The North-Carolina standard., 1837-10-11

Is, disguise it as you may, between discon-
nectlon and Bank of the United States
This Is the real issue to which all must
come, and ought now to be openly and fair
ly met.
But there are difficulties, in the way of a
national bank, no loss formidable than a re-
connection with the State banks. 1t is ut
terly impracticable at present to establish
one. There is reason to believe that ma
Jorlty OF the people of the United States are
deliberately and unalterably opposed to it
AT all events, there is a numerous, respecta-
bic, and powerful party, I refer to the old
States Rights party, who are, and ever have
been, from the beginning of the Government.
opposed to the bank, and whose opinions
thus long and firmly entertained, ought at
least to be SO much respected as to forbid the
creation. of one without an amendment of
the constitution. To this must be added the
lnsuperable difficulty, that, the Executive
branch Of the Governments is openly opposed
to 1t, and pledgedato interpose his veto, on
constitutional grounds, should bill pass to
incorporate one. For four years at least
then, it will be mpracticable to charter a
bank. What must be done in the mean
time2 Shall the Treasury be organized to
perform the functions, which have been re-
Gently discharged by the thnks, or shall the
State institutions be again employed until a
bank can be created? In the one case, we
shall have the So much vilifed and denoun-
| ced sub-treasury, as it is lalled; and in the
| other, difficulties insurmorhtable would grow
up against the establishn ent of bank
Let the State institutions e once reinstated
and reunited to the Government as their
fiscal agents, and they will be found the first
and most strenuous oppontnts of national
bank, by which they woult be overshadow
ed and curtailed in their Profits. hold it
certain, that in prosperous times, when the
State banks are in full opfation, it is impos-
sihle to establish nationl bank. Its crea-
ton, then, should the reunion with the State
banks take place, will b{ postponed, until
some disaster, similar to the present, shall
again befall the country. But it requires lit
tie of the spirit of prophecy to see, that such
another disaster would the death of the
whole system. Already ihas had two par
alytic strokes-the third you'd prove fatal.
But suppose these difficulties were over
come, would still be OPT JoseG to the incor-
the relief, which many anticipate, it would
be the most disastrous measure that could
be adopted. AS great as is the calamity un-
der which the country s suffering, it is no
thing to what would follow the creation Of
| such an institution, Ter existing circum-
stances. In order to compel the State insti-
tutions to pay specie, the bank must have
capital as great, or neatly as great, IN pro-
portion to the existing institutions, as the
late bank had when established, to those of
that day. This would give it an immense
| capital, not much less than one hundred mil
lions of dollars, of which large proportion,
say twenty millions, must be specie. From
what source is it to be derived2 From the
State banks? 1t would empty their vaults,
andleave them in the most helpless condi-
ton. From abroad, and England IN partic-
ular it would reproduce that revulsive cur
rent, which has lately covered the country
with desolation. The tide is still running
to Europe, and if forced back by any artii-
cial cause, before the foreign debt is paid,
cannot but be followed by the most disas-
trous consequences.
But suppose this difficulty is overcome,
and the bank re-established, ask what would
be the effects under such circumstances q
| Where would it find room for business, COM
mensurate with its extended capital, with
out crushing the State institutions, enfeebled
bv the withdrawal of their means in order to
create the instrument of their oppression g
A few of the more vigorous might survive
but the far greater portion, with their debt.
ors, creditors. and stockholders, would be in
volved in common ruin. The bank would
indeed, give specie currency, not by ena
bling the existing institutions to resume, bu
by destroying them and taking their place.
Those who take a different lew, and sc
fondly anticipate relief from a national bank
are deceived, by supposed analogy between
| tho rrosopt cifuof fiop of tho country md tho
of 1916, when the late bank was chartered
after the war with Great Britain. l was ar
actor in that scene, and may be permitted
to speak in relation to it with some little au
thority. Between the two periods, there i:
little or no analogy. They stand almost IL
contrast. In 1916, the Government was :
debtor to the banks, now it is a creditor
difference of the greatest importance, as ia
as the present question is concerned. Th'
banks had over issued, it is true, but thei
over issues were to the Government; sol
vent and able debtor, whose credit held b!
the banks in the shape of stock, was at par
1t was their excessive issues to the Govern
ment on its stocks, which mainly caused tn
suspension; in proof of which, it is a remark
able fact, that the depreciation of bank pape
under gold and silver was about equal to tn
proportion which the Government stock hell
by the banks bore to their issues. 1t wa
this excess that hung on the market and de
pressed the value of their notes. The solu
ton is easy. The banks took the Govern
ment stock payable in twelve years, and is
sued their notes for the same, payable o.
demand, in violation Of the plainest princl
pies of banking. 1t followed of course tina
when their notes were presented for pay
ment they had nothing but Governmen
stock to meet them. But its stock was
par, and all the banks had to do was to
into market with the stock they held, an
t take up their notes, and thus the exces