The Illinois free trader. (Ottawa, Ill.) 1840-1841, 1841-03-19


ed by its authors, it may be productive OF
much good, and be found one Of the best
safeguards to the Union. At the period
of the formation of the constitution, the
principle does not appear to have enjoyed
much favor in the State Governments. 1t
existed but in two, and in one of these
there was plural Executive. If we
would search for the motives which oper-
ated upon the purely patriotic and enlght-
ened assembly which framed the Consti-
,uticn, for the adoption of provision so
apparently repugnant to the leading demo-
cratic principle, that the majority should
govern, we must reject the idea that they
anticipated from it any benefit TO the ordi-
nary course Of legislation. They knew
too well the high degree of intelligence
which existed among the people, and the
enlightened character of the State Legisla-
lures, not TO have the fullest confidence
that the two bodies elected by them would
be worthy representatives Of such consli-
tuents, and, of course, that they would re-
quire no aid in conceiving and maturing
the measures which the circumstances of
the country might require. And it is pre-
posterous to suppose, that thought could
for moment have been entertained, that
the President, placed at the capital, in the
centre of the country, could better under
stand the wants and wishes Of the people
than their own immediate representatives,
who spend part of every year among
them, living with them, and bound to them
by the triple tie OF interest, duty, and af-
fiction. To assist or control Congress,
then, IN its ordinary legislation, could not
| conceive, have been the motive for con-
ierrlng the veto power on the President.
This Argument acquires additional force
from the fact Of its never having been
thus used by the first six Presdents-and
two OF them were members Of that CON
vention, one presiding over its delibera-
tons, and the other bearing larger share
in concentrating the labors of that august
body than any other person. But if bills
were never returned to Congress by either
Of the Presidents above referred to, upon
the ground of their being inexpedient, or
not as well adapted as they might be to
the wants of the people, the veto was APP
piled upon that want of conformity to the
Constitution, or because errors had been
committed from too hasty enactment.
There is another ground for the adoption
of the veto principle, which had probably
more influence in recommending it to the
convention than any other. refer to the
security which it gives to the just and
equitable action Of the legislature upon all
parts OF the Union. 1t could nGl but have
I occurred TO the convention that, in coun-
try so extensive. embracing so great a va
rlety OF soil and climate, and, consequent
ly, of products, and which, from the same
causes. must ever exhibit great differ
cncc in the amount of the population of
ITS various sections, calling for great d.
verslty III the employmenls of the people,
That the legislation of the majority might
not always Justly regard the rights and in
teresis OF the minority. And that acts of
this character might be passed, under an
express grant by the words of the Con
stituton, and, therefore, not within the
competency of the judiciary to declare
void. That, however enlightened and pa
iriotlc they might suppose, from past cx-
perlencc, the members Of Congress might
be, and, however largely partaking, in the
general, OF the liberal feelings of the peo-
+ pie, it was impossible to eXp ect that bo-
dies so constituted should not sometimes
be controlled by local interests and sec
tional feelings. 1t was proper, therefore,
TO provide some umpire, from whose STU
alton and mode of appointment more in
dependence and freedom from such innu-
ences might be expected Such one
was afforded by the Executive Depart
ment, constituted by the Constitution. A
person elected to that high office, having
his constituents in every section, State,
und subdivision of the Union, must con-
slider himself bound, by the most solemn
sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend
the rights of all, and of every portion,
great or small, from the injustice or OPP
preston of the rest. consider the veto
power, therefore, given by the constilu-
ton to the Executive of the United States,
solely as a conservative power. To be
used only, first, to protect the Constitution
from violation; secondly, the people from
the effects of hasty legislation, where their
VIII has been probably disregarded or not
well understood; thirdly, 10 prevent the
elects of combinations volatiye of the