Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1846-06-12
AN OMITTED LETTER.

AN OMITTED LETTER.
In the correspondence between Gen. Scott and
The War Department, copied from the Washing
ton Union yesterday, the subjoned Letter from
the General was accidentally omitted by that pa
per- This letter shows the earnestness with which
General Scott was prepared TO enter upon
the duties assigned to him by the President,
and his natural anxiety, not only in reference TO
his own reputation, but to the success of our arms
the enemy having been driven across the Rio
Grande, that, before offensive operations should
be commenced by pushing our forces into the in
1erior of Mexico, the preparations should be am
pie and complete for striking an effective blow.
This, it is obvious, he regarded as far more i'm
pOrtant than a succession of partial, even though
brilliant successes, in war of attachments,
which, without leading to any decisive result,
would harass our forces, and subject them TO Sc
we're loss, from disease as well from the casual
lies Of battle. Gen. Scott, it must be remember
cd, has all the advantages derived not only from
his long training and study as a soldier, but from
the instructive experience of the war Of 1912,
when, from an overweening anxiety to strike
speedily at the enemy, such as is now exhibited by
the Administration and its organs,-although they
harshly censure Gen. Gaines, in the same breath,
for adopting the most efficient, nay, the only
means TO enable Gen. Taylor TO strike that blow
promptly-we were unprePared for the contest,
and every where met with disgraceiul and humi-
liating disasters and defeats. Gen. Taylor, If is
true, was ''REApY," even with hi. small force,
as, under like circumstances, Gen. Scott would
have been, to rcpel an assault and he has not he
t.l nna ha adpd m heating and
disorsanizing the strong and welI-aPpointed army
by which he was attacked, us Gen. Scott would
not have hesitated had he been there TO cross into
the enemy's country. But is II certain that Gen.
Taylor will deem il wise or prudent TO penetrate,
with his present force far INFO tho interior OF the
country, at the approach of the sickly and rainy
season. and before he is certain of having in his
rear a corps dc reserre to fall back upon, in the
event of disasters, resulting from contingencies
which it is impossible he can oresee, and against
which, If he could anticipate, il would be still
more impossible 10 guard At all events, we
think the opinions of veteran and skllliul officer
like Gen. Scott-one whose career against
enemy infinitely more formidable in battle lban
the foe now to he encountered, has left no room
10 doubt his promptitude in every emergency
ought on a question like this, to outweigh those
of mere civilians like the President and Secre-
iary Of War, who unequal even to the task Of
"setling squadron in the field"
One word as to the correspondence itself. We
think il is obvious, from the failure Of the Secre-
tary o! War TO give Gen. Scott positive orders,
such as are invariably issued in such cases, that,
in originally apPrizing him of his selection TO
command the army Of invasion, there was a want
Of that sincerity and cordially which ought to ex-
ist between the Executive and n General on
distant frontier. Several incidental oircumstan.
Stances glanced at 10y Gen. Scott in his letters to
Mr.. Marcy, tend to corroborate this opinion
not the least OF which IL that this omission to is.
sue orders was accompanied by complaints Of the
hardness of his movements We owe 1t to can
dor, however, to say, hat there expressions in
Sen. SCOTS letters which we deem unfortunate,
and altogether indelensiblc and we are not sur.
priscG that the President, giving to these express
sions a construction personal to himself, even il
he really desired, originally that Gen. Scott
should assume the command Of the army, subse.
puentIy revoked his verbal directions TO that ef.
feet. That Gen. Scott had ample reason TO be.
Jieyc that he had "cnemes in high quarters, "
who would open a fire upon him sin the rear,
while he should be an the field, n0 one can ques.
ton who looks either at the peculiar manner in
which he was notified Of his appointment : or at
she omission, even while complaining Of his de.
law to give him orders, usual on such occasions
10 proceed to the scene Of action, and to leave the
details Of tho campaign aud the preparations for
is prosecution 10 be adjusted at Washington Of
(whal is perhaps still more Significantly at tn,
strenuous efforts made by certain members o
Congress 20 prevent his appointment to the com
mand, aud, after il was made to obtain its revo
cation or Of the blow AIMED at him n few day
ago, 10y the Bill before Congress Tor the appoint
incnt Of two additional MAJOR Generals, with th
provision. that az the close Of the Mexican cam
paign, but one officer Of thai rank, and he TO b.
designated by the President, should be retained il
service. These, and numerous other indica
lions, satisfied Gen. Scott. ~ il did his friend.
that his enemies in "bigh quarters" we're prepa
ring a miRe Soc hs destruction, and that they wer
determined, II possible, 10 crush him. BY wha
motives they wero actuatod, Il s not for us to con
lecture. The fact, however, Is, we think, demon
stfnfesl Nv a SORES Of circumstances which canno
have escaped the attention Of the most superficial
observer of events. Yet, Gen. Scott ought nsi
IN our opinion, Ia have made his wel-foundcd ap
psrhension Of these insidiOus assaults, matter @
grave complaint in his official correspondent
wHh The Secretary Of War, aud in terms person
aI, offensive 10 that officer, bis superior in ranl