Carroll free press. [volume] (Carrollton [Ohio]) 1834-1861, 1841-11-05
Mr. SECRETARY UPSHUR.

PuOlSnCu VOIuHo ldst yedFy "a OTleI
Inquiry into the true Nature and Char.
= acter Of our Federal Gove-nment."-
We are indebted to the Richmond Whig,
for the two following extracts from this
book, showing Judge Upshur's views
on the veto power, and the one term
principle We publish these extracts
as we find them-and marvel that the
author Of such sentiments should have
found so much favor at the White House.
As to the veto power he says:
"Another striking imporlection Of the
Constitution, as respects the Executive
department, is found in the veto power.
The right to forbid the people to pass
whatever laws they please is the right
10 deprive them Of self government-
1t is a power which can never be en-.
trusted to one man, or any number OF
men short Of the people themselves,
without the destruction Of public liberty.
1t is true that each department OF the
Government should be armed with a
certain power Of self protection against
tho assaults of the other departments;
and the Executive probably stands most
in need Of such protection. But The We.
10 power, as it stands in the Constitution,
goes far beyond this object 1t is, ia
effect, power in lhe Executive Depart
ment 10 forbid all action in any orher.-
IT is true that, Notwithstanding the veto
of the President, law may still be pas.
sed, provided tWo thirds OF each house
Of Congress- agree therein; but it is
obvious that the cases are very rare in
which concurrence could he expected
In cases Of plan necessity or policy
'he veto would not be applied, aud
those Of doubtful necessity or policy
would rarely be carried by majority
so large as two-lhlrds of each house.
And yet IN these it may be just as i'm
portnnt that The public will should be
carried out, as in cases Of less doubt or
difficulty. Ii may be, also that Pres
ident may oppose the passage Of laws
Of the pIainest aud most pressing ne
cesslty. And Ifhe should do so, it would
certainly give him most improper
power over the people, TO enable him
TO prevent the most necessary IegisIa
ton, with on y one third Of each house
Of Congress in his favor There is
something incongruous in this union Of
Legislative and Executive powers in
the same man. Perhaps it is proper
that there should be power somewhere
to check hasty and ilI.considered Iegis
latlon, and that power may be as we'll
entrusted to the President as to any 9th.
or authority. But it is not necessary
that it should be great enough TO pre-
vent all legislation, nor to control in
any respect the free exercise Of the Ie-
glsIaliVe will. 1t would be quite enough
for The security Of the rights Of tho Ex
eCutlVe and quite enough to insure TEN
perale and wise Legislation, TO aulhoriso
the President merely to send back to
the Legislature for reconsideration any
law which he djsapproved By thus
ahordng 10 that body time and opportu-
nifty for reflection, with all the addition
al lights which the President himself
can throw upon tho subject, we should
have every reasonable security for the
due exercise OF tho legislative wisdom,
and fair expression oI the public will.
But il, after all this, the Legislature in
both its branches, should still adhere
TO their opinion, the theory and the
sound practice of all our institutions re.
quire that their decision should be bind
ing and final
In speaking the one term principle he
Snys;
The re eligibility Of the President,
from term TO term, is the necessary
source Of numberless abuses. The fact
that the same President may be elected
not for a second term only, but for a
third or fourth or twentieth, will ere
long suggest to him the most corrupling
uses of his powers, in order TO secure
that object. AT present there is no dan
ger of this, Presidents are now made,
not by the free sut'ragcs Of the people,
but by party management; aud there
are always more than Que IN tho sue
cessluI party. who are looking lo their
own turn IN the Presidential office. II
Is too carly yet for a monopoly of that
high honor; but the time will come
when the actual incumbent will fad
means 10 buv off opposition, aud 10 IN
sare continuance IN office by proslilu.
ting the trusts which beoog 10 it.
This is so obviously within the nnlural
eOurse oI things, that It may veil excite
our surprise that the convention should
have left The pablo liberty wholly un
guarded at 80 assa'labIo poIut, 1t is
surely a plain dictate of wisdom, aud a
necessary provision IN every free Gov
ernmcnt, that lhero should be some def
nile limit IL tho duration Of Executive
power in the same hands. We cannot
hope to be lr3o from tue CorrLptlons
which result from an abnse OF PresidPn,