The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1845-05-05

cctaoiishtuent OF the ctate COnsutuuOn. Gan ~
fourth section OF the article referred TO presery
such Offices, entitle such causes 'skeep day"
# COURT Neither; nor for moment, in my opinion
Can II, then, abrdgc the duration of such offices,
abaie and put an end to such causes' IL is equal
a lmpotent, IN my opinion, to do either.
o The executive nor Legislative powers, constitute
v and established by Congress in the Territory {
Florida, nor the fnnctonaries administering eithel
can survive the change of government when sha
be effected because the effect OF the admission int
the Union is to vest those powers IN Offices create
by the substituted State government, and they
> be administered of course, by functionares of il
$ own appointment. The executive and legislativ
!, Jurisdictions will thus have passed away and III
Offices, therefore, which were constituted but TO Civ
! them practical efficacy, could not, by any means
or for any time, survive the disruption. But
most concerns US TO know whether. if at all. In
fourth section affects the duration Of the judicia
power vested in the territorial courts which wer
created by Congress, under its authority? II tn
power or any part Of it, survives it confers, an,
has, and keeps jurisdictions; and in the absence of
prohibition, mere implication would be enough /,
save the courts which would be essential to the ex
ercise Of that jurisdiction until their functions wer
supplied by substituted judicatures. But the ques
ton we have first 10 do with is what effect, i
any, the fourth section will have upon the Judi
cial power vested by Congress, and in the court.
which Congress constituted; or upon the jurisdic
ton which it gave to such courts; or upon the
officers appointed by the President and Senate, who
minister therein. After due consideration am moi
prepared TO attribute any effect in the premises to the
clause referred to in the constitution of Florida.
ascrbe the whole, such as it is, and be it what il
may, to the act Of Congress admitting Florida into
the Union. How far that act may be deemed to
affect those questions will be hereinafter considered
/ 1t may be said, that inasmuch the constitution
Of Florida has received the sanction of Congress
its provisions have derived therefrom all the weight
and authority rightly due to the act of Congress
w ad hat hxrr ha,
into the Union, imparting to, and accepting from
her, sovereign powers, and thereby giving to those
provisions activity and force, and putting them in
operation. Certainly il is fair to infer, and agree
its approval and has the impress of its authority;
but then these differences have their limitations and
restraints, and only be true and allowable in
those cases where Congreas has the right to exam
inc, and the Jurisdiction decide, and the power
reject, the several and particular provisions which
the instrument passed upon by Congress may con-
tain. Does Congress possess so large jurisdiction
in the premises that it may exercise supervisory
powers and discretion over State constitutions sub
mitted to Its approval without Imitation and there
fore without control have not read the consti-
tuition, and cannot think SO.
On the application of Territories to be admitted into
the Union as States, Congress may, indeed, admit
them, or refuse to admit them; but can it impose
any binding conditions of admission which are in.
compatible with that precise and indispensable equal
NY uiioHS c Ctdte5, III reference DOtn 10 the Sove
reignty parted with and the sovereignty reserved
which the constitution at once allows and requires
establishes and secures There is NO one practical
equality more precious or priced than the exclusive
ness of the power, inherent in every new State TO
determine for itself, without the et or hndrancen
OF Congress, what provisions its own constitution
shall contain, just every other State which has
entered into the Union has decided that question
aforetime for itself. Congress il, indeed to take
care that each State provides itself with ''republ-
can form of government" for none other could be
adopted 70 abide the restraints realize the priv
leges, which the constitution imposes in the one
case, and confers in the other. Beyond this and its
general acquiescence in the usual and essential re-
suits of substituting State for territorial forms of gov
ernment nothing, in my opinion, is to be inferred
from the admission or rejection of State, of the as
sent or dissent of Congress- either to the whole or to
any Of the particular provisions contained in its con-
stution, which can be regarded in any wise con-
elusive, or even as authoritative If future scruti-
MES shall make manifest repugnance of any of
them to the constitution, laws or treaties Of the
Union, would be past all the powers of Congress
70 protect, and hence nothing in the of admission
could save them from the penalties of nullity and
avoidance which the constitution itself and
iniiicts. On the other hand those provisions which
are free from such repugnance, and obnoxious to
no objections, derive and have all their force and
virtue from the conventions which established the
State constitutions, and the people who accepted
them, and none whatever from the imputed but i'm |
passive sanctions of Congress in admitting into the
Union the States which made them. If this were
otherwise, what else could follow, but that amend I
ments, made in State constitutions after the States
we're admitted into the Union, being without he
sanction of Congress, would be held as less author
tative and therefore of sghter obligation than the
provisions contained in them at the time thew were
admitted Such determinations would soon orgi.
nate the principle and arouse the incentive, and
hose influences being brought 10 bear would short
y thereafter introduce the practice of submitting
VI such amendments, 'and the State constitutions
to the revision and action Of Congress-
This would effect practical revolution of the gov
all sovereignty in centralism
and all that identity and distnctiveDess with these
states preserve in federation, together with all the
Inherent supremacy Of each in the powers they have
eseryed out of the grants which they made. would
disappear and be lost in the sameness and oneness
which would result from this centralizng urisdic-
ion over the municipal sovereignty of the States.
1ence do not think we can derive any aid in our
Examination from the saving provisions contained
the fourth section of the seventeenth article Of the
constitution of Florida and consequently that ifthe
ending suits and processes in the superior courts
! FLORIDA are TO be saved from abatement, and I
Keep day" therein, until the district court has been
rganized and put in operation, we must 20 in quest
authority elsewhere, and more adequate to the !
urpose in view.
The three acts of Congress cited in the paragraph
your letter, which have quoted, inform us Of
- 10 AZ With lhc Juuicdi power exlsung IN the
erritory of Florida was vested and of the iursdic
on they were possessed Of and before the act of
ne Sd of March, 1645, admitting Florida into the !
'non careful analysis Of these acts presents us
18th these results: ,
lst That Congress constituted and established in
le territory two superior courts, and vested the q
ldciai power in them "and in such inferior courts
~ justices OF the peace as the legislative council of
ie territory may from time to time establish I
"a. That, by virtue Of those acts the jurisdiction
n,errea upon the superior courts and which they
ana possessed Of at and before the pas
d to, may be summed up as follows: 2
1. The Jurisdiction derived from an act emit a
ca IAN act to establish the judicial courts of the
769 and the act entitled "An act in addition to tbe
7 entitled An act to establish the judicial courts
the United States,'" approved the Cd of March. n
f9ji both of which acts were extsnded TO- and ev.l
effect in, the Territory of Florida by the two acts
Congress you refer to--the one Of the 3Oth of 8
ARCH 1922 and the other of the Sd of March, 1924 ii
-