The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1840-01-30
NUMBER Is.

feet shape where and when alone Inc Opin'
IONS of the Executive may be heard. 4
community of power in the Executive De-
partments must necessarily lead 20 danger
Gus Communications and greatly to the advan-
tage Of President DESTROYS of extending
his power. Such constitution could new
or have been contemplated by those who
/ framed IT, as they well knew that those who
proposed the bills will always take care OF
themselves, or the interest Of their coDsth.
ueH,s; and hence the provision in the con-
siituiion, borrowed from that Of England,
restricting the originating Of Reseuue bills
TO the immediate representatives Gf the PEG.
pie. So far from agreeing Ia opuiun with
the distinguished character who lately re.
tired from the Presidency that Congress
should have applied TO him for project u
a Banking System, think that such an ap.
plcaiion would have manifested not ouiy
great subseryiency upon the part Of that DO.
dy, but an unpardonable ignorance oil the
chief danger 10 be aPpTehendcd from such
an institution. That danger uuquesliona-
bly, consists in an union Of interest between
the Executive aud the Bank. Wohld on
ambitions incumbent Of the Executive chair
neglect so favorable an opportunity as the
preparing Of the law would give him to N.
sert IN II provisions to secure hls influence
over IT In the authority gwen 10 the
Preslden, by the constitution "to recon-
mend to Congress such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expendient, It was Ger.
tainiy never intended that the measures he
recommended should be presented 10 q shape
suited for The immediate decision Of the
Legislature.
The sages who made the constitution,
TOO well knew the advantages which tho
crown Of England derived from the exercise
Of this power By lis ministers, TO have in.
tended Il TO be used by our chef magistrate,
or the heads Of department under his con-
troll. The boosted principle in the English
constitution, that the democratic branch OF
the government was not only necessary 10
receive money from the people, but that 1t
was lis unavoidable Prorogat;ve also 10 or
iguale all the bills for that purpose, is true
~ theory as in the letter, but rendered ut.
lerIy false and nugatory in effect, BY the
participation of the ministers OF the crown
in the detail Of Legislation. Indeed the IN.
fuence they derived from sitting as mem-
bers Of the House Of Commons, and from
welding the immense patronage ofthe crown
constitutional or usurped) gives them the
power over thai body, that renders plausi.
bic at least the base hattery, or as it s more
probable, The intended sercasns OF Sir Wal.
ter Raleigh, IN an address to James the LIST,
that the demand If the sovereign upon the
Commons for pecuniary aid, was intended
only that the tax might seem TO como
from themselves" whereas the inference is,
ii was really LAID BY the sovereign himself.
Having thus gwen you my opinion Of
things which might be done, and others
which might not be done, by President
coming INTO power by the support of those
Of the people who are opposed TO the prlnci-
pies upon which the present administration
is conducted, you will see that have omit
ted one, which re deemed by many Of as
much importance es any other. aflude
TO the appointment Of members Of Congress
10 office BY the President. The Constitu.
ton contains no prohibition Of such appoint
meuts, no dQubt because lis authors could
not believe IN lis necessity, from the purity
OF character which was manifested by those
who had the confidence of the people a, that
period. 1t is, however, an opinion very
generally entertained BY the opposition par.
ty, that the country would have escaped
much of the evil under which It has suffer-
ed for some years past, II The constitution
had contained a-provislon OF that klnd.--
Having had no opportunity of personal OBJ.
servation on the conduct OF the administra.
ton for the last ten years, am unable 10
decide upon the truth OF error OF this optn-
ion, And should be very willing that the
known subserYiency of the Legislature to
the Executive, in several memorable in-
stances, should be accounted for IN way
somewhat less injurious TO the character of
our country and Republlcanisn Itself, than
by the admission that the Fathers OF the
land, the trusted servants of a virtuous PEG.
pie, could be seduceG from the path Of duty
aud honor, by the paliry trappIngs and
emoluments of depending Offices. But if
the evil really exists, and if there be good
reason TO believe that Ifs source is to be-
found IN the compatibility of the members
of the Legislature, an atiectual remedy can
not be too soon applied.
And it happens in this case that there is
q choice Of remedies. One Of those, how
ever, is in ms opinion free from the obIec-
lions which might DC offered to the other.
The one 10 which object is, that which
the late President has been so loudly called
upon to adopt, 10 consequence of a promise
made at the commencement Of his admins.
tralion, VIZ: that the Executive, under no
circumstances, should appoint TO office a
member of either branch of the National
Legislature. There are, in my mind, sew
eral weIghty reasons against the adoption
Of this principle. viii detaln you .Ith the
mention of but two of them, because ! be-
l,eve that you will agree with me, that the
alternative | shall present, while it would
l. At contains M, faafn.o