The Hillsborough recorder. [volume] (Hillsborough, N.C.) 1820-1879, 1837-10-20

4
70 the government; . solvent and able
debtor. whose credit held BY the banks in
the shape Of stock. was Al par. II wss
their excessive issues 10 The government
on lis stock, which mainly caused the
suspension; 10 proof Of which, II is a re-
markable fact, thal the depreciation Of
bank paper under gold and silver was a.
bnut equal 10 the proportion which the
government slock held by the banks bore
10 their issues. In was this excess that
hung On the market aud depressed the
value Of their n0Ies. The solulinn j. ea-
sy. The banks took the government
stock payable in twelve years. and issued
their notes for the same. payable on de-
mand, in violation Of the plainesI princI-
| pies Of banking. II followed Of course.
that when their notes were presented for
payment. they had nothing but govern
ment stock 10 meet them. But lie stock
was al par, and all the banks had 10 do
was TO go into market with The stock they
held, aud take up their notes. and thus
the excess which hung upon the market
and depressed their value. would have
been withdrawn IRON circulation, and the
residue would have risen 10 par. or nearly
par with gold and silver. when specie
payments might be easily resumed. This
| they were unwilling to do. They were
proiung every way; BY drawing interest
on the stock; BY discounling on il a. ca
pltal. and BY It's continued rise in the
market. IL became necessary 10 compel
them I'd surrender these advantages. Two
methods presented themselves; one a
bankrup, law, and the other National
Bank. was opposed 10 the former,
then, as | am now. ] regarded il as a
harsh unconstitutional messure-oppos-
ed 10 the rights 1t HE states. II they
have moi surrendered The rights to incoT-
pOraie banks. as is conceded. iIs exercise
cannn, he controlled by the action III this
government, which has no power, but
what Is expressly granted, and no aulho-
titv ~ control the states IN the exercise
of their reserved powers. IL remained
IL resort to National Bans, as the
means af comPulsion. II proved efIectu-
al. Specie paymepIs were TesIo'ed. but
even with this striking advantage. il was
followed by great pressure in 1918. 10
and 30. as all who are old enough 10 re-
member that prrind must recolirc,. Such
IN fact, must ever be the const qaenre 0f
resumption. whcG forced under Ihr most
favorable circumstances; and such accord
ugly il proved even IN England With all
her resources, ard with all the caution
she used IN restoring specie circulation,
a'rer the lnng suspension of 1897. What
then, would be lis effects in The present
condition ii the country, when the 90.
verninent Is a creditor, instead Of a debt.
NJ, where there are so maay newl Gle
ste1 banks without established credit;
when the over issues are 81 great; and
when :" large a portion Of The debtors
are not in a condition TO be c0prcPd! A.
great as IS the tide If disaster winch -
passing we the land, II wrJd he IS no.
thing To what would tn,iow were a Ma
i
means of r'ercing .Yvrie pay rnfotS.
am bpund tn socak witto,t reserve
nm this lmpor,ans pHl'. NJ opinion
then Is that, II il Should 1e d-t, mined To
compel thr resio'au,n ot specie pay
nenls by The agency Of banks, there is
but nne VA, but To ,hai haze insupera-
bic "hjertlnns: mean tie ad'p;Ion Of
the PennsyIvauia Bank "f the u. States
as the fiscal agent Of the government. II
il already in operation, and sustained by
great resources and powerful connexions,
both at home and abruad. Through its
agency specie pavment, might undouhl-
edly be restored. and that with lar less
disaster than through a newly created
bank; but not without severe pressure.
| cannot, however. vote for such a mea-
sure: cannot agree to give preference,
and such advantages TO bank Of one Of
the members of this confeieracy, over
| that of others-a bank dcpenden. upon
the will of a state, aud subject TO its in
fuence and control. cannot consent To
confer such favors on the stockholders.
many of whom. If rumour is to be trust
ed. are foreign capitalists, and without
claim on the bounty Of the government.
But if all these, and many other "hjec-
tons were overcome, there is still one
which cannot surmount.
There has been, as we all know. a
conflict between one Of the departments
of the government. and that institution, in
which, in my opinion. the department,
was the assailant bu, | cannot consent,
after wha. has occurred, to give 10 The
bank triumph over the government. for
such its adoption as the fiscal agent Of the
government would necessarily be consi-
dered. Il would degrade the:government
in the eyes of our citizens and OF the
world, and go far to make that bank the