Daily Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1840-1842, 1841-08-14
THE VETO POWER

THE VETO POWER.
The uncertainty winch hang over ;hc cto Of IN
bank bill, has naturally drawn public attention +,
the vast power lodged in the hards OF the Exe.u
i've. II Is now made maniiost-the whole coun,r,
feels, that the welfare and the happiness Of the pso
pie under our boosted Democrats ins,i,u, ons ma,
DC subject 10 the arbitrary will of one man
lis, however, cannot now Jc remedIcd. excep, b,
/ the ioToc1rance Of the EXeeu'iye incumbent TO ex
ereise the power with which he is clothed IL i
VAIN 10 expect an amendmen, 20 the Cons,itu,ior
"oros"ung this provision altogether. We must r.,
y upon TIE genuine, practical 1--we for Dsr,ocr. c,
on the part OF the Executive.
] HaPPears however, that the veto power, of LAT,
years, has been exercised with much greater la,i
'ude than was evec anticipated by the iramers OF
| the Constitution. According 10 MIR. Jefferson. !,
was primarily designed as shield to protect the
Executive against the Legislature. In his written
opinion, delivered to General Washington scain,,
the charter OF the frs, bank in 81, he held III. fo
lowing language:
The negative Of The President Is the shield pco.
Nlded by the Constitution to protect against the IN
NasioAS OF the legislature LIST. The rights of the
Executive. !. OF the Judiciary. 81 OF the
States and Safe Legislatures. The present !, the
case ct a right remaining exclusively vi the .,,es
am Il consequently, ont Cf those IN ended hy the
Constitution 10 be placed under his protection
III must 9e aided, howevr e, that, unless the Pee
sdeht5 m.nd, o. view Of every thing, which is
urged Tor and against this bill, Iulerably clear that
II IS Uue uihoTIZed 10y the Constitutions: II the pTo
anu t'e esl hang So even 20 balance his iuGg.
mem, Just aspect for the wisdom of the Lcss.a-
turc, "CIi naturally decide the balance IN favor of
their cpnIVn: u IS chiefly for cases, where they are
ceaJy ms.ed by srror, ambition, or interest, that
INC CONSTITUTION has p.a ed cheek in the negative
Of the rrestcu-"
Ihrs opinion vas given IN a case, in which MIR.
Jefferson most earnestly invoked the veto but
Notwithstanding LIS individual wlsher, ne WAS sware
that u was power to be cautious and temperate
iy cSc-iel.
The writer's IN the Federaii,I took a similar view
OF the Veto and maintaned IL express TENS that hs
?Tim'y Irtucement 10 confer the power upon the
Executive was TO enable him to defend him,elC,'
On This suhiec' suboin an article fromthe Philn.
de phIa ".Horts .ir.riean," with the de,I,r,,,o-,
more than once avowrc, that all our FEELINGS and
principles are opposed to the exercise of this power
/ except upon wy extraordinary occasions. We
should prefer to see The power abolished altogether.
II makes our Government more monarchicar than
that OF Great BRIAN, where no sovereign has dared
/ to wi.AEo!d his assent, Tor more than century,
from any bI. which Lad eceived the support Of u,Ib
Houses o! Parliament With al our professions Of
Democracy, we should FOR d=cency's 4aks, at Iea.t
he as tsmo,-7t.; as q monarchca. Government.
om 'hc P"lt. $orrh American.
THE VETO TOSER.
! In the 73j No. oflhe Fedsr4lisl we hav, state
ment ofthC reasons and grounds of the origin of In.
veto power Il IL q clear and fair exposition OF the
views OF he time on this subject. by this we dis
cover ht the OBJECT Vi the veto was to defend the
TX cu;Ivc from the entertainments OF the Lecisla.
tive branch oitne Government This is a very ina
portani and instructive fact. The language is, Gas
a shield OF the Executive" Again: The primgr,
lnIuceWcGt TO confer the power IN question unon
the Executive, Is to enable him to defend himself:
the secondary u to increase the chances IN favor o.
! the community against the passing Of bad laws
] through haste, inadveriCnce, or design Arain
ia the case foe which II is chiefly designed that OF
an immediate attack upon the Constitutional rights
| OF the Executive" SC.
II is Of little consequence what me Secondary
purpose was, 50 long rs II appea that Ihe iBldru
Iadueement, and "the case for which il was chiefly
designed" was the real ground Of the law witbon,
which It would not probably have had existence
end that IS "ds a shield Of The Executive As
10 ms increase ei cnaoc"s 10 fsyo. of the commune
/ ", "h'cn is the second reason, the history Of the
veto IS the rest illustration. The 'cbancesn have
turned out very unfortunately, no, 10 saw caI,mi-
u1usy, 10 the public. The result has been direct
~ the reverse Cf what vas intended The increase
OF chances has fallen TO the Executive, disappoin,.
men' and defeat to the people.
Moreover, % appears thar tho danger nnrrehend
ed ut the time, was not that this power yyoulI b.
abused, bot ihit Il would not be used On account ri
IT'S responsibility. at j. evident saws the F,J-
erhiIs', th1t there would ue greater danger Of his
/ llhe ENecuuye) not using his power when neccsa-
~, ITO defend ms own pTCrCgntIyrs) than Of his
g'ins u too often orr kmuch. The King Of Great
Brt7'n with all his Of pserosa,v,s, and with
al, the influence he d. Vs from o. thousand sources
would a. This day, hesitate 70 ruta MIGHT'VE upon
the JOINT resolutions Of both House Of Parliauc,,
Nor Is Il probable tina, he would ultimately venture
TO exert this prerogaiyc, but iu case Of manifest
proprciy, or extreme necessity. A very consI-
derahe period has elapsed since the negative Of the
Crown has been exercised"
IL ls half a century since the above was written
and IN no instance we believe, hEs the veto power
been haztrdad by tho British Sovereign nor is .,
.ikey soon TO De again. /, has IN il too much OF
the smack Of arbIlry and absolute power for Brit
l.h liberty.
b., 10 return again TO the veto power in our
own Constitution and history:
]. Ms the shield 81 tic Executive II is OBJ
Vous from r. review Of our own history that this
apprahcndcd Cncroachmrnt Of the legislative a
The executive branch Of the Government, which
W. the apparent occasion oi this law was enrfrcIy
without foundation. Directly The reverse OF tbi-
has been our experience, which, rs is well known.
vas the pUucIpu. cause ~ the ate r0Ii,~1I rgyofu
ton, w: 10 aJrdgo aud restrain Executive power.
which bod usurped the powers Of the other co.ordf.
n1tr branches Of the Government. f. Will he seen.
therefore, that here has been TO occasion for the
use Of inls power, 50 Ear IS lhs primary" reason
UssI- ne lOr u Is concerned.
2. The prOdlgality aud bo.dnCss with VII ch the
yo'J power has been used Of late years contrary 10
/ expectation, and Tor other reasons than those
stated, az the time, for ils necessity might well
q 'e public concern, and demand popular Viz
/ lance.
/ 8 70 would seem probable o. our history fp III.
curronauralls Of Executive sway. such as has been
! "ine. .d for the last few yC1r. could have been
inr's'0u, mot tie Veto power would never have
been admitted into tho Constitution, but On %,
CONTRARY, 'hui Executive power would have beer
more crc'u.y guarded. Is d, right them or s,rIc q,
constitutional Co continue the use Of % Tor other bur
poses iHo was originally intended
Do q cunsN'uIOn1. question, lpptriaiUing 10 ih
n.'gnrH OF Executive pr.IOgauVcs, Tor which tb
N.o was 'pumruIy" ond especially allowed, rs
very urtu thing, 30 'Ir as the intention o .hc VET
% concerned, from 900 Other constitutional questions
! .Ins W the provisions NJ me Consultation, undo
iHn e..s OF .o Judiciary, alter hey have passed Oh
primary Court Di Congress "GHs judicial row.
-hlii extend . l'| cases 90 law and equity nr.sin
out OF hs Constitution, the laws OF tho u. States
Sc Does mo Executive power involve Iudlcl.
iI1rupn' AuI docs The Constitution exert Tvs
n-egCs' % tYhI The same Officer How, then, O.
lnH Executive g.I JudciJfy both be bro -ht ip
inc same held oiac'prl ls not the Executive viii
. 'sns To- power, In false pO.l'i1ni
Z D. Are not The cEposItIons OF The lramer7 Of Il
{ IONS. luh"ni 81 'ng wu.Crs Of the une and ruucu
= rent History, appcr7In.ng % the question, al
Q ye'i arI TIC True interpreters Of the Veto pOwc