Constantine republican. [volume] (Constantine, Mich.) 1836-1838, 1836-12-28

Even IT our powers were less doubtful
IN this respect, as the constitution now
stands, there are considerations afforded bv
recent experience, which would seem TO
make it our duty to avoid a resort to such a
system.
All viii admit that the simplicity and
economy of the state governments, mainly
depend on the fact that money has to be-
supplied to support them by the same men.
or their agents, who vote it away in appro.
priations. Hence, when there are extrava-
giant and wastefu appropriations, there must
be corresponding increase of taxes and
the people becoming awakened, will neces-
sarily scrutinize the character Of measures
which thus increase their burdens. BY the
watcssul eye of self-interest, the agents of
the people in the state governments are re.
pressed, and kept within the limits of lust
economy. But if the necessity of levying
the taxes be taken from those who make the
| appropriations, and thrown upon a more
| distant ana less, responsible set of public
agents who have power to approach the
people by an indirect and stealtl,y taxation,
there lis reason to fear that prodigality will
soon supercede those characteristics which
have thus far made us look with so much
pride and confidence to the state govern
ments, as the main stay of our Union and
liberties. The state Legislatures, instead
OF studying to restrict their state cxpendi-
lures to the smallest possible sum, will claim
credit for their profusons, and harrass the
General Government for increased supplies.
Practically, there would soon be but one
taxing power, and that vested in body of
men far removed from the people, in which
the farming and mechanic interests would
| scarcely be represented. The states would
gradually lose their purity as well as their
independence; they would not dare to MUIR
muir at the proceedings of the General
Government, lest they should lose their sup
plies; all would be merged in practical
consolidation, cemented by widespread cor
ruption, which could only be eradcted by
one of these bloody revolutions which oc-
casionally overthrow the dcspotic systems
of the old world.
In all the other respects in which have
been able TO look at the effect of such
principle of distribution upon the best in
terests of the country, can see nothing TO
compensate for the disadvantages to which
have adverted. If we consider the pro.
tective duties, which are, in great degree
the source of the surplus revenue, beneficial
to one section of the Union, und preudical
TO another, there is no corrective for the evil
! in such plan of distribution. On the con.
trary, there is reason to fear that all tho
complaints which have sprung from this
cause will be aggravated. Every one must
be sensible that distribution of the surplus
must beget disposition to cherish the
means which create it; and any system,
therefore, into which it enters, must have a
power and tendency to Increase, rather than
diminish the tariff. If il were even admit
, ted, that the advantages of such a system
; could be made equal to all the sections of
} the Union, the reasons already SO urgently
calling for reduction Of the revenue,
!, would, nevertheless, lose none of their
force; for it will always be improbable that
an intelligent and vrtuous community can
consent to raise a surplus for the mere pur-
pose of dividing it, diminished as it must in
evitably be by the expenses of the various
machinery necessary to the process.
The safest and simplest mode of obvia.
ting all the difficulties which have been
mentioned, isto collect only revenue enough
to meet the wants of the government, and
let the people keep the balance of the pro.
| perry in their own hands, to be used for
their own profit. Each state will then sup.
port its own government, and contribute its
, due share towards the support Of the general
government. There would be no surplus
! to cramp and lessen the resources of indi.
, vidual wealth and enterprise, and the banks
would be left to their ordinary means.
Whatever agitations and fluctuations might
arise from our unfortunate paper system,
they could never be attributed, Justly or un-
/ justly, to the action Of the federal govern
: ment. There would be some guaranty
that the spirit of wild speculation, which
seeks to convert the surplus revenue into
banking capital, would be effectualy check
, ed, and that the scenes of decentralization,
which are now SO prevalent through the
land, would disappear.
, Without desiring to conceal that the ex-
) perience and observation of the last two
years, have operated partial change in
, my views npon this interesting subject, it Is
! nevertheless regretted that the suggestions
( made by me in my annual messages Of 1890
and 1880, have been greatly misunderstood.
f At that time, the great struggle was begun
against that lattudinarian construction of
{ the constitution which authorizes the unlirn.
, tied appropriation of the revenues of the
, Union to internal improvements within the
states, tending to invest in the hands and
, place under the control of the general gov
} eminent, all the roads and canals of the
country, in violation of state rights, and in
, the derogation of state authority. AT the
1 same time, tho condition ofthe manufacture
, ing interest was such as to create an appre.
hension that the duties on imports could not,
, without extensive mischief, be reduced in
Z season to prevent the accumulation of
considerable surplus after the payment Of
, the national debt.
; In view ofthe dangers Of such surplus,
) and IN preference to its application to inter-
2 nalimprovements,in derogation the rights
{ and powers Of the states, the suggestion Of
. an amendment of the constitution TO au-
: thorize its distribution was made. twas an
!. alternative for what was deemed greater
4 evils-a temporary resort to relieve an O.
!. verburdcncd treasury until the government
c could, without sudden and destructive re-
b vtllsion in the business Of the country, gra-
-