The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-10-07

france by the rear or any appearance OF an enemy
On receiving report that nothing was 10 DC seen
for mile up and down, and that the field could not
be entered, moved on, deeming II importanlto
| communicate with the people at the house wlthlh
the field, and, if possible, gain some Information
from them, as my time was now very limited, ana
had not yet executed my orders IN full, Just az
this time was informed Of a horseman having APP
peared IN the road and retreated down path lead
ing back into the chapparal
cautiously examined this path with my squad
| ron for mile or more, and found, ms Afterwards
remarked to It. Kane, that about 500 cavalry had
passed there; adding that believed they had gained
our rear, and that we should have TO cut our way
back To camp, giving him, at the same time, those
minute Instructions for his guidance, IN that event
which he has detailed to the court Finding this
path was leading into marshy prairie, where
nothing 10 be seen Of the enemy, determined
10 return, and endeavor TO gain Information from he
persons seen In the field, II Il could be- done WIN
| safety For that purpose ! lett the head OF my
squadron, and made up 10 the advance guard Oh
arriving at the bars ordered them down, and went
IN alone determined not to risk the safety OF an IN
diVldual Of my command by taking any OF them m
TO the held, unless IL became necessary. Hence the
mixed nature Of my duties required me to dIyest
myself Of the immediate military command Of my
squadron, and TO assume the character of re-
connOltriBg officer Had my orders TO the squad
ron been strictly carried out il would not, says L.
Kane have closed on the advance guard, and conse'
quenty, my signal, made by beckon for that guard
TO move on, would not have been seen by them.
The signal was made by me without facing about,
on seeing persons flying from the houses, and be-
lieying could only communicate by having them
captured. Had the squadron permitted the advance
guard to resume Its proper distance, which pre-
sumed, as matter Of course, II would permit Il TO
keep, knowing my minute instructions on this point
to Lieutenant Mason were given in the presence
and hearing of Lieutenant Kane, who led the squad
kav he heiH At
all. That intended il should not do 80, fully APP
pears from my remark made on its first approach to
me. The placing a sentinel at the bars was unnc-
cessary, unless intended taking the squadron in.
The throwing out yidette, placing sentinel
ahead, was totally unnecessary, as the field was
open TO the right, and the advance guard could not
TAIL TO discover any enemy in front in time to fall
back on the main body at the bars. Besides, the
country In front had already been examined, and
found perfectly clear. When the squadron reached
me, was nnxousy engaged in gaining information;
and as the hour late, and my instructions re-
quired me to return by ~ o'clock that day, had
not moment to lose, but compelled, IN the eH-
ercise Of my delicate duties commander and re-
eonnoItrng officer, 10 hasten my interview with the
Mexican, and take up my march in return.
The conducting OF the squadron at the time Of the
alarm, which seems to have been somewhat dWelt
on by the prosecution, can under no circumstances,
be attributed to neglect on my part. So busily and
ahead of IT, and facing from IL, that could not pos
slby give 1t my personal attention, and, in the
words of Lieutenant Kane, II is not al all probable
that It's condition came under my observation. That
portion Of my duties necessarily left to my
officers, who had received most positive instruc-
tons, and frequent cautions that the enemy was
near. No precaution however, at that time, from
myself or any one else, could have altered the re-
sut-our fate decided long before entering that
held On the alarm being given, however, | exc
cuted the only move whrh offered the slightest
hope Of eNtrcation from our perous position. See
ing much the greater portion Of my squadron in the
saddle and close together, | ordered and executed a
charge upon the enemy at the bars, the only OPEN
ing, determined tc fall in the attempt, or, in the
words OF my instructions, to cut my way through
the enemy; and expecting that the squadron
might effect passage through opening,
hoped to make by the superior power of my horse
Seeing the utter impossiblllty Of this, on getting
near enough 10 observe the immense strength OF
the enemy, and finding, upon looking back, that
my men had swerved to the right, and that their
horses were almost unmunageable from the CALLING
effect Of the enemy's fire, abandoned this idea, and
wheeled to the right also My plan then was to
skirt the fence for opening. As none presented
itself, | ordered my men to dismount and tear
down the fence IN the face Of the enemy, but such
was now the condition of my command, produced
by the destructive fire 10 which it was exposed,
that | found it impossible to effect my purpose.
My own horse was now almost unmanngeable, and
| continued my route with a view Of eiectng an
opening at other point; hut in a very few mo-
ments my horse fell, severely wounded and by the
fall, totally disabled me; besides falling on me in
such way as to render it extremely difficult 10 ex
tricate myself, after having partially recovered FROM
the severe shock which had received.
In viewing the whole facts of the case then, gen.
temen, as developed by the testimony your rec
ord, tappears that was charged not only with the
military command Of my squadron of Dragons, but
with the still more delicate and responsible duty of
recommending the enemy for the purpose Of dscov-
erng his position, his strength, and his compost
ton. L had to examine most difficult COun-
try of tWenty-seven miles in extent, and return
to camp in the short space of fifteen hours,
eight OF which were in the night. ! was examin-
ing country Of this most difficult nature, with
which was totally unacquainted, and which was
correctly supposed to be in possession Of enemy
perfectly familiar with 1t. In doing this had to
combine the two almost inconsistent If not the to-
tally Incompatible characters, of recommending Off
Ger and commander of his military escort For my
own guide, had a citizen of the enemy's country,
Of doubtful fidelity at best, and who communicated
with them in a language wholly unknown to mo.
Such the nature of the country that it 10 the
opinion of the officers who were with me- that my
rear might have been easily gainedby day. as it was
by night, without the possibility Of my knowing
1t. And that an attempt to return, would have been
followed by total and inevitable destruction, The
enemy had spies upon us from the moment of our
starting to the time of our capture. Indeed, they
had full information Of this they always had be-
fore 1t, of every movement of our army. Such were
the relations which sustained towards them, that
concealment on our part was impossible, whilst the
slightest attempt to gain information of them was
hazardous in the extreme. Our little army was
compelled, under its instructions, to keep up a
peaceable attitude until the first blow should be Civ
en- by them. 1t was my misfortune to receive that
first blow upon my devoted head but it mad to be
received, and why not by me' | contend, them that
the result of my expedition not disastrous.
Nearly half squadron of Dragons was captured,
admit; but what signifies that, when compared with
the immense advantages to a commanding general
of knowing his real position--of being confident he
no longer occupied debaable ground-of being
certain the enemy were gaining his rear in force,
and determined to give him bate' If this was not
important information, why the immediate requsi-
ton for heavy reinforcements1 Why the redoubled
activity in the completion of Fort Brown Why the
sudden and rapid move upon Point Isabel for ammu-
milton and provisions'
But for the loss Of this squadron, gentlemen, for