Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1842-02-07

place IN the Constitution, not SOLITARY instance had
occurred OF its actual exercise Under the colonial state
OF this country the power ansplsnted tron the
pcrcnce which had been had OF 1t in Europe 10 the laws
relating 10 the colonies, and tina, double forn Tor
there veto OF the Colonial Governor. and also u
To OF the Crown But what thought Of this power
by tho inhabitants Of these States when rising
their freedom, might be the words oi the instIu-
ment in which they asserted their independence AT
the head Of all the grievances stated in that paper
suns for separation from Great Britain, placed
the exercise OF this very power OF the Royal Veto
Speaking Of the King, the Declaration Of Independence
emnlvad this language:
lie has refused hls assent To laws the most whole
some and most necessary ior the public good lie has
forbidden his Governors To pass laws OF immediate and
pressing Importance unless suspended in their opera
ton I'LL his assent should be obtained; and when
pended, he has utterly neglected 10 attend 10 thcm.'
Nodoubi tho idea OF cnerai,ng this power upon our
own Constitution adopted by tho Convention from,
having always found II as powcr recognised IN Euro
pean Governments Just n had been before derived by
them from the practice and history Of Rome. Al all
events, the power inserted feature, not only
IN the general Constitution of the Federal Government
but also in the Constitution oi portion o the States.
Fifty years had now elapsed the Federal Cons,llu
llon was formed, and II derogaton from the wis
dom and patriotism OF the venerable who framed 1t.
now To say that the work Of their hands, though per
feet ever had proceeded from human hands, was ne
,erthccss not absolutely because that was what moth
ing that sprung from had been. But now, nj
ter the lapse of hall century II interesting To pause
Ito look hack-torevew the history Of that period and
10 compare the predictions OF those who then looked in
10 tho future with the actual Is OF subsequent cxpo
renee. Any one al all acquainted with the contempt
ranoous history of the Constitution must know that one
great and radical error which possessed the minds OF wise
men who drew up that instrument apprehension
that the Executive Department Of the then proposed Go
venmcn would be too feeble 10 contend successfully in
struggle with the power If the Legislature. hence IT
was found that various oNpedons had been proposed in
the Convention, with the uvomed purpose Of scntlon
Ing the Executive arm; one Of which went far to
propose thai the President should be Chief Magistrate for
LIE. All these proposals had their origin in the pre-
valo ca-tha If the weakness Of the Executive, and
lis incomps &C To defend itself against the cncroac
mcnts If crfs,,.s - domino ton and dication.
Now let any man IL AT the actual working Of the
machine they constructed I'd see whether the anticpa
tons which haunted their mind IN the subsequent pol'-
cal history o this Government lie 'e'' sec "he'n''
the Executive Department, was the "Fah sP'' !" 'ne
system. Much had been said about the unFroacnnon's
of the Federal Government on the Governments oi me
States, from which complaints had arisen what VA CA
led the States rights party and its opposite, tui an rxa
nation OF the facts OF lhe would demonstrate 'ha' no
solitary instance had yet occurred olany such enciesfh
ment by the General Government; but, on the conrar,
r. {. could demonstrate this the proper time
cason for doing SO, that there had been abandonment,
by that Government of the exercise ol It's Just pow
in relation 10 the States and this To such extent
that the existing State othe country presented very much
the aspect as Tie od Nunltutlatiui uone
with all its weakness and labocillty.
Bat while there had been ~ sue hung IN the prse-
tee as encroacncni by the Federal npon 80 state 10Y
cnmcnts there had within the Federal Government II
self been constant encroachment by tho Executive up
the Legislative Department
First,lt attacked the treaty making power None
could read the language Of the Constitution with
Out at coming To the conclusion that the intention
Of the authors OF that instrument was that the Senate
should be consulted by the President not merely IN the
ratification but IN the inception Of all the treaties that IN
the commencement OF the negotiations. the instructions
Of tho ministers appointed 10 treat the character and pro
visions Of the treaty, the Senate should he consulted
and should first Wed its assent And such had fact
been the Interpretation put the treaty making power
IN the first and purcst years o our Government Every
recollcct the early history Of the exercise oi
the power, and the high sanction Of such usage. The
first President had been won't 10 come 10 the Senate
there propose foreign mission, and consult with his
constitutional advisers the members Of tho Senate on
the instructions 10 be given To the minister who should
be sent But this practice had since been abandoned
The President now, without n word o consultation with
the Senate. his personal sense Of proprlcy
concluded treaty and promised 10 the foreign Power It's
ratification; and them after all this had been DONE
and the terms of the treaty argeed upon, ho ior
the first time submitted it to the Senate for ntlfca
ton Now every must that there is Il
great difference between rejecting what had been al
ready actually done, and refusing To do that thing II
asked beforehand. All must feel TINT they often
rave their official assent What they would
have sanctioned bu, for the consideration that the treaty
already concluded, and that the faith Of the nation
IN sor, pledged for its ratification Another con
sequence Of this Executive encroachment was one from
which foreign Powers often experienced great inconven
cncehc meant the amendment OF treaties by the Senate
after they AT length submitted So great had the
Inconvenience from tins been, that IN moro re
treaties had to be the practice to insert in
the body OF the treaty itself provision against alienation.
that II must be ratified IN It's existing form or not ra
| fled at all.
| The next Executive cncroachncnt he should notice
was that which occurred in the dismissal from Office Of
persons appointed by and with the consent of the Senate
TIE effect OF this practice virtually to destroy all
agency and operation of the Senate IN such appoint
ments. OF what avail that the Senate should to
day soemnly ratify and confirm the appointment Of an
individual To an office under the Government, when the
President could the effect Of their act
by his breathe Every one knew that the power of
removal had been grossly perverted In the early days
othe Constitution had been maintained that the power
could be exercised only incase OF marasance mstea
sance office and that the President who should dare
to employ it for any other end would subject himself TO
impeachment. But history and experience has gone
to show that this liability to impeachment was mere
scarccow and that could have any practical ct
feet III popular Government, constituted as ours was,
and IN a country politically dvidcdas ever like to
be. BY the free exercise Of this power of removal the
Senate had lost its pracics influence the whole sub
cct of appointment office Instance after instance had
occurred where individual had been dismissed by the
Executive whom the Senate would gladly have rcpla
ccd in office, but whom they unable To retain there
and therefore compelled TO sanction the nomination
of The actual result of such state of things