The Charlotte journal. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1835-1851, 1836-12-23

Z
lion the basis OF taxation, the trainers Of the con-
stltution intended TO equalize the burdens which
are necessary TO support the Government and the
adoption OF that RATIO while it accomplished this
object, also the means OF adjusting other great
topics arising out Of the conflicting views respect
ing the political equality OF the various members
OF the conioderacy Whatever therefore dlsturbs
the liberal spirit OF the compromises which esisb-
lished rule Of taxation so ust and equitable, aud
which experience has proved 10 be so we'll aoapi,d
10 the genius and habits OF people, should be
received with the greatest caution and dlstrust.
A bare inspe ctlon, IN the annexed table, OF the
differences produced By the RATIO used IN the de-
porte acl, compared with The results Of distrlbu.
ton according TO the ratio OF direct taxation, must
satisfy every unprt JUDGED nind, that TIE former
ratio conrayenes the spirit OF the constitution aud
produces degree Of injustice IN The operation OF
The Federal Government, v blch would he fatal 10
the hope pefpetuaIng u. By Inc ratio OF direct
taxation, tor example, the State Of Delaware, 10 the
collection OF $50 UUU 100 OF revenue, would pay ln-
10 he Treasury s!es,7l6 and N a distribution oi
SjJ,UJV,O00 She would receive back from the Go
yernment, according TO the ratio OF the deposite
bill the sum o. S3U6, l22 and similar results would
follow the comparison between the small and the
large ,es'throughout the Union thus realizing
doubtless as unacceptable 10 thet;. a motive Tor
incorporating the principle in any system which
would produce II, as II would be Inconsistent with
the righls aud expectations OF the large States 1t
certainly the Intention OF that provision OF the
constitution which declares that all duties, Im-
posts and excuses" shall be uGlio.m throughout
the United States" to make the burdens OF taxa
uon tall equally upon tie people m whatever Slate
OF the Union they n,sy reside. Bot what would
be the value Of such al uniform RUE If the moneys
raised by II could be immediately returned By
different one whIch will give TO the people OF
States much more and 10 those OF others much less,
than their lair proportions Were the Federal
Government to exempt, In express terms, the ln,-
ports products and manufactures Of some portions
OF the country from ali dyies, while II imposed
heavy ones Ga others, the tJustice could not be
greater 1t would be easy TO show how, by the
operation OF such principle, the large States OF
,he Union woud not only have 10 contribute their
Just share TOW ards tie support OF the Federal Co
yernmeni, but also have to bear IN some degree
the taxes neees>ssg TO support the Governments
OF their smaller sisters: but II Is deemed unneces-
sary 10 stat the details where tie general prlncI
pie Is 30 obvious.
A :, stem liable to such objections never be
supposed 10 have been sanctioned 10y the trainers
d the constitution, when they conferred OH Con.
gress the taxing power, and feel persuaded that
u mature examination ~ the subject viii satisfy
every ono that there lnsurmouulabe difficult
ties in the operation Of any plan which car be de-
yl>cd Of collecting revenue Tor the purpose o. dis
lributirg H. Congress is only authorised TO levy
taxes 10 pay the debts and provide for the coni-
mon defence and general welfare OF The United
safes" There is no such provisions would
authorize Congress to collect together the proper
" Of tie country, under the name OF revenue, tor
the purpose of dividing it equally or unequaly a.
mong the States or the people. Indeed, II IS not
probable that such m idea occurred TO the
States when they adopted the constitution. But,
however this may be, the only safe rule Tor us ia
interpreting the powers granted to the Federal
Government, is TO regard The absence OF express
authority to touch a subject SO important ana deli.
cate as tins Is, as equivalent 10 a prohibition.
Even IT our powers were less doubtful IN
this respect, as the constitution nov stands,
there are considerations afforded by recent
experience, which would seem TO make II
our duty to AVOID a resort TO such sl stem.
All will admit that The simplicity and e
coaomy Of the State Governments, manly
depended on the fact that money has to be
supplied 10 support them by the same men,
or their agents, who vote IL away IN aDpro.
priatlons. Hence, when there are eNtray.
asau, aud wasteiul appropriations, there
must be corresponding increase Of taxes
: and the people, becoming awakened, will
necessarily scfutiulze the character OF meas
, ures which thus increase their burdens.
! Dy the atchiul eve If self interest, the
7 agents of the people IN the State Govern.
ments are repressed, aud kept within the
: limits of just ecoaomy. But IT the neces-
, sty Of levyIng the taxes be taken from
those who make the appropriations, and
thrown upon more distant and less respon-
sibie set of public agents, who have power
TO approach the people hy an indirect and
s,ealthl TAXATION, their rs reason to fear
that prodigahty viii soon supercede those
characteristics which have thus far made
us iook with so much PRIDE and confidence
TO The State Governments, as the main stay
of0ur Union and liberties. The State lie
I gis.ntures, Instead of STUDYING Ia restrict
their State expenditures 10 the smallest pos.
shle sum, will clam credit for their proiu.
sion, and harrasS the General Government
, for increased supplies. Practically, there
would soon be but one taxing power, and
that vested IN body of men far removed
from the people, in which the farming and
, mechanic interests would scarcely be rep
+ resented. The States would gradually lose
their purity as we'll as their independence :;
they would not dare Ia murmur nj the pro.
, ceedlngs of the General Government, least
) they should lose their supplies; alt "ouid