Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1842-03-15

is nothing left on which Injustice, or oPPresson' OF
usurpaton operate. Aud, finally n IS A' supreme
as IT is lust because conpteAeGins the Wi! oi all Wy
uniting that OF each OF the paris there Is nothing WIN.
IN or above to control it, II is indeed, the coz PoP"t
yox De the creating voice that called 'ae system mo
OK sence, aud Of which TIE G"vefniieht i's' - '
creature, clothed with Gei's"'eu P'"''' "
ils hgh bcheSis. , ,.
We are thus brought TO question OF the deepest
import aud on which the fate o: The system depehcs
how can THIS full perfect, Just an" supreme 'o'I "
The neopc embodied IN the Constitution, De brought 10
hear abnally and steadily connleracting the la'a
tendency OF Ii. Government TO the absolute ana aes
potlc control Of the numerical majority: W. may
he perm,,ed to Use bold expression, how Is ms
he deity Of our political system, TO be successfully IN
roked to interpose MS ail-powern creating voice -
save from perdou the creature OF It's VIII ana the "oN
of ia hand If i, canno, be done, ours, like all tree
Governments preceding II, must 20 Tue way VI az
flesh; but Il 1t can be, lis duration may DC Iron, ee'
ration to generation, the latest postery 'hs an
imnorspt question: will not attempt reply At this
tine II would lead me far beyond the l'mts properly
beonpnp to tins discussion descend ifo'n '"e VI
,esson nearer 10 the subject Immediately al ISSUE III
rider ia reply 10 objection 10 the veto power taken
by the Senator from Virginia, Oh tins SIDE The chaoef
H. es, his support OF this resolution the ground
that the object intended to be effected by the veto mas
,,d ,ha, the trainers OF the Constitution regard The
legislative department Of the Government, as 'e one
most 10 be dreaded and that Their motive Tor 'es's
the Executive with the reto was 70 check us
i've and not the Legislature, had proved to be the
most dangerous and that the veto had become ethef
useless or mischevous by being converted INTO sword
10 attack instead Of shield TO defend as was originally
Intended. ,
make no issue with the Senator, as TO the correct
ness of has statement assume The facts 10 be as he
supposcs: not because agree with him, but SIMPLY
with the view of making my reply more bret.
Assuming then, that the Executive Department has
proved 10 be the more formidable, and that requires
IL be checked rather than 10 have the power OF check
ING Others the first inquiry on that assumption should
be INTO the cause Of power, IN order to
ascertain the and the nature OF the danger and
the next, whether the measure poPosed-tha' OF az
yestnp II OF the veto, modifying It rs pfoPoseu-
would guard against the danger apprenehueo'
begin with the irst and IN entering on II, assert
with confidence that if the tSece''e has become ioi
mdable to the liberty safety OF the country or other
teparments of h- Government, the cause is not IN the
tnns,,tn,,on but in the and omissions of Congress
itself
According to my conception, the powers vested IN
the President by the Constitution, are few and Ell,
tctually guarded, and not OF themselves at all
formidable. In order 10 have Just conception OF the
extent OF his powers, it must be borne III mind mat
there but two classes OF powers known 10 the Con-
sttuton and they powers that are expressly grant
ed and those that are necessary 10 carry the granted
powers into execution. Now, by positive provision
OF the Constitution all powers necessary to the execu-
ton of the granted powers, are expressly delegated 10
Congress- be they powers granted 10 the Leg slatve,
Executive or Judicial department., and can only be eX
erciscd by the authority of Congress, and IN the man.
ner prescribed by law THIS provision may be iound
in what IS called the resduarv clause, which declares
that Congress shall have power "to make all laws
which shall necessary and proper TO carry into exc
cution the foregoing powers, Chose granted TO Con-
gess) "and all other powers vested by tins Constiu'
ION IN the Government OF the United States, or IN
any department or officer thereof \ more COM
urehcnst.e provision cannot be imagined IL car
res with II ali powers necessary and proper 10
tie execution oil the granted powers, be they lodged
where they may, aud vests the whole, IN terms mol
less expicit, III Congress and here let me add,
m missing that the provision as wise as II IS com
prehensve II deposites the righ! OF deciding what
noyers are necessary the execution al the granted
powers where and where only ~ can he lodged with
s,f.tv IN the hands oil the law making power, ana
fo.bds any department or oihcer OF t"c Government
from exercising any power not expressly authorized ey
The Constitution the laws, thus making ours emPia-
,ically a Government Of iac and Co"St"tto@
HAVING now shown that the President restricted by
The Constitution 'o powers expressly Granted To hh,
sod tina, any of las granted powers be such hatthey
reo,,-. other poners 10 execute them he cannot ex
.fc,,e them without the authority OF Congress, SHAH
no, show tia, there IS power vested IN hun
That ~ any say dangerous, unless made 50 by The acts
or permission oil Congress | sinai! take tiem III Inc
order they stand IN the Constitution .
lie Is IN the first place. made Commander Ch'et
Of the army and navy Of the T. s, aad the niiia, when
c,lI.d INTO actual service Large aud expensive mil
tsrr and naval establishments and numerous corps OF
militia. called INTO service, would no doubt increase
very dapu,rols!y ,h, power and patronage II The IRE
sdfr.t but neither take place but by the acon o.
CONGRESS Not soldier can be enlisted, sap al var
huit nora mltiaman called into service, without lis
authority; and very fortunately our situation Is such,
a, there is no necessity and probably, WILL be none
why his power and patronage should be dangerously IN
creased by either Of those means.
He ia next vested with the power to MAKE Ntaties
,cd Il, auuoint officers with tie advice ana consent oil
The Senate, and here again has power can only be made
dangerous, bv the Of one both Houses oil Con
gtess In the formation Of treaties two-ih'Tds OF the
Senate must concur and difficult 10 conceive OF n
treaty that could materially enlarge his powers lhat
would not require an Of Congress TO carry 1t INTO
effect The appointing power may, indeed, canger-
oasy increase h's patronage, If officers be nseiessiy
multiplied and too highly paid but II such should he
the case, the fault would he Congress- " whose eu
thoriy exclusively they can pe c!e"'eu VI u'ct 1"
pensaton regulated.
But much is sad IN THIS connection, OF the power
of removal, Justly accompanied by severe conutiha
non of the many and abusive instances OF the use o the
,ower and the dangerous influence 1t gives the fresi-
dent, in all OF which fully concur 1t rs, indeed,
corrup,ng and dangerous power, when orhcers are
greatly multiplied and highly paid, and when IS per.
vcred from its legitimate object 10 The advancement OF
nersonal or party purposes. But find no such power
:, ,b list of powers granted to the Executive, winch
;. proof that belongsto the class necessary
md proper execute some other power II exists Ill
a winch none doubt; and tor reasons already as
,qued cannot be exercised without authority oil la"
l then has been abused, it must be because Con-
oress mas no, done its duty in permitting to be eXer-
sed nv the President without the sanction OF law au
,horzng its exercise, and guarding against the abuses
to winch II so liable =,
Tc res,due of the list are rather duties than rights
that of recommending 10 Congress such measures as
he may deem expeden'; of convening both Houses on
extraordinary OF ad ournng them when they
canno, agree the tune; Of receiving Ambassadors
and other ministers; of taking that the laws be
faithfully executed, and commissioning the oihcers
of the United States OF all these, there IS but one
which claims particular notice, m connection with The
ro,t immediately under consideration; and that IS his
pouer as the admins ss,or OF the laws But whatere'
owcr he NAV have in that capacity depends on the ac'
ton Of Congress If Congress should limit ITS eg'sla
-, s ns TO leave as little as possible 10 discretion
i LIZ n,te 10 zee that they duly and faithfully