The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1842-02-10


tive, aud judicial, should ever be keIi sepa-
rate aud distinct. And Government was
the most perfect when most IN conformity
with this fundamental principle. To give,
then, TO the Executive any agency in the
ascertaiument and expression Of the will OF
the nation. was so far violation of this
great leading principle. But il was said
thai the trainers Of our Constitution had
nevertheless been induced TO place the veto
upon The list of Executive powers by two
conscientious the first was a desire to
protect the Executive against the power OF
the legislative branch, and the other was
prudent wish to guard the country agoins,
the injurious effects of crude and hasty leg
Islation. But where was the necessity to
protect the Executive agsins, the Leglsla
tive department We're not both bound
by their solemn oa;hs to support the Con
s,iiutioh "A? The Judiciary had 10 veto. Ii
the ursuncat was sound one, Why was
not the same protection extended 10 The Ju-
dietary also Was there not ample Sc.
cuflty against the eucroachmcnls Of the
legislative power in the absence Of the We.
10 p! First, there was the solemn cath OF
Office; then there was The authority Of the
Judiciary then iheie was the responsible
~ OF individual members 10 the People, and
this responsibility continually KEEP. Up by u
frequent appeal to the People; and, lastly,
there was the ultimate conflict of the Pre-
sldeni and the Legislature before the grand
tribunal of The nation itself, in case of any
attempt by the Legislature TO deprive him
Of the righliul exercise OF his authority
Besides. if veto be necessary as defence
against legislative power, why was there no
veio.against the highest description OF all
legislation, the fundamental legislation by
o convention? There was no veto there
there was no apprehension Of hasty action
no necessity was recognised for the con-
trolling will OF oas man 10 save the nation
from the needless acts Of lis own represen.
tatives. Blu. in the case of ordinary egis.
laiion why should such apprehensions be
INDUCED? Ga this subiec; experience was
our safest guide. Now. Mr.. c. had taken
The pains to look into tae provisions Of
twenty.six State Constitutions 10 relation
to this matter Of the veto, and the result
was highly curious and interesting. The
States were IN this respect divided, rs
equally as thei, number would admit, into
three distinct classes. Nine Of them gave
10 the Executive the veto power unless con.
trolled by two thirds of the Legislature.-
Eight other States conferred the veto, out
controlled il By second vote Of ma orl-
ty, as was proposed in the amendment now
under consideration. While the nine re.
naming States had not Inserted the veto at
all; andi al the head If these stood Que
which had been called the mother Of States
Virginia. Now, some Of these State
Constitutions we're Of q date anterior to
that Of the Constitution of the United States
ITSELF IL there had been this very great
danger Of executive encroachmeu, and Of
basiy legislation, one would suppose ii
would have been heard Of in these nine
States. Had any instance get occurred to
show that such danger did exist Mr..
Z. had heard Of Done-read of none-and
he put il to the advocates of this arbitrary
and monarchicaI power, be put il especial
ly 10 Democrats, who. while they professed
themselves, and he doubted no, honestly
and conscien,lonsly proiessed themselves,
friends Of the People, came out in the con.
test between monarchical prerogative on
the one hand and civil freedom 90 the 9th.
er, as the avowed advocates Of prerogai.7e
The put il 10 all Of them TO tell, If such
dangers both Of eucroachment aud rashness
as wers pretended as q pretext for the We.
10 did actually exist, how ii happened that
10 the nine States he bad named, during so
long a period as had elapsed since their
Constitutions were formed, no instances
had occurred either Of encroachment BY
the Legislature on the powers Of the Exc
cutiVe, or Of such rash and hasty legislation
as called for the restraint and safeguard Of
single sovereign will
Now, before he proceeded further, be
invited gentlemen TO form just estimate
Of this veto power; to look at II, 10 sec
what Il was, 10 ascertain what was its val
be, what II amounted to 10 the practical
operations Of Government. He should not
pretend 10 90 into any inquiry as TO IFS mo.
raj valae, or to estimate IFS influence on
the individual who exercised Il, or the dc
gree end extent 10 which, by means Of it,
IN cnnaoxiou With vast patronage, the
President could sway the minds of other
men, for that was power which admitted
Of 90 estimate. he should conii0e himself
10 what might be called mere numerical
estimate Of the amount Of the veto power,
and he would make this estimate bv taking
the numbers Of the tao Houses Of Congress,
as those Houses nov stood. The Senate
at present consisted Of fly two members;
OF that number majority consisted of
twenty seven; two thirds amounting 20
thirty SIX. Surprising law 10 be passed
by bare majority, land 10 all great and
contested questions bills we're wont to be
passed BY very small majorilies, then there
would DO 10 its favor twenty seven votes
The bill was submitted to the President
and returned by him with his veto. The
force Of the Presidential veto could no, be
overturned but by thirty six votes. Here,
a al. Il. l.