The Hillsborough recorder. [volume] (Hillsborough, N.C.) 1820-1879, 1841-03-11

high uusL NolhinE can - mere cor
guplia q. RaihihR more dssiIuetiFs q 81
hose n0ble fselinRs which bslong % ihe
chsRarler of . desoasd rspsbliSsn Psirlol
Mhen shis .eosrsppag p&ssiaa oaoe takss
possession af lie humsn mind. hks me
love VI ed. IL becones insasishls. u %
the nessrdying worn IN hn eoso@.
ero.s wilh BE growth ssd sirsnsthsss
wiah he deeliaing yssrs Of is victim. II
shis 10 tree. Il IL ne psrs 81 wisdon Ior a
republic 10 linn he ssrxies a hat eihcsF,
aIlsass. 10 when she has saN0sisd NE ma.
nagsnsni Of Der fsssign sslssiens. thssx
ecuIioa of her isws. and he eommsnd Of
her armies and nasies. 10 period 90 shoFt
a. 10 prsseas hls forgetting that he 70 me
sceoaasbls sganl not me pnneipal-ihs
servant. net the master. Bniil an amend
meSt Of he Constitution can be effected.
public opinion may secure abe desired OBJ
jsei give my aid 10 IL By renewing
The pledge heretofore gisea. thaL under
no Circumstances sill consent 70 serve .
second term.
Bot Il there 10 danger 10 public liberty
from The ,ckno wedges defects Of the con-
sliluli0n, 10 the ~snl Of limii 10 The con.
finance Of he executive power IN ihs sane
hands. there 10. apprshend. not much less
from misconslruction OF Thai instrument.
as il regards The powers actually given.
I cannot conceive that. by fair eonsiruc-
ZION. any OF either Of us provisions would
be fouaj 10 constitute The President a part
af The legislative power. ID esnnoi be
claimed from the power 10 recommend.
since, although enjoined az q duty nPoa
him. IL is privilege sh,ch he holds IN
common with every other eilixsn. And
although there may be some'hing more
of confidence N The prapriesy Of ihe msa.
sures recommended in The one case than 10
The other. in the obligslions Of ultimate de-
eisisn there can be- no Differences. In ihs
language Of the Constitution. . ell The 10
gislalive powers" -hish 10 grants ara
vested in The Congress OF the Uniied
S'a,es." |, woald be soleeism in Ian.
guage % say ina, say postioa Of these 10
not inelsdsd in the whole.
IL may be sand. isdeed. that the Con-
stiiuksa has gisen 20 the Executive The
power 20 ANAL ihe acts OF The Legisla.
live body by refusing 20 them bis assent.
So similar poser hiss necessarily result.
ed from thai ias,rumeni The Judiciary:
aud yet The Judiciary forms no part Of
the Legislature. There %. IL 10 true. this
differences between these grants OF power:
the Executive can put his negative upoH
the acts Of the Legislature for other cause
Than that Of wan, Of conformity 20 The
Constitution. whilst the Judiciary can on
ly declare void those which violate that
instrument. Bot The decision Of the Ju
dietary 10 6nal in such q case. whereas.
in every instance where the veto Of The
Executive 10 applied. il may be over
come by . cote OF lwo-ihirds OF both
Houses u Congress. The negative upon
the acts Of the Legislative. By the Exscu
tive authority. and that in the hands Of
one individual. would seem 10 be an in
congruiiy ~ our system. Like some
others Of similar character. however, il
appears 10 be highly expedienr and Il
used only with The forbesrsnce and in the
spirit which vas intended by i.s authors.
y may be productive Of gres, good, and
be found one OF The best safeguards 10 The
Union. Al the period Of The formation
Of the Constitution. the principle does
not appear 10 have enjoyed much favor
in the State Governments. ID existed
but in two. and in one Of these there vas
a plural Executive. II We would search
for the motives. which operated upon
The purely patriotic and enlightened as
srmbly which framed The Constitution,
for the adoption Of . provision 90 spps-
rently repugnansio the leading democratic
principle that the msjority should govern.
we must rejec, the idea tina, they aiicipa-
ted from i. any benefit 10 The ordinary
course Of Legislation. They knew TOO
we'll The high degree Of intelligence which
existed among The People. and the en-
lighlened character OF The Stale Legisla
lures, not To have the fullest confidence
that the two bodies elected by them
would be worthy representatives. Of such
constituents. and, Of course, that they
would require no aid in eoneeiving and
maturing The measures which the circum.
stances OF The connlry might require.
And u is preposierous to suppose that a
thought could for a moment have been
entertained. that the President, placed =,
the capital. in the centre OF the country.
could better understand the wants and
wishes Of The People than their ewn i'm,
mediate representatives, who spend q
part OF every year among them, living
with them. often lsboring with them. and
bound to them By the triple tie ofinieresi
duty. and affection. To assist as eoniro
Congress. then. in It's ordinary leeisla.
ton. could moi. | conceive, have been The
motive Of comforting The veto power on
The President. This argument acquire,
additional lorse from the fact Of iis nsvs,
having been thus used by the frst sls
Presidenis--snd Two Of them were mem.
bers of The convention. Que presiding ovsI
| IFS dellber stlons. and the miner hayiuc