Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1838-02-22
F"%ss 1898.

(sixty thousand dulIas) This, in my opinion, IS very
far below The ultimate permanent expense. AN ao'e
and experienced gentleman in my own State' Prac.
tcay versed in these questions, and zenous and
decided advocate wiiha Of the new system, IN SET
ting forth lis advantages and defending It from Inc 3D.
econs which had been urged against u, met ths very
of expense by giving it his opinion, formed upon
deliberate and careful reflection, that the annual expense
would exceed 5000 O0 (sr hundred thousand dol.
lars) Now, Sir when arrived here, at The extra se''
sion of Congress- and read the estimate OF The Seoreoy
OF the Treasury, could not but suppose, al hIs that
there accidental mistake in his figures, by the
omission Of CIPHER and that he intended TO have put
down the expense S6O00O0, six hundred thousand
dollars instead of $1,000, (sixy thousand dollaFs)
But, however, this may be, nothing can be more Ger.
tain that The expense Of this SYSTEM when fully develop
ed, must from lis complexiiy, and the number Of OFF,
Gers II Will call Tor, be very great We hive sandardto
appeal TO, this question, which worth far Than
any priori reasonngs The system has been long en-
tnbIished and fully tried in France and know lis
tual results there. On the other hand in Ensland the
agency Of banks has been extensively used in the COL
lection and disbursement Of ,!" public revenue instead
of the individual agencies which employed in France,
and conetD plated By this bill II Will be good test
therefore, Of Ibis question: 10 look al he relative eIpen
of the revenue systems OF France and England |
will read In The Senate comparative statement on the
subject which have taken from The work of highly
spectacle American traveller vouched by original
thnrities 10 which he refers From this D.
pears The Of collecting the England
is under the respective heads Of axat.on follows:
Customs per ceDt.-cxcse, per cehi-fecording and
stamps per ceuI Post Office, II per cenl.-and d.
taxes per eent; averaging upon the whole 10
per cent In France, under heads, the of
collecting the revenue is as follows: Customs, 80 PER
cent -eScisp % per nt-reco'ding and stamps per
cen-Pust Office, 10 PER eent.-drfct laxes, Is per
cent-averaging upon The wh"+, "a 23 per cent! |
well that divers circumstances are TO be taken
into cnnside ration, in explaining ibis differ.
ence Of expense between the French and English fiscal
systems; but 81 the principal of that differ
ence, land it is considered by Inc wrt,er, 10 whom
have reerred) WILL at ast be fDsnd in the fact of the
extensive of banking agency in The collection Of the
revenue in England and the exclusive employment Of
individual agency, for that purpose, in France.
But it is no, Drrey by The multiplication Of officers
and increase Of expenditure that the influence oil the
Executive branch of The Government teariuy extend.
ed by this BILL That influence is greatly augmented by
certain regulations introduces in regard TO the TIN.
ure oce-the compensation Of officers, and the forms
and usages Of fiscal administration IN lie hrst place,
the Treasurer the General and all lhe other
officers from The gbest TO the lowest employed in the
fiscal service may be required a ony e al The dlscre-
ton Of The Secretary OF the Treasury 10 give nc'o Off
ciuI bonds increased snGs to e fixed by the Secretary
OF the Treasury any law in reference 60 any OF the OIL
fetal bonds of any Of The said officers TO the contrary
Notwithstanding; md in default of giving such new
bond the officer would, of COURSE be deprived oil his Office
Now it is evident, that under srch ap0wer possessed by
the Secretary Of the Treasury all The officers connected
with the operations Of the Treasury would be converted
into the trembling vussaIs of the Executive. direct
removal from Office is OF more than ordinary
involves
in which the Secretary OF tae Treasury would be unw.
np to take the responsibility Of direct removal from
office and yet would accomplish the same object by
vexatous regusilion Of bond in so large sum- that
the officer could nol woul not find surees TO the in
creased amount Who doqs moi see, that, under such
regulation the officers Of the Treasury would lose all
sense Of Independence; and that those who would con-
10 hold Office on such Terms must be prepared II he
come the passive and unressng tools of power. Here.
toore it has been the wise policy of our legislation 10
fix by law The sp in which official bonds TO be given,
and leave nothing in that respect Or as little as posi-
be TO Executive discretion Again, it will be seen from
an examination of the BILL that the compensation Of Sc
vpra of the officers TO be appointed under it, such as
visiting agents cIrrks, &c, is TO be hxed by The Secre
tary his discretion, md not BY law Here Is another
source Of serVilc dependence the one hand and OF
increased Executive influence the Other which is not
in harmony with The general spirit and maxns oil our
legislation
Nv attention has also been attracted by provision Of
the bill which 10 me to introduce most danger.
Gus innovation in The established forms and us1ges of
the Treasury. IL Inns heretofore been fixed principle
of fiscal responsibility, that money should be drawn
from the Treasury, hnt upon WARRANT OF the Secretary
drawn on the Treasurer, coan,e,s gned by The Comp
troer and recorded by the Register, and upon that
warrant, when il reaches the hands OF The Treasurer
thus authenticated the TeasuIey draws his draft The
depository of the public money for payment. These
forms have always been held to be very important checks
and indispensable preliE,inares 10 any money being
drawn Of The Treasury OF IN other words pu7d by
the depository Of The public moneys The Secretary
the checks before mentioned, and then The Treasurer
draws upon the depository who is to make The pay
ment But in instance. does The Secretary draw d.
recy upon the depository o'capse mat woun oe 10 lose
the security the intermediate checks OF The Coinplrn
I.r and The Register BY the 10th section OF TINS oil
however in conrasenlion Of these established principles
aud checks it expressly Prov'ded that ioT the pu
nose of pnyutny the pnblie account snall he a"tu
far the said Secretary Gralc OF the Sntd dPo
sortcs as he may think most conducive to the public
interest or to the convenience Of the public creditors or
,,nEf ba
sury could draw out all The money in The Treasury or
which is the same thing in The hands OF the drposito.
ries whou, any check whatsoever. The effect OF IT,
whether 50 intended not is 10 place the whole public
treasure at bis unchecked and absolute disposal
Nov Sir is not The effect Of these various provisions,
and of the whole scope and tenor OF ibis BILL to concen
1rnte at last the entire cuntrol a" The public moneys, IN
the hands of the presden for te Secretary of the Trea.
sry aud oil the other fiscal officers ure bot his agents,
aopnn,ed by him, and removable at his Peusure But
the Senator from New York lMr. Wrght contends, that
the President would have 30 more control over The
public moneys under the proposed system, than It ihey
we're deposiied in bankshal the same legal tormnltIes
mas, be zone through 10 touch The public moneys in the
one case as in the other. may be True, mat Inc rfe
sden, has no egel coRIol over The pubic money
in the one case than in the othe but has lie not great
or proetcu control In the case the repositories oil
The public money would, be his agents, subject 10 his
,u,bori,v the creatures Of his viii, dependent upon his
pleasure their continuance in oce and MADE by 'he
necular provisions Of his BILL as have already SHOWN,
especially and haoltnay seDsole ., u t noanas &c
In complete control over Inc OF
the public money, he would possess vhtnaiy conuoi
ovor the pubic money i,seli But in the cnse OF the
employment. of banks The repositories of The public mo.
nov n;e institutions not created by the President-not
dependent, on him for their continued eIsienee;-on lhe
they bold Their Charters which, hev sFs
At all times responsible and thus guarded against any
undue Influences from other quarters, when misht warp
them from their integrity and their duties
In p,,hip, these remarks, Sir, speak IN no spirit OF
.,ous epousy MS 10 the highest Executive trust Of
the Government or of its actual incumbent but speak
in the sp, of The Constitution, which anticipates 'he
Iannaz and snnposes the possibility Of inc abuse OF