Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, IA [i.e. Ind.]) 1839-1854, 1847-10-12

into the Union under the proper stipulations.-
the express stipulation that she insti-
tute slavery without the Mt of the United
States. Ye, after she enters the Union, she can
exercise her rights of sovereignty and introduce
it. This assertion cannot be sustained either on
principle authority We have the right to
dispose Of territories fit; and if We
deem it necessary to our welfare or security TO
enact ordinance, declaring that slavery shall
never exist in any territory acquired of Mexico.
from whence do those who afterwards occupy it
derive the right TO annuI that ordinance Every
person who enters upon that domain by the act
Of entry, scents to the conditions of that ordi-
na nee and unless he is willing to comply with
its stipuIations, he has right to remain there.
There is therefore, a compact entered into be-
tween the United States and the people of that
territory and il cannot be annulled without the
assent Of both parties. II then the Wilmot Pro-
viso is adopted and a state is admitted into the
Union under the operation of its provisions and
that state in total disregard Of the ordnance was
to introduce slavery, it would infringe the COM
pact between it and the other states OF the Union.
and the law establishing slavery would be vio-
Iation of that clause of the Constitution OF tho
United States, which declares that no State shall
pass a law imparing the obligation of contracts
To sustain the positions assumed, will now cite
some judicial decisions based the ordinance
of 1877 for the government of the North West
territory. That ordinance enacted to insure
the formation of republican institutions i'll this
portion of the Union. 1t contains clause pro-
hbiting slavery similar to the Wilmot Froviso
If then it can be shown that the people of 1ndi-
Ohio cannot institute slavery, it must fol-
low that State created out Of territory acquired
Of Mexico, and which is peopled and admitted
into the Union under the operation Of the Will
mot Proviso cannot establish involuntary servi-
tnde- The cases are precisely analogous. Our
State Constitution CONTAIN, a r-~h;h;,;po
slavery; it is conceded that it well any 9TH
er clause in that instrument may be abrogated by
the people Of the State. But if we annul that
clause and insert establishing slavery,
violate provision of the ordinance of 1S7, which
has beer iudicaIly held to be a compact between
the United States and the people of the North
West territory. Our right of sovereignty does
not extend to the abrogation Of compacts. which
involve the interests of others. BY asserting to
that ordinance, we forever resigned the right of
Introducing slavery. except by the consent of both
parties to the compact. States are as much bound
by compacts as individuals, and no political rev.
olution or change in form of government will
absolve US from prior obligations. In the case Of
Hogg vs. GAINESVILLE Canal and Manufacturing
Company. ) Ham. 40, the Supreme Court of
Ohio, speaking of the 4th article of the ordi-
nance Of 1887. which regards navigable waters,
says, "This portion of tho ordinance of 1871, IS
as much obligatory upon the State OF Ohio, Is
our own Constitution. In truth 1t IS more 80;
for the Constitution may be altered by the peo-
pie of the State, while this cannot be altered
without the assent both of the people OF thrs
State and of the United States through their rep
resentatves. 1t is an article of compact, and
until we assume the principle that the sovereign
power Of the State, is not bound by compact,
this clause must be considered obligatory
In the case of Spooner VS.. Mcconnell and 9TH
ers, decided i'll the Circuit Court of the United
States, | McLean's Rep. 349. Judge Mclean,
speaking of the sixth article of the ordinance of
i1s7, says, "The sixth article Of the compact
prohibits slavery. The Constitution of the State
also prohibits it. Now notwithstanding this in
hbtion in the Constitution. the people OF the
State in Convention, might so alter the Constitu-
ton as to admit slavery. But does not the com
pact prevent such alteration without the con-
sent of the original States. II this be not the
effect of the compact, its import has been mis-
conceived by the people of the State generally.
They have looked upon this provision as secu-
rity against the introduction of slavery, even be-
yond the provisions of the Constitution. And
this consde ration has drawn masses Of population
to our State. who now repose under all the guar
antics which given this subject by the Con-
stitution and the compact. The provision Of the
compact in regard to slavery rests upon the same
basis as that which regards the navigable waters
within the State. They are both declared to be
unalterable, except by common consent III
then il is settled that the ordinance of 1857 IS
compact by the only adjudicatons that have
been had, it follows that any law which we may
adopt conflicting with its provisions is void. For
in the case Of Green VS.. Bdde, Wheaton, de-
cided in the Supreme Court of the United States.
which involved the validity of the compact be-
tween Virginia and Kentucky. it is held that
THAT Court has authority to declare State law
unconstitutional, upon the ground of its impair
ing the obligation of compact between differ
ent State. of the Union. The prohibition OF the
Constitution Embrace all contracts executed or
exacutory, between private individuals.
State and individuals, or between the States them
selves" In view of the above decisions, would
ask on what pretence can it be asserted that the
wilmot Provso would avail nothing If adopted.
II has been shown that it would be regarded a
pA ~,ch he IrAi hy