The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-04-16
REPORT ON HARBoR DEFENCE.
(eoNTINUEp.)

On the practicability of covering even a small
tent Of coast by cruising in front Of tor, In other
words the possibility of anticipating an enemy's OPP
.erations, discovering the object of movements Of
which we get glimpse and hear no tidings,
and of seeing the impress Of his footsteps on the
surface of the ocean-it may be well to consult
experience.
The Toulon feet in 1898, consisting of about
twenty sail Of line of battle ships and frgates,
about twenty smaller vessels Of war, and nearly two
hundred transports, conveying the army Of Egypt,
slipped out OF port, and surprised Malta. II was
followed by Nelson, who thinking correctly that
they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course for
Alexandria.
The French, steering towards Gambia, took the
more circuitous passage, that Nelson arrived at
Alexandria before them; and, not finding them there,
returned by way Of Ca ramana and Gambia to Sicily
missing his adversary in both passages. Sailing again
for Alexandria, he found the French feet at anchor
in Abouklr bay and, attacking them, achieved the
memorable victory of the Nile.
When we consider the narrowness of this sea, the
very numerous vessels in the French heet the actua
crossing of the two fleets certain night, ana tha
Nelson, Notwithstanding, could nothing OF the
enemy HIMSELF and hear nothing Of them from mer
chant vessels, we may Judge OF the ProoaDihty oi
waylayng our adversary on the broad Atlantic Inc
escape of another Toulon fleet in 1915 the long
search for them in the Mediterranean, by the same
able officer the pursuit in the West Indies their
evasion of him amongst the islands the return to
Europe; his vain efforts, subsequently, along the
coast of Portugal in the Bay Of Biscay, and of the
British channel and the meeting at last at Trafalgar
brought about only because the combined fleets
trusting to the superiority that the accession OF
several reinforcements had given, were willing
to try the issue of battle These are instan-
ces of many that might be cited, to show how
small is the probability of encounterng, on the
ocean, an enemy who desires to avoid meeting
and how little the most unring ZEAL the most rest
less activity, the most exalted professional skill and
judgment can do to lessen the adverse chances.
II follows therefore, that to rely on the Navy ex-
clusively for coast defence, must have, at each
point force equal to that of the attacking force,
and that this system of defence requires power in
the defence many times greater than that in the
attack as there are points to be covered
Leaving the sea-gong vessels the duty Of destroy
ing the enemys commerce, carrying the war into the
enemys seas, and contendng for the mastery of the
ocean, it seems therefore, that the true system of
defence for the coast requires us to erect fortica
tons, or provide our bays and harbors with steam
batteries, or to combine both according to local cir
cumstances. A well-digested plan of Notifications
is essential indeed, to the efficiency and safety of
our navy; for, without arsenas and dockyards, ade-
quately protected, our vessels would have no place
of refuge from superior force, and no opportunity
of reftting after battle the disasters of astorm
Aprejudice appears to have grown up, in certain
quarters, of late years. against these works, which, II
not arrested will prove In the end no less injurious to
the navy than to the country in general All nations
have fortified their ports and harbors; and although
history affords some instances where this defence
has failed, yet nation, at this time, ceases to con-
fde in them.
" In opposition to this mode of defence, much
stress is laid certain successful attacks that have
been made by ships on works deemed strong We
have doubt that all such results might be account
ed for by circumstances independent of the naked
question of relative strength but at any rate, when
carefully considered, how little do these results
prove, in comparison with numerous other instances
in which there was an immense disparity OF force IN
favor of vessels that have been signally defeated
In of the former description, it will, for the
most part, be found that extraneous influences have
been in operation-such as a discontinued garI ison
the camor of frightened citizens ignorant or dis
loyal commander; the works may have been absurd
planned badly constructed and the fort attacked
when the garrison was wholly unprepared to avail
themselves of the strength of the place.
But what is the experience Of history Let US
turn to certain examples:
q. he name OF Mariello tower was adopted in con-
sequence of the good defence made by small round
tower in the bay Of Marello in Corsica, in the year
1894, which, although armed with one heavy gun
only, beat of two British ships of war, without
sustaining any material injury from their fire."
Sir Sidney Smith, In the Pomlee, an eighty gun
ship. the Hydra, Of thirty guns, and another
frigate, anchored abou, eight hundred yards from
battery of two guns, situated The extremity Of Cape
Lecisa, and protected by a tower in which were five
and-twenty French soldiers and lieutenant The |
line Of battle ship and the frigates fired successive
broadsdes ill their ammunition was nearly expend
ed the battery continually replying, with a slow but
destructive effect. The POM ee at which alone it
directed its fire, had forty shot IN her hull her mzen
topmast carried away Lieutenant, midshipman, and
five men killed, and thirty wounded al leng 9Th,
force proving Intellectual, negotiation was resored to,
and, after some hours parey the officer, Corscan,
and relative Of Napoleon, capitulaied 1t then APP
peared that the carriage of one of the two guns had
failed the second shot, and the gun had been sub
sequeny fred lying the side OF the embrasure;
SO that in fact the attack Of an eighty gun ship and
two frgates had been resisted BY single piece OF
ordnance"
The above is quoted exactly in The words of the
British writers, CHE ships being Brilish,) and Of
course there could be motive to msrePresent the
affair to the disadvantage of the vessels.
The attack Gibraltar, in September, 1882, by
the French and Spanish floating batteries, made, as
was supposed shot proof and mounting AZ guns,
with 10 IN reserve to replace any that nigh. be dis
mounted, is well-known instance Of the power of
guns land.
We will now turn to affairs on our own shore
"In June, l776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding
squadron of two so gun ships, four of 70 guns TWO
20 guns and bomb ketch-in all according to their
own rate,) 252 guns attacked Fort Moultrie, in
Charleston harboI, South Carolina. The fort mount
however, defeated with great loss of life and injury
to the vessels, while the fort suferd in no material
degree, and lest but 80 men. The killed and wound
ed in the squadron were reported by the commodore
to be 2O5 being for every ten guns employed against
them, more than 66 men killed and wounded-a loss
than eleven times great in proportion TO the
opposing force, the loss at the battle of Trafalgar
"The affair at Stonington during the last war, al
frds apother instance of successful defence by bat
terry. In this case, there were only two anns (is
pounders) in battery, which was only three feet
high, and without embrasures. The battery, being
manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from The
town, repealed persevering attack of sloop of war;
causing serious loss and damage but suffering none"
The memorable attack on Copenhagen, BY Lord
Nelson in 1901 though successful in its objects, does
not initiate against our position. This place was
defended BY batteries, including the Three Crown
battery, mounting, in all, about 80 guns and aided
BY shigs Of wal mounting 1853 guns lying in the mar
row channel that leads to the city. Besides this,
there were floating batteries Of various kinds, carry
ing 626 guns placed on the Cutler line.