The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1838-03-06

Il
Most certainly not. In this ~ b. tha csse IN ,ha ~.
sldent, the responsibility, the power and inluence
| Of the officer would be increased.
Such the view be was compelled 10 tale a. N.
charge Of Executive patronage made aeuins he 6nsn-
cia system proposed by the bill in ia present form
but the imaginalions Of had carried them bevood
the present propositions and induced them 10 fear that
this was the mere commencement the entering wedge
10 multiplication Of Executive officers until they
should the whole land. like the locuss Of Egypt,
and eat out the substance Of the people. Where was
the foundation for this apprehension! With whom
rested the power Of increasing officers at any characteri
Not certainly, with the Executive. He can act in
ecing men for office, when the Offices are created by
Congress, and, with certain exceptions, he
menirom Office, athis pleasures but he create no Of
nee, nor can he multiply the number Of officers, OF any
grade or character This, them is not objection
against the Executive but against the legislative power
OF The Government II Is an objection which implies
dlstrus not OF the President, but Of ourselves. Aud
afraid ourselves in this matter OF DO we
stand in much fear Of those who may succeed Us in
these seats that we would rather commit the finances
Of the country TO incorporated banks, than the pre-
sent or future representatives OF the people and the
Statesl
But how stands the objection OF Executive patronage,
as applied TO the State bank deposite systeml The
first step 10 this system is the selection Of some twenty,
thirty, more banks, to do which the direct interest Of
sl their officers directors and stockholders, must be
addressed, and when selected the interest
listed 10 whatever contract may he made. Here is at
once, army Of persons brought within the reach
of Executive power, not like the salary officer upon
stipulated compensatons, but whose interests
wholly dependent upon the Of the patronage be-
stowednpon the amount Of money entrusted their
charge. Then up the competitions aud appliances
10 obtain selection, and the inducemert TO vicious
Executive to excite hopes and create expectations,
throughout the whole ue Of banking institutions in all
the States, But the selections are made, the money
deposited and passed 10 the citizens among the other
accommodations Of the favored banks This creates
another influence far more extended and earful--the
influence OF the debtors OF the selected banks for when
appropriations are made by law, the Executive ofecrs
those who charged win the execution Of the law
must direct the drafts which are to bring the money
from the banks to meet them. Let any unprecedented
mind compare the influences here embodied with the
Executive patronage conferred by the bill under discus
son and the decision be n favor Of the bank sys
ten, IN this respect!
But there is another view OF this matter. He had
shown that under the system proposed by the BILL the
Executive could not reach the money in the hands Of
the depositary without subjectlng both to condign
punishment. How is il here Suppose the Executive
corrupt and the bank willing TO be corrupted, or the re-
verse aud what To hinder his obtaining any amount
of the public money he peasesl He takes 1t not as
the money Of the people, but as the money Of the bank.
II is not in form, loan from the public money de-
posite but accommodation in the usual course of
banking business: and still, before the deposng Off
shall have left the counter OF the institution the
Executive may take the money he depositcs and no
other executive officer Of the Government, may do the
same thing, with equal impuniy.
Has the system provided for by the bill, then, any
thing 10 fear from comparison with that OF the State
bank deposite system, as to the dangers OF an IN
crease of Executive patronage! lie could not so
suppose.
Fourth He would now institute short comparison
Of what he thought would be the relative effects Of the
systems upon the State banking institutions them
selves
IL, tho Hi aYu
operate as check upon the issues and expansions OF
those institutions in either shape in which 1t had been
proposed pass it. If the notes Of the banks continue
to be received in payment Of the public dues. and the
depostares directed, in that case they unques-
tonably should be- TO call frequently and at short inter-
vals the balances against the banks and 10 demand
specie for those balances ths must operate as power
fu check upon all the banks in the vicinity OF those
depositares where the collections are large. IT. Oh the
other hand the receipt Of the bank be gradually
discontinued the collection Of the and spe
Gle collections Submitted, while the change will create
demand upon the hanks for specie, the disburse
ments Of specie by the Government VIII constantly dis
tribute among the people broader aud more perma-
nent basis for the paper circulation, which the banks
WILL Of continue, growing out OF their private
operations. That the demand for specie may, to some
extent diminish the profits Of banking, is more than
probable but if the effect shall be restrain tho issues
OF the banks keep upon them constant OF the
necessity Of more specie capital meet their liabilities
the operation, past experience abnndanty proves
will be greatly beneficial to the community, and will
work rather benefit than INJURY to the institutions
themselves In the mean time the disbursement, by
the Government, Of the specie it receives, cannot fail
not only TO give stability and confidence, TO some
tent least the general currency, by continuing in
active circulation portions Of the gold and silver
upon which the whole is based but must to the extent
OF the circulation have tendency to strengthen tho
banks against sudden pressures aud uniounded dis
trusts by enabling thc the more easily TO arm them
selves with coin. ..
What are the tendencies Of the opposite system upon
the banking institutions! Recent experience has an
swered this inquiry forcibly than 1t was in his
power to command language TO answer it, The effect
promote fearful expansions when large amounts
Of public money placed upon deposte, and ruinous
coniracons when the necessities the policy Of tho
Government required its payment The effect was to
stimulate dangerous not the banks onybut
their customers also when money was abundant In the
Treasury and add to the pressure by heavy calls from
the Treasury, when there was scarcity In short, the
effect of the latter system upon the banks had proved,
upon trial to be unmixed evil, while the influences OF
the former promised TO be rather favorable than una-
vorable!
Fiah. The next and most important comparison be-
tween the two systems the influence OF each upon
the Government Of the country and It's finances. The
proposed system would place the money of the Govern
ment oil times within the power and control Of the
Government Il would enable the Government, at all
times to pay its debts in currency not deprecated,
currency equal to the standard OF the Constitution and
the law Ii would render the Government financially
independent, and maintain IT in that position Under
such system we should more hear, what we we're
now daily hearing in this hail. that honest citizens bad
been drranded by being paid their demands against
Treasury in bank paper, which was deprecated, or
worthless and that Congress ought 10 indemnify them
for their losses thus occasoncd. These were some OF
the benefits certain to be derived to the Government
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