The Columbia Democrat. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1837-1850, 1840-01-04

mediate influence upon them, It becomes
our duty to see that proper direction is
given TO it. While the keeping of the pub
l,c revenue in separate and independent
Treasury, and of collecting 1t in gold and
silver, will have a salutary influence on the
system of paper credit with which all banks
are connected, and thus aid those that are
sound and well managed, it will at the
same time sensibly CHECK such as are 9TH !
crwise, by at once Withholding the means
Of extravaganza afforded by the public
funds, and restraining them from excessive
issues OF notes which ;hey would be coa-
stanlly called upon 10 redeem.
am aware it has been urged that this control I
may be best attained aud exefed by means of Ma |
tiouul Bunk, The Constitutional objections which
am well known to entertan would prevent me in
any event from proposing or dissenting to that re-
mcdy; but in addition to this, cannot after past
experience, bring myself to think that it can any
longer he regarded as effective for such purpose.
The history Of the late National Bank through all
its mutations shows that it was not so. On the
contrary, it may, after careful consideration of the
subject, be, think, safely stated that every period
Of banking excess took the ca1 that in 1917, and
lSl0 in 1929 in 1881, and in 1884, its vast expan4
sons, followed hy distressing contraciione, led TO
those of the State institutions. 1tswellcd and mad
dened tho tides of the banking system, but seldom
OIayed or safely directed them. At few periods
only was salutary control exercised, but an eager
desire, on the contrary, exhibited for profit in the
first places and IT, afterwards its measures were Sc
we're towards other institutions, it because its
own safety compelled it TO adopt them. 1t did not
differ from them in principle or in fom; it's meas
urcs eminacd from the spirit ofgain; it felt the
same temptation to overissues it suffered from, and
was totally unable to avert those inevitable laws Of
trade, by which it was itself affected equally with
them; and at least OF one OCCASION at an early day,
/ it was saved only by extraordinary cxertions from
the same fate that attended the weakest institution
it intended TO supervise. In 1884, it failed, equally
with others, IN redCcmng its notes, though the two
years allowed by its charter for that purpose had not
expired, large amount Of which remains to the
present time outstanding. 1t is true that having so
vast a capital and strengthened by the use of all
the rovenucs Of the Government, it possessed more
power; but while it was itself by that clrmstanee
freed from the control which all banks require, its
paramount objects and inducements were left the
same-to make the most for its Stockholders not to
regulate the currency Of the country. Nor has it,
as far as we are advised been greatly otherwise
elsewhere. The national character given to the
Bank of England has not prevented excessive fuc-
tiiatons in their currency, and it proved unable to
keep of IA suspension of specie payment, which
lasted for near quarter Of century. And why
should we expect it to he otherwlsel A national
institution, though deriving its charter from differ
ent source from the state banks, is yet constituted
upon the same principles; is conducted by men G.
, qualy exposed to temptations; and is liable to the
same disasters with the additional disadvantage
that its magnitude occasions extent of confusion
and distress which the management of smaller inst.
tnn,la pDuiI uDi DroInrC If can GnarplV bp 1Orht
ed that the recent supcnson of the United States
Bank OF Pennsy lvauia-of which the effects no
felt in that state alone but half the Unon;had it
origin in course Of business commenced while i
national institution; tG there is good reasor
for supposina that the same consequences would
: not have followed had it still derived its power
{ from the General Goyernment 1t is in vain whcl
= the influences and impulses are the same, to lool
for difference in conduct or results. By such ere
atons we do therefore but increase the mass Of pa
per credit and paper currency, without checknj
their attendant evils and fluctuations. The exton
of power and the efficiency Of organization whicl
we give, so far from being beneficial in practic
4 positively Injurious They strengthen the chair
Of dependence throughout the Union subject all part
more certainly TO common disaster, and bind ever,
bank ciicctualy in the first instance, TO thos
u of our commercial Cities and, in the end to d 70
reign power IN word, cannot but believe tina
= with the 1u understanding 0f the operations o on
/. banking system which experience has produced
public sentiment is not less opposed to the creation
ola National Bank for purposes connected with III
currency and commerce, than for those connecte
e with the sisca! operations of the Government
r Yet the commerce and currency of tn
: country are suffering evils from The opera
lions of the State banks which cannot ant
S ought not to be overlooked. BY thei
!; means, we have been flooded with depre
@ ciated paper, which it was evidently the de
i sign of the trainers Of the Consultation t
r prevent, when they required Congress t
y " coin money and regulate the value Of io
5 reign coins" and when they forbade tn
n States " 10 coin money, emit bills Of credit
+, make any thing but gold or silver "A tende
II in payment of debts" or "poss any lax
e repairing the obligations Of contracts" ]
C they did not guard more explicitly agans
i the present state of things, it was boCaus
Il they could not have anticipated thatthe fev
e banks then existing were to swell to an ex
7 tent which would eXpel to so great degrc
+ the gold and silver, for which they had pro
g vided, from the channels of circulation, an
Gil them with currency that defeats tn
!, objects they had in view. The remedy 10
u this must chiefly rest with the States fron
u whose legislation il has sprung No guot