Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1847-09-24
THE ARMISTICE-GEN. SCOTT,

At the time when the terms of the armis-
tice, proposed and entered into by Gen. Scott
were first published, some ten or twelve days
ago, and during that period the manner and
matter of the L" said armistice has been a to-
pic fruitful of many and grave speculations,
as we'll in private circles as in the columns of
the public press. Some there are, we find,
who condemn the old hero for entering into
any armistice at all, but are particularly con-
demnatory in view of the proposition coming
from himself. 1t is urged that the American
army could, and ought to, have entered the
city immcdiately-thatt then and there would
have been the time and place for Gen. Scott
and Mr.. Trist, our agent, to have dictated
at first we were much surprised at the whole
affair, and so expressed ourselves To US it
is still strange that the propositions for the ar
mstce should have come from the American
commander, when all accounts agree in repre-
senting that he could have marched into the
city, after the battles of the 10Th and goth,
without further or serious opposition. Still,
however, upon reflection, we think we would
be doing gross injustice to Gen. Scott and the
whole American staff were we, without know
ing the reasons for this course, blindly to con-
denim it, either as impoitic or unpatriotic. No
doubt General Scott had good reasons for his
course, which reasons will be made known at
| the proper time, and can then be freely discus
sed That Gen. Scott entered into the armis-
tice because he was compelled so to do, from
his weakness. we do not for one moment be-
lieve Perhaps he thought that if he entered
and occupied the city of Mexico with the
American army, the hopes of peace, or rather
of negotiations for peace, would thereby be
indefinitely postponed, inarmuch as the SEM
blance of Government that now exists there
| would have fled, God knows where, and there
would he no one 10 treat with. The official
dispatches will, however, soon be received,
and then we will hear the old hero's own rea-
sons "why and wherefore"
In the meantime, we cannot forbear giving
our readers the following remarks upon this
subject which we find in the Journal of Com
MERGE They are sensible and temperate =
Notwithstanding these brilliant results, many
intelligent men infer from the armistce being pro-
posed by Gen. Scott that after all, he felt unable
to cope with his multtudnous enemy. We infer
precisely the contrary. 1t was because he had
whipped their best troops in immense numbers,
and driven them into the city, capturing THEN most
important outworks; because the very cannon
which they had planted for his destruction, he
was now able to turn against themselves; because
he had materially reduced their strength physical
ly, and still more morally, creating CONSERVATION
where before confidence, that he could now
afford to take the initiative, perhaps at the solicit
tation of the British Minister, for suspension OF
hostties and the restoration Of peace On the
supposition of the croakers, that he proposed the
armistice for his own sake we should like to ask
what advantage he could possibly gain by it, since
it required both armies to remain in Stdtu quo,
neither receiving renforcements, erecting new de-
fences nor going beyond their existing lines. Gen.
Scott knew too we'll the Mexican character to
trust to temPorising policy. had not the circum-
stances been such as even in the view of the Mex
leans to forbid the idea that he did it from re-
gard 10 his own safety. He, however, wished to
avail himself of the powerful incentive to peace
} which the crisis supplied to the Mexlcans-the
, other alternative being, the occupation OF their
capital by $4,000 men flushed with victory. whom
the common people. men and women, had been
taught to regard as set Of unpnncipled rascaIs,
ready to commit any crime for the qualification OF
lust or malice. In case of serious resistance on the
part of the Mexican troops within the city, then,
to the modification of capture, and the dread OF
a hostile occupation, would De added the horrors
of bombardment. For this Gen. Scott wen: pre-
8 pared and the capture of Is heavy guns at Con-
treras and San Antonio made him still more So
The Mexicans had no chance of successful resls-
d lance. and they knew it. They had tried the on
. Iy means OF avoiding bombardment, (if General
Scott should see fit to inlict it and it had proved
Intellectual. They were now at his mercy, when.
Il ever he chose to let loose destruction upon their
e devoted heads This they appear to have well
understood, as well as himself. Else why did
. they readily embrace the overture which, before
the late battles, they had scornfuly rejected! Why
o did Gen. Valencia contrive to escape with two
companies, if he had hoped for victory within the
walls Why did the Mexican official paper, the
Diario del Gobierno, speak of said battles as ove'
> wheIming defeats. and say that thong the Ameri
: can forces were around the city, they had not ye