Jeffersonian Republican. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1840-1853, 1841-03-10

navles, to period so short as to prevent his
forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not
the principal, the servant, not the master I'm.
I'll an amendment Of the Constitution can be eff
tected, public opinion may secure the desired
OBJECT. | give my aid to it, bv renewing the
pledge heretofore given, that, under no circum-
stances, will consent to serve a second term
But If there is danger TO public liberty from
! the acknowledged defects of the constitution. in
the want of limit to the continuance of Execu-
tive power in the same hands, there is. ap-
prehend, not much less from a misconstruc-
ton Of that instrument, as it regards the powers
actually given. | cannot conceive that. by a
iaIr construction, any or either of its provisions
would be found to constitute the President
part of the Legislative power 1t connot be
claimed from the power to recommend since,
although enJolned as duty upon him, it is a
privilege which he holds in common with eve
rY other citizen. And although there NAV be
something more of confidence in the propriety
of the measures recommended in the one case
than in the other, in the obligations Of ultimate
decision there can 6e no difference Inthe Ian
guags of the constitution, 'all the legislative
powers which it grants ''are vested in the Con-
gress OF the United States" 1t would be
solecism in language to say that any portion of
these Is not included in the whole
1t may be said, indeed, that the constitution
has given to the Executive the power to annul
the acts of the legislative body, by refusing to
them his assent. So similar power has ne
cessarily resulted from that instrument to the
Judiciary, and yet the Judiciary forms no part
of the Legislature. There is, it is true. this
difference between these grants of power; the |
Executive can put his negative upon the acts
OF the Legislature for other cause than that Of
want of conformity to the Constitution, while /
the judiciary can only declare void those which |
violate that instrument. But the decision ofthe /
Judiciary is final in such case, whereas in I
every instance where the veto of the Executive /
is applied, it may be overcome by vote of two
thirds of both houses of Congress. The mega
i've upon the acts of the Legislative, by the Ex-
ecutlve authority, and that in the hands of one
Individual, would seem to be an incongruty in
our system Like some others of a similar
character however, it appears TO be highly ex-
oedlent, and if used only with the forbearance,
md in the spirit which was intended by It's au-
hors, it may be productive of great good, and
De found one Of the best safeguards to the u
hon.
1t the period of the formation of the consttu-
ion, the principle does not appear to have en-
DYED much favor in the state governments. It
existed but in two, and in one of these there
vas plural Executive. If we would search
or the motives which operated upon the purely /.
and enlightened assembly which framed
ne constitution, for the adoption Of provision
10 apparently repugnant 10 the leading demo-
ratio principle, the majority should govern, we
must reject the idea that they anticipated from
: any benefit 10 the ordinary course of leeiSla-
ion. They knew too well the high degree of F,
Intelligence which existed among the people,
nd the enlightened character of the state Le-
islature, not TO have the fullest confidence that
he two bodies elected by them would be worthy
representatives. of such constituents, and, of l
curse, that they would require no aid in con- I
Giving and maturing the measures which the
circumstances of the country might require .
md it is prGposterous to suppose that thought ;
ould for moment have been entertained that ,,
he President, placed at the capital in the CEN
re of the country, could better understand the
wants and wishes of the people than their own 7
representatives, who spend part Of t
very year among them, living with them, often 7
abonng with them, and bound to them by the .
riple tie Of interest, duty and affection.
To assist or control Congress then in its or :
mary legislation, could not, conceive, have I
cen the motive for conferring the veto power }
n the President This argument acquires ad- f
itional force from the fact ofits never having I
cen thus used by the first six Presidents,-and G
40 Of them were members of the convention, +,
ne presiding over its deliberations, and the :,
ther having larger share in consnmmating the
abors of that august body than any other per- i
on, But if bills were never returned to Cor !
ress by either of the above referred to- upon P
ne ground Of their being ineXpedient, Oh not as v
7ell adapted as they might be TO the wants Of a
ne people, the veto was applied upon that of 1
Tant Of conformity to the Constitution or be- :
ause errors had been committed from too :
asty enactment
There is another ground for the adoption of =
le veto principle, which had probably more in 7
uence in recommending it TO the convention 4
IAN any other; refer to the security which it 0
ives to the just and equitable action Of the Le-
islature upon all parts of the Union. 1t could 4
OF but have occurred to the convention that,
a country so extensive, embracing so great a
arety Of soil and climate and consequently Of U
roducts, and which, from the same causes, must |
yer exhibit great difference in the amount Of a
ne population Of It's various sections, calling {
or great diversity in the employments OF the 4
eope, that the legislation Of the majority might {.
OF always justly ylegard the rights and interests :,
the minority. And that acts of this charac- !,
er might be passed. under an express grant by !
le works Of the Constitution. and, therefore, Q
OF within the competency of the Judiciary to T
eciare void i
That boyvevar onIiobtouad and Dafriofic thew .