Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-10

becn determined is that they may 10 exposed 10 IN
vestmcn. both seawnrd and landward. and tnat they
ouphl TO be cupaLle of resisting combined attacN VI
in other words that their water batteries snoa I'D
deiences should be sufficient 10 resist Desieghg army
II is certain that whatever works we erect shou'u We
On constructed to be beyond the reach OF any eop as
main that would probably he attempted against them
d this capacly mus. depend upon their exposure and
unon the facility with which they can be reiieTeo Du.
this proposilion is fur different from one 10 construct
them upon scale Of magnitude which PrcsuPposfs te!
arc to be formally invested by powerful land furcc snu
which provides Tor their ability to make successful re-
sjstance dushing military CT naval otlicei may NC
willing TO risk something to get possession OF an
most hy prompt movement expecting 10 dcco"'p'''
his enterprise before his adversary Gun be PIepaieu'
or succor Obtained and this, when he looks 70 u"
orr advantage than the capture Of the garrison ana tue
effect which brilliant exploit IS calculated To prouuc''
md when he is that he must abandon ms con-
quest with as much CELEBRITY as he attninrd It, but io.
NAL investments Of fortified places with all lhef dii'
culles, and expense, and uncertainty, are only uhcrl
taken when there is object OF corresponding n-
pprancc to b. expected. We have works constructed
which il would require armies TO reduce. Have any
reason 10 anticipate that they VIII be aSsaed " !o'ce
| proportioned 10 their magnitude!
! have already remarked that European power can
not expect retain permanent possession OF any part
of this country IT, therefore, he succeed IN ovrrcoH-
ing or GLIDING fleets and prepared with respect
ape land force and ready 10 risk its employment upon
our territory he land at many points which We can
not close against him. His debarka:ion is no; question
of prac,icaby but Of expeditncy. 1t n safe harbor
or roadstead offers ITSELF and there is no defensive work
TO prevent his approach lie WILL of COURSE land at the
nearest point the Oh rct of his araudns enterprise
ftherc is such work. it will be question Of cacn!a
ton whether is better 10 attack and carry It, or TO seek
another, though distant point OF debaIkal!nn
think there can be little doubt but there few if any,
nositions in our country which enemy would not
under such circumstances, avoid. lie wnu!'l be
aware Of the facility OF communication when our
rivers canals and railroads afford, OF the powerful use
we should be prepared to nuke vi Stum IN It's VARIOUS
forms NJ nnplca and of the immense force which,
short time could be concentrated upon gwen pont ana
il is scarcely within the limits OF possibility that he would
venture formally 10 bcSiegc OF our Iorls, or II lie
did that he would not repent his raslnesS Neither the
Cooperation Of his fleet the nearer proximity Of the
place Of landing the ect Of attack would induce MN
to seek these advantages at the cost whch must aeno
tho slow process CT bcsiegng fort, when by removing
to another POSITION he would land III safety, and save III
time in pronp,npss of mo and in lis escape from
the petiis of doubtful contest more Than he would lose
by the difference in distance.
! aware, mny be objected that The weakness OF a
work might tempt enemy 10 attack 1t, and that may
be supposed the power OF some OF our orihcalns 20 re-
sst siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why
they may be compelled 10 cncounter one Certainly
the stronger work tho less will 1t be exposed to dan
ger But this would not furnish sufficient for
making its drfrnces out OF reasonable proportion to lis
exposure The true inquiry is, What circumstances
will probably induce ana enable all enemy To nssail
given point and with what furce aud how can we best
meet and repcl him; And believe just consdera
ton OF this proposition will lead to the conclusion, that
there are scarcely any positions in country where
crrlny would venture to set down before Il work too
strong resist coup dc main In the view, therefore,
which take of this whole subject, ii will be perceived
tat do not merely suppose an enemy Will not invest
larger works, but that They would not do SO were
these works much inferior to what they are: both in their
| dimensions and construction
| (T0 be continued in eur me1t.)