The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1838-07-03

tenn, which could not abide period of pecuna
nv pressure and distress. The moment danger
approached, it was found that each set of banks
was for Withdrawing within their own sphere,
and watching others with jealousy and disirus,
and that mutual confidence, aid and support,
without mutual interest, were out OF the ques-
ton. 1t was, therefore, considered AS demonstra
ted, that a uniform currency could not be attain
ed in this way, for the bills ofNew Orleans would
he at discount in New York, and so vice versa.
The new bank was, therefore, chartered. The
pressure, which is necessarily incident TO a re-
sumption of specie payments, followed, aud there
was some mismanagement OF the bank
in the outset but it on the whole met and
satisfied the expectation ofall who were anxious
for "a convenient medium of business and vigo-
rous prosperity. 1t gave, as we all know, uni
formscrculation; its bills were every where al
par. 1t also expelled from circulation the spu-
rious paper of other banks, not by its power, but
by presenting to the people choice of good or
bad paper; this is the great and effective power
of regulation, which such a bank holds over rot
ten institutions. The necessity for taking their
paper ceases, 81 they perish. 4 vast number of
banks vanished under this process, and have not
been heard of since. The great mystery of reg
ulation consisted simply in preference for good
money by those wEo use it. 1t sent out nothing
hut paper redeenabe with specie at sight
Wherever, therefore, there was deprecated cur
rency, it at once supplanted it, and thus COMPEL
ed all banks TO close their concerns or 10 pay spe
Gle.
From all this the administration was entreated
to learn wisdom; to profit by the lessons of ex-
perience, but they shut their eyes; all turned u
deaf ear towards it,
They pursued their own hayward policy, re-
solving to scourge the people again with calami-
ties from which they had escaped twenty years
before, and we shall see, in the sequel what were
the probable motives which urged them on u
gainst the lights of experience.
The experiment was therefore, renewed upon
more extended country; greater number of
states; a more MI nerouS people; a broader trade;
an enlarged capital; most extraordinary excess
of revenue, and in time of profound peace and
high prosperity. combination Of circumstan-
tances as favorable TO success or failure accord
ing to the manner ofusing them las could he uni.
ted if period had been deliberately chosen.
Every thing was, therefore, necessarily TO de-
pend on the manner in which the deposites and
public business were managed. Affairs were
conducted that the prophecies were soon verified
by history, as you shall see
We learn, Mr. President, from document 65 of
the house of representatives, Oath congress, that
in 1880 the number of banks and branches was
$50; in 1886, 1913, the capital, one hundred and
fortyfi five millions; in 1886 three hundred and
seventy eight millions Loans in the same time
rose from two hundred millions to four hundred
and fity-seven millions; circulation from sixty
one millions to one hundred forty millions. Trade
was greatly excited, and the extent of paper is
sues is shewn by the increase of circulation.
The bodest prophet, in his most extravagant
approximations of the future, has not pictured to
himself scene so extraordinary the policy of
the administration created. Property rose in val.
ue, and the mania of speculation seized the inn
petuous, and the whole country in a state of
feveresh excitement.
The deuded friends of the administration,
who did not penetrate the policy, or comprehend
coming events, mistook these lhroes of disease |
Tor proofs of vigorous health. They praised the
experiment. declured we had attained to the bet
ter currency, and that exchanges were on more |
favorable footing than formerly. There was not
word of truth in all this. Instead of less paper
we had got more instead of domestic exchange
At one-fourh of one per cent, in many places it
was four five. OF gold and silver we saw
nothing and heard nothing except in the press.
But, sir, at length the CRISIS came and the
country was struck down to the earth, where it
low lies PROSTATE ut the feet ofthe adminstra- :
ion. We had, in the outset, a currency of spe
,ie aud a circulation of bills equal to specie
low we have nothing but Il deprecated paper.
Thus fell the state banks, and thus have van
shed the golden visions which have been cher
shed in deluded ilnaginations.
This, sir, brings MS TO an important point in the
history Ol lnIS poHCN Olu tile ptesjteit mean
hey should fall? He had reiterated TO congress
md the country that he was for government
'ank, and an enemy to all others.
Did he ever lose sight Of this policy Were ,
he state banks substitute d for it in good faith,
n as temporary expedent to aid in attaining
he ultimate object.
The history of events throws much light on
Joint. $
After four distinct official communications OF
lis schemel to the public, he there was no
ope of exciting any feelings in his favor. II, |
therefore,, became necessary 10 abandon it, or to I
esort to some other plan of Introducing il; the {
after branch Of the alternative was seized, and '
ow let us see what was done. {
In 1888, at an unexpected moment, and blythe I
lrong arm of the president, the public money,
4 violation of law, was taken from the Bank OF /
ne United States and placed mostly III partisan C
anks of his own selection, and upon his own t
arms and conditions? Why was this money !
srnoved? Was the bank unsafe? His own t
gent (Mr. Toland,) appointed by him to exam d
he and report upon the matter, declared, in his 4