The daily union. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1845-1857, 1845-09-19
COMMUNICATIONS.
t For tho Union.
MR.. rNaERsoLL,s NEW WORK.
[cosrIsvED,l

[cosrMUED.
The second chapter opens with the following IN
teresting passages, relating to project 30 favor
ably regarded in those days, and not without its
advocates in the present:
.My historical sketch will begin with the first
session of the thirteenth Congress, May 1913,
when took my seat; that may tell only what
had occasion to know. But the events OF 1918,
IA and rs will not be Ineligible as II promised
by some preliminary account OF those OF lol2
The first chapter having explained the causes and
character of the war, this chapter will submit an
outline of the belligerent operations of the six
months Of the first year after its declaration.
'sTo conquer Canada was the promise and rei-
ance Of those who made against orders in coun-
Gil and impressment Nothing could be done by
sea, as was supposed; and one of the embarrass-
ments of the advocates of war, was that while de-
fensve against maritime aggressions, 1t must take
the appearance and bear the odium Of being aggres-
sive, for foreign conquest This false position was
especially hindrance, the constituted authori-
ties and majority of the people of the New Eng
land States were opposed TO the war, and denounced
the invasion of Canada az its worst direction and
effort. It's advantages and disadvantages were then
fully discussed; battalion them now, since the
design came to nothing, would be useless. A more
important historical consideration is whether our
plan of invasion was not wrong; beginning. with
blows aimed ut the branches instead of striking at
once at the root of English territorial and naval
power in America ~
(. "A project was then presented by very young
American officer, whose name will occur often
hereafter in connection with the most bril-
liant feats Of arms. project was present.
ed to Eustis, Secretary Of War, which he put
aside, with the rather contempuous remark that It
was very pretty plan. II predicated the enemy 8
resistess control of the ocean; and the probability
that NapoIeon's gigantic domination by land was
tottering its fall. To meet Great Britains supe-
~. her tha
States had but the skeletons of few regiments, and
a few frgates. The American seacoast would soon
be entirely bockaded, while our land operations du-
ring the first year Of hoslilities must be left chiefly
TO volunteers and militia How, then, should we
make what force we had be most effectually felt
Study of naval power shows that it does not depend
on ships but on seamen; that the nurseries of seamen
are commerce and fisheries; the naval marine de-
ponds on the commercial. In both, the United
States are second only to Great Britain, with ad-
vantages Of position which, with energetic action,
would enable them neutralize, if not Destroy her
transatlantic ascendency. France, when she pos
sessed the northeastern coasts Of America and ada
cent islands, employing thirty thousand seamen IN
the fisheries and the trade they nourshed, was
a full match for England at sea. AT that time the
American colonies fitted out an expedition which
besieged and took Louisburg, on Cape Breton,
finally exchanged for Madras at the peace of AK
Ia. Chapelle. At last, however, France lost those
possessions and with them the trident of the ocean
passed into the hands of Great Britain. North
American territories and fisheries the main pillar
of British naval power. With Nova Scotia and
Cape Breton to protect the Canadas, command New
foundand and the Gulf of St. Lawrence fisheries,
Great Britain is an insular fortress with these and
numerous other) outworks from which to project
ships Of war, like missile weapons, upon the wings
Of every wind with which to strike any quarter OF
the globe. Hemp and ship-timber for her navy
she may get from her North American colonies, as
well as from the north Of Europe; with her Ameri-
can fisheries and possessions, she can build, man,
equip, rig, arm, and ret her fleets altogether from
her own means. Bermuda is another outwork, by
means of which Mexico is controlled, nation that
never can be naval. While the United States act
on the policy of not interfering with foreign nations,
Great Britain, with Halifax in the northeast, and
Bermuda in the south, can put the Mexlcans, the
Indians, and her own marine, in positions TO act
against the United States BY Selling upon Hall
fax, the transatlantic faculties Of Great Britain
would be paralyzed; an entire revolution effected in
the commercial and naval power of the world Can
ada would fall, Of course, including Quebec, which
during six months, would be cut off by ice from all
European assistance. Montreal York, Kingston
Maiden, would also fall, of course. The Canadaa
would not only become parts Of the United States
but the empire Of the would be transferred from
Old England to New England. Halifax was the
great rendezvous and principal American station
with its large and excellent port, of British naval
power To wrest it from her, was simple, hOwev-
dlfcult operation, worthy the utmost exeruonS Oh
the American nation. It was the only place where
British vessel could be sheltered and retted with
perfect security, despatch, and convenience.
Z" In this confidential memoir, presented to
the Secretary Of War, Eustis, il was further
argued that the political influence of beginning
our hostlities by an expedition against Hall
fax, striking at the root, instead of wasting
strength in beating the air by blows at the branches,
Maiden, York, Fort George, Kingston, and Mont
real, might and probably would, be to unite all
parties in the United States, particularly Massachu
setts Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, in a
movement to depend for its success mainly on their
efforts if successful, TO rebound chiefly to their adj
vantage The commercial, northern and eastern,
parts Of the Union those opposed to the war
and to Madison's administration. Would not ar
intelligent and shapsghted population perceive, ir
this movement, motives for their rallying to the
standard of their country enabling government tc
unite and employ the whole moral and physical ca
pacity of the nation in the prosecution OF war, the
Justice Of which most acknowledged which, thus
directed would render its results especially profta
BILE TO the maritime interests, would vastly increase
their commerce, and give territorial counterpolst
to the southern preponderance by the recent admis
sion of Louisiana into the Union. Halifax, with
its fifteen thousand inhabitants, not as difficult
a conquest in 1872 as Louisburg in 1748, when the
people Of New England captured that wellar
fortress without English cooperation.
GAS a military measure, the mere movement of .
nearly the whole British force TO be concentrated
there, for the protection of Halifax thus strip the
whole coast Of blockadng ships-Quebec, Montreal
and all other places in both Canadas far from
the first named 10 Macknac, ofal but few troops
and leave those places at the mercy Of our troops
II we took Halifax, death-blow struck a
British American power as O diversion or demon
stration, the expedition would be more effectua
than any one or more we could send into Uppe
Canada.
'sThis project, of which the foregoing is fain
outline, was suggested, first to DR.. Eusts, whei
Secretary Of War, who merely said it was yer,
pretty plan; and afterwards to his in tina
department, Gen. Armstrong through COL Duane
but none ofthem rclished ii till Mr.. Monroe superse
ded Gen. Armstrong acting Secretary of War
Then il was seriously contemplated, and would prob
ably have been the plan Of operations for tn
campaign of 1915, but for the peace Of Client, il
December 1914. In the proper stage Of these his
torical membranes, ii will be more fully explained
At that time the young officer who suggested il, EN-
ployed as lieuenant-colonel commanding recruit
tn0 ndoov al Hartford IL, he,