The Mississippi Creole. [volume] (Canton, Miss.) 1841-1851, 1847-04-17


6culty and expense, Ihaye accordingly refrain
ed from.controlin9 his movements in any way.
Ifis force, therefore, forms no element in my
ealculatiops, particularly as it is now, or soon
WILDE, entirely beyond my reach.
/ The Mexicanarmy under General Ampuda
hasSlef Saltiilo, and fallen back on San Luis
Potosi--the last detachment, as understand,
being under orders to march to-day. General
Santa A ma reached San LUIS on the 9th inst,
and is engaged in concentrating and organic
ling the army at that point. Whether the
withdrawal Of the forces to San Luis be nten-
ded to draw us into the country far from sup
plies and support, or whether it be political
movement, connected with Santa Annals re-
turnsto power, it is impossible to say; it is suf-
! ficient for my present argument to know that a
heavy force is assembling in our front Saltil-
10. the capital of Coahuila, is virtually in our
possession, and can be occupied if necessary,
the moment the convention is at an end. The
occupation of Saltillo will lengthen our line
seventy-ive miles, but, on the other hand, may
enable us to draw at least a portion OF our
breadstuffs from the country. San Luis is
about three hundred miles from Saltillo, per-
haps more.
San luis is city of some 10000 inhahlt-
ants, in country abundant in resources, and
at no great distance from the heart OF the Re-
public, whence munitions of war and REIN
forcemens cun readily be drawn. L is at the
| Il, mil frop ha
Rio Grande, which must continue to be the
base of our operations, at least until we reach
| San Luis.
In view of the above facts, hazard nothing
in saying that column, to move on San Luis
P,tosi from Saltllo, should, to insure success,
be at least 10000 strong, of which 10000
should be regular troops, After much retlec-
ton, consider the above as the smallest num-
Der of etectire troops that could be employed
on this service without mourning the hazard of
disaster and perhaps defeat. There would be
required, besides, to keep open our long line,
protect the depots, and secure the country al
ready gained, force of 5000 men-this, with
out including the force necessary to send to
Tampico to take or hold that place.
| The above estimate may seem large when it
is remembered that important results have been
gained with much smaller force. But we
have hitherto operated near our own base, and
the Mexicans at great distance from theirs.
Saltillo may be considered about equidstant
/ from the Rio Grande and San Luis. Every
days. march beyond il lengthens our already
Hong line, and curtails thsiFs- weak ems US and
gives them strength Hence, the movement
should not be undertaken, except with force
so large as to render success certain.
In the above calculation | have supposed
the NIexicans able 10 concentrate at San Luis
force of 10000 to $4,000 men. With tolera-
BILE stability in the government, doubt not
their ability to do this, and it is not safe to as
sumo any less number as a basis
The force Of l2 months volunteers has suf-
fered greatly from disease. Many have died,
and great numberh have been discharged from
inability. So much has their effective strength
been reduced by this cause and present sick
ness, that, in the absence of official returns, |
am satisfied that 500 men PEI regiment would
be large average of electives among the volun-
teers. This wogl d give, including the cavalry,
force little short of 5000 men, or, adding
1000 regulars, (our present strength is not
3000,) total force of $4,000 men. Leaving
the very moderate number of 5000 to secure
our rear, should not be able to march from
Saltillo, with present and expected means, at
| the head of more than 10000 men--a number
which, from considerations above stated, /
deem to be entirely inadequate.
And l now come to the point presented in
the Seeretary's letter. A simultaneous move
ment on San Luis and Tampico is there sug-
gested; but it will be readily seen that, with
only half the force necessary to march on one
point, it is quite impossible to march on both,
and that nothing short of an effective force of
25 to 10000 men would, on military principles,
Justify the double movement. md it is to be
remarked that the possession of Tampico is in
dispensable in case we advance to San Luis,
for the line hence to the latter place is entire
! ly too long to be maintained permanently, and
must be abandoned for the shorter one from
Tampico, the moment San Luis is taken.
nave SPVhSu oHi1 VI INC huihoci "a hooPS
deemed necessary for the prosecution of the
campaign beyond Saltllo. 1t will be under
stood that largely increased means and mate
rial of every kind will be equally necessary to
render the army efficient, such as cavalry and
artillery horses, means of transport, ordnance
stores, &c.
The department may be assured that the
above views have not been given without ma
ture reflection, and have been the result of ex-
perienee and careful enquiry. 1t will be for
the government to determine whether the war
shall be prosecuted by directing an active cam
pagn against San Luis and the capital. or whe-
Their the country already gained shall be held,
and defensive attitude assumed. In the lat
ter case, the general line of the Sierra Madrs
might very well be taken; but even then, with
the enemy in otce in my front, it nigh. be
imprudsnt to detach to Tampico so lafge
foree as 3000or 1000 men, particularly of the
description required for that operation. If the
co-operation Of the army, therefore, be deem
a