Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1846-03-24

moral weapon 10 effect compromise, would ask
how could that be effected, but by using il as
the means 10 intimdale Great Britain intimi-
date by telling her that she must quit the terrific
ry within the year, or be expelled at its exPira-
ton by force. And what would that be, btil an
appeal 10 her fear with The hope of extorting ron,
cessions which her reason had refused TO ylelo!
Such an appeal in case of feeble nation would
be hazardous; but with one as great and power
ful as England instead OF weapon TO enforce
compromise, il would be one calculated 10 de-
feat il.
The remaining reason for voting notice on The
part of The Senators referred TO, is OF very oil
ierent character. 1t objects to the convention IT.
SELL and condemns the policy OF entering into Ell
Their tina, of 1918 or 1877, on the ground that IN
stead OF being The means Of securing aud perpe,
tuating our rights in The territory, they have
had the very reverse effect, TO weaken, instead
of strengthening our tile 10 The territory. My
opinion, must say, is precisely the opposite. II
would, indeed, have been desirable 10 have SET
tied it then by compromise on the 10Th parallel
Of latitude but that, as is we'll known, was i'm
possible al the lime. The offer, in fact, was made
side. but rejected on The Part OF Great Bri-
tain. The rejection left no other alternative but
an appeal 10 arms, or surrender OF our rights 10
the territory or 10 enter into The convention. 10
do nothing, would have been to ac9uiesce IN the
claims OF Great Britain, whose subjects were
then in actual possession. lier possession being
adverse 10 ours, would have been gradually ma
turing, through the long intervening period, into
TOO perfect title TO be opposed by ours. 10
avoid that, we were compelled to resort 10 force,
or enter into convention 10 preserve our rights.
We wisely preferred The laller, and the conven
liDns Of 1918 and 1927 were The consequence Of
that preference. They were entered into for the
two-iold objects, as substitutes Tor war, and The
means Of preserving our rights TO The territory as
they then stood, unimpaired. To appreciate The
wisdom OF The policy, il mus, be borne in mind
that at that time our means OF asserting our rights
TO the territory, or OF acquiring possession,
exceedingly limited compared to those OF Great
Britain, but that they were steadily and rapidly
increasing. Those who had the management OF
affairs a, that period wisely relied upon time and
the rapid spread If population in western direc-
tion as the means ultimately Of acquiring posses.
sion oil the territory and entered intolhe conven-
ton with view Of preserving our rights unim-
paired until they could operate with full effect.
Ii but TOO common Of late TO condemn The
acts OF our predecessors, and to pronounce them
unjust unwse, or unpalriotic from not advering
10 the circumstances under which they acted. Thus
10 Judge, is 10 DO great injustice 10 The wise and
patriotic men who preceded US In this case, ii
is to condemn such men as Monroe, Rush, Clay,
and Gallalin-all Of whom have had an agency
in directing or conducting The negotiation which
terminated in thee adoption OF these conventions.
Il would be hard TO pronounce men like them TO
have been unwise or unpatriotc in what they
did, or 10 have been so because President Jackson,
and others after him, acquiesced for many years
under the operation Of the convention Of 1927,
when they could have terminated it any time BY
giving years notice. have not nat med the most
prominent individual concerned in directing these
baca mn cir
has, in my opinion, cancelled any previous cred
il in that connsXion to which he would have teen
otherwise entitled.
Such was the state Of things attic commence
men, OF The session, when The President recon-
mended notice 10 be given 10 terminate the joint
occupancy; and such the position and grounds as.
sumed by the several portions Of the Senate in ref
erence TO The notice. Since then, as has been stated
there has been a great change, which has ma'eri-
ally affected the question ofnoice, and The position
taken by the different portions Of The body in refer
ence TO it, as shall next explain.
Public opinion has had time 10 devclope itself,
moi only ON this, but on the other side OF The At
lantic, and that opinion has pronounced most
audibly and clearly in favor Of compromise.
The development has been going on not only in
the community, but also in This body; and now
feel that hazard nothing in saying, that large
majority Of The Senate is in favor OF terminating
the controversy by negotiation, and an honorable
compromise. And what is very material, the OPT
MON of the British Government on the subject OF
compromise has been more clearly and specifcal-
" developed than when the message was trans
United 10 Congress; so much so, that there is
ground 10 hope that il is prepared 10 adjust The
difference in reference TO the territory, substantial
ly on the basis which was offered by the PTesi-
dent. II seems TO me impossible that any other
construction can be given TO what Sir r. Peel
said in reply 10 the question put 10 him by Lord
John Russell. His declaration was made under
circumstances calculated 10 give it great weight
The object OF making it was clearly not to cen
sure the able ard very faithful representative OF
Grea, Britain in this country, but 10 use the occa
sion 10 give assurance that he is ready 10 make
| compromise substantially on The basis Of the re.
ected offer. trust sincerely that such is the in
depreciation which our Government, has put upon
il; and that, regarding il as direct step towards
compromise, il has met il with step on our part,
| by suitable Instructions TO our Minister in that
country. II is 10 be hoped that communication
has already been transmitted TO that effect, which
may have the effect OF removing what would
seem 10 be the only material difficulty in The way
OF an adjustment-that is, which shall make the
frs, step towards resuming the negotiation.
A. thing. now stand no longer consider il as >
question, whether the controversy shall DC paci-
fcally arranged or not, nor even 10 what manner
/ ii shall be arranged. regard the arrangement,
now simply question Of time, and do trust
that, in concluding it, there will be no unneces-
sary delay. The business of both countries and
Of commerce generally, requires that il should be
concluded as promptly as possible. There is still
another and a higher reason why it should be
speedily settled. The question is one OF mo-
menlous and delicate character, and like all such,
,l,l orlar to dudp
tingencies, with the least practicable Gelay. A
further inducement Tor despatch in serng the
Oregon question is, upon ildepends the settlement
of the question with Mexico Until The former
is settled, there is but slender prospect that the
latter can be; for so long as the Oregon question
| is left open. Mexico will calculate the chances OF
| a rupture between us and Great Britain in The
event OF which she would be prepared to make
common cause against US. But when an end is
pu, 10 any such hope, she will speedily seule hel
| difference with US. trust that when NE come tt
settle il, we will deal generously with her, ant
that we will prove ourselves loo Just and magma
nimous 10 take advantage OF her feeble condition
II is this great change in favor ofthe prospec
of settling the controversy in reference 10 Oregon
honorably, BY negotiation and compromise, which
has occurred since the commencement OF the SCI,
sion that has made the great difference in the i'm
portance Of the bearing oil notice on the question
Of peace and war. What then was apparently
almost ho7eless. may bow be regarded as highly
probable, unless there should be some great mis-
management but jus, as compromise is more
hopeless, ro,ice becomes more important in its
bearings on The relations OF peace and war; and
on the other hand, Just as the chances Of compro-
mise are increased, notice becomes less important;
and hence its importance at the commencement
Of the session, and its comparatively little impor-
lance now.
shall mex, proceed to inquire, what bearing
the increased prospect ofcompromise has on The po-
son of,he Executive, and that Of the several por-
lions ofthis body, in reference to notice, and the
Oregon question generally. That it is calculated
10 affec, materially The position of the Executive,
must be apparent That he should recommend
giving notice to terminate the convention of joint
occupancy the territory, with view of assert.
ing our exclusive sovereignty to the whole, ae-
cording to his view Of our title, when there
was lille or no hope Of compromise, is no,
at all inconsistent with bis being prepar-
ed to adjus, the difference by compromise,
substantially on the ground offered BY him
self. now when there is reasonable prospect 1t