The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-03-19
THE "NoTICE" BEFORE THE SENATE

THE "NoTICE" BEFORE THE SENATE.
We believe that all the friends of Mr. Colqutt's
form of "notice," which urges a compromise, pro-
fess to support it the ground that it will tend to
bring about a peaceful adjustment Of the question
We think the effect Of its compromise clause will
be Just the reverse. From 1918 to l845, our gov.
eminent, in every branch of it, said compromise, -
Compromise " cur title is good, but still by all
means let us compromise ~ The Executive said
this continually in terms, and by repeated offers.
Congress said the same thing in refusing to extend
our jurisdiction over Oregon. And what did we
get by that course' Just this the offer Of The Co
itn,bia riper as a boundary. That-eraetly thai
was the result Of unanimous and persevering
action in the spirit of Mr.. Colquitt's resolution,
By making compromise the only watchword and
motto of all our negotiation for so long time, we
tested fully the resources of that policy, and, by
universal admission, have found it, as yet, fruit
less of all good result to the settlement of the ques.
uon. No one denies this. We acted on the avowed
idea of compromise, thus sedulousy pressed for
ward on our part most earnestly for thirty years,
be Judged by its fruits, then to u.s. in this matter,
there is not in the whole forest of diplomacy one
tree so utterly barren as this same old, BARE eafess
trunk of Compromise" If there be one word
TO conjure with in the whole mystic volume
of diplomacy, all the magic Of which re have
tried, over and over again, and all to no
good purpose 1rhaisoepsr--that word is compromise
IF ,fnr ot
wait till it be spoken by opponents, rather than
again thrust it forward ourselves. Yet some Of
our friends in the Senate wish to try it again
and to try it, Gas shall see,) in the face of all
this experience, under nsp and most manifest disad-
pantagss.
For in the first place, it is clear enough that the
adoption of this second section of the resolution by
the Senate, will bring the Senate and the House into
collision. No one can doubt that. Mr. Dargin, of
Alabama, proposed compromise notice in the House,
and the House threw it out by decided vote. We
have seen no particle of proof of probability that
any compromise notice, like Mr., Colquitt's would
have any better fate in the House at present Now in
controversy with foreign power, as in this ques-
ton ,naninitu between the two houses will be admit
ted, we presume to be great advantage, and COLI
sion between the two houses to be great evil. And
if the avowed wish Of both houses to compromise
could do absolutely nothing when tried for thirty
years, how much, we ask, can the expressed wish
of one house to compromise do now1
Again: if the message is to be regarded as an au-
thentic exposition Of The views of the Executive,
then the adoption OF Mr.. Colqutt's resolution will
bring the Senate into direct collision with the Ex-
ecutive on this point in the question of notice, as
measure Of negotiation. Some say this is the fault
Of the message. Others, more numerous, say this
is its wisdom and its force. au say this is the fact
set forth in the message. does moi ayow the idea
Of compromise, to be urged by us, as a weapon
of negotiation. Now, be it remembered, the SEN
ate and the Executive are the two branches
Of the treaty-making power. And in view Of this
fact, we ask, can any man fail to see the mighty
evil ofgoing into negotiation with foreign ma
lion, with the two branches Of the treaty-making
power in collision with each other, and acting in
different policy and on opposed IDEAS as TO the man
nsr in (which the negotiation is to be carried oni
Shall we do ourselves any justice, IL we 20 into
gotiation, while the initiating branch Of the treaty.