Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1847-12-14
VOLUME XLiV.-NUMBER IS.


efforts 10 collect means ard assemble troops hi
the purpose OF prU.racing The war.
A !ull discussion OF Inc compa ra,ive merits OF
these modes OF conducting our military operations
would extend this communication 10 an unwar-
rantable lensth; shall, therefore, conhne my
remarks 10 few prominent considerations reia-
tive 10 each.
With reference 10 speedy peace, with proper
indemnity and secuTiiy-he Only object G! the
Waffle line policy is regarded as Objectionable.
Ii our present position cannot command accep!a-
BILE terms OF pacifcaioa from Mexico retiring TO
an indie unity line would ceriany~Tail 10 produce
such result, i, would weaken the inducements
OF the enemy TO put cid 10 hos'iities. Re-
stored, by our voluntary surrender 10 the posses.
sion Of his capital and important departments,
and relieved iiom the pressure Of our arms, and
lrcm all apprei eGsioas OF further conquest and
annoyance, beyond the limits We might select, ne
would be left with more abundani resources than
he now possesses 10 prepare, at leisure and in Sc
curly, 10 strike an effective blow with c1ncenlral
ed forces al our detached posts. To hold these
posts SAFELY 10 retain possession Of the seaporis
We now have, III iha, should Tail within the poll
CYL and 10 prevent ncrlsiuDs lnlo the territories
|, which VIC might choose 20 appropriate 10 onr.
selves, would in my opinion, require force as
| large as would suffice 10 maintain what we now
occupy, ana 10 carry our operations still further
in The interior CT the enemy's country, and make
him feel the caIanics Of war in a way bes' cal.
cuasd to induce him 10 seek for peace. But il
in This ! am mistaken, ard the linc-rolicy should
| enable US 10 reduce the number Of our troops,
STILL it will not, as conceive, thereby effect re-
duc,on Of our actual expenditures .or the war.
In consequence 81 the interruption o. intercourse
! between the seapoGs in our possession, and The
central parts OF Mexico, The collections on i'm
| potts have hitherto been inconsderable. If the
| line.poicy is adopted, this intercourse will con-
tinue 10 be interrupted, and, consequently, the re-
ceip's oi revenue from This source will BIZ snail
Under the operation Of the Iine-policy, all ex
pec,alion Of lessenlns the burden Of sustaining on
troops, by deriving supplies and contributions from
the enemy would be disappointed. The supplies
in The vicinity OF our posts, would be withdraw
from our reach, as soon as our design to anC
appropriate them was aSccrtained or suspected
But, were il otherwise, as our posts would be re-
mote rom The wealth ani resources u the coun
try, the amount which could be oba ned would bl
inconsiderabe.
Su far from deriving advantage from the line
policy, b. way OF obtaining assistance from The
resources u The enemy, towards the support oil ou
/ troops, should, apprehend, confer upon a
portion If lie people OF Mexico a direct ben, fix
by opening /" hem At our posts market in which
We should become the purch s.s OF their produ.l /:
al an exorhi!tnt price. These considerations
without bringing into view others, have led me IC
look 10 one 81 the other modes Of operation haze
mentioned, as preferable 10 lha, OF occupying ali
indemnify line.
In regard 10 the second mode suegesled-thal
OF occupying the whole Countrywide wide ex.
tent If territory embraced in The Mexican repub'
ic The many important points to be sarrisoncd
hp " lines ID
open, present difficulties Of no ordinary magni-
tute, If our :cupancy is IL he CT such charac-
ter as to supeIsede the Mexican authority, and re-
qure the temporary establishment OF cie!l 90
vernment In carry ing this plan into effect, it
would not be reasonable TO rely upon The iavora-
bic ,lispusilion, or even neutrality OF any c0nsie.
rablc part OF the Mexican people, until scme as.
Sufance o. the stability 0i our power was derived
from its continuance. Our posts must therefore
be strong and our forces numerous, in order 10 Sc.
cure The many and lCng lines OF communication,
to disperse and chaslisc the guerilla bands which
would obstIuct them, and 10 suppress the more
powerful uprisines Of The people wherever they
nav Be attempted | cauno safely estimate The
force requisite Ia carry in!o full effect this plan,
n less than seventy thousand men. To insure
he presence ot that number 10 the enemy's coun-
try, and al places where they would be wanted, il
would be necessary to raise much larger force.
Tho great "rrsn>e 0t raising, organizing and
sending To their remote destination SO large Boz
dy OF troops as soon as needed to give effect 10
This plan, would, Iapprehend, bling very heavy
and, perhaps, embarrassing demand upon the
treasury
The third mode presented is, in my judgment
preferable TO the others. Beyond certain limits
il admits OF expansion and contraction; but, as q
fixed condition. all now held is 10 be retained, ant
no part surrendered, but in compliance with treaty
sjpulalions. This plan also conempIa.cs turtle
acquisitions extending 10 Other important points
more or less numerous, as circumstances may
| warrant.
| Notwithstanding our victories hare fallen viii
crushing weight upon the assembled armies o
| Mexico, mos, If those who hold in their hand:
the decision of he question OF peace, have sooC
beyond The range Of The physical evils inflicted BY
he war. By extending the theatre ni il, ait
changing Inc mode OF conducting il, they can b.
made 10 feel It's pressure. In consequence u on
| liberal and humane policy, we have, as yel
scarcely touched the substance OF The wealthy I'M
| influential classes in Mexico. As The Mexican
army has long been 10 them the instrument OF op
preston in the hands Of their successive rulers
| lis destruction has not deeply enlisted their sym
pa;hies or alarmed their Tears. Our army h
Afforded them better protection than their own
and Ibus, by our presence and our iOi bearancc
they have within certain limits, hitherto escape
| exacIiOus from either. But our successes hav
now opened the way 10 Act upon aud inhuenc
| those who probably can, il they will, puI an ent
10 hcsiilities. BY making them suffer the usna
calamilies OF war, they must be made TO desi:
peace.
fConrlud,G on Ssconi Pogc1