The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-11-09
communications.


the provisions ofthe Constitution; and ID even were
IL so whether such an institution would be better for
performing the fiscal services OF the General Govern
ment, than State Banks
Ii is admitted that such institution with branches
so established, would be less obi eciionabe than an
old fashioned Bank of the United States, in this,
among other respects that would contain some con-
cessions to State Rights Nevertheless, would il NOT
be unconstitutional Though such an institution
would not operate Propineo pigors throughout the u.
States yet, by the assistance of the assent Of the
States, its powers would be fully (benefcially
pernciously) exered though the assent Of the
States had not been asked aud obtained What can
not be legally done directly, cannot be ghtfulIy done
| by indrecon. It has been COMMENDED that such an
institution would not violate the Constitution, because
it would be within the principle Of enlagng the sphere
of federal powers by State assent, which il expressly
recognized by the Constitution. Whilst that is true
ii is equally that the subjects, uris lection
the soil for The erection Of arsenas, for instance in
relation to which federal powers may be enlarged
are specified in the Constitution and the fiscal
vice is not one Of those specified subjects. Besides
such an institution created by federal power and
conrved for federal user would, Notwithstanding
assent OF tue potu ia oPo-
rations be federal corporation, the power to create
which the republican creed aintains was interdicted
by being refused when the Constitution formed,
and does not exist not having been granted.
| Not being within the provisions ofthe Constitution,
is in itself sufficient objection to such an institutien
But were it otherwise, would il answer the purposes
SO well as the State banks2 What those purpos.s7
g To give the country the blessings of sound car
Iency and cheap exchanges" Let il be CONCEDED
that such institution would accomplish the sx-
changes cheapy than could State banks. II
could not secure sound currency for the country
| by which is meant the whole country. Such an in
stiution, long il should keep specie payments
and to the Of the currency existing in its notes,
would give the country the benefits of sound
cy. Its notes, issued moderate capital would con-
stute very uncomfortable part Of the currency, and
being endowed with moderate capital it would he
insufficient 10 keep in check and sound condition the
multitude Of State banks existing. h is not pre-
tended in any quarter that it would have tendency
to diminish the number of the State banks Nor
would it, if endowed with privileges large enough to
make profit, always keep up specie payments The
storm which drove the State banks in 1887 into the
harbor of suspension, and has since kept them there,
would thither drive such institution quite feeble
before its fury. This, too, those would be like
the reed in the fable bent by the wind but be
again. Scarcely stronger in the swes oftrade
than the State banks, those properly protected by
the General Government such institution presents
far eebler claims the country's support, in this
that it would furnish but little, whilst these would
still furnish the much larger part of its currency
/ The General Government would rely on the insu
ton of its CREATION whilst the State Banks would
be left to the rolled action of twenty-six Cor
more) Legislatures Far otherwise would be- should
such institution in any form, be dispensed with,
and the State Banks be adopted to do the fiscal SER
vice. In contracting with these, the Government
could prescribe wholesome conditions and restrictions,
which would be conormed TO for the benefits confer
red Thus the whole currency Of the country would
be benefciay affected, the State Banks stabilitated,
and the legislation of the States sys,ematzed. And
by contracts with thsm obviously the least excep-
tionable means by which the Government can exert
an influence on the institutions of the States Its true
'strength-hs good power-consists in making itself
felt not BY its energy but in its benecence not
by its control but in its projections, not by dragging
down the States closely to the centre but in eav-
ing them elevated in their just sovereignty and self
reverence and allowed to move on, TO more prosper
Gus heights, uncrpped, in their reserved rights and
allotted orbits
Would we ascertain the benefits of conditions and
restrictions prescribed to the organization and admins
tration of the State Banks in contracts between them
and the Treasury Department we need only to con-
suit the effects Of the deposte law Of 1886. The then
existing State Banks in their administration dscon-
tinued the emission of small sized notes, to put
themselves within the conditions which they could
be selected to keep the public money and secure the
receiseabili,y of their notes by the Government MOI
was that all. The Legislatures of several States in
organizing new banks, to secure to them the same
benefits observed the restrictions. For the sam,
reasons, other restrictions the conduct Of the State
Banks, and restrictions the legslatons of tn,
States, in creating banks, or the more and the
most salutary restriction that be imposed by those
contracts, to Wit, requiring the States to reduce th,
number of their banks, else not permit their notes
in receipts Of revenue, would soon obtain and be oh
served by all the States Thus, and thus only in my
judgment, with Difference to others, can an ameora
ton of the whole bank paper currency be secured and
maintained. Thus and thus only can be silence,
the illuminated leaders, who and abuse the jingle
Of the precious metals with which to begue the PEG
Pile to unite with them in chanting their orgies in eel
ebrating the phosophc empire of modern democracy
PUBLIUS
FOR THE MADisoNtAN.
, To the Secretaryof the Treasury Of the U. States!
+ The views of Statistcus," who has figured re-
, \ in the AL haya ipIn cod