The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-09-28

PErEHssuRs, September -, 1897
Dear Sir-I perceive the Rsto,msr- Msrekant il !.
little FESTIVE on the subject Of The acostion Of Trss
suy-Schsms and National Bank msn.--combinins 10
PROSTATE the State Bank sys,sm, now and forever.
wish the coalescing parties be reminded Of oue or
two things Of some little importance To themselves.
perhaps.
Can the late friends OF the late administration have
forgotten the pssseted, and at one time, doubtful
struggle on the side to dsest the President Of the
United States Of the power to remove executive subor-
dnates from Office and ON the other side to prevent
Its adeYion, and to defend its exercise in the case Of
Duane and SO IN the Of any executive subordinate
TO whom an intermediate custody Of the public treasure
might by law be con6dedi The memorable struggle,
surely, cannot have been so soon exscnded from the
recollection Of the late friends Of the late admiuists
ton Can true ends Of the present admins,raoa ex-
pect the National Bank men to Join them in their ef-
forts TO establish the SubTreasuy system except upon
the condition that the President be deprived Of the
power to dispace the new set Of Treasury agents to
whom the scheme proposes the national revenue shall
DO entrusted from its collection to its disbursement
The National Bank men, being, at the same time,
Whgs," cannot join the administration friends Of the
Treasury scheme, except upon thar condition. without
to the eproach and rdcue Of the most manifest ncon
sisency, Can Mr. Calhoun Join them, unless il be ON
that condition, openy avowed by him, withal, il he
would maintain his character for frankness, Can the
friends Of the administration who are friends Of the
Treasury seek accept his alliance or that Of
any other wing, that condition Can they give up
the doctrine that the power Of removal belongs under
the constitution to the President! Is it not in it's very
nature part and parcel of the executive poweri Isi
not essential to due execution Of the laws and to
regular administration Of the public affairs What, as
the conscrpt fathers Of the republic used to ask would
become Of the public interests IL during the recess Of
the Senate the President could not remove an unfaith
full public oiceri If he could not dsplace corrupt
ambassador, or head of department, other officer
engaged In the finances, expenditures Of the govern
ment Is there doubt that the power resides in him, or
danger in its being in him As the question Of doubt
there can be none, Besides the REASON Of the doc
trne and its uncontested exercise for long train Of
years, it was decided, in 1885, after able and ami
mated debate on the bill for organizing The depart
ment Of foreign affairs" that the power Of removal by
the President could not be abridged by the Legislature
that the constitution gave it to him. and the people only
could take il from him. As to the question Of danger
from improper remarks, it was said by Mr. Madison ON
the occasion referred to- In the first place, tic Presi
dent will be impeachable by this House (of Representa-
tves) before the Senate, for such an act Of NAL adm
nistration; for contend that the wanton removal Of
merorious officers would subject him to impeachment,
and removal from his high trust" Then, they who
descry danger in this power residing in the President
must draw largely an idea Of universal compatibility
corrupt President and acorrupt House Of Representa-
tves! They who thus descy and vociferate danger,
might be better employed in examining their own boz
SONS, to find il that they mpute to Others the most
allied in the land be tho source il is the burhen
Of their charges.
It is in vain that Of the wings cite Mr. Leighs
suggestion Of scheme Of the Treasury agencies to
Disguise their design; or to prop their claim to consis
tency unless indeed, they intend insist upon sur
render Of the Presidents constitutional power Of
val. When Mr.. Leigh made the suggestion, in 1884,
he careful to fory it, and candidy too, with that
condition. He insisted that il the doctrines Of the
protest allowed, it would be true, that every at
tempt to regulate the Treasury by law, to appoint
the place Of deposte and Of safekeepng Of the
public money, would DO vain and ide"-that il the
President have the control Of the public treasure,
by virtue of the power Of removal under the scheme Of
Treasury agencies, "republcanism would be nothing
but empty sound--the modern great ones Jest"
: - Can, ask sgain-can the high contracting
parties come to terms Yours, G.