The Arkansas banner., 1844-03-06

provisions, when against the defendant. and the former expressly forbids the allowance to him Of any stay of execution, appeal, cer- tlorari, writ oi error, or injunction, and de- clares that he "shall abide the judgment of the justice" We have therefore to consider and determine whether or not the Leeisla- ture is inhibited from making such judgments final and conclusive on the defendant; or, in other words, whether the Legislature can by law exclude this class of cases from the re- vefsing power of the Supreme Court, and every other intermediate judicial tribunal.
 The solution of this question involves an inquiry into the appellate power of the dile- rent tribunals constituting the judiciary de- parment of the government For if the con stitution invests in either one of them appel late jurisdiction over cases adiudicated by q Justice or Justices of the Peace by any affirm ative grant of such power, 1t cannot be pre- tended that the power so conferred can be divested by the Legislature. But if 1t is so granted by the Constitution, it is equally clear that the Legislature may in its discre- ton withhold 1t from them as 1t has done in this class of cases, and thereby make the ju- risdiction of the Justice of the Peace exclu- sive.
 There is certainly no provision in the Con stitution granting appellate power to either the County or the Prutbate Gottrtt, C ttor is stf such power thereby granted to the Circuit Court, unless 1t IS given to them by the fifth section of the sixth article thereof, which ordains that the {. Circuit Courts shall exer- else experimenting control over the County l Courts, and over Justices of the Peace in each county, in their respective circuits, and shall have power to issue all the necessary writs to carry into effect their general and specific powers.' The jurisdiction vested in l the Circuit Courts by the third and sirth sec lions of the same article is exclusively origi- nal ; and so far as it is conferred by the third section, 1t is so expressly deelaredt be; and although it is so explicitly declared in the l sixth section, yet there can in our opinion, be no reasonable doubt entertained, that 1t is the original cognizance only of matters in equity, that is thereby vested in them, and of this they may be divested when the General Assembly shall establish Courts of Chancery. The power therefor specifically granted to l the Circuit Courts, consists of the original cognzance and adjudications of" all criminal matters which shall not be otherwise pro- vided for by law: D the ssexclusve q original jurisdiction of all crimes amounting to felony at the common law;n the < original jursdic- ton of all civil cases which shall not be cog nizable before Justices of the Peace, until otherwise directed by the General Assembly;o the < original jurisdiction of all matters of contract where the sum in controversy is over one hundred dollars D and the original s.jurisdiction in matters of equity until the General Assembly shall deem it expedient to establish Courts of Chancery,n together with the power of exercising a experimenting control over the County Courts and Justices of the Peace in each county in their respec- tive Circuits.
 Besides the power thus specified in, and specifically granted by the Constitution to the Circuit Courts, they possess certain other powers, which appertain to all judicial tri- bunals, and vest in them of necessity upon their creation, and by the simple act of creat- ing them, amongst which is the power of preserving good order in the Court, so far at least a may be necessary to enable them to execute the specific powers with which they are invested, and perform the duties enjoined upon them efficiently and without interrup- tion This power therefore, though not spe- ciGed, is always considered as implied in the grant, and is every where maintained on the ground of necessity; and this as well as all similar powers with which Courts are gene rally invested are embraced by the terms used in the last sentance of the 5th section above quoted, which expressly confers upon the Circuit Courts the power of issuing all writs necessary to carry into effect their gene ral and specific powers; which, notwithstand- ing no new power is thereby conferred upon the Courts, clothes them by express grant with power which they would otherwise have possessed by implication only. But it IS otherwise in regard to the experimenting control given to the Circuit Courts over Coun- ty Courts and Justices of the Peace: because no such power is at all necessary to the com plete and efficient exercise of any other ju- risdiction or power with which the Constitu- ton invests them; and therefore without this express grant neither Court would by virtue of the Constitution alone, have possessed any jurisdiction or power over the other; and hence this must be regarded as substantive power existing in the Circuit Courts, by the express grant of the Constitution only. The terms of the grant are general, but they Im- port an authority as to the tribunals only, and seem to us to have no reference to par ties litigant, or to cases pending in, or de- cided by them, and do not, in any manner, appear to contemplate any direct proceeding by the Circuit Court, either against the par ties to the controversies there pending or determined, or upon the cases or matters there in controversy, or adiudicated, and in- asmuch as no appellate jurisdiction whatever appears to have been vested by the Constilu- ton in the Circuit Courts, we consider their power by virtue of this provision as extend- ing only to the tribunals mentioned, and con sequently the Circuit Courts can derive no jurisdiction therefrom to adjudieate any case there determined; but are bound in the ex- crcse of their experimenting control, to con fine their action to such process and proceed ings as may be lawfully taken against the tribunals themselves; and in such cases the Court acts, not in the exercise of its appel