The Yazoo City Whig and political register. (Yazoo City, Miss.) 1842-1844, 1843-06-16
ninl stock. and M ~

regarded in equity, being then reateo as
that species of property into which Il was
designed 10 be converted This distinction
! sporehend furnishes the ground on which
dover is TO be allowed or dlsalloWed IN chan
Gerry.
But 10 what extent or to what portion
of the real estate held by partnership, a
court Of chancery will apply this rule and
consider il as Joint stock convertible into
personally, is a question which seems 10
have been much mooted, and WhiChis even
now in rather an unsettled state. The
earlier decisions in England went no further
than 10 apply the rule TO such real estate as
was absolutely necessary for the puTpo:es Of
the partnership, or to such as was by the
agreement Of the parties to be held as joint
stock, and sold and applied as such at the
dissolution Of the firm. The late decisions
there, seem to incline toward the propriety
Of considering all lands held by partner
ship as standing on the same footing. One
reason which induced the court to favor a
change Of tho rule was that il was unjust TO |
prefer the rights Of the heir at law, when the /
whole. family may have been induced TO look
to il, and consider it as a common fund fs
the benefit Of all, when the firm should be |
dissolved This reason could have no
weight here, the right of primOgenature be-
ing abolished. Still some of the courts OF
this country seem inclined TO follow the mo-
dern English rule 10 its fullest extent. We
are not inclined to discuss this Vexed ques-
ton, as the cnse before US does not require
that we should decide between the cOnfi(S
ing authorities. Iapprshend that no cas
can be found which would furnish an author
ity for the interposition Of court Of chan
Gerry, unless the case should present one of
the following features list. That the land
held by the partnership was necessary to pay
the debts Of the firm. 2nd. That by the
contract of partnership it was agreed to be
treated as Joint stock and sold at the DISCO
luton. Bird. That the parties themselves
had considered it as personally and part of
the jontstock; or, 4lh. That a sale was ne
cessary TO make proper distribution. In
case which presented one ofthese questions,
a court of equity might possibly treat the
land as personally, but this is question ex-
clusively of equity jurisdiction, and we are
in this case not discussing it in that capacity,
nor do we think the facts would justify the
application Of the power even If we had it.
The articles Of partnership are not before
US, but Galloway, ono Of the partners, after
being released from his covenants, was ex-
amined as a witness. He says that the
partnership was formed in 1888 for carrying
on a mercantile business, which was after
wafds extended by mutual consent TO the
purchase and sale Of town lots, tracts Of land,
plantations, and to planting, and the record
shows that a very extensive business of this
sort was done. These purchases were not
made for the purposes Of the firm according
TO the original design. They were not ne
cessary to enable the parties to carry on a
mercantile establishment, nor have we any
evidence that tho lands so purchased were
by tho contract to be considered as perso-
nalty. They did not themselves treat the
land as personally or joint stock; they con-
veyed not by their partnership name, but as
individual tenants in common, and in every
instance a reIiaquis tment of doDer was Ia.
ken, showing that they considered that they
were making an ordinary conveyance ofland
The purchase of land with the joint fund
constituted them tenants IN common, anC
might be regarded rs a division OF tho tunC
TO that extent. The lands in which dove
is claimed lDCre sold during coUe-ture, ant
this necessarily cuts of the inquiry as +
whether they are 10 be considered as par
Of the Joint stock. No one who has an Ia
terosl in that stock is contesling the claim
The land is now beyond even the reach o.
tho convertible power Of court of equity
and even il it would under different circum
stances treat il as personally, for the pur
pose Of closing the firm, paying the debts
and dividing the surplus, it cannot now b.
so treated. II is now the case Of tenan
in common who has conveyed without valid
REIMBURSEMENT Of dover The statute il
express that tho widow shall be endowed o
lands Of which her husband died seized
and which be had before conveyed, in whicl
dover had not been relnquished. In sup
port Of this view Of the subject refer L
Green vs.. Green, lst Hammonds Rep. 353
Bell vs.. Phyn, Vesey, ass: Rig ley vs.
Waterworth, h. 425; Colyer on Partner
ship, 20 tO77; Roper on Husband and wife
345; Park on DOwery, 1867: 6 YergeI
20; Sumney vs.. Hampson, Ohio r. 32s
IL Mass Rep, 40.
II seems that dover in lot 232 was re
fused By The court because il was held i
trust, this lot having been conveyed b
Markham only. The deeds are not set on
al length, but it is agreed that they are pre-
perry described The record states that De
mandant read 10 evidence record Of decd Z
Lineous B. Markham 10 III. G. Runneli
conveying lot 90 in Yazoo City, for h
consideration Of $1,000. From this a
scFiplion we learn nothing Of a trust, and v
cannot therefore decide the question in CHI
way.
The rule in regard TO allOiting dove
whore Improvements have made By q