The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-03-06


SO extensively complained Of and the correciiyes wifi
may be applied. Some of the former are unquesiio
| amy 10 be found IN the defects of the Constitution
others, IN my Judgment attributable to mi
construction OF some Of its provisions. Ofthe form
Is The eligibility of the same individual 10 secor
term OF the Presidency. The sagaeious mind of Mr. JIG
ierson early saw and lamened this error and attemp
have been made, hitherto without success TO apply Il
amendalory power of the States to its correction A
however, one mode Of correction 10 IN the power
every PRESIDENT and consequently in mine, it would
Useless and perhaps invdious 10 enumerate the eyi
winch, In thcoplnion of many of fellow
'h's error OF the sages who framed the Constitute
may have been the source, and the bitter fruits whic
we are stun to gather from IT, If continues to dsfgu
our system II may be observed, however, as a gen,
fai remark that Republics commit no greater errc
tnnn 70 adopt or continue any feature in their system
OF Government which may be calculated to create
increase the love Of power in the bosoms Of those
whom necessity obges them 10 commit the manag,
ment OF Their affairs. And, surely, nothing is NOR
likely to produce such state Of mind than the Ion
continuance OF an Office Of high trust Nothing ca
be more corrnpting. Nothing more destructive of a
those noble feelings which belong to the character of
aevo'ed republican patriot When this corruptin
passion once takes possession of the human mind lik
the love OF gold 1t becomes Unsuitable Ii is the
dying worm in his BOSOM grows with his growth, an
strengthens with the declining years of its victim
this IS true, Is the pant Of wisdom for Republic
limit the service Of that officer at least TO whom sh
the execution OF her laws and the command Of her ar
mics and navies to period short prevent his for
genghat he the accountable agent not the PRINCIPAL
the servant not the master Until amend rent of tn,
Constitution can he effected, public opinion may
cure the desIcd object give my aid to it, by renew
ing the pledge heretofore given, that under no cir
culnstances, will consent to second term.
But if there is danger 10 public liberty from the ac
knowledged defects of the Constitution, in the want
of limit to the continuance Of the Executive power in
hp snfn hnn L..
from a DEMONSTRATION Of that instrument az il re-
CARDS the powers actually given. cannot that
ny lar construction any either of its provisions
would he found 10 constitute the President part of the
Legislative power II cannot be claimed from the
power 10 recommend, since, although enioned as a
duty upon rim, 1t Is a privilege which he holds in
common with every other citizen. And although there
may be something Of confidence in the proprcty
OF the measures recommended in the case than in
the other IN the obligations of ultimate decision there
can be no difference In the language Of the Constr
tuition all the legislative powers which IL grants
are vested in the Congress of the United States Ii
would be solecism in language to say that any por-
lion of these is not included in the whole
Il may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has
given to the Executive the power to annul the acts
p the legislative body by refusing them his
SO similar power has necessarily resulted from that
instrument TO the Judiciary, and yet the Judiciary
urms no part Of the Legislature. There is it is true
his difference between these grants of power; the
Executive can put his negative upon the acts OF the
for other than that Of want Of
ormity to the Constitution whilst the Judiciary can
only declare void those which violate that instrument
But the decision of the Judiciary is final in such a
ase, whereas IN every instance where the veto Of the
executive is applied It may be overcome by vote of
wo thirds of both Houses of Congress. The mega
i've upon the acts ofthe Legislative, by the Executive
authority, and that in the hands Of one individual
You'd seem to be an incongruity in system Like
ONE Others OF similar character, however it appears
be highly expcdient, and if used only with the for
earance and in the spirit which was Intended by lis
uihors, 1t may be productive Of great good and be
ound one Of the best safeguards to the Union AT
he period of the formation of the Constitution the
rncipe does not appear have enjoyed mu oh favor
the State Governments. Ii existed but in two and
a one Of these there was plural Executive If we
'oud search for the motives which operated upon the
urey patriotic and enlightened assembly which fran
the Constitution for The adoption of provision SO
pparently repugnant to the leading democratic princ
le, that the majority should govern, must reject
10 idea that they anticipated from any benefit TO the
rdinary course Of legislation. They knew too well
lie high degree OF intelligence which existed
the neeeS es d Fh Such
curse that they would require no and IN concciVing
N maturing the measures which the circumstances OF
a. country might require. And ii is preposteous 70
nnno.e that thought could for moment have bcen
that the President, placed at the Capital
i the centre Of the country could better unaerstaho
he wants and wishes OF inc peoIle tnah WY 49, -
Mediate Representatives, who spend part OF every year
mono them living with them, often iaDoring win
hem and bound to them by the triple tie oi interest,"
uty and affection To assist or control Congress ,hen
its ordinary legislation could not, lconceve, nave
een the motive for comforting the veto power on the
resident. This argument acquires additional force
rom the fact Of its never having been thus used ny the
list tx Presidents and two of them were members
# the Convention presiding over It's Deliberations,
md the other bearing larger share IN consunmatins
IL. I'll ,p-T,lhn ar "a pn
But If bills were never returned TO Congress by either
fthe Presidents above referred to- upon the GROUND
,f their being inc xpedent not as well adapted as
hey might be 10 the of the people, the veto was
,pned upon that OF want OF conformity 70 ihe cohsu
on or because errors had been committed from too
hasty enactment , I'LL.
Tbcrc il another ground for the adoption OF the We
ia prncipe, which had probably more influence IN re-
it TO the convention than any other Ire
f 10 the security which il gives othe just anu cqui
he action of the Legislature upon all parts OF tue
Union 1t could not but have occurred TO me conven-
ton that in country extensive embracing SO great
a variety of soil and climate and consequently OF pro-
duets and which, from the same causes, must ever
hibit great difference in the amount OF The population
of its various sections calling for great diversity IN
Tho emuloymcnts of the people, that the legislation
of the majority might not always justly regard the
rights and interests ofthe minority And that acts OF
this character might be passed under an express grant
nv the words Of the Constitution and, therefore, no
within the competency OF Tue Juu'e'aS - -
void. Tha, however enlightened and patriotic they
mcht suppose, ftom past experience, the inemners
Congress might be- and however largely parakng, II
tho general, Of the liberal feelings OF the people wa
impossible to expect that bodies SO constituted shou'
not sometimes be controlled by local Interests ana sec
tiona feelings Ii was proper therefore 70 ProSiu'
sonc umpire, from whose situation ana moue 81 al
nointment more independence and freedom IRON sue,
influences might be expected. Such one was anor.i
ed by the Executive Department, c instituted by IN
Constitution. A person elected to that high once
having his constituents in every section, state an
subdivision of the Union, must consider h'mse
hound by the most solemn sanctions, guard, Proec
and defend the tights Of ALL and of every portion grea
or small, from the injustice and oppression oil me res
consider the power therefore, gwen by the 20,
stilution 10 the Executive of the United Staes see.
| as a conservative power. To be used only hts',
i aaxiAla Il.au