Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1837-09-11

posie and distribution Of the revenue. Of all
times partially, and, on three different occa.
sons exclusively; first, anterior 10 the estab
lIshment Of The frat Bank OF the United States
secondly, in the interval between the termina
ton Of that institution and the charter of its
successor; and, thirdly, during the limited nc.
rod which has now 50 abruptly closed The
connection thus repeatedly attempted, proved
unsatisfactory on each successive occasion.
Notwithstanding the various measures which
were adopted 10 facilitate or insure its success
Cn the last occasion, in the year 1888, the en-
pioyment OF the State banks wa g guarded cs-
pcclalIy, IN every way which experience and
caution could suggest Personal security was
required Tor the safe keeping and prompt pay
mcnt oi me moneys TO be received, and iull re-
turns of thea condition were from timo IN
time, TO be made by the repositories. In The
first stages The measure was cminently success.
tul, notwithstanding the violent opposition of
the Bank Of the United States, and the unoeas
ing efforts made to overthrow il. The select
ed banks performed with fidelity, and without
any embarrassment to themselves or 10 tho
community, their engagements 10 the Govern
ment, and The system promised to be perma.
nontly useful. But when It became necessary,
under the act Of June, 1885, to withdraw from
them the public money, for the purpose OF pla.
cling tin additional Institutions or of Trans
iesrng it TO the STATES, they found it inconyo.
nient 10 comply with the demands of the Trcu-
sury, and numerous pressing applications wcre
made for Indulgence or relief. As the install.
mcnts under the Opposite law became payable,
their own embarrassments, and the necessity
under which they lay OF curaling their dis
counts and calling in their debts, increased the
general distress, aud contributed with other
causes, TO hasten the rcvulsion in which, at
length, they in common with the other banks,
were fatally involved.
Under these circumstances, il become our
solemn duty 10 inquire whether there are NOT,
IN any connection between the Government
aud banks of issue, evils of great magnitude,
Inherent in its very nature, and against which
no precautions can effectually guard.
| Unforeseen in the organization of the Gov
eminent, and forced on the Treasury by early
necessities, the Practice of employing banks,
was, in truth, from the beginning, more a
measure Of emergency than Of sound policy.
When we started into existence as nation, in
additonto the burdens OF the new govern.
ment, we assumed all the large but honorable
load of debt which was the price OF our ber.
ty but we hesiiated 10 weigh down the infant
industry of the country by resorting to ade-
qua,c taxation for the necessary revenue The
facilities Of banks, in return for the privileges
they acquired, were promptly offered, and per-
haps too readily received, by an embarrassed
Treasury. During the long continuance of a
national debt, and the me .vening difficulties
OF foreign war, the connection was continu.
ed from motives Of convenience but these
causes have long since passed away. We have
no emergencies that make banks necessary TO
aid the wants Of The Treasury; we have no
| load oc national debt 10 provide for, and we
have on actual deposit a large surplus. No
public interest, therefore, now requires the re-
newal Of connection that circumstances have
dissolved. .Tie cop1plete organization OF our
Go ernmept, the abundance Of our resources,
the gtucrai harmony which prevails between
the different states, and with foreign Powers,
u all enable us now TO select the system most
consistent with the Constitution, and most con-
ductive to the public welfare. Should we then,
connect the Treasury, for fourth time, with
the local banks, it can only be under a convc.
lion that past failures have arisen from accden.
tai, not inherent defects.
I A danger difficult, if not impossible to be a
voidcd in such an arrangement, is made stri-
kingy evident in the very event by which it
has now been defeated. A sudden act of the
banks entrusted with the funds Of the people,
deprvcs the Treasury, without fault or agency
Of the government Of the ability TO pay its cred
itors in the currency they have by law right
10 demand. This circumstance no huctuaion
If commerce could have produced, if the public
revenue had been collected in LEGAL currency,
and kept in that form by the officers of the
treasury. The citizen whose money was in
I bank receives it back, since the suspension, at
a sacrifice in its amount; whilst he who kept
il in the legal currency of the country, and in
his own possession, pursues, without loss, the
current his business. The government plu-
ced in the situation of the former, is involved
in embarrassments it could not have suffered
had it pursued the course of the latter. These
embarrussments are, moreover, augmented by
those salutary ard Just laws which forbid il TO
use deprecated currency, and, by so doing,
take from the government the ability which in
! dvidnals have of accommodating their trans
f actions to such catastrophe.
A system which can, in time Of profound
peace, when there is a large revenue laid by,
thus suddenly prevent the application and use
OF the money Of the people, in the manner and
for the objects they have directed, cannot be
wise: but who can think, without painful re-
Election, that under il, the same unforeseen c.
vents might have beiallen rs in the midst OF a
war, and taken from us, at the moment when
most wanted, the use Of those very moneys
which were treasured up 10 promote the ma
tiona welfare and guard our national rights
To such embarrassment and TO such dangers
will this government be always exposed, whilst
, il takes the moneys raised for, and necessary
TO- the public service, out Of the hands OF lis
> own officers, and converts them into q mere
right Of action against corporations entrusted
with the possession of them Nor can such
results be efiectualy guarded against in such
system, without investing the Executive with
control over the banks themselves, whether
D State or National, that might be objected to-
Ours is, probably, the only Government in the
world that is liable, in the management OF lis
, fiscal concerns, TO occurrences like these Bat
this imminent risk is not the only danger at
T., iendant on the surrender Of the public money
. TO the custody s. control Of local corporations.
/ Though the object is aid 10 the Treasury, it1
effect may be to introduce into the operations