The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1846-12-05

and supposing the army able TO make an av-
erage offive miles day--inore than il has
beeu able 10 make yet, and much more than
il would he able TO make in its advance--it
would require 100 days TO reachthe Capital
But few fights would much protract The
time, and one serious disaster would make il
Indefinite.
We say nothing about supplies for such an
army and their cost--this last would be enor-
nous, and we doubt even the practicability
Of supplying an army on such long line
and through such a country AT any cost AS
to Supplies from The country, how are they
to he obtained The country does not pos
sess them II has no commercial towns with
magazines of food. There is said TO be a.
bundance ofcattle, but these must be caught.
Shall the army stop to forage for its daily
food? The enemy will not furnish it-that
would be treason. He will more probably
tiles would see that this were done. For
aging at best furnishes hut precarious and
scanty supplying army ever did or can de-
pend upon it.. Everything will have to be
brought from the Rio Del Norte, on wagons
and mules. t..-
But go to Saltillo, it is said Ard why 10
SaItilo? Cui bono? what would he gained
by it. Another fight, another useless waste
oflife, and go miles farther from our Cnnar-
go depot. But 10 go TO Saltillo the marching
army should not he less than 10000, the in
termediate garrison not less than 1000 the
escorts ofsupply trains not less than 1,000,the
garrison to watch Monterey not less than
1000, the escorts from Montereyto Camargo
not lsss than 1000, the intermediate gar
risons on the road from Monterey To Canlar
go not less than 500, the garrison Mt Canlargo
500, that at Matamoras 1000. So that 10
make secure the expedition 10 Saltillo, will
require about 1900 men. Allofwhom will
have 10 he supplied with food and nmmuni-
ton. The difficulties which have already all 4
tended the transportation of supplies from
Ca,nargo TO Monterey, furnishes data which
should not he neglected. -t
We talk about Rancho, without rejecting
what Rancho is. A mere farming estab-
tishment, few ofthem very large. Suppose
we encounter one, conveniently situated,with
= abundance ofcnttle in the woods who are 10
collect these, who knows where they are and
! how to drive them up, or to throw the lasso
and catch them? The people who know are
4 our enemies; will they aid to conquer their
country? They have not yet done so, and
dare not if they would. We have as yet seen
no disposition to befIiend us 1t would tie
unnatural for such disposition TO exist, and
folly TO count npon it. What is then 10 he
: done? Small foraging parties would he de-
r stroyed. Shall the whole army stop and for.
I age? Then what becomes Of the progress
of the campaign? Again we refer 10 The
progress from Camnrgo TO Monterey.
Moreover cattle are fresh meat, and fresh
meat must he daily supply. How can any
army, when did any army, get on, which had
, to hunt for its daily food h"
An impression seems to exist that MI nm
army has to do is 10 fight. But should not
the reflection he made that men cannot march
q al nd .
But if ever the notion ofmoYing upon Mex
leo from Monterey was entertained, and that
it was we have no doubt, 1t is now saidto be
abandoneh and the present plan is 10 move
upon San Luis Potosby land from Monterey
in one direction, and by land from Tainpico
in another. This appears TO us to be about
rs wild and impracticnble scheme us the
reputed move from Monterey upon Mexico.
| San Luis is an inland town, about lG0 miles
from Tampico, where the landing upon III"
Gulfc0ast will have to he made. IL is also a.
bout 375 miles from Monterey. II is said to
contain $4,000 Inhabitants, which number
could, ON grent emergencies, for the defence
ofthe town, furnish 10000 fighting men, aud
could fendiy furnish an efficient force of
in 10, or 5000 fighting men. Such Il town
threatened, will not be unprovided with
means obedience, nor will il be unwilling,we
presume. TO defend itself -1h ,.ti'
The plan has the appearance OF what mill
tary men call a s'combined movement" butt
evidently admits of no combined action, and
shows most clearly an utter want of knowi-
edge, ofaI essential elements of combined
movement Who ever heard or read of a
combined movement involving 375 miles on
one side, and 160 on the other, through an en-
emy's country, and without the possibility OF
one column making known its progress to
the other. $3.50 Tsi tf a9N Hrth VIVA
As all the regular forces are nat Monterey
and vicinity, the attack aud progress frontn
Tampico must he entirely mnde by volunteers,
and as there can be no combinations OF action @
between the two armies, each must be ade-'
quate to- protect itselfand to do the whole
work. 1ls EH6 A9NHiaH woH ad itihI ~hNu3'
The landing at Tampico,is one of the worst 2
upon the Gulfcoast full of danger, aud viii
probably he attended with serious accIden'.i
There is nothing to capture at Tampico, a y
barren coast, void of settlements. iud na9 Iiae'
But we will suppose the landing5to be
made. These troops then have 10 march a.
bout l6O miles, over mere mule path. to at@
tack a town containing $4,000 inhabitnnts.--4 9
Every species of supply must be carried with o
them. or ammunition and food, on pack 8
mules, or lift he practicable. in wagons, as
until San Luis be taken nothing can he OH o
tained from the country. The enemy will
have accurate knowledge ofthe progress of
each army, and will be. able 20 meet each %
without fear from the other Their troopsad
will be upon aueguality with oiir Volunteers. n
and even better in being more subordinate, 81
as the sentiment Observation-Disclosures classes 81