The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-08-05
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THE VETO ROMER.

AS there seems 10 be disposition on the par
OF the public press to PREJUDICE veto, or at leas
10 speculate upon the possibility of the exercis,
OF the veto power, and to discuss its nature anc
extent, il would be well TO look into The Consti
tuition, and such other lights as we possess, in
order 10 take a fair start. A paragraph in city
contemporary of the Sd inst seems TO imply
that the exercise of the veto power is illegiti.
mate, and that the signature Of the President Ia
bills is rather an obligatory clerical act, than the
exercise Of an independent and discretionary
power granted by the Constitution.
The language of the Constitution is this
Every bill which shall have passed the House OF
Representatives and the Senate shall before il be-
comes law, be presented to the President of the u.
s. If he approve he shall return it, but if not he sha
return IT, with his objections that House in which
it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections
at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider ii
II, after such reconsideration two-thiids of that
House shall agree to pass the bill it shall he sent
gethe- with the objections, 10 the other House by
which 1t shall likewise be rcconsidered and if 40
proved by twothrds of that House il shall become a
law But in all such he of both Houses
shall be determined By yeas and nays and the names
oil the persons voting for and against the bill shall be
entered the journal Of each House respectively II
ten days Sundays excepted after it shall have been
presented To him, the shall be law in like
manner if he had signed it, unless the Congress by
Their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case il
shall not be law"
Gen Harrson's view of this subject is briefly
stated ia his excellent letter to Harmar Denny
as follows:
That in the exercise Of the veto power he THE
pro eh, l,,,it
such as are in his opinion unconstitutional ID Such
as tend TO encroach the rights of the States or in
dylduals 81. Such involving deep interests may
IN his opinion require more mature dellheration or re-
ference to the will OF the people, to be asceaned at
the succeeding elections"
II there shall be a necessity for reflection up
on this subject the following able article from
the FederoHst, No. 70, will be a useful aid
The propensity of the legislative department to in
trde upon the rights and to absorb the powers of the
other departments, has been already more than once
suggested the insuthciency of a mere parchment
delneation Of the boundaries Of each has also been
remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing
each with constitutional arms for It's own defence
has been inferred and proved From these clear and
indnbitabe principles, results the propriety of a ne
gatNe either absolute qualified in the executive
upon the acts OF the legislative branches Without
the one or the other, the former would be absolutely
unable to defend himself against the depredaons of
the latter lie might gradually be stripped Of his
authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilatcd
by single vote. And in the one mode or the other
the legislative and executive powers might speedily
come to be blended in the same hands If even
no propensity had discovered itself in the e-
gislaye body, to invade the rights of the executive
the rules OF Just reasoning and theoretc propriey
would OF Themselves teach us that the one ought
not to be left at the mercy Of the other but ought to
possess constitutional and efectual power OF self
defence.
But the power in question has further use II
not only serves az shield TO the executive, but it
furnishes an additional security against the enaction
OF improper laws 1t establishes a salutary check
upon the legislative body calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitan-
cy, or OF any impulse unfrendly to the public good
which may happen to influence majority of that
body.
The propriety Of a negative has, upon some occa-
sions, been combatted by observation, that it was
not to be presumed a single would possess
more virtue or wisdom than a number of men and
that unless this presumption should be entertained,
II would be improper to give the executive msgis-
trale any species Of control over the legislative
body.