Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1840-03-27

,,c,a,ed BY military wisdom, and by a due regard
O our own circumstances and 10 the situation OF
he enemy. The reasons for this opinion II is evi-
lently improper now TO give but we hold oursel-
YES ready at a future period, and when olucr CIR
rimstances shall have INTERVIEWED, 10 satisfy every
man of its correctness who is anxious TO inVcsti-
gate and wiling TO receive the truth. And win a
ready acquicscencc, eyond the mere claims OF NIL
iiary duty, w arc prepared TO OBEY a general,
whose measures meet our most deliberate appro-
l%a,ion, and merit that Of his country.
SAMUEL WELLS, Col, II II. .. 5. L.. ,
THOMAS y. OwiNcs, Col. 80 r. Y. $. !.
GEORGE PAUL, Col. IL II. Us !.
J. G. BARTLETT, Col. Q. M 6.
JAMES v. BALL, Lieut.. Col.
ROBERT MoRRIsoN, Lieut.. Col.
GEORGE ToDD, Mai. 10 X. U. :. Il,
Rp. GRAHAM, Mai. IL r. u. S. |.
George CRocnAN,. Mai. II r. U. 5. /.
l.. HuKIIL, Mai. u Assist. lnsp. Gen.
+. d.. WooD, Maj. Engineers"
GLOVER SANDUsKY, Aug. ", 1913.
=" have with much regret seen IN some OF the
public prints such mis- representations respecting
my refusal to eyacuate this post, as are calculated
not only TO injnre me in the estimation OF h10lnary
men, but also to excite mnfavorable impressions
as TO the propriety o fGeneral Harrlsons conduct
relative TO this affair.
ellis character as a military man is too well
established TO need my appreciation or support.
But his public service entities him at least to COM
mon justice. This affair does not furnish cause OF
r%eproach. If publlc opinion has feen lately mls,e'
respecting his late conduct, it will require but a
moments cool, dispasslonate reflection, to con-
vince them of its propriety. The MEASURE RE-
GENTLY ADOPTED by HIM SO FAR FROM pEsEny.
ING CENSuRE, ARE The CLEAREsT PROOFS OF HIS
KEEN PENETRATION AND ABLE GENERALSliiP. IL
is true that | did not proceed Immediately 10 exc
cute his order TO evacliaie this post but this diso-
hedlence was not, as some would wish to believe,
the result of a fixed determination to maintain the
post contrary to his most positive orders, as will
appear from the following detail, which is given
to explain my conduct.
"About 10 o'clock on the morning Of the Both
ultimo, a letter from The adju,ant generals Office,
dated Seneca Town, July 29lh, 1913, was handel
me by Mr.. Conner ordering me TO abandon this
post, burn it, and retreat that night to head quar-
tiers. On the reception Of the order, | called a
council of officers, in which it was determined not
10 abandon the place, at least until the further
pleasure of the general should lie known, as il
was thought that an attempt TO retreat in the open
day, in the face Of Il superior force of the enemy,
would lie more hazardous than to remain in the
fort, under all its disadvantages. therefore wrote
a letter TO the general, couched in such terms as
| thought were calculated TO deceive the enemy
should il fall into his hands, which ! thought more
than prohablc,-as well as to inform the general
should it lie so fortunate as TO reach him, that
would wait 10 hear from him. before | should pro-
coed to execute his order. This letter, contrary &c
my expectations, was received by the general
who not knowing what reasons urged me 10 write
in a tone SO decisive, concluded very nationally
that. the manner of it was demonStrativc of the
most positive determination 10 disotey his orders
under any circumstances | was therefore siS-
pended from the command Of the fort, and ordered
to headquarters. But on explaining TO the gene
raj my reason for not executing his orders, ant
my object in using the style | had done, he was SO
perfectly satisfied with the explanation, that | was
Immediately relnstaied in the
"It will lie recollec,ed that the order above allnd.
ed to, was written on the night previous TO my
receiving it-had 1t cen delivered TO me, as /
was intended, that night, | should have oleyed il
without hesitation lis not reaching me in tim,
was the only reason which induced me TO consul
my officers on the prOpriety of waiting the gene
rais further orders.
at has lecn stated, also, that upon my repre-
sentalions ofmy ability TO maintain The post, th,
general altered his determination TO abandon il.
his is incorrect. No such representations wer,
ever made. And the last order received from tn,
general was precisely The as that first given, viz
THAT if discovered The approach of a large Brl
tish force by water, (presuming that they woth'
bring heavy drtiil,r!,) time eno"s' Il 70 erect n re-
treat, | was TO do so but if | could not retrea
with safety, to defend the post TO the last exit
nifty.
"a day or two before the enemy appeared LeiOr
Fort Meiss, the general had reconnoitered The sur
rounding ground, and being informed that the hi
on the opposite side of Sandusky completely com
manded the fort, | offered to undertake, with tn,
troops under my command 10 remove it to tina
side. The general, upon reflection, thought i
Rest not TO attempt, as he believed that if the enc
my again appeared on this side of the lake,
would be before The work could be finished.
Sits useless 70 disguise the fact, that this fort
commanded by the points of high ground aroun
II a SinTIp stroke nj the eve maUG this clear 4