, 1840-10-03
WHOLE NUMBER 363.
own terms with the Ruling Moneyed In
ll..l1

SlitullOn OIL the lahu!
Or, to select an example Of a somewhat
different character, familiar to every one:
Andrew Jackson opposed the late United
States Bank. By the exercise OF the veto
power, he prevented its re-charter. he
waged war with the most powerful instItu-
ton in the country, and defeated it. But
what NIGHT he have done? Ifhe had
been-not Andrew J~ackson-not the incor-
ruptible patriot he was-but a man liking ease
and quiet, and willing to purchase these at
any expense; a man who could be tempt
ed-or say even bought OVERLY the Bank
what might have happened? What would
the Bank not have done to secure her char
ter. She could afford to pay the State OF
Pennsvlvania-and did afterwards pay her;
four millions of dollars for a charter less
valuable. She could as well have afforded
to pay that sum to Andrew Jackson. Or,
if money could not tempt him, there were a
thousand other modes of seduction. If the
President Of the United States and the
President of the United States Bank had
combined for any political object, how enor-
nous would have been their power! The
Bank proved almost strong enough to put
down Jackson; Jackson uds strong enough
to put down the Bank. What if these two
great powers, Executive and Commercial,
had combined for a sinister object! What
il they had c%onspired together against the
liberties of the country! They talk idly and
causelessIy, in these days, Of the union OF
the purse and the sword; here would have
been that very union, in good earnest. The
President-the Commander in-chief of the
army and navy of the United States-the
-. II Ill o-ao.,-a notCar and nofrOn<
age-on the one hand; and, on the other, the
Bank, welding a capital OF fifty millions,
granting accommodations to the amount OF a
hundred millions--the Great Regulator-the
Commercial Ruler-the Mighty Institution,
possessing the "sinews of war;" and dIspen.
sing or withholding, at its nod, plenty and
prosperity throughout the country.
How ominous the conjunction! And what
prevented it? The personal character OF
Andrew Jackson. How ill-guarded and in
defensible is a system of policy, which de.
ponds. as its only protection against dangers
so appalling, on the personal character OF
man!
Thus it appers, that the privilege OF u.s.
ing the public money cannot be granted to
any moneved corporation, either State or
National, without giving to the President,
directly or indirectly, great power and pat
ronage. The power, too, is of the worst
kind-power over the public purse.
All this is cut off at once, by the lnde-
pendent Treasury Law. 1t forbids, under
severe penalties, that the public money
shall be used at all, exception the public
service.
Now, though the custody Of money with
The richf 10 use il, be a great privilege; the Gus
todv. rithout that right, is no privilege at all,
but rather a hard duty with much RESPONSE
biIity and no profit.
This is all that now remains to the Presi-
/ dent, or rather to the pulic officers OF his ap-
5 poin.ment. THE DUTY ALONE RE-
MAINS, THE PRIVILEGE IS GONE.
They cannot, directly or indirectly. They
have but the barren, thankless, burdensome
duty of keeping it, untouched, unproductive,
without interest or increase. The keeping
of so much refuse iron would be as profitable
, an office. 1t would be a better office, at
. the same salary; for the responsibility would
not be a hundredth part so great.
1t NAV be said. in reply, that, notwithstand-
ing the felony clauses, the President, or his
S officers, may, in secret, still use the public
money. so they may rob, or steal, or COM
| mt forgery. or any olner CRIME thdtrs pun
ishable as felony. But they have the very
same inducement to abstain from the one
crime as the other-the sense Of right and
the fear of punishment. They have no
more permission to use the public money,
than they have to pick their neighbor's pock-
ct; and the same punishment awaits them IN
D., the one case as the other.
) But while so much power and patronage
is taken from the President by this law. does
{ it not confer new powers in return? Yes
y The power Of nominating to the Senate four
officers, who are to give enormously heavy
! bonds, perform severe duties. and receive, in
: return. on an average, less than three thou
sand dollars annual salary. How much OF
a privilege is that9 The establishment OF
four new land offices. circumstance which
would never be mentioned or thought OF by
, the public,) would be a greater increase to
executive patronage than all this is confer.
red by the Independent Treasury Law.
What conclusions, then, do we arrive at,
= from a careful examination of this subject!