The Camden journal. [volume] (Camden, S.C.) 1836-1851, 1841-02-03

the result, or surel Y they would not have
been so zealously and necessarily urgee
by those who advocated the claims of the
buccessfuI candidate. How then, can gen
slemen now turn round, and tell us tha
there was but single question at ISSUE
tand that question the Sub-Treasury! .
But he, Mr.. G. desired to speak with
perfect candor. Though he by no means
considered it certain, yet there was rea'
SON to fear that majority of the oommu-
nifty was opposed to that highly important
measure. If such should turn out to be
the fact, he would regret it profoundly;
but are gentlemen certain that there is a
majority in favor Of any alternative mea-
sure that can be presented, and that there
is not a majority in its favor, against any
such alternative! That is the point. Let
me tell gentlemen. when they come 10
the real quesiion-not only whether the
Sub b-Treasury shall be repealed, but what
shall be substituted, they will not find so
easy victory as they expect. That is
the question which you must meet, and it
will be in vain to attempt to elude it. As
to one of the only two possible alterna.
tives-he referred to the repudiated and
condemned pet bank system-which the
gentlemen had so Justly denounced so far
back as 1884, on the question Of the re-
moval of the deposites, as the most tal'
lacious, rickety, and corrupt system
which could be adopted, which they pro-
phesied, and truly prophesied, would ex-
plode and blow up its authors, he took it
for granted that there was no danger OF
that being imposed on the country by the
coming administration. He trusted that
would not be the result of all the late agl-
tation, and the decided victory they had
achieved.
As to the other alternatives National
Bank-he weuld not 60 into that now
1t will be time enough, after General Har-
rison comes in, and recommends it to
our adoption, if with his constitutional
objections, he ever should. But come
when that time might, if it ever should, ne
should stand up and resist it with every
faculty, and all the energy with which ma
.ure had bestowed on hin; for, as he lived,
he believed the day on which National
Bank shall be established, with capital
Of fifty or a hundred millions, and TWEEN
ty years duration, and with power and
privileges sufficient to control the curren-
cy and business of the country, would be
the end of our liberty, and would as effec-
tually create a sovereign power, as if
General Harrison were elected President
for life; with the right Of succession in
his descendants, and even more so.
To either of these, the much abused
Sub Treasury will be found to be the only
condemned and villi6ed as it
was, the country, if it desired to preserve
its free institutions, must come to il; nor
was ii less for the advantage of the banks
than the country, that it
should. Yes, for the banks, he knew
what he said; he weighed every word
He regarded those the greatest enemies,
in reality. to the banks, however kind
their intention, who would force them
again into union with the Government,
o. ngaiast the deep conviction of the lnjus-
lice, impolicy and upconstituhonality of
such union, Of powerful and determined
party, not much inferior in numbers than
their opponents, if tested even by the
late election; for, however strong the vote
in favor of Gen. Harrison, it did not much
exceed one hundred thousand out of up 1
wards Of two millions of votes. If, a.
yainst the fixed opinion of this powerful
lesolute party, the coming Administra-
ion should force reunion between bank
md Government, they would, at the
SAME time, force them into the political
arena of party conflict, which could not
all TO overthrow the whole system in its
moments. He warned the
banks, and those invested in them, against
he fatal tendency Of their indiscreel
friends, who would, under such circum-
stances, force the reunion. He was no
enemy to the existing banks, while he
had no confidence in the system as it ex-
isted in this country and Great Britain.--]
He believed that banks Of issue and circu.
|ation were founded on a mistake, and
must run down, by their own inherent
defects, against every effort to stay their
descent, and had long thought so; but
he made no war on them, and never had.
They were running down of themselves,
according to his impression, too fast for
the good Of the country, and his policy
was to retard, and not accelerate their de-
scent. He acted on the same principle
in 1894. when the deposits were removed: