Virginia free press. (Charlestown, Va. [W. Va.]) 1832-1916, 1843-02-09

tain and inaabitatt symptom Of tse scenes. dssola
ting scenes Of reFplsion, which were TO follow 81,
months aftervaTdsin 1887.
long period pf general peace add or great pro,
periy al the bEtnehes Of trade and industry rea
aered expansionsrn more prevalent than contrae
ions. and thus from the known excessive profits o
banking To this county, engepdefed ah appetite fo
the multiplication Of bark charters, This was N,
true Of the inordinate increase Of bzns and
not 70 be traced, n Mechanic supposes to the pol
cal movements Of the party then in power And
slthough the god-like the inspired prophet DAME
1 Webster, solemuls aud prophaticsliyL warned Val
buren. Who was then President Of the Senate VI
who elaimthe right TO think for ourselves beIjey,
that be wdelyerTs :, Miller. in M, csieuIs,;o,
oiihe time Of he hertfuelionof the earth, which i
athousahd years ~ !
These esusst N Mhiehz have referred. We hay,
eeea informs 11faIsd q ~ eourss ,,es,, sissvs
or four Years I1e |Nnff5of Banks AMI h,
capital Of The eoutkry va enlarged in still greater
proportion The multiplication Of banks, and 4.
banking capital II 50 short period, could not fat
! y produce apronortionste expansion of our paper
circulation Such the result, as the history o.
our country proves, With the further consequence
increased prices NJ property, an inflated, bloatet
eredit system. a1h an almost universal spirit FOL
speculation. IheI multiplied banks found read,
borrowers because sn almost entire community wers
stimulated 20 6orrew; and the great mass borrowed
not TO expehd the sum borrow ed IN aid or nroduc,
I'VE industry, Shieh would have benefited the cour
Try, but TO speculate IN Western lands. And her,
let me reply TO Mechanic thai granting his premises
70 DC true hatthe of these lands paid the
cash Tor them, still they were debtors the banks
tor the sum borrowed 10 pay for Them apd the avail
q these loans were vested in unprednctiye e$pits
\ What next These immense sums were vested id
splendid schemes bt Internal Improvement, in State
Stocks oteyery Kind to purchase to-day for high
price, property which III was believed some Other
borrower would purchase morrow al a still higher
| e1eei 10 proeess Of this SOFT, employing hun
EHOf mi 81 - IL a
ahd banking DISCOUNTS who So stupid as not 10 Zee
that the NANCY titus employed would produce re-
WILSON'S. WHY, Messrs, Editors the AMOUNT Of III.
lersst ANNUALLY aeStung in favor Of the banks VAS
enormous while HE property in bonds. in State
SOCKS, was annually producing nothing. Influences
ot nus powerful character could not fail to be fel,
from the Atlantic 10 the Rocky mountains M
Large loans were proposed, either for the
purpose OF iurther speculation, or to relieve
them from dltfefIties, and{ il soon became D.
parent that the tanks which had risen up from
desire Of gam From thesdemand which had
already been made upon them, had absorbedtoo
much OF their own capitslin this way TO ems bic
them 70 make thh loans tosahose who desired
tnem Inc naE1ets of Europe were naturally
sought, ana Tor a tmesthe State stocks of all
descriptions were greedhy taken. But, saws
Mechapic, we ''sre likelY 10 be the gamers by
thIs operation, VIE have The stakes in our own
hands and some olBhe democratic States are
rePudiating these debts. Suffice il 10 say, that
these States are Enotacting in good faith, nor Is
i an honorable qensolstien to Mechanic, or any
'high minded Antericah- What next, was the
consequences OF khisf inflated credit systemi-
The consequence may well besimagined When
these demands cAme upon ussat home and from
Europe, Il was hn electrick shock throughout
our country, and the depression and EN- barrass-
ments weAeel h commercial stransac lions, in
every brafich of'trade. in the prices of proper
", IN ourdomestic industry, in the wages of
labor, dow FROM these excessive uses of credit
=. nome and tsfse hbs sa sse g. ovsEsosk Tie
you believe il Fit il even so, that the States Of
these United STATES are now indie bted to Europe
in the enormous sum Of 5000, O1o, 900, the inle-
rest Of which Isl annually about $4,000, 600,
which operates 10 drain of our specie, for these
schemes Of inteTnal improvements.
Twill now ask Mechanic, il there is the least
reason 10 believe that, if the Bank Of the U. S.
had continued ID be the depository Of the pub
lie revenue until May, 1880, that IFS fate woula
have been averted.5or thatEwe should not then
have had general suspension or specie pay
mentss why the public deposites would oRly
have added fuellto the fame, and would have
! tempted the bank TO engage 10 still wilder spec
uations. The oyer-banking and over trading6f
1 1886, which was conducted under its auspices
would have become Still greater, the expansions
would have been still more dreadful. Nv hat
control has il exercised over the currency Of
the countryP The history Of the l1te Bank,
I through ali its mutstons,e shows that it never
I exerted any control over the cRrrency. On
the contrary, III may after Eeful examina.
ton of the subject be. ! think, safely affirm.
ed, that at every step of banking excess
and coniractfons, il was the first TO take the
! lead-was this not the csse in 1917, in 1918,
ih 1923, 10 1881, and in 1884, its vast exPan-
sions followed Up by itsdistressing coptraclions
led TO those Of the State institutions How was
il in 1887, when it failed equally with others 10
Iredeeming its notes in speciei II is true, that
having so vast Rcapital, and strengthened by
1he use ofthe reEenue of the Government, when
il had them it POSSESSED more power but while
+, il was ilself, 10y that circumstance, freed from
the control (which all banks require-its para
mount objects and inducements were Ieit the
same, toImake The most for its stockholders, mot
to regyiate the currency Of the Country nor has
| il, asIarla as ! aim advised, beensfound operating
othsfwise, elscNhere The natfensl character
\ given 10 the Bank Of England, hasonot prevent
H "a excessive huciualions in theircurreney, and
III proved unable to keep of suspension OF
/ specie pa ymenis. which lasted forneariy a9uar-
4 Ter Of century. And why should wesexpect i,
4 to be otherwise national insl ituti6n, though
\ deriving its charter from 1 different source,
than the Stat banks, is yet constituted upon The
same principles, is conducted By meh equally
liable to the same disasters, with the additional
disadvantage, that its magnitude occasions an
extent of confusion and distress, which the
acknowledgements Of smaller instI:utieRs could
/ not produce Can ,Mechsnic, or any other man
doubt il, that the late suspension Of the VI. S.
| Bank 10 Pennsylyap of which The effects hre
now felt in THAI State, apd over half the Unipn.
had lis origin III course OF business comments I'd
! while il was national Institution, and is there
no good reason for suPposing shat the same
consequences would have followed, bad j sill
have deriyedits PowsEs from the General Gov
ernment
/ II is in vain, let me tell Mechanic, when the
| il dueuces and impulses ere The same. to l4ok
| for a difference in CONDUCT and, results. By
chsrtering such Institutions, we do therefore
but increase ne mass Of paper credit and paper
eurreacy, without checking their attendant evils
and haciustioas | cannot but believe thai wi
4 The full understanding OF the operstonsl upor
the banking system, which experiences hai pro-
duced public sentiment Is no less opposed tc
4+rfe creation of national bank for purpose.
connected With currency and commereei thar
/ for those connected With the fiscal operations o
the Government.
shsil wproceed TO his structures upon TIA
part Of the address, which says The struggle oi
80 and 40 resulted il placing the Goser4hlent
J in the hands Of party, who have gfossly
grossly. m;smhnaged our affairs, exhauslkh th
: funds. increased the debts, and prosiFAted III
credit Of The Gesernmeut SC SC. iastead Q
...,fsliw afiaekfnO and ronfuiin1 these state