The Ohio Democrat. [volume] (Canal Dover, Ohio) 1840-1900, 1840-12-18
voLUME2. NUMBER 81.
sovereign pOwer,in Kidding the country,
as far as practicable, Ofthe existing g.

as far as practicable, Of the existing g.
vii.
lts power to act as a regulator is no.
thing more, as is proved by experience,
than power to induce the local banks
to expand as il expands, and 10 compel
them 10 contract when II cont: scis. Bat
the same experience, proves that 1t stands
full as much in need Of aregulatoT a.
the local banks themselves. And why
should il not? lis object is the same
Ito make largo dividends for its stock
holders. lis temptations are the same
g. is subject 10 the same laws oftrade.
II was organized on the same piinci-
pies, and subject to tho same Impulse
with like institutions created by the
States. II is, therefore, unreasonable
to expect, that in lis administration therU
would be more safety than in similar
state institutions; or, that il would be
capable of regulating The local banks
beneticiaIly, when it has proved to be
incapable Of regulating itself.
THE STATE BANK.
The late Bank of the United States,
on the expiration Of It's charter in 1886,
received new one from the State Of
Pennsylvania, cOntering equal, if not
greater powers and privileges, than the
former. Its capital wac the same; it's
stockholders the same, and its manage
ment continued in the hands of the same
officers. 1t was said, by the President
OF the Bank, when the new charter was
presented 10 the stockholders for their
acceptance, that it was then IN a safer,
stronger, and in more prosperous con-
dition than il ever was; and that the
connection which had previously v exis-
ted between the Bank and the General
Government was an unnatural one, ben
efcial neither to the Bank or the Gov
ernmenl. The stockholders were pros
sed to accept cfthe new charter from
the State, on the ground that II was 10
, every respect more desirable than the
old charter, granted by the Gene raj Go.
vernment Yet, notwithstanding all
l these boasted advantages under the new
, charter, 80 far fon its being able TO
regulate the exchanges and the curren-
f cy, and to keep the other banks in pro-
} per check, it is now universally admit
0 ted 10 have been enc OF the leading and
: most active agents in producing the diC-
< 6culties under which the couairy has
!, been laboring for the last eighteen
!? months. So far from lis regulating
it he other banks, ii was the 6rst, un-
70 der its former charter, to expand its cir =
d cu|ation and engage in hazardous trade
d aud speculation. 1t Twas among the first
\, to suspend specie payments, and the last
= TO resume. We have seen it, instead of
= exeriing its power 10 restore to the coun
a try sound currency, using all it's in
l. Auence 10 p event the other banks from
Is redeeming their notes in specie.-We
see this institution now, alter having
J, been in operation between four and five
al years under lis new, and. as was claims
,; ed, advantageous character, utterly proc
i, trated, in state OF sus ,ension, and as
10 king aid from surrounding institutions.
le in order 10 save it from bankruptcy.
d. What reason have we to believe that The
y fate or influence of this institution
re would have been different if it had re-
le ceved its corporate powers and privil-
al eyes from the General Government in
is stead oftbe State of Pennsylvania As
al before remarked, the source from
l. which it derived its charter could Meth.
iy or take from or add 10 its ans to NEE
ng it's engagements, or have prevented i
ny from pursuing that Course Of fpoiiry tha
on has inv Olved it in it's present d.fflcuItie q
ch Whether, therefore, we are guidedby III,
he ligh Of experience, or by opinions draw
es from critical investigation Of the nat
We ural tendencies Of United States
a Bank, we are forced 10 believe that sucI
x- an institution would but add to the de
he rangement of the currency, and,by grea
3 ly increasing the paper circulation, wit
Ie, out increasiDgr in corresponding ratio
iu the specie basis, tend to involve III
il whole paper system, sooner or later, i
"a one common ruin. 1t is not, therefore
zen by the creation ofa u States Bank q
er- by the multiplication Of paper money
,ry that tho evils attendant on the presei
its banking system, are to be remedied.
we The danger to be apprebended fro,
'ns such an institution, iu political poi
all ofview. is not to be overlooked or dil
'n- regarded. lie friends claim, that
sx- would possess the power Of regulatir
ale the nine hundred and fifty~four loc
ion banks. with their capital Of three hui
10 dred and twenty four millions. Admi
the ting that it would possess this powe
ate, what would be the political consequei
red es, ifn should act in frien dly allan
his with the National Executive, and VIE
al this vast money power for political Pul
AK posesl Ills claimed, that the patroI
the age Of The National Executive is alre'
or dy too great and dangerous TO publ
ub- liberty. If we add to the already O