South Branch intelligencer. [volume] (Romney, Va. [W. Va.]) 1830-1896, 1836-06-25


uste. Bot there is a principle, recog
nized by all the American Constitu-
lions, which was unknown TO the an.
cient republics. They all acknowledge
rights in the minority, which cannot
rigbtfully be taken from them. Expe.
repce had shown that in large assea,
bIies these rights were not always res
pected. Ii would be in vain that they
should be enumerated, and respec. for
them enjoined in the Constitution. A
popular assembly, under the influence
Of that spirit OF party which is always
discoversble in a greater or leas degree
10 all republics, might and would, as
il was believed, sometimes disregard
them. To guard against this danger,
and to secure the rights Of each indi
| vidual, the expedient of creating De-
partment independent Of the others,
and amenable only TO the laws, was
adopted. Security was thus given a.
gainst any palpabIe violation OF The
Constitution, TO the injury Of individa-
ais, or OF minority party. But IL was
still possible for wilfuI aud excited
majority to enact laws Of the greatest
injustice and tyranny, without viola
ting the letter Of their charter.
And this take to be The organ Of
the veto power, as well in the State
Governments as that of the U. States.
II appears to have been the intention
to create an umpire between the con-
tending factions which had existed, it
was believed, and would continue to
exist. II there was any propriety in
adopting this principle in the Govern
ment Of a state, all the reasons in favor
of it existed in ten fold degree for in
cooperating il in tina, Of the u. States.
The operations Of the latter, extending
over an immense tract of country, en-
bracing the products OF almos. every
cline, & that country divided too into
q number OF separate Governments, in
many respects independent Of each
other and ofthe common federal head !,
left bu. little hope that they could al
ways be carried on 10 harmony. 1t
could no, be doubted that sectional in
terests would at times predominant In
the bosoms OF the immediate represen-
tatives OF the people and the States,
and combinations formed destructive
of the public good or unjust and OPP
pressiye to a minority. Where could
| a power to check these local feelings,
and to destroy the effects Of unjust
combinations, be better placed than in
the hands Of that department whose
authority, being derived from the same
common sovereigns,is coordinate with
the rest, and which enjoys the grsa,
distinction of being at once the imme-
diate representative OF the whole Peo-
pie, as well as of each particular Slater
In the former character, the interests
of the whole community would be rig
idly supported, and, in The latter. the
rights of each member steadfastly
maintained. The representation from
the State authorities in the Electoral
Colleges, consider one of the most
felicitous features in the Constitution.
1t serves as an eternal memen,o TO the
Chief Magistrate that it is his duty to
guard the interest of the weak against
the unjust expressions of the strong g.
powerful. From these premises, you
will conclude that consider the quail
flied vsto upon the acts OF the LegisIa
ture conferred by the Constitution upon
the President, as conservative pow
er, intended only 10 be used to secure
the instrument itself from violation, or,
in times of high party excitement to
protect the rights Of the minority, and
the interests Of the weaker members Of
the Union. Such, indeed is my opin-
ion, and such we must believe to be
the opinion of nearIy all the distin-
guished men who have filled the exec
utive chair. III were President Of
the United States, an act which did
not involve either Of the principles a.
bove enumerated, must have been
passed under very peculiar eircumstan-
ces Of preeipi,ancy or opposition TO the
known public will, to induce me to re-
fuae to it my sanction.
1.-THE opinion 1 have given of the
motives of the trainers of The Cons,itu-
tion, in giving the veto power to the
President,is correct, it follows that they
never could have expected that he who
was constituted the umpire between
contending factions should ever idsnti-
fy himself " ith the interests of one of
them, and voluntarily rase himself
from the proud eminence of leader Of
nation to that Of chief Of party. ]
can easily conceive the existence Of a
slate of things hp which the Chief Ma.