Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1839-04-11

tender without debasInS himself, and CIV
ing up sacred trust vested in him, by the
State of which he is member, for The
common good; nor can this Government
demand its surrender, without transcend
ing its powers and infringing the rights Of
the States and their citizens.
Ii may also be said that, in most cases,
it would be impossible to distinguish be-
tween the official and the political acls of
the officer, so as 10 subject the former to
penal restraints, without interfering with
ihe aller, and that it would in practice
render ineffective rhe admitted right of the
Government to punish its officers for the
abuse of their official powers. II may be
so, but little or no evil can result. What
ever defect of right This Government may
labor under, in such cases, is amply made
up by the plenary power of the States.
which has an unlimited control over the
electoral rights of its citizens, whether Off
GERS of this Government or not. To them
The subject may be safely confded. |, is
they who are particularly interested in
seeing that right so sacred shall not be
abused, nor the freedom Of election he inn
paired. We must not forget that States
and the people of the States are our con-
stituenIs and superiors, and We hui their
agents, and that if The right in question be
abused, or the freedom of election i'm
paired, it is they. and not we, who must
mainly suffer, and who Of course are the
best Judges of The evil and the remedy.
If the policy of The States demands it,,
they may impose whatever restraint they
please on the Federal officers within their
respective limits, in order TO guard against
their control or influence in elections; and,
if it be necessary to divest them entirely
of the right of suffrage. To those who
are so much more interested and compe-
tent to Judge and act on this subject than
we are, I am for leaving the decision as
10 what ought 10 be done, aud the applica-
ton of the remedy Entertaining these
views, am forced 10 The conclusion that
this bill is unconstitutional. and If there
were no other reason to oppose its pas
sage, would be compelled 10 vote against
| it.
But there are others sufficiently decisive
10 compel me to withhold my support, were
it possible to remove the constitutional OBJ
lection. So far from restricting the pat
ronase Of the President, should the bill
become a law, it would, if mistake not,
greatly increase bis influence. lie has
now The almost unlimited power Of remo-
viug The officers of this Government-a
power. the abuse Of which has been the
subject Of much and, in my opinion. OF
just complaint on The part Of the chamber
to which the mover ofthis bill belongs, OH
the ground that it was calculated to in.
crease unduly the power and influence Of
that department of The Government. Now
what is The remedy this bill proposes for
that evil? To put restrictions on the re-
moving powerl The very reverse. To
make it The duty, as it is now the right Of
the President to removs, and in disclargins
this high duty he is made the sole judge,
without Limitation or appeal. The fate Of
The accused would be exclusively in his
hand, whether charged with the offence of
opposing or supporting his administration.
Can any one. the least couversant with
party morals, or The working of The hu-
man heart, doubt how the law would he
executed? Is it not certain, that it would
be most risidIy enforced against all officers
who should venture to oppose him, either
in the Federal or State Governments, with
a corresponding indulgence and lenity To-
wards those who supported him? A single
view, without proIonsing the discussion,
will decide. Should there be a President
of such exalted virtue and patriotism as to
make no discrimination between friend
and foe, the law would be perfectly USE
less; bu, if not, it would be made the pre-
text for indiscriminatc removal Of all, who
may refuse to become his active and de-
voted partisans; and it would thus prove
either useless, or Dorse than useless.
With the object which the mover of the
Bill has in view, il seems TO me, he ought
to take The very opposite course, and in
stead of making it the duty Of the Presi-
dent 10 remove, he ought 10 impose res
trictions on the power ofremoval, or 10 d..
vest him entirely Of it. Place the Of
flee holders, with their yearly salaries be-
yond the reach of the Executive power,
and they would in short time be as mute
and inactive as this bill proposes to make
them. Their voice, I promise, would
then he scarcely raised at elections, or
their persons be found at The polls.
But suppose The immediate object of
The bill accomplished, and The officers rem
dered perfectly silent and passive; it might
even then be doubted whether it would
cause any diminuIion in the influence of
patronage over elections. 1t would, in
deed, greatly reduce the influence of the
office holders. They would become the
most Insignificant portion Of the commu-
nifty, as far as elections were concerned.
Blu, just in The same proportion as they
might sink. the no less formidable corps
of office seekers would rise in importance.
The struggle for power between the ins &