Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1844-02-10


r,,;aad t,o modes nf slcc.ing President fi's, Tue
,,.,nn, IS 10 be made 10 eject him through fePtse"
lives nearly representing Tue "he pp'' " =,
nor,on Of Federal uumbsrs, al" si'hl" tia' !" = u"
=, NJ ,an,a by the House Of Representatives, IN winch
10 49,, =; ,k.u bg State, each STATE castny but one
vot. and t,us being equal. BY certain contfvances
no,ber Ridden Ell nnrd by the C"nsutuoh' lhe
LARGER States have Tunased to vote by S'ars, ana ~
rho propnrtIon Of their e,tre representation III o''a
uo,spa OF Congress; IL saccrssfu 10 This attempt, a"
election OF Pres dat ~ the result ri ms 'iire mate
connexion between the popniar and FedriaaEr P''h-
ciol.s OF our Govern acct Bat experience ha' eh"''b
"a at 10 the success nt tgS ID" Of eject ni Siotei
ooattivance necessary and ,hs IS C"uvrntn ~ if
p.ry TO nominate candidate up,a whoa M are 10
unite, otherwise, asV's."ns '"ly carry '"r ef'' :"
the House OF Representa- vs.. IA WHICH s'H'' ie
small States ~lli have much power a. ts 'aIEe -
Il Is indispensable To success thit ne S'i'et 9'""s
should agree Il such C'hsent'"', aaa suph'' u
Is decs ons Tney afe ASKED 10 c'!ee@@ g'.a'
mower nothing lsss than equal Toice IL the ei coi
Of Presd.nt Waa equivalent IS - be oiisfed ''iF N
ar snch concession: Mr.. Van Barren has himself
said There reason Ia believe that they VIII
ever consent to give up the power iaey now h"Vt'
without any equivalent ,cttioat resT 10 tte primer
p,c upon ,chich the Constitution uaS tonnatd-Mat 81
COMPROMISE The eqciy@l-nt with who" ih-y would
he satisfied with which they ou2ht 70 BE- sasiltd -
THE BREAKING UP OF THE CONSoLiDa ED
STRENGTH OF THE LARGE STATES, on Tue
ESTABLISHMENT OF TiiE DIS ,h'Ci sis-
TEN is IN ruin titrfors. for grat'ems" 10 be, or
N affect IL BE- aror IF taking he etttton Jro'a NE
I, House, UNLESS THEY ARE WILLING TO DO
THAT ALSO, WITHOUT WHICH THE LEA D.
ING OBJECT CANNOT BE EFFECTED : ,ci'h-
on. Mat, ALL Is EMPTY PROFESSION. Ne must
for the purpose Of tie election. ma.e oil the States 81
the same sac ,chieh ,cead be the effect Of The District
Spstem, and then, AND THEN ONLY, can We give
the election Of President and Wee PRESIDENT y II
PEOPLE, PRESERVE THE PURITY OF TIE
SYSTEM, AND, IN REALITY. RESTORE The
BALANCE OF POWER AMONG TIE STATES
TO THE FOOTING on WHlCH II SlOO) a
THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
The true grounds oi COMPROMISE are here 81 accu-
rately stated aud their ins;ce Is maH,es that We
scarcely need enforce them. Ualess then the large
States agree TO "break up their consolidated strength
by adopting the Distrc, System IN the Convention,
how can they xpec tae Southern aad the Smaller
States (for this respect their Interests are !tnca}
to Weld a power Important that OF an sqra ace
IN the Presidential election: II - van - say that sneh
equality ought To have been admitted III me
Constitution. II is o! ts c"rnnro:nis's--onc OF the
conditions of the Of the smaller STATES 10 ;he
Confederacy-,t amongst the most important OF their
chartsred and conventional rights They have rish
10 expect equivalent when they yield such power
and they offer liberal terms t. The larger States when
they agree yield upon the democratic pr!ncipie, OF
n nomination BY the people. without representation
b2 Districts in that Convention, here eau be no nc
rnina,ion By the people, and whilst netting can be
achieved for The progress of the popular principle We
substituting rev, 1nc uneqoai feosia!!'e asso
citation.
But it may b, asked, why should the smaller States
be the especia! advocates oil the nomination OF PIES
dent through representatives elected BY the people, ana
of the vot. by single DISTRICTS which is to gre The con-
troll Of the Convention TO majority Of the American
people taken as a whole? 1t might be sufficient an
swer why the larger Safes SHOULD object to such
compromise The mailer propose II: but the ques-
ton deserves direct reply The desire TO eject
the By the people ouh. II be the
whether consider the United Sta'es as one people,
or as several communities, and ought 10 be as strong
IN the la-gc tie small States For, otherwise, We
repose this immense trust IN the lnnGs oi an frsio"-
siba ogarchy, and destroy one OF the mast important
of the Dem ocra,ic elements oil Constitution.
But why should the smaller States desire the sense
of the American people III be taken as whole, and not
by it's distinct communities constituting t!e different
Staes and If go why do they not offer II resign the
Two votes given 10 each State addition 10 It's proper!
ton according TO federal numbers: II there be any
reason to desire the people to vote upon tins SUBJECT rs
one people the same would also induce the WISH
that no other than general or national considerations
should govern that vote AS Stale organizations, ana
the necessary DIVISION o.! people Into communities
for other objects would always afford strong tempta
ton sectional rather than nationsl CONSCIENTIOUS
the additional two votes may be justly considered as 90
more than n and safe ynart
10 the smaller States and weaker section, against the
dangers of improper combinations, to wh'ch they are
peculiarly exposed the preference o the smaller
States for an Executive representing the American
people rs a whole, the present mode, Is easily ex-
planned They only ask, that whatever prnciple be
adopted the Presidential election shall be CONSIST
emily followed They are wiling to an election upon
the federave principle defined in the Constitution,
f that be the preferred mode. /! the OF the
pie upon this subjec, is to be taken by communities, The
Constitution has established that 'he strength of shes-
communities shall be equal H. however, tins node be
objected 10, not sufficiently Democratic They are
wilng to tn. change, ,f that principle be really and
consistently adopted. They ONLY ask, then, that, IN
conformity with It, the nomination shall be made by
majority of the whole people, aud not 5y separate com
munes, voting Stat-s nnd with unequal pawers.
t,a ohio al he Ia par
the Democratic principle into the Executive feature OF
our Constitution, IL M. that end u be attained more
readily by their propoS,,on, than by The scheme now
favored in the larger Sta,esa To deveops the causes
which render the executive influence the best cacula
ted Of all in form al Federal Government 10 induce
coamcn spir; aud affection IN our people, or 10 She"
how this Influence becomes more efficient 10 this end,
in proportion II emanaes itnly and directly
from the will OF the American people taken whole,
would carry far beyond the proper limits Of this ad
dress II such we're the OF the power OF the
President in order to secure and enlarge lis basis, he
would find it necessary to cultivate common spirit
and harmonious feeling, in, al least all The party ID
which he belonged
Amid the conflicting interests and intentions OF 80
many, the rule Of ns;,ce would probably be his guide,
would afford The only safe and Of recon-
cling differences and alaying heats Ia SO great
power directed by such disposition, the smalss, States
and weakest sections would find valuable defence,
and the necessity for daily compromise, would beget
feeling which would preserve the harmony of the party
anu the country, oy administering eihitJ III ca9ss
differences, sprngIng either from sentiment Or IT.
icret, for which the fundamental law cannot adequate
ly provide, and which must he adjusted they arse
What inducements are offered TO the Southern, ana
what TO the smaller States, to occede to the PROPOSED
organization OF tS Convention, The South see IN ",
the perpetual exclusion Of favories from the Pres
dency; for although c:ery non-savehojlng State
should be federal still would those States control The
nomination Of Republican Convention. The smaller
States see themselves stripped, only of their char
tered rights but CT the natural advantages aris-
ing from their better chances of union by the scheme
of consolidating the vote OF the larger Statee ana
The people the right of popular fepIeseha.o" oe
MED and The evsieo, Of convention representing con
yen,,on SO often repeated, that at last no constituent
knows IS and no Ltatse can de-
signa;e his constituents -
What possible ground of preference can the smaller
States have for this mode Of electon that by the
House of Representatives, Does IT secure greater
purity diminish the chances for intrigue IN the Pre-
s;dental Election Far from ii. Objectionable as the
House of Representatives may be Electoral body