Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1842-03-19

that whilst the operations of the Exche-
quer would tend to promote the real inter-
ests of the sound banks, it would, at the
same time, tend to drive into liquidation
the unsound ones. Banking capital, which
has SO enormously increased within few
years past, would be reduced. There
would, eventually, only enough remain to
TO answer the commercial and other bust
ness wants of the country. The large sur
plus of capital which sought investment in
banks for the exorbitant profits of those in
stitutions, under an inflated and unnatural
state Of the currency, would retire, and
perform the more legitimate office of per-
manent loans, on bond and mortgage. to the
agricultural interests of the community.
One great evil which the country has ex-
perienced has been from the withdrawal of
capital from the farming interest TO invest
It in banking operations. That interest,
from the very nature of their business,
ought not to be driven to bank accommo-
dations. They should be able to command
permanent instead of temporary loans
ANY system, therefore, which should aid
the retirement Of the surplus banking cap
ital would greatly benefit the substantial
| producing classes Of the country.
FROM what has been said, it will be seen
that the EXchequer will furnish a uniform
currency and eticctually equalizc exchan-
ges. 1t has no discounting power, like that
Of the late Bank of the United States; a
power which was the principal source Of
all the difficulties and of the subsequent
disasters of that institution In order to
make dividends, il was necessary to employ
It's enormous capital in the shape of dis
counts The great portion of those dis
counts was not based upon legitimate bust
ness paper. They were long loans, stock
loans, accommodation loans. permanent
I loans. And one.reason for this was, that,
within the sphere of the operations of the
bank, there was not enough of legitimate
business paper to employ its capital. There
was, therefore, kind of necessity of en-
'ploying it otherwise; and that apparent ne
cessity, in the otherwise disastrous state Of
the times, has led TO its final overthrow.
The Exchequer will possess all the ben
Ieiits of Bank of the United States with
out its attendant evils. It's powerful to do
good, but power!cSs to do harm. The i'm
mediate effect Of the adoption of the mea-
sure will be, once more TO restore the conf
dence of the country. That confidence is
everywhere impaired. 1t is impaired in
individuals; it is impaired in banks: it is
impaired in our State Governments, and
even shaken in the General Government.
The people require some action on the part
of Congress which shall restore it. That
; can only be done by the adoption of sys-
tenn like the one proposed: system which,
in its leading features, is perfectly unas-
sailable. 1t will lay the foundation of pub
lie confidence SO broad and SO deep that il
cannot be shaken. That confidence, once
restored, will extend itself throughout tho
, country, and peace and plenty will follow
in its train.
, But, if any suppose this system will no.
accomplish all that its friends anticipate, il
will certainly accomplish much; and mas
much as we can do nothing else, and we
should we hesitate to try it? We shall al
all events have established one great and
fundamental principle--a principle which
lies at the bottom Of this currency question,
namely, that it is the right and duty of this
Government, in the collection, safe-keeping
and disbursement Of the public revenue, &c
aid in furnishing a uniform currency and
equalizing the exchanges Of the country
and if, in the judgment Of any, the measure
does not go far enough, we shall have q
stock on which we can engrait such fur
Their provisions as shall come within the
constitutional power of Congress-within
the great principles which have been laid
ldown-and such as shall be deemed expe'
dent and justified by public sentiment.
4 The system can be tried without risk
and during period when there can be NJ
nope Of adopting another favorite measure
If, on trial, it shall be found to answer tho
purposes for which it is intended, then the
necessity of National Bank will be su,
persedcd, and its friends will have no rea
son or desire to urge ii. If it should moi
answer those purposes, then even the oppo-
ncnts Of a National Bank may become sat
. isfed that such an institution is the only
, remedy for tie evils Of dcrangod and dis
5 ordered currency. But until some sucl
s system be adopted, it may well be doubtcC
= whether, in the present aspect and past eX
= pcricnce Of our banking institutions, th'
: People can be brought into the support of
f national bank.
IS Shall we, then, fold our arms, and delibe
?, rately resolve to do nothing! Can tn
IS friends Of National Bank, as well as til
Il friends Of the Sub-Treasury, justify them
! selves to their constituents or the countr
o in such course! These arc questions 70
s, grave consideration. Both these systems
+, in one shape and another, have been dis
c credited; and with no present prospect 0
{, either Of them being re.established. VIII;
ID then remains to be done! The People e2
e pect and require action al our hands. TIL
l. committee present the EXchequer plal