The Ohio Democrat. [volume] (Canal Dover, Ohio) 1840-1900, 1844-02-01


legislation. ,-.
There are times of excitement and great popular
commotion, when principle and prudence are merged
in the convulsions OF the hour The Representatives Of
the people and States become infected by sympathy
and their legislation does not result from calm debefa
tion, and dspassonae reflection but is characterized
by indscretion and folly, instead of wisdom Here the
President from his elevation above the tumul beneath
him, cody nteposes calls upon Congress to reconsider
their hasly and ndiscree acts re-enac by majority
OF WohTds Teach House; abandon them altogether
or refer them to the sober second thought OF the reo
pe." And it is remarkable fact worthy to be noted
here that never yet have the people failed in their sober
second thoughts to sustain Presidents appeal of this
description.
s. Because, we regard the Veto power as the great
protective power agansegslave violations ofhe con-
stitution an essentially democratic feature of our
constitution and government and as the great reliance
OF the people against oppression and disregard of their
rights by an unjust and factious party congressional
majority; and because the main argument for the abo-
lition fthe veto power, namely that popular maor
ties should always prevail and control would apply
with equal force to the abolition of the Senate and the
Judiciary, in the election appointment of neither2of
which does the element of direct popular majority enter
at ALL e If then the argument is good to abolish the We
to power of the President it is equally good to abolish
the dissenting veto ofhe Senate which is the Senatorial
veto upon the acts of the House and the power of the
Judiciaryto declare law ofCongress unconstitutional
and void which is the Judicial veto upon the legislative
acts of the President and both Houses OF Congress
This argument Of popular majorities would in fact de-
stroy the whole constitution and system of government
established under it. and sweep away Senate President
and Judiciary, leaving the House of Representatives
the only remnant nthe general wreck of government
which, as now stands complex yet simple composed
ofmany, yet harmonously unites into one, with one
common will, the unitive emanation of many, seems
almost like the devise OF higher wisdom andthe work.
manship of mghtier hand than MANS
Besides, the power Of the veto is but suspensive
power 1t can, in its utmost extension control the ac-
on ofCongress only for short time until the sense of
the people shall have been ELECTED upon the question:
IL the President was wrong, the people will deter
mine by the election of congressionalmajority against
him. and it is not to be supposed that President would
ever oppose himself to the will OF the people thus
| phatically expressed. .7 .'.,.... ..... p.
Moreover the veto does not absolutely annul the ac-
ton Of Congress-it it simply renders il incumbent upon
that body repass the act negatived by majority of
twothirds Of each House; and it would be reflection
upon the intelligence and patriotism OF any Congress
to suppose that they woudf repass the act mega
tived by majority Of twohrds, if such act really
important and imperatvey demanded by the interests
of their constituency, and reflection upon the Presi-
dent and upon the people who elected him, to sup
pose that he would negative bill thus important and
necessary
At all events, it is not an absolute and conclusive
but only snspenSiUe negative. 1t can control only
small majority of of Congress- who may or may not
represent ma aior'tyof States people orinterests.
So far fromits being the much paraded and odious
Zone man power" every exercise of it GGaeiiS1es and
restraints his power. The President is the executor of
the laws and his power and patronage derived solely
from those laws enacted by Congress- Therefore eve
ry veto of President deprves him of the execution OF
the provisions of that act so dsproved Of and is to
that extent restriction upon his patronage and pow
er.
THE DEMOCRACY ARE OPPOSED TO THE
ASSUMPTION BY THE FEDERAL Gov
ERNMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE
STATES.
l. Because such an assumption by the Federal
Government would be an exercise of power in direct
and papabe violation of the constitution The author
y to assume the debts of the States where confer
red or intended 10 be conferred by that Instrument
Nor it. by the most atitudinarian construction be
deduced from any of the granted powers incident to
them, nor derived from by any species of implication.
Indeed the only plausible ground upon which this pow
is attempted to be assumed is that all government
established for the common good, and therefore, that
they do whatever may in their opinion, conduce to
the general welfare. And they assume, that the as
sumption ofSate debts blythe general government would
conduce to the general welfare and thence concluded,
that the federal government can and ought to exercise
power. This argument no BETTER however, than their
arguments of numerical majorities, applied to the
abolition OF the Veo-it Is douby false when appliedto
the government of the United States The government
the United States is indeed designed to promote the
general welfare but not the general welfare ofa simple
absolute numerical majority but the general welfare
of all the several elements and Interests of tue federal
government states people of states and people Of the
United States, when combined and ascertained in the
peculiar manner and by the several different means
prescribed by the Constitution And no one portion or
department of that general government can presume for
the general welfare but can only contribute its share
wardsthe development & efectuaton ofthe general good
or will of ALL in conformity with the mode and provision
ofthe Constitution And in no event can it be the will
of the people conducive to the general welfare to vi
olate the Constitution tor that is the permanent SUI
preme will OF the people, paramount to any temporary
feeling or interest To do what is not hrein authori-
zed the people have themselves determined, that there
must be an amendment of the Constitution, and they
have with view to the perpeuty of the government OF
the Constitution, provided in that instrument for amend
ments whenever lapse Of time change of crcumstan-
ces may render them necessary.
Because such assumption by the Federal Govern
men would tend more than any other measure Of fed
eralism and perhaps than all others together to
consolidation of the States, 1t would obierate the
ancient landmarks of the Constitution, md remove the
governments. 1t would at once destroy the beautiful
equilibrium established by the constitution between the
relative powers and duties of the federal and state gov
enments, by giving preponderating and corrupting
influence to the federal government over the states by
means of its control over the treasury and revenues oil
the States. II would annihiate the independence and
sovereignty of the States by rendering them mere pen
sioners upon the federal treasury 1t would transfer the
duty and power of taxation to pay State debts and de-
fray State expenses from the State itself the General
Government, and by so transferring taxation, destroy
all check upon State extravaganza in contracting debts
and in other expenditures, by relieving them from res
4 possibility to the people What is the check upon e