Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-16

dams lot taxed, three-fifths of all other per-
sons. The actual enumeration shall be made
within three years after the first meetinr of
the Congress Uf the United States, and with.
in every subsequent term Of ten wears, in
such manner as they shall by law Direct
The humber Of Representatives shall not cx-
coed one for every thirty thousand but each
State shall have at least one Representative ;
and until such enumeration shall be made,
the State of New Hampshire shall be emit.
tied TO choose three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
one, Connecticut FIVE, New-York six, New
Jersey four, PENNSYLVANIA eight. Delaware
one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Car.
olina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia
three.
Upon this Mr.. Spooner remarks:
"The argument claimed from this clause,
in support of Slavery, rests entirely upon the
word free and the words 'all other persons
Or rather, it rests entirely upon the meaning
of the word free for the application Of the
words 'all other persons depends upon the
meaning given TO the word free The slave
argument assumes, graiuiiDuSly, that the word
free is used as the correlative Of slavery,
and thence it infers that the words all other
PERSONS mean slaves."-(p. 49,
He then proceeds to argue that the clause
! has no relation or reference 10 slaves-that 10
suppose it to have, subjects us TO all sorts Of
"ditiicullies, Inconsistencies, contradictions,
and absurdities," bat he assures US that these
will all vanish if, with him, we hold that:
1.-THE word free describes the native and
naturalized citizens of the United States, and
the words all other persons describe resi-
dent aliens, Indians not taxed and possibly
some others."--(p 7s.)
Mr.. Spooner nowhere denies that the
''pidin, ~OJrj0us, and common" use Of the word
free" is TO designate one not a slave and
he allows that If 1t be so interpreted here, the
Constitution must be confessed to recognize
Slavery. But he informs that the word has
also a technical legal meaning, designating a
person in any community, who is invested
with peculiar privileges, &C., and so might
describe a citizen as distinguished from an
alien. This is true. He asks us to pass by
the plain, obvious, and common meaning,
and adopt this technical one, in accordance
with his rule above quoted, that where words
are capable of two meanings, the one consis-
tent with Justice, is to be preferred to that
which is not so. Now, here the Court is in
a dilemma. We bow TO his rule we are
anxious TO construe this clause so as to defeat
injustice and sustain the right. But while,
on the other side, he tells us that by adopting
the obvious meaning of the word %"free," we
shall recognize SlaveTy.-Mr. Gerrit Smith,
and other tender consciences, intreat us tc
hold that this word free" does exclude slaves,
and hence the clause allows only three-ffths
of such to be represented /; assuring US that
this arrangement is "a bounty on liberty, and
an attempt to promote the Anti-Slavery cause.
(Smith, 10 Whittier.)
Besides, we know that the clause. in oul
sense, was reluctantly submitted to by the
South, as an unfair abrid gement of their rights
and eXulted in at the North as a just rebuke
of a bad system. This, therefore, cannot be
a case " SO monstrous" that, in the language
of Marshall, "all mankind would, lcihouI
hesitation, unite in rejecting the application
1t rather resembles one of those 'poIitical in.
conveniencies" referred 10 in the citation from
Cranch, with whose results Courts have no
thing to DO.
Again, Mr.. Spooner and his friends, objec
to our construction as working injustice, be,
cause the master now votes practically fol
three-fiths of his slaves. Suppose the Cour
adopts his Interpretation. The master will
then get all his slaves counted instead o
three-ffths of theml The Court cannot SCI
INV nat lNoull ilihNn du VIC CduSC u
Justice. We cannot oblige Carolina to al
d.. low her slaves TO vote, no, not even if they
should be emancipated. If the Constitution
considers the slaves property, then it recog
nizes Slavery. If, as Mr.. Spooner asserts
D it does not recognize Slavery, then it must
Y as he all along allows, consider the slave
person. The slaves being persons, they mus
be included either among ''free persons,'' G
: among 'three-ffths Of all other persons."-
Il The last is the old pro-slavery construction
If, on the other hand, Mr.. Spooner, or an
o one else, shall so constTue "free persons" Il
n TO include the slaves, the only result Of tn
9 new Interpretation will be to increase the p,
v litical weight of the Shareholders by ir
two-ffths of their slaves The Court ihinl
it better, in This rieW, to adhere to the ObUiOl
meaning of the clause. 1t acknowledges tn
the clause is bad, as now Interpreted, but Il
= proposed change only makes it ''Two-FIFTHs
worse. The Court will cheerfully 90 out
its track to adopt a strained construction
subseTve justice, but never will do so witt
the only result of such departure from Il
plain and obvious meaning" is to strengtht
j. the hand Of the tyrant. Mr.. Spooner's rul
therefore, of preferring the righteous to Il
unrighteous meaning of ambiguous word
1t does not apply here. Unhappily no choice
Z, left us, and we must adhere to the O6ui0l
meaning, which leaves the Constitution pr
slavery.*
d But though Mr.. Spooner does not der
g that this use of the word ''free'' is the plat
*The only possible reply TO this argumeI
Q is that The Supreme Court will first free II
slaves, and then this bad result will not 70
l low from the new Interpretation. or cours
if the slaves are freed, Mr.. Spooner ma
construe the Constitution as he p%leases.-
That Judges have no power to emancipal
under the general principles of law, we trie
10 TO show in our first article; that the Const
h tuition gives them no such power, we sha
J. show further on. Unless they have il,
one way or another, tho above argumeI
seems irresistible.