Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1840-03-14


thc constituent paris of Parliament are The King tn,
ii"rsc OF Lords, and ii" House of Commons: but il
wall appear, hereafter that he has made the Executive
branch "t The Legislature the same sense as did
lr Jciierson and chiefly because of its participation
lcgsia We power through the veto. Now Mr. Rivcs
shall not say that drawing an analogy particular
or general, between British and American Constitutions
as between things identical similar; for, knowing his
iabtlal unalrncss, take this opportunity of dccar
ing distinctly, that employ the simply by way
OF Illustration. Perfectly aware with what
nice and critical gentleman have to deal avoid
'nIsntrrprrtatinn or pcrvcrsion We cmphatcaly dis
claim the attempt to derive any constitutional argument
| from the English government As this, however, is a
question not things, but of definition perfect
y warranted in referring to the country whence have
derived many of our forms, TERMS and indeed insttu-
tons. England like the U. States has her executive
Judiciary and two branches Of the legislature and is
therefore very well in n discussion concerning the
meaning or of identical terms, appeal to her
great authorities and recognized usage For this we
have the high example of Mr. Madison
st is, however, to be Observed, says De Lolmc
IN another place, sthat though in his political
pacity OF one Of the constituent parts of Parliament,
that is, ruth regard to the share allotted 10 hU iegiSa-
TIRE authorty &c, referring obviously TO the veto
power. To the same intent speaks Blackstone when
he declares that "wtl us, therefore, in England, this
supreme power is divided into two branches; the
Legislative, 10 wit The Parliament consisting of King,
Lords and Commons the other Executive, consisting
|
marks he another place, 'ior preserving the balance
of the Constitution, that the Executive power should
BE- branch, though not the whole of the Legislature.
To show in what and for what reason, he consi-
dcred the Chief Magistrate branch of the Legislature,
we suboln the following extract from the cclcbra-
ted commentator "To hinder therefore, any such en-
croachments the King is himself part of the Parlia-
ment, and this is the of his being So very
properly therefore, the share of the legislation, which
the Constitution has placed IN the crown, consists III
sufficient to answer the end proposed" We repeat
again, that draw differences from the British Con-
stItution in favor of powers TO be derived from the
Constitution of the United States We cite these celc-
brated authorities, only TO show that Mr. Van Buren,,
and of course, MIR. Jefferson not ''strangcy
mistaken" as Mr. Rivcs would have it supposed in
gardng the veto power comforting legislative
butcs upon the Chief Magistrate.
Mr.. Rivcs cannot escape by drawing distinction be-
tween an2absolute and qualified negative for that dis
tincton does not affect the principle and besides, in
this very letter. he treats it practically nugatory,
when he observes, that "wtl the great influence
which his station coniers, the President rarely, If
ever fail to command the support of Mird of
the other of the two Houses of Congress, which would
be sufficient 10 sustain hs negative, and thus put it III
his power, by his single fiat, to control all the rest of
both bodies of the Legislature. Indeed, Judge Story
very scnsbly remarks, that 'practcally Speaking ii is
quite prohematical, whether qualified negative may
not hereafter in England become efficient pro-
makes appeal ohe Other Legislature bocS, and
ScGGrny comprs the crown to bear the exclusive odi-
un of rejection. lie very properly adds, that 'thc
whole structure of Government is so entirely
different, and the elements Of which IL Is composed,
are so dissimar from that of England, that no ar
rumcnt can be drawn from the practice of the latter
to assist in just arrangement of the Executive
thory." The view Just expressed of the qualified
negative is enforced by the opinion of Chancellor Kent
who observes according tn Story. for have not the
a., "a,
given TO the President Of the United States appears
be wisely dIgcstcd, than any Of the examples
which have been suggested. We think there can b" |
no doubt that the negative absolute, the increased
decacy and responsibility OF It's exercise would result
in 4 less frequent resort 10 lis use.
1t is, indeed, true, observes Mr.. RveS, that the
Constitution sets out with the general theory axiom
that call legislative powers herein granted shall be
vested in the Congress of the United States which
shall consist of Senate and House Of Representa-
tvcs. But when we come 10 the application OF the
theory, do not find some important limitations upon
it. and certain admxturc and blending of powers
which, while they seem to depart somcw what from, give
greater practical strength and real efficiency to the
constitutional principlc-Mr Madison has
met Mr. Rvcs verbal objection, by show
ing that although in nearly all the Constitutions Of the
States they existed at the time when he wrote, the
theory of independent distribution of powers, was
only admitted but expressed, yet it departed
from their organization and practical arrangement
AStSh.. Constitution oil Massachusetts drc[arns
among things, that tho ssExccutivo ahau nfFSi
exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either
Of thrm,' &c-aYct observes MIR. Madison, I'm the
very Constitution to which this declaration IS prcXeu,
n partial mixture of powers has been admitted. =
And then he cites as one example of this, "that the
Eyccutivr magistrate has "A qualified negative on
tho legislative BODY" "Nlaryland, h. remarks,
:. has adopted the maxim in the most unqual fed
terms declaring, that the Legislative, Executive and
Judicial mowers of Government, ought to be forever
fran p1cbp nj npr
tution notwithstanding, makes the Executive Mays
trate appolntahlc BY the Legislative Department, and
the members of the Judiciary by the Executive De-
n,r,mrnt Mr. Riycs ought not, at least, to have been
ignorant of the old Constitution OF Virginia. 81 ne
language of Virginia. continues Mr. Madrson SIS stIIs
more poincd on THIS subject. Her Constitution de-
clarcs that the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary
DEPARTMENTS, shall be separate and distinct, so that
neither exercise the powers properly belonging 10 inc
o,hor &c sYet, we find that 49, the Chief Alags-
,t. with his Executive Council, are appointable by
the epslaturc that members of the latter arc r'.
onnalIv DISPLACED at the pleasure OF the Legislature, ana
that ali the principal officers, both Executive and judi
c;arv are filled BY the same department. Inc ESccu-
five prcrogavc of pardong also, Is IN one case vest
ed in the Legislative Department.
81, has been shown observes Mr.. Madison in an.
swcripo the admitted objection, that the separation OF
the mowers is not absolute. 'tiat the political apo
,beom does not require that the Legislative Executive
and Judiciary Departments, should be WHOLLY uicoi
nccted with each other. shall undertake 10 snow, uat
unless these departments so far connected ana
blended as TO give each a constitutional control over
the others. the degree of separation which the MAXIM
requires, as essential to free Government can never
in practice be duly maintained These are the very
words of the great framer e1pounder and philosopher
Of the Constitution Ho asserts that not only are the
departments or powers, not absolutely disconnected
but that il was not intended indeed proper that they
hould be So The clear mind of MIR. Madison has seen
and pointed ont the proper distinction and safeguard
1t is not in the absolute dsconnccon OF the respective
departments or powers Of the Government, but IN their
proper. practical independence, yet constitutional CON
troll and check upon each other lie admits and l'lstI-
flies certain degree of blending in the Constitution
in the framing of which, he had borne so conspicuous
part "The accumulation OF all powers, Lcss,atvc,
Execr,;vc and Judiciary in the same hands, whether
of one, a few, many, and whether hereditary sell
appointed or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny: Were the Federal Ion'
stitntion therefore, really chargeabc with this accumi-
aton no further arguments would be necessary TO m
spire universal Reproduction of The system persuade