The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1842-04-16
REP0RT ON HARBOR DEFENCE.
(coNrINUCD.)

words, the possibility OF anticipating an enemys OPP
erations, discovering the object Of movements of
which get no glimpse and hear no hdngs,
and of seeing the impress of his footsteps on the
surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult
experience.
The Toulon feet, in 1898, consisting of about
twenty sail of line of battle ships and frigates,
about twenty smaller vessels of war; and nearly two
hundred transports, conveying the army Of Egypt,
slipped out of port, and surprised Malta. 1t was
followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that
they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course for
Alexandria.
The French, steering towards Gambia, took the
more circuitous passage, that Nelson arrived at
Alexandria before them; and, not finding them there
returned by way # Ca ramana and Gambia to Sicily
missing his adversary in both passages Sailing again
for Alexandria he found the French fleet at anchor
IN Aboukr bay; and, attacking them achieved the
memorable victory of the Nile
When consider the narrowness OF this sea, the
very vessels in the French heet the actual
crossing of the two fleets on certain nlght ana tat
Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing OF the
enemy himself, and hear nothing of them from mer-
chant vessels, we may judge OF the probability OF
waylayng our adversary on the broad Atlantic The
escape of another Toulon fleet in 1905 the long
search for them in the Mediterranean, by the same
able officer; the pursuit in the West Indies their
evasion of him amongst the islands the return to
Europe his vain efforts subsequently, along the
coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and Oft the
British channel and the meeting at last at Trafalgar
Drought ABOUT only because inc COUONCu HCCIo
trusting to the superiority that the accession Of
several renforcements had given, were willing
to Try the issue of battle. These are instan-
ces, of many that might be cited, to show how
small is the probability of encountering, on the
ocean, an enemy who desires to avoid meeting !;
and how little the most untirng ZEAL the most rest
less activity, the most exalted professional skill and
judgment can do to lessen the adverse chances
1t follows therefore, that to rely on the Navy ex-
clusively for coast defence, must have, at each
forCn 10 that Of tho oft oElnnf
and that this system of defence requires power in
the defence as many times greater than that in the
attack as there are points to be covered.
Leaving the seagoing vessels the duty of destroy
ing the enemy's commerce, carrying theHar into the
enemys SEAS and contending for the mastery of the
ocean, it seems, therefore, that the true system of
defence for the coast requires us to erect orthca-
tons, provide our bays and harbors with steam
batteries to combine both, according to local cir
cumstances. A we-digested plan of Notifications
is essential indeed, to the efficiency and safety of
navy for, without arsenals and dockyards, ade-
quately protected, our vessels would have no place
of refuge from superior force, and no opportunity
of rettng after battle the disasters of storm.
prejudice appears to have grown up, IN certain
quarters of late years. against these works, which, if
mot arrested will prove in the end no less injurious to
the navy than to the country in general All nations
have fortified their ports and harbors and although
history affords some instances where this defence
has failed yet nation at this time, to con-
fde in them.
/" In opposition to this mode of defence, much
stress laid certain successful attacks that have
been made by ships works deemed strong. We
have no doubt that all such results might be account
ed for by circumstances independent OF the naked
question of relative strength but at any rate when
carefully considered, how little do these results
prove, in comparison with numerous other instances
in which there immense disparity OF force IN
favor of vessels that have been signally defeated
In cases of the former description, it WILL for the
most part be found that extraneous influences have
been in operation-such as discontinued garrison
the camor Of frightened citizens ignorant or dis
y planned badly constructed and the fort attacked
when the garrison wholly unprepared to avail
themselves Of the strength of the place.
But what is the experience of history Let us
turn to certain examples:
~ he name of Marello tower adopted in con-
sequence Of the good defence made by small round
tower in the bay of Martelo, in Corsica in the year
1894, which, although armed with one heavy gun
only, beat of one or two Bntshshps of war, without
sustaining any material injury from their fire..
81 Sir Sidney Smith, in the Pompee, an eighty-gun
ship, the Hydra, Of thirty eight gums and another
frgate, anchored abou. eight hundred yards from
battery Uf two guns situated on the extremity OF Cape
Lecisa and protected by tower in which were i've
and-twenty French soldiers and lieutenant. The
line of battle ship and the fgates fred successive
broadsides till their ammunition nearly e1pend-
ed the battery continually replying with slow but
destructive effect. The PomIee, at which alone 1t
directed its fire, had forty shot in her hull her mzen
topmast carried away, lieutenant, midshipman, and
five men killed, and thirty wounded al length,
force proving Intellectual negotiation was resoIed TO,
and after some hours parley the officer, Corscan,
and relative of Napoleon, capItnlated 1t then APP
peared that the carriage of Of the two guns had
failed on the second shot, and the gun had been sub
sequenily fired, lying the side OF the embrasure;
80 that in fact the attack of eighty-gun ship and
two frigates had been resisted by single piece Of
ordnance"
The above is quoted exactly in the words of the
British writer's Che ships being Brish,) and of
course there could be no motive 10 msIepresent the
affair to the disadvantage of the vessels.
The attack on Gibraltar, in September, 1852, by
the French and Spanish floating batteries, made, as
was supposed, shot proof, and mounting l42 guns,
with 10 in to replace any that might be dis
mounted is a weLknOwn instance OF the power OF
guns on land,
We will now turn to affairs own shore.
sin june, l776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding
squadron of two so gun ships four of 20 guns two of
% guns, and bomb ketch-in all according to their
own rate,) 252 guns attacked Fort Monltne, In
Charleston harbur, South Carolina. The fort mount
ed thirty pieces of heavy artillery. The English weIe
however defeated, with great loss of life and injury
to the vessels while the fort suffered in no material
degree and lost but 80 men, The killed and wound
ed in the squadron were reported by the commodore
to be 2O5 being, for every ten guns employed against
them more than 68 men killed and wounded-a loss
than eleven LINES great, in proportion TO the
opposing force the loss at the battle OF Trafalgar
The affair at Sonington, during the last war, at
fords another of successful defence by bat
terry. In this case, there were only two guns (l8
pounders) in battery, which was only three feet
high and without embrasures The battery, being
manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the
town. repealed perseverng attack of sloop of war
causng serious loss and damage, bot suffering none
The memorable attack on Copenhagen, by Lord
Nelson 1901 though successful in its objects, does
not initiate against our position. This place was
defended by batteries, including the Three Crown
battery, mounting, in all, about 80 guns, and aided
by Sings Of mounting 1853 guns, lying in the
row channel that leads to the CITY, Besides this,
there floating batteries of various kinds carry