Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1842-03-22
No. lO5.-vOLUME XXXvIn.

other limitation to this power aso than the discretion
and pleasure oCongrcss and when that to be the
construction of the constitutional powers of the Legs
iaae over the money and property and credit Of the
hiion we may cease TO talk OF limitations and resrc-
ties under our SYSTEM and prepare knees to bend
ar our heads TO bow, to the supremacy of Parliament
Still another position has been sometimes assumed
a'od the conclusion here expressed, and which
&c follow almost rreslstIby from the provisions of the
constitution quoted. 1t is, that money not property
~ lie sense in which that term is used in the third
ton of the fourth article of the Constitution before
tered to- and that the power there conferred to dispose
OF and make all needu rules and regulations respecting
the territory and other property belonging to the United
states, does not and was not intended 10 confer pow
er over the money Of the IT, s., but only the land
the buildings the forts, the ships, and the like property
1t this position be sound, the argument is at end
TO any power derived under this provision OF the Con-
sutIon TO make the distribution proposed TO be made
10 the States, because that proposition 10 Distribute
money! not lands or any other PTopertythc proceeds
Of the lands not the lands themselves and those pro-
ceeds are 10 be first made money in the National Trea
sary, and to be drawn from them by the States in
money
I This simple to the proposition scarcely
fail TO show its faacy, because the proposition thus
carried out to its consequences would admit that Con-
gress might conslluonally give the lands hut could
not give the money for which the lands should SELL
So, also. in relation TO the other branch OF The PROPOSE
ton the 'other property, the doctrine would be- that
Congress could give The money from the Treasury
perty with the money, and distribute it when pur-
chased Or, if it should be insisted, it doubtless
would be, that the 'tproceeds of the land and other
property could be consttutionally distributed, well
the property ITSELF then this constitutional doe-
rne would be, that Congress cannot take the money in
the Treasury derived from lmppst, and distribute IT.,
but that take that money and purchase the
land, in the of Louisiana and Florida it has
done, purchase any "other property" with the mo-
ney and then again sell the land other property pur-
chased, and distribute ''lhe proceeds the money
ceived for it. Will any man contend that the Consti
tuition of the u S. forces the Congress Of the U. s. TO
such miserable shifts and devices 10 enable it TO per-
form lis constitutional duties to the States and the peo-
ple Is it not rather when undertake perform acts
and to exercise powers, TO which the Constitution is
stranger, that find ourselves in these labyrnths Of
Inconsistencies and contradictions?
Mr.. w. thought these views which demanded
the most solemn consideration and reflection from the
members Of the Senate II possible his views
were mistaken, and he greved to say that, whether
mistaken not, he but too conscious that the
orty of tue body he addressing believed them 10
| be so.
Under this conviction he forced TO examine this
exercise of the taxing power Of this Government as
question OF expedlency and IN this aspect It's intrn-
sic importance would not be found to be diminished
In the order of inquiry he had proposed he would con-
slider
| 2 The necessary influences upon both the State
and National Governments Of the establishment Of the
policy Of distribution, and the consequent exercise oil
the Federal taxing power TO raise money for the States
To lay and collect taxes, is an odous exercise of
power in popular sense, and one which no peops
would quietly bear but for collateral considerations
ing either from the necessity of the tax, measure
Of revenue, from some anticipated consequential be-
net to be derived from particular tax imposed upon
specified interest, or description of property On the
other hand the expenditure of public money is ordna
rily popular exercise of powers and especially in The
locality where the expenditure is to be made These
two powers ordinarily reposed in the same hands,
most usually exercised in combination with each
other, and the very theory of Government, so far as
they concerned is that the oppressive character oil
the first in lis influence upon those who the subjects
Of taxation, be neutralZed by the benignant cha
of the second in the influence which its proper
and just and equal exercise cannot ail TO produce The
policy of distribution 10 separate these powers, and de-
vove the exercise of each upon different and distinct e
gisatve bodies, acted upon by different and in many
conflicting interests and influences and acting under
widely different responsibilities Under this policy the
Congress is to be the taxng Legislature while the Le
gisatures of the States to hold the dppropriatiRg
power and thus the checks and balances of government
al power are these most essential particulars, TO DO
destroyed The passion on the part OF the State Legs
laures to expend is longer TO be restrained by their
fears 10 tax and direct and Instant conflict is thus IN
yted between the OF an odous power
here and any restraint upon the exercise of
beneicent power there Which of the parties will pre-
vail in such conflict Look at the constitution OF this
body 1t stands upon the State Legislatures Our COM
missions are from those high bodies and many Of tho
members Of the Senate conscentiousy believe in the
duty of obedience to instructions ven from them 10
the Senators of their appointment The will OF the
Legislature Of each State, then, will be law to the Sena
from the State, upon subject OF this description
Here therefore, the result OF the conflict Cannot be
doubtful How will it be in the other branch Of Con-
gress' There the representatives hold their places not
by election from the Legislature, bat the people OF
their Stale and from the people who elect the pc
puar branch at least Of the State Legislature There
representatives. in the popular branch OF the respective
State legislatures, however, are in numbers, compared
with the representatives ofthe people in the House
ofRepresentaves, from three four in some States,
forty in others, to one and the representative
in the State legislature representing much smaller DIS
trict or territory and performing all his official service
within the State much nearer the people, much more
with them, and enjoys much greater opportunities 10
make his acceptable the constituent body and to
impress upon them favorable views Of his policy than
does the representative in Congress. Suppose then
local expenditure, confined TO single Congressional
district to he the object and the members OF the State
Legislature from that district urge upon the common
constituency the benefits and advantages to tem Of the
expenditure, and their anxiety TO appropriate and ap
py the money provided their representative in Con-
gress be persuaded TO vote the tax TO raise It, Sup
pose the in Congress finds it in his power
TO be present, and in TO this appeal from his
co-represenatives in the Legislature he attempts TO
show the common constituency, what the fact really
would be If equality in the taxation and distribution
should be preserved that he TO succeed in inducing
Congress impose the tax, it would be upon hem and
them alone it would be mposed-tha the effect OF the
policy would be compel them first TO put their hands
in their pockets and pay this money to the
lector and that in the progress of me after the lapse
of year perhaps mouey they had thus paid would
come back 10 them to meet their iavorite local ex-
pendture, diminished by the amount of the fees oil
that collector and such other expenses might be al
tendan upon lis collection, safe keeping and RETURN
How would this honest, truth-,ell'ng representa-
tive, be answered by his popularity seeking opponents,
that not their limited constituency alone, but all the
people Of the whole Union share in the tax, while
they alone would enjoy the benefit, and blessings TO
flow from the expenditure Of the money: How readily
would the reply be made that the tax IS merely voiun
tary and he who should not choose to consume foreign
imported goods would not be compelled to pay cent,
where the rich and luxurious The peculiar objects
of the taxations And how confidently. and in many
instances trumphanty, would this fal!acy be urged
upon those who daily paying an onerous tax upon
upon the very salt which must season their humble
food and whe would thus be made humte petitioners