Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1838-05-14

YOU be so KIND rs To give me Nout sentiments fela-
tive to the eilee, OF the L. s. Bank national
currency, and what your opinion ~ IN relation 10 the
renewal OF the charter. The situation IN which the
Government was placed wi hout lis all, during the
last war ia general advantage in regulating cx-
change. facilitating the rrmttanccs of Government
aud individuals from various parts OF the unIon and
generally its importance connected with tho best in
tcrcsts Of our country
! am &c. 5. +. BURROWS.
Cor. JAMES MoNRor.
Letter jiom AZ. Monroe
Nrw Nonk, january 2o,h, 1891.
You nsk me what ~ my oriuion of the effect
which the United States Bank has the national
currency and OF the policy OF renewing it's chatter !
what the situation OF tho Government without its
aid during the last war what IFS general ndyan-
tages IN regulating exchange, IN facilitating remit.
tanccs to individuals aud its general mportapcei
When the old t. s Bank was first instituted, |
one of those who voted against IN the Senate.
doubted the power of the Government under the
Consiii To make such an establishment, aud was
fearful that the influence which would give TO The
Government ovei the moneycd concerns Of the u.
mon would have very mpropcreilee on our free s,s
tenn. The Bank was instituted soon after the Go
vcrnncnt wns adopted, and At period when the
question OF the relative powcls OF tho two Govern.
ments excited great feeling, and divided Con
grcss and the people into very jealous aud violent
parties. ] was OF that party which construed the
powers OF the National Government strictly, aud
sough impose II correspondent restraints. SO
iar as any change has since taken place IN opn-
ION. II has been the result of experience, aud pronp
ted by d belief that such change would rive strength
10 the system, aud not weaken er cndangcr il.
Between such u Bank, and amy arrangement
which the Government eau make the alternative
must be, First between u Bank of the Government
ITSELF and unde, its exclusive control !, Secondly "A
reliance on its own resources and surplus funds
deposited in a manner to produce the best effect :;
and Lasig, dependence on the Banks OF the
several States. have no hesitation III declaring ma
3ecidcd opini1n that neither ~ these conid plSh
he great oblects contemplated; that each OF them rs
liable IN other respects 10 the most serious oblet
tons To Bank of the Governments this remark
IS applicable IN both views and with peculiar force
IN the latter. II confined 10 the metropolis II could
not extend ITS discounts bcyord very limited CIR
Gle, its agency Opposite for the revenue re-
ccivcd IN the several States; foi rcnliianccs 10
individuals and for other objects 1t would be equal
" limited. Such institution requires an ac-
i've SUPERVISION by those oi whose benefit ~ lnien
dcd. The regular official duties Of all the Depart
mcuts in the Executive render II impossible for that
Branch 10 perform that service without AN intercr
cncc with those duties 10 the injury OF the public
II branches should be established their position mi h
enable item to remedy some of the defects stated
but they would accumulate Others Of much greater
force. The interference with the constitutional
regular duties Of the Executive would, IN the same
degree, be increased. But this is comparatively "A
n
the control Of the Executive by the appointment of
lis Directors, aud IN all liz operations, might, in the
hands of a bad administration, be welded as an IN
strumcut to Sop the foundation OF the Government
itself. Appeals would be made to the Government
from every part OF the Unun for its influence IN oh
tanning discounts, and thus seduction might be
practlced 10 great extent for the worst purposes.
The influence would be reciprocal. Those
necied by such a tie with the Government would be
looked to FOR support at elections, aud would not
fail 10 render ii. Thus the revenue Of the nation,
raiscdby the proper objects to support their
free Government might be made instrument TO
It's overthrow
The second alternative suggested, afefidnce on The
surplus funds, for the accomplishment OF the objects
contemplated, it must be obvious, must ial in every
instance. The revenue Of a Government is general
~ limited to certain specified objects, according 10
an estimate for EACH aud which il is appropriated.
The fund raised sometimes falls short OF the OBJ
Ject. 1t seldom exceeds II IN any considerable a
mount. For the want OF a surplus it must be idle III
the Treasury until appropriated, and liappropria-
ted on provision for an emergency Tor war, for ex
ample il still lie IDLE in the Treasury until
that occurs or be loaned our. 1t could not lie idle.
The whole nation would revolt against it, and loan
ed il might he inpossb lie to obtain when cal
led for. and might even be lost. In this mode the
regulation OF the value OF the currency of exchange,
aud Of rendering service, by facilitating fcmtanccs,
would be abortve.
The third alternative which has been suggested,
reliance on the State Banks, would be equally I'M
productive. The Government would require no
aid except in time of war,when immense sums would
be necessary, winch could be procured only by
loans /; and when application should be made 10
them, there is good cause 10 apprehend that each
would endeayor to obtain the best terms il could
There is particular tond between them aud the
National Government. and impc!!ed by thef in
terests and that OF the stockholders, it is natural
that they should pursue that course. Should such
an emergency arise, would menace the over
throw of the Government the interests thereby excl
ted might be paramount. aud force the banks, UNI
der the direction Of the Stockholders TO unite in
common effort TO save the country. But the gfea
| object is to prevent such crisis by command q
funds, which would enable the Government 10 ares
it. In every other object the State Banks woult
fail. There being standard to which all must ad
here, no connection between those Of the difleren
! States, and many Of them with limited funds and il
embarrassed circumstances, they would neither reg
ulale the value oil coin, exchange, nor ficat,
remlttances.
National Bank occupies different ground
| Connected with the Government by its charter
aud its capital, which consists of stock, in which tn,
Government participates III certain degree, there i
no instance in which, on principle, there be
difference of interest between them, aud many pow
erful considerations BY which the interest of tn
Bank must stimulate il to support the credit OF tn
Government N euy situation III which il may b