Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1845-02-14


New York and Pennsylvania, under the present
constitution, that assent was given, not by the
legislature, but by a convention of delegates,
chosen directly by the people for that single and
express object, and no other; and with authority,
therefore, to bind the people in a manner to winch
no other representative body was competent.
But it would seem to the members of this con-
venton that if any thing can be more clear than
the want Of all constitutional authority to annex
Texas to the United States it is that the form in
which such annexation is now attempted to be
brought about, is an undsguised and open viola
ton of express constitutional provisions.
A treaty, for the annexation of Texas to the
United States, was negotiated last year, between
the President of the United States and the Texan
government, and laid before the Senate, for its
constitutional ratification, at the last session of
Congress. 1t was sent, like any other treaty,
and required, of course, the concurrence of the
same proportion of Senators as other treaties re-
quire, two-thirds of all present.
A confidence, very i'll founded, as events have
shown, had been already expressed, and sgnif-
ed to Texas that the concurrence of that num-
Der of Senators was certain. After many weeks
of debate, the treaty was rejected by vote of
thirty-6ve to sixteen--it thus appearing that not
only had two-thirds of the Senators not voted for
it, but that two-thirds had voted aginst it.
Here was supposed to be an end Of the trea-
ty; but no sooner was Congress assembled, at
its present session, than joint resolution was in
troduced, declaring that this treaty, the ratiica-
ton of which had thus been decisively refused by
the Senate, the only body which could constitu-
tionaly give it ratification should, nevertheless,
become the supreme law of the land This
resolution is now pending modified in its form,
but providing substantially for the same object;
it has already passed the House Of Representa-
tives, and should it pass both houses, then an at
tempt will have been made and will have sue
coed, so far as the forms of law are concerned,
to ratify treaty by mere majortcs of both
houses, instead Of the constitutional authority of
the Stae.
We know not on what clsioH bad objects
have been more emphatcally pursued by bad
means or in which the recklessness Of the origi-
nal purpose has been followed up by grosser dis
regard of all constitutional and jus! restraint. If
this precedent prevail, the treaty making pow
err, as established by the constitution, is at an
end. 1t will be no longer for the Senate, the
great conservative and mostpcrmanent body of
the government, to act deliberately and gravely
on treaties with foreign States, to Judge Of them
in the light of its own wisdom, and under the
responsibility of its own high character, and to
grant its ratification, if the constitutional number
of senators present concur. The ratification of
treaties will become the business of party MAJ Or
tiles, temporary maorlties, it may be bare ma
jorities, of the two houses, acting under the in
auences, and liable to all the errors which may
occasionally affect the proceeding of such num-
erous assemblies.
Both the negotiation and the ratification of
treaties are, in their nature, parts Of the execu
tive power of government Wherever the exec
utive power is vested, there the treaty-naking
power ordinarily goes with it, and as part oft
There may, indeed, be limitations, introduced
for greater security; and in this case it is not
important whether we consider the Senate of the
United States as partaking, in these respects, of
the executive power, Or as being clothed, by the
provisions of the constitution, with special au-
thority in regard to treaties That authority is
established and does exist. 1t exists, in CONCUR
renee with the power of the president and if
the ratification of treaty may be made by ma
iorities of the two houses, the negotiation of a
treaty might as well be undertaken by the same
authority.
The House Of Representatives has legisla-
tive power and none other and whatever may
be the form Of resolution or law for the an
nexation of Texas, STILL as such resolution or law
must imply the assent of Texas, the thing to be
accomplished is plainly compact between indie
pendent governments 1t is, in its nature there
fore, convention or agreement between two
nations and convention or agreement between
two nations is treaty, and must I've sanctioned
in the way provided for all treaties
The entering into treaties with foreign nations
is a matter of the very highest Importance, often
attended with danger, and always requiring grave
deliberation. Yet the common good does re-
qure that governments should enter into such
treaties, for commercial and other Just and prop
er purposes. But while the power is granted
special limits and securities are also established
Senators are elected by States and an equal
number from each State; to decide upon treat
les is one of their express constitutional power;
and duties. No treaty with foreign power car
be ratified, unless two thirds of the senators con
cur in effect, unless two thirds of the States
concur.
Here is, then, constitutional guaranty, no
only that all treaties touching the general gooc
of the country shall be deliberately considered
but that nothing which may affect the rights, in
terests and authority of States, shall be done un
der the treaty making power, without the con
sent of two-thrds of the States themselves.
And it appears to this convention that if W.
can conceive of any bargain, compact or agree
ment with foreign State, under the authorit,
of the general government in which the States
as States have peculiar, most important ant