The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-10-07

this, il is charged, is perfdy TO the Wing party.
Yet, eonfessedly on all hands, the President
was not nominated or elected on a pledge to this
particular form of bank, or TO any bank
Nor did the Wing party come into power in
virtue of such pledge.
In refusing TO sign those bills, then, he yio-
lated no engagement, and committed no act OF
perfdy in the sense Of forfeited pledge.
If those Bank bills WERE by distinct under
standing before the election, or in any other way,
the sole and exclusive essence OF WhlgisIn,
then there would be something Of plausibility
IN this charge OF perlidy 10 the party. But, In
any, the strongest point OF view, they were but
one Wing measure among many.
VI thirty-one Wing measures, a member oil
the party concurs in thirty, but disapproves one.
Is he Tor that cause TO be unchiTched? Surely
not; for II so, there are few who could stand
the test. And yet that is the precise fact in this
matter, so far rs regards the President.
But, in this particular, the PRESIDENT as an
upright man, could do no otherwise than he
did. He conscientiously disdpprOped those
bills. And the Constitution, which he was
sworn to obey, commands him, expressly and
pcremptorily commands him, if he do not APP
prove Of any bill presented to him for signature,
to return it TO the house Of Congress in which
il originated. 8 If he approve he shall sign it
| II not, he SHALL return it." are the words Of the
Constitution. Would you, as conscientious
men yourselves, forbid the President Of the
United States to have conscience
In fact, if he had approved the Fiscal Agent
bill, he would have been quite singular in that,
for nobody else did.
But il is said, the constiulionality of Ma
tional Bank is d closed question, decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and by
successive Presidents Of the United States
! This assertion is great error What has
been thus decided is simply this
There is, in the Constitution, no express pow
| er TO incorporate Bank.
But if the National Legislature be of opinion
that particular description Of Fiscal Agent,
called Bank, is necessary and proper to the
| execution of any of the powers granted TO Con-
gress in the Constitution, then Congress pos
sesses the power to create such Fiscal Agent.
The Supreme Court have decided that the
Legislature is the constitutional Judge OF the
fact Of the necessity and proprlciy OF such
Fiscal Agent.
II the Legislature, by their action, in their
incorporation of such Fiscal Agent declare
the opinion that such agent is necessary and
proper for the execution of some express power,
then the Supreme Court deduce, as corollary
from the fact so declared, the legal consequence
of the constitutionality of such agent.
In the given case, the Legislature is TO look
into the bill proposed and see whether the agent
created by II Is necessary and roper one
The Senate is to do this on its responsibility
i i
do this. And if they concur in the opinion, then,
by the decision of the Supreme Court, the con
stitutionality of the agent so created follows as
a consequence.
Ii has not been decided, either by the Su-
preme Court or by the action of any past Pre-
sdent Of the United States, that any bill what
| ever, no matter what its contents, TO which the
title "BANK" is gwen, does by virtue of that
title become of necessity constitutional On
IL.
nothing. The quantity and quality of its pow
| ers--the nature of the functions bestowed upon
it--their necessity and propriety, well Tin the
detaiD at the precise time, as (by prlnciple) in
general, all these are questions Of fact and
| right, to be examined in each case of a proposed
| bank and to be examined by the President as
well as by the two Houses of Congress
| And these are questions which, when they
| arise in the given case, are to be considered as
well by the President as by the members of
| Congress, IN obedience TO THEIR conscientious
convictions of the force of the Constitution
! Their judgment of those questions is nowise
precluded or excluded by the fact that the Su-
| preme Court has passed on the general question
of the constitutonality of Bank. On the con-
trary, such judgment as deferred 10 and i'm
| posed upon them by the very decision of the
Court itself Such judgment of those questions
| by them upon their consciences, is the consti
tutional means, and the only means, OF ascer-
tanning the premises, out of which, when so
| ascerained, the Supreme Court is to draw the
consequ nee of the constitutionality OF Bank.
| The not perceiving, or, percclvlng, the re-
| glecting 10 act upon, these plain truths, was the
| cause Of many errors at the late session OF Con
gress.
| II induced members, instead of looking into
and examining the particular powers of the
proposed Fiscal Agent and showing Their ne
cessity and propriety as the essential elements
| of the conclusion of consttutlonality IN the
given case,-it induced them, taking for granted
this the very thing TO be proved,-lt induced
them to expcnd all their efforts in arguing the
false idea that the question could not and must
not be looked into or examined at all.
Their minds dominated by this sophism, and
having adopted as the rule of their own action
| the theory OF denegation OF reason and self
qualification which il implies II is not strange
| that they assumed the same rule applicable
to the President.
| In refusing thus to shut his eyes, and in
serutinizing the true question, that, namely, OF
| the necessity and propriety of each and all OF
the proposed powers of the Bank in the given
case, the President, instead of acting in conflict
with the decisions of the Supreme Court, did
in fact tread in the very path, and aim at the
very mark, which those decisions prescribe.
But, il is said, the Bank question, at the pre-
sent moment has been decided by the Wing
party, ana the PRESIDENT ought 10 nave coniofm
ed himself To that decision. To which, II II
were so, it is obvious to reply, that no detcrml-
nation of party can settle a constitutional ques-
ton, or preclude a question of conscience.
1t is further said that the President ought TO
approve whatever the Party in Congress do.
That would be to abolish at once all the con
situtional functions and duties of the President
of the United States,-to render him eventually
the mere puppet of faction, Ito transform him
into simple countersigning clerk,-and TO
transfer all the substantive power Of the Govern
ment into the hands of Congress.
Though President through the votes Of a par