The pilot and transcript. [volume] (Baltimore, Md.) 1840-1841, 1840-06-24


principle has been adopted by several other
States; and, until very lately, it seemed to be
very rapidly growing into favor.
Before can form correct opinion of the
manner in which this power should be exercised,
it is proper to understand the reasons which have
induced its adoption. In its theory, it is mani
| testify an innovation upon the first principle OF
republican government-thatt the majority should
| rule. Why should single individual control
the will Of that majority?
1t will not be said that there is more probable
| ty of finding greater wisdom in the executive
chair, than in the halls of the Legislature. Nor
| can it possibly be supposed, that an individual
residing in the centre of an extensive country,
| can be as we'll acquainted with the wants and
wishes of a numerous people, as those who come
Immediately from amongst them-the Partakers,
for portion of the year, in their various labors
and employments; and the witnesses of the eff
| fects of the laws in their more minute as well as
| general operations.
As far, then, as it regards knowledge of the
wants and wishes of the people, wisdom to dis
cover remedies for increasing the public pros
Perity, it would seem that the legislative bodies
did not require the aid of an executive magis-
trate. But there Is principle, recognized by all
the American constitutions, which was unknown
to the ancient republics. They all acknowledge
rights in the minority, which cannot rlghttuily
be taken from them. Experience had shown
that in large assemblies these rights were not al
ways respected. 1t would be in vain that they
should be enumerated, and respect for them
Joined in the constitution, popular assembly,
under the influence of that spirit of party which
is always discoverable in a greater or less de-
gree in all republics, might, and would, as it was
believed, sometimes disregard them. To guard
against this danger, and to secure the rights of
each individual, the expedient of creating de-
partment independent OF the others, and amena-
BILE only to the laws, was adopted. Security
was thus given against any palpable violation of
the constitution, to the injury of individuals or
a minority party. But it was still possible for
wilful and excited majority to enact laws of the
greatest injustice and tyranny, without violating
the letter of their charter.
And this take to be the origin of the vets
power, as we'll in the State governments, as that
of the United States. Ii appears TO have been
the Intention to create an umpire between the
centending factions, which had existed, it was
believed, and would continue to exist If there
was any propriety in adopting this principle in
the government of State, all the reasons in
favor of it existed in tenfold degree for ineor-
porating ii in that of the United States. The
operations of the latter, extending over an i'm
menSe tract of country, embracing the products
of almost every cline, and that country divided
too into number of separate governments, in
many respects independent of each other and of
the common federal head, left but little hope that
they could always be carried on In harmony.-
1t could not be doubted that sectional interests
would at tunes predominant in the bosoms of the
immediate representatives of the people and the
States, combinations formed destructive of the
public good, or unjust and oppressive to a mi
nority. Where could power to check these
local feelings, and to destroy the effects of unjust
combina tions, be better placed than In the hands
of that department whose authority, being de-
rived from the same common sovereign, is co-or-
dinate with the rest, and which enjoys the great
distiction of being at once the immediate repre-
sentative of the whole people, as well as of each
particular State?
In the former character, the interests of the |
whole community would be rigidly supported |
and, in the latter, the rights of each member
steadfastly maintained. The representation from |
the State authorities in the electoral colleges
consider of the most feicitous features IN the
constitution 1t serves an eternal memento to
the chief agistrate that it is his duty to guard
the interests of the weak against the unjust ag-
gressions of the strong and powerful From these
premises, you will conclude that consider the
qualified veto upon the acts of the legislature,
conferred by the constitution upon the President,
a conservative power, intended only to be used
TO the instrument itself from violation, or,
in times of high party excitement to protect the
rights of the minority, and the interests of the
weaker members of the Union. Such, indeed, |
is my opinion, and such we must believe to be |
the opinion of nearly all the distinguished men
1
President of the United States an act which did |
not involve either of the principles above emu
merated, must have been passed under very pc
culiar circumstances of precipitancy opposi- |
ton to the known public will, to indEce me to |
refuse to it nv sanction.
If the opinions have given of the raetives of
the trainers of the constitution, in giving the
veto power to the President, is correct, it fol-
lows, that they never could have expected that
he who was constituted the umpire between con-
tending factions, should identify himself
with the interests of one of them, and volunta-
rily race himself from the proud eminence of
leader of nation to that Of chief of party |
easily conceive the existence OF state of
things by which the chief magistrate of State
may be forced to act upon party principles; but
such course is entirely opposed to all the obi
cations which the constitution imposes on Pre-
sident of the United States. The immense in
fuence he possesses viii always give to his party
the preponderenee, and the very circumstance Of
its being executive party, will be the cause of
infusing more bitterness and vindictive feeling in
these domestic contests.
Under these circumstances the qualified veto
given by the constitution, may, If the President
should think proper to change its character, be-
come as absolute in practice as that possessed
by the kings of England and France. From the
great variety of local interests acting upon the
members of the two houses of Congress, and
from the difficulty of keeping all the individuals
of large party under the control of party dis
cipline, laws win often be passed by small ma
ioritles adverse to the interests of the dominant
party; but if the President should think proper
to use the veto power Tor the purpose of pre-
noting the interests of his party, it will be in
vain to expect that majority so large as two
thirds in both houses, would be found in oppose
ton to his wishes Ia the hands Of such Presi-
dent, the qualified veto of the constitution would
In practice be absolute
have, upon another occasion, expressed my
views upon the danger Of dominant executive
party. 1t may, perhaps, be said, that the chief
magistrate will find it impossible to avoid the in
magistrates, however, have been able to escape
its influence; or, what is the same thing to act
as If they did not feel it. As one mode Of avoid
ing it, it would be my aim to interfere with the