Vermont telegraph. [volume] (Brandon [Vt.]) 1828-1843, 1837-03-08
We think it clear, that atheism does not

We think it clear, that atheism does not
of ITSELF incline men to gratuitous, unpro-
voked falsrhood The most it can do is,
to remove restraint from those who are
tempted by other causes, so that the tempt
alton to untruth is more likely to over
come its subject. There must, then, exist
something more than mere in6delity, be-
fore we are warranted in suspecting a
Witness when that other something
is discovered to exist, then we may, with
justice, feel less confidence in atheistic tes-
timony. In such cases, our juries are
fully competent to exercise sound discre-
ton, in weighing the credibility of the
offered testimony.
Every man, who has studied the histor-
ical works of Hume and Gibbon, both of
whom were infdels, is aware, that, upon
all subjects apart from theological opin-
ions, those works are of standard authori-
tv and value. We need not seek further
than Hume's History of England and
Gibbons Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, for proof, that the testimong of
disintcrested in6deIs is of great value, and
entitled to high consideration.
9th. By some Of the wiser provisions
of law, the duties and functions of Judge
aud Of Jury are kept as distinct as possible :;
and by the constitution of the u States,
as well as of the several States, the right
of jury trial is secured to the party &C
cused in all important cases,
Both of these principles are violated by
! the exclusive operation of the legal rule
now under discussion; for that rule au-
: thorizes the jud ge to trespass upon the
duties of the jury, and to take away the
constitutional right of the individual ac-
cused of illegal opinions.
The jury have exclusive cognizance of
facts,-of their nature, weight and infu-
ence When, therefore, a question is
raised upon the religious opinions Of a
witness, upon the fact Of what he believes,
the fact should go to the jury, and they
shonld determine whether it be proved,
and of what influence it is, or ought to be-,
in the case. But the practice is otherwise.
The Judge investigates these facts, and
decides upon them, without regard to the
Jurors
Were the law restored to its true and
! rightful condition, no man, offered as a
witness, would be refused, on the ground
of character or of opinion. If be pos
sessed knowledge of important facts, he
would admitted; and if there were cir
cumstances which weakened the value oil
his testimony, those facts would also be
given in evidence, as relevant to the case,
and thus the jury would be made, what it
Is intended to be, the judge Of the facts, in
every trial. Thus, for example, if an in
fidel were rendered as witness, he would
be fully examined in regard to his knowl-
edge of the case and then the jury might
be informed, that he was an infdel, and
TO weigh his testimony in the light of that
fact. In this manner, the boasted right of
jury trial would be of some value.
The constitution of Massachusetts, in
accordance with the frame of government
in most of the other States, provides, pos
itively, that "no subject shall be despoiled
or deprived of his property, immunities
or privileges, put out of the protection of
the law, &C., but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land.'
By the phrase, 1.-The judgment of his
| pCcIS, 10 ZIG fCIulCl vi JuIf
and the manifest intent of the constitution
is, to secure the right to a jury trial in all
important cases. The other phrase, "the
law of the land" refers to certain cases in
which men may be arrested before trial;
or to petty offences and trifing questions
which are decided without going to juries ;;
in all which cases. the party is served
with formal process of law, and with OPP
portunity for preparation. But by no fair
construction can this informal method OF
DISTINGUISHING a witness be included IN
that phrase for that method is at variance
with both the spirit and letter Of every
chapter of the constitution.
Is not, then, the witness, who is thus
set aside, "despoiIed of his immunities
and privileges 2" Is not the right of tes-
tifying in court of justice, /" a privilege2'
Is not the enjoyment of well-earned
good name, of a fair reputation, of legal
protection, Can immunity y" And when
person is thus exposed to legal abuse
and to the uncurbed maIignity of all who
choose to take advantage of his legal ina
bility to testify, is he not "put out OF the
protection of the law2' TO all these
questions, there is but one answer and
that is now upon the lip OF every friend OF
freedom.
We say, then, that the exclusion of wit
nesses from the privilege, or rather the
right, of testifying, on account Of religious
opinions, is both illegal and unconstituton-
al, for the reasons above assigned.
10th. But we further declare it uncon-
stitutional, as converting witness into a
criminal, and then proc eeding at once,
without notice, and without any formal de-
scription of his offence, to trial and sen
tence. 49,