Morning herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1837-1840, 1837-09-06

ticpaed its severity A concurrence of circumstan-
Inadequate of themselves to produce such wide
spread and calamitous embarrassments, tended 50
greatly to aggravate them that they cannot be
looked in considering their history Among these
may be mentioned, most prominent the great loss
ofcapital sustained by our commercial emporium IN the
fire ofpecember, lS35-a loss, the effects Of which
were moderated at the timc because postponed for
season by the great facilities Of credit then exstlng
the disturbing effects in commercial cities OF the
transfers of the public moneys required by the depo-
site law of June, 1886, and the measures adopted by
the foreign creditors OF our merchants 10 reduce their
debts and to withdraw from the United States
large perls0n of our specie.
However unwilling any OF our citizens may hereto
fore have been to assign these the CHEF IN
srumentaiIty IN producing the present state OF things
the deyeopements subsequently, made, and the actual
condition of other commercial countries, must as 1t
seems to me, dspe all remaining doubts upon the SUBJ
jccts II has since appeared that evils, similar to
those suffered by ourselves, have been experienced IN
Great Britain, on the continent and indeed through
0us the commercial world; and that, in ether eoun-
tries, as well asan our own they have been uniformly
preceded by an undue enlargement OF the boundaries
of trade, prompted with u.s. by unprecedented ex-
pansons of the systems of credit reference to the
amount of banking capital, and the issues of paper
credits put IN circulation IN Great Britain, by banks,
and in other ways, during the years 1884, 1885, and
1896, will show an augmentation of the paper curren
cy there, as much dspropsrtoned to the real wants
of trade as in the United States. With this redundant
of the paper currency there arose IN that country
also spirit Of adventurous speculation, embracing
the whole range of human enterprise. Aid was pro-
fusey given TO projected improvements large invest
ments made in foreign stocks and loans; credits
for goods granted with unbounded lberality to
merchants in foreign countries; and all the means OF
acquiring and employing credit were put in active
operation, and extended in their effects to every de-
partment of business. and to every quarter OF the
globe. The reaction proportloned IN its violence
to the extraordinary character of the events which
preceded it. The commercial community of Great
Rrifai fno foCf
and their debtors in this country not only sudr
denly deprived of accustomed and expected credits,
but called upon for payments, which, in the actual
posture OF things here could only be made through
general pressure and at the most runous sacrifices
In view of these facts, il would impossible for
sincere lnqurers after truth TO resist the conviction,
that the of the revuson both countries have
been substantially the same. Two nations the most
commercial in the world, enjoying but recently the
highest degree of apparent prosperity, and maintain
ing with each other the closest relations ar0sudden
ly in time of profound peace and without any great
national DISASTER arrested in their career and plunged
into state of embarrassment and distress. In both
countries we have witnessed the redundancy of
paper money, and other facilities of credit. the same
spirit of speculation the same partial successes; the
same difficulties and reverscs and length nearly
the same overwhelming catastrophe The most ma
eral difference between the results in the two coun-
tries has only besn that with us there has also occur
red an extensive arrangement in the fiscal affairs of
the federal and state governments occasoned by the
SUSPENSION SD OF specie payments by the banks.
The history OF these causes and effects in Great
Britain and the United States, is substantially the
history of the revulson in all other commercial coun-
tries.
The present and visible effects Of these circum-
stances on the operations of the government and on
the industry of the peopy point out the objects which
call for your immediate attention.
They are-to regulate by law the safe keeping,
transfer, and disbursement Of the public moneys; TO
designate the funds TO be received and paid by the GO
To he
every demand upon It; TO prescribe the terms Of in
diligence, and the mode of settlement TO be adopted
as well in collecting from individuals the revenue that
has accrued, as in Withdrawing it from former depo-
STORES, and to devise and adopt such further
sures, within the constitutional competency of con-
gress as will be best calculated to revive the enter
prise and to promote prosperity of the country.
For the deposlte, transfer aud disbursement of the
revenue, National and State banks have always, with
temporary and limited exceptions, been heretofore
employ Jed but although advocates of each system |
arc still TO be found il is apparent that the events Of
the last few months have greatly augmented the de-
sire, long existing among the people Of the United
States, to separate the fiscal operations Of the Gov
eminent from those of individuals or corporations.
Again To create national bank as fiscal agent |
would be to disregard the popular will, twice solemn
ly and unequlvocally expressed. On no question of
domestic policy is there stronger evidence that the |
of large majority deliberately fixed
and cannot concur with those who think they see, |
in recent events proof that these sentiments arc or
a reason mat tRey should be- changed.
Events, similar in their origin and character, have
heretofore frequently occurred, without producing
any such change and the lessons Of experience must
be forgotten we suppose that the present overthrow
Of credit would have been prevented by the existence
Of national bank. Proneness 10 excessive issues
has ever been the vice of the banking sysem-a vice
rs prominent IN national in state Institutions
This propensity is as subscrvient to the advasce-
ment of private interests in the in the other
and those who direct them both, being principally |
guided by the same views, and influenced by the same
motives, will be equally ready TO stimulate cxtrava.
gance of enterprise by lmprovldence Of credit How
sirkngly is this conclusion sustained by experience
The bank of the United States, with the vast pow
ers conferred on il by Congress, did could not
prevent former and similar embarrassments; nor has |
the still greater strength il has been said possess by
its present charter enabled IL in the existing emer
gency TO check other institutions, to save it.
self In Great Britain, where il has been seen, the |
same causes have been attended with the same ef |
fects national bank, possessing powers far greater
than asked for by the warmcst advocate of such |
an institution here, mas also proved unable TO prevent
an undue expansion Of credit and the evils that flow
from IT, Nor can find any tenable ground for the |
re est Adjustment of national bank In the derangc-
ment alleged present to exist in the domestic
changes of the country or in the facilities IL may be l
capable of ahording them. Although advantages Of |
this sort were anticipated when the first Bank Of the
United States was created they were regarded as an
incidental accommodation not one which the Fede- |
raj Government was bound, could be called upon
to furnish This Accommodation Is now, indeed, af |
ter the laDae of dema ndcd from n