The daily Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1841-1845, 1842-04-15

I S4O,0O0,OO0. The whole expense Of building the
forts regarded necessary for the defence Of the At
lantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico is estimated al
S2l ,767 $50 The cost of ordnance and carriages
With supply powder and shot, will be - 763 0io
and 81, 90 men will be required TO them IN time
of war at annual cost Of S9,993 SAT; Making IN
ALL S34 524, 2i3, being about IS 0OO 600 less than
would be expended in calling out the militia Tor the
same object in slx months TO say nothing OF the loss
The nation would suffer by 30 large an amount OF Ia
Dor being distracted from the productive industry oi
the country and the fearful waste OF lie key ore
suit from such costly harassing and hazardous sys-
TEN of defence.
Vast as is the extent of our coast there are com,
paraiyey but few points which require to Dc ueenueu
against a regular and powerful iorce' ~
portion of Il is inaccessible TO large ships, and only
exposed to the attacks OF parties IN boats ana smaii
vessels against which well organized militia, VAIN
inferior works, which can be erected IN short Tune
and al small cost will afford sufficient protection
What shall be the of defence for these impoI-
tant points is therefore the real question The OPP
Mon, SO acceptable to free people, that navy Is the
true defence OF the country, ls TO certain extent
correct. He, however, forms but an Imperfect con
ception OF the use OF navy, who would nave our
ships lying harbo, lowering on our coast iea'-
ing the enemy 3 commerce in the undlslurbed ENJOY
me of the sea, and our own without countenance
or aid. war with such nations as France or Eng
land and even Russia conducted on this plan would
sweep tho American flag from the ocean Instead,
should penetrate every to protect our own and ACT
with vigor against the eneuy's navigation In TINS
way during the last war; rendered benz tits thou
SIND times greater say nothing of the honor 1t ac-
CURED than any that could have resulted from state
Of passiveness al home. Ef
Let us for a momen, consider the proposition, that
the defence should be by nary erclustpeiy. sup
pose we possessed but single seaport and that we
relied entirely fleet. BY remaining within this
port we should be certain Of meeting the enemy,
&. h.. nm
reasonably calculate on successful defence, and as
there could lie escape for the defeated vessels, the
issue would be truly calamtous If our fleet be equal
to his the defence would he complete, throwing out
the hazard and mishap liable to attend contests OF this
nature. Here the chances of victory to the parties
would be equal, but the consequences most unequal.
The enemy might loose his feet but he could lose no
more; whereas we would lose not only that, but the
object the fleet designed to protect II he did not
think proper to attack fleet either lying In port or
watching in the vicinity, he would cut up our com.
meIce the ocean for II we lett our station TO pro-
iect it, we leave port utterly detencesss.
II, ON the other hand, having timely notice OF the
preparation and movements of the enemy, we under
take to meet him on his way or to shut Lin up IN his
port, nothing but decided inierioity ON ispart
would prevent him from Offering us battle; Tor hav-
ing protected himself at home by other means, it de-
eaed, he has place of refuge and all Is not lost
with his fleet; and, should single vessel escape, II
might capture our own port LETT deenceless But
how Will II be on the supposltlon oil numerous lnpoI-
tant ports either side instead of single one All
maritime nations except the United States, are foti-
fed in all their harbors, and possessed of available ma
val means superior to what are likely to be for
years to Believing his ports to be safe without
the presence of his vessels the enemy will at once,
make our shores the theatre OF his operations. We
have previous indication OF his rlicuar point
Of attack and, consequently for certifying
one place rather than another SO that the chances
against will be in proportion to the number OF our
ports. Our fleet, granting il equal TO that of the
enemy, cannot be arranged as to meet his enter
prises. If is concentrated, by detachng vessels
from his squadron, in few hours he might burn our
shipping or public establishments and leave for some
convenient rendezvous before the attack could be
known 10 our commander. AS we cannon foretell the
place of attack, how we to know where to ace
our fleet, to intercept the advancing foel 10
attempt 10 cover such coast by cruising in
'front.' traverse distance nearly equal TO that he
passes over in coming from his country to ours and
10 protect our cities, under these circumstances
against fleet Of twenty vessels if we could sweep
The Atlantic well as the Gulf of Mexico, would
require hundred vessels of size and arma ment
equal TO theirs-a calculation below the mark when
we consider the position that Bermuda and the West
Indies bear to our frontier.
+ + To he continued. J