Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1840-12-10

md furnishes another proof of the necessity |
Tor some additional safeguards to protect the
immense interests Of society in these institu-
lions. 1t may be impossible to prevent crime
under any system, but it is not very difficult
to detect offenders Of this class under vigil
liant application of the general laws of the
land, and of the particular bylaws of bank
ing companies.
The condition of our banks generally for
some years past, has excited much and anx-
ious inquiry as to the advantages and incon-
vcnences OF the established system of credit
This system has been exposed to the dangers
ofitS ownpecullar structure, land to those which
are incident to our system of government
The conflicting agencies of seven and TWEEN
ty governments, each of which has claimed
and exercised the power of Legislation over
this subject, continues to present difficulties
which exist no where beyond the limits of
the United States. The number of local in.
terests to be accommodated, besides the polit-
cal influences which have been connected
with this subject, do not permit the govern
ment of any State to close its eyes upon the
surrounding causes which must, to some ex-
tent, intefere with, if they do not control its
own policy. Our experience has often sug-
gested the inquiry, whether many of the in
convcnicnces which we have felt, did not re-
suit necessarily from the peculiar forms IF
6S H., he'd bs %sG,ss, they Were not
as we'll as the dangers which have been "a
voided by limited and jealous concession of
power from the States to the Federal Govern
ment. While the power to regulate the cur
rency, If diScrectly used by the Federal Gov
eminent, might save us much inconvenience,
| the trainers of our Federal compact seem to
have been aware that il was one which might
be abused for very different purposes. AS
the power of Government must necessarily
be conhded to frail and fallibe men, it is bet
| ter to grant too little than too much and I'M
der governments Of prescribed, constitutional
| limits, 1t is not safe to exercise any power
which is not clearly granted or necessarily
implied. While we can only influence the
other States, as they may influence us, by
force of example, and the Federal Govern
mcnt by our voice constitutionally expressed
as one of its constituents, il is impossible for
us TO foresee what will be the action Of either
| IN reference to sub ject on which as much as
| any other, the whole Union has Il common
interest. I he Federal Government, in its
| fiscal relations with the States, must either
employ its own means, or those of the States,
for the collection and disbursement of its rev.
enue; and whether it relies on a national
bank, and Independent treasury of specie, or
OF treasury nU:cs, or OF government credit in
some other form, OF on the State Banks, to fur
nish the medium of collection, and as gem
eral or special repositories of its revenue, its
| influence must be felt TO greater or lees ex-
tent by any system which the States can a.
dept. Each State, therefore, has duties as
well as interests, resulting from its intimate
association with the other States, and with
the Federal Government, which should not
be disregarded in its deliberations on this
subject. If we had absolute jurisdiction of
this whole subject, or if we were called to le-
gislate on it as an original question, our views
and our duties might be very different. But
it is proper for us to regard the condition of
the country as it really is, and not as our inn
aginations might depict it. When Banks
were first introduced, they were intended to
be, what they ought now 10 be, the means
of circulating paper always convertible in
failure to realize this just expectation, wheth-
er it is to be ascribed to errors Of legislation,
or to mismanagement of the banks, or to
both causes, has demonstrated the necessity
for reform of abuses which have been so
extensively felt by society.
| would suggest that there is necessity
for more direct and efficient responsibility in
tile agents or officers to whom the business of
banks is confided. The present rate of bank
profits on fair business transactions, renders
it questionable whether stockholders can be
made personally liable, without destroying
the system; but the responsibility of direct
ors to greater extent than now exists, e.
ven if it should require premium or salary
to induce the acceptance of the office, would
be practical economy, if it prevented only a
small portion of the losses which so fire.
quently occur. The commissioners appoint
ed to investigate the affairs of the Bank of
Virginia, have expressed no opinion as to
the liability of the Directors under the act of
1887, and as 1t is properly question for ju-
dicial construction, should it arise, forbear
to express any opinion with regard to it,
While it would be unjust and injurious to
the corporations and individuals, unneccssa-
rily to expose private credit, publicity as
TO the general results flank business, is cal
cuiated to render these institutions more
safe and useful. The quarterly reports, now
doubt not, of increasing their canton and
vigilance. Though the discretionary power
is vested In the executive, to appoint a spe.
cial commission to examine any ofthe banks,
1t is power which was designed only for
emergencies, and the necessity for its exer-
else cannot we'll be known until the dancer
has occurred. 1t is therefore not remedial
A permanent board of competent commits
sioners, organized so that portion of the
members would be renewed annually, and
examining ali the banks at regular intervals,
would probably answer better.
The efficacy of forfeiture and other penal
ties now imposed to prevent suspensions of
specie payments, may well be questioned,
since they are invariably released, and could
not well be enforced. without ipnictino CO