Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-02

ty of murder. His own opinion is that no
Government has a right To take life-the ma
jority have ordered him, by specific statute,
in such case made and provided, 10 doom the
culprit 10 the gallows. How is he to act!
Which is claw" 10 him ! We say 10 him,
quit the bench rather than violate your con-
science. Mr.. Spooner i~nstructs him that all
laws Inconsistent with natural justice are
void, and that he is bound TO stay there and
declare them 50. Accordingly as every mans
own conscience is, for the time being, his
highest and hottest guide, lie must set up his
own idea Of right; and as of old, every mans
foot rule was regulated by the length of The
reigning Kings foot, so now Judges are 10
reverse the advice of Lord Coke and "be
guided by thc crooked cord Of discretion, and
not by the golden metwaud (yard-stick) of the
law
Cicero. the heaihcu, maintains that for a
merchant in tine Of famine to conceal the fact
that a plenty Of grain will come Tomorrow,
and thus grind a high price ,o-day out Of the
starving people, is contrary 10 natural JUS
tice.' Palcy, the christian, thinks such con-
due; right. II such a sale is brought before
MIR. Spooner, to be enforced, which way will
lac decide! What is law I this eternal, UNI
aIterable, unnistakablc law, he so much prai-
scS.
Gerrit Smith thinks the three-ffth slave ba-
SIS an Antl-Slavery provision, ga bounty on
llherty-an attempt to promote the Anti Sla-
very cause Mr.. Spooner thinks lust the
reverse. Which way shall the poor Judge,
in search Of natural iaO, interpret the clause?
lncidit in Scyllam cupieus vitare Charybdin.
Ii he steers clear of Spooner one way. he
Is sure TO run foul Of Smith the other. How
grateful will he be to the author for getting
him clear of the - old chaos of conflicting
%edicts," and introducing him TO such a ma
tural, unalterable, universal, simple, %intelli-
glble principle" which supercedes all other
law, and /" is necessarily tie mig Mw''W
If Mr.. Spooner, 10 escape this dilemma,
shall explain his principle TO mean that a
Judge is 10 decide, not according to his own
individual idea Of right, but the general sense
of the age or nation in which he lives, we
hardly care to dispute such a proposition with
him-for it is Of little practical importance;
since in the 1oOraS IF lis Statuie-book will each
magistrate always find the best, if not the on
~ evidence OF what lis nation thinks lust and
right. 1.-The laws" says Aristotle, ..are the
morals of the State and the character of the
whole people taken collectively" If Mr..
SpoCner should feel disposed to appeal from
the decision of one nation to the general sense
OF Christendom, he will find that there never
was a sin, for which any Judge, DESTROYS of
supporting 1t, could not find abundance of phi
losophers to uphold him in thinking it right;
ami surely Slavery at present, finds many
such, both in Church and State. Hence, on
either plan there could be no uniform and
regular Government.
We shall conclude our discussion of this
point by showing that the almost unanimous,
# not unanimous voice Of lawyers and Judi
clal tribunals repudiates this power. Our
extracts Will be drawn from as many different
sources as possible, because il has been a IA
voTlte course with Liberty party debaters and
others to maintain that all acts of Parliament
or Of any legislative body, contrary to reason
and justice are void, and that Judges NAV
treat them as such-a proposition identical
with Mr.. SPooner's, and clearly not sound.
This doctrine is usually sustained by dis
connected quotations from Blackstone. amonr
which the following generally occupies the
first place:
This law of nature being coeval with
mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. 1t
Is binding over all the globe, in ali countries,
and at all times: no human laws are of any
validity, if contrary to this and such Of
them as are valid, derive all their force, and
all their authority mediately or immediate
ly, from this original. "-Blackstone, Vol. |,
p. IL.
1t will be observed that Blackstone only
asserts that bad laurs are v0id, without touch
ing the question of the remedy in such case,
or whether Judges may declare and treat them
so. Ills able commentator, Prof. Christian,
In a note on this passage, discusses this
point, and decisively rejects the doctrine. He
slys:
"lf an act of Parliament should, like the
edict of Herod, command all children under
a certain age to be slain, the Judge ought 10
resign his Office rather than be auxiliary TO
its execution; but ii could only be declared
vOid 6y The same Legislative Power Jy which IL
1caS 0rdaiHed."
With this, the other commentators, Chitty
and the rest, agree. Sedgwick unites with
them in the same opinion. Woodeson, Black
stones second successor in his professional
chair, adds his assent in these words:
awe cannot expect that all acts of legis-
lators will be e~thically perfect; but if their
proceedings are to be decided upon by their
subjects, Government and subordination
cease Chitty's Blackstone note, p. H.
Wood FL. Jur. AZ.
Blackstone himself, in a subsequent mare
of his work, distinctly denies the doctrine
which some might infer from the general
terms he had used above. On the DIST page
OF his volume, he says:
81 know it is generally laid down mora
largely, that acts of Parliament, contrary IN
reason, are void. But if the Parliament will
positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, know OF no power, in The Or
binary forms of the Constitution, that is YES
ted with authority to control it; and the ex-
amples usually alledged in support of this
sense OF the rule, do none Of them prove.
that, where the main object Of a statute is I'M
reasonable, the Judges are at liberty to reiec
1t; tor that were to set the Judicial powe
above that of the Legislature, which woul,
be subyerslye Of all Government. = =