Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1846-06-12

can frontier, as it is always unjust to junior
general who has done well, and is supposed TO
be doing well, 10 supersede him by general OF
higher rank, without sending with the latter cor
responding rsiniorcemsns. should esteem my
sell The unhappy instrument OF wounding The no.
norable pride OF the gallant and judcious Tay-
lor, if ordered TO supersede him under different
circumstances.
However the foregoing suggestions Chastity
thrown loeether) may be viewed, | have deemed
il due more 10 The country than my humble self
thai should present them, and await the wishes
or the orders Of The President.
With great respect, | have the honor 10 remain,
Sir your most obedient servant,
WINFIELD SCOTT.
Hon. w. L. MARCY,
Secretary OF War,
WAR DEPARTMENT, May 25, 1876.
Sir: have received your letter of the 2lst in
slant, and, considering lis extraordinary charac-
Ter, and. the grave matters set forth therein re-
nactng upon the motives and objects Of The Pre-
sdent in rendering to you, as he has, in an expl-
Gil manner, the command oil The forces destined
for the war against Mexico, deemed i, 10 be my
duty 10 lay it before him, and to take his direc-
tion in regard 10 its contents.
The passages in your letter which have excited
his surprise and dep regret, are those in which
Gil, Ill niR towards yourself, or p7econdenlnGt,on,
and course OF condue, on his part which has
already, as you allege, imreded your labors Of
preparation and crippled your energies
A reference 10 TWO o. three paragraphs in
your letter will show that he is moi at liberty TO
give different construction 10 your language
You wero, through me, and also al personal in
| terview with the President, made acquainted with
his settled determination 10 put you in i'm mediate
l,F sl,n q. h. vi
Ing on the war with Mexico, and you had, as you
state been devoting your time and attention 10
preliminary and preparatory arrangements. I'm
the mids, Of these nllliitudinous and indspensa-
| bic occupations" Guu say,) Il nave learned
| from you that much impa,iesce IS already felt,
perhaps in high quarters, that have not already
put myself in route for the Rio Grande; and now,
with fourteen hours day Of preliminary work
remaining on my hands for many days, I find
myself compelled 10 stop that necessary work to
| guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemna-
| ZION IN the quarters alluded 10. am TOO Old a
soldier, and have had too much special expert
rience, net 10 feel the Infinite impor;ancs OF secur-
ing myself against danger {ill WILL or precon-
demnaten) in my rear, before advancing upon
| the public enemy. MOI an advantageous step
can I've taken in a forward march, without The
confidence that all is wei! behind II insecure in
| that quarter no general car put his whole heart
and mind iuio lie work 70 be done in front.
am, therefore, not a little aarmed-nay, crippled
in my efges-by the knowledge OF The impa-
liencs in question:; and beg TO say fear no
other danger"
This language scarcely requires comment
| That it conveys The strongest suspcion-not 10
say direct imputation OF most unworthy mo-
| lives in The Executive government-of bad faith
towards yourselt-of a reckless disregard Of The
| interests OF The couniry-of design TO carry on
a war against you while you are sent forth 10 carry
on war against the public eneIay, there can be,
think, no question You must allow me 10 ad.
verl to the only fact to which you aude as the
foundation for such grave imputalions. You
hare learned, Won say, from mr., that much impa-
t,saee is tet perhaps in high quarters, thai yosi
arc net already PIT IN roaie j0r he Rt0 Gr1nde,
&c. What was said on This point at our inter
view, when this subject was alluded 10, is no! so
fully stated as it ought 10 De, considering The pur
| poses TO which you have converted ii. You pre-
nled 10 me fully and clearly the difficulties and
| delays which, in your opinion, would attend The
assembling OF The volunteers on the Rio Grande,
| and in conclusion, expressed your belief that il
| could not be done before the LIST day Of Septem-
Der next then alluded TO the troops which were
now fastening TO Gen. Taylor's Standard under
his requsilion-to the excited feelings oflhe coun-
try-to the patriotic ardor Of those iroops-,o the
/
! would feel, if an army Of eight or len thousand
men were on the Rio Grande comparatively
| inactive during their entire tour OF service
which being limited 10 three months, would
terminate before The period named by you for the
assembling of the volunteers on The Rio Grandc
| twas with special reference 10 The employment
Of The troops that would be on that frontier by The
Isl day OF June, that spoke Of what would be
the sentiments Of the country, and Of The spirited
and gallant men who had entered into he service,
and OF the expectations OF the Executive upon
this subject. was well aware that the President
was most anxious that the war should be prose.
| cued with promplness and visor, and that The
brave and patriotic men who had been called out
should have an opportunity TO render their coun-
try active and effective service. knew, loo, that
the President confidently hoped and expected that
| large portion Of the volunteers, authorized by
the act OF May 18th, would arrive on the frontier
in sufficient force for active operations before the
| lime which you indicated With The view of Sc
curing this important object, The most energetic
measures had been adopted. Every considera-
ton of economy and duty forbade that the troops
should, if thus collected be permitted TO remain
inactive, by reason OF the absence Of the general
officer, who, fully possessed oil The views of the
Executive, was 10 direc, their movements.
Ibid not deem it improper, indeed ] considered
it matter Of duty, TO communicate 10 the sener-
al, to whom the President had freely sonfded the
management Of the war his views and expecta-
tons upon this point. That this communication,
made in the manner il was, should not have been
kindly received, is surprising to me; bu, vastly
more SO is the fact that il should be made the ba-
sis of the most offensive imputatiuns against the
executive government, which had voluntarily Sc
leeed you 10 conduct our army, and determined
to M, al your disposal the amples, means il cou'l
command TO insure victory, and 10 bring Inc war
TO successful and speedy termination.
It was also matter OF unicisned surprise 10
me, that you should have attributed 10 the Pres-
den. the intention of opening a fire upon your
rear, while fire in front was opened upon
YOU by The enemy. On what foundation could
such an assumption resl1 Had not the Pre-
sident, in frank and friendly spirit just in
trusted you with command on which the glory
and interest of the country depended, TO say no
thing Of the success of his own administration
How could you, under these circumstances, ar
rest your labors Of preparation, and suffer your
energies to be crippled, for the purpose OF indulg
ing in Liberal imputalions agains, the man who
had Just bestowed upon you the highest mark OF
his confidence?
Entertaining, as il is most eviden, you do The
opinion that such are the motives and designs OF
the Executive towards you, and declaring it TO
be your explicit meaning that 'you do not desire
to place Yourself in the most perious OF all posi-
tions-o freupon your rear from Washington, and
tbs fire in front fron. TIC 11cricans," and so enter
tanning them entirely wiihou, cause, or even the
shadow of justification. the President would be
wanting in his duty 10 the country, If ne were 10
persist in hi. determination OF imposing upon
you The command Of the army in The war against