The Evansville journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1834-184?, 1844-02-15

In taking the ground have, in favor of
maintaining the right secured to the smaller
States by the compromise of the Constitu-
ton, am actuated by no partisan feeling or
desire to conciliate their good opinion. If
the case was reversed, and the rights of the
larger, instead of the smaller, were invaded,
would with equal readiness and firmness,
stand up in their defence. | am the parti-
san of neither one or the other, but simply
supporter of the Constitution, and what |
believe to be just and fair. | regard the
Constitution as the only ark of safety for all,
and believe that in defending it, defend
the interest and safety of each and all--the
the greater as well the smaller-the States
whose rights are invaded.
have laid down the principle, on which
/ rest the objection in question, with the linn
itation, that the relative weight of the States
should be maintained, making due allowance
for their relative party strength. The pro-
priety of the limitation is so apparent,
that but a few words in illustration will
be required The Convention is party
Convention, and professedly intended to
take the sense of the party, which cannot be
done fairly, if States having but little party
strength, are put on an equality with those
which have much. IF that were done, the
result might be be, that small portion of
the party from States the least sound, polit-
ically, and which could give but little sup
port in Congress, might select the candidate.
and make the President, against great ma
llority of the soundest and on which the Pre-
sident and his administration would have to
rely for support. All of this is clearly toe
unfair and improper to be denied. There
may be great difficulty in applying a rene
dy in Convention, but do not feel my
selfcalled upon to say how it can be done, o'
4 by what standard the relative party strength
of the respective States should be determine
ed; perhaps the best would be their relative
strength in Congress at the time. In laying
4 down the principles, added the limitation
for the sake of accuracy, and to show how
4 imperfectly the party must be represented
when it is overlooked. | see no provision
in the proposed Convention to meet it.
But, in order to realise how the Conven
ton will operate, it will be necessary IL
view the combined effects of the objection:
which have made. Thus viewed, it will
be found that Convention so constituted
t tends inesstbly to centralization-central
ization of the control over the Presidential
election in the hands of few of the centrol
: large States, at first, and finally, in politics
7 managers, Office holders and Office seekers
: or to express it differently, in that portion c
: the community, who live, or expect to iv
on the government, in contradistinction t
D the great mass, who expect to live on thei
t own means or their honest industry, and VIII
: maintain the Government, and POLITICAL
2 speaking, emphatically the people.
e That such would be the case, may be in
: ferred from the fact, that it would afford tn
: means to some six or seven states lying col
4 tiguous and far from the centre of the Unior
to control the nomination, by concentratin
N their s.ssitDv votes, IN conventions. Civ
) them the power of dong so, and it woul
) not long lie dormant What may be don
!, by combination, where the temptation is s
It great, will be sure ere long to be done. ]
e combine and conquer is not less true as
1t maxim, where power is concerned, than t
n '.Divide and conquer" Nothing is bette
Of established than the desire for power ca
Y bring together and unite the most discordal
e materials.
n But the tendency to Capitalization will nc
/ stop there. The appointment of delegate
: en- masse by State Convention, would tenC
y at the same time and even with greater fore
1t to centralize this control in the hands of ii
Il few, who make politics trade. The FART
/ err the Convention is removed from the PEI
n pie, the more certainly the control over
j. will be placed in the hands ofthe intereste
D few, and removed three or four degrees, as
e has been shown it will be, where the appoin
If ment is by State Conventions, the power
e the people will cease, and the seekers {
e Executive favor will become supreme. A
u that stage, an active, trained and combine
e corps will be formed in the party whose Who'll
n time and attention will be directed to POI
is tics. 1t will be their sole business. In
} their hands the appointments of delegate
I in all the stages will fall, and they will tax
c. special care that none but themselves
J. their humble but immediate dependents sha
IN be appointed. The central and State CONVEX
as tons will be filled by the most experience
u and cunning, and after nominating the Pr
u sident, they will take good care to divide Il
re patronage and Offices, both Of the Gener
of and State Governments, among themsely
lie and their dependents. But why say sril
or Is it not already the case? Have there n
n been many instances of State Conventiol
or being filled by office-holders and office-see
n, ers, who, after making the nomination, hay
as divided the Offices in the State among ther
~ selves and their partizans, and joined in /
r. commencing to the candidate whom the
re have just nominated, to appoint them to u
a. offices TO which they have been RESPECTIVE
10 ly allotted. If such be the case in the
IT. fancy of the system, il must end,