Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1844-02-24

4. No. 80.
objected to by some. who then took so
prominent part in lis favor. IF you have
not succeeded, there is at least some consO-
lation in rejecting that if others have since
changed, you now stand where you then
did, in the purer and better days Of the
party. ] was in favor Of it then, as am
now, not because ! consider the resolutions
as perfect. theoretically. as the existing pro-
visions Of the constitution, but because |
believe il would, in practice, more certainly
accomplish what the trainers of the consti-
tuition intended. But. while the provision
stands as it does, would regard myself
as little short of traitor TO that sacred
instrument should ! give my assent. d.
reciy or indirectly. to any practice which
would have the effect of divestng the
smaller States Of the due weight which it
secures TO them in the Presidential election.
And here let me add, that, as objectionable
as think Congressional CAUCUS for NOM
mating President, it is in my opinion, far
less so than a convention constituted as is
proposed. The former had indeed many
things to recommend it. Its members.
consisting Of Senators and Representatives.
were the immediate organs Of the State
Legislatures or the People; were response
bic to them respectively; and were for the
most part. of high character. sta 1ding and
talents. They voted per capita. and. what
is very important, they represented fairly
the relative strength of the respective
States In Ill these important particulars
it was all that could be desired for nomi-
mating body. and formed striking contrast
to the proposed convention; and ve, it
could not be borne bv the people in the
then purcr days of the Republic l. acting
with Gen. Jackson and most Of the leaders
Of the party at that time. contributed n
put it down, because we believed it to be
liable TO be acted on and Influenced by the
patronage Of the government--an objec.
ton far more applicable to convention
constituted as the one proposed than 10 a
Congressional caucus. Far. however, was
il from nv intention, in aiding to PIT that
down, to substitute in its place what re.
gard as an hundred times more objecti0na.
bic in every point Of view. Indeed, if
there must be an intermediate body be-
tween the people and the election, unknown
to the constitution. il may be well oues.
toned whether better than the old plan OF
a Congressional caucus can be devised.
In taking the ground have. in favor o.
maintaining the right secured to the smaller
States by the compromise Of the consttu-
ton. am actuated by no partisan feeling
or desire 10 conciliate their good opinion
IF the case was reversed. and the rights OF
tho larger instead nf the smaller were in
vaded, l would, with equal readiness am
frmness, stand up in their defence. ] an
the partisan of neither one nor the other
but simply supporter of the constitution
: and what | believe to he just and fair
, | regard the constitution as the only arl
of safety for all; and believe that in de
| Tending It, defend the interest and safet,
5 Of each and all, the greater as well as tn
smaller; the States invading the rights o
: others as well as the States whose right
2 are invaded
S have laid down the principle on whc
| rest the objection in question, with III
: limitation that the relative weight of III
u, States shall be maintained. making due
: allowance for their relative party strength
The proprietv Of the limitation is so ap
: parent that but few words, in illustration
. will be required. The convention is
; party convention, and professedly intcndc
: 10 take the sense of the party, which can
l not be done fairly if States having bu
; little party strength are put Oh an equalit!
{ with those which have much. If tina
r were done. the result might be that sma
= party from States the least sound, polii
I cally, and which could give but little SUP
: port in Congress, might select the cand
i date, and make the President. against
: great majority of the soundest, and o
e which the President and his administrative
5 would have 10 rely for support. All this
d clearly too unfair and improper 10 be dt
n MED. There may be a great difficulty
j applying a remedy in convention, but
r do not feel myself called upon TO say ho'
relative party strength If the respactiN
q States should be determined; perhaps Il
, best would be the relative strength
o Congress at the time. IL laying down Il
3 principle. added the limitation for t!
'. sake Of accuracy, aud to show how il
ID perfectly the party must be represeute
q when il is overlooked. ! see no prov.sr
l. in the proposed convention 10 meet IT,
ie But, in order to realize how the CONVEX
.. ton will operate, it will be necessary
1t view the combined effects of the ohie
'r lions which | have made. Thus We've
k il will be found that a convention 81 co
re struted tends irresisiibly to Capitalization.
VI, Capitalization of the control over !
f, Presidential election in the hands Of ie
I'd of the central large States at first, 81
o. finally in political managers Office hode
to and Office seekers; or, to express it ditTv
-, = 80,