The North-Carolina standard., 1837-10-11
VOL. III.....NO. 154.


gold and silver and his promissory notes, and
that he should have the use of the public
funds, from the time of their collection until
their disbursement. Can any one estimate
the wealth which such contract would con-
fer2 His notes would circulate far and wide,
!, over the whole extent of the Union; would
be the medium through which the exchanges
of the country would be performed, and his
ample and extended credit would give him
control over all the banking Institutions and
monied transactions of the community
The possession of an hundred millions would
not give control more effectual. ask
would it be fair, would it be equal would it
be consistent with the spirit of our institu
tons to confer such advantages on any in
dividual? And if not one, would it be if con-
ferred on any number? And if not, why
should it be conferred on any corporate body
of individuals? How can they possibly be
entitled to benefits so vast, which all must
acknowledge could not be justly conferred
on any number of unincorporated indiyidu-
ais
| state not these views with any intention
OF bringing down odium on banking institu.
tions. l have no unkind feeling towards
| them whatever. l do not hold them res
ponsible for the present state of things. Il
has grown up gradually, without either the
banks or the community perceiving the con-
sequences, which have followed the connec-
ton between them. My object is to state
facts as they exist, that the truth may be
seen in time by all. This is an age of in
vestigation. The public mind is broadly a.
wake upon this all important subject. 1t
affects the interest and condition of the
whole community, and will be investigated
to the bottom. Nothing will be left unex-
plored, and it is for the interest of both the
banks and OF the community, that the evils
incident to the connection should be fully
understood, in time and the connection be
gradually terminated, before such convul-
sions shall follow as to sweep away the
f whole system, with its advantages as well
as its disadvantages.
4 But it is not only between citizen and ci-
tiZen that the connection is unfair and une-
f quail. II is as much so between one portion
of the country and another. The connec-
tiOn of the Government with the banks.
whether it be with a combination of State
banks, or national institution, will neces-
, sarily centralize the action of the system at
the principal point of collection and dis
bursement, and at which the mother bank,
or the head of the league of State banks
must be located. From that point the whole
system, through the connection with the
Government will be enabled to control the
exchanges both at home and abroad and
, with it the commerce, foreign and domestic,
including exports and imports. After what
has been said these points will require but
little illustration. A single one will be suffi-
cient; and I will, take, as In the former in.
stance, that of an individual.
. Suppose, then, the Government, at the
I commencement of its operation, had select
I ed an individual merchant, at any one point
in the Union, say New York, and had con-
nected itself with him, as it has with the
banks, by giving him the use of the public
: funds from the time Of their collection un-
+ til their disbursement, and of receiving and
paying away, in all its transactions, nothing
, but his promissofy notes, except gold and sill
yer; is it not manifest, that decisive con-
troll would be given to the port where he re-
sided, over all the others that his promis-
sorry notes would circulate every where, thro'
all the ramihcations of commerce; that thew
would regulate exchanges that they would
,, be the medium of paying duty bonds and
: that they would attract the imports and ex-
e ports of the country to the ports where such
extraordinary facilities were afforded. If
such would clearly be the effects in the case
: supposed, it is equally clear, that the con-
!: centration of the currency at the same point,
through the connection of the Government
I with the banks, would have equal, if not
: greater effects and that whether one gene
raj bank should be used as an agent, or
1 league of banks, which should have their
e centre there. To other ports of the coun-
try, the trihing advantages which branch
: or deposite bank would give in the safe
) keeping of the public revenue, would be as
v nothing, compared to the losses caused to
their commerce by centralizing the monied
: action Of the country at remote point
Other gentlemen can sneak for their own
e section; can speak with confidence of that,
: The entire staple states, l feel a deep con-
n viction, banks and all, would, in the end. be
n great gamers by the disserverance, whate.
t, yer might be the temporary inconvenience.
) If there be any other section, in which the
3 effects would be different, it would be but to
h confirm the views which have presented
u As connected with this, there is point
h well deserving consideration. The Union
It between bank and Government is not .only
r. a main source of that dangerous expansion
l. AMI contraction in the banking system,
Y which have already illustrated, but Is also
l. one of the principal causes of that power
Il tul and almost irresistible tendency to the
l. increase of banks which even its friends see
j. and deplore. | dwelt on this point on for
It mer occasion, (on Mr.. Webster's motion to
6 renew the bank charter in 1885, and will
It not repeat what then said. But in addi-
ton to the causes then enumerated, there
l. arc many others very powerful, and among
j. others the one under consideration. They
l. all may be summed up in one general cause.
It We have made banking too profitable; far,
IS very far too proflable;> and, may add, in
or huential. One>of the most ample sources
$. Of this profit and influence may be traced,
L kl--