The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-12-09

enea the settled principles and policy Of ibe National
parry, and weakened in the same degree ours
I ihey are, and ever have been the decided adyo
cafes o. a National Bank, and are now in favor of
one WIN capital ample TO be sufficient to con-
o me state institutions and 10 regulate The curren
cy ana exchanges OF The country To ioin Them
Win helr aSowed object in the attack 10 overthrow
.nose "a power on the ground they occupied against
tnk, would Of course, not only have placed The
government and country in their hands, without OPP
position, bal would have committed us beyond Ire
possibility OF exircaion for b4nk and h,o,bad
our party in the ranks Of the National Republicans
me nrst lruits OF The victory would have been an
ovei-shadowing National Bank, with an immense
capital, mol less than fifty 10 an hundred millions
| which would have centralized the currency and ex
changes, and with them the commerce and capital OF
The country in whatever section the head of the in
stilntion might b. placed. The next would BE- The
indissouble union Of the political and money power
IN The hands Of our political opponents whose prin-
eiples and policy are so opposite 10 ours and so dan
gerouS TO our institutions as well oppressive 10
| us ..
| Such clearly would have been the inevitable re-
suit II we had joined In the assault on those in power
in the position they had been constrained TO occupy
and he must indeed be blind--all past experience
be lost on him, who does not see that so infatuated
course would have been fatal 10 us and ours. The
connection between the government and the b1nk
! would, by necessary consequence In the hands of
that party, have led 10 renewal of that system of
unequal and oppressive legislation. which has i'm
i
\ have escaped with such peril and difficulty. The
4 bank when united with the government, is the ma.
/ ural ally OF high duties and extravagant experdi-
| ture The greater the revenue, and The more pro-
fuse the disbursements, the greater its circulation,
] and the more ample its deposites This tendency on
the part of that institution, and the known principles
and views of policy of the party, would have coope-
rated with irresistible force, to renew the system we
! have pulled down with much labor, with az
gravation Of It's oppression far beyond thing
have yet experienced and thus the fruits of all
our exertions and struggles against the system would
| have been lost--forevsr lost
BY taking the opposite course the reverse Of all
this will follow, if our Stale Rights party be but firmly
united and true to their principles Never was there
before and never prob bly, will there be again fair
an opportunity to carry out fully principles and
policy, and reap the fruits Of long and ardu-
GUS struggle. BY keeping the banks and The govern
ment separated, efeciually prevent the cenlraIi-
cation of the currency and exchanges Of the coun-
try at one point and Of course the and the
capital leaving each to enjoy that portion which its
natural advantages, with its industry and enrerprize
| may command BY refusing TO join our late allies
in their attack on those in power where they have
sheltered themselves, We prevent the complete as
cendancy of the party and their principles, which
must have followed, and gain the only opportunity
we could have of rallyng anew the old State Rights
party of 1927, on the ground they then occupied,
an opposing power, TO hold in check their old orpo-
nentS the National Republican party. 1t would also
give US the chance OF ehecing what still more i'm
portant to US, the union Of the entire South The
Southern division Of the administration party must
re-occupy the old State Rights ground They have
no alternative; and unless who have so long, and
under SO many difficulties, adhered to il, shall now
desert our stand, the South must be united. If once
united, will rally round the old State Rights par
ty all in every section who are opposed 10 CONSOLE
daton, the overaction of the central govern men;
and the political parties will again be formed on the
old and natural division Of Stale Rights and Nation
al which divided them at the commencement of TIE
i government, and which experience has shown. is
nf mar mo n yCtpp1
and most favorable 10 its successful operation.
/ As obvious as oil this must appear felt that as
sumed heavy responsibility in taking the course
did II was impossible that all the circumstances
and motives, under which l acted could at once be
generally understood and, of course, the part
coinpelledto take was liable to be misconceved and
grossly misrepresened. We had been SO long con-
tending against the abuses and encroachmenis of The
Executive power TO forget that they originated in
the prior abuses and encroachments Of Congress and
were accordingly exclusively intent expelling
from office, those who had acquired and exercised
their authority in manner SO dangerous, with ut
rejecting into whose hands the power would go, and
what principles and policy would gain the ascend
ancy With this stale Of feeling on the part of
friends, saw it was impossible to take position,
which, by consequence was calculated y cover those
in power, however urgent the cause, without occa-
sioninS Shock in the first instance, and the impu-
tatun ofunworlhy motives, TO meet which, however
transient the Misrepresentation might be, required
some resolution and frmness.
But there were Other and far greater causes Of re-
sponsblty, To which this as nothing, OF all
the interests in the community the blnkng is BY far
the most influential and formidable-the active,
and the most concentrated and pervadng and of all
the points, within the immense circle OF this interest
there is none, in relation to which the banks
more sensitive and tenacious, than their union with
political power Of the country. This is the source
of vast amount of their profits and Of still larger
portion of their responsibility and influence. To
touch their interest this tender point is combine
all in one united and jealous opposition, with some
exceptions in our portion of the community, where
the union of the two powers acts njuriously TO the
banking well as to the commercial and other great
interests of the section.
To encounter so formidable an opposition support
ed by political party with whom had been acting
for some years against entire power, and who
! garded the union Of the Government and the nkS
as essential 10 the union of the States themselves,
was to assume heavy responsibility, under the most
4 favorable circumstances; bat to back and sustain
those in such opposition in whose WISDOM firnness
and patriotism, have reason to confde and over
whom have no control is to double that responsible
lily, This responsibility have voluntarily assumed
! Desiring neither office, nor power, and having TO
| hope personally from the movement, motive, but
the disastrous political consequences which clearly
saw must follow from any other course, to the coun-
try and its institutions generally and section in
duced me to take the stepl did. That it has met the
appreciation of SO respectable a portion of my old
constituents and friends whose early and sieadlast
support under every trial and difficulty am so much
| indebted, is source of deep qualification which
shall long remember and acknowledge
With great respect, ! am, &c
-. II, J. G. CALHOUN.
NJ. Laborde J. Jones, +. II. Wardlaw, j. w.
Wimhish Cnmmter