Lexington union. (Lexington, Miss.) 1838-18??, 1840-01-24

control may be best attained and excrtcd
by means OF "A National Bank. The con-
stltulonal objections, Which | am well
Known TO entertain, would prevent me ~
any event from proposing or asserting to
that remedy; but in addition to this, /
cannot, alter past experience, bring my.
sell to think that 1t can any longer be eX.
ienslvely regarded as affective fnr such
purpose. The history Of the late Nation.
ional Bank through all lis mutations
shows that 1t was not 50. On the coatra.
rs, II may, after careful consideration oi
the su(J CT, be, think, stated, tia, at eve
Iry period Of banking excess it took the
lead; that in 1917, and 1918, ia 1923, in
1851 lis vast expansion, followed ty dis.
iresslng coniractlons, led TO those Of the
Safe Institutions. 1t sNelied and mad.
dened The tides Of the banking system, but
seldom aIIayed, or safely directed them.
at few periods only was a salutary con
rel exercised, Gni an eager desire, on tie
contrary, exhibited for profit in the frs
! place; and il, attefvaid. ITS measures
were severe towards olher institutions, il
WAS because lis own safety compelled Il to
ad pit them. Ii did not differ from them
IN pfInciP'e or IN fJrm; its measures
c0anted from the same spirit Of gain; j.
tell the same temptation to ovcri-sues il
suffered from, aad was totally unable t.
avert, those Inevitable laws Of trade, BY
which il was Itself affect d equally viii,
them, and at least on one occasion, at an
early day, il was saved ouly by eXtraor.
dinaly cXegtlous from the same fate jhat
attic aded the weakest institution il profess.
ed 10 supervise. In 1887 ii failed equal
| ~ with others, in redremng lis notes,
though the two years allowed ~ its char
ter ter that purpose lad no; EXPIRED Il
large amount of which remains TO the
present time outstanding. ! is trge, that
having so vast capital, and Strengthened
/ lay the use Of all the revenues OF the gov
eminent, II possessed more power; but
while il was Itself, by that circumstance,
! freed from The control which all banks re-
qnIre,its paramount jecl and induccmeut
were left the same-io make the mos, for
rs stockholders, nor 10 regulate the cur.
rcncy Of The country. Nor has it, lis far
as we are advised byeu found t. be greatly
otherwise elsewhere. The national char.
acter given to the Bank of Eaal,nd has
not nrevcne1 excessive fluctuations in
heir currency, add 1t proved unable to
keep of a suspension Of specie payments,
winch lasted for nearly Il quarter ot ecu
tufy. And Why should we expect it 10
be otherwise? A National institution,
though deriving its charter from "a different
souI:e than the State banks, is yet consi-
tated upon ;hc same principles, is cGnluc-
ted by men equally exposed to tenptalion,
and is liable TO the same disasters, with
/ The additional disadvantage that its mag.
nltude occasions an extent OF confusion
and distress v hch the misn)auagemeni OF
smaller institutions could produce. Il
can scarcely be doubted that Tie recent
suspension Of the United States Bank of
Penusy lyania, Of which the effects are
felt not 10 that State alone, but over half
The Un!on, had lis origin in course OF
business commenced while it was ma.
tional Institutions; and there is no gojd
reason for surprising that the same conse-
quence would not have l,iEov ed had If
still derived its powers from the General
Government. II is IN vain, when the IN
tinenccs and impulses are tha same, to
look Tor IL difference in conduct or results.
Dy such creations we DO therefore, but
increase the mass Of paper credit aud pa.
per currency, without checking lhelr at,
lendant evils and tluc ultions. The ex.
tent of power and The efficiency OF organ.
Izlinn which we give 50 Ear from being
beneficial, are in practice, positively inlu.
rious. They strengthen the cham OF
dependence throughout tie Union subject
all parts more certainly TO common d,sas
ter, and bind every bank more clIeclnally,
in the first instance, 10 those Of our com.
mercial cities. and, in Tie end, to for.
eign power. In a word, cannot bat
believe that, with the fGll understanding
OF tho operations of our banking system
which experience has produced, public
sentiment is not less opposed to the crea.
ton of a National Bank for the purposes
connected with currency and Commerce
than for those connected with the fiscal
operations Of the Government.
Yet the commerce and currency Of the
cc2ntry are suffering evils from The opc-
ra,iDns of The State banks which cannot
and ought not 10 be overlooked. BY their
means, we have been flooded with de.