The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1847-03-23

BETWEEN
WAR DEPARTMENT AND GEN. TAYLOR.
sPICE AND SPIRIT.
| (Contixusd)
| HsApaUARrERs ARMY OF OCCUPATION
| Camp near Monterey, Oct IL, 1916.
Sn,-I have the honor to acknowledge the communi.
cation Of the Secretary Of War; with enclosures dated
tho 2?d ultimo; also one fromlyour Office of September
H. relative to the designations OF volunteer officers and
General Orders" No. Al, all of which delivered
| by Lieut. Armistead on the 10th instant
will be seen OF once that under the terms Of the
Pitulation OF Monterey, cannot deaoh force south of
line from Lnares to San Fernardo and canns there
FORE even there other Obstacles comply pre-
sent with the instructions Of the Secretary cannot
doubt that receiving the intelligence OF the capture
Monterey modified instructions were issued by the
shall with as little delay a. possible. reply at length
on ali topics Connected with the csmpsisn
am SIR very respectfully your obedient servant
| Major General g. army Commanding.
The AD'urArr dxrxAAL OF the army Washington, DC.
HEADsuARrERs ARMY OF occurArror,l
Camp near Monterey, Oct IL. 1916.
| sn,-In my acknowledgement dated the llth inst of
briefly stated that the detachment to Tsmpco could not
Dc made without contravenng the convention of Monte.
point and the general question Of the csmpaixn left
toe subsequent Communication; which have now the
honor to submit for the information of the GeneraLn.
Chicf and Secretary Of War Such point has boon
reached in the conduct of the and the progress Of
our arms a. to make proper place my Impressions
wish to remark, first Of all, that have considered
6rigader General Wool though formally under my or
operation with which was not at liberty to interfere
Though greatly in doubt to the practcabiity Of his
reaching chihuahua with artillery and deemn9 the inn
portance OF the operation at any be at all
commensurate with its difficulty and expense have ac
oordingly reiraned from controlling his movements in
any way His force. therefore, forms element in my
calculations, particularly is now or soon will be-
| entirely beyond my resch. go y
| Ma
Satlo, and fallen back San Luis Potosi-the last de-
achment as understand being under orders to march
sh instant and 10 engaged in ntrating and organ
zing the aimy at tina. point Whether tho withdrawal
me forces to ban Luis be intended to draw into the
country lar from supplies and support whether be
political movement, connected with Santa Annals re-
turn to power impossible to say is sufficient for
assembling in front. Saltio the capital Of Goa
hula 10 virtually In our possession. and can be occu
pied necessary the moment the convention IL at
end The occupation of satio will lengthsn our line
70 miles, but on the other hand may enable draw
San Luis is about 800 miles from saltlo perhaps more
san LUZ is . city Of seine so,o0 inhabitants, in
country abundant in resources and great distance
from the heart Of The republic whence munitions of war
and renforcsnsnts readily be drawn Ii is at the
same time nearly 900 miles from the Rio Orande which
n Do s base OF our operations at least
In view of the above facts, hazard nothing in saying
that column, to move San Luis from Saltllo should
to insure success be least 20 900 strong Of which
900 should be regular troops. After much reflection
CONSIDER he apove al the smallest number Of effective
troops that could be this service without
curing the hazard Of disaster and perhaps defeat
There would be required besides to keep open our long
line protect the depot and the country already
gained force Of 200 menths without including the
force necessary to send to Tampco or hold that
place.
| The above estimate may seem large when il il TO-
membered that important results have been gained with
bsse, and the Mexicans at great disance
from theirs. Salhio maybe considered about squidis.
tant from the Rio Grande and San Luis Every days
| I,I
tails and gives them strength Hence
the movement should not be undertaken except with
| iorce so large a. to render success certain
In the above calculation have supposed the Mexcans
able to at San Luis force to SO 900
doubt not their ability to do this and is not SAFE to a.
| sumo any less number a basis
The force Of twelve months volunteers has suffered
greatly from disease Many have died. and great num-
Der have been discharged for disability. So much has
their effective strength been reduced by this cause
present sickness that the absence Official returns
am satisfied that 500 per regiment would be large
average Of electives among the volunteers This would
men, Or adding 900 regulars Jour present strength is
not Ooo) total force Of $4,000 men, Leaving the very
not be- able t. march from with snS ss
pected means, at the head Of than 10 900 mena
number which from considerations above stated deem
And now come to the point presented in the Secrea-
rvs letter smsltaneous movement on San Luis and
seen that, with only half tho force which consider
necessary to march point is quite possible to
|
force Of 49, to 80 600 men would on military prnci.
pies, justify the double movement And il il to be re-
marked that tho possession Of Tanpico is indispensable
10 case We advance to San Luis for the line hence
the latter place Is rely too long maintained per-
msnsnty, and must be abandoned Cor the shorter one
from Tampico, the moment San Luis Is taken.
have spoken only of the number Of troops deemed
necessary for the prosecution Of the campaign beyond
ssltlls 1t will be understood that largely Increased
and materials Of every kind Ill be lyInece
sary 10 FENDER the army efficient such as cavalry and
artillery horses means OF transport ordnance stores ~
ad lot the Inv
have not been given withSat mature reflection
been the result Of experience and careful inquiry II
will be for the government to determine whether the
shall be prosecuted by directing active campaign
against San Luis and the capital whether the country
already gained shall be held and defensive attitude
sumed, In the latter case the general line of the Sierra
Madrs might very well be taken; but then, with
the enemy in force in my front, II might be impruden
to dctach to Tampico 30 large force 5000 1000
men Ips cularly OF the description required for that
operauon II the cooperation Of the army, therefore,
be deemed essential to the success Of the expedition
against Tsmpico, trust that II will be postponed for the
have not been unmudfu Of the Importance Of taking
Tampico, and have at least once addressed the depart
ment the subject. Nothing but the known exposure
Of the place the ravages Of yellow fever prevented
from organizing al expedition sganst last sumner
knew that, il taken, could not with any certainty be
held and that the cause would not be removed before
the last OF November, or first OF December
II may be expected that should give my views as to
the policy Of occupying defensive line, TO which have
above alluded am free to confess that in view Of the
aimcultes and expense attending movement into the
heart OF the country and particularly In Of the
settled and revolutionary character Of the Mexican GO
vernment the occupation OF such line TO the
best course that can be adopted The line taken might
either be that which propose TO insist the
tho line to which we have advanced viz The Sierra
Madre, including chihuahua and Santa Fe. The former
me could be held with much smaller force than the
.er put even the limo Of the Sierra Madre could be
held with force greatly less than sud be required
an active campaign. Monterey controls the great out
with an advance atao. and smsii COZ At Monc S
~ VICTORIA and TamPico, would ensctualy cover