The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1838-08-03
FROM THE RIcHxoSD WIG.
no Henry CLAW. EsuIyrrr

4" nay last, called your attention
70 the vast iniisence exercised by the Pre-.
sident OF the Uniiei States, in virtue of his
con'roi over the monetary sys,em d the
country. Derived from his command Of
The Astounding revenues Of the Union. and
Organized by means Of the banking sysem.
II has established connection between his
ONCE and the prosperity, the comfort. the
very substance of private individuals. which
has proved source af fearful influence =
but you may remember that, id adyerf,op
to this, | declared that | did not mean i
press the argument against the CONSTITUTION.
atty OF a Bank, which might be deduced
IRON the superior efficiency, for all sinister
purposes, of This implied power, 10 any and
all the express powers Of the Government.
Nor did ipress it. did but propose TO
ask whether the equivocal generation of a
power go dangerous, does not make il the
duty Of those who call it into existence. so
TO place II, and so to hedge it round with
restrictions, and SD to fetter it, as to afford
some hope OF safety from the wounds il,
nigh, INFECT On the public happiness, liber
" aud peace.
But am sensible that, this power, Under
some modification, is iaseparable from the
nature Of the thing. Somewhere 1t mus,
be placed and ! acknowledge that, 10 urg
ing the necessity of Withdrawing the com.
mand OF 1, from the Federal Executive.
am proposing but to change the seat of the
disease, and not TO eradicate il. This NAV
he impossible. If so, II is an evil which
we cannot remove, and must be content 10
mitigate as we may. You, am persuaded,
SIR, will agree with me, that the control of
The monetary system Of the whole country
by any Department OF the General Govern.
meni, however desirable for commercial
and financial purposes, must be great 20,
htiedi evil. Should It not, then, be our
study 10 devise some means 10 separate the
political mischief from the fscal md com
mereiut 1dcdatages OF Babk
Ii seems 10 be assumed that the Govern.
mrni cannot safely make use af Bank of
the Dulted States as fiscal agent, without,
rcsen ne TO ITSELF such control of its OFT.
ralions rs may guard against the lndIscre.
lion or dishonesty Of the institution. That
security against these things should be Ia
ken, Is lnconeslble-ihat, for lhls purpose,
the administration OF The affairs Of The Bank
should be controlled by some power from
without, IS not denied. But give me leave
10 ask, us 1t necessary that thus power, in
whole or in part, should be exercised by The
Federal Government IN ans Of It's depart.
men,s p
| am sensible II must seem presumptuous
10 a nameess individual, TO sugges, tho,
on lhIs critical aud delicate subject. Nay
MORE am sensible that il is ptesump,u.
ous-and frankIy own, that, were II IN nv
power TO carry INTO practical operation the
ideas that | am about To present, should
tremblc to assume the responsibility. But
II IS SAID, and truly, that "wise men learn
more from fools, than fools from wise men.
Bear with my folly, then, pray YOU.
| think II may be safely assumed that the
States collectively eau never lind an inter.
est IN acting dishonesty IN mere money
matters by the Government of the Union.
" hat, then, would be the effect OF reserv.
ing To The several States q part OF the stock
OF Bank OF the United States, proportion.
ed to their representation ~ the two Houses
OF Congress, and such, In ITS total amount,
rs 10 secure 10 them an efficient control of
the operations OF the institution. The
Safes at this moment hold on deposite from
the Government ofthe United States, sum
Of money not much short of thirty millions
OF dollars. For the reimbursement of this
sum, they are liable 10 ba called on BY Con.
gress. What il It were provided that each
State should be forever discharged of this
liability BY taking stock TO that amount, TO
be reserved for theml This sum would be
more than half of the capital OF fifty mil.
lIous proposed by you, and would Justly Sc.
cure TO the States a majority in the d.
rectorv.
1t cannot be supposed that Bank direct
cd and chiefly owned by the States, would
fail to execute, IN good faith, all It's engage.
ments with The General Government, which
is but The creature and agent Of the States
themselves, established for their use. No
case can be supposed 10 which they would
choose 10 embarrass its finances, but one OF
iohdelity on the part of the General 60
vernment 10 its proper duties. To suppose
that they would descend TO any thing ike
dishonesty 10 the prejudice Of their own at.
fairs, would be absurd, even if the respect
due to sovereign States did not forbid such
an idea in anv case whatever. Tn this
side, there could be no danger. But might
not great benefit arise from such an ar
rangemeu,l Would il not be great a.
chlevemeni, IT, by such means, the States
could be enabled TO oppose counter check