Anti-slavery bugle. [volume] (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, 1846-11-20
From the fnti-Slavery Standard.
G00DELL ON THE CONSTITUTION.
CONCLUDED

[CoNcLUDED.
We have finished our notice of all that Mr..
Goodell urges under the head Of strict con-
struction, and now pass to that part of his
book in which he tries TO discover the mean
ing OF the Constitution from the ''prevailing
spirit" of the instrument.
The first point insisted on is the preamble,
which states the Constitution to have been
''ordained in order to establish justice and Sc
cure the blessings of liberty" &c.
"Liberty and Justice are very changeable
terms, ana take their tone from the lips that
utter them. Mr.. Goodell thinks them so clear
and unmistakeable, as TO include, everywhere,
the idea of emancipation and freedom. So
do we, when they are properly used. But,
unfortunately, men differ on this point. Lii
berry and Justice to one man, mean aristo-
cracy and an order of nobles--to another, uni
versal sufrrage-to one individual, property
and equal laws-to another, community of
goods and Fourierism-to a third, no mar
riage and a general scramble. Now, we shall
find out what ideas the men of 1889 attached
to these words, by consulting the COnstitu-
ton itself, which they declare they establish
in order to secure their tdeas of liberty and
justice. The Constitution, therefore, is to
give a definition to the preamble, not the pre-
amble to force a meaning upon the Constitu-
ton.
Valuable as is the aid Of coniemporaneous
Interpretation, in helping us to understand
some antiquities in the Constitution, we are
glad to have one more opportunity OF agree
ing with Mr.. Goodell, in declaring our full
and hearty assent to the following remarks of
his on the common reference to the in'entio ms
OF the trainers of the Conslitution-(Page
s3.)
''The design of the parties TO a written
agreement, is 10 be held quite distinct from
the designs of the men employed to draw up
the paper. And We. the people Of The United
Stdies,' who adopted the Constitution, and
whose act and instrument it is, are not bound
to concede that our design, in adopting and
maintaining it., was, of necessity, identical
with what may be proved to have been the
design of the persons, or a portion of The per-
sous we employed to prepare it for us. What
the Convention of 1887. or a portion of it,
intended TO effect by the Constitution, is not
to be conlounded with the designs, especially
the OBJECT of THE PEOPLE
Uh0 adapted ii. The objects of the Conven-
ton, or members of it, may deserve our at
%lention, and their testimony to the spirit OF
their times, may command respect. But
their intentions are mol to be substituted for
the intentions of THE PEOPLE, or con-
lounue0 WIN tnem.'
The second point made is as follows =
The English Common Law knows no slaves
-(Abundant evidence is adduced of this.)
The United States Constitution is moulded
and fashioned on the model of the English
Common Law:-(No proof, whatever, is Civ
en- of this.)
Therefore, it is an Anti Slavery instrument.
The first point is beyond dispute, and the syl-
IorIgnn urnnl1 ha On - - IL
cond assertion could be maintained. As the
only evidence produced is an assertion of MIR.
II. d. Weld, we shall postpone any criticism
until some real proof is adduced.
We may, however, state in passing, that
the doctrine laid down, generally in this con-
%nection, by several Liberty party debaters,
that all acts of Parliament, contrary to reason
and justice, are void, and that the Judges
may treat them as such, is not law. This
principle is generally sustained by discon-
nected quotations from Blackstone. His able
commentator, Mr.. Christian, long ago reject
ed the doctrine. He says, 'If an act of Par
lament should, like the edict of Herod, COM
mand all children under a certain age to be
slain, the Judge ought 10 resign his office
rather than be auxiliary to its execution but
ii could only be declared pOid by the same leg
~islative power by which it was ordained"
Blackstone, himself, on a subsequent page of
his work, explains more definitely the gene
raj terms he had previously used. On the
9lst page of his first volume, he says:-
81 know it is generally laid down more
largely, that acts of Parliament, contrary to
reason, are void. But if the Parliament will
positively enact a thing to be done which is
unreasonable, | know of no power, in the or
binary forms OF the Constitution, that is vest.
cd with authOritv In aonfrol IL. anb tho av-
amples usually alleged in support of this
sense of the rule do none of them prove, that,
where the main object of a statute is unrea
sonable, the Judges are at liberty to reject il;
for that were 10 set the judicial power above
that of the Legislature, which would be sub
versive of all Government. = y \ +
Ii we could conceive it possible for the Par
lament to enact that n man should try as well
his own causes as those of other persons,
there is no court that has power to defeat the
intent of the Legislature, when couched in
such evident and express words, as leave nc
doubt whether it was the intent of the Legis.
lature or not"
Chancellor Kent, also, of New York, the
highest living authority, though citing and
praising the few old cases which sustain "a
different doctrine, concludes with Blackstone,
thus -
"When tits said in the books that a statute
contrary to natural equity aud reason, or re.
pugnant or impossible to be performed, is
void, the cases are understood to mean thai
the courts are to give the statute a reasonable
construction. They will not readily presume,
out OF respect and duty to the lawgiver, thai
any very unjust or absurd consequence was
within the contemplation of the law. But il
1t should happen to be too p~alpable in its di,
rection to admit of but one construction, there
Is no doubt fnhe English iaO, as 10 the binding
efficacy Of the statute. The will of the Legis-
lature is the supreme law of the land, and
demands perfect obedience. "-Kent's Comm.
J. Az.