Iowa territorial gazette and advertiser. [volume] (Burlington, Iowa Territory [Iowa]) 1840-1846, 1844-02-24

"Wit hholo II Or, u demanded, would il
pe sh ort OF on insult to refuse il Can IL
ne thou ght that the mailer States are 80 de-
based an q absorbed in the party politics of
Z the aay,'as 10 permit themselves 10 be in.
Directly stripped Of a right which, their high.
minded and pa triotic ancestors held e. asar
rs even TO prefer the loss Of the Con..itu.
ton itself rather than surrender IL? Iob.
Ject then 10 III: proposed con ven ton n this
connexipn, because It makes no compensa.
lion 10 The smaller States for the surrender
81 inns unquestionabie and important con.
stuutionai right. Instead Of that, its adyo.
5 Gates Pcremptpr'ly and indignantly refuse
any, ana treat with scorn every attempt to
seca'e i. Some have gone even SO far as
TO deny that the eventual choice of the
House constitutes any portion Of The cleo.
ton, and to manifest open hostility against
the PROVISION Of the Constitution wh,oh con.
tains it.
II there was no other objection, the one
under consideration would he insupcrable
with me. l differ utterly from the advo-
Gates OF the proposed Convention in refer.
ence TO this provision. | regard II as one
OF the hrst importance, not because desire
The election TO go into the House. but. be.
cause | believe it to lie an Indispensable
means, i'll the hands Of the smaller States.
= Of preserving their just and constitutional
weight in the Presidential election, and
through that, in the Executive Deya rtn,ent
aud the Government itself, which believe
to be essential to the preservation Of our
suhlme FEDERAL system. | regard the add
lustment OF the relative weight of the States
IN the Government to be tie funda J.
compromise of the Constitution, and that on
which our whole political system depends
Its adjustment constituted the great diff
Guilty in forming the Constitution. The
principle Oh which it was finally effected
Was, that, while due concession should he
made TO population, provision should be
also made, in some form, to preserve the
original equality Of the States in every de-
Partment Of the Government. The princi- 5
pie was easily carried out in constituting 2
the Legislative d, par;mcnt, oy preserving
Tie equality OF the States in one branch,
ttt'e Senate.) and conccdng to population
ITS full prcpondcrance in the other. But
the great and difficult task Of reducing it
to practice was in the Executive depart
ment. at tho head of which there is hut i
s'isg officer. So great was il that il Occu-
pied the attention ofthe Convention from
lime totime during the whole session, and
was very near causing failure at last. 1t
would have been an easy TASK to constitute
THAI department either on The principle OF
the equality of the States in the Govern.
mem or that Of population. To combine
the two, in the election OF single officer,
was quite different affair, but, however
dithcuit, had I" be performed at the haz
arr Of losing the Constitution.
II was finally accomplished by giving to
the larger States nearly tire same prepon-
derancc in the electoral college as they
have in the House, and to the smaller, in
the event ola choice by the House. the same
equality they possess in the Senate; thus
following closely the analogy OF the Legis.
iativc department. To make il as close us
possible, it was at first proposed to give the
eventual choice to the Senate, instead of the
House; butt was altered. and the present
provision adopted 70. reasons which did net
feet the principle.
II WAS believed by the trainers that the
practical operation of the prov ison would
be. that the electoral college, in which the
influence OF the larger States preponder-
ates, would nominate, and that the House,
voting by States. where the equality is pre-
served, would elect who should be the Pre-
sident. To give it that operation in prac-
lice, the provision, as it originally stood in
the Constitution, was, that each elector
should vote for two individuals, without dis
terminating which should be President or
Vice President. and if no one had ma jori
y OF tAc whole votes, then out of the five
highest of the House, voting by States,
should elect one, and the person not elect.
cd. having the highest number OF votes,
should be the Vice President 1t has been
since altered, so that the electors should des-
ignate which should be President, and which
Vice President, and the selection Of the
House was limited TO the three highest. II
IS manifest that il this provision Of the
Constitution had been left to operate BY it.
self, without the intervention Of caucuses
OF party conventions between the people
and the election, that the practical opera
tion would haze been such as have stated,
and such as was clearly intended By the
trainers Of the csnstitution.
The object intended is important. The
preservation Of the &c ative weight of the
States, as established by the Constitution in
all the departments, is necessary to the sue.
cess and duration Of our system Of Govern.
ment; but it NAV be doubted whether the
provision adopted to effect it in the Execu.
tive department is not too refined for the
strong, and | may add corrupt passions,
which the Presidential election will ever ex.
cite. Certain it is, that if the practice Of
nominating can ddates for the Presidency
by conventions, constituted as they propose,
shall become the established usage, it will
OF the Constitution, and will be followed by
u radical and dangerous change, not only
in the Executive department., but in the
Government itself.
This danger was early forescen, and to
avoid it, some of the wisest and most expe.
rienced statesmen of former days so strong
ly objected to Congressional caucuses TO
nominate candidates for the Presidency,
that they never could be induced to attend
them: among these it will be sufficient 10
name NJ. Macon and Mr. I.owndes. Others,
believing that this provision Of the Consti-
tuii,n was too refined for practice, were So
licitous to amend it, but without impa'rlng
the influence of the smaller states in the
election. Among these, I rank myself
With that object, resolutions were intro
duccd, in 1928, in the Senate by Col. Ben
ton, and IN the House BY Mr. Nc Dufiie, pro-
viding for the dis,ricting the States, and
for referring the election back to the peO-
pie, in case there should be no choice, to
elect one from the two highest candidates.
! The principle which the amendment pro-
posed was, to give a fair compensation to
| the smaller States for the surrender Of
! their advantage in the eventual choice by
the House, and at the same time to make
the mode Of electiDg the President more
strictly in conformity with the principles of
/ our popular institutions, and TO be less liable
to corruption than the existing provision.
They received the general support of the
| party, but were objected TO by u few, as
| not being full equivalent TO the smaller
| States. "rhc principle embraced is idcnti'
cal with that on which you proposed to con
stitute the Baltimore Convent ion, but which
| has been SO dictatorally objected 10 by
some, who then took SO prominea: part
4 AnI