Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-10

in defensive point Of view Alone the ocean should De
our great field of operations. No one would advocate
The project of endeavoring to make our coISt
10 ATTACK Such scheme would be utterly lhPfacucu
HE superior feet conveying the necessary troops,
od tIct landing at points upon our shores,
evcn if The best devised plan of fortyng them were
consumma,ed Aud from the nature OF inaftme opera
tons such fleet could bring its whole strength 10 pear
onv nar,icuar position und by threatening or as
r;i;rr v,rous portions Of the coast, either anticipate
the ardv movements Of troops upon land ana eHecl
L Ic, before their concentration, or render il nrces
sary to keep in service force lar 10 al OF Tue
enemy but 80 divided to be inferior to 1t upon any
givrn noint These dangers and difficulties would De
vcred or avoided by the maintenance OF leet COM
intent 10 meet any hostile squadrnns which might be de.
ached to Our coast would lhus DC afiendro
IN the ocean and the caues of war would be as mt
tie felt as the circumstances OF such conflict would
permit ,.
As to the other advantages of navy, in the protection
of commerce. they do not come within the scope OF my
nourirs and are not therefore advcrcd TO- Nor is
necessary or indeed proper that should present those
considerations Of distance of exposure ana OF station,
which would render feet numerically inferior in thc
aggregate that Of the enemy, yet still sufficiently pow
er!u upon our coasts, to meet and overcome any
armament which could probably be sent here.
II seems to me- therefore, that our first aud best torh.
cation is the navy Nor do see any limit to our ma val
preparations except that imposed by due regard 10 tho
public revenues from time to time, and by the probable
condition Of! other maritime nations. Much of the ma
tcric employed in the construction and equipment OF
vessels is almost indcstructbs ut any rate mny be
preserved or long series OF years; and, II ships can bs
thus kept without injury upon The stocks: by being quilt
under cover do moi see what should restrain US from
proceeding to build many may be deemed necessary
and as fast due regard 10 their economical and sub
slantia construction will permit, and 10 collect ana pre-
pare for immediate all the munitions OF war and other
articles of equipment not liable TO injury decay by the
lapse OF time. Nor do | that these preparations
should be strictly graduated by the number OF seacn
who would probably enter the service at This lime or
.ol IT. h,illn aud prnin ssnl
properly requires much time, well with reference to
the execution of the work to the proper condition OF
the materials employed. And the costly experiment
made by England when she too hastily increased her
feet about thirty years ago. b. building ships with I'M
proper materials and bad workmanship, ought 10 furnish
US with profitable lesson These vessels soon decay
ed, after rendering very little service. Naval means
should therefore be provided at period OF LEISURE to be
ready for inime date employment in period of eygen
CIV; and due regard to prudence dictates that these
means should so far exceed the estimated demands OF
the service, us 10 supply in the shortest time any loss
accustomed by the hazards of tile and the
cidents Of war We may safely calculate that the
number Of in the United States will increase
in proper ion 10 that rapid augmentation which is going
OIL ia all tie other branches OF national interest II we
assume that, al period, we may expect TO em0ak
in war our capacity TO man fleet will exceed pre-
sent means by ratio not difficult 10 ascertain. And
even them by greater exerons, and perhaps higher wa
ecs larger portion may be induced 10 enter the naval
service, while eXertlons can make corresponding
addition to the navy ITSELF but at loss Of time and ex
pensc, and n sacrifice of its permanent interest.
But whatever arrangements we may make TO over
come any naval armumentS sent out TO assa u.s. we arc
liable TO BE- defeated and TO be exposed 10 ali The cose
uuenccs resulting from the ascendency Of enemy
And the practical question Isl what shall Gc done with
view to such state Of things? AS have already re-
Marked any attempt by Notifications to shut up our
coast SO that enterprizng foe with VICTORIOUS fleet
conveying competent force, and disposed to encounter
all the risk Of such expedition: could mol make his
descent upon the Shore would be useless in ITSELF and
would Expose to just censure those who should PROJECT
such 4 scheme. And on the other hand, the Govern
mcnt would if possible be still censuiate, were
our important maritime places left without uny deten
sivc works Between these extremes is practical me.
dum and 10 ascertain where 1t lies we must briefly look
at the various considerations affecting the subject
What have we TO appprehrnd in the event OF war !?
IS within the limits Of reasonable calculation, that
any enemy will be able and Disposed 10 drbatk upon
our coast army sufficiently powerful to lay siege TO
our Notifications, and to cndeuvo BY this slow aud I'M
certain process obtain possession Of them: put out
of view the enormous expense attending such pan
the distance Of the Of operations from the points
of supply and support, with Tie consequent difficulties
and dangers aud the possibility that the conveying fleet
might Le ovrrpowercd ny superior force and the wle
expedition captured or destroyed. All these consi-
deraous which pruden; statesman directing such
enterprise will overlook. But beyond these is qucs-
ton barring still more directly upon tn" point under cxa-
inaou. Is there any object to be atiaincd, sufficient
" ipnrlan Justify The risk of placing body Of land
lrs before of these works. too strong to he carried
by coup dc main, and eneavorng to destroy its de-
fences by regular investment? think there can be
take it for granted that nation would embark in
the Quxoc enterprise Of conquering this county,
Any army therefore, thrown upon our coast would push
for yard with some definite object To be attained by
prompt movement and by vigorous excrons. Our ex-
prriencc, than half century ago. demonstrated
That an invading force could command little than
the position il actually occupied. 1he.systcm of forti.
fcaliuns adopted in Europe not applicable TO
her IN
great avenues OF communication, natural artificial,
and these closed defended by furresses construct
ed with all the skill thai science and experience sup
ply and Nith all the that wealth and power can
command An invading army must carry these posi-
uns BY rsca!ude Ivy sfEe, leave sufficient delac-
lcnls 10 blockade them, must turn them and move
on with all the difficulties attending The interruption Of
their Communication, and with the dangers which such a
force in their must necessarily occas Works Of
this character keys to many Of the European states,
whose political safety depends upon their preservation.
Their possession cnubes their governments to meet The
frat shock of war; and to prepare their arrangements,
political military, TO resist avert the coming
Storm Aud although during some Of tic wars which
arose out of the French revolution, when, from
causes which history is developing. tile armies Of
France set defiance the received maxins Of military
experience and jnstlyng their apparent ras!ress by
success, reduced, with une1amped acity, or carried
their operations almost in contempt Of the strongest
urtiiicaiions the s1bngaon of each Of which had been
I'LL then the work of campaign, sill the opinion is
yet entertained By many, that This system of defence is
best pied to the condition Of the European
nifty.
There is also striking difference between the pnlili-
cal situation Of those countries and that Of ours which
gives these defensive preparations character Of I'M.
pnr,ance which never apply to the United States.
The possession Of plal in the Eastern hemisphere is
often the possession of the kingdom Habits of feel
ing and opinion political assocalons and other
combine 10 give to the metropolis an undue ascendency.
Internal pares contcnding for superiority, and cy:cr
nal enemies aiming at conquest, equally seek gain pos
session Of the seat Of government. And The most
less observer of the of tie last half century, must
be struck with the fact that the fate Of the capitals and
the kingdoms Of modern Europe closely connected