The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-08-28

Of the popular branch OF csAho ArB's'a'u'.
inc ia Dissent {" BY unanimoos vote and It's re.oiu
ton may be defested by tic vote In the Senate anu
81 Both branches of the Legislature may concur IN
resolution of decided dissent, and yet the governor
nav exert the veto power conferred on MN py inc
state constitution and their legislative action be de-
sss,sdp The State may afterwards protest against
such unjust inference, but lis authority % gone,
The President continues /" To differences 90 violent
and as they to me Irrational cannot Yield my
consent No court Of justice would or could sancuo
them without reversing all that Is established IN judi
ciaI proceeding, by introducing presumptons al pari-
ance Nth fact and differences at the expense 81 reason
State in condition Of duresse would be presumed
10 speak as individual, manacled and In prison,
might be presumed TO be in the enjoyment Of freedom
Far better 20 say the States, boldly and frankly,
Congress tciIs and submission Is demanded
Now MIR. President, will not ask whether these
animadversions were prompted by a reciprocal spirit
Of amy and kindness, but inquire whether oil OF
them are perfectly just
stuional right Of Congress 10 exercise the branch
ing power within the States Internationally and with
out limitation did make small concession when
thew consented that il should be subjected to The re-
srictions specified IN the compromise clause. ney
did NOT il is true, concede every thing they did not
absolutely repounce the power TO establish branches
without the authority of tho States during the whole
period of the existence of the charter but they dd
agree that reasonable time should lie allowed to
The sever States determine whether they would or
would moi give their assent TO the establishment OF
branches within their respective limits They did not
think right to leave open question for the space
af twenty years. nor that State should be permte ed
grant to-day and revoke tomorrow its assent nor
that il should impracticable condi-
tons TO its assent but that should dentivey decide
the question: after the lapse Of ample time for full de-
Liberation. And what that time No State
would have had less than four MONTHS and some OF
them from five TO nine months, for consideration.
Was IT, therefore, entirely for the President TO
aayf hat N nm AL nj ia
piM?" Forthwith means Immediately instantly
without delay, which cannot be affirmed Of space OF
time varying from four to nine months And the
President supposes that the high privilege" OF the
members Of the State Legislature submitting the ques-
ton to their constituents is denied But could they
not at any time during that space have consulted their
constituents
The President proceeds to put what must, with
the greatest Difference and respect consider extreme
cases. He supposes the popular branch to express
its dissent by unanimous vote which overruied by
tie in the Senate. He supposes that both branches
OF the Legislature may concur in resolution OF de-
cded dissent and yet the Governor may exert the veto
power" The unfortunate of the State whose
Legislative will should be checked by Executive
authority, would not be than that Of the Union,
the will Of whose Legislature in establishing this
bank, is checked and controlled by the President.
But did il not occur to him that extreme cases
brought forward the side, might be met by cx-
treme suggested the other : Suppose the
lishment of branch bank by unanimous vote,
which is overruled by equal vote in the Senate.
Or suppose that both branches Of the Legislature by
majoIites in each exactly wanting one vote to make
them wothlrds, were to concur In resolution lnyl-
ting the introduction of branch within the limits Of
the State and the Governor were to exercise the veto
power, and defeat the resolution. Would II be very
unreasonable in these two to infer the assent OF
the State to the establishment of branch
Extreme should never be resorted to. Happl-
fl mi nd helr are
influenced by them, consequence of the rarity OF
their occurrence
The plain, simple, unyarnishcd statement OF the
is this Congress believes itself invested with consti
tutiona power TO authorize, uncondnenally the es-
adjustment of Bank Of the United States and
branches, any where in the United States, without
asking any other consent of the States, than that
which is already expressed in the Constitution. The
President does not concur in the existence OF that
power, and was supposed 10 entertain an opinion that
the previous assent OF the States necessary Here
was unfortunate conflict Of opinion Here was a
for compromise and mutual concession, If the diff
ference could be reconciled Congress advanced 50
far towards compromise to allow the States to
press their or dissent but then thought that
this should be done within some limited but reason
able, time and it believed, since the Bank and its
branches established for the benefit of twenty six
States, if the authorities Of any one OF them really
could not make up their mind within that limited time
either to assent dissent to the Introduction Of
branch that il not able, after the lapse
Of the appointed time without any positive action, one
way the other Of the part ohe State to proceed as
as if il had assented. Now, if the power contended
for by Congress really exists ii must be admitted that
here was concession--a concession, according 10
which an unconditional power is placed under tempo
rary restrlcuons--a privilege offered to the States
which was not extended to them by either Of the char
tiers Of the two former Banks of the United States.
And am totally at loss to comprehend how the Pre-
sident reached The conclusion that it would have been
far better to say to the States, boldly and frankly,
Congress wills, and submission is demanded" Was
II better for the States that the power of branching
should be exerted without consulting them at all
w as 1t nothing to afford them opportunity OF say
ing whether they desired branches moi How can
it he believed that clause which qualities, restricts,
and limits the branching power, is more derogatory
from the dignity independence, and sovereignty OF the
States than If 1t nexorably refused TO the States any
power whatever to deliberate and decide the intro
duction of b-anches2 Limited the time was, and
Internationally az they were required to express them
selves, still those States and that probably would have
been the with the greater number) that chose 10
announce their assent dissent could do So and get
prevent the introduction Of branch. But the Pre-
sdent remarks that the State may express, after the
most solemn form ofcgislaton, its dissent which may
from time to time thereafter be repeated, in full view
OF its own interest which never be separated from
the wise and henefccnt operation of this Government
and yet Congress may by virtue Of the last provso
| override It's law, and upon grounds which, To such
State, will appear to rest on constructive necessity
and propriety, and nothing more.
Even if the dissent of State Should be overruled
in the manner supposed Ivy the President how is the
condition Of tina, State than it would have been
if the branching power had been absolutely and
conIltionally asserted in the charter2 There would
have been al least the power Of dissenting conceded
with high degree of probability that if the dissent
were ex pressed no branch would be introduced.
The last proviso to which the President refers is in
those words And provided nevertheless, That
whenever 1t shall become necessary and proper fol
carrying into execution any Of the powers granted by
the Constitution TO establish office Offices in any
of the States whatever and the establishment thereof
shall be directed by law, shall be the duty of the said
directors to establish such Office Offices accordingly
This proviso was intended 10 reserve N newer Ia