The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1844-03-22

any former one ever did, and must there.
fore be the most constitutional ever seen, il
there is any truth under this new idea Of
the party heretofore loud for "the most
limited use of power" Sd. If mandate.
ryn at all, therefore, upon the States, it is
less so than all former laws, because il leaves
them less TO do. Blu, 4lh, as Mr., Collan.
er has shown, there are many cases where
Congress exercises these pretended manda
tory powers.
The largest aud clearest answer of all,
however, is this {; that the Constitution in
vests Congress, in this matter, with strict
ly DISCRETIONARY POWER, 10 in,erpose its
legislation mken 1t sees good, and 10 whdt
eItent it sees good. 1t is impossible to de,
ny that this is altogether the quality of the
power given and it is inseparabe from
the nature Of that power that i, may be
used either in part or III whole, just as the
occasion may require. Nay, the general
rule is, that it shall always be strictly pro-
portioned TO the contingency which induces
its exercise. Few powers in legislation
ever did or ever could exhaust themselves
at an effort: but the very character of Dis
cretionary Power foibids that it should at
tempt 10 do so. This, take il, disposes
completely of all the objections to the law
that are worthy Of the slightest attention.
proceed, therefore, 10 the next series of
the Nulliiers' propositions, in order 10 show
that their claim Of power TO overthrow this
law is as monstrous as their reasons against
the law are futile. Were Ike latter ever
SO good, where did a merely legislative bo
dy get the right Of thus acting upon them
judcially LIE, US sec.
?. They say that, by the lst clause Of
the 9TH section of the lst article OF the
Constitution Each House is the Judge
of the elections, returns and qualifications
Of its own MEMBERS" and thence they in.
fer that, in this matter, they take cognzance
of every question that can rise on an elec.
ton, whether that question be Of the laws
or the constitution; whence again they de
duce, that 1t is fer them, and them alone,
10 Try the constltutionaiiy Of all Election
Laws-Of course wthou; appeal.
Here, we think, they have committed a
capital error. The good old broad system
o; Jacksonian usurpation was safer petlier
and mDuter grounds are not half so easy TO
defend. They should have stuck to their
srea, and sweeping doctrine which his
strong instinct Of power" that Every
ager. OF the Government Legislators and
all) swears 10 support the constitution, and
IS, therefore, TO Judge for himself of the
consii'uiionaliiy Of all laws" Why, when
they had possession this mighty platform, +
from which ALL laws can be so easily up ,
set, abandon it, to poise themselves on SO
small too,bold, for The overthrow Of sin
gle SOFT OF law Are they grown too de.
generate and TOO weak TO brandish their
leaders club Aud Go they thus, instead
Of putting on his armour, creep into one Of
his shoes, and take that for stronghold
Now, does The clause TO which they re
fer warrant, for single branch Of the leg
stature, power at single vote, On mere
resolution, TO overthrow the deliberate Acts
of both branches, perfected through all the
guarded forms Of law, aud ratified BY The
Executive assem-: II could not repeal lhe
act without this concurrent action bu! II
can strike it dead
Like the Jacksonan inference from an
oath, this is erecting, out of the most sub.
ordinate duty Of legislation. broad supre.
macy over the law itself. 1t is building,
out Of new ministerial business, more
!han sovereign power.
Now, is there nothing 10 shew what the
true limit and nature Of the faculty is, con
.erred BY this clause? Yea, It's definition
need only be stated, 10 satisfy every body
The whole power Of either House ia The
premises is precisely co-extensivc with tina,
Of all the other ministerial officers tSheriffs,
judges Of elections, &c. that take par, in
Inc execution OF the subssiing election laws.
These have exactly the same right TO look
into the validity OF that law, as Congress
when sitting in disputed cases upon their
acts. Ii can but correct, by appeal, their
execution Of the law whatever should have
bound them binds it. They merely Judge
IN The first Instance and /, metely super.
yIses. 10 suppose any thing else, any
higher and new matter of decision. is to
suppose that the other ministerial officers
could never make coppeten. decision,
because not competent TO consider the whole
ground upon which one should be made.
We can conceive no answer 10 the mat
ter thus simply stated. Nevertheless, il
may be we'll 10 consider the efIcc. Of any
supposed remedy which the Constitution
may have here intended for anti cons.itu
tonal laws.
Is this remed,! How The law
stands on the statute book. So standing.
IS il any less binding upon any body it be
fore bound Is the Senate bound by It D.
Suppose it bad provided for the election of
Senators 100, as il might have done, and
the decision Of the other House had sci il
ASIDE, upon the sane grounds, as void in
toto And suppose the Senate then firm.
ed the law, nullifed by the other House
( Is i! :hen law or no law : or IS il a law 10
one and no law 10 the other Would the
present decision Of one House bind tue Elk
eculive or the Judiciary or the States p
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