Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1847-12-17
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR.
This is long and ably written document,
and we regret that our limits will not permit
us to place it before our readers in this num-
Der of the Journal. We, however, make room
for the following extract, which we consider
of the greatest Importance just at this time
It will be seen that the Secretary has selected
three modes as to the future operations of our
army in Mexico, for the consideration of Con-
gress. He briefly but forcibly discusses
them all, and selects the third as the most
preferable, which is vigorous prosecution of
the war; But we invite the readers attention
to the extract we make on this subject:
"Our further operations must, in my opin-
ion, be conducted in one of the three follow
ing modes: = take and hold an indemnity line
to recede from all places and positions now
occupied in advance of it, and cease from all
aggressive operations beyond that line; second,
10 overrun the whole country, and hold all
the principal places in it by permanent garr-
sons; and third, to retain what we now pos
sess, open the lines of communication into the
interior, and extend our operations to other
important places, as our means and the pros
pect of advantages shall misunderstanding a
disposable force always ready, within ap-
proachable limits, to annoy the enemy, to
seize supplies, enforce contributions, and frus-
trate his efforts TO collect means and assemble
troops for the purpose Of protracting the war.
&c full discussion of the comparative mer-
its of these modes Of conducting our military
operations would extend this communication
to an unwarrantable length; shall, therefore,
continue my remarks to few prominent con-
siderations relative to each.
"With reference to speedy peace, with pro-
per indemnity and security--the only object
of the Wharf.-The line policy is regarded as OBJ
jectionable. If our present position cannot
command acceptable terms Of pacifcation from
Mexico, retiring to an indemnity line would
certainly fail to produce such result; it would
weaken the inducements of the enemy to put
an end to hostilities. Restored, by our vol
untary surrender, to the possession of his cap
ital and important departments, and relieved
from the pressure of our arms, and from all
apprehensions of further conquest and annoy
ance, beyond the limits we might select, he
would be left with more abundant resources
than he now possesses, to prepare, at leisure
and in security, to strike an effective blow with
concentrated forces at our detached posts. To
hold these posts safely, 20 retain possession OF
the sea ports we now have, if that should fall
within the policy,) and to prevent incursions
into the territories which we might choose to
appropriate to ourselves, would, in my opin.
ion, require a force as large as would suffice
to maintain what we now occupy, and to car
nv our operations still further in the interior Of
the enemy's country, and make him feel the
calamities of war in way best calculated &c
induce him to seek for peace. But if in this
am mistaken, and the line policy should ena
BILE us TO reduce the number of our troops, still
it will not, as conceive, thereby effect a re-
ductlon OF our actual expenditures for the war
s In consequence of the interruption of in
tercourse between the seaports in our posses
sion, and the central parts of Mexico, the col
lectons on imports have hitherto been incon
siderable. If the line policy is adopted, thi:
intercourse will continue to be interrupted
and, consequently, the receipts of revenue
from this source will be small.
"Under the operation of the lne-policY, al
expectation of lessening the burden of sustain
ing our troops, by deriving supplies and con
tributions from the enemy, would be disap
pointed. The supplies in the vicinity of ou
posts would be Withdrawn from our reach, a
soon as our design to seize and appropriate
them was ascertained or suspected. But, wer
it otherwise, as our posts would be remot
from the wealth and resources OF the country