Constantine republican. [volume] (Constantine, Mich.) 1836-1838, 1836-12-28

congress such thoughts as have occurred TO
me 10 aid their elaboration in treating il in
a manner best calculated to conduce 10 the
common good.
The experience of other nations admon-
lshed us to hasten the extinguishmcnt of
the public debt. But it will be in vain that
we have congratulated each other upon
the disappearance of this evil, if we do not
guard against the equally great one of pro-
noting the unnecessary accumulation Of
public revenue. No political maxim is
better established than that which tells us
that an improyident expenditure of money
is the parent of profligacy, andthat no poo
pie can hope to perpetuate their liberties
who long acquiescc in policy which tax
es them for objects not necessary to the le-
climate and real wants of their govern
ment. Flattering as is the condition OF
our country at the present period, because
OF its unexampled advance in all the steps
of social and political improvement, it cam
not be disguised that there is lurking
danger apparent in the neglect oftlis war
ming truth, and that the time has arrived
when the representatives of the people
should be employed in devising some more
appropriate remedy than now exists, to
| avert it.
Upon our present revenue system, there
is every probability that there will con-
tinue to be a surplus beyond the wants Of
the government; and it has become our
duty to decide whether such result be
consistent with the true objects of our gov
eminent.
Should surplus be permitted to accu.
mulale beyond the appropriations, it must
be retained in the treasury as it now is,
or distributed among the people Of the
states.
To retain it in the treasury, unemployed
! in any way, is impracticable. 1t is, be-
sides, against the genius of our free insti.
tutions 10 lock up in vaults the treasure of
the nation. To take from the people the
right of bearing arms, and put their weap-
ons Of defence in the hands of standing
army, would be scarcely more dangerous
to their liberties than to permit the gov
eminent to accumulate immense amounts
of treasure beyond the supplies necessary
to its legitimate wants. Such treasure
would doubtless be employed, at some time,
as it has been IN other countries, when OPP
portunity tempted ambition.
TO collect it merely for distribution TO
the states would seem to be highly impoli-
tic, ifnot as dangerous as the proposition to
retain it in the treasury. The shortest re-
Election must satisfy every one that TO re-
quire the people TO pay taxes to the gov
eminent merely that they be paid back a.
gain, is sporting with the substantial inter-
ests of the country, and no system which
produces such result can be expected to
receive the public countenance. Nothing
could be gained by it, even if each indi-
vidual who contributed a portion of the
tax could receive back promptly the same
portion, but il is apparent that no system OF
the kind can ever be enforced, which will
!, not absorb considerable portion Of the
money, to be distributed in salaries and
} commissions to the agents employed in the
process, and in the various losses and de-
precautions which arise and the practical
effect of such an attempt must ever be to
burden the people with taxes, not for the
J purposes beneficial to them, BIT swell the
/ profits ofthe depesite banks, and support a
, band of useless public officers.
A distribution to the people is impracti-
, cable and unjust in other respects. il
would be taking one mans property and
giving it to another. Such would be the
, unavoidable result of q rule ofequality (and
} none other is spoken OF, or would be likely
to be adoptcd) inasmuch as there is no
J mode by which the amount of the individu-
!, al contributions of our citizens to the pub
lie revenue can be ascertained. We
know that they contribute unequally, and a
, rule therefore that would distribute to them
: equally, would be liable to all the objec-
tons which apply to an equal division OF
, property. To make the general govern
ment the instrument of carrying this obi
Gus principle into effect would be at once
} to destroy the means of its usefulness, and
change lhe character designed for it by the
trainers of the constitution.
But the more extended and injurious
consequences likely to result from a policy
which would collect surplus revenue fol
the purpose Of distributing it, may be forci.
bly, illustrated by an examination of the eff
: fects already produced by the present de-
| pOSltC HlS dCt, dttilOuSll
: designed to secure the safe.keeping of the
: public revenue, is not entirely free in its
tendencies from many of the objections
, which apply to this principle of distribution.
The government had, without necessity re.
, ceived from the people large surplus
which instead OF being employed as hereto
) fore, and returned to them by means of the
public expenditure, was deposited with sun
dry banks. The banks proceeded to make
, loans upon their surplus, and thus CONVEX
, it into banking capital and in this man.
, ner it has tended to multiply bank charters
and has had great agency in producing
; a spirit of wild speculation. The posses
, sion and use of the property out of which
! the surplus was created, belonged to the
] people; but the government has transfer
J red its possession to Incorporated banks
] whose interest and effort is to make large
r profits of its use. This process need only
1 to be stated to show its injustice and bat
: policy.
1 And the same observations apply to III,
8 influence which is produced by the step
0 necessary to collect as well as to distribute
$ such revenue. About threc.flths of al
b the duties on imports are paid in the city o
: New York, but it is obvious that the means
: to pay those duties are drawn from ever,
c quarter the Union. Every citizen in CIV