Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1838-06-28
POLITICAL.
From hc Richmond Hhig.
TOIlENRN CLAY. ESQ-I,rrr,

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the Astounding revenues OF the Union, aud organized
by means o the banking system, IL has established "A
connection between h's Office aud the prosperity, the
comfort, the very subsistence III private individuals
which has proved asoutee OF lrmiul influence. Bnt
you may remember that, IN ad,eitne to thls de
clalcd that did not mean to p,rss the atpnn,,ni
against the consuutionality of n Bank which mpht
be dtdnccd from the superior efficiency for all siuls
ter purposes, oi tins implied power, to any aud all
the express powers Of the Governments No, did
press IL did but propose 10 ask whether the cqn-
vocal generation OF a power so dangerous does not
make II the duty OF those who call II into existence
so 10 place il, and hedge round with res,rc
tons, and a" 10 tctcr H. rs 10 Afford some hope OF
safety from the wounds ii might lnflie ON the public
happiness, Liberty aud peace.
But ! am sensible that this power, under some
modification, is iusepafablc from the uatmc Of the
Thing. Somewhere II must be placed and arknow.
ledge tla IN urging the necessity of Withdrawing the
command of II from the Federal Executive, | am
proposing but 10 change The seat of the disease and
hoi to eradicate II. THIS may be impossible. II So
II IS an eva which We cannot remove, aud must be
content To mitigate aswc may. You, am persuaded,
Slf viii agree with me, that the conio Of the none
tary system OF the whole country by any Department
OF the Gcuer1l Government, however desirable iof
commercial and financial purposes. must be \ great
Pott'cdt evil Should II not, then. be ON study 10
devIse some means 10 separate the poiAcai mi,thjfj
from the FSeat and commercial advantages Ola Bank
II seems In be assumed that the Government can
not safely make OF Il Bank OF the nitcd States
as fiscal agent. without rcscrving to it,eli such
control OF IFS operations rs may guard against the
discretion OF dishonesty OF the institution That Sc
cutlty against these things should be takcn neon
tcstble-that ion tins purpose. the administration of
the all ms OF the aik should be controlled by some
power from without /, not denied. Bun give me
leave to ash, rs II necessary that tins power, IN
whole OF in part, shond be exercised by the Federd
Government III any OF ats departments p
am sensible II must seem presumptunus in a name
Ia IL.
aud delicate SUBJECT Nay more am sensible thai
II IS presnmptuons-and frankly own, that were
II III my power To cary INTO practical operation the
ideas that am about To present | should nemblr To
assume the responsibility But II Is sald, aud Truly
that "wlsc men learn moc from fools than fools from
wise n."-liear with my lolly then, pray Won.
'hInk IT may be safely assumed that the States
colectlteIy can never mud an interest IN acting dis
honestly III mere money matters by the Government |
OF the Union. What, then, would be the effect of
reserng 10 the several States pan of the stock of
Bank of the United States, rroportloncd To lh,i,
representation in the Two Houses of Congress and
such, III ITS total amount rs ia secure them an Ell
Gent control OF the operations ol the institution
lhe States nj this moment hold, on dcpogtc from
the Government ofthe United States sum ol money
not much sho,t Of lhlry millions of dollars For the
reimbursement al tins sum. they are liable Ia be
called on by Congress. What # II were provided
than each State should be forever DISCHARGED of his
Inability by taking STOCK to that amount 10 be rcsct-
OF tie capital OF fifty millions proposed by you aud
would justly secure 10 the States majority IN the III
rcctory.
1t cannot be supposed that Bank directed and
clIeiy owned by The States, would fail 10 execute in
good faith all its engagements with the General COY
etnmcut which is but the creature and agent of The
States themselves, established for their use No
case can he supposed III which lhcy would choose to
etnbatrass ITS inanccs but one 81 indclty the par
oil the General Government 10 lis proper duties. 70
suppose that they would descend 10 any ia NJ like /
dishonesty 10 the prejudice of Iheir own affairs |
would be absurd If The respect due To sovereign
States did not forbid such an idea in any case What
ever On tins side, there could be danger. But
might not great benefit from such an arrange.
mcnt! Would II not be great achievements IT, by /
such means the States could be enabled to oppose a
countcr-chcch to the influence which the Federal
Government derives from lis vast revenues not only
through Is patronage, but YET more through It's power
over the prosperity aud subsistence OF lndriduals
frankly own, sir that, in discussing the consttti-
tionaluy OF Bank Of the Jnitcd States, | may some
times have opposed an uncandd duness to the ar. /
gumrnts of ITS advocates. | am not conscious of
having done so. But convinced rs am, OF the mis-
ehleyous political effects ri any Bank OF the L. S. I
heretofore established, nay mind may have taken a
perverted view OF the constitutional question. But
let nae see Bank 50 constituted be an lnslru-
ncnt of conu0 in the hands OF the States, and |
should certainly wish To find IN the Constitution
sone authority for It's establishment. | might MOI
hhd ~ bn We must forget the marvellous aptitude of
the human mind 10 find reasons for approving what il
eagerly desires before we can doubt, that, OF The nu-
tudes who deny the CoHsututloualuy of a Bank I
many would be relieved OF lhclf sefuplcs In tins
view, see reason why the whole capital stock of
such Bank might moi be held by the States. None
why II might not be increased iiom time to time, rs
the growth and necessities Of the country might re
qnire: None, why the charter might not be pcrpct-
ual None, Why the Bank should MOI be established T
by rrevolable contract, IN the right to receive aud
keep all depositcs None, why the Government
OF the United States should have any more authority
over the Bank than any other deposIlor, beyond the
right to be kept advised OF the condition oil its AT I
fairs
assure you, sir. am profoundly sensible of my
Insuhclcncy 10 the task OF suggesting any thing
than hint OF the folly of which am prepared TO be
convinced by single word. the difficulty OF
organizing the directory of Bank 50 constituted. |
But understand, that among men skilled III the bu
siness OF Banking, an idea is beginning 10 find favour
winch might be adrantageousy applied N this case.
1t be desirable, as some suppose, that every Bank
should he organized with legislative directory, pos
sesslng lull power TO regulate the principles and eX
tent OF the business OF the Bank. and an executive
directory having authority but to carry into effect
the orders and ennctaleus OF the other, then might
this advantage be emincnty enjoy ed by such an ns
ton as | am surprising. What should hinder the I
appointment Of the Executive branch in the Ordinary
way while the other mi ght be made to consist OF
number OF members, equal TO the number OF States
One chosen by each State II necessary the con
currence of both bodies iaht be made indspcusa-
blc TO the adoption Of measures OF high and extra
ordinary character. OF tins kinsl, | will mcuton as
an example, all suspensions of specie payments. Non
need we doubt of the ability with which the Affairs OF
such an institution would be managed, when We re- I
Uop hot. I'm .1