Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-10

stances when "ouiu tn investigate the consldera-
o ,cb hear upon this subject, as ney are LOO s
GUS TO require examna.loh ~ ;ncreuse and improve.
III III ;, arc now such active operation Wco.
ieht s, mon these lakes could dscmoark an army ~
poost any point. If iareor were closed oy lofied
a!lo' a ,vou;d only have 10 seek the nearest beach
III nd their men, from boats, that no dctences we
uld construct would secure us against INVASION; ana
,cnnorary block houses and batteries would probably he
found sufficiently powerful to rpei the attacks Oh "s
vessels seeking 10 enter the harbors upon the
lakes if we could furesee the existence OF any crcu
stances which would induce IN enemy to ehdea'" ~
force entrance into them. :, ,:
As To the communication between The lakes me i
ljury from prugr1 pcul causes, necessarily
to that frou, Luke Erie TO Lake Huron, ana 10 te ' no
OF MichiImackinac Or the former! almost SHY ni'ts
consist of two rivers, comp ctey cclrmahueu .t' %
oapsite banks while the entrance INTO one VI ': m
r!v.r 81 C,Iai, is mppded BY bar, over winch theie
are but about eight feet Of wafer No armed vessels
could force their way up these rivers Willy VIC ,s,r,
were in cnenys possession, who 's , ~; eot
batteries at every projecting point aho M"o' ~ 'S.'
n;,ht in many places sweep the decks with mnskely;
Al 70 the Straits Of Mcmackinac. they are too broad
10 be commanded by stationary ori1calons even any
circumstances should lrad 10 le Const uI'.on a fp
me mt of hostile fleet upon he bleak ana remote soes
,f a,chednsk bay, in The north eastern extremity Oh
Lake Huron. -, c,: .
or,., m tournament deIecs and that we may safety
reIv far us srcury upon those resources both IN ile
neTsoun and ,n0icriri, which the extent and other ad
vanages our cnun,y ensure to us, ana winch must give
| US the superiority in that quarter.
II NAV perhaps. be deemed expedicnt 10 eslapils
devm for the reception of munitions OF war In some part
of the peninsula Of Michigan, and to strengthen II ny
suc, drepccs will enable 1t 10 resist any coup nc Hutn
which may he attempted From the geGgraphicai lea
lures of the country possessions here rccede from
their natural points Ut support, anu are placed IN lte
date contact with fertile and populous part OF the
ncghboring coony In the event oi Disturbances inc
ordinary communications might he interrupted, and 1t
would probably be- advisable to have In dcpoSlte sup
ply of all the necessary means for offensive or defensive
oprrations and place these beyond tie reach VI any
p,erprisinp Office. who mig ut b. dspoSrd by sudden
moycnru t to gain possession Of them The c&pendi-
ture for such all objec. would b. comparatively unpo-
ant even should the contingency bc judged sufficiently
/ probable TO Justify precautionary measures.
| had the honor, a communication 10 lie Chairman
of the Committee Military Affairs OF the Senate, dated
February 49, 1886, copy Of which was sent 70 Tie
Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs OF The
House of Representatives, TO suggest the mode best
adapted in my opinion 10 secure our frontier against
the depredations Of the Indians The basis of the plan
wns the establishment Of road from point upon
the Upper Mississippi 10 Red river: passing west OF Mis-
souri, and Arkansas and the construction OF posts in pro-
| Der situations along it. think the ordinary mode OF
construction ought not to be departed from Stockadrd
frs with log block houses, have been found iuy sutl
Gent ior all the purposes of defence against Indians
They may he built speedily, with little expense, and,
when necessary by the labor OF the troops Our Indian
boundary has heretofore been recedng, not stationary
one and much Of it is yet Of this character And even
ed and guaranteed their permanent occupation OF the
possessions assigned TO them, may find 1t necessary,
in the redemption Of the pledge wc have given TO protect
them, TO establish posts upon their exterior boundary,
and thus prevent collisions between them end the rudcr
INDIGENOUS tribes of that region think, therefore, that
no works of permanent character than these
should be constructed upon Indian frontier. cor
don established at proper distances upon such road
with the requisite ,neans of operation deposited in the
posts and with competent gorrsons to occupy them,
would probably, afford greater security to the advanced
settlements than any other measures in our power
The Dragons should be kept in motion along during
the open Of the year, when Indian disturbances
are to he unprecedented. aad their presence and Ia
clity OF movement would tend powerfully 10 restrain the
predatory disposition OF the Indians; and II any sudden
impulse should operate drive them into hos!ilrs,
The means Of assembling strong urce, with all neces-
sary supplies, woud he at hand And as circumstances
permit the posts ia the Indian country, in the rear
of this proposed line Of operations should be abandoned
and the garrisons transferred To II.
| But W OIL our narilime frontier that most
1p sed Our ccast Tor three thousand miles is washed
the ocean, which separates US from those nations who
have made the highest advances IN all the arts and par
cuarly in ,osc which minister TO the operations OF war,
and with whom FROM intercourse and political reu-
tons we are most liable to he drawn into collision If
this great medium OF communication, The element at the
same time of separation and OF unlun inteIPoses ccu.
liar obstacles TO the progress Of hostile deinonstr atoms,
it also offers advantages which not less obvious, and
which, be successfully resisted, require corresponding
arrangements and cxcrtiuns These advantages depend
ON The economy and facility Of transportation, the
ccerty OF movement, and OH the power of an enemy ~
threaten the whole shore, spread out before him, and To
select his point of attack at pleasure powerful hos
tile feet upon The coast Of the United States presents
some of the features of war, where heavy nlass is
brought TO act against dctachments which may Le cut
| up in detail although their combined turcc would cI
coed the assang foe. Our points of exposure 81
numerous and dslan, that il would be impracticabe to
keep each Of them force competent 10 resist the G
tack OF ency, prepared BY his nav! ascrndrncy and
his other arrangements, TO make sudden and vigorous
inrnad upon shores. II becomes rs, therefore, 10 IL
que how the Consequences Of this state Of things are
| 10 he best met and avrrlrd
The lst und most Obvious and in every point of view
the most proper method Of defence is an augmentation
of naval means xtent prnpntoned 10 the
and The necessities of The nation. do not
the actual construction and equipment Of vessels only
The number Of those III service must depend OH the
state Of the country at given period: But mean the
collection of all such materials may be preserved with
ont injury, and due cement o.! those branches
of interest essential Ia the growth OF navy. and which
may be property nurtured by the Government; that,
the approach OF danger fleet may put to sea- with
out deny, sufficiently powerful to meet any force which
will probably be sent TO coast.
Our great battle upon the yet to be fought and
we shall gain nothing by shutting eyes 10 the ma
ture Of the struggle the rxertions shall find it
necessary to make. A II our institutions essentially
pacific, and every citizen feels that his share OF Ihe
interest is affected by the arrangement Of business
by the expense and by III. uncertain result OF
| This erin;. presses upon The community and
the Government and is guarantee that shall
never be precipi!n,rd ntn contest embark in one
unless lmpsrionsly required Ivy those considerations
which leave alternative between resistance and dis.
| honor. Accordingly all our history shows that are
disposed tn bear while evils ought 10 BIZ borne thar
10 seek redress by appeals 10 still, however,
test must come and It Eeiouves u.s. while have the
means and the opportunity, To look forward attend
ant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences
IL is no part OF my object 10 enter into the details of
naval establishment. That duty will lie much more ap-
propriaey and ably performed by the proper departments
but of the views shall present on the subject
Of system OF Notifications be materially infect
ed by any general plan Of naval operations which, in the