The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1842-04-16

SAC, 0OO, 600. The whole expense Of building the
forts REGARDED a. necessary for the defence Of the AT
antic and the Gulf Of Mexico 10 estimated at
12l ,767 $50. The cost of ordinances and earrlages
with supply of powder and shot, will be ~ 1851
and IS 900 will be required to man them Ia time
Of war; at an annual of SO 1898 SAT: making, ID
all, 1874 52A, 2l3, being about S. 0OOOOO less than
would be expended In calling out the militia TOT the
object in SIX months to say nothing OF the ioSs
the nation would suffer by 80 large an amount OF Ia
Dor being distracted from the productive industry u
the country and the fearful waste of life likely to re
suit from such costly, harassing, and hazardous syS
TEN of defence
Vast as is the extent of our coast, there are CON,
paravey but points which require to be defended
against regular and powerful force considerable
norton of il is inaccessible to large ships, and only
exposed to the attacks of parties in boats and small
vessels, against which we'll organized militia, win
inferior works. which can be erected In short time
and at q small cost, will afoId sufhcient pfotec'ioh.
w hat shall be the means of defence for these lmpor
lant points is therefore the real question: The OPT
nion acceptable to free people, that navy Is the
true defence of the country, Is, TO certain extent
correct. He, however, forms but an imperfect con-
cepton of the use of navy, who would have our
ships lying in harbor or lowering on our coast ea'-
ing the enemy 3 commerce in the undisurbed ENJOY
ment of the sea, and own without countenance
aid. A with such nations as France or Eng
land and even Russia conducted on this plan, would
sweep the American flag from the ocean instead
then, of keeping watch on our seapoard, the navy
should penetrate every sea- protect our own and act
with vgcr against the enemy's navigation. In this
way during the last war; it rendered benefits thou-
SIND times greater say nothing of the honor It &C
CURED than any that could have resulted from state
Of passveness at home.
Let us for a moment consider the proposition that
the defence should be by nary erclusipely Sup
pose we possessed but single seaport, and that we
relied entirely on our fleet By remaining within this
port, we should be certain of meeting the enemy,
should he assa it, If his force be superior, we cannot
reasonably calculate successful defence, and as
there could he no escape for the defeated vessels the
issue would be truly calamitous. If our fleet be equal
to his, the defence would he complete throwing out
the hazard and mshap liable to attend contests OF TINS
nature Here the chances of victory to the parties
would be equal but the consequences most unequal
The enemy might loose his fleet, but he could lose no
more; whereas we would lose not only that, but the
object the fleet designed to protect II he dd not
think proper to attack our fleet either lying IN port or
watching in the vicinity he would cut up our COM
on the ocean; for II we left our station 70 pro-
lect it, we leave our port utterly defencelsss.
If, on the other hand, having timely notice OF the
preparation and movements of the enemy, we under
take meet him his way, or to shut Lin up In MS
own port nothing but decided nferiority on his part
would prevent him from offering battle; for, hav-
ing protected himself at home by other means If de-
feated he has place of refuge, and all Is not lost
with his fleet; and, should single vessel escape, 1t
might capture our own port, left defenceless But
now VIII II De on the suPposltlon Oh nueiouS 'inPoi
tant ports either sde instead of single one All
maritime nations except the ned States, are foIt-
fed in all their harbors and possessed OF available ma
val means superior to what ours arc likely to be for
years to Believing his ports to be safe without
the presence of his vessels the enemy will at once
make our shores the theatre of his operations We
can have no previous indication OF his particular point
Of attack and consequently, reason for iortlylng
one place rather than another: 50 that the chances
aganst us will be in proportion to the number OF our
ports. Our fleet, granting it equal to that OF the
enemy, cannot be SO arranged as to meet his enter
prises If concentrated by detaching vessels
from his squadron in few hours he might burn our
shipping or public establishments, and leave tor some
convenient rendezvous before the attack could be
known to our commander AS We cannot foretel the
place of attack, how are we to know where to ace
our fleet, SO to intercept the advancing foel 10
attempt to cover such coast ours by cruising In
'front.' we traverse distance nearly equal to that he
passes in coming from his country TO ours and
to protect our cities, under these circumstances,
against fleet of twenty vessels, if we could sweep
the Atlantic as well the Gulf of Mexico, would
require one hundred vessels of size and armamen,
equal to theirs-a calculation below the mark, when
we consider the position that Bermuda and the Wes
| Indies bear to our frontier.
{ To be continued.