The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1847-12-08

wounded of about thirty; but the defences were foun,
too strong and too well guarded to be taken by escaad
with so small force. The party, after destroying sons
of the buildings in the town, retired with the prisoner
to Vegas Our loss in this affair was three slightly wound
ed and kicd-the gallant commander of the party
who fell in sorming the works,
On the Sd OF February the command under Col Price
after difficult march through deep SHOWS arrived a
Pueblo de Taos, place of considerable strength sur
rounded By adobe walls and strong pickeis, with buing
well calculated for defence and capable of holding large
garrison. Preparations for an immediate attack were
made batteries opened upon the town, and the fire
continued during that and the following day; but, owing
10 the hghtness OF the metal "a six FOUNDER and
tain howitzers II was found impossible to make breach
in the walls 1t then determined carry the place
by assault. and il was done in gallant manner. The
next morning the insurgents sued for peace which was
granted condition of surenderng up OF their
principal leaders, who had nsgaed the disturbance and
were directly concerned in the murder OF the governor
and others About hundred and fifty, of The
or eight hundred Mexcans engaged in the battle were
killed land the loss side was seven killed and forty
five wounded Some of the leaders in this scheme for a
general massacre who had survived the several engage
ments by winch the outbreak was suppressed, tried
Occasionally through the course of the last summer
some of our grazing parties along the line of the
settlements, attacked BY Struggling bands of Mex
and Indians embodied for predatory purposes and
some loss was sustained on both sides
Most of the troops first sent to New Mexico vol
uneers from the State Of Missouri who engaged for
only twelve months. The terms of their service expired
in August and early April and May others engaged
Tor the war were accepted to take their places making
the force Ill new MEXICO ABOUT three thousand
six hundred and thirty-four men, including battalion
for service IN the Indian country on the routes to Santa
Fe and Oregon.
On the 3ist of March, call was made on the State of
Missouri for regiment OF mounted volunteers, part of
which directed TO be employed in establishing mill
tay posts the route TO Oregon pursuant to the act of
the 10th of May, 1916 and the remainder ordered
10 Santa Fe TO supply the place of the twelve months
men whose term OF service would expire in the sumner
Afterwards this direction modified, that the whole
regiment pressed on 10 Santa Fe and battalion of
similar troops from the State assigned to the
duty OF establishing the Oregon posts
Upon full consideration of the subject, il deter
mined to con6ne the operations of the year TO mill
tary sationsboth this side of the Rocky mountains.
Instructions given, and the necessary arrangements
made, for post near Grand Island where the road TO
Oregon strikes the Platte river, and another at
Fort Laramie. As the former in the region where
Indian depredations had been committed, and force
there would hold the Indians in check, the earliest aen
ton was directed to be given to that work, but the APP
proach OF winter has necessarily suspended it, Not much
progress has been yet made its constructions beyond the
collection OF materials and the needful preparations for
carrying 1t on early In the spring
Our career OF success, so disastrous to Mexico; our
conquest of many OF her States and terrtores the
subugaton and occupation of her capital the defeat and
dispersion of her armies the capture of most of her
terrell OF war, and the annhilaton of her foreign
merce, have not yet brought peace or the offer of such
could be accepted by the United States without
national degradation The still continues and it is
proper present suggestions in regard to its further
prosecution In making these suggestions, pass, with
out remark, the proposition that shonld abandon all
Acquisitions and withdraw troops from the
mys country Such proposition could only be serious
ly entertained il reality the vanquished party
and convinced OF inability to polong the
test with reasonable hopes of success.
Our further operations must in my opinion be con-
Quoted in of the three following modes first, to
take and hold indemnity line 10 recede from all places
and positions occupied in advance of it, and cease
from all aggressive operations beyond that line; second
to oveun the whole country, and hold all the principal
places in il by permanent garrlsons and, third retain
what possess open the lines OF communication
into the INTERIOR and extend our operations to other i'm
iages shall misunderstanding disposabe force always
ready within approacbable limits, to annoy the enemy,
to seize supplies enforce contributions, and Illustrate his
efforts 10 collect and assemble troops for the pur
pose OF protractng the war
[ full discussion OF the comparative merits of these
modes OF conducting our military operations would
tend this communication to an understandable length; /
SHALL therefore, conne my remarks to lew prominent
considerations relative TO each
With reference to speedy peace with proper ndem-
nifty and secury-the only object of the Wharf.-The line
policy is regarded Objectionable. If present posi-
ton cannot command acceptable terms OF paciicaton
from Mexico, retiring to indemnity line would certain
y fail to produce such result 1t would weaken The
inducements OF the enemy to put an end to hosttes.
Restored by voluntary surrender, to the POSSESSION
OF his capital and important departments, and relieved
from the pressure OF and from all apprehen-
sions of further conquest and annoyance beyond the
limits might select, he would be left with abun-
dan than he now possesses TO prepare at les
and in security, to strike effective blow with
cenrated forces at detached posts To hold these
posts safely to retain possession OF the eeapors
nave, III SnOua WInn the poilcy,) ana 10
vent ncrsons into the territories which might choose
TO appropriate to ourselves, would my opinion require
force large would suffice TO maintain what
occupy, and to carry our operations still further
the interior OF the enemys country, and make him feel
the caiamites of in way best calculated to induce
him to seek for peace. But if in this am mistaken,
and the line policy should enable TO reduce the
Der of troops STILL it will not, conceive, thereby
effect reduction of actual expenditures for the
In consequence OF the interruption OF intercourse be-
tween the seaports IN our possesson and the central
parts of Mexico, the collections imports have hitherto
been nconsderable If the line policy is adopted, this
intercourse will continue TO be interrupted, and,
lquenty the receipts of from this will be
small.
Under the operation OF the linepolcy, all expectation
of essenng the burden of sustaining troops by der-
wing supplies and contributions from the enemy, would
be disappointed The supplies in the vicinity of
posts would be Withdrawn from reach, as
suspected But, it otherwise posts would
be from the wealth and of the country
the amount which could be obtained would be incon-
siderable.
So far from deriving advantage from the line policy by
way OF obtaining assistance from the resources of the
enemy towards the support of troops should,
apprehend confer upon portion OF the people OF Mex
leo direct benefit by opening TO them at our posts
market, in which should become the purchasers OF
their products at exorbant price. These consdea-
tions without bringing into view Others have led me to
look TO of the other modes of operation have
toned, preferable to that OF occupying indemnity
! line.
Inregard 10 the second mode suggested,that of
plying the whole counrythe wide extent of territory en-
braced IN the Mexican republic, the many important
points to be garsoned and the long lines OF communi-
cation to be kept open, present difficulties OF no ordinary
magnitude, if occupancy is to be OF such char
acte to supersede the Mexican authority, ana re-
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