The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1838-02-21


worthy of imitation, bui, To the extent Of
: the whole public disbursements, il would
constantly circulate among The people a
basis for the paper currency of the Stale
banks, aud thus aid them ia Keeping their
!, representation Of coin stable aud firm, and
!, equal in value to coin itself. Beyond these
influences, it would leave the people aud
+ the States to regulate, in their own way,
and without the Interference of federal
power, that portion of the general curren-
!, cy which, by the divisions of power under
our system, falls within their jurisdiction
and is the constant subject of their action.
1t would then be clear TO all, if that por-
ton Of the currency should sink below the
standard of currency for the public Trea-
sury, that wrong existed somewhere in
State legislation, or in the management of
those entrusted by Stale legislation with
the regulation of that currency and the
federal authorizes would be free from i'm
putation or suspicion, and would stand be-
fore the whole country holding up the true
standard Of currency, and inviting from the
State authorities a correction of the errors
which should at any time disturb or depre-
ciate that portion committed to their
care.
How, in this respect, does the opposite
system act? The State banks are, to
much the greatest, if not to the entire, ex-
tent, private institutions, controlled by pri-
vate individuals and private interests, and
owned in whole, or to the extent of ina
jority of the capital, by private citizens, as
private property. Private gain, then, as
necessary and natural consequence of the
very constitution of these banks, was their
principle of government, and, as an equally
necessary and natural consequence, they
would keep that portion of the currency
which they were authorized to furnish for
the country, at sound, standard value,
when private interest, and the prospect of
private gain, should so direct, and they
would suffer it to deprecate by the same
rule. Give them the national treasure, and
permit them to subject it to the fluctuations
of their interest, and can a stable currency
be expected, either for the Treasury or the
people =! Who are the legitimate custom
ers of the banks? More particularly the
merchants. Their business pervades not
the whole of their own country only, hut
the whole civilized world. The laws of
the States of the Union, therefore, are reg
ulatons much too limited for them and
even the laws and regulations of any single
Government, as 10 either trade or currency,
are but municipal in their character, when
applied to their operations. Still they
themselves have local habtations, and the
( case may well and frequently occur, when
it is vastly more important to them that
they should be able to command specie to
! export, in liquidation Of their foreign debts,
than that our local banks at home should
redeem their notes in specie. When, in
such a condition of trade and of the mer-
camille interest, will always be likely to De
the condition of our local banks Set "a
side the consideration that the merchants
may be able to- control those institutions
from the stock they hold, and merely as
sumo that they are the principal debtors
I TO the banks, and are to continue to be
their principal customers. Let the argu-
men, rest here, and give the banks the pos
session aud control of the national treasure.
Which interest would prevall Would
the Treasury of the country he sustained,
and the payments to !tle public creditors
be made III species or its equivalent, or
would the views and wishes of the mer-
chants be consulted, and the currency be
made to bend to private and corporate in
terests Let the experience of the last
year answer the inquiry. He would ex-
press his confirmed opinion, that, under
such system, the currency of the public
Treasury must share all the reverses and
fluctuations of foreign and domestic trade,
and all the hazards of corporate banking,
Ios
tions of the Treasury itself must be sus-
pended, or the law of Congress, as to
currency, violated, whenever revulsions
shall Cypress the country, and the custom
ers of the banks, or the alternative be re-
sorted to, as 1t recently has been, by the
national authorities, to coIvoke Congress,
relieve the banks and the public debtors,
and resort to the credit of the nation to sus-
tain its Treasury, until the natural opera (
tons of hcalthful business shall again re-
store the equilibrium.
Such, in his mind, were the probable in !
t1uences of the two systems upon the gene
raj currency of the country.
He would now proceed to aLswer very
few of the prominent objections made 10
the blll and pass, as rapidly as possible, to
his conclusion. The first of these objec-
lions which he would notice, was that the |
sy stem proposed by the bill was an attack
upon the State banking institutions, cal |
culated to destroy their credit aud use
fulness. This, if true, was grave charge,
and therefore required some consideration.
An attack must be an infringement of some
vested right, or course of treatment SO
manifestly against the public good as to
partake Of wanlonness and immortality, or
spirit of revenge. Was any right of
these institutions proposed to be infringed
upon Did their charters, granted by the
States, for fixed and specified purposes,
include among those purposes The safe