Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1843-06-02

serving harmony union and concert, would be clearly,
not only no, authorized by the example Of the general
ticket, but without justification or excuse
Another view remains deserving the most serious
consideration; going show, that the introduction OIL
The renera! Ticket far Com niordng reason or pre-
ceaenl IN ayo. Of The plan proposed by the Richmond
Convention furnishes strong grounds against H. Inc
very fact that II has adopted in choosing electors
and tha, /, has increased The relative weight OF Inc
larger States and populous portions OF me Onioh
in the electoral college aud the election OF tfesidehl
instead ola reason why Their weight should be increased
ia the General Convention aud the nomination OF the
candidate is one of the strongest against it. 1t obvI-
ousIv nak Il more Important 10 the others, that what
has been lost in the election shall not be lost IN the
nomination also If IL be lost there, too, all will be
hopelessly lost To understand the full force OF the
remark it must be recnl!ected that The nomination IS
necessary To make the vote OF the electoral college
certain Ono indeed, of the leading and aVowed OBJ
iects is TO avoid dvson IN order 20 Prtrent e election
from goin0 iafo nc House where the vote IS by States
aud where the largest and the smallest New YORK and
Delaware stand on The same level. The certain con.
sequence of nomination IS, TO deprive the smaller
States of the chance Of This contingent advantage
given them bv an express provision Of The Constitutions
in order 10 compen Tor The advantage which the
larger States have The electoral college. II forms
one of the mpromSes in adjusting The relative weight
of the States IN the Executive Department. and not
\
mers We wish to be understood. We are not the
advocates of carrying the election to the House We
know that there strong reasons against 1t, and we
are sincerely DESTROYS oil avoiding it, II ii can be done
on fair and equal terms but not SO blind as not
10 see tina, things stand, if the smaller States
and less popuous sections should surrender this
tngent advantage, without securing IN the nomination
a compensation, winch would preserve the relative
weight assigned them b. The Constitution, they will
virtually surrender nil control over the Presidential
election and the Executive department. The plan Of
the Richmond Convention does not secure il on the
contrary, it Is apparent, from what has already been
stated, that IN gong into convention on that plan
far from securing compensation for sure ndering
their contingent advantage, the smaller States would
have less weight in the convention, and nomina
ton, than in the electoral college and election
But the case is still stronger AS weak the mode
Of voting and counting would make them in The Con
yenton, under the plan of The Richmond Convention,
they would be made shll more so, under that portion
of IT. whuh recommends four delegates TO be appointed
from each District shall next proceed 10 show
Its Obvious effect will be 10 give much larger number
OF Delegates 10 the central aud contiguous Sts.es than
The exterior and remote: Tor The plain reason tina,
they could attend with far less relative Inconvenience,
expense and time. The remote OF their delegates
could 20 aud return home few days. al the expense
OF few dollars, and with bat little sacrifice Of time
and c1EvenIence owing to the nearnes and great ia
ces which railroads and steamboats, afford for travel
ling in that portion of the Union. Such would not be
the with the delegates from the exterior and more
remote States To them the expense time and sacrifice,
would afford formidable obstacles against attending
The result would be- that from the there would be
a fell attendance and from the other thin enc. One
would send host OF FIVE hundred six hundred dele
gates and the other handful probably of scarcely an
hundred lie has very imperfect knowledge Of our
Gaure, who does not this great relative increase
OF influence and weight the States Which should send
the mos; nd The dmnuton Of those ch should send
the handful. The voice of the mary would be almost
sure 10 Grown that OF the few
Bu; thls relative increase OF weight in the Conven
ton OF the central and contiguous States, would be in
reality but relative increase of the weight OF The lar
ger nembere OF the Union, those having the great
est population are, fact, for the most part the
trail and contiguous States, he the less poPulous gene
rally the exterior and remote The causes, then
though apparently operating among the different classes
Of States would, fact, unite aud combine TO ncre
The relative influence of The States and portions
OF the Union, and would by their joint operation give
them an overwhelming weight in the Conyen'ion and
through II, over The nomination, the election and LIZ
ecuuve Department.
We have now, trust, conclusivey shown, shat the
plan Of the Richmond Convention, in the mode OF yoi
~. a"d counting, recommends, instead OF conforming
Ia, departs wholly from, the analogy OF the Electoral
College, and that il adopts principle unknown TO the
Constitution, and which, in lis opeIation would destroy
the relative weight of the States, fixed by It's
promises in the election OF President and Vice Presi
dent and, OF course, no, standing the test OF the prIn
cpes to which We proposed 10 bring IT. should be re-
lected So clear and jus. is this conclusion 10 our
minds, that hazard nothing in asserting, that no
State would venture 10 propose, amendment to the
Constitution, the mode Of voting and counting recon-
mended by the Richmond Convention, containing, al
The same time, provision TO dves the smaller States
OF their contingent advantage OF the election devoy
ing on the House; that II proposed, 1t would not
receive the vote Of single Stale in the Union so
strong wonld BE the Of justice against IT. And
yet II that plan should become The precedent, and ge
neral CONVENTIONS for nominating Presidents and Vice
Presidents The established practice, would, in effect,
supersede the existing provisions IN reference 10 those
elections, and become virtually, part of the Con-
stitutlon; as much SO, if formally adopted an
amendment
Blu, if the mode of voting and counting recommend
ed by the plan should be rejected seems TO US IL
clearly ought to be- and the per capita adopted, as
must be 10 conform 10 the Constitution, then the other
portion OF the plan which recommends four delegates
to be appointed from each election District must also
be rejected. The reason IS plain: it would be incom-
pabe with the pcT capita mode OF voting, which, IN
ORDER to preserve the relative weight OF the States as
fixed by the Constitution, makes it necessary, that each
should have the same number oe delegates in the Ge-
neral Convention, that II is ent,tled 10 in the Electo
raj College Were IL however, possible, TO meet this
objection 10 the number Of delegates from each district,
recommended b. the Richmond Convention it would
ia!i under The test of the other principle promised,
which requires, that every practicable means should be
adopted, order that the General Convention should
utter truly the voice OF the people, in contra disnc
ton to that Of mere politicians To effect that, is
dispensable the delegates shonld, in all possible cases.
be directly appointed by the people. The greater the
number of intermediate bodies, the farther the appoint
ment s removed from the people, the feebler VIII be
their voice and the potential that of political
gers II IS That which constitutes The great and fatal
obect'on Ia appointing deeEat by Stale Conventions
which themselves are always one, and sometimes t@o
or three degrees removed from the people However
proper they may be, 10 make previous arrangements
preparatory to their appointment, hazardous leave
tina, 10 them. If il be left TO he it would be vain to
hope would not become in time, the channel BY which
improper influences, and corruption itself might
enter and control the proceedings of the Convention
aud, through it, the nomination and election No plan
could he better devised to give those who hold
pect to hold Office the control of the election, and ,
through them, give the President the power Of nomina
ting his successor In other Words TO dvest the peo
pie Of the control the election, and 10 transfer it,
and with it the control over the Executive Department
10 those who hold seek 10 hold Office. There is
proc.'"y IN all popular Governments to that result,
which be prevented only by the greatest caution
and vigilance
Such is the danger of appointing the delerates bv