The daily national Whig. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1847-1849, 1847-11-15
Our Future Policy.

Cry OF Mexico, Oct ~, 1910.
If Gen. Scott had even 1000 additional troops al
this timest enough to hold the capital and fit out
small expedition besdes-he might break up and
scatter the Mexican army with ease. But he does
not hold foot of land between this and Vera Cruz
outside the range Of 24-poundcr, nor will he until
reinforced
What is to be the policy of our Government in re-
aton the conduct of this war2 hear 1t agitated
that we TO take up some line as boundary, fall
hack upon il, cease all active operations and merely
hold and sustain the boundary that may be adopted.
This course although preferable to our past milk and
water policy will never do TO my humble thinking
we shall be ut war with the Mexicans for all time;
The simple withdrawal of our troops will be looked
upon MS proof positive OF our inability To sustain
ourselves here in the heart Of the Republic while
long line ofmlitarydefences will be barassed bya proud
hut ignorant people until MonteZuma is forgotten or
his history Incorporated with heather mythology.
No kind of warfare, il warfare 1t could be called,
would suit the Mexicans wel-we should be placing
species Of wall between them and the murderous
nroads of the dreaded Apaches and Camnnches, and
while they would laugh at us for our pains they
would annoy us for our presumption. Relieved from
immediate danger the thousands OF worthless mill
tary demagogues would bestr themselves in forming
new armies and in raising new means, and what
could they effect against the slight curtain OF de-
fences line extending from the Gull to the Pacific
or from the Rio Grande TO the California coastt II
will help the matter some, perhaps, if strict block
AIDE of all the seaports of the country Is put down In
the programme Of the system, but all will fail in
bringing about peace with nation utterly blind to
us OWN INTERESTS, anu brave W ueSiee WHICH ualoi
Is afar OIL
You may ask then, how is peace to be obtained
The safest, wisest, most expeditions and cheapest
plan would be to reinforce this line at once with
so 900 men. This should be the first step. Then real
war should be declared against Mexico, not quasi
half-and-half state of hostiities at presenkecp
all that have got and let il be understood that we
are to get and hold all that we can--send every Of
Rcer captured close prisoner to the United States,
and provide strong places in which TO keep all the
privates-have no talk with the people their lead
ers save that our intention is overrun destroy and
conquere-let all the inhabitants be made to know
that we are at war with them-follow up blows with
blows, not with soft words-leave peace commits
sioners and peace propositions at home, instead OF
sending them to a market where there is no demand
for such absurditiesin short, and to repeat what
have already urged have force in the country sif-
cient TO give the enemy respites nor time to re-
cover their noraie but let every hard fought battle
| we shall soon have peace. hear that Gen. Scott
is blamed in of the papers Of the United States
for delaying his march upon the capital as long rs he
| did. How could he do otherwise with the force he
had on first entering Puebla? With the scunty
means afforded him he adopted altogether the wisel
policy Surprising that he had pushed upon this
city in the early part of June he might have driver
Santa Anna and the army out 1t is true and win
comparatively little loss but at that time he woulc
have had large ana hostile popuntion within the
gates with not than sufficient numbers TO keep
| them in subsection while Santa Anna would have
4 surrounded the capital with tho force then at his
hands, occupied every avenue, cut OIL all supplies,
and finally compelled Gen. Scott to fight the battle
of Mexico every disadvantage 1t had to be fought
somewhere and our Communicated only waited
until he had sufficient force to ensure success.