The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-07-13

which is anything but honorable to them even io
| revenue purposes 90 on 10 say, that the first oh
lection TO them is that they Increase the expense and
add greatly 10 the difficulty Of collecting the reye
| nue.. | ann told that very large number Of IN,
clerks-as many as one hundred-employed 10 The
i New York custom-house, may be, | do not Sav
/ will be- but may be dispensed with IL you get III
ad vaorem system established. Get rid Of this sy,
TEN of specific duties and you dispense with
the army of weghers, measures, guagers, and
clerks You can also in that dispense with /,
i large number Of clerks in the Treasury Department
a large portion Of whom being devoted TO the labo,
resulting from these specific duties. You also -,
| rid of those most vexatlous questions which come
up before our comptrollers, occupying their time al
exclusively TO the great detrimeDt Of other bust
ness. That is fact well known. The most diff.
cult questions which come up before courts Of
Justice connected with the cusom-house business
originate in this system of specific duties The
contested arising from specific duties are ten
TO one arising from al valorem duties. There IA
also constant danger under the specific uuty-sys,em
Of the ofice-making mistake either in measuring
/ weighing, or guaging. The probability Of eolo
sion and fraud under this system Ia as ten 10 one
under the ad vaorem system. Articles on which
ad valorem duties imposed, in going through
the custom house, pass under the Surveillance of
the collector, naval officer, appraisers, and as.
sistant appraisers, clerks and examiners. A
constant succession of checks against fraud is thu,
established. Under the specific duty system the
case is altogether different, the article passing
through the hands Of but one officer who after ths
process Of weighing, measuring, or guaging passes
i the article TO the hands OF the importer, without be-
4 ing subjected 10 the sautary check which the shs.
system ipterposes against COLLISION and fraud In.
der such system need not say singh officer may
| defrsud the government TO an immense amount with
impunty. do not say that such species Of fraud
is common. but maintain that the probabilities Of
the occurrence Of fraud under the present system
| are infinitely stronger than IL would be under the
system which this bill seeks 10 establish; mas.
much in the one case the article passes
through the hands Of a single officer; in the Other
case through the hands Of several Let me dwell
on this a moment longer. We will suppose an on.
Ger weighing any amount Of silk--how easy for him
to trip the beam, or fraudulently TO state wrong re-
suit. IL he makes a mistake in weighing, who Is TO
detect IN II absurd enough TO make Il in measuring
| he may be detected but in that case he easily
escape under color Of an innocent Of ealcula
| ton. l thus fully sustained in the assertion
| that the chances OF fraud, COLLISION, and mistake
under the specific duty system arc numerous; under
the ad valorem system they cannot occur. But, SIR
il there mistakes, no frau ls committed by
public ofiicers-supposing all your officers to Be
models Of purity and fdelity-sIill maintain that Il
is infinitely difficult detect mistakes, raudu-
lent or otherwise, in measuring pece-gooda
under the specific duty system, than Il 10 to
detect fraud or error In valuations under
the ad valorem system. IL you wish TO
avoid frauds, instead Of abandoning the ad valorem
system, adhere more closely to Il. The probability
Of frauds under the and under the other system
is as ten TO one. Under the bill now before you,
you will have fewer frauds than have been per.
petrated under any other revenue law. You will
collect the duties with more certainty and at less
pense, with the smallest possible probability offraud,
and then II has the great merit its face Of carry
ing the rate ofduiy with il. But there is another
| objection. Il is grounded on the assumption that
the value of the goods will diminish in consequence
lnf INN pvcd Of hat
been the result of experience. A specific duty
may be imposed with the view of making il one
halt the value Of the article, and yet, by gradual
fall IN the price the duty may come to amount to
the full value Of the article. Thus duty Of fifty per
cent may become cent per cent, and thus, under
system Of specific duties, you gust ever be doing
that Of which some gentlemen entertain such rei-
glous horror-you must be constantly unkerins
with the tariff; you must aave continual recourseto
leg islaon, in order to relieve yourselves from the
fluctuations in the price of articles subjected spe-
cihc duties. Another objection is that specific du.
ties make no distinction between coarse and fine
goods large proportion Of the people are com
PEELED to purchase coarse articles account Of their
cheapness. To discriminate against coarse goods,
is, therefore, to discriminate against poveryagana
the masses-aganst the people; to benefit few a, the
expense Of the many. lfever there were unus,
system of laying duties than that against which am
now speaking, have yet to learn oft. do think
that all intelligent and impartial men must agree with
me that the tariff Of l842 is full of instances Of the
gross absurdity and gross injustice Of taxing art
ces nearly the same at very different rates without
any reason, except that generally the highest rates
are imposed en- the coarse articles. To show the
inequality of the specific duties, may mentions
fact recently communicated to me. l am told that
lady's shawl OF great value lately imported, paid
only about per cent, the specific duty being levied
on its weight and this fine and costly that
the duty amounted to but per cent. Such are the
inequalities Of specific duties. defy gentlemen to
show such injustice and inequality under the ad
lorem system. But if there were no other objection
than this to specific duties, that they conceal and
are intended to conceal, the amount Of duty it
sufficient to condemn them. For take it that these
duties never could have been levied il they had been
LEVIED in broad day, and IN plain English--if the
people Of the country had known how much they
paid. repeat, then, sir, the effect of the specific
duties is to conceal the amount of duty, and that
is their object Sir, consider that it is the very
essence oflberty under any system Of government,
that the people should know the amount Of their
taxation. heed not enlarge on that. There can
be no genuine freedom-there can be no practical
Iliberty-where every man does not know the extent
to which ne is taxed by his government.
But, Mr.. President, take il for granted that the
great objection which will be urged against this bill
VIII be that an adequate revenue will not be raised
i by It for the purposes of government. Such do.
hciency could result only in one case, and that is
the duties were laid SO high as to be prohibitory,
thus preventing importatons. take it for granted,
that If the duties are considerably reduced, so much
so as to lead to very large Importation we can
have upon an average twenty-one and half per
cent, which would give us twenty-eight millions Of
revenue. But gentlemen tell us that this will not
produce revenue enough. None of them, however,
have the hardhood say that will be because the
duties are prohibitory. Now | hold that the duties
are still too high. maintain that by farther re-
duction we could obtain more revenue. It is diff
cult to determine on what articles the increased re.
duction should be made, but have no doubt that
thirty per cent, or twenty-five per cent is too high
IN the aggregate for revenue duty, and that the
mass OF articles we would raise moro revenue at
twenty-five per cent than at thirty and still more
a. twenty pcr cent than at twenty-five per cent.
That is my opinion. Now, one set OF gentle
men will tell you in one breath, that by this
bill we never can raise a revenue, and 10 the
very next breath, speaking for the manu-
'acturers, they declare that we will be inundated
with mportations-Aooded with English goods
Well then, can only say we will also be inundated
In mn ,,,,a IL. ,I.,,o.