North American. [volume] (Swanton, Vt.) 1839-1841, 1840-01-22
swANToN, VT. JANUARY 90, 1910.


cred such an attempt and as there could
not more than one-thrd part Of my troops
cross at one time, the other two-thi.ds
would OF course fall into their hands. This
could not reconcile 10 my own feelings as
q man, much less as an officer: therefore
concluded 10 maintain the ground, If posi-
bic, and all 10 fare alike. In consequence
of this resolution, | despatched two mes
sengers--one 20 LapraiTie 10 Col. Brown,
and the other TO Assumption, French
settlement, to Mr.. Walker, who was in
our interest, requesting their speedy assist
ance, giving them, AT the same time, to IN
derstand my critical situation. In the
meantime, sundry persons came TO my
guards, pretending 10 be friends, but were
by them taken prisoners and brought 10
me. These ! ordered to confinement, until
their friendship could be further confirm
ed for was jealous they were spies, as
they proved to be afterwards. One Of the
principal of them making his escape, ex-
posed the weakness of my party, which
was ihe final cause of my misfortune for
| have been since informed that Mr.. w.
agreeable 10 my desire, exeried himself,
and had raised considerable number Of
men for my assistance, which brought him
into difficulty afterwards but, upon hear
| ing of my misfortune, he disbanded them
again.
The town of Montreal was in a great
tumnt. General Carleton and the royal
party, made every preparation 10 go on
board their vessels of force, as was after
wards informed, but the spy escaping from
my guard TO the town, occasioned an al
tera,on in their policy, and embroidered
General Carleton TO send the force which
he had there collected, GU: against me.
had previously chosen my ground, but
when | saw the number of the enemy as
they sailed out Of the town, perceived il
would be day of trouble, if not OF rebuke;
but had no chance to flee, as Montreal
was situated on an island, and the River
St. Lawrence cut off my communication to
General Montgomery's camp. encour-
aged my soldiery to bravely defend them
selves, that we should soon have help, and
that we should be able to keep the ground
if no more. This, and much more, az
frmed with the greatest seeming assurance,
and which in reality | thought to be in
some degree probable.
The enemy consisted Of not more than
40 regular troops, together with a mixed
multitude, chiefly Canadians, with num-
Der of English who lived in town, and some
Indians in all to the number OF near five
hundred.
I The reader will notice that most of my
party ,cere Canadians indeed, it was o
motley parcel of soldiery which composed
both parties. However, the enemy began
to attack from wood-piles, bitches, build
ngs, and such like places, at a considera-
BILE distance, and | returned the fire from a
situation more than equally advantageous
The attack began between two and three
O'Clock in the afternoon, just before which
ordered a volunteer by the name OF Rd
Young. with detachment of nine men as
| flank guard, which, under the cover O
the bank of the river, could not only ammo,
the enemy, but, at the same time, serve
, as flank guard to the left Of the MAR
, body.
The fire continued for sometime on botf
sides and was confident that such re.
mote method of attack could not carry tht
, ground, provided it should be continued
: till night: hut near half the body Of th,
enemy began TO flank round TO my right
upon which | ordered volunteer, by th'
e name of John Dugan, who had lived man.
: wears in Canada, and understood III,
French language, TO detach about fifty o
/, the Canadians, and post himself at an adj
P vantaeeous ditch, which was on my right
, 10 prevent ms being surrounded: be ad
a vanced with the detachment, but instead
4 of occupying the post, made his escape, a
a did likewise Mr.. Young upon the left, will
: their attachments. | soon perceived iha
d the enemy was in possession of The ground
: which Dugan should have occupied. A
this time | had but about foriy-fve mel
d with me some Of whom were wounded
r and the enemy kept closing round me
e nor was ii in my power TO prevent II; b.
r, which means my situation, which wa
o advantageous in the first part Of the al
Y tack. ceased to be so in The last; and belnl
4 almost entirely surrounded with such vas
h UNEQUAL numbers, ! ordered retreat, bu
T Iound that those of the enemy, who wer
n of the country, and their Indians, coul
: run as fast as my men, though the regu
d lars could not. Thus | retrealed near
! nile, and some Of the enemy, with III
n savaees, kept flsnking me, aud other
e crowded hard in the rear. In fine, | ex
Is pecied in a very short time, TO try III
h world OF spirits; for was apprehensiF
4 4 l. az,