Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1840-01-09

on all those who connect il with The CEN
tre Of trade. Distant banks may iuil'
without seriously affecting these in our
principal commercial cities; buI the lall'l:e
ofthe latter is felt al the exlrenities OF The
Union. The suspension AT New York, IN
1737, was every where, with very few ex-
rrprinns. (1llowed, at soon as it was
knnwn: that recently ii, Philadelphia i'm
me'lia'ely affected The hanks Of the South
and West in similar manner. This de
ppndence of our while banking system on
the institutions in few large cities, is moi
found in the laws of theirurganiza'ion, but
in those Of trade and exchange. The
hanks at that centre to which currency
flows, and where it is received in payments
for merchandise. hold the power of con-
trolling those in reginuS whenre it comes,
while the latter possess Io means OF res
training them; so i,alrhe value Of individ.
val property. and the prosperity of trade,
through the whole interier ofrhe country.
are made 10 tlepend on The good or bad
management or the banking institutions in
the great seats of trade on the seaboard.
But the chain of this dependence dies
not stop here 1t does not terminate at
Philadelphia or New York. IL reaches
across the ocean and ends i'll Lnndnn. the
cenlre of the credit system. The same
laws of trade which give to the hanks in
our principal cities power over The whole
banking system of the United States, sub
iect The former, in their turn. TO tn mu"ey
puwer in Great Britain. 1t is moi deemed
that the suspension of the n. York hanks
in 1897, which was followed in qiuck sue
cession throughout the Union, produced by
an application of that power; and it is now
alleged in extenuali0n of the present con-
dilion of 50 large portion Of our banks
that their enlharrassmen,s have arisen from
the same cause.
From this influence they cannot now
entirely escape, for it has its origin in the
credit currenries Of the two countries, it is
strengthened by The current of trade and
exchange, which centres in London. and
is rendered almost irresistible by The large
debts contracted there Ivy our merchants,
our banks, and our StaIes. 1t is thus,
that an introduction of new hank intn
The most distant Of our villages, places
The business of that village within the in.
hueuce nf the mnney power in England.
II is ,hus that every new debt which W"
contract in that country, seriously affects
our currency, and extends over The pnr-
suits Of our citizens its powerful influence.
We cannot escape from this by making
new banks, great or small. State or Ma.
llonal. The same chains which hind those
now existing TO the centre of this system
of paper credit, must equally ietier every
similar institution we create. II is only
by the extent to which This sysIen, has
hcen pushed Of laIe, that we have hern
made fully aware of its irresistible Icnden
cy to subject our own banks AMI currency
to a vast controlling power in a foreign
land, and it adds "A new argument to those
which illustrate their precarious situation.
Endangered, in the first place, by their
own msn,anagement, and again by the
conduct Of every institution which connect
them with the ceurc Of trade in our own
country, thew are vet subjected, beyond
ail This To The effect of whatever measures,
pulley, necessity, or caprice, may induce
those who control The credits of England
To resort to. ] mean not 10 comment up.
on these measures, ,-presenr nr past, and
much less, tn discourage the prosecution
of fair commercial dealing between III
,wo countries, based on reciprocal benefits.
but it having nnw been made manifest
that the power of innicting hpse and sim
liar mi! rips is, hy the resisieS law of n
currency aud credit trade. equally rapahl"
uf extending their consequences through
all the ranlifcalions Of The banking system,
aud, bv that means. inlircctly obtaining.
particularly when our banks are used as
[leposilories of the public moneys, a dan
serous political influence in the u. StHtes,
have deemed it my duty to hiring the
Snliect To your notice, and ask for II your
serious consideration.
lsan argument required beyond the cx-
position of these facts. 10 show the impro
pric,y ofusins our banking institutions as
tlepusi,orics of the public money! Can
we venture not only 10 encounter the risk
ortheir individual aud mutual mismanaee-
nreu,, bur. at the same time, TO place our
foreign and domestic policy entirely under
the control ofa fnrcign nnneyed interest!
To do so is to impair the independence Of
our Government, rs the present credit syS-
TEN has already impaired the indepen-
dence of our banks. il is to submit all its
impnran, operations, whether of peace or
war.tO be controlled or thwarted at tlrst by
our own banks, AMI then by power a:
broad greater than themselves. cannot
brug myself 10 depict the humiliation to
which this Government and people might
be sooner or later reduced, If The means
for defending their rights are to be made
dependent upon ,hose who may have the
most powerful of motives to impair them.
Nor is it only in reference to the effect
of this state of things on the independence
of our Government or of our banks, thai
the subject presents itself for consideration
4 I,