The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1846-04-03
NUMBER rs.

POIHoH " lhe oeha'e-among which con-
sder myself as incladcd--aud who were
opposed TO The giving Of this notice. They
opposed il on grounds directly tie reverse
Of those on which these gentlemen adyoca.
ted il. Those Nho advocated the notice
did so because they believed there would be-
40 compromise, and could be none. We
were opposed 10 the notice, because we did
not agree with them in that opinion. We
believed. on the contrary, that compFo.
mise might be effected, and a common
ground assumed TO which both nations would
agree. We did not think that the Amer.
can title 10 the whole OF Oregon TO be SO
perfectly clear as 10 be indispuja5le. We
held that the title Of neither nallon 70 the
whole country was perfect and, therefore,
we could not, and did not, believe that two
powerful aod enlightened nations, such as
Great Britain aud the United States, would
90 to war on such a question, SO long as
war could by possibility be hono;ably and
properly avoided. THIS was The view OF
all who opposed tie giving Of notice at this
time. We wished to give 10 both parties
III this controversy breathing lime-a
season for calm and mature reflection I'M
der the influence Of which they might coma
to some just, and honorable, yet pacific con.
cluson and because we thought that tho
immediate giving Of such a notice as was
proposed would bring Great Britain TO ono
OF lwo ietnatiyes-eiiher to aclulesce in
the state Of things in which We had placed
the question, 80 as TO permit US to get pos
session OF the territory by the gradual re.
suits Of colonization, or TO change The onas,
and cast the blame Of making war from our
shoulders upon hers, compelling her 10 take
the attitude Of the aggressor.
There we're other,gentIenen "a this body
" ho acted from different views. These
" ere 10 ia, or OF q compromise. They, too,
thought that our title was not perfect, but
Jet were in favor Of giving notice, because
hey believed, notwithstanding The tone and
anguage of the message, thai. the two
measures we're compatibIe-lhat we might
give this notice 10 terminate the couven.
lion, and yet effect 40 amlcable compromise
81 all our difficulties. The grounds on which
they come 10 this conclusion seem to bs
three. 10 the first place, they think that
the language oil the Executive shows that
he still enler,ans The hope OF compromise.
They quote TO US his expfeea language
where he says that he hopes an amcabls
arrangement may be made Of the questions
in dispute, an fully aware that the Pres.
idcut does use this language, aud that the
same thing was said twice by the Secretary
Of State, in the course Of the correspond.
once but It seems Impossible TO me that,
on the plainesi and lus,est rules OF construc.
tion, the message can be considered as ex.
pressing that meaning. Its a most solemn
and weighIy State paper, addressed by the
Executive Of the nation to CO ordinate
branch Of the Government, and 10 which he
Is bound to hold the plalnest aud most ex.
plicit language-to state with the utmost
rraukuess his real sentiments, and 10 give
The reasons on which they are founded.
This is his duty, and this he has performed.
cd he says, very clearly, that he recon.
menus this notice in order that we may as.
eri our title to the whole territory, and, if
necessary, support tina, tito by arms. |
annot look beyond the message for the
residents motives. To do so would, 10
ny judgment, be to disparago the charac'
pr Of the President.
Another ground taken by these gentle.
zen is, that the President wants TO employ
his notice as moral weapon, not physi.
al one. But no such idea is expressed 10
he message. The language Of the Pfesi.
lent ia explicit TO the contrary. Il looks
iot to q moral, but physical termination
# the difficulty. But, admitting that he
wants to use il as moral weapon, what
oes that meant Il must mean that he
rants 20 use it for the purpose Of intimida.
ion. Now, | submit to the common sense
f every gentleman, whether, if this notice
houd be used IN that light, with a great
nd powerful nation like Great Britain, Ms
fleet, instead Of leading to a compromise,
'ouId not be precisely the reverse. Ii
'ould be direc, appeal TO her fears, TO in.
uce her to yield, under such motive, what
be would not yield otherwise.
The third reason is, that the convention
{ 1918, and removed in 1927, was wrong
rom the beginning that, as measure Of
olcy, il was great mistake that lis Ell
ect was to (et,er the assertion OF our rights;
nd that il would have been better, so far
5 our rights in the territory were concern
d, if there had been no such convention at
IL. In tina, opinion cannot cuncur;
issent from it wholly hold precisely the
opposite opinion believe that, but for
ha, convention, the preservation of our
ights could have been effected only by al
ppeal TO arms. We mus. either have gone
D war in 1873 aud 1927, or must have &C.
uiesceI in the host!3oclaims of Great Brit
IN, for in that case they would have been
osule.) live could at that time have OBJ
lined the latitude of 40 deg. as compro'
lise boundary, it would have been wise in
8 to have done so but we attempted hin
am. The attempt failing, what other al
ernative was len US Either this conven.
100 or war. The convention was substl.
ute for war and, while it prevented war,
t at the same time preserved our rights III
oregon iuvlolats go long as the convention