Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1847-01-23
From the Ns~ Orleans Picayune.
THE WAR--LAST CAMPAIGN
FUTURE OPERATIONS,

from he New Orleans Pic0yune.
THE WAR--LAST CAMPAIGN
FUTURE OPERATIONS.
The annexed criticism upon the opera.
tons of the Army in Mexico. is from the
pen of gentleman who is every inch
soldier. Its temper is unexceptionable, and
it's reasoning 10 deserving of the most Sc
rious consideration. Whatever opinions
may be entertained respecting the conclu-
sions to which the writer has arrived, il
will be conceded that he scrutinizes the past
with military eye. and prndicts the fu-
ture with the boldness of mind convin.
ced Of the accuracy of its deductions.
MONTEREY, Mexico, Dec. 9th, ls46.
In writing of the operations of the cam
Paign, beg that l may not be cassed
among the "scribes from the Army" who
write only to trumpet forth their own fame
nd that of their corps--doing justice to
none, injustice to many, and binding the
people as TO the operations Of the army
Such letters ire read with deep regret, for
they are disparaging to the reputation and
good name of the American soldiery. l
suppose the people are, and indeed ought
to be, satisfied with the achievements of the
Army. We have accomplished a great
deal under many difficulties and trammels
and having done so much, we must claim
the privilege of pointing GU, those difficult
ties and trammels, Of showing cause why
they should never have existed, and proving
that had they not existed, we should be
much further advanced in attaining our OBJ
ject--an advantageous peace.
The fundamental principle in war is "to
operate, with superior forces, combined
movement on decisive point" and no plan
Of campaign can be promptly successful
unless framed on this principle. particularly
where il is thesintention to act entirely on
the offensive. Unfortunately for our Gov
eminent this principle did not enter as an
element in the present plan of campaign,
and all operations growing out Of it are ne
cessariIy directly opposed to it. Had we
met an enterprising enemy, this defect in
the present plan of campaign would have
been rendered much more apparent, and its
failure much more signal by it's defeat in
detail. Suppose Gen. Wool, with his force
and enormous supply Of transportation and
subsistence, had been concentrated on Gen.
Taylor, would the latter have marched on
Monterey with only 5000 men, not having
more than enough transportation to carry
subsistence for that number, and having to
leave behind him his battery train on that
account? Gen. Taylor had not sufficient
transportation, with depot as near as Ger
ralvo in his rear, to transport with his army
of 5000 men supply to subsist it longer
than two days after the Oath, Qhe day Of
capitulation,) and had during the engage.
ment 10 despatch his train back TO Cerralvo.
Had this concentration been effected, Gen.
Taylor would have had with his army be.
fore Monterey one months supplies, when
he could have forced an unconditional sur
render of the town and forces, or followed
on their rear in retreat and eventually have
captured or massacred Ampudia's entire
army.
Had not the chihuahua expedition been
planned, and had the force and supplies of
that army been promptly concentrated on
General Taylor, we would have been be-.
fore Monterey eight weeks sooner. when
it might have been taken without firing a
gun. And why was this Chihuahua expe.
dition portion of the plan of campaign!
Was it not reasonable to suppose that after
our victories before Matamoras, our enemy
would occupy and hold, as strategic points.
Monterey and Saltillo, covering the strong.
est passes in the Sierra Madre, and having
San Luis Potosi as base Of operation?--
San Luis should then have been, in the plan
of campaign, the objective point, and all of
our energies should have been exerted
on this line. As it turns out. General Kear-
ney takes New Mexico without firing a
gun. Chihuahua is taken by small detach-
ment from his command without firing a
gun, and after the battle of Monterey Gen.
Wool arrives at Monclova, and reports his
advance on Chihuahua as useless, whilst
our enemy, whipped at Monterey, abandons
Saltillo and concentrates at San Luis
which he never could have done had Gen.
Woods army been promptly united with
General Taylor's. Owing to this error in
the plan Of campaign, our enemy not only
gained time TO fortify and fight at Monterey
but as natural consequence from it, he
also gained time again to concentrate al
San Luis. With the combined material oil
the two armies the objective point, San
Luis. might have been gained, and, by a
decisive action with Ampudia's forces alone
at that point, the campaign might have
been ended, and probably the war. These
are some of the difficulties under which we
have labored. and but for which our Army
could have done much more for the coun.
! try. BY these General Taylor has beer
trammelled in his operations, and has no,
had an opportunity TO display to the world
what he could have done, had the plan Of
: campaign been framed on military princ
pies.
But let us look little further into thu