The Illinois free trader. (Ottawa, Ill.) 1840-1841, 1841-01-15

against any such alternative, That ;s
'ne point. Let me tell gentlemen, when
'"ey come to the real question-not only
""e'ler the Sub-Tleasury shall be re-
l'ealeu, but what shall be substituted
','ey VIII not find so easy a victory as
'''e! expect. That is the question which
V" must meet, and it will be i'm vain to
attempt to elude it. As TO ono IF tho on
~ two possible alternatives-be referred
TO 'ne rePudlated and condemned ne, hank
S!S'e'h--wflich the gentleman mir. Claw
mad so justly denounced. 81 far hal.
1881, on the question of III. rem,raI So
the deposites, as the most fiuacious rick.
Guy and corrupt system that could be
adopted, which they prophesied. and ,ru.
Iy prophesied, would explode and blow
up It's authors, he took it for granted that
there was no danger of that being imposed
on the country by the coming administra-
ton: He trusted that would not be the
result OF all the late agitation, and the de-
clded victory they had achieved.
As to the other alternativc-a National
Bank-hc would not 90 into that now.
1t VIII be time enough, after Gen. Har-
rlson comes III, and recommends it to orr
adoption, If, with his constitutional obiec-
tons, he ever should. But come when
that time might, if it ever should, he
should stand up and resist it by every fac
ulty, and all the energy with which Ma
ture had bestowed on him; for, as he
llved' he believed the day on which
National Bank shall be established, with
"A capital OF fifty or a hundred millions.
and twenty years duration, and with
power and privileges sufficient to control
the currency and business of the country.
would be the end of our liberty. and
would rs ei(ec,ual!y create SOVEREIGN
power, as if Gen Harrison were elected
President for life, with the right of sue
cessiOn in his descendants, and even
more so.
10 either of these, the much abused
Sub-Treasury will be found to be the
only alternative. Condemned and vilfed
as it was, the country, if it desired to pre-
serve its free institutions, must come to
1t; nor was it less for the advantage of
the banks themselves, than the country,
that it should. Yes, for the banks; he
knew what he said he weighed every
word. He regarded those the greatest
enemies, in reality, to the banks, howe
yer kind their intention, who would force
them again into union with the Gov
ernment, against the deep conviction of
the injustice, impolicy and demonstrations
ality of such union, of a powerful and de-
! ternincd party, not much inferior in nrm-
bers Than their opponents, if tested even
by the late election; for, however strong
! the vote of the electoral college, the pop
ular vote in favor of General Harrison did
not much exceed one hundred thousand
out of upwards of two millions of votes.
If, against the fixed opinion of this pow
eriul and resolute party, the coming Adj
ministration should force reunion be-
tween Bank and Government, they would,
mt the same time, force them into the poll
teal arena of party conflict, which could
not fail to overthrow the whole system in
its convulsive movements. lie warned
the banks, and those interested in them,
against the fatal tendency of their indis-
Greet friends, who would under such cir
cumstanccs, force the reunion. He was
no enemy to the existing banks, while he
had no confidence in the system as 1t en-
listed in this country and Great Britain.
lie believed that banks of issue and CIR
culation were founded on a mistake, and
must run down, by their own inherent
defects, against every effort to stay their
descent and had long thought so but he
made no war on them, and never had.
They were running down of themselves,
according to his impression, too fast Tor
the good of the country, and his policy
was to retard, and not accelerate their
descent. He acted on the same principle
ed; and in obedience to it, urged a
course, which, if it had been adopted,
would have saved the country and banks
from the disasters which have since fol-
; loved On the same principle he acted
at the extra session in 1897, and had ever
since, in advocating the separation of the
: Government from the banks, as the only
means of extricating them from politics,
and leaving them quietly to be reformed
or run out, under the action of an enlight-
ened and calm public opinion. He was
aud ever had been, averse to all sudden
and forced measures in reference to the
currency, even as applied TO our system,