Mississippi Democrat. (Carrollton, Miss.) 1844-18??, 1846-08-05

llclanS, VINO nave Dnt niue nollo0 OF stfa-
tegy. Thus Napoleon remarked of the he.
roic Iannes, that mo officer could so skilIul-
ly handle 10000 men 10 the feld;' but at
the time of his death at Essling, he was Just
beginning TO have a notion OF strategics.
Again, the great genius of the French en-
peror was displayed az much in following
up victory as in gaining it. To this end
he extended those branches Of military
force that are most efficient in improving
victory. Al one time the French cavalry
numbered 10000 men; of these in one in
stance 10000 men, after helping TO defeat
the enemy as infantry, were mounted on
horses taken from him, 10 complete his de-
feat. This subsequently caused contro.
versy to spring up among the martlnets,
tacticians and ad Iutants, as TO whether a
cavalry recruit was better or not for having
learned to act on foot. The great principle
by which the best applicatlonoi force to suit
the occasion was made never occurred TO
them. The success which the undlscl.
plined armies of revolutionary France OBJ
tanned over neighboring states was not be-
cause of the excellence of their materials,
but because, as Napoleon expressed it,
" Carnot had organized victory" The
great war minister had so arranged the
campaigns that the armies were OF neces-
sity victorious.
The new principles of war illustrated
by the French arms, and the terrible We.
hemence with which they were executed,
occasioned many changes in old nations !;
among others, The truth became apparent
that fortified places had lost very conside-
rably of the value they formerly held either
in the Imagination of mankind or in reali.
~. In modern war the use OF fortresses
is reduced nearly to their simple effects
upon communications. A fortress which
secures exclusively to the pnssessog GER
tain passage of river or mountain pass,
is valuable, as gate is valuable which
keeps one man out and lets another in. In
this sense fort is called "key," and like
a key is of Importance only when it is the
key to something. The idea that fortresses
in an open country will check an invading
army for fear OF the operations of the gar
rison on its rear, is obsolete. If force
retires before large one, it will, by throw
ing garrisons into forts, weaken itself still
further. The effect of fortresses, in tne
present state of affairs, is reduced to the
degree in which they may promote opera
Itons against men, and therefore the i'm
lportance of them has been secondary tC
the organization of the army.
The countries of Europe have all large
standing armies kept up in time of peace
from the supposed necessity of being al
ways prepared for war, in order to aver
attack. Whenever diplomacy takes al
angry turn, great expenditure is usually
incurred in arraying and raising men, bull
ding ships, &c. TO assist diplomatic bar
gains, movements Of troops and a grea
clatter in the arsenals is thought necessa
nv. 1t would appear that nation is no
thought strong unless her people are KEEP
always with arms in their hands, as if thos
men would be incapable of becoming sol
f diers when occasion calls for their services
r Thus the United States have been sneeret
, at because their army is small and thel
government economical. The leadin
4 Journals Of Europe scarcely regard US a
3 power, because there are but 5000 me
| in the army. Yet recent events hav
/ shown that one fourth Of that army wa
sufficient TO protect our southern frontle
4 against four times the force, and to lnyad
\ the enemy's territory; that armies large
! than any England ever had on foot can /
: few weeks be placed at threatene
!, point; that economy of money in time
+ peace makes expenditure in time of wa
n more easily borne; that the country is lu
f of sklluI and we'll educated military mel
r sufficient to officer an army of 100000
e and the aptitude Of the people for mlItar
exercises will not, we think, be questioned
o 10 respect to material, the resources of tn
n country are exhaustless. With all thes
!, elements of creating the instrument, an
n the acknowledged ability Of our tactlclan
@ we will not doubt that strateglcal GEM
n will be found when required. In fac
!. from the progress of the science of war,
r. must result that the maintenance of armIt
a will become unnecessary; that the prese
}. walton of the science in lis yigor will a
q ways suffice for nations wants.
ar The regular army of the United Stat
v is now organized as indeed are most m
:. dern armies, into staff and adminstrni'
o departments, and four arms Of service, Vi
i infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineer
,f The numbers of these are 55S, office
n and general staff, two Dragon regiment
;. POS, four artillery regiments, 2,30
,r eight infantry regiments, 1871, and AZ
.. unattached, being at West Point and els
" where, making total o! IA regiments a
(. s,349 men. The men Of The army a
,e enlisted for three years, and are most
ID foreigners, German and Irish. The En-
ar Iish army has a similar organization, and
r. composed Of l,703 general officers, %
EAf