, 1841-10-30

. many times the cost to garrison our hume
, rous forts. Aideo by the swiftne,s Of steam,
J she could menace at the SAME lime every
point Of our coast; while we, ignorant of the
time or point where the blow might fall.
would have to stand prepared, at every. mo
ment and at cvery'point, TO repeslher attack.
A hundred thousand men constSaily under
arms would be insufficient for tie purpose:
and we would be compehed.to Weld, in the
end. inglorionsly, without .strik::- blow.
simply from the exhaustion Of & leans.
Some other mode of defenc. .hen. mus,
De sdught. There rs none other but the ma
Wy. 1, Of course include steam as we'll as
sails. If we want to defend our coast and
protect our rights abroad, it is absolutely nee.
essarv. The only questions are, how far our
naval force ought to be carried; and to what
extent it would supersede the system Of Tor.
tiicalions?
Before | enter on the consideration of this
Important point, owe it TO myself and the
subject TO premises that my policy is peace.
and that ] look to the navy but as the right
arm Of defence-not as an instrument of con-
quest or dggrdnd,-ement. Our road to great
ness, rs | said on a late occasion, lies not
over ruins of others. Providence has bestow-
ed en- us n new and vast region, Astounding
IN resources beyond any country Of the sam
extent on the globe. Ours is a peaceful task
to improve this rich inheritance! to level
its forests; cultivate its fertile soil; develope
its vast mineral resource; give the greatest
rapiditv and facility of intercourse between
its widely extended parts; stud its wide sur.
face with Furnishing cities, towns, and villa.
ges; spread over our richly cultivated fields.
So vast is our country that generations after
generations may pass away in executing this
task during the whole of which time we
would be rising more surely and rapidly in
numbers. wealth, greatness, and influence,
than any other people have ever lone by
arms. But to carry out successfully this,
our true plan of acquiring greatness and hap
piness, it is not Of itself sufficient TO have
peace and tranquility within. These are IN
deed necessary, in order to leave the States
and their citizens in the full and undisturbed
r~.>>cs>ion OF their resources and energy, by
wiIrh Ia work cut. in geDerous rivalry, the
high destiny which certainly awaits orr coun-
try If We should he hu, true to ourselves
But. Il important rs they NAV he. il is not
much less Sn :" have safety against external
drngcr. mi the Influence and responsibility
abroad nec-S>arv Ia SECURE our exterior in
teresis and rights $50 important to our pros
perity) against aggression. look TO a navy
for these objects; and il is within the limits
they assign | would confne its growth. To
what extent, then, with these views, ought
our navy to be carried? In nv opinion, any
navy less than that which would give us he
habitual command Of our own coast and seas,
would he little short Of useless. One that
could he derived from sea and kept in harbor
by the force which Great Britain could safe
ly and constantly allot to our Coast, would be
of but little more service than in auxiliary
aid to our Qualifications in defending our har-
bors and maritime cities. would be almost
rs passive as they are. and would do nothing
to diminish the expense, which ! have known
would be so exhausting, to defend the coast
exclusively nv Notifications.
But the difficult question still remains TO
be so'ved-What naval force would he suf-
ficient for that purpose? 1t will not be ex-
pected that | should give more than n con-
~jectural answer to such n question. nave
neither the data nor the knowledge of naval
warfare TO speak with any thing like precis-
ion; but ! feel assured that the force required
would be far less than what would be thought
when the question is fairly propounded.-
The very idea Of defending ourselves on the
ocean against the immense power Of Great
Britain on that element. has something start
ling at the first blush. But, as greatly as
she outnumbers US in ships and naval resour-
ces, we have advantages that countervail
that, in reference to the subject in hand. If
she has many ships, she has also many points
to guard, and these as widely separated as
are the parts of her widely extended empire.
She is forced to keep home fleet in the cha
nel,-another in the Baltic,-another in the
Mediteranean.-one beyond the Cape of
Good Hope, to guard her important posses.
sions in the east, and another in the Pacific.
Our s~ituatian is the reverse. We have no
foreign possessions, and not a point to guard
beyond our own maritime frontier. There
our whole force may be concentrated, ready
to strike whenever a vulnerable point IS ex.
posed. Ii to these advantages be added
that both France and Russia have large ma.
val forces; that between US and them there
is no point Of conflict; that they both watch
the naval supremacy of Great Britain with
jealousy: and that nothing is more easy than