Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1837-09-15

1.-THE character and diminish the influence of
our political system. and bring once more
into existence concentrated moneyed power
hostile 10 the spirit, and threatening the per
manency, Of our republican institutions.
Local banks have been employed for the
deposte and distribution OF the revenue, at
all times partially, and on three different &C.
casions, exclusively: first, anterior to the es
adjustment Of the first Bank of the United
States; secondly. in the interval between the
termination of that institution and the char
ter of its successor: and thirdly, during the
limited period which has now so abruptly
closed The connection, thus repeatedly at
tempted, proved unsatisfactory on each sue
cessive OCCASION notwithstanding the various
measures which were adopted to facilitate or
insure its success On the last occasion, IN
the year 1888, the employment of the State
Banks was guarded. especially. in every
way which experience and caution could
suggest. Personal security was required
for the safe-keeping and prompt payment of
the moneys TO be received; and full returns
Of their condition were, from time TO time to
be made by the deposi,aries ln the first
stages, the measures were eminently success
ful, Notwithstanding the violent opposition Of
the Bank OF the United States. and the I'M
leasing efforts made 10 overthrow it, The
selected banks performed. with fidelity. and
without any embarrassment TO themselves or
TO the community, their engagements TO the
Government; and the system promised to be
permanently useful But when i, became
necessary. under the act Of June, 1896, to
Withdraw from them the public money. for
the purpose OF placing il in additional inst.
buttons. or Of transferring il to the States. they
found il, in many cases, announcement to COM
| ply with the demands Of the Treasury, and
numerous and pressing applications were
made for indulgence or relief, As the in
siamen,s underline deposit law became pay
able, their own embarrassments. and the ne
icessity under which they lay Of cuitailing
their discounts and calling in their debts, in
creased the general distress, and contributed.
with other causes, to hasten the revulsion in
which. al length. they in common with the
other banks, were fatally involved.
4 Under these circumstances. it becomes
our solemn duty to enquire whether there are
not. 10 any connection between the Govern
ment aud banks Of issue. evils Of great mag
niiude. inherent in its very nature, aud
. lagainst which no precautions can effsctually
! guard
Unforeseen in the organization Of the
} Government. and forced on the Treasury by
early necessities. the practice Of employing
banks was, in truth. from the beginning
I more a measure Of emergency than sound
policy. When we started into existence as
! a nation in addition to the burdens Of the
, new Government, we assumed all the large
bui honorable load OF debt which was the
: price Of our liberty; but we hesitated to
weigh down the infant industry OF the coun-
: try by resoriing TO adequate taxation for the
2 necessary revenue The facilities Of banks
S in return for the privileges they acquired
e were promptly offered, and, perhaps, toe
+ readily received by an embarrassed Treasu
e ry. During The long continuance of ma
4 tiona debt and the intervening difficulties O
: a foreign war, the connexion was continued
/; from motives of convenience. But these
: causes have long since passed away. We
: have no emergencies that make banks ne
cessary 10 aid the wants Of Treasury; we
n have no load of national debt to provide for
$ and We have on actual deposit a large sur
plus. No public interest, therefore. now re
!. quires the renewal of a connexon that cir
o cumstances have dissolved The com
i pe,e organization OF our Government; tn,
a abundance of our resources; the genera
$ harmony which prevails between the differ
J. ent States and with foreign powers-all en-
d able us now TO select the system most con
b sisient with the constitution, and most condu
j. Give to the public welfare Should we, then
!. lconnect the Treasury, for the fourth time
!. with the local banks, il can only be under
!. conviction that past failures have arisel
n from accidental, not inherent defects.
: A danger, difficult if not impossible to b
/, avoided in such an arrangement, is mad
h slrikingly evident in the very event by which
v il has now been defeated. A sudden act o
p the banks intrusted with the funds of the PEG
/, pie deprives the Treasury. without fault o
r agency Of the Government, OF the ability t
II pay It's creditors in the currency they hav,
e by law right to demand This circum
a stance, no fluctuation Of commerce coult
il have Produced if the public revenue has
l. been collected in the legal currency, ant
y kept in that form by the officers ofthe Treas
r lury. The citizen whose moneyw in bank
n receives il back, since the suspension. at
r. sacrifice in its amount; whilst he who KEEP
l. il in the legal currency ofthe country, an,
e in his own possession, pursues without los
l. the current of his business The Govern
i Iment, placed in the situation of the former
n is involved in embarrassments il could no
v have suffered. had il pursued the course 0
r the latter. These embarrassmenls ar
% moreover augmented by those salutary an,
just laws which forbid il to use deprecate,