The Madisonian. [volume] (Washington City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]) 1837-1845, 1837-09-23

ness, anu tne stagnauon oil commerce, money
| in the Atlantic cities was abundant, idle, and
seeking Investment at four or FIVE per cent
| So says Mr.. Cheves-so we can all remem-
ber-but to refresh memories, and establish
this important fact. will read paragraph
from Mr.. Cheve's late letter to DR., Cooper:
Before the close Of the first year Of my
administration. adequate capital had been as
signed to the Offices in which it had been de-
| ficient, and the bank and its Offices generally,
then or very soon after, were in condition to
do extensive business, had the situation of the
country permitted il. But the commerce Of the
country became perfectly stagnant. Money
was drug. The bank, to keep up its bust
ness as far as possible, discounted long pa
per, say at four and six months, and perhaps
longer. Il was even proposed, with the same
object, to lower the rate Of interest to FIVE per
cent. believe local banks at Boston did, in
some instances, discount at that rate. In Phil
adelphia, think, the local banks discounted
paper having nine months to run, and perhaps
more The commerce Of the country was
reduced from a state Of great excitement,
such as we have just Witnessed, to state OF
collapse, such as / fear we may soon suffer
Under these circumstances the discounts fell
of, the bank was too safe. 1t had, at times,
believe, as much specie, perhaps more, in
its vaults than il had notes i'm circulation
Under this want OF demand for money, was
SO fortunate as to obtain the public loans, to
the amount Of six millions of dollars, which
the bank was able to pay for and retain an
abundance of specie in its vaults"
Such is the testimony of Mr. Cheves, and
thus easily and rapidly did the recuperutive
energies OF this young, vigorous, athletic
country recover from the depression and de-
ISOLATION Of that day. The effect cannot be
different now on the contrary, the recovery
must be more rapid and easy ; for the distress
now is not the tythe of what il was then the
real money in the country, the gold and sill
yer, was not the fourth part then Of what it is
now the distress then was all real, and no
part Of It assumed, pretended, artificial, forced,
and fictitious, contrived with malice afore-
thought, to govern elections and politics, and
to coerce the revivifcation Of national bank.
remember the times Of which Mr.. Cheves
speaks. came to the Senate in 1890; and
know that his picture Of the abundance of
money, the facility Of getting loans, and the
low rate of interest, is entirely just Our own
Legislation proves it for loan of three mil
lions was authorized in the session of 1919
millions, both expressly to defray the current
expenses of the Government; and both loans
were eagerly bid for by capitalists, and at
rates considerably below six per cent. It was
six millions out Of these eight that Mr.
Cheves congratulates himself for having been
fortunate enough 10 obtain for the Bank OF the
| United States. The picture drawn by Mr..
Cheves is correct as applicable to the Allan
tic board, for which he intended it; it is not
correct as applicable to the West, and was
not SO intended by him. The great region did
not recover for several years after 1919. 1t
had been eviscerated Of its gold and silver
to sustain the Bank of the United States! 1t
had been sacrificed to save that bank AT the
time that Mr.. Cheves refers to, it was, SO far
as the precious metals were concerned, the
empty skin Of an inundated victim, sacrificed
upon the altar Of salvation to foreign insti-
| tuition. Not so now. Thanks to the ever
glorious Treasury order. That order has
saved the West from the fate which over
whelmed her for SO many years after the re-
vulsion of 1919. She is not now, in respect
to money or any thing else, the empty skin Of
sacrificed victim. She has her fair proper
ton of all The blessings of good government,
as well as her fair proportion of all the bless
ings of Heaven. She is able and willing to
pay her share Of the public revenue in solid
money. The sales Of the public lands, since
the suspension of specie payments, are fully
equal to what they were in the best years be-
fore the two years Of the bank expansions and
mad speculations. These sales have gone on
in June, July, and August, at a rate to yield
near four millions per annum, which is equal
to the best years before 1885 and SO. Mr..
Cheves was right in his picture of the money
ed plethora on the Atlantic board. 1t was a
drug there in less than one year after the
great catastrophe Of 1919; it will be a drug
there again, and from the same causes
stagnation of trade and collapse Of business
within few months. 1t is on the Atlantic
board that these Treasury notes will be bor-
roYed. Money will be loaned upon them.
They will be taken as investments, to be laid
by; not as currency, to be showed into circu-
lation. ID"
The bill has been denounced as the germ
of new national debt. 1t certainly proposes
the creation Of debt. But for what purpose,
and under what circumstances To comply
with the maxim, that public debt is public
blessing! By no means But to relieve the
States from being called upon for reimburse
ment Of any part Of the twenty-seven millions
dollars which have been deposited with them
to relieve the merchants from an immediate
payment Of four millions-and to relieve the
late deposite banks from an immediate press
for six millions. This, is the object. The
loan Of ten millions on the Treasury notes
comes in place Of the four and six millions
due from merchants and the banks. 1t is be.
cause we cannot collect one, that we create
the other. If we had the ten millions from
the merchants and the banks, we should not
want the Treasury notes; not being able to