The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-12-29


assuredly s but yet simple and disembarrassed. That
the State banks are be employed fiscal agents Of
the Government Is as have shown, admitted both by
the practice and language ofthe Administration The
only question IL, how and in what are they TO
be employed Are they TO be employed Al tho Sole will
and pleasure Of the EreeRps they to be employ
ed under the sanction limitations and responsibility OF
lapf The Sub-Tressury scheme, though still recon-
mended and even earnestly recommended 10 name and
intended possibly, TO be pressed in fact, is virtually
abandoned in Argument The objections taken to il by
its opponents have, BY one, been practically admit
ted. only by the public reason, which has emphat
cay pronounced lis condemnation Of the scheme, but
by the Administration itself The great and vital prn-
cipe Of the system is the collection OF the in
hard money This, accordingly, was put forward most
prominently in the message Of the President the
session OF Congress- aud urged by him with pecu-
liar earnestness The legislative discussion, during that
session, it will be recoected by all us turned mainly
on that Fundamental principle Of the system IL was
found TO be unensbe in the open field Of argument and
accordingly we have heard nothing OF it in either
OF the two subsequent messages Of the President
annual reports OF the Secretary Of ahe Treasury.
The next great question on which issue join
ed between the advocates and the opponents Of the
Subtreasury scheme was the comparative safety Of
the banks and the public officers repositories of
the public money. Notwithstanding the triumphant
appeal we made to the past experience OF the Go
vernment on this head, and the vast amount Of losses
which we showed by the authentic records OF the
Treasury had been sustained from defaulling public
officers, II was still commended that banks less
safe than individual agents, and reports were called
forth from the Secretary OF the Treasury explain
ing away the conclusive testimony OF his former re-
ports, and making out by certain reconcile calcua-
tions OF interest and OF alleged depreciation heavy
loss In figures hough no, in fac) againstlhe banks
10 offset the enormous defaults Of public officers
But what does the Secretary now say under the
teachings of "Tecent events reviewing his re-
ports both for and against The comparative safety OF
banks as public repositories Banking institutions
H. 49, To-.
Mr. Woodbury. in his late annual report 10 Con-
gress) as class OF agents generally unsafe, when
looking to eventual losses, or he says in another
part OF his report in relation TO eventual payment"
l should like 10 know from MIR Woodbury. what
prospect of eventual payment he has from the sub
Treasurers who have recently fled The country, and
put the ocean between them and the Solicitor Of the
Treasury.
ion, the most impressive testimony the superior
safety Of banks repositories by The extraordinary
and unusual provisions he recommends to guard
against the defalcatons of public officers. He ex-
pressly says indeed that "the experience of every
country has shown that pubic officers not at all
times proof against temptation" To counervail
the force Of this temptation, he invokes the penal
Legislation of Congress TO "vsit" the nfdelity of
these agents with severe and ignominious punish
ment" But of what avail would be even the bloody
code Of Draco, when the improved methods OF loco
motion TO which the enterprisng and inventive
genius Of the age has given birth and OF which two
OF our Sub-treasurers have already availed them
selves, afford so ready of escape and of con-
sequent impunity, under foreign jurisdiction Z
Far better would il be, in my humble Judgment, 10
heed the prayer which Divine Wisdom has taught
to human weakness and 10 "lead not" public officers
(who are but men) into temptation" by committing
70 their custody large sums Of the public treasure
but the President, as II conscious that neither the
ngors Of legislative enactment, nor the vigilance Of
Executive supervision could adequately provide for the
safety Of the public moneys in the hands of individual
agents, has gravelv submitted to Congress proposition
which, must with all Difference say, appears to me
the most extraordinary record, and utterly oppos-
ed to the spirit at least Of the Constitution What is
i'll Why, that Congress should appoint an ambula,oy
committee of their own body look after the Pres-
dents Sub-treasurers, To make frequent examinations
of their affairs and accounts of which these officers
the President adds, should have previous notice.,
and then to report to the Eretufrc such deslcations
found to exist" Yes sir, committee Of Con-
grcss TO hunt up defaues and report them the Err
ecuiipc Whose duty is it, would ask, under the
Constitution, to supervise and inspect the counc, Of
public oficersl The Executive power" by the Con-
stitution, expressly I" ~eoed in the Presiian,
appoints the public officers, who his agents and
sisans in the performance Of his high trust: he alone
has the power OF removing them, and upon him alone
should rest the responsibility for their conduct and the
measures necessary TO ascertain their fidelity or IN
worthness. Congress is the Legislative department
whose province it is enact a,rs, the execution Of
which, then, devoves on the President Congress
have nothing 70 do with the functions and details OF adj
President alone. proposition, them making them
sharers in that responsibility through committee Of
their body to which should be assigned the subordinate
and ministerial duty Of inspecting the affairs and
counts OF Subtreasurers, and reporting their defaca
tons to the Erecptre," must repeat, appears
utterly opposed the principles of the Constitution and
wholly incompatible with the dignity Of Congress. No,
sir even If the occasion legitimate one shall
see, trust, committee Of Congress reporting
to any other body than to Congress itself If the Pre-
sdent will have Subtreasurers he must look after them
by agents of his own. As much as Executive power,
| lament to say, has invaded and subdued the lofty
spirit and rghtlu independence Of the legislative de-
parment we ale not yet, trust prepared for the hui
initiation OF appointing committee Of the American
Congress a corps of beadles to hunt up defauliing
Sub-reasurers and report them to the Executive. That
novel and extraordinary measure should have been
proposed by the President necessary means Of
guarding the public money from defacaton the hands
Of Sub treasurors, the most emphatic acknowledge
men he could have made OF the inherent insecurity of
that system.
Notwithstanding however, all these admissions,
express implied, of the superior safety and conve
nience Of banks as repositories and fiscal agents,
the President recommends again the Subreasury
scheme to Congress. and even says his opinions in
favor of il " have been strengthened by recent
events !" What the President can find in /" recent
events" TO sustain his renewed recommendation of
the SubreaSury scheme, II utterly surpasses my
powers of comprehension to imagine. Recent erent
sir! Let US, for moment, inquire what these
cent erentS have BEEN and how they bear on the two
rival systems proposed for the safe-keeping of the
| public moneys. First, to the system Of State
| banks as public repositories. What is the testimo-
| ny of recent epents with regard TO them Have We
not recently seen them, within fifteen months after
general suspension ofspecie payments, brought upon
| them by an unprecedented combination of adverse
| circumstances among which not the least was the
hostile policy OF the Government itself-have we not
seen them, within this short period without even
cheering voice from the Government amid the diff