The Democratic pioneer. [volume] (Upper Sandusky, Ohio) 1845-1853, 1847-02-05

ana us auV|eSts, ~ W cts 80 ~ AiN"J os'''S' :
al distance, particularly by those who
do not understand the position which we
occupied, [otherwise they might come TO
different conclusion in regard TO the
matter1 yet, on due reflection, lseenoth-
ing to induce me TO regret the course l
pursued. The proposition on the part OF
General AmpndIa--which had much to do
in determining my course in the matter
was based on the ground that our govern :
ment had proposed to his TO settle the ex-
isting difficulties by negotiation. (which
knew was the case, without knowing the
RESULT which was then under considera-
lion by the proper authorities, and which
lie General Ampudial had no doubt would
result favorably, as the whole of his people
were in favor Of peace. lfso, consider
ed the further efision Of blood not only
unnecessary, but improper. Their force
vas also considerably larger than ours;
and from the size and position ofthe place,
we could not completely invest t;so that
the greater portion Of their troops--lt cot
the whole had they been disposed to do
SO, could any night have abandoned the
4 city, al once entered the mountain passes,
Iand effe cted their retreat, do what we
could! Had we been put TO the allerna-
tive Of taking the place by storm, (Which
there is no doubt we should have succeeded
in DOING we should, 10 all prota4ilty,
have lost fifty or one hundred men in kill
ed, besides the wounded, which ! wished
to avoid, as the re appeared to be pros
pect of peace even ifa distant one. also
wished TO avoid the destruction of women
and children, which must have been vety
great, had the stormins process been re-
sorted to. Besides they had a very large
and strong fortfcation short distance
from the city, which, if carried with the
bayonet, must have been taken at great
sacrifice Of life; and, with our limited train
Of heavy or battering artillery, il would
have required twenty or twenty five days
to take it by regular approaches.
That they should have surrendered a
place nearly as strong as Quebec, well
fortified under the direction of kilful en-
gneers-their orks garnished with forty
two pieces of artillery, abnndantly sup
piled with ammunition, garrisoned by 4.
600 regular and 1000 irregular troops, in
addition to some thousand citizens capa-
BILE Of, land no doubt actually bearing
arms, aud aiding in its defence Ito an op
posing force Of half their number, scan,ily
supplied with provisions, and with light
train of artilery--is among the nnao-
countable occurrences of the times
am decidedly opposed to carrying the
war beyond Satilo in this direction, which
place has been entirely abandoned by the
! Mexican forces, all of whom have been
concentrated at San Luis Potosi; and !
shall lose no time in taking possession Of
the former, as soon as the cessation OF
hostilities referred to expires--which ]
have notified the Mexican authorizes will
be the case on the 18th instant, by direc-
lion of the President Of the United STATES.
If we are lin the language of Mr.. Polk
and General Soou) under the necessity OF
sconqnering a peace" and that by taking
the capital of the conntry, we must 60 to
Vera Cruz, take that place, and then
march on the city of Mexico. To do so
in any other direction, ! consider out OF
the question. But, admitting that we
conquer a peace by doing so-say, at the
, end Of the next twelve months-wlil the
amount Of blood and treasure, which mns'
be expended in doing 50, be compensated
by the same! | think not-especially /
, the country we subdue is to be given up
and imagine there are but few individn'
ais in our country who think Of annexin G
Mexico to the United States.
) do not intend to carry on my opera
J tions las previously stated) beyond Saltil.
, lo,-deeming it next to impracticable t'
do SO. 1t then becomes a question as t'
what is best to be done. 1t seems to me
the most judicious course to be pursnet
: on our part, would be TO take possession
at once, of the line we would accept b,
negotiation, extending from the Gulf c
Mexico 10 the Pacific, and occupy thu
same, or keep what We already have pos
session of; and that. with Tampice, (which
| hope 10 take in the course OF the mex
month, or as soon as I can get the means
of ftransportation,) will give us all on thi'
side of the Sierra Madre, and, as soon al
| occupy Saltillo, will include six or sev
, en- States or provinces, thus holding Tam
} pioo, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Mon
} olova, Chihuahua, (Which presume Gen
> eral Wool has possession of by this time
3 Santa Fe and the CALIFORNIA; and sa.
| to Mexico, "Drive us from the country
, throwing 90 her the responsibility an
expense of carr, ing on offensive war,--a
1 the same time closely blokcading all he