Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-06-19

1
of discovering works completely masked when the approach 10
the vicinity of those works is guarded by the enemies pic
quets, who e upon them time they within sight
OF any portion OF their line OF works The stone breawork
extended from battery No. to battery No ?, distance
of about 800 yards this work all points partially con-
ceaed with brush, and there nothing at the point assault
ed which indicated concealed masked works at that place
more than any other portion OF the line. No matter what
portion the line was approached the enemies pcquels fired
upon the recommending parties Under these circumstances
impossible for the most sklul engineers, by acts the
most daring to make any better reconnaissance than
made during four days aduous and peous Duty exposed TO
the constant fire OF the enemys picquets.
knew the works very strong, and reported TO the
General Chief and that would cost large portion OF my
command carry them His reply was, The enemy there
in strong position and force, and he must be whipped and
direct you assault him in the 'front.' believing you will do
your duty" II we had known the exact strength of this po-
son would probably have sought other place to have
but it not probable we would have Jared much
better ~.
The question is distinctly asked, "Why assaulted bate
y No. why did so before was ready and with SO small
force " As to these questions refer TO the ol-
lowing portion OF my detailed report "Upon arriving at my
position for assault commenced the formation OF my ASSAULT
ing forces without the loss of moments time. had my
self placed Col Haskes regiment in position for assault mp.
on the left side OF the angle had placed Col Robess regl
ment he supporting force Of askes regimen in position
short distance in the had ordered Wynkoops regi
ment he advance Of the other asaung foce) It's posi-
ton (and it its way to its position with Col Camp
bells regiment its supporting force when the enemy dis
command This fire destructive that it would have
swept away my entire command had remained in its posi-
long enough to have completed the formation OF the
forces for the assault Owing the mpeneabe chaparral
which covered the whole face of the country, it equally
impossible fall back and complete the movement, if
such movement would not have thrown the force entirely
out of position Seeing that alternative left me but to
retreat with the whole command in the face Of the
fire. and break the order of bae and violate the orders of
the General Chief and thus bring disgrace upon the whole
brigade dash rapidly forward upon the enemy works
with the forces which in position, instantly sent my
ddecamp Lieut. Rains, with orders to bring Col Robertss
regiment quickly possible to the support OF Col HASKELL
and directed this last regiment charge the enemys works
also sent my -de-camp Lieut. Anderson, TO Col Wyn
koop with orders for similar movement upon the works in
front of his position, being the opposite side of the angle
Haskes regiment dashed noby forward with shout OF
husiasm Hence it will be that the course which
took of charging the works the only one left me.
1t is manifest therefore, that the effort throw upon
the responsibility of the failure carry the work assaulted
Ceno Godo is altogether unjust The alleged in my
orders and dispositions of the assaung forces have shown
but that they were the contrary, the pro-
per orders and dispositions for that purpose most vigorous
and determined e,rt made to carry them by Col Has
kes regiment not successful because OF the strength
the work assaled and the almost nsumountabe obstacles
and barriers to its approach Though Col Roberts was IN
close supporting distance of Col HASKELL being within $50
200 YARDS and ordered his immediate support before
the latter ordered charge yet he did not get up time
sustain the assault made by Hakes regiment before
cut down and forced to retire. Upon the report of the fact to
me, though at the time entirely disabled in the use of
my right arm by canister shot, Immediately formed the
whole command the attack and had ordered the
charge when the enemy up the white flag and render
ed disposed charge the fault of this failure to the
misconduct of any officer portion of my command, but to
the Gibraltar like strength Of the works themselves
The Colonel further says enjoy the reputation OF leading
his command in this charge Cerro Gordo was not
that enjoyed the reputation of doing what nowhere claim
to have done In my official report distinctly state that
the head of the column-n person placed his
OTderad ordered Col
Wynkoop his position, and that after having or
which fully explained in my detailed repor ordered the
charge of his regiment then moved the line OF the
e intending lead il person the sorming party Of
which Col Wynkoops regiment constituted the advance but
prevented by wound received from doing II had
led the charge of HaskePs command think should have
led it differently and with different results and the severity
of the fire had down all my field officers except myself
driven back my command, think should have fallen
back with it in good order. GIDEON ]. PILLOW.
NEW ORLEANS, JUNE Z, lS47.