Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1840-10-15

but In former times, it was exercised with
such moderation and justice, that it gave lit.
tie or no cause for jealousy and when the
danger OF such a power of removal from of
hceu at the will and pleasure of the President
was objected to in debate; MIR. Madison argued,
that 1t was not to be presumed that the Presi-
dent would remove any officer without Jus,
cause, and declared, that if he should do SO,
1t would be an impeachable offence. How
often, and how recklessly, this inpeaehabLe
offence has been committed of late wears, this
whole people must be prepared to bear wit
ness.
President Jackson, whether actuated bv
passion, or design, did, in effect, divest the
Senate OF its share of the appointing powers.
Having the sole power of nomination, ii the
Senate refused to concur in the appointment
of his nominee, he nevertheless persisted in
the nomination, and held tho office vacant.
however lmperiously the public service re-
CURED that 1t should be filled, until the re-
iractory spirit of the Senate was subdued as
II none other but his favorite was competent
to discharge the duty. Instances occurred
during the administration of both Washing
ton and Jefferson, in which the Senate refused
to confirm presidential nominations for office.
and each of these Presidents Immediately
presented another nominee, in whose appoint
mcnt the Senate concurred. When President
jackson set his heart upon an appointment
ne resolved that the person he proposed should
Or appointed, or that there should be no an
polntment at all. He went, perhaps, oniy
ior victory over the Senate; he achieved, in
fact, victory over the Constitution. His ex-
ample stands unrebuked to this day; and no
well informed man now regards the Senate's
confirmation of an Executive appointment as
any thing but form.
In referring to the practice of appointing
members of Congress, during their term ol
service, or shortly afterwards, to civil Offices
OF trust, honor or emolument, as one of the
abuses OF the presidential patronage, and as
one OF the causes, now in constant and regu-
lar action, OF the extension and increase of
Executive power and influence, il must he
acknowledged, that it did not originate with
PRESIDENT Jackson. Appointments of the
Kind had occurred before his time, though
they were comparatively rare, and were qen-
orally made on very particular occasions: but
the vital mischief of the practice was perceiv.
ed from the beginning, and it was condemned
by many of our wisest statesmen. and bv
none Or we mistake not) more earnestly than
oy PRESIDENT jackson, and his friends, before
ms elevation to office. So important was it
deemed, that general propositions have been
made ior an amendment of the constitution
TO correct 1t. Indeed, the effect of such a
Practice TO give the President direct infiu-
cnce over the Legislature, and an influence in
IT'S nature corrupt and corrupting, is too obvi-
Gus TO require calculation or Comment. The
precise grievance of which we comnla;n in
this particular, is the excess beyond all for
mer example, to which the practice has been
carried OF late years, and (what we think but
too apparently the consequent aggrayation of
It's influential effect upon Congress. And a
Kindred practice has grown up, which has be-
come particularly frequent and noticeable I'M
der the administration of President Van BIZ
rem, and which Is yet more efficient to sustain
ana extend the overgrown power and infu
ence OF the Executive. \ member of Cen
gress, for example, or Governor of state de-
voted to the President, and active and zeal
Gus to promote his views, incurs the disan-
probation OF his constituents, and is Turned
out OF place; or a partisan of the Presiden,
offers himself a candidate for the sutTraoes 81
the people for office, and is rejected. Presi-
dent an buren, seems lately to have made
IL ms business to correct the Judgment of the
people On such occasions, and to make CON-
Pensatlon to his discarded friends by appoint.
ment to Offices sometimes honorable. as well
lucrative, sometimes merely lucrative, there.
by lndemnlfylng them for any disappoipt.
ment or sacrifice they may have incurred in
MS service, and stimulating others to like
meritorlous exertions, by the hope held out Of
similar reward. 1t We're invidivus to men.
lion names, since it is unnecessary to do so
the cases are numerous, recent and notorious
IL really seems to us, that the foreirn cmbas
sizes have been set apart and Appropriated r.
the purpose of providing rewards for spffer
| ers In this branch of partisan service. I'm.
less the people are content that the PATRONAGE
OF the Executive shall be used TO counterac
their own power, they ought not to re-eec
President Van Buren,.
In the general exercise of the Execu,iv,
patronage, during the whole course of the adj
Ininistrations we reviewing, we doubt i
trace can be found Of any motive. object q
principle, IN the choice of public officers, bu
the reward OF party devotion, or the punish
inent oil independence; and the exaltation. il
oo'h ways OF the presidential power. 1t i.
mos. notorious, that party zeal, reckless
Iatiiess, understanding zeal in support O
'ne resident, MS party, his measures and nj
PfetehSions, has been an indispensable quail
Iicatlon, 1t indeed, it has not been The onl,
qualification, to which any serious REGARD ha,
been paid, for all appointments of honor an,
trust, or OF any considerable emoIument.
Is merit achievable at the cheapest rate. I
requires neither industry, nor abilities. no
virtue; on the contrary, it not unfreouentl,
liners the absence of them all for when bioI
reward is the need of mere zeal, the mos
unworthy will generally be found the mos
ciamorous in their professions of LOYALTY. an,
the least scrupulous in the servic, by which
they essay to recommend themselves TO ia
Vor. The consequence was natural and in
evitablo; vast number of men have bee,
appointed to office, who have earned thei
places only by their partisan services; win
hoid them by no other tenure, and who bav