Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1838-04-27

lSuiHClSDuy itWONtu W justly IL Nh"uS''"H"
the most prominent cause remains with in.
creased intensity. Accordingly
III. The credit system of the United
States and the exclusive metallic system are
now fairly 10 The field face 10 face with each
lniher One or the other must fall There
can be no other issue Ii is not question
OF correcting errors OF reforming abuses,
but OF absolute destruction not which shall
conquer. but which shall survive. The
present struggle loo must be FINAL II the
banks resume and are able by sacrificing ih,
communily 10 continue for n few months, il
will be conrlusiyely employed at the next
elections 10 show that the schemes OF The
Executive are not MS destructive as they will
prove hereafter But if they resume and
again are compelled 10 suspend, the Execu-
tive will rcjoice'at this new triumph, aud
they will iall in the midst OF universal out
lcry against their weakness. This is per
llrctly understood, and accordingly all the
influence OF the Executive is directed to drive
The Banks, by popular Outrage and clamor,
into a premature resumption--not business
resumption, general and permanent, bot
political aud forced resumption, which may
place them at the mercy OF those in power.
They who have spec iai charge of these in.
teresls must then beware Of being decoyed
from their present position They are now
safe and strong. and should not venture hey
ond while the enemy is in the plain before
{ them. II they resume, one of two things
will happen--their notes will not De recev-
ed by the Government or they will be re-
ceived. II they are not received, the Gov
eminent, 10 The extent of the revenue will
force the holders OF the notes TO draw specie
from the Banks 10 be deposited with the col
; ectors Of the revenue. For the difference
between the revenue and the expenses, the
Government will issue treasury notes 10 be
sold for bank notes, and converted into spe-
; Gle, and as the disbursements are made ut
1 points on the frontiers, remote from the pla-
ces OF collection, Il vii! not return 10 the
/ Banks issuing i, except circuilously But
II the notes are received, they will not as
formerly be deposited in Banks and drawn
4 out again SO as 10 enter into the circulation,
leaving the public creditor his choice OF spe-
Gle or notes, but they will be left in special
depos,e with the receivers. When war
. rants are drawn on these receivers they will
. call on the Banks for specie TO pay the ia
,ored public creditor. selecting oil course the
9 Bank on whom they will draw according &c
!. its servilny or opposition 10 The Executive
- and thus placing them all under his control
$ Now under such circumstances. is it wis,
!, for the Banks 10 disarm themselves in ih,
}. presence of their eneny2
l. III The disorders ofthe currency lie tot
e deep for superficial remedies. and these pal
G liatiyes initiate without curing. Congress
d and Congress alone. can apply adequate re
% lief What Mr.. Madison said TO Congress
Y in 1916 is even more true in 1888 -" Fo
The interests OF the community at large,
b. said he, as well as for the purposes OF HI
IS |" Treasury. it is essential that the nation
s. should possess currency OF equal value
~ /" credit and use whatever it may circulal,
N {" The constitution has entrusted Congress
e. " exeiasirely with the power Of creating an
o regulating currency Of that description.
The only reform in the currency which tina
n. body has yet made, is the issue OF ten mil
II. lions oil irredeemable paper money, and
al proposal for ten millions more. Is it wort
,e while then, SO long as Congress fails To es
i, erclse its legitimate powers, TO waste III
S. strength of the country in efforts 10 accom-
8 plish what we all know 10 be impraciicuble
10 10 resume now without some clear under
= standing with the Government, seems 10
: tbIowi ing away the benefits of experience
and the lessons Of misfortune. We hay
o, gone through all the modification and al
\. the Inconvenience ofsuspension. Let us er
o, deavor to profit by them 10 fix the futur
N on some solid 5asis-have some guarante
n of the stability ofthe currency, and not St
is every thing aflodt again without KNOWN
rs where we may be driited. For
IN ". Compare the situation Of the banks Q
IL the last resumption aud now. After su:
50 pension for nearly three years, Congress
H. applied all its power TO induce, TO persuad,
U, and to assist the Banks in their efforts 10 re
II. sumo They passed the resolution Of 1916
ie authorizing the receipt ofihe notes oil specie
IL paying Banks But this alone was insult
: cient; and at the same Time they esablishe
nj the Bank of the Unied States, with cap
Is tai OF thirly-fve millions That Bank ca
ar led Convention Of State Banks and agree
nj that if they would resume specie payments
is would
lie /. Assume all their debts TO the Govern
: ment Of the United States
rs 2 Discount 10 those who had payment
1t. 10 make to the Government, the whole am
le OF their bonds. and in addition
Sc g. Discount to those not indebted to tn
Re Government two millions in New Yorl
id Two millions in Philadelphia, one and ha
te million in Baltimore, and "a half a million j
III Richmond
IT. Would sustain the resumng Banks j
o. case the resumption brought them into dl
re 6culty
Id The Bank at the same time imported, q
tn the expense Of more than half million. tn