Madison Whig advocate. [volume] (Canton, Miss.) 1839-1841, 1840-02-08

c Van Buren,, in the Legislature of New
e York, was busily engaged in getting ul
! instructions to Rufus King. Senator I,
;, Congress from that State, to vote agains
1 the admission of Missouri, as star,
! State, Gen. Harrison, then a member 0
: Congress, was CALAMITY fighting side By
} side with the South, and contending fol
: the unrestricted admission of Missouri
. Upon all occasions since that period, as
often as he has been called upon for his
! opinions upon the exciting topic of aboli-
ton, he has uniformly and unhesitating
, ly denied the right of the free States or
|. the general government to interfere
: with the institution of slavery IN the
South These opinions we shall Law be
Il fore our readers herea1er.-Nash Ban
"Among the principles proper 10 be
adopted by any Executive sincerely de-
sirous to restore the administration TO its
original simplicity and purity, deem the
following to be Of prominent importance :
Il. 10 confine his services 10 a single
term.
ii. To disclaim all right Of control
over the public treasure, wit h the excep-
ton Of such part of it as may be appro-
/ Prlated by law, to carry on the public
services, and that to be applied precisely
/ as the law may direct, and drawn from
/ the treasury agreeably to the long es-
tablshed forms Of that department
/ ''llI. That he should never attempt 10
/ influence the elections, either BY the
/ people or the State Legislatures, nor suf-
fer the federal officers under his control
to take any part in them than by giving
their own votes when they possess the
right of voting
''lV. That in the exercise of the veto
power, he should limit his rejection of
bills to: LIST. Such as are in his opinion
unconstitutional. FL. Such as tend 10
encroach on the rights of tho States or
individuals. 3rd. Such as involving
deep interests, may in his opinion re-
qulre more mature deliberation or refer
ence to the will of the people, to be as
certained al the succeeding elections.
~ That he should never suffer the
influence of his office TO be used for pur-
poses Of a purely party character.
wi That in removals from Office of
those who hold the appointments during
the pleasure of the Executive, the cause
of such removal should be stated if re
quested, to the Senate al the time the no
mination Of a successor is made.
Sand lrst, but not least IN Importance. /
''Vll. That he should not suffer the 4
Executive department of the govern
ment to become the source of Legislation;
but leave the whole business of making
laws for the Union TO the department to
which the Constitution has exclusively
assigned it, until they have assumed that
perfected shape, where and when alone
the opinions of the Executive may be
heard. A community of power IN the
of the laws between the le-
gislature and the Executive departments.
must necessarily lead to dangerous com
binations, greatly to the advantage of
president DESTROYS of extending his pow
err. Such construction Of the constitu-
ton could never have been contemplated
by those who framed it, as they well
knew that those who propose the bills.
will always take care of themselves, or
the interests of their constituents, and
hence the provision in the Constitution,
borrowed from that of England, restric-
ting the originating of revenue bills TO
he immediate representatives, Of the
people. So far from agreeing in opin-
on with the distinguished cha racer who
ately retired from the presidency, that
congress should have applied TO him for
1 project of banking system, think
hat such an application would have
manifested not only great subserviency {
Ipon the part Of that body, but an unpar-
Ionable ignorance of the chief danger {
o be apprehended from such an instiIu-
ion. That danger unquestionably con-
lists in a union of interests between the {
Executive and the bank. Would an :
,itious incumbent of the Executive
hair, neglect so favorable an opportuni-
V as the preparing of the law would
1--WE him, TO insert in il provisions 70 Sc
,ure his influence over IT? In the authori-
V given TO the president by the Constitu- Z
ion ssto recommend to congress such mea-
ures as he shall Judge necessary and ex-
il was certainly never intended !
hattie measures he recommended should c
,e presented in a shape suited for the i'm {
Mediate decision of the LEGISLATURE I
The sages who made the Constitution. G
90 well knew the advantages which the c
rown of England derives from the ex- I
rcise of this power b. its ministers. tol
ave intended it to be used BY our chief [
magistrate. or the heads of departments T
nder his control The boosted princi- I
les of the English Constitution, that c
he consent of the democratic branch IS |
Iol only necessary to receive money :
rom the people, but that il Is invIolable
rerogative also 10 originate all the bills I
or that purpose as true in theory, but I
utterly false and nugatory IN {
fleet, By the participation of the minis {
ers OF the crown In the details OF L. '
.islation- Indeed the influence they I
erive from sitting as members Of the |
House of Commons, and from welding Q
he immense patronage OF the crown
or usurPed.) gives them
lower over that body. that renders Piau- I,
able at least. the f1aftery- or as u IS
more probable. the intended sarcasm OF {
,ir Walter Raieigh, in an address 70
anles l., that the demand Of the soye-
eirn upon the Commons for PccuBIaryI
id. was required only that the tax might
eem to come from themselves
aTo the duties which | have enume-
ated. SO proper Ia my opinion 10 be per-