Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1838-02-15

responsibility not the power and influence Of HE ocei


responsibility not the power and influence Of HE ocei
wc.,i :" Increased. 49,.
St:c, .c view ne .aoH?nI.ie" 10 ;a1 ~ -
charge Of Executive H1sTo3~g" 'no"@ t'''"i t' a.
system proposed hy the D ~ 'i$ p1rS.n "'",' w. 80,
imaginalons Of some had carried ttE" oeyTna ,,'s .
sent propositions aud induced them To fear mat luis
the mere commencement the entering wedge 20 hu''
tipcaon of Executive officers, Until, lhey sho'iu cover
the whole land like the locns,s ct Egypt ana cat ou'
the substance Of the re"p,c "nete was s,G
Increasing officers of any character: Not certainly
with the Executive. He act in selecting men for
Office when the offices created by Congress ana
with certain exceptions, he can remove men from oihcr
al his pleasure; hut he create oilIcp nor can he
multiply TIE number of officers, Of any grade or carac
ter This, then, is not objection against the Exccu
tive, but against the legislative power Of the G""srn-
ment ii is an objection which implies diSlrus n"t OF te
President but Of ourselves And AFRAID 10 trust
ourselves in this matter do we stand in much lear
of those who may succeed in these seats, mat we
would rather commit the finances &" the country l" III
corporntrd banks, than to the present or future
ta,ves Of the people and the States?
But how stands The objection Of Executive patronage
as applied 10 the State Bank deposite system me hrsl
step in this system is the selection Oh so.e '"ey
thirty ur more banks do which the direct interest VI
all heie officers directors and stockholders, must We ao
d,ese.d ard vh,n seIpc,ed the same interest enlisted
in whatever contract may bn made Here 49, NJ once IN
army Of persons brought within Inc reac" u exc
culve power not like the salary officer upon s p"'aeu
but whose interests are wholly depend
ent upon The extent of the patronage besiowed-mpon
The amount Of money entrusted 10 their charge lneh
come up the competitions and appliances 10 OMAN
selection, and the inducem1nt To vicious Executive ID
excite hupas and create expectations, Throughout lhe
whole line Of banking institutions III all the Sales D"'
the selections made the money deposited ana pass
ed TO the citizens, among the olher accommuao"s ~
the favored banks This creates another influence lar
more extended and frarfn-the influence OF the oeot-
of nh, ci,Ib I'm
made by law, the Executive otlicers-ihoSe VINO are
charged with the execution OF the law-must oect the
drafts which are 10 bring the money from The banks 10
meet them Let any unprejudced mind compare tue
influences here embodied with the Executive patronage
conferred by the bill under dis cnsslon ana can he aec
sion be in favor of the bank syslem, in this respect;
But there is another view of this matter. re had
shown that under the system proposed by the ol Inc
Executive could not reach the money in the hands oil
the depository without suhrcng both to condgn pun
ishment How is it here? Suppose the Executive cor
rupt and the bank willing 10 be corrupted, or the re-
verse and what is to hinder his obtaining any amount
of the nubc money he ppases? te takes it not rs the
morey of the people, but as the money e! The oank-
II il not. in form, loan from the public money on DC:
poste but an accommodation in the usual course %!
banking business and still, before the depos!!lng officer
shall have left the counter Of the institution, The Execn.
tive NAV take the money he dcpcsites, ana no one
punishable. The deposlng officer himself. any other
executive officer of The Government, may do the same
thing. with equal impunity.
Has Tho system provided for BY the BILL then,
thing 10 fear from comparison with that OF tie STATE
bank depaslte SYSTEM as TO the dangers oil an increase
of Executive patronage? He could not so suppose
Fourth He would institute short comparison OF
what he thought would be the relative Effects OF the two
systems upon the State banking institutions themselves
The system proposed By the bill! would necessarily
operate us check upon The issues and expansions OF
those institutions in either shape in which il had been
proposed to pass it, If the noes the banks continue 10
be received in payment of the public dues, and lie depo
sitor!es are directed in that they unQuesona5r
should be- call frequently, and at short intervals H."
the balances against the banks and to demand specie Tor
those baianccs this mast operate as powerful check
upon all the banks in the vicinity OF Those repositories
where the collections large. IT, on Tie other hand,
the receipt Of the bank notes he gradually discontinued
in the collection of the revenue, and specie collections
substituted while The change will create demand
upon the banks for specie, the disbursements OF specie
BY the Government will constantly distribute among lie
people broader and more permanent basis Tor the paper
circulation which the banks WILL of course, continue,
growing Of their private operations That the demand
for specie ay TO extent diminish the profits Of
banking than probabie but il the effect shall be
TO restrain the issues Of the Banks, 10 keep upon them
constant of the necessity ct more specie capital
TO their liabilities, the operation, past experience
ebundnny proves, will be greatly 10 the CON-
munity, and will work ratera baneh than an injury 10
the institutions themselves. In the mean tune, the dis
bursemen by the Government OF The specie receives,
cannot fall not only TO give stability and confidence 10
some extent least 10 the general currency, by con-
tinung in active circulation portions OF the gold
and silver upon which the whole is based, bu, must, 10
the Of the creaa,on have tendency to strength
the banks against sudden Pressures, and uniounded
dsrusts by enabling hem the more easily to arm them
selves>wIti coin.
What the tendencies OF The opposite system upon
the banking institutions Recent experience has MS
saered this inquiry forcb!y than it was in his
power command language to answer il. The effect
10 promote fearful expansions when large amounts
Of public money placed upon deposite, and runous
conractions when The necessities or the policy OF the
Government required its payment. The effect was 10
stimulate 10 dangerous excuses, not the banks only but
their customers also when money abundant IN Ia"
Treasury and TO add 10 the pressure, by heavy calls
from the Treasury when there scarcity. In short
the effect of the latter system upon The banks had proved
upon trial, to be unmxed evil while the influences OF
the former promised be rather favorable than una.
vorabic.
Remainder in our merit