The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-08-05


supposition that the legislative will not be nfal-
| BILE that the love Of power may sometimes betray
1t into disposition 10 encroach upon the rights OF
the other members Of the government that a spirit
Of faction may sometimes peryert its deliberations
that Impressions OF the moment may sometimes
hurry il into which itself on mature refec-
/ ton, would condemn. The primary inducement to
| comforting the power in question upon the execu-
tive IS TO enable him TO defend himself the secon-
Diary Is 10 Increase the chances in favor of the COM
muny against the passing of bad laws through
| haste, inadvertence, or design. The otener a
sure IS brought under examination, the greater the
diversity IN the situations OF those who 10
Inc il, the less must be the danger of those errors
| which flow from want Of due deliberations or of
| those msteps which proceed from the contagion of
some common passion interest Ii is far less pro-
baDle, that culpable views Of any kind should infect
all the parts OF the government the same moment
and IN relation TO the object, than that they
should by turns govern and misead every one Of
! them.
II may perhaps be said, that the power of pre-
venting oad laws includes that Of preventing good
ones ana may be used TO the one purpose, well
as To the other. But this objection will have little
weight with those who can properly estimate The
mischeis OF that Inconsistency and mutaby in the
laws which form the greatest blemish in the cha
recter ana genus OF our governments. They will
consider every institution calculated to restrain the
excess of law-makng, and TO keep things in The
same state IN which they may happen 10 be at any
gwen period, as much more likely To do good than
harm, because II IS favorable TO greater stability in
the legislation. The injury which NAV possibly be
done by defeating few good laws, will be amply
compensated by the advantage Of preventing num-
Der Of bad ones.
| Nor is this all The superior weight and inilu-
ence of the legislative body in free government
and the hazard TO the executive in trial of strength
with that body, afford satisfactory security that
| the negative would generally be employed with
great caution and that, in its exercise there would
! oitener be room for charge of timidlty than of
\ T. ash Of al. -
OF sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he
draws from thousand sources, would at this day
hesitate to put negative upon the Joint resolutions
/ OF The two houses Of parliament lie would not
IAN to exert the utmost resources Of that influence to
strange measure disagreeable TO him, in its pro-
gress 10 the throne To avoid being reduced to the
dilemma OF permitting it to take effect or of risking
The dspleasure OF the nation by opposition the
sense OF The legislative body Nor is it probable,
that he would ultimately venture to exert his prero-
gatiye, but in Of manifest proprety or extreme
necessity. All well-nlormed men in that kingdom
will accede to the business Of this remark A very
considerable period has elapsed since the negative of
the crown has been exercised.
/ II magistrate powerful, and so well fortified
as British monarch, would have scruples about the
exercise OF the power under consideration, how much
/ greater caution may be reasonably expected in a
/ President OF the United States, clothed, for the
short period of four years with the executive a,-
thorlty Of government wholly and purely repub-
| llcans
1t is evident that there would be greater danger Of
his not using his power when necessary, than Of
his using 1t too often or too much. An argument
indeed against its cXpedency, has been drawn from
this very source. II has been represented on this
account as power odiols in appearance useless in
practice. But il will not follow that because il
might rarely, IT would never be exercised. In the
case for which il is chiefly designed that of an i'm
mediate attack upon the constitutional rights Of the
executive, or in case in which the public good
evidently and palpably sacrificed, man Of tolerable
iirmness would avail himself Of his constitutional
means Of defence, and would listen to the admoni-
| tons OF duty and responsibility. In the former sup
position, his fortitude would be stimulated by his
immediate interest in the power Of his office in the
latter, by the probability Of the sanction Of his con
stltuents who though they would naturally incline
| to the legislative body in doubtful case would
hardly suffer their Partially to delude them in
very plain one. speak now with an eye to ma
glstrac possessing only common share of firmness
| There are men, who, under any circumstances,
viii have the courage to do their duty at every
| hazard.
| But the convention have pursued mean in this
business, which will both facilitate the exercise of
the power vested in this respect in the executive
magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend on the
sense of considerable part of the legislative body
Instead of absolute, is proposed to give the
ecutlve the qualified negative, already described
This IS power which would be much readily
exercised than the other who might be
afraid to defeat law by his single VETO, might not
scrupe TO return il for reconsideration; subject to
being finally rejected, only in the event of more
than one-third Of each house concurrng in the suf
hciency OF his objections He would be encouraged
by the reflection that if his opposition should pre-
vail, II would embark in it very respectable pro-
portion of the legislative body, whose influence
would be united with his in supporting the propri- |
ETY. OF his conduct in the public opinion. direct
and categorical negative, has something in the APP
pearance OF IT more harsh and apt to irrate,
than the mere suggestion OF argumentatiye objec-
tons TO be approved or dsapproved, by those to
whom they are addressed. In proportion it |
would be less apt to offend il would be apt to |
be exercised; and for this very reason it may in
practice be found more efecual. II is to be hoped |
that It VIII not often happen, that improper views
viii govern so large proportion as two-thrds of
both branches of the legislature at the same time
and this too in defiance of the councrpoisng weight
of the Executive II is at any rate far less probable
that this should be the case than that such views
should faint the resolutions and conduct of bare
majority. power of this nature in the Executive
VIII often have silent and unpercelyed, though I
forcible operation. When men, engaged in uniust-
flable pursuits, are aware that distractions may
come from quarter which they cannot CONTROL they
will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of
opposition, from doing hat they would with eager
ness rush into, If no such external impediments were
TO be feared.
This qualified negative as has been esewh re-
Marked IS IN tins State vested in council, consist
ing OF the Governor, with the chancellor and Judges
OF the supreme court, any two OF them. II has I
been freely employed upon variety of occasions
and frequently with success And its utility has
become SO apparent the persons, who, in compiling
the constitution, its violent opposers have from
experience become its declared admirers.
MIR. WRIGHT AND THE DISTRICT
BANKS.
During the debate in the Senate on the District
u