The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1839-08-31

lodged elsewhere. Let the change be made by
whom and when Il may, and we venture to predict
that the wisdom and viIluous influences Of the old
order Of things on this subject which was establish
ed by the early expounders OF the constitution. will
soon be found TO excel those Of the new one and
that The inconveniences and detrimens TO the public
welfare, resulting from the new, will far exceed
these OF the old arrangement
The President has the incidental power TO refuse
and 10 dismiss obnoxious ambassadors or other pub
lie ministers and an official involabiliiy, in civil
cases, AT least, IL implied from the nature Of the
functions of his office. President Washington in
1913, issued proclamation furbidding The citizens
OF The United States 10 take any pan In the then
hosilities between Old England and France and
directing them strictly 10 observe the duties II neu-
Taiity. Though vehemently assslied at The time,
Il Is the received opinion that IL an aci with
in The incidental powers Of The office 10 be done.
The only remaining power OF the President
deemed OF sufcie IL porance 10 be reciied Ii IN
deed we have omitted any Of bis powers whatever
is conferred BY clause which we shall iranscribe
verbatim, TO wit:
"The President shall have power 10 Gil up all
vacancies that may happen during The OF The
Senate by granting commissions which shall expire
AT the end Of their next session"
Our comments on this clause, shall be The CON-
ments OF another writer, promising only that what
may have been the intention OF the trainers of
the constitution in omitiDg To take more in de-
timing this power, the power actually given Is as u
is indirectly adn iied 10 be, and the only remedy,
ShoH OF Amending the CONSTITUTION, rs the one indi-
| Gated by the writer whose comments we adopt, as
follows:
7" The appointments thus made, expire at the end
of The next term OF the Senate, by the constitutional
| Limitation Suppose the President should 6I va
cancy during the recess OF The Senate and should
then nominate this officer To the Senate, and The
Senate should reject him and the President should,
on the FIRST day Of the recess appoint him again to
fill the vacancy, may he not in this manner perpetu-
ate an appointment without The consent Of the Sc
nate Certainly this cannot be the Intention OF The
constitution, for il would defeat the coordna'e pow
er Of appointment which Il has vested in the Senate:
yet such practice has in some instances recently
| obtained Where is the remedy Nobody Is YES
ted with power TO anDul the appointment; but i can
be effeciually restrained by Withholding the appro
pratioas. Here, then, is instance OF The signal
virtue OF powers, effective and restraining, vested d.
rectly in the representatives OF the people" But,
we ask, suppose no appropriation OF money is re-
quise to efecuate the object Of The appointment in
executing the duties OF the office, the appoinee,
to crafty the arbitrary will of the President choose
To execute the Office without emolument, or where
| The emolument consists in contingent fees,-where
is The remedy Echo answers, 1here? unless, in
deed the Presidentso acting without sufcien cause
should seek reelection: in this case he would
encounter the censorial and elective powers Of the
! people.
| To Be continued.