The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1845-03-28


sign the covenant which question the hrst part oil
nv argument disposed Off and, secondly, who Ia au-
thorized 10 assent the act ~ 10 VINO Perions o
act presume there 10 now no que s.on Una, 'no par
" 10 DO bound alone can do that. For just as 'ir
giDis or North Carolina by her own iDdePeDdentwii
and free agency became party TO this compact, so
Texas now, or the State that may come IN a thoa-
sand wears hence-will independent oil all help' do
the same thing, in the self-sans manner-oonsre's
conserving But there Is no mixture OF au'ho1ny u
act between Texas and ourself all inc co.Se"'
ours all the ratification aud adoption is hors.'
But II is already suspected that have over,
looked an important matter. l shall be reminded
that, companying the act by which the new
State comes under the Constitution, spd s'anu'
In union with the previous States, there are certain
provisions In the form oil terms ana lhciuens ~"
that the settlement Of these terms and incidents -
matter of treaty utterly deny that such provisions
are, in any sense treaty hold the contrary 70 oo
as demonstrabe as any proposition IN Enciid. bu'
let II be conceded 1t is treaty and nave only 10 re-
mind gentlemen Of the fact that the Trainers oil the
Constitution have given to Congress the power 10
make that particular treaty by which new State
is admitted into the Union" as they might have g"en
the whole treaty making power, II they had thought
proper TO do And having authority TO AUNT
Congress has discretion to admit or not admit the
new State Now, terms and incidents address them
selves To this discretion and where The discreuoh 3D.
there also, be the power TO decide upon these
terms and incidents. Who but Congress herself can
know how this that thing will affect her own DIS
cretioni How could Congress conceive purpose
from impulse IN the bosom Of the President and
Senate TO draw conclusion from ideas IN their mind
Preposerous! You might as reasonably SET two men
10 making the syllogism-one TO perceive the
premises without knowing any thing Of the conciu-
sion, the other 10 draw the conclusion without know
ing any thing OF the premises.
Nor can any rule OF strict construction be applied
restrict the power of Congress IN this matter The
rt.la at an
does not apply to questions OF power between the df
ferent departments OF Government, but between the
different sovereignties-the States and the Federal
Government. Between the departments Of the Fed
era Government the rule Of distribution is extremely
loose and powers greatly mix ed and nierchaDged
SO much So that Mr.. Hamilton says in the Federal
s that the maxim, TO separation Of departments,
amounts TO than that the "whole Of the le-
gislatiye power shall not be given to the executive
the whole Of the judicial to the legislative, &c. And
Mr. Webster, ia an able discussion of this subject,
says in language still stronger Than that of Mr. ii
that unsettled and indefinite is the rule to what
specific powers belong TO what department-"That
the mere denomination OF the department does not
confer on that department any powers whatever" IL
would be most unreasonable therefore, well as re-
pugnan TO authority, TO apply the strict rule here
But suppose il should be applied, what have to
fear from it, am the Constitution grants call
powers necessary and proper" &c; and those who
will look at the immense mass and variety of con-
suuctve power resulting legltimatey from the au-
thoIity to Establish post Offices and post roads," "a
constructive power, by which you institute great
cabinet officer with some twelve thousand sub
ordinates, and commit to the penentiary or the
sallows the people of the States for breach of
post office laws) will readily admit that the most
rigid construction would be sufficiently liberal
70 admit hundred times the power sought by in
the present instance But the rule of strict construc-
ton protested by the State Rights party is, in truth,
rule Of great liberality while that OF the Consoli-
datlon party one OF gross peryeIson and falsca-
ton and as such, we condemn it.
But let all this go for nothing | shall proceed
now to show, that If the Constitution has simply pro-
vded for the admsslbility Of States without saying
by wha, authority, the power would have naturally
lodged itself Just where the Constitution has placed
tin Congress-and not with the treaty making au-
thoritles. The power is in sense treaty power,
nor is the subject such as the treaty could ever act
upon
The received definition of treaty is this " A con-
tract between sovereipntes, which has the force of
law, but derives its obligation from good filth" This
definition is unobectionabie but as great astuteness
has been attempted, some how, to twist and disort
the matter, shall subject il to short analysis
The term, contract, must be taken in a proper
sense. There must not be mere reciprocal acts the
one done by one severed party the other BY the other
several party And it does not help the mat
Ter, That ttese several acts Of separate powers
are mutual consideration OF each other. The
act must be joint, TO be treaty. Congress may
make law respecting British imports in consequence
of law made by Great Britain respecting American
imports. And though we may intend to repeal ours
as soon as Great Britain has repealed hers yet there
IS no treaty. And it makes difference that SUCH
our legislation, resulted from authentic official infor-
nation communicated to the President by the British
Minister and by the President laid before Congress
The President continually lays before us such inor.
nation, and we frequently found legislation upon it,
ana although, In all such cases. there is manifest
understanding between the two nations, yet there is
no treaty. Legislation for the purpose of recipro-
CITY, Partakes no more of treaty than legislation for
the purpose of retaliation The act must be one and
joint, to be treaty. The treaty making power of
one nation cannot act except IN connection with the
same power Of another nation. In strctness it is but
sem-power, belonging wholly 10 neither We
have treaty making authorities, and England has
treaty.making authorities, but the power resides
among them as a body and, taken 10 body. thew
constitute sort of international legislature from
which special international laws proceed, binding on
those making them, and no Others
The treaty-makng authority, properly sneak.
ing, has no exclusive jurisdiction whatever
There Is no right OF the citizen connected with
our foreign relations, that Congress has not ;urs
dicton TO legslae for. If Great Britain sbonid
by act OF Parliament, commit it to the discretion
OF the United States, to regulate the matter of right
oil seafch boundaries, navigation, or any other mat
ter between The two countries, The treaty maxim
power here could not claim TO ex cude Cong,ess from
these SUBJECTS but on the contrary Congress could
and would necessarily, exclude the treaty authorities
The defect of jurisdiction in Congress does not relate
70 The subject matter, but the foreign person who
'hlerposlng an equivalent authority, contravenes
the action OF Congress-and thus makes an occasion
for treaty. and puts in requisltion the
power SO that whether our treaty making power ,s
to be resorted to or not depends upon what The other
nation does And lay it down, that the treaty pow
81 holds no jurisdiction as matter of right, bu, as
ne
the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress advances And
II the necessity should cease foreign nations might
cause II TO do, our treaty power would become 6,no
fus o6oo That is, If other nations should consen,
that the United States might regulate all matters of
ren. ana intercourse between their people and ours
Congress would at once Gust and slpplapt the hoIe
treaty-maklng authority. The treaty.makine an
thority holds its jurisdiction in respect of The ;h