Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1847-01-21

my ere this put in condition to strike decisive
blow, or at any rate, during the present favora-
BILE season Of the year? 1t cannot now be done
we must wait another year; and, sir, know oil
no reason but the feebleness of the Treasury
why we have not been in condition TO act with
a force adequate TO the object in view. attrlb-
ute it to that, and to that alone.
Well, how will it end, if go on in this way
Will our condition improve? Will it not be-
come worse and worse every day? We may con-
tinue to obtain oans though there seems TO be
some doubt about our ability to do so. There is
still, | think, way in which we can obtain loans,
and that way is only by sanctioning and circula-
ting n paper currency of this Government. BY
means of Treasury notes and this Government
paper we may obtain loans from the mass Of the
people, but we can never obtain them from capt.
talists, with the restrictions which exist IN what
is called the Independent Treasury act. We
can undoubtedly obtain loans in the way have
said, but these loans must have limit. Is il for
moment 10 be supposed that they could 20 on
in this way, without knowing when this war was
to have an end, relying solely and entirely upon
loans, without providing any additional revenue
to meet the interest upon these loans Why,
every man must see that the credit of the Gov
eminent will sink. 1t cannot be sustained in
course of action of this kind. 1t is impossible
that it could be otherwise. There is no such ex-
ample in history, either in our own or in that Of
any other nation. A debt increasing at The rate
of thirty-fve millions year, without providing
single dollar to meet the interest on those
loans! Sir this is strange state Of things
There was an apparent inconsistency in the rec
ommendaton of the President year ago. We
were then engaged in two controversies with for
elgn Powers, either of which, as it seemed to be
the opinion of the Executive, might have result
ted IN disturbing the peace OF the county,
WE'LL sir, it might naturally have been supposed
that the desire of the Executive would be to show
those nations that we were in readiness, if it be.
came necessary, TO resort to the last extremity.
This would seem to be his obvious policy and
to do this, il was TO be expected that he would
suggest to the consideration of Congress the pro-
prlety of strengthening and increasing the tinan-
ces of the country, in order to be prepared for u
result OF this knG if it could not be avoided. -
But, instead of this, the Executive recommended
modification of the revenue laws. And for
what purpose? With view to increase the
revenue' No sir; but with n view to a reduc-
ton of the revenue, or at least 10 reduction of
duties. had always supposed that the affairs
of Government, like those of an individual re-
qurcd that the state of the finances should be
looked to before commencing any enterprise or
undertaking, 10 sec whether they were equal 10
the demand that would be made upon them. But
Executive; for when we became actually Cngag.
ed IN war--when the matter was no longer doubt
ful, but war had actually commenced to my ".
ter astonshment a measure was pressed upon us
to reduce the revenue A measure was passed
which was calculated in all probability 20 reduce
the finances Of the Government below what they
should be in time of peace. Ii is a matter of
simple arithmetic. find by calculation that to
sustain your peace standard of revenue under
The new tariff act, you must have one hundred
and forty six millions of impoitations. Whether
you are likely to have this amount every one can
Judge for himself. | do not believe that we will
But, sir, our difficulty does not stop at this point.
We are told the law must not be disturbed. The
Secretary might have recommended Without es-
seniialy disturbing his theory-he might have
recommended general addition TO the rates of
duty in all the schedules Of this law, except, per-
haps, the last. This think, might have been
done but it seems that this is not proposed, and
! is not TO be proposed. We'll, what then can be
done? There is no proposition for any other
mode of indirect taxation, and believe there are
enough in both Houses of Congress who believe
that this great source of revenue, imposts, must
be fairly exhausted before resort can be had to
any other, whether in time of war or peace, let
| the condition of the country be what 1t may. 1t
! is the settled policy of this country that this
source of revenue must be thoroughly exhausted
before the people can be called on to contribute
from any other. Well, sir, is it exhausted p
WHY, it does not accord with the theory of the
Secretary or the chairman Of the Finance Com
mittee here TO increase the revenue by raising
the duties. According to their theory, to ralse
revenue you must reduce the duties We'll,
am willing to hear from the Secretary how much
money he can get into the treasury by further
reduction. am willing The experiment should
| ha trio I do In | vote
for such q law, because have no belief in the
doctrine. | believe that duties will produce rev.
enue in the proportion which they bear to the
mportatons in the aggregate. lmportalions are
governed by the amount OF exports, by the state
of The currency, and other things; hence think
the position is well established that the amount
of revenue will depend upon the average of du
ties. And now this whole scheme of increasing
the revenue by diminishing the duties, is found
to be not only an hypothesis, not only an expert
ment, but, sir, 1t is an experiment which is to be
tried in the face of facts, and in opposition tc
our whole experience. That experience has
shown us that the rate of duties has had no in
huence on the imPorations, but the revenue has
been invariably greatest when the rate of duties
was highest. The state of the currency has hat
a thousand times more influence upon the amour
of importations than the rate of duties has had
whether high or low. This, then, is an expert
ment to increase the revenue by diminishing thu
, duties, directly contrary to all experience al
experiment already exploded as entirely nettica
cious
Well sir, Continued Mr.. Miles, | have sail
pretty much all | intended TO say. ], for ono
protest against this policy. | protest against
as inconsistent with the protection of the coun
J try; as inconsistent with the vigorous prosecu
: ton of the war, and as creating Unnecessarily
r national debt. Why do gentlemen think tina
a because we have small war on our hands, the
are absolved from reasonable accord to thei
= own principles? And is it not one of the firs
Y principles of the Democratic party at least-an
believe might say of both parties-that ma
a tionai debt is national curse and should be a
e voided, if possb&eto be avoded' Nothing br
t extreme hazard, nothing but war in which
y country might suddenly be engaged by powerli
J, invading force, can justify reliance solely an
/ exclusively on loans and the creation Of nation
e al debt And shall we do nothing in small wa
il of this kind? Shall we do nothing to sustai
e the Treasury? Shall we not bear a part at lea
u of the burden that we are thus creating? Is
O all to be handed over TO posterity? Are we %
: ing to entail upon those who come after us III
/ blessings Of national debt of perhaps an hur
S bred millions? And, sir, let me make anoth,
n remark. This is the way, suppose, that we al
e to carry out this system falsely called fire.
c trade system-a msnomer altogether. There
i no such thing as free trade in this country an