Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1841-09-13

And what was that ne2 No state would have
had less iaan four months, and some of them from
five to niue months, for consideration. was II
therefore entirely correct, for the President to say
that an unconditional answer is claimed forth =
v0itk" Forthwith means Immediately, instantly
without delay, which cannot he affirmed OF
space of time varying from four 10 nine months
And the President supposes that the high Privl-
lege of the members of the State Legislature sub
mittng the question to their constituents is denl-
ed? But could they not at any llme during tno'
space have consulted their constituents?
The President proceeds to put what must
with the preatest Difference and respect, consider
as extreme cases. He supposcs the popular
branch to express its dissent by unanimous vote
which is overruled by q tie in the Senate. lie
supposes that "both branches OF the Legislature
may concur in resolution of decided dissent, and
yet the Governor may exert the veto power, >
The unfortunate case of the State whose Legisa-
tive will should he so checked by the Executive
authority, would not be worse than that OF the
Union, the will Of whose Legislature, in estah-
fishing this bank, is checked aud controlled by Inc
President
But it did not occur to him that extreme cases
brought forward on the one side might be met
by extreme cases suggested on the other? Sup
pose the popular branch were to express lis as
sent to the establishment of a branch bank by n
unanimous VOTE which is overruled by an equal
vote in the Senate. Or suppose that both branch
of the Legislature, by naorities in each exact
ly wanting one vote TO make them two thirds,
were to concur in resolution inviting the intro
duction of a branch within the limits of the State,
and the Governor were to exercise the veto power
and defeat The resolution. Would ii be very un-
reasonable in these two cases to infer the assent
of the State to the establishment of n branch
Extreme cases should never be resorted TO-
Happily for mankind their affairs are but seldom
affected or influenced by them in consequence Of
the rarity of their occurrence.
The plain, simple, unvarnished statement oil
the case is this Congress believes itself invested
with constitutional power to authorize, uncond-
tonally, the establishment of Bank OF The United
States and branches, any where in The Unlled
States, without asking any other consent OF the
States than that which is already expressed III the
Constitution. The President does not concur in
the existence of that power, and was supposed TO
entertain an opinion that The previous assent oil
the States was necessary. Here was an uniortu-
nate conflict of opinion. Here was case for
compromise aud mutual concession, If the differ
ence could he reconciled. Congress advanced SO
far towards q compromise as to allow the States
TO express their assent or dissent, but then 1t
thought that this should he done within some
limited, but reasonable, time; and it is believed,
since tie bank and its branches were established
for the benefit OF twenty six states, ii the autorl-
ties of airy of them really could not make up
their mind within that limited time either TO as
Stlll VI ulSS6El " inc ulIUuuCtOu VI d btHitH'
that it not unreasonable, after the lapse OF the
appointed time without any positive action one
way or the other on the part of the State, 10 pro-
coed as iii had assented. Now, if the power
contended for by Congress really exists, it must
be admitted that there was concesslon-a con-
cession according TO which an unconditional
power is placed under temporary restrictions a
privilege offered to the States which was not ex-
tended to item by either of the charters OF the
two former banks Of the United States. And
am totally al a loss to comprehend how the Presi-
dent reached the conclusion that it would have
been " far better TO say 10 the States boldly and
frankly, Congress wills, and submission is demnll-
ded." Was it better for the States that the power
of branching should be exerted without consulting
them at all? Was nothing to afford them an
opportunity to say whether they desired them or
not ? How can it be believed that clause
which qualities, restricts and limits the branching
power, is more derogalory from the dignity, indie
pendence and sovereignty of the States, than If it
Inexorably refused to the States any power what
ever to deliberate and decide on the introduction
of branches? Limited as tie time was, and I'M
condltionay as they were required to express
themselves, still those states, and that probably
would have been the case with the greater num-
Der that chose TO announce their assent or dissent
could do so, and get or prevent the introduction
OF branch. But the President remarks that the
estate may express, after the most solemn forms
to time thereafter be repeated, in full view of lis
own interest, which can never be separated from
the wise aud beniticent operation OF this Govern
ment; and yet Congress may, by virtue of the las
provIso, override lts law, and upon grounds
which, to such State, will appear TO rest Oh con.
s'ructye necessity and propricty, and nothing
more
Even if the dissent Of State should no over
ruled, in The manner supposed by the President
how is the condition of that State worse than il
would have been ifthe branching power had beer
absolutely and Internationally asserted in the
charter! There would have been at least the
power OF dissenting conceded, with high degree
OF probability that if the dissent were expressed nc
branch would be introduced.
The last provso to which the President refer:
IS in these words: "And provided, nevertheless
That whenever il shall become necessary and
proper for carrying into execution any OF the
powers granted by the Constitution, TO establish
an Office or Offices in any of the States whatever
and the establishment thereof shall be directed by
law, It shall be the duty of The said directors L
establish such Office or offices accordingly"
This proviso was intended to reserve n powe
to Congress TO compel the bank to establish bran
ches, if the establishment of them should be ne
ressary to the great purposes Of this Government
Notwithstanding the dissent Of State. If 10
example, stale had once Internationally dis
scented TO the establishment of branch, and al
forwards assened, the bank could not have bee
compelled, without this reservation OF power,
establish the branch, however urgent The wants
the Treasury might be.
The President, think, ought 10 have seen,
the form and language of the proviso the spr
of cancellation in which it was drawn as know
1t does not assert the power; it employs the Ian
guage of the Constitution itself, leaving every on
free 10 interpret that language according to h
own sense of the instrument
Why was it deemed necessary to speak of i
being :" the language of the master TO the vassa
of I" this iron rule, that Congress wills and sui
mission is demanded z" What is this whole Fec
era Government but mass of powers abstracte
from the sovereignty OF the several States, an
welded, by an organized Government for the