Rutland herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1823-1847, 1840-04-14

2Hth. on TIC treasury Noic biN. give hints AZ
The direction which events in that quarter are
likely TO take. which derive peculiar signifcan-
Cy from the circumstance OF Mr.. Bell being
chairman OF the Committee IN question.
Fromyarious parts OF the repor, Of Mr. Bells /
speech in the National lutclgcncor, we bring
together the illusions 90 which we refer:
"Mr. Bell would appeal to several gentle
men then IN their places, TO say whether lac
had not, At an early day IN the session, predict
cd that We would have a breeze OF war before /
We departed from the capitol-bciorc we clos
ell the present session OF Congress;-,hai a /
movement, would be made before that time, |
either upon Sir John Harvey IN the East, or |
upon John Ross in the West. Mr.. Bell said /
he had been carefully watching the signsIoi
this determination, not 50 much IN regard to /
what was taking place on our Eastern ironil4r, |
as 10 the movements upon our Western border, !
which happened to be more within the sphere
prescribed TO him as member of this House.
4 sort of moral preparation for a war Is in
progress;-propcr means arc employed to
mould public sentiment, Ito give il suita-
ble direction TO sustain Interior movements.
But the main object, said Mr.. Bell, OF his
rising to address the committee. had been TO
| call their attention TO the state OF ihings ana
10 the extraordinary proceedings OF the tXecu-
tive upon our western frontier" "lle would
of our relations with the Indian tribes than he
was able to do in regard TO the Eastern bound
airy question. Whether we were 10 have
war with Great Britain or not-vheiher that
war, il we must have one, was near al hand, or
| could only occur nj same distant period he had
not the information to guide him in forming
! any settled opinion: though he believed, from
all the knowledge he had upor the subject,
there would be no war in that quarter; but he
was not prepared to say with the gentleman
from Louisiana (Mr Garland) that we need
j be under no apprehension OF awar In any quar-
ter. He was sorry he could not say so. lie
regretted that there did appear to him to he
but too much ground to apprehend a war-not,
indeed, with Great Britain, not with any pow
err in every way smaller and more inconsider-
able. This difference, however, he did not
deem of sufficient weight to deprive the subject
of all interest and importance lie thought
much and irreparable mischief might grow out
of war with one of the great Indian tribes OF
the west And he prepared, after the
most anxious inquiry, and much reflection, TO
express the opinion that the course OF policy
now pursued by the Executive towards one OF
the most powerful tribes upon our western cor
der, it was bis Deliberate opinion. lhat' II
the policy Of the Administration in this1esteci
: was not speedily and radically changed, a
afford the Secretary of War ample scope, a
fair field, for testing lis project of a standing
armyoi hundred thousandn a'ional guards or
militia regulars; for fifty thousand OF ihem at
least. would he required Immediately lor the
defence ofthe western frontier, if the Admins
traion should persist in the present policy
towards the Cherokee Indians. Mr. Bell said
he had felt the greater desire to say a word
upon this subject, because it seemed to be sup
r posed, oflate, that Congress had little or moth
ing to do in the direction of Indian affairs
Congress never declared war against an
Indian tribe, and it was hence inferred, as the
, practice Of the Government OF late showed,
that our Indian relations were exclusively
within the control OF the Executive. Hence
the Florida and other wars, in which we had
been recently involved, were Executive wars
got into in consequence OF Executive policy
and management and carried on at Executive
discretion. Congress was only resored to
for necessary supplies of money. lie thought
the course Of the Executive, in the present
S case demanded the serious notice of Congress:
, and of the country. The consequences OF ar
Indian war on the Western frontier. all coulC
, readily see and all, he trusted would depre
; cate them as much as he did. He would no
!; undertake to say that the executive had dom
4; wrong, absolutely and wifully. He had no
g. sufficient information ofthe ground on which 1t
. policy was founded TO say that;-it might he al
right. Whatever might be the direul resul
of war with the Indians upon the Wester
: country, there might 10 sufficient induce
= mcn,s to encounter them all Z; therefore, h
!. would not in advance, condemn or censur
= the Administration. All he ment TO say was
: that this was a subject Of such serious impoI
: lance TO the whole country, as to call for IN
J. vesiigation by Congress into the ground
J.. upon which the Executive thought proper {
persist in a particular course of policy, at tn
imminent hazald Of so great an evil as an Ir
C dian War He had avoided giving this que'
ton a party complexion. He had endeavore
= honestly 10 keep party feelings and interest
separated from il in his own mind though i
was well aware of the difficulty of doing 81
= Still, he sincerity hoped that the questio
d would not be taken up by the House, when
e should come before i,(as it must in SON
q shape,) as a party question. lie trusted
r would be viewed, on all sides, one of qui
u too much delicacy and imPoTtaneo-of Il
n much concern TO the whole country, TO loo
G upon it in that light. lie hoped that becaus
! these Indians were so small power, the sui
iect of our relations with them would not
passed over as undeserying our serious motto
ia Besides the distressing caiam,ies ever inc
{, dent TO Indian warfare, there were 9th
, weigh,y reason why we shhuld inicrpose o
!. authority in the present instance, # we shon
find j, necessary 10 do 50. The character
s. the country for magnanimity and forbearan
~ towards the weak and powerless, was nvolv
ne in the question. Our course towards the
C people, in their preseni'stuation, should
~ guided by such maXims as to secure future a
in and mn