The New era. [volume] ([Portsmouth, Va.]) 1845-1847, 1846-03-24

II
| influence of which, it was hoped that negotiation
might be renewed, and the difference honorably
compromised Or, in case that should fail thnos
might remain as they have been without resort
TO force In that case, the territory would be left
open to emigration, and the question, TO whom it
should ultimately belong would be decided by
settlement and colonization, unless Great Britain
shonid give notice on her part, in order TO pre-
vent 1t: If she should we would at least gain
! the advantage of transferring the responsibility
from US TO her, should war ensue
Another portion of the Senate appeared 10 be
| IN favor both OF compromise and notice. Their
views were not explicitly expressed but, as far
as they were developed, they, too, seemed to
think that our title was not so perfect as TO ex-
cude an honorable compromise; and appeared to
anticipate 1t in opposition TO the message in 70
commencing it on the three following grounds
First. on the ground of the general declaration of
the President IN the latter part of the message,
that ne hoped an amicable arrangement may be
made OF the question in dispute, in connection
with declaration of Mr.. Buchanan to the same
effect In one of his letters TO Mr.. Pakenham
1t Is impossible for me, with every disposition TO
support the recommendation of the President in
favor OF notice, TO concur in the opinion that a
mere general expression of the kind, and insisted
on in another portion of the message, even when
backed by similar declaration of the Secretary
opinion clearly and explicitly expressed by the
message in recommending notice, that no com
promise which ought TO be accepted could be eff
fected. | cannot admit of such constructions
not only because think it unreasonable but be-
cause | regard the duty of the President, imposed
by the. constitution, to recommend measures to
Congress as one of solemn and important char
acter, and that it ought TO be performed with the
utmost candor and sincerity. Being addressed to
Il e
ought TO express, plainly and explicitly, his rea-
sons and motives for recommending the measure.
emitting none which he regards as material. and
inserting none but such he believes ought to
have an influence upon the deliberations of Con
gress 1t ought to be free from the suspicion of
being diplomatic. To admit the contrary. would
destroy ali confidence between the legislative and
executive departments TO the great detriment of
the government With these impressions, it
would be TO dlsParage The character of the Presi-
dent for me TO concur in the construction.
The next ground taken by the portion of the
Senate referred TO is, that notice is recommended
to be given by the message, not with The view of
giving power to the President to assert our rights
to the whole territory, but as a moral weapon to
enforce compromise.
To this construction have the same difficulty
in asserting as 10 the preceding There is no.
thing in the language Of the recommendation to
authorize It, On the contrary, every word it
contains looks expressly, as has been stated. 10
the enforcement of our rights to the territory on
the expiration of the notice. To give contrary
Interpretation would be to give diplomatic char
acter to the message, and be subject to all the OBJ
Jectlons which have been just suggested But
admitting that it was intended, as alleged as a
moral weapon to effect compromise would ask
how could that be effected, but by using it as the
means to lntmidate Great Britain-to intimidate
by telling her, that she must quit The territory
within The year, or be expelled at its expiration
by force. And what would that be, but an ap-
peal 10 her fear with the hope of extorting con-
cessions which her reason had refused to Weld
Snch an appeal in case of feeble nation would
be hazardous butiwith one as great and power
iul as England, instead Of weapon to enforce
compromise, it would be one calculated to de-
feat It.
The remaining reason for voting notice on the
part of the Senators referred to, is Of very differ
ent character. 1t objects TO the convention itself
and condemns the policy of entering into either
that OF 1918 or 1927, on the ground that instead
OF being the means Of securing and perpetua,inc
our rights in the territory, they had the very re-
verse effect, to weaken, instead of Strengthening
our title to the territory. My opinion, | must
say, is precisely the opposite. 1t would, indeed.
have been desirable TO have settled it then bv
compromise on the 10Th parallel of latitude:
but that as is we'll known, was impossible at the
time. The offer, in fact was made on oHr side.
but rejected on the part Of Great Britain. The
rejection left no other alternative but an appeal to
arms or surrender of our rights to the territory.
or to enter into the convention. To do nothing
would kaye been to acgulesce in the claims Of
Great Britain. whose subjects were then in actual
possession Her possession being adverse to ours,
would have been gradually maturing, through ths
long intervening period, into too perfect title 70
be opposed by ours 10 avoid that. we were
compelled to resort to force, or enter into CON
ventlOn to preserve our rights. We wisely
preferred the latter, and the conventions of 1918
and 1927 were the consequence Of that preference.
They were entered into for the two. fold objects
as substitutes for war and the means Of preserving
our rights 10 tho territory, as they then stood,
unmpaired. To appreciate the wisdom of the
policy, II must be borne in mind that at that time
our means Of asserting our rights Of the territery
or of acquiring possession were exceedingly Imi.
ted, compared to those of Great Britain, but that
they were steadily and rapidly increasing Those
who had the management OF affairs al that period
wisely relied upon time and the rapid spread Of
population in a western direction, as the means
ultimately of acquiring possession Of tho territory
and entered into the convention with view If
preserving our rights unimpaired until thev couId
operate with full effect
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