The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1838-02-21

u
r interests and Responsibilities, separate from
2 his sense Of the public good, would desire
g the passage of this I'.w. He could see
i, nctbing desirable to that officer PERSONAL,
e to grow OFT of il, while he could see "a fear.
ful load Of personal responsibility III every
feature of the system.
But the officers who were 10 keep the
r. public money, were also executive officers
. and perhaps it was here, and not with the
President, that this great increase OF Exec
: utiye power wns apprehended. The same
inquiries were alike applicable to this sug-
gestion. How could The possession of mon
/ ey by The officer, which he could only use
in pursuance of appropriations made by
} law, without subjecting himself to the Sc
verest punishment, increase the power and
: influence Of that officer with his fellow cit
izens? Suppose he should become cor.
. rupt and violate the law. Would not every
respectable man whom he should approach,
sllun and avoid him, and could the certain
ty Of detection give him time to establish an
influence, based upon the power Of the mon
ey embezzlcd, which would be dangerous
To public liberyl Most certainly no.. In
this, as in the case of the President, the re-
sponsbility not the power aud influehcnce,
of the officer would be increased.
Such was the view he was compelled to
take of the charge of Executive putronage
made against the financial system proposed
by the bill, in its present form but the inn
az ginations of some mad carried them be-
yond the presen: propositions, and induced
them to fear thar this was The mere com
he al
tiplicaiion of Executive officers until they
should cover the whole land, like thelocusts
of Egypt, and eat out the substance of the
people. Where was the foundation for
this apprehension With whom rested
the power Of increasing officers of any cha
racter Not, certainly, with the Execu-
tive. lie can oct in selecting men for Of
fee, when the offices are created by Con-
gress, and, with certain exceptions, he can
remove men from Office at his pleasure +; but
he can create no office, nor can he multi
ply the number of officers, Of any grade or
character. This, then, is moi Nh objection
against the Executive, tut against the leg
islalive power of the Government; it is an
objection which implies distrust, not of the
! President, but of ourselves. And are we
afraid TO trust ourselves in this matter, or
do we stand in 80 much fear of those who
may succeed US in these seats, that we
would rather commit the finances of the
country to Incorporated banks, than to the
present or future representatives Of The peo-
pie and the States
But how stands the objection Of Exccu-
tive patronage, MS applied to the State bank
! "A a. a..
system is the selection Of some twenty,
thirty, or more banks, to do which the d-
rect interest of all their officers, directors
and stockholders, must be addressed, and,
when selected, the same interest is enlisted
in whatever contract may be made. Here
is, at once, an army OF new persons brought
within the reach of Executive power, not,
like the salary officer, upon stipulated COM
pensutions. but whose interests are wholly
dependent upon the extent of the patronage
bestowed--.upon the amount of money en-
trusted 10 their charge. Then come up the
competitions aud appliances to obtsin Sc
lection, aud the nducement to vicious Ex-
ecutive To excite hopes and create expecta-
lions, throughout the whole line of banking
institutions in all the States. l}ut the Sc
leclions are made, the money deposited aud
pas ssed to the citizens, among the other ac-
communications of the favored banks. This
creates another influence far more extended
and fearful--the influence of the debtors of
the selected banks; for when appropriations
are made by law, the executive officers
those who are charged with the execution
of the law-must direct the drafts which
are to bring the money from the banks to
NEE, thcm.--Let any unpreJudlced mind
compare the influences here embodied with
the Executive patronage conferred by the
bill under discussions, and can the decision
be in favor of the bank system, IN this re-
spee,.
But there is another view Of this matter
He had shown that, under the system pro-
posed by the bill, the Executive could not
reach the money in the hands of the depos-
itary without subjecting both to condign
punishment. How is it here Suppose
the Executive corrupt, ami the bank willing
to be corrupted, or the reverse, and what is
to hinder his obtaining any amount of the
public money lac pleases He takes it no,
as the money of the people, but the money
of the baud. Ii is not, in form, loan
from the public money on deposite, bat an
accommodation in the usual course of bank
ing business and still, before the deposit
ting officer shall have left the counter of the
institution, the Executive may take the mo-
ney he deposits, and no one is punishable.
The deposiliug officer himself, or any 9th
er executive officer of the Government, may
do the same thing, with equal impunity.
Has the system provided for by the bill,
then, any thing to fear from comparison
with that of the State bank deposite system,
as to the dangers of an increase of Execu-
tive pstronagel lie could no, SO suppose.
J Fourth. lie would now institute a short
comparison of what he thought would be
the relative effects Of the two systems upon