Vermont telegraph. [volume] (Brandon [Vt.]) 1828-1843, 1837-03-08

shadow of shade of an object, that may
( have long passed away. The imperfec-
tons of language, the diversities of un-
derstanding, and the t-eachery of memory,
render it wholly impossible to know what
weight of evidence belongs to the nara
tive of other mems opinions; and the
constant changes which take place in
every ones opinions, and which may, in
a few days OF hours, totally alter his creed,
make it impossible to regard even a cor
rect transcript of the past as a true por-
trait of the present, in regard to that
creed.
The Romans regarded the early Chris
tians as atheists, denying all diyinities,
and, by their laws, punish them as deni-
ers of God. But there was never made
a greater mistake than this, in regard to
human opinion, nor does history furnish
more striking proof of the danger of
condemning our fellow beings unheard.
So much for the first error of this Sec
ond method.
Here, also, we find repeated the blum
der Of admitting as true part of the wit,
nesS's Story, and, upon that truth, denying
the veracity Of every other of his declara-
tons. For here, his former assertions, as
related by others, are believed, while all
that he may now say is rejected, unheard,
as false; and this is done, although he is
presumed to remain unchanged in the
opinions formerly expressed Truly, this
rule of law reminds one OF the tabled
Centaurs,-half horse, half man,-so in
congruous are It's provisions, so diverse
the nature of its action. 1t admits, as true,
the loose and careless statements made by
a witness, without reflection, or in jest, or
interrogativeiy or cGusG argument, and
not as the mature results of deliberation
and investigation, made long since, and
now repeated by third persons,-but it re-
fuses to admit the declarations of the same
man, uttered under all the solemnities of
an oath, in a court of justice, and with all
the careful deliberation of one who states
his genuine convictions in the choicest
words
Such are the practical errors and alb
surdities necessarily resulting from this
law of evidence.
Another imperfection of the existing
law will appear from the following con-
siderations
If iufdel sentiments ought to exclude
the holder of them from being witness
in one case, they ought 10 do so in all
cases. Nor is the inadmissibility of such
a person rightly affected by the circum-
stance of mis- having concealed, or made
known, his creed He is an infdel, al
though he may never have disclosed the
fact; he is no more than an infdel, al
thou gh he may have proclaimed it on the
housetops In some of our States, out Of
regard to the principles which we have
already stated, the courts do not permit
the witness himself to be inquired Of
touching his religious faith.
Now let US suppose case to occur in
one Of those states where the last named
rule of law prevails, in which an infdel,
not known, but supposed to be such, is
offered for witness. According to the
rule complained Of he ought not to be al
lowed to give evidence, he ought not to be
believed. But as he cannot be examined
in regard to his sentiments, as nobody has
ever heard him speak of his belief, he is,
therefore, of necessity, admitted to testify,
) and his evidence, if it be not rendered
suspicious by something besides his relig-
ion, is received as truth. Thus does the
law in one case reject, and in another
, case admit, precisely the same class of
: men as witnesses. ut mihi sic non
, omnibus
| A rule of law, whose opinion is thus
inevitably unequal and inconsistent, is of
course, founded on practical error.
The remedy for this legal imperfection
f is obvious and simple. When any man
? is offered as a witness in our courts, let
, the matter of his religious notions be re-
t garded, not as a ground of admission or
: of exclusion, but as invalidating or sub
: stantiating his credibiity, and 60, as an
: important fact, with his testimony, to the
| jury, who are the rightful judges as to
a the value and effect of the evidence bro't
, before them. If this were the course
;, pursued, then there could be no legal
t or rational objection to inquiring of the
It witness himself as to his religious opin-
ions but those opinions, like other facts
t calculated to effect the value of his testi-
r mony, might very properly be drawn from
: his own statements.
: This change of legal practice would
practically render the form of oath or
d promise immaterial; for he who regards
j an oath as obligatory upon his conscience,
= regards, also, a solemn promise as bind
S ing him in like manner: while he who
e does not acknowledgement force of an oath,
n denies, also, the validity of anv other form
y Of promise, SO far as the judgments ofGod
It are concerned.
S This modification of the law would
- leave every jury to decide for itself, wheth'
e er an atheist who has no fear of God be.