The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-03-06
NO.76.

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was content 10 suppose, for the purpose Of this argument
that not dollar to be thus LOST and yet be trust
ed he had shown that The system proposed by the bill
for the management Of The national fnsnces was NOR,
economical and less expensive the las-paying public
than either system Of general special State bank
deposites.
Third. His next point Of comparison should be III.
patronage conferred upon the Executive branch Of the
Government by The antagonist systems.
thad been already that the system proposed b,
the bull, required the appointment Of four sdditiona
officers, with salaries Of from two to three thousand dol
lars, This a direct increase OF the Executive
power aud patronage; but when should be Iecollect
ed how many officers, with equal salaries already ex-
isted and with how much facility officers added to
that number al almost every session Of Congress- and
IN almost every one of the Executive departments, lie
must hope that unreasonable alarm would be felt in
any quarter OF the house by this very limited addition
to the existing number If they were not TO be con-
stitutionaly appointed IT, being appointed duties
were to be assigned to them mol OF character com
patbe with civil and political institutions then the
offices ought not to be created, the duties assigned
regardless of oil consequences which rejection of the
proposition might bring upon The country. IT, however,
the appointments are TO be colsiutonally made, and
the duties Of the officers to be necessary TO the
public service he must be permitted 10 say that he
posed too confidently upon the intelligence Of the
American people, to suppose they would condemn the
measure because its details called for such accession
would not permit himself far TO dstrust the conf
dence Of citizens in the Government Of their choice
to believe that they would not feel perfectly safe in
the decisions Of Congress the Offices 10 be
ed and IN the President and Senate select The
to fill those Offices.
Was it, could be- true that greater safer trust
TO be placed in local banking Interpretations than
could be placed IN the constituted authorities Of
Government as organized under the Constitution
Were the taxpaying citizens Of our Republic afraid
entust the safekeepng of the national treasure Off
Of their choice and responsible TO them and
70 the laws OF Congress, and anxious confdc it
banks, created by national authority which no
branch Of the National Government had any control and
in the management of which neither the people their
Government had any voice! He did not believe this
was the state OF public opinion, He did not believe
that disrust towards our national authorities had yet
gained this extent. lie not ready admit that
banks, such as State banks and with the
recent experience Of the danger Of resting the operations
Of the public Treasury upon them, the favo
rites Of the people Of this country than their we'll
tIied and faithful servants
twas not his wish design, he would repeat again,
to say any thing unjust injurious to these insiitu
tons. Within their proper spheres they were conve-
nent and useful bot events had perfectly salts
fed bis mind that they not the fit keepers Of the
treasure treasury Of nation that this important in
clen to national independence ought not to be com
mted to the charge Of institutions whose interests
leaned SO strongly towards hazardous misappcaiion
Of such trust
VAST, could il have been, contemplated by the
trainers OF our system Of Government that they had
provided fit and trustworthy depository OF the nation
al inancesl That banks, interpretations private ncor-
poratons chartered for private uses, owned by private
individuals and managed by persons responsible only TO
the stockholders, be called in sustain the most
delicate trust under any Government That the will
Of these institutions must be consulted 10 the terms
upon which they would consent accept the trust and
at FALL Tho IF
included, must cater with them for terms upon which
the money of free people could be kept and paid ont
and to the character OF the currency which either
should he permitted to enjoys Had propositions to this
effect been submitted to the convention which framed
the Constitution, what would have been their fate
Does any one believe they would have been found
in that Constitution which is the pride OF freemen every
where No: such dependence upon such aid would
have found no countenance there. Can it find counte-
nance in the Senate now
Could any one doubt. them that the peoples money
should be confded to the peoples servants, to their
officers, responsible to them and to their aws and that
the appointment OF such and many officers should
be found necessary to perform this trnst IN manner
safe and convenient the Treasury, and to the people
themselves was not only in strict conformity with the
Constitution, and the very nature Of our civil insu
lions, bot inperous duty upon every Congress He
could entertain doubts upon either point.
There another direct grant of Executive patron
age and power under the hllthe authority TO appoint
the necessary clerks TO perform the mechanical duties
required when they could be performed by the Off
to whose keeping the money to be entrusted
and had been that this might involve the selcc
ton aud appointment of from six to twelve clerks
He would consume no time in commenting upon this
grant Of power the mere statement OF the fact should
suffice.
These two were the only direct grants Of Executive
patronage which the bill proposed onake but 1t seem
ed TO be supposed that the power and Influence OF the
Executive was to be immensely and dangerously IN
creased all the officers charged with the keeping OF
any portion Of the public money; and this idea formed
Of the most weighy objections against the system
How he would ask is this inference derived Not one
of additional compensation proposed TO be given
any of the existing executive officers, IN conse-
quence Of the additional duties imposed upon them by
this bill They were all now subject 10 removal from
office by the President, at his pleasure Whence, then,
he TO derive this increased power over them
Could he command the money in their hands! No;
unless he was ready 10 commit direct inraction Of the
Constitution and the officer TO subject himself to pro-
tracted Imprisonment and Infamous punishment, he
bill provides that oil money, in the hands oil every de-
posary shall be held there to the credit OF the rea-
surer or in other words, in the Treasury; and the
Constitution declares that money shall he taken from
the Treasury but in conformity to appropriations made
by law The bill makes any unlawful use OF the money,
by The officer in whose charge IL Is punishable by n-
prisonmenl for term less than two years. 10 let
the President have the money would be as criminal un-
der the law to let any other citizen OF the country
have it, and detection would be as certain in the Que
case as the other The only difference would be that
the President If he make himself the knowing
recipient would subject himself 10 impeachment for the
violation OF the Constitution and The fraud upon the
Treasury whereas tho citizen would incur no criminal
liability whatsoever. Where then, is the dangerous
increase Of power given to the PRESIDENT Suppose he
remove the officer the money STILL in legal sense,
in the Treasury He gains TO by the reno
val and If he did, he could make Of il without a
violation Of the Constitution 1t was easy 10 that
this system would impose great additional responsibility
upon the President he must select all the persons
h "a IN be cntrnsted with public money ard ID is his