The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1845-05-29
Supreme Court,
naf,r.o N enlI nnl,

Before full Bench
MAY 2S-Case Of Polly Bo line-The interest and T.
ctement that prevailed during the trial in this case
Room was not more crowded than ordinary occasions
The case has been already frequently reported and
the facts SO fully before the public that we do not
deem Introductory abstract OF the history Of it me-
cessary.
Mr. DE- WIrr resumed the argument for the conside.
ration of the charge OF Judge Edmond to the triers
which ption is taken upon the challenges to the
favor for bias of jurors Board and Nc MILAN The first
point in the charge of his Honor to which he complained
that in order to disquaIify The juror the juror
should have formed belief as to the truth of the facts
which the Jurors had heard or read An hypothetical
opinion based upon statements heard or read without
the formation OF any opinion as to the truth OF those
statements is disquafying opinion at least is pro-
per to be submitted the riers evidence OF bias,
without specific instructions them that belief Of the
statements themselves is absolutely necessary Because
if the circumstances proved should turn out to
pond with the statements heard read the opinion from
being hypothetical becomes certain which may well be
and generally would be dangerous than belief
of the statements without the formation OF the conclusion
fact deducible from them g. Because the mind in such
would be inclined to the conclusion, ii only
juror would be apt to regard more iavoraby evidence
supporting the conclusion than evidence tending to
overthrow it and fourth becauseif the Juror swears
that he has formed opinion, derivable from the cir
cumstances it is unsafe to enter into enquiry how far
the juror believed the circumstances which he had read
No knows the degree of credit which he attaches to
rumor report, while every attaches some degree
OF credit to them and yet when placed upon the stand
there are few who would be willing to swear to a deli
berate belief in the truth fsuch rumor repoH-
Again. it may well be- and generally is true that the
first detail circumstances derived from preliminary
examinations is substantially correct and the contest
upon the trial Is frequently to whethert the
cuson of guilt flows from the crcum stances, than to
whether the circumstances themselves are true The
prisoner may admit all the circumstances and admitting
them has right to contend to the jury matter of fact
that they all consistent with innocence. With what
effect then would the counsel for the prisoner urge to
the jury, that Notwithstanding all the circumstances
proved admitted their client Innocent They had
to the pride of deliberately formed opinion
to the conclusion derivabe from circumstances,
which to be dreaded than belief in the truth of
the circumstances without the formation of any
opinion of guilt founded upon them. The pre-
vailing error in the ruling of the Court seems to
have BEEN that the Judge lost sight of the distinction
which, matter Of law and challenge for principal
cause, would dsqualify juror and the state Of mind,
wthstandng competent evidence Of bias the rers
consider, challenge for favor Counsel here stated
nation Of opinion and challenge the favor consist.
ing in this that challenge for cause the law ners
from the formation expression Of opinion that the
juror is biassed but CHALLENGE for favor it is
ton Of fact for the trers to decide; the juror from his
state Of mind described BY himself is biased not
Under challenge to the favor for basthe only ques-
ton Of fact for the trers is the mind Of the juror
BIASED either for against the prisonerl If the trers
are satisfied that in any way the mind Of the juror has
received an opinion impression to guilt inno
cence-whethcr vague and unsettled, fixed and def
nte-whether from conversation, newspaper reports,
evidence personal knowledge, any other the
juror is disqualified by of bias If the juror state
that he encrains such an opinion impression specu
latOn 10 It's Strength nxcdneSS-Or to whether
it will require evidence to it's mpro-
per. The law presumes that an existing preconceved
opinion impression, inclination Of mind will require
evidence to remove it. or at least that the mind will be
inclined to regard more favorably evidence which
firms than that which contradcts the pre-conception
Whether it will require evidence to remove the OPT
MON or Impression, is not the lest. It is enough if
slighter evidence in support of the opinion or i'm
preston would suffice to prodnce conviction, than
would otherwise be the In support of his position
Counsel cited Devereux and Battle, North Carolina
Reports,) 200; DAVIS Arrangement 334 Johnson,
Monroe, Appendix IA Wendell, lsi; Cranch, 1877
Pickering, 496 and several other authorities. The
second point complained OF in the charge of Judge Ed
monds uron the same challenges was that conclusion
founded such beie OF the truth Of the circumstances
heard and read necessary to disquasv the juror He
insisted tnat belief the truth OF the circumstances
without any conclusion founded on such belief, suf
dcient to dquaiy because the juror would listen
favorably evidence tending support circumstances
than to evidence tending to contradict them He also
submitted to the Court that the Circuit Judge had erred
in charging the trers THAT mere faint impression
founded either personal knowledge OF the circum
stances, or on relation of them by those who have
such knowledge or on mere rumor or report, is not
such opinion disquallhes." This last instruction
involved the proposition that il juror knows, either
personally from eye witnesses the real facts and cir
cumstances OF the case from which the conclusion of
guilt is sought to be derived and has in addition formed
faint impression to the conclusion Of guilt inno
dervable from the facts and circumstances ofwhch
he has such knowledge he Is Notwithstanding mat
ter Of law, competent juror lie commended that there
reasoning upon which this instruction could be
sustained-and gave several illustrations, show that
was erronesus The Circuit Judge further charged,
fourth That it must be fixed and decided opinion such
it will require evidence TO remove he that
it necessary that it should require evidence to
remove it, but it enough il it such opinion
that the juror would listen avoraby to evidence to
sustain it. Mr.. d. w. further insisted that the Circuit
Judge had erred in deciding that the juror John Buckly
was incompetent to serve because o. his having sworn
he would not convict ina capital case on
evidence. He argued that the disqualification pointed
by the statute only applied to the Of juror VINO
conscientious scruples against nictng the punish
ment of death not to the OF juror who, ac-
count his tender regard for human e would not
vict except testimony Of eyewitnesses The learned
counsel cited various authorities and entered into long
argument in support of his position on this point and
went to say that there set OF circumstances
from which the law infers guilt Guilt always an in
dence they satisfied from the conclusive tendency
of the evidence. You had, therefore, right to
that shall convict matter of law circum
stantal evidence than bSve to say that he shall
particular set Of circumstances the EVIL
dence of any particular number OF eyewitness
man is not be disqualified from serving juror be-
cause he up for himself standard of evidence with
which he will not convict If he is opposed con-
scentiousy faon infcting the punishment of DEATH.
The point made by Mr. Dew related to the alleged
of the judge in overrung the following questions
men to be true did you then form opinion to her
guilt innocence O. If the evidence should support
the circumstances which you heard and read have you
belief to the guilt innocence of the prisoner =
Ques-lfth the circumstances which you have heard or
read be true have now an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant Also, in overruing the
question to the juror, Handerow. Did you give any
degree Of credence to the statements have heard or
reads and in overruling the question put to the juror
Gardner--"Have you ever thought Mrs. Bodine was
guilty of the crime for which she is trial. This
question objected to by the Counsel for the People
The objection allowed and sustained by the Court,
on the ground that the question should be, had you
opinion instead of have you thought = and in
ovcrruling the questions to the juror Coon Did what
as to the guilt innocence of the prisoner r " Was
your mind then free from any impression or
bias as to the guilt innocence OF the prisoner and in
ovcrruling the question to the juror, McColgan Did
you read produce any on your mind as
ed that these questions ought to have been allowed to be
answered. because they tended to elicit the state OF
mind of the jurors to whom they were put as to the guilt
or innocence the prisoner; and because they tended
to show that the jurors in point of fact had retained
feelings sentiments Of hostility towards tho prisoner
That any Of these questions if answered in the af
frmativc, would have manifestly evinced, that the
Juror to whom it was put was an unfit person to pass
upon Mrs. Bodnes life death. He referred to previ
Gus parts Of his argument and authorities before cited
to show that whatever may be the character and degree
Of the opinion, to the guilt or Innocence OF party,
10 no nd in disQuaiy a