The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-11-14
TO MARTIN VAN buren,,
or rms vxIrED srArEI
LETTER II.

LETTER II.
In INV iasi communication, l remarked, that II was
through the article in the Gob. which quoted, that
was for the hrsi time appraised that the Secretary
of the Treasury ever entertained the opinion that,
he iatereas rAicA Represented icerc aafag onia 10
he~ Of tie Treasury Department As represented
the interests ftbe Depose Banks in part therefore
il must have been their Interests which the an
tagonist interests 10 those Of the Treasury.
As the Globe made reference 20 the testimony Of
its editor, given before the Wise committee
(the committee Of which Mr. Garland was ehairman)
have turned 10 that for the Tsi time ever il,
and find the following as part Of the answer which
he gave 10 the FIRST interrogaory propOunded 70 him
by The committee. Mr., Blair stalled
What the precise character Of the agents (my)
business was, the witness (himself) was never in
formed in detail but understood generally that il
was 10 superniend their Interests as the DePosiie
banks. The witness, on some occasion, in CONVEX
sation with the Secretary, was desired by him TO
bear in mind thai those Interests were not always
urged by the managers Of the banks in such wise
as 10 be compatible with that Of the public, and he
therefore, guarded against the agent as one who
might be representing an adversary Interest 10
" thai Of the public
That such feeling should have been entertained,
is 10 me- and for how long time il has existed
know not andiha neither the banks which repre-
senled, nor myself should never have been appris-
ed of IT, does truly surprise me and that the editor
of the Globe should have been guarded against
the agent that he might be upon the WATCH and
"scraaiHiSe tie desgns" Of that agent" (myself) is
+
II would seem be contradiction Of all the priE-
ciples which characterize the intercourse which
must naturally subsist between principal and agent,
that such could have been the fact. An antagonist
interest Of the agent TO thai of the principal must
inevitably lead 10 a speedy dissolution Of the
connexion. Such an interest as as il was
discovered that il existed, would forbid longer
continuance of il ON the part OF the principal
Whether or not, while have been acting for some
of the deposite banks, have been representing
adversary interea 10 that Of ne pnbiic," that public
has a right 10 know. The Banks, too, have a
deep interest in knowing, whether ] have been
faithful, and have acted with fidelity towards them,
or have been guilty Of so representing cir Interests
TO make them appear adversary 10 h1t 81 TIE Pat-
he cannot but view il in the light OF serious al
legation against me- which am bound by every OBJ
legation OF duiy and principle TO sindicate myself
from, al the earliest moment il came TO my know
ledge.
There are additional considerations which unite
with the foregoing 10 impel me to the undertaking,
in discharge of what consider an obligation Of
duty
The employment Of State Banks as the fiscal
agents of the Federal Government, and the suspen-
sion Of specie payments BY those banks while act
ing, are both circumstances, destined 10 occupy
conspicuous place in the future history Of this
try, All thai is Immediately connected with those
two events therefore, belongs TO the country and in
my opinion every individual having in his posses
sion facts calculated TO reflect new lights coors
upon one or both those circumstances would be doing
wrong BY Withholding them ".t. r 81
that General Jackson took on himself alone the Ere
sponsibility' of the removal of the deposiies from
the Bank OF the United Staes,' and the employment
of State Banks as repositories Of the public funds
that he declared the measure 10 be his and that
it an Experiment." General Jackson's repu-
taiion was Saked on the success failure of that
measure .... ...,.. E...
II was under these circumstances that the early
selected banks entered into agreements with the Go
yernment TO become its fiscal agents With them it
was no less an experiment, than il was with the Go
vernment. The whole interests Of the pToprietors
of each Of those banks together with the Tepu-
tation Of those TO whom they had entrusted their
management were also staked on the success fail
ure of their undertaking. They and the Govern
ment had one, and but one, and that was common
cause could not in the very nature be- that an an
tagonia interest could have existed. If there had
existed such an interest with the banks against that
OF the public it would seem hardly possible that it
should not have operated have marred the
full operation OF the measure to such an extent in the
course Of four years, TO have become visible 10
those who were the sentinels on the tower watching
and guarding il. No such discovery appears ever
TO have been made. None such was ever ann ounced
But, year after year, testimonials in duplicate,
issued from high places, of the most complimentary
and fattering character both the complete sue
cess which had attended the measure, which was
longer looked upon as an " experiment; !" and to the
ability zeal and fidelity which the banks had mani
tested in all things connected with the agency which
they had embarked in.
But few short months after the last of these esti-
monias was laid before the American people,
tastrophe befe not only the Banks employed by the
Government, but all the banks in the Republic All
were involved in one common fate. The notes which
were but little time before sung so loudly to the
praise of the DeposIte Banks were now on the sud
den instant, changed TO tones of loud and bitter
condemnation They were stigmatised with every
base epithet, furnished in the vocabulary degrade
them, and those connected with them in the ewes Of
the world The evils which the catastrophe caused
were upon the land. The banks were charged with
producing them. Few stopped 10 inquire whether
justly or wrongfnlly. A popular clamor was raised
against them Enough were found 10 add fuel 10 the
fame to keep it burning. Few TO quench it.
My part of the history Of the Deposite Bank sys-
tenn, will now commence.
The views which entertained in relation to the
principles upon which that system ought TO be con-
Quoted, TO secure its pernanence and usefulness TO
the country, will be fully made manifest as pro-
gress. How far the interests ] represented, or the
mode and manner in which represented them, were
antagonist to those ofthe public, will be made equally
manifest.
The deep stake which those banks, first selected,
had involved, caused il 10 be antagonist" To their
wishes and interests, that the number of banks en-
poyed should be augmented beyond the actual neces-
sites for the fiscal convenience Of The Government
They had deep interest too, that no bank should be
newly selected arr added to their number and there
by add to the responsibility Of their undertaking. the
condition Of which was not so perfectly good and
sound as in no way to endanger the success Of the
measure.
Under these circumstances it became part of my
duty TO watch and protect the interests Of my employ
ers in these particular points.
The first occasion, that presented, wherein felt
called on in the discharge Of my duty to my consti-
tuents to express any thing like remonstrance
against contemplated addition 10 the number ofthe
Opposite Banks then employed, was soon after the
close of Congress, in March, 1885 On the gid day
Of that month addressed letter to the Secretary OF
the Treasury, from which make the following cx-
tracts ..#t
:" Acting as do, in the capacity Of agent of many
of the DepoSite Banks IL may be proper, previous to
my entering upon the subject which led to this com
munication, for 10 state That while thus acting
as agent, il know myself, could not be induced
from that consideration 10 recommend or adynraie