The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-09-12


shock, though thus lessened, still occasioned
loss TO anaPpalling amount. The fall was chief
ly consequent from the over-production, and
the abrupt withdrawal Of foreign credit, com
bined with some other circumstances which
need not now be paricularized The over
production originated partly, like most other
excuses here, from an extraordinary extern
sion OF credits and OF bank issues, and partly
from keeping open the sales of public lands TO
all persons, and at the former low prices after
other articles, including cotton and lands, had
suddenly risen much in their nominal value.
Under this tempting state of things, those
sales were exorbitanty enlarged, till they
amounted to over twenty millions Of acres in
year, when not more than three or four mil
lions were probably necessary and not SO
much had before been requisite, annually, to
meet the natural demands for new public lands
for raising cotton, and for all other kinds of
agricultural employment But this excess in
sales, so unexpected and ruinous, can it is be-
lieved, be averted hereafter, whenever they
are likely to go beyond desirable amount,
by passing laws which shall confne them to
actual settlers, or increase the price TO others.
The same measures, with other remedies
hereafter suggested for some other existing
evils, will help to correct future excuses in
the production Of the great domestic staple OF
the Union.
Another of the causes of the present en-
barrassments was the Unprecedented quantity
Of foreign goods imported. BY stimulants to
over trading, such as very extended and often
renewed credits abroad, as well as at home,
so treacherous in appearances OF prosperity,
those importations were dangerously swollen
to the amount OF almost two hundred millions
of dollars year, and thus constituted an ex-
cess over our exports of about sixty millions,
and involved the country in foreign debt,
merely commercial, whose balance against
us, after all proper deductions for freights,
profits, and similar considerations, probably
exceeded the aggregate of thirty millions of
dollars.
That excess, so little anticipated and SO in
discreet, the system of credit formerly in use,
and better regulated, would have seasonably
prevented, by requiring an early adjustment
Of balances, and, thus turning the foreign ex-
changes against US, would have stopped many
extravagancies both in trade and bank issues.
But stimulated and unrestrained, as before
described, it increased the duties some mil
lions beyond what prudent though prosper
GUS state of trade was likely TO produce, and,
combined with some other causes, has over
whelmned the mercantile interest with many
of those disasters under which it has suffered
so severely the past season. From many OF
these, no just legislation can now afford much
relief Nor could any legislation heretofore
have prevented severe revulsions from this
source, except by imposing checks on nordl-
nate credit and banking, as well as on sudden
and large expansions and contractions in bank
issues and by that further reduction OF the ia
riff, which has been so strenuously urged for
two years past to be adopted, whenever our
| fiscal condition evinced that the whole OF the
accrung duties were not needed for public
purposes. Because the great surplus, forced
into the Treasury by the excuses in the sales
of land, and in duties on imports, not being
seasonably withdrawn, either by equivalent
appropriations or further reductions in the cur
rent receipts through new laws or by invest
ments, has undoubtedly contributed, through
the loan of it while in deposite, to sustain, in
some degree, if not produce, the spirit Of over
trading. That surplus was often deprecated;
and the only sound legal preyentiyes still
appear to this department to be, the measures
before enumerated for preventing its accumu-
lation And after it had undesignedly hap
pened, the wisest disposal of it was supposed
to be, to expend it, as fast as useful, on proper
objects of a public character and, in the
mean time, not to leave il in the deposlte
banks, but to invest it in State stocks, as
| provident fund, to remain both safely and
profitably till wanted to aid in meeting current
expenditures or extraordinary contingencies.
| The undersigned regrets that he was not SO
fortunate in sustaining his opinions concern
ing the transient and fluctuating character OF
the excuses in our revenue, as to have re-
ceived the concurrence of Congress in relation
to those cautionary provisions formerly re-
commended by him for meeting the revulsions,
| deficiencies, and contingencies which he sup
posed incident to them, as well as to our fnan-
cial system generally. He is at the same
time, aware that the deposte act, SO far as it
placed part of the public money with the
States for safe keeping, and the Treasury cir
cular issued by the direction Of the Executive,
as to the kind of money receivable for public
lands, were intended, among other things, to
obviate portion of the evils connected with
those excuses. Nor does he entertain any
doubt that they both contributed, at first, 10
awaken caution among the more considerate,
and to excite strong suspicious, II not convlc- :
tons, in prudent minds, as to the great eN-
travagancies of credit into which the commu-
nifty had rashly plunged But after those
measures had accomplished these and similar
benefits with portion of the community,
though others still felt justified in anticipating
continuance of SURPRISES and distributions,
the subsequent influence Of either the act or
the circular, in checking the threatened mis-
chiefs, is believed in most cases, to have been
overrated. The operations of the deposlte
act, in supplying deficiencies Of revenue, BY
recall from the States, however well in
tended, will probably prove very deficient In
some other respects they have, by first re-