The Camden journal. [volume] (Camden, S.C.) 1836-1851, 1841-03-17

| '''sitos'oii' ioi 'io r.
!of a provision SO apparently repugnant tt
the leading Democratic principle that tht
majority should govern, we must rejcc
the idea that they anticipated from it an!
benefit to the ordinary course of legisla
ton. They knew too well the high de-
gree Of intelligence which existed among
the people, and the enlightened character
of the State Legislatures, not to have the
fullest confidence that the two bodies
elected by them would be worthy repre-
sentatives of such constituents, and, of
course, that they would require no aid in
conceiving and maturing the measures
which the circumstances Of the country
might require; and it is preposterous to
suppose that a thought could for mo-
ment have been entertained that the
President, placed at the capital, in the
centre of the country, could better under
stand the wants and wishes Of the people
than their own immediate representatives,
who spend part Of every year among
them, living with them, often laboring
with them, and bound to them by the tri-
Iple tie of interest, duty, and affection. To
assist or control Congress, then, in its or
dinary Legislation, could not, / conceive,
have beenthe motive for comforting the
veto power on the President. This ar
gument acquires additional force from the
fact Of its never having been thus used by
the first six Presidents; and two of them
were members of the convention, one
presiding over its deliberations, and the
other having larger share in consum-
mating the labors of that august body than
any other person. But if bills were never
returned to Congress by either of the
Presidents above referred to, upon the
ground of their being inexpedient, or not
as we'll adapted as they might be to the
wants Of the people, the veto was applied
upon that of want Of conformity to the
Constitution, or because errors had been
committed from a too hasty enactment.
There is another ground for the adop-
ton of the veto principle, which had pro-
baby more influence in recommending it
to the Convention than any other. Ire
fer to the security which it gives to the
just and equitable action of the Legisla-
ture upon all parts of the Union. 1t could
not but have occurred to the Convention
that, in country so extensive, embracing
80 great a variety of soil and climate, and,
consequently, of products, and which,
from the same causes, must ever exhibit a
great difference in the amount of the
population of its various sectious; calling
for great diversity in the employmcnts
of the people, that the legislation Of the
majority might not always justly regard
the rights and interests of the minority =
and that acts of this character might be
passed, under an express grant by the
words of the Constitution, and, therefore,
not within the competency of the judi
ciary to declare void; that, however en-
lightened and patriotic they might sup
pose, from past experience, the members
of Congress might be, and however large
ly partaking in the general of the liberal
feelings of the people, it was impossible
to expect that bodies so constituted should
not sometimes be controlled by local in
terests and sectional feelings: 1t was pro-
per, therefore, to provide some umpire,
from whose situation and mode of ap-
pointment more independence and free
dom from such influences might be eS-
pected. Such one was afforded by the
Executive Department, constituted by
the Constitution. A person elected to
that high office, having his constituents IN
every section, State, and subdivision of
the Union, must consider himself bound
by the most solemn sanctions to- guard !,
protect, and defend the rights of all, and
of every portion, great or small, from the
injustice and oppression of the rest l
consider the veto power, therefore, gwen
by the Constitution to the Executive OF
the United States solely as a conservative
power, TO be used only, 1st, TO protect the
Constitution from violation; 2dly, the peo-
pie from the effects of hasty legislation,
where their will has been probably disre-
garded or not well understood; and, 3dly,
to prevent the effects of combinations vio-
lative of the right of the minorities. In
reference to the second of these objects,
| may observe, that consider it the right
and privilege Of the people to decide dis
puted points of the Constitution, arising
from the general grant of power to Con-
gress 10 carry into effect the powers ex-