Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1847-12-10

H. we're. MIu I|Un q MIuIINII ~ NNNN|"NNNils ~ -
not 70 he expected that Mexico, after refusing
10 establish such Q line as q permanent bound
Iry, when our victorious army are IN Possession
of her capital, and in the heart Of her country,
would permit us 10 hold il without resistapce.-
I That she would continue the war, and N the
most harrassing and enjoying forms, there can
be no doubt. A border warfare Of the most
savage character, extending oyer a long line
would be Increasingly wagcd. II would require
a large army 70 be kept constantly IN the field,
stationed Of ross and garrieons nlong such q line
TO protect mud defend Il The enemy, relieved
from the pressure Of our arms ON his coasts and
In the ~popnlous parts Of Tho interior, would d.
rect bis attention to this line, and, selecting an
isolated post for stack. would concentrate his
forces upon il. This would be a condition Of
affairs which tho Mexicans, pursuing their IA
vorite system Of guerrilla warfare, would prob
rbly prefer 10 any other. Were we 10 assume q
defensive attitude on such a line, all the advan-
tages Of such a state of war would be on the side
Of the enemy. We could levy no contributions
upon him, or in any other way make him feel
the pressure OF the war, but must remain mac
tive and await his rcproach, being In constant
uncertainty at what point on the line, or at
what time, he might make an assault He may
assemble and organize an overwhelming force
in the interior, on his own side Of the limo, and,
concealing his purpose, make a sudden assault
upon some Of our posts 40 pistant from any 9TH
er as TO prevent the possibility of timely succor
OF achievements and in this way our gallant
army would be exposed to the danger Of being
cut OF in detail or, II, by their nnequalled
bravery and proves every where exhibited
during this war, they should repulse the enemy,
| their numbers stationed at any one point may
be 20 small too pursue him 1.-THE enemy be re
pulsed IN one attack, he would have nothing 10
do but to retreat to his own side Of the line, and
being in no fear Of pursuing enemy, may re-
inforre himself at leisure for another attack on
| the same or some other post. He may, too,
cross the line between our posfs, make rapid in
cursions into the country which we hold, murder
the inhabitants, commit deprcdations on them,
and then retreat 10 the interior before a suii-
| cicnt force can be concentrated 10 pursue him
Such would probably be the harrassing charac-
ter Of a more d~efcnsiue war on our part IL
our forces, when attacked, or threatened with
attack, be permitted to cross the line, drive
back the enemy, and conquer him, this would
be again 10 invade the enemy's country, after
having Loaf all the advantages Of the conquests
we have already made, by having Voluntarily
abandoned them. To hold such n line success
fully and in security, il Is far from being certain
that il would not require rs large an army as
would be necessary TO bold all the conquests we
have already made, and 70 continue the prose-
cution Of the war in the heart Of the enemy's
country. IL is also Car from being certain that
the expenses Of the war would be diminished
! by such a policy.
] am persuaded that tho best means Of yindi-
eating the national honor and interest, and Of
bringing the war to an honorable close, will be
to prosecute it with increased energy and pow
err in the vital paris ofthc cnemy;s country.
In my annual message to Congress, Of Decem-
Der last, / declared that ithe war has not been