Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, IA [i.e. Ind.]) 1839-1854, 1841-09-11

States 10 determine whether they would or would
no, Give their assent 10 the establishment oil
branches within their respective limits 1hey
did no, think right 10 leave II open question:
for the space Of twenty years; nor thai 0'a's
should be permitted to grant to-day ana fetoAo
tomorrow It's assent nor that 1t should annex
onerous or impracticabe conditions 70 lis assent
but that il should defnitIveiy decide the qnestoh
after ihe lapse Of ample time for full deiiberatioh
And what WIS that tIme2 No State wouid nave
had less than four months, anu some oi llein from
i've To nine months for consideration was II.
therefore, entirely correct Tor Inc ffesue'' -
saw that On .snncondIlonal answer Is c.aimed
forttrah?'' Forthwith means immediately III
stautly without delay, which cannot De ai'1'iiea
Of space of time varying from Tour 10 nine
mon ths.-And the President suPposes max me
"hgh privilege" Of the members OF the state Lee
gIslature submitting the question to tne!f con
s,ltuents is denied? But could they not at any
time during that space have consulted tAeif CON
stituents?
The Presiden. proceeds to pu, what | must,
with the greatest Difference and respect, consid-
er ns extreme cases. He supposes the popular
branch 10 express It's dissent by unanimous 'ole
which is oveErued by a tie IN the SENATE. lie
supposes that s.both branches OF the Legislature
may concur in resolution OF DECIDED dissent.
and vet the governor may exert the veto power
The unfortunate case Of the State hose Legs
laiive will should be 50 checked by Executive au-
thoritv, would not be worse than mat OF the Chi-
on the viii of whose Legislature, IN establishing
this bank, IS checked and controlled by The FTes-
ident.
i But did It not occur TO him that extreme cases
brought (orw I'd on the side, might be met by
extreme suggested on the other! suppose
the popular branch were To express Its dSSc"t "
tho establishment OF a branch bank by uhahi-
nous vote which is overruleG by an equal vote
, in the Senate. Or suppose that both branches
of the Legisla lure, by J1rItles IN each exact
~ wanting one vote 10 mako them t"o-thlfdS,
were 10 concur in a resolution inSiing tie in'to-
= duction Of a branch within the Gs oil the State,
, and the Governor were to exercise me veto pow
en- and defeat the resolution. Would II be very
: unreasonable in these two TO infer the as
sent Of the State to the establishment OF branch
4 Extreme cases should never Ice resoried to.
t Happily for mankind their affairs are but seldom
affected or influenced by them, IN consequence OF
$ the rarity Of their occurrence
f The plain, simple, unvarnishcd statement OF
the case is this: Congress believes itself Iaves
ted with constitutional power to authorize, IN
II condtionaly, the establishment OF Bank OF ihe
d United States and branches, any where IN the U
1 nited States, without asking any other consent o
/ the States than that which Is already expressed
= in the Constitution. The President does not con
, cur in the existence of that power, and was sup
DIT posed entertain opiRion that the previous as
II sent of the States was necessary. there was a
to unfortunate conflict of opinion. Here was cas
20 for compromise and mutual concession, II the DIT
i so far towards a compromise TO allow III
le States express their assent dissent, but the
IN it thought that this should 30 done within som
ID limited but reasonable time and 1t believed, sine
30 the bank and its branches established Tor IN
H. benefit of ,wenty-six States. if the authorities
IN any one of them really could make up their MN
n within that time either assent tissen
rs to the introduction of a branch, hat II was NJ
ir unreasonable. after the lapse Of the appointe
limo without any positive action, ono way c
II, the other, the part of the State, to proceed
g if il had nssented. Now, If the power confer
he ded for by Congress really exists ii must be az
sr- mitted that here was couccssou--a concession
'r- according to which an unconditional power
II placed under temporary restrictioas-a priviiea
en- offered the States which was not extended
= them by either OF tne charters Of the two iurnt
ed banks of the United States. | am totally
nj loss to comprehend how tho President reacho
&c the conclusion that ii would have been .ur be
us ter to say 10 ihe States, boldly and frankly Coz
he gross w ills and submission is demanded" Was
N better for the States that the power Of branchin
NO should be exertcd without consulting them al
nt- Was ii nothing TO afford them an opportunity
iat saving whether they desired branches no
lat How can il be believed that clause which qua
N ies restricts and limits the branching power,
BIS more derogaiory from the dignity. independent
g. aud sovereignty of the States, than if II ineyo
l6e ably refused to the States any power whatey
We to deliberate and decide the introduction
IN branches? Limited the time was, and unco
mo d.ionaily they were required TO express ther
IN selves, sti. those States (and that probably Won
OF have been the case with tho greater numbe
en- that chose announce their assent or dlsse
he cn,,Id do 50 and GET or arevent tho introdpc,i
the Of branch RIt The President ran,arks n
ss .sthe Stafa may exnress after tho mast saler
es- form of legislation, lis dissent, which may fre
Gu slime time ihegealler be repeated, in fall vie
lay Of lis own interest which car neyer re sanerrt
set f,oul the wise and beRefcont onern.ion Of II
fer Governmen,..nb yet CONGRESS NAV -, y;r,ra
ler the lsst nroviso oyerrfla IL law en ,,a, ro,
'ay which, to.such State, viii appear 10 rest on
'ce' constructive necessity and proPriety, and no
on ing more"
lss Even If The dissent IF Slate should be o,
- ruled IN the manner supposed by The Preside
IdI- - - -, = - -. :. .