Boon's Lick times. [volume] (Fayette, Mo.) 1840-1848, 1841-08-28
THE VETO POWER.


or at least to speculate upon the possibility
Of the exercise of the veto power, and to
discuss its nature and extent, it would be
well to look into the Constitution, and such
other lights as we possess. in order to take
affair start. A paragraph in city contem-
porary of the Sd inst, seems to imply that
the exercise of the veto power is illegiti-
mate, and that the signature of the Presi-
dent to bills is rather an obligatory clerical
act than the exercise of an Independent and
discretionary power granted by the Con-
stitution.
The language of the Constitution is this:
II ,NEvery bill which shall have passed the House
OF Representatives and the Senate, shall before
i. becomes a law, be presented to the President
Of the United States if he approve he shall return
it, il not ne shall return it, with bis objections, TO
that House in which it shall have originated, who
shall enter the objections at large on their journal
and proceed to reconsider it. IT, after such re.
consideration, two-thrds OF that House shall agree
to pass the BILL it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, aud if approved by two.
thirds of that House, it shall become law. But
in all such cases the votes OF both Houses shall be
determined by yeas and nays, and the names Of
the persons voting for and against the bill shall
be entered on the journal Of each House respec.
lively. If any bill shall not be returned by the
President within ten days Sundays excepted,)
after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall I've law, in like manner as if he had signed
il, unless the Congress, by their ad ournment.
prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a
law"
Gen. Harrisons view of this subject is
briefly stated in his excellent letter to Har-
mer Denny, as follows:
THAT in the exercise Of the veto power he the
PresidentI should limit his rejection Of bills TO-
LIST, such as are in his opinion unconstitutional
I'd. such tend to encroa oh on the rights OF the
States or individuals: Sd. Such as involving deep
interests, may in his opinion require more mature
delheration reference to the will Of the people,
to be ascerained at the succeeding elections"
If there shall be a necessity for reflection
upon this subject the following able article
from the F5deraliSt, No. 70, will be useful
aid:
The propensity Of the legislative department to
intrude upon the rights aud 10 absorb the powers
Of the other departments, has been already more
Than once suggested; the nsuficency Of mere
has also been remarked upon; and the necessity
OF furnishing each with constitutional arms foI its
own defence, has been inbred and proved
From these clear and indub principles re.
suits the proprety of mega. !e, either absolute
or qualified, in the executive, upon the acts o.
the Legislative branches. Without the one or the
other, the former would be absolutely unable tc
defend himself against the depredaiions of the lat
He ,rb. ba IF
thorites by successive resolutions or annihilateC
by single vote. And in the one mode or tn,
other, the legislative and executive powers nigh
speedily come to be blended in the same hands
II even no propensity had ever discovered tsel
in the legislative body, TO invade the rights Of thu
executive, the rules OF Just reasoning and thee
selic Propriety would Of themselves teach US, tina
the ore ought not 10 be left at the mercy oil tht
other, but ought to possess constitutional anc
etfectual power of sell.deence.
But the power in question has further use. -
|, not only serves as shield to the executive, Blu
it furnishes an additional security against the en-
action of improper laws. 1t establishes a saluta
ry check upon the legislative body. calculated tc
guard the community against the effects Of faction
precpancy, or of any impulse unrriendly to The
public good, which may happen to influence {
ina oriry Of that body,
The propriety OF a negative has, upon some oc
casions, been conbatted by an observation, tina
it was not to be presumed single man woulC
possess more virtue Or wisdom than number 0
men; and that unless this presumption should bt
entertained, it would be improper TO give the ex
ecutive magistrate any species Of control over lh
legislative body.
But this observation, when examined, will ap
pear rather specious than solid. The proprety o
the thing does not turn upon the suPposition o
superior wisdom or virtue in the executive; bu
upon the suPposition, that the legislative will no
be inldlible that the love Of power may some
times beray it into disposition 10 encroach upor
the rights Of the other members Of the govern
ment that spirit OF faction may sometimes per
vert its deliberations, that impressions Of the mo
ment may sometimes hurry it into measures which
itself, on mature reflection, would CONDEMN
The primary inducement to comforting the pow
er in question upon the executive, is TO enabl
him to defend himself the secondary is to in
crease the chances in favor of the community
against the passing Of bad laws, through haste, in
udvertance, or design, The ofener measure il
brough; rnder examination, the greater the diver
si.y in the situations Of those who are to examine
ii, the less must be the danger OF those error
which flow from want Of due tellberation, or 0
those mssteps which proceed from the contagior
Of some common passion or interest It is ia
less probable, that cul pahle views Of any kind
should infect all parts Of the government at tht
same moment, and in relation to the same object
than that they should by turns govern and mis-
lead every one Of them.
4. - Il