Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1847-01-14
MONTEREY. Mexico. Dec O 1sA6


the Government
MONTEREY, Mexico Dec 9, 1876
In writing of the operations of the Campaign.
beg that may not be casscd among the ..scrbblers
from the Army" who write only to trumpet forth
their own fame and that of their corps-doing JUS
tIcc to none, injustice to MANY and blindinT The
people as to the operations of the Army Such let
tiers arc read with deep regret for they arc dspar-
aging to the reputation and good name of the A.
merican soldery, l suppose the people are, and
indeed ought to be- satisfied with the achievements
OF the Army. We have accomplished great deal
under many difficulties and trammels. and having
done 50 much we must claim the privilege of point
Ing ont those difficulties and trammels of showing
cause why they should never have existed and pro-
wing that had they not existed we should be much
further advanced in attaining ohject--an advan-
tageous peace.
The fundamental principle in war is e.,o operate,
with superior forces, combined movement on a de-
cisive point" and no plan of campaign can be
promptly successful unless framed on this principle.
particularly where is the intention to act entirely
on the offensive. Unfortunately for our Govern
ment this principle did not enter as an element in
the present plan of campaign, and all operations
growing out OF 1t are necessarily directly opposed to
n-iiad we met an enterprisng enemy, this defect
In the present plan of campaign would have been
rendered much more apparent, and its failure much
more signal by defeat in detail. Suppose General
WOOL, with his force and enormous supply of trans
Portaton and subsistence had been concentrated on
Len Taylor, would the latter have marched on
Monterey with only 5000 men, not having more
than enough transportation carry subsistence fol-
that number, and having to leave behind him his
battery train on that account2 Gen. Taylor had
not sufficient transportation, with depot as near as
Cerralyo In his rear, to transport with his army of
oOOO men supply to subsist it longer than two
days after the 9th, (he day of capitulation) and
had during the engagement to despatch his train
back ID Cerralvo. Had this concentration been eff
rectcd, Gen. Taylor would have had with his army
before Monterey one months supplies, when he
could have enforced an unconditional surrender of
the town and forces, followed their rear in re-
treat and eventually have captured OF massacred
Ampudia's entire army.
Had not the chihuahua expedition been planned,
and had the force and supplies Of that army been
promptly concentrated on Gen. Taylor, we would
have been before Monterey eight weeks sooner,
when 1t might have been taken without firing q
gun. And why was this chihuahua expedition a
portion OF the plan of campaign Was it not rea-
sonable to suppose that after our victories before
N1atamoras, our enemy would occupy and hold as
strategic points, Monterey ard Saltillo, covering
the strongest passes in the Sierra Madrc and having
San LUIS PotoSl as base of operations2 San Luz
ls should then have been, in the plan Of campaign,
TIE objectice point, and all Of energies should
have been exerted On this line. As it turns ont,
Gen. Kearney takes New Mexico without firing
gun, Chihuahua is taken by a small detachment
from his command without firing gun, and after
the battle OF Monterey Gen. Wool arrives at Mon
clova, and reports his advance on chihuahua as
useless, whilst our enemy, whipped ut Monterey,
abandons Saltio and concentrates at San Luis,
which he could never have done had Gen. Wool's
army been promptly united with Gen. Taylor's s.
Owing To this error in the plan OF campaign our
enemy not only gained time to fortify and fight at
Monterey, but rs natural consequence from it, he al
50 gained time again to concentrate at San Luis
with the combined material Of the two amies the
objective point, San Luis might have been gained
and, by decisive action with Ampudias forces n
lone, at that point, the campaign might have been
ended and probably the war.--These are some of
the difficulties under which we have labored, and
but tor which our Army could have done much more
Tor the country. BY these Gen. Taylor has been
trarnmellod in his operations, and has not had an
opportunity to display to the world what he could
have done, had tue plan of campaign been framed
on military principles
But let US look little further into the difficult
ties growing out of and caused by the present plan
OF campaign. What is the relative position of our
own and the enemy's forces at this time? Santa
Anna has beyond doubt concentrated Mt San |. uis
81 ,OO0 men he holds a central position which
with his force, cannot be approached from this di
rectlon even BY superior forces owing to the scar
city Of water which, a large portion Of the route
Is held in tanks, and entirely at the disposal Of the
enemy. He holds himself invnci5lc at that point
relying the strength Of Vera Cruz TO resist at
tack, which must be taken before we can approach
him by gaining his rear.
The number Of Gen. Taylor's army is very far
overrated, even by the Union, which seems to cs-
innate it at the actual volunteer force sent into the
field and the regular force prescribed by law with
out any allowance for the diminution Of his force
from casualties and Sickness which has far exceed
ed what might have been reasonably anticipated I'M
dor the most unfavorabie circumstances VVhatev-
may be thought Of the strength Of our force in
Mexico at this date, assert, and without fear of
contradiction that not more than fourteen thousand
eGectire men could be brought into action tomorrow
morning out of the whole army in the field. Now.
what disposition of this inferior force necessarily
results from the plan Of the campaign? San Luis
cannot be approached from this direction, and TO
get at our enemy must approach him on another
limo. But the all important passes in the Sierra
Madre must be held, TO prevent our enemy from
gaining or rear and our forces, although inferior