Juliet signal. [volume] (Juliet [i.e. Joliet], Ill.) 1844-1???, 1847-12-21

either to Withdraw the army altogether, or
to retire to a designated line, and simply
hold and defend it. To withdraw our ar
myatogetherfromth conquests they have
made by deeds Of unparalleled bravery.
and at the expense of so much blood and
treasure, in war just on our part and
enc which, by the act of the enemy, we
could not have honorably avoided, would
be to degrade the ration in its own est.
nation, and in that Of the world. To re-
IRE to ti0e, AMI simply hold and defend
It. would not terminate the war. On the
'contrsry, ii would encourage Mexico to
persevere, ind tend to protract it indefi.
nitety, 'si a...' ..'s -af '.4E4
Il is not to be expected that McKee,. az.
sec refusing 10 establish such a line, as a
permanent boundary, when our victorious
armies are in possession of her CAPITAL.
and heart OF country, would permit us to
holdIt without resistance. That she VOID
continue it, and that in the most harass;no,
and annoying forms, there can be no donbi
n border warfare, of most savage char.
scter' extending over a long line, would
be increasingly waged. 1t would require
large army to be kept continually in the
neld' stationed at posts and garrisons a.
long such line, to protect and defend il.
Inc enemy, relieved from the presence IF
our armies on his coasts, and the populous
parts OF the interior, would direct. and go.
FectIng an isolated post ior attack, would
concentrate his forces upon il. This
would be condition of affairs, which the
Mexicans, pursuing their favorite system
o. guerrilla warfare, would probably pre-
Ter to any other. Were we to assume
defensive attitude on such a line. all the
advantages Of such a state of war would
he on the side of the enemy. We could
levy no contributions upon him, or IN anv
other way make him feel the pressure of
Inc war; but must remain inactive and a.
wait his approach being in constant un-
certainty ut what point of the line, or at
what time he might make the assault. He
may assemble and organize an oYerwhel-
ming force in the interior, on his own side
OF the line, and concealing his purpose.
make sudden assault upon some one of
our posts, so distant from any other as to
prevent the possibility oftimely succor or
reinforcement; and in this way our gallant
army would be exposed to the danger of
being cut off in detail, or if by their un-
riVol!ed bravery and proves, everywhere
exhibited during this war, they should re-
pei the enemy, their numbers stationed al
any one point may be too small to pursue
him. go.
If the enemy be repulsed in an attack,
ha WILL hoya pnfb;p ole,o 81 L.
treat his own side ofthe line, and beng in
no fear of pursuing enemy, may rein
force himself at leisure for another at
tack on the same, or on some other point.
He may, too, cross the line between the
posts, make incursions into the country
which we hold, murder the inhabitants
thereof, and then retreat to the interior,
before sufficient force can be concentra-
ted TO pursue him. Such would probably
be the harassing character of a more de-
fensive war on our part. If our forces,
when attacked or threatened with attack,
be permitted to cross the line. drive back
the enemy and conquer him, this would be
again to invade the enemy's country, af-
ter having lost all the advantages of the
conquests we have already made. by hay
ing voluntarily abandoned them. To hold
such line successfully, and in security,
it is far from beng certain that it would
not require as large an army as would be
necessary TO hold all the conquests we
have already made, and TO continue the
prosecution OF the war in the heart of the
enemy's country. 1t is also far from be-
ing certain that the expenses of the war
would be diminished by such policy.
lam persuaded that the best means of
vindicatlng the national honor and inter-
ests, and Of bringing the war to an honor
able Llose, will be to prosecute it with in
creased energy and power, in the vital
part ofthe enemy's country. In my an
nual message to Congress. declared that
thy war had not been waged with a view to
conquest; but having been commercially
Mexico, il has been carried into the enc
my's couBtry,an will be vigorously pros
ecuted there, with view to obtain an hon
orable peace, and thereby secure ample
indemnity for the expense of the war as
we'll as to our much injured citizens, who
, hold pecuniary demand against Mexico.
Such, in my iHdgmentco ntinues to be the
true policy, indeed the only policy which
will probably secure a permanent peace.
L has never been contemplated by me,
as an objec: OF the war, 10 make perma-
aent conquest Of the Republic of Mexico;
or to annihilate her separate existence as
an, independent nation. On the contrary
ithas ever been my desire that she main
tain her nationality; and under good
government, adapted to her condition be
aProspeSous and free republic. The u
nited States were the first among the ma
ions % recognize her independence; and