The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1843-01-18
THE EXCHEQUER-THE ALLEGED DAN
GERS OF IT CONSIDERED.

The efficiency of the Exchequer as a means
of providing a sound currency and regulating
exchanges, can be fully asceraned only by ex-
pertinent. There is every reason to believe and
anticipate, however, that in that respect, il would
answer all the expectations which have been
formed Of il. Such is the unhesaing convic-
lion of intelligent practical men, who have ex-
amined the features and bearings Of IT; and, in
fact. the objections of political opponents, so
far as they respect the efficiency OF the Exche-
quer as financial machine, neutralize and des-
troy each other; some declaring that it would
be powerless, and others as zeaously contend
ing that il would be far too powerful. There
can hardly, indeed, be doub', tina, paper cur
rency founded on the means of the Government,
and backed by the credit and resources OF the
nation, would in the outset, at least, excel any
other currency of the same kind, boih in value
and uniformity
The alleged danger of the Exchequer is,
therefore, the chef or only objection TO il which
requires TO be discussed and it is somewhat
TO be regretted that its opponents, including even
the grave Senators Mangum and Buchanan, in
an accumulation of fearful eplhets and dire
forebodi ngs, have not been more precise and
specific in their designation of the expected
dangers. To call the Exchequer "a murder
Gus car" or ga Juggernaur," without giving
some reason why it would be so, is not to ar
que against the prof ct, but to abuse it-and is
more suitable to a stump orator, anxious 10 eA-
cite passion and prejudice, than 10 a Senator,
DESTROYS of inviting fair and candid and patr-
otto discussion.
The alleged dangers of the Exchequer may
be classed under three heads Isl. Danger
from Executive patronage. ID. From the union
Of the purse and sword. Sd. From an initiation
and depreciation of the currency.
If il could be shown that these dangers were
not peculiar to the Exchequer, but belonged in
at least an equal degree TO every other proposed
Fiscal Agency Of the. Government, the ques-
ton might be considered as settl d in favor Of
trial of the Exchequer for the People have
tried and condemned, in turn, every other form
of fiscal agency, and fiscal agent, in some
FORM they must have. The Exchequer is the
only one which remains un'red and, possibly,
the best may have been reserved for the last.
l. As to the danger from Erecutire pat
ronage Ii must be considered, that whatever
form Of fiscal agent the National Legislature
may establish it must necessarily, at the same
time, create or establish a large amount Of pat
ronage, and the question Is, where can the con-
Irol ofthe patronage be most safely lodged
fTba p,,L Of ,ba ITnftad oil 4,
large patronage, not only in the beslowal of of
fees, but, in still greater degree, through its
power Of lending money or discounting Now
this patronage, possessed by Bank, might BE-
welded by it, either in aid of, or against an
administration of the General Government and
in either case il might be welded against the
People. A Bank would look to the interests of
ts stockholders, or its favorites, and not TO those
OF the community at large. 1t might take the
part Of corrupt administration against the
People, or II might use lis power to overthrow
an honest and patriotic Administration A
grave charge against the late Bank of the uni.
ted States was its interference in politics and
many believe that nothing bat popularity so
overwhelming as that Of General Jackson could
have withsiood it. efforts. Between the danger
Of such power delegated to a corporation for
long term Of years-and not to be reached by
the People, except perhaps through the doubtful
and tedious process Of a scire Jacias-and the
danger Of the Limited amount of patronage
which the establishment of the Exchequcr woulI
vest in the President subject to the direct Goa
troll of the People, there can hardly be a comoa-
rison.
The same objection existed, and was charged
in the strongest terms, by the present Whiq
party, against the State Bank system. The
Deposte Banks, il was alleged, were selected
from party or political motives, and the Govern
mcnt deposiies made the basis Of loans to parti-
sans and favorites of the Administration.
The Sub-Treasury system, too, was liable o
the same objection Of an increase of T. Executive
patronage, and was opposed most zealously on
that ground; and, if that system had not been
overthrown, with the Administration v bicb in.
troduced II, 1t Is difficult to say to what amount
Of patronage II might not have given birth, and
thu, too, without any counterbalancng adyan-
tages to the People in the regulation of the cur
rrncy or exchanges.
This danger, therefore, Of patronage which
mightb. brought into conflict with the free
dom OF elections" and with the interests of the
People, has been urged against every plan of a
fiscal agent which has been suggested. The
Sub-Treasury was more free from danger 10
the People, in this respect, than either a Bank
o the United States or the State Bank system
and the Exchequer, with such guards and re-
strctions as have been earnestly recommended
by the President, may be made still more safe
than the Sub Treasury The popular objection
TO the sub-Tressuy system was, not the
If -.