The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-08-15

TO the British monarchy in comparison with the
American republic. This shall proceed to show,
by contrasting the points and periods Of stability in
the councils of the two
And first, as TO the Executive power. Ia Eng
land that branch of the public authority is vested
nominally, IN the king, but really in the prime or
first minister of the crown appointed for life if 80
long he Is sustained an his policy by coincidence
Of opinion on the part Of the House Of Commons.
When, therefore, that House dlsagrees with him,
and not till then, he retlres, and change of mfnis
tiers and councils ensues. In our republic, the Ex-
ecutiye chief has four years assigned him by the
forms of the constitution, aud never than eight
by the practice of reelection. Taking, them the du-
ration Of the Executive power in the same hands,
the test OF stability in the councils Of the two
governments, and how stand the facts? They stand
thus From l754 TO 1885, period of eighty -oRe
years, England had no less than twenty-four prime
ministers. or these, nine held power each less
than single year; but FIVE Of them held il, each,
over four years, and the aggregate time of the
eghty-one years, divided by the aggregate number
Of the twenty-four ministers, will prove that the
average time of each minister In power was but
three years, four months, and fourteen days.
Our government began in 1888, and from then TO
1874, period Of hfty-sx years, We had but nine
Presidents, and the aggregate OF the ffysx years,
divided by the aggregate Of the nine Presidents will
prove that the average time of each President in
power was six years, two months, and seventeen
days.
From the union of Ireland with England, in 1901
down to 1895, period of thirty-hve years, Eng
land had fourteen prime ministers, and we, in the
same period, but five Presidents her fourteen min
listers having thus enjoyed an average Of two years
and six months in power and our five Presidents
an average Of seven years exactly.
And now, 10 the popular elective branches Of
the legislative power in the two governments. How
stand they 10 the contrast on the point Of stability
These admit of less accuracy Of comparison, Def
cause, in both countries, in England the House o.
Commons, with us, the House Of Representatives,
are elected for fixed period, and being muttu-
dinous assemblies, are affected by re-eecIIons only
partially and in the persons their individual mem
ben. The House Of Commons is elected for seven
years-our House Of Representatives for two years,
yet circumstance makes II practicable TO test the
stability Of the former. Ii Is this: though elected for
seven years the House Of Commons is at all times
subject be dissolved by the crown, at the will OF
the prime minister, whenever IN his judgment the
change Of public opinion since the election
of the last House, has made that House no
longer the exponent of such opinion. At each dis
solution new election is ordered, that the new
House, thus elected, nlso for seven years, may
press the true sentiments Of the people, but be Itself
dissolved, as soon as i shall cease to do SO, by
new change in the public opinion. Are then these
Houses of Commons ever thus dissolved And If
so, how often have such dissoutons occurred under
the boosted steady and stable system Of the British
monarchy
Here are the facts. From the first imperial Par
lament in 1901, to l54l period Of forty years,
there have been no less than thirteen Houses OF
Commons elected, each for the term Of seven years,
and less than thirteen dssolutions ofthose houses
within that period. That is to say not one OF
the thirteen subssted through the years. term
for which 1t elected but on the contrary, every
of the thirteen were dissolved before Its
pired. And If the aggregate of the forty years be
divided by the aggregate of the thirteen houses,
will be seen that the average duration of each
House, though elected for seven years was in fact
but three years and one month, whilst no less than
six ont Of the thirteen houses dissolved with
in two years after the date Of their election, and
two out Of the thirteen within six months from such
date.
= Here sir, are the stern facts-aDd the only de-
scripton of facts by which the stability or fuctua-
ton of a nations councils can be determined Here
the evidences of that sodty and steadness with
which, we told, the British empire rests upon its
foundations. Here the evidences of that continuous
regularity Of political action which are asked to
look to in proof the superiority Of such system
over our own. Yes, over our own, which so many
European writers admonish us to abandon, as
thing too much exposed TO the dangers of anarchy
from the sudden shocks ofthe popular will.
No, sir, l boldly affirm it, and can clearly prove
it, by the lieess evidence Of public records, that no
government in Europe has, since the date Of our
given few evidences of weakness IN
its foundations versatility in its counsels, ours
Or as many such evidences that of G. Britain. And
what is the cause of such weakness and versatility
Internal discontent-that feverish restiveness excl
ted in the English people by those cravings of hun
ger, which drive them to seek relief in the change of
public councils-a relief, however not to be found
save in that change, which shall restore the lost
equilibrium Of society, by reapportionment of the
elements Of life among the masses,
Sir, have drawn this contrast of the internal con-
dltion Of the two countries to show the contentmes
under our systemic show that its strength is to be
found in that contentment-to show the discomfort
under the system of England-to show that in such
discomfort consists her weakness. have done this
in eounteraction of the efforts SO laborousy made,
to depress the feeling ofmy country, to inculcate up
on her sense Of subordinaton to England, and to
extor from her people humiating concession by the
terror of Englands imaginary power. have done
this, to show that terror to be groundless-to show
strength to be sufficient to defy her-and, with
the like view, shall proceed yet farther, with this
contrast. ~"
have said SIR that the social condition Of the
peope--nternal contentnen-was the basis of
nations strength, and the strength of its govern
ment; and in trying the two countries by this test,
have but to ask what is now the great the all dis
turbing question in Englandi 1t is that awful, that
last question which precedes civil butchery and
revolution,-it is, "What can the government do
to save the people from starvation " IL is the ques
ton Of bread, death. II has been asked. 1t can
not be answered, Schemes have been devised
They have failed. Others tried, and others failed
The question recurs again and again, as often
Parliament convenes 1t occupies every session. 1t
is the standing question Of debate. And the empire
is convulsed by elections, which are made to turn
upon the number OF crumbs government afford
TO throw 10 a starving people, and upon the number
Of bayonets necessary TO repress those cravings Of
hunger 1t has not the food TO appease. Between
standing armies and standing famine the naked and
breadless masses ravng with despair hourly threat
en- 10 dash against the constitution itself, and TO
bring all rights and all wrongs, all property and all
men, to the bloody arbitrament of social revolu-
ton. ...a.r H.
On the other hand how is il with us' What
American says, 81 have no bread ?" What single
man of them threatens his government with revolu-
tom Who among them all, lifts his hand to resis,
the execution of the law What is the question
which we yearly in this chamber discuss' Is il the
question, "How shall we save the people from fam
new No, SIR, no. Ours is the question, "How
shtl we render fellow-citizens already comfort
able and happy, still richer and yet more happy !"
This is question. The same instincts which
prompt men TO desire competency, prompt them,
also TO desire surplus; and IL s the best means OF