Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1845-12-12


some of those who felt themselves constrained, I'M
der the peculiar circumstances existing the time,
to vote in its favor, proclaimed its defects and ex-
pressed their determination to aid in its modlfca-
ton on the first opportunity, affords strong and
conclusive evidence that il was not intended to be
permanent. and of the expediency and necessity
of its thorough revision.
In recommending to Congress reduction of
the present rates of duty, and revision and modi
fcation of the act of 1912, am far from enter
tanning opinions unfriendiy to the manufacturers.
On the contrary, desire to see them prosperous,
as far as they can be so, withoutimposing unequal
burdens on other interests. The advantage under
any system of indirect taxation, even within the
revenue standard, must be in favor of the manu-
featuring interest; and of this other interest will
complain.
I recommend to Congress the abolition of the
minimum principle, or assumed, arbitrary, and
false values, and of specific duties, and the subst-
tuition in their place of Gd raorena duties as the
fairest aud most equitable indirect tax which
eau be imposed. BY the dd Ualorem principle. all
articles taxed according to their cost or value,
aud those which Of inferior quality or of small
cost, bear only the just proportion of the tax with
those which are OF superior quality greater cost
The articles Consumed by all are taxed at the same
rate. A system of ad UoIorem revenue duties.
with proper Determinations and proper guards a.
gainst frauds in collecting them, it is not doubted,
will afford ample incidental advantages to the
manufacturers, and enable them to derive as great
profits as can be derived from any other regular
business. 1t is believed that such system, strict
ly within the revenue standard, will place the
manufacturing interests on stable footing, and
inure to their permanent advantage; while it WILL
~, hor 70 oil b.
great interests of the country the incidental protec-
ton which can be afforded by our revenue laws.
Such system, when once firmly established,
would be permanent, and not be subject to the
constant complaints, agitations, and changes which
must ever occur, when duties are not laid for rev.
enue, but for the "protection merely" of favored
interest.
In the deliberations of Congress on this subject
it is hoped that spirit of mutual concession and
compromise between conflicting interests may pre-.
vail, and that the result of their labors may be
crowned with the happiest consequences.
! BY the constitution of the United States it is
provided, that mo money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in consequence Of appropriations made
by law" A public treasury was undoubtedly con.
templated and intended to be created, in which the
public money should be kept from the period OF
collection until needed for public uses. In the
collection and disbursement of the public money
no agencies have ever been employed by law, ex.
cept such as were appointed by the government
directly responsible to it, and under its CONTROL
The safe keeping of the public money should be
confided to public treasury created by law, anc
under like responsibility and control. 1t is not te
be imagined that the trainers of the constitution
could have intended that treasury should be Gre
ated as place of deposit and safekeeping of the
public money which was irresponsible to the gov
eminent. The first Congress under the consttu
tion by the act of the I'd September, 1889, "tc
establish the Treasury Department" provided fo
the appointment of treasurer. and made it hi
duty 'to receive and keep the monies of the Uni
ted States" and cat all times to submit to the Sec
rotary of the Treasury and the Comptroller, O
either of thcn the inspection of the monies in hi
hands,
That banks, national or state, could not have
been intended to be used as a substitute for thu
treasury spoken Of in the constitution, as keeper
of the public money, is manifest from the fact that
at that time there was no national bank, and blu
three four State banks of limited capital existed
In the country. Their employment as deposito
rles at first resorted to to limited extent Blu
with no avowed intention of continuing them per
manently, in place of the treasury of the constitu
ton. When they were afterwards from time t,
time employed, it was from motives of supposed
convenience
| Our experience has shown, that when bankin.
corporations have been the keepers of the public
money, aud been thereby made in effect the treas
ury, the government can have no guaranty that i
can command the use of its own money for public
purposes. The late Bank of the United State
proved to be faithIess. The State banks which
were afterwards employed, were faithless. But
few years ago, With millions of public money i,
their keeping, the government was brought aImos
to bankruptcy, and the public credit seriously i'm
paired, because of their inability or ndsposition tt
pay, on demand, to the public creditors, in the on
ly currency recognised by the constitution. Thei
failure occurred in period of peace and great in
convenience and loss were suffered by the publ
from it. Had the country been involved in a for
elgn war, that inconvenience and loss would hav
been much greater, and might have resulted in ex
IRENE public calamity. The public money SHOULD
not be mingled with the private funds of banks o
individuals, or be used for private purposes Wbel
is placed in banks for safe-keeping, it is in eec
loaned to them without interest, aud is loaned b,
them upon interest to the borrowers from them
The public money is converted into banking CAPT
tai. and is used and loaned out for the privat
profit of bank stock holders; and when called for
Gas was the case II 1887 it may be in the peck
cts of the borrowers from the banks instead of be
ing in the public treasury, contemplated by tn,
constitution. The trainers of the constitution cou
never have intended that the money paid into tn
+ treasury should be thus converted to private use
and placed beyond the control of the government
4 Banks which hold the public money are ofte,
tempted by desire of gain, to extend their loans
increase their circulation, and thus stimulate,
not produce spirit of speculation and extrava
gance, which sooner or later must result in ruin
f thousands. If the public money he not pernlitte
to be thus used, but be kept in the treasury an,
paid out to the creditors in gold and silver. tn
temptation afforded by its deposite with banks to a
undue expansion of their business would be check
ed, while the amount of the constitutional curreu
cy left in circulation would be enlarged, by its en-
ployment in the public collections and disburse
ments, and the hanks themselves would in conse
quence, be found in safer and sounder condition
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