Burlington hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa) 1845-185?, 1846-09-10

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my invitation. His defeat, as have be
fore stated, would have required six time
probably ten times the number of me-
and more than ten times the quan,il,
and amount of munitions Of War to ena
BILE us to re establish or strength ant
moral power to hold the Mexicans il
check, than can now be needed. Will
therefore such disaster is probable, a
it was, then believed, and de still be
lieve, it better to have fve or ten Regi
ments too many, than to have singh
man short of the safe and reliable numbe
necessary to ensure victory III the frs
great conflict. The first battle in Wa
between the most civilized nations sci
dom fails to result in a panic on the par
Of the vanquished army. and great in
crease of The moral prowess on the par
of the victor.
The capture or defeat of Gen. Taylor.
army would probably have given the
present government of Mexico degree
of military distinction. as to have called
to the frontier hundred, if not hundred.
of thousands, of the finest horsemen anc
swordsmen of the Republic. If reason
correctly in these views, | was RICH. in
anticipating, and in desiring the high
public funclionaries of the Western States
TO anticipate, large call Cor volunteers
Had neglected to do so, and waited two
weeks to obtain orders from the War
Department, and General Taylor's army
had been in the mean time defeated,
should have been denounced as any thing
but an efficient officer.
In my letter of the Gath Of September,
1915. to the Department of War, after
pointing out, with all possible respect,
the strange efforts employed 10 repudiate
my authority, by disconnecting General
Faylor's brigade from my division, with
out my knowledge. by giving him conf
dental instructions, without apprizing
me thereof, | concluded in the words
which follow:
at is now apparent that all the once
scattered sections of Gen. Taylor. army
of Occupation have been happily concen.
trated without any such disaster, as |
| with thousands of other men of some
experienced had reason to anticipate might
| occur between the 18th and goth Of Au-
gust. heartily rejoice at this result. -
1t may be the means Of saving the United
States and Mexico from war-a war
which has to me too much the appearance
of family dislurbance-G civil war-
(the most frighiful of all the trials of ar
to the honest yotaries Of free government
Ito be averted, if possible, by every
rational precaution."
My conduct, however, is not to be
Judged by what has happened subsequent
TO the embarkalon of the Louisiana vol
unieers, but by the actual state of things
as represented to me a, the point of time
when | made the call, and which prompt.
ed me TO make ii; acting as every iudicious
officer is bound to act. upon the sound
principle that the ecork Of preparation
for aCar ought never TO be put off until
the york Of destruction upon our frontier
by sarage or half savage foe has been
begun or completed.
feel now most sensibly every senti
ment then uttered. claim the equity
and the right of being judged, not by the
result of Gen. Taylor's measures or
movements. His army was in grea. peril
He had been left las have in another
place stately with neither adequate means
nor men to sustain the National Honor;
opposed to an army near four times his
numbers, and cut off from his military
stores. The country was uncertain
whether he could escape destruction. By
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his own indomitable courage, the gallant.
ry of his officers and men, and the Provi
dence Of Almighty God he extricated
himself from the difficulty cm de sac
in which he was placed. At the ap-
preach Of this crisis he had requested me
TO send troops to him with all possible
despatch. AS commander of the Western
Division Of the United States, | immedi-
ately resored to the only possible me ans
known TO me of meeting his wishes, and
l should have deemed myself recreant to
my trust, and meritng dismissal from the
service, if | had folded my arms and
postponed action on the subject for two
weeks, until orders could have been re-
ceived from Washington.
have taken leave to remind the De-
partment of War Of the well known fac,
that the very same intelligence upon
which acted during the month Of May,
1916, prompted the Department to ask
and obtain Bill authorizing a levy OF
fifty thousand Volunteers, and appropria
ting ten millions of dollars (slO, 900, 900
TO meet the same exigency.
AS the War Department seemed to b,
of opinion, by the letter Of the 2Slh Of
May, that there is no discretionary power
lodged in an officer situated as was,
took leave TO ask for information, if &
}servile instruction should occur; if al
Eruption should be made by large tribes
Of Indians; if "a swarm of war steamer.
with Paixhan guns, were seen lowering
about our sea coast near me; or if Gen
eral, at the head of great part Of the
army of the Uniied States upon the from
tier of neighboring State near me shall
ask assistance, would it be my duty to
refuse all aid until | should have received
orders from the City of Washington?
humbly conceived that tine latter case hac
existed within the month Of MAY. If
erred in deeming General Taylor and hi.
army in situation SO hazardous as Il
demand immediate succor, | could no