Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1847-12-17
the amount which could be obtained would be
lnconsiderahla

uncomfortable.
>. so, far from deriving advantage from the
ine'pollcy, by way of obtaining assistance
from the resources of the enemy, towards the
support OF our troops, we should, apprehend,
confer upon portion of the people of NIexi-
co direct benefit, by opening to them at our
posts market, in which we should become
the purchasers of their products at an exhor-
bltant price. These considerations, without
bringing into view others, have led me to
look to one of the other modes of operation [
have mentioned, as preferable to that of &C.
cupying an indemnify line.
&C In regard to the second mode suggested
that of occupying the whole countryside
wide extent of territory embraced in the Mex
lean republic, the many important points to
be garrisoned, and the long lines of communi-
cation to be kept open, present difficulties of
no ordinary magnitude, if our occupancy is to
be of such a character as to supercede the
Mexican authority, and require the temporary
establishment OF civil government. In carry
ing this plan INTO effect, it would not be rea-
| sonable to rely upon the favorable disposition.
or even neutrality, of any considerable part of
the Mexican people. until some assurance of
the stability OF our power was derived from its
continuance. Our posts must therefore be
strong, and our forces numerous, in order to
secure the many and long lines of communica-
ton, to depress and chastise the guerrilla
bands which would obstruct them, and TO sup
press the more powerful uprisings of the peo-
pie wherever they may be attempted cannot
safely estimate the force requisite to carry in
10 1ull effect this plan, at less than seventy
thousand men. 10 insure the presence of that
number IN the enemy's country, and at places
where they would be wanted, it would be ne
cessary TO raise much larger force. The
great expense OF raising, organizing, and SEN
ding to their remote destination so large bo-
dy OF troops as soon as needed 10 give effect
to this plan, would, Iapprehend, bring very
heavy. and perhaps embarrassing, demand up
on the treasury.
''The third mode presented is, in my iudg-
ment, preferable to the others. Beyond GER
tain limits, it admits of expansion and contrac-
ton; but, as fixed condition, all now held is
to be retained, and no part surrendered, but in
compliance with treaty stipulations This
plan also contemplates further acquisitions ex-
tending TO other important points, more or less
numerous, as circumstances may warrant
Notwithstanding ouI victories have fallen
with crushing weight upon the assembled az
mics Of Mexico, most of those who hold in
their hands the decision of the question Of
peace, have stood beyond the range of the
physical evils inflicted by the war By ex-
tending the theatre of it, and changing the
mode of conducting it, they can be made to
feel its pressure. In consequence of our lib
eral and humane policy, we have, as yet.
scarcely touched the substance OF the wealthy
and influential classes in Mexico As the
Mexican army has long been to them the in
strument Of oppression in the hands of their
successive rulers, its destruction has not deep
y enlisted their sympathies, or alarmed their
fears. Our army has afforded them better pro-
lection than their own; and thus. by our pres
ence and our forbearance, they have, within
certain limits, hitherto escaped exactions from
either. But our successes have now opened
the way to act upon and influence those who
probably can, if they will, put an end to hos
tilities. By making them suffer the usual Ca
lamites of war, they must be made to desire
peace.
&c In addition to the troops required to gar
rison places to be retained, it is proposed to
have in he field a competent force for aggress-
| i've operations-to strike the enemy whenever
! he may present vulnerable point; to open
avenues from the ports in our possession into
the enemy's country, and to cover and sub
tricts and productive agricultural regions. j
is not deemed proper to point out in more de-
tail the movements and objects contempt LATED
in the further prosecution of the war upor
this plan.''