State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1831-1836, 1836-06-21

tive bodies did not require the aid of the
Executive Magistrate. But there is a prin-
ciple recognized by all the American con-
stitutions, which was unknown to the an
cient republics. 1t would be in vain that
they should be enumerated, and respect
for them enjoined in the Constitution. A
popular assembly, under the influence Of
that spirit which is always dscoverable in
u greuter or less degree in all republics,
might, and would as it was believed, some
times disregard them. To guard against
this danger, and to secure the rights Of each
individual, the expedient of creating De-
partment independent of the other, and
amenabe only to the laws, was adopted.
Security was thus given against any pal
pable violation of the Constitution, 10 the
injury of individuals, or minority party.
But it was still possible for wilfill and
excited majority to enact laws Of the great
est injustice and tyranny, without violating
the letter ofther charter.
And this take to be the origin of the
veto power, as well in the State Govern
ments, as that of the United States. 1t
appears to have been the intention to create
an umpire between the contending actions
which had existed it was believed, and
propriety in adopting this principle in the
Government of State, all the reasons in
favor Of it existed in a tenfold degree for
incorporating it, in that of the United States
The operation OF tie latter, extending OVER
an immense tract of country, embracing
the products ofalmost every cline, and that
country divided too into "A number of sepa-
rate Governments, in many respects indie
4 4 al.
federal head, left but little hope that they
could always be carried on in harmony -
1t could not be doubted that sectional in
terests would at times predominant in the
bosoms of The immediate representatives
of the people and the States, aud combina-
tons formed destructive of the public good,
or unjust and oppressive TO n minority.
Where could a power to check these local
feelings, and TO destroy the effects of unjust
combinations, he better placed than in the
hands of that department whose authority,
being derived from the same common sove-
reign, is coordinate with the rest, and which
enjoys the great distinction of being at
once the immediate representative of the
whole People, as well rs of each particular
State?
In the former character, the interests of
the whole community would be rlgdly
supported, and, in the latter, the rights of
each member steadfastly maintained. The
representation from the State auth rites in
the Electoral Colleges, consider one of
the most fecitous features in the Consttu-
ton. 1t serves as an eternal memento to
the Chief Magistrate that it is his duty to
guard the interests of the weak against the
unjust aggressions ofihe strong & powerful.
From these premises, you will conclude
that consider the qualified veto upon the
acts of the Legislature, conferred by the
Constitution upon the President, as con-
sej udtiue power, intended only to be used
to secure the instrument itself from violation
or, in times of high party excitement, to
protect the rights of the minority, and the
interests of the weaker members of the
Union. Such, indeed, is my opinion, and
such indeed we must believe to be the
opinion of nearly all the distinguished men
who have filled the Executive Chair If /
were President of the United States, an act
which did not involve either of the princi-
Piles above enumerated, must have been
passed under very peculiar circumstances
Of precipitancy or opposition to the known
public will, to induce me to refuse 10 it my
sanction.
If the opinion have given of the mo-
tives of the trainers of the Constitution, in
giving the veto power to the President, is
correct it follows that they never could
have expected that he who was constituted
the umpire between contending factions
should ever identify himself with the in
tcrest of one of them, and voluntary rdeee
himself from the proud eminence of leader
of nation TO that of chief of party.
can easily conceive the existence of a state
of things 10y which the Chief Mag strate Of
a State may be forced to act upon party
principles but such course is entirely
opposed to all the obligations which the
Constitution imposes on Il President of the
United States. The immense influence he
possesses will always give 10 his party the
preponderance, and the very circumstance
OF its being an Executive party will be the
cause of infusing more bitterness and vin-
dicative feeling in these domestic contests.
Under these circumstances, the qualified
veto given by the Constitution may, if the
President should think proper to change
its character, become ms absolute i'll prac-
tice as that possessed by the Kings of Eng
land and France. From the great variety
of local interests acting upon the members
of the two Houses of Congress, and from
the difficulty of keeping all the individuals
of large party under the control of party
discipline, laws will often be pissed by
small majorilies adverse TO the interests of
the dominant party hut if the President
should think proper TO use the veto power
for the purpose of promoting the interests
of his party, it will be in vain to expect that
a majority so large as two-thirds i'll both
Houses would be found in opposition to
his wishes In the hands of such Presi-
dent, the qualified veto of the Constitution
would in practice become absolute.
have, upon another occasion, expressed
my views upon the danger of dominant
Executive party. 1t may, perhaps, be said