Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1844-02-01

ian md TO NANTES. open hostility against the pfoS'
ion Of the Constitution which conlnnsit
If there was no other objection, the one under eoh
.;do,,,ion would be insuperable with me- DINER Ut
. rv from the advocates Of the proposed Conveh.o"'
in reference to this provision. regard as Que u ~
SIC, ,,nnorance not because desire the el'cuoh u %
, tho Housp but because believe 1t to be an mas
ens,ba means in the hands OF the smaller safes u
prs.,v,np their Jus, and COM tuonal weight IN the
-n;ai election, and through mat, IN the hAeeu
tive Department and the Government itseii, "h'en
hsliav to be essential to the preservation oil our SUD-
Line federal system | regard the adjustment oil lne
.,,ve weight of the States in the Government to De
The fundamental compromise of the Constitution ano
that on which our whole political system depends lis
adjustment constituted the great difficulty IN forming
he Constitution. The principle on which II was n,
n,Iv effected was that while due concession should
ha made 10 popuaton provision should be also maze,
~ s,mo form to preserye the original equality OF the
States in every department OF the Government. ne
princip, was easily carried out IN constituting The ie-
,sa,iye department. by preserving the equality OF the
S,a,es in one branch uhe Senete) and conceding 10
nonuation its full preponderance IN the other But the
prent and difficult task Of reducing it 10 practice, was
in the Executive Department, at the head OF when
there is but single officer So great was 1t, that II
occupied the attention oil Inc convention, from ne ~
time during the whole session, and was very near caus
inn failure at last 1t would have been an easy task
constitute that department. either on the principle OF
the equality of the States in the Government or that
Of incubation To combine the two, in the election OF
single officer, was quite difficult affair but how,
difficult, II had 10 De performed, At Inc naZaro oi
losing the Constitution
II was finally accomplished, by giving 10 the larger
States nearly the preponderance IN the electoral
college as they have in the House, and to the smaller,
in The event of choice by the House, the equal
iv they possess in the Senate thus following closely
the analogy of the Legislative Department To make
as close as possible it at first proposed TO give
the eventual choice 10 the Senate instead Of the House
bu il was altered and the present provision adopted,
for reasons which did not affect the principle
II was believed by the trainers, the practical operation
of the provision would be- that the electoral college, in
which the influence Of The larger States dependencies
would nominate, and That the House voting by States
where their equality is preserved would elect who should
he the President To give that operation in practice
the provision it originally stood in the Constitution
was that each elector should vote for two individuals
without discriminating which should be President OF
Vice President, and if one had majority of the
whole votes then out of the FIVE highest the House
voting by States should elect one, and the person not
elected having the highest number OF votes, should be
the Vice President 1t has been since altered, that
the electors should designate which should be Pres
dent and which Vice President, and the selection Of
the House was limited to the three highest 1t is mani
fest that if this provision of the Constitution had been
left operate by itself, without the Intervention Of eau
eusses or party Inventions be :ween hs people the
election, that the practical operation would have been
such have stated lnQ eucn as was clearly lnlenoeC
by the trainers of the Consultation.
The object intended is important. The preservation
Of the relative weight OF the States, established by
the Constitution in all Departments is necessary to
the success and duration of our sysem of Government
but it may be doubted whether the provision adopted
TO effect in the Executive Department. not too ren
ed for the strong and may add corrupt passions, which
the Presidential election will excite. Certain II
that if the practice of nominating Candidates for the
Presidency by Conventions constituted as they propo
sed shall become the established usage, 1t will utterly
defeat the intention OF the trainers ct the Constitution
and would be followed bya radical and dangerou:
change, not only in the Executive Department, but in
the Government itself.
This danger was early foressen, and to avoid it, some
Of the wisest and most experienced statesmen OF tor
mer days 50 strongly objected 10 Congressional caucus
ses TO nominate candidates for the Presidency that they
ne YER could be induced to attend them; among these
will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and Mr.. Lowndes
Others, believing that this provision OF the Con
tituiion too refined for practice, were soeItous lc
amend it, but without lmpaIrng The influence oil th'
smaller States in the election Among the Sc, rant
myself With that object, resolutions were introduced
in SS, in the Senate by Col Benton, and in the House
by Mr. McDutfe, providing for dstrcting The States
and for referring the election back TO the people, IN case
there should be no choice, TO elect from the TIVE
highest candidates. The principle which governed II
the amendment proposed, was 10 give fair compensa
ton the smaller States for the surrender OF their ad
vantage in the eventual choice by the House and a
the time TO make the mode of eectIng the PresI
dent more strictly in conformity with the principle,
of our popular inst tutons and to be less able tt
corruption, than the existing provision They re
ceived the general support of the party, but were
objected to by few, as not being full equivalent &c
the smaller States. The principle embraced, is denti
cal with that which you proposed TO constitute The
Baltimore Convention, but which has been dictate
rally objected to by some, who then took promnen
part in lis favor If you have not succeeded there is
al least some consolation in rejecting, that if oher
have since changed, you now stand where you ther
did in the purer and better days Of the party. ! was
in favor of i, then, as | now, not because con
slider the resolutions perfect, theoretically, The
existing provisions of the Constitution, but because
believe would practice more certainly accomplish
what the trainers of The Constitution intended Blu
while the provision stands as ii does, would regart
myself ltle short of aitor TO that sacred nstru
ment, should give my assent, directly, or indirectly
10 any practice which would have the effect of divest
ing the smaller States of the due weight which /
secures To them in the Presidential Election, whe
Their designed or not Ans here let ME add, that a.
ohjec tonable rs | think a Congressional caucus
for nominating President il is, IN my opinion, la
less so, than Convention constituted, as is proposed
The former had indeed man, things to recommend 1t
Its members, consisting of Senators and Representa-
tyes, were the immediate ogans of the State Legsla
lures, the people: responsible to them respec
lively, and for the mos part of high character
o"o pr ."p's"i " 40
very important they represented fairly The relative
strength of the party in her respective States In al
these important particulars was all that could be de-
sired for nominating body and formed striking con.
trast to the proposed convnton and yet it could moi
be borne by the people in then purer days of the
Republic acting with Cen Jackson and most OF the
leaders Of The party at the time, contributed 10 put it
down. because bellevedt TO be liable to be acted on
and influenced by the patpnage Of the Government
an objection far more applicable to convention
sttuted as the proposed, than ts Congressional
caucus Far, however, vast from my intention, in aid
ing TO put that down, TO Substitute in it's place what
regard as hundred iimesmore Objectionable in every
point of view. Indeed, if here be intermedi-
ate body between the people and the election unknown
10 the Constitution, it may be well questioned whether
better than the old plan Of Congressional caucus
can be devised.
In taking the ground have, in favor Of maintanins
the right secured TO the smaller States by the compro-
mise of the Constitution am nctuated by no partisan
feeling desire 10 conclliate their good opinion. If
the reversed and the rights of the larger
stead of the smaller we're invaded, would with equal
readiness and irmneS stand up in their defence. /
am the partisan of nesr the other, but simply
supporter of the Constitution, and what believe to
be just and fair regard the Constitution as the only
ark of safety for all, ard believe that in defending it,
defend the interest ind safety of each and al-the
greater we'll as the smaller-the States invading the
right of the Others as we'll the States whose right