Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-31

mike deep inroad and greatly hatass the country
along the Shores although no enterprise even "a Tue
cssnt state Of population could be carried tar into te
Interior Were it only to relieve long ne OF iontel
from predatory ncursions, access 10 his iaNe on '
North should be denied But there ure otne very strong
reasons for this exclusion by closing e aae a. a.s
r nnvnl superorty this lake would be avoided anu
the whole lake would remain in our possession serving
nc the hest possible military line OF communication, IN
case The United Suites should assume offensive opera
80, ains, The weakest point Of the Canadian border.
Fr,r the Northern end Of this lake the forces OF the
United States should march into Canada and intercept
the communication by the ST. Lawrence, either at or
near the mouth Of the Rcheeu river, al Montreal island
nj some pnt where the ship channel Of the river could
he commanded, intermediate between these Places or Ut
any two all Ut these Places according 10 cifcuhSta
ces Maintaining any all these positions, "oua limit
the defence in Tie province above 10 inc CONSUMPTION
of The means then in STORE and would completely para
1--we its offensive power. Although no other object
were in view than the defence Of the rontier upon the
upper lakes effort necessary 10 secure ana MAINTAIN
this position should be spared, because 1t IS only mus
that the for naval superiority on Inc taxes,
which, if suffered to begin, is both e1haustg anu
inlcrminuble can be avoided
Without aid from abroad Canada cannot contest such
question with the United States; and, 80 long as the
United States possess that superiority the defence or Tic
upper portion Of the frontier will be complete.
From being the most expensive OF all MODES OIL de-
fence naval superor in our hands may mus pecomt
The cheapest; two or three small armed Vesses on each
and 10 the transports bearing troops and munitions, be-
ing al! that would be needed. ~
military enterprises would in this way be warded off
from the numerous rich and popuous cities aud towns
now enbelslng border, which 1t would not DC easy
to project from the calamtes Of war by mere military
works. without running into great expense, were the
rncmy's naval means TO allow his approaching them ~
his pl assure.
the fortified position Of Isle aux Noix and any other
upon the Rcbeeu should be at first left in rear being
reached or mastered by suitble bodies OF troops, and
should be subjected 10 immediate investment ana Vgo'
attack 10 be speedily reduced, ana 10 open e
navigube water communication within twenty miles OF
Montreal ,
If the preceding remarks be we'll founded, it would
appear that the peace and safety OF the paris Of tue
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, might be made
to flow from military operations carried Oh against
Canada, by the line Of Lake Champlun and the river
Richelieu; and in order 10 this military operation being
always practicable and be taken up pleasure
thing more is necessary than the fertilization Of the outlet
Of Lake Champlan. 1t mi ght have been before re-
marked that the offensive movement in question Is not
deemed he difficult hazardous, would II be ne
cPssariy restricted to holding positions OIL the ST. Law
rence-actvc operations against Quebec, to which this
is the most convenient road, following as matter OF
course upon these first successes.
The security, therefore, that may be obtained for the
upper frontier by military operations on the lower, may
least justify these upper portions III waiting the pro-
grcss OF events.
The unexamped increase Of population upon these
very borders, the hundred ways, already finished
in hand, Of connecting these borders with the heart
Of the country, may so elevate the military resources
of the region that in the event Of war, it will matter
little in which of the political conditions first supposed
the opposite territory may be founda resisess torrent
sweeping it from end to end; and although it might mol
be prudent rely, in such matter the spread
Of wealth and numbers, muy be certain that there
will exist ample to create all such articia mi
ltary aids the circumstances may call for, and we
may infer that the application of these aids would now
be premature.
The military consequences Of the occupation of the
outlet Of Lake Chang plain obvious That it must
not be supposed they not perfectly understood by
our neighbpr the border. As it would cOnse-
queny be great object with him to avert the conse-
ouenccs alluded to- lie would in the event of war, GOTTEN
breaking SUDDENLY be first, if possible, in taking
such a position would prevent commanding
the issue of the lake; and hence it is That in the pre-
parann Of the only permanent military work now re-
commended for the Northern frontier advisable
to admit unnecessary delay.
A position for closing the lake, selected during the
last war, and Of which the ratification brgun
after the peace, found ufle progress had been
made, lie within our territory, and abandoned.
There is however, position equally good close at hand
and in all respects admirably adapted 10 the object in
view.
The ratification of this outlet will probaby coast
rbout Gro 900 dollars.
All Of which is respectfully submitted.