The Mississippi Creole. [volume] (Canton, Miss.) 1841-1851, 1842-01-15

first blow would be struck at US through
our own institutions. No nation, 1t IS
presumed, would expect to be successful
over us for any length of time, in a fair
contest of arms upon our own soil; and
no rise uatlon would attempt it, A
more promising expedient would be
sought, III grraying what are supposed
10 b. tha hostile elements of our social
system against one another. An enemy
supposed, and free to land upon any part
of our soil which might promise success
10 his enterprise, would be armed with a
four fold power of annoyance Or the
ultimate result Of such lncursions: we
have no reason to be afraid; but, would
he the more expensive, the more embar-
RAISING. and the more horrible in It's ei-
iccts, by compelling us, at the sametime,
TO oppose an enemy in the field, aud TO
guard against attempts to subycrt our so,
cial systems.
'.Heretolore we have found in the shall
lowness of many -four waters security,
10 a certain extent, against invasion by
sea. So long as ma ratime wars were
conducted IN vessels of large size and
great draught, we had a little TO appre-
bend from them except at few points,
and those were susceptible of adequate
defence on land. But this security can
no-Ionger be relied on. The application
of steam power TO vessels Of war, and
the Improvements which have recently
been made in artillery, are destined TO
change the whole system Of maratime
war. Steamboats,, Of light draught, and
which may be easily transported across
the ocean in vessels Of larger class,
may invade us at almost any point ofour
extended coast; may penetrate the in
teriour through our shallow rivers, and
thus expose half our country to hostile
attacks. The celebrity with which move
ments could be made, the facility with
which such vessels could escape, and the
promptness with which they could
change the point of attack, would ena-
bic an enemy, with a comparatively in
considerable force, to harass our whole
seaboard, and to carry all the horrors Of
war into the securest retreats OF onr peo-
pie. The effect of these incursions
would be terrible everywhere; in the
southern portion of our country they
might, and probably would, be disastrous
in the extreme.
sit is obvious that war thus conduct
ed must be successful to a very great
cxient,in spite ofalI the defences on land
which We would contrive. Nothing less
than the conversion of half our country
into military garrison could protect US
against it. Such is the exposed condition
OF our country, such is the character Of
our institutions, and such the position of
oar people. that a population of twice
our present number, under the best pos
sble military organization, would avail
us but little. Whilst the combined pow
ers Of the world could not subdue US.
even a secondary naval power could
avoid our defences, set our armies at
defiance, and prosecute against US a
war intolerably harrassing and disas-
trous.
"Phe single question, then, which we
have to decide, in reference to this sub
jet, is, where and by whom shall those
battles be fought, which may hereafter
become necessary in defence of our pro-
perty, our institutions, our honor, and
our lives? Shall we meet the enemy up
the ocean, with men trained and disci-
plned for the contest; or suffer him tc
land on our shores, trusting to a scatter.
ed and harrassed people 10 expel him
from their farms and their Preside? This
question admits of but one answer. Blu
"A l. Il
those high interests to which have al
luded can be adequately protected By
cur present naval force. -Four thousand
miles of exposed sea and lake coast,
foreign commerce scattered through thu
most distant seas, and domestic trade ex
posed alike upon the ocean and upon on
interior waters, are, in effect, surrender
ed to the enemy,when they are entruste
to the protection Of some twenty ships i
commission.
''lf these views be not altogether de
ceptive, the policy OF increasing our ma
Wy, without further delay, is Obvious
Hoac far it shall be increased, the wis
dom of Congress will decide. Lookin
to it as the chief, if not the only adequat
defence of our country against lhos
wars of incursions from which so muc
evil is TO be apprehended, respectful
suggest that it cannot safely stop short {
half the naval force ofthe strongest maj
time powerin the world. Our policy
peace; and we do not propose to GU
selves a war of aggression in any cas-
except SO far as may be necessary as
measure of defence. It's not probabl
that any nation could detach from othe
sdrvice more than one fourth of il
whole naval force, to attack us upon on
own coast. so that after dad11efinn sue