North American. [volume] (Swanton, Vt.) 1839-1841, 1840-06-03

| il is true, two az three forts or fortified
spots besides but they are lsot enti-
tied 10 much consideration. These are.
Fort Wellington, q; Prescott, and Fofl
Maiden, at Amherstburgh
The population oi the two Canadas does
not greatly exceed, lift does at all, 900 900
OF souls. The lower province does not,
/ probably, contain more than halt mil
lion.
OF the entire British American provin-
cial population, fully one third, spak TIE
French lang uage and DO NOT STEAK,
the English. make no further aIlusion to
this fact, at this ime,-- will lee, -
perhaps anxlousy-that the power OF
Great Britain, in America, Is not increased
thereby.
Upon The actire hostility Of the British
colonists TO the Republican fue, / think, your
Exceency may calculate with certainty !;
but, more OF this, aeon.
Under such circumstances, the forest,
which still covers even large portion of
the settled parts OF the territory, is pro-
lection, and resource. A brave yeo-
many, ardent TO spill the blood OF the in
vader, would neutfalze the action oil even
well appointed and numerous hostile ar
my, embarrassed in its operations, by the
forest character OF a territory.
| The substance Of the British army, and
! OF the inhabitants, is not the least impor-
tant consideration, in the investigation of
the power Of Great Britain in America, in
| the event Of war with the United States.
The provinces cannot furnish the supplies
OF an army. These were chiefly derived
from the United States, when Great Brit
ain waged war with them, in 1879, 1918,
and 1914. Subsistence, from the same
quarter, is not TO be depended on, in the
event OF future hostility.
| have mentioned the subsistence of the
British colonsls, as an object OF soliciiude
likewise. The active military assistance,
the colonisis will be called upon TO render,
will interfere with the cultivation of their
farms. The devastation caused by irrup-
tons OF the enemy, or, by portions of the
province. being the theatre Of active war
fare, must be taken into account. II is
not unlikely, that the subsistence of the
inhabitants and the troops, will cause
great embarrassment.
| have how alluded to the British Amer
lean territory, population, and resources.
Fully twenty five thousand British SOL
dieFs, in addition 10 provincial defenders,
would be necessary TO repel invasion and
whether, even with tbs large force, the
entire territory could be maintained, is
doubtful. have already described it, as
a narrow belt OF land, between the north
ern wilderness and the enemy. To dislri-
butte $4,000 men along frontier OF up
wards OF 1000 miles, will be, to frtter
away their strength, and powers OF resist
ance or attack. To concentrate them,
will necessarily compel the abandonment
of considerable portions of the territory.
The warfare of Great Britain, along
this frontier, infer, from the circumslan-
ces enumerated, would be DEFENSIVE.
Let me now point the glass in another
direction towards the ocean--towards
the maritime power OF Great Britain.
This arm of power is truly formidable.
The fleets Of England would place the
immense sea-front OF the United States
in much the same position, in which an
immensely extended frontier places Brit
ish America. The same facility TO the en-
envy, to strike an effective blow, upon anv
one point, in any one locality, conferred
by that extenslveness, would be afforded
to the fleets of Great Britain, acting on so
vast a seaboard.
The events of the war with the II. s.
have shown, that the American CONNER
cial marine can be swept, with a broom,
from the ocean and, that a blockade, so
efficient as to prevent the entry or exit
Of vessels, TO or from their ports, can be
maintained. Ii is within my knowledge.
that the U. S lrigate Constellation, inef-
fectuaIly attempted, though perseveringly,
during the greater period Of The war, TO
escape TO sea the President, frigate, vain
Nv attempted TO elude the British squadron.
The vigilance, the skill, with which the
blocade was maintained, extorted praise,
even from the foe.
But the immense sea front OF the u. s.
offers facilities OF annoyance, such as no
enemy would overlook. An army Of TO-
600 could keep the entire coast, from Pas
samsquoddy TO New Orleans, ia a state Of
alarm and, necessarily, Cat vast cost
the population generally, would be under
arms. A landing effected in Delaware,
would draw troops from Pennsylvania,
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey. Sud
den embarkation and transportation of the
same troops, 10 the Penobscot, would
cause the assemblsge of the military, from