Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1844-03-08

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he 80 altered that Congress should only exercise
this power when State entirely neglected 10
make the provisions. II is true such amendments
were proposed and were not adopted, and that
clearly shows two things first, that IL was then
distinctly understood that the Constitution gave
the power to Congress to interfere with the mode
of elections even where the States had made reg
ulallons on the subject and, second, that IL was
thought advisable TO retain TINT power IN Congress;
and, therefore, the proposed amendments were re-
ljected.
What, then, is the power of Congress over this
matter answer, it is precisely the same as hat
Of the states. The power to prescribe the regu-
lalons by the one, aud the power to make and al
Ter such regulations by the other, have the same
latitude and the same limitation /; but, 10y the very
terms of the proposition, the power OF Congress
is Ultimate and paramount. This clause of the
Constitution must receive practical construc-
ton, and not be rendered preposterous and un-
meaning by refinements and distinctions incapa-
bile of practical application. The substance of
the provision is that the States shall regulate the
mode of the election, subject TO the supervision
snd control of Congress. AS far as Congress
thinks proper TO make regulations its authority is
paramount and binding on all. and the States are
:. bound to complete the regulations consistently
with those made by Congress. The times, Places
and manner of holding elections, bur The eIe-
ments-tle ingredients in the composition of reg
uiGiions They, together mean the mode of election,
and are intended TO mean the whole including all
things that make IT, 1t is utterly impossible, prac-
ticay, TO separate these elements, and regulate
one, without in some measure directing as to the
other. They are like The form, color, aud material
OF thing-.neer exist alone.
1t is now very fully conceded, both by the
speakers and the report Of the committee, that
Congress possesses the power to make the regu
lations to the mode of the election in all par
tculsrs provided that such regulations are so en-
tire as 10 require no action by the State Legisa-
ture. The majority report goes so lar as TO allow
that Congress might make regulations either as to
lime, place. or manner, but its'reguations must he
perfect aud complete on that subject Ii is Diff
cult to see how this concession aud these dis'inc-
tons be made, consistently with the principle
on which the report is understood to go-that is,
that Congress can 90 nothing which requires leg
slaon by the Stale, or wIich gives. direction TO
such legislation. But how can Congress settle The
time OF election without requiring all the State
Legislatures TO make laws 10 direct the elections,
aud regulate the duties of the officers who attend
them 10 conduct accordingly? Or, suppose that
Congress should regulate the place or places of g.
ection-say to be al each court mousse, town house,
and parish cburch-would not all the laws of
States require to he altered accordingly? 1t is
utterly impracticabIe 10 make any such distinc-
tion, and preserve the principle.
All this 49, however, of little importance. The
great point still remains and it is thus: Il 10 nsis-
ted that Congress can never, constituionalIy leg
u
quire action by State Legislature; that all acts
OF Congress must operate on the people proprid
Uigore, 10y their own force, and not through State
legislation; and therefore it be the du-
~ OF stale Legislature TO regari or pei iect any
such measure Tiis is laid down principle in
our Government, founded ON the reason hat State
Legislatures not the subjects or agents Of Con-
sress and II is insisted that such has been The u
inform practice in our Government. This brings
The question 10 very narrow point, and in con-
sdering il, | will state some general principles,
which, ii sustained, will settle it,
When power exists in the General Govern
menl and The same exists in the Stale Govern.
meht each may exercise the same for It's own pur-
poses. FOR Instance: Congress may raise a direct
lax, and SO may Stale but, in such case, each
must be for It's own use, and each must act indie
pendent of The other. If power is granted TO
Congress, that does not deprive the Slate of The
exercise OF thar power, unless forbidden by the
Constitution aud the exercise of that power by
Congress only suspends tue power ct the State TO
any ACT Inconsistent with what Congress has done.
(5urgis Us. CrOwiiusheld. A Wheaton, l22.)-
Snch Is the cuse OF banking laws, put in the ina
jorhy report (12 Wheaton, 2i3)
There is another entire class of cases in the
Constitution. | speak of that class where there
Is granted power 10 the States, to be exercised
under the direction, SUPERVISION or control OF Con-
gress. There nre several such grants OF power
IN the Constitution, in various forms OF express
pretne court that y ale cannot obtain Iegsla.
i've power from Congress. Wheaton, 207.) -
But, IN relation TO this class of cases, tie Slate
derives It's power from the Constitution, but the
authority OF Congress is paramount, and SO far
AS 1t goes, IS imperative ; and in the exercise of
ths power, Congress has often and early, both
lmpledly, and directly, aud explicitly, required
legislative action by the State Legislatures, and
without which the action OF Congress would have
been incomplete and imperative in its purpose.
All power exercised by State Legislature for
The Stale, as sovereign State, is exclusively de-
rived from the State Constitution. II IL comes
from any other quarter it is not power given by
tie Stale, and in It's exercise the STATE Legislature
10 not The agent 81 the. State, but the agent OF
those who gruned the power. In the exercise OF
all powers granted to . Legislature, in a State
lConstHullon, II is sovereign, and cannot be gui-
Lded, controlled, checked, directed by Congress,
unless some limitation arises from thes Uni:ed
States Constitution.
So 100, the powers granted by the United States
Constitution 10 Congress, whore nolhug il said or
clearly implied about State Legislatures, is to be
exercised by Congress; and State Legislatures
cannot direct Congress in such action, nor can
Congress nuke the State Legislatures their agent,
either in whole or in part, 10 perform such SER
vice. Hence, II has been holden that Stale cannot
derive power oil Legislation from Congress. Hence,
Congress cannot mike agen,s OF slate officers,
or create any duty which they would be forced 10
discharge rs lhey are not amenable TO Congress.
But when power is, by The Constitution Of the
Unded States, conferred on Stale Legislature,
subject to the action of Congress, there Ihe State
Legislature does not act as the agent and Leglsia-
ture of its Slate, deriving Jrom and exercisngJor
the State under their Constitution, but as the a.
gent OF the United States; and by the very terms
of the grant, il becomes subject 10 the supervision
and coHirol OF Congress, and. 10 which control is
should cheeriully submit.
Now, look through all the State Constitutions in
the Union, and from which solely Il Legislatures
derive their sovereign power, and You will look in
vain for any power TO make any law regulating the
appoinIIng Representatives TO Congress, any more
than to appoint foreign ministers. Such q pows
or, then, they do not possess the Legislature of
sovereign State Ii is derived from Tie State,
but from the United States Constitution, and by
that TO be exercised, under the direction and con-