The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1841-05-06

oy lis charter and Its capital, which con-
slsts of stock. in which the Government
participates in q certain degree, there is
no instance in which, on principle, there
eau be difference Of interest between
them, and many powerful considerations
BY which the interest of the bank must
stimulate It TO support the credit of the
Government IN any situation in which il
may be placed. Ii the credit of the stock
should sink, the capital of the bank would
decline IN equal degree the effect OF which
would be felt in all its operations. Its
paper would deprecia,e, and check be
given TO It's circulation, if not an entire
suspension. Standing at the head Of the
moneyed operations OF the Government, il
Is lis intermediate agent IN making remit
tances TO banks and individuals throughout
The Union, and likewise between indiyidu.
ais, from which much credit and influence
are gained, II not profit. Ii has the means,
and may be considered the most powerful
agent IN raising and sustaining the circu-
!ailng medium on n par with specie
throughout the Union, and of elevaiing the
State Banks 10 that standard, by subecting
them 10 the necessity of reaching and ad-
herring to II, 10 sustain their credit, and
even their existence. Let the credit Of
the Government sink, and all these adyan-
tages are lost. The Bank, therefore, from
a regard to interest, is bound 10 sustain H.
The directors, except the few appointed
by the Government, are elected BY the
stockholders, and are amenable to them
II gives us support therefore, to the Gov
eminent on principles Of national policy.
IN the support Of which il is interested and
would disdain becoming an instrument for
any other purposes.
The view above presented is supported
BY experience, and particularly by the
events Of the late war. When the war
commenced, the Government had not the
funds which were necessary TO support it,
and was, IN consequence, forced to resort
to loans, which were with difficulty OBJ
tanned from any quarter, even in u limited
degree, and on uniayorable terms. |
have not the official document before me,
and cannot state the sources from which
any loans were obtained, nor the condi.
tloas, with the decline Of the public cred
II Us the war advanced. | we'll remem-
bey however, that when | was called
by the President 10 the Department of
War, on the 3lsl Of August, 1914, the
Certificates Of the Treasury were selling
al $50 in the 500, b. which $40 were
lost. 1t was evident that, If reliance
Vas placed on the sale Of Certificates only,
a still further decline would ensue, and
that the worst consequences might be ap-
pretended. The country was invaded
through the whole inland and maritime
frontiers, and powerful squadrons were at
the mouth OF every bay and river leading
70 our principal cities, which were threat
caed with attack and ruin. The Metropo.
is Of our Union had been forced, and its
public buildings DESTROYED. Such was the
state Of the country, and the funds, when
| entered the Department of War. Tn
der such circumstances, an appeal was
made 10 the patriotism aud interest Of the
cities, and banks within them, by the De.
partD.eni Of War, with the sanction Of the
President, for loans Of money necessary
tor their own defence, for that Of the mari.
time frontier, ana the Union. For the
first loan that was obtaned-one million of
dollars from the city OF New York, which
took place few DAYS after / entered the
Depaltmen;--no price was fixed. As
the Treasury notes were selling for $50
in the 800, that was claimed, but not
acceded to. 1t was left for subsequent ad-
Iustnlent, 10 be settled on fair principle
Several millions Of dollars were obtained
from the District Of Columbia and princi.
pal cities throughout the Union, and, ac-
cordng to my recollection, at par. This
proves that, until the Inion Is threatened
with run, no loans can be obtained in
emergencies, without National Bank,
otherwise than at a great sacrifice
These considerations led to a change in
my opinion, and induced roe 10 concur
with the President in the propriety Of 10
shutting such bank, after the conclusion
Of the var ~ ISIS. A. to the conslitu-
u9aai objection, il formed no serious OBJ
siac.e. 10 voting against 1t IN the first
instance, | was governed essentially by
policy. Tic construction | gave to the
Constitution considered strict one
In the latter instance it was more liberal,
but, according TO my judgment, justified
by It's powers.
The above sketch contains my scnti-
nents On the subject Of your several inter
rogatorieo, which | communicate 10 you
not for public ylea, but in a spirit Of con-
tdence. Since my retirement, | have
sought to avoid all political controversies.
Having colcurfed with Tie President in
the propficty Of nstitullng the latter bank,
my opinIon was not withheld, as is ! pre-
sumo known, AID 1t remains unaltered.-
Should a justification Of my conduct for the
change 81 sentiment in the interval between
.hc institution Of the first and second bank
become necessary, or any other appeal is
made 70 make il public duty to explain
the cause Of that change, shall not with
hold It. shall be attentive 10 the course