The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1838-01-31
DEFENCE OF THE FRONTIER,

Senate relative to n plan for the protection
Of the North and Eastern boundary of the
United States. the Secretary OF War, on the
9th inst, transmitted report, in which he
speaks in favorable terms Of Narragnnset,
Bay, ss a superior harbor and important
military station. We subjoin large extracts
FROM the report for the purpose of showing
his opinions with regard to the importance
of strong permanent Notifications, which i,
will be seen are directly the opposite of
those expressed by his predecessor, Mr..
Cass. His remarks upon Narragansett Bay
we have placed in italics.
Speaking of permanent Notifications he
says:-
Without them, the commencement, of a
war will always be disastrous. Our laws
do not allow the use of the summary means
resored to by other nsaratIme powers, to
man their fleets. Our ships Of war are TO
be manned by volunteer seamen, and the
coast might he laid waste, and important
points occupied. before our naval f,rce could
be put in motion. Indeed, without fnrifi-
cations, and strong ones too. ships of war
are exposed To he captured or DESTROYED be-
fore they can be fitted for sea. AT Copen-
hagen, the whole Danish fleet was captur-
cd, the batteries slenced, and bumiIin,ing
terms imposed upon a nation, by the sud-
den attack of an overw heIming force.
With respect to the magnitude of the
works, to which objections have been urged,
they will be worse than useless il they be
not of a description to stop an enerny's sqa-
dron, ard, if assalable by land. aud in a po-
sition no. promptly to be succored, strong
enough to resist a coup de main; not suci,
an assault as the common accepta,;on of
the term implies, but to offer an cffectual
resistance for FIVE or six days, against an
attacking force of 10000 men, furnished
with all the means and appliances To con-
duct siege. Not to provide against such
expeditions would he to neglect the lessons
of experience, and 10 act in opposition to
the principles of modern warfare. II has
been said that we are too strong to dread
such assaults, aud need not provide against
them; that the enemy could never hope To
Keep permanent possession of any part of
our territory, and, therefore, we are saf;.
from attack. An active and en,erpr;suo
enemy viii make war upon the resources
OF Its adversary, and by The temporary &C.
cupation OF auy one Of our naval depots.
principal cities, or harbors, they might drive
this country To eypend an amount of blood
and treasure To recover it, ten times grea,.r
than the cost of the expedition. There is
always danger of the attempt being made.
and without due precauiion, we are exposed
to suffer the degradation Of having our soil
occupied ny foreign foe. From these
dangers, neither ships of war nor steam
batteries can protect the nation; The former
cannot te rendered effective to the full a.
mount Of their force at the commencement,
Of a war, nor until commerce receives such .
Il check as to throw out Of employment a
sufficient number of seamen to man the
feet; nor then ought it To be relied upon
to watch over our long line of coast. To
resist the navies of England or France it
must he concentrated, aud either the At
lansic frontier or that of the Gulf of Mexi-
CO be abandoned. With regard to steam
batteries, they ought only to be regarded +,
in the light of auxiliaries to the permanent
defences of the coast; important, it is true,
but, for reasons which it would be tedious 9
to detail here, entirely inadequate, of them {
selves, to afford sufficient protection to the r
great interests we are called upon to guard ,
on our Atlantic frontier, and on that of the .
Gulf Of Mexico.
As it may be objected to the compile ton |
of all the works projected, that il ever we
should be ihvolved in a war with either of n
the great maritime powers, they are too far b
Oft to assall our coast with success, or To
send formidable expeditions against the u
United States, and, therefore, 1t is unneces. q
sary to incur this great expense, will sim
ply observe, that the events of the past wars
prove this assertion to be erroneous, and 1,
that such stations MS Halifax and Bermuda
on our Atlantic frontier and the West India
islands on that of the Gulf of Mexico, are !,
near enough to bring those powers within
striking distance of all the vulnerable y
points upon our seaboard. And with re- !
gard to the expense To he incurred, | beg :.
to refer To the very able and luminous ex- :
position of the board of engineers laid be-
fore Congress in February, 1921, where it !,
is conclusively shown that the cost of pro- T
tecting the seacoast of the United States.
when menaced by an assailing expedition
Of 10000 men, hy means of a co,npe,enr
force of militia for the Iiml,ed period of six :
months, would exceed the amount reouired
to establish a permanent system Of de- !,
fence.
Having laid before you the exposed state I,
Of our seacoast, and stated the dangers TO I
10 winch tne country would be exposed in the "
event ot war, most earnestly recommend IS
The early completion of the foriications in u
tended to cover our principal cities and ma n
'af establishments, and to protect the en- m
frances Of our great hurbors. Without en-. n
ering into the controversy respecting the r.
proper selection of The sites for these works. NJ
which would demand profmnd knowledge h.