The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1844-01-25
From the Southern PatiiO
THE APPOINTING POWER.

The Constitution has wisely placed the power Of
appointment to Office jointly in the Executive and Sc
aate. The purpose OF this was, doubt TO give the
initape Of this important function to that depart
in which presuppostd to reside the best capacity for
and opportunities Of choice Of the agents of political
authority, and to place the check against abuse OF
that power ia that branch of the Legislature, which
Of presumed experience and absence of party
impulses, would exercise II with most dignity and I'M
paraity. But il evident that this coordinate pow
Ter OF appointment does not work smoothly lorlioDs
of the Executive machinery of the Government
There is not al Jus counerpoise between them that
preserve the balance OF the Constitution The Exc
cutive has too little and The Senate large share
Of The appon ing power. The former is invested by
the theory of The Constitution with the entre adj nin-
istrali,e functions of the Government. In practice
these functions may be made ineffective by the action
| of that body which divides with the Executive the
tight TO clohe individuals with the attributes Of Office.
Now, if any principle in politics is firmly eslab-
lshed, it is that the unity vgor and systematic cha
racter Of all administration of government, depend in
the largest degree Executive freedom in choosing
the agents Of authority. The widest possessions OF
political rule in the ab-tact-the highest pow, r. of
dTt elton and command in Government must be derp,-
ed of iiue value and less utility, f the selection Of
the instruments of execution is ftequently largely
tramme ed. Administrative power mus, be known
and Eel, in its beneficial results by an aptitude of
to ends How is this to he attained ii the exc.
cution of public meas ures-if the service of the
Staeis committed 10 head with the view 10 uni
ty vigor and consistency and the power of counter
action in the choice Of agents is used by another and
dstinc, deposit, ry of political authority, between
which there happens to exist no political ympa,hy 2
Such government must IN experience present an
irreconccable anomaly-a practical contradiction,
whatever may be It's theoretical vir ur however wise
y balanced and adjusted may be the dferent parts of
its Constitution.
Ii would seem, them that the Senate cannot be con.
sdered ia any sound or practical view of he appoint
ing power, properly invested with any larger share
of discretion than embraced an impartial view of
the moral or intellectual fl ness OF the parties nomi-
mated for Office, who before 1t. The require
menls OF the Constitution are fully answeTed-the
safeguard of the public thoroughly provided for by
this Limitation OF Senatorial discretion. Political OPP
nons-abs,ract views of The powers and in u notions
OF that instrument- constitute Just Principle of To-
lection or exclusion from office. To act on a con-
trsry construction OF the Constitution and view Of
The foundations Of public duty-to assume that the
Senate can proceed TO exercise this branch Of lis
functions on other grounds than moral intellectual
incapacyon oiber conside aiions than an ten ated
damage To the public service, from he actual or pre-
sumed unfiness of those 1t IL called upon 10 cothe
with the authority and dignity Of otiice-s to make
party Impulses and not potfouc suggestions the rule
of public conduct-p render political resentmen's
stronger than the dictates OF public duty-o DESTROY
and not TO preserve this among the most important
balances OF the Constitution.