Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1842-03-19


cept or sell bills or drafts on account of the
Board of Exchequer, which banks, acting
as agents. are prohibited to do. In all
these cases there would be no officers TO be
appointed, and the selection Of the specie
paying banks as agents. would be made by
the Board of Exchequer, who, it has been
already shown, are independent of Execu-
tive influence. The only officers, then, to
be appointed, would be at the agencies, es-
tabished at some of the most important
commercial points. These are to be ap-
pointed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
on the recommendation Of the Board of Ex-
chequer, and the Secretary of the Treas
ury appoints, on like recommendation, such
inferior officers of the board as in the judg-
ment of the board the transaction of its
business may require.
Any of the officers of the agencies may
be removed by the Secretary of the Treas
ury, on the recommendation of the board,
for physical inability, or incompetency, or
neglect, or violation of duty; but he must
state his reasons for the removal of any
principal officer of any agency, in his gen.
eral annual report of the transactions of
the Exchequer.
The whole extent of Presidential patron
age, under the plan of the committee, is in
truth thus reduced to the simple nomination
of three commissioners of the Exchequer,
subject to the advice and consent of the
+ Senate; the appointment and removal of all
the other officers of the Exchequer, either
at the seat of Government or the agencies,
being virtually vested in the board, itself
made effectuay independent of the power
of the President by the tenure of office
now proposed.
From this brief view of the appointing
and removing power, it will be seen that
the Executive patronage, by reason of the
appointment to Office, is very little, and the
Executive power, by reason of the removal
from office. is still less.
2. As to the purchase Of bills Of exchange.
To this feature of the plan of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury the committee object:
l.. That it would be exchanging the credit
of the Government for the responsibility Of
individuals, and consequently expose the
Government to great hazard and eventual
loss: 2. That it might be used for political
purposes, and for party favoritism: 3. That
it would lead to fictitious dealings in ex-
change, without any real business basis.
The evils which would flow from all
these sources need not be enlarged upon
They will at once strike the mind of every
rejecting man.
But, aside from these objections, there
are others which would induce the commit
tee to reject this power to purchase ex-
change. To exercise it discreetly and safe
ly, three things are necessary, namely, in
dividual interest, individual sagacity, and
individual vigilance: interest, to secure pro-
per attention; sagacity to distinguish real
from fictitious operations; vigilance, TO
watch over the transactions from inception
f to maturity and payment These qualities
bined to the desired extent in public Off
Ger, however faithful and honest he may be
He may intend, conscientlously. TO dis
charge his duty; but in business operations
of this description he cannot discharge ii
as an individual would transact his own bu-
siness. 1t would, therefore, be dangerous
to give this power, without Incorporating
the interests of individuals into the system,
which is not proposed to be done.
: The committee, however, propose in an-
other mode to confer substantially the same
benefits without any of the risks. This can
be done by authorizing the Exchequer and
its agencies to sell and collect bills of ex-
change. In this there is 20 possible haz-
! ard.
/. AS to selling. This may be done, Ell
Their by one agency drawing bill on an
other, on payment of the amount and pre-
MUM in specie, OF by accepting the bill
: payable at the agency where drawn, as will
tha Of he
tween them, and best promote the interests
of all parties. This will answer all the
. purposes of buying Or discounting bills Of
exchange. Buying or discounting bills or
time is, in other words mode of anticipa
S ting funds. The legitimate object of bill
of exchange is not to anticipate, but TO re
nit funds. These funds may be RENTED
e without the hazard, on the part of the Gov
eminent. of the purchase of the bill, anC
:. at the same time accommodate equally wei
6 the individual to whom they belong. Fo
r example, if a merchant in New York ha
: funds in Cincinnati, for which he is emit
O tied to draw at sixty days, he may direc
e his correspondent there, at the end of tina
$ time, to deposite the amount in the agenc!
/ at that place, and send him bill at sight Of
d the agency at New York, where he can re
l. ceive the amount on presentation of tn
: bill. In the mean time, if he wishes to ar
= ticipate his funds, he can get his note don
!. at one of the local banks, whose business
= is to discount, and rely upon the bill of hi
,. correspondent at Cincinnati to meet it &
v maturity.
d 2. As to collecting, the committee pre-
\. pose to authorize the Board of Excheque
&c. ,lns 10