Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1836-12-13


ties. The state legislatures, nstead.of Studying to
restrict their state expenditures to the smallest pos
sible sum, will claim credit for their rofusion,
and harfass the General Government for decreased
supplies. Practically there would be but de taxing
power, and that vested in body Of men fl reno
we'd from the people, in which the farninghnd me
chanic interests would scarcely he represented
The states would gradually lose their purify as well
as their independence they would not dae to mut
muir ut the proceedings fthe General Government,
lest they should lose their supplies all would be
merged in a practical consolidation, cemnted by
widespread corruption, which could onlyoe Grad
icated by Of those bloody revolutions which oc-
casionally overthrow the despoiic system f the old
world.
In all o,hc. respects in which have BEN able TO
look at the effect Of such principle Of ditribution
upon the best interests of the country, cin see
thing TO compensate for the Disadvantages IN which
have ndverted. five consider the protective dit
ties, which arc, in great degree, The sorce Of the
surplus revenue, beneficial TO one seclpn Of the
Union, and pfeludlcia TO another, there is no cor
receive for the evil in such plan Of dstrbuiion.-
On the contrary, there ~ reason to fear tint all the
complaints which have sprung from ills cause
would be aggravated. Every one must b. sensible
that distribution of the surplus must bcet dis
position to cherish the means which creau IT and
any system, therefore, into which il entrs, must
have a powerful tendency TO increase, raher than
diminish the tariff. If il were even admitted
that the advantages Of such system cou, be made
equal 10 all the sCcuOns oil the OniOn the reasons
already so urgently calling for reduction of the
revenue, would, nevertheless, lose none Of their
force 1t will always be improbable that inielli-
gent and yiruous community can consent Il raise a
surplus for The mere purpose Of dividing dimin-
ished IL must inevitably be by the expenses Of the
various machinery necessary 10 the process
The safest and simplest mode Of obviaiing all the
difficulties which have been mentioned, is it collect
only revenue enough to meet the wants Of he gov
ernmen and lie, the people keep the balance of the
property their hands, 10 be used for their
profit. Each State will then support its own Gov
eminent, and contribute its due share towards the
support Of the General Government. There would
be no surplus to cramp and lessen the resources of
individual wealth and enterprise, AMI the banks
would be lcit TO their ordinary means. Whatever
agtaiions and fluctuations might arise from our un-
fortunate paper SYSTEM they could never be attribu
ted justly unjnsty, to the action Of the Federal
Government. There would be some guaranty tina,
the spirit Of wild speculation which seeks to convert
the surplus revenue into banking capital, would be
eiectuay checked, and III the scenes Of demon al
zatlon, which are now prevalent through til,
land, would disappear.
Without desiring to conceal that the experience
and observation of the last years, have opera
ted partlo change IN my views upon this interest
ing subject is nevertheless regretted that the sug-
gesiions made by me in my annual message Of i 80.
and 1880, have been greatly misunderstood, A
that time the great struggle was begun against tina
atudnarian construction Of the cons Tuition, which
authorizes the unlimited Appropriation ofthe reven-
ues ct the Union TO internal improvements within
the States, tending TO divert into the hands, anc
place under The control Of the General Government
all the principal roads and canals Of the country il
violation Of Stale rights, and in dorogaron Of Stat,
authority. AT the same time, the condition of the
manufacturing interest was such to create APP
pr chez sion that the duties on imports could not
withou, extensive mischief be reduced in season t,
prevent the accumulation Of a considerable surplus
after the payment of the national debt. In view o
the dangers OF such surplus, and in preference I,
It's application TO internal impr nveinents in deroga.
ton of The rights and powers Of the States the sug
geehon OF an amendment Of the constitution to au
| thorise lis distribution was made twas an alter
| native for what were deemed greater cvils--a TEN
| porary resort TO relieve 10 oyerburdenod Trcasur
until the Government could withou, a sudden an
destructive revuslon in the the business ofthe coun
try gradually return to the lust principle of raisn
no more revenue fom the people, IN taxes, than
necessary for lts economical support. Even The
alternative was not spoken Of but in connecto
with an amendment Of the constitution. No TEN
porary inconvenience can Justify tho exercise Of
prohibited power, or power not granted by that in
sirument; and il was from conviction that h
power to distrbu ute a temporary surplus Of reYenu
is OF that character, that it was suggested only
connection with an appeal TO the source Of all leg,
power in the General Government, the States whic
have cstabi shed it. No such appeal has been ia
ken, and in my opinion a distribution Of the o"'Pl'
rovonus by ConSresa. .i,hor 10 the Suites or &c Ih
people, is TO be considered as among the prohlb
lions Of the constitution. As already iniimai led II
views have undergone change, so far as 20 be cor
WINGED that no alteration Of the const tuition in IL,
respect is wise expedent. The influence Of az
cumuatng surplus upon the legislation Of Geuer
Government and the States it effects upon the cree
. system Of the country, producing dangerous ereI
SONS and runous contractions, fluctuations in Il
price of p opeftt, rash speculations, extravaganza
and detlorauon of morals, have taught US d
important lesson, that any transient mischief viii
may attend the reduction Of our revenue to 4
A wants Of our government, is 10 be borne in prefe
encc to an overlooking Treasury.
Under our present revenue system, there is eve
\ probability thar there will continue 10 be surpl
: beyond the wants Of the Government and it |,
e | become our duty to decide whether such result
consistent with the true objects OF our Governmer
v Should surplus be permitted to accumulate, b
+ yond the appropriations, il must be retained in
. Treasury as it now is, or distributed among I
= people or tina States.
Il To retain it in the Treasury, unemployed in a
: way, is impraciicable. II is, besides against I
l. genius Of free institutions to lock up in vau
9 the treasure Of the na,lon. To take from the p,
70 pie the right Of bearing arms, and put their weapo
'- Uf defence in the hands Of standing army, woi
r be scarcely dangerous 10 their liberties tn
IS TO permit the Government 10 accumulate INNER
m amounts Of treasure beyond the supplies necessa
/. 10 its legitimate wants. Such treasure wol
D doubtless be employed, at some time, it has be
lie in other countries, when opportunity tempted am
- ton.
~ To collect merely for distribution to the Stat
=, would seem 10 be highly impolitic, # no, di
" gerous, as the proposition to retain it in the Ire
~ ury. The shortest reflection must satisfy ev
'e one that to require the people to pay taxes to
!, Government, merely that they may be paid b'
" again, is sporting with the substantial interests
~ the country, and no system which produces sucS
result can be expected to receive public count
DO ance. Nothing could be gained by il, even If e'
Of individual who contributed a portion Of tho
IS could receive back promptly The saioe portion.
H. it is apparent that no syo,cm Of the kind can
ne be enforced, which will not absorb considera
r. portion Of the money, TO be distributed, in sala
ng and commissions to the agents employed in tho ,
So cess, and in the various losses and depreciati
us which arise from other causes and The pract
al effect Of such an attempt must ever be to burt
ch the people with taxes, not for purposes beneficial