Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1844-08-02
MISCELLANEOUS.
wASIIENGTON AND NAPOLEON

w ASHkNGEON AND NAPOLEON'
BY J. PArLprNG AUTHOR of DurcHMAN's riREspr, &c
The superiority of virtue over mere genius, was
probably never eXempllfied on a scale Of greater
magnifcence, more completely demonstrated,
than IN the lives and fortunes of these two lustrl
Gus persons AS man of genius, Napoleon was
without doubt superior to Washington, but his viz
tues bore no comparison to those of the other. la
the activity and cotnprehensivcness Of his mind;
in that cearness Of perception which enabled him
to foresee ana overcome the obstacles which impe-
ded his course, and achieve an unparalleled sue
cession of triumphs, few men either of ancient or
modern times equaed him. In these respects,
Washington was not his peer perhaps; and yet
when we consider the relative positions Of the two,
] am inclined to believe he was not much his ihfe-
rior lie certainly eXce1ed him in wisdom, tho
he may have been his inferior in genius.
The mind of Washington was equal to the full
and entire comprehension of the sphere in which
he acted; and his sAgucity i'll pointing out the
probable events Of the future, as well guarding
against either present remote cunting ncles, Is
everywhere strlkngy displayed, not only in his
acts but opinions. His letters to Congress, during
the p.ogress OF the Revolution, are principally oc'
clpied with pointing out approaching danger, or
recon ending the best means tol advancing 1t (;
and it cannot be doubted, that had his advice and
exhortatlons been properly attended to- the struggle
for liberty would have been far less proracted and
sanguinary. But he was not, like Napoleon an
absolute monarch, leader, the mi ser OF his peo-
pie he was the servant Of his countrymen, and
could advise, but not direct or control their actions
or opinions, except by the force OF his reasoning,
and the wight Of his character. These constituted
almost the only authority he exercised, except III
his military capacity and thus situated, his means
were never in any degree correspondent with the
greatness of his designs, or the difficulty which
bcset him at every moment OF his military career.
We are not, therefore, 10 Judge OF his talents by
the victories he gained, but by the defeats which
he avoided and his browning merit as warrior Is,
that Of having performed great things with weak
instruments and comparatively insignificant means
Napoleon on the contrary, in the more early
stages of his career, was the absolute leader OF al
infuriated multitude nation of thirty millions Of
people, acting under the influence OF an enthus
asm of which the world furnishes few examples
as to the extent Of its consequences. This acne
had previously, under leaders of far inferior capa
city, achieved a succession of victories over the
veteran troops Of Europe. Napoleon placed him
self at the head of an irresistible impulse, which
was sufficient in itself to carry him to the summit o
glory. AS emperor, he reaped the benefits Of thi:
national enthusiasm, which had resulted in the
formation of warlike nation and armies Injured t
victory, as well as rendered ali but invincibe by
q ardor almost equal to enthusiasm confidence
4 result of long series of successes amounting
lrodigies. With such Instruments aided bl
possession of absolute power over a rich ant
b
duer EetiOns, governed by enteebled monarch
.e pning over subjects rendered unwarllke by hav
inr for centuries relied on standing armies 70
protection and disafiected or indifferent towards
government of which they experienced little Blu
Oppression. But had he been placed in the sltua
ton of Washington, equally clrcumstanced IN HI
means and his authority, there is every reason 1
believe that for want Of the virtues OF that pur
and illustrous man, rather than from an inierlorit
of genius, he would have filled in accompllshln
the great ect OF freeing his own country, or sui
jecting others.
Napoleon was inferior to Washington in patrio
ism. He was not born in France it was not h
native land, endeaTed to him by the ties and assC
Citations OF childhood. He loved glory better tina
France, and sacrificed his adopted country on III
altar oil Unsuitable ambition Without doubt, til
position he occupied often entailed on him the ne
cesslty of warning in self defence, even when b
seemed the aggressor. 1t was indispensable til,
he should be Cesar or nothing to oyerturn III
thrones of others, or cease to reign himself
this point of view. they may be called delensiN
wars, partaking in the sentiment of patriotism, b,
cause the safety and glory Of France were identil
ed with his own. But these motives, however the
might have mingled incidentally with other moi
powerful indictments cannot justify his condu
towards Spain, or his invasion of Russia. Ii
throne was too well established at these times
fear either the one or the other and an imparti,
poserty, while it pardons many OF his appare
aggresslons, will, in all probability, denounce the
as the offspring not of patriotism, but ola bonndle
ambition, incapable of being saliated by tue a
QUESTION of glory or power
If we turn toward Washington, we shall SOL =:
glance that ambition, if il influenced his a
ceptance of the command of armies which scarce
had an existence at the time, was only late
motive, that, OF itself alone, could not hive stimuli
ted him to assume station which presented in pc
spectve very remote and doubtful triumph on o
hand, and an ignomnous death on the other.
was undoubtedly fully aware of the obstacles, d
fcutes and discouragements which presents