Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1841-08-28
with all the influence he draws from thousand

with all the influence he draws from thousand
Sources would at this day, hesitate to put neg.
alive upon the joint resolutions OF the two Houses
OF Parliament. He would not fail TO exert the
utmost resources Of that influence TO strangle
measure dsagreeable TO him, in its progress TO the
throne, to avoid being reduced TO the dilemma of
permitting it TO take effect or of riskng the dis
pleasure Of the nation, by an opposition to the
sense Of the legislative body Nor is it probable,
that he would ultimately venture to exert his
prerogave, but in case OF manifest propriety, or
extreme necessity. All well.informed men in
that kingdom will accede to the business Of this re.
mark. A very considerable period has elapsed
since the negative of the crown has been exercised.
II magistrate so powerful, and so well fort.
fed as British monarch, would have scruples
about the exercise Of the power under considera.
ton, how much greater caution may be reasona-
bly, expected in President of the United States,
clothed, for tine short period Of four years, with the
executive authority OF government wholly and
purely republican?
1t is evident,that there would be greater dan.
ger Of his not using his power when necessary,
than Of his using it too often or too much. An
argument, indeed, against its expediency, has
been drawn from this very source. 1t has been
appearance, useless in practice. But it will not
follow, that because it might rarely it would new.
er be exercised. In the case for which it is chief
ly designed, that Of an immediate attack upon the
constitutional rights Of the executive, OF in case
in which the public good was evidently and pal.
pably sacrificed, a man of tolerable fnnness
would avail himself of his constitutional means OF
defence, and would listen 10 the admonitions Of
| IL, L.. h,
tion his foritude would be stimulated by his i'm.
mediate interest in the power Of his office; in the
latter, by the probability of the sanction Of his
constituents; who, though they would naturally
incline to the legislative body in doubtful case,
would hardly suffer their Partially 10 deude them
in very plain one. speak now with an eye 10
a magistrate possessing only common share Of
firmuess. There are men, who, under any cir,
cumsances will have the coulage 10 do their duty
at every hazard.
But the convention have pursued a mean in this
business which will both facilitate the exercise Of
the power vested in this respect in the executive
magistrate, and make its efficacy 10 depend on
the sense Of considerable part Of the legislative
body. Instead Of an absolute, it is proposed to
give the executive the qualified negative, already
described. This is power which would be much
more readily exercised than the other. A man
who might be afraid to defeat law by his single
vETo ght no: scruple to return it FOR re.consid-
Grafton; subject to being finally rejected, only in
the event Of more than one.third Of each house
concuning in the suiliciency Of his objections
He would be encouraged by the reflection, that il
his opposition should prevail, i! would embark in
it very respectable proportion of the legislative
! body, whose influence would be united with his
in supporting the propriety Of his conduct in the
: public opinion. A direct and categorical mega
} tive. has something in the appearance Of it more
harsh, and more apt 10 initiate, than the mere
suggestion OF argumentatlve objections to be ap
proved OF disapproved, by those TO whom they arr
: addressed In proportion as it would be less ap
t to Offend it would be more apt to be exercised
and for this very reason may in practice be
I found more effectua. Ii is to be hoped that il
e will not often happen, that improper views will
govern so large proportion as two-thlrds Of both
/ branches Of the Legislature at the same time and
E this too in defiance Of the Contemplating weight
Of the Executive. lis at any rate far less proba
bic, that this should be the case, than that such
views should faint the resolutions and conduct
/ Of bare majority. A power Of this nature in
the Executive, will often have silent and un.
perceived, though lorc;Jle operation. When
} men, engaged in justfabe pursuits, are aware,
that distractions may come from quarter
!, which they cannot control, they will often be re.
strained by the bare apprehension of opposition,
from doing what they would with eagerness rush
into, if no such external impediments were to be
t feared.
This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere
{ remarked, is in this State vested in council
: consisting Of the Governor, with the chancellor
and judges Of the supreme court, or any two o
= them. 1t has been freely employed on variety
Of occasions, and frequently with success. And
its utility has become 50 apparent, he persons,
t who, in compiling the constitution, were its VIC
{ lent opposers, have, from experience, become