Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1845-12-27

true honor and welfare OF his country.
JOURNAL COMMERCE OF DECEMBER IL.
The GREAT QUEsTIoN--The quiescent policy
recommended year or two ago by Mr.. Calhoun
in regard to Oregon, at the time a sagacous
policy, and would have secured to US eventually a
larger share of Oregon than shall be able to OBJ
tain at present, either by negotiation otherwise.
But that policy, conceive, is no longer applica-
Bile. The political waters are too much disturbed
TO admit of repose, without the removal of the ex-
citing cause The question must be settled
but HoO, is the great problem offered for solution
the statesmen and phianthropists of the two coun-
tries. 1t is to be denied that the failure Of the
recent negotiation, and the circumstances attending
it. have added TO the complication of the affair, and
rendered peaceabe adjustment of it more difficult
The blame of that failure must be heavy some
where and, as at present advised we fear large
share of it rests upon our own Government. We
have not yet seen the whole Of the correspondence,
1--WE suppose the remainder will arrive tonight, and
be published in our columns simultaneously with
this artice,) but il appears certain
/. That while the British Minister offered more
favorable terms than had been offered before,
the American Government offered less favorable |
terms than had been offered before.
Q. That when it became evident that there was
little prospect Of adjusting the dispute by compro-
mise the British Minister offered to submit it ar
American Government
g. That the negotiation was broken off by the
American Government, and not by the British Min
ister As preext for this act, 1t IS said that Mr..
Pakenham had made use Of offensive language.
Whether the fact be SO, the reader will probably
be better able to Judge when this sheet reaches him
than we are at present.
From these data, we infer that the responsibility
of the failure of the late negotiation rests chiefly
with our own Government We wish the case
were otherwise; but truth is truth, notwithstanding.
Had the overtures of the British Minister been met
in corresponding spirit had our Government adj
vanced instead Of rereating it is not improbable that
further concessions would have been made on be-
half of Great Britain; but the dead reco of those
first presented naturally discouraged any further at
tefnpts in the same direction The avowed object
Of the negotiation was adjust the dispute on terms
of compromise Compromise implies mutual
concession. 1t is true that neither party bound
by the concessions offered in former negotiations
yet it was reasonable TO expect that no proposition
less favorable than had been offered before would
now be made. Had Great Britain done this, it
would have been deemed little better than an insult
Why should we not be bound by the same rule 2
If either party had announced in advance its pur-
pose to deduct from the concessions it had formerly
made, without adding an equivalent in some other
way, may safely say that the negotiation would
not have been entered upon. Ii better that II
had not been entered upon, than to result as has.
And what does our Government propose in this
unhappy state of things Having virtually shut
the door, both to negotiation and reference, what
does it recommend substitute! Nothing dis
tncfly but, as a preliminary measure, il recon-
mends the giving of immediate notice to England
of our wish to terminate the joint occupancy This
being done, the joint occupancy will cease, accord
ing to the treaty, at the end of one year from
the date of such notice. After which each party
viii be at liberty to take possession Of any or all
Of Oregon, as it may see fit. The rest need not be
told: it will follow matter of course.
As the case now stands, we do not care how soon
the notice is given, being convinced that nothing
but the most urgent necessity if that, will in
duce an adjustment of the dispute on equitable
terms. Before such adjustment take place
each party must be prepared to make tohdt deems
liberal sacrifice because each, being accustomed
10 look only on its side Of the argument, and
not allowing sufficient weight TO the other, deems
its own title clearer and better than it is.
But, what folly for two great nations to rush &c
the verge of destruction with pretty fair chance
Of being precipitaed down the abyss) Just for the
sake of compelling themselves to do what they
ought to be willing and desire to do without com
pulsion How much better to be just, or even gen
erous, now, when they can do it with honor, and
with saving OF millions upon millions on the
score of expensel Even the preparation which
would and should be made in this country, if we
anticipate war with Great Britain, would cost us ar
outlay Of fifty millions. England is already arm
ing but as she is always obliged to keep extensive
land and naval forces in pay, she can prepare
without SO great sacrifice.
But what are sacrifices we may be asked, where
the national honor is concerned Nothing; bu
what thenl That word :. honor" is greatly abused
II is made pretext for half the wars and murders
and outrages Of all sorts, with which the world j.
filled. Doubtless our honor should be carefully
guarded; but let us be sure that what we call homo
is not infamy. We say man is honorable in hi
dealings when he takes no undue advantage Of hi
felow-man when he is willing to do justice as h
is to receive it. Nations are but companies of in
dyiduals. The public sentiment of the world pre-
nounces verdict Of approval upon generous acts q
individual nations, and condemns the opposite
When nation is so punctlious in regard to an ur
certain boundary. that, sooner than make reasons