Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1841-03-18


least, 10 whom she has intrus,ed the man
ase,nent of her foreign relations, the exc
cution Of her laws, aud the command ol
her armies and na.,es, to period so short
as to prevent his forgetting that he is the
accountable agent, not the prncipal---ihe
servant, not the master. Until an ameid-
ment of the Constitution can be effected,
public opinion may secure the desired OH
ject. give my aid 10 ii, by renewing The
pledge heretofore given, that under no cir
cumstances, will consent 10 serve Sc
cond term.
But ii there is danger to public liberty
from the acknowledged defect of the Con-
stitution, in the want of limit 10 the contin-
uance Of the Executive power in the same
hands, there is, ] apprehend, not much
less from a misconslruction Of that lnslru-
ment, as it regards the powers actually
given. l cannot conceive that, by tar
construction, any or either ofits provisions
would be found 10 constitute the President
part of the legislative power. IL cannot
be claimed from the power TO recon-
mend, since, although enjoined as a.duty
upon him, it is privilege which he holds
in common with every other citizen. And
although there may be something more OF
confidence in the propriety ol the measures
recommended in the one case than in the
nther. in the obligations of ultimate deci-
sion there can be no difference. In the
language of the Constitution, "all the le-
sislative powers which it grants "are
vested in the Constitution of the United
States" 1t would be solecism in Ian
guage to say that any portion of these is
included in the whole.
It may be said, indeed, thatthe Consti-
tuition has given to llie Executive the
power 10 annul the acts of the legislative
body by refusing TO them his assent. So
a. similar power has necessarily resulted
from that Instrument to the judiciary; and
and yet the Judiciary forms no part of
the Legislature There is, i, is true, this
difference between these grants of power,
the Executive can put his negative upon
the acts Of the Legislature for other cause
than that Of want Of conformity to the
:. Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can only
declare void those which violate that in
.s,rument. But The decision of the Judici-
airy is final in such case, whereas, IN ey-
cry instance wi here the veto of the Execu-
tive is applied,i it may be overcome by vote
Of two-thirds of both Houses Of Congress.
The negative upon the acts Of the Legisla'
tive, by the Executive authority, and tha,
in the hands of one individual, would seem
to be an incongruity in our system.
Like some others Of a similar character,
however, it appears TO be highly expedient;
and if used only with the forbearance, and
in the spirit which was intended by its
authors, it may be productive Of great
good, and be found one of the best safe
guards in the Union. At the :period OF
the formation Of the Constitution, the prin-
ciple does not appear 10 have enjoyed
much favor in the State Governments. II
existed but in two, and in one of these there
-was q plural -Exosa,;pa---If.-u would
search for the motives which operated up
on the purely patriotic and enlightened
assembly which framed the Constitution,
for the adoption Of provision so appa-
rentiy repugnant to the leading democratic
principle, that the majority should govern,
we must reject the idea that they antici-
pated from'it any benefit to the ordinary
!. course of legislation. They knew too well
the high degree of intelligence which ex-
isted among the people, and the enlighlen.
ed character of the State Legislatures, not
to have the fullest confidence that the two
bodies elected by them would be worthy
representatives Of such constituents, and,
of course, that they would!require no aid
in conceiving and maturing the measures
which the circumstances Of the country
might require. And it is preposterous to
suppose that thought could for moment
have been entertained, that the President,
placed at the Capital, in the centre of The
country, could better understand the wants
and wishes of the people than their own
immediate representatives, who spend 4
part of every year among them, living with
them, often aboring with them, and bound
10 them by the triple tie Of interest, duty,
and affection. To assist or control Con-
sress. then. in its ordinary legislation, could
not, conceive, have been The motive for
conferring the veto power on the President.
This argument acquires additional force
from tho fact of its never having been thus
Hsed by the first six Presidents-and two
of them were members of the convention,
enc presiding over its deliberation, and the
other having larger Share in consummat-
ing the labors Of that august body than any
other person.
But if bills were never refused to Con-.
gress by either of the Presidents referred
70, upon the ground of their being inexpe.
dieut, or not as well adapted as they might
be TO the wants Of the people, the veto was
applied upon that of want of conformity
to the Constitution, or because errors had
been committed from too Ehasty enact
ment.
There is another ground for the adoption
of the Veto principle, which had probably
more influence in recommending it TO the
convention than any other | refer it 10
the security which i, gives to the just and
equitable action of the legislature upon all
parts ofthe Union. It,could not but have
occurred 10 the convention that, in coun-
try SO extensive, embracing so great va
rlety of soil and climate, and, consequent
ly, of products, and which, from the same
causes, must ever exhibit great differ
ence in the amount of the population of its