Sentinel of the valley. [volume] (Woodstock, Va) 1841-1848, 1843-12-14

mefCialIy barren without II, VIII so De
ost--and, to crown all, the whole ex.
penses Of repair, the whole interest upon
tiie outstanding debt Of the Company.
and finally tire principal itself, will be
thrown as a permanent and crushing tax
upon the con merce Of the Canai-that
is, upon the private property OF the con-
tiguous and surrounding country--thns
concentrating tax which was meant to
be ditIused. aud converting ~ CONNER
cal highway into an actual and srievous
mortgage upon private estates
These ruInous consequences the Cum-
pany is in no respect whatsoever able TO
prevent. so that the State must suffer
them, unless she Interietes n prevent
them for herself. She. rs|eed lis the
true and real sufferer at last. aid what
ever in this matter, the contract Ubiiga-
ton of the company may be, the compa-
ny, at best, is only her agent; whilst
hers is the prior, the larger. the perpet
ual obligation to protect her interests and
her people from every injury to which
the duties of a State can extend. Ac-
ing upon this principle. the supporting
haad Of the Legislature should be given,
at once, to the improvement in question.
There is no other that could SECURE it
more, which could better demand it up
Oh the ground Of sectional and legislative
faith, or where eiitctual aid could SO
surely deliver FROM present evil, and so
widely operate for future good. Pos
sessing an ampler tributary connexion,
than any other commerce.! Ike III the
State. there is 10 one means accessible
to the Legislature through which SO &C.
NAL an influence could be extended to
the labor. the progress, aud the educa-
ton, Of SO large a portion OF our people
no Que by which so much could be
done to check emigration-to obliterate
amongst US all causes and pretexts of
sectional bitterness--to bring cur vari-
Gus and scattered people into intercourse
and brotherhood with each other-to
substitute societies OF men with all the
faculties Of numbers ia the place Of soli-
tary and separated families, and thus to-
consolidate the power. the interests and
unity of the State. Looking at this im-
provemeDt in the light Of these and kin
bred considerations, | could not, with
out a conscious Abandonment of duty,
omit to recommend it to the Legislature,
most strenuously as a lit and proper sub
ject for its prompt and generous assis-
lance. Should the Legislature agree in
the propriety of this recommendation.
the necessary funds could be raised up
on the credit of the State, and might be
given up to the company upon such con.
ditions as it should consider prudent to
impose.
The form Of that assistance, should
any be granted, it is competent only to
the Legislature to decide: but would
respectfully suggest as the most expe'li-
ent. under existing circumstances, that
the Legislature shall assist the company
by loan which shall. at least. be sufii
cient in amount to complete the section
which is partially finished, and thereby
to save it from early and entire ruin.
To those who object, for whatever rea-
son, to the organization of the company
as not suited to this great work, or as not
! sufficient for il, and who are unwilling.
on that account, to subject to its admin
istration the funds OF tina State, nut who,
at the same time, are most anxious to up
hold and promote the work itself-to
such 1t will be rendered apparent by re-
| Election, that whilst other modes OF re-
lief could be proposed than the one re-
commended, yet that there is no one, all
points considered, which would, per.
haps, be more suitable in itself, or more
free from external objection. Should
the Legislature think proper to make
the loan recommended, it is proposed as
an accompanying condition, that it should
reserve for the State power in the acts
OF the company more proper tomato TO
her interest than that which is now es-
tabished by law. The power now held
by the States is that of giving at all the
general meetings Of the stockholders a
vote which shall be equal to one fourth
Of all the votes given by others, and Eve
hundred in addition. This it might be
expedlent to continue, if, as in the case
of other joint stock companies, three
tifths Of the stock were in The hands OF
t individuals. But as in this case the
shares Of individuals amount TO about
. one.seyenth Of the whole stock, and can
not, and do lot. in fact, secure the con-
: trolling authority Of private interest i'll
8 the administration of the company, (which
5 is the main principle of the joint stock
: systen,) there is no sound reason why
the State, bv an arbitrary restraint upon
! hei self, should secure that authority II
, her corporate partners, and thereby place
f the positive control of the company in
their hands. as if banks, colleges and city
| corporations were more competent and
more suitable managers of its uust than
, herself.
But whilst there is no sufficient reason
: for making the State less in power than
her corporate colleagues, when she is
, more than double in interest, there are
sufficient ones against making her the
unchecked and absolute power Of the
concern. Hence. would suggest thai
the vote of the State. be it what it may.
shall be divided equal amongst Der thre t
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