The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1844-02-02

PtSeuce more certainly accomplish what the ifam-
efs OF The Constitution intended But while the pro-
vision stands as II does would regard myself rs
niue short OF traitor TO that sacred instrument,
should give my assent directly indirectly 10 any
practice which wculd have he effect OF diyestng
The smaller States Of the due weight which Il Sc
cures to them IN the Presidential election whether
designed or not And here let me add, that as OBJ
Jectonaoe as | think Congressional caucus for
nominating President, II is in my opinion, far less
SO, than Convention constituted as Is proposed
The former had indeed many things TO recommend
il. Its members consisting Of Senators and Repre-
sentaliSes were the immediate organs OF the State
Legislatures, or the people, responsible To
them respectively, and were, for the most part Of
high character, standing and talents. They voted
per capita, and what Is very important they repre-
scented fairly the relative strength Of the party in
their respective States. In all these important par
tculars, it was all that could be desired for noaina
ting body, aud formed striking contrast TO the pro-
posed Conventions and yet il could not be borne by
the people, IN the then purer days Of the Republic.
l. acting with Gen Jackson and most OF The leaders
ot the party at the time contributed 10 put il down.
because believed it 10 be liable to be acted ON and
influenced by the patronage of the Government-an
objection far more applicable TO Convention const
luted as the one proposed than to Congressional
caucus Far, however, was Il from my intention, in
aiding to put that down, TO substitute in its place
what regard an hundred times more objectiona-
BILE in ever, point of view Indeed if there must be
an intermediate body between the people and the
election, unknown TO the CONSTITUTION, it may be well
questioned whether better than the old plan of a
Congressional caucus can be devised.
In taking the ground have, in favor Of maintain
ing the right secured to the smaller States by the
compromise OF the Constitution, am actuated by
partisan feeling or desire TO concilate their good
opinion. II the case was reversed and the rights Of
the larger, instead of the smaller, were invaded,
would with equal readiness and frmness, stand up
in their defence. ! am the partisan Of neither
nor the other, but simply supporter Of the Cons-
tuition, and what believe TO be just and fair. re-
gard the Constitution the only ark of safety for
all, and believe that in defending it, defend the
interest and safety Of each and a--lhe greater as
well ar the smallerhe States vading the rights of
the others, well the States whose rights in
vaded.
have laid down the principle which rest the
objection in question, with the limitation that the
relative weight Of the States should be maint1 ned
making due allowance for their relative AIRY
strength. The propriey Of the limitation is ap-
parent, that but few words in illustration will be
required. The Convention is party Convention
and professedly intended TO lake the Of the
party, which cannot be done fairly il States having
but little party strength are put on an equality with
those which have much. Ii that were done, the re-
suit might be that small portion Of the party from
States the least sound, politically, and which could
give but little support in Congress, mi hit select the
candidate, and make the President against great
majority of the soundest and which the President
and his Adm nistraton would have to rely for sup
port All this Is clearly too Unfair and improper TO
be denied. There may be great difficulty in apply
ing remedy in Convention, but do not feel cali
ed upon to say how il can be done, by what stand
ard the relative party strength of the respective
States shhuld be determined perhaps the best would
be their relative strength in Congress at the time
In laying down the principle, added the limitation
Tor The sake OF accuracy and to show how imperfect
~ the parry must be represented when il is overlook
ed | see no provision in the proposed Convention to
meet it,
But, in order to realize how the Convention will
operate, il will be necessary TO view the combined
effects Of the objections which have made. Thus
viewed, il will be found that Convention so consti-
tuted tends rresisby to Capitalization cenraliza-
ton Of the control the Presidential election in
the hands Of few Of the central large States, at
first, nnd finally, in political Managers Office hold
ers and ofceseekers or, TO express II differently,
in that portion Of the community who live, expect
to live, on the Government, in contradstincon to
the great mass, who expect to live their
means or their honest industry, and who maintain
the Government, and politically speaking, emphali-
cay the people.
That such would be the case, may be inferred
from the fact that it would afford the means TO son
SIN or seven States lying contiguous and far from
the centre OF the Union, to control the nomination,
and through that the eec' ion by concentrating their
united votes in the Convention Give them the pow
er OF doing So, and it would not long lie dormant
What may be done by combination, where the temp
tation Is so great will be long be done
TO combine and conquer, is not less true a maxim
where power IS concerned than TO ''D, ide and con
quer" Nothing is better established, than lhat the
desire for power can bring together and unite the
most discordani materials.
But the londenc, 10 ceprazstion will not stop
there. The appointment Of Delegates en- masse by
State Convention, would tend at the same time aud
with greater force TO centralze this control ia
the hands of few, who make politics trade The
farther the Convention is removed from the people,
the more certainly the control il will be placed
in the hands OF the interested few, and when remov
ed three four degrees has been shown il will be-
where the appointment Is by State Conventions the
power Of the people will cease, and the seekers Of
Executive favor will become supreme AT that stage
active, trained and combined corps will be formed
IN the party, whose whole time and attention will be
directed 10 politics. Ii will be their sole business
Into their hands the appointments Of delegates ~ all
the stages viii fall aud they will take special cate
that none but themselves their humble aud ,,bedi.
dent dependents shall be appointed The Central
and state Conventions Ill be filled by the most ex-
perienced and cunning, and after nominating the Pre-
sden they viii take good TO divide the patron
age and Offices, both Of the General and State Gov
ernments, among themselves and heir dependents -
But why say uiH2 Is Il not already the case ? Have
there not been many instances Of State Conventions
being filled by ofice-holders and Office kers who
after making the nomination. have divided the Offices
IN the State among themselves and their partisans,
and joined in recommending to the candidate whom
they have just nominated TO appot them to the Off
ces TO which they have been respectively allott d.
IL such be the in he infancy Of the system il
must end If such conventions should become The es-
tasshed usage in the Pre.id Dt's nominating his
cessor. When IT comes to that, II will not be long
before the sword viii take the place OF the Constitu.
ton.
Such are my objections to the mode in which the
proposed Convention is TO be constituted and my
sons for entertaining them. They are SUCH that
cannot refuse 10 obey them without renounc,ng the
principles which have often avowed in public and
private, and whch have gu deJ me through the whole
course ofmy puolic life.
In coming to this conclusion, | have no, p ssed
over, without careful examination, the reasons as
signed by its advocates for constituting the Convcn-
ftcv, h,x a..