Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-09-11

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He inferred that, as the Americans had deprived
themselves OF the right TO the fisheries, they could
not demand guaranty of them from the hing OF
France. Independence was guaranteed by the ALI
ance de6nitively but the possessions and conquests
only as they should be found al the cessation of
arms. If the fisheries were 10 be guaranteed, why
not the other privileges enjoyed by the Americans as
British subjects, such as the trade TO the West India
Islands, and the cutting of logwood and mahogany
in the Bay Of Honduras II is 10 be observed that
the fishery III the open sea and on The banks OF
Newfoundland was not brought into question by
M. de Vergennes. He considered il as free 10 the
Americans as twas to any other nation
These views of the French Court whether right
or wrong, related in their application entirely to the
construction of the treaty OF alliance, IN regard to
the extent OF the guarantees, and not desire OF
curtang any privileges which the Americans might
gain to themselves at the peace. 1t was not ques-
ton whether the Americans should establish their
boundaries 10 suit themselves, and possess the fish
cries. or not but whether France was bound to carry
on the war at all events till these were obtained.
finger was not lifted by the French Count to pre-
vent these acquisitions This is proved by the
communications TO their Ministers at other Courts,
and by the whole tenor of their conduct, as well
during the war as at the peace. They had nothing
to gain or lose IN the way OF possessions, as the
event proved, for, in negotiating their treaty,
these points, with reference to the United States
touched and if they arranged their fishery
TO their satisfaction than it existed under for
mer treaties, this not at the expense of the
Americans. Nor was any thing done in the dark,
or under false colors Congress were well acquant-
ed with the sentiments of the French Ministry, and
the confidence of that body was not impaired ex-
cept in few members, whose jeaouses had their
roots in other causes than the real merits of the
points at issue.
We come now to the negotiation of peace. The
American Commissioners Adams, Franklin, and
Jay, were instructed by Congress !" to make the
most candid and confidential communications upon
all subjects TO the Ministers Of our generous ally,
the King of France, and to undertake nothing in
the negotiations for peace without their knowledge
and concurrence" And the treaty of alliance st-
pulated that neither OF the two parties should
conclude peace or truce with Great Britain with
out the formal consent of the other first obtained"
The first advance was made from the British Min
istry, in March, 1882, by secret agent sent TO
confer with Count de Vergennes concerning the
disposition of the King of France in regard to peace
This agent was soon followed by another, Mr.. Os-
valid, to DR.. Franklin, the only Commissioner then
in Paris, Mr.. Jay being at Madrid and Mr.. Adams
IN Holland. 1t is not the intention here to pursue
the history of the negotiation any further than to
speak OF the parts in which the French have been
supposed to have acted nsidiously or unfairly to-
wards their allies
Mr.. Grenvile was commissioned to negotiate in
Paris with the several belligerent Powers. In his
first proposal to the French Court he said The
King OF England, to facilitate peace was dis
posed TO treat of the independence of the United
States with the King of France, on the condition
that all other things should be placed on the foot
= ing of the treaty of 1861 Count de Vergennes
answered, that his Majesty could not treat of The
interests ofMe United States, because he had no
po,cers for that purpose /; and that it comported
with the dignity OF the King of England, well
as OF the United States, TO enter into direct ne
gotidtion betUeen themselves for these objects"
i What stronger proof could be adduced, that, so far
from aiming to control the American treaty, Count
de Vergennes for leaving itwholly in the hands
of the American Commissioners Mr.. Grenville
took care TO profit by these hints. In his second
letter 10 Mr.. Fox, then one of the Secretaries OF
State, dated May 18th, he says
every thing the belief that the demands Of France
and Spain will be such it will be found difficult perhaps
impossible, for England comply with II from the expec-
atons the Courts of Madrid Versailles entertain Of being
supported by America in these claims they will derive the
greatest confidence in making them and if So whatever
could be found practicable TO weaken that support and give
France and Spain the apprehension of losing it, would
be to take from them the strongest ground Of their preensons
negotiation. 1t is that the present state Of the con-
nexion Of America with France and the good faith she pro
esses to observe in it. has given prospect for proposing
separate and distinct treaty But whether by giving in the
first instance independence America instead Of making il
conditional article Of general treaty. might not gain the
effects though the form of separate treaty whether more
might not be gained in welounded expectation than would
be lost in substance whether America possessed Of her
great object, would not be infinitely less likely lend herself
other claims than il that object should remain to be blended
with every other and stand part Of interest whe-
ther the American Commissioners would think themselves
warranted after such measure, in adherng the demands
Of France and Spain whether if they should the thirteen
Provinces would consent the carrying the upon such
motives all these questions which Of immediate
and important consideration"
The ardent desire of separating the Americans
from their allies in the negotiation is here clearly
manifested. This desire was both natural and DO
lite, and was founded national pride and the unut-
terable aversion Of the King of England, shown in
all The previous attempts at mediation, to the in
reference Of any foreign Power between him and
his former subjects. MIR. Fox was authorized to
embrace the suggestions of Mr.. Granville, which in
TACT accorded with his own principles and he wrote
to him in reply:
You should lose time in taking all the advantage pos
be OF the concession which his Majesty has, from his ar
dent desire Of peace been induced make with respect TO
the independence thircen