Windham County Democrat. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1836-1853, 1847-12-30

yon 'lie collection of materials and the neei,l n.
P" S lor carving 1t on early in the spring
49, st e',eer Oh success, so disastrous to Mexico.
Il conquest OF SO lraiiy Of her States and ,orr,o
res tne suhJugation and occupation of ber c;,I
uercat ana dispersion of her armies: the con
vi ros OF her 'ndieriet of war; and the annhi
,'9 VI hsr lorelgn commerce. have not vet Ir,juas
INC still continues: ana X Is pfopef 10
some suggestions in regard to IFS further prosecttloni
In making these suggestions, pass, without remarks
the proposition that we should abandon all our ac-
questions, and withdraw our troops from the enc
nys country. Such proposition could only hc Sc
riously entertained If we were in reality the van
pushed party, and were convinced of our inability
to proong the contest with reasonable hope of sue
cess
Our further operations must in my opinion be
conducted in of the three following modes
frst to take and hold indemnity lines recedo
from all places and positions occupied in att
of it, and cease from all aggressive operations
beyond that line; seco'it to the whole
try and hold all the principal places in it by perna-
nent garrisons; and third, to retain what we now
possess, open the lines of communication into the
interior, and extend bur operations to other mpor-
tant places, as our means and the prospect of adj
vantages shall misunderstanding disposabe force
always ready within approachable limits to annoy
the enemy, to seize supplies enforce contributions;
and Illustrate his efforts TO collect means and
bic troops for the purpose Of protracting the
A full discussion of the comparative merits OF
these modes of conducting military operations,
would extend this communication 10 an unwarranta-
bic length | shall, therefore, cohine my remarks to
Il few prominent considerations relative TO each.
With reference TO Il speedy peace, with proper in
demnity and sccurity-the only object of the
the line policy is regarded us Objectionable If our
present position cannot command acceptable terms
of pacfcaon from Mexico, retiring TO an indemnity
line 'vo"Id "oriainy 1il tn produce snrh result il
would weaken the inducements of the enemy To put
an end to hostilities. Restored, by our voluntary
surrender, TO the possession of his capital and i'm
portant departments and relieved from the pressure
of and from nil lpnsion of fitrtha
conquest and annoyance, beyond the limits he might
select he would be left with more abundant resour-
ces than he now possesses TO prepare, at leisure and
in security, strike effective blow with concen-
trated forces at our detached posts To hold these
posts safely, to retain possession of the seaports
have, m that shall fall within the poIicy) and to
prevent incursions into the territories which we
might choose to appropriate to ourselves, would, in
my opinion, require force as large would suffice
to maintain what occupy and to carry Our
operations still further i'll the interior of the enemys
country, and make him feel the caamities of war in
way best calculated TO induce him to seek for peace.
But if i'll this ! am mistaken, and the ne-pocy
should enable to reduce the number of troops.
STILL it will not, conceive, thereby effect reduce
ton of our actual expenditures for the war.
In consequence of the interruption of intercourse
between the seaports in possession, and the
trail parts of Mexico the collections on imports have
hitherto been inconsiderabe. II the ne-pocy is
adopted, this intercourse will continue 10 be inter-
rupted, and, consequently, the receipts of revenue
from this source will be small
Under tile operation of the linepolcy, all expect
H'ion oI iessenng burden sIisrnininq orr
troops by deriving our supplies and contributions
from the enemy, would be disappointed. The SUI
plies in the vicinity of our posts would he Withdrawn
from our reach, as soon design to seize and
appropriate them was ascertained or suspected. But
were 1t otherwise, as our posts would be remote from
Tie wealth and resources of the country, the amount
which could be obtained would be inconsderabe:
so far from deriving advantage from the linepoli-
cy by way OF obtaining assistance from the resour-
ces OF the enemy, towards the support of our troops
we should apprcliend, confer upon portion of the
people Of Mexico direct benefit, by opening 10
them at our posts market, in which we should be-
come the purchasers of their products at an exorbi-
tant price. These considerations, without bringing
into view others, have led me to look at one of the
other modes of operation have mentioned, as pre-
ierable to that OF occupying an indemnity line.
In regard TO the second mode suggested-that of
occupying the whole couDtry-the wide extent of
territory embraced in the Mexican republic, the ma
ny important points to be garrsoned, and the long
lines OF communication TO be kept Open presents
difficulties of no ordinary magnitude, if our occu-
pancy is to he of such character as 10 supersedc
the Mexican authority, and require the temporary
establishment OF civil government In carrying this
plan into effect it would not be reasonable TO RELY
upon the favorable disposition, or even neutrality of
any considerable part of the Mexican people, until
some assurance of the stability of Our power was
derived from its continuance. Our posts must there
tore be strong, and our forces numerous in order 10
secure the many and long lines of communication,
to dispense and chastise the guerilla bands which
would obstruct them, and to suppress the more
powerful usurpings of the people wherever they
may he attempted. cannot safely estimate the force
requisite 10 carry into full effect this plan, at less
than seventy thousand men. To insure the presencc
OF that hhnber in the enemy's country, and at pla-
ces where they would be wanted, it would be neces-
sary raise much larger force. The great expense
of raising, organizing, and sending TO their remote
destination so large body of troops as soon as need
ed to give effect to this plan, would apprehend,
bring very heavy, and perhaps embarrassing, de-
mand upon the treasury.
The third mode presented is, in my Judgment
preferable TO tile others. Beyond certain limits, it
admits of expansion and contraction but, as fixed
condition, all now held is to be retained and no part
surrendered, but in compliance with treaty stipdla-
lions This plan also cOnemplates further acquisi-
tons extending 10 other important points, more or
less numerous, as circumstances may warrant
Notwithstanding our victories have fallen with
crushing weight upon the assembled armies of Mex
co most of those who hold in their hands the deci-
sion of the question -, ny eX@
tending the theatre of it, and changing The mode OF
conducting it, they can be made to feel its pressure.
In consequence of our liberal and humane policy,
we have, us yet, scarcely touched the substance oI
the wealthy and influential classes in Mexico. As
the Mexican army has long been TO them The instru-
ment of oppression in the hands of their successive
rulers its destruction has not deeply enlisted their
sympathies, alarmed their fears. Our army has
afforded them better protection than lhelr own anu
thus by our presence and orbearance, they haye
within certain limits hitherto escaped exactions from
either. But our successes have now opened the way
TO act upon and influence those who probably can,
if they WILL put an end to hostlies. 10y making
them suffer the usual ceamltIes OF war, they must
be made 10 desire peace.
In addition to the troops required to garrison pln-
ces be retained is proposed TO have IN the neld
competent force for aggressive opeTaions-to STRIKE
the enemy whenever he may present vulnerable
noint: 10 omen avenues from the ports in our pos
! into tla