Staunton spectator, and general advertiser. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 183?-1849, 1838-05-03

last two pages ! have written. You may,
mol" outstanding, if you choose, give the let
Ter place in "The Fincastle Democrat
| Very respectfully, Yours&c.
~ ROBERT CRAIG.
To r. Cawthon.
WAsH1NGToN, April 10th, 1888.
SIR:-i was in too great hurry when
wrote you last ON the Sub-Treasury cues
tlon, to NIL up my design, by q great deal
IL was particularly my desire 10 have sub
mitted some remarks in regard TO Execu>
i've patronage, but had moi time then "a do
so. will now offer some.
J The opponents OF the measure of diyorcino
The Treasury from the Banking system en-,
deavor very naturally, 10 avail themselves O,
the prejudices of the people against Execu-
tive Patronage, which, they aver, will he
greatly increased by the adoption of The Sub
Treasury plan. / rejoice 10 see the people
jealous of the growth Of political power in
| every department OF the government; but
as any virtue run into extremes becomes a
vice, | should be extremely sorry TO know
that this jealousy had precluded the action of
their reason aud judgment upon this, or any
other subject. The Executive is regarded
as the most dangerous OF the three depart.
ments OF Government. A wise people there
lore, will ever deem il their duty 10 guard
with sleepless vigilance against the usurpa-
ton OF power, by the Executive But when
| The people are warned TO be thus careful TO
| prevent the entertainments of Executive
power, he is not better than an idiot in nm :
derstanding, who would draw the inference
that executive power was an enemy OF hu-
man liberty, and ought 10 be overthrow
1t IS power, without which there would be
no government, and power upon which.
consequently, the people are dependent for
their rights, civil, political and religious, as
much as upon the Legislative or Judiciary
Departments of government. We ought
not, then, 10 go broad cast against Executive
power, merely because il is Executive now
er, out we should enquire into the nature and
necessity OF The powers proposed TO be con>
ferred, and upon full and rational view of
all circumstances, determine whether thew
ough! 10 be conferred or not. ] have made
these remarks, not 10 emooih the way 10 an
apology for clothing the President with a
great increase ofpaironage, but to dispel pre- :
JUDGE, and give reason its fair scope. IL is
my decided opinion that the force OF Execu
tive Influence will he very much weakened
by the adoption ofthe Sub Treasury scheme.
And how will this effect be produced. In a
most obvious way. The Sub.Treasury
scheme will produce an antagonistic relation
between that portion OF the monetary system
welded by the Government and that por,ion
welded by the Banks: and 10 this state of
things, who does not see that The odds will
be a hundred told in favor of the Banks.
Au!horise the deposites of the public money
to be made in the Banks and you, a, once, o.
pen channel through which Executive in :
fiuence may reach thousands, when il could
never bave reached dozens, il the Treasury
had been divorced from all connection with
Banks. All who are interested in the Ranks
as oihcers and stockholders, will be more or
less, according to interest, subject to dIrec,
Executive Influence, SO long as such con
nectIon remains between them and the gov
eminent as puts it in The powor of the Exc
cutIve to bear upon their interests. Great
alarm is pretended. however, at the addition
al number of officers whose sppointmen, will
be made necessary by ,heSub- Treasury nlan
l Will ask any candid man whether Execu
tive Influence is less dangerous when exert.
Jed through President of State Bank
than " hen exer;ed through a receiver and
keeper ofibe public money? This usder-
take 10 say will be The answer. No. i,
will he more dangerous, because the influ-
ence stops with the receiver and keeper of
The public money, while il runs down from
the President OF the Bank through chain of
officers and an army Of stockholders. There
is no conductor for the pernicious fluid. ex-
tending from the receiver into The BODY of
the community. 1t is due that Should here
make another remark. From my obserya
lions, since have been in public life, there
IS less reason to apprehend mischief from the
patronage OF appointments, than the people
at large seem TO suppose. 1t is true i: ena
bles the President, sometimes, to make
friends, but such is the case, that, in making
one friend, he makes very frequently two or
more enemies. Ifihen there is poison in
the appointing power, il is more than neu.
tralized by an sniidote which is INSOFAR able
from it. could make good this position Nv
citing cases but this decline to do, because
1t would require the mention Of names.
IL is 10 the constitution that the people are
to look for their security against Executive
encroachmeots. Let them take care 10 pre-
serve unimpaired the guards here thrown a.
round their liberties, and they are SAFE. Ev.
cry thing necessary 10 enable the people 10
protect themselves is supplied by this ",he