The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-07-14


Congress, most earnestly, that the deposies in the
Stale banks, be regulated by law. He adds
. The power Of Congress 10 direct in what places
the Treasurer shall keep the moneys In the Treasury,
and impose restrictions upon the Executive authority,
in relation to theicustody and removal. Is unlimited.
and its exercise will rather be conred than discouraged
by those public officers and agents on whom rests tho
responsibility for their safety II is desirable that
little power possible should be left to the President
or Secretary Of the Treasury over those institutions,
which. being thus freed from Executive influence, and
without head 10 direct their operations would
have neither the temptation tbs ability to interfere IN
the political conflicts Of the country Not deriving their
charters from the national authorities, they would never
have those inducements to NEEDLE in general elections,
which have led the Bank OF the United States TO sgtato
and conyulse the country for upwards OF woyears"
BY reason OF some difference of opinion, as to the
details of BILL no law TO regulate The deposiies with
the State banks was passed at that session o. Con-
gress. In the mean time the public mind became
much excited on this subject, and President Jackson.
in his message Of December, 1885, found Il necessa-
~ TO repel in the strongest terms all idea Of keeping
the public money under Executive control, and there
by extending Executive influence. de says
Although clothed with the legal authority and sup
ported by precedent aware that there was in the
act Of the removal Of the deposites, liability TO excite
that sensitiveness to Executive power which il is the
characteristic and the duty OF ireemen TO indulge but
relied this feeling, also, directed by patriotism and
intelligence, to vindcae the conduct which, ~ the end
would appear to have been called for by the best inter-
ests Of my country The apprehensions natural to this
feeling that there may have been desire, through the
instrumentaty of that measure to extend the Execu-
tive influence, that it may have been prompted by
motives sufficiently free from ambition, were not
overlooked Under the operation OF institutions, the
public servant who is called to take step Of high
responsibility, should feel in the freedom which gives
rise such apprehensons, his highest security When
unfonnded the attention which they arouse and The dis
cmssions they excite, deprive those who indulge them,
Of the power 10 do harm when JUST they but hasten
the certainty with which the great body Of our citizens
fail TO repe attempt to procure their sanction
any exercise Of power Inconsistent with the jealous
maintenance Of their rights. Under such convictions,
and entertaining doubt that my constitutional obi-
cations demanded the steps which were taken in refer
ence TO the removal of,he deposites, il impossible
for me to be deferred from the path Of duty by fear
that my motives could be msjudged, or that political
preudces could defeat the just consideration OF the
merits of my conduct The result has shown how safe
is this reliance upon the patriotic temper and enlghten
ed discernmeut Of the People That measure has now
been before them, and has stood the test OF all the Sc
we're analysis which its general Importance the interests
affected and tho apprehensons it excited were calcu-
lated produce and it now remains for Congress 10
consider what legislation has become necessary in con-
sequence.
81 need only add - what have, former occa-
sons said this subject generally that in the regula-
tons which Congress may prescribe respecting the Gus
tody Of the public moneys, is desirable that as little
discretion may be deemed consistent with their safe
keeping should be given to the Executive agents No
one can be more deeply impressed than with the
soundness Of the doctrine which Restraints and limits. by
specific provisions, Executive discretion as far as 1t
be done consistently with the preservation OF It's
constitutional character In respect TO the control over
the public money, this doctrine is peculiarly applicable,
and is in harmony with the great principle which felt
was sustaining in the controversy with the Bank OF
the United States which has resulted in severing, to
extent, dangerous connection between mo-
neyed and political power The duty Of the Legisa-
ture to dene by clear and positive enactnents, the
and extent OF the action which it belongs ito the
Executive to superinend springs out Of policy snsa-
gous to that which enons upon all the branches OF the
Federal Government abstinence from the exercise OF
powers not clearly granted. In such government,
possessing only limited and specific powers the spirit OF
it, general administrator cannot BIO wise or just when
it opposes the reference Of oil doubtful points to the
great Of authority, the States and the People
whose number and diversified relations, securing them
against the influences and exctements which may mis-
lead their SCENTS, mako hs tho safest dapostnry af
power. In it's application to tho Executive, with re-
ference to the Legislative branch Of the Government,
s rule Of action tho sneSs On % A
authority, which can be regulated by Congress. The
bases which may operate upon him will no, be so likely
to extend to the representatives Of the people IN that
body"
In pursuance Of these recommendations my col
league brought forward proposition for that pur-
pose, which became law, and which he now pro-
poses to repeal Do not the same reasons exist now
in favor of retaining il, that existed when Pre-
sident Jackson first recommended 1t Most as
suredly they do. Then why repeal i? The sena-
tor from Missouri Mr. Benion) says, twas first re-
commended on account of the large surplus then on
hand, and having none now the cause for its adop-
tion has ceased to exist. ! say, not So The Sena-
tor is mistaken. There was no more surplus at the
time this measure was first recommended, than We
have reason to anticipate and ought to have in or
binary times 10 meet the current expenses Of the Go
vernment. We must not take the present state of
the Treasury as the criterion Of the future, unless
the Executive and his friends have determined, by
their experiments to exhaust the resources, and dry
pthe revenues Of the country There is every rea-
son for the continuance Of the law now, that existed
for its enactment then.
We have seen that after The removal of the Depo
sites from the Bank OF the United States and before
the passage of the deposite act, General Jackson en-
trusted the custody Of the public money to the Stale
Banks He exercised, through the Secretary of the
Treasury, his discretion as TO the time AMI manner
of its deposiie; the banks in which, and the terms
upon which, il was deposited; but, he felt, from the
beginning, the tremendous responsibility he was as
Stunning, and with all hispopulary, and his firm hold
upon the affections of the people, he foresaw the tor
rent of popular Indignation which would follow the
conviction on the public mind, that the whole reve-
nues Of the country 10 be taken out of the
tody Of the law, and drawn within the absorbing
vortex of Executive discretion He relied upon the
nreJudceS Wncn nau DeeH excled against the Unlled
States Bank TO justify the removal of the deposiies
but there was nothing which he dared rely 10
shield him from the vengeance Of an abused and
| confding people, f he should attempt to keep them
within the control OF Executive discretion instead Of
entrusting them to the custody of the law In his
famous manifesto read TO the cabinet before the re-
moval Of the deposites, he carefully guards against
any inference of an intention to take them within his
own CONTROL and in every message to Congress from
that time down to the passage of the deposite act he
urges most earnestly that the custody Of the public
money shall be regulated by law. Even his popu-
larity could not have whstood the strong current Of
public feeling, if he had manifested, in the slightest