The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1846-12-03

United States for the settlement Of tho Oregon ques
i ton"
President on the 10Th Of June, for their previous
advice, accompanied by message, which explicitly
states, that the opinions he had expressed on the
Oregon question, IN his message OF the preceding
| December, remained unchanged. He then proceeds
10 Declare that "should the Senate, by the constilu
tonal majority required for the ratification of trea'
ties advise the acceptance Of this proposition, OF
advise IT with such notifications as they may, up
on full deliberation, deem proper, i shall conform
my action to their advice. Should the Senate, how
ever decline by such constitutional majority to give
such advice, or TO express an opinion on the sub
iect shall consider my duty 10 reject the offer
The Senate, on the 18th of June, by a majority OF
80 10 H. advised the President to accept the proposal
| of the British government; and the final treaty, IN
accordance with this advice, was speedily concud-
ed and ratified by both parties.
few remarks upon the advice given by the Sem
ate TO the President, and we shall have done with
the Oregon question. "
And, in the first place, we cannot but commend
the firm, consistent, and dgnihed course pursued by
the President throug bout the whole transaction.
He never hesitated-he never faered, from first TO
last, In maintaining what he believed to be the true
policy for securing the territorial rights of his coun-
try. And when, at last, in accordance with the ex-
| amples Of Washington and Jackson, and with the
expressed sentiments Of an overwhelming majority
Of both houses Of Congress, he consented to submit
10 oenalt, II was accom-
panied by equiyocal declaration, that he still adj
hered to his original conviction of the right of the
United States TO the whole of Oregon.
In the second place, il was both provident and
fortunate, that Mr. Buchanan, in bis dispatches
TO Mr.. McLane, had clearly stated, that I'M
der no circumstances could the President submit
TO the Senate any proposition which would bring
| the line OF partition upon the continent south OF
| the parallel of 40 degrees, nor which would make
general and perpetual surrender TO the subjects
of Great Britain Of the navigation of the Colum-
ba. Had it not been for this avowed predeter-
mination, the British government might, and proba,
bly, would, judging from the tone Of their public
press have been encouraged by the debates and pro-
ceedings in the Senate, demand line so far south
Of this parallel to include within their territory
some Of the harbors on Admiralty inlet and Pugets
sound; or they might have demanded the perpetual
navigation of the Columbia for all British subjects
especially as this had been offered by Mr. Gallatin
in 1896. In either alternative, their proposition
must have been rejected by the President, and no
man can anticipate what would have been the con-
sequences.
Although, after being thus forewarned, they did
not venture in their drsugh Of convention to pro-
pose that the United States should surrender the
perpetual navigation Of this river for all British sub
Jects yet they asked 1t for the Hudson's Bay Com
pany.
When the President submitted this draught to the
Senate, he accompanied it by despatch from Mr..
McLane to Mr. Buchanan Of the 18th May, which
as clearly indicated his objection TO this right of nav
igauon, confined though il was TO the Hudsons Bay
Company az if he had expressed il in the strongest
language. This despatch declared that in regard to
the navigation Of the Columbia the draught submit
ted was not to be considered as the ullimatum Of
Great Britain. On the contrary, Mr.. McLsne ex-
presses his strong conviction, that il the government
of the United States should propose limit the right
to a term of years, this modification would be ac-
cepted by the British government.
Rnttt Ill r.l
events Of the Oregon negotiation that the British gov
eminent had such confidence in the Senate that they
would most probably have rejected this modifca-
ton, unless it had obtained the previous sanction of
| that body. Mr.. McLane says:
at is not to be disguised that since the Presi.
dents annual message, and the public discussion
that has subsequently taken place in the Senate it
will be difficult, if not impossible to conduct the
negotiation in its future stages without reference to
the opinion of senator's or free from speculation as
to the degree Of control they may exercise over the
result. Whatever, therefore, might be prudent and
regular IN the ordinary course Of things, think 1t
of the utmost importance, upon the present occa-
sion, if the President should think proper to pro-
pose any modification of the offer to be made by
Mr. Pakenhann, that the modification should be I'M
derstood as possessing the concurrence of the co-or
dnate branch of the treaty power.'
The reason why the British government were
encouraged to attempt at all to obtain this priv
ege for the Hudson's Bay Company, is made man
fest by another portion Of the same despatch, in
which Mr.. McLane states as follows: al do NOT
think there can be much doubt, however, that an
Impression has been produced here that the Senate
would accept the proposition now offered, at least
without any material modification, and that the
President would not take the responsibility of re-
jectlng 1t without consulting the Senate"
The President had every reason to believe, when
ne submitted this despatch of Mr.. McLane to the
Senate, that in view Of all these circumstances they
ya,,lI ha,ro .oI, sd H.. i.
suggestions. But he was disappointed in his ex-
pectation. When Mr.. Niles made q proposition
to this effect 1t was rejected by vote of 10 70 81
and this result showed that the British government
were not mistaken in blocking to the Senate.n
We do not propose to discuss the disputed uues-
tIon whether the privilege granted to the Hudson's
Bay Company of navigating the Columbia will ex-
pre in 1859, with the termination of their present
license to trade with the Indians west ofthe Rocky
mountains. We very much doubt whether the
United States could establish the affirmative of this
proposition. The best security which we have
against the permanency ofthc privilege will be found
IN the fact that the Hudson Bay Company, before
the lapse of many years. will cease to derive any
advantage from it, and will therefore abandon its
use At the best, il is but bad ma yigation and is
interrupted by several portages between Fort Van
couver and the 49th parallel; and they will resort to
other more convenient modes of reaching the ocean
In any event. the use of the river confined as il will
be to the mere transportation of their furs to market
from the territory north of 40 degrees and to re-
ceivng the supplies necessary for their servants in
that region, is matter of no great importance. Be
sdes as the country north of this parallel becomes
coonIzed and settled, the hunting and trapping will
cease to be profitable, and the company will ere
long, retire from these pursuits and, as a conse-
quence, abandon the nav CATION. Indeed, even at
present their profits have been greatly diminished
In regard to the possessory rights to land, which
the treaty secures to the Hudson Bay Company
and to other British settlers and the right of the
Pugets Sound Agricultural Company to their
farms, we consider these to be practically of no
great consequence. We presume that if no such
provision had been made for them, the government
of the United States would not have expelled them
from their possessions. They would at least have
granted them presumption rights to purchase these
possessions at the minimum price Of the public
lands-Sl 25 per acre. The great concession once
made of abandoning our rights north Of the 49th
parallel, stipulation of this character in favor of
those who have settled and improved the country
and will become American citizens, ought to have
presented no serious obstacle to the conclusion of
the treaty -
I1nOn tho uhnIa Al