Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1844-08-16

Constitution, with proper limitations anu T''aiS>
might destroy or weaken The ScPaia'c anu u ,i''e-
pendent sovercisntieS Of the Sta,cs' nese
among other difficulties inseparaniy CONNECTED
with the subject, are merely sialea " u'o .",,'l
mittee for consideration ana feiiec.ioh S"oui
Congress undertake without previous amend
ment of the Constitution 10 adjust ans "'o9' 'i'
ticult and vexatious question $3.50,
1.-THE Government cl the /. ). possess lhe pow
or under the Constitution 10 distribute inc c"hno
funds OF the Union III the manner ptoToseo a. an
il must possess il to the most hh''li'cu cAei'' -
Congress NAV by means ol impu>' o'''ic> anu cA'
ci>e>, FIRST coiicc; from the people an amount ~
med only by their discretion, anu next orioc i
out again among The States. Without any power
or control over The States IN lis eNicl"l",e, e"e'
Stale NAV, il il chooses. repeal !'' ie di 'aA''
and apply lis dividend I" liis support 81 l's ON II
State Government. The General government
womb thus become the mere agent ur TaX-9aiher-
or of the States 10 collect The State revenue ana
as must happen, in unequal proportions, from me
/ whole people of the Union. 10 ne aPphed 10 lhe
support OF The State Governments.
| Al the formation of the Constitution, was any
such agency necessary, or was any su.h ii'ene-
cd 10 be conferred? In looking 10 Inc causes
which led 10 the adoption Of the present Colsit''-
tion it was never heard 81 a> one, 'ia' lie STATES
had any difficulty under the SiiicieS OF Cohicae-
ration in collecting the necessary revenue ioi inc
support OF their respective STATE GOVERNMENTS
| TINT constituted ho par, OF 'iie cIi VI iheohNe-
niencc complained Of and intended 10 be rene
dei or provided for hy he new Constitution
| Nor did the States intend 10 confer upon The new
, Government whicI. they were about 10 create. 4
/ pownr To collect revenue ior any such purpose
| yNof was n part of their inherent sovereignty
which they chose TO retain; and had they parted
with il. they would have been reduced to stale
of dependence on the new Government. wholly
subordinate 10 il, saad utterly incompatible WIN
the idea OF their reserved sovereignty, when, II
cannot be seriously urged I've any, was intended.
Yet. give 10 the Federal Government an unlimited
power 10 collect money by taxes on the people
and an unlimited power 10 diSburSe il by dis,r-
button among the States, without any power over
lis app,c;lion when disbprSed. and this Will lie
the practical operation. And i! this sc The prac-
iicai operation il is difficult 10 conceive that more
is wanted 10 make he Government al Tie mon.
ON. of consolidated power The power 10 lay
and collect Taxes duties, impo>is anu excuses.
was conferred. not Tor The purpose oil raising mo-
acy. that il might be given back again TO the
States. either fer The purpose OF supporting Tie
State governments. or tor any other purpose. bll
for elcat national and general purposes, en'imc-
rated and limited 5y the Constitution itself. II
was granted 10 the Federal Government, because
] IL
tencc and successful operation OF the new Go
vcrrncnt itself. II WAS granted, ilr>, 10 render
the taxes duties, mpostS ami cXciseS. whict!
might be imro>ed and their collection, uniform
in all The States: and thereby 10 remedy the evil
and Inconvenience not 10 say injustice, oi The
coun,ervailing regulations, which before that time
were frequently le>oitcd 10 by the States is against
foreign nations and against each other; and Sc
condv, 10 enable the new Government 10 proriac
for its own necessary support. and 10 pay lhe
debts. without bein" dependent on the iarly and
uncertain contribution Of the quotas before that
time required 10 b. furnished by the STATES.
The Committee have now presented 10 the
House the opinions which they entertain, aS well
as the reasons and authorities on which those OPT
Mons rest, in regard to the question Of constitu-
tional power which they have regarded rs the pa
ramount question invoked in the examination OF
the subject referred TO them. If tie House shall
not concur with them in opinion bu >ia believe
that the power has been conferred upon The tede-
raj Goccrnnen,. 10 engage in a system OF internal
Improvements, III either ot the three modes rsi
above specified, constituting the present plan. then
the following may be slated a. some OF The otec-
hons 10 the expectancy Of prosecuting such Sl>-
ten in either Of those mn!eS which, is believed.
would not apply IL The plan OF distribution oi he
surplus funds among III" States, should the House
BE- OF opinion also. that that power has been con-
l,,rrcd or that il would be cxpctent hereafter, by
4 suitable amendment Of the Constitution, with
proper limitations aud guards 10 confer il
Isl. Owing to an unavoidable difference oi
opinion, extensively prevailing both IL ant out CT
Congress, in regard 10 the present plan. our past
experience has shown, that ore section Of The
Union has been found aflayci against another
State has been opposed 10 State, and b. looking
10 The votes III Congress, upon all appropriations
Tor Improvement, IN Whatever SHAPE proposed,
they Will he found Ia IL strongly marked hy geo
graphical boundaries The people Of different
sections Of The Union are Tins made 10 regard
each oiher rather a. domestic enemies and rivals
in Interest than rs members OF the same common
Govemuen; possessing common interest. Pre-
,uiiccs arc cngendered and sectional feelings eS-
cited calculated TO produce the mos, delcicrious
ami fatal ellects'upon the harmony oi orr Union,
and against which our first vcnerated Chief Ma
sis,rate. drawing upon The fund of his ample cx-
percnce, and speaking from his extensive obser-
walton and intimate practical knowledge OF orr
political condition, warned Us.
2nd Ii tends inevitably To- corruption-to what
in common parlancc is understood by political
.Ioe-roing" and TO w;ls,ctul and improvdent ex-
pcndi,urc Of the public money. Combinations
OF sectional and local interest Will he formed,
strong enough u carry through Congress every
proposition for improvement, whether useful or
not whether local or national in its character
and without regard 10 the general interest OF The
whole.
3ri II it be attempted to ccniine the action of
The Government, 10 works OF 4 national and not
local characcr-a distinction, the disregard Of
which, 'would, OF necessity lead 10 the subver-
sion of the Federal SyStem"-vet, in the Ian
g,,aee OF the President by whom this distinction
IS referred 10, tint even is an unsafe one, arb-
trary in its nature, and liable consequently, to
great abuses, il is too obvious 10 require the con-
frma,ion Of experience" TO this itmay he ad-
Ced that endless and vcXalious disputes would
arise in Congress. and between Congress ana the
Executive. in determining what is national ana
wha, is local Each branch must. Of consequence,
&C; upon lis own arbitrary opinion. One Com
eress NAV commence 4 work as national, and
succeeding Congress NAV think it local, and with
hold the appropriations 10 complete II. 50, one
President NAV give his sanction 10 n particular
measure as national, ana his successor, consider
mo itas local. NAV withhold his approval. There
* no criterion or fixed rule by which the question
~ n he settled, or satisfactorily determined.
Ith II dislurbs and destroys that harmony
which should ever prevail in our legislative coun-
ellis.
5b 1.-THE system continues on the present plan,
the representatives oi the people instead OF acting
for the general interest OF The whole, are 10 be en-
gagged IN dlsIePutdpic se'atilhc ioi uie p''"iiN
money each acting with vicW solely 10 The sec
,opal and local interest OF his immediate consti-
luents
9Th A necessary consequence OF the objections
stated will be. unequal and unjust appropriations
of the public money even in those sections 1.-THE
Union whose representatives NAV advocate the
policy. Is it just, for instance, that New York,
( Pennsvlyania and Other States, who have already
taxed their own citizens to make their own inter
nal improvements should now be required to sub
mi, 10 The coec,iono additional taxes, levied on
their citizens BY the Federal Government, 10 make
improvements in other States !
| The inequality is. however, more S'rikngy il
Illustrated, when We lock TO those sections of the
/ Union, where Representatives either doubt The eX-
! is,cncc OF the power, or think 1t lnexpcdlent 10
/ exercise il. who cannot consistently with ,hcir
opinions, engage in The general scramble for their
| share, and whose constituents, therefore, vino
/ equally contribute 10 supply the Treasury with