Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-16
From HE National A. S. Standard.
LySandCr SpOOnCr on the Constitution

domestic SLAVERY is THE MOST PRuMI-
NENT FEATURE IN THE ARIsTocRATIc cOUNTE-
NANCE OF THE PROPOSED CoNsTITUTIoN."-
Gouverneur Norris in The Conrcnii0n If 1897.
Madison Papers.
We pass to the next point Of Mr.. Spoon
er's argument, that the Constitution of the
United States legally interpreted, does not
recognize or sanction Slavery. He consid-
ers himself to have proved {:
THAT the Constitution of the United
States, not only does not recognize or sane
ton Slavery, as a legal institution, but that,
on the contrary, it presumes all men 10 be
free /; that it positively denies the right of
property in man and that it, Of Itself, makes
it impossible for Slavery to have "A legal en-
istence in any of the United States.''-(pp
Sc, sly
What, then, are the legal rules by which
the Constitution is to be interpreted The
following are those selected by Mr.. Spooner,
and upon these he bases his argument:
LIST. The language Of c.. ]. Marshall. in
Ogden .. Saunders /; ne Wheaton, 1872 y
where he said that, in constituting the Con-
stitution
"The intention of the instrument must
prevail that this intention must be collected
from its words; that its words are 10 be un-
derstood in that sense in which they are gem
orally used by those for whom the instrument
was intended, that its provisions are neither
to be restricted into insigniicance nor extended
to objects not comprehended in them, nor
contemplated by its framers."
Cd. The rule laid down by the Supreme
Court in . Cranch, 800. Here Mr.. Spoonpr
- -.ultI,, a,,-l a,.Nal L.. .l -
tence; we prefer, however, 10 give the entire
paragraph, that the reader may ave before
him the DhOie doctrine, as the Co. rt laid it
down. The sentence quoted and relied up
on by Mr.. Spooner is the second, which, for
distinction, we have included in brackets.
That the consequences, are to be consid-
cred in expounding laws, where the intent is
doubtful. is a principle not to be controvert-
ed but it is also true that it is a principle
which must be applied with caution, and
which has a degree of influence dependent on
the nature of the case TO which it is applied.
Where rights are in(ringed, where funda-
mental principles are overthrown, where the
general system of the law is departed from,
the legislative intention must be expressed
with irresistible cteurneSs, to induce a Court
of justice to suppose a design to effect such
Objects. But where only a political regula.
ton is made, which is inconvenient, if the
intention of the Legislature be expressed in
terms which are sufficiently ineligible tc
leave no doubt in the mind when the words
are taken in their ordinary SENSE, it would
be going a great way to say that a constrain.
ed Interpretation must be put on them to avoid
any inconvenience which ought to have beer
contemplated by the Legislature when the
act was passed, and which, in their opinion,
was probably counterbalanced by the p~artic.
ular advantages it was calculated to pro,
duce."
This latter rule is explained by Mr.. Spoon
er to amount to this (p. G2.)
THAT where words are susceptible Of TIVE
meanings, one consistent, and the other in
consistent, with justice and natural right
that meaning, and only thai meaning, which
is consistent with right, shall be attributed
to them-unless other parts of the instrument
override that interpretation"
And that in order to sanction anything con
trary to natural right, the terms must be
'.plenary, express, explicit, distinct, %unequiv
ocal," Up. 59,) and must need mo extrane
Gus or historical evidence to fix upon then
their immoral meaning."-P. 62.)
We shall defer our criticism on this erpla
nation to a future time, and granting Nj
Spooner, for the present, all he asks, proceed
to consider the argument he has erected up
on this basis. We will first, however, re
mind the reader of two other rules, whici
Mr.. Spooner will not dispute, so UNIVERSAL
recognized as not TO need proof, but whic
will be found in the places named.
LIST. Every word in the Constitution i
to be expounded in its plain, curious, an
Common sense, unless the context furnishe
some ground to control, qualify, or enlarg
it. If word has a technical and a commo
sense, the latter is to be preferred, unles
some attendant circumstance points clearl
TO the former"
Story Comm. l, 436, 438. c.. J. Ma
shall L, Wheaton, 3Oi, ID, Wheaton 332.-
1, Brock, 1923. Dwarris, 7O2. Kent's Conn
/, 1862. Chitty on Contracts, 81. Blacl
stone, /, 60. Federalist, SO.
In 4, Wheaton, l22, Chief Justice Ma
shall, speaking of a departure from the OF
vious meaning of words" says:
III in any case the plain meaning of a pr
vision, not contradicted by any other provi;
ion in the same instrument, is to be disrega
!ded, because we believe the trainers of III
instrument could not intend what they say
it must be one in which the absurdity and il
Justice of applying the provision to the ca:
would be so monstrous that all mankin
would, without HtSltdllOu, uLll6 III ItltCllH
the application. &C. J. Marshall 4. Whe
ton I22.
Cd. Every word must he made to hav
some meaning. Chitty on Contracts-Blac
stone ., 3sO-Bacon's Abridg't Statute,
Cranch 1877.
In the light of these rules let US open II
Constitution. The first clause we meet
as follows Cart. l, Sec. p
Representatives and direct taxes shall
spportioned among the several States whiC
may be included within this Union, accor
ing 10 their respective numbers, which sha
be determined by adding to the whole nun