Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1837-09-15

gree promoted by the possession OF any pat
ronage not actually necessary 10 the per
formance of those duties But, under our
present form Of government, the interven-
ltion of the executive officers in the custody
and disbursement Of the public money seems
to be unavoidable; and, before il can be nd
mitled that the influence and power OF the
4 Executive would be increased by dispensing
with the agency OF banks, the nature Of that
intervention in such. an agency must be care
fully regarded, and comparison must be
instituted between its extent in the two
cases.
i The revenue can only be collected by Of
fcers appointed by the President, with the
advice and consent Of the Senate. The pub
lie moneys, in the first instance must, there
fore, in all cases, pass through hands Sc
lected by the Executive. Other officers,
appointed in the same way, or, as IN some
cases. by the President alone, must also be
intrusted with them, when drawn, for the
purpose OF disbursement II is thus seen,
that even when banks are employed, the
public funds must twice pass through the
hands of executive officers. Besides this,
the head Of the Treasury Department, who
also holds office at the pleasure OF the Presi-
dent, and some other officers Of the same
department, must necessarily be invested
with more OF less power in the selection,
continuance, and supervision Of the banks
that may be employed The question is
then narrowed TO the single point, whether
in the intermediate stage between the collec-
ton and disbursement of the public money.
the agency Of hanks is necessary to avoid
dangerous extension of the patronage and
influence of the Executive2 But is ii clear
tina, the connexon of the Executive with
powerful moneyed institutions, capable Of
ministsring to the interests Of men. in points
where they are most accessible to corrup-
ton. is less liable to abuse than his constitu-
tional agency in the appointment and con-
troll of the few public officers required by
the proposed plant Will the public mon
ey. when in their hands, be necessarily ex-
posed to any improper interference on the
part of the Executive2 May it not be hop
ed that prudent fear Of public jealousy
and disapprobation, in a matter so peculiar
ly exposed to them, will deter him from any
such interference, even If higher motives
be found inoperatve7 May not Congress
SO regulate, by law. the duty Of those Off
GERS. and subject il TO such supervisors and
publicity, as to prevent the possibility Of any
serious abuse on the part Of the Executive2
And is there equal room for such supervis-
ion and publicity, in a connexion with banks,
acting under the shield Of corporate immu-
mites. and conducted by persons irIesponsi-
BILE to the Government and the peope2 Ii
is believed that considerate and candid in
vestgation Of these questions will result in
tlas.- sh.tt <Io f,r
less liable 10 objection, on the score Of Elk
ecutive patronage and control, than any
bank agency that has been or can be de-
vised.
With these views. leave to Congress the
measures necessary to regulate, in the pres
ent emergency, the safe.keeping and trans
fer of the public moneys. In the perform
ance of constitutional duty, have stated to
them, without reserve, the result of my own
reflections. The subject is OF great import
ance, aud one Of which we can scarcely ex-
pect TO be as united in sentiment as we are
in interest. 1t deserves full and free dis
cussion, and cannot fail to be benefited by a
dispassionate comparison ofopinions Well
aware myself Of the duty of reciprocal con-
cession among the coordinate branches Of
the Government | can promise reasonable
spirit Of cooperation so far as il can be in
dulged in without the surrender OF constitu-
tional objections which | believe to be well
founded. Any system that may be adopted,
should be subjected to the fullest legal pro-
vision, so as to leave nothing TO the Execu-
tive but what is necessary 10 the discharge
of the duties imposed on him. and, what
ever plan may be ultimately established, my
own part shall be so discharged as to give
to it fair trial and the best prospect Of
success.
The character of the funds to be received
and discussed in the transactions OF the
Government, likewise demands your most
careful consideration.
There can be no doubt that those who
framed and adopted the constitution having
in immediate view the deprecated paper Of
the oonfederacy--of which FIVE hundred dol
lars in paper were, at times, only equal 10
one dollar in Communicated TO prevent the
recurrence of similar evils so far, at least, as
related TO the transactions Of the new Gov
eminent. They gave TO Congress express
powers TO coin money and to regulate the
value thereof and of foreign coin; they re-
fuse TO give it power to establish corpora
tions-the agents then, as now, chiefly en-
ployed to create a paper currency; they
prohibited the States from making any thing
but gold and silver legal tender in pay
ment of debts; and the first Congress d.
rected, by positive law, that the revenue
should be received in nothing but gold and
silver
Public exigency at the outset of the Gov
=. A 4