Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1846-03-21

versy breathing timea for calm and reec-
lion under the influence of which they might
just and honorable, yet pacific conclusion and because
thought that the immediate giving OF such notice was
proposed would bring Great Britain 70 OF two aerna-
nyeseither to acquesce in the state OF things In which
had placed the question: TO permit 10 get possession
Of the territory by the gradual results Of coonizaton to
change the Onus, and the blame Of making from
shoulders upon hers compelling her TO take the attitude Of the
aggressor.
There were other gentlemen in this body who acted from
different views. These in favor OF compromise.
They, too thought that title perfect but yet
favor of giving notice. because they believed notwsand
ing the and language OF the message, that the two mea
compatblehat might give this notice TO ter
inmate the convention, and yet effect anicae compromises
OF all difficulties. The grounds which hey TO
this conclusion TO be three In the first place. they
think that the language of the Executive shows that he still
eneains the hope OF compromise. They quote to US his
express language, where he says that he hopes amcae
arrangement may be made of the questions in dispute.
fully that the President does this language and that
the thing said twice by the Secretary Of State in the
Of the correspondence but impossible to
that the panest and ustes rules OF construction, the
message be considered expressing that meaning Is
most solemn and weghy State paper, addressed by the
Executive of the nation coordinate branch of the Gov
eminent and in which he is bound hold the panest and
explicit Ianguageo state with the utmost fankness his
real sentiments and 10 give the which they
founded This is his duty, and this he has performed And
he says clearly that he recommends this notice IN order
that may title to the whole territory, and If
cessay, support that title by cannot look beyond the
message for the Presidents motives TO do would in my
Judgment be dspaage the character Of the President
Another ground taken by these gentlemen is that the Pre-
lent wants to employ this notice moral weapon not
physical But such idea expressed in the message
The language of the President explicit the contrary II
looks moral, but physical terPnaton fxbe diff
Guilty But admitting that he to mofal wea
pom, what does that II must that he wants to
it for the purpose of intimidation Now, submit to the
common Of every gentleman whether this notice
should be used in that light with great and powerful nation
like Great Britain, its effect instead Of leading to compro
misc would not be precisely the II would be di
rect appeal to her fears induce her YIELD under such
motive, what she would not yield otherwise.
The third is, that the convention Of 1878, and
newed in 1927, wrong from the beginning that
Of policy it great mistake that its effect was
etter the assertion of rights and that would have
been better far rights the territory concern
ed there had been such convention ut all In that opn
ion cannot concur dissent from it wholly hold pre-
csey the opposite opinion believe that but for that
venon the preservation Of rights could have been effected
only by appeal TO We must either have gone to
in 1918 and 1927 must have acquesced In the hostile
claims of Great Britain (or that they would have
been hose five could at that time have obtained the lat
tude of 400 compromise boundary, would have been
TO have done but attempted it IN vain That
attempt falling what other alternative was left Us Either
this convention The convention substitute for
war and, while it prevented war; the time pre-
served rights Oregon invioate long the conyen-
ton should continue. think that those who entered into
this day for judgment the Of predeces
sors and pronounce them have been unjust unwise
unpaoc while pass the circumstances OF Their day.
and under which they acted Look at the men concerned
Look at Monroe-at Rush-at Clay it would be hard,
Deed like these have been either unpa-
iotic unwse. Or if look at the great names Of those
who have since acquesced in the theyaoptedat
Jackson, and at others sinceit would hard to say
that such deliberately acquesced in arrangement hos
tile to the best interests of their country do not the
prominent individual concerned understood to refer TO Mr.
ADAMS because his since that time has cancelled
previous credit to which he might have entitled himself
Such the of things when this resolution of notice
first introduced into the Senate. Since then, have
sd there has been mighty change public opinion has de-
yeoped ITSELF not only this but the other side OF the
Atlantic and that voice Of public opinion has uttered itself
audiby and clearly favor of compromise. Here
too the change has been manifested nsomuch that
hazard nothing when say that large, very large, ma
joty Of this body at this moment in favor of coppms
an honorable compromise And does an exngunge
and conduct Of the British Government itself clearly demon
that is in favor of compromise and substantially
the basis which have ourselves offered Sure am that
intelligent and rejecting read the language Of Sir
Robert Peel In reply to Lord John RUSSELL and not see that he
prepared proposition substantially the with
that which rejected by Mr. Pakenham This declaration
Of the Premier of Great Britain made with very great eff
feet his object making was not to censure the able and
very faithful representative of Great Britain this country,
but give emphasis 10 the that he really
make just and fair compromise Of the disputed question
hope sincerely that Government has overlooked that
deciarauon; direct
trust it has been met in the spirit trust that intl
has, before this me gone abroad to Great Britain to
that effect the only difficulty which now lies
in the way.
Under the that enterain il is longer question
whether difficulties may be pacihcaly arranged or not
is question the It simply ques
ton Of time But there ought he delay, because the
business Of both nations and Of the world requires that it
should be settled On great, and momenou and delicate
questions like these there the highest public why
there should be delay Once settle the question Of Orc
gon and may then settle the question Of Mexico but ill
then, Mexico will calculate the chances Of rupture between
and Great Britain and if she any chance Of
against us she will go the Power which makes
upon Remove these chances pu, end such hope,
and Mexico will speedily settle every pending question be-
tween her and the United States and them trust that
shall deal generously with her She is weak-eebe in the
exeme-and trust that shall adopt harsh
with her.
have explained the change which has taken place in
the bearing of this Of notice the questions Of peace
and The change consists this that when the notice
recommended there existed hope of compromise but
the highest and confident hope felt by almost all
Now therefore, there great interest connected with
deciding this question of notice. way another Just in
proportion the prospect Of compromise small the inn
porance Of the notice great but the prospect Of
promise increases the Of notice becomes Of es and
less Importance We have reached point when we
decide the question without much feeling either side
now proceed TO inquire what is the bearing Of this
the position Of the Executive, and what the posi-
ton of the parties in this body.
The conduct Of the Executive be greatly changed
He must act very differently from what he weuf have
done when he recommended the notice under the
that there could be compromise but that must
rights by That he advise the same thing
which he advised then, impossible Then he had not the
remotcs expectation Of compromise II now he has DIFF
fsrent view, and thinks that Gea, Britain ready