The Hawk-eye and Iowa patriot. (Burlington, Iowa) 1839-1843, 1841-03-25

4
BURLING'
them to commit the management Of their
} affairs. And, surely, nothing is more
J likely to produce such state Of mind
, than the long continuance Of an office of
high trust. Nothing can be more de.
structive of all those noble feelings which
} belong TO the character of devoted re-
: publican patriot. When this corrupting
? passion once takes possession Of the hu-
: man mind, like the love Of gold, it be-
5 comes Unsuitable. 1t is the never diving
I worm in his bosom, grows with his
growth. and strengthens with the declin.
r ing years Of its victim. If this is true, it
: is the part Of wisdom for Republic to
limit the service of that officer, at least, to
z whom she has entrusted the management
Of her foreign relations, the execution of
: her laws, and the command of her armies
(, and navies, to a period SO short as 10 pre-
e vent his forgetting that he is the account
: able agent, not the principal, the servant,
!, not the master. Until an amendment Of
. the Constitution can be effected, public
9 opinion may secure the desired Object
. give my aid to it, by renewing the
$ pledge heretofore given, that, under no
a circumstances, will | consent to serve a
e second term.
e But if there is danger to public liberty
: from the acknowledged defects of the
{ Constitution. in the want of limit to the
h continuance of the Executive power in
n the same hands, there is, apprehend,
it not much less from miscons,ruction oil
: that instrument, as it regards the powers
n actually given. | cannot conceive that,
|, by fair construction, any or either of It's
r provisions would be found to constitute
8 the President part of the Legislative
e power. 1t cannot be claimed from the
v power to recommend, since although en-
l. joined as duty upon him, i, is privi
IS lege which he holds in common with ev
T. cry other citizen. And although there
t. may be something more of confidence il
n the propriety of the measures recommend
1t ed in The one case than in the other, il
. the obligations of ultimate decision there
If can be no difference. In the language o
e, the Constitution, call the legislative pow
II ers'' which it grants s'are vested in tn,
le Congress of the United States" 1t woul,
'e be solecism in language to say that any
v portion of these is not included in tn,
l. whole.
it 1t may be said. indeed, that the Consti
E. tuition has given to the Executive TIL
le power to annul the acts of the Legislative
lr body, by refusing to them his assent. S,
Mt similar power has necessarily resulted
Or from that instrument to the Judiciary
III and yet the Judiciary forms no part 0
u the Legislature There is, it is true, thi
&c difference between these grants of power
it. the Executive can put his negative upo1
in the acts of the Legislature for other caus
n than that of want of conformity to TIL
n, Constitution, whilst the Judiciary Cal
err only declare void those which violate tina
at instrument. But the decision Of the Ju
ar dietary is final in such case, whereas il
n every instance where the veto of the Elk
e, ecutive is applied it may be overcome b.
e. vote of two thirds of both Houses G
10 Congress. The negative upon the ACT
III of the Legislative, by the Executive au
We thority. and that in the hands of one ind
if vidual, would seem to be an incongruit
=, in our system. Like some others of
it similar character, however, it appears I
re be highly expedient, and if used onl
e. with the forbearance, and in the spir
,ir which was intended by its authors.
IT, may be productive Of great good, and b
m found one of the best safeguards to tn
ed Union. AT the period of the formatio
of of the Constitution, the principle does NJ
he appear to have enjoyed much favor in tn
he State Governments. 1t existed but
,r- two, and in one of these there was pit
ed rail- Executive. If we would search ft
in the motives which operate upon the purel
in patriotic and enlightened assembly whic
.p- framed the Constitution, for the adoptio
nd of a provision so apparently repugnant
Use the leading democratic principle. that tt
a majority should govern, we must reje
de the idea that they anticipated from it an
w. benefit to the ordinary course of legisl
)H- uOis AHcy hHo" 1oo well VIC h'Sn
ay gree of intelligence which existed amor
ZEN the people, and the enlightened charact
be- of the State Legislatures. not to have II
md fullest confidence that the two bodi
st, elected by them would be worthy repr
We, sentatives Of such constituents, and.
oc- course, they would require no aid in co
ave ceiving and maturing the measures whl'
TO the circumstances OF the country mig
i, require. And it is preposterous to su
ent pose that though, could for nome
as have been entertained. that the Presder
ex- placed at the Capital. in the centre OF i
8. country, could better understand Il
: wants and wishes of the People tn
ur- their own immediate Representatives, wi
ex- spend part of every year among theI
&c. living with them, often laboring wi
Of them, and bound to them by the triple
ind ofinterest, duty, and affection. To ass
,rs, or control Congress then in its ordina
,is- ordinary Legislation, could not, CO