New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1844-02-03


even to prefer the loss of the constitution ITSELF raier
than surrender it. | object then to the proposed con-
rention this connection, because makes no CON
pensaton to the smaller States, for the surrende OF
is.unquestionable and important constitutions!
right. Instead OF thatts advocates percmporlly ana
Indignantly refuse any. and treat with scorn every
attempt TO secure it. Some have gone even so lar,
az TO DENY that the eventual choice ofhe House con-
stutes any portion Of the election and TO manifest
open hostility against the provision OF the constIn
ton which contains IT.
Ifthere was no other objection, the one under con-
sideraton would be nsuperabe with ne. difeI
utterly from the advocates of the proposed Conven-
ton in reference to this provision regard II as
one of the first importance not because desire the
election to 90 into the House, but because believe
it 10 be an indispensable means, IN the hands
or the smaller States. OF preserving their just
and constitutional weight in the Presidential cleo
ton, and through that. III the Executive Depart
nlent and the Government itself. which believe tc
be essential to the preservation OF our sublime cd
eral system regard the adjustment OF the relative
WEIGHT of the States in the Government 10 be The
fundamental compromise of the Constitution, and
that on which our whole political system depends
It's adjustment constituted the great difficulty IN
forming the Constitution. The principle on winch
i was finally effected was that, while due concession
should be made to population, provision should
be also made IN some form. TO preserve the Original
equality of the States IN every department OF Inc
Governments The principle was easily carried out
in constituting the Legislative Department, by pre-
serving the equality of the States in one branch
1.-THE Senate,) and conceding to population It's full
remembrance III the other. But the great and DIT
icuit task of reducing TO practice the TX
ecutive Department, at the head OF which there Is
but single officer. So great was ii that il occu-
pied the attention OF the Convention from time to
time during the whole session, and was very near
causing failure atlast. ltwould have been an easy
task to constitute that department either on the prln-
ciple of the equality OF the States IN the Government
or that of population To combine the two, in the
election of single officer, was quite "a different affair."
but however difficult, it had to be performed at the
hazard of losing the Constitution.
1t was finally accomplishedby giving to the larger
States nearly the same preponderance in the Elect
oral College, as they have in the House, and 10 the
smaller. in the event of choice by the House, the
same equality they possess in the Senate thus fol-
lowing closely the analogy OF the Legislative De-
partment. To make tas close as possible, it was at
first proposed TO give the eventual choice TO the Sen
ate, instead of the House, but altered and the
present provision adopted for reasons which did not
affect the principle.
1t was believed by the trainers, the practical ope-
ration of the provision would be- that the Electoral
College in which the influence of the larger States
preponderates would nominate, and that the House
voting by States, where their equality is preserved,
it that operation in practice the provision, as IT
originally stood in the Constitution, was that each
elecor should vote for two individuals, without dls-
eliminating which should be President or Vice Pre-
sident; and if no one had majority OF the "hoie
votes then out of the five highest the House, voting
bv States should elect one, and the person not
elected having the highest number OF votes should
be the Vice President. 1t has been since altered,
so that the electors should designate which should
he President and which Vice PRESIDENT and the Sc
lection of the House was limited TO the three high
est. 1t is manifest that If this provision OF the Con-
sution had been left to operate by itself, without
the intervention of c0ucuses or party conventions
between the people and the election that the prac-
teal operation would have been such as have
stated, and such as was clearly intended by the
trainers of the Constitution.
The object intended is important. The preserva-
ton of the relative weight of the States, as esab-
lished by the Constitution in all the Departments, Is
necessary to the success and duration OF our system
of Government; but it may be doubted, whether the
provision adopted to effect it in the Executive De-
parment is not too refined for the strong, and may
add, corrupt passions which the Presidential cleo
ton will excite. Certain it is that the prc-
tce Of nominating Candidates for the Presidency. by
Conventions, constituted as they proposed, shall be-
come the established usage, will utterly defeat the
intention of the trainers of the Constitutions and
would be followed by radical and dangerous
cnan0e not Only III tiic put
IN the Government itself.
This danger was early forseen and to avoid it,
some of the wisest and most experienced statesmen
of former days, so strongly objected 10 Congressional
caucuses to nominate candidates for the Presidency,
that they never could be induced to attend them
among these ii will be sufficient TO name Mr.. MACON
and Mr. LOWNDES. Others, believing that tins pro-
vision OF the Constitution was too refined Tor prac-
tee, were solictous to amend it, but withous i'm
pairing the influence OF the smaller States IN the
election Among these, rank myself. WIN that
object, resolutions were introduced, IN lo2o n me
Senate by Col. BENTON, and IN the House by MIR,
McDUrFIE, providing for dstrcting the States, and
for referring the election back the people, i'll
there should be choice, TO elect one from the two
highest candidates. The principle which the amend
ment proposed to give fair compensation TO
the smaller States for the surrender OF their advan-
tage in the eventual choice by the House, and at the
same time TO make the mode of electng the Presi-
dent strictly in conformity with the principles
of our popular institutions, and 10 be less liable to
corruption than the existing provision They re-
ceived the general support OF the party, but were
objected to by few, as not being q full equivalent
10 the smaller States. The principle embraced is
identical with that on which You proposed 10 con-
sritute the Baltimore Convention, but which has
been so dctatorially objected by some, who then
took so prominent part in It's favor II You have
not succeeded, there Is al least some consolation III
rejecting that II others have since changed you
nov stand where you then did. in the purcr and
better days OF the party. | was jnfavor OF 1t then
as am now, not because consider the resolutions
as perfect, theoretically, the existing provisions
Of the Constitution, but because believe il would
in practice, more certainly accomplish what the
trainers of the Constitution intended But while the
provision stands as it does would regard myseli
as little short Of traitor TO that sacred instrument
should give my assent, directly or indirectly, to
any practice which would have the effect of diyest-
Ing the smaller States of the due weight which il
secures 10 them in the Presidential election. And
here let me add, that as Objectionable as think a
Congressional caucus for nominating President, il
is in my opinion far less So than Convention con
stituted as is proposed The former had indeed
many things 10 recommend it. lis members con
ssting OF Senator'S and Representatives, were the
Immediate organs OF the State Legislatures, or the