Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-23

~ ~ sN
Madison Papers.
In our critisism of the Constitution, we
have proceeded thus far on the plan of allow
ing Mr.. Spooner to explain the rules of law
in his own way, and to extend them as far
as he pleases. Let us now pause a moment,
and see whether any legal decisions or prin-
ciples sustain him to the full extent Of the
rules he lays down. These are Up. 62.)
LIST. Where words are susceptible of two
meanings, one consistent, and the other in
consistent, with justice and natural right, that
meaning, and only that meaning. which is con-
sistent with right shall be attributed to them
-anless other parts of the instrument over
rule that Interpretation.
I'd. "Another rule is, that no eTtrGreOuS or
historical eUidence shall be admitted to fix up
on a statute an unjust or immoral meaning,
when the words themselves of the act are sus-
ceptible of an innocent one."
The only authority he adduces in support
OF these is the following sentence from 2.
Cranch, 800:
"Where rights are infringed, where funda-
mental principles are overthrown, where the
general system of the law is departed from,
the legislative intention must be expressed
with irresistible cledrness, to induce "a Court
of Justice to suppose a design to effect such
Objects"
We see nothing here which supports the
second rule laid down by Mr.. Spooner. The
Court hold that " the intention must be ex-
pressed with irresistible clearness," but say
nothing Of the means by which they will ar
rive at such irresistible certainty as to the in
tention Of the legislator, whether they shall
be exclusively internal or not. Elsewhere he
cites the language OF Marshall-"The inten-
ton is TO be collected from the words."-(l2.
Wheaton. 1922 But neither does this sup
port Mr.. Spooner's second rule, for it is evil
dent from all the other decisions of the Chief
Justice, that where words are ambiguous, and
admit Of a construction more or less extended,
the extent of the power is to be fixed by con-
sidering the general objects of the Constitu-
ton, the practice under it, and the historical
evidence Of the meaning. In all his great de-
cisions he constantly refers TO the history and
institutions of the country. He does so in
this very case from which these words are
cited. Also at length in 4. Wheaton, 122
6. Wheaton, 264 g.. Wheaton, l /; ~. Whea.
ton, 4l9. In Q. Wheaton, L. he says:
1--WE know of no rule for constituting the
extent of such powers, other than the language
of the instrument which c%onfers them, taker
in connection with the purposes for which
they were conferred"
Let the reader refer, on this point, to tn,
authorities cited in our second article, espc
cially 10 that from 3. Howard, "a. In III,
whole course of the Supreme Court decisions
we know Of no such rule as this second ont
Of Mr.. Spooner's. In the whole of Judg,
Story's chapter on rules of Interpretation
Comm. Blk. Ill. C. W where he has group
ed together all the decisions CT the Suprem,
Court on this point, there is no ~allusion Il
any such principle. On the contrary, Stor,
lays it down that "a power granted in gene
raj terms, is to be co-eTtensirc with the term.
unless some clear restriction on it is deduct
BILE from the context" arguments from
impolicy or inconvenience ought to have NJ
weight they are an unsafe guide; men dit
fer, and times differ &c. &c. And again
"The causes which led TO the enactment Of
law are often the best opponents of its words.
Comm. !. 1884, 4O7, 40. That the sam
rule prevails in England is shown by our pre-
vious extracts. In 8. Bingh. l9l, also, Chic
Justice Tlndal said
"If the words of an instrument be ambigu
Gus, the Court will call in aid The acts don
under it, as a clue 10 the intention Of the pa
ties.'-See Dwarris, 695. /. Kent, 462.
AS we have remarked before, reference
the institutions of the country and its histoT
is one of the means the Courts use to dete
mine, with irresistible c~learness, the meanin
of statutes.
Any other principle would lead to inn
merable absurdities. We will adducc one
two:
The Constitution makes every "natur
born citizen'' eligible to the Office of Pre-;
dent. Now, women are citizens. Are tn,
eligible! Here is a case precisely with
Mr.. Spooner's rules; the words are suscep
bic of a meaning consistent with natural il
lice in which case he says, " that meanin
and only that meaning, is to be adopted"
Rutherford Natural Law, a work of hi!
authority admits that antecedent TO son
especial compact" women have the sar
%"natural right as men to act, vote, &C.,
members Of civil society.-p. 2S9. v
know, also, that taxation and representatio
on American theory, ought to go together
and women are taxed this forms another re
son for allowing them a participation in I
honors and authority of office. Plainl
ahen, according to MIR. Spooner's rules, "
men are eligible TO the Presidency. But
is Just as plain that this is not law, nor I
meaning of the Constitution; and that I
Supreme Court would be justified in relerri
to the history and customs of the country a
of the race and class of nations to which
belong in so constituting this clause.
Mr.. Spooner has ~foreseen this absurd CO
sequence of his rules, and unwilling to I
low them to their natural result, has endes
ored to guard against it, by pointing out II
the Constitution, in speaking Of the Preside
always uses the masculine gender. But :
argument proves too much. 1t would ST
women out Of the protection Of almost all CO
stitutional provisions. For instance. "
person shall be compelled 10 be a wiln'