Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1841-03-06

Ipita in Tie centre the country, could better under
stand the wants and wishes of the People thnn their
own immediate representatives, who spend part Of
every year among them, living with them, often Ia
boring with them, and hound to them hy the triple tie
of interests duty, and affection. To assist or control
Congress- then, in IFS ordinary legislation, could not,
conceive have been the motive for comforting the veto
power the President. This argument acquires ad.
ditionnl force from the fact of IFS having been
thus used by the first six Presdens-and Two of them
were mbers Of the Convention one presiding over
it's Deliberations and the other having larger share in
concentrating the abnrs of that august body than any
other person. But if bills returned Com
gress by either of the Presidents above referred to,
upon the ground Of their being nexpedent, moi as
well adapted they might be 10 the wants The Poo
pie, the veto applied upon Tint Of want Of conform
y to the Constitution, or because errors had been COM
United from too hasty enactment.
The is another ground fnr the adoption of the veto
principle, which had probably influence in re-
common ing it 10 the Convention than any other.
refer to the security which gives to the just and equ-
table action of the Legislature upon all parts OF the
Union 1t could not but have occurred TO the Conven-
ton that conntry extensive, embracing 30 great
a variety Of soil and climate, and, consequently, oil
products, and which, from the causes, mnst
ever exhibit great difference in the amount OF the
population of its various section calling tor great
diversity in the empoyments of the People, that the
legislation Of the minority might not always Justly
regard the rights and interests Of the minority; and that
acts of this character might be passed under express
grant by the words of the Constitution and therefore,
not within the competency Of the Judiciary to declare
void. That however enlightened and patriotic they
might suppose, from past experience the members oil
Congress might be- and however largely partakng, IN
the general, of the liberal eengsof the people, IL was
impossible TO expect that bodies constituted should
not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sec
tional feelings. II proper therefore, TO provide
some umpire from whose situation and mode OF ap-
pointment independence and freedom from such
influences might he expected Such one was afford
ed by the Executive Department, constituted By The
Constitution person elected 10 that high office,
having his constituents in every section, State and
subdivision Of the Union, must consider himself bound
by the solemn sanctions, to guard, project and de-
fend the rights of all, and of every portion, great
small from the injustice and oppression of the
consider the power therefore, given by The Con-
sltuton 10 the Executive Of the United States solely
as power to be used only ls To protect
the Constitution from violation; IDLY the People from
the effects ofhasy legislation where their will has been
probably disrcgaded not we'll understood; and, IDLY
pre- vent the effects of combinations volare OF The
, rghts of lninores. In reference 10 the second Of
ri these objects, may observe that consider il the right
and privilege Of the People TO decide disputed points oil
the Constitntion arising from general grant OF power
to Congress cnrry into effect the powers expressly
even. And believe, with Mr. Madison, chat re-
pca,ed recngniions under varied circumstances, IN
acts o. the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
S Of the Government, accompanied by indications IN
different modes of the Of the general will
ni the natO0, as aH0fuiHn lnr eSutHL
orty for his considering such disputed points as set
tied.
Upwards of half century has elapsed since the adop
ton Of present form of government 1t would be
object highly desirable than the qualification OF
the curiosity of speculative statesmen 1t IT'S precise SIT
uaiion could be ascertaned, fair exhibit made OF the
operations of each Of its Departments, of the powers
which they respectively claim and exercise, of the col
listens which have occurred between them, or between
the whole Government and those Of the States, or either
of No hen n,
after fifty years trial Of system, with what IN
the commencement Of lis operations, and ascertain whe-
Their tie predictions of the patriots who opposed lis adop-
ton The confident hopes o; lis advocates, have been
best realized The great dread othe former t. have
that The reserved powers Of the States would be ab-
f sobed by those Of the Federal Government, and con-
sodaed power established, leaving to the States the
shadow only, Of that independent action for which they
had zeaousy contended, and the preservation oil
which they relied the last hope Of liberty. With
out denying that the result to which they looked with
much apprehension is in the way Of being realised,
i, is obvious that they did clearly the mode Gifts
accomplishment The General Government has selzed
upon none of the reserved rights Of the States As far
any open warfare may have gone, the State aulhorI
ties have amply maintained their rights. To casual
observer, system presents no appearance 4" dscord
between the members which compose It. Even the adj
dition OF many new ones has produced no larring-
They move in their respective orbits perfect har
mony with the central head, and with each other
But there is still under current al work, BY which
if not seasonaby checked the worst apprehcnsons OF
our anti Federal patriots Will be realized And not only
will the State authorities be overshadowed by the
great increase Of power in the Executive Department
Of the General Government but the character OF that
Government, not its designation, be essentially and
, radically changed. This state of things has been IN
part effected BY causes inherent in the Constitution,
and in part by the ncver.iang tendency OF political
power 10 increase itself By making the President the
sole distributor Of all the patronage of the Government
the trainers O: the Constitution do not appear 10 have
IL. rontl Eppn!p
formidable instrument 10 control the free operations of
Tie State Governments OF tri;ng Importance III FIRST
it had early Mr.. jefferson administration, become
powerful to create great alarm IN the mind 81 that
patriot from the potent influence it nigh exert III
trolling the freedom Of the elective franchise III such
could have then heen the EFFECTS of its influence how
much greater must be The danger at tins time quadruPed
in amount certainly is, and more pleely under
the control Of the Executive WILL than their consruc-
ton of their powers allowed the forbearng charac
ters of all the early Presidents permitted them 10 make:
But it is by the extent Of its patronage alone tina,
the Executive Department has become dangerous,
but by The which IL appears may be made Of
the appointing power, 10 bring under its control
the whole revenues Of the country. The Con.
sttuton has declared il to he the duty OF the FIesl-
dent that the laws are executed, and il makcs
him the Gamma ndcr. in Chief Of the Armies and
h NAVY Of the United States. Ii the opinion Of the
most approved writers upon that species Of mixed
Government which, in modern Europe, is termed
.Eonarchy in contrndisi;nc;on TO Dfspotism is
rect, there wanting other addition 10 the powers
of our Chief Magistrate TO stamp monarchcn charac-
ter on our Government bnt the control Of the public fl
nances And to me it appears strange, indeed, That any
one should doubt that the entire control which the Pre-
sdpn possesses the officers who have the custody
of the public money, b. the power Of removal with or
without cause does, for all mschicvous purposes al
least virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal
The first Roman Emperor, in his attempt to seize the
sacred treasure, senced the opposition of the officer
to whose charge il had been committed, by sisnrt.
cant auson 10 his sword. BY selection Of political
ms rumenls for the Of the public money, refer
ence to their commissions by President, wonld he
quite as eIrctual an argument that "f Cesar 10 the
Roman Knight. am not nsensiblc Of the great diff
Guilty that exists in devlsng proper plan for the SAFE
keeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and
know the importance which has been by men
Of great abilities and patriotism 10 the divorce, il
called the Treasury from the Banking institutions 1t
is the divorce winch complained Of but the unhal
lowed union ofthe Treasury with the Executive Depart