Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1845-12-27


ther inadequate appropriation Of $780, 900 towards
building the Phadephia New York. Boston, and General
Greene, only partially appedihe three last mentioned
ships having proved not to be seawohy and the provision
the Philadelphia being apparently superseded by the act
I'd January, 1913.
quite true that notwithstanding the report of the Sec
rotary of the Navy and that Of the Naval Committee Con-
gross did not provide for any increase Of the navy till after the
umphs of the year 1912. But there obvious differ
between the Of force and the use to which
1t shall be applied. On this point doubt entertained
at the time respecting the intentions of Congress No
Der of that body expressed within my knowledge wish or
expectation that the ships should be laid up The style Of
all the laws that subject implies that they shall be actively
employed Above ALL il cannot be supposed that if intend
ing TO lock the navy, Congress should by their last
have ordered three fgaes be repaired equipped
for service and have incurred useless expense of
for that purpose The inference drawn by Com. Stewart
from that assumption inadmissbe The
the To have confined voluntarily and permanently
the public ships safe port would have been in direct
opposition the of the laws and the intentions of
Congress- That commander-in-chef the President may
according TO circumstances order vessels to cruise
main in port is true But there is thing which he is
authorized to do.
My is mentioned having proposed that our ships
should be employed in the defence Of New York. which, If
did, very silly suggestion since, ignorant of
military and naval affairs yet had always understood that
gates, whether in of port could stand 74 and
that when in port they protected by FORTS not that they
could be used protect forts In point of fact though
additions made afterwards New York was, the
plan, for which would be assign
the author Every with whom conversed agreed
that if ships Of the line succeeded passing the outward
fences, Governors, Eiss, and Bedows Islands, the only
efficient way defend the city FORTS erected
nient distances the North river both in the city itself and
the opposite New Jersey shore And will be SEEM by
the report of the Secretary Of War of Sd December 1911
that two of those forts already erected No naval aid
but that Of the suggested and was the gem
eal opinion Of the officers consulted that though useful in
they could not from various render any
efficient aid in the defence Of the harbor Of New York
to the plan Of dsmanng the gates and converting them
into floating batteries, having heard discussed, can
form judgment Of its pacticabily efficiency. But it
is the which have alluded, when saying that
there things which the President not authorized
do Congress has always reserved to itself the right and
erced exclusively the power to prescribe not only the amount
but the species Of the military naval force The President
might convert figae into dsmantled floating bat
terry, than he might build 74s under law authorizing the
building of l6gun Ships raise regiment Of Dragons under
law authorizing of artillery When Congress wanted
floating batteries they passed law Goth March, sl4 for
that purpose, designating them by that name.
There also facts and acts of the Navy De-
parment which is difficult to reconcile with the supposion
that there any time any determination by the Admin
sraon adopted meetings Of the Cabinet to lay all the
public ships in some port, and not to risk them
appears certain that all the ships had been ordered imme
iaey before the declaration Of to unite at New York
place of rendezvous Commodore Stewart thinks
that Commodore Rodgers sailed with his squadron the 2ls
Of June without orders That he had orders is, however
certain In his letter of the LIST Of September 1872 to the
Secretary of the Navy he says The United States Con-
yres and Argus did join the 2ls Gune, with which
vessels this ship and the Hornet accordingly sailed in less
han hour after received your orders of the 18th Of June
accompanied by your official communication OF the declaration
# war" These orders have not been published In the
mean while it incredible that Commodore Rodgers
houd have sailed if he had not been least permitted
by those ORDERS other previous instructions. Com
Stewart appointed to the command Of the Argus the
I'd of June for the express purpose of making cruise in the
West Indies And Captain Porter, giving account of his
he
the Navy In pursuance of your orders of the Gath
June sailed from Sandy Hook the Sd of July" &C.
three ates and two smaller vessels put to the
Of Jne after having received order dated 18th Of June
Those Com Stewart for cruise OF the 22d. Those
Of Cant Porter tn sail criss with fgets Essex) are
iutrd the 24th. And yet the two rold
that determination by the President and Cabinet to Law
all the vessels had been adopted prior the 2s and
confirmed the evening Of that day. In order to every
doubt necessary that the orders of the 18th of June
Commodore Rodgers and indeed all the orders issued by
the Navy Department during the months of June and July
1872 should be published They have been recorded
and although loose papers may have been destroyed
the time Of the capture of Washington the records
saved since Mr. Godsboough appeals them in his letter
Of the year 1925 to Com. Bainbridge
The strongest evidence adduced by Com. Stewart is the
statement of his interviews with the Secretary of the Navy
Owing circumstances irrelevant to any question at
ISSUE my intercourse with Mr.. Hamilton very limited
He may have been inefficient; he certainly amiabe
dhearted, and honorable gentleman. From his official
reports he appears have been devoted to the of the
he is stated to have entertained that subject Yet his Off
ca instructions of the 18th of June and Sd of july 1872 to
Com. Hull, which for the first time in Mr.. Ingersols
work. evince anxiety bordering timidy, fear to
any responsibility and wish, if any misfortune should
happen, make the officer solely responsible for it, But adj
hitting Com Stewards "reminiscences to be entirely correct
and putting myself of question: is clear that they do
affect Mr. Madison.
In the first interview Of the Commodore with Mr.. Hamil-
ton he enumeraes with great force, all the that could
be alleged against the public ships Of the United States being
able escape capture destruction by the British navy, and
dwels its superiority, not only in numbers but in skill
and experience The contrast between him and the Pesi
dent remarkable. In the interview with Mr. Madison he
says to Mr. Hamilton that they ought not to despair of
navy, and that though small would perform its duty and,
after hearing Commodore Banbdges observations, he adds
cit is victories want if you give them to and after
wards lose your ships they be replaced by others In
the next interview, late in the evening" with Mr. Hamilton
he states that the Cabinet still persisted in their opinion Of
laying up the ships and that Mr. Monroe the only
Der who advocated their being He then reer
aes his objections and expresses the remarkable sentiment
that bis conscience would acqut him If by sending
our vessels to the germ Of navy should be lost
seems impossible not to infer that the Secretary Of the Navy
himself the principal obstacle to the active employment
of the public ships Indeed, if he had in that council united
his voice to that of Mr. Monroe and surprising Mr. Eusts
and myself TO have been present and have taken the oppo
site de the Cabinet would have been equally divided and
Mr. Madison with such views of the subject he entertained
and had expressed would without hesitation have decided In
favor of the opinion Of the Secretaries Of State and Of the
Navy.
II is claimed that the final decision of the President
almost wesed from him by the perseveng interference Of