Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1844-02-24

means, in the hands Of the smaller States,
of preserving their Just and constitutional
weight in the Presidential election, and
through that, in the Executive department
and the government itself, which believe
to be essential TO the preservation of our
sublime federal system. | regard the ad
justment of the relative weight of the
States in the government to be the funda-
mental compromise of the constitution,
and that on which our whole political
system depends. It's adjustment conStitu.
ted the great difficulty in forming the con-
stitution The principle on which it was
finally effected was that, while due con-
cession should be made to population, a
provision should be also made, in some
form. TO preserve the original equality of
the States in every department of the gov
eminent. The principle was easily carried
out in constituting the legislative depart
ment, by preserving the equality of the
States in one branch, Ohe SenateO and
concedng to population its full preponder-
ance in the other. But the great and diff
cult task of reducing it to practice was in
the Executive department, at the head of
which there is but a single officer So
great was it that it occupied the attention
the whole session, and was very near caus-
ing a failure at last. 1t would have been
an easy task TO constitute that department
either on the principle of equality of the
State in the government or that of popu!a-
ton. To combine the two, in the election
of single officer, was quite different
affair; but, however difficult, it had to be
performed at the hazard Of losing the con-
Stltution.
1t was finally accomplished by giving 70
the larger State nearly the same prepout-
erance IN the electoral college as they have
IN the House, and to the smaller, in the
event of a choice By the House, the same
equality they possess in the Senate; thus
following closely the analogy as the Iegis!a-
tive department. To make it as close as
possible, it was at first proposed TO give
the eventual choice 10 the Senate, instead
of the House, but it was altered and the
present provision adopted, for reasons
which did not affect the principle.
1t was believed by the trainers that the
practical operation of the provision would
be. tina, the electoral college. in which the
influence of the larger States preponder,
: ates, would nominate. and that the House
J voting by States, where their equality is
, preserved, would elect who should be the
! President. To give it that operation in
! practice, the provision, as it originally
, stood, in the constitution, was, that each
: eector should vote for two individuals,
2 without discriminating which should be
: President or Vice President, and if no one
= had majority of the whole votes, then
b out of the five highest of the House, voting
e by States, should elect one. and the person
: not elected having the highest number o.
e votes, should be the Vice President. |
r has been since altered. so that the elector!
= should designate which should be Presi
f dent. and which Vice President. and the
T.. selection of the House was limited to The
h three highest. 1t is manifest that if thi
e provision of the constitution had been left
: to operate by ITSELF without the interven
:. ton of caucuses or party conventions be-
d tween the people and the election. that the
: practical operation would have been sucl
as have stated. and such as was clearly
It intended by the trainers ofthe constitution
: The object intended is important. The
: preservation of the relative weight of tht
d States, as established by the constitution
e in all the departments, is necessary to the
r success and duration of our system o
e government; bu, it may be doubted whclhe
d the provision adopted TO effect it in the Ex
: ecutive department is not too refined 70
IS the strong, and ] may add. corrupt pas
e sions, which the Presidential election wi
o ever excite. Certain 1t is, that if the prac
= tice of nominating candidates for tn
e Presidency by conventions, constituted a
d they propose. shall become the established
d usage, it will utterly defeat the intento
ID of the trainers of the constitution. am
h would he followed by a radical and danger
" Gus change, not only in the Executive de
e partment, but in the Government itself
ID This danger was early foreseen and I
lie avoid il some Of the wisest and most eXpC
h rienccd statesmen of former days 5
y strongly objected to congressional caucusc
DC to nominate candidates for the presdcnc,
I'd that they never could be induced to atten
n. them; among these il will be sufficient t
d. name Mr.. Macon and Mr.. Lowndes. Or
I! ers, believing that this provision Of tt
es constitution was too refined for practiC'
Iy were solctous 10 amend it, hut withol
es impairlng the influence Of the smaiIt
III States in the election, Among these ran
RS myself With that object, resolutions wei
Of introduced, in 1928. in the Senate by c.
il! Benton. and in the House by Mr.. McDu
lis fe, providing for districing the States, ar
IA for referring the election back to the pc
er pie, in case there should be no choice.
n. elect one from the two highest candidate
o. The principle which the amendment pr
Sc posed was, to give fair compensation
to the smaller States for The surrender
as the;r adyaDtanp in the eventual choice