The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1846-03-19

OOuu-tudt most
explicit language in the expression OF his opinions
without tho slightest prevarcatlon. He (he Presi-
denD had told them IN the most explicit manner, to
assert the right OF the United States to the whole
territory, if necessary, by an appeal TO arms; and
having done this, he thought he could look to no
Interior motives on the part OF the Presdent--it
would be throwing an asperslon upon hum 80 to do
But IN the aspect which he question had now assum
ed, he would ask, was this done tor moral effect!
Was II done In order to effect compromise, by
using It as moral weapon! And 1t this declara-
ton were used as q moral weapon, did the Pfesi.
Gent intend to use II tor purposes OF intimidation
II so, 1t would be idle TO employ such stratagem OF
diplomacy towards Great Britain-sucaa resort
would be perfectly useless relation to that govern
ment. The Senator from Missouri had considered
tnat !ns convention OF Joint occupancy from the be-
ginning, was wrong-hat those who formed il made
great mistake in 1918 and q and bartered our rights
Dy the terms Of the compact. He wholly dssented
from this view OF Its character anu results and took
an opposite view. He conceded IN the wisdom of
those who procured the provisions OF this agreement
and the temporary compromise OF this convention.
They would have decided against the necessity OF
asserting our rights by arms or acquiescence in
abandoning our rights to the territory II 1t had been
possible at that time to establish our title at 49, We
all know that was at several times attempted and
tailed This convention was at once substitute
lor war, and used as NEE ms OF proptiating our
rights; and though honorable Senators might be OPP
posed to Its terms, he considered that the men OF
that day had acted wisely in effecting this ar
rangement. Looking upon the time and the date, it
would be wrong in u.s.. at this day. to pronounce
harshly upon the acts OF our predecessors When
they locked at such men as Monroe, and Rush, and
Clay, it would be hard to look to their names, and
to such names as Jack son and others, down to lSi3
a want OF patriotism. It would be hard to pro-
nounce on those men, who acqulesced IN
this compact from time to time. He did
not now refer to another prominent indlvid-
ual who also had some cOnnexlon with the ques-
ton. This was the state of opinion, the position
which the three parties occupied, when the subject
OF the notice was brought before them in the early
part OF the sesslon-that our rights must be aban-
then, mighty change had taken place in public
oplnlon-a great change here and in the community
abroad and the pronunciation OF that change was
clearly and already IN favor OF compromise" In
this body, he could SAY that great portion of the
Senate, very large majority, were clearly in favor
OF compromise" honorable compromise. But
this was not all: the British government itself had
given the strongest demonstrations that il was dec
svely disposed to and substantially in favor Of COM
promise. No man OF intelligence could read the
remarks OF Sir Robert Peel, IN to Lord John
Russell, without saying that England was prepared
to accept compromise, or act on any propositions
substantially the same, upon the same basis, as
that which had been declined. The declaration
was made, and the object was sincere-it was done
government here, that il was intended to give en-
phasls to his declaration. He hoped that the gov
eminent had not overlooked Mr. Pakenham, in
consequence of these declarations. He (Mr. c.
government to reopen the negotiation. He trusted
that propositions had already been made and sent
across the Atlantic AS he took it, he no longer
considered 1t a question or alternative OF war sit
was now resolving itself simply into question of
time Regarding It as question OF time, he hoped,
then, there would be no delay-because, in great
question like this, where such mighty consequences
depend upon 1t, there should be no delay Once let
them but settle Oregon, and every thing would pro-
gress. Once settle Oregon and then they could settle
their difficulties with Mexico So long as they lett the
Oregon question open, Mexico would calculate on
the chances Of aid from Great Britain in her difficult
ties with the United States. Leave them that
chance, and he was Of opinion that Mexico would
look to avail herself Of il but settle the Oregon
controversy, and then Mexico would be reduced to
peaceable terms; and he trusted that, when that
day should come, we should deal with Mexico in
all generosity. He had explained the mighty
changes which had taken place on this question, in
according to the Message, as having no hope Of
compromise but the aspect OF the question was al
tered; had now every hope OF compromise. There
was great amount OF difference to the style Of
the notice. or how it should be settled 1t was cut
down to point at which they could dispose OF the
question without any notice whatever. He would
now come to another polnt-as to what was the
bearing OF this great question The opinion OF the
Executive may be, that he should act one way
when confident OF a compromise but by giving
the notice, and asserting our title, he would be au-
thorized by that to adopt different course. Now,
ii at that time he said nothing about compromise,
the circumstances OF the time were in his favor
but if, after having said SO, the Executive now,
under the present favorable aspects to a peaceabe
adjustment, declined compromise, he (Mr Calhoun)
could not envy him his feelings, or his position /;
but he had no such fear. The change had taken
place, and yet the extreme friends Of Oregon might
think it would be Inconsistent in them now to adopt
different course on this point, which Is not ex-
pressed in the Message. This question OF con.
slstency was a grave one. Some considered
1t consisted in continuing in the same party-others
that consisted In always acting the same way or
circumstances. The professions, with the policy of
public men, he considered were somewhat anao
gous. What would they think of the physician who
would in his first attendance upon patient pre-
ways to prescribe them, whatever the symptoms OF
the disease Such consistency was not required OF
the President, since the complexion OF the question
had entirely changed and those friends OF his IN
commencement OF the debate on the notice, the point
being pressed upon them would at least hesitate to
refuse compromise, and he would feel no surprise
il the gentlemen who felt themselves SO constraln-
ed IN the beginning, would go further by and by
His friends, he would call them. and he was glad
SO to call them. He thought there was some doubt
now, as to whether our claim to all Of Oregon was
60 clear and UNREASONABLE as At flrst supposed
Though some gentlemen may think 1t to be SO, and
and their convictions were honest still he thought
that something was due to what had taken place on
the subject. Was not something due to the change
which had taken place In the majority OF their Polt-
cal friends, who OF opinion, that the title Is
not so clear Ii nothing was due to them, was
nothing due to those who entertained the question
Of compromise upon objections to the destructive
and ruinous policy Of an appeal to arms! He APP
pealed to them, whether, upon 80 grave aquestion,
they would divide this question He appealed
to them whether they would push their opin-
ions to such an extreme as would divide their
party! He trusted not. As to the other portion
of the party, with whom he ranked himself,
he knew their opinions had undergone no change.
Nothing could have induced HIM In the commence
ment to vote for the notice, but he may be induced
now to modify 1t. This brought him to the ques-
not Upon that question, he could see but two pos
sible reasons why the notice should be given One
was, that il would facilitate the settlement of the
question and quiet the agitation that was certain to
result by running the controversy into the next
Presidential election, or from allowing the question
to remain OPEN The effect Of a speedy and peacea-
BILE adjustment would leave all quiet and settle the