Morning herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1837-1840, 1838-04-09

Now under such circumstances 10 wise Tor ne
Banks 10 dsarm themselves in the presence OF ther
Ill. The disorders Of the currency lie too desp for
superficial remedies and these paatves rrtae with
out curing. Congress, and Congress alene, can ap-
ply adequate relief. What Mr.. Madison sald TO Con-
gress in 1916, 10 even more true IN lSSo-"rsr the
interests of the community at large" said he as
well for the purposes of the Treasury, II - essen.
tal that the nation should possess currency OF equal
value, credit and use, wherever II may circulate Inc
Constitution has entrusted Congress erciuoay WIN
the power of creating and regulating currency OF
that description" The only reform IN the currency
which that BODY has yet made, is the issue OF ten nall
lions Of lrredeemabe paper money and proposaifor
ten millions more. lsit worth while, tnen, SO long
as Congress fails TO exercise its legitimate powers 10
waste the strength Of the country In efforts 10 accom-
plsh what we all know to be imPractlcablef 10 re
sumo now without some clear understanding win the
Government, seems to be throwing away the sene-
fits ofexperlence and the lessons Of misfortune. we
have gone through all the modification and all the IN
convenience of suspension. Let us endeavor to pront
by them-to fix the future on some SOLID Dass-have
some guarantee Of the stability Of the currency, and
not set every thing afoat again without knowing
where we may be drifted. For
Nv. Compare the situation of the Banks at the last
resumption and now After suspension Tor nearly
three years, Congress applied all It's power 10 induce,
to persuade and assist the banks IN their Efforts to
resume They passed the resolution Of 1916, author
ling the receipt of the notes of specepayng banks
But this alone was insufficient; and at the same nme
they established the Bank of the United States, with
capital of thirty five millions. That Bank called
Convention of State Banks, and agreed that II they
would resume specie payments, 1t would
|. Assume all their debts to the Government OF the
United States.
e. Discount to those who had payments to make
to the Government the whole amount OF their bonds;
and in addition
8. Discount TO those not indebted to the Govern
men two millions in Ne York. two millions in Phil,
adelphia, one and half mil ions IN Baltimore, ana
halfa million in Richmond-and
A. Would sustain the resuming banks IN case tie
resumption brought them into difficulty.
The Bank at the same time imported, at an ex-
PeHse of more than half million, the sum OF seven
ton it's discounts reached twenty Millions Com
pare, with this state ment our condition now
Then the Government agreed 10 receive for all dues
the notes of the Bank of the United States-now all
bank notes are refused and dlscredlted Then the
Government endeavored to sustain the Banks-now
il is striving to destroy them. Then 1t established
new and vigorous bank capltal-now It refuses TO
bank and seeks 10 cripple these IN exis-
tence. Then we had two hundred and sixty banks
now we have nearly nine hundred
In short, what reliance have the Banks now with
the Executive hostile to them1 What protection like
that of the late Bank of the United States have they to
sustain them9 None whatever.
The only circumstance not wholly unfavorable IN
the comparison is the low rate of exchange with
England. Bat nothing general or permanent can DC
inferred from this circumstances, which frequently
dental in New York, from the unnatural condition
into which her measures of extreme rgor have driven
every thing Ifunder ordinary circumstances, while
other things underwent no depression, exchange on
England should decline, it might be inferred that
England owes to the United States more than we
have yet drawn from her. But il is not exchange
alone that has fallen.-Exchange on England hash
fallen in New York as much as the internal exchan-
ges or stocks real estate house rent have fallen
This fact seems decisive TO the cause. But can
this depression continue Certainly not These
rigorous measures understood to be only prellmi-
nary-only preparations for an expansion by the
Banks of New York, which is TO restore ease and
confidence Well, the moment this ease and conf
deAcc RETURN all things will rise, and exchange Of
course among the number. Besides, this unnatura
condition will work its own remedy, as all Irregular
ties are cured by their own excuses. To sell every
the English have bought all the produce we have Z,
spare, we must Of course buy from them what manu-
features they have TO spare. As as the proceeds
of our industry are realized in England-while w
have gradually exhausted supply of English goods
eur own merchants will convert their property into
fresh supply 10 be brought over; or, il this process
be Toe slow the English manufacturers themselve.
will send their own goods for sale. In either case
the exchange will recover its equilibrium, and Of
course will rise here, for between tive such countries
as America and England, permanent inequality OF
exchange as basis Of the metallic currency ofelther
is impossible.
W Perceiving nothing in the conduct of the Co.
verRment TO Justify an early resumption, let US see Il
there be any thing the state of the country which
recommends IT, Now what is the condition Of ouI
affalrs The suspension found us with heavy deb
to the BaHks-not less probably than five hundred
milllons-wlth large balances from the Southern and
Western States to the Atlantic cities, and with very
considerable debt TO Europe. All parties were will
ing TO pay almost all were able to pay but grea
forbearance and great indulgence were necessary
from the creditor, and above oil, after such con
vusion, the great restorer was tnne time to settle
time TO adjust accounts; time TO send the debtors
crops 10 market; time TO dispose Of his property with
the least sacrifice time TO bring out his resources t6
pay his debts. In all the large movements Of human
affairs, in the operations Of nature the great law il
genteness-volence is the last resource Of weakness
The disease Of the country was an overstrancd anc
| distempered energy. The remedy was repose. The
question Of the currency though important was only
| secondary The first concern was to pay our debts
and especially not to depreciate the value of oul
means of paying them Accordingly il seemed te
that after the suspension, the true course OF TIM
coantry was to begin gentle and gradual dmnutior
\ Of loans sufficient 10 prevent the hazards of ex
| pansion while the restraint of specie payments wal
removed, and to prepare for the resumption, but with
| no rash competition TO the amount which th,
several banks could carail-to make no volsn
changes in the standard of value, and give time for
settlement with foreigners, and ameng ourselves, or
the same, or nearly the same basis upon which these
mutual engagements were ccnracted-lettiHg tn,
crops 20 to their destined markets without deprcciat
ing their price. After this, the resumption with the
aid Of Congress, would have been easy and sponans
oas II in this spirit that the Bank Of the United
i hao l,~,sp ,b~It If it,