The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-12-11

in returns, and embezzlements, by rendering them
peniientiary offences.
Honest diligence can never suffer by these
changes, while careessness In business and laxity
ofprinciple will be prevented, or exposed and pro-
pery rebuked.
Additional safeguards like these are also Of vital
importance In moral view, by more eheeiually
preventing as well as Furnishing wrong.
They are, therefore, earnestly urged again on the
consideration of Congress. Whether locking 10
further security or other important ends one OF the
most desirable alterations which Is incorporated into
the plan Of an Independent Treasury, provides that
any use Of the public money for private purposes be
hereafter considered illegal and punished as dan
gerous breach of trust. The experience OF the last
few years demonstrates the proprety OF such an or
ganic change in our system, whoever and whatever
may be the fiscal agents employed. The change, so
fara respects mere collecting and discussing Off
GERS, will have decisive tendency TO preserve not
only the Government but them and their securities,
from those losses which II was never contemplated
they should hazard, by making loans or speculaons
with funds held in sacred trust for purposes entirely
public In their character and constant In their de-
mands. Had such proposition been adopted early
In our legislation doubtless il would have prevented
most if not ALL of the losses heretofore sustained
from those classes of officers, and much wreiched-
which has beiallen both principals and suretieS.
Some Of the earliest acts OF Congress wisely pre-
vented officers OF the customs and Of The Treasury
Department from being concerned in commerce. or
dealing in the public lands public, stocks These
restrictions were doubtless introduced chiefly with
view TO remove the temptation and hazard incident
10 the possession of the public money. But the pro-
hiblion TO employ that money for private purposes,
under severe penalties has not yet been introduced,
except in substance in the Mint, by making embcz-
elements there punishable as felonies. lis expedi-
ency has been urged by the Department heretofore,
and seems confirmed BY experience as well as iheo-
~. The success Of such a provision in the Mint,
where losses from It's establishment 10 the present
moment, have for so many years, and after having
the custody OF many millions of money, been
known nj &
efficacy.
Finding that no new act on this and some similar
points was paSSad by Congress al its late session,
circular bearing on them, was issued by this De-
parment soon after the adjournment copy of which
is annexed
In regard TO deposite agents, heretofore consisting
chiefly Of banks, the change from former usages,
which would be introduced BY such a prohibition
would be greater But the present condition of the
Treasury and OF the country is highly suspicious for
the reform. Diminished as is the balance of the
public money now on hand and manifest as is the
policy Of the Government to keep It so hereafter,
the apparent pecuniary disadvantage caused either
to the banks 10 their customers would be slighter
than at any former period.
Ia the mean time, and under the specializing ma
mia ofthe age the alteration would yield most
valuable protection against the recurrence OF disas-
tTous adventures so far as stimulated by the more
easy loans OF such funds, through bank repositories
and against the consequent losses 10 the institutions
themselves, well as bankruptcies and misery 10 nu
merous individuals.
Above all other considerations in favor Of this
change, if we advert to sound views in political
economy, will be its influence in removing every
temptation to the dangerous disposition increase
taxes or revenue on account Of their incidental use
for assistance and capital in private enterprises. II
would also restore official practice TO the true theory
OF the CONSTITUTION which, in its primitive purity
must undoubtedly have intended that the public mo-
ney should be collected solely for public purposes,
and should BE- kept, not for the emoument of indi-
viduas corporations, but for the single object OF
meeting, with promptitude and fidelity, the obga-
tons OF the Government
Originally, the departure in practice from this the
DRY was not in any case, even in implied terms al
| lowed by Congress- II was permitted only by early
construction of the Treasury Department; and in
relation 10 Deposite Banks alone, for the benefit,
through them, OF the mercantile interest which con-
stituted their principal customers and owners. But
since the extinguishment of the national debt and
the accumulation of large balances in the Treasury
this departure has been expressly sanctioned by
Congress, in The deposte of and has tended
very undesignedly, without doubt TO place the Go
yernment in the invidious attitude of great money
lender of its current funds rather than Of surplus
| and that for the apparent benefit, not Of public bo
T % and Of
society Immediately connected with them. Besides
this, the public servants, however ScrupulouS, have
thus become exposed to tine grossest imputations Of
! favorsm, Partially and corruption, in making
these indirect loans. A radical change in the sys-
tenn, in this respect is, therefore, very desirable
4
| ployment of the public money, would render both
the possession and the SUPERINTENDENT of it, which
are now objects of just jealousy, but mere naked
powers, and, BY their great responsibility, DANCE
rous only TO their poSseSSors. They would become
entirely useless for either political influence or pr-
vate emolument, and could contribute nothing TO the
depraved appetite Of the age Tor power and specu-
| ation.
public money and purity Of character in its manage
ment, it must be manifest, from the remarks already
made and from the warning events Of the last two
years, that legislation should look not only to them
| But much further.
Recent occurrences have shown that the whole
treasure of the United States, when entrusted to
banks, is liable, in critical periods TO be sweep, at
| vernment.
The good faith of the Union may thus be sudden
| ~ placed in extreme jeopardy Indeed il will be
| fortunate If the accumulated ills Of broken public
credit throughout the land are not actually added
and not visited on the labor and pursuits of the
whole people 1t follows therefore though banking
institutions have never been regarded by the under
signed as class OF agents generally unsafe, when
looking to eventual losses and though TIE additional
securities and prohibitions before mentioned might
be Incorporated into system of banks, but with
less facility than into the plan of an Independent
Treasury that the great and widespread danger ex
| perenced OF late from the employment of banks as
fiscal repositories is which ought if possible TO
be avoided. Arising as il does from their liability
to general suspension of specie payments, the in
dividual officers who hold money on deposite are
exposed 10 no such calamity; and when the recent
suspension happened the specie in The possession of
many of them proved exceedingly seasonable and
useful in discharging The public obligations in the
manner imperaively required by law. Though an
apparent security against of the Notifying
baIrassments resulting from such general suSpen-
sion might be obtained by adopting system of spe-
cal deposites, yet in order to render such deposes
convenient in fiscal operations the banks must, as
heretofore explained, have 10 the funds, and
| be tempted in an emergency to use them. The