The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-08-04

amendment Of the constitution, with proper hmlta'
tons and guards, might destroy or weaken the sepa
rate and Independent soyerelghtles OF the States
These, among other difficulties insepaIably con-
neeted with the subject, are merely stated by ihe
committee for consideration and reflection, should
Congress undertake, without previous amendment
of the constitution, TO adjust this most difficult and
| vexatiOus question.
| IL the government of the United States posses the
power, under the constitution, TO distribute the com.
mon funds Of the Union in the manner proposed
at all, IL must possess il TO the most unlimited ex'
tent. If Congress may by means of impost do
ties and excuses, first collect from the people an
amount limited only by their discretion, and nexl
divide it out again among the States, without any
power control Ine States H. It's expenditure,
each State may il it chooses, repeal its internal tax
es, and apply its dividend TO the support OF It's owh
State government. The general government would
thus become the mere agent or tax-gatherer OF the
States TO collect the State revenue, and, as must
happen, in unequal proportions, from the whole
people Of the Union TO be applied 10 the support OF
the State governments. At the formation of the
constitution, was any such agency necessary, or
| was any such intended 10 be conferred In looking
TO the which led TO the adoption Of the pres
snt constitution 1t was heard Of one, that
the States had any difhculty under the articles OF
confederation in collecting the necessary revenue for
the support Of their respective State governments
That constituted no part OF the evil Inconvenience
| complained Of and intended 70 be remedied or pro-
yided for by the new constitution. Nor did the
States intend to confer upon the new government
which they about 10 create a power 10 collect
revenue for any such purpose. That was part OF
their inherent sovereignty which they chose 10 re-
tain; and, had they parted with IT, they would have
4 been reduced to a state Of dependence on the new
| government, wholly subordinate 10 Il, and utterly
beom patble with the idea Of their reserved Eoyer-
eighty, which, il cannot be seriously urged by any,
was intended. Yet, give to the federal government
| hu IaN IN The
people, and an unlimited power to disburse Il by
distribution among the States, without any power
over its application when disbursed, and this will
be the practical operation. And II this be the
practical operation, It is difficult TO conceive
what more 10 wanted TO make tho govern
ment Of the Union one Of consolidated pow
sr The power ito lay and collect taxes duties,
imposts, and excuses" conferred, not for the
purpose Of raising money, that Il might be gwen
back again to the States. 'ither for the purpose OF
supporting the State governments, or for any other
| purpose but for great national and general pur-
poses, enumerated and limited 10y the constitution
itself Ii was granted TO the federal government,
because it absolutely necessary TO the continued
existence and successful operation Of the gov
eminent itself IL was granted first, to render the
taxes, duties, mposts, and excuses, which might be
imposed, and their collection, uniform IN all the
States and thereby TO remedy the evil and incon-
yenience not TO say injustice, OF the couneryallIng
regulations, which, before that time, were frequent
y reSorted To by the States, al against foreign ma
tons, and against each other; and secondly, to en-
able the government to provide for its own ne
cessary support, and TO pay the debts, without be-
ing dependent on the tardy and uncertain contribu-
ton Of the quotas before that time required to be
furnished by the States.
| The committee have now presented TO the House
the opinions which they entertain, as we'll as the
reasons and authorities on which those opinions
rest, in regard to the question of constitutional
power, which they have regarded as the paramount
question involved in the examination Of the subject
referred to them. If the House shall not concur
with them in opinion, but shall believe that the
power has been conferred upon the federal govern
ment to engage in system Of internal improve
ment in either Of the three modes first above spe
cied constituting the present plan, then the follow
ing may be stated some Of the objections 10 the
expediency of prosecuting such system in either
Of those modes, which, il is believed, would no.
apply the plan Of distribution OF the surplus funds
among the States, should the House be Of opin
ion, also, that that power has been conferred
tina, i wSsd o. be ssPsSlsn hsssas BY saa
itations and guards, to confer IT,
LIST. Owing to an unavoidable difference Of opin'
ion extensively prevailing both in and out Of Con-
gress in regard to the present plan past expert
ence has shown that one section of the Union has
been found arayed against another: State has been
opposed to State; and, by looking to the votes in
Congress upon all appropriations for improvement
in whatever shape proposed, they will be found To
be strongly marked by geographical boundaries
The people Of different sections Of the Union are
thus made to regard each other rather as domestic
enemies, and rivals in interest, than as members oil
the same common government, possessing common
interest. Prejudces engendered, and sectional
feelings excited, calculated to produce the most del
eterious and fatal effects upon the harmony of our
n Union, and against which our first venerated Chie
Magistrate, drawing upon the fund of his ample ex-
nd apeakiup from his Obserya
/ ton and intimate practical knowledge Of our po-
e cal condition, warned us.
I'd. 1t tends inevitably to corruption-to what in
common parlance is understood by political "log-
rolling" and to a wasteful and mprovident expend-
iture of the public money. Combinations Of sec
tonal and local interests will be formed, strong
enough carry through Congress every proposition
for improvement, whether useful or not, whether 10
cal or national in its character and without regart
to the general interests Of the whole.
3d. If it be attempted to confne the action of the
, government to works of a national and not local
Character distinction, the disregard of which
"would Of necessity lead to the subverson Of thu
federal system"-yet, in the language of the Presl
dent, by whom this distinction is referred to, "tha
even this is an unsafe one, arbitrary in Its nature
and liable consequently to great abuses, is too OBJ
, vious to require the confirmation of experience.
To this it may be added, that endless and vexatiou
disputes would arise in Congress- and between Con
gress and the Executive, in determining what il
national and what is local. Each branch must, o
consequence, act upon its own arbitrary opinion
One Congress may commence work as national
and succeeding Congress may think it local, ant
withhold the appropriation to complete 1t. 80, on
: President may give his sanction to particula
measure as national and his successor considering
it as local, may withhold his approval. There is nj
criterion or fixed rule, by which the question cal
be settled or satisfactorily determined.
4th. 1t disturbs and destroys that harmony which
should ever prevail in our legislative councils.
9Th. If the system continues on the present plan
the representatives of the people, instead of actin
for the general interests of the whole, to be en-
gagged in a dsreputable scramble for the publ
money, each acting with view solely to the sec
tional and local interests of his immediate oonst
tuents.
9th. A necessary consequence Of the objection
stated will be unequal and unjust appropriations o
the public money, even in those sections OF tn
+ Union whose representatives may advocate the pol
4 ICY. Is il just, for instance, that New York. Penn
syvania and other States, who have already taxe
their own citizens to make their own internal i'm
. provements, should now be required TO submit "a
the collection of additional taxes, levied on thei
citizens by the federal government to make i'm