Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1840-01-03

WO'lUp 'n"sE w fCulONs whence " CONES,
While the latter possess no means Of re-
sraining 'hcm 50 that the value of iodiId-
uol properly and the prosperity of ,tnic,
through the whole Interior of the ccun
Try, are maze 10 depend on tho good
or bad management of the bank inr irtll-
'u''ons IN the great seats of trade aud on
tho scoboard.
Bn' this chain Of dependence does no,
stop here. |, DOES not terminate ar Phil
adelphia or New York. I, reaches across
tho ocean and ends in London, The centre
of he credit system. The same law, OF
trade which give to the banks in our
principal cities power over the whole bank
ing system Of the United Safes, subipc,
the FORMER. in 'hclr turn. 10 The money
power in Great Britain. It is not denid
that the suspension of,he New York banks
in 1887, which was followed 10 quick sue
ccss'on throughout the Uoion. was pro.
doced by an application Of That power;
aud 1t is now alleged, in c,lcDua'ion Of
the present condition Of 50 hrge por
ton Of our banks, that Their embarrass-
mon's have arisen from the same cause.
From this influence they cannot now
entirely escape. for It has its origin in the
y credit currences of the two countries, it
is strong hened by The ctrtont Of trade
and exchange, which centr,s IN London. IL
l. rendered almost irresistb e by the large
'eb's contracted there by our merchants
our banks and our states. It is thus tina,
al Introduction Of a new bank in to the
most dls,art Of our VILLAGES, places the
business Of that village within he ithnencc
Of The money power in England. |, IA thus
that every new debt which we contract IN
that country, seriously affects our own
currency, and extends over the pursuits
Of our ellzens lis powerful Influence. We
cannot escape from this by max ing new
banks, great or small, state or national.
The sane chains which bind those now
exisingto the centre Of this system Of pa
per credit must equally fe'ter every SIM
liar Institution we create. 1t is only by
thu eX,elt to which tbs system has been
pushed o la'e, that we have been made
fully aWae of its irresistible tendency TO
subject or own banks and currency Ia
a vast conrolling power in foreign land
and It add new argument to those which
illustrate heir prfcarlnUs si'ua'lon,sD En-
! dangcred u the first place by their own
mlsmanageucnt and again by the conduc,
of every Institution which connects them
with the cc,'re Of trade n our own c0un
try. hcv ar, :uhi eced, beyond all this
to the etfectVi whatever measures policy
necessity. or coprico, NAV induce those
who u'rol tie credits Of Eng land to resort
10. ! mean not 10 comment upon these
measures. present or past, and much less
TO discourage lhc prosecution OF fair com.
merc,aI dealing between the two countries
based on recipient benefits but it hav
inr now been made manifest mat the pow
er OF lnn letting 'hese and similar minries.
Is. by he reSlS'le>s law ofcredtt currency
and credit trade equally capable OF extend.
ing their cons quenccs through all Tho
ramifica'ions of our banking system, and
by hat means ind rectly obtain ing, psrrjcn.
Iarly when cur banks are used as deposit
tories Of tho public moneys, dangerous
p'1N,c,i il ilrcnc, in ,hr Uni'cd S'n,ea. |
have deemed It ny dn'y to briug the sub
jet to your no ice, aud ask for it your se>
rlous consideration.
Is an argument required beyond The ex
position of 'hese facts to show the impro.
prlcty of using our banking institutions es
repositories Of the public money, Can
we venture MT only to encounter the
risk OF their ird vldual and mu'unl mla'
management. BIT at the same llmc.io place
cur 'Oroirn an, domestic policy entirely
under the con''Ol ola foreign mnncvPd IN
terosl To do 50 Is 10 impair the indr.
pcndcncn Ut on vernmpnt, as the pre-
sent credit sysom has already impaired
the Indepcnc" ,ur banks. II is 10 submu
all - important operations. whether
of peace or war. to be controlled ar
'hwar'ed at fis, by our banks, nud then
by power abroad greater than themsc ives
! canuh bang myself TO dep CT The hum,l.
ln'Iun ~ whlchrhls government and pro
pie might b. s'nror or later reduced, !,
the means for defending their rights are
10 BE- made DEPENDENT upon those who may
have the most powerful OF motives to I'M
pair then.
Nor is IL oily in reference to the eff.c
lhlS state of lngs on the ,ndcpcndcnce %
our government or Of our banks, that the
auliect prcscus l'sef for consideration
1t j. to b. viewed also IN It's relations :,
the gcnrnl tade Of our country. The
',mp Is m. log past when a deficiency o
foreign croDswas thought to afford pro
fi,nbie ma Ike for the surplus of our indus
try but nowwe wait with feveiish INK
,ely the wnf the English harvest. no
so much from motives OF commenahle sym
! pa'hy, but 'e,rful lest its ANTICIPATED ia,i
IRE should nr,oW The field of credit Their,
, Does not TIL speak volumes to the pat
rlo'' Can system b. bene fcenr, WISE
or just, wht creates greater Anxiety 70
interests DEPENDENT on foreign creduthal
for the gengal prosperity Of our own com
try and the Profitable expectation Of til,
surplus prodlce of our labor'
The circumstances to which I hav
thus adverhd, appear to me to ufior,
we'ghry reaons. developed by late event
to be added o those which have on for
mer occasions offered, when submittln.
to your better knowledge and dlscernmen
The proprietv OF separating the custody O