The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1839-02-02
MIR. MADIsoN,s VETO.

To the House of Representatives. of the United States:
Having considered the bill this day presented to
me, entitled "an act TO set apart and pledge certain
funds for internal improvements; and which sets
apart and pledges funds, :" for constructing roads
and canals, and improving the navigation Of water
courses in order TO facilitate promote and give Sc
curity 10 internal commerce among theseyefa states,
and TO render more easy and less expansive the
means and provisions FOR the common dc ifpces am
constrained, by theinsuperable difficulty feel in
reconciling the bill with the constitution Of the Uni
ted States to return ii, with that objection, TO the
House of Representatives, in which il originated.
The Legislative powers vested in Congress, are.
specified and enumerated in the 9Th section OF the
first article of the Constitution; and it does not APP
pear that the power proposed TO be exercised by the
bill, is among the enumerated poweTsj or that II
falls, by any Just Interpretation, within the power to
make laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution those other powers vested BY the Con-
siitulion in the government Of the United States
I "The power to regulate commerce among the Sc
veral states" cannot include power to construct
roads and canals, and TO improve the navigation OF
wafer courses in order to facilitate promote and Sc
cure, such commerce, without latitude Of con-
strucon, departing from the ordinary import OF the
terms, strengthened by the known inconveniences
which, doubtless, led to the grant Of this remedial
power TO Congress. Fo refer The power, in ques-
tion 10 the clause, "to provide for the common de-
fence and general welfare" would be contrary to the
established and consistent rules of Interpretation; as
rendering the special and careful enumeration of
proper Such view of the Constitution would
have the effect of giving to Congress general
power of Legislation instead OF the defined and linn
tied hitherto understood to belong to them the
terms common defence and general welfare" en-
bracng every object and act within the purview of
Legislative trust It would have the effect of sub
jecting, both the Constitution and laws of the seve-
raj States in all not specifically exempted to be
superseded by laws of Congress; itbeiDg expressly
declared, that the Constitution of the United
States and laws made in pursuance thereof shall be
the supreme law of the land and the judges of every
state shall be bound thereby any thing in the Con-
sitution or laws of any state 10 the contrary nowith
Standing" Such view of the Constitution, finally,
would have the effect Of excluding the Judicial au-
thority of the United States from its participation in
guarding the boundary between the Legislative
powers of the general and Of the state governments
inasmuch as questions relating TO the general well
fare, being questions of policy and expediency, are
unsusceptible of judicial cognizance and decision.
"A restriction of the power g TO provide for the
common defence and general welfare to cases which
are to be provided tor by the expenditure OF money,
would still leave within the Legislative power of
Congress all the great and most important measures
of government; money being the ordinary and ne
cessary means Of carrying them into execution.
IL general power 10 construct roads and canals,
and to improve the navigation OF water courses,
with the train of powers incident thereto be not pos
seSSed by Congress- the assent of the states, In the
node provided by the bill, cannot confer the power
The only in which the consent and cession of
STATES can eXleDu the power OI OOuSItSS
are those specified and provided for in the consu-
ton.
! am not unaware Of the great importance of roads
and canals, and the improved navigation of water
courses; and that power in the National Legisla-
ture to provide for them, might be exercised with
signal advantage TO the generalprosperity But see
ing that such power is not expressly given by the
Constitution; and believing il cannot be deduced
from any part of it. without inadmssable latitude
of constructions and reliance on insufficient pre-
cedents; believing, also that the permanent success
of the Constitution depends on definite partition Of
powers between the general and the state govern
ments, and thatno adeguate landmarks would be left
BY the constructive extension Of the powers of Con-
grtss as proposed nthe BILL have no option but to
withhold my signature from III cherishing the hope
that its beneficial objects may be attained, by re-
sort for the necessary powers, TO the same wisdom
and virtue in the nation, which established the Con-
situon in its actual form, and providently marked
out in the instrument ITSELF safe and practicable
mode of improving it, as experience might suggest
JAMES MADISON.
March g. 1917