State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1831-1836, 1836-04-26

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fourth article Of the Constitution, is bound t
protect the States, "on application of the LIE
gislature, or the Executive (when the Logisla
turo cannot be convened,) from domestic VIC
lcnce," Congress is consequently bound tC
withhold the use oil its mails Tor the circua
ton Of such publications. as tend to excite
violence in the States. The constitutional
question involved in this argument will be ex
amined hereafter our first object being TO as
certain the extent of this obligation on the
! General Government supposng one to exist
and to inquire into the manner in which II is
to be carried into effect. The particular case
which induced the argument of the Postmas.
ter General is, tho circulation Of publications
which are alleged TO have a tendency TO excite
the slaves to instruction but his language is
general, applying 10 all publications which any
State may conceive tend to instigate rcvolts
from its authorities. If one State has right
to call on Congress to enact laws to prevent
the effect of a mail circulation of publications
within its limits, any other State has the same
right and il the judgment of one State is to
be received as evidence Of the evil tendency OF
particular publications, the judgment of every
other State must have the same force, and inn
pose the same obligation on Congress. A
statue, therefore, founded on this principle,
would provide that il should be an offence a.
gainSt The United States for any person to send
Through The nai! into any State any publication
the circulation Of achich might be prohibited by
the la,cS of such State.
A statute of this description would not only
punish the citizen of Massachusetts before the
federal court in his State, for sending publlca-
tons by mail on the subject Of slavery into
Georgia, but would also punish the citizen OF
Georgia, before the federal court in his State,
for sending publication on any subject into
Massachusetts, that subject, whatever 1t might
be- having previously come under the interdlct
Of the law Of Massachusetts. Nor would 1t
limi the extent Of the operation OF this statute
to provide that the law af the State prohibiting
the circulation of publications should not be in
compatible acith The Constitution and the laicS
ofthe United States For it is to he observed
that, although the Constitution OF the United
States prohibits Congress from making any
law "abrdging the freedom OF speech, or oil
The press" yet il contains no such prohibition
on the States. Upon the subject OF the press
the legislation of the States Is only limited by
their State Constitutions, and those Constltu
tons are subject to no control by the General
Government SO long as they remain ''republi-
can in form" 1t is believed that the Consti-
tutons of most if not all, OF the States con-
Legislatures over the press, but, without such
restrictions, the power would be full and com
plete, even 10 the establishment OF n censor
ship. 1t ia not perceived that such power,
alarming as might be its exercise, would be
an inlring cement Of the constitution OF the
United States, or that the Government OF the
Union could exert over it any legal supervls-
ion. The Constitutions which now contain
restrictions are liable to amendment and may
be remodelled to answer any objects which
the people of any State may, for the time be-
inc, desire to accomplish. A law, therefore,
nude in conformity with the principles assum-
ed by the Postmaster General, would be Inn
tied in its operation only by the will oil the
People of any one State, serving to determine
what publications it should be criminal Tor the
citizens Of every other State TO send into that
State by mail. In relation TO publications on
the subject of slavery, one State might enact
that it should be unlawful to circulate such
publications. only as had manifest tendency
TO excite the slaves TO instruction another,
with the same declared objects in view, might
extend the prohibition TO all publications on
the subject of slavery; third might coniine
its prohibitions to newspapers and small peri
odicals; a fourth might exclude the larger re-
views and pamphlets and fifth might except
from its prohibition the annual messages OF the
Governors Of the several States, and speeches
in Congress, while sixth might include them
But the operation of the law would extend 10
all sentiments and opinions which any state
might deem of dangerous tendency. One
| State might prohibit the dissemination OF the
| Catholic doctrine /; another, that OF the Pro-
testant one that of one political sentiment
and another that of its opposite; and, under a
law OF this description, the extraordinary spec
table might be exhibited of two district courts
Of the United States sitting on the same day
in two different States, one engaged IN pas
I sing sentence on an individual convicted unde
the statute for sending by mail publication
advocating one opinion, and the other passing
sentence on another individual, convicted un
der the same statute, for transmitting public
alton OF the directly opposite opinion; the one
! publication being, perhaps, a satisfactory ant
conclusive rcfutalon of the doctrines OF tn,
other. Some of the cases enumerated may
be of improbable occurrence; but they all ial
within the legitimate scope Of statute found
cd on supposed obligation in Congress II
prohibit. the mail circulation Of publications
| offensive TO the States, and are all cases TO
which, under such Il statute, punishment
must be inflicted whenever they should hap
pen.
! This law would possess another anomalous
character, for which the minority have sough
in vain for an example. 1t would refer to lh'
laws Of foreign jurisdiction for the definition
of the crime for which it provided punish
ment 10 laws which never had been, and ne
yer could be, legally promulgated TO the accu
: sed. Ii Is legal maxim, Ignorant non er
! cUsd iegtm," that ignorance Of the law is NJ
excise TO the offender but this maxim il
founded on the principle that the laws are Of
record, open TO Inspection and have also heer
published within the jurisdiction under which
Iho offence is committed. No presumption
can arise Of the legal PRONUNCIATION Of tn
laws Of a forlgn Gov, rnment, and yet The Of
tender, hs this statute, would he punished 70
their violation, He who would seek TO avoit
the penalties Of such a statute, must, in poin
n Of fact, not only obtain knowledge Of tn