New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1845-08-07
-. s,preme Court and the Law of Libel.

Jewctt, in the case of J. Fea,moTe Cooper vs. Gree-
lev g. McEirath recently argued on demurrer in
this City by Mr.. Richard Cooper for the plaintiff
and Mcssrs. w. II. Seward and j. Congcr for the
defendants. Yet we trust our readers, possessing
their souls in patience, viii read thoroughly, and
be able to educe from il thai wisdom and luminous
meas which have evaded our duh penetration.
We do not assume TO pass any Judgment On the
soundness Of this Opinon-it would i'll become US
TO do 90 until we shall have obtained clearer con.
cepton Of what it is For the present purpose we
will assume that, however repletc with destitute
of reason and common sense il is admirable Su-
preme Court Law, as by ruling and precedent duly
affirmed and established.
Ii is not, therefore whs, the Opinion does but
wha, it does not contain which has painfully disaP
pointed us We did hope TO find, from tribunal
so grave and exalted, some discussion Of the vita
and imminent considerations involved in the pend
ing issue Let us here briefly resiaie them in or
der ihot the public may regard them if il shall think
proper, even though Judges may not. We feel q
strong assurance that such public discussion involves
no legally punishable contempt Of Court
The settled definition of Libel in the Courts Of
this State appears to be az follows:
"hisa eensorioa. ridicrling writing poure or sigr
made ruth mischierous malicious intent towards g0r'
vnm,nf, magistrates or iadtridnais
Now we do not care to quarrel with this deiinr
ton, though we think the word .false has dropped
ont of il rather unfortunately. 1t is possible, in
deed that perfectly true statement may be made
with mischievous or malicious intent Where
this in asserted however, it does seem TO us die
tate of common sense if not Of Common Law, that
the malicious intent should beproced in some way
and not iudiciay inferred from the mere fact that
the defendant has stated truth which tends 70 the
disparagement Of the plaintiff. AS the defendant
however, is allowed under plea Of Justification 10
prove the truth of his statement. lif he can exactly
hit the legal tecbnicalites insisted on we will lei
this pass as of secondary moment; but the Legal
definition of libel ought TO be clear, whole and
accurate by this time.
T. What we do wish to know, and trusted the Su
preme Court would take this occasion to tell u.s. is this
What Is the Freedom Of the Press7 Is it limited
TO right to state facts merely Or does it extend
to opinions also For instance John Smith has
stolen horse and newspaper states the fact This
we understand to be justifablc if the Editor have
legal evidence Of the fact and is able successfully
the gauntlet of demurrcrs errors in pleading
&c. &c. Bat suppose John Smith has merely bought
q horse the only property Of poor widow, refuses
to pay her for il, and il able keep her out Of it
and q newspaper commenting on the fact says
" Smith acts dishonest part !p'-whereupon Smith
sues him for libel. and declares on this sentence
(which is clearly libel, according to New York de
finition) hoc rs The Editor 10 defend h,msef? He
has merely said what every body knows and every
honest admits TO be true but how is 10 go 10
work to establish 1t the satisfaction Supreme
Court IF he demur. he is loored beyond shadow
Of doubt; il he pleads the General Issue, he is
declared from proving any thing and admits the
libel; and if he undertake to Justify, rhot is he to
JUSTIFY and how' These are points on which ce
hoped the Supreme Court would cnlightcn the pub
lie in this Opinion; il they have done so, we arr
shut out from the general illumination
Q. Next we did hope the Court would consider
and throw some light upon the rcasonableness and
force Of the legal presumption that an Editor who
makes statement preiudced to an individual IL ne
cessarily instigated to do 50 by malice. We will
suppose that John Jones's house has been burnt
when well insurcd-thc origin Of the fire remaining
agraph in newspaper charging or strongly insnu
ating that Jones set his house fire. in order to H.
fraud the insurers Here is a libel, no doubt Snd
the presumption 10 fair, in the absence OF any
ieracting evidence that Gossip (who had no business
to be writing in newspapers was impellcd to
make tho charge by spirit of malice or mischief.
But suppose the reporter for a neighboving newspa
per, inquiring into the origin of the fire, is his
duty, discovers certain circumstances which strong
ly implicate Jones as the author OF the calamity.
and which induce his neighbors TO entertain the
conviction that he is the man. He accordingly
states the circumstances and expresses the conyic-
ton, either as his own or theirs. II may turn out
after ALL that the opinion mistaken and that the
facts are susceptible Of different explanation.
Jones has been injured, and is entitled to redress
But how Shall the reporter, the Editors, the
Publishers, and even the hired Printer of the paper
TALL legally amenable for libel be accused and lc
gally convicted of "a msSchser0Hs and malicious
intent" (which they never entertained 10 injurc g
man whom none of them regard with any feeling
whatever, and only of them ever heard of till
he prosecuted them for libel Does il compor
with tho perfection Of human reason that an Of
theSc men should DC so made 10 sufier IN time
ney and reputation for the perfectly innocent and
natural mistake OF one In order to secure justice
to one mus; such fragrant injustice be done TO many
B. Again Is there not a clear and broad common
sense distinction between real libel and M unla
vorsblc opinion avowedly based facts of general
noiorely For instance, an Editor says of his hum
bic neighbor, Bill Tompson is a sheep thief and
rogue 4" referring to no facts within the knowledge
of the public bat Theoretically acts OF which he is
personally cognizant the words are maniiestly Ii
belous. But suppose he says of candidate forpub.
lie station, Mr. Tyler Tor Clay Polk Wright, Fill
more. or any one else treats the Tariff Tor Texas
question very Acknowledgment like jockey than
a Statesman is this remarh,-bcing merely harsh
expression of his own conviction, founded on facts
Of general notoriety,of the OFFS libel They
come within the letter Of the New-York definition.
but arc they within its SPIRIT ESQ., how pub
lie condact be assed otherwise than in unbroken
psnegyric2 Here we hoped for light from the Su-