The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1843-07-30
ne Trial OF Hogers-thr charge OF the
Judge-the Jury dIseharged.


Judge-the Jury discharged
1he Court convened at the usual hour on Thurs
DAY morning, and the jury having been called and
lound 10 DE In their places his Honor Chici Justice
nav addressed the prisoner ana informed hun
that he was at liberty to add anv re marks of his
own TO the observations of his counsel upon the
evidence In the case
The prisoner rose in his place when directed to
90 SO oy an nthcer, and after listening To the re-
mark OF the Judge, which was once or twice re-
peated, stood moment as If at a loss to know
what was required OF him. and sat down again
without speaking.
Chief Justice SHAW then proceeded TO charge the
jury win reference 10 the law which should govern
their decision His address occupied two hours
and hall in the delivery, and Was in high degree
clear. impartial, and interesting We quote from
the Boston Attas. He remarked at the outset upon
the grave and important character OF the duty
which had devoved upon the Jury in reference to
the case before them, and upon the considerations
which should influence them In preparing their
minds Tor It's performance He then went on 10
state the law OF the case, in substance as follows
The Legislature OF the Commonwealth, he remark
eo, mad Tor reasons OF public eXpediency, provided
that TIE state prison should, so tar as the examlua-
ton OF offences therein was concerned, be- deemed
to be as well part OF the county of Suffolk as OF
MiddeseX. The trial OF persons accused ct murder
mad, by the same authority, been made the duty OF
quorum OF the Justices OF the Supreme Court and
OF jury selected partly by lot partly by the choice
OF Their ielow-citlzens, aud partly by the prisoner
himself The Court had therefore entire jursdic-
|
the jury to decide both upon the law and upon
the facts that is to Judge what facts were prove d,
ana whether such as were proved amounted TO the
offence charged In the Indictment They were to
examine all the evidence, and then to say upon
their oaths, whether or not the prisoner guilty
OF the witu murder of Charles Lincoln Jr, Esq
The relations OF the prisoner and his victim to
each other did not affect the law of the though
they might tend to illustrate the fdcs and the
tives OF the prisoner. OF the fact that the unortu-
nate Warden toll by the hand of the prisoner, and
died instantly from blow inflicted by him, there
could be no doubt The question then was, whether
the homicide IN this Case amounted to murder The
crime. IT murder defined to be the wful and
malicious taking OF human hfe by person OF COM
petent judgment, IN the peace OF the Common
wealth and without Jusilhable cause. Homicide
might be either Justhable, excusable, criminal :,
and the atterln greater or less degree. In this
case these distinctions were immaterIal. The act
OF the prisoner was either murder with malice afore
thought, or excusable homicide. Where person
wilma instrument expressly adapted to the purpose
committed an act OF barbarous violence the law
| presumed the existence OF malice In his heart and
IL was tor hun to show any circumstances OF pallla-
ton or Justification. In the case at the bar there
were all the physical ingredients of murder. The
question then was, whether the act of the prisoner
was to be excused by reason OF his insanity Upon
their view OF his question their verdict must entire
" depend 10 would be proper for them 10 state In
their verdict II In favor OF the prisoner that 1t was
founded on his insanity. The question whether he
should be sent to the State Prison for the rest OF his
term OF sentence, or to the State Lunac Hospital,
would then be one to be decided by the Court In
view OF all the circumstances of the The Jury
had only TO say whether he was penalty liable. The
presumption OF law that the act OF killing was
voluntary and malicious Therefore, when that
was proved, the burden OF showing circumstances OF
excupatIon was upon the prisoner, unless reasona-
bic doubts OF his guilt should have arisen from the
case proved on the part OF the government The
presumption OF malice was to be conclusiveIy re.
bu'ted in some way, and it was immateria from
which side the rebuttng proof might come; whether
from the Witnesses for Government, or from distinct
evidence offered by the other side The crime OF
murder was defined by no statute-in It's nature
II could not bet must be gathered from the
common law OF our community, received
iron England by our fathers, and adopted 10 a
greater or less extent by their descendants.-
To commit thus crime person must be oil compe-
tent understanding. child incapable OF dslln.
gushing between right and wrong, a furious mad
man, or an idiot, could not, OF course be guilty o.
murder. Ii there were no w II, power OF Judging
OF the nature OF actions, conscience, or II the
power OF the understanding were oblIterated by
controlling mental disease, there could not be guilt
Thes" were extreme cases. In all such the general
rule OF law was so plain and simple that they were
never brought to trial. The difficulty was in the
vast number and variety OF Intermediate cases, TO
which no general rule could be made to apply
Such were cases OF partial insanity, where the un
dersandlBg perverted by insane delusloDs, influ
enclng the subject OF them TO believe IN the exls-
tence of false state of facts where there some
capacity and the question then was whether that
divlduai to distinguish between right and wrong.
Or there might be cases OF monomana, In which
the mind OF the patient was upon all subjects
but one. In these cases the aff1 ced person might
be capable OF reasoning correctly, OF drawing cor
rect lnterences but as this reasoning was built upon
false foundation, as the facts from which these
differences were drawn had no existence but in The
intiamed imagination OF the sufferer the conclusions
were false. ln these the was not excused,
it he had the capacity To distinguish between right
and wrong as TO the particular criminal act Again,
person might be of unsound memory, incapable
of understanding the relations of things, his duty
TO others. But although aborng under partial in
sanity, IT the person understands the nature and
consequences OF his act then he is responsible for
1t. Then 1t the prisoners mind had been proved
unsound, the question would be whether his mental
disease overpowered his reason and his JUDGMENT,
so that his act was the result OF an uncomfortable
impulse. In that case 1t would be the act OF his
body rather than his mind The evidence here had
been OF partial lnsanlty-melancholy, accompanied
by mental deusIon or hallucinatiOn. This deluson
or morbid belief might or might not exist, but where
II really existed, II would Justify acts committed
under its immediate influence, which would have
been ustiabe had the supposed state OF lacs really
existed. For instance, II man should sincerely
think that another, who was coming towards HIM
in the kndest manner with present, was advan-
cling with pistol to kill HINT the former should
really see things through this dlsordered medium,
and should kill his imagined adversary, with view
merely ~ defend himself from imminent danger, he
would be justified. This form OF insanity was usually
inulcdleu ny pio0uibS ,noTDluy over one particular
idea, which could not be removed; and this hallu-
clnation would exculpate person, where the sup
posed state OF facts existing only in his mind, were
such would justify him If they really existed in
the nature OF thngs-as in the case last stated, or
in the case OF man who believes himself to act
under the immediate direction of the Deity, and
who acts only in accordance with such imaginary
commands. But If the delusive belief concern some
trfng matter only, IT the subject OF il be capable
of Distinguishing between right and wrong, then his
haluclnaton would form no excuse Tor his criminal
act To apply this principle to the at the bar, if
the prisoner labored under delusive belief merely
that the Warden was going TO punish him by
short solitary confinement shower bath not
dangerously severe, then he would be fully respon.
sble tor his act. The rule was, that il the insane
deuson was such to justify the act # the ina
gined state OF facts really existed, then the deu
sve belief was justification. Or il the afflicted