Martinsburg gazette. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1833-1855, 1846-03-26

acted from different views. Inese were IN IA
ror ola compromise. They, too, thought that
our tile was rot perfect, but vet We're il favor
Of giving norce, because taey belleged, not
w.iAagauding thetone and language 9ftae met
sage, that the two measures were cCTapau-
bie--thaf we might give notice to terminate the
convention, and ret affect an amicatle com
promise OF all our difficulties. The grounds
on which they come TO this conclusion seem
70 be three. in the first place, they think that
the language Of the Executive shows that he
still eniertalns the hope ofcomprornise. They
quote Us his express language, where he says
that he hopes that an sHicabie arrangement
may be made Of the questions IN dispute.
am fully aware that the President does use
this language, and that the same thing was
said twice BY the Secretary Of State IN the
course OF the correspondence but II seems inn
possible to me that on the plalnest and busiest
rules OF construction, the message can be con
sidered as expressing that meaning. II IS a
most solemn and weighty State paper, address
sed By the Executive OF the nation 10 the Co
ordinate branch of the Government and in
which he is bound 10 hold the plainest and
mos, explicit language-to state with the ut
most lrankness his real sentiments, and to give
the reasons on which they are iounded. This
is his duty, and this he has performed And
he says, very clearly, that he recommends this
notice IN order that we may assert our title TO
the whole territory. and. If necessary, support
that title by arms. ! cannot look beyond the
message for the Presidents motives. To do
so. would. in my Judgment, be to disparage
the character of the President.
Another ground taken by these gentlemen is,
that the President wants to employ this notice
as moral weapon, not physical one But
no such idea is expressed IN the message.
The language of the President Is explicit to
the contrary. 1t looks not to moral, but a
physical termination Of the difficulty. But
admitting that he wants 10 use II as a moral
weapon, what does that mean2 II must mean
thathe wants 10 use il for the purpose of init
mdaton Now, submit to the common
sense of every gentleman, whether, if this mo-
tice should be used in that light, with great
and powerful nation like Great Britain, its eff
feet instead Of leading TO n compromise, would
not be precisely The reverse. Ii would be di
rect appeal to her fears, to induce her TO yield,
under such motive, whatshe would not yield
otherwise.
The third reason is, that the convention of
1873, and renewed IN 1877, was wrong from
the beginning that, as measure of policy, it
was a great mistake that its effect was to fetter
the assertion of our rights; and that il would
have been better, 50 far as cur rights in the ter
rtorv were concerned, if there had been no
such convention at all. In that opinion can
not concur; dissent from it wholly; hold
precisely the opposite opinion; believe that,
but for that convention, the preservation OF our
rights could have been effected only by an APP
peal to arms. We must either have gone to
war in 1918 and 1927, or must have acquies-
ced in the hostile claims of Great Britain, (for
in that case they would have been hostile) If
we could at that time have obtained the latitude
at 400 as a compromise boundary, 1t would
have been wise in us TO have done so but we
attempted it in YAM That attempt falling
what other alternative was left usl Either
this convention or war. The convention was
a substitute for war; and, while il prevented
war, ii at the same time preserved our rights IN
Oregon inviolate so long rs the convention
should continue think that those who en-
tered into that treaty acted wisely. lthas be
come but too common al this day for US TO sit
in Judgment on the acts OF our predecessors,
and to pronounce them to have been unjust,
unwise, or unpatriotic, while we pass over the
circumstances OF their day, and under which
they acted. Look at the men concerned. Look
at Monroe-at Rush-at Clay; It would be
hard, indeed, to pronounce men like these to
have been either unpatTiotic or unwlse. Or, II
we look at the great names of those who have
at Jackson, and at others since--it would be
hard to say that such men deliberately acquies-
ced in an arrangement hostile to the best inter
.sts oftheir country. do not name the prom
ment individual concerned, Understood 10 re-
fer to Mr. ADAMS, )because his course since that
time has cancelled any previous credit 10 which
he might have entitled himself
Such was the state Of things when this reso-
luton Of notice was first introduced INTO the
Senate. Since then, as | have said, there has
been a mighty change public opinion has
developed Itself not only IN this, bat on the
other side of the Atlantic; and that voice of
public opinion has uttered itself most audibly
and clearly in favor of the compromise. Here,
too, the same change has been manifested in.
sorauch that hazard nothing when | say that
a large, very large majority Of this body IS at
this moment in favor ola compromiSe--an
honorable compromise. And does not all the
language and conduct Of the British Govern
ment itself clearly demonstrate that II is IN IA
yor of compromise; and substantially on the
basis which we have ourselves offered Sure
! am that no intelligent and rejecting man can
read the language Of Sir Robert Peel in reply
to Lord John Russell, and not see that he is
prepared to act on a proposition substantially
the same with that which was rejected by MIR.
Pakenham. This declaration Of the Premier
Of Great Britain was made with very great et-
feet; MS object in making ii was not TO cen
sure the able and very faithful representative
Of Great Britain in this country, but 10 give
emphasis TO the assurance. that he was ready
to make Just and fair compromise Of the dis
puted question. hope sincerely that our
Government has not overlooked that declaIa-
ton; II was direct step towards compromise.
and trust il has been met in the same spirit
trust that intelligence has, before this time.
gone abroad 10 Great Britain to that effect, so
as TO remove the only difficulty which now
lbs in tie way.
Under the views that entertain, 1t is no lon
ger question whether our difficulties may be
practically arranged or not; nor Is ileven a
question as to the manner: it Is simply
question of time. But there ought to be no
delay, because the business Of both nations and
of the world requires that il should be settled
on great, and momcntous, and delicate ques-
ions like these, there are the highest public ros-
sons why there should be no delay. Once set
de the question Of Oregon, and we may then
settle the question Of Mexico; but till then,
Mexico Will calculate chances Of a rupture be
tween us and Great Britain, and if she sees
IF cka mill