The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-11-21
From the Richmond Enquirer.

The people Of Virginia have an hsbitual constant al
most Instructive dread OF the dangerous power and cor
ruptng influence of extended Executive patronage.
Their jealousy has been such as to make them re-
fuse to the Executive all his Just authority. When il
was attempted curta the constitutional power OF that
branch Of the Goyenment--he public sentiment Of the
Stale, after the careful delberaon and patient in
yesgaton, indicated the powes OF the Executive TO re-
NOV subordinate officers, and to supervise the conduct
OF the heads Of departments in constituting and execut
ing the laws.
The concession OF this prerogaiye, far from making
the people Of Virginia indifferent to the extension OF
Executive patronage is calculated to make them watch
1t moro narrowly suspect every effort to enlarge il, and
restrain at every point where il inclined to over
dow its proper bounds.
The power Of impeachment, although safeguard in
cases oil corruption and fragrant misdemeanor--onc, by
the by, which we too much in the habit Of dsparag
ingdoes not reach these cases, where, though
rupion or official nsdemeanor be proved the power
and influence Of Executive patronage may be brought
IN conact with the freedom and purity Of elections =
Cases OF this Sort it may be expected will occur under
every administration. No man. who has proper regard
for the purity Of the Govcrnment-no genuine republic
canwil say, that such things do not need reform call
restraint, and Justify vigilance. This reform is not
be attained by putting into power those, who profess alb
horrence Of political proscripton-who denouncc with
unmgaed violence, the sentiment, that tho spois OF
the vaaquished belong to the yicorsor those who pro-
claim, that reform" in these matters, sis highly in
scrbed on their banner. We have had many mourn
ul proofs how little reliance be placed in such pro-
fessions--no matter by what party they made or
however ostentatiousy paraded. II is melancholy
truth IN the history Of parties, that steadily
and invariably adhered IN power, to the principles
which brought them INTO power however honest sin
cere their professions may have been however willing
faithfully to redeem their pledges.
| ltwould not be difca to mention specific instances
OF this kind, the conduct Of political parties in
country, well the parties Of former times, those OF
the present day. But wish to avoid exciting partisan
feeling and leave the selection of the instances others
All will doubtless readily find fragrant examples in the
conduct Of their adversaries though they will thank
Cod that as Tor themselves and their friends, they
| not as these Publicans."
The chief, if not the only practical safeguard against
the most common dangers Of Executive patronage, and
the political corruption and Executive power incident to
it, is TO avoid whenever it be done, the creation Of
new ofices-to diminish the number Of old officers and
to limit The discretion much possible Of those that
cannot be dispensed with. The existence Of some pa
ronage is one Of the necessary evils Of Government
We must submit to it, and to its occasional abuse,
because OF It's attendant benefits The patronage arising
from the power OF appointment to and removal from Of
flee, probably be lodged where safely less
dangerously than with the Chief Executive Magistrate,
where the Constitution has placed it. Its liability to
abuse there is readily admted-and ought to teach all
the wisdom of giving to that department little scope
and temptation TO abuse power the orderly and
gular administration Of the Government will admit In
guage Of Gen Jackson, this doctrine peculiarly ap
| plicabe.
Sensible Of the application and force of these truths
the advocates Of the SubTreasury scheme labor very
earnestly to convince US, that it will require very little
addition TO the number Of officers, and give addition
power and influence to the Executive in regard to the
control tho public money. It has been stated by
Mr. Woodbury. in his Report to Congress, that the pro-
lect would probably require only an addition of about
ten clerks and involve only about sixty thousand
dollars Of additional expense.
Without mputng to that officer any want Of sinceri-
and candor in assigning nconsiderabe addition
of expense and patronage to his schemebut arbuting
his under estimate to that natural bias which, It may be
fairly supposed, operated upon him to make his project
acceptable possible, | must say that have no,
faith whatever in his calculations believe advocate
OF the SubTreasuy plan in either House Of Congress
ventured TO endorse the Secretarys estimate. How
could they These now duties OF keeping and dlsburs-
ing the public money are to be devoved upon officers
already exstence-and having other distinct mpor-
tant and responsible duties to perform. They impose
new nsibies-requre different qualities and qua
l6catons-and in many cases. would subject the officers
to and onerous service and labor Ii the old officers
had not enough do BEFORE why has not the Secretary
heretofore recommended dminuon Of their number!
If the compensation for their present duties and respon
sbiites is too great why has not the Secretary recon-
mended reduction Of their salaries On the contrary,
if their present duties sufficiently onerous, and their
pay not too great how can he impose additional duties
4
tonal compensation 1t would be difficult to answer
these questions Indeed, the bill which was pressed
upon Congress- and which generally supposed to be
the work OF the Secretary himself, seems to disclose
reluctant consciousness his part, that his estimate Of
the additional expense and patronage was too loose
| for beginning.
After making little Treasurcrs Of :" the Treasurer of
the mint and branches-aH collectors Of the customs and
surveyors acting in that capactyaH rcccipcrs Of public
money and posimasiers," the bill provided. THAT the
said officers, respectively, may be allowed any
sary additional expenses for clerks, &c.-such ex-
pcnses be first expressly authorized by the Secretary
c-and afterwards for the expenses thus authorized the
bill provides, that" SUFFICIENT be and the is
hereby appropriated out Of any money in the Treasury"
&c. First, unlimited number Of clerks authorised
AS many the Secretary peased-and then an indef
mite and unlimited appropriation Of all the money in the
Treasury, required, to pay this unspeced number Of
clerks aud other expenses Why this unusual and ex
traordinary form OF limitation as
10 object, or specification as to amount the Sccrea-
nv has made an estimate in which he himself felt conf
dent Of the number Of new clerks and the requisite ad
dtonal expenses No! there was-there must have
been, lurking apprehension in his mind, that more
officers would be necessary, and that his sixty thou
sand dollars would not be SUFFICIENT even to set in
motion this great, overwhelming Treasury machine. II
would hardly have bought oil enough to grease the
wheels. The number Of Treasurers that would
have been created by this act is probably l2000
great and small all having duties perform under their
present appointments Add to these the new functions of
Sub and least thousand Of them would
say in less than twelvemonih, that they could do
the duties OF both oficesand Congress would be called
on to make four or FIVE hundred new officers,
clerks but SuTreasurers with clerks under them, and
nine tenths of the rest will ask and be allowed additional
compensation for the extra duties imposed on them
Tho expense in the opinion Of all practical at
oil acquainted with the in which this business
Of Office holding and salary raising managed in Wash
ington will not fall shor; of half million, and will pro-
badly exceed that sum Even this however, would be
OF no great moment, if any valuable result was to be
purchased by it, But that expense any expense
such tribe as sixty thousand dollars year, intoera
bic, when il is to be incurred only to "a swarm
OF useless oiicers"-to set in motion "new and I'M