The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1847-02-06

/ III regard 10 giving up the cityH-ae
ding that "the circumstances which die
tated, no doubt justified the change.
Although the terms of capitulation ma
be considered too liberal on our part b
the President and his advisers, as we
as by many others at distance, partic
ularly by those who do not understan
the position which we occupied, 10th
erwlse they might come to q differen
conclusion in regard to the matter,) We
on due reflection, ] see nothing to in
duce me to regret the course ] pursued
The proposition on the part of Gener
al Ampudia-which had much TO do il
determining my course in the matter
was based on the ground that our gov
ernment had proposed to his to settle
the existing difficulties by negotiation
(Which | knew was the case, withou
knowing the result,) which was ther
under consideration by the proper au
thorities, and which he General Am
pudia) had no doubt would result favor
ably, as the whole Of his people were
in favor Of peace. If so, | consider the
further eflusion of blood not only unne.
cessary, but improper. Their force
was also considerably larger than ours
and from the size and position of the
place, we could not completely invest
it; SO that the greater portion of their
troops-if not the whole-had they
been disposed to do so, could any night
have abandoned the city, at once en-
tered the mountain passes, and effected
their retreat, do what we could! Had
we been put to the alternative of taking
the place by storm, (Which there is no
doubt we should have succeeded in do
ing,) we should, in all probability, have
lost fifty or one hundred men in killed,
besides the wounded, which | wished
to avoid, as there appeared TO be pros
pect of peace, even If distant one. !
also wished to avoid the destruction Of
women and childen, which must have
been very great, had the storming pro-
cess been resorted to. Besides, they
had very.large and strong forlifcation
a short distance from the city, which,
if carried with the bayonet, must have
been taken at great sacrifice ofllfe; and
with our limited train of heavy or bat
tering artillery, it would have required
twenty or twenty-five days to take it
by regular approaches.
That they should have surrendered
a place nearly as strong as Quebec,
well fortified under the direction of skill
ful engineers-their works garnished
with forty-two pieces of artillery, abun-
dainty supplied with ammunition, gar
risoned by 1000 regular and 1900 IT.
regular troops, in addition to some
thousand citizens capable of, (and no
doubt actuallyD bearing arms, and aid
ing IN its defence--to an opposing force
Of half their number, scantIy supplied
with provisions, and with light train
If artiIery-is among the unaccounta-
BILE occurrences Of the times.
| am decidedly opposed to carrying
the war beyond SaItlo in this direction,
which place has been entirely abandon
ed by the Mexican forces, all of whom
have been concentrated at San LUIS
Potosi; and shall lose no time in TAX
ing possession of the former, as soon as
the cessation of hostllties referred TO
cxpires-which have notified the Mex,
lean authorities will be the case on the
/ 9th instant, by direction of the Presi-
dent Of the United States.
FIVE are Gn the language Of Mr..
Polk and General ScotD under the ne
cessity Of "conqaering peace" and
that by taking the capital of the coun-
try, we must go to Vera Cruz, take
that place, and then march OF the city
Of Mexico. TO do SO in any other d.
reclion, | consider out of the question.
But, admitting that we conquer peace
by doing so-say, at the end of the
twelve months-will the amount OF
blood and treasure, which must be ex.
pended in dong so, be compensated by
Ihe same9 | think not-especially if
the country we subdue is to be given
up; and | imagine there are but few in
dividuals IN our country who think Of
annexing Mexico to the United States.
do not intend to carry on my OPP
era,ions (as previously stated beyond
Saltlllo,-deeming it next to impractl-
cable TO do so. ltthen becomes ques-
ton as to what is best to be done. 1t
seems TO me, the most judicious course
to be pursued on our part, would be to
take possession, at once, OF the line we
would accept by negotiation, extend.
ing from the Gulf Of Mexico to the Pa
ci6c, and occupy the same, or keep
what we already have possession Of;
and that, with Tampico, (which | hope
to take in the course Of the nextmonth,