The Columbia Democrat. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1837-1850, 1837-09-16

the ADDITIONAL expenses, at the safne estlina'e'
si,tv thousand dollars a year.
There can he no doubt Of the obligation
Of those who are entrusted with the affairs
or government. to conduct them with as NJ
lie cost to the nation as is consistent WIFI
the public interest; anditis for Congress
and ultimately for the people, to decide
whether the benefits TO be derived from kee-
ping our fiscal concerns apart, and sever
inc the conncxion which has hitherto eXis-
ted between the government and banks
offer sufficient advantages to justify the
necessary expenses. If the object TO be
ACCOMPLISHED is deemed important to the
future welfare of the country, cannot allow
myself TO believe that the addition to the pub
lie expenditure Of comparatively so small
| an amount as will be necessary to effect 1t,
will be obie cted 10 by the people.
1t will be seen by the report of the Post
master General, herewith communicated
that the fiscal affairs of that Department
have been successfully conducted since
Nav last upon the principle of dealing only
in the legal currency of the United States,
and that it needs no legislation to MAINTAIN
its credit, and facilitate the management OF
its concerns; the existing laws being, in the
opinion of that officer, ample for those
objects. .,
Difficulties will doubtless he encountered
for a seas on, and Increased services requir-
ed from the public iunctionarics; such are
usually incident to the commencement OF
every system, but they will be greatly les
sened in the progress Of its operation.
The power and influence supposed to he
connected with the custody and dis
bursement of tie public money is naturally
and, with great propriety, peculiarly sensl-
tive. Much has been said on them, IN
reference to the proposed separation ct the
government from the banking institutions:
and surely no one can object TO any appeals
or Snimadversinns on the subject, which
are consistent with facts, ard evincea pro-
per respect for the intelligence Of the peo-
pie. Ifa Chief Magistrate may be allow
ell to speak for himself on such point,
can truly say, that to me nothing would be
more acceptable than the Withdrawal from
the executive, to the greatest practicable
extent, of all concern in the custody and
disbursement of the public revenue; moi
that would shrink from any responsibility
cast upon me by the duties otmy office
but because it is my firm belief, that its
capacity for usefulness is no degree promo
ted by the possession Of any patronage no
actually necessary 10 the performance o
those duties.-But under our present form
of government, the intervention OF thu
Executive officers in the custody and dis
hursement of the public money seems TO ht
unavoidable; and before it can be admitted
that the influence and power of the EXecu
tive would be increased by dispensing witt
the agency of banks, the nature of that inter
vention in such an agency must be careful
ly regarded, and a comparison must b
instituted between its extent in the tw
cases.
r The revenue can only he collected b.
officers appointed by the President, wit
the advice a. consent of the Senate. Th
public moneys, in the first instance, mus
-, therefore, in all cases, pass through hand
selected by the Executive. Other officer
!, appointed in the same way, or, as in som
cases, by the President alone, must also h
entrusted with them when drawn for III
: purpose of disbursement. 1t is thus see
that, even when banks are employed, tn
\ public funds must twice pass through I'll
= hands Of the Executive officers. Beside
this, the head of the treasury department
= who also holds his Office at the pleasure
:, the president, and some other officers of II
=. same department, must necessarily lie il
q vested with more or less power in the s.
= lection, continuance, and supervision,
the banks that may he employed. TT
i question is then narrowed to the sing
: point, whether, in the intermediate stat
= between the collection and disbursement
i the public money. the agency of banks
/ necessary to avoid a dangerous cxtensiC
h Of the patronage and influence Of the exec
;. tive! But is it clear that the connection
- the executive with powerful moneyed inst
:. tutons, cap1hle of ministcring to the inte
# est Of men in points where they are mo
accessible TO corruption, is less liable
:. ahtfSe, than his constitutional agency in II
s appointment and control of the few publ
II officers required by the proposed plar
% VIII the public money, when in their hand
= he necessarily exposed to any improp
n interference on the part of the Executv
e May it not he hoped that a prudent fear
3. public jealousy and disapporbalion, in
J. matter so peculiarly exposed to them, vi
.NFw /. r