The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1845-12-13
occur when duties are not laid for revenue; but for

occur when duties are not laid for revenue; but 10
the "protectiou merely Of favored interest.
In the deliberations of Congress on this subject
it is hoped thst spirit of mutual concession AM
compromise between conflicting interests may pre-
vail, aud that the result Of their labors may b.
crowned with the happiest consequences.
BY the constitution of the United States it is pro
vided, that ''no money shall be drawn from tn
treasury, but in consequence of appropriation
made by law" A public treasury was undoubt
edly contemplated and intended to be created, il
which the public money should be kept from th'
period of collection until need for public uses. IL
the colecto and disbursement Of the public mon
ey no agencies have ever been employed by law
except such as were appointed by the government
directly responsible 10 1t, and under lis control =
The safe keeping of the public money should b.
coniided to public treasury created by law, ano
under like responsibility and control II Is not tc
be imagined that the trainers of the constitution
could have intended that treasury should be crea
ted as place OF deposite and safekeeping of the
public money which was irresponsible to the gov
ernment The first Congress under the consti.
tution by the act of the second ofSeptember, 1883
.'to establish the Treasury Department" provided
for the appointment of treasurer. and made II his
duty sto receive and keep the moneys ofthe United
States, and "at all times to submit to the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Comptroller, or either oil
That banks, national or state, could not have
been intended to be used as a substitute for the
treasury spoken of in the constitution, as keepers
of the public money, is manifest from the fact, that
at that time there was no national bank, and but
three or four State banks ofhmited capital existed
| in the country. Their employment as repositories
was at first resorted to, to limited extent eut with
| no avowed intention OF continuing them perma-
nently, IN place of the treasury of the constitution
IL.
ployed, it was fIom motive Of supposed conve.
| nience.
| Our experience has shown, that when banking
corporations have been the keepers Of the public
money, aud been thereby made in effect the treas
ury, the government can have no guaranty that il
can command the use of its own money for public
purposes. The late Bank of the United States
proved to be fathless. The State banks which
were afterwards employed, were faithless. But q
few years ago, with millions of public money in
their keeping, the government was brought almost
to bankruptcy. and the public credit seriou sly i'm.
paired because of their inability or lndspositon to
pay, on demand, to the public creditors, IN the on
ly currency recognised by the constitution. Their
failure occurred in period ofpeace and great in-
convenience and loss were suffered by the public
from 1t. Had the country been involved in for
eign war, that Inconvenience and loss would have
been much greater, and might have resulted in
extreme public calamity. The public money
should not be mingled with the private funds Of
| banks or individuals, or be used for private pur-
poses When it is placed in banks for sofek eeping,
it is in effect loaned to them without interest, and
is loaned by them upon interest to the borrowers
from them. The public money is converted into
banking capital, and is used and loaned out for the
private profit of bank stockholders; and when cal
led for, Gas was the case in 1877 may be in the
pockets of the borrowers from the banks, instead
of being in the public treasury contemplated by
the constitution. The trainers of the constitution
never have intended that the money paid into the
treasury should be thus converted to private use,
and placed beyond the control of the government
Banks which hold the public money are often
tempted, by desire gain, to extend their loans
increase their circuaton and thus stimulate if not
prodoce spirit of speculation and extravaganza,
which sooner or later must result in ruin to thou
sands, Ifthe public money be hot permitted to be
thus used but be kept in the treasury and paid out
to the public creditors gold and silver, the temp.
taton afforded by its deposte with banks to an un-
due expansion of their business would be checked,
while the amount of the constitutional currency
left in circulation, would be enlarged by its en-
ployment in the public collections and dlsburse-
ments, and the banks themselves would in conse-
quence be found in safer and sounder condition.
Atpresent, State banks are employed as depos
tories, but without adequate regulation of law,
whereby the public money can be secured against
the casualties and excesses, revusions, suspensions
and dealcatioDs, to which, from issues, over
trading, an inordnate desire for gain, or other
causes, they are constantly exposed The Secre-
tary of the Treasury has in all cases. when it was
practicable taken collateral security Tor the amount
which they hold, by the pledge of stocks of the
United States, or such of the States as were in
good credit. Some Of the deposlte banks have CIV
en- this description of security, and others have
declined to do so.
Entertaining the opinion that "the separation of
the moneys OF the government from banking insti-
tutons is indispensable for the safety of the funds
OF the government and the rights ofthe people"
recommend to Congress that provision be made
by law for such separation, and that constitutional
treasury be created for the safe-keeping of the
public money. The constitutional treasury re-
commended Is designed as secure depository for
the public money, without any power to make
loans or discounts, or 10 issue any paper whatever
as a currency or circulation. | cannot doubt that
such treasury as was contemplated by the con-
sttution should be Independent of all banking cor
poratons. The money of the people should be
kept in the treasury of the people created by law,
and be in the custody of agents of the people cho,-
EN- by themselves, according to the forms OF the
constitution; agents who are directly responsible TO
the government, who are under adequate bonds
and oatbs, aud who subject to severe punish
ments for any embezzlement, private use, or mis-
application of the public funds, and for any failure
in other respects to perform their duties. To say
that the people or their government are incompe.
lent or not to be trusted with the custody of their
own money, in their own treasury, provided by
but must rely on the presidents, cash
iers, and stockholders of banking corporations not
appointed by them, nor responsible to them, would
be 10 concede that they are incompetent for self
government ,
In recommending the establishment of a consti-
tutiona treasury, in which the public money shall
be kept, desire that adequate provision be made |
by law for its safety, and that all executive dscre-
tion or control over it shall be removed, except
such as may be necessary in directing its disburse
ment in pursuance OF appropriations made by law. |
Under our present land system, limiting the min
mum price at which the public lands can be en-
Tered to one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre.