Southern Argus. [volume] (Columbus, Miss.) 1834-1842, 1842-01-18

not be conducted at this day as st would
have been even twenty years ago. 1t would
be alwar dimensions. aiming at evolution.
The first blow would be struck at US
through our institutions. No nation, it is
presumed, would expect to be successful
over US for any length of time. in fair
contest ofarms upon our own soil: and no
t0iss nation would attempt it. A more
promising expedient would be sought,in ar
raging what are supposed to be the hostile
elements of our social system against one
another. An enemy so disposed, ami free
to land upon any part of our soil which
might promise success to his enterprise,
would be armed with four-fold power of
annoyance. OF the ultimate result ofsuch
incursions,we have no re ason to be afraid,
but, even in the best event, war upon our
own soil would be the more expensive, the
more embarrassing, and the more horrible
in its effects. by compelling Us at the same
time 10 oppose an enemy in the field and
to guard against attempts to subvert our
social systems.
Heretofore we have found in shallow.
ness of many ofour waiers,security, to a
certain extent. against invasion by sea. So
long as maritime wars were conducted in
vessels Of large size and great draught we
had little % apprehend from them except
at few points, and these we've susceptible
Of adequate defence on land. But this Sc.
curity can no longer be relied on. The
application of steam power to vessels of
war, and the Improvements recently
been made in artillery, are destined to
change the whole system of maritime war.
Steamboats, Of light draught, and which
may easily be transported across the ocean
in vessels of larger class, may invade us
at almost any point Of our extended coast,
many penetrate the interior through our
shallow rivers, and thus expose half our
country to hostile attacks. The celebrity
with which these movements could be
made, the facility with which they could
chahgc the point of attack, would enable
an enemy, with a comparatively small
force, to harrass our whole seaboard, and
to carry all the horrors of war INTO the Sc.
cure retreats Of our people. The effect of
these incursions would be terrible every
where, but in the the southern portion of
our country they might, and probably
would. be disastrous in the extreme
1t Is obvious that war thus conducted
must be successful TO a very great extent,
in spite Of all the defcnces on land which
we could cOntrve. Nothing less than
the conversion of half our country into a
military garrison could protect us against
it. Such is the exposed condition Of our
country, such is the character of our ins,I.
tutionS, and such the position of our peo-
PIE, that population of tWice our present
number, under the best possible military
orgaulZation, would avail US bu! little
~ tIfss1 siSe-roinofneu TOwrrS or TIE worIu
could not subdue us, even a secondary
naval Power could avoid our land defen.
ces, set our armies at defiance. and prose~
cute against us a war in,olerably harrass.
Jog and disastrous.
The single question, then, which we
have to decide, in reference to this sub.
1 iect, IS, where and by whom shall those
battles be fought, which may hereafter be
come necessary in defence ofour property
our Institutions, our honor, and our lives
Shall we meet the enemy upon the ocean
with men tr lined and disc plined for tht
contest, or suffer him to land on our shores
trusting to a scattered and harrassed PEG
pie 10 expel him from their farms and lheI
firesides1 This question admits of bu
one answer. But IT is worse than idle Il
suppose that all those high interests t
which have alluded can be adequatel
protected by our present naval force
Four thousand miles ofexposed sea an
lake coast, foreign commerce scatlere
: through the most distant seas, and a dc
, me site trade exposed alike upon the ocea
and Upon our interior waters, are, in ell
feet, surrendered to the enemy, when the
r are entrusted to the protection Of SON
: twenty ships in commission.
;. IL these views be not altogether deceI
u tive, the policy Of increasing our Nav
n without further delay, is obvious. Ho
i far It shall be increase !, the wisdom {
: Congress will decide. Looking to it g
the chief, if not only adequate defence {
our country against those wars of lncu
sion from which so much evil is to be az
pretended, ! respectfully suggest that W
cannot safely stop short Of half the nav
force Of the strongest maritime Power
the world. Our policy is peace, and W
{ do not propose to ourselves war of ag
a erosion in any case, except so far as
. measure Of defence. 1t is not prohab
, that any nation could detach from othe
service more than one fourth of its who
naval force, to attack us upon our ow
coast; so tkal, after deducting such part
i our force as we could not. employ at al
and such part as we should be compete
to employ elsewhere, we might reasonJ
e bly, hope 10 repeal from our shores an
marinme Power, with only half its fore
in ships. With less than this, our flee
would serve only 10 swell the triumph
and feed the cupidity Of our enemy. It
: better to have none at all than to have lie:
\ than enough. ! am aware that this gre
e increase of our naval power cannot be e
' fected in any short time. propose it OF
II ly as the object at which our policy Dug
= to aim, aud towards the attainment
which your measures ought 10 be steadi
directed. An annual appropriation,
liberal as tho means Of the Treasury W
IN few years accomplish all that is de:
: rable.