Columbus Democrat. [volume] (Columbus, Miss.) 18??-18??, 1837-10-21

10 The Bank ofthe United States. Il rose out OF the
acton ofthe Government.
The Bank, IN Increasing its business, acted in D.
bedlence 10 the condition OF things at the ume and
IA conformity with the Banks generally in the same
section. Ii was at this juncture that the late All
mnNtraiion came into power-a luncuIre remarNa-
bic IN many respects, bat more especially in relation
to the question Of the currency Most of the
which have since terminated in the complete pros
traunn OF the Banks and the commercial prosperity
OF the country were in luI activity.
Another cause, about that time, Il do not rcmem-
her the precise date) began to produce powerful e-
iectS refer to the last renewal of the charter of
the Bank Of England II was renewed Tor ten years
and, among other pro hSlons, contained one making
the notes Of that bank LEGAL tender in all eases ex-
cept between the bank and ITS creditors. The effect
was TO dispense stl t'rther with the precious met
ais in that great commercial country, which OF course
caused them 10 flow out IN every direction through
the various channels OF its commerce. A large por-
ton took their direction htherward, and served still
further to increase the current, which, FRI m causes
already enumerated, was flowing in this direction;
end which sill further increased the force of the re.
mfaing current, on the turn OF the tide.
The administration did NOT comprehend the diff
cultes and dangers which surrounded it. Instead Of
perceiving the true reason of the expansion of the
currency, and adopting the measures necessary 10
resist it, they attributed ii to the Bank of the United
States, and made It the cause or preteXt of wagng
war on that institution. Among the first acts of
hostility the depoSlteS were removed and transfer
red to selected State Banks; the effect of which, IN
stead of resisting the tendency 70 expansion was to
throw OFT the only restraint that held the banking in
sttutons ofthc country in check; and ofcourse gave
10 the swelling tide, which was destined 10 dcso,ae
the country powerful impulse. Banks sprung up
IN every direction; discounts aud issues increased
almost without limitation, and an immense surplus
revenue accumulated IN the DepoSite Banks which,
after the payment OF the public debt, the most ex-
traTag1nt appropriations could not exhaust, and
which acted as additional banking capital The
value ormoney daily deprecated -prices roSc--aud
then commenced those unbounded Specnlations, par
ticulary IN public lands, which was transferred, by
millions OF acres, from the public TO the spectators
for worthless bank notes I'LL at length the swelling
Hood was checked, and the revulssc current burst
Its BARRIERS and oversprcad and desolated the and
The first check came from the Bank of England,
which alarmed at the loss Gifts precious metals, re-
fused to discount American bills. In order TO pre-
vent further decrease Of its cash means and cause
return of those which it had lost. Then followed
the execution OF the deposte act, which, instead OF
remedial measure, as IT might have been made, If
properly executed vas made the instrument Of
weakening the Banks at the point pressure, espa-
cally IN the great Metropolis Of the Union, where so
large portion Of the surplus revenue was accumu-
lated. Aud, inanly, the Treasury order, which still
further weakened those Banks, by Withdrawing their
cash means 10 be invested in public lands IN the
West
II Is often easy TO prevent what cannot be rene
died, which the present instance strongly illustrates
1.-THE Administration had formed true conception
OF the danger in time, what las since happened
might have been easily avertcd. The near approach
OF the expiration Of the charter Of the United States
Bank, would have afforded ample means for staying
the desolatlon lit had been timely and properly
used saw It then, and purpOsed to renew the
charter for limited period, with such notifications
SSpTShasi6h 81 etaffasHey; aEsed. the increasing
gradually and finally, wear out The connection be-
tween the Bank and the Governmcnt.1o use the
expression then used, "to unbank the Banks;' 10
let down the system easily, and 50 to effect the sep
aration between the Bank and the Government AS
to avoid the possibility OF that shock which then
saw was inevitable without some such remedy. The
moment was emnendy propltlous.
Tie precious metals were flowing IN upon us
from every quarter, and the vigorous measures |
pnrposcd TO adopt in the renewal OF the charter,
would have ehectuaIy arrested the increase OF Banks
and checked the excess OF their discounts and issues
SO that the accommodating mass Of gold and silver
instead Of being converted into Bank capital and
swelling the tide Of pnper circulation, would have
been substituted in the place oil bank notes, as a
permanent and wholesome edition 10 the currency
ofthe county.
Butneither the Administration nor the opposition
sustained me, aud the prccions opportunity passed
unsezed. then clearly saw the coming calamity
wasineyitabe, aud il has neither arrived sooner, nor
is it greater than what anticipated.
Such are the leading causes which have produced
the present disordered state of the currency Ihere
are others OF q minor character, CONNECTED wan The
general condition Of the commercial world and Che
operations Of the Executive branch OF the Govern
ment but which, oithemscIves, would have produ-
ced but little effect 10 repeat the causes in a few
words. the vast increase which the tariffs Of 1874
and % rave to the fiscal acton Of tie Government
combined with the causes | have enumerated, gave
the first impulse to tie expansion Of the currency.
These in turn, gave the extraordinary impulse TO
overriding and speculation Uhey are effects and
not causes which has finally terminated in the pres
emf calamity 1t may thus be ultimately traced TO
the connection between the Banks and the Govern
ment and it is not little remarkable that the sus-
pension OF specie payments IN 1916, In thus country
and that i797, in Great Britain were produced by
like causes
There is another reason against the union Of the
Government and the Banks, intimately connected
proceed to state. 1t gives preference TO one por-
ten of the citizens over another that it IS neither
fair, equal, nor consistent with the spirit Of our in
stItuhons
That the connection between the Banks and the
Government, the receiving and paying away their
notes as cash. and the use Of the public money from
the tire of the collection TO the disbursement is the
source Of immense profits 10 the banks cannot be
questioned. 1t is impossible, as ! have said to as
certain with any precision TO what extent their IS
sues and circulation depend upon it, but it certainly
constitutes large proportion single Illustration
may throw light on this point Suppose the Gov
eminent were TO take up the veriest beggar in the
street, and enter into contract with him that noIn-
ng should be received in payment of his dues or for
the sales Of its public lands in future, except gold
and silver and his promssory notes, aud that he
should have the use of the public funds from the
time Of their collection until their disbursement
Can any one estimate the wealth which such con
,rac+ v,ould conlera His notes would circulate far