Democratic standard. [volume] (Georgetown, Brown County, Ohio) 1837-1850, 1841-03-16
NEW sERIEs.-VOL. 1. NO. 80.

! saw and ldmen'ed this error. and a,iempls
have been made hitherto without success.
% apply the amenIirury power Of the
States 10 Us cOrrerliOn. As. huwev.
er, one mode of correction is ia The pow.
er Of every President, and consequently in
IN ne, it would be useless, and peEhaps in.
VIdious, TO enumpraie the evils o! which.
in the opinion of many Of oar fellow ci,i-
ns'ais error Of ihe sages wlm framed The
Constitution NAV have been the go ice,
aud the biuer fruits which we arc sill to
gather from it, if it continues 20 d!sigure
our sys em. II may he obs served. how.
ever, as a general remlrk that Republics
can commit no greater error than to adopt
ar continue any feature in their systems
Of Government which may be calculated
To crede or increase the love Of power,
in the 5osnms Of those TO whom neces-
s!ty 0hliges them 10 commit The mlnage-
ment Of their affairs. And. surely, moth.
inu is more likely 10 produce such state
Of mind than The long continuance OF all
office of h'gh trust. Nothing can be
more corruplrg. Nofbing more destruc-
i've Of all those noble feelings which be-
long 10 The CHarcier ola devoted repub.
Iican prtriot.
When this corrupting passion once
takes possession Of the human mind.
like the love Of gold, it becomes in
sl'iab'e, II is the neverdying worm in
his bosom, grows with his growth, anil
strengthens with the declining years Of
its victim. If Ibis is true, it is the pllt
oI wisdom for Republic to limil the
service OF that officer, al least, 10 whom
she has entrusted the management Of
her fOreign relations, the execution Of
her laws, and the command Of her armies
and 9lCs, 10 a period 81 short as 10
prevent his forgetting that he is the ac.
cnuntable agent, not the principal the
| servant. not the master. Until an amend.
inent Of Ina Constitution can he effected.
public opinion may secure the desired
object. give my aid to it, by renew.
ing The pledge heretofore gwen, that, I'M.
der no circumstances, will consent 10
serve second term.
Bat fthere is danger tC public liberty
from The acknowledged defects Of the CON
stituliOn, in the want Of limit TO the con,
linuance of the Executive power in the
same hands, there is, | apprehend, not
much less from miscOnslruclon OF thai
instrument as it regards the powers acIu-
ali | -,
fair construction, any or either Of lis pro-
visions would be found TO constitute The
President a put Of the Legislative pow.
er. 1t cannot be power 10 recommend,
since, although enioined as duty upon
him, ii is privilege which he holds in
common with every other citizen. And
although there may he something moro Of
the measures recommended ia the one
case than in the other, in the obligations
of ultimate decision there can be no differ
ence In the language Of the Cpnsiiu.
ton, "aII lie legislative powers" which
it grants "are vested in the Congress
Of the United States" 1t would be sol.
eciSm in language TO say that any por-
lion of these is moi included in the whole.
1t may be said, indeed, that The Con.
siluiOn has given 10 the Executive the
power tO annuI tae acts of The leg slalive
body. by refusing 10 them his assent So
Il similar power has necessarily resulted
from that instrument TO the judiciary, and
yet the judiciary forms no part Of the ie-
giSlalure. There is, it is True, this differ.
ence between these grants of power; the
Executive can put his negative upon the
acts ofth legislature for other cause thaa
want Of conformity 10 the Constitution,
whilst the Jud dciary can only decllre void
those which violate thai instrument. Bat
the decision of the judiciary is final IN
such cases; whereas, in every instance
where the veto of the Executive is ap.
Piled it may he overcome bya vote 0t iwo
thirds OF both Houses Of Congress The
negIlive upon the acts of the ieg.slat We
hy tie Ex.cniva auiilfly, and that in
the hands of one indipidull, would seem
To be an incougraly in our system. Like
some others Of a sim,llr ciAraC ar. il ap.
pears TO DC highly cXpedien,, and in the
spirit which was intended by its authors,
if may be productive Of great good, and
be found one of the best safe guards to
the Union. At the period of the form
alton of The Constitution, the principle
does not appear to have enjoyed much
favor in the State Governments. 1t exist
ed but in two, and in one Of these there
vas plural Executive. If we would
search for the motives which operated
upon the purely patriotic and enIightond
assembly which framed the Constitution
for the adoption of a provision so appar-
emily repugnant to the leading democrllic
principle, that the majority should govern,
we must reject the idea that they an,icipa-
ted from il any benefit 10 the ordinary
course of legislation.
They knew too we'll the high degIee Of
intelligence which existed among the peo-