The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1847-02-11


at all adequate to the discharge OF OF new duties
suddenly thrown upon It, know the head OF that de-
parIneni we'll A more gallant soldier more faithful
officer yigant administrator, service does not
assistants under him deserve commentator for their ZEAL
capacity, and industry But agents. without expert
ence had be selected and il vain to EXPECT pur
chases would be judiciousy and economically made,
and property well preserved, applied, and accounted
for in this new exgency, as IN the ordinary routine oil
service.
Besides sir there one very obvious consideration
must keep in view in looking at expenditures. 1t APP
plies party but belongs to ALL for its TO be
sought in institutions. The accumulation of supplies
for military operations sgreaer and always has been
greater, than in any other army in the world The re-
sponsbiy of those who direct them is heavy and i'm
mediate, from the ever-viglant supervision OF public
opinion that it is felt in all their arrangements Fearing
TO do too little they to do too much and thence loss
in purchases and ultimate waste in application II was
something like this which helped TO swell the expense OF
two small Indian wars and one quasi war TO thirty mil
lions of dollars And we have an illustration of its ope-
ration in able letter OF the 5th OF December last to the
Secretary OF War; from General Jesup, who in defending
his department from the charge OF General Taylor, that
his of transportation were insufficient and not IN
time while speaking of the boats ordered says that 'the
number required by the General was believe, nearly
quadrupled ultimately by the officers OF the department
And again 50 twas known that he General Iaylor) had
wagon train amply sufficient for double the force he
commanded before the arrival Of the voluncers" that is
to say, for the force he was expected to operate with
when the supply was furnished Why this pihng OF Pc,
lion upon Ossa Why this doubling and quadruping of
materials 1t to be o the taxes cannot es
cape, and therefore must submit TO with the best
grace we may though It is to be remarked thai no injury
happened TO the public service in this for the excess
if not wanted when procured, was finally found useful
and actually insufficient.
But sir, there other difficulties beyond these
which presented themselves TO the government. We
were comparatively ignorant of the true state OF the coun-
try about to enter. We had almost no know
ledge of its INTERIOR its roads, its passes It's natural
tical supplies of water, its of transportation and
subsistence, the condition OF It's tortresses, and OF many
other important facts, Typographical and statistical con
nected with the movements OF invading army Where
we should first strike, and how should do If, were
difficult and delicate subjects OF inquiry There IS IN
every country, line OF operations, along winch hos
tile army may easily move, and where lis movements Will
produce the greatest effect upon the people, who are IN
vaded and upon their government may be- that strong
fortress should be the object of attack or the CONNER
cia metropolis the principal place OF trade and popula-
ton the political capital the seat OF government, and
the central point of influence and authority. Now, in
Europe, all these facts well known. Contiguty OF
positions continued intercommnncaon and ever-renew
ing wars have revealed the internal condition OF the
countries in that quarter OF the globe Each knows its
strong and weak points, and these are equally known to
other powers. Extensive Typographical bureaus make
part OF the military organization OF all the larger
States OF Europe No reasonable expense IS spared to
collect and deposite in them all the information which
future exigencies may render necessary Lines OF com
municaon, the direction and condition OF roads, the
crossing of streams, the passage OF mountains, the state
of the foresses whether isolated making part of the
deiences OF city, the means OF transportation, the eX-
tent of supplies all these Objects essential to army
in the progress of its operations, examined and stu
died and the result is ready whenever the time for ac
ton arrives And besides this, experience has shown
the vulnerable points; where the severes blow can
be inflicted and where the moral effect OF military dsas-
tiers will be sensiby felt and most likely to render
campaign decisive. 1t was information like this spread
before him. which enabled Canot in his cabinet at Paris
mark with almost mathematical precision the ope
raons of the French armies and to direct plans OF IN
vason which the genius of the great generals OF that
day, in combination and execution was brought into adj
mrabe cooperation with the genius OF the minister who
! had matured and prescribed them
There amentable deficiency in country OF all
this kind of knowledge respecting the condition OF Mex
leo, at the time she attacked forces upon the Rio
Grande; and the government was suddenly called upon
direct the operations of campaign IN region which
So much for the difficulties Now for the results Let
remark the first instance, sir, that not movement
as understand relating to operations on the northeast
frontier of Mexico has been directed from the seat OF
government, which has not met the appreciation OF the
distinguished officer who has connected his name
with o h hist g s Sn BY q % ri i
and TO the administration. His own movements he was
free direct and control Immediately after the decaa
ton OF he requested to communicate to the gov
eminent his views to what should be the future oper
atoms the Rio Grande, and the movement he pro-
posed to make before the rainy season
have applied to the War Department Tor information
upon this subject; and have been permitted to look at
that part of the correspondence with Gen Taylor which
relates to past events and has thus became matter Of his
tory. will state its bearing upon the last campaign.
/ In letter from the War Department of June s. 1896
to Gen Taylor, the Secretary OF War; after informing
him OF the proposed augmentation Of his force and MAX
ing some udcious suggestions remarks that, ln taking
POSITIONS need scarcely observe that the means OF get
ting supplies transporting munitions OF war; as well as
the ability to keep open the channels by which these
supplies and munitions to be furnished, are points to
be well considered" &c. "The President is DESTROYS OF
receiving your views and suggestions IN relation to the
fall campaign His determination is to have the war
prosecuted with vgor and TO embrace in the objects to
be copassed in that campaign, such will dispose the
enemy TO desire end OF the Shall the
campaign be conducted with view of srik
ing at the city OF Mexico, confined so far
as regards the forces under your immediate com
this point will doubtless have important influence
on the determination of the government here Should
penetrate far into the interior OF Mexico, how
are supplies to be obainedi Can they be- any consider
able extent drawn from the enemys country must they
be obtained from the United States These very inn
portant questions, and the them will have
important bearing in settling the plan and objects OF the
campaign" &c.
sit is important to know your opinion of the descrlp
ton of troops best adapted to operations in the interior
OF Mexico what portion should be infantry, artillery
cavalry &c peace must be conquered in the shortest
space OF time practicable your views of the manner OF
doing requested 1t is not doubted that you will
push your advantages TO the utmost extent be done
with The means at your command"
General Taylor in answer stated very clearly the
ture of the operations which should lake place. and the
difficulties attending them, resulting principally from de-
fcIent OF transportation, and from OF bread
stI Considering the distance from Camargo to Mexico
and the nature of the country, and its want of re-
sources, he looked upon that line of operations
as an mpractcable He therefore of
opinion that operations upon that frontier should
be confined TO cutting off the northern Provinces and in
that point OF view. he thought the expedition Chhua
hua Of great Importance He says he has absained from
Cruz because the yellow fever would have permitted
ne tn hold IL and he deemed II q kp no