Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1841-11-04
THE VETO POWER.

THE VETO POWER.
AS this feature of our Constitution begins TO
excite public attention more and more the follow
ing extract from volume published last year by
the present Secretary Of the Navy, Mr.. Upshur,
entitled, "A brief Enquiry into the true nature
and character of our Federal Governments" may
be Of interest to our readers :-Yrg. Herald.
The EXTRACT.
''Another striking imperlection Of the Consti
tuition, as respects the Executive Department. is
people to pass whatever laws they please is the
right to deprive them of self-governmcnt. 1t is
power which can never be entrusted to one man.
or any number of men, short of the people them
selves, without the certain destruction of public
liberty. II is true that each department of the
Government should be armed with acertain pow
or oil self-protecton against the assaults of the
other departments; and the Executive probably
stands most In need of such protection. But the
veto power as 1t stands in the Constitution, goes
TAR beyond that object. II lie in oiovt, power In
the Executive Department to forbid all action in
any other. 1t is true that, notwithstanding the
veto of the President, law may still be passed,
provided t,co-thirds of each House of Congress
agree therein; but it is obvious that the cases
are very rare in which such concurrence could be
expected. In cases of plain necessity or policy
the veto would not be applied; and those of doubt
'N' hS>oSoitJ VI POiCy Woulu rarely De carried DY
a majority so large as two-thirds of each House.
And yet in these it may be just as important that
the public will should be carried out as in cases
OF less doubt and difficulty. 1t may be, also,
tnat PRESIDENT may oppose the passage Of laws
o. the pia,nest and most pressing necessity. And
II he Should do so, it would certainly give him
most improper power over the people, to enable
him to prevent the most necessary legislation.
with only one-third of each House of CONGRESS
In his FAVOR. There is something homogeneous in
this union of Legislative and Executive powers
in the same man. Perhaps it is proper that there
shouiu oe power somewhere, to check hasty
and ill-considered Legislation, and that mower
may be as well entrusted to the President as to
any other authority. But it is not necessary that
1T should be great enough to prevent all legisla-
tlon nor to control in any respect the free exercise
OF the legislative will. 1t would be quite enough
Tor the security of the rights of the Executive,
and quite enough to ensure temperate and wise
legislation, to authorize the President merely to
send back to the Legislature for reconsideration
any law which he disapproved. BY thus afford
ing to that body time and opportunity for refec-
ton, with all the additional lights which the
President himself could throw upon the subject.
we should have very reasonable security for tho
due exercise of the Legislative wisdom and a fair
expression OF the public will. But if, after all
this, the Legislature, in both it's branches should
still adhere to their opinion, the theory and the
sound practice of all institutions require that
their decision should be binding and inal.''
THE ONE TERM QUESTION.
The following ia an extract from the same
work
"Ihe re-eligibiiy Of the President, from term
TO term, is the necessary source of numbcrless
abuses. The fact that the same President NAV
be elected, not for second term only, but for a
third or fourth, or twentieth, will ere long suggest
to him the most corruptiug uses of his powers in
order to secure that object. Presidents are now
made, not by the free surrages of the People, but
by party management: and there are always
more than one in the successful party who are
looking to their own turn in the Presidential Of
nee: It's too early yet for monopoly of that
high honor; butth time will come when the ac-
tuai incumbent will find means to buy off opposi-
ton, and to ensure a continuance in Office by
prostltutng the trusts which belong to it. This
is so obviously within the natural course ofthings
that 1t may we'll excite surprise that the Con-
ven'ion should have left the public liberty wholly
unguarded at so assailabe point. 1t is surely a
plain dictate of wisdom, and a necessary provj-
sion In every free Government. that there should
be some definite limit to the duration of Execu
tive power in the same hands. We cannot hone
to be free from the corruptions which result from
an abuse of Presidential power and PATRONAGE.
until that officer shall be eligible only for one
term-a long term, if you please-and until he
shall be rendered more easily and directly respon-
sioie TO the power which appoints HIM"