The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1847-09-22
What vii, be done with Mexiros

What will be done with Mexiro 2
This is an important question In the present
position ofafiars
Al he next Presidential election no important
issues will be presented to the people for adjudi-
cation, except such as grow out OF the Mexican
war. The tariff will doubtless be let unds-
turbed-t would be madness In the wings To pro-
nounce for restoration of the tariff of 1872
and the sub.treasury law will by that time be too
firmly established to make its repeal safe issue
for its opponents Acquisition or no acquisition,
free territory or the Missouri compromise, will
be the great questions to be settled, and from this
circumstance, as well as from ns own intrinsic
Importance, the question, "What shall we do
with Mexico 70 possesses at this time grave
and peculiar interest.
The recent news affords no light by which to
scan the dark recesses of the future. Santa An
ma may make peace, but will the Mexican Con-
gress ratify it or if it be ratified by the Mexican
Congress, will il be ratified by ours Even sup.
posing treaty ratified in all due form, it depends
mainly on the people of Mexico to keep it. Are
they so disposed 1t is more than questionable
But a treaty either will or will not be made IF
it be made, our government will have nought to
do but to Withdraw the army within the terrific
~ ceded, and maintain possession until the hos
tiity which now burns in the breasts of the
Mexican people, shall have died out. The ex.
pense attending an armed occupation of the from
tier will be trifling, compared to the advantages
arising from the possession of the CALIFORNIA;,
with their numerous and capacious harbors. If
Mexico make war again, it will be under every
disadvantage, and with the unpleasant prospect
of losing other ortions Of her domain. The ter
ritory W shall acquire will be settled by hardy
race accustomed to hard knocks, and against
whom all attempts at dlspossession would be un-
ayatling.
But the negotiations which had been entered
upon at the last accounts, may terminate unfa-
voraby Mexico may still refuse to make peace,
and we may be compelled to maintain absolute
possession Of the country for series of years.
In such a case il is clear the duty of the govern
ment will be to seize and appropriate the reve-
nues of the country, and to organize such force
as will crush all opposition From the mines, the
monopoles, the rich haciendas, the imports, con-
tributions might be exacted lis evident that a
larger revenue than Mexico has ever been able
10 raise, might Je raised in this manner. 1t
would be well to make the country supply our
army with provisions and other necessaries in
kind, but the officers are unwilling to carry out
this plan, and they deserve too we'll of their
try to be forced to perform any duty that may be
di,agreeable to them. A sufficient revenue,
however, can be collected TO maintain the army,
and the appropriation of such revenue will serve
the double purpose of strengthening our arms
and weakening those Of the enemy.
In order that commerce might flow from the
sea.coast to the Interior il would be necessary to
maintain strict blockade of all the coast where
custom houses are not established, and 10 raise
the army to such a standard, that our military
stations would be secure in their strength from
ali danger of attack and the roads would be kept
clear OF guerllas and other like annoyances. The
failure of negotiations for peace cannot prevent
the capital from surrendering to our arms,
and that point will be the limit of our offensive
operations in that direction. 1t would be vain
to reckon upon the dsorganization of the Mexi-
can army as proof that another army cannot be
raised. After the affair of Cerro Gordo it was
annihilated, and yet the capital has been defend
ed by host of between twenty and thirty thou
sand men. While there are men and generals,
and every tenth man in Mexico is general an
army can be organized with cut much difficulty
But it is quite safe to predict that, after what has
passed. no contingency can arise that will rem
DER the ueIedt OF our arms Dy the MeXlCane even
remotely probable.
Thus, the capital in our possession-the reve-
nues in our Professionalism coast bockaded-
our army safe from attack-the wealthy classes
burthened with taxes of which peace can alone
relieve them-the enemy having no hope of the
war being abandoned because of it's pressure on
our ctizens-the Mexican church in the enjoy
ment Of its revenues, having perfect immunity
for its worship, and, therefore, without appre-
henslon Of disturbance when peace shall have
given US portion Of the territory, Mexico will
have every inducement to seek for peace, while,
II she still refuse, we shall be in position to
LOOK upon her stubborness with comparative
indifference.
Sucn, In case negotiation fails we have the
best reason to believe, will be the course adopt,d
and recommended TO Congress for adont; On bv
this administration. But it is difficult 70 .ay
how far our government may be able % csrry
out this policy. In order 10 defrav the exn.ns.
of maintaining an army in Mexico, il will, he ns.
ces sary TO open up the country to the commerce
of all nations. Our citizens will have. of
course, peculiar advantages, and it is need.
less to say they will improve them. Should
peace not be made for ten or fifteen years, how
many of those who will settle down'in that rich
and fertile country will be disposed to leave it