Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1838-02-15
V9H.gasEi NNXEy.---Yo. S..

ton OF the public press whch nlos srenropslr rnpsea
this measure; Of the entire failure of this and ,, and
the other "pe! bank; Of tie sixty thousand dollars
here, and forty thousand dollars there and aniold
thousands where else. lost 10 the p"opp he this
experiment trying Administration, in consequence ol'
the employment of these Stale Banks rs fiscal apen;s
OF the public Treasury. he hoped and believed these
pictures were ove!G!awn; he WIS content TO SUP.
pose, Tor ha purpose 81 this argument that net one dol.
lar was 10 b. thus csl, and YET he trusted he lad shown
that The system proposed By the bill for lie
OF tie naona! finances, was more economical a"d l's,
expensive TO the tax paving public than either stem
OF general Or special State bank depOsi,rs
Third His next point Of comparison should hr the
patronage conferred upon the Executive b-anch Of the
Government by the antagonist systems
II had been already seen that the system proposed b.:
The bill reqs'rcd The appointment of four additional oil
GERS, with salaries Of from three thousand dollars
his was direct increase of the Executive power md
patronage; bu, when il should be recolecled how many
oIcerS with equal salaries, already existed end with
no" much facility officers were adied 10 that number ut
almost every session o! Congress, and in almost every
one nt the Executive departments he must hope that
no unreasonable alarm would be felt in any quarter o.
the house by this very limited addition 10 the existing
number II they were not 10 be consttutiunaiiy ap
pointed, or H. being 50 appointed duties to be
signed to them not of character compatible wi our c
vi ana Pocii institutions, then the Offices ought
be created or the duties assigned regardless OF all
qnsnces which The rejection ofthe proposition might bring
upon the country. IT, however, the appointments
he consuiinnaliy made. art the duties ot the officers
seem 10 he necessary TO the public service lie must he
permitted 10 say, that he rrpu9ed too confidently upon
the Intelligence of til" American people, suppose they
would condemn the !rdsurP, because its details called
for such accession Of Executive slrrEg. 10 carry out
their wishes. he w0a!d not prrI himself sGar 10 dis.
trust the confidence OF citizens in the Government
of their choice. as TO believe that they would not feel
perfectly safe in the de csions OF Congress as 10 The offices
to be created and in the President and Senate seize.
the persons ,u fill those Offices.
Was ii, could it be true, that greater saiir trus;
10 be placed in local bnning interpretations than
could be placed in thu constituted authorities of Go.
vernment, organized Under the CONSTITUTIONS Were
the tax paying citizens %! our Republic nAid 10 cntrust
the sale Keeping q! the national 10 officers OF
their choice, and responsible them and the laws
ct Congress. and ANXIOUS conhe il to banks not
atd by national authority, which branch oi the
National Go"rrnnent had any control, and in the
ageinent of which neither Inc People their GOVERN
ment had any voice. lie did believe this was The
state Of public opinion. He cid not believe that dsIust
towards national authorities had yet gained this
tent He was not ready to admit ha, hunks, such
our Stale banks are and with the experience
OF the danger OF resting the operations OF the public
Treasury upon them the invoritcs Of the peu
pie OF this c"untry, than their wettied and iuIlt
iul servants.
1t moi his wish design lie would r'pca, again,
10 say anything unjust or iauTpns to these institutions.
Within their proper spheres they coI:rnicut and
useful but recent events had perfectly satisfied his mind
that they not the fl keepers OF the
sury of naon that this important incident to national
independence "aght not 20 be committed TO the chage
of institutions whose interests leaned strongly towafs
hazardous nisapplicat:on of such trust.
Was 1t, could it have been. Contemplated by The fla.
mcrs ct our system OF G"rcrnncnt that they had pro.
vided no tit and trustworthy depository ri the national
finances! That banks, iICDrporatluns private incnrpo
rations, chartered for private uses owned by private
divduas md managed by persons Responsible onlv 10
the stockholders, must be He'd in to sustain the most
delicate trust under my Government? That the will Of
thrse institutions must he consulted ns 10 the terms upon
ACCEPT
all the authorities OF The country. Congress itself IN.
Guided must cater with them for upon which the
money of free people could be kept and paid oul and
To the character of the currency which either should he
permitted to enjoy: Had propositions this effect beer
submitted TO the Convention wimh framed the C"nSt!-
tnlian, what would have been their fate Does any
believe they would now ha been fnlnd in that Cons
tuition which is the pride OF lreeIlcn where ~"
such dependence upon such aid would have found
countenance there. Can it find in the Sc
nate now:
Could any one doubt, then, that the peoples monry
should be cOnl!ded To the people SERVANTS to their Off
GERS responsible to them and their laws; and that tie
appointment OF such aud many officers should hc
found necessary 10 peri form This trust in sa:
and convenient TO the Treasury, and to the people them
selves, not on in strict counEmy with the Con-
suton and the very nature OF civil institutions,
hut an lmperlnus duty upon every Congress- liz cou!
entertain no doubts upon either point.
There another direct grant Of Executive patron
aye and power under the bi-the authority to app,mt
the necessary clerks to perform the mechanical duties
required when they could not be performed by the Oil.
10 whose keeping the money 10 be enrustcd--
and had been that this might Involve the selcc;"n
and appointment OF from 81: 10 twelve clerks. lie
would consume time in commenting upon this grant
Of power the mere taem"nt of the fact should suffice"
These two were the only direct grants OF Executive
patronage which the bill proposed make; but il sco'nru
TO be supposed thai the powt: and influence Of the Exc
culve was TO be immensely and dangerously increased
all the oiicers charged with the keeping of any
portion of the public money; and this idea formed IN"
OF the most wryhly objections against The system. How.
lie would ask, this Inference derived Not ccnt
Of additional compensation is proposed I" be given toany
one OF The existing Executive officers in consequence
ri the additional duties imposed upnn them BY this bill.
They all subject 10 rrmov1i frnu, Office hy
the President. ct his pleasure Whence, them was he
TO derive this increased power over thea: Could be
command the money in their hands, No: unless he
ready to commit direct iniraction Of the Constitution.
and the officer to subject hinselo protracted 'mprlson.
nen and infamous punishment Fhe b.!! pr0V!d's tiat
oil money, the hands OF every depository, ShiH De
held there 10 the credit O! the TFrGsu!rc or, Il; other
words az in The Treasury; and the Constitution declares
that money shall b. taken from the Treasury bnt IL
conformity 10 appropriations made by law The b!Is
makes any unlawful nse of the money, BY The officer
in whose charge il is, punishable b. Imprisonment:
for term not less than two years To let the prrsi-
dent have the money would be criminal under Tie
law, 10 let any other citizen Of the country have It,
and detection would be certain in the az the
other The only difference would be that the President
if he were to make himself the knowing recipient,
would subject himself 10 npeuchmen, for The violation
of the Constitution and the fraud upon the Treasury;
whereas the citizen wn:Ild incur criminal liability
whatsoever Where, then, Is the dangerous increase "i
power given 10 The President? Suppose he remove The
officer the money is STILL in legal sense in III. lreaau-
ry. He gains 10 il BY the removal, and II he
did, he could make Of it without violation OF
the Constitution. 1t was easy TO that this system
would impose great additional responsibility upon thu
President as he must select nil the persons who are to
be entrusted with pubic money, and s his duty to see
that they all obey, observe, and execute me ia" ne
would venture the assertion that no honest man who
was TO hold the Office of President, consulting merely
his personaI Interests and responsibilities, separate from
his sense Of the public good would desire the passage
OF This law He could see nothing desirable 10 mat OFF,
Ger persouay to grow out Of il, while be- could Il
fearful load Of PERSONAL responsibility every feature OF