The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1844-11-10
Of the following suggestions, there is conceiva
BILE explanation of il. '-''
FIRST SUPERSTITION.

VIC cApidnaton OF IL.
FIRST sUPPosrrIoN.
That the hre generated steam faster than il was
discharged through the cylinders or valves and hal
an accumuaiiop OF elastic vap0r was thereby col
lected 10 the boiler, having pressure which aug
menteo IN me ratio OF It's accumulation, until al
ensth tnis pressure became greater than the resist
ing power Of the crown piece, which bursting
downwards, caused the catastrophe.
SECOND srPPosIrIoN.
That water was not supplied to the boiler az fast
as II was consumed by the evaporation, and that
thereby the crown piece and upper hues became
uncovered; that az a necessary consequence, these
paris became overheated, and possibly even were
rendered lncandescent; that in this condition,
water being thrown upon them, flashed suddenly
into steam OF enormous pressure and caused the
catastrophe.
40 THIRD SUPERSTITION
That the engine was stricken by lightning which
broke H. tore the crown piece from the sides Of The
6re-box, and caused the catastrophe.
FOURTH SUPERSTITION
That lightning passing on the boiler raised some
part oft high temperature; tnat the taking
up the heat was rapidly evaporated, as il would
have been by contact with highly heated or in
very extrene pressure being thus suddenly pro-
duced, the boiler yielded 10 the force, and the
catastrophe took place. m
These suggestions, including in my opinion every
possible cause OF the observed effects, | directed
my inquiries to the discovery OF such facts as were
likely TO supply the means of either establishing
them, or setting them aside. shall examine them
successfully. and state distinctly the circumstances
and reasoning which have led me 10 their rejection
or adoption, as the case may be.
FIRST QUESTION.
Was the boiler exploded by the undue accumula-
ton of steam within II by reason of the fire pro-
noting the evaporation faster than the cylinders
could carry oil the steam?
II appears by the evidence of Thomas Yeager,
engineer OF the train immed iately following the
Richmond, that just before starting from Reading
both safety valves were blowing of Il appears,
also, by the evidence Of Thomas Cowden, brakes
Just before the accident. 1t is evident, then,
that both safety valves were free. According To
the load carried by the engine, the steam which
passed through the. cylinder would have con-
sumed water at the rate OF about one cubic
foot per minute. To admit the possibility Of large
accumulation OF steam IN the boiler, II would then
be necessary TO suppose the evaporation to proceed
at much greater rate than would be sufficient "a
sustaa this discharge through the cylinders nd the
two safety valves Mr.. Kirk, the foreman OF thu
company, proved that while the engine stood foI
fifty minutes at Reading, the valves not blow
ing of, which elbows that no accumulation was
then taking place.
That The material OF the boiler wsuld not yield
10 any ordinary pressure was proved by the mos
conclusive evidence | caused pieces Of the crown
plate to be bent under the hammer, and doubled
up, both hot and cold and they showed all lie
signs OF sound iron also caused pieces to b.
broken, which displayed at the fracture the usual
appearance OF the fibrous structure characterzine
good iron. / also caused the crown piece TO be
Of Philadelphia, and Mr.. Simpson, master ma
chinist to the. railway company, whose OPT
Mons were in accordance with my own,
and who declared that the explosion of thu
boiler by the mere accumulation Of steam within
by the ordinary action OF the fire could not have
happened.
Il there were tendency in the boiler to make
steam faster than it was passing through the cylin
a hA huu uaA
Of speed in the train IL appears, on the contrary
ny the evidence OF two of the brakesmen. that the
speed was not increased at the time Of the explo-
sion, and that il did not exceed ten miles hour.
My opinion ia, that if the engineer had tried 10
produce this explosion by stimulating the fire the
utmost, tho operation OF the cylinder being free,
and the two safety valves having play, he could moi
have done II.
The question must, then, be decided in the mega
tive, and the first OF the four suggestions must be-
rejected as Involving consequences and requiring
admissions which are physically impossible.
SECOND QUESTION.
Was the explosion caused by neglect or failure
in feeding the bolierl
Tojudge rightly OF this question, 1t will be neces.
sary attend To the routine of the duty Of the
gine-maD, and to consider The character of the
driver Of the engine which exploded, and the evl-
dence as 10 the particular occasion on which this
supposed neglect or failure occurred.
The boiler OF a locomotive 10 fed with water by
TWO force. pumps, which wrought by the en-
glne, and which drive the water from the tank OF
tender into the boiler. These pumps can be put il
operation or suspended at the discretion Of the en-
sine-man. As the pumps are liable, from varleu,
causes, 10 get out OF order, 90 that even whel
working they NAV not deliver water to the boiler
there is cock provided in the feed pipe, Gale q
the "ny cock" by which the engine man can as.
certain whether the pumps, when in operation, are
doing their duty. There are also several cocks
placed at different heights on the boiler, called
guage cocks, by opening which the engine man can
At ali times ascertain the depth Of water in the
boiler, and whether il may require feeding.
Proper attention TO the feeding OF the boiler IL
the first and most important duty OF the engine man
II is duty the neglect of which, he knows must be
invariably followed by explosion, from the effects
OF which others engaged on the tram may by pes
sbiiiy escape, but which must cost him his life
Ii is therefore duty almost never neglected even
by the worst engineers. The engine man ex-
amines, from ktime 10 time. the condition OF the
boiler by the guage cocks, and opens the feed
pumps, SO an to keep the level Of the water to a
proper height There nre particular occasions on
which il is an invariable rule fill The boiler. On
approaching any chief station, where some delay
anticipated, the engine ceases to supply fuel
to the furnace, opens the fire door TO check the
combustion, and puts on the feed. BY these means
he arrives with a full boiler and low fire the
evaporation is suspended during The delay, and he
starts again with full boiler. the fire being restore
To its activity before starting. But II the cvap0ra-
tlon while he stands should boil down the water,
he ascerans this by The guage cocks, detaches the
!"
short distance along the road with the feed pumpe
on, 80 a. to fill the boiler. Also, on approaching
an ascending grade where, by reason OF the in
creased resistance, a full power OF steam becomes
necessary, il is the custom to fill the boiler well
just before coming to the foot OF the grade so that
ascending the pumps may be shut OIL, and the
lmpedsd evaporation used during the ascent
These are rules well unde rstood by engne-men,
and which it may safely be assumed are never neg
lected by men OF good character and tried habits
BY the evidence OF all the witnesses eonnecte o
with the Reading railway, Joseph Ward was one
of the very best and most trustworthy engIne-msb
on the line. lie was FIVE years in the service Of
the company, and for The i've preceding years war
engaged by the Baltimore and Ohio and other
companies, with all oi whom he had the best cha
racter. Mr.. KIRK, the foreman Of the company al
Reading, and Mr. Simpson, the master machnlsl
AZ Richmond, both declare that they did not be.
heve il possible that Ward could have negle cted
The feed pumps. II Is aso proved that his habits
were sober general, and that he was quite sober
on the occasion IN question.
But besides this general evidence, we have spe.
cial proof Powell, one Of the brakesmen, saw
WArd before arriving n Reading. freuue nilv frv