The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-02-17


red,) will, nj last, be found in the fact OF the
extensive use oil banking agency in the collec-
ton OF the revenue in Lngland, and the ex-
elusive employment OF individual agency, for
that pa pose, Ia France.
But il is MT merely by the multiplication
Of officers and the increase OF expenditure,
that the influence OF the Executive branch Of
the Government Is iearlully extended by this
bill. That influence is greatly augmented by
certain new regulations II introduces in regard
to the tenure OF nfhce--the Compensation OF
officers, and the forms and usages Of fiscal
administration. In the first place, the Trea-
surer, the Receyers-General, and all the other
officers, from the highest to the lowest, emf
ployei in the fiscal service, may be required
al any time, at the discretion OF the Secretary
OF the Treasury, 10 give aeu official bonds,
in increased sums, to be fixed by the Secreta-
ry Oft the Treasury, .any law IN reference 10
any Of the official bonds ofauy Of the said OF
fcers to the contrary Notwithstanding !" and
III default OF giving such new bond, the oticer
would, Of course, be deprived OF his Office.
Now, il is evident, that under such power
possessed by the Secretary Of the Treasury,
all the officers connected with the operations OF
the Treasury, would be converted into the
trembling vassals OF the xecutlve. direct
removal from office is measure Of more than
ordinary energy, and involves responsibility.
Cases might exist in which the Secretary of
the Treasury would be unwilling to take the
responsibility of direct removal from Office,
and yet would accomplish the same object by
ycxatious requisition of new bond in so
large sum, that the officer could not, or
EnI IN fha SpH
amount. Who does not see that, under such
regulation, the officers of the Treasury
would lose all sense Of independence and
that those who could consent to hold office on
such terms, must be prepared to become the
passive and unrcsisting tools of power. Here
toiore it has been the wise policy of our leais-
lation TO fix by law the sum in which official
bonds are to be given, udto leave nothing in
that respect, or as little as possible, to Execu-
tive discretion. Again, it will be seen from
an examination OF the bill, that the compcnsn-
ton ofs4yeral of the officers to be appointed
under il, such as visiting agents, clerks, &c. is
to be fixed by the Secretary at his discretion.
and not by law. Here is another source 0.
servile dependence on the ore hand and of
increased Executive influence on the other,
which is not in harmony with the general spirit
and maxims OF our legislation.
My attention has also been attracted by n
provision of the bill which seems to me to in
troduce a most dangerous innovation in the es-
tablished forms and usages OF the Treasury.
1t has heretofore been fixed principle OF tis-
cal responsibility, that no money should be
drawn from the Treasury, but upon warrant
Of the Secretary drawn on the Treasurer,
couniersigned by the Comptroller, and re-
corded by the Register, and upon that war
rant, when it reaches the hands of the rrea-
surer thus authenticated, the Treasurer draws
his draft on the depository of the public mo-
ney for payment. These forms have always
been held 10 be very important checks, and
Indispensable preliminaries TO any money be-
ing drawn out Of the Treasury, or in other
words, paid by the depository of the public
moneys The Secretary draws his warrant
upon the Treasurer. subject TO the checks be-
fore mentioned, and then the Treasurer draws
upon the depositary who is to make the pay
ment. Bat III no Instance, does the Secreta-
~ draw directly upon The depository, because
that would be to lose the security oil the inter-
mediate checks of the Comptroller and the
Register BY the 10th section Of this bill,
however, in contraveriion of these established
principles and checks, it is expressly provid-
ed, that " for the purpose Of pigments on the
public account, it shalt be lawful for the said
Secretary TO drap upon any efthe said depoN-
tarirS, as he may think most conducive to the
public interest, or to the convenience of the
public creditors or both" Under this provi-
sion the Secretary of the Treasury could
draw out all the money in the Treasury, or,
which Is the same thing; in the hands of the
depostares, without any check whatsoever.
The effect oft, whether SO intended or not, is
to place the whole public treasure at his I'M
checked and absolute disposal.
Now, sir, is not the effect of these various
provisions, and of the whole scope and tenor
of this bill, TO concentrate, at last, the entire
control of the public moneys, in the hands o.
the President for the Secrelaryof the Trea-
sury, and all the other fiscal officers arc but
his agents, appointed by him, and removable
at his pleasure But the Senator from New
York. (Mr. WrighL) contends that the Pres-
dent would have no moro control over the
public moneys under the proposed system,
than if they were deposited in banks that the
same legal lormaliies must be gone through
to touch the public moneys, in the one case,
as in the other. 1t may be true, that the Pre-
sdent has no more legui control over the pub
lie money in the one case than in The other;
but has he not greater practical control. In
The one case the deposi'aries of the public
money would, be his agents, subject to his
authority, the creatures Of his will, dependent
upon his pleasure for their continuance in Of
flee, and made be the peculiar provisions Of
this bill, as have already shown, especially
and habi,uay sensible Of that dependence.
In possessing SO complete a control over the
keepers Of the public money, he would pos
liz cnnirI IL