Vermont telegraph. [volume] (Brandon [Vt.]) 1828-1843, 1841-03-17

THE management Of their affairs. And
surely nothing is more likely to produce
such state of mind than the long contin-
uance of an Office of high trust. Nothing
lcan be more corrupting, nothing more de-
structive of all those noble feelings which
belong to the character of devoted re-
publican patriot When the corrupting
passion once takes possession Of the HUI
man mind, like the love of gold, it be-
comes Unsuitable It is the never-dying
worm in his bosom, grows with his
growth, and strengthens with the declining
years of its victim. Ii this is true, it is
the part of wisdom for republic to limit
the service of that officer, at least, to whom
she has entrusted the management of her
foreign relations, the execution of her
laws, and the command of her armies and
navies, TO period so short as 10 prevent
his forgetting that he is the accountable
agent, not the principal-the servant, not
the master. Until an amendment of the
Constitution can be effected, public opin-
ion may secure the desired object. [ give
Emy aid to it BY renewing the pledge here
tofore given, that under no circumstances,
will consent to serve second term.
But if there is danger to public liberty
from the acknowledged detects of the Con-
stilutlon, In the want of limit to the con-
ttinuance Of the Executive power in the
same hands, there is, apprehend, not
imuch less from misconstruction of that
instrument, as it regards the power actu-
Tally given. | cannot conceive that, by
fair construction, any or.either of its pro-
visions would be found to constitute the
/ President part of the Legislative power.
1t cannot be claimed from the power to
recommend, since, although enjoined as
lduty upon him, it is privilege which he
holds in common with every other citizen.
And although there may be something
more of confidence in the propriety Of the
measures recommended in the one case
THAN in the other. in the obligations of ul-
Itifnate decision there can be no difference.
ln the language of the Constitution, "alf
the legislative powers" which it grants
! " are vested in the Congress of the United
tStates.' It would be a solecism in Ian
guage to say that any portion of these is
not included in the whole.
! It may be sold, that the Constitution
has given to the Executive the power to
annul the acts of the Legislative body by
refusing to them his assent. So a similar
power has necessarily resulted from that.
instrument to the Judiciary: and yet the
Judiciary forms no pait ofthe Legislature.
/ There is, it is true, this difference between
these grants of power. the Executive can
put his negative upon the acts of the Leg.
islature, for other cause than that of want
, lof conformity to the Constitution, whilst
the Judiciary can only declare void those
which violate that instrument But the
decision OF the Judiciary is final in such a
case, whereas, in every instance where the
veto of the Executive is applied, it may be
overcome by ayote of two-thirds Of both
Houses of Congress. The negative upon
the acts of the Legislative, by the Execu-
, tive authority, and that in the hands Of
one individual, would seem TO be an in
Ieongruity in our system. Like some 9TH
ers of similar character, however. It ap-
pears to be highly expedient and if used
only with the forbearance and in the spirit
which was intended by its authors, it may
be productive of great good, and be! found
one of the best safeguards to the Union.
| At the period Of the formation of the
! Constitution, the principle does not appear
to have enjoyed much favor in the State
Governments. # existed but in two, and
| in one of these there was plural Execu-
tive. II we would search for the motives
, which operated upon the purely patriotic
and enlightened assembly which formed
the Constitution, for the adoption of
provision so apparently re2ugnant to the
leading democratic principle, that the ma
/ jority should govern, we must reject the
idea that they anticipated from it any ben
. eft to the ordinary course of Legislation.
They knew too well the high degree of
intelligence which existed among the Peo-
. pie, and the enlightened character of the
State Legislature, not to have the fullest
confidence that the two bodies elected by
them would be worthy representatives of
such constituents, and, ofcourse, that they
5 would require no aid in conceiying and
7 maturing the measures which the circun.-
! stances of The country might require.
E And it is preposterous TO suppose that a
$ Thought could for a moment have be- n
: entertained that The President, placed at
, 1.-THE capitol, in the centre of the country,
r could better understand the wants and
wishes of the People than their own in
E mediate representatives, who spend part
of every year among them. living with
5 them, ofien laboring with them, and bound
!. to them by the triple tie of interest, duty.
E land affection. To assist or control Con
gress, then, in its ordinary legislation,
5 lcouh not, l conceive, have been the mo-
Tive for comforting the veto power on the
!, President. This argument acquires ad-