Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1847-09-22

VI Sdu, huSet, Ao'ueiSo4o" 'nS -
o'clock in the morning, to fall back to the
village CT Coyoucan, Intending by this 20
concentrate the forces in order to meet the
movements already exhibited by the enc:
my, and to develope promptly my plan OF
operations. But this General, forgetting
that there cannot be two conimanders-in.
chiefs in the field of battle--forsetting that
the execution Of plan will not admit oi
observations tha, render it nusalory. pei
milted himself to object 10 the orders
which he had received; and as obedience
and discipline SD essential in military mat
ters had thus been banished from between
US, it became necessary, for the evadIns
Of greater evils which may be readily
foreseen, 10 tolerate what 10 consent 10
would appear an absurdity, and thus in
spite of myself was forced 10 let him 60
on, charging him with all the responsible,
ty of the result. As might have been ex-
pected, this result was fatal. lie moved
forward mutu proprio for more than a
league to choose a position whence he
could 90 out 10 meet the enemy, without
informing me in the least, either OF the
moycmen, or Of his designs. His refusal
10 comply with my directions was the firsl
notice that had Of his temerily; and i'm.
mediateIy the explosion Of cannon pointed
out his position, and al the same lime gave
me TO understand that he had engaged with
The enemy. Although oppressed with the
presenlilnenl of what was about 10 take
place, Immediately put myself at the
head of brilliant brigade Of 1000 men
and pieces Of artillery. arrived at the
moment when considerable force of the
enemy had gained the rear Of the unlOrlu.
nate Generals position; aud scarcely could
check their operations because II was al
ready near night. !,
/ But noted with The most profound
grief thai his position was all isolated one,
that there was large barranca between
US, that the enemy occupied an lnterme.
diale wood, that The force OF my command
could not advance by the route left open
without compromising themselves in the
same manner the other had done, and in
short, i, was only with battery that ar
rived late upon the field that any thing
could be accomplished. The fire having
ceased. our brigade took up its quarters in
the adjoining village Of San Angel, for The
rain fell in such torrents that TO have Kept
troops out in the field would have been
as much as to insure their defeat.
Before this, however, directed my aid
de- camp. Col. Ramiro. to 80 round the
head of the terrible barranca that lay in
'front.', and by way Of the skirt Of distant
hill, iguided by deputy, D. Jose Maria del
Rio, who was we'll acquainted With the.
ground, TO hasten al the top Of his speed TO
the camp OF the said General and give him
the most positive orders to spike bis artil-
lery, which il was no longer possibly 10
save, anu TO fall back that very night upon
San Angel with his infantry and cavalry,
by the only road that was left him. This
my aid de-camp did, communicating my
orders between 10 aud Il O'Clock at night;
but instead Of yielding implicit obedience,
the said General would hardly allow my
Aid to speak. iulerrupling him with his
wants, which were 600U men and muni-
tions; aud finally be sent him away with
Two official reports, signed aud sealed, i'll
one of which he states, that on The preyi--
Gus evening he xhade beaten the enemy
putting him 70 shameful flight, aud that
10 consequence, he had granted promotion
10 generals, chiefs and officers,
% the following morning / again ap-
peared in the same field, reinforced by
brigade which | had ordered from The
Capital, with the design of forcing the
Pass at every IIuzard; Lut when | was
commencing my operations the enemy
made their attack. Ii lasted ten minutes;
and | witnessed, in The despair the defeat
of those soldiers deserving of beler fate,
who were unfortunately commanded by
General who had cut himself off from as
sisance.
The consequence of this defeat were to
me terrible ; The enemy, by rapid move.
meut, could now arrive at the Capital
before il could possibly be succoIed ; he
could, by flank movement, cut oil my
detachments; he could, from the result Of
his victory, brius the whole Of his forces to
bear upon part Of mine; anu, in fine.trom
the INSTRUMENTATION and want Of skill of
slnSle general, ne tuiueu " h'e Wv" ~
cOun: all the advantages Of ryposl'on.
The strong advance work OF San Antonio
could not 6e defended because our line
hadbeen cur;audl directed lhat,he garrison
should Withdraw while | was covering the
fort aud tele de pontof Churubusco. The
enemy advanced. and, cutting of part
of the troops that were in retreat, presented
himself in front ofour most advanced
enlreuchmenrs. Here again put myself
at the head of our soldiers. and ;my efforts
cost The enemy the loss Of no little blood,
Our losses. although lamenlable, were the
natural consequences ola sudden retreat,
occasoped by the surprise, and embar-
rassed by the trains which were passing
alone The narrow causeway, hanked
throughout its whole extent. The defence
was from line 10 line, until arriving at the
third line, where /, in person, checked
the enemy, aud thus saved The Capital,
which had been so unexpectedly exposed
TO danger. While was occupying myself
on the 22d, with the reorganization of the
forces aud the manning Of the batteries