Columbus Democrat. [volume] (Columbus, Miss.) 18??-18??, 1837-10-21

But suppose these difficulties were overcome.
would still be opposed 10 the Incorporation OF BauA
50 far from atiOrdlng the rthel which many antici.
pate, would be the most disastrous measure that
could be adopted. As great as is the calamity I'M
der which the country Is suffering it is nothing tn
what would follow the creation OF such an insti,u-
ton under existing circumstances. Ia order TO
compel the State institutions to pay specie. the
Bank must have capital as great, or nearly rs
great, IN proportion 10 the existing Institutions as
the late Bank had, when established, to thos, Of
that day. This would give it animmense caDital.
not mach less than one hundred million of dollars
oil which large proportion, say twenty millions,
must ba specie. From what source is 1t to he de-
rived From the State Banks Il would EMMY
Their vaults, and leave them in tile most helpless
condition. From abroad, aud England in particu-
lar: 1t would reproduce that revulsve current.
which hes lately covered the country with desola-
ton. The tide is sill running to Europe, and if
forced back by an artificial cause, before the foreign
debt is paid, cannot but be followed by the most
disastrous cOnSesuenc
But suppose this difficulty overcome. and the
Bank re-esablShed. ask wkat would be the effects
under such trcumStanceS' Where would il fnd
room for business Commensurate with its extended
capital without crushing the State Institutions en-
| leebed by the withdrawal of their means in order
70 create the instrument OF their opprcSs.onf
few ofthe more vigorous might survive but the far
greater portion, with their debtors, creditors and
stockholders would be involved in common RUM
lie Bank would, indeed, give specie currency
not by enabling the existing institution to resume
but by destroying them and taxing their place.
Those who take a different view, and so loniv
anticipate relief from National Bank. are decciy-
ed by supposed analogy between the present stu
alton Of the country and that of 1916, when the
late bank was chartered, after the war with Great
Britain. | was an actor in that scene, and may be
permitted to speak in relation 10 it with some little
authority. Between the two periods there is little
or no analogy. They stand almost in contrast. In
1916, the Government was debtor to the banks
now is creditor; difference of the greatest i'm
portance, as far as the present question is concern
ed The banks bad ovcriSsued, II is true, bat taer
over-issues were to the Governments solvent and
able debtor, whose credit, held by the banks in the
shape OF stock, was at par II was their excessive
issues to the Government on its stock, which main
Y caused the sus ension in proof Of which, it isa
remarkable fact that the depreciation of bank pa
per under gold and silver was about equal to the
proportion which the Government stock held by
the banks bore to their issues. 1t was this excess
that hung on the market and depressed the value of
their notes. The solution is easy
The Bank took the Government stock PAYABLE in
twelve years, aud issued their notes for the same
payable on demand IN violation of the pIaincs
principles of banking Ii followed OF course, that
when their notes were presented for payment, they
had nothing but Government stock to meet them.
But its stock WIS at par, and all the Banks had to
do was to 90 into market with the stock they held
and take up their notes, aud thus the excess which
hung upon the market aud depressed their value,
would have been withdrawn from circulation, and
the residue would have risen to par, or nearly par
with gold and silver, when specie payments might
be easily resumed
This they were unwilling to do. They were profit
ing every Way-by drawing interest on the stock,
by dscounhng IN 1t as capital and by its continued
rise in the market. Ii became necessary t. compel
them TO surrender those advantages. Two methods
presented themselveS-one bankrupt law, and the
other National Bank. was opposed to the for
mer then, as am nov. | regarded it as hars
and unconstitutional measure, opposed to the rights
Of the States. Ii they have not surrendered the
right 10 incorporate Banks, is conceded, its cxer
else cannot be controlled by the action OF this Gov
eminent, which has no power but what is cNpreSSy
granted, and no authority TO control the States in
the exercise of their served powers 1t remained
to resort to National Bank, as the means ofcom-
pulSion. 1t proved etlectual. Specie payments were
restored but even with these striking advantages
it was followed by great pressure in 1918, 10 and
90, as ali who are old enough TO remember that
period must recollect Such, in fact must ever be
the consequence oil resumption when forced under
the most favorable circumstances and such ac-
cordingy, it proved even in England, with all her
resources, and with all the caution she used in re-
storing specie circulation, after this long suspen-
sion Of 1919. What, then, would he its effects in
the present condition Of the country, when the Gov
eminent is creditor, instead of a debtor; when
there are so manly newly created Banks without
established credit, when the issues are SO grea
Il Ia IF tha obi
in condition to be coercedi As great as IS the tide
of disaster which is passing over the land, it would
be as nothing to what would follow were a National
Bank to be established as the means Of coercing
specie payments.
am bound to speak without reserve on tins I'M
portant point. My opinion then is, that if it should
be determined to compel the restoration Of specie
payments by the agency of Banks, there is but one
way-but to that have insuperabe objections. |
mean the adoption OF the Pennsylvania Bank Of the
United States, as the fiscal agent of the Govern
ment. Ii Is already in operation, and sustained by
great resources and powerful connections, 10th at
home and abroad. Through its agency specie pay
ments might undoubtedly be restored and that with
far less disaster than through newly created Bank,
but not without severe pressure. cannot, how
ever, vote for such a. measure. cannot agree to
give preference and such advantages TO Bank,
OF one of the members OF this confederav those
Of otlters-a Bank dependant upon the will ola
State and subject 10 its influence and control. |
cannot consent to confer such favors on the stock
holders, many of whom, if rumor is to he trusted,
are foreign capitalists, and without claim on the
bounty OF the Government. But, fall these and
many other objections were overcome, there is still
one which cannot surmount.
| There has been, as we all know, conflict be-
| tween one of the departments Of the Government
and that institution, in which, in my opinion, the de-
partment was the assailant, but cannot consent,
after what has occurred, to give 10 the banka tri-
umph over the Government, for such its adoption
as the fiscal agent ofthe Government would neces-
sarly be considered. 1t would degrade the Gov
ernment in the eyes of our citizens and oihe world,
and 90 far to make that bank the Government seli.
But if all these difficulties were overcome, there
are others, to me, wholly insurmountable. belong
to the State Rights party, which, at all times from