The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1839-02-28

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principles 81 our Government for Congress 10 regulate
by law the mode Of selecting the fiscal agents the
curtes proper 10 be taken the duties they shall be
quired 10 perform and the terms which they shall be
employed"
The same COMMITTEES reported the following resou-
lion:
Resoiped, That State Banks ought 10 be continued
as the places OF deposit Of the public moneys and that
70 ~ s1pedieM for Congress make further provision
by law, prescribing the mode Of selection, the securities
TO be taken, aud the manner aud terms which they
are To be employed"
The whole tenor Of this sentiment, and the whole
force OF this resolution is that the public should
not be entrusted the actual control and custody Of The
Executive.
Ia conformity with tho principles thus expressed the
committee reported bilI which is thus characterized
by them
In determining upon the mode in which the deposite
banks shall be selected, the committee Of opinion
proper to leave the selection in the first ntance TO the
head oil the Treasury. 10 some other person desg
mated by law but, rhen once selected 10 put out Of
e Po1er Of The Ereenpe 10 discontinue such depository
rithom The sanction and appreciation Of Congress.-
Should IT, how ever, be deemed expedien for Congress
themselves TO designate by law the banks which shall
hereafter be employed repositories, instead Of dele
eating the power Of selection tie first instance, 10 an
Executive officer there could be no objection to that
mode, provided it BIO deemed practicable TO make the
selections, such manner 10 protect and preserve
the public funds To be deposited therein.
.The bill which they report prescrbes, first, the mode
in which, aud by whom the State Banks hereafter TO be
employed as the public repositories shall be selected
Secondly, the terms and conditions upon which they
shall be employed, the duties and services they shall
perform, and the securities which they may be required
to give, in order eecoaly protect the Government
against possible danger OF loss; and, thirdly, it pro-
vdes that when selected they shall be placed be-
yond the power and control Of the Executive Depart
men except so far the safe and prudent management
OF the public revenue may render such control ndspen
sable
The bill restricts the discretion Of the Executive and
places i, out Of the power Of the Department to dis
continue the selected hanks places of public deposite
to cases Of failure the part Of said banks TO comply
with the terms and conditions which they may be
employed, or to in which any of said banks may
become unsafe repositories Of the public moneys, and
Congress the ultimate control the whole
subject. BY its provisions the Secretary Of the rrea
sury cannot during the session Of Congress, dismiss
from the service Of the Treasury any bank Of depose
without having first obtained the sanction and approba
ton Of Congress and If, during the recess Of Con-
gress any bank shall fall to comply with the terms and
conditions upon which it has bean employed il,
from the periodical returns Of its condition and business,
or otherwise the Secretary Of the Treasury shall deem
It to be necessary in order TO protect and preserve the
public Interest," to discontinue any Of said banks pub
JIG repositories, he Is authorized such order,
temporarily, but required the commencement Of the
next session, to report to Congress the and the
evidence upon which he has ordered such discontinue
ance, reservng to Congress the right approve
verse such order. Thus, all apprehension that the
power OF the Executive over the selected banks may
be used as government patronage, for corrupt pur-
poses, is eectualy removed. SO long the selected
banks shall continue perform the duties required Of
them by the provisions Of the bill (shoud it become
law and so long they shall continue TO conduct
their business to keep the public funds deposited
L.. a..
Of the Executive but will be entitled their custody
matter Of right, unless il shall be the pleasure of
Congress to withdraw them, or change the place Of de-
posite.
So fearful was the committee Of the power Of the
Executive to remove the public depositcs, that in this
bill they impose strong restriction upon this power
and these not only the views Of Gen Jackson and
the committee but the whole party. 1t would have been
impossible for General Jackson strong the affections
Of the people as he to have stemmed The torrent Of
popular excitement which rising against him,
accoun. Of the removal Of the public depostes from the
Bank Of the United States, had he accompanied that
act with an earnest recommendation to Congress to
strict the future exercise Of such power by the Execu
tive not account Of any regard for the bank but the
onnlpotence Of such power.
Now. sir does the Sub-treasury scheme, as recon-
mended Ivy the Executive conform TO these principles
Of General Jacksons administration! Ga the contrary
sir, they in direct hostility to them The pro-
position OF General Jackson was to place the public
money in repositories not existing by Executive,
federal authority, but by State authority and in
these repositories, to restrict the power Of the Execu
tive TO il discretion. The present proposition
to place the public funds in the keeping Of those who
hold their place at the will Of the Executive power
which overawes and controls all others, and leaves the
public funds entirely at Executive discretion.
For the proof that such is the character Of the sys
TEN, proposed by the Executive refer to the following
extract from the Presidents second annual message
Speaking Of system Of special deposites, he says:
I" This plan u.s. to some extent, in accordance with
the practices OF the Government, and with the present
arrangement Of the Treasury Department, which, ex-
cept perhaps, during the operation of the late deposte
act has always been allowed during the existence
OF National Bank, to make temporary use Of the
State Banks in particular places for the safe keeping of
portions of the revenue This discretionary power
might be continued, If Congress deem it desirable,
whatever general system might be adopted, long as
tho connection Is voluntary, need, perhaps anticipate
lew OF those difficulties and little Of that dependence
on the banks, which must attend every such connection
when compulsory IN its nature, and when arranged
as to make the banks fixed part Of the machinery Of
Government. 1t is undoubtedly in the power of Con-
gress SO to regulate and guard to prevent the pub
lie money from being applied the use, or interminged
with the affairs, Of individuals Thus arranged, al
though would not give to the Government that entire
control over Its own funds which desire to it
by the plan have proposed, it would it must be adj
mltted in great degree accomplish one Of the objects
which has recommended that plan TO my Judgment
the separation Of the fiscal concerns Of the Govern
ment from those Of individuals or corporations -
Again, in the last annual message, speaking of this sub
ec he says " Like other State establishments they
he banks may be used, not, IN conducting the af
fairs Of the Government public policy and the general
interests oil the country may seem to require. The
only safe or proper principle upon which their intercourse
with the Government can be regulated is that which
regulates their intercourse with the private citizenhe
comforting Of mutual benefits. When the Government
can accomplish financial operation better with the aid
of the banks than without it should be liberty seek
that aid would the services Of private banker or
other capitalists agents. giving the preference those
who will serve it ON the best terms"
These two extracts disclose the whole policy Of the
President; is leave the Executive in possession OF
full power in relation to this subject to use not use,
deposit with, not, the banks to it may expe
dent. That it designed that this discretion should