Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1847-04-23
SALEM, OHIO, FRIDAY, APRIL %, 1917.

TIE IlIne, nc was SUI liable 10 Suier any pun
ishment, even death, afterwards prescribed by
the statute. On this principle, acknowledge
TO be absurd and unjust, one man would have
been executed for an act which was not muir
der when he did it, unless the King had par
doned him.. Lev. 81. Still this custom
so far conformed to legal principles, that It re-
manned in force three centuries, and no au-
thority but that of the whole Parliament could
repeal it.-See note to Blackstone, |, TO-
Here we see that the Courts by tciched GUS
toms do not mean morally wicked, but such
as violate tie general system of the law.
"Customs, says Blackstone, must be rea-
sonable." (which is not always, says Coke,
to be understood of every unlearned mans
reason, but Of artificial and legal reason, war
ranted by authority of blackstone
Comm, /. 20. See other instances, 3. 40.
Story Equity l, S. Is.
"Slavery," says Lord Stowell, one Of the
first Judges Of the age, /" never was in Anti
qua the creature of law, but of that custom
which operates with the force of law, and
when it is cried out that mahis uSus aboIer-
dus est (bad customs are TO be abolished,)
it is first 10 be prored that even in the conside-
ration Of England the use (custom) Of slave
ry is considered as a maIus usHs (bad custom)
in the colonies. -. Hagg. Adm. 94.
In the face of this rule that I" bad customs
are not binding and not law"-the system Of
villeinage, (,vhiie Slavery under which men
and women were bought and sold, like cat
tie: see Stephens, Blackstone, Coke,) grew
up from custom alone, was held legal for GEN.
turtles, and died out only by disease with
out the enactment of a law in regard to it from
the beginning TO the end of its existence I;
clearly showing that the Courts in constituting
tho word had in tbic nnpnaction uill ho AVG
respect to the usages and laws Of the land in
which they are sitting.
Dwarris also, in discussing the question,
whether laws against reason are void, says:
ave must distinguish between right and
power, between moral fitness and political
authority, 1t must not be entertained as q
question of ethics, but of the bounds and lin
its of Legislative polcer."-r. CAS-.
And Coke, even when he went so far as
to think that bad law might be disregarded
tells the Judges that 50 they are not to be guild
ed by the crooked cord of discretion, but by
the golden metwand of the hauc.'
1t is a general principle that no Court will
give effect TO the law Of another nation, il
that law be inconsistent with sound morals.
See Story Conflict of Laws.
But who shall decide what sound morals
area
The Court of Kings Bench, in London,
perhaps the first Court in the world, awarded
TO a Spaniard damages against an English
! man who had taken possession on the high
seas, w~rongfully, Of certain slaves belonging
: TO the Spaniard, on the ground that Slavery,
though contrary TO justice, was not forbidden
; by the nations or the law of Spain.
Contracts founded on immorG! considera'
lions are void. But Chief Justice Shaw sta
ted, in the Med case, that a contract for the
sale of a slave made in New Orleans, where
: Slavery is lawful, would be enforced in Mas
? ~sachusetts.
These instances show that Courts will lool
! to the general spirit of the national laws, tt
. discover whether a rule or provision be i'm
moral or inconsistent with right, and will finC
! out "by the law" as Coke says, " what il
; il %stice."
I The language of Lord S,owell in regard tt
! the Slave-Trade proceeds on the same princi
Pile:
h 81 must remember that in discussing thi
. question, | must consider it not according Il
any priuaie moral opprehensiOns Of my own
(f | entertained them ever so slncerely,) Blu
J as the lar considers it. y \ An act mus
{ be legally criminal, because neither this Cour
y or any other can carry its private apprehen
: sions, independent of law, into its publ
G judgments, on the quality of actions. 1t mus
! conform to the judgment of the law upon tina
u subject, and acting as a Court, in the admin
i~stration of law, it cannot attribute crimina
ty to an act where the law imputes none. |
must look to the legal standard of moralit
on a question of this nature.
Ie And that standard must be found in the la,
of nations, as fixed and evidenced by genera
re ancient, and admitted practice, by treatie'
Is and by the general tenor of the laws and o
p dinances and formal transactions Of ~civilize
ID Siates.''-2. Dodson Adm. 247.
j, Marshall quotes and endorses this in II
Wheaton &C, cited in our first article.
e. The language of our Supreme Court wheI
1T ever the Justice of Indian land titles has com
Sc before them, will show the SAINT principle.
e. In g.. Wheaton, $40. Chief Justice Ma
shall:
G. "We will not enter into the controvers
o. whether agricultuTists, merchants, and mani
81! (~acturers have a right, on abstract principle
Il. to expel hunters. Conquest gives a ttl'
r. which the Courts or the conqueror cannot d.
nv, whatever the private and speculative opii
ions of individuals may be respecting the or
re- ginai Justice of the claim. However xtravi
on cant The pretension of converting the dlscov
'T ~ of a country into conquest may appear,
IN the principle has been asserted in the first u
IRA stance and afterwards sustained /; if a COUNT
in has been acquired and held under it; if Il
s.) property of the great mass of the communl
original. in it, it becomes the law OF Il
of land and cannot be questioned. = HOY
,ut ever, the restriction may be opposed 10 nGfuT
it right, if it is indispensable, it may, perhaF
a be supported by reason and certainly cam
IS be rejected by Courts of Justice"
re- In 4. Howard, 572, the Supreme Coz
me say of the same point, Indian titles:
" sit would be useless, at this day, to
nd quire whether the principle thus adopted
or Just or not.
SIS eff it were an open question, it would