The Madisonian., 1840-01-11

these local feelings, and 10 destroy the effects
Of unjust combinations, be better placed than
10 the hands oi that department whose author
ity, being derived from the same common So
vereign, Is coordinate with the rest and which
enjoys the great distinction Of being at once
the immediate representative Of the whole
People, as well as Of each particular State
Ia the former character. the interests OF the
whole community would be rigidly supported,
and, in the latter, the rights Of each member
steadiastly maintained. The representation
from the State authorities in the Electoral
Colleges, consider one Of the most felici-
tous features in the Constitution. Ii serves
as an eternal memento TO the Chief Magis-
traie tina, ii ls his duty to guard the interests
OF the weak against the unjust aggressIons OF
the strong and powerful. From these premises,
you will conclude that consider the qualified
veto upon the acts of the Legislature, confer
red by the Constitution upon the President, as
a conservative power, intended only to be used
10 secure the instrument itself from violation,
or, IN times of high party excitement. to pro-
tect the rights Of the minority and the inter-
esis of the weaker members OF the Union
Such, indeed, is my opinion, and such we must
believe to be the opinion oil nearly all the dis
iingushed mea who have filled the Executive
Chair. Ii were President Of the United
States, an act which did not involve either OF
the principles above enumerated, must have
been passed under very peculiar circum-
stances Of precipitancy Or opposition to the
known public will, to induce me to refuse to
il my sanction.
Ii the opinion have given Of the motives
Of the trainers OF the Constitution, in giving
the veto power to the President, is correct. it
follows that they never could have expected
that he who was constituted the umpire be-
tween coniending factions should ever identi-
/ fy himself with the interests of one of them,
and voluntarily rdzee himself from the proud
elninence Of leader Of nation to that Of chief
Of party. can easily conceive the eyist-
ence Of state of things by which the Chief
Magistrate Of State may be forced to act
upon party principles but such course is
entirely opposed to all the obligations which
the Constitution imposes on President Of the
United States. The immense influence he
possesses will always give to his party the
prepondcrance, and the very circumstance of
its being an Executive party will be the cause
OF Iniusng more bitterness and vindictive feel
ing in these domestic contests. Under these
circumstances, the qualified veto given by the
Constitution may, If the President should
think proper TO change its character, become
as absolute in practice as that possessed by
the Kings Of England and France. From the
great variety Of local interests acting upon the
members of the two Houses Of Congress,
and from the difficulty Of keeping all the indi-
vlduals OF large party under the control OF
party discipline, laws will often be passed by
small majorites adverse to the interests of the
dominant party but if the President should
think proper to use the veto power for the pur
pose of promoting the interests OF his party, it
will be III vain to expect that majority so
large as two-thirds in both Houses would be
found in OPPOSITION TO his wishes. In the hands
of such President, the qualified veto Of the
Constitution would in practice become abso-
lutte.
| have, upon another occasion, expressed
my views upon the danger of dominant Ex-
ecutive party. 1t may, perhaps, be said that
the Chief Magistrate will find ii impossible to
avoid the influence of party spirit. Several
OF our Chief Magistrates, however, have been
able to escape its influence; or, what is the
same thing, to act as if they did not feel it.
AS one mode OF avoiding IL, it would be my
aim TO interfere with the legislation Of Con-
gress as little as possible The clause in the
Constitution which makes it the duty of the
President to give Congress information of the
state of the Union, and to recommend to their
consideration such measures as he shall Judge
necessary and expedient, could never be in
tended to make him the source of Legislation.
Information should always be frankly given,
and recommendations upon such matters as
come more Immediately under his cognizance
than theirs. But there it should end. If he
should undertake to prepare the business of
Legislation for the action of Congress, or to
assume the character of code maker for the
nation, the personal interest which he will
take in the success Of his measures will ne
cessariy convert him into partisan, and will
totally incapaci,ate him from performing the
part Of that impartial umpire, which is the
character that have supposed the Constitu-
ton intends him to assume, when the acts
passed by the Legislature are submitted to his
decision. do not think it by any means ne
cessary that he should take the lead as re-
former, even when reformation is, in his OPT
Mon, necessary. Reformers will be never
wanting when it is well understood that the
power which wields the whole patronage of
the nation will not oppose the reformation.
have the honor to be, with great conside-
ration and respect, sir, your humble servant,
w. II. HARRISON.
TO the Hon. SHERRoD WILLIAMS.
The Van Buren, claimants to seats in Congress
from New Jersey, must be highly gratifed by the
result Of their efforts, They have been potent be-
yond even their own expectations-for they have
not only succeeded in keeping out the returned mem