Bloomington herald. [volume] (Bloomington, I. T. [Iowa]) 1840-1849, 1841-03-26


granted to constitute despotism, If concentrated
in one of the departments. This danger is greatly
heightened, as it has been always observable that
| men are less jealous of encroachments Of one de-
partment upon another, than upon their own re-
served rights. When the constitution of the Uni
ted States first came from the hands of the Con-
vention which formed it, many of the sternest Re-
publicans of the day were alarmed at the extent Of
the power which had been granted to the federal
government, and more particularly of that portion
| which had been assigned to the executive branch.
There in 1t features which appeared not to be
in harmony with their ideas of simple representa-
tive Democracy or Republic. And knowing the
tendency of power to increase ITSELF particularly
when exercised by single individual, predictions
were made that, at no very remote period, the gov
| eminent would terminate In virtual monarchy. 1t
would not become me to say that the fears of these
patriots have been already realized But, as sin
cerely believe that the tendency of measures, and
of mems opinions, for some years past, has been in
that direction, it is, conceive, strictly proper that
should take occasion to repeat the assurances
have heretofore given of my determination to arrest
the progress of that tendency, if it really exists
and restore the government to its pristine health
and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any le
climate exercise of the power placed in my hands.
proceed to state in summary manner as
can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which
have been extensively complained of, and the
corectives which may be applied. Some Of the
former are unquestionably to be found in the defects
of the the Constitution others, in my judgment,
are attributable to misconstruction OF some OF its
provisions. Of the former is the eligibility Of the
same individual to a second term of the Presidency.
The sagacious mind of Mr.. Jefferson early saw and
lamented this error, and attempts have been made,
hitherto without success to apply the amendatory
power Of the States to its correction. AS, howev-
er, mode of correction is in the power of every
President, and consequently in mine, it would be
useless, and perhaps inydious to enumerate the
evils of which, in the opinion of many of our TEL
ow-citizens this of the sages who framed the
Constitution may have been the source, and the
bitter fruits which still to gather from it, if
it continues to dlsfgure our system. 1t may be
observed, however, as a general remark, that Re
publlcs can commit no greater error than to adopt
or continue any feature in their systems of Gov
eminent which may be calculated to create or In
crease the love of power, in the bosoms OF those
to whom necessity obiges them to commit the
management of their affairs. And, surely, moth
ing is more likely to produce such state of mind
than the long continuance OF Office OF high trust.
Nothing be more destructive of all those noble
feelings which belong to the character OF devoted
republican patriot. When this corrupting passion
once takes possession of the human mind, like the
love of gold it becomes Unsuitable. 1t is the
dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth,
and strengthens with the declining years of its
victim. If this is rue it is the part OF wisdom for
Republic to limit the service of that officer, at
least, to whom she has entrusted the management
of her foreign relations the execution Of her laws,
and the command of her armies and navies, to
period SO short to prevent his forgetting that he
ic no accountable not tho rrIucJnal the
want, not the master. Until an amendment of the
Constitution be effected, public opinion may
secure the desired object. | give my aid to it, by
renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under
no circumstances, will consent to serve second
term.
But if there is danger to public liberty from the
acknowle d4ed defects of the Constitution, in the
want of limit to the continuance of the Executive
power in the hands, there is, apprehend,
not much less from misconstruction Of that ms'ru
ment, as it regards the powers actually given.
cannot conceive that by fair construction, any
or either of its provisions would be found to con-
sttute the President part of the Legislative pow
or. 1t cannot be claimed from the power to recon-
mend since although enjoined as duty upon him.
it is privilege which he holds in common with
every other citizen. And although there may be
something more of confidence in the propriety of
the measures recommended in the one case than in
the other, in the obligations Of ultimate decision
there can be difference. In the language OF the
Constitution, "aIl the Legislative powers which it
grants 'are vested in the Congress of the United
States" 1t would be solecism in language to
say that any portion of these is not included in the
whole.
1t may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has
given to the Executive the power to annu the acts
of the legislative body, by refusing to them his as
,1foI
from that instrument the Judiciary, and yet the
Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature There
is it is true, this difference between these grants of
power; the Executive can put his negative upon
the acts of the Legislature for other cause than that
of want Of conformity to the Constitution, whilst
the Judiciary only declare void those which Vi
olate that instrument. But the decision of the Jul
dietary is final in such case, whereas in every
instance where the veto of the Executive is appli
ed it may be overcome by vote of two thirds of
both Houses of Congress. The negative upon
the acts Of the Legislature, by the Executive au-
thority, and that in the hands of one individual,
would seem to be an incongruity in our system.
Like some others of similar character, however,
it appears to be highly expedient, and if used only
with the forbearance, and in the spirit which was
intended by its authors, it may be productive of
great good, and be found one of the Safeguards to
the Union. At the period of the formation of the
Constitution, the principle does not appear to have
enjoyed much favor in the State Governments. 1t
existed but in two, and in one of these there was
plural Executive If we would search for the
motives which operate upon the purely patriotic
and enlightened assembly which framed the Con.
sttution, for the adoption of provision SO appa-
rently repugnant to the leading democratic prnci-
pie, that the majority should govern, we must
reject the idea that they anticipated from it any
e 4
knew too well the high degree Of intelligence
which existed AMONG the neone and the enliph.