Mississippi Democrat. (Carrollton, Miss.) 1844-18??, 1846-08-05
From the Democratic Review.
MODERN ARMS AND ARMIES,


effects IN the concentration of great power
in a small body of men. A handful of
troops, drilled, disciplined and armed ac-
cordlng TO scientific rules, and guided by
experienced and skiful officers, NAV be
productive of the most important results.
and even change the destiny of nations.-
A marked example OF this has been ex
hIbited during the last few years in the
case of China. That nation, some two
centuries since, was overrun by the war
like Tartars of The north, and the Man
chow dynasty established Under the
policy established by that government, she
remained secluded from the rest of the
world down TO lS43, and the population
had reached 300 millions of souls; at that
time the British government having diff
culties with China, sent 1000 soldiers un-
der Sir Gordon Bremen TO blockade Can.
ton. nation occupying the islands of
the North Sea, and numbering some 26
millions of inha bitants, attacked the an
Glen! nation of China, outnumberine them
l3 times, with force of a few thousand
men, and that little army was sumcient to
enable It's leaders to dictate terms 10 so
mighty nation. A small polished axe in
The hands of skiful woodman, will at a
few well applied strokes bring down the
sturdiest oaks. In a similar manner, that
small highly disciplined band of English.
men, in few weeks shook power that
had been undlsturhed for ages, and by
bringing 1t within the intercourse of ma
tons, laid the foundation of a mighty re-
volulon. So great are the results flowing
from the application of science to the d.
rection of force. Nor are all armies alike.
We have recently seen an army composed
of2,OOO Americans, utterly defeat, in two
successive engagements, three times their
number of Mexcans, under skilfuI lea.
ders. These great results flow from the
superiority of skill and intellect in the de
rection of masses. Napoleon, in his me-
moirs, informs US that two Mamelukes
kept three Frenchmen at bay, because
they were better armed, better mounted
and better exercised but a hundred
Frenchmen were a match for like num-
Der of Mameukes, and 1000 French could
easily beat 1900 MameIukes. The caval-
ry generals, Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle,
formed IN three lines; when the Name
lukes attacked the first line, the second
came 10 the assistance on the right and
left. The Mamelukes wheeled 10 turn the
TANKS of the new line; at that moment the
third charged them, and they were always
broken. Such is the effect of tactics and
evolutiOns.
The difference between TACTICS and
strategics was but indiferently well I'M
derstood until fully developed by NaPo-
leon The difference between them may
be stated in saying that the mixing of col
Ors, preparing canvass and choosing brush
es, are the tactics of painter. Strate-
gicss are how 20 paint. The former re-
ceived great Improvement as connected
with modern weapons, from the king oil
Prussia. The true principle of the latter
was the discovery of which Napoleon was
born to make, and he conquered the Eu.
rOpean continent in developing it. 1t had
always been assumed that what was true
of the relative position of troops in actual
combat, was also true of armies at a great
distance from each other. That is to say,
since the invention of firearms forces have
necessarily been drawn up in long thin
lines; therefore, if an army was attacked
upon one Oh both of its TANKS it was al
most sure to be defeated. The reason was
that in such position no effectual resls
lance could be offered until a change II
front was made to correspond with that o.
the enemy, and making this change under
the pressure of his attack was impossible
without disorder. 1t was always assumed
therefore, that an army between two
others no matter how distant, was also II
a dangerous position. Napoleon saw
once that if the armies were distant from
each other, this central position was the
strong and not the weak point. As long
as the central army had time to concen
trate upon one enemy before the other ar
rived, the chances were all in favor of the
central position This general principle,
combined with other causes, was the source
OF his success. aud he was IN the latte
years combatted with the allies in the only
manner that he could be resisted success
fully, which was by Systematically retiring
when he advanced upon any one force.
was the application of the highest order o
intellect to military affairs, at time wheI
the combinations OF Europe against repub
lican France offered the broadcast field 70
the development of genius. The pro
greSs of the art OF war was illustrated b,
the conquest of Europe. 1t was the ex
clan,ation of Wellington, on hearing of tn
mastery operations OF Napoleon aroun
Ro,ishon. in 1909, that 'the art of wa
nyas never perfected until then" Subor
1;n.to N the vast field of stategics are tn
.ant;cs of armies, or the organization an
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