The People's press, and anti-masonic Democrat. [volume] (Middlebury, Vt.) 1836-1838, 1837-09-12

an average of thirty thousand dollars but that,
deductng one million for the use OF the mint, and
assuming the remaining four millions to be in the
hands Of one half the present number Of officers
"a supposition deemed more likely to correspond
with the fact-the sum in the hands ofeach would
still be less than the amount of the most of the
bonds now taken from the receivers of public
money.
Every apprehension, however, on the subject,
either in respect to the safety Of the money, or
the faithful discharge ofthese fiscal transactions
may, it appears to me, be effectually removed
by adding to the present means of The Treasu-
ry the establishment by law, at few important
points, of offices for the deposite ard disburse
ment of such portions of the public revenue as
cannot, with obvious safety and convenience,
be left in the possession of the collecting off,
GERS until paid over by them TO the public cre-
ditors. Neither the amounts retained in their
hands, nor those deposited in the Offices, would,
in an ordinary condition Of the revenue, be
larger in most cases than those often under the
control of disbursing officers of the Army and
Navy, and might be made entirely safe, by re.
quiring such securities, and exercising such
controlling supervision, as Congress may by
law prescribe. The principal officers whose
appointments would become necessary under
this plan, taking the largest number suggested
by the Secretary ofthe Treasury, would not ex-
coed ten !; nor the additional expenses, at the
same estimate, sixty thousand dollars year.
There can be no doubt of the obligation Of
those who entrusted with the affairs of Go
vernment, to conduct them with as little cost to
the nation, as is consistent with the public in
terest: and it is for congress, and ultimately
for the people, to decide whether the benefits to
be derived from keeping our fiscal concerns
apart, and severing the connection which has
hitherto existed between the Government and
banks, offer sufficient advantages to Justify the
necessary expenses. If the object to be &C.
complished is deemed important to the future
welfare Of the country, cannot allow myself to
believe that the addition to the public expendit-
ure, of comparatively SO small an amount as
will be necessary to effect it, will be objected to
by the people.
| 1t will be seen by the report of the Postmas-
ter General, herewith communicated, that the
fiscal affairs of that department have been Sue
cessfully conducted since May last upon the
the principle Of dealing only in the legal cur
rency of the United States, and that it needs no
Legislation to maintain its credit, and facilitate
the management of its concerns the existing
laws being, i'll the opinion of that officer, ample
for those objects.
Difficulties will doubtless be encountered for
season, and increased services required from
the public functionares such are usually Incl
dent to the commencement of every system,
but they will be greatly lesSened in the progress
of its operations.
The power and influence supposed to be
connected with the custody and disbursement
ofthe public money, are topics on which the
public mind is naturally, and with great propri-
ETY. peculiarly sensitive. Much has been said
on them, in reference to the proposed separation
of the Government from the banking nstitu-
tons |; and surely no one can object to anyep-
peals or animadvcrsions on the subject, which
are consistent with facts, and evince proper
respect for the intelligence Of the people. If
Chief Magistrate may be allowed to speak for
himself, on such point can truly say, that to
me nothing would be more acceptable, than the
withdrawal from the Executive, to the greatest
practicable extent, of all concern in the custody
and disbursement of the public revenue not
that | would shrink from any responsibility cast
upon me by the duties of my office, but because
it is my firm belief, that its capacity for useful
ness is in no degree promoted by the possession
of any patronage not actually necessary to the
performance Of those duties. But under our
present form Of Government, the Intervention
of the Executive officers in the custody and dis
bursement Of the public money seems TO be un-
avoidable and before it can be admitted that
the influence and power of the Executive would
be increased by dispensing with the agency of
banks, the nature of that Intervention in such
an agency must be carefully regarded, and
comparison must be instituted between It's ex-
tent in the two cases.
The revenue can only be collected by Off
GERS appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. The public mon-
les, III the first instance, must therefore, in all
cases, pass through hands selected by the Ex-
ecutive. Other officers appointed in the same
way, or, as in some cases, by the President
alone, must also be entrusted with them when
drawn for the purpose of disbursement. 1t is
thus seen that, even when banks are employed,
the public funds must twice pass through the
hands ofthe Executive officers. Besides this.
the head of the Treasury Department. who also
holds his office at the pleasure of the President,
and some other officers of the same department
must necessarily be invested with more or less
power in the selection, continuance, and super
vision, ofthe banks that may be Employed
The question is then narrowed to the single
point, whether, in the intermediate stage be-
tween the collection and disbursement of the
public money, the agency OF banks is necessa
ry 10 avoid dangerous extension of the pat
ronage and influence Of the executive But it
is clear that the connection of the Executive
with powerful monied institutions capable Of
ministering to the interests of men in points