The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1847-02-06


Their force was also considerably larger
than ours; and from the size and position of
the place, we could not completely invest it,,
so that the greater portion of their troops, If
not the whole, had they been disposed 10 do
so, could, any night, have abandoned the city,
mt once entered the mountain passes, and eff
fected their retreat, do whnt we could. Had
we been put to the alternative of taking the
place by storm, (which there is no doubt we
should have succeeded in doing I'VE should,in
all probability, have lost fifty or one hundred
men killed, besides the wounded, which |
wished 10 avoid, rs there appeared TO be n
prospect ofpeace, even if II distant one. | al
so wished TO aviod the destruction ofwomen
and children, which must have been very
great, had the storming process been resorted
TO. Besides, they had IL very large and strong
fertilization, short distance from the city,
which, if carried with the bayonet, must have
been taken at great sacrifice fife; and, with
our limited train ofheavy or battering artille-
ry, it would have required twenty-five days 10
take il by regular approaches.
That they surrendered place nearly rs
strong us Quebec, well fortified under the
direction of skil(ul engineers -their works
garnished with forty-two pieces of artillery,
abundantly supplied with ammunition, gar
rsoned by 1000 regular and 1000 irregular
troops, in addition TO some thousand citizens
capable of land no doubt actually bearing
arms, and aiding in its defeuce--to an oppos-
ing force ofhnlf their number, scanlily sup
piled with provisions, and with light train
ofartllcry-is among the unaccountabIe &C.
currences of the times.
am decidedly opposed TO carrying the war
beyond Saltillo in this direction, which place
has been entirely abandoned by the Mexican
fnrcn- all Of NGyhnp, hapn haon al
nj Sau Luis Potosi; aud shall lose no time
in taking possession ofthe former as soon MS
the cessation of hostiIities referred to expires
which have notified the Mexican authOri-
ties will he the case on the 18th inst, by di-
rection ofthe President of the United States.
five ore lin the language of Mr. Polk and
General Scott under the necessity of Soon
qucrnga peace" aud that by taking the cap
itul of the country,-we must go 10 Vera
Cruz, take that place aud then march on the
city OF Mexico. TO do so in any other direc-
ton consider ont of the question. But adj
hitting tna! we conquer pence by doing so,
say at the end ofthe next twelve mouths
will the amount ofbloo d and treasure, which
must he expended in doing so, he compensa-
ted by the same? think noi,-especially if
the country we subdue is to be given up: and
imagine there are but few individuals in orr
United States.
do not intend to carry on my operations
las previously statedlbcyond Saltillo-deem-
ing it next To impracticable 10 do so. 1t then
becomes question as 10 what is best to be
done. Ii seems to me the most iudiciOus
course to be pursued on our part would he 10
take possession, Mt once, oithc line we would
accept by negotiation, extending from the
Gulfof Mexico to the Pacific, and occupy the
same, or keep what we already have possess
sion of and that, with TampicoI (Which hope
to take in the course ofthe next mouth, or us
soon us ! can get the means of transporta-
ton,) will give us all on this side of the Sierru
Madre, and, as soon as occupy Saltillo, will
include six or seven states or provinces thus
holding Tampico, Victoria. Monterey, Saltil- !
10. Monclovia, chihuahua, (which presume
Wool has possession ofby this time,) Santa
Fc aud the Calitornias,-und say to Mexico, |
''Drivc us from the country" throwing OF her |
the responsibility and expense of carrying on
offensive war; NJ the same time closely block |
aiding all her ports on the Pacific aud the
Gulf
A course of this kind, if perscvered in FOR
"A short time, would soon bring her to her |
proper sand compel her to sue for peace
provided there is government in the couu-
try sufficiently stable for us 10 treat with,
which, | fear, will hardly be the case for ma
NY years to come, Without large reinforce
ments ofvolunteers from the United Suites
say ten or fifteen thousand chose previously |
sent ont having already been greatly reduced |
by sickness and o;her casualties, II do not
believe it would be advisable To march beyond |
SaItillo, which is more than 200 miles beyond !
our depots on the Rio Grandc--a very long
line on which TO keep up supplies lover
land route, in country like this,) for Il large !
force, and certain to be attended with an eX-
peuse which will be trightful TO contemplate
when closely looked into.
From Saltillo to San Luis Potosi, the next
place 0timportance on the rond to the city of |
Mexico, is three hundred milestone hun
drcd and forty badly watered, where no sup
plies ofany kind could be procured for men
orhorscs. have informed the War Depart
nent that 10000 efficient men would he ne
cessary to insure success FIVE move on that
place,-(a city containing population $780,
600, where the enemy could bring together
and sustain, besides the citizens, an army of |
50,000) a force which, apprehend, will hard
ly be collected by us, with the train nGcessa-
ry to feed it, as well as to transport various
other supplies, particularly ordnance and mu-
ntions of war.
In regard to the armisticc, which would |
have expired, by limitation, i'm n few days, we
lost nothing by it as we could not move even
now, had the enemy continued to occupy
SatiIlo; for, strange TO say the first wagon
which has reached me since the declaration
of war, was on the I'd inst, the same day on
which received from Washington an ac-
ofmy despatch announcing
the taking of Monterey; and then received
only 1875, so that have been, since May last,
crippled, and am still so, for want
Transportation.
After raking and scraping the country for
miles around Camargo, collecting every pack