Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1841-03-15

cessary to carry into effect the specified powers but
IN relation to the latter also. 1t is however, con-
solatory to reflect that most of the instances of the
alleged departure from the letter or spirit of the
sttution, have ultimately received the sanction of
majority of the people. And the fact that many
oil our statesmen most distinguished for talent and
patriotism, have been at one time or other of their
political career, on both sides of each of the most
warmly disputed questions forces upon us the in
ference that the errors, if they were, are at
ulbutable to the intrinsic difficulty, in many nstan
COS, of ascertaining the intentions of the trainers
of the constitution rather than the influence of any
sinister or unpatriotic motive.
But the great danger to our institutions does not
appear to me to be in n usurpation by the govern
ment of power not granted by the people, but by
the accumulation, i'll of the departments, of that
which was assigned to Others Limited az nre the
powers which have been granted, still enough have
been granted to constitute desp otisn if concen-
trated in one of the departments. This danger is
greatly heightened as it has been always ooserva-
Bile that men are less jealous of entertainments of
one department upon another, than upon their own
reserved rights. When the Constitution of the I'm
tied States first from the hands of the Conven,
ton which formed it, many of the sernest Rcpubli-
cans of the day were alarmed at the extent Of the
power which hs.l been granted to the federal gov
erment and more particularly of that portion which
had been assigned to the executive branch.
There in it features which appeared not to
be in harmony with their ideas of simple represen-
tative Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the
tendency of power to increase itself, particularly
when exercised by a single individual predictions
were made that, at no very remote period, the gov
eminent would terminate in virtual monarchy. 1t
would not become me to say that the fears of these
patriots have been already realized. But, sim
cerey believe that the tendency of measures and of
mems opinions, for some years past has been in that
direction, it is | conceive strictly proper that
CHI tnly 60,
have heretofore given, of my determination to arrest
the progress of that tendency if it really exists and
restore the government to its pristine health and
vgor, as far as this be effected by any legiti
mate exercise of the power placed in my hands.
proceed to state, in summary manner as
can my opinion of the sources of the evils which
have been so extensively complained of, and the cor
receives which may be applied Some of the for
ner unquestionaby to be found in the defects of
the Constitutions Others in my judgment, are attrb
ut2ble to misconstuction of some of its provisions.
Of the former is the eligibility of the indivd
ual to a second term of the Presidency. The saga
cious mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented
this error, and attempts have been made, hitherto
without success, to apply the amendatory power of
the states to its correction. As, however, mode
of correction is in the power of every President and
consequently in mine, it would be useless, and per-
haps nvidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in
the opinion of many of our feow-citizons, this err
ror of the sages who framed the Constitution may
have been the source and the bitter fruits which we
still to gather from it, if it continues to ds6gure
our system. 1t may be observed, however, as a gen.
eral remark, that Republics can commit no greater
error than to adopt or continue any feature in their
systems of government which may be calculated to
create increase the love of power, in the bosoms
of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit
the management of their affairs And, surely moth
ing is more likely to produce such state of mind
g -
Nothing can be more COMMUNICATING more de-
structive Of all those noble feelings which belong
to the character of devoted republican patriot.
When this corrupting passion takes possession
of the human mind, pke the love of gold, it Incomes
Unsuitable. 1t is the never-dying worm i'll his hos
ON, which grows with the growth and strengthens
with the declining years of its victim. If this is true
it is the part of wisdom for Republic to limit the
service Of that officer, at least to whom she has en-
trusted the management of her foreign relations,
the execution of her laws, and the command of her
armies and navies, to period she It as to prevent
his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not
the princ pal the servant, not the master. Until
amendment of the Constitution can be effected pub
! lie opinion may secure the desired object i give
my aid to it. by renewing the pledge heretofore CIV
en- that, under circumstances, will consent to
serve second term.
But if there is danger to public liberty from the
acknowledged defect of the constitution, in the
want of limit 90 the continuance Of Executive pow
er in the same hands, there Is ] apprehend, not
much less from the misconstructlon Of that instru-
ment as it regards the powers actually given j can
not conceive that, by fair construction, any Ell
ther of its provisions would be found to constitute
the President part of the Legislative power 1t can
not be claimed from the power to recommend, since
although enoined duty upon him, it is a priv
| lege which he holds in common with every Other
citizen. And although there may be something more
nf ~, tlp NJ hn mnaS
commended in the than in the other, in the
obligations of ultimate decision there can be no diff
ference In the language of the constitution al
the Legislative powers (which it grants "are vestet
in the Congress of the United States" 1t would b.
solecism in language to say that any portion o
these is not included in the whole.
1t may be said indeed that the constitution hai
given to the Executive the power to annul the act
of the Legislative body, by refusing to them hi
his assent. So similar power has necessarily re
suited from that instrument to the Judiciary, ant
vet the Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature
There is, it is true, this difference between thes
grants Of power; the Executive can put his mega
tive upon the acts of the Legislature for other caus
than that of want of conformity to the Constitution
| while the Judiciary only declare void thos
which violate that instrument But the decision q
, the Judiciary is final in such case, whereas il
every instance where the veto of the Executive
applied, it may be overcome by vote of two third
of both houses of Congress. The negative upo
the acts of the Legislature, by the Executive all
thorty and that in the hands of one individual
would seem to be an incongruty in our system
Like some others of similar character, howeve
it appears to be highly expedient, and if used onl
with the forbearance, and in the spirit which wa
f intended by its authors, it may be productive {
great good and be found one of the best safeguard
TO the Union
AT the period of the formation of the constitution
the principle does not appear to have enjoyed muc
D favor in the state governments. 1t existed but
two. and in one of these there was plural Execu
tive If we would search for the motives which oE
n Grated upon the patriotic and highly enlightene
. assembly which framed the constitution, for the
+ doption of a provision apparently repugnant
s the leading democratic principle that the maiorit
8 should govern, we must reject the idea that the
anticipated from it any benefit to the ordnar
= course of legislation They knew too well til
= high degree of Intelligence which existed anon
u the people. and the enlinhtened character of Nh