The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1844-02-03

ment ITSELF which believe be essential to the preserva
tonof our sublime federal system regard the adjustment
the relative weight Of the States in the to be
the fundamental compromise Of the Constitution and that
on which our whole political system depends Its adjust
ment constituted the great difficulty in forming the Con-
stituton The principle which il was finally effected
was that while due concession should be made to pop,-
ation provision should be also made in form to
preserve the original equality of the States every de-
Partment Of the Government. The principle was easily
carried out in constituting the Legislative department. by
preserving the equality Of the States in one branch ths
Senate) and concedg to population its full peponder
ance in the other But the great and difficult task in re-
ducing it to practice was 10 the Executive Department
at the head OF which there is but single officer great
was it. that occupied the attention Of the nventon
from time to time during the whole session. was very
task to constitute that department either on the principle
of the equality Of the States in the or that Of
population To combine the two in the election of single
officer was quite different affair but however difficult
had to be performed at the hazard Of losing the Const
tuition.
1t was finally accomplished by giving to the larger
States nearly the peponderanse in the electoral
lege they have in the House. and tho smaller in the
event Of choice by the House the same equality they
possess in the Senate thus following closely the anoogy
Of the Legislative Department To make it close pos
sble was at first proposed to give the eventual choice
the present provision adopted for which did not
affect the principle.
It was believed by the ramors the practical operation
Of the provision would be- that the electoral college, in
which the influence of the larger States preponderates
would nominate, and that the House voting by States
where their equality is preserved would elect who should
be the President TO give it that operation in practice
the provision it originally stood in the Constitution
without discriminating which should he President OR
Vice President and if had majority of the whole
votes then out of the five highest the House voting by
States should elect one and the person not elected hav
ing the highest number Of votes should be the Vice
sident It has been since altered that the electors
should designate which should be President and which
Vice President and the selection the was limited
to the three highest 1t is manifest that if this provision
Of the Constitution had been left to operate by ITSELF
without the Intervention OF caucuses party
ons between the people and the election that the pract
cal operation would have been such have stated
and such as was clearly intended by the trainers ofthe
Constitution.
The object intended is important The preservation of
the relative weight Of the States, established by the
constitution in all the departments necessary the
and duration OF system OF government; but
may be doubted whether the provision adopted to ef
feet IN the Executive Department. not too refined for
the strong, and may add corrupt passions, which the
Presidential election will excite Certain is that
if the practice OF nominating candidates for the Presden
Cyl by conventions constituted they proposed shall
become the established usage will the in
tenon Of the trainers of the Constitution and would be
followed by radical and dangerous change, not only in
the Executive Department hut in the government ITSELF
This danger was early oreseen and 10 auoid it, some
Of the wsest and most experienced statesmen of former
days so strongly objected to Congressional
nominate candidates for the Presidency that they new er
could be induced to attend them; among these viii be
sufficient to name Mr. Macon and Mr. LOwndes. Others,
believing that this provision Of the Constitution
refined for practice, solcous amend it, but with
out imparing the influence of the smaller States in the
election. Among these | rank myself With that OBJ
ect resolutions introduced in 1929 in the Senate
by Col Benton, and in the House by Mr. McDuhie pro-
vidng for distributing the States and for referring the
election back TO the people in there should be no
choice, to elect one from the two highest candidates
The principle which governed In the amendment pro.
posed was to give fair compensation to the small
Ter States for the surrender Of their advantage in the
eventual choice by the House and at the same time to
conformity with the principles Of our popular institutions
and be less liable to corruption than the existing provision
They rscs ed the general Of the STt were
the smaller States: The principle embraced is identical
with that on which you proposed to constitute the Balt
jected to by some who the4oo prominent part in its
favor. If you have not succeeded there at least
consolation in reecngthat others have since changed
you stand where you then did the purer and better
days Of the party. was in favor of IL then, now
not because consider the resolutions perfect heoret
caly the existing provisions of the Constitution hut
because believe would in practice certainly
complish what the trainers of the Constitution intended
But while the provision stands II does would regard
myself little short OF traitor TO that sacred instrument
should give my assent directly indirectly. to any
practice which would have the effect of divesng the
smaller States of the due weight which to them
in the Presidential election whether designed not And
here let add that Objectionable think Congress.
sional caucuss for nominating President, II is in my
opinion far less than Convention constituted pro-
posed The former had indeed many things to recommend
It. Its members. consisting Of Senators and Repre-
sentatives, the immediate organs Of the State Lee
gslatres, or the people; were responsible to them
spectivey and were for the most part Of high charac
ter standing, and talents They voted per capita, and
what Is very important they represented fairly the rea-
tive strength Of the party in their respective States in
all these important particulars, II was all that could be
desired for nominating body and formed striking con-
trast to the proposed Conventions and yet could be
borne by the people In the then days Of the Repub
lie acting with Gen Jackson and most of the leaders
oil the party at the time contributed 10 put it down. be-
believed to be liable to be acted and nn
enced by the patronage OF the Government-an objection
far applicable TO Convention constituted as the
proposed than to a Congressional Far how
it from my intention in aiding to put that down.
to substitute in its place what regard as an hundred times
more Objectionable IN every point OF view. Indeed, il
there must be intermediate body between the people
and the election unknown to the Constitution may be
well questioned whether better than the old plan Of
Congressional coucus can be devised.
In taking the ground have In favor of maintaining the
right secured to the smaller States by the compromise Of
the Constitution am acnaed by partizan feeling
desire to concilIae their good opinion If the
reversed and the rights of the larger instead of the
smaller, invaded, ! would with equal readiness and
firmncss stand up in their defence am the partzan OF
neither nor the other but simply supporter of the
Constitution, and what believeto be just and fair re-
gard the Constitution the only ark Of safety for all and
believe that in defending it, defend the interest and
safety Of each and athe greater as well as the smaller
the States in aiding the right OF the Others well the
States whose right are invaded
! have laid down the principle, which ! rest
the objection in question, with the limitation that
the relative weight OF the States should be mnin.
tanned making due allowance for their relative party
strength, The propriety of the Limitation is SO APP
parent. that but few words in illustration will be
required. The Convention is party Convention, and
professedy intended to take the sense of the party
which cannot be done fairly il States having bnt little
party strength put an equality with those which
have much If that done, the result might be- that
small portion Of the party IRON States the least sound
politically and which could give but little support in Con-
gress might select the candidate and make the President
against great majority Ct the soandest, and on which
the President and his administration would have to rely
for support All this clearly unfair and improper to
be denied. There may he great difficulty in applying
remedy in Convention, but do not feel myself called
upon to say how be DONE by what standard the
relative party strength Of the respective States should be
deermined perhaps the best would be their relative
strength in Congress at the time. In laying down the
principle added the limitation for the sake Of accuracy
and show how mperecty the party must he represent
ed when it is overlooked see provision in the pro-
posed Convention to meet it,
But, in order to realise how the Convention will oper-
ate will be necessary TO view the combined effects Of
the objections which ! have made Thus viewed it will
be found that Convention constituted tends rresst
bly, TO Of the control
the Presidential election in the hands of few of the
trail large states at first and finally in political managers
office holders and Office seekers to express different
y in that portion Of the community who live expect
to live the government, in contIadstinction to the
great mass, who expect to live on their means
their honest industry and who maintain the govern
ment and politically speaking emphaticaliy the people
That such would he the case may be inferred from the