The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1844-02-09

derance in the electoral college, as they
have in the House, and TO the smaller, II
the event Of choice by the House, the
same equality they possess IN the Senate
thus following closely the analogy OF the
Legislative Department. To make II as
close as possible, il was al first proposed 10
give the eventual choice TO the Senate, To-
stead of the House. but i! was altered and
the presen, provision adopted, for reasons
which did no, affect the principle.
Il was believed by the trainers, the prac'
teal operation Of the provision would be-
that The electoral college, in which the M
fluence of the larger States preponderaies'
would nominate, and that the House voting
BY States, where their equality is Preserv-
ed, would elect who should be the Presl
dent. TO give it lha. operation IN pfac'
,ice, the provision, as it originally stood N
the Constitution, was that each elecior
should vote for two individuals, without
discriminating which should be President,
or Vice President, and if no one had ma
iority OF the whole votes, then out OF the
five highest, the House voting by States.
should elect one, aud the person not elected,
having the highest number of votes, should
be the Vice President. Ii has been since
altered, so that the electors should desig
nate which should be the President, and
which the Vice President, and the selection
of the House was limited 10 Tho three
highest. II is manifest, that il this prosi-
sion Of the Constitution bad been lcit to OPP
crate By Itself, without the Intervention oil
caucuses, or party conventions between the
people aud the electors, tina, the practical
operation would have been such as have
stated, and such as was clearly intended by
the trainers Of the Constitution.
The object intended is important. The
preservation Of the relative weight Of the
States, as established by The Constitution
IN all the Departments, is necessary TO the
success and duration of our system Of Gov.
erument; bu, il may be doubted, whether
the provision adopted 10 eiiec. il in the Exc
culive Department, is not too refined for
the strong, and may add, corrupt passions,
which the Presidential election Will ever
excite. Certain It is, that it the practice
of nominating candidates for the Presden
cy, BY Conventions constituted as they pro
posed, shall become the established usage,
it will utterly deiea, the intention Of the
fra ners of the Constitution, aud would be
followed BY radical and dangerous change,
not only in The Executive Department, but
ia the Government itself.
This danger was early foreseen, aud TO
void IT, some of the wises, and mos, expe
fenced statesmen Of former days so strong
y objected to Congressional caucuses TO
dominate candidates for the Presidency, /
ha, they never could be induced 10 attend
hem; among these i, will be sufficient to
name Mr. Macon aud MIR. Lowndes. OH
ers, believing that this provision Of the
Constitution was too refined for practice,
we're solicitor. TO amend it, but without i'm
pairing the influence Of the smaller States
in the election. Among these, | rank my
self. With that object, resolutions were
introduced, in l52s, in the Senate by Col.
Benton, and in the House by Mr.. McDuf.
&c, providing for dlsirlcting the States, and
for referring the election back 10 the PEG
pie, in case there should be no choice, 10
elect one from tho two highest candidates.
The principle which governed in the amend
meRt proposed, was 10 give fair compcn
saion to the smaller States for the surfen
der Of their advantage in the eventual choice
by the House aHd a, the same iuc TO make
the mode of electng the President more
strictly in conformity with the principles Of
our popular institutions and 10 De less liable
TO corruption, than the existing provision.
They received the general support Of the
party, but were OBJECTED to by few, as not
being full equivalent to The smaller States.
The principle embraced is identical with
that on which you proposed to constitute
the Baltimore Convention, but which has
been so dictaiorially objected TO by some,
who then took so prominent part in its
favor. IL you have no! succeeded, there
IS Of leas; some consolation 10 rejecting
tina, if others have since changed, you now
stand where you then did, in the purcr and
better days Of The party. | was IN favor Of
il then, as | am now, not because consd
er the resolutions as perfect, theoretically,
as tho existing provisions of the Consiitu.
ton, but because believe il would in prac.
lice more certainly accomplish whs, the
trainers Of the Constitution intended. Blu,
while The provision stands as il does, would
regard myself as little short Of a traitor Ia
that sacred instrument, should | give my
assent, directly or indirectly, 10 any prac.
lice which would have the etiec, Of divest
Ing the smaller States Of the due weight
which i; secures 70 them III the Presiden
llal election, whether designed or not
And here let me add, that as Objectionable
as think a Congressional caucus for nom
mating President, j; is in my opinion, fal
less SO, than Convention constituted as i.
, proposed. The former has indeed man,
! AL.:-.--- i-.-.aaa.~..ao..d., Iia .naaaha,s 90,
sistlng Of Senators and Representatives
were the immediate organs of the State
Legislatures, or the people ; were response
/ BILE to them respectiyelv. and weye n, ,bf