Herald of the times. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1830-1846, 1836-07-14

the ideas oil mere military man Tor our guloe
and our government, as to naval engineering
and tactics, as to naval desidcrata, aud naval
capabilities to supply them; IN word, as 10
all resources for naval warfare; who mas new
er made study Of either, aud to reject tue
instructions Of mon who have made these
things the study aud business of their lives,
whose profession they arc. and who are pre-
eminent IN their profession. The true way
of testing the value OF the Secrcrury's ideas
would be to suppose them addressed 10 one
OF our eminent naval engineers, versed IN ma
val tactics and intimately acquainted with
all our wuters, am all our naval capacities,
and to see how they would strike his nind.
fancy he would feel very much IA llannlbal
did when he heard the eloquent Grccian So
phist hurup-uc before him on the art of war;
displaying no doubt, all those common sense
plausibiltics on the subject, OF which my
honorable friend from Virginia Mr.. RNEs)
seems to think go highly, while he underval-
ues and speaks so dlsparagingly Of the les
SONS Of professional and practical wisdom. -
All the audience we're il, rapturcS with the
eloquent orntlon nnd loud in its praises--al'
except iannlbal he was mute; but, beng
pressed for hIs opinion, he at length SAID:
."Why, gentlemen, have seen fool. before,
and heard thsm speak; but never before
listened to any thing quite so foolish" Our
naval engineer might be too courteous to
speak out as Hannibal did; but secretly, |
have no doubt, he would feel exactly as Han
nibal did, especially az to this part of the Sec
retury's report. Here | cannot torbear say
ing that his general ideas as toa system of
naval preparations proper for this country 10
adopt appear to me to have been hastily TAX
EN- up-to want comprehension; in word,
that his sketches, meant for an outline of II
system, appear to me not to be the sketches
OF n, INNS ter mind; at lenst not of a mastcr
mind exerted on this subject. His system
looks only to the operations Of defensive war;
not to the operations of offensive war al well
as the defensive. And as to defensive war,
his system looks primarily to that Of particu-
lar cities, and not primarily, q. it ought, to
that OF the whole country, IN which case that
Of the particular cities would OF course be i'll
cluded. Such system, as his for this coun-
try niiist be essentially defective; far from
what il ought 10 be, far from what a perfect
system would be. Surely this couatry ought
to possess herself of the means OF conceL Ltra-
ting AT will the whole force Of her naval
marino at some commanding point, aud of
thence directing ut will that force in oil its op-
erutions; and further, she ought to make it i'm
possible for the enemy to deprive her of these
means. Though this object is attainable, de-
monstrably so, yet the Secrctary's scheme
asprcs to nothing Of the kind; on the contra
ry, he would leave the country in such state
AZ would give to the enemy an opportunity to
possess herself of such means, and to turn
them against the country. Giving credit to
tho Secretary for talents, as do, I repeat
that | think he must have taken up his ideas
,u Ian cnl
qnaintance with naval subjects, contenting
himself with the common sense views which
present themselves to mind not cnligbten-
ed by navnl science, nor improved, nor seek
ing to be improved by the lessons of profrs-
sional and practical wisdom-ideas which,
am persuaded, he himself, on better informa-
tlon and farther reflection, will renounce us
unworthy of his high reputation.
| IL that day is to arrive when we are 10 have
n great naval war, to assert rights or redress
wrongs, as so many predict, and which is but
too probable, from the conflicting claims and
unsettled rights of nations on the ocean; and
from the selfishness Of arrogant power, max
ing ltselfits own arbiter Of contested rights,
aud deciding, almost invariably, in its own ia
wort is, say, but too probable that we are
to have such war, (how soon, we niiist leave
to the revelations of the unknown future,
adnonished by recent events, when another
brand added to tho fuel might have kindled
into such a war, it would be faulty to blind
ourselves to the danger involved in the future,
or to bo unprepared for it when it does come.
In the event OF such wal, when the question
is probably to be settled, whether we are to
have our equal share of the equal dominion
Of the ocean; or to yield it's supremacy To- a
mother Power-who can imagine that in this
great contest the enemy will content himself
with lowering on our coast with his fleets;
aud thence making his predatory incursions
on our shores? No; he would, if he could,
plant himself on our coasts, in some position
where he could have secure rendezvous for
his fleet; and whence he could command our
whole comnerce-strike where he pleased
and when he pleased; and keep our whole
immense extent of seaboard in one continu-
al turmoil OF alarm. Now Rhode Island, be.
yond all other places, would be exactly this
position, and he would bend all his efforts to
possess himself of it, and t" entrench himself
there. From that moment we should carry
on the war under every disadvantage. He
would compel us to multiply our land forces
SO enormously as to make the burden intol-
crable; or to leave our seaboard n prey to his
predatory incursions. In one campaign he
would make the diNerence OF lie expense oi
the war to us--more than tcn-told the cost
Of securing that GIbraltcr to ourselves.-
With its possession, and secured to US as i,
laay he, we should carry OH the war with eve
ry advantage. With that Gibralter in on,
hands, our fleets would do more towards the
protection of our coast and our commerce
than an army Of a hundred thousand men
!, however judiciously placed on our seaboard
IN tto
seas, which, on Its return, must pass aon,
our coast, with that Gibralter in our hands
would be peculiarly exposed to the en,erpr
ses Of our naval marine. There and theme,
we should let slip the dogs of war, almost il
- G fho .