The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-01-17
COM MUNtCAT1ONs.
For the UaioI

The remarks submitted for your consideration in
the last communication which had the honor to
address to YOU referred psI eulary to the condition
of the armament Of our Notifications and the heess;
sity of making provision for the immediate supply
quire into The policy of system of defence which
has received the approval Of SO many distinguished
military and scientific men, nor did deem il ma
terial TO show how far the plan had been carried into
effect by the partial complexion Of some Of the works,
or rendered ndgatofy by the postponed commence
nent and still deferred completion Of others. Such
AN inquiry, however pertinent Is too vast and in.
yolyed 10 be undertaken in these brief notices; il
may be enough to say that although the great sys-
tenn of defence which was adopted was considered
to be vastly strengthened by, il not to its chief
excsllenee to the eonnexon Of the plan, and while
every portion Of the country had a right to equal
protection, it was believed the destruction or even
temporary occupation Of some points, would cause
the nation greater expenditures than the cost of all
the works required. Yet an examination of the
elaborate reports of the engineer and typographical
departments will show that, although millions upon
millions have been expended, not one single fortih-
cation, planned for the protection of our great
military and naval establishments, is yet completely
finished, and not one Of our great bays or chefcom-
mercia avenues is at this moment completely guard
ed and protected.
| will now proceed to examine briefly the condi-
ton Of our navy, an the next means of defence.
The opinion that the navy is the true defence OF
the country, and that ours is sufficient for the pur.
Pose IS 30 popular, and so acceptable to the pride o
the nation, as TO be generally received without ques-
/ l.. =.
the skill, seamanshp and distinguished PATRIOTS m
OF our officers and men. Too many Of The gallant
| spirits Of the of 1879 yet suryiye-too fresh in
our annals their glorious achevements--too em.
| ulous Of similar renown are our younger officers
| to make me doub. fora moment, that in any coming
contest, our navy would do all that enterprise no
bic daring, and professional skill could effect; but to
suppose our little navy able 10 protect our whole
coast with its innumerable bays and inets, against
the powerful fleets Of an enemy, would be to expect
| an impossbllIty. As the enemy choose his
own mode OF warfare, as well place of attack, II
we depend upon our navy alone, IL will be necessa-
ry for us to be prepared TO resist a combined feet
because should we not be so prepared, the enemy
| coming in that array, would bring destruction
wherever he made descent. Our navy being in
force at any one point, that point no doubt, would
be protected; but all other points would necessarily
be unprotected as, since prescience could indicate
the point to be attacked the power of ubiquty alone
could place our fleet aLoays in the path of the inva-
der Being in this state Of concentration moreover
should the enemy, upon approaching our coast, fear
to engage fleet TO feet should he prefer acting by
detachments, he could dispense his forces and make
Simultaneous attacks on numerous points, avoiding
that only guarded by our feet
For these reasons, and Others which are given in
the able report already referred to- nothing can be
more clear and conclusive than the following propo
sitions-that is to say:
/. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval
H..
deemed worthy Of protection must be at least equal
10 pO,csr to the attacking force.
2. As from the notice Of the case, there can be no
reason for expecting attack one of these
points rather than another, and no time for trans
ferring our state Of preparation from TO another
after an attack has been declared, each of them must
have assigned TO IT the required means; and
3. Consequently, the system demands power
in the defence, as many times greater than in the
attack as there are points to be covered.
Since, in the existing state of things, such de-
fence as the foregoing would be impossible in the
event Of hostities it will be for our navy act
they so gloriousy did in the war of 1912; that is,
instead Of attempting to cover coast, by crus-
ing in front of it-instead of lying in harbor and
contentng themselves with keeping few more of
the enemy's vessels than their own number in
watch over them instead of leaving the enemy's
commerce in undspu,ed enjoyment Of the sea, and
our own commerce without protection-they scat
tered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean,
penetrated the most remote seas, everywhere acting
with the most brilliant success; and as the report
most truly says, Sin the amount Of the enemy s
property thus destroyed, Of American property pro-
tected or recovered, and in the number Of hostile
ships kept in pursuit Of our scattered vessels-shps
evaded If SUPERIOR and beaten if equal-they render
ed benefits thousand fold greater, to say nothing
of the glory they acquired for the nation and the
character they impaired to it, than any that could
have resulted from state of passiveness within our
own harbors"
But these very exploits will call for increased ex-
ertlon on the part OF our navy in any coming war,
and especially with Great Britain. The brilliant
glory which our navy won, must not be darkened--
the impressions Of their power must not be efiaced-
the memorials of their discipline, seamanship, brave
ry IN battle and humanity in conquest have become
national property, not to be yielded up but with ma
tional existence. They are to bear in mind that all
this, as enrolled in history, has passed into the udg
ment of the world. The United States hare. what
England had of naval pre-eminence. In another war;
we have to keep, she to get, what in the last we
won and she lost; but it would be the very fool
shness OF pride to suppose England had forever lost
the sword OF maritime power, and worse than fool.
shncss, by fattery to lead ournavy to delude them
selves or initiate that vain-glorious confidence which
was, in some degree, the cause of our enemy's dis
comfture 1t must also be remembered, that in the
war of 1912, the American navy had ADVANTAGES
which it will not have again. The American sea-
men had a cause Of their own, in which they were
ny tner fOe The Brit
ish seamen had no such motive. The English sailor
fought from the habit of obedience to command
The American fought with all his heart in defence
of Sailors rights" But the war of 1912 taught
England lesson which she has endeavored to profit
by; she has not only "nursed her wrath to keep it
warm, but has been preparing herself to regain her
lost position. She has not sought to increase, but
to improve her navy--her ships are not only better
built, but better fitted, armed, and equipped Her
seamen ''lhough still entered till discharged" are no
longer impressed; they have better rations, kinder
'r'",nn"nt. and he'ter pay Now after all we owe
to our navy, after more than thirty years of
peace, while the increase Of our commercial MARINE
has been unparalleled with all the naieriel at hand,
with every element of power in our posses,
sion, what have we done for our navyi Nothing,
N comparison with what great rival has done
Even at this momentous crisis, when every arrival
from England brings fresh intelligence Of the extra
ordinary activity throughout Great Britain in prep
aration for war, not only in her regular dock
but by contracts with individuals to deliver an in
definite number of ,oar steamers by giren day, no
counervailing exertons seem to be required on our
part. Nay, more than this: at n time when our nun