Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1843-08-08

| numOer u representatives.. / ne increase IS not accord
ing to any common ratio-for,% although the addition Is
equal inevery State, the electors are not propoftiona,e
TO the representatives. in any State. The addition OF
two in each State, TO the number OF representatives.,
affects very variously the quantum of electoral power
in each. Thus, in Delaware, it is increased three.iold-
in Rhode Island it is doubled-whilst in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, there is an addition 10 the re-
preventative number Of a very small per cent. It's
evident, therefore, that a representation of the States
in Convention, according TO the House of Represen.
tatves, for the purpose of recommending, advising,
perhaps controlling the bestowal of the electoral vote OF
each, would be unjust and unequal, and would de-
tract most inluriously from the relutive weight and m
auence of the less populous States. Besides, the
House OF representatives is one entire body, convened
together from all the States, in which all the mem
bers not only consult and discuss, but vote indlscri-
Intimately. Not SO with the electors appointed by each
State. They are kept separate and apart, as oistinct
bodies-they assemble in their respective States IN
unconnected, independent Colleges, and ore expected
TO vote according 10 the will of their constituents,
without consultation or arrangement with otner COL
leges. And the more effec,ually to secure hdel'ty IN
the Electoral Colleges to their respective constituents,
the electors- are required TO meet IN their several states
on the same day throughout the Union -thereoy pre-
GLIDING all concert, management collision, or Juggiery,
by which the popular will OF any State, as expressed
at the time of election, might be surrendered, evaded,
or defeated.
In addition, then, to the conclusion, which, itis DE-.
lie we'd, has been clearly established, that the ratio OF
members in the House Of Representatives. would be an
unequal and unfair rule OF representation IN q Ma
tional Convention, it would seem, from Inc comparison
lust submitted, of the organization OF the House, and
ito mode of voting with the separate organization OF
The electors. that the former furnishes no suitable ana.
logv or proper rule for the organization Of a Conven-
ton, or the regulation of its voting, expressly consli.
tuted to affect and control the action Of the latter. We
have, then, no resort, but TO the principle, upon which
The appointment Of electors is placed, and TO the organ.
ization and proceedings Of the Colleges themselves, tor
analogy, argument, and illustration. And TO no other
source could we wish to resort, in reference to a Ma.
tional Convention, held for the very purpose Of so har-
monizing the popular VIII IN the several States, thai
when the electors shall meet separately in each State
on the same day, faithfully carrying out the purpose
Of their constituents, there will result q concurrence
of their ~sufrages sufficient TO secure the election oil
President and Vice President, according to the pre-
vailipg ense Of the people, as primarily intended by
the Constitution, and happily to prevent the evil OF
a contingency, to be tolerated only as less in mogni-
tude than IN absolute defect of election.
The Legislatures of the States may, and most Of
them do, direct the electors TO be chosen by a genera
i ticket-tha, is, that every voter in the State shai!
give his suffrag e for the entire number Of electors TO be
appointed. In this mode the principle prevails, thai
the majority in the State shall control The minori-
ty-that the msjority have a right TO appoint all the
electors, secure unanimily in the College, and thus
give the whole electoral vote to the same individuals
The constitutionality of this plan is now universally
conceded.
In this mode, too, each State ia fully recognized as
a .eparaie and sovereign Republic, Omitted in this
character with the CO. States by a Constitutional com
pact,) because il is of the very essence of Republican
Democracy-(aye, of Liberty that the majority shall
control and govern, and that the minority shall cheer
fully yield TO the voice OF the majority, fairly ascer
tanned, in all matters affecting their common concerns
and the general interests and rights of the State. Ane
The very process by which the majority and their vii
il ascertained, exhibits, at the same time, the minority
who are thus bound, upon principle, 10 yield In Inc par
ticular matter thus decided-and, therefore, such de
cision having been made, cannot be recognized as
distinct portion of the citizens claiming distinct rights
and a separate share of political power. A minority
advancing such a pretension, and strngglins TO main
tain it, becomes the minor faction IN the State-and by
resisting the regularly ascertained will at the majority
they disregard and oppose the fundamental doctrine o.
representative Democracy.
The Legislature may directthe electors 10 be chosen
by districts-that is, that portions of citizens residing
within defined limits, may elect one elector-the nun
Der Of districts being equal 10 the number of electors
This is a distribution and apportionment of the whole
number of electors, which the citizens jointly, and, IN
common, are entitled to-, among equal sections or parts
The constitutoual'ty of this plan has not, and proba
bly, will not, be questioned. By this mode, unanimlty
among the electors may not be secured. Elected by
separate portions Of The State, they may differ among
themselves, and yet truly reflect the will OF their con
stituents. The majority of a district, compared with
the whole State, may be a portion OF the minority
and yet they secure one vote, and the expression o.
their choice in the Electoral College. At The frs
blush of the subject, this may be esteemed as securing
a just right to a minority, as a concession 10 the mino
rity- principle But it is not founded on any such
principle, nor, indeed, could it be sustained and JUST.
fed on any such principle. The Legislature, upon the
theory Of our representative system, in pursuance oil
the will of the majority of the State, directs, that the
electors shall be thus &c parately, and not jointly chosen
The district mode of appointment, then, having beer
adopted upon the ground, that the majority prefer it
the principle Of the majority prevailing, is then car
tried into the separate elections of the several dis
tricts-the majority in each district prevailing over The
minority in The appointment of the eleetor. In no in
stance, in no part Of the arrangement, is political power
or elective privilege, conceded 10 belong, Of right OF
Justice, to q minority in the State, or in the district. i
is true, in common parlance, we speak of mInoritie:
in a State, of the rights of a minority, and Of the duty
of a majority not TO Cypress q minority.
There can be no question, that the action of the
!, controlling majority to be rightfnl, ought to be reason
able-that the equal rights aud privileges of each in :
dividual either ought 10 be acknowledged and secured,
and that none should be partially Disseminated for
preference or prescription. But whilst il ls thus readily
admitted, that every citizen, as of right, without refer
ence TO his political opinions, or his religious creed,
may claim indiscriminate equality in the enjoyment OF
his property, and the exercise of his franchise, yet
that there does, or can exist in a Republican Govern
ment, a minority, as a separate and distinct body, en-
titled as such to a proportloned share of the rights and
political power of the State, is, indeed, past the com.
prehension Of the unpretending Democrat who pens
these lines. The doctrine which argues the possible
existence of a minority in a State, as a body dnstinc,
from the major part, with a just claim as such to pc.
litical rights, does present itself, in the humble est.
nation Of him who now addresses you, as a startling,
but not a novel or unprecedented heresy. And IN
matters Of election especially, and in recommends
tions or appointments by popular suffrage, it seems ut
terly abhorrent TO the great first principles of Demo
cruiio Government. This minority. principle WIS a
cherished object of Federalism, particularly urged in
reference to the elections Of President and Vice Presi-
dent. In the great debate in the Senate of The United
States, upon the amendment to the Constitution, de-
signed, more efectually, to secure the election to the
majority, and to exclude the minority, not from parti.
cipation, but from the power of defeating The majority,
and acquiring the control themselves, the claim OF
a minority TO political power, especially in the
election Of those officers, was strenuously main
tanned by Tracy, Hillhouse, and other distinguish
ed Federalists. The claim was most triumphantly
refu,ed by that profound statesman, John Taylor,
and his illus,rious compeers. You will readily ex-
cuse the introduction here of an extract from one of
( Taylor's speeches, deemed particularly pertinent, be-
cause delivered on the subject of securing the election
of President and Vice President TO the people Of the
States, and Guarding against either devolving on the
House or Senate, and being controlled by n minority
t"Sir, (said he much has been said about the rights OF