Lexington union. (Lexington, Miss.) 1838-18??, 1841-07-17

Treasury. -Thisextraordinary retreach.
Reat and reform document, IN which the
Secretary manifested an ovcTweening
desire to prejudice tie pubic mind against
the administration OF the National fnan.
ces, By his immediate predecessor Mr.
Woodbury., gave rise to much bitter dis.
cussion ia the Senate.
Dir. Woodbury., now a Senator in Con.
gress from New Hampshire, completely
demolished the report of his censorions
successor in the Treasury Department;
and showed conclusiyely that it was re-
ple,e with errors, no. only Of principle
but Of fact.
The report IN no wise COMFORTS with
the pledges OF the now dominant party, so
repeatedly male by them, when seeking
power at the hanos Of the people, Instead
Of adhereing totheir deceptive waichwords
retrenchment and REFORM" which were
inscribed in huge letters on their striped
balls and log-cabn banners, it asks an
increase of Expenditure, an increase Of
debt, and an increase Of taratioa.
The Secretary opposes the raising OF a
loan by the issuance Of Treasury notes,
Cor the purpose of Iiquidating the existing
aad accrung deficit in the Treasury; and
recommends, instead thereof, the negotia-
ton Of loan having eight years to run,
but redeemaJIe by the Government, on
six months notice.
He advocates a National Bank as the
fiscal agent Of the Government, in keep.
ing aud discussing the public moneys; 4
goes into an elaborate argument TO eslab>
Iish the superiority Of such an agent, over
the Independent Heasury system.
His first aud enlargement against the
last named system, is that under it, the
public moneys cannot be made safe; in
proof Of which, he brings forward loss,
sthin the last twelve years, of more
han two millions Of dollars by defaults.
1t is passing strange that one as well
'ersed in the financial history of our gov,
as the present Secretary, should
tempt to introduce the defaults above
lluded 10, as evidence of the insecurity
f the public moneys under the Independ--
mi Treasury system, 1t is well known
o that Officer, that no part of this great
oss by defaults, occurred under this system;
but that on the contrary, the greater
portion Of it, occurred under the old u. S.
Bank deposit system, which he aud his
,arty now seek to revive.
An examination of the financial history
IT the Government will show that almost
he whole Of these defaults were made By
collecting officers; and as such officers
IRE necessary concomItants of all fiscal
systems, the Secretary's proof of the inse.
:urity Of the public moneys under the In
dependent Treasury system, is alike ap,
,Iicable to all.
He contends farther that this system
continues the risk beyond the period of
collection, by placing the revenue in the
hands Of individuals for safe keeping,
where, he contends, 1t is not as safe as if
10 the keeping Of bank.
The history of banking, from its origin,
teaches us that no bank of discount and
circulation can be restrained by checks
and guards however many may be thrown
around it; for the very nature and legil.
mate tendency Of such institution, soor
place them above the power that created
hem, aud all your boosted restraints are
'ut as ropes Of sand.
Not so with individuals selected as
ieepers of the public moneys, by the
President and Senate of the U. S., for
heir problty, intelligence and moral
worth; and guarded aud restrained as
contemplated IN the act Of July 4th, 1910.
For man is ever propelled by the strong.
st inducemen;; and in this case, there
would be many and strong inducements to
ct honestly; and much to fear from an
opposite course.
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