The Evansville journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1834-184?, 1846-12-31
GUERILLA WARFARE.

resistance, and nghtlng pltcned DatueS aito-
gelher wrong. They say with unwonted
frankness, that the Mexican troops, though |
not deficient in courage, lack the cool and
steady temper and well trained discipline of
the American, and that such encounters are
necessarily unequal and must in |
general bring loss and discontinue upon The |
Mexicans. According TO the authorifies
the only efficient and certain plan for rid
ding the country of the invaders, and COM
polling them by degrees TO fall back, and
evacuate the various posts they now occupy,
is for the Mexicans to adopt system oil
Guerilla warfare, and by means of constant
and harrassing assaults and light skirmishes;
hanging on the rear of the Americans, cut
ting off stragglers and annoying US at every
step of our progress, to defeat US in detail,
and render our sojourn in theirteuitory utter
ly mpractieable. To this system the closest
warriors of the Mexican press give their un-
qualified appreciation, and seem to conclude
that if put into early and thorough execution
il will work more miricIes than all the STRAIT
egg of a Napolean. @ Esd
Calculations of this kind on paper are IN
doubtedly easy. Leaving out of view all
the most important links in the chain Of rea-
soning, it is not very difficult to jump to a
satisfactory deduction. A part OF the prem
ises of the Mexican press is not likely to be
gainsaid. Few will question the inferiority
of their forces to the United States in con-
stancy. stearnness OF purpose, Indifference
to dagger. and habits of prompt obedience
in short in all those qualities which contribute
TO form the character of an experienced
soldier. Nor will any one be disposed to de-
ny that whenever Mexicans meet Americans
in the open field, these qualities will tell,
and will assuredly causes The defeat OF the
former. But it does not follow that because
Mexico cannot stand against US in regular
comb,,, she can accomplish the ruin of our
troops by system of Guerilla warfare. This
| is most violent and untenable conclusion
from exceedingly imperfect and unsalislacio-
ry data
| The first and most essential requisite for
the mode of warfare in question, is a self-sac-
Irificitg patriotism, and heroic spirit perva-
dinga whole people, mbrueing them with
the lercest haired of the foe, and animatng
then TO sustain description of life emin-
eniy fruitful in suffering and privaiion.
Such spirit actualed the people of Spain,
wien they rose almost as one man, and
ldogged the French like sleuble hounds hunt
ling them from point 10 point and making
every crag and covert in the kingdom rest
for the murderous escopeto. What evidence
have we that the MexicBns are actualed by
sentiments powerful enough to produce such
rsuIls2 Is it the difficulty experienced by
their leaders in raising armies? Is it the
reluctance with which the miserable and
ignorant leperos are torn from their squalid
dwellings and forced to take their place in
the ranks? Is it the strait to which the Re-
lpublic is reduced Tor want of money, wher
There are FIVE hundred men alone in that
lcsuniry who could furnish the means OF car
irving on the war, and not sleep the colder, o.
Hire the coarser for live may talk abou
{ TIE enthusiasm of Mexico as much as we
} phase, but there is nothing whatever &c
v ppve that this enthusiasm has reached the
: pt0ple--or has become so universal anC
y orerpowering as 10 prepare them for carrying
e on hostities in The mode indicated. Ant
s t. compare the mongrel nation termed Mex
8 loan intermixture OF Castilian with In
e dan and Negro blood-a hybrid product re
r Harkab!e for nothing but the vices of tn
y oiginal s!ock-to compare them with tn
: manly courage and indomiable constancy O
Cid Spain, is like comparing whelp do!
j. With Lion, because they both belong to III
; canine order.
e Bu' even assuming that the Mexican
3. culd be brought to The scratch that thel
3 bind and bigotted hostility to the American
r. vas INJURED by seIf-reliance, devotion an
IT patriotism sufficiently potent TO lnstigat,
?, item to Guerrilla war; the geographical as
= pct of the country would offer inseparabl
H. Obstacles. Mexico is ten times as large a
p, Spain, and has not more than half her popr
y hton. The Guerilla system would 5ecOm
lie mpracticabIe over such an immense space
ii most of which is sparsely inhabited. Spal
D il essentially mountainous country, abounc
l. ing in defles, difficult passes, and roads wer
of armies may lie in ambush. Mexico, thong
1T not wanting in mountains, possesses extrem
Sc Elains and deserts perfectly open, whel
as roops cannot conceal themselves, and wheI
'e he operations of predatory bands becom
at mposs ible. All these circumstances milita
r. strongly against the feasibility of such
,e scheme, and prove it to be the idle coinag
c. IF Mexican vanity inflated by the belief TIL
RS he people of that miscaled republic, ca
es emulate the vaIor and devotion that erewhi
10 threw lingering halo over the moulderr
II. glory oil CASTLE.
lie If however, every difficulty, whether exis
n ig in the character of the people or Il
at face of the country, were surmounted, an
Is. the Mexicans were TO try the experiment
of Ia Guerilla warfare, we really believe the
1g would be beaten at their own game. III
&c Texan Rangers, and most of the voluntee
in rom the western States are composed OF mt