Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1838-03-01

of The public revenue and of having their notes receV
ed and treated gold and silver in the dues OF Inc 90
verrnent and in all its fiscal transactions: nave We
the right 10 do all this in order 10 brslow confidence I'D
the banks with the view to enable them 10 resume spe-
Gle paymentsi, What is The state Of the cusc! he
banks are deeply indebted the county, ard are una
Bile to pay; aud we asked to give them these advan
,ages in order 10 enable them 10 pay their debis IAN
we grant the boon; In answering this important ques-
ton BEGIN with the fact, that our Government is one
Of limited powers II exercise n" right but wha' Is
specifically granted; nor pass any law but what is ne
cessary aud proper to carry such power into effect
This small pamphlet [:oldng 1t uPl contains inc ION
s,uton lis grants OK power are few and pldni ahd
| ask renenen to turn 10 il, and Pclnt oul the
mower that authorizes to do what is proposed 10 oe
done or to show that pass this substitute is necessary
TO carry any of the granted powers into effect II mel
Tier eau be shown what is proposed Gamma" he conslu
,icnally done; and till il is specifically pointed OUT am
] warranted in believing that it cannot be shown.
Our reason is often cnnnunded by mere name. An
ACT in the minds Of many may become oil doubtful con-
stu.ioual authority when applied 10 bank which none
would for n moment hes! tate 10 pronounce grossly un
CONSTITUTIONAL when applied TO OH individual l" lee
ourselves from this Illusion ask, ccnd this Govern
ment consli,ulionaly beslow individuals private
association the advantages proposed to be bestowed on
the selected banks order TO enable them tn pay their
debts, Is there one who hears who wnuld venture
10 say, yes in The case oil Tie most extensive mer
chant mercantile concern, such rs some oil ulnse III
New York or ~ Orleans al the late suspension, Whose
embarrassnens involved entire sections 10 distress =
But if not on what principle can determination be
made in fave OF The banks, They local Institutions
created by the States for local purposes, composed like
private associations of individual citizens on whom the
of the State cannot confer particle "i constitution
Of right under this Constitution, that does not he!ohg
10 the humbes, citizen So far from it, if there Ge dis
(inclinn il against the banks They removed lar
Their from the control Of this Government than the indl
vduu citizens Who b. The Constitution. are expressly
r., I,,, in mn nv
instances; while the State Banks constituting Por.
ton of the domestic institutions Ut The SlaleS ana rest
ing their reserved rights entirely beyond our con-
troll so much So as to be the subject OF bankrupt
law although the authority ~ pass one IS expressly
granted by The Constitution.
On what possible ground ihen can The right IN 1nes'
ton be placed, unless, indeed, on the broad principle
that these local institutions, intended for State purposes
have been extended, and have so connected tnrn''
selves with The general circulation md business OF the
country as TO the interest of the whole community,
SO rs to make il the right and duty OF Congress 10 re-
gn!ae them; or in Short on The broad principle oi tue
general welfare; There is none other, that can per
ceve but this would be to adopt the Old ana exploded
rrnc at all times dangerous, but pre- emnrny so
This time when such loose and dangerous conceptions
of the Constitution abroad in the land The argu'
ent good in case, is good IN all similar cases.
If this Government may interfere with any one oil the
domestic institutions Of The States, The ground OF
promoting the general welfare. il may with others II
may hestow privileges TO control them, IT may APP
Fropale money for The same purpose ana mus a"of
might he opened 10 interference with Stale Inslitu'
tons, of which we OF certain section Oughl al lhs
time To be- nat little jealous.
The argument might be pushed much farther. We
only otter 10 confer great and important privileges
on the banks 10 be selected, but, in turn, ask Them 10
spuIae lo comply with certain conditions, the object OF
which is to bring Them under The supervision and control
Of this Government II might be asked, where Is The
right to purchase such supervision or CONTROL
Ii might be repeated that they are Stale Institutions IN.
corporatrd solely fur State purposes and 10 be entirely
under Slate control and that all supervision on our part
is 10 violation of the rights Of The STATES 1T might be
argued that such supervision or control is calculated 10
weaken the control of the States over their own inslIlu
TONS ard render them less subservenl TO their pecu.
liar and local interests for the promotion Of which they
were esabshcd and too subservienl to other, and per-
haps conflicting interests which might feel but little
sympathy with those Of the States. But iLrbear-
Other and not less urgent. Oh econs claim my attention
To date too much on one would necessarily sacrlhce
the claim of others.
next Object that whatever may be the right 10 enter
into the pr posed bargain, the mode in which IL is pro-
posed 10 make il is clearly Unconstitutional 1t rightly
comprehend il. | am not certain that do; but, II
understand rightly The plan is for the Secretary Of the
Treasury to select twenty five Stale banks as described
in the substitute, which to be submitted To the two
Houses be confirmed rejected, by their joint rcso-
luons without the approval Of the President; in The
same mode as they would appoint chaplain, or eslnh'
Iish joint rule for he government oil their proceed
inms.
In acting on the joint resolution, if what suppose be
intended each House would have the right Of course,
10 slike from the name OF any bank and insert
ther which would in fact vest in the two Houses the
uncomfortable right of making The selection. Now, II
this be the mode proposed, as nler IRON Inc silence
Of the mover it is plain and papab!e violation OF The
Constitution. The obvious intention is, 10 evade The
veto power of The Executive, which cannot be- without
an niractnn of express provision oil the Conslitu
tiun drawn up with the utmost care, and Intended TO
prevent the possibility of evasIon is contained IN The
sI,n1n Ilp Inst
the Secretary to read:
Livery order. resolution, or VOTE 10 which Tie con-
curencc Of the Senate and House of Representatives,
may be necessary Except on question OF adlournnenO
shall be presented the President of the United States,
and before the same shall take effect shall be approved
by him. or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed
y lwo thirds Of The Senate and House Of Representa-.
tiyes according the rules and limitations prescribed
in The case OF bill.
Nothing can be more explicit, or full. II is more
nossbe To evade the Executive veto on any join, vote,
Than in the passage Of bill. The veto WINS vested IN
han not only TO pntect his powers, but as an ad.
dhona guard to the Constitution. am not the adVo-
cate nc Executive power, which have been often COM
psed 10 resist of late when extended beyond It's proper
rms, as shall ever be prepared to do when tits. Nor
am The nd yucate of egisalive Judicial. stand ready
L, protect ALL within the sphere assigned by the Consll
,u,inn and Ia resist them beyond. To tins explicit and
comprehensive provision of The Constitution, IN prnlec'
ton Of the veln there but snge exception, resulting,
by necessary implication from another portion oil The III
sirumpnt not less explicit which authorizes each House
to establish the rules Of lis proceedings Under Tins pro-
vision the Houses have full and unconiroabe au
lhory within the limits of their respective walls, and
over those subject TO their authority III their official cha
raclcr To that extent, they may pass Jnlnl votes ana
resolutions, without the approval OF The EXecutl'e but
beyond that, without it. they are powerless
There ism this special reasons why his approval
should not be evaied The President is at the head of
the administrative department of the Government, and
especially responsible for its good management In
order 10 hold him responsible he ought have due pow
in the selection oil its agents. and proper control over
powerful and influential Of all the agents OF The Govern.
ment and ought not TO be selected without the concur
of the Executive If this substitute should be
adopted and The provision in question be regarded such