Rutland herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1823-1847, 1840-01-07

Hu, this chain of dependence does not stop
here. Ii docs not terminate At New York or
Philadelphia. IL reaches across the ocean,
and ends IN London the centre Of the credit
system. The same laws of trade which gave
TO the banks m our principal cities power over
the whole banking system OF the United States
subject the former N their tom, 20 the money
power 10 Great Britain. Ii is not denied that
the suspension Of the New York Banks In
1897, which was followed in quick succession
throughout the Union, was produced by an APP
plicaiion OF that power and il is now allodged
In excavation Of the present condition Of so
large a portion OF our banks, that their embar-
easements have arisen from the same cause
From this Influence they cannot now entire
ly escape, for II has its origin IN the credit
currences of the two countries il is strength
cned by the current OF trade and exchange
which centres in London, and is rendered al
most irresistible by the large debts contracted
there by our merchants, our banks and our
States. II is thus that an Introduction of a
new bank into the most distant of our villages
places the business Of that village within the
influence of the money power of England. II
is thus that every new debt which we contract
in that country, seriously affects our own cur
rency. and extends over the pursuits Of our
citizens its powerful influence. We cannot
OF small, State or National. The same chains
which bind these now existing 10 tho centre
of the system of paper credit, mus, equally fet-
ter every similar institution we create. IL is
! only by the extent TO which this system has
been pushed of late, that we have been made
! fully aware of lis irresistible tendency TO sub
lect our own banks and currency to a vast
controlling power in foreign land and it adds
a new argument to those which illustrate their
precarious situation. Endangered in the first
! place by their own Encouragement, and again
| by the conduct of every institution which con-
meets them with the centre Of trade IN our own
country. they are yet subjected, beyond all
this, to the effect Of whatever measures policy
necessity or caprice may induce those who
control the credit of England to resort to.
mean not to comment upon these measures,
present or past and much less to discourage
the prosecution of fair commercial dealing be-
tween the countries, based on reciprocal ben
efits but it having now been made manifest
that the power of inflictiug these and similar
| injuries, is, by the resstess law of a credit
currency and credit trade, equally capable of
| extending their consequences through all the
ramifcatons Of our banking system, and by
| that means indirectly obtaining, particularly
when our banks are used as repositories of
the public moneys, dangerous political in
| fluence in the United States. / have deemed
it my duty TO bring the subject TO your notice,
and ask for il your serious consideration.
| Is an argument required beyond the expo
sition of these facts, to show the Improperly
of using our banking institutions as deposito-
ries of public moneys! Can we venture not
only to encounter the risk Of their individual
and mutual mismanaoement, but, at the same
! time, to place our foreign and domestic policy
| entirely under the control of a foreign money
| ed interest To do SO is to impair the indie
| pendence of our Government, as the present
credit system has already impaired the indie
pendence of our banks. 1t is to submit all its
important operations, whether of peace or war
| to be controlled or thwarted at first by our
own banks, and then by power abroad grea-
ter than themselves. | cannot bring myself
to depict the humiliation to which this gov
eminent and people might be sooner or later
reduced, fthe means for defending their rights
are to be made dependent upon those who
may have the most powerful of motives to i'm
pair them.
Nor is il only in reference to the effect of
this state of things on the Independence of our
Government or of our banks, that the sub
lect presents tselffOr consideration it i, to
be viewed also in its relations to the general
trade OF our country The time is not long
past when deficiency of foreign crops was
thought TO afford a profitable market for the
surplus of our industry but now we wait with
isverish anxiety the news of the English har-
vest, not so much from motives of commenda-
Bile sympathy, but fearful lest its anticipated
failure should narrow the field of credit there.
Does not this speak volumes to the patriot +
Can a system be beneficent wise, or lust,
which creates greater anxiety for interests de-
pendent on foreign credit than for the general
prosperity of our own country, and the profit
able expectation of the surplus produce Of our
labor I
The circumstances TO which have advert
ed appear to me to afford weighty reasons, de-
veoped by late events, to be added to those
which have on former occasions offered,
when submitting to your better knowledge and
discernment the propriety of separating the
custody Of the public money from banking in
stitutions. Nor has anything occurred to les
sen, in my opinion, the force of what has been
heretofore urged. The only ground on which
that custody can be desired by the banks, is
the profitable use which they may make Of the
money. Such use would be regarded in in
dividuals as a breach OF trust, or crime Of
great magnitude, and yet it may be reasona-
bly, doubted whether, first and last, il is not at
tended with more mischievous consequences,
when permitted To the former than 10 the lat
ter. The practice Of permitting the public
money 10 be us ID by its keepers as here, is
believed TO be peculiar 10 this country, and 10
exist scarcely any where else. To procure it
here, improper influences are appealed TO
unwise connections are established between
the Government and vast numbers Of power
ful state institutions; other motives than the
public good are brought 20 bear both on the
Executive and Legislative departments, and
selfish combinations, leading 10 special legis-