Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1843-08-08
FUK THE ENQUIKER.
Organisation of the National Contention.

OEnuVt~btfot u lc
! Gentlemen Your remarks in the Enquirer OF the
2s,h ul,imo, connected with an article re-published
from the New York Plebeian, headed "South Carroll
lathe National Convention which have been
carefully perused to day, have induced the following
remarks, which are respectfully addressed to the calm
consideration of your readers. No analogy or argn-
menI can be fairly draw from the equal re representation
OF the States in the Senate, or from the single vote OF
each State, in the House of Representatives, in the
possible contingency contemplated, affecting the cues
lion OF the representation of the States, IN a general
Convention, 10 nominate and candidates
preparatory to the election of President and Vice Pre-.
l,dsnl, upon the popular principle provided IN the Con
Isiiuuon, as originally adopted, and as designed TO be
,sHIl more emphatically maintained and secured oy
Subsequent amendment. The equal representation IN
the Senate, recognises and secures the principle, that
the States are equal, sovereign, and independent-that
as such, they acceded TO the Confederacy, individual.
,y, BY separate ratification and adoption of the Consti-
tuition, and that, in such character, they are parties TO
The compact Of union. The election OF President and
Vice President is effected through the Intervention CT
ELECTORS, appointed separately, it IS true, by the States,
ibnt By popular suffrage, and In unequal dIspropor-
,.ona,e numbers, TO be ascer,ained by a compound pro.
ices, applied TO all the States. Hence, the equal repre-.
Isen,ation in the Senate, bears no analogy TO the prin-
:eple, which governs the appointment of electors, and
lcannot fairly constitute the basis OF q consultation
among the States touching the choice of the recipients
Of electoral suffrage. Stll less can any argument be
'%cedcced from the uncertain contingency Of an elec.
ton by The House of Observation-Disclosures, that is
a provision Tor a mere possible case, the occurrence OF
which other provis uons are intended 10 prevent. 1t is
iooth illogical and absurd, to quote a possible case which
may not happen, and which 1t is designed and contem.
lpa'ed to anticipate, as an active rule to govern pro-
'ceeo'ng:, or as the basis of preparatory arrangements
'of The accomplishment Of an election in a different and
preferable mode, which, if successful, annihilates the
t~hoie possibility.
Besides, in the event of the election devolving on
tthe EOrsa uhprptp aach Stota o,vos a sinula vote II
iS"i be borne IN mind, that that single vote is given
Upon consultation and agreement, and by ballot, OF
..e Whole body OF the popular representation Of the
isa'e, and even, then, it is restricted to one Of three per
is'hs, previously Disseminated and recommended by a
portion OF the popular suffrage and confidence. lfany
,"sument or analogy can be derived from this contin.
9,n' arrangement, il would seem to be, that, as in the
I"oase, The whole body of the represe natives give the
zoe 10 which the State is there entitled-so in q Con.
'FnAon, to %expound the popular will in the designa-
'1'h OF candidates to be elected by the electors Of each
'ia'e, The whole delegation from each Stale, upon con.
so'alion and argument, ought TO declare the electoral
voice OF The State entire, and without division-Or, If
ne body OF delegates from each State is TO be re-
S'cleo to a single vote, as in The contingency of an
'fe'i"n by the House, then, 10 perfect the simll,tude
sha analogy, there should be q T evious quasi election
" o"s'ehauon, 10 ascertain how, and upon whom the
eecioral vote should be bestowed, and one of the
."ee having the highest number of electors, according
% 'he result OF this preliminary trial of strength, should
''ns oe eiisiole 10 the nomination and recommendation
i0' Inc Convention. But even this far fetched semblance
" analogy IS evanescent. 1t disappears before the
conditional fact, that the same popular mode is pro.
"ced for the election OF President aud Vice President:
''hc yet, in case of failure 10 elect either in the first
;'s'ance, a different body and a different mode is pro.
wed, as The failure may be Of the one or the other
4 National Convention is to be charged with the no
i|''a'ion OF both officers, recommended 10 the People
- Tue United States for election in tho same mode,
"'1ush' The surfaces of the Colleges of Electors and
'"'! ae thus nominated and recommen ded for the very
t''ose OF ensuring their election. and defeating the
@s>'e contingency as 10 either. Now, as both are to
"o'n'"ated by the same body: which possibility will
p'titffed as the basis of Conventional organization.
Iva" 'hey be moulded into harmonious Combination,
,m s 10 PLAN tor further argument, that the prepare
p! 1,pah'2at,on Tor the popular election of electors Of
"ue".a and Wee President, cannot be founded upon
squa' presentation of the States in the Senate, or
>" me provision for the possible eventual election Of
u,,n lug oy the House, or Of the other by the Senate, or
cs awy feasible combination of the two contingent
ie,.0 . can any forcible analogy be draw from the
ls pseo's'inn of the States, according to numbers. in
a'ase OF representatives tits granted, that both
mo-, nov nonss of Representatives, and in the appoint.
Rem" Electors, the popular principle is consulted
eo,s ,S are apportioned among the States &c
b., n.y. % numbers, which numbers are determined
sti,t tonuon fixed rule. The number of electors to
Con-" eaeh State is entitled, is also ascertained by
lie "I'ohal process, which makes it greater than
sec,o.a" e OF representatives.. But this excess of the
over the representatives., is produced by the