The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1841-03-16

amendment OF the Constitution eau ne erected
public opinion may secnro tho desired object !
give my aid to il by renewing the pledge hereto
fore given, That under circumstances,iw Twill | con
sent To serve second term.
But il there is danger to public liberty from the
! 1cknow lodged defects ortile Constitution. in the
want OF Limit IN the continuance of the Executive
power in ,he same hands, there is, l app:ehend,
not much less from miscnnstruction Of the ins,ru
men, as il regards the power actually gven.-l
cannot conceive that by lair construc lion, any
either of its provisions would be bound to corsii
tu'e the Presdent part Of the Legislative power.
it cannot he claimed from the power to recommend,
since although enjnined duty upon him, it is a
duty he holds in common with every other citizen
And though ,hore may he something more of conf
dence in the proprieiy The messtifes recommend-
ed in the one than in The other, in the ubea-
iIons Of ultimate decision there can be no differ
ence. In the language Of the Constitution, "aii
the Legislative powers which ii grants fare vest.
ed in the Congress of the United States" 1t would
he n s"lecism in language, TO say that any portion
Of these is not included in the whole
1T may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has
given to the Executive the power to annul The ncls
of the Legislative body, by refusing them his as
sent. So similar power has necessarily resulted
from that instrument 10 the Judiciary; and yet the
Judiciary forms pait Of the Legislature. There
is, il is true, difference between these grants Of
power: the Executive can put his negative upon
the acls olthe LeeIsatue for oier cause than that
of want Of conformity To the Constitution; while
the judiciary can only declare those void which VI
onte thn, instrument. But the decision of the Ju-
ciary is fnal in such case; whereas, in every in.
stance where mo veto Of the Executive is applied
il may he overrnicd by vote Of twn-,hIrds ofboth
Houses uf Congress. The negative upon the acts
Of the Legislature, by The Executive authority, and
that in the hands Of one indiv ,dua would seen, To
be an inconaruity in our system. Like some 9th.
ers of similar character, however it appears he
highly expedient; and if used only with the for.
bearance and IN the spirit which was siDtnnded by
its authors it may he prnduciive Of great good, AMI
be found one Of the best safeguards to the Union.
Al the period of The formation Of the Cnnstitu
zion, the principle does not appear to have enjoyed
much favor in the Siate Governments. IL existed
in but two aud in one Of these there was n pn, al
Executive. If we would search for the motives
which operated upon The purely patriotic aud
hghiened assembly which framed The Constitution,
for The adoption Of provision so repuguaut - the
leading democratic principle, that The majority
sh"Eld govern, we must reject the idea that they
anticipate any benefit 10 the ordinary course IF leg
isaiion. They know too we'll the high degree of
intelligence which existed among the People, and
the enlightened character of the S'ne Legislature,
to have the fullest confidence that the bod
les elected by them wonld be worthy represen la
tivcs Of such constituents, and, of course that they
would require aid in concciving and maturing
the measures which tho circums tanccs of the coun
try might ure And it is preposerous TO sup
pose that n thought could for moment have been
entertained lhn, the President, placed the capt.
toll in The centre of tho country could better under
stand the wants and Wishes OF tho People than
their own immcd ia:e representatives, who spend
par. Of every year among them. often Iaborng with
them, and bound by triple tie Of interest and af
fncion.
To assist control Congress, then, in its ordlna
ry cgisa,on could NOT, conceive, have been the
motive for ferrinR the veto power the Preai.
dent This argumen, acquires additional force
from the fact Of its having been thus used by
the first six Pres denis-and two of them were
members of the Convention. one presiding over lis
deliberations, and the other having larger share
IN concentrating the labnrs of that august body
than any other person. Butt hills were
turned to Congress by either Of tine Presidents a
hove referred to- upon the ground IF their being in
the wants Of the people, the veto applied upon
that want Of cnnfnrmiry t. the Constitution, or be-
cause errors had been committed from too hasty
enactment.
There is another ground for the adoption of the
veto principle, which had probably more influence
in recommending il to the convention than any 9th
or. refer to The security which il gives to tho
Just and equitable action Of the Legislature upon
all paris ofihe Union. II could not have occurred
to the Convention that, in country so extensive;
embracing great variety of soil and climate,
and consequently, ofp,oducts, and which from the
snnre causes must ever exhibit great difference IN
the amount Of The popmlotnn gifts various sections
calling for great diversity in the emr'oynen's "I
the people, that The legislation of the MAJORITY
might not always regard the rights an" iiereS' at
The minority; and the acts Of this character might
he passed, under an express grant by the words oi
the Constitution, aud, therefore, MOI WITHIN the
competency ofthe udicary to declare 'od lhat,
however enlightened and patriotic they might sup
pose, fiopn past experience, tho me'nh'rs "' Con-
II 4 runIy N