The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-01-10
THE ExcHEoUER BILL.

ave, and thus unites the purse aud the sword.
Whatever may be the intrinsic weakness of the
objection, il may have the power to arouse or
lnyigorate prepossession, though il may not
boast even plausblity sufficient TO create the
trs germ OF conviction of the truth of the allie
CATION We have treated the charge cooly and
dlspasslonately, and endeavored TO show that
the Exchequer Bill confers no more power on
the Executive over the Treasury, than any
other plan that has been proposed no more
than he possessed under the Sub Treasury no
more than he possessed when the Great Bank
or the banks were used as depositares. We
have shown, that in proposing the appointment
Off agents by the President by and with the
advice and consent Of the Senate, it proposed
the only plan of appointment authorized by the
| Constitution; and the assertion affirming that
the Treasury is under the entire control OF the
President, merely because il is lodged in the
hands of agents directly or indirectly appointed
by him, with the constitutional retrictions, can
assume the iainest semblance of plausbty,
only under suppostion, the most improbable.
The President, under the proposed plan, has no
control whatever over the Treasury, and though
he Is nominally commanders n-chef Of the
army, it does not perfect the union in his
hands between tLe pui,e aud .hc sword
Though he were a Cesar or Burr, he
cannot direct the man ,gement of the pub
lie funds as he pleases, no more than he
can, in virtue of his title of commandment chief
of the army, seduce its integrity and induce 1t
l,o, a.. tbay
petration of acts the most nefarious, unless we
suppose, that no virtue influences men in civil
lie, and all the honesty in the country is sacri-
feed to the army and navy. Such, however,
is the Specification Of the assertion, that the
President ha, the Treasury under his control, be-
cause it is managed by the agents OF his appoint
ment. We dread nothing from a standing ar
my, though its officers are appointed by the
President, and he is, under the Constitution,
its commander we dread nothing from the
navy, though its officers are appointed by
the President, and he is also, under the Con
stitution, its commander; but we are exhorted TO
apprehend most sensilively the agents Of the
Treasury, because they are appointed by the
President, though their tenure Of Office and the
mode in which they are to discharge their duties
are guarded in the strictest manner that could
be devised from Executive interference we are
exhorted to disbeeve the possibility of honesty
in Treasury agents-because they are neither
soldiers nor seamen Rather too great stretch
Of faith is required Of US. If no trustworthi-
ness is to be found among our citizens dissoca-
ted from the army and navy, we may say at
once that republican government is impo,-
sible
But the appointment Of the agents by the Pre-
silent gives an alarming extension to Executive
patronage, already too widely diffused. We
answer, that devise what plan you please, this
patronage will be extended The objection
possesses no more force, when urged against the
Exchequer scheme than it does against any
other plan. 1t loses most of its force when the
patronage that it confers is compared with that
enjoyed in connection with the navy. In fact
this whole objection against the proposed inan-
cial scheme is more specious than solid--has
gained more credit from the earnestness and
confidence with which it has been urged, than
from any intrinsic strength with viii h it is
/ induced
The cry Of the union Of the purse and the
sword being naturally calculated to alarm a
people peculiarly sensitive in regard to every
thing calculated to affect the permanence of their
liberty, we have taken more pains TO show that
in the case of the Exchequer the cry is ground
lessly raised, than we would had plau ,ible rea-
soning been urged against it. 1t is more easy to
reiue, an argument than 10 remove prejudice,
when once deeply seated We therefore have
returned again to this subject. We wish the
merits of the Exchequer scheme to be dispas-
sionatey investigated. II could not hope such
an investigation through the distorting mists OF
prejudice. If, however, the control conferred
on the Executive over the Treasury by the Elk
chequer, be still conceived to be dangerously in
tended, it remains with the wisdom of Congress
to devise such notifications will remove the
objection.
l BANKING IN DISQUALIFICATION
The last papers from New Orleans furnish Us
Y with scme facts and commentaries which illus
trate in striking manner the present rela