Vermont telegraph. [volume] (Brandon [Vt.]) 1828-1843, 1840-01-08

lnelr precarlous situation ENDANGERED
IN the first place by their own misman.
t agement, and again by the conduct of eve
Iry institution which connects them with
the centre of trade III our own country
they are yet subjected beyond all this. to
the effect of whatever measures policy.
necessity, or caprice, may induce those
who control the credits of England 10 re-
sort TO. L mean not TO comment mon
these measures present or past, and much
less to discourage the prosecution of fair
commercial dealing between the two coun-
tres, based on reciprocal benefits: but il
having now been made manifest that the
power of infiicting these and similar iniu-
rles, is, by the resistless law of a credit
currency and credit trade. equally capable
OF extending their consequences through
allt The ramlficatlous of our banking sys-
tenn. and by that means indirectly obtain
ing, particularly when our banks are u.s.
ed as repositories of the public moneys. a
dangerous political influence in the Unit
ed States, | have deemed it my duty to
bring the subject to your notice, and ask
Tor 1t yo1r serious consideration.
Is an argument required beyond the ex-
position of these facts, to show the impro-
prlety OF using our banking institutions as
repositories of the public money? Can
we venture not only TO encounter the risk
OF their individual and mutual mismau-
agement, but, at the same time. to Mace
our foreign and domestic policy entirely
under the control of foreign moneved
INTEREST," To do so is to impair the indie
! pendence of our Government, as the pres
emf credit system has already impaired the
independence of our banks 1t is to sub
NIT all its important operations, whether
OF peace or war, to be controlled or
thwarted at first by our own banks, and
then by power abroad greater than
themselves. cannot bring myself TO de-
pct the humiliation 10 which this Govern
nent and people might be sooner or later
reduced, if the means for defending their
rights are to be made, dependent upon
those who may have the most powerful of
motives to impair them.
Nor is it only in reference to the effect
OF this state of things on the independence
OF our Government or of our banks, that
the subject presents itself for consideration:
1t is 10 be viewed also in its relations to
the general trade of our country. The
time is not long past when deficiency of
foreign crops was thought to afford prof.
liable market for the surplus of our indus,
try; but now We wait with feverish aaxi-
ETY. the news of the English harvest, not
so much from motives of commemorate
sympathy, but fearful lest its anticipated
failure should narrow the field Of credit
there Does not this speak volumes to
the patriot? Can system be bene6cent,
wise, or just. which creates greater ankle
ty Tor interests dependent on foreign cred
IT, than for the general prosperity of our
own country, and the profitable exporta-
tIon OF the surplus produce of our labor
Ihe circumstances TO which | have
thus adverted appear to me to afford
welghty reasons, developed by late events,
TO be added to those which | have on form
er occasions offered, when submitting 10
your better knowledge and discernment
the propriety of separating the custody Of
the public money from banking instilu-
tons. Nor has any thing occurred to
lessen, In my opinion. the force of what
has been heretofore urged. The only
ground on which that custody can be de-
sired by the banks, is the profitable use
which they may make Of the MONEY!
Such use would be regarded 10 individo-
ais as breach OF trust, or crime of great /
magnitude, and yet i! may be reasonably |
doubted whether, first and last, it is not at
tended with more mischievous conse- |
quences, when permtted to the former
than 10 the latter The practice of ner-
uniting the public money 10 be used bv
Its keepers as here. is believed to be ne.
cuiar to this country, and 10 exist scarce.
~ any where else To procure it here.
improper influences are appealed TO un-
wise connections are established between
me government and vast numbers ofpow-
efful State institutions; other motives
man the public good are brought to bear
oosh on the Executive and Legislative de-
paftnents, and selfish combinations. lead.
ing TO special legislation, are formed. Il
is made the interest Of banking institu.
lions and their stockholders throughout
the Union 10 use their exertions for The
increase OF taxation and the accumulation
OF surplus revenue; and, while an ex-
cuse is afforded, the means are furnished
Tor those excessive issues which lead TO
extravagant trading and speculation, and
are The iorerunners Of vast debt abroad
and suspension of the banks at home
Impressed, therefore, as [ am, with the
propriety of the funds of the Government I,
being WITHDRAWN from the private use of
either banks or individuals, and the nub.
lie money kept by duly appointed public
agents; and believing. as | do, that such
also Is the judgm which discussion re-.