Richmond daily Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1842-1861, 1846-06-24
THE OREGON ADJUSTMENT.

have been divided on this question. been so long
and so earnestly quarrelling The Wings and
the Conservative portion of the Administration
party, by whose cooperation the proposition Of
the British Government, 10 make the 49th de.
gree the boundary line between Great Britain
and the United States has been accepted have
been not only willing but anxious, from tho be-
ginning, to adjust the controversy upon that ba
sis. Did the President concur with them in that
desire Assurodly not: Ii he had done so, the
question would long since have been settled. Did
he not, on the contrary, take the EXTREMIST
ground, both before and after the rejection of his
compromise proposition by Mr.. Pakenham-a
proposition which was offered by HIM with the
certainty that il would be rejected And did
not his friends denounce those who were in favor
of the line OF 40 as British Wings" And yet,
now that terms OF adjustment, proposed by Great
Britain, identical in their main features with
those indicated by Mr.. Webster many months
ago as equitable, just and proper, and subsequent
Nv so demonstrated to be by the unanswerable ar.
gument of Mr.. Benton, have been promptly &C.
cepted by constitutional majority of the Senate,
and have been thus absolutely forced upon the
President, who, IA the very act of submitting
them to that body for consideration, declared that
they oUgh 10 BE- rejected, -notwithstandIng this,
we say the Presidents organ and its echoes
clait1 for that functionary all the honor Of the
deed, am exclaim, with uplifted hands and eyes,
as il IN the very ecs,Acy Of mingled wonder and
delight, Behold the fruits OF his wisdom and his
trmaessl =" And yet they tell US, too, in the very
same breath, I've quote from the Washington
Union,) chad not the Senate taken ia part The
a. negotiation ola Of has hands, we have no doubt
I" he would have obtained better terms from Great
" Britain even than those which are contained in
the treaiy'-thus, by implication, censuring
The Senate for asserting 10 treaty the formation
of which nevertheless they assert is creditable
10 the diplomatic skill and energy Of the Admin.
istrauon. In such a maze of contradictions are
the eulogists and courtiers of the Executive in.
volved by their rreconcileabe efforts to satisfy
both wings Of their pary-to crafty the advocates
of the treaty, by representing the pacific adjust.
ment of the controversy triumph Of the Pre-
sidents "new poicy;" while the Fifty four Forties
are TO be appeased by the assurance that if they
have not obtained all that they claimed it is sole.
ly because the Senate took The negotiation in part
Out Of the Presidents hands 1--WE should like to
know if the President did not ask their advice,)
and thereby deprived him Of the power of secu.
ring the recognition by Great Britain OF the clear
and unique stionable" title OF the United States 10
'rhe whole" of the territory in dispute
The President, too, in transmitting the British
proposition TO the Senate, took occasion to express
his hostility to the terms of compromise, and ad-
vised their rejection. How can he claim any
credit for the settlement of the question, then
Al II
ing arrangement would have been defeated, and
negotiation would have been "inevitaby' sue.
ceeded by war For, when il has been satisiac.
torilyascertained that the British Government,
IN submitting its last proposition, had gone to the
very limit of concession yielding to US more than
ii had ever exhibited disposition to relinquish
before, and that this ultimatum had been adopted
by bare ms Jority of the British Cabinet,
ii cannot be doubted that its rejection would have
been succeeded at once by declaration of war.
Upon what ground, then, does the Washington
Uaion base its extraordinary assumption that, but
for the interposition of the Senate-an interposi.
ton, however, be it remembered, not forced upon
the Executive, DIT expressly solicited by him, in
order to relieve himself from responsibility which
he was too tmd to uncomfortable President
would have obtained from Great Britain better
terms than those contained in the treaty. Ifhe |
could have done So why did he not, instead Of
Choking to the Senate" act upon his constitu.
tonal responsibility, by rejecting the British pro.
position, and by following it up with an ultima
fum Of his own, embracing those "better terms"
which we are now assured, had he been left to
pursue his own course las he would have been
&. oct ha hay
from the British Government If It was in his
power TO secure these 'beuer terms" and they |
have been lost by the action Of the Senate, he is |
none the less censurabe for that loss on account |
OF the interposition of that body because It's in |
deposition was the result Of his own solicitation,
Bnd could not have occurred had lac possessed
the nerve to act IN accordance with what he and
his organs now tell Us were his solemn and deli.
berate convictions Of public duty. The de.
tenoe thus set up for him by his friends is thus
converted into weapon Of assault, the force Of
which he cannot evade for surely it will not he
pretended that he "a b,ameless, ", from want Of
firmncss or auy other cause, he has enabled the
Senate 10 sacrifice the rights aud honor Of the
country, when he held in his own hands the au.
thority. and his friends assure he had the pow.
q
accordance with those rights and that honor
But there is not, in truth, a shadow Of fouuda.
ton Tor the assertion Of the Union, that the Pre-.
sdont, but for the intervention Of the Senate,
could have obtained "better terms" from Great
Buia,n-that IL TO say, by negotiation. So far
from II, all the information in possession Of
ihe country points emPhatically to the opposite
conclusion. II is obvious that, in the terms pro.
posed, and accepted, Great Britain had made her
las, and final offer lf, then, "bcttor terms" had
ever bees secured it must have been at the fearful
price Of long and bloody war, which in treasure
alone, 10 say nothing Of the waste Of human life
and the wreck Of human happiness, would have
been out Of all proportion 10 the importance Of
those "better TERMS" even though they had been
such as the most ardent Of the 50 40 men might
have dictated, ~ Gen. Jackson, almost with hi,
dying breath, advised. Eat the cannon's mouth. y
Hut who belicves that, IL a war had resulted from