Lincoln telegraph. [volume] (Bath, Me.) 1836-1846, 1840-09-03

of an extensive country, can be well acquainted
with the wants and wishes of numerous people as
those who come Immediately from amongst them
the partakers for portion of the year, in their var
ious labors and employments, and the witnesses OF
the effect of the laws in their more minute as wen
general operations. As FAR then, as it regards
knowledge of the wants and wishes Of the people,
and devising for increasing the public prosperity, IL
would seem that the legislative bodies did not re-
qurs the aid of an Executive Magistrate. But mere
is principle, recognized by all the American con-
stutions, which unknown to republics, 1hey
all acknowledge rights in the minority. which can,
not rightfuliy be taken from them. Experience had
shown that in large assemblies these rights were
not always respected 1t would be IN vain that lhey
should be enumerated, and respect for them enJoln-
ed in the constitution. fl popular assembly, under
the influence of that spirit of party which is always
discoverabe in greater or less degree in all repub-
lies might and would as it believed, sometimes
disregard them To guard against this danger, and
secure the rights of each individual, the expedlent
of the others and amendable only to the laws, was
adapted. Security thus given against any paipa-
BILE violation of the Constitution to the injury Of in
dividuals minority party, but it was still posi-
BILE for willful and excited majority to enact laws
of the greatest injustice and tyranny, without VIOLA
ting the letter oftheir charter.
And this take to be the origin of the veto power,
as well in The State Governments as that Of the Uni
ted States 1t appears to have been the intention to
create an umpire between the contending factions
which had existed, it was believed, and would con-
tinue to exist. If there any propriety in adop-
ing this principle in the Government of State, all
the reasons in favor of it existed in tenfod degree
for incorporating it in that of the United States.
The operations of the latter, extending over an
immense tract of country, embracing the products OF
almost every cline, and that country divided too
into number of seperate Governments, in many
respects independent of each other, and of the COM
mon federal head. left but little hope that they
could always be carried on in harmony. 1t could
not be doubted that sectional interests would at
times predominant in the bosoms Of tne nn',eaa. ;
representatives of the People and the States, comoi-
nations formed, destructive to minority. Where
conld a mower TO check these local feelings and 10
destroy The effects of unjust combinations, be oeuer
placed than in the heads of department whose au-
ihority, being derived from the same common SOW
ereign, is coordinate with the rest, and when en-
lows the great distinction Of being at once the i'm.
mediate representative Of the whole people, as well
as of each particular state!
In the former character, the interests OF the
whole community would be rightly supported,
and, in the latter, the rights of each member
steadfastly maintained. The represe ntatlon IRON
the State authorities in the Electoral Colleges,
consider one of the most elcitous features in the
Constitution. 1t serves an eternal memento
to the Chief Magistrate that it is his duty to guard
the interests of the weak against the UNJUST ag- |
gressions of the strong and powerful rom
these premises, you will conclude that CONSIDER
the qualified veto upon the acts of the Legislature,
conferred bv the Constitution upon the President,
as a conservative power, intended only to be used
to secure the instrument itself from v'olation OF
in times of high party excitement, 10 prolect Tue
rights of the minority, and the interests OF tne |
weaker members of the Union. Such, indeed, Is |
INV opnion. and such we must believe to be the |
omnion. of nearly all the distinguished men who
have filled the executive chair II | were fresi-
dent of the United States, an act which did not
involve either of the principles above enumerated,
must have been passed under very peculiar CIR
cumstances of precpitancy, or opposition TO the
known public will, to induce me to refuse my
sanction. ri
1.-THE opinion | have given of the motives OF
the trainers of the Constitution, in giving the
veto power of the President is correct, 1t follows
that they never could have expected that he VINO
was constituted the umpire between the con-
tending factions should ever identify himself with
the interests of one of them and voluntarily
yaSee himself from the proud eminence of leader
of a nation, to that of party: can easily con-
ceiye state of things by which the Chief Mag
strate of State may be forced to act upon party
principles but such course is entirely opposed
to all the obligations which the CONSTITUTION
;mnoses on the President of the United States,
The immense influence he possesses will always
give to his party the preponderance, and the very
circumstance of its being an Executive party Will
be the cause of nfusing more bitterness ana VIM
dictiye feelings in these domestic contests Unoer
these circumstances, the qualified veto given by
the Constitution may, if the President should
think proper to change its character, become as
absolute in practice that possessed by the
KINGS of England and France. From the great
variety of local interests acting upon the men,
hers of the two Houses of Congress-, and from
keeping all the individuals of large party I'M
der the control of party discipline, laws will often
be passed by small muorites adverse to the inter-
.ests of the dominant party but if the President
should think proper to use the power for the
nurpose of promoting the interests OF his party,
Il will be in vain to expect that majority so
large as two-thirds in both Houses would be
1onnd in opposition to his wishes In the hands
of such President the qualified veto of the Con-
stitution would in practice be absolute
have. upon another occasion, expressed my
views upon the danger of dominant executive
Marty. 1t may perhaps, be said, that the chief
magistrate will find it impossible to avoid the in
Anenee of party spirit. Several OF orr Chief
Magistrates however, have been able to escape ITS
,nHnence; or what is the same thing, to act as If
they did not feel it. AS one mode OF avoiding 1t,
II yovld be my aim to interfere with the legisla-
.t;on of Congress as little as possible The clause
in the Constitution, which makes it the duty OF
the President to give Congress information OF
the state of the Union, and to their consideration
such measures as he shall Judge necessary and
exped,ent could never be intended to make MIN
the source Of legislation. Information shouio DC
frankly given, and recommendation upon such
matters as come more Immediately under MS
.copnrzance than theirs But there 1t should END,
IF he should undertake to prepare the business OF
Legislation for the action of Congress, or to as
10 u1rar for 10