Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1841-1853, 1846-04-02

vsntages Of free trade, to he followed by consequence
not difficult to be perceived. Influenced by these con
siderations, | came 10 the conclusion that our true polio
the present with as little interference as possible on GU
part. In that respect, they possess great capacity from
their origin aud their native instincts. l would let then
go there and settle the country in their OWN way, givinI
them all the and, countenance, and support which WI
could, without extending our authority over them ieni
torially, until il could be properly and safely done. Bu
be il done when u may, great judgment and caution
will be required, for there lies the great difficulty of recon
ciling their interest with that on the eastern side Of tn,
Rocky mountains.
The other line Of policy looked to the termination By
giving notice and taking adverse possession of the terri
tory. The hill of 1913, already alluded to. was intende,
as the first step. ] opposed it, not only because ] be-
lieved that some Of its provisions violated the convention
and that the course it indicated was highly impoIitic. 1
seemed TO me, indeed, to require little reflection to per
ceive that if the bill should pass. and the policy it iDdi
Gated be adopted. that negotiation OF war would necessa.
rly follow; and that, if the former should be resorted to
the first instance to prevent war, il would terminate eiiher
in compromise or war. There could be no other result
Nor was il more difficult TO perceive, that IL the question
was compromised. il must be on the basis Of the 49th par
allel. The past history Of the affair, the fact that il had
been frequently Offered by US substantially as an ultima.
tum, added tn the fact that 4eo was the boundary on this
side Of the Rocky mountains, left no doubt on my mind
that, if settled by compromise, il must be on that basis. 1t
is true that our offer heretofore on that basis had been reject
ed, and that il might thence be inferred that Great Britain
CCNhN " "AA Ut hoAiSis Il du bOt
Of that impression. Things have greatly changed since our
offers were made and rejected by her. Then the advanta-
ges under the convention were all in her favor, but now
they have turned in favor Of us. Then our capacity to
settle the county was small but now, for reasons already
stated, they are great; and what is far from being imma.
terial, this increased capacity to settle and coIonize
strengthens the foundation Of our claims to the territory.
The capacity to settle and colonize a contiguous open
region not capable of being settled or colonized by any
other power, goes b'ck to the original principles on which
all claim TO territory is founded.
Seeing that such would necessarily be the consequences
Of the line Of policy indicated by the bill, and wishing to
avoid both compromise aud war, | took a decided stand
against it. / was very ably seconded in my opposition (;
so much, that notwithstanding the apparently large major
lily in its favor, when the discussion commenced, it passed
This body by an equivocal majority Of one. say equivo-
cal, because one of the Senators felt himself constrained
by accidental causes TO vote for the measure, after he had
avowed his opinion against il. Since then, session after
session, measures have been introduced to give notice and
extend our authority over the territory, with a view ulli-
mately of taking possession of the whole. As anticipated,
negotiation, in order 10 avoid war, followed and now we
are brought to the alternative of compromise or fighting.
as ought to have been foreseen from the beginning. 1
again repeat that / am in no way responsible for the pre-
sent state of things and if | am compelled in conse-
quence to vote for compromise and notice, the response
biity rests on my friends behind me, whose course has
forced on the government into il by the line of policy they
have pursued. / do not impeach their patriotism but I
cannot but think that they permitted their zeal in behalf
of the territory, and the Impotence of those they repre-
sent TO occupy it, to get the control of their better iudg-
ment.
Having been thus brought, by the line of policy to
which / was opposed, to choose between compromise and
war, | without hesitation take the former. 10 making the
choice, l am actuated by no unmanly fear Of The conse-
quences of war. know that in the existing state of the
world, wars are necessary-that the most sacred regard
for justice and equity. and the most cautious policy, cam
not always prevent them. When war must come, | may
appeal to my past history to prove that | shall not be
found among those who may faIter but / shall take care
never TO contribute by my acts to p~recipiiate the country
into war, when it can be fairly avoided. / am, on princi-
pie, opposed TO war, and in favor of peace, because | re-
gard peace as a positive good, and war as a positive evil
As a good, | shall ever cling TO peace, so long as il can be
preserved consistently with the safety and the honor of the
country and as opposed to war, / shall ever resist it, so
lorg as it may he resisted consistently with the same con-
siderations. / am emphatically opposed to it in this case,
because peace, IN my opinion, can be preserved consistent
" with both, and war avoided without sacrificing either
1 am opposed to it for the additional reason, because il
would be, in my opinion, highly impoHtic-a considera-
ton never TO be overlooked when a question of the kind
is under consideration. L regard it as highly impoiitic in
this case, because | believe that. should we resort to it, we
would lose, instead of securing. the two objects for which
it would be avowediy declared, as | shall now proceed 10
show.
The first is, to secure what is claimed to be our rights
to the whole Of Oregon, under the cry of "aH of Oregon
or none" Those who would go into it for that object
will, in my opinion, find in the end that 'H0ne'' is much
more probable than "GH." In coming to this conclusion,
| concede to my cOuntTymen the highest bravery, energy,
patriotism. and intelligence, which can be claimed for
them. But these cannot overcome the great obstacles
which we would have to encounter, compared TO what
Great Britain would have in a contest for Oregon. As
long as she has a large force in the East, and remains mis-
,ress Of the Pacific, she will be able to place there a much
more efficient force, and at far less expense, than we pos
sibly can at present, which would there decide the contest
in her favor.
But were it otherwise, from the nature of the contest,
Oregon, though the cause Of the war, would be speedily
forgotten. The struggle once begun, would soon cease to
be for Oregon. Higher and far more powerful motives
would soon guide the contest. Ii would speedily become a
struggle for mastery between the greatest power in the
world on the one side, against the most growing on the
other. Actuated by all the feelings belonging to such a
struggle, both sides would put forth all their vigor, energy,
and resources, and, overlooking minor points, would aim
to strike the most vulnerable point, and where each might
have the greatest advantage, leaving Oregon to be won or
lost as the contingencies of so mighty a contest might
decide.
The next object, as is alleged, is to protect our citizens
in Oregon. What has just been said is enough to prove
how utterly it must fail. Instead of protection, war
would most certainly sacrifice them and that is the strong
reason, with me, for opposing it. | feel our obligation to
protect them as citizens, and brethren, and kindred. We
have encouraged them 10 emigTate, and | will not give a
vote which, in my opinion, would ruin and abandon them.
But what war would fail to effect, would be certainly ac-
complished by compromise on the line offered by the Pre-
sideni. There ore none of our citizens. if | an correctly
informed, settled north of 40. Establish that line, and
we at once give our citizens in Oregon peace and security,
and with them full opportunity to realize their object in
emigrating.
But passing from Oregon, 1 take broader ground, and
oppose war for reasons looking 10 the whole. | see no.
thing to hope from war, be its result what it may. On
the contrary, | bolieve that, the most successful and trium-
phant war that could be waged-one 10 which all would
be accomplished which its most extravsgant advocate
could dare hope form which we should conquer the
Canadss, New Brunswick. and Nova Scotia-in which
we should drive the British flag from the continent, and
compel Great Britain to yield the whole by treaty in the
short period of ten years, would be disastrous TO US. |
alIude not to its ravages and devastations-to the oceans of