Litchfield enquirer. [volume] (Litchfield, Conn.) 1829-current, 1841-03-11

however, as b general remark, tn9I NePuOce cs.l
commit no greater error than 70 adopt or continue
any feature in their systems OF government whcn
may be calculated create or increase the oVe q
power, in the bosOms Of those 10 whom necessity on-
ges them TO commit the management OF their aE1ars.
And surely, nothing is more likely to produce snch
state OF mind than the long continuance OF an onlSe "
high trust. Nothing can be more corruptlng' no.hng
more destructive OF all those noble eenes ~,cn
When this corrupting passion once takes possession
OF the human mind, like the love OF gold, becomes
Unsuitable. 1t is the neverdying worm IN ms 1osom'
grows with his growth, and strengthens with ine Ge-
cining years Of its victim. II this IS :rue, 1t 10 me
part Of wisdom for republic TO limit the service OF
that officer, at least TO whom she has lnirusted the
management Of her foreign relations the execution OF
her laws, and the command OF her armies and naves,
to period short as to prevent his forgetting that ne
is the accountable agent no! the prnciPal-the ser
yan mot the master Until an amendment o. , .s
cure the desired object. give my aid 10 1t, by re-
newing the pledge heretofore gven.hat, under no cr
cuInstances, will consent to serve second term.
But il there is danger TO public liberty from the &C.
knowledged defects Of the Constitution, IN the want
Of limit to The continuance Of the Executive power IN
the same hands, there is apprellend not much less
from misconsIruciion Of that instrument as II re-
CARDS the powers actually giver. cannot conceive
that by lair construction, any ur either OF IFS proVl-
sons would be found to constitute the President part
OF the legislative power. 1t cannot be claimed from
the power to recommend, since, although enolned as
duty upon him, it is privilege which he holds IN
common with every. other citizen. And although
there may be something more OF confidence IN the
proprety Of the measures recommended IN tie one
case than in the other, in the obligations OF ultimate
decision there can be no difference In the language
Of the Constitution "a the legislative powers which
it grants are vested in the Congress OF the United
States" 1t would he solecism in language to say
that any portion of these is not included in the whole
1t may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has
given To the Executive the power 10 nnnu the acts oil
the legislative body by refusing to them ls assent
So similar pc ~er has necessarily resulted from that
instrument to the Judiciary; and yet the Judiciary
forms part Of the Legislature. There is, it Is true
this difference between those grants Of power :: the
Executive can put his negative upon the acts ot the
Legislature for other than that Of want OF con.
fornty to the Constitution, whilst the Judiciary con
But the decision Of the Judiciary is final in such
case, whereas, in every instance where the veto oil
the Executive is applied. it may be overcome ny n.y.
negative upon the acts Of the Legislative, by the Elk.
ecuve authority, and that in the hands OF one lndl-
viduai wonId seem 10 be an incongruty IN our sys-
tenn. Like some others Of a similar character. how.
ever, it appears to be highly exPedient; and il used
only with the forbearance, and in the spirit which
was intended by It's authors it may be productive OF
great good and be found OF the Safeguards to the
Union. AT the period Of the formation OF the Cnstl;
tuition, the principle does not appear 10 have enjoyed
much favor in the State Governments. 1t existed
but in two, and in one Of these there was plural
Executive. 1t we would search for the motives which
operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened as
sembly which framed the Constitution, for the adnp-
!ion Of q provision go apparently repugnant 70 the
leading democratic principle that me majority tnoald
from il any benefit to the ordinary course Of cgisla.
tion. They knew well the high degree Of intelli-
gence which existed among the People, and the en-.
have The fullest confidence that the two bodies elect
ed BY them would be worthy representatives Of such
and, of course, that they would require
no aid in conceving and maturing the measures
which the crcums,an Of the country might require
And 1t is preposerous TO suppose that thought could
for moment have been entertained. that the Prtsi-
dent PLACED at the Capital in the centre Of me souI
the people than their own immediate representatives.
who spend part Of every year among them, living
with them, often laboring with them, and BOUND to
assist control Congress, then, in it's ordinary e-
gsaon, could not, conceive, have been the motive
for comforting the veto power on the President This
argument acquires additional force from the tact OF
It's ha wing been used by the first six Presidents
and two Of them were members Of the convention.
one presiding over its deliberations, and the other
nav f6ody Than any other person Bit Y bss
were never returned TO Congress by either Of the Pre-
ing inexpedient, not well adapted they might
be to the wants Of The People, the veto WINS applied
upon that OF want Of conformity the Constitution
because errors had been committed from too has'y
There is another ground for the adoption ofhe Veto
principle, which had probably more influence in re.
commencing 1t to the convention than my other. l
refer to the security which gives to the just and sqn
liable action oil the legislature upon all parts Of the
Union. II could no, but have occurred to the con.
ven',on that in country 60 extensive, mbracing so
great variety Of soil and climate, and consequently
'f products. and which, from the same causes, must
ever exhibit great difference in the amount Of the
population Of its various sections. calling for great
legislation Of the majority might no, always justly re.
gard the rights and interests Of the minority. And
that acts Of this character might be passed under
express grant by the words Of the Cons.iI
therefore, not within the competency OF the judiciary
to declare void That, however enlightened and pat
rloiic they might suppose from past experience. the
members Of Congress might be, and however largely
parfakng in the general Of the liberal feelings Of the
people, was impossible to expect that bodies
stiiuted, should NOT sometimes be controlled by local
interests and sectional feelings. was proper, there
lore, TO provide some umpire. from whose situation
and mode OF appointment more independence and free
dom from snch influences might be expected. Sucha
one was afforded by the Executive Department, con.
stifntcd by the constitution. person elected to that
high Office. having his constituents in every section.
state and subdivision Of the Union, must consider
himself bound by the most solemn sanctions to guard,
protect and defend the right: 81 ALL and 9f every por
Of the rest consider the veto power therefore CIV
en- by the Constitution to the Executive Of the United
States, solely as conservative power; to be used
,niy, LIST. 10 protect the Constitution from violation
sGIy, the people from the effects Of hasty legislation,
where their will has been probably dsregarded or not
well understood and. Sdly. to prevent The effects Of
reference to the second Of these objects l may OBJ
serve that consider it the RICH. and privilege Of the
people to decide disputed points of the Constitution,
arising from the general grant Of power to- Congress
10 carry into effect the powers expressly given. And
believe, with Mr.. Madison, ",hat repeated reeogn.
lions under varied circumstances, in acts Of the le.
sisa,ive, executive, and judicial branches Of the CO.
accompanied by indications in different
modes OF the concurrence at the general will Of the
nation. afordinG the President sufficient auihor
~ for his considering such disputed points se,led
Upwards of half century has elapsed since the
adoption Of our present form of government. 1t
would be an object more highly desirable than the
qualification of the curiosity Of speculative statesmen