, 1841-03-20

ance OF the Executive power in the same
hands, there is, ! apprehend, not much less
from a lnisconstruction of that instrument. as
1t regards the powers actually given. | can
mol conceive that, by fair construction. anv
or either of its provisions would be found TO
constitute the President a part of the Legs
tive power. 1t cannot be claimed from the
power to recommend, since, although en-
joined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege
which he holds IN common with every other
citizen. And although there may be some.
thing more of confidence in the proprietv OF
the measures recommended in the one case
than IN the other in the Obligations of ulti-
mate decision there can be no difference
In the language OF the Constitution. .all the
legislative powers which it grants .are YES
ted IN the Congress of the United States
il would be a solecism in language TO say
that any portion of these is not included in
the whole.
1t may be said, indeed that the Constitu-
ton has given TO the Executive the power
70 annul the acts of the legislative BODY, by
refusing to them his assent. So similar pow
er has necessarily resulted from that instru-
ment 10 the Judiciary. and yet the Judiciary
forms no part of the Legislature. There is.
1t is true, this difference between these
grades OF power, The Executive can put his
negative upon the acts of the Legislature
for other cause than that of want ofconfnrmi-
ty to the Constitution. whilst the judiciary
can only declare void those which violate
that instrument. But the decision of the
Judiciary is finalin such case. whereas in
every instance where the veto of the ExeCu-
tire Is applied. 1t may be overcome by a
vote Of two-thirds Of both houses of Con
gress. The negative upon the acts OF tie
Legislature. by the Executive authority. and
that in the hands of one Individual. would
seem TO be an incongruitv in our systcm.-
Like some others of similar character. how
ever, it appears 10 he highly expctienf. and
II used only with the fOrbearancp. and in the
spirit which was intended by lis authors. il
may be productive of great good. and he
found one OF the best safeguards 10 the I'm
ion. At the period of the formation of the
Constitution, the principle does not appear
10 have enjoyed much favor in the State
Governments. 1t existed but in two. and in
one OF these there was 4 plural Executive.
If we would search for the motives which
operated upon the purely patiotic and en-.
iightened assembly which framed the Con-
stitutloD, for the adoption of 4 provision ap-
parcnily SO repugnant 10 the leading demo-
cratic principle, that the majority should
govern, we must reject the idea that they
anticipated from it any benefit to the ordina.
~ course of legislation. They knew too
well the high degree of intelligence which
existed among the people. and the eniiahten-
cd nharorsar Sc ,ho .,A l-l.z H.. i
them. would be worthy representatives Of
such constituents. and, Of course. that ticv
would require no aid in conceiying and ma
turing the measures which the circumstance
OF. the country might require. And it is
preposterous 10 suppose that n thought could
for 4 moment have been entertained. that the
President, placed at the Capitol. in the CEN
ire OF the country, could better understand
the wants and wishes OF the people. than
their own immediate representatives,, who
spend 4 part OF every year among them. liv-
ing with them, often laboring with them, and
bound to them by the triple tie of interest.
duty and affection. To assist or control
Congress, then. in IFS ordinary legislation
could not, | conceive. have been the motive
tor conferring the veto power on the PGesi.
dent.
This argument acquires additional force
from the fact of lis never having been thus
used by the first SIX PresidentS,-and two Of.
them were members of the Convention. one
presiding over its deliberations. and the 9th
er bearing Il larger share in concentrating the
labors of that august body than any other
person. But if bills were never returned to
Congress by either of the Presidents above
referred to, upon the ground of their being
inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they
might be to the wants of the people. the
veto was applied upon that of want of con-
conformity to the Constitution, or because
errors had been committed from Il too nasty
enactment
There is another ground for the adoption
of the veto principle, which had probably
more influence in recommending it to the
than any otter; | refer to the
security which it gives to tie just and equi-
able action OF the Legislature Upon NIL parts
,f the Union. 1t could not have occurred
o the convention that in 4 country SO extern
I'VE, embracing SO great 4 variety Of soil and
and consequently Of products. and
Which, from the causes, must ever exhibit
great difference in the amount of the poDu-