Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1846-02-07

game and hunters disappear; within few years
the fur trade will have died It's natural DEATH and
no yestige shall remain, at least south Of Fuca's
straits OF that temporary occupancy, OF those vested
British interests, which the British Government Is
now bound TO protect. When the whole territory
shall have thus fallen III The possession Of an agri.
cultural industrious population, the question recurs
by what principle will then the right of sovereignty
all along kept in allegiance be determined /
The answer is obvious. In conformity with ma
tural law, with that right OF. occupancy for which
Great Britain has always commended, Ire essdpiofs
Of the land, The inhabitants 6f he country, from
whatever anar,cs .Eey may have come, will be Of
right as well in fact the sole legitimate sovereigns
of Oregon. Whenever sufficiently numerous, they
will decide whether it suits them best to be an inde-
pendent nation or an integral part Of cif great Re-
public. There cannot he NE slgh HEST apprehension
that they will choose 10 become dependant colo
ny for they will be the most powerful nation bor
dering on the American shores Of the Pacific, and
will not stand in need of protection against either
their Russian or Mexican neighbofs. Viewed as
an abstract proposition, Mr. Jefersohs opinion APP
pears correct that i will bS best for both the Allan
tic and The Pacific American nations, whilst enter
taning the most friendly relations, to remain indie
pendent rather than to be united under the same
Government. But this conclusion is premature;
aud the decision must be leh u posiefity.
There Is a poihi oh which wish not to be mis-
understood. The prolongation, in 1927, Of the
convention of 1918, was evidently intended as a
temporary measure, since it was made revocable at
the will Of either party. The Observation-Disclosures Of
the two Powers Had Been unable TO agree on the
terms Of defnitiye arrangement or even in defn-
ing with precision the conditions on which the con-
q r. a
nate period. It viii be seeh, by reference to the
protocols and correspondence, that although il was
generally admitted that neither party ought during
such continuance to exercise any exclusive sove-
reignty over the territory, the American Penipoten-
ary declined to agree to any convention containing
an express provision I'd that effect or accompanied
by the insertion iii the protocol Of declaration for
the same purpose by the British Plenipotentiares.
The reason was not only because an exclusive right
over Astoria and its dependencies was claimed by
the United States, but principally because it was
anticipated that in order to have in fact authority
equal to that exercised by the Hudson Bay Compa-
ny, it would become necessary for the United States
to perform acts which the British Government might
contend to be forbidden by such express provision
or declaration. The consequence was, that the con-
venton recognises some certain rights, and imposes
no positive restrictions, but only such as may be
supposed to be implied in the clause which declares
that nothing contained in it should be construed to
impair or affect the claims of either party. The
probability that it might become necessary for the
United States to establish territorial or some sort
of government their own citizens was explicit
ly avowed the deficiencies of the renewed conven-
ton of 1927, and the Inconvenience which might
ensue, were fully understood; and the continuance
of that of 1918, made revocabe at will, agreed
on with the hope that the two Powers would embrace
an early opportunity, if not to make deinitive
rangement, at least to substitute for the convention
another, defining with precision the acts which both
parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform
SO long as the sovereignty remained in allegiance.
The inconvenience alluded to have been fairly
stated in this paper and some of the by which
they may be avoided have been suggested. Ii is
not therefore, on account of the intrinsic value OF
the convention that It's abrogaton is Objectionable
and dangerous. 1t is because nothing is substituted
in its place; it is because, if the two Powers are
not yet prepared to make defnitive agreement, il
becomes the duty Of both Governments, instead OF
breaking the only barrier which still preserves
peace, to substitute for the existing convention one
adapted to the present state Of things, and which
shall prevent collisions until the question of sove-
reignty shall have been settled. The inconveni-
ences which were only anticipated have become
tangible, from the time when American citizens,
whom the United States are bound TO protect, be-
gan TO make settlements in the territory of Oregon.
The sudden transition from an agreement however
defective TO promiscuous occupancy, without any
provisions whatever that may prevent collisions, is
highly dangerous. When this is accompanied by
an avowed determination on the part of the United
States TO assume that exclusive sovereignty which
Great Britain has positively declared she would re-
slst, War becomes inevitable.
1t has been attempted in these papers TO prove
LIST. That neither of the two Powers has an alb
solute and indsputable right to the whole contested
territory; that each may recede from its extreme
pretensions without impairing national honor or
wounding national pride and that the way is there
fore still open for a renewal of negotiations.
"a. That the avowed object of the United States,
in giving notice Of the abrogaton Of the convention
the determination to assert and maintain their as
sumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty
over the whole territory that Great Britain is fully
on that point and has constantly and ex-
picity declared that such an attempt would be re-
sisted, and the British interests in that quarter be
protected and that war is therefore the unavoidable
Of such decisive step-a war not
,nly necessarily calamtous and expensive, but in
is character aggressive, not UNSUITABLE by the magni-
ude and importance Of its object, and of which the
chances uncertain.
Sd. That the inconvenience of the present state
If things may in great degree be avoided that if
10 war should ensue, they will be the same, if not
greater, without than under convention that not
single object can be gained by giving the notice at
'y the present convention and therefore provoking
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