Southern Argus. [volume] (Columbus, Miss.) 1834-1842, 1841-03-24

which appeared not io be ii harmony with
theif IDEAS Of q simple Representative Democ
racy, Or Republic. And knowing the tenden-
cy ofpower 10 Increase itself particularly when
exercised BY asingle individual, predictions
were made, that at no very remote period the
government would terminate in virtua ,monar-
ciiy. II would not become me to saw. that
the fears of these patriots have been already
realized. But, as ! sincerely believe that the
tendency Of measures and mems opinions for
some years past, has been in that direction. IL
IS, conceive strictly proper, that shouldiake
lhis occasion to repeat the assurance have
heretofore given, of my determination to arrest
the progress of that tendency,If it really tx
lists, &c, restore the government to its pristine
health and vigor, as faras this case can be Ell
fected by any Legitimate exercise ofthe power
placed in my hands, ,m. re..
proceed to state in as summary manner as
| can, my opinion of the sources of the evils
which have been so extensively complained Of
and the correctives which may be applied
Some of the former are unquestionably TO be
found in the defects Of the constitution, others
N my judgement, are attributable to a mis-
construction of some Gifts provisions. OF the
former Is the Eligibility of the same person to a
2nd term of the presidency. The sagacious
mind Of Thomas Jefferson carly saw and la
mented this error, and attempts have been
made hitherto, without success, to apply the
amendatory power of The States to its cor
rection. As, however one mode ofcorrection
is in thepower of every President, and conse-
quently in mine, it would be useless and per-
haps invidious to cnumerate the evils of which
in the opinion of many Of our fellow citizens,
this error oft sages who framed the cOnsti-
tuition may have been secure, and the bitter
fruits which we are still TO gather from it, if it
continues to disfgure our system. 1t may be
observed, however, as a general mark that
Republics Can commit no greater error than to
adopt or continue any feature in their systems
ofgovernment which may be calculated to ere
ate or increase the love of power, in the bos-
oms Of those 10 whom necessity obliges them
TO commit the management of their affairs.
AID, surely, nothing is more likely to produce
such state of mind tnan the long continuance
of an office of high trust. Nothing can be
more corrupting-nothing more destructive of
all those noble feelings which belong to the
character OF the devoted Republican patriot
When the corrupt passion once takes possess
sion of the human mind, like the love of god
it becomes Unsuitable. II is the never dying
worm in his bosom; grows with his growth
and strengthens with the declining years Of its
victim. Ifthis is true it is the part of wisdom
for a'Republic to limit the services of that off
Ger at least, to whom she has entrusted the
management other foreign relations, the exc
cutloD of her laws, and the command of her
armies and navics, to period so short as to
prevent his forgetting that he is the accounta-
bic agent; not the principle; the servant not
flteaa ,ff
sltution can be effected, public opinion may
secure the desired object. | give my aid to it
by rene wing the pledge, heretofore given, that
under no circumstances, will | consent 10
serve a second term.
But if there is danger to public liberty from
the acknowledged defects o. the Constitution,
IN the want of limit TO the continuance of the
Executive power in the same hands, there is,
] apprehend, not much less from msconstruc-
ton of that instrument, as IT regards the pow
er actually given. I cannot conceive that, by
a fair construction, any or either of its provis-
ions would be found 10 constitute the Presi-
dent part of the Legislative power 1t can
not be claimed from the power to recommend,
since, although enjoined as a duty upon him,
it is privilege which he holds in common
with every other citizen. And although there
may be something more of confidence in the
property Of the measures recommended in the
Dnc case than in the other in the obligations
IF ultimate descision there can be no differ
snce. in the language ofthe Constitution, ''all
legislative powers" which it grants aare vest
ID in the Congress ofthe United States 1T
would be a solecism IN language to say that
my portion of these is not included m the
whole.
ltmay be said indeed, that the Constitution
las gwen to the Executive the power TO an
mi the acts of the legislative body, by refusing
o them his assent. So similar power has
resulted from that instrument TO
he Judiciary. and yet the judiciary forms no
art of the Legislature. There is, il is true;
his difference between these grants of power,
he Executive can put his negative upon the
lcts OF the Legislature for other cause than that
1f want of conformity to the Constitution
whilst the Judiciary can only declare void those
which violate that instrument. But the de-
csIon of the Judiciary is final in such case,
IN every instance where the vote of
the Executive is applied it may be overcome
by vote of two thirds of both houses of Con-
gross. The negative upol the acts ofthe Le-
gislative, one individual, would seem to be an
incOngruity in our system. Like some others
of a similar character, however it appears to
be highly expedient, and if used only with the
forbearance and in the spirit which was inten-
ded by its authors, it may be productive oil
great good and be found one of the best safe
guards to the Union. AT the period of the
formation of the Constitution, the principle
does not appear to have enjoyed much favor
IN the State Government. 1t existed in but
two, and IN one of them there was a plural Ex-
ecutive. five would search for the motives
which operated upon the purely patriotic and
enlightened assembly which framed the Con.
stltutIon, for the adoption of provision so ap.
parently repugnant TO the leading democratic
principle that the majority should govern, we
must reject the idea that they anticipated from
1t any benefit to the ordinary course of lepisla-
ton. They knew too well the hirh degree
OF intelligence which existed among the peo-
| pie, and the enlightened character Of the State
Legislatures, not TO have the fullest confidence
that the two bodies elected by them would b,
worthy representatives of such constituents
and, Of course, that they would require no al,
in conceiving and maturing the measure
which the circumst ances of the country migh
require. And il is preposterous to suppos
that thought could for moment have bee
ascerteined, that the President placed at tn
Capitol, in the center ofthe country, could bel
ter understand the wants and wishes Of til,
people than their own immediate Representa-
tives, who spend apart of every year anon
them, living with them, often labouring wit
them, and bound to them by the triple tie
interestduty and affection.
To sist or control Congress then in It's OF
binary legislation, could not, conceive, hay
been the motive for comforting the veto powe
on the President. This argument acquire
additional force from the fact Of its never hay
ing been thus used by the first six President
and two of them were members Of the Coz
vention, one presiding over its deliberation