The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1841-10-21


by the two first. While this would have, been
Jusuhed TO any extent demanded by the public
service, either Tor peace war; yet il cannot be
excused as means Of merely filling up va
cum created IN the Treasury at the same SEES
sion, and created for the purpose OF being filled
up by an increased tariff The three measures
which have noticed were parts of one system.
and their connection with the other measures of
the session, warrants one in believing that they
were all mere pretexts for reviving under spe-
cious DISCUSSES extravagant expenditures and a
nigh tariff. No one will be found to advocate
as measure OF fiscal expediency distribution
from an empty Treasury. The idea is so alb
surd as to excite surprise, and therefore we must
look elsewhere for the reasons of this distribu-
tive policy They will be found in the ne
cessities OF the debtor States and the Gu
Pidity oil manufacturers, and the same policy
which lnds It's pretext for high tariff
IN distributing the proceeds Of the lands will
hereafter seek pretext for one still higher
IN assuming the entire debt of the States. This
measure will aid in paying the interest Of the
State debts, the next will strike at the principal
Without regard to the inherent and invincible
objections 10 the principle Of such a measure, il
IS obnoxious TO the exporting States, because
they will have necessarily to pay much more
than they can receive. The future extension of
this system to the assumption of the State debts
IS foreshadowed BY an argument relied on now
TO justify the distribution of the proceeds of the
nds We are,teld that the money arising from
the sales Of the public lands is mol (ast has been
heretofore regarded) part of the public reve-
nue., and hence it will be easy 10 prove that the
vast sums already received and expended in
that character, constitute the basis Of debt due
from the United States TO the States united
This debt will have to be paid too as the distri-
button of the current proceeds now are, from
the taxes imposed at our custom houses, so that
TO the precise extent to which the treasury of a
State is relieved, whether for principal or inte-
rest, the Treasury of the United States Gov
eminent will have to be increased In other
words, State taxes may be diminished but Fed
era taxes must be increased, and the authority
and importance Of the Federal Governmentw
be augmented at the expense of the States.
After an experience of fifty years, the Gov
eminent of the United States is thrown back
upon system OF measures, almost identlcaly
the same as those which characterised the first
division Of political parties in 1891 measures
involving the whole scope of powers conferred
upon that government and those retained by the
States, involving the same financial dependen-
cIes OF these governments; and reasons are now
urged in behalf Of these measures, which, If
they ever had force, have long since been ex-
ploded, and are no longer applicable 10 the al
tered social and political condition of the coun-
try. The Sntes are no longer what the colonies
were. They have proved themselves capable
OF realizing what was anticipated by the fra
mers OF our federal compact They are the
pillars on which the Union may safely rest, and
the only danger is in the erection of an I'M
wieldy, ovushadowing superstructure which
will find its own ultimate ruin in their weakness.
They are capable of mpartipg vitality and
strength to tne Federal Government, but it is
as constituent body imparts to its representa-
tive, and not as mental to sovereign.
We are then compelled by necessity over
which we have no control, to meet these ques
tons, as they have been met, as questions of
power, involving the gust purposes and legiti-
mate designs Of the Federal Government. We
now hear as was said in 1871, that besides the
other accessions to the credit of the States from
federal legislation il is necessary for Congress
10 create a National Bank not to aid as mere
fiscal agentin establishing the credit of the Fed
eral Government, but to give currency to the
States. The credit of the Federal Gov ernmcnt
is now better than that of any bank. 1t could
not now as il did in '9l, derive credit from its
association with individuals. On the contrary,
it has now the power (and it is invoked 10 use
it) to bestow credit on corporation and indi-
viduals
There are many causes consplrlng to render
the subject of the currency one OF the most
complex in our system of government, and TO
conceal from observation the true sources of our
embarrassments. All the errors of State and
Federal legislation with all the evils resulting
from the blunders Of seven and twenty govern
ments, and much of the disappointment of pri-
vate indiscrction, all is ascribed to deranged
currency. An excited fancy is too apt to depict
a bank as the great moral and political panacea.
While these ideal benefits are so much eXagge-
rated, they who venture to call public attention
TO what they consider the true causes and the
true cure of our deranged currency are denounc-
ed as enemies of the credit system. AT the ha-
card of mourning this accommodation, must in
vite your attention 10 this subject as one of more
practical Importance to you than a presidential
election nearly four years in advance. ! aver
then as the result Of some reflection, that the
whole difficulty on this subject proceeds from
the radical defects of our banking system. If
the state banks were what they should be, there
would be no necessity for the agency Of the Fee
dera Government TO be invoked TO protect the
people against the incompetency, the frauds or
the decisions of their own local banks. Con
ccding (what am not satisfied is the act) that
National Bank could be created and so man
aged as to afford relief against the evils of tn.
State bank system, such relief in the nature of
things must be only temporary, and would fall
far short of the inherent evils of the system il
self There is more danger, apprehend, that
the State banks, as they are now constituted and
Tor the most part administered, would overrule
a National Bank for evil, than that II would
overru them for good. The chiefgood anticipa
ted from United States Bank is the caution and
restriction it would impose on the issues of the
State banks. MAY not the State governments
do this or is il admitted that bank once crea-
ted is beyond the reach Of the Government Gre
ating it Our State banks in many instances
(it is certainly in Virginia) are part and par
eel Of the government BY errors OF legls-
laton as conceive, they have become so lden
tilted with the operations of the Government
Qtsef banker) that the representatives of the |
people dare notrequire The banks oobcy the laws.
They have attained TO species of exemption
from laws which bind the State itself and every