The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1838-03-23


bank, which none would, for a moment, hesitate
TO pronounce grossly unconstitutional. when ap-
Piled TO an individual. To free ourselves from
this sllusion, ask, could this Government consti.
tutionslly bcstow on individuals OF private asso-
ciAilon. the sdvan:ages proposed to be bestowed
on the selected hanks, IN order 10 enable them to
pay their debts l. there one who hears me " no
would vsature TO say, yes, even in the case OF the
most extensive merchant or mercantile concern,
such as some of those in New York, or New Or
leans, at the late suspension, whose embarrass-
msnIs involved entire sections in distress But
II not, on what principle can discrimination be
made in favor Of the banks They are local in.
stutions, created by the States for local purposes
composed. like private associations, Of individual
citizens whom the acts of the State cannot GEN.
fer a particle OF constitutional right under this
Constitution, that does not belong 10 the hulnblesi
citizen. So far from il, II there be distinction,
II is against the banks. They are removed furih
or from the control of this Government than the
individual citizens, who by the Constitution, are
expressly subject TO the direct action OF this &C.
vernmeni in many instances; while the State
banks, as constituting portion OF the domestic
institutions of the States, and resting their re-
served rights, entirely beyond our eortrel; 50
much ST. as not 10 be the susjec, of bankrup, law,
although the authority TO pass one is expressly
granted bv the Constitution.
Ga what possible ground, then can the right in
question be placed, unless, indeed, on the broad
principle that these local institutions, intended for
State purposes, have been extended and have so
connected themselves with the general circulation
and business THE country, to effect the inter-
es, Of the whole community, so as to make 1t the
right and duty Of Congress to regulate them; or
N Short on the broad principle of the general
welfare There is none other, that eau per
csVe bui this would be TO adopt The old aud tx.
ploded principle, at all times dangerous, but pre-.
emlRenily so al tins time when such loose and
dangersous conceptions Of the Constitution are
abroad IN the land. Ii the argument is good In
one case, 1t is good in I'll similar cases. Ii this
Government may interfere with any one of the do
mes,ic Institutions of the States en- the ground of
promoting the general welfare. ii NAV with others
II 1t may bssioN privileges 10 control them, il may
also appropriate money for the same purpose and
thus doc. might be opened to an interference
with State institutions Of which we Of a certain
section ought al this time to be not a little Jealous
The argument might be pushed much farther
We not only offer TO eoRfer great and important
privileges on the banks be selected bat IN turn,
ask them to stipuiste 10 comply with certain con-
dltions, the object OF which is TO bring them up
der the supervision epd control of this Govern.
rlent II might be asked, where Is the right pur-
chase Of assume such supervision or coutrs1 II
might be repeated thai they are State institutions,
incorporated solely for Stale purposes and to be
entirely under State control, and that all super
vision on our par, IS in violation OF the rights OF
the States. II might b. argued tina. such SUPER
vision or control Is calculated TO weaken the con.
troll of the States their own Institutions ana
% a,Ase tL~ -
and local interests, for the promotion of which
they were established; and too subservient 10
other, and perhaps conflicting interests, Ahich
might feel but little sympathy With those OF the
States But | forbear. Other and not less VI.
gent, objections claim my attention. To dilate
too much on Sne would necessarily sacrifice the
claim of others.
| next object, that, Whatever may De tbs right
10 enter into the proposed bargain. the mode ia
which it is proposed to make IL Is clearly nRcon.
stitutoRai, If | rightly comprehend it. | am mol
certain that do but, if understand it rightly
the plan il FOR the Secretary Of the Treasury 10
lect twenty five STATE banks described 10 the sub.
siilute, which are to be submitted 10 the two
Houses TO BE- confirmed, or rejected BY their joint
resolutions, without the approval Of the Persistent
iR the same mode as they would appoint chap,
lam, or establish joint rule for the government
OF their proceedings.
Ia acting on the joint resolution, + what sup
pose be iatsndsd each House would have the rig ht
Of course, 70 strike from !, the u any bapa
and insert another, which would tn fact vest in
the two Houses the uncoptrolabls right Of making
the selection. Nov, II this be the mode proposed
as | infer from the silence or the mover, il i, q
plain and papable violation Of Tire Constitution
The obvious inteAtisa is 10 evade the power OF tht
tf.h -. = Z
Of an express provision Of tie Constitution, drasr
up wiih the utmost care, and intended 10 prevent
the possibility Of evasion. Il is contained in HE
lst article, 9Th section and the last clause. wLlct
/ ak the Secretary 10 read
(" Every order, resolution, or vote 10 which th,
concurrence Of tbs Senate and House Of Represeu
tatIyes may Is necessary, except on a question 0
sdjournmeu,) shall Be presented to the President
the United States, aad betore the same shall TAX
effect, shall be approved By hin, OF being dlsap
proved By hin, shall be repassed by lwo-ihlFds 0
the Senate and House OF Representatives, accord
ing to tie rules and limitations prescribed in tn
case Of bill" ~
Nothing csa be more explicit, or full II IL NJ
mere possible 10 evade the Executive veto, Oh AM
Joint vote, than 10 the passage Of bill. The vet
Wa vested 10 him net only to protect his own pow
ers, bu, a. an additional guard 20 the Constitution
| aln not tbs advocate Of Executive power which
have been often compelled TO resisa 81 late, sheE
sxisnded beyond It's proper limits, as shall eVei
be prepared To DO when II IL. Nor am the adVo
Gale OF Legislative OF Judicial. | stand ready L
protect all, Within the sphere assigned by the Con
stItnlion, and to resist them beyond. To this ex
PLAT and comprehensive provisions Of the Coasti
taten. 10 protection Of the veto. there is bit sin
gle exception, resulting, b. necessary implication
from aao her portion Of the ia-trument not less ex
plIcii, which authorizes each House TO establish
the rules 81 it, proceedings. Under this provision
the two Houses have fall and uncomfortable aB
thory within the limits Of their respective walls
and over those subject TO their authority 10 thei