The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1838-12-11


this class Of public officers 10 the general supervis-
ion Of the Executive, TO examinations by com;
miiee Of Congress at periods OF which they should
have no previous notice, and to prosecution and
punishment for felony for every breach OF trust
The safe keeping of the public monies, under the
system proposed, might be placed on surer foun-
dation than ii has occupied since the establish
ment of the Government.
The Secretary of the Treasury will lay before
you additional information containing new details
on this interesting subject. To these l ask your
early attention. That it should have given rise
| to great diversity of opinion cannot be SUBJECT OF
sur prise. After The collection and custody oil the
public moneys had been for so many years con-
nected with and made subsidiary to, the advance
ment of private interests return to the simple and
selfdenying ordinances of the constitution could
not be difficult. But time and tree discussion eli
citing the sentiments of the people, and aided by
that couciliatory spirit which has ever characterz-
ed their course on great emergencies; were relied
upon for a satisfactory settlement OF the question:
Already has this anticipation on one important
pont nj Ieast-the improperly of dlvertng pub
lie money to private purposes-been fully reaIlz'
ed.
| There is 10 reason to suppose that legislation
upon that branch ofthe subject would now he en-
barrassed by difference Of opinion, or fail to re-
ceive the cordial support of large majority OF our
| constituents. The connection winch formerly eX-
listed between the Government and banks was IN
reality ininrious TO BOTH well rs TO the general
interests of the community at large. II aggravated
the disasters of trade and the arrangements oil com
mercial intercourse and administered new excite
ment and additional means to wild and reckless
speculations, the dsappolntments OF when threw
the country into commissions of panic, and all but
produced violence aud b!oodshed
The imprudent expansion oil bank credIls,
which was the natural result of the command OF
the revenues of the State furnished the resources
for unhounded license in every species OF adven-
ture seduced industry from lis regular and sauta-
nv occupations by the hope of abundance without
labor, and deranged the soc al state by temPunsd all
trades and professions into Inc vortex Oh specu"o"
remote contingencies.
The same wide-spreading influence mpeded al
so the resources of thcGovernment, curtalled lis
useful operations, embarrassed the fuilmeni OF its
obligations, and seriously interered with the exc
cution Of the laws. Large appropriations and op.
pressive the natural consequences OF such
connection, since they Increase the pr"his oil
those who pllowed TO use the public funds, and
make it their interest that money should be accu-
lated and expenditure multiplied.
1t is thus that a concentrated money power is
tempted To become active agent in political al
fairs, an all past experience has shown on when
side that influence will be arrayed. We deceive
ourselves if we suppose that II VIII ever be i"und
asserting and supporting the rights OF the commu-
nifty at large, in opposition TO the claims Of the
few.
In Government w hose distinguishing character
stic should be diffusion add equalization OF lis
benefits and burdens the advantage OF tIndIvIdna's
will be augmented at the expense of the mas OF
the people. Nor is ii the nature of combinations
for the acquisition of legislative influence to con-
fine their interference to the single object fer
which they were originally formed. The tempta-
ton extend it to other matters, is, on the CON
trarv, not uurequent!y too strong 20 be rtsisteu'-
The influence, in the direction OF public AFFAIRS, or
the community at large, is, therefore, in no slight
danger of being sensIby and iniurously effected hy
giving 10 a comparatively small, but very efficient
class direct and exclusive personal interest IN go
impol tant a portion of the legislation of Congress
that which relates to the custody OF the puoilc
moneys If laws acting upon private interests
cannot always be avoided, they should be confined
within the narrowest limits, and left, wherever
possible To the Legislatures of the United States
When not thus restricted, they lead to coinhIna-
tons Of powerful associations foster an influence
necessarily selfish, and turn the FAR course 81
legislation To sinister ends rather than TO objects
that advance public liberty, aud promote the gener
al good.
The whole subject now rests with you, and
I cannot but express hope that some def
ute measures will be adopted at the present sss-
ii m.
It will not. am sure, be deemed ont of place
for me here to remark, that the declaration Of my
views in opposition the policy of employing
banks rs the repositories of the Government funds
cannot Justly be construed as indicative OF hostility,
official personal, to those institutions or 10
renest, in this form, and in connection with tins
subject, opinions which have uniformly entertain
ed, and on all proper occasions expressed Enough
always opposed their creation in the form OF cx-
elusive privileges and, State magistrate, aim
ing by appropriate legislation to secure the com,
munity against the consequences oither occasional
acknowledgements, have yet ever wished to see
them projected in the exercise of rights conferred
by law, and have never doubted their utility, when
properly managed, in promoting the interests ct
of the community. To the General Governm. Mt
they present themselves merely as State institutions
having no necessary connection with lis legislation
or lis administration, Like other State establish
mou,s they may be used or not in conducting the
affairs of the Government, as public policy and tho
general ntere stsofthe Union may seem 10 require
The only safe proper principle upon which their
intercourse with the Government can be regulated,
is that which regulates their intercourse with the
private citizen-the comforting of mutual benefits;
When the Government can accomplish financial
{ operation better with the aid of the banks Than
without it should be at liberty to seek that ana as
It would the services of private bankers or oher
capitalists or agents. ing the preference TO 'hcso
who will serve 1t on the best terms. nor can
there ever exist an interest in the officers OF INC
General Government, such, inducing them to
embarrass or annoy the State banks any more than
to incur the hostility of any other class Estate in
st,uons, of private citizens It's not IN the
nature of things that hostility to those institutions
can spring from this source, or any opposition to