Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1841-1853, 1846-12-10

UnskIlled in military science, IL would d. presumpu-
Gus and foolish in to affirm that the writer has
brought profound knowledge and accurate judgment
10 his task; but we can say, without exposing our
selves to criticism, that he has made the varying
characteristics of the respective battles plain TO our
understanding and this, wesuppose is test of quail
fcation--N. Y. Com Ado.
. Il would seem as though the present campaigns
against Mexico had given 10 our army experience OF
all the modes Of warfare. At Palo Alto the combat
was one Of artillery mainly, upon open plain, which
afforded every advantage 10 tie cavalry of the enemy.
and where the formation Of squares, which converts
each regiment into Geld fertilization, had 10 be
sorted to by General Taylor, and where too, the fly
ing batteries, which in our cities had been looked
upon rather part OF the pageaniry of war, proved
their value. The battle of Palo Alto was battle at
arms length. The battle Of Resaca, the contrary,
was breast to breast conflict. where every sinew
was strained to give fall the adversary and which,
though involving art aud skill, depended principally
upon sheer courage and main strength There the
bayonet did its work and told its story. There was
here of the platoon firing and parade maDcuvres
Of the preceding day. The contest in the woods.
The general conflict involved dozen minor actions,
all tending the victorious result Here cavalry act
ed successfully against artillery which, though some
times DONE as at Waterloo is mode of warfare of
unfrequent occurrence, and only resorted to where
the general knows bis men, and can combine the DIFF
ferent of the serv.ce-horse and foot-to pro-
duce the desired result
The character Of the two battles Of the 9Th and 9th
or May was essentially diverse. sui more diverse
was the part which fen The lot of that portion Of the
army left at Fort Brown. With not enough Of am
muntion to give to his men that active employment
which, in battle, overcones personal apprehension by
mere physical excitement the commanding officer at
Fort Brown had to rely upon that passive courage,
which few but veteran troops possess While the
batteries of Matamoras were filed with men, who, in
comparative safety, fired at the Americans though
hey shooting at mark, the soldiers Of Fort
Brown, instead Of the hammer and sponge, the hand
49,
or idly watching the fight of shells aimed and well
aimed too, for their destruction. This was third
pecies of the great genus. battle. fourth followed
IN the march to Monterey. Here the contest not
with the Mexicans. But it contest almost
destructive In which toll and fatigue had to be over
come under a hot sun, in inhospitabe country,
and where the very absence of an enemy TO fight with
was, considering the character of the armya large
part being vounieers-in itself obstacle and dis
couragement.
But this march, this fight against time and climate
mountain and plain, river and morass, of Incalcu
liable value, looking ultimate results. 1t turned the
militia into regulars. 1t taught every man othem that
the soldier to be good one, must give up his indie
pendence; that victory must depend upon obedience
that without this there personal safety IL taught
them that however individual valor might have done
of old, in modern warfare, bush fighting excepted,
depended upon converting masses into indl-
viduas, whose will the mind of the officer that
directed them. The march to Monterey taught the
fdluc VI regular phrase OF
to shoulder" that used by the Scotch regiments at
the battle Of Fontenoy-" stick thegyher, front and
rear" When Gen. Taylor therefore encamped at the
Walnut Springs, three miles from Monterey, his six
thousand men may have been counted upon as army
Of regulars.
At Monterey the character OF the conflict was again
changed. 1t was no longer the pitched battle of the
open plain, the tumutuous melee Of forest fight,
or the passive resistance of bcsieged men, the pa
tlest endurance of the oisome march. The bect was
.I.o So
commanded by surrounding emnences, all of which
were fortified, while the city itself built after
faBbien that made each house breast-work. Means
quite different from those which successful at
Palo Alto and Resaca had to be employed, The dra-
COON here powcrless-the flying artillery Of but
occasional service. Heavy artillery and infantry
the of service to be relied The shell, the
heavyball, the bullet and the bayonet, the upon
which victory to depend. Fortunately, the Amer
lead commander was equal to the new emergency,
and had with him army fully competent TO the ex-
eeution of his designs.
II is not our purpose ia repeat the accounts of the
battles of Monterey. There or two matters,
however, that seem to authorize remark even at SO
great distance are from the scene of action,
the principal of which is the great disparity OF loss be-
tween the divisions Of Gen. Taylor and Gen. Worth
We are inclined to attribute this to the difference
between the work which they had TO do respectively
not to any greater prudence on the part oil
Gen. Worth, or any rashness or indifference to the
loss of life on the part Of Gen. Taylor. Taylor gave
to Worth that, which to the latter was under the
circumstances, the greatest boon he could receive-s
separate command-when the glory he night vii
might be his exclusively and in which he has IL
truth won sufficient to satisfy even his daring anC
chiyalrous temper.
That WORTH in the use of his troops did not spare
them, is evident from one Of the accounts, which
states tina: the sormng party of the battery command
ing the Bishops Palace was looked upon as, in truth
..foriorn hope" But batteries like those aroun'
Monterey, upon heights steep that their assailant
had to Chamber up precpices to reach them, and con
structed temporarily, for Of these at least SEEM
to have been built Of sand-bags, less dangerous t.
attack than would, at first sight, appear. Cannon
cannot be sufficiently depressed to sweep the fac
of steep ascent. The hill itself is a cover for tn
storming party; and it iS only when the summit i
reached, that grape and canister and musketry cal
be used with effect and, even Them but for singl
discharges for time IS given TO reload, before til
bayonet becomes busy; and flight hand to han
contest is the alternative for the defenders of III
fort. What is here stated is proved to be probable
at least by the fact that, in carrying the heights abou
Monterey, Gen. Worths loss was so small. What
the loss the heights had to be carried, and Wort
was Just the man, and we knew him well of old, I
carry them.
General Worth began by carrying the fort whc
commanded the Bishops Palace, which infer I
have been the same ridge, though, perhaps, o
different elevations of it; and lower down. and, in il
turn, commanded by the palace, seems to have bee
the city The taking Of these forts secured the car
ture Of the palace which then became unienable, an
when that fell into Worhs hands he had below hir
still, and at bis mercy the western part of the city
into which he penetrated far on bis side TaylC
did on his. Like a of bricks set on end by boy
the upsetting of the first the fall succession
of the others. Cvnsunmate judgment seems to has