State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1831-1836, 1836-02-09

on such grave and important subjects, other.
wise than by direct and responsible recon-
mendation--a public and open recommends
ton, equally addressed and equally known 10
all whose duty calls upon them to act on the
subject 2 What would be the state Of things
if he might communicate his wishes or opin-
ions privately to members of one House, and
make no such communication TO members of
the other? Would not the two Houses be
necessarily put in immediate collision Would
they stand on equal footing Would they
have equal information What could ensue
from such manner of conducting the public
business but quarrel, confusion and conflict?
A member rises in the House of Representa-
lives, and moves very large appropriation of
money for military purposes. If he says he
does it upon Executive recommendation, where
is his voucher? The President is not like the
British king, whose ministers and secretaries
are in the House Of Commons, and who are
authorized, in certain cases, TO express The o.
pinions and wishes of their sovereign. We
have no kings servants; at least we have
! none known TO the Constitution. Congress
| can know the opinions OF the President only
as he officially communicates them. Ii would
| he curious inquiry in either House, when a
| large appropriation is moved, If II were neces-
sary &c ask whether the mover represented the
President, spoke his sentiments, or, in other
words, whether what he proposed was Sin ac-
cordance with the views of the Executive ~
How could that be judged of By the party
he belongs TO Party is not quite unique e.
| nough for that. By the airs he gives himself
Many might assume airs, lthereby they could
give themselves such importance as 10 be os-
teemed authentic exposi,ors OF the Executive
will. Or is this will 10 be circulated in wbis-
pors7 made known 10 meetings of party men
intmoted through the press or communica-
ted in any other form, which still leaves the
Executive completely irresponsible? So that
while Executive purposes or wishes peryade
the ranks Of party friends, influence their con-
duct, and unite their efforts, the open, direct,
and constitutional responsibility is wholly a.
voided. Sir, this is not the Constitution oflhe
United States, nor can it be consistent with
any constitution which processes TO maintain
separate departments in the Government.
Here, then, sir is abundant ground, in my
| judgment, for the vote of the Senate, aud here
[ might rest it. But there is also another
ground. The Constitution declares that no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury but
in consequence Of appropriations made by
law. What is meant by appropriations ~
Does this language not mean that particular
sums shall be assigned, by law, 10 particular
objects How far this pointing out and fixing
the particular objects shall be carried, is ques-
ton that Cannot be settled in any precise rule.
But "specifc appropriations" that is to say,
the designation Of every object for which mon
ey is voted, as far as such designation is prac-
ticable, has been thought 10 be u most imror-
tant republican principle. In times past, pop
ular parties have claimed great merit from pro-
Tossing TO carry this doctrine much farther, an d
to adhere 10 ii much more strictly than their
adversaries Mr. Jefferson, especially, was an
advocate for it, and held it to be indispensable
TO safe and economical administration and
disbursement Of the public revenues.
But what have the friends and admirers Of
Mr. Jefferson 10 say 10 this appropriation ?
Where do they find, in this proposed grant OF
three millions, designation Of object, and par
ticular and specific application Of money ?
Have they forgotten, all forgotten, and wholly
abandoned, even all pretencc for specific APP.
! preparation II not, how could they sanction
such vote as this ? Let me recall its terms.
They are, that "lhe sum CT three millions of
dollars be, and the same hereby is, appropra-
ted, out of the money in the Treasury not 9TH
erwse appropriated, to be expended in whole
or in part, under the direction Of the President
Of the United States, for the military and naval
service, including Notifications and ordnance,
and TO increase the navy: provided such en-
pendures shall be rendered necessary for the
defence Of the country, prior TO the next meet
ing of Congress-"
In the first place it is TO he observed, that
whether the money shall be used at all or not,
is made to depend on the discretion Of the
President. This is sufficiently liberal. 1t
carries confidence far enough. But, il there
had been no other objections, if the objects of
| tho npnroDriotion had hppu snHirpntly daccri-
bed, SO That the President, if he expended the
money at all, must have expended 1t for pur-
poses authorized by the Legislature, and moth
ing had been left 10 his discretion but the ques-
! ton, whether an emergency had arisen, in
which the authority ought 10 be exercised, |
ght not have felt bound 10 reject the vote.
There are come precedents which might favor
such contingent provision, though the prac-
| tce is dangerous, and ought not 10 be followed
except in cases Of clear necessity.
| But the nsurmountable objection 10 tho proposed
grant was, that it specified no objects. 1t was as
general as language could make IT. 1t embraced
every expenditure tina, could be called either militia
rY of naval 1t was to include "fortifcations ord
nance, and increase Of the navy, but it was not
fined to these 1t embraced the whole general sub
ject Of military service. Under the authority Of such
law, the President might repair ships, build ships,
buy ships, enlist seamen and do any thing and ey-
cry thing else, touching the naval Service without
restraint or control.
He might repair such Notifications as he saw fit,
and neglect the rest; arm such as he fit and
neglect the armng Of others or build new fortifca
tons whenever he chose. But these unlimited pow
ers over the Notifications and the navy constitute
by means, the most dangerous part Of the propo-
sed authority; because, under that authority, his
power to raise and employ land forces was equally
absolute and uncontrolled He might levy troops,
embody a new army, call out the militia in numbers
to suit his own discretion, and employ them rs he