Constantine republican. [volume] (Constantine, Mich.) 1836-1838, 1836-12-28

must be TO some extent injured, while that
of the place where the funds are concentra-
led, and are employed in banking, are pro-
portonably extended. But both in making
the transfer of the funds which arc first &C.
ccssaiy to pay the duties and collect the sur
plus--and in making the transfers, which
becomes necessary when the time arrives
for the distribution of that surplus--there is
a considerable period when the funds can.
not be brought into use and it is manifest
that besides the loss inevitable from such an
opcra,ionseits tendency is to produce fiuc-
tuat;ons in the business of tho country,
which ere always productive OF speculation,
and detrimental to the interests of regular
trade. Argument can scarcely be neces-
sary to show that measure of this charac-
ter ought not to receive further Legislative
encouragement.
BY examining the practical operation Of
the ratio for distribution, adopted in the de-
posite bill ofthe last session, we shall Disco
yer other features, that appear equally OBJ
lectionabc. Lett be assumed, for the sake
of argument, that the surplus moneys to be
deposited with the states have been collect
ed, and belong to them, in the ratio Of their
federal representative population--an as
sumption founded upon the fact that any de-
ficiencies in our future revenue from inn
posts and public lands, must be made up by
direct taxes, collected from the states in
that ratio. 1t is proposed to distribute the
surplus, say $3O,O00,00O, not according to
the ratio in which it has been collected and
belongs TO the people ofthe states, but in that
of their votes in the colleges of electors Of
President and Vice. President. The effect
of distribution upon that ratio is shown by
the annexed table, marked A.
By an examination Of that table, it will
be perceived that in the distribution of sur
plus of ss30,000,000, upon that basis, there
is great departure from the principle which
regards representation as the true measure
of taxation and it will be found that the
tendency of that departure will be to increase
whatever inequalities have been supposed to
attend the operations of our federal system
in respect to its bearings upon the different
interests of the Union. In making the
basis of representation the basis of taxa
ton, the trainers of the constitution intend.
ed to equalize the burdens which are neces-
sary to support the Government; and the
adoption of that ratio, while it accomplished
this object, was also the means of adjusting
other great topics arising out of the con-
llicting views respecting the equality of the
various members of the confcderacy.-
Whatevorthoreiore disturbs the liberal spirit
of the compromises which established q
rule of taxation SO just and equitable, and
which experience has proved to be so well
adapted to the genius and habits Of our peo-
pie, should be received with the greatest
caution and distrust.
A bare inspection, in the annexed table,
of the differences produced by the ratio
used in the deposite act, compared with the
results of distribution according 70 the
ratio of direct taxation, must satisfy every
unprecedented mind, that the former ratio
contravenes the spirit of the constitution
and produces degree of injustice in the
operation of the Federal Government which
would be fatal to the hope of perpetuating
it. BY the ratio of direct taxation, for ex.
ample, the state of Delaware, in the col.
lection of ss3O,OO0.OOO of revenue, would
pay into the Treasury Ss1s9,7l6 and in 0
distribution of $3O,O00,000 she would re-
ceive back from the Government, accord
ing to the ratio of the deposite bill, the sun
Of 1906, l22 and similar results would
follow the comparison between the small
and the large states throughout the Union
thus realizing TO the small states an advan.
tage which would be doubtless rs unaccep.
table to them as motive for Incorporating
the principle in any system which would
produce it, as it would be Inconsistent with
the rights and expectations of the large
States. 1t was certainly the intention o.
that provision of the constitution which de.
clares that Z" all duties, imposts and excuses
shall "be uniform throughout the United
States" to make the burdens of taxation
fall equally upon the people in whatever
state of the Union they may reside. Blu
what would be the value of such an uni.
form rule if the moneys raised by it could
be Immediately returned by a different one
which will give to the people ofsome states
, much more, and 10 those of others much
less, than their fair proportions Were the
Federal Government to exempt, in express
terms, the imports, products, and manufac
lures of some portions of the country from
, all duties, while it imposed heavy ones or
others, the injustice cannot be greater.
would be easy to show how, by the opera
ton of such a principle, the large states 0
the Union would not only have to contri
butte their just share towards the support o
the Federal Government, but also have tt
, bear in some degree the taxes necessary tc
support the Government of their smaller
, sisters; but it is deemed unnecessary tc
/ state the details where the general principle
is so obvious.
; A system liable to such objections cal
: never be supposed to have been sanctioned
by the trainers of the constitution, wher
, they conferred on Congress the taxing pow
or: and feel persuaded that mature
examination of the subject will satisfy every
, one that there are insurmountable dltilcul
, ties in the operations of any plan which car
: be devised of collecting revenue for the
! purpose Of distributing it. Congress il
only authorized to levy taxes "to pay TIL
!. debts and to propide for The common defenc'
and general ncifarc of The United States.
, There is no such provision as would autho
i rze congress to collect together the pro
( perty of the country; under the name o
5 revenue, for the purpose Of dividing it equal
Y ly or unequally among the states or I'll,
. people. Indeed, it is not probable that sucl