Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1843-08-08

ing to any common ratio-for, although the addition is
equal in every State, the electors are not proportiona,e
TO the representatives in any State. The addition Of
two in each State, to the number of representatives,
affects very variously the quantum of electoral power
in each. Thus, in Delaware, it is increased three-fold-
in Rhode Island it is doubled-whilst in New York,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, there is an addition TO the re-
preventative number Of a very small per cent. IL IS
evident, therefore, that a representation of the States
in Convention, according 10 the House of Represen.
tatives, for the purpose OF recommending, advising,
perhaps controlling the bestowal Of the electoral vote of
each, would be unjust and unequal, and would de.
tract most injuriously from the relative weight and in
auence of the less populous States. Besides, the
House OF representatives. is one entire body, convened
together from all the States, in which all the men,
bers not only consult and discuss, but vote indiscri-
Intimately. Not so with the electors appointed by each
State. They are kept separate and apart, as distinct
b~odies-they assemble in their respective States in
unconnected, indie ent Colleges, and are expected
to vote according 10 the will of their constituents,
without consultation or arrangement with other Col
leges. And the more effeciually TO secure fidelity in
the Electoral Colleges to their respective constituents,
the electors are required to meet in their several States
on the same day throughout the Union thereby pre-
GLIDING all concert, management, collusion, orJugglery,
by which the popular will of any State, as expressed
at the time Of election, might be surrendered, eyaded,
or defeated.
In addition, then, TO the conclusion, which, it is be-
lieyed, has been clearly established, that the ratio of
members in the House of Representatives would be an
unequal and unfair rule Of representation in q Ma.
,ional Convention, it would seem, IRON the comparison
JUS, submitted, of the organization of the House, and
lis mode of voting with the separate organization Of
the electors, that the former furnishes no suitable ana.
logy or proper rule for the organization of a Conven-
tiHn. or the regulation of its voting, expressly consti
tinted 10 affect and control the action Of the latter. We
have. then, no resort, but 10 the principle, upon which
The appointment of electors is placed, and TO the organ.
ration and proceedings of the Colleges themselves, Tor
analogy, argument, and illustration. And TO no other
a ..ah n aoA N orc fn a N a.
tional Convention, held for the very purpose of 50 har-
monizine the popular will in the several States, tina,
when the electors shall meet separately IN each State
on the same day, faithfully carrying out the purpose
of their constituents, there will result a concurrence
of their sufruges sufficient to secure the election oil
President and Vice President, according to the pre-
vailing sense of The people, as primarily intended by
the Constitution, and happily TO prevent the evil OF
a contingency, to be tolerated only as less in nugni-
tude than IN absolute defect of election.
The Legislatures Of the States may, and most oil
them do, direct the electors to be chosen by a genera
ticket-tha, i, that every voter in the State shall
give his suffrage for the entire number Of electors TO be
appointed. In this mode the principle prevails, thai
the majority in the State shall control The minori-
ty-tbat the ms orIty have a right 10 appoint all The
electors, secure unanimt,y in The College, and thus
give the whole electoral vote 10 the same individuals
The constitutionality of this PLAZA is now universally
conceded.
In this mode, too, each State is fully recognized a.
u tepdTIte u uNSiSiSh itPuoiSs NuhhSa ~ t'S
character with the CO. States by a Constitutional com
pact,) because it is Of the very essence OF Republican
Democracy (aye, Of Liberty that the majority shall
control and govern, and that the minority shall cheer
fully yield 10 the voice OF the majority, fairly ascer
tanned, in all matters affecting their common concerns
and the general interests and rights of the State. Ane
tbe very process BY which the majority and their vii
IL ascer,ained, exhibits, at the same time, the minority
who are thus bound, upon principle, TO yield IN the par
tcular matter thus decided-and, therefore, such de
49, -..z- lAN. --lo an-~ot hn nnnuni1a -
distinct portion Of the citizens claiming distinct rights
and a separate share Of political power. A minority
advancing such a pretension, and strugg ling to main
tain il, becomes the minor faction in the State-and BY
resisting the regularly ascer,ained will OF the majority
they disregard and oppose the fundamental doctrine o
representative Democracy.
The Legislature may direct the electors TO be chose
by districts-that is, that portions of citizens resldin!
within defined limits, may elect one elector-the nun
Der Of districts being equal 10 the number ct electors
This is a distribution and appointment OF the Who'll
number of electors, which the citizens Jointly, ana, II
common, are entitled to, among equal sections or parts
The constitutionality Of this plan has not, and proba
bly, will not, he questioned. By this mode, unannn'i,
among the electors may not be secured. Elected b.
separate portions OF the State, they may differ among
themselves, and yet truly reflect the will OF their con
stltuents. The majority Of a district, compared wit
the whole State, may be a portion of the minority
and yet they secure one vote, and the expression 0
their choice in the Electoral College. At the frs
u 1Aoob VI kC obJCCt tAto boJ 70
a just right to a minority, as a concession 10 the mino
rity- principle. But it is no, founded on any sucl
principle, nor, indeed, could it be sustained and JUST
fled on any such principle. The Legislature, upon TN
theory Of our representative system, in pursuance o
the will OF the majority Of the State, directs, that tn
{ electors shall be thus separately, and not jointly chosen
. The district mode of appointment, then, having beei
adopted upon the ground, that the majority prefer il
the principle OF the majority prevailing, Is then car
3 Eried into the separate elections of the several dis
tricts-the majority in each district prevailing over In
minority in the appointment of the eleetor. In no in
3 stance, in no part Of the arrangement, is political power
, or elective privilege, conceded 10 belong, Of right o
Justice, TO o minority in the State, or in the district. !
IS true, in common parlance, we speak of minori,ie
in a State, Of the rights of a minority, and of the du,.
of a majority not to Cypress a minority.
There can be no question, that the action of III,
controlling majority to be %rightfnl, ought to be reason
! able-that the equal rights aud privileges of each in
dividual citize n ought 10 be acknowledged and secured
and that none should be partially Disseminated fol
preference or prescription. But whilst it is thus readily
admitted, that every citizen, as of right, without refer
ence 10 his political opinions, or his religious creed
may claim indiscrlminate equality in the enjoyment o
his property, and the exercise Of his franchise, ye
that there does, or can exist in a Republican Govern
ment, a minority, as a separate and distinct body, en-
titled as such to a proportioned share of the rights ane
political power of the State, is, indeed, past the com
prehension of the unpretendlng Democrat who pens
f these lines. The doctrine which argues the possible
existence of a minority in a State, as a body distinc
from the major part, with a just claim as such to po
li,ical rights, does present itself, in the humble est
nation Of him who now addresses you, as a startling
but not a novel or unprecedented heresy. And II
matters Of election especially, and in Recommended
tons or appointments by popular suffrage, it seems ut
terly abhorrent to the grea. first principles of Demo
cratic Government. This minority-principle was
cherished object of Federalism, particularly urged in
reference to the elections Of President and Vice Presi
dent. In the great debate in the Senate of the United
States, upon the amendment to the Constitution, de
signed, more effectually, to secure the election TO the
majority, and 10 exclude The minority, not from par.i
cipation, but from the power of defeating the majority
and acquiring the control themselves, the claim Of
a minority TO political power, especially in the
election Of those officers, was strenuousIy main
tanned by Tracy, Hillhouse, and other distinguish
ed Federalists. The claim was most triumphantly
refuted BY that profound statesman, John Taylor
and his illus,rious compeers. You will readily ex-
cuse the introduction here of an extract from one oil
f Tsylor's speeches, deemed particularly pertinent, be
cause delivered on the subject of securing the election
of President and Vice President TO the people Of the
States, and guarding against either devolving on the
!, House or Senate, and being controlled by a minority
las, (,a;J La \ r,oh haa heen said about Tho ,;rbto n