The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-11-04
PoLITICA AL.
From the Psnnsylssnian.


Oregon question 10 arbitration, and Us rejection W
the President
The British government, having in vain attempt
ed TO induce the President to take back his with
drawal Of the offer Of compromise on inc parallel
Of 49s and 20 suffer Il 10 stand as the basis OF iur-
ther negotiation, next resorted TO aproposai 10 aro
tTate the question. Instructions for this purpose
were Forwarded 10 Mr. Pskenham before the date OF
the Presidents messagein December last, disappears
from Mr.. MeLane's letter TO Mr.. Buchanan Of the
lst of that month.
On the subject Of arbitration public opinion is no
longer divided Indeed, should not refer TO II at
all, II this were not necessary TO complete We" oi
the conduct of the administration throughout the
Oregon negotiation. We do not believe that there
Is candid individual in the country Who would not
admit that the President acted with wise fore
cast in rejecting the British proposition TO arollra1e
the Oregon question.
But this was not so at the time. There is por
ton of the whg party which has not yet shaken of
the yoke OF colonial yassaage. They still cling 70
the mother country, as they did during the late war
and ever ready 10 esp0use her cause against Iha
of their own country. These the legitimate sue
cessors OF the Hartford convention federasts Of the
late war. These men, bound by affection TO Great
Britain and dreading her power, were loud IN their
dsnunciatons of the President for rejecting nbua-
ton.
Another class Of individuals, opposed to war from
principle, (but who would uneonseousy invite hos
tues by the very means which they adopt TO avoid
them,) condemned the President for what they term
ed "his reckloss and ani-Chrstian conduct" IN re-
fusing arbitration. Il shocking, in their oPln-
ion, the civilization OF the nineteenth century, 10
reject tribunal so peaceful and appropriate for
the settlement Of international disputes And yet
these honest fanatics have discovered that the
President pursued the best 10 preserve peace
between the two countries; and that one Of his prom
nent for rejecting arbitration, was the dan
ger that this, If adopted, might eventually lead to
war. ra d. .r.
We shall now proceed to enumerate some Of the
reasons presented by the documents for rejecting
arbitration
l. Tho first reason TO which we shall refer is: the
danger of war which would have resulted, under
the peculiar circumstances OF the case, ron the
great delay consequent al filtration Our past ex-
perence IN former aIbtrations with Great Britain,
has demonstrated how very tedious are the pro-
esedings To use the language Of MIR. Buchanan;
THE necessary delay In selecting the arbtrators, IN
organizing the board, In submitting the proofs and
arguments 'of the plenipotentiaries, who must on
every point await the instructions OF their respective
governmenls,' would probably postpone the final
award for several years. Meanwhile, the tide Of eml-
grafton from the United States would be constantly
swelling and the danger Of collisions between Brit
ish subjects and American cuzens in that re-
mote territory, would be constantly increasing. In
my opinion, IN order 10 secure a peaceful, there
must be a prompt settlement Of the controversy
There never was question in which delay will
prove more dangerous" .....'...
g. The difficulty Of selecting suitable arbitrators
There would have been serious objections 10 any
Of the soyereigns Of Europe, account Of their IN
innate eonnexion with Great Britain, and the pow
erful influence which she exercises over them. The
objections would have been equally strong against
committing such vast territorial rights to the arbi-
trament Of individuals. These would probably have
been inf ueneed, il they had not been corrupted AT
all events, they could not have avoided suspicion.
Their award, If against this country, would have
been a source OF new difficulties.
g. The disposition Of arbitrators always to make
a compromising award. We have memorable
example Of this in the award OF the king Of the
Netherlands on the northeastern boundary question.
Great Britain had always commended, and had re-
corded in the last protocol between Mr.. Calhoun
and Mr.. Pakenham, that the territory in dispute
was confined TO the country between the Columbia
river and the 49lh parallel Of latitude. On this she
would have insisted before the arbitrators, and
urged its division between the parties. The Pres
ident was resolved to hazard the loss OF any
portion Of territory south Of this parallel, and
with it necessarily, from their position, the valuable
ports and harbors Of the Strait Of Fuca, Admiralty
inlet and Puget's sptid.
4. The President lid not consider the territorial
rights Of the United States proper subject for
irritation especially where such great and valuable
interests at sake when it was his clear convic
ton that the United States held the best title in
istsnoe to the whole territory.
5. Even f IL had been possible to remove all
yaese objections, arbitration impracticable be-
.ause Il morally certain that no treaty for arbi-
tration could have Obtained the constitutional ma
jority of thirds of the Senate necessary TO its
ratification. As Mr.. Buchanan observes: "Severa
of the senator's who might assent to a compromise
upon the parallel Of 49o, would not be willing to
leopard by arbitration, the possession of the har-
bors Admiralty inlet and Puget's sound south Of
that parallel. Indeed for commercial purposes, the
United States might almost as well abandon the
n.la 10 pnualu olf
these harbors; because, south OF them within its
limits, good harbor exists. The rejection of
such treaty by the Senate, would involve the ques
ton in far greater endorsements than exist at
present, and would render its amicable adjustment
still more difficult" IS
For these and other considerations, which might
be stated from the correspondence the President at
an early period, had determined not to arbitrate the
Oregon question: and this determination had been
municated 10 the British government before they made
the offer. In proof of this assertion, we need only
copy the following extract from Mr.. Buchanan's
despatch to Mr.. McLane, of February g. 1886
"In the spirit of frankness and friendship the lnten
ton of the President decline the proposition of
bitration, should ii be offered was early made
known to the British government in unofficial con-
versations, between Lord Aberdeen and yourself,
at London, and Mr.. Pakeuham and myself, in this
city. That government must therefore, haze anticipated
the result Of Interpretations to arbtrats before they were
presented" i#..ta1a~ .'
In the lace OF THIS perfect knOWcdge tnat II would
be rejected, truth compels us to declare, that the
British proposition to arbitrate must have been
mere expedient to gain time to ascertain its effects
Upon those disposed to become its partsans in this
country, and to produce a favorable impression on
the world. raa.ua nr.a ~ r'.
But what was the nature of the proposition sub
mtted through Mr.. Pakenham, on the 9th De-
cember, I845' This was, not to refer to the arbi-
traitor the question of the title claimed by the two
countries to the Oregon territory but to submit the
question merely ''of equitable division of that
Territory to the arbitration Of some friendly
eign or State" 1t will be seen at a glance that
the acceptance of this proposition would have been
an express admission, on the part Of the President,
that Great Britain had right to portion of the
territory in dispute. "And this, too, Gas Mr. Buch-
apan observes in his answer in the face of the note
to Mr.. Pakenham, Of the Both August, by which
the President had asserted, in the most solemn
FORM the title Of the United States, to the whole
territory, g8a aaa laa '.a &"
This proposition was rejected by Mr. Buchanan