Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1842-03-15

stitulions To this no general answer can be given
II is the work of the wise and experienced, having tul
and perfect knowledge of the country and the peop II
every particular for whom the Government is intended
1t must be made to fit, and when it does, it will Il. nj
other, and will be incapable Of being initiated or tor
rowed. Without then, attempting to do what canao
be done, propose to point ont, how that whic.
have stated has been accomplished in system o
Government, and the agency the veto is intended K
have in c!sacting II.
| hrgin with the House Of Representatives.. Tiers
each State has Representative according to its Fedora
numbers, and when met ma ority of the whole nnn,
Der Of members controls lis proceedings thus giving Il
the numerical majority the exclusive control h.c ugh
nut. The effect to place its proceedings in the power
of eight millions of people over all the rest, and
the largest States, If united, the other twenty;
The consequence, if The louse the exclusive agar
of the voice of The people, would be the domination o.
the stronger the weaker interests of the coDmun
ty, and the establishment of intoe.able and oppres
srenespotism. To find the remedy against what woulc
be great owl, must turn to this body. licre
entirely different process adopted TO take the
of the community. Population rs entirely disregardcd
and States without reference 10 the number Of people
made the basis of representations the effect OF which
is place the control here in majority OF the States
which, had they The exclusive power, would exercise II
despotcay and oppreSsvely would the ilouse oil
Representatives.
Regarded then, separately, neither truly represents
the of the community, and each is imperfect oil
Itself but when united and the concurrIng voice oil
each made necessary enact laws the corrects
the defects OF the other and instead Of the less popu
lar deroga;ng from the popular, as supposed by
the Senator, the two together more full and per-
feet utterance to the voice OF the people than either
could separately Taken separately six States might
control the House, and little upwards of four millions
miph control the Senate, by combination of the four
teen smaller Stute,; but by requiring the concurrent
votes of the two the six largest States must add eight
others TO have the control in both bodies. Suppose,
for illustration they should unite with the Ell ht small
est which would give The least number by which an
could pass both Houses, will be found by adding
the population in Federal numbers Of the six largest to
the c;Gbt smallest States, that the least number by
which an oct can pass both Houses, if the members
should he true 10 those they represent, would be 49,
$40 aga:ns. minority Of Gl9,797, instead Of s,000,
OGO agains. 1900 9O3 if the assent Of the most popu
Ia, branch alone required.
This more full and perfect expression OF tie voice Of
the PEOPLE by the o.the two compared 10
either separately is great advance towards full and
perfect expression ofthcr voice; but great as IS II
ialls far Short and tie rainers Of the Constitution
were accordingly not satisfied with it. To render il
stl more perfect their next step TO require the
nj of the President before act oil Congress could
become law, and, il he dsapproved, 10 require two
thirds Of both Houses 10 override his veto. We
thus brought TO the point Immediately under discussion,
and which, that account, claims full and careful
examination.
One of the leading motives for vesng the President
with tins high power, was, undoubtedly to give him
the means Of protecting the portion CT the powers al
otted TO him By the Constitutions against the encroach
mept of Congress. TO make division of power CT
ectual veto in one form or other Is Indispensable
The robt of each TO Judge for itself of the extent OF
the power allotted its SHARE and protect itself in
the exercise what in reality is meant by division Of
power Without il the allotment to each department
would be partition, and no division oil. Acting
under this impression the trainers OF the Constitution
have carefully provided that his approval should be
cessary not only TO the acts of Congress- but to every
resolution vote order requiring the Consent of the
two Houses to render impossible TO eiude 1t by
ony conceivable device This of itself was an adequate
motive for the provision, and were there no other,
oupht 10 be sufficient reason tor the rejection OF tins
resolution Without il, the division OF power between
the Legislative aud Executive departments would have
been merely nominal.
But it is not the only motive There is another and
dee per TO which the division itself Of The Government
into departments is subordinate; TO enlarge the popular
basis by increasing the number OF voices necessary to
its action AS numerous as nre the voices required TO
obtain the assent of the people through the Senale and
the House to an act it not thought by the trainers
or the Constitution sufficient for the action of the Co.
vernrent in all Nine thousand eight hundred,
as large as is the NUMBER regarded still too
few and six thousand one hundred too many TO remove
all motives for oppression the la'er heng not 700 Few
to be plundered and the former not too large to divide
the snoils of plumber among. Till the increase OF
numbers on one side and the decrease on the other
reaches that point there is no security for the weaker
aganst the stronger especially IN so extensive coun-
try as ours. Acting in the spirit of these remarks The
authors cf the Constitution, although they deemed the
of the Senate and the House sufficient,
with the approval of the President to the enactment of
laws in ordinary cases. yet, when he dssented, they
deem it sufficient presumption against the measure TO
require still greater enlargement OF the popular basis
for its enactment With this view, the assent of two.
thirds of both Houses were required to overrule his
veto that is eighteen States in the Senate and con-
suencv of ten millions six hundred thousand in the
other House.
Rut il NAV be said that nothing is gained towards
on,rrino the polula basis Of the Government by the
veto power: because the number necessary to elect
majority to the two Houses wthou! which the act could
moi mass would be sufficient to elect hin. That is trne
Bat he may have been elected by different portion OF
The peope or if not great changes may take place dur
ur his four years both in the Senate and the House.
WHICH NAV change The majority that brought him into
mower and with the measures and policy 10 be pnr'
sued In either he might find It necessary to IN.
his veto to iraintan his views OF the Consttu
ton or the policy of the party OF which he IS the hean
and which elevated him 10 power
Rut n still stronger consideration for vcstins HIM
with the mower nav be found III the difference OF the
manner Of his election compared with that OF the men,
hers of either House The Senators are elected by the
y,te Of the Legislatures of The respective States and
Toe menibeTs nj TIC House ny sHt PeoPr, VIM, ." az
uost all the States, elect by districts in neither IS
there the least responsibility of me mbrIs any one
They are az far their responsibility may be concern
ed, solely and exclusively under the influence oil M ihe
States and people, who respectively elect them. MOI
80 the Presd, Mt The votes OF the whole are counted
in his election, which makes him more or less RESPONSE
bic TO very part-o those who voted against him. as wei
as those to whom he his election which he must
feel sensiby 1.-The should be aspirant for
he will desire gain he favorable opinion OF States tha'
opposed him. as well to retain that OF these wnch
voted for him. Even if she should not be candidate
for collection, the desire of having tavore elected
or maintaining the acendency of his party, may have
to considerable extent, the same influence over nun
The effect, in either case, would be to make nun look
more to The interest Of the mhofe-to soften sect'ona
feelings and asperty-to be more patriot, IMAM the
partisan of any particular interest; and through The M
iuence of these give more general cnatace
10 the politics of country and thereby render the col
son between sectional interests less heree e. nan u
would be if legislation depended solely on lhe mem
bers of the two Houses, who owe no respons'o','y
but to those who elected them. The same 'ntiu
ence acts even ON the aspirnns for the PRESIDENCY
g. considerable extent OJ