The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-12-12

Connected
this iequry, which believe 10 he not wholly unwor-
Thy OF pubic attention repeat here, only the we'll
known iuct that In consequence of the strength of
tue Gull stream and trade winds there is virtually no
passage Tor our trade eastward the south side of
he island Of Cuba 1t must, of necessity, pass
through the Gulf of FLORIDA, a narrow strait which
can be ehecually bockaded by two active steam fr-
gates, and Probably by one. Even if trading vessel
should pass such blockading force in the night il
would have but path open 10 IL for a great dis
lance, and might of course be pursued with a certain
~ OF being overtaken. II would not enjoy even the
ordinary chances Of vessel escaping from a blacka-
ded port INTO wide and open sen.
The facts % which have thus a.lyerted show
striking peculiarly In condition The greatest
portion OF our commerce, confined 10 a single channel
vi some hundreds of miles is exposed in a peculiar
manner 10 any enemy having possession of the sea
and-what would render condition still worse
If we be without naval force that commerce may be
annihllaed at a cost which would not be felt by any
teDtb-rae maritime power
II these views he correct, | sm al a loss perceive
what portion OF our country not interested ia them
To the States bordering the Gulf of Mexico, and
TO all those which the Miss ssipp channel
OF trade, the subject 10 of deep and daily increasing
interest. 30 far as their prosperity depends the
outlet OF the various productions Of their country,
they have but single question decide Is is moi,
their commerce woSh the cost Of naval power ade-
quaie 10 protect has no other protection and II
cannot have any other until its present channels shall
be changed
out of the peculiar character Of Government aud
institutions and the exposed condition of lake
and sea coast On these points only repeat the
suggestions offered in my last report No country
IN The world has greater interest than TO guard
Itself against invasion. If are destined TO
again the smoke Of an enemys camp. should at
least be careful not to allow il to ascend from our
own soil Ii is IN all respects better for u.s. repe
an enemy from our coast, than TO subdue him after
he has landed upon our shores To do this, must
cherish our naval power,not the institution of a
day or OF year,-not subject which we can lay
aside, and take up again whenever please, the
policy or the caprice OF the moment may dictate -
but great and permanent institution worthy OF
great people, and demanding the grave attention of
Government an institution resting upon wise sys-
tem and worthy to be maintained in the spirit Of a
| liberal, comprehensive and stable policy.
These considerations forbid to fall so far in the
rear of other nations, and Of the age in which we
live, TO surrender due share of the dominion
OF the seas. commerce, such as ours, demands the
protection Of an adequate naval force people,
scattered all over the world have right to require
the occasional presence of flag to give assurance
to all nations that their country has both the will and
the power TO protect them Our position among the
nations is such 10 leave us without excuse, If We
voluntarily strip Ourselves Of power which all
other nations are anxious TO grasp Our forms OF
government and municipal Institutions suggest that
naval force our safest, and prhaps our only, de-
fence and additional recommendation, of no
small weight, the expenditure which this defence re-
Qultte Is 10 Dc CnltHy among OWu
encouraging their enterprise invgorating their in
dustry, and calling out the abundant and now almost
hidden resources OF our country.
If our Navy is not to be put down altogether, nor
abandoned to neglect and decay, it is high time that
it were placed upon some fixed and permanent plan.
With view to this, respectfully offer the follow
ing suggestions.
In the present favorable condition of our foreign
relation, promising long continuance of peace, l
cannot recommend any considerable appropriation
for building new vessels of war. We have already
as many vessels it will be necessary to keep in
commissions except perhaps, in the classes Of sloops
of war and small brgs and schooners. A few more
Of these required, and they be built out of
materials on hand at very small cost. 1t
seems to me to be too obvious to admit of doubt,
that our true policy is to apply much possible,
of the appropriations for the general naval service
to the employment of ships in commission.
hope to be excused for repeating here, an idea
thrown out in my last report and which am anxious
to enforce because it is the foundation of all sound
policy in regard 10 the Navy IL is easy thing TO
build ship of IL is a difficult hing qualify
oice'!o command her, This simple proposition, which
every knows to be true, should never be lost
sight of by nation that does not intend to abandon
the ocean altogether. 1t requires at least five years
OF strict attention to make good seaman and not
less than twenty years of active service in different
grades, TO form properly qualified naval commander
Surely then since competent officers cannot spring
up with every exgency which may require their
vices, true policy demands that we should keep the
requisite number of them in constant training, TO be
| ready whenever their country shall call for them
The best ship Of war is powerless, when unskilfully
commanded. We build fleets for our enemies, when
we put them in charge of incompetent men.
In order to carry out this dea it is necessary not
only that we should keep more ships in commission
than heretofore, but that we should employ them in
different manner. Our squadrons foreign sta
tons, have been generally kept too much in pot;
have been too little employed in cruising, and too
seldom exercised in squadron maneuyres. To re-
medy this, propose system Of interchange be-
tween the several squadrons, and with that view,
to arrange them that no p, except perhaps that of
the commandment chief, shall remain more than
year on the same station. propose that the squad
rons of the Mediterranean and the BraZs shall con-
sist as near possible, Of the same number and
classes OF vessels and that the same equality shall
prevail between those of the East Indies and the
Pacific, After particular intervals Of time, a vessel
OF the Mediterranean squadron shall be 10 Bra
Z and, at the same time. Of the same descrip-
ton from Brazil to the Mediterranean and of the
squadrons Of the East Indies and the Pacific. The
advantages OF this system great and obvious.
|. BY keeping the ships more at sea- the officers
will be more exercised in their proper duties and
will acquire of the science and practice of their
profession.
2. Discipline will be better learned and better en-
forced, both officers and crews. II is always
Taxed while vessels in port.
s. The dangerous connexions and fatal habits,
often formed amid the seductions Of luxurious rts,
will be avoided
4. Officers will have better opportunity to be-
come acquainted with different coasts and harbors;
with their currents, winds, &C., with the languages,
manners, customs, sc. Of different regions Of the
globe all which information is indispensable TO an
accomplished naval commander
~ The flag of the country viii be displayed in
different ports, on many different vessels, thereby
giving to foreign countries better idea Of the ex-
tent of our naval power Heretofore, the habit f
sending the same vessels repeatedly to the TO-
reign station, has produced the impression that
had no others to send, and has thus detraced from
the respect which ought TO attach TO a naval
power