Herald of the times. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1830-1846, 1837-09-21

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+ To The hoo Houses Of Congress at The con.
mencemem ofihe ertra session Of the Itcenty
i .6M Congress.
Ftliow Citizens Of Me Senate
and House Of Representatives
II lCONCLUDED FROM OUR LAST.
/ The power and influence supposed to bt
connected with the custody and disbursement
Of public money, are topics on which the
public mind is naturally, and with great pro
priety, peculiarly sensitive. Much has been
said on them, in reference to the proposed
separation ofthc Government from the bank
ing institutions; and surely no one can Oh
jet to any appeals or animadversions OIL the
subject, which are consistent with facts, and
evlnce proper respect for the intelligence
of the people. If Chiet Magistrate may be
allowed TO speak for himself, on such point
] can tinly say, that to me nothing would be
more acceptable, than the withdrawal from,
the Executive,to the greatest practical extent,
OF all concern in the custody and disburse-
ment OF the public revenue not that would
shrink from any responsibility cast upon me
by the duties Of my office, but because it is
my firm belief,that its capacity for usefulness
Is IN no degree promoted by the possession
the performance Of those duties. But under
our present form of Government, the inter-
vcntion of the Executive officers in the Gus.
tody and disbursement of the public money
seems to be unavoidable /; and before it can
be admitted that the influence and power of
the Executive would be increased by dispen.
sing with the agency Of banks, the nature Of
that intervention in such an agency must be
n filI IoI h,,
instituted between its extent in the two ca
ses
The revenue can only be collected by Off
GERS appointed by the President with the all
vice and consent of the Senate. The public
moneys, in the first instance, must, therefore,
in all cases, pass through hands selected by
the Executive. Other officers appointed in
the same way, or, as in some cases, by the
President alone, must also be entrusted with
them when drawn for the purpose Of disburse-
ment. 1t Is thus seen that, even when banks
are employed, the public fund must twice
pass through the hands Of Executive officers
Besides this, the head of the Treasury De-
partment, who also holds his office at the
pleasure Of the President, and some other Of
ficers of the same department, must necessa.
rlly be invested with more or less power in
",
OF the banks that may be employed. The
question is then narrowed to the single point,
whether in the intermediate stage between
the collection and disbursement of the public
money, the agency Of banks is necessary to
avoid dangerous extension of the patronage
and influence of the Executive? But is it
clear that the connection Of Executive, with
powerful moneyed institutions capable ofmin-
th.. ..,ta g t.
where they are most accessible TO corruption,
Is less liable to abuse, than his constitutional
agency in the appointment and control Of the
few public officers required by the proposed
plan? Will the public money, when IN their
hands, be necessarily exposed to any improp-
er interference on the part o! the Executives?
May it not be hoped that prudent fear of
public jealousy and disnpprobation, in mat
ter SO peculiarly exposed to them, will deter
him from any such interference, even if the
higher motives be found imperative? May
not Congress so regulate, by law, the duty of
thosc officers, and subject it to such supervis-
ion and publicity, as to prevent the possibil-
ty OF any serious abuse on the part of the Ex-
ecutive? and is there equal room for such
perversion and publicity in connection with
banks, acting under the shield of corporate
and conducted by persons ire
sponsible to the Government and the people?
1t is believed that considerate and candid in
yest:gation Of these questions will result in
the conviction, that the proposed plan is far
less liable to objection, on the score Of Ex-
eeutive patronage and control, than any bank
agency that has been, or can be devised
With these views, leave to Congress the
measures necessary to regulate, in the pres
mt G., Il e.,
)f the public moneys. In the performance of
constitutional duty, have stated to them
without reserve, the result Of my own reiec-
ions. The subject is off great importance
md one in which we can scarcely expect to
be as united in sentiment as we are in inter-
est. 1t deserves full and free discussion,
md cannot fail to be benefited by dspas-
'ionate comparison Of opinions. We'll aware
myself ofthe duty of reciprocal concession a
nong the coordinate branches Of the Gov
can promise a reasonable spirit of
so far as it can be INDUCED in
without the surrender of constitutional OBJ
ections, which ] believe to be well founded.
Any system that may be adopted should be
ubjcctcd to the fullest legal provision, so as
o leave nothing to tho Executive but what is
necessary to the discharge Of the duties i'm
'osed on him; and whatever may be ultimate
y established, my own part shall be so die
horged as TO give to it fair trial, and the
est prospect of success.
The ckaractcr Of the funds to be received
nd disbursed in the transactions Of the Gov
-nment, likewise demands your most care
ll consideration. IN
There can he no doubt thu. those who
ramed and adopted the Constitution, having
D immediate view the deprecated paper of
nc Confederacy-o of which FIVE hundred dol.
hrs in paper were, at times, only equal to
nc dollar in coin-intcnded to prevent the
occurrence of similar evils, so far at least MS