The voice of freedom. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1839-1848, 1847-12-16

Since the liberal proposition OF the United States
was authorized TO be made i'll April last, large eX-
penditures have been incurred, and the precious
blood of many of our patriotic feIIow-citizens has
been shed in the prosecution OF the war inns con-
sderation and the obstinate perseverance OF Mexico
in protracting the war; must influence the terms OF
peace which 1t may be deemed proper hereafter W
accept.
Our armies having been every where victorious,
having subjected to our military occupation large
portion of the enemy country, including his capitol,
and negotiations for peace having failed, the lmpor
tant question arises, In what manner the war ought
to be prosecuted2 and what should be our future
policy? cannot doubt that we should secure ana
render available the conquests winch we nave
already made; and that, with this view, we should
hold and occupy by our naval and military forces,
all the ports towns, cities, and provinces, now III
our occupation, or which may hereafter iau lhto our
posscsson that we should press forward our militia
ry operations, and levy such mllitary contr'nHqons
on the enemy, as may as far as pracucaDle; oenay
the future expenses OF the war.
Had the government Of Mexico acceded to the
equitable and liberal terms proposed that mode Oh
adjustment would have been preferred. Mexico
having declined to do this, and failed to otler any
other terms which could be accepted by the United
States, the national honor, no less than the puonG
interests, requires that the war should DC P!secueg
with increased energy and power until just ana
satisfactory neace can be obtained. In the mean
time, as Mexico refuses all indemnity, we should
adopt measures to indemnify ourselves by appro-
priating permanently portion OF her territory
Early after the commencement Of the war, New
Mexico and the CALIFORNIA; were takeu possession
of by our forces Our military and navaly COM
manders were ordered to conquer and hold them,
subject to be disposed of by treaty of peace.
These provinces are now in our undisputed occu-
nation, and have been so for many months; all re-
sistancc the part of Mexico having ceased within
their limits. am satisfied that they should never
be surrendered to Mexico. Should Congress concur
with me in this opinion, and that they should be
retained by the United States as indemnity, cah
perceive no good reason why the civil jurisdiction
and laws of the United States should not at once De
extended over them. To wait for treaty OF peace,
such as we are willing to make, by winch our re-
lations towards them would not be changed, cannot
be good policy; whilst our own interest, and that OF
the people inhabtng them requires stable, feSPoh-
sibe, and free government under our arthorltV
should as soon as possible be established over them
Should Congress, therefore, determine to hold these
provinces permanently, and that they should here
after be considered as constituent parts OF our cou'-
try, the early establishment of territorial govern
rlents over them will be important for the more
perfect protection Of persons and property; and |
recommend that such territorial governments be
established 1t will promote peace and tranquility
among the inhabitants by allayng all apprehensons
that thew NAV still entertain of being again subject
to the jurisdiction of Mexico. invite the early
and favorable consideration OF Congress to TINS
important subject
other Mexican provinces which have been reduced
to our possession by conquest lhese other mexican
provinces are now governed by our mihtary ana
naval
which is conferred upon conqueror, by the laws OF
war. They should continue to be held as means
of coerciug Mexico to accede to just terms OF peace
Civil as well as military officers are required 10 con-
duct such q government. Adequate compensation
to he drawn from contributions levied on the enemy
should be fixed by law for such officers as may be
thus employed What further provision may be-
come necessary, and what final disposition 1t may
he proper to make of them, must depend on the tu-
ture progress of the war, and the course which Mex
leo may think proper hereafter to pursue =,
With the views | entertain, cannot favor the
nocv which has been suggested, either to Withdraw
onr army Altogether or to retire to designated line
and simply hold and defend it. To withdraw oui
army altogetherfrom the conquests they have made
by deeds of unparalleled bravery, and at the eX
nense Of so much blood and treasure in war OF Jus
lice on orr part and one which, by the act of the enc
nv we could not honorably have avoided, would be t
degrade the nation III its own estimation ana IN ina
of the world ,,,,,c,: :.
would not terminate the war. On the contrary l
would encourage Mexico to persevcre, and tend t
nrotract it indefinitely 1t is not to be expected
as apernanent boundary, when our victorious arm,
are in possession Of her capital and IN the heart
her country would permit us to hold 1t without re
sistance That she would continue the war, and II
no donbt A border warfare in the most savag
character extending over long line would b
increasingly waged. 1t would require large army
10 be kent constantly in the field stationed at post
Il HlNNNNN $3.50 49,
fend Il. The enemy relieved from the pressure q
our arms on his coasts and in the populous parts
the interior, would direct his attention to TINS line
and selecting isolated post for attack would con
centrate his forces upon it. THIS would pc con
Gton of affairs which the Mexicans, pursuing thel
fovorite system Of guerilla warfare, would probaol
nrcfer to any other. Were we to assume deier
sive attitude on such line all me advantages
such state of war would be on the side OF the enc
nv We could levy no contributions upon nm, q
in anv other way make him feel the pressure of tn
war Int must remain inactive and await his al
rroscb bcngTin constant uncertainty at what poil
On thn line or ut what time, he might make an as
SAINT. He NAV assemble and organize an over
whelning force in the interior, on his own side
the line, and concealing his purpose, make sue
den assault upon some one OF our posts so dlsEu
from anv other as to prevent the possibility OF time
lv succ6r or renforcements and in this way ou
Gallant army would be exposed to the danger OF Dc
lug cut off in details or, If, by Their uneqnaile
hrIverv and proves every where exhibited durn
this war they should repulse the enemy, their nun
bers stationed at any one post may DC too smal
nursue him. If the enemy be repulsed i'll one attac
he would have nothing to 90 but 10 rercat 10
own side of the line, and, being in no fear OF q pu
euinr army may reinforce himself at leisure, II
another attack on the same or some other Iost'
He NAV too cross the line between our post
make rapid ncursons into the country which v
Hold, murder the inhabitants, commit depredatloi
on them and then retreat to the interior before
sufficient force can be concentrated to pursue hi
Such would probably be the harrassing character
a mere defensive war on our part IL our Toes, Wn
attacked, or threatened with attack, be permitted
cross the line and we drive back the enemy and co
quor him, this would be again to invade the enemy
country, after having lost all the advantages OF t
connuests we have already made, by having volu
tarily abandoned them. To hold such a line su
cessuy, and in security, it is far from being ccrta
that it would not require as large an army as won
he necessary to hold all the Conqucsts we have
ready made, and to continue the prosecution of t
war in the heart of the enemy's country. 1t is al
fur from being certain that the expenses Of the W
would be diminished by such policy.
aro nersuadcd that the best means of vindcati
the national honor and interest, and Of bringing t
war to an honorable close will be to prosecute
with increased energy and power i'll the vital pa
c,ntrt