Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1846-03-26
TWENTY-NINTH CONGRESS-.
M- CoILoun ON fhe Oregon question.


rose and gave his views on the Oregon question
He said the question was, whether the Notice be
given aud to that question he should limit ms re-
marks lie should refrain from any remarks on
the title as he was connected with the negotiation
There was one point in which all agreed-thai
great change Of opinion bad taken place since the
commencement; Of this session, as TO the Importance
Of giving the Notice. Then it was regarded as
question of peace or Of war Now, II was mat
ter of little importance whether il passed or not
The reasons given by the Message for the Notice,
no longer applied to the case.
The strong voice Of public opinion, on both
sides Of the Atlantic, had called for compromise.-
This Senate, he hazarded nothing in saying was in
favor of compromise. No one could read the declar-
atoms Of Sir Robert Peel without conviction that
the British government was prepared to accept or
act upon proposition substantially the same as that
which we had affirmed.
That ntmation ought to be met by our govern
ment He hoped it had already been met On
that point he had no information He relied, how
ever upon the opinion that the necessary steps had
been taken on that subject The only difficulty be-
ing removed, the matter would be Immediately com
promised Ii was only question Of time; and, in
that view, not moment ought to be lost IN termi-
mating the difficulty and all its injurious consequent
ces. Great Britain was now ready 10 meet US sub
stantialIy on our own ground He believed that
this was So The position Of the Presiden, was now
essentially changed on this subject II he adhered
to his former position, he would not envy him the
result. The statesman must accommodate himself
TO circumstances.
But the position Of this body was changed. Even
his friends who for the whole Of Oregon, must
feel that their position was changed and he would
not be surprised if they should vote against their
own layoriie measure. He believed, too, that those
friends as he would call them, had now come to
the oninion that onF fitle IN all of 0re0on
so clear as they first conscentiously thought; and
he appealed to them whether now, with divided
country, and divided party they were prepared to
press the extreme claims Of the United States.
His own position aud that Of his friends was
much changed much so, that he deemed the
passage Of the Notice Of little importance, and might
perhaps vote for 1t himself.
lie was persuaded that Great Britain would not
act definitely, until Congress had acted and, in
this point Of view, il might be well to pass the No
tee, in order to hasten the settlement Of the ques-
ton.
lie could not. however, vote for absolute
Notice, nor for the House Resolutions He
thought the latter equvoca II we wished the
question TO be settled by compromise let us say So
unequvocally. If he voted for any proposition, ii
would be one that declared that the question should
be settled by compromise. He looked to the effect
Of the measure on the great question Of peace and
to be most likely to produce pacific arrangement
In 1872 MIR &. saw this question coming. He
saw there were two alternatives before US One
was, to adhere to the Convention OF s27, for the
period was at hand when its benefits would enure
TO us Our population increasing, and South
ern pass was opened 10 our emigrants Our power
OF colonization rendered ii certain that we should
secure the country. II twenty thousand miles
from q. BritaIn-the most remote of any part Of
the hahfable etfof.a hor &. -
aud was nearer to her lie therefore wished to &C.
euPy the country quietly The only objection was,
that Great Britain might give the Notice but this
he did no, apprehend for it very clear to him
that Great Britain did not propose to make perma-
nent settlement in this country.
If any thing would ever ALLEVIATE that portion of
the country from US. il would be high duties Our
people want there to enjoy free trade. Therefore,
he had wished that our people there should be left
for while, TO themselves.
Bill came up TO extend our laws over Ore
gon. TO this he had great objections 1t would
soon bring US to point at which we must settle
the title 10 the country, by negotiation or war.
He had long deemed il desirable and proper that
the country should be divided by 40 He did not
wish 10 hasten the issue in lS43 From that time
TO this, these measures for the Notice and for the
extension Of our laws over the territory, had been
repeatedly and continually pressed, until we were
brought 10 point where we must compromise or
tight. He was not accountable, therefore for the
issue now made. He had desired TO prevent it,
lie had an aversion 10 war, as positive evil he
was Tor peace, as positive good. He was opposed
TO war when not required by national honor and
interests There were great and powerful reasons
Tor not gong TO war when the object could no; be
ehcied by 1t. If we went to war for the whole of
oregon or none, we should come of with none
1t would cease to be an Oregon war. 1t would
be struggle for empire Every effort that the
highest courage, and unbounded resources would
permit would be exerted The safety of our peo-
pie IN Oregon would not be promoted by war All
their interests would be destroyed by il.
But, if we should be able to dictate peace. at
the END oil ten years war, our own terms he de-
med that II would be polite. The blows would be
tremendous on both sdes-ihe devastation spread
Tar and wlde-industry completely paralyzed II
would be not only British war, dut an Indian
war, and Mexican war We should have 10 raise
seven armies and two navies,oue of the latter for
the Lakes We should have war around the whole
circuit OF the country. The Mexican troops would
De an eihcient force, when Differed and paid nv
ureat Britain. The military force required would
be at least 300 600 men, Mr. Gallatin estimated
the cost OF war at sixty-6ye millions a wear. He
was under the mark ten years war would leave
US 'oO millions in debt and, with deprecated
currency We could not borrow money in En-
rope, except at runous rates for this matter had
oeeh so unfortunately managed, that all Enrope
was against US. The line between the Federal
ana stale Governments would be lost The power
OF the States would be oblilerated We should
nave three or four victorious generals TO provide for
and each at the head of an army wonld s,rnnla r. ,