The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-10-20
THE VETO AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY.

II may be no improper time to address lew
wo,ds IN the Southern States Of this Confed-
.,acv in relation TO the Veto power OF the Con-
.,;u,;on to its exercise they may hereafter be
indebted for the preservation Of their peculiar
institutions" and what is OF still more para
,nount importance, the maintenance, IN undlmln-
;shed strength, of State jurisdiction. To Vir-
pipis, most particularly would we direct our
remarks,-for to the far-reaching vision OF her
great statesmen is the country indebted for this
conservative principle: and to the moral infiu-
ence of her name shall we be obliged, under
Providence, for its guardianship. 80
When the sovereign States of the Old Con-
federacy relinquished certain absolute natural
rights for The formation of more perfect Union'
they wisely determined to establish a check
upon the encroachments OF the National Legis-
lative Assemblies. All power, they knew, tend
ed 10 consolidation. Instructed by experience,
they acted with political foresight. History had
taught them that other States, allied by similar
bonds of amity and by seemingly mutual inter
e,ts, had, after years of jealous contests and
ambitious quarrels, eventually sunk into one
consolidated government. The larger and more
powerful had reduced into complete subjugation
the weaker; or banded interests had swallowed
up those adverse and less capable OF defence.
They therefore provided such constitutional
checks as should prevent undue prePonderance !;
and, calling to mind the power that in ancient
Rome rescued the people from the tyrannous
conduct Of selfish aristocracy, they ordained
the Tribun,ial Veto, which they considered es-
sential to the least possible abridgement OF State
soyereienties. Without such defensive power
lodged somewhere, they foresaw there could be
no guarantee of the independence OF States
And they could not but arrive at the conclusion
that no safer deposite could be made of such
power than in the hands OF the National Execu-
tive; who, in representing all the confederated
States, would permit injury to none.
State rights have no protection in the lower
House from rash and encroachinS legislation;
there, majority, opposed 10 the institutions OF
any State, even to their customs or municipal re-
gulations, might abolish, or, at least, fatally mo-
dify them. And but little more reliance can be
placed upon the Senate; for, besides that ma
jority of States might possibly be opposed to
certain peculiar circumstances in the condition
of the rest, in times of high party excitement,
members of Southern sections might be found
--as they hare been tound-who for certain ex
pected or stipulated rewards, would be traitor
Gus to their duties, and faithless to their con-
stituents.
The Presidential Veto, then, is the bulwark,
and the only bulwark, against legislative en-
croachments. 1t is the balance wheel in the
Constitution. Destroy it and the whole ma
chinery of our present Union would become a
wreck.
And not only in protection Of State rights,
but of the People themselves, irrespective Of
territorial lines, is this Veto power to be exer
cised. 1t is not speculative reasoning, it is
experience teaches us that the exercise of this
constitutional privilege of the President cant
save the country from the many disastrous con-
sequences of hasty and inconsiderate legislation
The President is the immediate representative
of the whole People, as well as the sworn
guardian of State independence. 1t is his duty,
as it is his interest, to watch over, to cherish,
and to defend the individual rights of the Peo-
pie, regardless of sectional divisions. AS he is
elected by the different States without reference
to the place Of his birth or his residence, so in
his delegated powers he represents not one
State, or one section, but an union of twenty
SIX different sovereignties and to each indivi-
dual of these different sovereignties is he respon
sible for the due exercise of his constitutional
privileges.
The Presidential Veto is the break-water be-
tween the madness of hasty excited legislation
and the aggregate interest of the People-t
saves them from the rashness Of heated part-
sans-it affords them time for the discussion of
measures, till their introduction into legislative
halls, to them entirely new-and it gives them
an opportunity to declare their dissent to pro-
posed laws which they feel would prove no1ous
to their best interests.
The view we have taken ofthis saving power
Of the Constitution is neither unsound in theory,
nor unsuslained in practice. Its theory is cor
rect, and so will appear, when we reflect upon
the different responsibility, motives OF action
and mode of election of the President and the
legislative assemblies. He can only be respon-
sible to the wishes and opinions of the whole
People, for they are all his constituents. His
attention to the greatest good of the whole
country is the foundation of his popularity and
the source of his influence; and when he CON-
suits sectional feeling, he arrays against him the
force of the masses but the representative is
elected by a comparative few, hsmmed in by
geographical lines, and governed by strong local
partialities and interests; and in his conduct
must pay due regard to the prejudices, as well
Is reasonable wishes, of his constituents. A
majority of an assembly thus constituted may
enact laws in derogation Of the rights, certainly
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