Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1847-12-16
DECEMBER 16, IS47.

conquests which We have already made and that,
with this view, we should hold and occupy, by
our naval and military forces all the ports, towns
and provinces now in our occupation, or which
may hereafter fall into our possession; that we
should pross forward our military operations, and
levy such military contributions on the enemy as
may, as far as practicable, dcfray the future ex
penses of the war
Had the government Of Mexico acceded TO the
equitable and liberal terms proposed, that mode
of adjustment would have been preferred. Mex
leo having declared to do this and failed to Of
fer any other terms which could be accepted by
the United States, the national honor, no less
than the public interests, requires that the war
soould be prosecuted with increased energy and
power until just and satisfactory peace can be
obtained. In the mean time, as Mexico refuses
all indemnity, we should adopt measures to in
demnily ourselves, by appropratng permanently
a portion of her territory. Early after the com
mencement Of the war; New Mexico and the
CALIFORNIA; were taken possession of by our for
ces Our military and naval commanders were
ordered to conquer and hold them, subject TO be
disposed Of by treaty of peace.
These provinces are now in our undisputed &C.
cupation, and have been so for many months; all
resistance on the part of Mexico having ceased
within their limits. | ain satisfied that they
should never be surrendered to Mexico. Should
Congress concur with me in this opinion, and that
they should be retained by the United States as
indemnity, | can preceive no good reason why the
civil jurisdiction and laws of the United States
should not at once be extended over them. To
want for treaty of peace, such as we are willing
| to make, by which our relations towards them
would not be changed cannot be good policy
whilst our own interest, and that of the people
inhabiting them, requires that stable, response
! BILE, and free government under our authority
nod NV
them. Should Congress, therefore, determine to
hold these provinces permanently, and that they
shall hereafter be considered as constituent parts
of our country, the early establishment of terrific
rial governments over them will be important for
the norerperfect protection of persons and prop
erty; and recommend that such territorial gov
ernments be established. 1t will promote peace
and tranquility among the Inhabitants, by alay-
ing all apprehensions that they may still enter
tain of being again subjected to the jurisdiction
of Mexico | invite the early and favorable con.
sideration of Congress to this important subject
Besides New Mexico and the CALIFORNIA; there
are other Mexican provinces which have beer
reduced to our possession by conquest. These
other Mexican provinces are now governed
by our military and naval commanders, un
der the general authority which is conferred
upon conquerer by the laws of war They
should continue to be held as means of coer
cling Mexico to accede to Just terms of peace
| Civil as well as military officers are required tC
conduct such government. Adequate compen
sation to be drawn from contributions levied OF
the enemy should be fixed by law for such Off
GERS as may become necessary, and what fina
disposition it may be proper to make of them
must depend on the future progress of the war
and the course which Mexico may think proper
hereafter TO pursue.
With the views | entertain, | cannot favor the
policy which had been suggested, either to with
draw our army altogether or to retire to a desig
mated line and simply hold and defend it. IL
withdraw our army altogether from the conquest
they have made by deeds Of unparalleled brave
ry, and at the expense of so much blood and treas
ure, in just war on our part, and one which, by
the act of the enemy, could not honorably
have avoided, would be to degrade the nation il
its own estimation and in that Of the world.
To retire to line, and simply hold and defent
it, would not terminate the war. On the contra
ry, it would encourage Mexico to persevere, ant
tend to protract it indefinitely.
1t is not 10 be expected that Mexico, after re
fusing 10 establish such line as a perrlatlen
boundary. when our victorious army are in pos
session of her capital. and in the heart of he
country would permit US 10 hold it without re
sistance That she would continue the war
and in the most harassing and annoying 1orlns
there can be no doubt. A border warfare OF thu
most savage character, extending over a Ion!
line, would be increasingly waged. 1t woult
require large army TO be kept constantly Il
the field, stationed at posts and garrsons alont
such line TO protect and defend it. The ell
envy, relieved from the pressure of our arms OIL
his coasts, and in the populous parts OF the In
terror, would direct his attention 10 this line, AM
selecting an isolated post for attack, would con
centrate his forces upon it. This would be
condition of affairs which the MeXicans, pursr
ing their favorte system of guerilla warfare
would probably prefer to any other. Were W
to assume defensive attitude on such line
all the advantages of such state of wartar
would be on the side of the enemy. We coul
levy no contributions upon him, or in any othe
way make him feel the pressure of the war, br
must remain inactive and await his approach
being in constant uncertainty at which point o.
the line, or at what time, he might make a
assault.
He may assemble and organize an ove
whelming force in the interior, on his own sid
of the line and, concealing his purpose max
sudden assault upon some one of our posts 5
distant from any other as 10 prevent the poss
biliy of timely succor or achievements an
in this way our gallant army would be expose
to the danger of being cut of in detail or i
by their unequalled bravery and prowess ever
where exhibited during this war, they shout
repulse the enemy, their numbers stationed 1
any one post may be too small TO pursue him
If the enemy be repulsed in one attack, h
would have nothing 10 do but 10 retreat 10 hi
own side of the line and being in no fear of
pursuing army, may reinforce himself al leisur
for another attack on the same or some othe
post He may, too cross the line between OF
posts, making rapid ncursions into the countr
which we hold, murder the inhabitants, con
nit depredations on them, and then retreat
the interior before a sufficient force can be COZ
centraed to pursue him. Such would pr
badly be the harassing character of a mere de
fensive war on our part If our forces, whe
attacked, or threatened with attack, be permi
ted to cross the line, drive back the enemy, an
conquer him, this would be again to invade tn
enemy country, after having lost all the a,
yantages of the conquess we have alread
made, by having voluntarily abandoned then
To hold such line successfully and in securt
il is far from being certain that ii would n
require as large an army as would be necessaI
10 hold all the conquess we have already mad
and to continue the prosecution OF the war
the heart of the enemys country. 1t is ais
far from being certain that the expenses of II
war would be diminished by such policy.
am persuaded that the best means OF Wind
eating the national honor and interest, and
bringing the war to an honorable close will b
TO prosecute it with increased energy and poN
er in the vital parts of the enemy's country.
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