Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1847-03-27


mand We have not the requisite information enable
determine whether il shall be conducted by land or by wa
ter, in part by each II is very important that the Depart
ment here should be put possession of all the Information
which be collected the subject the earliest period
You therefore directed forward to this Department
with the least possible delay all The facts you collect
this subject
she Rio Gande is regarded the base Of operations and
that must be firmly maintained 1t left General Taylor
to determine what force necessary for that purpose But
The movement of the expedition you will learn from
my letter 10 Gen. Tayloto be delayed for further direction
from this place to the mode of advancing into the enemy
country. As you shall learn from General Tayler
that sufficient force for the enterprise be spared and
ceIve his directions IN regard to it. you will lose time in
putting them in execution If General Taylor should
give directions as TO moving by land wate the choice will
then be left for your determination As you have
settled this point you will make known the officers
Of the several branches of the public SERVICE the Rio
Gande, what may be required They will be instructed to
comply with your acquisitions expedtiously practicable
Measures will be adopted, by direction from this Department
to have them prepared to the acquisitions you may
make on them.
On the 18th Of October Gen. Taylor briefly replied to the
Secretary acknowledging the receipt of his communication Of
The 22i September and informing him that under the terms
of the capulaon of Monterrey (Which capiulaon had
existence at the time The Secetarys letter written
cannot detach force south of the line from Linares
San Fernando, and cannot therefore, there OBJ
staces comply present with the instructions of the Sece
ary cannot doubt that receiving the intelligence OF the
capture OF Monterey modified instructions issued by the
Department"
And again, the 5h of October in further response
the same communication, Gen Taylor writes follows
"HEApouARrERs ARMY OccUrArIoS,
.CAMP NEAR MONTEREY, Der. Is, 1916.
SIR: In my acknowledgment dated the 18th instant, of
the instructions of the Secretary of War; of September 3d.
briefly stated that the detachmentto Tamplco could not be
made without contravenng the convention of Monterey.
Other and detailed this point and the
general question Of the campaign left 10 subsequent com
muncation which have the honor to submit for the in
formation of the Genealn-ch and Secretary of War
Such point has been reached the conduct OF the and
the progress OF our arms TO make proper place i'm
and convictions very fully before the Government
al wish 10 remark first of all, that have considered
Brgadier General Wool, though formally under my ORDERS
yet charged by the Government with distinct OPP ration
with which was not at liberty interfere. Though greatly
IN doubt as to the praciicahy OF his reaching chihuahua
with artillery and deemng the importance of the operation
any be all commensurate with its difficulty
and expense have accordingly RETAINED from controlling his
movements any way. His force, therefore, forms ee
ment In calculations, particularly it now, will
be, entirely beyond my reach.
The Mexican army under General Ampudia has left Sal
o, and fallen back San Luis Potos-the last detachment
a understand being under orders march day General
santa Anna reached San Luis on the 9Th Instant and is
gagged concentrating and organizing the army that point
Whether the withdrawal of the forces San Luis be intended
to draw US into the country far from supplies and support
whether 1t be political movement, connected with Santa
Annas return power, is impossible say is sufficient
Tor my present argument to know that heavy force
bling in front SalIo the capital of Coahuila, is vtu-
lily IN our possession and be occupied necessary, the
moment the convention end The occupation Of Sal
lilo will engthen our line rs miles, but, the other hand
aay enable to draw at least portion of breadsus
on the country San Luis is about 800 miles from Salto
erhaps .
"San Luis is city of 60 900 inhabitants in coun-
y abundant in and great distance from the
cart Of the Republic whence munitions of and reinforce
nenis can readily be drawn Il is al the time nearly GOO
niles from the Rio Grande which continue be the
ase of our operations, at least until reach San Luis
ln view OF the above iacts hazard nothing saying
hat column to move San Luis from Satilo should to
ensure success be at least 90 strong which 900
should be regular troops. After much reflection, consider
he above the smallest number OF effective troops could
employed this service without mourning the hazard Of
disaster and perhaps defeat There would be required
SIDES TO keep open our long line, protect the depo aud
cure the country already gained, force of 5000 menhs
without including the force necessary send Tampico
take or hold that place.
The above estimate may large when it remember
ed that important results have been gained with much
smaller force But have hitherto operated our own
base and the Mexcans at great distance from theirs Sal
to may be considered about equdsan the Rio Grande
and San Luis Every days march beyond engthens our
already long line and curtas heirs-weakens us and gives
them strength Hence the should under
TAKEN except with force so large TO render certain
"ln the above calculation have supposed the Mexicans
able to concentrate San Luis 900 to So 600
men, With tolerable stability in the Government, doubt
their ability do this and il is not safe to assume anv
less number basis.
Ihe force of tweve-monhs volunteers has suffered greatly
from disease. Many have died. and have been
discharged for disability. So much has their effective strength
been reduced by this and present sickness that the
absence OF official returns satisfied that 500 men per
regiment would be large average OF electives among the
volunteers. This would give including cavalry force
little short of 5000 men, or adding 900 regulars (our
present strength is not 3000 total force Of 900 Leav
the very moderate number 900 to secure our rear
should not be able TO march from Sito with present and
expected MEANS at the head Of than TO- 600 men-a
number which, from considerations above stated deem be
entirely inadequate.
And now to the point presented in the Secretary
letters simultaneous San Lis and Tampico
there suggested but will readily be that with only
half the force which consider necessary march on one
point 1t is quite impossible march both and that moth
ing short OF an effective force Of 2 900 men would
on military principles justify the double movement And
Is 10 he remarked that the possession Of Tampico is nispen
sable IN case we advance San Luis for the line hence TO the
latter place Is entirely too long be maintained permanently
and ust tie abandoned for the shorter from ampco the
moment San Luis is taken.
vi have spoken only Of the number troops deemed neces
say Tor the prosecution of the campaign beyond Sao II
VIII be understood that largely increased and material
OF every kind will be equally necessary render the army
ehcen, such cavalry and artillery horses means of trans
port, ordnance stores, &c.
1.-The Department may be assured that the above views
have not been given without mature reflection have been
the result OF experience and careful inquiry will for
The Government to determine whether shall prose-
cued by directing active campaign against san Luis and
the capital or whether the country already gained shall be
held and defensive attitude assumed In the latter case
the general line OF the Sierra Madfe might very well taken
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