The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1846-11-01
LATEST INTELLIGENCE.
81 THE N ALL 8.


wAsHrNoroy, Oct 80, ls48.
aspects and prospects Of the Var 9th Merieo-Cen-
fempIated Combined Movements of Gen Tavior and
'e'" FdnrSon-Dtieuhies TO an Early Junction of
me f'oo .armtes-RentOresments Provisions and NV
Hitions required The Castle Of ST. Jokn-Plan + an
Attack for its reduction, &c. 4e.
The victory, the cspiuation, and the occupation of
Monterey, give to the invasion of Mexico the mos, com
handing igndcagce-portendng, it docs in this a.
pect the speedy succession Of the most vigorous prose-
cuton of the bn part and the desperate de-
fence the part the Mexcans There at least the
encouragement to hope for speedy termination Of the
Mexican in triumphant demolition of the Mexican
forces
Gen. Taylor has every to hope for q collision
with the enemy long before he the $40 miles
intervening to San Luis Potos He may find Santa Anna
at Saltio--or the recognised army from Montereyhs
may lose several hundred in reducing the place
and may have to leave garrison of thousand for its
security He may have several battles to fight before
reaching the junction at San Luis and when he arrives
there his forces may be reduced to Eve thousand men,
assuming that he will not leave Monterey with less than
ten thousand San Luis with population of 10000
will be formidable barrier to the advance Of 900 men,
IL the population show of the pluck of the cit
zens OF Monterey. But Gen Patterson with 900 men
is to come up from the east from Tampco up the Panu
CO 80 miles, after capturing in cooperation with the
navy the forts at that place and alter conouerinR the
5000 Mexcans assembled for s protection and is thus
to form junction with Gen. Taylor at San Luis Now,
this viii require the incest calculation and the most
punctual movements the part of tho two divisions
from the north and the east to up to San Luis 81.
multaneousy, and in the nick of time for the combina.
ton. Indeed, it hardly be done. The route from
Tampco after you traverse the plains of sixty
miles, represented to us exceedingly abrupt bro
KEN and difficult of passage, being absolutely inaccess
BILE to any means Of conveyance except the footed
mules of the country. How Sen Patterson to get his
artillery and baggage wagons along this route up
bride paths along the edges Of cliffs in the COR
ges of deep rsvnes The thing be done, but how
long will it take this 5000 men to do iii The same Of
General Taylor He has better road for he traverses
the table lands but he has yet to make the ascent
from Monterey. We are sure he will only 60 ahead
we are equally sure that If the enemy should unexpec
eddy hem him they did at Fort Brown he has the
M he ss aa to i
marc to San Luis He has not II will require all
Of the eight weeks of the armsce and perhaps month
longer to enable him, after garrsoning the city, to
leave Monterey with force Of ten thousand Gen
Wool and General Kearney are at great distance 1t
them 10 concentrate at Monterey Then there are pro
visions to be collected before tho long march b:
Taylor will be required before he make forward
movement with the most active exertions Of the War
can leave Monterey before christmas il will be earlier
than the calculations ofour military men in this quarter
VIII allow.
The inerregnum is then to be employed upon the sea
board, in attack upon Tampico, and in the oocupa
ton of that port by garrison IS the base Of the forward
stration may not be anticipated for month to come
the forces Of General Patterson will have a cosstwise
Tampico. The distance will probably have to be made
by land for the norhers ofthe Gulf dangerous to its
Harvey, the New York, and other vessels will bear
witness BY the most active exertions therefore,
concentration of General Taylor from Monterey, and
nj (,epara patfa rOm
at San Luis admitting the possibility OF the route from
the coast WESTWARD before the middle the end of jan
uary next, if ever it is effected at all Both armies
may be victorious and yet both may be compelled to
halt for achievements and supplies for month the
With these views-and their pausiblity will not be
quesoned-the inference is inevitable that the future
active assistance of the War Department in reinforce
ments of and the fullest supply Of wholesome and
ought to mustered forthwith, to garrison the
posts in the to keep open the communication with
the depots of supplies and to reinforce the two divisions
of the army. Further acquisitions will have to be made
out Of the question: and nothing less
than the safety Of the army its and its comfort,
to say nothing Of the credit Of the Administrative in
short and decisive termination Of the war; demand more
volunteers, more mules more munitions, more trans
ports and provisions for men and horses-for the
dry has set in in Mexico and the grass begin
The time and the plan of the attack on the castle of
Vera Cruz uncertain if not undecided upon. But to
conclusion the Administration has Of late rapidly
tended. It is this-that the contest cannot now DO
closed while that fortress permitted to stand unassail
ed, and that in its reduction the prestige the rsliying
point the key of the republic is lost and the door TO
gotaton open An officer Of the navy, distinguished
less for his practical views than for his experience in
the srvics 10 conversation with us to-day expressed
The castle Of Vera can be taken. The garrison
are neither British, French, nor Argsntnesthey are
well at distance, are good for nothing It close quar-
ters The castle be boarded in a night attack. We
can run two or three gaes at night GROUND the north
ing up close to the walls can pour thousand men into
the castle from the decks in less than half hour, cut
ting the enemy sword in hand The place must be car
red by a coup de To stand of and be shot at,
might lose every vessel employed. But we must make
would board ship, and the parapes the land side
be easily scaled the deck Of seventy four
have been reduced in the beginning Of the war Il viii
have to be carried before the war 10 ended, and the
sooner il is done, the sooner the war will be clossd
We give these opinions wit hout comment except that
in the conclusion that the sooner the Mexican
ricolOr the bastons of St John displaced by the
Mexico strike bargain for peace The Navy IL anxious
for chance land ought to be permitted the privilege
OF a demonstration.
We believe that Santa Anna will seize the first plausi
BILE preext for spirit OF the people OF Mexico
for stubborn resistance will not permit him to negotiate
until the danger Of humiliation is apparent With the
reduction Of Vera Cruz we believe they would assent
to the hard necessity fer peace, even at the price Of
California and the line Of the Rio Gande. or yet more
southern boundary in a straight latitudna line. We
shall have convince the Mexicans that they are con-
quered in conquering peace-they will hardly be coz
vinced while we hesitate assault upon ST. John
There two plans Of coercing them to teay-ono
by the reduction of their great castle frghul only to
look at and the other BY ovsrrunnng the whole country
and garrisonng every town. Our behef m tnat the lot
mer alternative resolved upon, that it will be carried
effect, and that Publications Of peace will be sx-
changed before the anniversary Of Palo Alto or Of
Resaca de 10 Palma or at the arthest before the return
morning the batteries Of Worth first opened
their thunder under tie heights Of Monterey.
Respectfully, THE DOCTOR.
WARRINGTON, Oct 80, 1886
Short as Pie Crust.
fno hut lotyer rail-