The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1844-01-26
From the Southern Patriot
THE APPOINTING POWER.

The CONSTITUTION has wisely placed the power of
appoint office Jointly in the Executive and Sc
The purpose of this was, doubt to give the
Initiative of this important function to that department
in which presuppos TO reside the best capacity for
and opportunities of, choice of the agents of potca
authority, and to place the check agans, abuse o
that power in that branch of the Legislature, which or
unit Of presumed experience and absence of party
impulses, would exercise it with most dignity and I'M
partiay But Is evident that this coordinate pow
er of appontmen mt does not work smoothly PORTIONS
of the Executive machinery of the Government
There is not { Just erpoIse between them that
preserve the balance OF the Constitution. The Exc
cuve has too little and the Senate too large share
uf the appoin ing power The former IL invested by
the theory of the Constu ION, with the entire admin
istrative functions of the Government In practice
these functions may be made ineffective 10y tie action
of that body which divides with the Executive the
hight TO clothe individuals with the attributes of Office
Now, if any principle in politics is firmly eslab
lished il is that the unity, vlgor and systematic cha
racer OF all administration OF government, depend IN
the largest degree, Executive freedom in choosing
the agents Of authority. The widest possessions OF
political rule in the alb tIact-the highest pow, rs of
direction and command in Government must be deem
ed of little value and less utility, # the selection of
the instruments of execution is frequently largely
trammel ed. Administrative power must be known
and elt in its beneficial results 10y on aptitude of
ends. How is this TO be attained II the
cution of public measures-It the service of the
State-is committed TO head with the view TO uni-
,y vgor and consistency, and the power of counter
action in the choice of agents is used by another and
distinct depost,ry Of political authority, between
which there happens TO exist political sympathy 2
Such government must in experience present an
irreconcileabe anomay-a practical contradiction,
whatever may be it, theoretical virtue, however wise.
ly balanced and adjusted may be the different parts Of
its Constitution.
1t would SEEM then, that the Senate cannot be con-
sdered in any sound or PRACTICAL view Of the appoint
ing power properly invested with any larger share
Of discretion than is embraced in impartial view Of
the moral or intellectual iness of the parties nom
mated for office, who come before it. The require
menls OF the Constitution fully answered-the
safeguard OF the public IL thoroughly provided for by
this limitation of Senatorial discretion. Political OPP
Mons abstract views Of the powers and injuncons
Of that MISUNDERSTANDING Just principle Of
lection or exclusion from office To act on a con-
trary construction Of the Constitution and view Of
The foundations OF public duy-to assume that the
Senate can proceed to exercise this branch of It's
functions other grounds than moral or Intellectual
inca J,ciy-on other considerations than antcit aed
damage the public service fon he actual or pre-
stunned unf of those it is called upon to cothe
with the authority and dignity of oifce-is to make
party impulses and not patrol suggestions the rule
Of public conduct-to render political resentments
stronger than the dictates OF public duty-io destroy
and not TO preserre this among the most important
balances Of the Constitution.