The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1839-12-17
GEN. HARRIsoN's CREED,

GEN HARRISoN's CREED,
As many may not be aware Of the politica
principles recently promulgated by Gen. Har
rison, we have thought we should be only
doing him, rs well as ourselves, justice, by re
publishing, from his letter TO Harmar Denny
the following extracts, which comprise all thai
is material in il having any bearing upon the
principles Of administration by which he |,
pledged to be guided, il elected. We believe
them to be sound, and just such, as far as
they 60, as ought 10 enter into the administers
ton Of our Government at this particular and
important crisis. Gen. Harrison says:
Among the principles proper to be adopt.
ed by any Executive sincerely DESTROYS TO re-
store the administration to It's original simpli.
city and purity, deem the following to be Of
prominent importance.
II. To confne his services to a single
term.
I'll. To disclaim all right Of control over
the public treasure, with the exception Of such
part Of il as may be appropriated by law, TO
carry on the public services, and that to be
applied precisely as the Law may direct, and
drawn from the treasury agreeably to the long
established forms OF that department.
"lII. That he should never attempt to in
fuence the elections, either by the people or
the state legislatures, nor suffer the federal
officers under his control to take any other
part in them than by giving their own votes
when they possess the right Of voting.
CIV. That in the exercise of the veto
power, he should limit his rejection Of bills
to: LIST. Such as are in his opinion uncon-
stitutional. I'd. Such as tend to encroach on
the rights of the states or individuals. 3rd.
Such as involving deep interests, may in his
opinion require more mature deliberation or
reference TO the will of the people, to be as
certained at the succeeding elections.
~. That he should never suffer the inlu.
ence Of his Office 10 be used for purposes of q
purely party character.
"Vl. That in removals from office of those
who hold the appointments during the plea
sure of the Executive, the cause Of such re-
moval should be stated if requested, to the
Senate, AT the time the nomination Of a sue
cessor is made.
" And last. but not least in importance,
avII. Ttn he should not suffer the Exc
cutive department of the government to be-
come the ource of legislation but leave the
whole business Of making laws for the Union
to the department to which the Constitution
has exclusively assigned it, until they have
assumed that perfected shape, where and
when alone the opinions Of the Executive
may be heard. A community of power in
the preparation Of the laws between the legis-
lature and the Executive departments, must
necessarily lead to dangerous combinations,
greatly to the advantage Of president de-
srous Of extending his power. Such con-
sruction of the constitution could never have
been contemplated by those who framed it, as
they well knew that those who propose the
bills, will always take care of themselves, or
the interests of their constituents, and hence
the provision in the Constitution, borrowed
from that of England, restricting the origin
ating Of revenue bills to the immediate repre-
sentatives of the people. So far from agree
ing in opinion with the distinguished charac-
that congress should have applied to him for
project of a banking system, think that
such an application would have manifested
not only great subservency upon the part of
that body but an objectionable ignorance Of
the chief danger to be apprehended from such
an institution. That danger unquestlonably
consists in union Of interests between the
executive and the bank Would an ambitious
incumbent Of the executive chair neglect so
favorable an opportunity as the preparing of
the law would give him, to insert in it pro-
visions to secure his influence over it! In
the authority given to the president by the
Constitution to recommended congress such
measures as he shall Judge necessary and ex-
pedient," il was certainly never intended that
the measures he recommended should be pre-
scented in shape suited for the immediate
decision of the Legislature. The sages who
made the Constitution, too well knew the ad-
vantages which the crown Of England derives
from the exercise Of this power by its minis
tiers, to have intended it to be used by our
chief magistrate, or the heads Of departments
under his control The boosted principles Of
the English Constitution, that the consent of
the democratic branch is not only necessary
to receive money from the people, but that
it is It's inviolable prerogative also 10 origin
ate all the bills for that purpose, is true in
theory, but rendered utterly false and nuga-
tory in effect, by the participation of the
ministers Of the crown in the details Of le-
gislation. Indeed the influence they derive
from sitting as members ofthe House Of Com
mons, and from welding the immense pa
tronage Of the crown Constitutional or usurp-
ed,) gives them power over that body, that
renders plausible, at least, the fattery or as
it is more probable, the intended sarcasm Of
Sir Walter Raleigh, in an address to James l.,
that the demand of the sovereign upon the
Commons for pecuniary aid, was required
only that the tax might seem to come from
themselves
Having thus given you my opinion Of
some things which might be done, and others
which should not be done, by President