The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-06-26
'ernmeni, might be


made instrument 10 It's overthrow
The second alternative suggested a reliance on the
surplus funds for the accomplishment of the objects
contemplated IL must be obvious fail in every in
stance The revenue OF The Government is generally
limited certain specified objects according 10 an es
tlmats for each and TO which il is appropriated The
fund raised sometimes falls short of the object Ii sell
dom exceeds il in any considerable amount. For the
want OF surplus must be idle in the Treasury until
appropriated, and appropriated provision for an
emergency-ior war Tor exampeit must still lie idle
IN The Treasury until that occurs be loaned
out IL could not lie idle The whole nation would
revolt against Il and loaned out Il might be mpos
sible 10 obtain when called for and il might be-
lost In this mode the regulation of the value of the
currency, OF exchange and of rendering service by ia
ci'aiing remittance would be aboriive. The third al
tentative which has been suggested reliance on the
State Banks, would be equally unproductive. The
Government would require aid except in time OF
war, when Immense sums would be necessary which
could be produced only by loans and when appca-
ton should be made TO them there good use To ap
prehend that each would endeavor 10 obtain the best
terms II could There is particular bond between
them and the National Government and impclled by
their interest and that Of the stockholders is natural
that they should pursue that Should such an
emergency arise menaced the overthrow Of the Gov
nmen the interest thereby excited might be para
mount, and force the Banks, under the direction OF
the stockholders, 10 unite in u common effort 10
the But the great object such
CRISIS by the command OF funds which would enable
the Government 10 arrest II. In every other object
the State Banks would fail. There being standard
to which all adhere connex ion between those
OF the different States, and many of them with limited
funds and IN embarrassed circumstances they would
neither regulate the value of coin, Of exchange, nor
| facilitate remttances.
| National Bank occupies different ground. Con-
necled with the Government by its charter and cap
ltal which consists of stock in which the Government
participates in certain degree, there is instance in
which, on principle, there be difference of inte
rest between them, and many powerful considerations
by which the interest otthe Bank must stimulate il 10
support the credit OF the Government in any situation
in which it may be placed If the credit of the stock
should sink, the capital of the Bank would decline in
equal degree the effect of which would be felt in all
its operations Its paper would deprecate and check
he gwen TO lis circulation, if not entire suspension
Standing at the head OF the moneycd operations of the
Government it is its intermediate agent in making
| mlttances to banks and individuals throughout the
Union and likewise between individuals from which
much credit and influence gained fnot profit IL has
the means and may be considered the most powerful
agent IN raising and sustaining the circulating medium
on par with specie throughout the u Mon and of Ell
evating the State Banks to that standard by subject
ing them to the necessity of reaching and adherlng to
it, to sustain their credit and even their existence
| Let the credit of the Government sink and all these
advantages are lost. The Bank, therefore, from
gard to interest, is bound to sustain it, The directors,
except the few appointed by the Government elect
ed by the stockholders and amenabe to them. 1t
gives its support therefore, 10 the Government prn
cples of national policy in the support of which is
interested, and would dsdain becoming instrument
| for any other purpose.
| The view above presented is supported by expert
ence and particularly by the events of the late war
When the commenced the Government had not
the funds which necessary to support it, and was
in consequence forced TO resort loans which
with difficulty obtained from any quarter, even In
limited degree and on untayorable terms. have not
the official documents before me, and state the
sources from which any loans were obtained, the
conditions, with the decline of the public credit the
war advanced ] well remember however, that when
was called by the President to the Department OF
War on the 3lst of August, 1914 the certificates OF
| the Treasury selling at $50 in the $780, by
which $50 were lost 1t was evident that, if reliance
was placed the sale of certificates only still fur
| theT decline would ensue, and that the worst conse-
quences might be apprehended The country was in
| vaded through the whole inland and maritime from
tiers, and powerful squadrons at the mouth of
every bay and river leading to our principal cities,
which were threatened with attack and rum. The
Metropolis of our Union had been forced, and its pub
lie buildings destroyed. Such the state of the
country and the funds when entered the Department
| of War Under such circumstances, an appeal was
made To the patriotism and interests Of the cities, and
banks within them, by the Department of War with
the sanction of the President for loans of money
cessary for their defence, for that of the maritime
frontier, and the Union. For the first loan that was
oblanedone million Of dollars from the city of New
/
Departmental price was fixed.
| As the Treasury notes were selling for $50 in the
$780, that claimed, but not acceded to. IL was
left for subsequent adjustment, to be settled on fair
principles Several millions of dollars were obtained
! from the District of Columbia and principal cities
throughout the Union and, according to my recollec
| ton, at par. This proves that until the Union is
| threatened with ruin, no loans can be obtained, IN
| emergencies without a National Bank, otherwise
than at great sacrifice These considerations led to
a change in my opinion, and induced me to concur
with the President in the propriey Of nstituting such
a bank, after the in 1915. As the constitutional
| objection IL formed no serious obstacle.
In voting against it, in the first instance, was gov
erncd essentially by policy. The construction gave
| TO the Constitution | considered a strict In the
latter instance it more liberal, but according 10
my Judgment justified by its powers.
The above sketch contains my sentiments on the
sqbjcct of your several nterrogatories, which com
municate to YOU for public view, but i'll spirit of
confidence. Since my retirement, have sought to
avoid all political controversies Having concured
with the President in the prope,y of iustituting the
latter bank my opinion was not withheld, as is, pre-
sumo, known, and ii remains unatercd. Should jus
tifcatlon of my conduct for the change of sentiment
in the interval between the institution of the first and
second bank become necessary, any other appeal is
made to make it public duty to explain the OF
that change | shall not withhold it, ] shall be attcn
tive TO the of events, and not fail to perform
that duty, should either call be made
am dear sir, with great respect and sincere re
JAMES MONROE.
SLAs L. BuRRows, Esq N. Y.
| MIR. CRAWFORD ON SAME SUBJECT
WOODLAND, Dec. 1881.
| Dear Sir Your friendly letter, the subject of
the u nted States Bank, has been received by due