The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1844-02-02

all cases funded on compact, 10 which he consent
OF each State required, Ia the absence Of compact
the invarabic mode Of voting such States, Is, in
all cases. BY the majority. their vote counting one.
The course which Virgins has resolved 10 take, is in
violation Of this plain aud funda mental rule, aud Il IL
should become settled practice, would be destruc
tive Of the foundation which the whole structure
Of the State Right doctrine is reared
hold IN the next place. TO be an Indispensable
principle that The Convention should be consttu
ted, ~ 10 give to each State, in the nomination Of
candidate, the same relative weight which the Con-
stution secures To II In the election Of the President
making due allowance for IFS relative party strength
BY the election, ! IA, an the whole--the eventual
choice when 1t goes into the House of Representa-
lives, as wtl as the primary vote in the electoral
college. The one is much part Of the election
the other The two make the whole The adop-
ton Of the one, in the Convention which framed the
Constitution, depended the adoption Of the other.
Neither could possibly be adopted alone. The two
were the Result Of compromise between the larger
and smaller States, after long and doubtful strug-
gle, which threatened the loss Of the Constitution
ITSELF The object Of giving to the smaller States
equstyIwnh the larger in the eventual choice by the
House was to eoua.srposs the preGonderance Of the
smaller would have voted against the whole provision,
and its rejection would have been the consequence.
Even as stands, Delaware voted against IT, In
hrmaton Of what state, refer to MIR. Madison's
report on the proceedings Of that Convention.
Having stated what mean by the election, il will
require but few words TO explain my reasons for
the principles have laid down. They are few and
simple, and rest on the grounds that the nomination
IS In reality The election, il concurred in far
the party is concerned II is so intended TO be- The
leading reasons assigned for making it, is to prevent
division OF the party aud thereby prevent the cleo
ton from going INTO the House, where the smaller
States would have the advantage intended TO be
cured TO them by the Convention by being placed on
an equality with the larger.
Such being the intended object and effect | now
submit to every candid mind, whether the Conven-
ton ought not to be constituted to compensa e,
IN the nomination. for the important advantage in the
election which the smaller States would surrender by
going into q Convention. Would il not be unfair-a
pslpable want Of good faith and subversive Of the
compromise Of the Constitution to withhold IL Or,
If demanded, would il be short Of insult to refuse
il Can it be thought that the smaller States are so
debased and absorbed in the party politics of the day.
as to permit themselves to be thus indirectly stripped
OF right which their high minded and patriotic
cesors held so DEAR to prefer the loss Of the
Constitution itself, rather than surrender it ,
object, then, to the proposed Convention, in this
connection because il makes no compensation 10 the
smaller States for the ender of this unqueston-
able and important constitutional right Instead Of
that its advocates peremptorily and Indignantly
fuse any, and treat with scorn every attempt 10
cure il. Some have even gone so far deny that
the eventual choice of the House constitutes any
portion Of the election and to manifest open hostility
against the provision of the Constitution which con-
tains II.
IL there was other objection, the one under con-
sideraton would be insuperable with differ
utterly from the advocaes Of the proposed Conven-
ton, IN reference to this provision. ] regard it
OF the first Importance, not because desire the
election to go into the House. but because believe
to be an indispensable means, in the hands of the
smaller States, of preserving their just and consu-
uonal weight in the Presidential election and through
that in the Executive Department and the Govern
meht itself, which believe TO be essential TO the pre-
servation OF our sublime federal system. ! regard
the adjustment of the relative weight Of the States in
the Government TO be the fundamental compromise
of the Constitution, and that which whole po
iitical system depends. Its adjustment consi ued
the great hculiy in for ning the Constitution. The
principle on which it was finally effected was, that,
while due concession should be made to population,
aprovision should be also made, in some form, to
preserve the original equality Of the States In every
department OF the Government The principle was
easily carried out IN constituting the legislative de-
Parmen by preserving the equality of the States in
one branch, (the Senate) and concedng to population
its full Preponderance in the other. But the great
and difficult task Of Of reducing TO practice was, in
the Executive Department, at the head Of which
there IS but single officer. So great it, that it
occupied the att, ntien Of the Convention, from time
10 time, during the whole session, and very near
causing failure at last Ii would have been easy
task to constitute that department. either the prn
ciple OF the equality Of the States in the Government
or that OF population. To combine the two in the
election oil single officer quite different affair
but however difficult, it had to be performed at the
hazard of losing the Constitution.
IL was finally accomplished, by giving TO the larger
States nearly the same preponderance in the electoral
college, as they have in the House, and 10 the small
err in the event of choice by the House, the same
equality they possess IN the Senate thus following
closely the analogy Of the Legislative Department.
To make 1t as close possible, il was at first pro-
posed to give the eventual choice 10 the Senate, in
stead Of the House, but it was altered and the pre-
sent provision adopted for reasons which did not af
feet the principle
1t was believed by The famers, the practical ope
ration Of the provision would be- that the electoral
college, IN which The influence OF the larger States
preponderaes, would nominate, and that the House
voting by States, where their equality is preserved
would elect who should be the President. To give
that operation In practice, the provision as II orr
ginaliy stood in the Constitution, that each cleo
tor should vote for two individuals without dscrimi-
mating which should be President, Vice Pre- ident
and IL no one had majority OF the whole votes, then
out OF the five highest, the House voting by States
should elect one, and the person not elected, having
the highest number of votes, should be the Vice Pre-
sident IL has been since altered, that the cleo
tors should designate which should be Pr sdcbt and
which Vice President, and The selection Of the House
was limited to the three highest II is manifest, that
II this provision Of the Constitution had been left TO
operate by ITSELF without the Intervention Of
&c, or party conventions between the people and the
election, that the practical operation would have
been such as have stated, and such as clearly
intended by the trainers Of the Constitution.
The object intended is important. The preserva-
ton OF the relative weight Of the States, estab-
shod by the Constitution IN all the Departments, IL
necessary TO the and duration OF system
OF Government, but il may be doubted, whether the
provision adopted 10 effect it in the Executive De
partmeDt, Is not too refined for the strong aud may
add, corrupt passions which the Presidential election
will ever excite Certain Il is, that if the practice OF
nominating candidates for the Presidency by Con
yeniious instituted as they proposed shall become
the established usage, II will utterly defeat the in
tenton of the trainers Of the Constitution, and would
be followed by radical aud dangerous change, not
only in the Executive Department, bu, in the Gov.
,t..l(