The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1837-09-12

greatly disproportionate TO tner reu '"iue' LioL
Sandiiure of immense sums in improvements Wnio
r. many cases. have been found TO be ruihousy III
nroyident; tho diversion to other pursuits VI H.;
of the labor that should have been appneu ~ o.
culture thereby contributing TO- the eNPenuiTo ona
large sums in the importation OF grain ho I'M =. =
an expenditure which, amounting IN 1901 ~ 10,
hout two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, "as'
in the first two quarters OF the prosent y 'nJ
creased to more Than two millions VI uo'S s,,Its
finally without enumeratng other injurious 'osu u,
the rSpid growth among all classes, ana osPeeiu,y
in our great commercial towns, OF iuXur'ous ii
founded too often on merely 1anced weatn a and
detrimental alike to the industry, 'ho 'eSo'i'N'
the morals of our people, .:x ,,, bore
| Unwever unwilling any of our citizens may mere =
toGro have boon to assign to these causes tiie cei
Iinstumeniay in producing the PIcsoht 9t
things the developments subsequently 'auU,
the actual condition of other commercial couh'ios,
must as it seems 10 me, dispel all remaining eoupi
upon the subject. 1t has since appeared th"' ov.'
simi lnr TO those suffered by ourselves nave poeH ca
porenced in Great Britain, on the CONTINENT anu
indeed throughout the commercial world; ana tha.
in other countries as well as within our own, they
have boen unfor nly preceded by an undue enlarge
ment of the boundaries of trade, promPted us WIN
u.s. by unprecedented expansions OF lhe systems VI
credit A reference to the amount OF banking cap
ta and the issues Of paper credits put IN crcuia-
lion in Great Britain, by banks, ana other ways,
during the wears 1884, 1885, and 1886, Will show
an augmentation of the paper currency ,neLo US
UGH dlsproporuoned 10 the Teai ""hte Vi "'' IA
in the United States. A..
With this redundancy ofthe paper currency there
arose in that country also a spirit OF adventurous
speculation, embracing the whole range OF human
enterprise. .
Aid was profusey given to projected improve
ments and large investments were made In ioreiSn
stocks and loans; credits for goods were granted
with unbounded lberality to merchants In foreign
countries; and all the means of acquiring ana en-
blowing credit put in active operation, ana eN-
tended in their effects to every department OF busi-
ness, and 10 every quarter OF the Sope. Inc re-
4 tic 1,Inln n n "
traordinary character of the events which preceded
| 1t was so impossible that such state OF things
could long continue, that the prospect OF reVuson
was prescnt TO the minds of considerate men before
il actually came None, however, had correctly
anticipated its severity. A concurrence of clrcum-
stances inadequate of themselves to produce sucil
wide spread and calamitous embarrassments, lend
ed so greatly to aggravate them, that they cannot
be overlooked in considering their history. Among
those may be mentioned, as most prominent, the
great loss of capital sustained by our commercial
emporium in the fire Of December, lo3o-a loss,
the effects of which were moderated at the time,
because postponed for season by the great faci-
ties of credit then existng the disturbing effects IN
our commercial cities, of the transfers OF the pub
lie moneys required by the deqoslte law OF June,
1885, and the measures adopted by the foreign
creditors of merchants oreduce their debts and
to withdraw from the United States a large portion
of our specie.
The commercial community of Great Britain
were subjected to the greatest difficulties and their
debtors in this country were not only suddenly de-
privcd of accustomed and expected Credits but call
ed upon for payments, which in the actual posture
of things here, could only be made through gen.
eral pressure, and at the runous sacrifices.
In view Of these facts, ii would seem impossible
for sincere nqurers after truth to resist the convic
tion that the of the revulsion in both
tries have been substantially the same. Two ma.
tions. the most ercial in the world, enjoying
but recently the highest degree of apparent pros
perity, and maintaining with each other the closest
relations, suddenly, in time ofprofound peace,
and without any great national disaster, arrested in
their career, and plunged into state OF embarrass-
ment and distress.
In both countries we have witnessed the same
redundancy of paper money, and other facilities of
credit; the same spirit of speculation; the same
partial successes; The difficulties and rcverses
and at length, nearly the same overwhelming ca
tastrophe. The most material difference between
tho results in the two countries has only been that
with us there has also occurred extensive de-
rangement in the fiscal affairs of the Federal and
state governments, occasioned by the suspension of
specie payments by the banks.
The history of these causes and effects, i'm Great |
Britain and the United States, is substantially the
history of the revulson in all other commercial
countries.
The present and visible effects of these circum
stances on the operation of the Government, and
on the industry of the people, point out the OBJ
jects which call for your immediate attention.
They are-to regulate by safe law the keeping |
transfer, and disbursements, of the public moneys to
Government; to enable the treasury to meet prompt
ly every demand upon 1t; to prescribe the terms of
indulgence and the mode of settlement to bo adopt
ed, well in collecting from individuals the reve-
nue. that has accrued, in Withdrawing it from
former repositories, and to devise and adopt such
further measures, within the constitutional compe-
tency of Congress, will be best calculated to re-
vve the enterprise and to promote the prosperity of
the Country.
For the deposit, transfer, and disbursement of the
revenue, National and State Banks have always
with temporary and limited exceptions, been here
tofore employed; but, although advocates of each
system are still to be found is apparent that the
events of the last few months have greatly aug
mented the DESIRE long existing among the people
of the United States, to separate the fiscal opera
tons OF the Government from those of individuals
or corporations
Again to create National Bank as fiscal agent,
would be to disregard the popular will, twice sol.
EMMY and unequivocally expressed. On no cues.
ton of domestic policy is there stronger evidence
that the sentiments of large majority are deliber-
ately hxed; and cannot concur with those who
think they see, in recent events proof these
sentiments are, or reason that they should be
changed ~
Events, similar in their origin and character have
heretofore frequently occurred without