The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-06-08
TO this Minister, Of the paralysis of the Federal Gov

Il.
~ means OF carrying the Government oil the on'
| ted States Whilst Congress Is now discussing no'
whether this House shall raise ample means 70 sup
port the indispensable establishments OF the uoea
| ment but whether il would cut down and pros'ra'e
those establishments in order to escape the necessity
of raising those means. Whilst this was the specta
Gle which Lord AshbuHon saw here, MI y. oou'u
not but consider with humiliation and shame the con
lras exhibited across the ocean IN the conuno' " ,ne
British Government. There Sir Robert feei came
forward in frank courageous and siatesmanliAe
manner and instead of proposing TO disturb OF o'n
nish the establishments of the Government, recon-
nIended the increase of the Army ana navy eaeo
for by the times and this, notwithstanding tue large
deficit in The actual resources O.. the Treasury, nor
in order TO NEE, that deficit and Ia provide the means
of conducting public affairs, did he resort TO any tenn
porary nakeshifi expediens, but maniully prought
in PROG oson TO supply the deficiency by an income
tax upon all the property IN the United hingdom'-
Here on the contrary instead u resolutey facing The
difficulty instead of assuming the responsibility, as
they bound TO do, of imposing on the People OF
the United States such taxes sthe interests OF the
country require, the members o, Congress, to AVOID
doing this, were discussing the gu, stion, not merely
whether were they would dishand the Army, and dis
mantle the Navy or not but, when he looked back
all the incidents of the session, IT seemed to be
question whether they would disband and dlsmanlIe
the Government What must be the effect OF this on
the mind of the foreign negotiator} What would be
the question in the heart of Lord Ashhuron, and
that of his instructor, Lord Aberdeenf would "
not be, how far can Great Britain SAFELY lns'st-how
far is the United States disposed t. concede-how lar
is the United States in a condition 10 insist, ana To
withstand the exigence of Great Brltanl Every man
must see that in this point OF view the reduction OF
the Army and Navy, at this time, must exercise
most perncious Influence over the pending negoua'
tons How were conditions to be extorted nom TINS
powerful and proud rival ofhe United States Were
they to be demanded due TO the honor of the Uni
ted States unless stood in such an attitude as to
be able TO back those demands2 Were we to disarm
ourselves and throw ourselves on the mercy OF Eng
land for such terms she might vouchsae to grant
u.s. No. We must respect ourselves, If we desire TO
be respected by others He did not put question OF
war; for he held that any immediate war was not TO
be anticipated but was now impossible For IN the
position in which we had placed ourselves, Great Brl-
tain had only TO do Just as she pleased 10 con'ele
or not to concede to insist or not to insist, or, what
was likely enough, to put off the day of settlement,
until she relieved from all her present domestic and
foreign difficulties and then encounter us unembar-
rassed and singe-handed no present war is to be
feared but If not war; yet something lar worse than
war-an extreme national degradation, which might
procrastinae, but would in fact, augment the causes
and the chances of future He desired once for
ALL to the People of the United States that, II
these negotiations fail to whatever else that failure
might be owing, it would not be for any want OF TRUTH
Justice and right in the cause of the United States
for any deficiency of zeal spirit in the conduct
of the negotiations, on the part of this Admlnistra-
ton
Was it not Ireposterous, at this conjuncturc, for
the House to rush, in such hot haste, into general
reduction of the military and naval detences of the
United Statesi There was no occasion Tor such pre-
cpitation; in few months they will be here again.
in situation to reduce the Army and Navy if jus
titled by the termination OF the pending negotiations
and required by the then condition of the county
Nevertheless, they were proceeding with such rash
and headlong haste in this reduction, without any
proper investigation of the wants of the country, and
of the details of the military and naval service, and
on considerations which seemed 10 him utterly futile
and undeservng of the good sense of the House.
What was the system of the military deiences-of
the peace military deences of the United States g.
II was, in the first place, the Navy, by which we
were to maintain the sanctty and integrity OF our
homes--to prevent foreign enemy rom reaching
and landing on our shores, and especially on the
Southern coast of the United States, there TO fix it.
self SOIL and nhct injuries the institutions
of the United States 1t was, in the next place, the
forfcation and harbor defencesof the United States
to impede an enemy from landing on our shores, or,
if he landed, to afford to the tumultuary assembly of
militia which should assemble to repel invasons--
and which must, in the outset, be undiscipned-tor-
titled shelter from behind which to receive the as
sault of the enemy
These were our fixed and permanent deiences. In
addition to these was anything else needed' Was an
army; If we needed, in time OF peace, any standing
army, this committee found TO go into the ques-
ton of what amount Of standing army was needed.
If gentlemen conceded that any standing army was
needed in time of peace, it was their duty to examine
the details of the question, and see what number
was necessary. 1t became then question of details
not to be decided by impulse hastily but in careful
investigation of those details.
He gathered, from the universal opinion OF all
conversan with this subject, from the records OF Go
yernment and from all former debates on the subject
that the peace use OF the Army was admitted What
then, were the uses of the Army in time OF peace
He answered, first Notwithstanding the fact that
we were to rely on the volunteer other militia
force, when war comes, yet in the time OF peace we
needed standing army--a skeleton army-around
which, nucleus greater army is to be formed
when war comes. He assumed that as trusm
He assumed further, that we needed, in time Of
peace certain portion of that description II the Ar
my which, from its very nature, required education
and instruction, the scientific branch of the Army,
the engineer and Typographical corps, which could
not exist without educaio ion and experience and
which in addition always useful the country,
as being the depository of vast amount of iniorma-
ton and military knowledge, continually useful TO
Government which could not otherwise exist in the
country. He assumed as the third peace use of the
Army its performance at garrison, post, and guard
duty No man commended that, il we needed GER
tam number oftroops at forts they to be of
the militia.
Aaoher truism he thought he nigh assume was,
that needed certain quantity OF military force
for special duties such for the purpose of OCCASION
al contests with the Indians, for holding the lntians
in check and keeping guard on them. This duty
required permanent force, and was to be performed
by fixed troops. He did not know but this might he
done by the militia, but every gentleman must admit
it would be far more economical to employ regular
troops.
He assumed these peace uses of the Army of the
United States-uses which all admitted as the basis
of the conclusion to which he had arrived on the
subject This view wholly independent of the
question of the defences Of the counry. In time
Of war they would require augmentation Of the
military as well the naval force. The war Iues-
ton did not enter into this argument.
What was it that Congress was prop sing TO do
with reference to the Army and what had it done as
to the Navy2
The House had not only reduced the Navy appro'
priaon from the sums asked by the Secrear of the
hui had mnle unsitlNr reduction of the Ma.