Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1841-1853, 1846-04-02

| ground mat lDSted0 OF OelOg Tue VI ccuti"6 wv
perpetusting our rights in the territory, they have bad tn
very reverse effect, to weaken. instead Of Strengthening
our title TO the territory. My opinion, / must say, - pre-
cisely the opposite. IL would. indeed, have been desirable
aIleI Of latitude but that, as is well known. vas imPossi
bic at the time. The offer, in fact, was made on our side
hut rejected on The part of Great Britain. The rejection
left no other alternative but an appeal to arms, or a surren
der Of our rights 10 the territory, or to enter into thu
convention. To do nothing would have Deen TO &C
quiesce in the claims Of Great Britain, whose subjects
were then in actual possession. Her possession being sd
verse to ours, would have been gradually maturing
through the long intervening period, into too perfect a
title 10 be opposed by ours. To avoid that, we were com
PEELED to resort to force, or enter into a convention TO pre-
serve our rights. We wisely preferred the latter, and the
conventions Of 1918 and 1927 were The consequence Of
that preference. They were entered into for the twO-fold
objects, as substitutes for war, and the means Of preserv-
ing our rights to the territory, as they then stood, unim-
paired. To appreciate the wisdom of the policy, il must
be borne in mind, that al that time OUT means Of asserting
our rights TO the territory or Of acquiring possession were
exceedingly limited, compared with those OF Great Britain,
bot that they were steadily aid rapidly increasing. Those
who had the management of affairs at that period wisely
relied upon time and the rapid spread of population IN q
western direction, as the means ultimately OF acquiring
possession Of the territory. and entered into the conven-
ton with a view Of preserving our rights unimPaired until
they could operate with iull effect.
1t is but too common OF late to condemn the acts Of our
predecessors, and TO pronounce them unjust, unwise, or
uupatriotic, from not adverting TO the circumstances under
which they acted. Thus to judge. is to do great injustice
TO the wise and patriotic men who preceded US. In this
case, it is to condemn such men as Monroe, Rush, Clay,
ana Gallatin-all of whom have had an agency in direct
ing or conducting the negotiations which terminated in
the adoption of these conventions IL would be hard TO
pronounce men like them to have been unwise or un-
patriotic in Whist they did, or 10 have been so because Pre-
sident Jackson, and others after him, scquiesced for many
years under the operation OF the convention Of 1927,
when they could have terminated il at any time by giving
a years notice. / have not named the most prominent
IL. L =. -. a.. l.
cause his course on this occasion has, in my opinion, can
celled any previous credit in that connexion to which he
would have been otherwise entitled.
Such was the state Of things at the commencement of
the session, when the President recommended notice TO be
given 10 terminate the Joint occupancy and such the po-
sition and ground assumed by the several portions of the
Senate in reference 10 the notice. Since then. as has been
stated. there has been q great change, which has materially
affected the question of notice, and the position taken by
the different portions OF the body in reference 10 II, as /
shall next explain.
Public opinion has had time to develope itself, not only
on this, hut on the other side Of The Atlantic and that
opinion has pronounced most audibly and clearly in favor
of compromise. The development has been going on net
only in the community, but also in this body; and / now
feel that I hazard nothing in saying, that a large majority
Of the Senate is in favor Of terminating the controversy by
negotiation, and an honorable compromise. And what is
very material. the opinion of the British government on
the subject Of compromise has been more clearly end spe-
officially developed than when the message was transmit
ted to Congress so much 50 that there is ground to hope
that it is prepared to adjust the difference in reference to
the territory substantially on the basis which was offered
by the President. 1t seems 10 me impossible that any 9TH
er construction can be given 10 what Sir Robert Peel said
in reply to the question put to hin by Lord John Russell
His declaration was made under circumstances calculated
to give it great weight. The object of making it was
clearly not to censure The able and very faithful representative
of Great Britain in this country, but to use the occasion
to give assurance that he is ready to make o compromise
substantially on the basis of the rejected offer. l trust
sincerely that such is the Interpretation which our govern
ment has put upon it and that, regarding it as a direct
towards compromise il has met 1t with a step on our
part, by suitable instructions to our minister in that coun-
try. II is TO be hoped that a communication has already
been transmitted to that effect, which may have the efecl.
of removing what would seem 10 be the only material
difficulty in the way of an adjustment; that is, which
shall make the first step towards resuming the negotiation.
As things now stand, | no longer consider it as a cues
ton, whether the controversy shall be p~achicaIly arranged
or not, nor even in what manner il shall be arranged. ]
regard the arrangement now simply a question OF time,
and | do trust that, in concluding IL, there will be no unne-
ressary delay. The business of both countries, and of
commerce generally, requires that it should be concluded
as promptly as possible. There is still another and a
reason why it should be speedily settled. The
question is one of a momentous and delicate character, and
ike all such, should be settled in order TO avoid adverse
contingencies with the least practicable delay. A further
Inducement for despatch 10 settling the Oregon question
is. upon it depends the settlement Of the question with
Until the former is settled, there is but slender
prospect that The latter can be for so long as the Oregon
question is left open, Mexico will calculate the chances
Of a rupture between us and Great Britain, in the event of
which she would be prepared to make common cause
against US. But when an end is put to any such hope,
she will speedily settle her difference with US. 1 trust that
when We o to settle ii, we will deal generously with
her, and that we will prove ourselves too just and magnan-
nous to take advantage of her feeble condition.
1t is this great change in favor Of the prospect Of set
the controversy in reference to Oregon h~onorably,
by negotiation and compromise, which has occurred since
be commencement of the session, that has made the
Hr II r Il 1870 6 49,.
On The question of peace and war. What then was appar-
entity almost hopeless, may he now regarded as highly
unless there should be some grea. mismanage-
rent but just as compromise is more hopeless, notice
more important in Its bearings on the relations oil
and war and on the other hand, just as the chances
Of compromise are increased, notice becomes less i'm
portant and hence its importance at the commencement
IF the session, and its comparatively little importance
now.
! shall next proceed to enquire what bearing the increased
prospect Of compromise has on the position Of the Execu-
and that of the several portions of this body, in re-
to notice, and the Oregon question generally. That
il is calculated to effect materially the position of the Ex-
ecuiivc, must be apparent. That he should recommend
giving notice to terminate the convention of joint occupan-
cy Of the territory, with a view of asserting our exclusive
to the whole, according TO his view Of our title,
there was little or no hope of compromise, is not at
all inconsistent with his being prepared TO adjust the differ
by compromise, substantially on the ground offered
by himself, now when there is a reasonable prospect il may
effected. Measures Of policy are necessarily controlled
by circumstances, and consequently what may be wise and
e~xpedieni under certain circumstances. might be eminent
y unwise and impolitic under different circumstances.
To persist in acting the same way under circumstances es-
sentially different, would be folly and obstinacy, and not
consistency. True consistency, that of the prudent and
lhe wise. is TO act in conformity with circumstances, and not
to act always the same under a change Of circumstances.
There is a prevalent error on This point. Many think that the
essence of consistency is to act always the same way
-adhenng to the same party, or 10 The same measures oil
policy, without regard to change of circumstances. Their
consistency is like that of a physician, who, in the treat
ment of highly ~infammatory fever, would administer emet-