The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1839-06-26
GEN. JAcKsoN's LETTER
no THE LeolsLaruRE or THE STATE or TENNESSEE
IN ocToBgH, 1895

IN ocToBEn, 1888.
Two years ago, by tie unsolicited suffrage Of the
Legislature OF Tennessee Mas appointed 10 The situs
uon o. senator ~ Congress Pursuing the principle by
winch mao ever been governed, neither seek alter
nor decline Office, the appointment conferred was ac
cepled. Aware OF the practice which had long pre-
vailed, OF selecting from each extreme u The STATE a
person for the high and responsible situation of Senator
elt regret at hclng brought forward TO disturb sys-
TEN which had so long obtained vet inasmuch as he
Legislature, without any knowledge or understanding
my part. had called me The situation il was in.
possible to withhold my consent and accordingly the
appointment was, though reluctantly, accepted mol,
however, without It's being previously professed by my
bends that longer term Of service than Congress
would neither lie required nor expected That service
sas been periormed was still, though bordering aud
in doubt whether exceptions TO nv resgnog might not
be TAKEN and il il might be proper for execute
the foil term which you had assigned me, when my
mind was brought TO conclusion by some late pro-
ceedags OF your own. aud determination formed 10
surrender Immediately back into yonr hands the respon
sblc trust you had heretofore confded
One indictment TO my determination is, that travel
ling to the city Of Washington twice year imposes no
inconsiderable fatigue; and although this is minor
consde stion and which would have been with
cheeulness il business involving the interest Of
happy country had required the excrtion. yet am
aware Of hing Of great national mportal which is
likely TO before Congress, excepting a subject
that yon have lately had before yonr hodythe aend
ing the Constitution Of the United States 10 relation
the choice Of Chief Magistrate. Upon this matter
greatly doubted whether it might not be nv dnty again
appear in the Senate and extend my feeble aid to-
wards producing alteration in which great interest
with the people Of the United States exists, and on
which the security Of our republican system may de-
pend But having been advised Of resolution OF your
honorable body, presenting again my The Anne
resn people for The Office Of Chief Magistrate OF this
Union, could no longer hesitate on the should
pursue, doubt yielded TO certainty. aud determined
forthwith ask your indulgence, to he excused from
any further service in the Councils Of the Nation.
Thus situaed--my name presented to the freemen
Of the United States for the frs, office known the
CONSTITUTIONS could NOT. with any thing Of approba
ton on my part consent either urge or encourage an
alteration, which nigh: the appearance OF being
induced by selfish considentions-hy desire 10 ad-
vance my own views, feel thorough and safe
vction that imputaon would be ill-founded, and that
nothing could prompt me TO any active that
subject which my judgment did not approve yet. as
from late events II might be inferred that the prospects
Of could be rendered probable only
ty the people having the choice gwen to them direct
alb ind8nt would be afforded TO ascrbe any exer
tins Of NINE to causes appertainng exclusively my
IT, lmputaons thus made would be extremely irk-
srme 7, any person of vr and independent feel
ing tn y would certainly prove 10 me; aud hence
The determination from situation where strong
suspicious might at least attach, and with great seeming
pioprie'v. hasten Therefore, To tender this my resg
nation into y hands Of who conferred it, that
the exercise e the const ona rights, they may
hue 10 sone one deserving their confidence and APP
probation.
Being about 10 retire again private life, it is, pro-
baby the last time shall have opportunity Of adj
dressing you. Permit me, then, to suggest
remarks upon the amendment which you have proposed
TO the Constitution OF the United States Our political
fabric being regulated by checks and balances, where
experience that those which have been resorted
TO are Inefficient that, however we'll their hounda-
ries have been defined the parchment Of the Constl-
tuition barrier 10 the encroachments OF power
corruption in any Of the departments OF government
is Necessary corrective should be applied and, under
such circumstances the duty OF the people to
that one is provided t- ...
There is no truth more sacred in politics and none
more conch,vey STAMPED upon all the State Consttu-
tons. as well as the Federal Constitution, than that
which requires the three great departments OF power
the Legislative, Judicial. and Execntise--to be kent
separate and apart But, simple and manifest as this
truth H. tho difficulty of arriving il in practice with
constitutional restraints, still remains and presents
question whether the wisdom and virtue Of the present
generation with view 10 amendment in this important
matter, may not he usefullv employed Gratitude 10
the founders of orr happy Government cannot he less
ened by honest efforts part to improve, rather
TO forfv the blessings which have been transmitted to
us with snch additional guards experience has proved
be necessary. Upon this principle, Tventnre fully
accord with 10 the contemplated change proposed
10 the Constitution, and, indeed, would go further
With view to sustain eiecnally in practice, the
axiom which divides The three great classes Of power
into independent, constitutional checks, would impose
provision rendering any member Of Congress negi-
BILE to office under the General Government during the
term for which he elected and years there
after. except IN Of judicial Office; aud these
would excepf, for the that vacancies in this de-
par,men' frequent and because no
barrier should be incrposed in selecting the bench
men Of the first talents and integrity. Their trusts
and duties helng of the most responsible kind, the
widest possible range should he permitted, that Judi
cions and safe selections might be made. The poit-
clan may err, his he presently retrieved
and considerable injury result hn with Judges. par
tculay the last resort error is fatal because without
remedy. .>
The effect Of such cons itutional provision is
obvious. By il Congress, in considerable de- gree,
would be free from that connection with The Execu
tive Department which, at present, gives strong
ground for apprehension and jealousy The part Of
the people. Members, instead Of being liable 10 be
withdrawn from egislatng on the great interests Of
the nation through prospects Of Executive patronage
would be more literally confded in BY their con-
sliluentS while their vigilance would be less inter-
rupted bv party feelings and party excitementS.--
Calculations, from intrigue or management, would
fail; nor would their deliberations or their nve>t-
CATION OF subjects consume so much time. The
morals Of the country would be improved, and vr-
tue uniting with the labors of the Representatives,
anu WIN tue bUiCldl lHlHlS'eIN W 'HC ldNt N'ua
tend TO perpetuate the honor and glory OF the Go
vernfnent
But if this change in the Constitution should not
be obtained and nportant appointments CONTINUE to
devplve on the Representatives in Congress, il re-
ouires no depth OF thought to be convinced that
rup ion will become the order Of the day; and that,
under the gatb of conscientious sacrifices 10 estab
sh precedentS for the public good evils OF serious
importance TO the freedom and proSperi OF the Re-
public may arise. II is through this channel that
the people may expect to be attacked In their cons,-
tuiional sovereignty and where tyranny may well be
apprehended to spring up in some favorable rmer-
gency Against such inroads every guard onght tobe
interpcsed and none better occurs than that of clos
ing the suspected avenue with some necessary con-
situional restriction We know human nature to
be prone to evil: we are early taught TO pray that
we may moi be led into temptation and hence the
opinion that by constitutional provision all avenues
10 temptation on the part Of our political servants,