, and without your being put in
possession put by stipulation into ossson of such
handing positions will ensure good ah the part OF the
enemy Being satisfied this point you may conclude an
armsce for limited time, and refer the Proposition to treat
peace to the Government here. In such case it should
be stipulated t pending the armistice tho authorities OF the
enemy's county shall fussh your army With all necessary
suppGes and practicable to regula
lions fo- r,.iay agree 70 pass the proper receipts
leaving the payment or the settlement account of such
supplies to the denive treaty of peace between the beige
rents. :
"An expedition foot against the province of New
Mexico, and probably North California under Colonel kear
ny is considered account of the distance of his theatre
of operations from yours independent OF general
mand unless indeed events should bring him, unexpectedly
down the Rio Grnde south within your sphere In such
you may extend your orders him, directly through
| Brigader General Wool
"of the troops ordered upon Antonio. is intended
by the President nmatedn the copy of instructions here
with) Bgader General Wool that large portion should
under his Immediate command be directed by you, under the
proper general instructions against the city OF Chihuahua and
other important points may indicate, within the province
OF that name oder capture and to hold the sub
| jec to defnitive featy of peace"
Next follow henstructions General Wool and brief
from Gen. Scott Gen. Taylor, directing things
| ba Inv The
The three letters of sufficient importance be
given entire, as follows
General Taylor 10 the Secretary of Uay.
| HEADaUARrEns ARMY OCCUPATION,
| MArAMoRos, july ?, 1876.
Sir In reply the communications Of the Secretary of
War, dated May 2sh' and June 9Th, and that of the
eenerai chief dated Jane 18TH have the honor submit
the following views regard to the operations against Mexico
from this quarter will remark that my constant efforts 10
procure information in relation the of the country,
amount Of supplies, &c, have not been satisfactory
could WISH the various often differing i'm
poant particulars Either from the ignorance interested
motives Of those who profess give normaon extremely
difficult to obtain any upon which implicitly rely.
In calling upon the States of Louisiana and Texas for
auxiliary force of about 5000 men, my expectation
that be able clear the of the Rio Gande
high Laredo and occupy or control the country to the
foot Of the mountains capturing and holding Monterey if
circumstances permitted With the proper transportation
could easily done, depot would now have
been established Camargo and operations pushed up
the valley Of the San Juan The difficulties and embaass
ents that have experienced for want OF such transportation
have already been sufficiently made known These difficult
ties have been increased by the great of volunteers that
have been ousay 5000 men beyond my original call
nevertheless propose, upon the arrival OF the steamers
hourly expected throw forward this force, with the regular
troops Csnargo, and establish there depot
which operate towards the mountains My for
tanning these sxmonths volunteers service have been
forth in another communication and DESIRE from motives Of
health and other considerations to keep them employed
lively possible The twelve-monhs volunteers can, in the
meantime, form camps healthy points in my and,
while receiving instruction, await the for extern
sve operations The above dispositions be made in the
perhaps better than any other time, the
river then in good navgabe state For operating with
heavy force-say 5000 from this poin-owards Mon
teey and Saho, through which passes the only artillery
route mountains il is indispensable TO employ the
river channel of supply and the valley OF the San Juan,
of the heads Of which Monterey is situated, line
of operations The direct land route from this point to Mon
terey is much longer than the line from Camargo IN wet
weather impossible for artillery heavy wagons and IN dry
scany supplied with Assuming, them Camargo as
the depot and the valley of the San Juan the line of opera
TONS the question arises what amount OF supplies can be
obtained and how a column I've subsed this route
pretty well determined that cannot depend
considerable supply of breadsus short of Monterey or per-
haps Sao seventyve miles further south Beef in album
Dance il is believed be procured and this, with per-
hps occasional issues of mutton must mainly depend for
the meat part of the ration From Camago Salto them
expect depend upon depot for bread ard
of opinion from all learn of the of the coun
try pack mules and means Of transportation generally that
column exceeding 1000 cannot be maintained in bread
alone far Sao Salto itself is at great distance
from fertile grain growing districts but how far
the production those districts may exceed the supply
not with any certainty determine.
The above calculations, in regard 10 subsistence made
the suggestions that shall find the people OF the coun
try, if friends, least passive and willing to part with
their produce the best advantages believe shall find
such their temper this side of the mountains whether
this neutrality indifference extends beyond, well be
question Should they prove hostile destroy their crops and
drive away their stock it will be extremely difficult matter
sustain column at Satillo-stl pass beyond
that city
Surprising column of the above strength-say 5000
men-abIe to maintain itself at Salo, it will become ques
on depending for its solution upon the elements above nd
Gated, how far that force may be increased what amount
the tweve-monhs volunteers may be safely and protab
thrown forward from the rear with TO future operations
From Camago to the city of Mexico is line little II any
short 900 miles length The Of the costy
are say the best superintendent and long spaces
of the route known be deficient Although the road,
advance SOUTH approaches both yet the topography
the country aud the consequent character OF the commun
cations orbds the taking line oil supply, either from
Tampco or the Pacific coast Except in the (deemed
mpobbc Of entire acquiescence not support on the part
of the Mexican people, SonsJe tmpactcabe to keep open
so long line Of communication. 1t therefore my opinion
that operations from this frontier should not look to the
city OF Mexico, but should be confined to cutting of the
northern provincesan undertaking of comparative facility and
assurance of success.
With the view of cutting off the northern provinces the
projected expedition from San Antonio to Chihuahua be
of great Importance From the best information however,
which possess would suggest mounted troops alone
for that expedition satisfied that the route from that
point Chihuahua is not practicable for artillery or wagons,