The Arkansas advocate., 1836-01-08

have he mower which we have seen exercised, to divert the public funds from the legitimate purposes of the government. The collection and custody ol the revenue being, on the contrary, source ot credit ia them will increase the security winch the States provide for faithful execution of ther trusts bv multiplying the scrutnies 10 Wnlcn tnelr loperaons and accounts will be suDJeciea' l nus disposed, as well from interestas the obligations oi their charters, cannot 5s dos5tca 'nat sne e
 ditions as Congress may 1t to adopt respecting the deposites in these instiiuiiois, eg se the gradual dsnse ef the small bills. wili be cheer fully complied with and that we shall soon gam, in place of the bank of the United States, pfacti- cal reform in the whole paper system of the country. If by this policy we can ultimately witness the sup pression of ali bank bills below twenty dollars, IL
 apparent that gold and silver will take their place, and become the principal circulating medium Tn the common business of farmers aiid mechanics ei the country The attainment of such result will form an era in the history of our country, which will be dwelt upon with delight by every true friend l of it's liberty and independence. 1t will tighten the l great tax which paper system has so long col lected from the earnings of labor, and do more to revive and perpetuate those habits of economy and simplicity which are so congenia to the character of republicans, than all the legislation which has yet been attempted.
 To this subject feel that cannot too earnestly invite the especial attention of Congress, without the exercise of whose authority the opportunity to accomplish so much public good must pass unm- l proved. Deeply impressed with it's vital import
 anee, the Executive has taken all the steps within his constitutional power to guard the publlc revenue, and defeat the expectation which the bank of the United States indalged, Of renewing and perpetua- ting it's monopoly, on the ground ofits necessity as a fiscal agent, and as affording sounder currency than could be obtained without such institution. In the performance of this duty, much responsibi ty was incurred, which would have been gladly avoided the stake which the public had n the ques i ton could have been otherwise preserved Althogh clothed with the legal authority, and supported by precedent, was aware that there was, in the act of the removal Of the deposes, liability to excite that sensitiveness to Executive power which it is characteristic and the duty of freemen 10 indulge but relied on this feeling, also directed by patr- osm and intelligence, vindicale the conduct i which, in the end, would appear 10 have been called for by the best interests of my country. The apprehensions natural to this feeling, that there may have been desire, through the instrumental |y of that measure, to extend the Executive influ encc, or that if may have been prompted by motives not sufficiently free from ambition, were not over | looked. Under the operation of our institutions, the public servant who is called on to take a step of high responsibility, should feel in the freedom (which gives rise to such apprehensons his high est security When unfounded, the attention which 1 they arouse and the discussions they excite, de- ] prive those who indulge them, of the power to do harm: when just, they but hasten the cer- tdifty with 'Thich tic great body et enr citizens never fa 70 fepe an attempt to procure tner Sai1c ton to any exercise of power inconsistent with the jealous maintenance of their rights. Under such conviction and entertaining no doubt that my con- l stitutional obligations demanded the steps which were taken in reference to the removal of the depos- lites, 1t impossible for me to be deterred from the path of duty by fear that my motives could be misadged or that political prej1dices could defeat the just consideration of the merits of my conduct I The result has shown how safe is this reliance upon the patriotic temper and enlightened discern ment of tho people. That measure has now been before them, and has stood the test of all the se- we're analyss which it's generaIimpoftanee, the n- teress 1t affected, and the apprehensons 1t excited, were calculated to produce: and 1t now remains for Congress to consider what legislation has be- come necessary i'll consequence.
 need only add to what have on former occa- sons said this subject, generally, that in the re- gulatlons which Congress may prescribe respecting the custody of the public moneys, it is desirable that as little discretion may be deemed consist ert With their safe-keeping, should be given 10 the Executive agents. No can be more deeply impressed than am with the soundness of the doctrine, which restraints and limits, by specific provisions, Executive discretion, far it can be done consistently with the preservation of it's constitutional character. In respect to the con- trol over the public mon /, this doctrine Is pecu- iaiiy applicable, and is in harmony with the great principle which felt was sustaining in the roversy with the Bank of the United States, which
 
 oas connection between moneyed and political power, The duty of the Legislature to define, by clear and positive enactment the nature and ex- 1iit oi the action which belongs to :!;c Executive to superlnend, springs out of policy analogous to that which enjoins upon all the branches of the Federal government, an abstinence from the exer- else ot powers not clearly granted. In such gov ernHen possessing enly limited and specific powers, the spirit of its general administration cannot be WISE or just, when it opposes the reference of all doubtful points to the great source of authority the States and the people; whose number and d Versthed relations, securing them against the inu- ences and settlements which may misIead their agents, make them the safest depository of power in It's application to the Executive, with reference to the Legislative branch of the government, the same rule of action should make the President ever anxious to avoid the exercise of any discretionary authority which can be regulated by Congress. The olases which may operate upon him will not be SO likely to extend to the representatives of the people in that body.
 In my former messages to Congress, have re- peatedly urged ihe propriety of essening the dis crehonary authority lodged in the various depart ments; but 1t has produced no effect, as yet, ex- cept the dlscontinuance of extra allowances in the Army and Navy and the substitution oi fixed sa- laries in the latter. It is believed that the same principles could be advantageousIy applied in all cases, and would promote the efficiency and eco- nomy of the public service, at the same time that greater satisfaction, and more equal justiee would be secured to the public officers generally. s The accompanying Report of the Secretary of War, will put you in possession of the operations of the Department confded to his care. in all it's diversified relations. during lhe past year. a
 am gratfed In being able to inform ayou that no occurrence has required any movement of the military force. except such as Is common to state