Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1843-08-08
FOR II ENQUIRER
TON Il EsEVOIHLF'
Organization of the National Contention.

Gentlemen Your remarks in the Enquirer of the
os,h ul,;mo, connected with an article re-published
from the New York Plebeian, headed "South CarolI
ua-Ihe National Convention which have been
carefully perused to day, have induced the following
remarks, winch are respectfully addressed to the calm
consideration of your readers. No analogy or argu-
ment can be fairly draw from the equal re representation
.of the States in the Senate, or from the single vote OF
each State, in the House of Representatives, in the
possible contingency contemplated, affecting the ques
lion of the representation of the States, IN a general
Convention, TO nominate and candidates
preparatory to the election of President and Vice Pre-
.srden', upon the popular principle provided IN the Con
,shtu,on, as originally adopted, and as designed TO be
,sulI more emphatically maintained and secured by
subsequent amendment. The equal representation IN
The Senate, recognises and secures the principle, that
the States are equal, sovereign, and ndependent-that,
as such, they acceded to the Confederacy, individual
.y, BY separate ratification and adoption Of the Consti-
tuition, and that, in such character, they are parties to
lie compact of union. The election of President and
Vice President is effected through the intervention CT
ELECTORS, appointed separately, it IS true, by the States,
ibnt By popular suffrage, aud in unequal dIspropor-
itonate numbers, to be ascertained by a compound pro.
,ces., applied to all the States. Hence, the equal repre-.
isen:ation in the Senate, bears no analogy to the prin-
,cpe, which governs the appointment of electors, and
,canno, fairly constitute the basis OF a consultation
among the States touching the choice of the recipients
,i electoral suffrage. STILL less can any argument be
'%teduced from the uncertain contingency Of an cleo.
ton by the House Of Observation-Disclosures that is
a provision Tor a mere possible case, the occurrence Of
winch other PROVISIONS are intended TO prevent. 1t is
both illogical and absurd, to quote a possible case which
may not happen, and which 1t is designed and contem.
,p'a'ed to anticipate, as an active rule to govern pro-
leeed'ngs, or as the basis of preparatory arrangements
l'of The accomplishment of an election in a different and
preferable mode, which, if successful, annlhilates the
whole possibility.
Besides, IN the event Of the election devolving on
,'e House, wherein each State gives a single vote, it
w." be borne in mind, that that single vote is given
upon consultation and agreement, and BY ballot, of
!@e whole body Of the popular representation OF the
isa'e, and even, then, it is restricted to one Of three per
Is'hs, previously Disseminated and by a
portion of The popular suffrage and confidence. lfany
iSs1mento or analogy can be derived from this contin.
gsmt arrangement, it would seem to be, that, as in the
Inonse, the whole body Of the representatives give the
zoe TO which the State is there entitled-so in q Con.
Vshi'on, to expound the popular will in the designa-
'1'n OF candidates TO be elected by the electors Of each
sale, the whole delegation from each State, upon con.
s"'ai'on and argument, ought 10 declare the electoral
voice OF The State entire, and without division-Or, it
oe body Of delegates from each State is 10 be re.
s'e'ed to a single vote, as in the contingency of an
'fc''"n BY the House, then, 10 perfect the similtude
so analogy, there should be q previous quasi election
VI o's'gna''on, TO ascertain how, and upon whom the
'ectorai Vote should be bestowed, and one of the
1ee having the highest number Of electors, according
'e result oil tins preliminary trial of strength, should
S''s'ofe " e"c iiHdu anu EeC0tnme DO0tiOD
,oi the Convention. But even this Ear fetched semblance
., analogy 10 evanescent. 1t disappears before the
Constitutional fact, that the same popular mode is pro.
weed for the election Of President and Vice Pres,dent:
.'nd yet, in case of a failure TO elect either in the first
Instance, a different body and a different mode is pro.
.dsd, as The failure may be of the one or the other
j National Convention is 10 be charged with the no
lm'Ha'ion of both officers, recommended 10 the People
~ Tie United States for election in tho same mode,
,af'Hgh The SURFACES of the Colleges of Electors-and
s"e5 are thus nominated and recommended for the very
F''eese OF ensuring their election, aud defeating the
Ns>a.e contingency as TO either. Now, as both are 10
~ nom mated by the same body: which possibility will
Preferred as the basis of Conventional organization,
,'an they De moulded into harmonious combination /:
~ y 100 PLAIN Tor further argument, that the prepara-
~ o'aahizatlon for the popular election Of electors Of
s"eht and Wee President, cannot be founded upon
equal representation of The States in the Senate, or
,ra me provision for the possible eventual election Of
= u oy The House, or Of the other by the Senate, or
i" any feasible combination of the two contingent
,s,. No' can any forcible analogy be drawn from the
,s ttseh'a'ion of the Suites, according to numbers, in
n i 'us OF Representatives. It's granted, that both
ma house OF representatives, and in the appoint.
R-n, u Electors, the popular principle is consulted
Cord sseh'a'ives are apportioned among the States &C
By, "s 20 numbers, which numbers are determined
VIII, tonmon fixed rule. The number of electors to
Con-, Co.. each State is entitled, is also ascertained by a
Tie aLuonal process, which makes it greater than
see,o,"" Of representatives. But this excess of the
over the representatives, is produced by the