The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1837-12-15
POLITICAL.
From the Edgefeld IS. c. Advertiser.

tsf Vi ihfItation from COMMITTEE OF our Clllzcns,
who rendered him the compliment of public Din
ner tor his able and patriotic services al the re-
cent eventiul session OF Congress
FoRr IlnI, Nov. 3rd. 1881.
GeHtlensn-lt is with very great reluctance
decline your kind invitation 10 partRke Of a pubic
dinner. From quarter and on no occasion could
an expression Of appreciation be more Acceptable,
slt SO short is the interval between this and the
next regular session Of Cong ress, and ladis pen
sable Is II, that should devote il exclusively 10
my domestic concerns, preparatory 10 my long alb
sence from home, that am compelled 10 decline
the honor intended.
la saying that on no occasion could the express
zion OF your confidence be more welcome intend
no unGeabing comron place. During the long
period OF my public ervice never have | seen a
more important crsi. thar the present, and on none
have ! ever been compelled, in the discharge Of
my duiy, TO assume greater responsibility. |
saw clearly en- my arrival at Washington, at tho
commencement of tho late extra session, thsl our
affairs had reached the point, when according to
the course We might take, should reap the full
harvest OF our long and grdU0us Struggle against
the entertainments and abuses of The General &C.
verument, or lose the fruits of oil oGr labor. |
clearly saw, that our bold and vigorous attacks
had made deep and successful impression. State
interposltion had overthrown the protective Tariff
snd With il the American System, aud pat step
to Congressional usurpalion sns the joIet attacks
Of our party and that OF osr Old opponents, the
National Republicans, had efeclually brought
dos the pow Of the Executive, Bnd Arrested its
encroachnenis for the present II was ter tina.
purpose we had united. True 10 our principle of
exposition to The eucroachment OF power, from
whatever quarter II might come, did not hest.
tote, after oyeTtbrowlng the protective system and
arresting legislative usufpaiioR, to JOIN The au-
thors Of bat sysiem in order 10 arrest The eucroach-
meuts OF tie Executive, although We differed as
widely as the poles almost every other question,
and regarded the Usurpatlen O the Executive, hu;
as necessary coBsC qnence OF The principles and
policy Of allies. II joining them we
were not Inseasible 10 The embarrassment of our
position. With such allies, success Vas difficult
aud victory itself, without change at principles
aud policy on their part, dangerous; and, accord-
ipgiy, while We united with them a ainst the Ex-
ecuIlre, refused ~ participation in the Presi-
dsRtla contest. But, Niih all It's euberrasstu
Il was the only Practicable course left US, short of
abandoning sur principles, OF lhe coEuiry, BY re-
tring altogether from The field OF contest In ais
embarrasst positien sc waited the development
of events, with the Fl ,ct determinations that le.
what Hlight coa.s, Ne would IHtiuxibiy pursue the
course, with regard 10 cur principles, aud tie
success OF our cause demanded.
Such was the position occupied, from $50,
whore cur contest with the General Government
Terminated, TO the commencement Of the late k,x-
ira session. when II became manifest great
change had ben effected, hich could not bas
Dave poR eYtul influence eur future course.
l. soon became apparent after The meeting OF Con-
ress, tha the JOINT resistance OF ourselves aad cur
tuc allies 10 conjunction with the course Of evenIs
"a reference TO the currency, bad brought down
tie lofty pretensions at the Executive department.
The union between the Government ana the mo-
ney power, which had greatly strens thencd
hose in authority, at hfsl had nat only erased but
hey were forced to take ground against lhe re-
nnien of the tao, and to make war against those
very banks. which had been tie instruments of
their power aud aegrandizemeni. Forced 10 take
his position, and Invested great measure of
patronage and influence from the exhausted state
II the Treasury, they ere Goa PEELED 10 tall back,
o. the cuiy means OF saving themselves, on the
priaLtpss ns lc27, by which had elected rom
office tne National Republican party. sRd 10 which
orr por,isn OF the old party OF - have infie1blY
7dhered bot from which the other adhoring to he
Administration had SO greatly departed IN prsc-
nee. As soon Rs saw this state 81 things, clear
y perceived that very Important question wax
presented for our determination, Which wo wero
compelled to decide forthN ia !; shall we eootinus
our Joint attack, with the Nationals. ou THOSE in
COVER, 10 the new position, Nhieh they have been
compelled o occupy 1t twas clear with our cint
sorces We could utterly evsrthgow aud deu.aiish
then, but it vas not less clear. that the victory
would nurs not to US but exclusively 10 the bene-
lit Of eur allies and their cause They we're the
most numerous ard powerful aud The poirl Of as
saat on the position which the psrty 10 be assault
ed had taken in relation 10 Ia, banks, veuld hay
greatly strengthened the settled principles and
icy Of the National party, and weakened in
same degree ours. They are, and ever have =
he decided advocates of national bank, an
now in fayer OF ons, with capital SO ample.
be sufficient TO control the State Institutions, and
to regulate the rarrsnoy and exchanges OF tho
country 1'e oiA them, with them avowed object
IN the attack, 10 overthrow those in power on the
ground they occupied against bank, would, OF
course, not cnr have placed the Government and
country in their hands without opposition but
would have committed us, bsYend the possibility
# eJtrics,on, for bank, and absorbed our party
n the ranks ef ihs Nationsl Republicans Tie
irsl fruits Of the victory would have been IN over
hadowing national bank, with en- immense csoi.
al, NOT less ,haa tfom ftly to hundred millions,
which would have centralized the currency and
and 18th theEa the commerce and can.
tai o. the country, in whatever section thu head Of
he Institution might be pisesd. The next would
70 tbs ind!ssoluble unisn of the political aud HE
Dorey power in the hAeds OF our old political CO.
onsnts, whose principles and policy are 80 uppo-
I've 10 ours, aud so dangerous 10 opr institutions
. vel! as oppressive to US.
Such clearly weuld have been tie inevitable re-
ult il We had Joined in the assault, on those in
over, in the position they had hesn constrained
, Oceupy and he mus, indeed be blipd-sll nsss
Xpsrlenee must be lee, 10 hias who does ret see,
no, SO infatuated oaurss would have been fatal
us and ours The eonst stAeu between the Go.
synmen, sud tia bank wsala, " Necessary con.
in abs bsrsz &C ib,x se.,tc H.. LII q,