The New era. [volume] ([Portsmouth, Va.]) 1845-1847, 1846-01-17
FORMING, JANUARY II, 1916.

! chances of war under the circumstances which
at present surround us. But Ishould certainly
prefer The whole country up TO $40 4O', if there
De means compatible with the peace and honor of
Inc nation, as think there are, by which we
should probably obtain the whole territory. But
how do these gentleman stand who support this
| resolution as a peaceful measure, and vet main
tam that we can take nothing less than our whole
claim on Oregon. If the measure be peaceful is
IL not manifest that, by adopting it, they essenti-
ally abandon the whole country north of the 4oth
parallel? IL they adopt il as the means of OBJ
tanning the whole country. they can only do so
upon the suppostion that il is to lead to war and
that thus we shall obtain the whole shall pre
sently endeavOr to ascertain what would be the
probable consequences under that conjnncture of
circumstances. But here | must pause to saw,
that do not mean TO disparage or disapprove the
proposition made by the administration to settle
Inc question amlcably upon the basis of bounda-
ry along the 10th parallel Under the circum
stances, and the course of previous negotiations.
the President could have done no less than to
have made snch an offer. II was due to public
opinion at home and abroad, it was due to our ma
tonal character, and the great interests of human
lty. that we should manifest desire 10 do much
for an honorable peace. The terms which he Of
tered would have been considered by each party
I" The dispute as falling short of the full measure
OF thelr Just claims, but in the more impartial,
but perhaps, less informed opinion of the residue
"i The civilized world, they would have been re-
garded as fair, equitable. and honorable to both
countries. He would have done much, too for
tue country In thus securing by peaceful and hon
"rahe means, an advanced post for our popula
Ii"n M to the 10th parallel He would have ac
CURED. as far as | have been able to inform nv
sell, much the most valuable portion of the coun-
try. both for commercial and agricultural pur-
poses know that The Chairman of the Com
mIi!ee on Foreign Affairs has expressed differ
ent opinion. But with great Difference and res
pect tor that opinion, must be allowed to declare
my dissent from it. The opposite opinion ex-
pressed by Mr. Greenhow, 10 whose enlighlen-
ed researches the country is so much indebted
seems 10 me 10 be sustained upon better grounds
The harbur of Port Discovery, of which Vancou-
yer speaks in terms so high, and the harbors ON
Admirallty inlet, said to be admirably adapt
ed to the uses of commerce.
As ! am informed they are better not only in
natural capacity, but from position, than those
higher up on the coast. OF the superior agrcul.
tura advantages Of the portion of the territory be-
low the 49th parallel presume there can be no
doubt, and think they are very generally admit
ted The President might well suppose that he
would effect much in securing the peaceful pro-
gresS OF our infant settlement in Oregon up to the
49th parallel; and this being DONE he might safe
ly leave 1t To time and American enterprise 10 do
the rest But, Mr.. Chairman let me return TO
the inquiry into the probable consequences of civ
ing this notice. have said that the best possible
result would be an adjustment on The basis of a
boundary along the 49h parallel but have seen
nothing as yet to convince me that it was the
most probable result If tho minister from Great
Britain refused TO consider this proposition, when
made In the course of an amicabe and courteous
correspondence, is 1t very probable that she will
be more inclined to accept 1t when we give the
notice, under circumstances which imply that she
must either agree to our proposition, or 90 TO war
for The whole country? If the British minister
represented the real views of his government, is
II probable that with their dispositions that gov
eminent Will be the more inclined to acce pit our
offer account Of the threat which it NAV SUD-
pose to be implied by giving the notice? If
she really designs to go to war, rather than com
promise upon the terms which we proposed, is
there anything unreasonable in surprising that she
might think the present time and circumstances
as favorable as any likely to occur for striking the
hlow2 If she really attaches the importance to
her whole claim on Oregon, which many seem TO
imagine, and regards war for it as inevitable
will she not think that the sooner she strikes the
blow the better for her? Or if, on the other hand
she is anxious to settle the question amicaby, and
desires nothing more than terms which may be re-
garded as honorable by her own people and by the
world. Will this spirit be conclaed by our Civ
ing the notice, and by the circumstances under
which II will be given? To sum up the whole,
rs II not manifest, on the one hand, that if this
step should lead to war, we give to Great Britain
instead Of reseryng it to ourselves, the advan-
tage ct choosing her own time for it2 If, on the
other hand, this be designed as a peace measure,
Is 1t not more likely TO defeat, than encourage a
renewal of negotiations in a sensitive and high
spirited people2 Such seems to me to be its prob.
able tendencies; and unless Great Britain should
think this disputed territory TO be oflittle value to
her, however important it might be to u.s. and IN
less she enteTalns strong desire for peace, can
see no other result TO flow from this notice so prob.
able as that of war One thing is perfectly clear
this measure must either lead to a settlement on
the basis of boundary along the 49lh parallel, or
It must produce war. Our western friends saw
the whole extent Of our claim and if this be
that they will be content with nothing less than
so. is not war inevitable, under present circum-
stances II war is TO be the mode of settling
This question at last, il would seem to me that it
would be far wiser 10 preserve the present state of
affairs, that we may be able to choose our own time
tor lighting, and select period when we were
better prepared for the contest, and when the at
Lendant circumstances might be more propiiious
Let Us look, Mr.. Chairman, into the clrcumstan-
ces under which this war would now be waped
and ascertain, If we can, its probable consequences