Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-13

ms "'' w. =, nreren, his approach Inc TWO ior,s
rono.ed n he erected ut Fhr"g NECK sau no,noI
olnt eign hvond the reach Of their guns and would
ii' " ~ ,ht distance his marcia, While, on the No'n
mus aGu .Ia river would be ulerposed between him
and the city On The Long sSe tGeas woo'
II is obvious, then, that in the consideration OF THIS
, involving an estimated expenditure, in the aggre.
gate Of 5,S07 1863, and efficient gurrsons IN time VI
war of 9uC0 men, close investigation should be mace
into all the circumstances likely to influence the opera
tons of an enemy Is the anchorage ground between
the Nar.ows aud Sandy Hook of sufficient value 10 an
enemy looking to the rick of his Occupation " 49,.
coast, and to the doubts that may be reasonao'y s
tained Of the result ofso great an experiment
red on, in fact, in the sea- to authorize Inc r.
menl of these works without new exa'iia'o''
is The probability of the Decentralization ol "n liam
Gravesend bay, in preference to some o'h'' pun: 80
the coast of Long Island, II conseT ba s,mr o,es
great as to require these preparations: ne sa'e r
tuns may be usked respecting Ri'kIns l"'''' nv
work at hrog Point is in the process OF @ ;d
and as the river is only about three.touttiis oi % W.
a, This place think its completion would be suihcieh'
for this line of defence till the proposed general e@aniA
The situation of New York sfords fine theatre inr
the operation Of floating batteries; ana "he.lei eu.
ci.r, nhr of them would secure it from the designs
of an enemy better than the full completion OF The e5
tensve system of permanent torlltcatlons recommend
ed, is question deserving investigation oucll an III.
ves,iraon recommend; and alter all inc necessary
should proceed place this COMMERCIAL metropolis OF 'e
country in q state Of security.
The works al Newport cover about twenty acres and
will mount 4CS guns, und will need Tor their de'ehce
ahou, two thousand four hundred cannot, my
self forescc the existence Of any circumstances which
now call for fortress of this magnitude IN the very heaF
Of New England, constructed, not merely to command
the arbor OF Newport bat TO resist siege when "ouo
probably require nearly twenty thousand men TO carry
i, on AM at loss TO conjecture what adequate mo-
tive could induce foreign government to dclach meet
and army upon this enterprise ] lie expense "ou'o oe
enormous The French army that invaded Egypt was
less than 10000 men, and required tor ' au
transportation between 500 and GOO vessels line army
that conquered Algcrs about equal III force, ana re-
uurrd ii is said, about 4U0 transports. besides the ships
of war This scale Of preparation for enterprises against
the shores Of the Mediterranean may enable US TO furm
some conception Of the arrangements that would he ne
cessary send the ocean 10 this county, IN the
present day of its powrr expedition strong 10
form an establishment upon our shores, and TO furnish II
with supplies necessary 10 its subsistence and operations
1t has been supposed indeed, by the Board of Eng-
ncers that an army would find sufficient reason tor the
occupation Of Rhode Island, in the consideration that II
would afford secure lodgmcnt, whence expeditions
could be sent to every part OF our coast But II Is 10 DC
otserved that part Of Naragansc Bay is necessary
for the safety uf hostile fleet watching that part OF our
coast, Gardeners Bay, in that vicinity, IS most safe
and convenient station, which occupied by the Br
fish during almost the whole OF The late war ana Is
pretty clear that be defended by taunay
Notifications that can be constructed. II it can, ny
floating batteries may Management bay and the enc
nv thus prevented from occupying the latter Also with
GU. these extensive urrangeents requiring, after Fort
Adams shall have been completed at an expense OF one
million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars four
other forts and wall to be constructed, and eleven
hundred and yseven thousand dollars to be expended
do not think that tho most prudent forecast ought to
lead 10 the apprehension that force competent 10 seize
such a position, would be sent to country, or that
anv circumstances could enable them 10 maintain 1t IN
the face Of the vigorous efforts that would be made to re-
cover it, and in the midst "f country abounding IN all
the to give effect 10 their eIerons But perhaps
the most striking objection to the completion OF this e1
rnsive plan is, that under possible Circumstance
it effect the desired object That object, 1t understand
it. is not the mere exclusion Of an enemy from Rhode
Island but it is prevent him from taking possession
of safe and Convenient position, whence he could de-
lach his forces by of his naval superiority, to
nuy other part othe cust which would thus be exposed
10 his depredations
The value of Gardiners Bay place of naval rem
devious, have already described Block Island, in
its ncg hborhood, cnud be occupied by troops desiring
only lodgmcnt; and could Nantucket Island,
and Marthas Vineyard and these are only few hours
sail from Narragansett Bay. Buzzard's Bay is also
safe and capacious harbnr which cannot be defended,
and Mar,IIa's Vineyard Sound affords commodinus
places of anchorage. fleet riding in these moorings
would have under its command ell the islands IN THIS
group, and could secure its communications with It's
land forces encamped upon them, which would thus be
enabled at any proper nc to throw itself upon other
parts of the 1t may be doubted if there not
cannon mounted upon Rhode Island, whether enc
NV acquainted with the topography and resources of
this country would select it his place Of arms, if
NAV 50 term it, when hcrs islands III The neghbor
hood which would answer this purpose nearly as WE'LL
and where lie would be in perfect safety long he
could maintain his naval ascendancy; and longer than
that he could not, under any circumstances: occupy
Rhode Island. And if rightly appreciate the strength
and spirit of that part OF the country, his tenure IN any
event. would be short aud difficult. do not mean to
convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be de-
sll,, be %
precautions should be taken against events which are
not likely to happen. AS there is no naval establish
here it is not necessary to enter into any question
concerning defensive arrangements exclusively CONNECT
ed with that object.
II will be perceived, also, that il is prnpoIed TO fory
Mount Desert island the coast Of Maine, aud that
the cxpcuse is estimated live hundred thousand dollars
aud the number of the garrison competent to MAINTAIN
it. at one thousand men. This proposition is founded
not on the value OF this arbor TO US, for possesses lit
,e and is in effect unoccupied, hut account of It's
Importance 10 the enemy Were there no other secure
position they could occupy in that quarter and which
could not be defended, should think the views submit
ted upon this branch Of the subject entitled 70 great
weight. But there are many indentnlions upon this
coast aording safe anchorage and which are either not
gable of being defended, from their great number
would Involve enormous expense, which no sound
views Of the subject could justify. An enemy, there
fore cannot be deprived of the means of stationing him
self upon this coast And before this expenditure at
Mount Desert island is encountered it ought TO be clear
~ a5ceTt1lned tne
tagrs to an enemy, between the occupation Of Mount
Desert island and that of Of the other rosdsteads
in this quarter incapable Of Defence would be sufficient
ly great to warrant this measure. My present impress
sion is, that it would not.
And on the subjcc, of roads.eads generally with few
exceptions, depending on their local positions, em in.
clned to the opinion that any attempt 10 fortfy them
would be njudcious do not speak of harbors and in
lets which occupied by cities and towns but Of mere
anchorage grounds deriving their value from the shelter
H. I f.ll hp defnn
cuded from hem the advantages would justify any
soaabIe expenditure, But this is mpraclicabe; and
doubt whether the circumstances in which most ofthem
differ give such marked superiority 10 those We can de-
frd over those cannot, TO lead to any attempt TO
fortisy them in the first instance and to maintain gar
risons in them during war;