, 1840-07-04

/ provision would hereafter prevent all gener'
al suspensions, we might venture upon The
measure. We might expect 10 be able to
deal with here and their an individual case.
But this provision is not certain TO prevent
general suspension in great emergencies, OF
great commercial revolutions. Twice, within
a few years, the banks have suspended, not
withstanding the penalties OF their charters,
and the laws of their own states. The real
truth is, that. in the absence OF all regulation
or control by congress, the banks have at
tempted, and do attempt, regulation by their
own concert Of action. They make u law
for themselves.
A general suspension is the result Ola gen
eral concurrence or Of 4 general convection
Of the necessity of suspension, on the part OF
all the banks, or many OF them. This has
happened, and in the present state OF affairs
may happen again, Notwithstanding Il oank-
rupt law. In my opinion, indeed, 1t is Ger
tain 10 happen, Notwithstanding all the hank
rupt laws we can pass, until con yreSS snail
do its duty, by enacting prospective and
preventive remedies; and IT It should happen,
one of two things must ensue, either congress
would be called together TO repeal the law,
or an utter and dead stop would take place
in the payment of debts. in the concerns OF
commerce, and indeed, in all the business OF
life.
In addition to the charters, it is 20 he
remembered that several of the states have
provisions Of their own, founded on their
own statutes, for proceeding against failing
banks. Such banks are pu, into commits
sion, or under sequestration by the state
courts, and n judicial administration and set
Element of their affairs take place. Is our
bankrupt law expected TO Supersedc these
state bankrupt lawsl Are our courts TO
~dispossess the state courts!
Sir, | will not pursue this subject further.
| repeat that in the part of the country to
which | belong, | believe there is n pretty
strong disposition TO include the banks in the
bankrupt law. The people in that quarter
apprehended from it no danger TO themselves
or their own institutions, and they wish 10
see banks elsewhere coerced, by the most
e~fiectual means to resume and 10 maintain
specie payments. | need not say that they
are among the greatest sufferers by the pres
ent most ruinous state of things. They pay,
and Others do not pay them. They cannot
long stand the present state OF the currency,
and, like them, | am ready TO take any prac-
teal measure, any thing short of convulsive
shocks. between state authority and the
authority ofthe United States. TO relieve it.
Bat | confess that, for myself, TO say nothing
of the constitutional points, see formidable
difficulties in subjecting state banks to for
feiturs and destruction by an act OF bank
ruptcy. At any rate, if the banks are 10 be
dealt with in bankruptcy at all, their case
would require, obviously, very many peculiar
provisions. and they should constitute the
subject of a bill by h.mselves. Such a
bill should be prospective, the commence
ment of its operation deferred, the act of
bankruptcy more clearly determined, pro-
visions made to avoid, as far as possible,
collision with state authorities, and provi-
sions also for superseding the commission, on
resumption OF payment Of security given.-
Various provisions Of this kind, as it seems
to me, would be essentially necessary.
70 be concluded merit Deek.