The Middlebury people's press. [volume] (Middlebury, Vt.) 1841-1843, 1842-11-08

Ipermanency and stability of office. in orde
to prevent the necessity of the interyentio
of the executive veto, a power always view
ed by the people with jealousy, and its eA
%lercise generally marked with disapproba
ton. By giving to the senators a term G
three years, you place them beyond the in
~luence of the sudden e~xcitements ofthe da,
and yet leave them sufficiently responsible
to their constituents. 1t is believed that ii
selecting candidates for that office for thu
term of three years, more care will be taker
to secure men worthy of the trust. thar
when the selection is made to fill the office
but for the term of one year.
By a division of the Senate into three
classes, which a portion only will go oui
each year, there will remain a majority oil
old members, by whose experience the new
ones will be greatly benefited, and the
whole together will form a salutary check
upon tAe dhoye numerous branch of the legs
~lature. Besides, the Senator for three years
will find a greater obligation resting upon
himself to become acquainted with the du-
ties of his station, than if he were appointed
but for a single session. of four OF five weeks.
AS his services and attainments will be
known and appreciated By his constituents.
so will he be stimulated by a laudablo am
bition to qualify himself for a faithful and
honorable discharge oil the important duties
assigned him. Thus will the conservative
power of the Senate be made to operate up
on the government, and thus will that de-
gree of stability in the laws be preserved,
so highly necessary in securing the liberty
and prosperity of the people.
The Council have also had in considera'
ton the Judicial system of the state. They
have much to admire in the organization Of
this system. The plan of combining the
supreme with the county courts for the trial
of issues of fact, so far as to associate a
Judge of the supreme court with the Judges
of the court, has proved by experience TO
fulfil every purpose which its most ardent
advocates could have anticipated. The
great imp ovements which the adoption C.
this system has introduced in the admins
tration of justice must be apparent to all
who will compare it with the system by
which il was proceeded. But this Council
believe that the time has arrived when an
advantage might be obtained by giving to-
the Judges of the supreme court a greater
degree of independence. This should be
done by charging the tenure Of their Office.
As this is a subject fixed by the consti-
tuition, and cannot, like the organization
of courts, core under the control of leg
islative enactment, it, necessarily de-
wolves upon US TO recommend such an
Improvement. On the best reflection
we can give the subject connected with
the present Improvements Of the age, we
cannot do our duty 10 the state, without.
at this time, recommending an amend
ment Of the constitution so as TO give to
the Judges an office to be held by them
Sc ven years from the date Of their re-
spective elections. This proposition has
been brought into favor with the Coun-
Gil BY considerations, some Of which they
will mention.
In no state in the union. with the e1-
ception of Vermont and Rhode Island,
are the judges of the his hest court elected
annually.
The appointment being made by the
j lint ballot Of the two houses of our leg
stature, it becomes highly necessary to
place the supreme judges beyond The en-
croachments Of that body. We cannot
expect an impartial ami secure admins
tration OF the laws, without comforting
upon the Judges an independence which
can never be realize d under appointments
annually made by the legi Stature
The judicial power should be separa-
ted so far from the legislative and execu-
tive, as that neither should exercise the
duties appertaining to the other. Each
should be independent Of the other
Neither should encroach upon the other;
and, as the judicial is a weaker body, it
should, in the exercise Gifts functions, be
rendered as independent of the other as
circumstances will admit.
1t is an attribute of the supreme judi
cial tribunals to Judge of the constitution
atty Of all laws passed by the legislature,
when properly brought IN review before
them. They are always TO regard the
constitution as the fundamental law of the
land, and superior I any legislative en-
actment. Consequently, if the law Is not
warranted by, or is rePugnant to, the
provisions Of the constitution, as Is
times the case, the judges are bound to
pronounce it imperative and void. Can
it be expected that Judges, dependent
every year upon the legislature oil their
appointment. will possess the necessary
6rmness to judge over the heads Of that
body, and declare their enactments void
The observation of every one, who has
attended to this subject, proves that the
contrary effect is the result.
This Council, then, are fully Of the
opinion that, to secure talent, experience,
fidelity and independence, the tenure Of
the office Of the judges should be enlarg-
ed.
Yet it may happen that the judge may
prove himself 10 be Incompetent, or OF a
unsuitable for so high a