The North-Carolina standard., 1837-10-11


creditors. The effect was to dispense still
further with the use of the precious metals
In that great commercial country, which, of
course caused them to flow out in every di-
rection through the various channels of its
commerce. A large portion took their di-
rection hitherward, and served still further
to increase the current which, from causes
already enumerated, was flowing so strong
ly in this direction, and which still further
increased the force of the returning current,
on the turn of the tide. .a
The administration did not comprehend
the difficulties and dangers which surround
ed it. Instead of perceiying the true reason
OF the expansion of the currency, and adopt
ing the measures necessary to arrest it, they
attributed it to the Bank of the u. States,
and made it the cause or pretext for waging
war on that institution. Among the first
acts OF hostility, the deposites were remov-
ed, and transferred to selected State Banks:
the effect Of which, instead of resisting the
tendency to expansion, was to throw off the
only restraint that held the banking institu-
tions of the country in check: and of course
gave to the swelling tide, which was destin-
ed to desolate the country, a powerful inn
pulse. Banks sprung up in every direction:
discounts and issues increased almost with
out limitation: and an immense surplus re-
venue accumulated in the deposite banks,
which after the payment Of the public debt
| the most extravagant appropriations could
not exhaust, and which acted as additional
banking capital; the value of money daily
deprecated: prices rose, and then commenc-
ed those unbounded speculations, particular
| ly in public lands, which was transferred,
by millions of acres, from the public to the
spectators for worthless bank notes, till at
length the swelling flood was checked and
the revulsive current burst its barriers, and
overspread and desolated the land. -,
The first check came from the Bank of
England, which, alarmed at the loss of its
precious metals, refused to discount Ameri-
can bills, in order to prevent further decrease
of its cash means, and cause a return Of
execution of the deposite act, which, instead
made, if properly executed, was made the
instrument of weakening the banks at the
point of pressure, especially in the great me-
tropolis of the Union, where so large por-
tion of the surplus revenue was accumulate
ed. And, finally, the Treasury order, which
still further weakened those banks, by with
drawing their cash means to be invested in
public lands in the west.
1t is often easy to prevent what cannot be
remedied, which the present instance strong
y illustrates. If the administration had
formed a true conception of the danger In
time, what has since happened might have
then been easily averted. The near ap.
proach of the expiration of the charter of the
United States Bank would have afforded
ample means Of staying the desolation, if il
had been timely and properly used. saw
it then, and proposed to renew the charter,
for limited period, with such notifications
as would have efectually resisted the in
creasing expansion Of the currency and, at
the same time, gradually and finally wear
out the connection between the bank and the
Government. To use the expression then
used, ''to unbank the banks" to let down the
system easily and so to effect the separation
between the bank and the Government, as
to avoid the possibility of that shock which
| then saw was inevitable without some
such remedy. The moment was eminently
propitious. The precious metals were flow
ing in on us from every quarter; and the
vigorous measures purposed to adopt in the
! renewal OF the charter would have effectual-
ly arrested the increase of banks, and check.
ed the excess of their discounts and issues
so that the accumulating mass of gold and
silver, instead of being converted into bank
; capital and swelling the tide Of paper circu.
lation, would have been substituted in the
place of bank notes, as permanent anl
wholesome addition TO the currency of ths
country.
But neither the administration nor the op
position sustained me, and the precious op
4 tportunity passed unseized. then clear1,
saw the coming calamity was inevitable, ant
it has neither arrived sooner, nor is it great
er, than what expected.
Such are the leading causes which hav,
produced the present disordered state of tn
currency There are others of a minor char
acter, connected with the general condition
of the commercial world, and the operation
of the Executive branch of the Government
but which of themselves would have pro
duced but little effect. To repeat the caus
es in few words, the vast increase whicl
!, the tariff of 1924 and '28 gave to the 6sca
the causes have enumerated, gave the frs
impulse to the expansion of the currency
These in turn gave that extraordinary i'm
pulse to overtrading and speculation 1.-THE,
are ehe:ts, and not causes, ) which has final
: ly terminated in the present calamity.
may thus be ultimately traced to the con
nexion between the banks and the Govern
ment; and it is not little remarkable tha
the suspension of specie payments in 1871
: in this country, and that OF 1897 in Grea
Britain, were produced by like causes:
f There is another reason against the un
ion of the Government and the banks, init
t mately connected with that under considera
ton, which shall next proceed to state.
f ftgives preference to one portion of citizen
! over another, that is neither fair, equal, nc
E consistent with the spirit of our institution:
/ That the connexion between the bank an
] the Government; the receiving and payin
e away their notes as cash, and the use OF th
: public money from the time of the collectio
to the disbursement, is the source of In