Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1842-01-20

AWooi coitilsnoners mus virtually ueI
wing their appointment frvin Congress, entrusted
with very important powers in regard TO the redemption
Of tho public debt. being authorized, their discretion,
to purchase II In iom tlmo 10 time, to borrow money for
the purpose. aud to appoint subordinate agents
Now, VII, II the constitution Of tins commission, which
continued IN full activity for forty years Of history
was nu! plain usuaton, what Is there TO prevent Con
grcs from making legislative organization Of the Urea
s,"y q the United States the same principles, and
cnsumnatng that complete separation Of the purse and
the sword. Of the Treasury from the Eaecufre, winch
has been ~ loudly demanded by the public sentiment Of
the country The Treasury Department, Mt present
constituted embraces great variety OF functions entire
~ distinct In their character and which ough to be scpa
rated in practice All that relates the general finances
OF the country. plans for raising and for the
support OF public credit estimates of income and expend
lures, SC. might be lo with proprcty. at present
the hands Of the Secretary cabinet minister But
Whatever relates To the receipt safe keeping and issuing
lY the public money, In pursuance Of Appropriations
made by law, functions which constitute the Jrsa
'"y proper IN the contemplation Of the Constitu
ton Of the United States, corresponding to the Ear
chequ'r In England, should bc under separate and
ndopcnden, administration. Let n new Department,
then be created comprohsndinp these functions cxclu
s'vely, which. together with the and compiled
ted details incident To the and transfer of the
public funds, would afford ample occupation for dis
tant and responsible department Let board Of ex oico
commissioners formed upon the model of the Commits
sioncs OF the sinking Fund consisting for example, OF
tho Chef justice Of tho United States of the President Of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House OF Represen
tavcs Tor the time being be placed at the head Of this
department. and he changed with general supervisory
on risiioioiol power the Treasury Of tie United
States, whchwould require nothing at their hands
'an one or two periodic inspections Of the condition OF
the Treasury IN the Of tina year. and annual
report OF its operations tobc made Congress within the
INST month OF each session. This board being thus
stltuted the head of the Department under that
clause ct the constitution which authorizes Congress by
law To vest the appointment Of such inferior officers az
they think proper IN the heads Of Departments" &c.
provision might be made for vcstne the appointment Of
Treasurer. OF tho members OF the proposed Erche9,er,
and OF all other officers concerned IN the duties of
the Department, IN the Board Of Commissioners.
who should alone too have the power Of removing any
oil these functlonares from Office in case Of NAL
Vcrsauon or ineompetcncy. ! throw out these sug
gcsons for the consideration of the Senate. not as
having very thoroughly pondered them myself. though
they have often passed through my mind in the deep
anxiety feel for the accomplishment of tho object at
which they a'n--nn entire withdrawal of the Treasury
rom any conneAon with, dependence on the Exccu
1--WE II there should be constitutional impeachment 70
their adoption and confess inclined To be
IN searching Tor one in such cause they would be tho
means OF clectng great political reform and Of afford
'nga security for the public liberty, the importance
Of which, IN the general sentiment Of the country
not am sure, lac overracd
IT, however. upon consideration il should be though,
that the actual provisions Of the Constitution, notwth
standing the practical construction II ed IN the
OF the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund oppose an
Insurmounnble obstacle to the arrangement hero suggest
ed there II yet another mode oircndeng tho member
the proposed Exchoque Board virtually independent of
the power Of the President in regard the constitution
ay Of which, presume, there can be no doubt in III.
minds of majority OF this body. | mean by providing
that they shall no, be removed from the Office in any case
'oihom the concurrence Of The Senate: rcservng. how
over, To the President the power of suspension case Of
mistSn'uct or lnideny and Of appointnga Temporary
substitute .ur,ao the recessed the Senate which as soon
meets shall Oct, mine whether the officer shall be
restored or be finally removed from office pruvs-
ion of this kind, by throwing the officer the shield
Of Senatorial Justice would render him indcpena"nt Of
the mere will Of tho Executive and give him the ro1u
site hmncss IN the contentious discharge Of his duty
As to the constitutional power Of Congress thus re-
gulac the tenure Of offices created by IL think there is
reasonable ground Of doubt The decision of Congress
IN 1889, the general question Of the power Of
val-a decision in which, under the luminous reasoning
Of Mr. Madison, my judgment has always acquiesccd-
went no further according to my apprehension Of it,
than To affirm that, in the absence Of legislation 10 the
contrary the power Of removal resulted TO the President
have never understood il preclnding tho power Of
Congress- whenever thought proper do 10 express
provisions, to regulate differently tho tenure Of Offices
created by it, and To declare in what manner M well as
for what causes, the incumbent shall be removed
The honorable Senator from Kentucky, (Mr, CLAY,)
II mistake not, brought forward proposition in 1885,
providing that officer appointed by tho President by
and with the advice and consent Of the Senate should
be removed from Office without the concurrence OF the
Senate subject however, TO temporary suspension by the
President when necessary during the the Senate
The application OF this principle Ia especially called for in
regard to all officers entrusted with the custody and man
agement OF the public moneys. II has been felt and
acknowledged In the institutions Of our sturdy British
cesors from time lmmcmoral; for while the mass of
public nncfonarics there hold their offices during the
pleasure OF the Crown. the office the of Ercjeqer "the
great conseTvaor called of the revenues of the
nation are entrenchod behind tenure Of good behavior
and hold their situations when appointed ndepcn-
IDENTIFY of the pleasure Of tho Crown Surely our nation
al Treasury, maintaining precisely the relation TO
the public revenues, should be rendered. least indie
pendent Of the power Of the Executive here am ready
them for one, TO join the honorable Senator from Ken
lucky, heart and hand. in carrying the principle
his proposition regard TO the members OF the proposed
Board OF Exchequer, and all other officers connected with
tho public Treasury. Tho honorable Senator has Just
laid upon our table proposition for amendment Of
the Constitution, to vest in Congress the appointment
of the principal officers of the Treasury with view to
separate that Department more efectually from the pow
CT OF the Executive. and 10 subject the control Of the
Legislature. lilo will pardon me. am sure. for sug
gestng whether would not be better pursue his OBJ
ect by resort to the which the Constitution as
it stands, puts at disposal rather than by proposing
an amendment to tho instrument which, now that the
concurrence OF twenty out Of twenty independent
creigntics has become necessary effect may he
thing to be wished but which, case, persuad-
cd, shall We ever see accomplished
That the plan submitted to us by the Secretary of the
Treasury would receive important notifications from the
hands OF committee in regard to its machinery, well
as In other respects, there be ground doubt
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