Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1844-02-08

WdS dIl tndt COulu De desired Tor "A Nominating
body, and formed striking contrast to the pro.
posed conventions; and yet, it could not be borne
by the people In the then purer DAYS of the Re
public. j, acting with Gen. jackson and most
OF the leaders OF the party at the time. con,ribu
ted to putt down, because we believed is To be
liable to be acted on and influenced by the pa,ro-
mage OF the Government--an objection far more
applicable 10 a convention constituted as the one
proposed, than TO u Congressional caucus Fnr
however, was II from my intention i'm aidinu To
put that down, 10 substitute in its place what |
regard as an hundred times more objectionable i'm
every point OF view. Indeed, if there must be
an Intermediate BODY between the people and the
eiecuep, unknown To the Constitution, il NAV be
well questioned whether better than the old plan
oil Congressional caucus can be devised.
In taking the ground | have, in favor of main-
tanning the right secured TO the smaller States by
the compromise of the Constitution, am actua,ed
oy no partisan feeling or desire to conciljate their
good opinion. Ii the case was reversed and the
rights OF the larger. instead of the smaller were
Invaded, would with equal readiness and firm.
ness, stand up IN their defence. | am the par,i-
san oi neither one nor the Other, but sim,,ly Il
supporter OF the Constitution and what | brli,ve
| 10 DE just ana TAR. regard the Constitution as
The only ark OF safety for all, and believe thai in
defending 1t, defend the interest and SAFETY "a
each and ai--the greater as well as the smaller
me States invading the right of the Others, as
Wen as the States whose right are invaded.
nave laid down the principle. on which rest
tue opjecton In question, with the Limitations that
The relative weight of the States should be main
'aned, making due allowance for their relative
party strength. The propriety VI the Limitation
Is so apparent, that but few words, i'm ilIus,ra-
ton, will be required. The Convention is a mar
" Convention, and p:oiessedly intended to take
the sense OF the party, which cannot be done
'a'ry' u States having but little party strength
are put on an equality with those which have
much. If that were done, the result might be-
mat a small portion of the party from States the
ieast sound, politically, and which could give but
',.,e support In Congress, might select the can
oidate, aud make the President, against a great
majority OF the soundest, and on which the Pre-
siuent and his administration would have 10 relv
Tor support. All this is clearly too unfair and inn
proper to be denied. There NAY be a great diff
culty In applying remedy in a Convention, hut
DO not ieti myself cailt upon to say how il can
be done, or by what standard the relative party
strength OF the respective States should be deter
mined; perhaps the best would be their relative
strength In Congress at the time In layinu
| down The principle, added the Limitation for the
sake OF accuracy, and to show how imperfectly
,he party must be represented, when it is over
( looked. see no provision In the proposed Con-
vcniIon TO meet il.
! But, In order TO realise how the Convention
VIII operate, IT will be necessary to view the
combined effects of the objections which have
maze. mus viewed, it will be found, that Il
Convention so constituted tends rresstiby To
cehirdllzalion--centraliZ Of the control over
The Presidential election in the h nds of few of
''e central, large States, at first, and finally i'm
Poi'icai managers, oilice-hulders aud olfce-seek-
eIS; or to express it differently. in that portion of
we community, who live, expect TO live on the
government, IN contradistinciIon To the great
mass, who expect To live on their own means or
'heir honest Industry; and who maintain the Co
refGmen'' and politically speaking, are emphatcal-
: ly the people.
That such would he the case, NAV be inferred
from the fact. that il would afford the means TO
some SIX or seven States lying contiguous and
no' Tar from The centre of the Union, to control
me nomination. and through that, the election,
by concentrating their united votes in the Cor
veh"on' Give them the power of doing SO, and
IL would not long lie dormant What NAV be
zone by combination, where the temptation is so
great, VIII be sure ere long to be done. To com
pine ana conquer is not less true as a maxim
where power is concerned, than to I" Divide and
conquer" Nothing is better established, than
that the desire for power can bring together and
unite the most diScordant materials.
Dat me tendency to Capitalization will not stop
mere. The appointment of delegates, en- massc,
ny stale Convention, would tend at the same
Nihe' ana even with greater force, to centraiiZe
TINS control in tho hands of the few, who make
polillcs trade. The farther the Convention is
removed from the people, the more certainly the
cohiroi over 1t Will be placed IN the hands of the
Interested few, and when removed three or four
degrees as has been shown it will be- where the
appointment is by State Conventions, the power of
the people Will cease, and the seekers of Execu-
tive favor will become supreme. At that STAGE
an active, trained, and combined corps will be
ioI'heu IN Inc party, whose whole time and atten-
uon VIII be directed to politics. II will be their
sole business. Into their hands the appointments
oil delegates, In all the stages, will fall and they
VIII take secial care that none but themselves OF
and .hfsyiI
appointed. The Central and Stale Conventions
VIII De hHcd by the most experienced and cunning
ana after nominating the President. they will lake
good care to divide the patronage and Offices both
OF Tie General and State Governments, amonr
themselves ard Their dependents. But why saw
'cH? is 1t not abeady tie case? Have there moi
been many instances OF State Conventions beinr
iiIied by Oihce-hoders and Office seekers, Who af-
Ter making the nomination. have divided the Offices
ID the State among themselves and their paTiZans
ana joined In recommending 10 the candidate
whom they have just nominated, 10 appoint them
10 The chces TO which they have been respective
" allotted 1T such be the case in the infancy
OF The system, 1t must end, if such Conventions
should become the established usage, lin the pres-
ioenl nominating his successor. When il comes
10 mat it will not be long before the sword will
Take the place of the Constitution
Such are my objections to the mode in which
me proposed Convention is TO DO constituted and
my reasons for entertaining them. Thew are
such, that ] cannot refuse to obey them without
renounclng the principles which ! have often a.
vowed IN public and private, and which have
guided me through the whole course of my public
life.
In coming TO this conclusion, have not passed
over, without careful examination, the reasons as
signed by It's advocates for constituting the Con
venllon as they propose. They have not dimin-
ished the force of my objections ] propose to no.
tice the most prominent.
That which they have urged with the greatest
confidence, IS that each State has RIGHT to APP
upl CHI nj