Mississippi Democrat. (Carrollton, Miss.) 1844-18??, 1846-08-05

SiOot ICsuttS. mere are maDV able tao
'lcIans, who have but little notion of stra-
tegy. Thus Napoleon remarked of the nc.
role Lannes, that mo officer could so skilful.
y hancle 10000 men in the feld;' but at
the Time OF his death at EssIing, he was Just
beginning to have notion of stratepics.
Again, the great genius of the French en-
peror was displayed as much in following
up victory as in gaining it, To this end
ne extended those branches of military
force that are most efficient in IMPROVING
victory. At one time the French cavalry
numbered $4,000 men; of these in one in
stance $4,000 men, after helping to defeat
the enemy as infantry, were mounted on
horses taken from him, to complete his de-
feat. This subsequently caused contro.
versy to spring up among the martinets.
tactlclans and adJutants, as to whether a
cavalry recruit was better or not for having
learned to act on foot. The great principle
by which the best applicauonof force to suit
The occasion was nude never occurred to
| them. The success which the undisci.
| pinned armies of revolutionary France OBJ
tanned over neighboring states was not be-
| cause of the excellence of their materials,
but because, as Napoleon expressed it,
"Carnot had organized vlctory'' The
great war minister had so arranged the
campaigns that the armies were of neces.
sity victorious.
The new principles of war illustrated
by the French arms, and the terrible We.
hemence with which they were executed,
occasioned many changes in old nations 4;
among others, the truth became apparent
that fortified places had lost very conside-
rably of the value they formerly held either
IN the Imagination of mankind or in reali-
| ". In modern war the use OF fortresses
is reduced nearly to their simple effects
upon communications A fortress which
secures exclusively to the passessor a GER
tain passage of river or mountain pass,
is valuable, as a gate is valuable which
keeps one man out and lets another in. In
this sense a fort is called "key," and like
key is of Importance only when it is the
| key to something. The idea that fortresSes
in an open country will check an invading
army for fear of the operations of the gar
rison on its rear, is obsolete. If foroo
retires before large one, it will, by throw
ing garrisons into forts, weaken itself still
| further. The effect of fortresses, in the
present state Of affairs, is reduced TO the
degree in which they may promote opera,
tons against men, and therefore the i'm
portance of them has been secondary to
| the organization of the army.
The countries of Europe have all large
standing armies kept up in time of peace
from the supposed necessity of being al
ways prepared for war, in order to aver
attack. Whenever diplomacy takes al
angry turn, great expenditure is usually
incurred in arraylng and raising men, bull
lding ships, &c. To assist diplomatic bar.
gains, movements of troops and a grea
clatter in the arsenaIs is thought necessa
ry. 1t would appear that a nation is no
thought strong unless her people are KEEP
always with arms In their hands, as if those
men would be incapable of becoming sol
+ ders when occasion calls for their services
; Thus the United States have been sneereC
at because their army is small and thei
government economical. The leading
journals of Europe scarcely regard US al
a power, because there are but 5000 mel
in the army. Yet recent events have
shown that one fourth of that army wa:
sufficient to protect our southern frontie
against four times the force, and to invade
the enemy's territory; that armies large
than any England ever had on foot can il
few weeks be placed at a threateneC
point; that economy of money in time o
peace makes expenditure in time of wa
more easily borne; that the country is full
{ of skiIlul and well educated military men
r sufficient 10 officer an army of 100000
} and the aptitude of the people for miitar,
exercises will not, we think, be questioned
, In respect to material, the resources of thi
country are exhaustiess. With all thes
I elements of creating the instrument, an
The acknowledged ability of our tacticlans
we will moi doubt that strategical geniu
will be found when required. In tact
:. from the progress of the science OF war,
must result that the maintenance of armle
will become unnecessary; that the preser
walton of the science in It's vigor will al
wavs suffice for nations wants.
The regular army of the United State
' is now organized as indeed are most me
dern armies, into staff and administrative
!, departments, and four arms of service, viz
+ infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers
E The numbers of these are $50, officer
and general staff, two Dragon regiments
. 1905, four artillery regiments, $50;
r eight infantry regiments, 1871, and AZ
!. unattached, being at West Point and eIs'
Y where, making total Of Il regiments an
!. s. $40 men. The men of the army al
. enlisted for three years, and are most
4 foreigners, German and Irish. The En-
Itch army has a similar organization, and