The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1838-05-11

revenue VIII force The holders n the 10 draw
specie from the banks To be deposited with the
collectors OF the revenue. For the difference be.
tween the revenue and the expenses, the Govern.
ment wi. issrs Treasury notes, TO be sold tor
hank notes, aud covcrted into specie, and, as the
disbursements are made at points the frontiers,
remote from the places OF collection il will not re-.
turn to the banks issuing il except circultously.
Bot the notes are received. the, will not, for.
nerly, be deposited IN banks, and drawn out again
So as 10 enter into the circulation leaving the pub
lic creditor his choice of specie notes. but they
will be left IN special deposle with the receivers
When warrants are drawn on these receivers,
they will call on the banks Tor specie 10 pay The
favored pubic creditor, selecting Of course the
bank whom I ey will draw according to its
servllity or opposition to the Executive and thus
placing them oil under his control. Now, under
such circumstances, Is it wise tor the banks 10
dlsarm themselves IN the presence o! their enemy ?
i'll. / he disorders of the currency lie loo aeep
for superficial remedies, and these palliatives rr
tate without curing. Congress aud Congress a.
lone, can apply adtquat. rellef What Mr. Masi
said TO Congress in 1916 is even more true 10
1898. For the interest OF The community al
large saa he, as well as for the purposes OF The
Treasury, il is essential that the nation should pos.
currency OF equal value, credit and use
wherever it may circulate. The Constitution has
entrusted Congress erclusirety with the power OF
creating and regulating currency OF that descrIp-
ton" The only reform IN The currency hIeh
that body has yet made. is the issue OF ten millions
Of irredeemable paper money and proposal for
ten millions more l. Il worth while, then, so
long as Congress fails 10 exercise It's legitimate
powers, TO waste the strength OF the country IN
efforts 10 accomplish what oil know 10 be i'm.
practicable To resume now without some clear
understanding 3ith the Government, seems 10 be
throwing away the benefits o expe fence, and The
misfortune. We have gone through all The NOR
thcaton and all the Inconvenience OF suspension.
Lat US endeavor TO prohl 10y them 70 hN the ~
lure on some guaranty o. the stability OF the cur.
rency. aud moi ct every thing ahoa again with
out knowing where We may be dllted. For
". Compare the situation OF the banks al the
last resumption aud nov. After suspension or
nearly three years, Congress applied all ITS power
o induce, 10 persuade ard to assist the banks III
their efforts 10 resume. They passed the resolu.
lion o. 1916, authorizing the receipt Of the notes
OF specie pay Jog banSs. But this aenr was IN.
sufficient and at the same tins they established
the Bank OF the United States, with capital OF
thirty FIVE millions. That bank called d conven.
ton OF State banks, and sgretd that they would
resume specie payments, 1t would
L. Assume all their debts to the Government OF
the United States.
4 2 Discount TO those v no had payments 10 make
70 the Government the whole anonnt OF then
bonds and IN addition,
3 Discount to those not indebted TO the Govern
a,ent, tao millions in New Y rk, two millions in
Philadelphia one and bali million in Baltimore,
and hall nliios 10 Richmond; and
A. Would sustain the Tesuurg banks IN case
the resumption brought them INTO dlth utv.
The banks at the same time Imported at an eX-
pense OF more than half million, the sum OF Sc
ven millions OF specie; aud two months alter The
resumption its discounts reached twenty millions
Compare Nth this statement our condition nov
Then, the Government agreed to receive for all
dues thC notes Of the Bank Of the United States
now all bank notes are refused and dlscredIled
Then. the Government endeavored TO sustain lhs
banks nov, IT is striving 10 destroy them. lhen
il established new aud vigorous bank capital
now, 1t refuses TO create new bank, aud seeks ic
cripple those IN existence. Then We had two
hundred aud sixty banks; now, We have nearly
uine hundred.
/ 10 short, what reliance have the banks now
with the Executive hostile 10 them What pro
lection like that of the late Bank OF the UUiteC
States have they to sustain them None what
ever.
The only circumstance not wholly untavorabl'
in the comparison is tn, low rate OF exchange VIII
England. Bot nothing general or permanent cat
be inferred from this circumstance, which ire
uuently occurs, aud on the present occasion l
wholly acciaental in New York, from the unnatu
raj condition into which her measures of extrem
ripor have driven every thing II under ordina
~ circumstances, while other things uuderwen
no depre >sIen, exchange on England should dc
cline II might he inferred that England owes L
the United States more than we have yet draw
=. hen q, has
len. Exchange on England has no, fallen IN New
York as much as the internal exchanges or stock
or real estate or house rent has fallen. Thus fac
seems decisive as Ia the cause. But can this de
pression continue Certainly not These rlgor
Gus measures are understood to be only prellnIn
ary, only preparations tor an expansion by IN
I banks OF New York, which is to restore ease an'
confidence. Well the moment this ease and con
tdencc return, all things will rise, aud exehang'
OF course amslg the number. Besides, TINS I'm
natural condition will work its own remedy, a
all irrcgul rites are cured by their own excuses
To sell every thing and buy nothing Is Impractl
cable, aud when the English have bought all tn
produce we have to spare, we must o. course ou
from them what manufactures they have 10 spare
As saon as the proceeds of our industry are roa
lized in England, while we have gradually exhan'
ted our supply of English goods, our ewn mel
chants will convert thar product, into fresh sur
ply to he brought over; or, ii this process be to
slow, the Eaglish manufacturers themselves wi
send their ow n goods for sale, In either case tn
exchange will recover It's equilibrium, and o. cours
will rise here, for, between two such ceuptries
America and England, permanent inequality
exchange, a. a basis of the metallic currency
either is Impossible,
V Percsivine nothing in The conduct OF III
Government To justify an early resumption 'e'
see IL there be anv thing in the state OF the cour
try which recon- mends 1t. Now what is the Gu
d,tien Of our AFFAIR."? The suspension toun
us with heavy deb, to the banks, no, less proh'
bly than five hundred millions, with large bslsr