Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, IA [i.e. Ind.]) 1839-1854, 1842-03-05

lection, safe-keeping, and disbursement OF ihe
public revenue, aud thereby, incidentally. aid II
furnishing a uniform currency, and equallzlng
the exchanges.
This is deemed the right and duty of the Go
vernment; and tho only question which remain:
is-Ifow shall II be done!
Different modes have been proposed and tried
They are, fret, a Bank of tho United States:
secondly, the State bank dcposlto system: and
thirdly, tho sub Treasury
Tho first, O Bank Of the United States, is at
this tina utterly out Of the question. The histo-
ry Of the past years shows that "a charter for such
an institution canno, be obtained, however desra-
bic il maj be deemed by many, and the state srf
the times demonstrates that, If obtained, its stock
could no, be taken up, so as TO put it in successful
operation.
The second, the State baul. dopnsi,o system,
was discarded and put down by its most proIni-
nent fricnds-ihoso who were foremost IN esiab'
fishing it--before it had received u fair trial, as
others Of its advocates believe. All, however,
concur in srying that /, cannot DO re-e6tabiished
The third, tho sub>Treasury, es The committee
/ believe, was signaiiy condemned by the People;
and Congress, in accordance with the popular
will, took the carries. opportunity TO repeal II.
The committee cannot, therefore, anticipate
any state Of things in which either of these dis
cuIded systems can 70. a long time, if ever, be re-
viyod. Years may elapso before those who have
the strongest, predictions for either can be graft
fed; and perhaps that time will never arrive
BE that as il may, they are each Of them, at pres.
ent, far enough beyond our reach. Why, then,
shall we va;nly attempt To clutch otter "A thing
which constantly eludes our grasp? Shall VIC
permit the country to suil5r Gndor lis present EN-
barras5monts because wo cannot bring 10 ITS aid
cur flvorite mode Of rolloi! And moro especial
ly shall we permit this when that mode cannot
be atained? The committee think not; and this
brings Thorn 20 the consideration of the plan Of q
fiscal agent recommended by tho President, TO
ported on by tho Secretary of tho Treasury, and
referred to them by order Of the State.
Tho prominent objections 10 this plan. rs indi
Gated by the opinions expressed IN the Senate Oh
the motion for reference are. j. Tho patronage
aud power which i, gives to tho Executive; =.
The purchase e bills Of exchange; 3. Tho issue
of Treasury notes on the credit Of tho Govern
rnen,. Can those OH sctions be obViatod or re-
moved? And, If they can, vii! tho system. be ef
ficicn, for the purpose for which ii is Intended?-
The committee unhosita:ing!y answer both ,!.esa
questions in tho affirmative, and proceed briefly
to consider the objections.
/. As TO Erecmire Patronage and Popcr.
The patronage under This system consists 10
the appoiu,men, of office and the power in the re-
nova from Office. These objections will lie, 10 n
greater or less extent, to any system which can
Lo adopted. But the committee think, under tho
III diff ations proposed, they will be substantial
" obyia.od. The President, with the advice and
consent Of the Senate, appoint three commission
err. who form the board OF Eyc!eq1er. These COM
lIs3SSiDISIS u btiIicf Oi0 obi "iAAs flN 'pb1H
renco of the Senate and for physical inability,
Incompetence, or neglect or violation OF duty
They are therefore, Independent of any improper
Executive Influence. If any should DC atteHnpted to
be exercised over them The number Of agencies
is to be determined by the 3 lard Of Exchequcr;
but to be Limited 10 rs few as the eXIgencles OF
the service will admit, and In no case 10 exceed
Two in any State or Territory. The probability
il, that, with the exception Of enc or two States,
there would he no necessity fer more that one
agency to each, and IN many instances even that
might be dispensed with; and these agencies may
BIO the sound specie paying banks Of the States,
where il would not DO Desirable for tho agencies
to receive deposiics, or 10 accept or sell bills or
drafts on account, OF the Board of Eychequor.
which banks, acting as agents, nIe prohibited to
do. Ia all these cases there would be no officers
to be appointed, and the selection Of the specie
paying banks, as agents, would DO mado by the
Is ard OF Erchequer. who, IL has been already
nro independent OF Executive influence.
The emily officers, then, TO be appointed, would be
at the agencies established at some OF the most
important comnercIal points. These arc TO he
appointed By the Secretary Of the Treasury, on
the recommendation of the Board Of Exchequer,
and the Secretary of the Treasury appoints. On
like recommendations, such inferior officers of the
Board as in The Judgment of the board the trans
action OF its business may require.
Any OF the officers OF The agencies may be
removed by the Secretary of tho Treasury, on
the recommendation OF the board, for physical 10
ability, or ,ncompe,eucy or neglect, or violation
of duty; but ho mus, state his reasons for The re-
n,oval Of any principal officer Of any agency, in
general annual report Of tho transactions OF
the Exchaqucr.
Tho whole extent of Presidential patronage.
under the plan Of the committee, Is in truth thus
reduced 10 the simple nomination Of three com
Of The EXchequer, subject to the ad-
vice and consent Of the Senate; the appointment
and removal of ell The other officers Of the Elk
either a, the seat Of Government or
the agenci, 8. teing Vic ually vested in The board,
Itself made etfec,nally independent of the power
of the President by the tenure Of Office now pro-
posed.
From this brief view of the appointing and
removing power, it will be seen that the Elk