The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1847-03-20

BOTH and that nothing short of an effective force of 1000
10 $1,000 men would, on military principles, Justify the
double movement, And it is 10 be remarked that the
possession of Tampico is indispensable in case we
advance San Luis for the line hence to the latter place
is entirely too long 10 be maintained permanently and
must be abandoned for the shorter one from Tampico
the moment San Luis is taken.
have spoken only of the number OF troops deemed
necessary for the prosecution of the campaign beyond
Salhllo II will be understood that largely increased
means and matercl of every kind will be equally
cessary to render the army efficient such cavalry and
artillery horses, of transport, ordnance stores &c
The department may be assured that the above views
have not been given without mature reflection and have
oeen the result OF experience and careful inquiry II will
be for the government to determine whether the
against San Luis and the capital or whether the country
already gained shall be held and defensive attitude
sumed IN the latter case. the general line of the Sierra
Madre might very well be taken but even them with
the enemy in force in my 'front.' might be mprldent
detach to Tanpco so large force 1000 1000 men,
Se
senia to the of the expedition against Tamp
CO. trust that it will be postponed for the present
have not been unmindful Of the importance OF taking
Tapico and have at least addressed the department
on the subject Nothing but the known exposure of the
place to the ravages of yellow fever prevented from
organizing an expedition against it last summer knew
that If TAKEN could not with any certainty be held,
and that the would not be removed before the last
OF November, or first OF December.
II may be expected that should give my views as to
the policy of occupying defensive line TO which have
above alluded am free confess that in view Of the
uiiHcultleS ana expense attending movement mo the
heart of the country, and particularly in view Of the
settled and revolutionary character of the Mexican gov.
ernment the occupation OF such line seems to the
best course that be adopted The line taken might
either be that which propose insist the boun
dairy between the repubcs-say the Rio Grande-or the
line to which we have, advanced, viz; The Sierra, Ma
Dire, including Chihuahua and Santa Fe. The former
line could be held with much smaller force than the
atter but even the line of the Sierra N1adre could be
held with force greatly less than would be required for
an active campaign. Monterey controls the great outlet
from the interiors strong garrison at this point, with
advance at Saltilo, and small corps at Monclova.
Lnares Victoria and Tampco would efectuay cover the
line.
have limited my remarks to the position of the army
this frontier and the requirements for campaign against
San Luis Potos the suggestions the Secrearys letter
being confined to this general theatre OF operations.
Should the government determine TO strike decisive blow
at Mexico it is my opinion that the force should land
Vera Cruz Avarado, and after establishing
depot march thence on the capital The amount OF troops
required for this service would not fall short in judy
ment OF 2500o men, OF which at least 10000 to be reu
lar troops.
In conclusion, feel it my duty to make remarks,
which would gladly have been spared the necessity of
vice. to record my protest against the manner in which
the department has sought to make important deach
men from my command specifically indicating not only
the general officers but to considerable the troops
that were to compose it. While remain in command of
the army against Mexico, and am, therefore, justly held
by the government and the country for the
ganizing all detachments from it, and regulating the time
and manner of their service Above all do consider 1t
important, that the Department Of War should refrain
from corresponding directly with my subordinat and
communicating orders and instructions on points which,
by all military precept and practice pertain exclusively
to the general in chief command Confusion and disaster
alone result from such course The reason alleged
viz the loss of time in communicating with General Pat
terson, has no pcation for the Secretays despatch
from that officer to my headquarters in sixty hours
and he could not move, at any rate, without drawing
largely upon this column for artillery and regular troops
beg il may Be understood that my remarks have no
event Of making such detachment, would have placed
tunder Major General Patteson but conceive that this
mode of regulating details and ordering detachuents di
from the Department Of War, violation OF the in
egrty of the chief command in the field, pregnant with the
worst evils and against which deem il my duty respect
fully, but earnestly to protest.
am, sir, very respectfully, your obedent servant
Major General, u. s. A. cond'g.
The ADJUTANT GENERAL, OF the army Washington, d. C.
HrApauARrEns ARMY OF OCCUPATION,
Camp near Monterey, Oct &c, 1916.
Sir In reply to much of the communication of the
Secretary OF War; dated September %, relates the
mode Of supplying the army beg leave to submit the
twoud have been impossible hitherto, and is 50 now,
sustain the army any extent by forced contributions
IF money or supplies. The country between the Rio
rande and Sierra Madre is poor furnishing only corn
md beef These articles obtain at moderate rates. but
different system had been adopted, il is certain that
hey would not have been procured at all II sufficient
ices of supply have drawn from the country has
neutalized much OF the unfrendly feeling with which
we were anu greatly 10
ate operations The people have tin their power at
any me to destroy their crops, and would undoubtedly
10 So rather than see them taken forcibly Add to
which they would have no inducements to plant again.
The prices thai have been paid are reasonable being
almost all cases the prices of the country. ti
Should the army, in its future operations reach por
hon of the country which may be made to supply the
troops with advantage shall not fail to conform to the
wishes and instructions OF the department in this par
ocular. aw
1 am, sir very respectfully, your obedent servant,
z. TAYLOR,
Major General u S. A, comdg.
The ADJUTANr GENERAL OF the army, Washington, d. c.
WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, Nov. IS, 1s4s.
SIR You will have perceived by my despatch of the
18th ultmo, that the government apprehended at that
ime that you would be likely encounter many and
ous difficulties in extending your line of operations
ar as San Luis Potosi. These approximations
irmed by your despatch, of the 18th ultmo, which
received the Goth instant In the belief that 1t might
not be advisable unless circumstances favored push
forward in that direction, it became important that
operations should be undertaken upon the gulf coast In
case that should be decided attempt at present
lake any place beyond Monterey Satllo with view
Of holding permanent possession, it was believed that
q sufficient force would be detached from the troops
in the field with such additions be made)
for successful attack upon the most important points
on the coast, still leaving enough hold the positions
you have gained and menace the enemy with forward
movement. -Il X. .a.I
BY interceptng my despatch OF the ID OF September "a
copy OF which herewith ransmt and probably through
other MEANS the enemy has already become aware OF our
intentions to operate in that quarter, and undoubtedly
will be prepared make vigorous resistance III has
become quite evident that larger force han mat lndica-
ted in nv communication OF the 18th ultimo, Will be re-
CURED for that expedition The President having decided