Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1846-03-21

Ii
Elections, in Saturdays paper, on the errors into
which the best and wisest of Constitution trainers
may fall, and have fallen, from the mistake of adopt
ing too high standard Of intelligence and virtue for
the mass OF mankind, has handed us the annexed
remarks and quotations as fitting sequel TO the
article of Saturday.
] One OF the Oldest and by no means least saga
cious, OF the books that treat on the art of wisely
| constituting STATE--we mean Plato's Repub-
lie has passage which curiousy exemplifes
the slight degree in which Governments condescend
to follow the track designed by those who have set
them up. In his First Book, Socrates (who is the
chief nterlocutor Of the dialogues is dscoursng Of
the end Of government itself. He shows that il is
for the protection Of the weak, not the profit of the
strong, that il is instituted but that where this aim
is accomplished without him, the philosopher, the
sage will wish to take no share in ruling, because
he desires not power nor wealth. As, then, the
possession Of power bring the wise men nothing
which they regard with desire, is only the fear OF
i'll which can induce them to forego their personal
quiet and freedom, to enter upon the cares and pains
of sway; and ne proceeds to explain what dread it
is that may drive them into assuming authority:
I" 'Ehe wise, then, will not take part In public al.
fairs with the purpose of enriching themselves be-
cause they would fear to be looked upon as merce-
nary II they sought the epouments of public life,
or as punderers, if they secretly appropriated the
public funds. As little could they have public ho-
nors in view, for they are not ambitious. They
must then, be compelled to take part in the govern
ment by the fear Of some punishment 1t is, to all
appearances for this reason that voluntarily to take
obo rf xno x 4r
unworthy Of the sage. Now, the severest punish
ment that can be visited upon the good man, when
ne refuses to govern others, is to be governed the
bad and it is this fear which obliges the wise to
take upon themselves public Office not for interests
nor ambitions sake, but because men worthy to
rule them and others are not to be found. So that
could State be found composed only of virtuous
citizens, sOOuld there contend as much to be
allosced TO remain in priUate life as they noD do
for public employmenfs. It would there be ac-
knowledged on all sides that the true magistrate
keeps q, Uies0 not has oson ends bat the interests
Of all has fe1otc-citizens and each one of these,
persuaded Of this TRUTH would choose rather to be
happy under the care of another than 10 bear the
fatigues and cares of governing wisely"
Plato then reasoned about as well concerning
these things, and about as much anticipated state
Of political Jacksonism, did the great authors of
the " rederallst when they argued that this Co
yernment must work well, because the people were
to choose their own rulers, and would therefore be
sure to select the best known to be faithful and
able. For, first, the people are no longer permitted
to choose: packed convention, directed by cabal,
chooses for them. And secondly, were the people
allowed to choose. they no longer seek wise and
an equal friend Of all citizens, but party chief or
oup Of he hoe az. 4
thing, is ready to become SO, in order to mount to
power and the "spois."
But the old Greek especially missed the mark in
thinking that the good and wise should shun public
life when things were going well, and should seek
il again when all was going ill; for it is only in the
former condition Of things that the good and wise
stand any chance of being suffered to take any part
in governing, and just in proportion as the Com
monwealth needs them are they sure to be excluded
from its trusts.