Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-03-19
VIRGINIA LEGISLATURES.
DEFERRED DEB.4TE.-[CosrlsvEp.l
HOUSE OF DELEGATEs- Saturday, Jan. %

DEFERRED Observation-Disclosures
HOUSE OF DELEGATEs.-Saturday JaH %.
ENPUNGING RESOLUTIONS. ~
Mr. Fo:rA1SE said it was certainly with great diff
dence that he take part in debate IN SO
important One who had lived in retirement, and had
-noueber been unaccustomed to wrcSte upon an arena
like The present required little assurance TO attempt
TO express his sentiments upon complicated question
like the present He should therefore ,conGne himself 10
discussion of the principal points, without gong lnto
a minute detail or suffering himself to be led into de.
tails foreign 10 the immediate question lie should also
refrain from casting any upon his political oppo
nenls although they had in all cases set him an example
of forbearance. He hoped however they were all IN the
pursuance of truth, though they might widely differ
in their modes of searching after IT. or III the csae
which they placed upon it. From the turn wh'ch Tue
debate had taken, the most important point OF enquiry
seemed to be, whether the President coMitlea al u-
constitutional act in discharging the Secretary OF The
Treasury under the circumstances OF the case! III IL
could be made to appear, that the rteS'oeht hao
right 10 remove his Secretary, then 1t would ioow as
consequence that The Senate had not right TO cesure
him for that act The Constitution declares that the EN.
ecutive is vested in the President alone he heads OF
and other Executive Officers are appointed
by him with the consent OF the SENATE Us suo'G; ~ "''
superyison and CONTROL aud removable at his plea
sure-e being the sole Executive, was necessary mat
he should have power over the inferior Officers appoint
ed to aid him in the execution OF the laws ana Tor TINS
nprnose the Constitution has him ample powers
The power of appointment is qualified by rendering II
necessary that the Senate should CONSENT Dnt Tue power
of removal his without restriction; and tlS scwS IN
dependent of the necessity That II should nr So na' ne
has the power those officers in the performance OF
their duties. He being responsible LOT tne uuc e"ccu
ton of the laws, must, consequence possess INC
to remove his subordinate officers Upon ms p'lhl Us
il has been repeatedly disputed will cite the authority
of MIR. Madison
az think it absolutely necessary that the fFes'dGnt
should have the power Of removing from othce--hake
him necuarly RESPONSIBLE for their conduct and subject
him for Impeachment hil,sef if lie suffers them with
impunity to commit high crimes ana uilsdenlrahors
against the United States-or neglect TO snperinl'nu
their conduct to check their excess - IS ono
of the most prominent features IF the Constitution, prIn-
cipe that pe,uadcs the ecOtc sysem that there should be
the hpest possible responsibility i'll all the Executive oiii
GERS thereof"
uif The heads Of the Executive Departments are sub
:. ., rsnovol alone by the President, have in him
ssecur;tv for the good behaviour O; the officers
And again he says: ~ ,
at IN doing the Executive duties OF his oifcc he
G J;snjoced This makes him responsible to the great
Executive power, and makes the President Responsible
to the public for the conduct OF the person ne has ho
mated and apppointeu ID AID nj" l" ''e "o'''''''0
of his department. r., -
II will be recoected that i'll the debate III Congress-
an This subject in 1852 contcnded, that the power
of removal incidental with the power o' appoint
ment: and that therefore, the Senate must CONCUR In
rcnv to that position, Mr. Madison says
f YOU take this construction, anu say that an occr
&c tho f,ynculive shall not be displaced bat by and with
thacn q
swerabe for the conduct OF the oi'ccr-H ~W aepend
1on The Senate; you destroy real responsibility without
obtaining shadow =.
If it Should be enQuircd why the Senate was joined
with the President in appolnlnglo Office: Mr MauSon
says: -.
answer merely for the sake Of adVislng-belng sup
posed, from their nature, better acquainted with the
character the candidates than an Individual
II ia evidently the intention OF the Constitution, that
the first Magistrate should be responsible for the Execu
tive Dparmcnt; So far, therefore, we do not make the
officers who are aid him in the duties OF that De
partment responsible to him. he is not responsible TO the
country. .. , ..,l
the heads of Departments.
The Constitution aiivms, that the Executive power
shall be vested in Prcsden-Arc there exceptions
Yes there The Constitution says hat inc Sena,e
Office unless in case of inferior ohccrs-and no other
sThr question resolves itself into this-ls the power
IF dsnl,cinu an Executive power: conceive that II
W - i; in lis nature, Executive, it is the power Of
orcrsccug aud controlling those who execute
the laws -"Now If the officer, when once appointed,
is not TO depend the Tor his o'hcia existence,
confess do not sec hotc INC TeSoc"t cah He c0rcH0o
the la,cs are faithfully erecatcd,
Vest this power jointly with the Senate, and you abo-
lish that great principle Of unity ana rejp9nsSy IN The
EIeeure Department, rch 'cas intended or the secure
IN of liJcrtv and the pubic good
:: so;-Iou may set the Senate at the head OF the
Executive Department, or require oihccrS 10 hoi he
nlnces at the pleasure Of tG l9use OF REPRESENTATIVES,
and BY this MEANS you link together two branches oil inc
Government, which the PreSefS@eso"y ee0''ty '0'N9
requires to be Separated
T5e law PASSED I'd September 1852 and another passed
IItb Sept and standing next IN order on the Statute
hooL ack nowledres the Treasury Executive De-
tr,ent The title to this act is, ian establishing
The salaries of the Executive Officers OF The Govern
ment" The first officer naricd IN the law Inc Secreta-
~ of the Treasury, then the Treasurer, NC, NC
Il thus appears that the Secretary OF The treasury
? f>r. ,,p rusiI II holm ihn U,,,o.
STORY of the Executive power under the Constitution
the Secretary of the Treasury is placed under his CONTROL
and perform his duties under the PRESIDENT diIcct
supervision The Constitution gives the power !" lie
President call for the opinions OF his officers IN witt
inu and it was evident that this power was given him
in order that he might control them in the performance
Of their dues-in order that he might ascertain from
their written Statements their views subjects placed
under their Charge and that hc found they
or pursuing n wrong course, aud obstinate in that
course he might dismiss them from office. The opinion
ofMr Jefferson may also be cited upon this head-lt APP
neors that shortly alter the adoption OF the Constitution
The Cabinet frequently met to consult upon carrying it
;nto effect In one OF those meetings, difference
occurred upon call which the House OF Representatives,
had made for papers from the department On this sub
49, 10 the fonrth volume Of Jefferson Correspondence
a. tics as follows "April 3D. met again at the rrcsi-
dents house on subject "a cal! tor persons aud
oners &c by committee OF tho House OF Kcpresrn.
tatiyes We had all considered ana were OF one m,na
,;nte enquiries; Second that it might call tor papers
anerallv Third that the Executive ought to commune
sote such papers as the public good would permit ane
ouaht to refuse those the disclosure of which would in
lure the public; consequently were TO exercise discre
ton; Fourth that neither tue committee nor The hou s
I'D ahoss papers ,ocrc under the President alone; but
,hat the committee should instruct their Chairman ia
the House to address the President. Note Ha
milton agreed 10Th us IL oil these points, except US to the
."sar of the House to call OIL heads OF Departments
Observed that as 10 his Department. the act establish
~ IT, had made it subec, to Congress in some points
8 No. thouoht himself not far subject, as to be obg'
90 to produce all the papers they might call for &c
col :. annenrs from this extract that all the mem.