The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-10-07


nistraton deemed the State Banks competent 10 per-
form all the duties TO the government and 10 the
country which the Bank OF the United States
had performed For my own part never believed
they could perform those duties, in all respects,
Well, They lacked the capital and the concert of
action necessary to render them equal 10 an nslitu
ton which had its branches at all the great business
and commercial points OF the country and which,
BY one common interest and By one common impulse,
could operate successfully, and with more Ia
ciliiy, than the State Banks could do, with less
means, and with less concert But conceived there
were other objections to that bank, which more than
counlerbalanced any supposed advantages which II
possessed over the State Institutions. BE that, how
ever, as il may, they were put forward by The Admi-
niStration as the only practicable substitute for a
Bank of the United States. After the Deposies We're
removed from that Institution they placed with
the State Banks, which entered into an arrangement
with the Government 10 perform all the duties which
had been required Of and had been performed by,
the Bank OF the United States. They entered upon
those duies-they performed them 10 the entire salts
faction Of the President and the Secretary of the
Treasury. The annual Messages of the one and
the annual Reports OF the other bear ample teSiimo
ny TO their competency and fidelity. For three sue
cessive years was the whole nation congratulated on
the entire success OF this experiment upon the IL
naDces Of the Government and the currency OF the
country. Nay, the people were congratulated upon
the better currency which had been introduced,
and upon the reduction of the domestic exchanges
from end of the Union to the other by reason OF
The superior advantages and the wiser management
of the State Banks, 10 which these duties had been
entrusted. Ii such were the results of the expert
menl with the State Banks, why are we now asked
10 abandon them, and 10 try the "untried expedient
of the Sub Treasury schcmel Why are we asked
10 acopt measure which we declared, when il was
formerly presented was AN effort 10 enlarge Exc
cuye power and put in his hands the means of cor
rupton2 2" Why are we asked 10 substitute il for a
system which the Secretary OF the Treasury, at that
time, declared was much superior TO individual
agents of the United StatesF"
The answer to all this is that the experiment has
failed. Does the failure of the experiment remove
the objections which were so strongly urged against
the scheme which we are now called upon to adopt
Does it make that scheme less diSorganizing less
" revolutionary" Does il render the public trea-
sure more safe and less liable to be "plnndered -
Does il cease to g enlarge executive power" and
does take from 60 its hands the means of eorrup-
,tion" No. sir, it does no such thing These OBJ
iections stand in full force against it, They cannot,
in the nature of things, be removed from il. Then
why insist its adoptionl These objections forbid
it, even If the experiment of the State banks had
failed. But il has not failed 1t has never been
fairly tried The pecuniary pressure and embar-
rtssment, which have been felt throughout the Unit
ed States are without parallel in the history OF
Government. Every class in the community, but
especially the mercantile class, has suffered
from the great arrangement Of the monetary con-
Germs of the country This arrangement has not
been confined to It has pervaded Great Britain,
d
Europe Intimately connected as England and the
United States are in their commercial relations, any
cause which materially affects the cannot fail
in some sort 10 affect the other. 1t is not my inten-
ton on this OCCASION trace the causes of the pc
cuniary embarrassment which has pervadcd both
countries Inend merely to advert TO some of the
more immediate, and which might, perhaps, be
termed secondary causes, so far as they have bear
ing upon the alleged failure of the experiment of
the State Banks Whilst agree with the President
in some of the causes assigned by him. do not think
he has taken as comprehensive and enlarged view
of them further examination and reflection would
have enabled him to do But, enough has been said
10 show that the banks could no longer hold out
against the pressure which was made upon them,
from whatever causes it may have originated. Pub
lie confidence had become impaired. Confidence,
the very basis of bank credit well as commercial
credit, was taken from them. The suspension OF
specie payments the inevitable consequence II
without fault on their part. | know they have
been charged from high source with treachery
and bid faith towards the Government and the peo-
pie. Sir | regret, more on account of the source
from whence such charge comes, than for any
other reason, that il should have been made against
them II must have been made from miSconception
or Misrepresentation, and not from real knowledge
of Their situation, or of the causes which led to the
catastrophe so much deplored. Sir, there was no
proper effort on the part of those who could have
done most towards it, to maintain the confidence of
the community in them. On the contrary, every
thing vas done to impairit No sooner had the war
anllnS the baHk Ol lne 0llllfu otdcs CSdSeu,
war more violent and more unreenting was waged
agains the State institutions. Every means was EN-
ployed to impair public confidence. They were de-
nounccd in our Legislative halls and by the public
press. They were denounced at public meetings by
those who advocated exclusive metallic curren-
CIV The Jacobinical terms of Rag BaronS" and
"'rag money" were familiarly introduced into our
higheS legislative assemblies, and adopted by our
highes; political journals. The dwelling resolutions
of wand and town meetings were responded to by
i, irh eth W thprpbV g.
sentns to- and encouraging the anti-bank as well
as antl-Socal doctrines put forth on such occasions
To ctp the climax, the "Specie circular" was issued
by tn, Executive directing that gold and silver
should be received in payment for public lands, in
stead IF the notes of specie paying banks, auho
rised by the Joint resolution of 1916 BY this act
the part of the Executive, the confidence Of the Gov
eminent was withdrawn from the banks, and was
signal to the people to withdraw theirs also II can
moi be expected that the community shall maintain
its confidence in any institutions when the conf
dence of the Government is once Withdrawn.
The manner in which the specie circular was is
sued was another item in the want of confidence
which prevailed through the country. twas issued
BY the Executive after decided expression of, one
branch of Congress against the proprety of its adop-
ton The proposition was introduced by the Sena-
tor from Missouri (Nlr. Benon) in the shape of a
resolution in April of the session of 1896, and was
rejected by an almost unanimous vote II was again
brought forward the latter part Of June, near the
close of the session, in the shape of an amendment
to some public bill, and was again rejected, and with
the same unanimity. Such was the opinion of the
Senate ut that time on this measure, and such was
lis decision twice distinctly made. II was consider
ed by every ono too as subject for legislative ac
ton What was our establishment then, when i'm
mcdiatcly after our adjournment, and before we
reached our homes, we saw the same measure adopt
ed by Executive authority, which had twice been
rejected by the legislative action Of the Senate i
is not my intention to examine the power by which
the Executive issued this order and thereby created
different branches Of the revenue were TO BE- re-
ceived. Idono doubt that the Executive acted from
the most honest and patriotic motives; and there
are those who believe The order operated well, al
though | am not one Of that number i was in
tended to diminish the amount of the proceeds OF
the sales of the public lands Before It's adoption,