Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1842-09-10

President temporary expedient, limited in
its operation to the space of one month,
during which to avoid as they thought, the
possibility of collision with the appre-
hended antipathies Of the President, they
had suspended for the same month the dis
tribution of the proceeds of the sales of
public lands, which, by previous law, was
to take effect the day after the expiration
Of the compromise.
Not only was this most conciliatorv mea-
sure CONTEMPORARY rejected, but in total
disregard of the avowed opinions Of his
own Secretary Of the Treasury, con-
curing with those, nearly unanimous,
of all the most eminent lawyers of the
land, in solitary reliance upon the hest
tating opinion of the Attorney General
he has undertaken not only to levy taxes to
the amount of millions upon the People,
but to prescribe regulations for its collec-
ton, and for ascertaining the value of i'm
ported merchandise, which the law had, in
express terms, reserved for the legislative
action of Congress.
And now, to crown this system of con-
tinual and unrelenting exercise of Execu-
tive legislation by the alternate gross abuse
Of constitutional power and bold assump-
ton of powers never vested in him by any
law, we come to the Veto Message referred
by the House TO this committee.
. A comparative review of the four sew
eral vetos which, in the course of fifteen
months, have suspended the legislation Of
the Union, combined with that amphibious
e PRODUCTION, the reasons for approving and
signgning bill. and at the same time stri-
r king, by judicial construction, at its most
2 important enactment, illustrated by con-
e temporaneous effusions of temper and of
D sentiment divulged at convivial festivals,
and obtruded upon the public eye by the
> fatal friendship of sycophant private cor
\ respondents, and stripped to its naked
, nature by the repeated and daring as
. sumption both of the legislative and of ju.
,, dicia power, would present anomalies of
e character and conduct rarely seen upon
!. earth. Such an investigation, though
e strictly within the scope of the instructions
:. embraced in the reference to this commit
s tee, would require voluminous report,
c which the scantiness of time will not allow,
f.. and which may not be necessary for ma
turing the judgment of the House upon the
e document now before them.
{. The reasons assigned by the President
e for returning to the House of Representa-
h tives, with his objections the bill TO pro-
e vide revenue from imports, and to change
e and modify existing laws imposing duties
al and for other purposes, preceded by a
Is brief dissertation upon the painful sensa-
j. tons which any individual invested with
,e the veto power must feel in exercising it
70 upon important acts of the Legislature.
e. The paragraph is worded with extreme
8. caution, and with obvious intent TO avoid
re the assertion, made in such broad and un-
en- unqualified terms in the letter read at the
Philadelphia independence day dinner
its party, that Congress can enact no Tau
s- without the concurrence of the Executive
n There is inthis paper studious effort tC
of save any individual from the imputatior
c. of asserting the unqualified independence
IS, of the Executive upon the Legislature, anc
he the impotence of Congress to enact any
~ law without him. That assertion, made il
ID, go explicit and unqualified terms, in the
is the Philadelphia letter, is here virtually dis
claimed and disavowed. The exercise Of
n. some independence of Judgment, in regarc
b. to all acts of legislation, by any individual
as invested with the veto power, is here cur
es tailed and narrowed down to the mere
.s- privilege of not yielding his well-consid
lie, cred, most deeply fixed, and repeatedly de
10, clared opinions on matters of great public
re- concernment, to those of coordinate de
e. partment. without requesting that depart
en- ment seriously to re-examine the subject 0
ST. their difference. The coordinate depart
if ment to the Legislature is no longer the
al coordinate branch ofthe Legislature. Tit
'se power of Congress TO enact law withou
ed the cooperation of any individual Execu
by tive is: conceded, not merely by unavoida
he BILE inference, for the closing paragraph o
ed the message, recurring again to the same
of troublesome Renaissance, observes that
-as after all, the effect Of what he does is sub
elf stantially TO call on Congress to reconside
the subject. If. on such reconsideration,
ial majority Of two thirds of both House
'as should be in favor Of this measure, it will be
Ito come law Notwithstanding his objection:
at The truism of this remark may perhaps
les accounted for by the surmise that it was
lis new discovery, made since the writing c
nd the Philadelphia dinner-p party letter; an
al the modest presumption ascribed TO III
ate Constitution that the Executive can con
to nit no error of opinion unless two-thirC
ns. of both branches of the Legislature are
ors conflict with him, is tempered by the an
red liable assurance that in that event he w
es- cheerfully acquiesce in result whic
eat would be precisely the same whether
ern should acquiesce in it or not. The ap
ust tude of this hypothetical position may :