Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1846-07-11
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.
THE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN GENERAL
SCOTT AND THE ADMINISTRATION.

as we can in the misunderstandng-re but per-
sonal one to US, and not at all calcula-
ted to promote the public service-which has been
allowed in the very outset of War, TO spring up
between the Administration making that war ana
the Commandern-Ch Chief of the Army, on whose
experience, skill, and labors of military combination
it relied and still chiefly relies for its successful pro-
secution. By whose fault--his own or that OF ms
civil superiors-the country is deprived IN con-
test where its honor is saked, oil the services III Inc
field of the veteran soldier, to whom 1t would most
willingly have committed its standard Tor DhoSe
benefit the Army itself is not led by the man to
whom il looks with undoubted professional conf
dence and affection for what cause he, whom Gen.
Jackson could trust with the South Carolina war, and
Mr.. VAN buren, with the Black Hawk war and the
Canadian connections, cannot now be trusted with
the Mexican expedition, we will not yet undertake
to say. We might inquire, were any public adj
vantage to be expected of i, why difficulties have
so quickly arisen between the present Executive
and the Chief of our Army No previous quarrel
between them existed such did exist between
President JACKSON and the same officer when he
sent him to South Carolina. As to political vari-
ance or jealousy much jealousy existed of him
under the three last Presidents under the present
one and yet, until now, there was no impeachment
created to any public plan, by either political or
personal differences between those Executives and
this favorite officer Of the Army. Could Generals
JACKSON and ScoTT keep peace, who had so long
disliked each other, and yet not Mr.. Polk and the
same Officer! Could the latter and Mr.. VAN
buren, or Mr.. TYLER trust each other, and not Mr..
Polk and he They could keep down their quar-
rels in time of peace, when public duty less de-
manded concord: why it not now be done in
time of war? There must surely be great fault
then, somewhere or other.
But for the effect, we should certainly say that
the cause Of quarrel serious one. And, in
deed, the effect itself is singular for, while it APP
pears to have disqualified General ScoTT for COM
manding the main body of the Army in person, il
does not dsqualify him from directing and dispo-
sing here-as he is well known to be now doing,
for not only the main movement but every subordi-
nate one-all those military arrangements and COM
binaons which are essential to success, and which
only complete knowledge of the art of war and
all It's manifold parts of action can supply. Since
them the trust which Gen. ScoTT is perfectly well
known to be laboriously dscharging is one that i'm
plies still higher confidence and greater skill
than the lead Of single corps in the field against
an enemy not considered too little con-
sidered-able brave; and since it is thus plain
that the highest confidence is still reposed in him
as to every thing but that which gives the opporu-
nifty for gathering the immediate laurels in a field
where the crop is supposed easy and abundant one
must surely be puzzled to imagine why he is not
sent to the Rio Grande, if it ever was deliberately
designed that he should go, if it ever meant
that he should have the option to go if he liked.
For our part we do not see that, in such case,
the Uishes OF an officer are to be consulted. Some
have been sent whom private circumstances made
DESTROYS of staying at home and others equally
competent and exceedingly anxious for the service
have not been permitted to go. Nor is it supposed
that, in the field the former sort will do their
duty less bravely or zealously than would the lat
ter. Could the contrary be expected, then the Adj
minstration should have consulted the real wishes
of every soldier. But, in truth, putting apart that
instinct of patriotism which is sure to awake in
presence Of the public enemy, the love of glory is
always motive enough to him the thought of whose
life il has been to seek that at the lannon's mouth
and, when the whole land looked TO our troops as
sure of marching from victory TO victory, General
ScoTT, whose confidence in the superior valor and
discipline of our army was at least as high as any
bodys, cannot by possibility have preferred to the
brilliant position of its immediate commander the
more laborious and comparatively ingorious one of
designing campaigns, adjusting supplies, receiving
reports, and doing here in his Office, in Short just
what Secretary Of War should be able to do.
But, BESIDES all Gen. ScoTTs letters, and particu-
larly the two of the 25th Of May and the final one
of the 9th, convey his wish to go, and only signify
]. That, believing Gen. TAYLOR will surmount
every pending danger, he is unwilling to go merely
to supersede him, when his own presence here is
much more important.
2. That, as military man, he k,aoUs that the
larger operations which he has been orally in
formed that he is TO lead, cannot possibly begin
until the lst Of September, and will be delayed i'll
he does not remain here until every thing has been
duly organized.
3. That meantime there are party cabals on foot
here which threaten to deter the President from
sending him, or seriously to embarrass him in the
held; and that he fears the Secretary is lending
himself to those cabals.
:. That provision, looking as il contrived for
the express purpose of turning him out of the
service, has been specially and secretly introduced
at the instance Of the Secretary in hill % al he