The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1842-04-19
REPORT ON HARBoR DEFENCE.
(coNcLUDED.)

We will conclude the subject with Driei aii snn
to the attack by the French 1eet IN November 100
,Indor Admiral Baudin, on the castle OF ~. juan
d'Ulioa at Vera Cruz and which Is irequenuy al
duceA "a AN instance of the inefciency Of iorthca-
tions.
The Mexicans brought nineteen guns only INTO ac-
ton, and many of these were OF sman caiiosl u'oio
heing oply one 24-pounder, and the remainder con-
stiog of twelve Is and lSpounders with one Spoun-
dsr These reduced into "a FOUNDERS the smallest
s;ze Of guns generally used on shpboard, make the
nineteen equivalent to twelve guns.
The French ships mounted 1873 guns, or, comput-
ing only one broadside, "a guns, and sea mortars.
The Mexcans permitted the French to be lowed
by armed steamers into position, without molesting
them, and the firing commenced on the part OF the
assalants. Early in the action shell from the heet
caused the explosion of magazine IN the castle,
which dismounted three of the Is guns The French
fired $50 shot and Shells and, but for the explosion
caused by the negligence of the beseged, there is
nothing to account for the surrender Of the fort The
exaggerated statements of injury inflicted on the
walls by horizontal shells not sustained by the Of
fetal report of the engineer Of the expedition al
though the works were built of stone much softer
than any used in such works in the United States
"Of 1877 guns found in the fort, lO2 were not SER
viceable-29 only having been dismounted by the
French fire. The heaviest injury was sustained In
the batteries where the explosion took place"-an
accident that cannot from like causes in our
forts The works out Of order the guns Old and
neglected and the garrison experienced and igno-
rant of military defences No idea OF taking the
place entertained by the admiral in this attack
he designed to weaken the defences somewhat-to
dsprit and annoy the garrison, preparatory to gen.
era assault at night But the culpable, inconceiva-
BILE neglect Of the Mexicans rendered further efforts
ON his part unnecessary. Only sixteen guns were en-
gagged in the fight and such was /" the ineftcency OF
their fire. that, although three French frlgates were
struck in their hulls about 800 times they lost but
SO men, in killed and wounded. Tie lphegenle
was hulied l60 times and yet but l3 men were hurt "
Very few therefore, of these l6O balls could have pass
ed through her sides and yet in proportion to the guns
engaged the loss of the French here was upwards OF
four times as many as that of the English at Trafal-
gar Few if any, Of the guns exposed to the direct
action Of the French broadside were dismounted or
sileuced (which continued to FIRE till the end OF
the action. Ofthe % guns dsmounted, 5 were blown
up, and the remainder were on the opposite side OF
the work. and struck by shot or shells which had pass
ed the walls facing the ships From the position
taken BY the French, only Is guns were actually
brought to bear against them from the fort. Had
the Mexicans thrown their powder into the sea- or
carried it their barracks, and every man, making
pillow of key slept through the whole cannonade,
Gas might have been done safey,) in their quarters
in the curtain casemates the castle of ST. Juan dU
loa would have, we doubt not, been as competent to
resist the projected assault was when the French
first arrived before 1t.
Numerous other cases are furnished by history, of
character still more favorable to position but
we do not how it is possible to avoid the deduc-
ton, from what have referred to- that fixed bat
teries on shore resist the attacks OF ships even
with more numerous and heavy armament, If pro-
perly planned, and managed with ordinary bravery
and skill.
For large cities, therefore, naval depos, &C., stu.
ated harbors not too great in extent to admit OF good
defence at the entrance would still rely, for the
most part on permanent fOrtifcatlOns though, even
here fewer forts will be required and the defence
more complete, should the plan we shall recommend
succeed according to expectation.
There is however, another Glass; consisting of i'm
porant establishments situated at distance up some
river or bay as the Delaware Chesapeake, &C., too
wide to be commanded by batteries upon the shores
The reliance must, from the nature of the case, be
floating Defence and if of the kind hitherto propos
ed of magnitude at least equal to that the enemy
may bring. This would involve great expense, more
than it is likely we shall be able to bear for many
wears to come Such, indeed, the faults Of thu
old system of floating defences it has been suggested
by high authority that it will be better to give W
the bay to the enemy, combining our deiences to tn
more important harbors and rivers that discharge int
the bay' glance, however, at the map, will SHOW
that to erect the necessary forts these rivers
harbors and which, after all, will prove but PARTIAL
effective would far transcend the entire cost OF de
Tending the important points along the whole exten
of the coast by the plan of Mr. Stevens now brough
forward.
II must be confessed that there are certain position
where floating defences of some kind indispensa
ble Broad sounds or roadsteads, and harbors witt
wide entrances, where deep soundings may be CARR
ed at distance from the shores greater than eftec
tive gun range will present such situations and her
there is no alternative. The question, therefore
which presents itself is what shall be the description
of this floating defence to be employed? Gun boats
under certain favorable circumstances, as In calm
and in harbors containing shoals and shallow Inlets
might sorely harrass if not destroy, enemys fleet
But experience satisfies us that feet of this class
vessels cannot be safely relied to resist the fire
combined fleet. 1t is difficult to keep them in al
effective position they easily scattered by storms
and cannot advance recede, with sufficient rapdt
against more active vessels.
Floating batteries containing more guns and haV
ing thicker sides buiwarks than gun boats, re
commended by some, as superior to the latter. The
must, however be strong and massive, and conse
uuentIy unwledy, and incapable OF sudden change O
place, to advance on defeated foe OF to evade
victorious one The application of steam would it /
true obviate in Degree this objection but thel
it would be difficult construct them, on the plal
suggested in such way to protect their wheels an
machinery from shot that might, in moment, plac
them in a condition utterly helpless and useless
has been proposed to build these batteries with yer
thick wooden bulwarks shot proof and resemblin
in construction batteries shore. But against tn
large bomb of late years introduced into tn
armament Of ships, it il doubtful If this excess Q
thickness is a material advantage. The protection
from solid shot, afforded by their massive sides, it
probable will be more than counterbalanced by tn
greater injury horizontal shells as the Paixhan shee
would nAict, by lodging in the timber, and produc
ing terrible ravages by bursting. In the attack or
Gibraltar, the floating batteries were made proc
against cold shot and, thought by the cohstruc
tor against hot shot too, which, being buried deep
closely jointed timbers could scarcely communicate
flame; and which, if occurring, might by means o
fire engines, be subdued The decks, too covered
with roof of slopng timbers; and yet nine of thes
floating batteries were burnt by hot shot from thu
shore. A few bomb ketches, armed with heavy Sci
mortars in the invading fleet, would constrain tn
floating batteries TO quit the position selected for ra
ing fire on the enemy, and abandon their concentra
ted array, in maintaining which, their effectiveness
depended.
The naval constructor Mr.. Humphreys, has esti
mated the cost of of the heavy floating batteries
proposed by General Gaines in his plan Of nationa