Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-10-30
THE sTORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC.


Gen. Bravo gives tie following account of the
operations at and about Chapulepec, on The 18th
and 9th, to the Minister of War Of Mexico. The
american Star, IAN American paper published in,
the city of Mexico,) IN commenting upon this do
cument, says that instead of eight hundred Mexi-
cans being engaged the report Of the firing sounded
very much like it came from at least two thousand
muskets. The same paper denies that the Ameri-
cans employed three or four thousand men in the
attack, and says that the work was carried by a
mere storming party. As regards Gen. Bravo's'
statement that army wavered during the assault,
the Star explains that the wavering referred to
an absolute halt, the forlorn hope, in lheir
IRENE eagerness to reach the work, were leaving
too large an interval between themselves and their
support; a momentary halt had, therefore, to be
ordered. With these explanations we give the do
cument of Gen. Bravo:
EXCELLENT SIR: Having to give you and the nation
of the late the fortress of Chapue
pee, which under my charge, am under the painful
cessity of doing it in the present which, you will
see only relative the unfortunate days of the 18th and
18th nstants during which time had the exclusive
mand, you well know all the operations previous that
directed by his exceency the President, GeneIa
in Chief Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna
On the afternoon Of the 18th the enemy took possession Of
the house called Mono del Rey, which borders the
Chapuepec, the side which plainly ndi-
Gated their intention of attacking in quarter it was
natural 70 suppose they could have other reaking pos
session OF the points they abandoned the afternoon
sh This indicated likewise the necessity our part of at
tending the defence Of the wood on The preservation Of
depended that of the fortress for without the garrison
would have been deprived Of all assstance and would even
haye been IN need OF water which obtained from there
The forces which bad under my command on the morn
ing Of the 18th amounted according tie enclosed account
TO s32 distributed IN the therein stated and
81
mountain howitzers, all supplied with full ammunition and ar
iery OF the said forces there 36z men TO keep
the lower points and roads Of the hill and the rest kept the
Heights. The Notifications Of the building hal hardly com
menced and the fort protected by woodwork was too feeble
TO resist the artillery Of the enemy In this affairs the
enemy commenced firing ha-past six o'clock on the
morning of the 9th from three batteries situated one the
hacienda de la Condess another the Aobspado de Ia
cubaya and the third the hills Of Moline del Rev Their
firing continued without ntermsson until Ealpast seven at
night Their different projecles superior ours did not
much damage at first owing the badness Of their aim
but recying their AIM the edce suffered much the
garrison considerably essened in killed. wounded and hurt
Among the latter the esteemed and faithful Gen Don
Nicolas Sadana This firing only answered by three Of
large pieces the carriage for fourth having sent
from the citadel bad been requested by me.
During this day, two adsde-camp from his exceency the
President and one from your Excelency,
know and ascertain il needed any in defending
the fortress My only his Exceency was that
baitaions should be me- stationed il the
wood to support the small force scattered about in it, The
battalion Of San Bias under command If its Colonel
Acoencat sent but recalled in the evening by his
eycency the President without giving the chief who
had charge of the position any notice wha Between
and at night another message from the President
received, which induced 90 down the gate Of Ras-
Wl, and HIM person. lie there told he had
neay recalled battalion Of San Bias and gave me orders
- withdraw the small force they had supported az his Excel
eny determined to abandon that position aud defend the
height alone. Your Excelency Of the observations
opposition resolution, and that the effect they
had induced the President with that was ne
cezsay keep the woods every risk. He then offered to
Tnd nc another battalion that very night IN order main
tam the position in the wood and reinforce the garrison sh1uI
they ned insisted the necessity Of being PROMPT
" done stating bis Exceency that with the troops hcn
hct' "rnpos-ibe to pass H. as the battalion from Iouca
nal nearly all deserted and that the small force remaining bad
y al moral courage from the efc Of the firing that dav
ut me President concluded by stating that he would send
Them Immediately, he did wish to concentrate large
boy OF troops the fortress, and thus present greater body
20 NE power Of the my proectes me- however
that we would be succored in time.
me battalion offered not sent and this obliged
dismemte The force had guarding the heights augment
WIN Vo men that which sustaining the point below
WIN oE Tie works of the fortress with orders return
70 me iFTss Of attack by superior force By this
means e force that stationed in the woods compos
90 @l2 "n 37a kept the advance or outer works, and
Dung The night the dcserion continued, though in less
nunoef e garrison Of the works likewise dmluishcd
ana y all Iae battalion from Touca which, when received
amounted 70 $50 men, there only remained ~ and the
officers, ~ laurO Cardenas, ID. Julian Molina, ID Manned
Jneh' ~ Jose Maria Romero, d. Juan Estrada, ID Josc
Mara 70 tes, and d. Angel Cona; therefore, a, daylight
on he l9N only counted little 200 in the piu-
cpa par o. the fortress resist the assault three Of the
envy columns, $500 10 1000 strong and even many
those re" wfc demoralzed by the fatal example OF their
companions aud that Of Of the officers that they attempt
ca sh' m such degree make il necessary TO FIRE upon
eVefa y th'n who letting themselves down from
the top Of The building.
IN view Of this difficult position and knowing that the
my would commence the assault Immediately, JUDGING by
activity their fires, which they recommended half past
IN me morning directed yod, hour after my u
the l3ih IN which stated the direction Of the troop and
absolute necessity Of my being reinforced with different kind