Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1836-05-17
WASHINGTON, March %, 1885.

And am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your most obedlent
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
It. Cot. Eng. Brerct Col.
Brig. Gen. CHI GRArIor, Chief Engineer, Washington
T. n-as.nno a summary statement of the general sys-
tom Of defence of the country by iortfcatuns popos
cd and in part executed, it is proper TO refer for much
niormato as localities Us to particular projects, and
for statements and arguments hat elaborate, to
COMMUNICATIONS made at different times by The Board OF
Engineers for forticutons.
These communications, of 4 nature iorbidding too
great publicity 10 be found in the records of The War
Department. in the shape Of reports Of the Board of En-.
gneers Of 1917 1919 1890, 1921 1872, lc23, 1924 aud
1925 Reference may also be made with advantage
the revised report of the Board OF Engineers pre-
scented in lS2G, and published as document No. lo3,
of the Stale papers OF the first session OF The nine
teenth Congress- The report OF lS6 just referred TO-
was drawn UP by the undersigned, and was the work OF
much research and of mature delberaon; and in giving
it now careful perusa he thinks that the information
called for by the Senate cannot be better afforded
least by him, than by again presenting that report,
occasionally condensing curtang, or emitting PORTIONS
of The argument and certain descriptions and adding
such new facts may have been developed by further
research. made prominent and interesting by the
progress Of improvement in The country.
The elements going 10 make up the general system
Of maritime defence are navy, fortifcations interior
communications by land and wafer, and regular army
and wel.organiZed militia.
The macy must be provided with suitable establish
ments for construction and repair; stations, horbors oil
rendezvous and ports Of refuge All these must be
vered by Notifications having garrisons of regular troops
and militia and being supplied with men and materials
through the lines OF interior communication: MOI De-
ing required to remain in the arbors Tor their defence,
the navy pre- -cminent as offensive arm, will be pre-
pared 10 transfer the war distant oceans and to the
shores Of the enemy and to act tho great which It's
carly achievements have foctod and TO which its high
destiny will lead.
Fortfcations should st Close all important harbors
inst, nd 10 OIL
commercial marine;
3D. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions,
where, protected by naval superiority, he might
himself during the war, keeping the whole frontier IN
constant alarm
3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from
attack;
4th Must protect the great Cities
9Th. Must prevent, far possible the great ave-
Of interior navigation from being blockaded al her
entrances 10 the ocean;
9th. Must the coastwlse and interior Navigation,
by closing The habors and the several nets which ill.,
tersec the lines of interior communication, thereby fur
ther aiding the navy in protecting the navigation OF the
country; and
7,h Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast,
and also all their commercial and manufacturing esta-
blshments which Of nature TO invite the enterprise
cupdi,y of an enemy.
Interior communications will conduct, with certainty,
the necessary supplies of all sorts to the stations, har
bors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establishments
Of construction and repair for the both of the toEt'
cations and of the navy; will greatly facilitate and eH
pedilc the concentration Of military force and the trans
fer Of troops from point to another will ensure 10
these troops supplies of every description, and Will
preserve paired, the interchange Of domestic conf
mcrcc during periods Of the most active external
warfare.
The army and militia, together with the personnel OF
the marine constitute the vital principle Of the SYSTEM
Il is important to notice the reciprocal relation OF
these elements OF national Defence element is scarce
" more dependent another, than the whol system on
a., l,,r l,aoo,
merely passive; expose ourselves the more to suffer
the evils Of war, at the same time Thai we deprive
ourselves Of all means OF intcting them Withdraw
interior eommunicaon aud the naey will often he great
" embarrassed Tor want OF snrPnes, whe tt 'otn'a
tons will be unable to offer full resistance Tor want Of
timely relntorcenlens. "hhdraw Jo'lfeHnonS, anc '!e
interior communications are broken up, and the nHcy IS
left entirely without collateral ata "
That element IN tue s(sei Vi ueieHce which Is "om
to be attended TO Inc JTc"'ton oi lhe ltohef' II
may not be unprohIaoe mere 10 go more mo
detail, Us 10 Tie Iea'o u ls WIN 'ic ore' "e'oeI
OF the systeih Tic iI'ne Is '"e io so'e 1o"
illusions hereafter 10 DC announced WI" DC inc more ap
parent.
In considering the relation OF fortltcatlons and OF the
navy to the defence oil the country IL VIII appear mat
the functions OF the latter are not less appropriately Of
trnsivc Than those OF the FORMER are ueie"
siVe; ulal inc iu'e' 'oSIs 'nuon y, 10 In J 40 .
nv inrIJ IN ny cnsr frnfcrrng now 10 the navy pro
r, ho rJ;.d m a. substitute for Qualifications
p@1 ~. ..,,.. T.. .;,.. ,.,n,,,;-,o,
Ih's position IS nougn.' may Se , taS !, oan
II our navy DC :e''' ~ ,nas W ia" ', XIII. ra
oAef' OF COURSE w!tnUut :i.I vs.. aa, ~ "aaJ
sstance single sh'ps oe'ns "sseu Wy nee.s VI snau
rons liaVlng numerous PGlhls aloT: OUT t1enuea
frontier to protect all OF wh,ch must oe s'.nnlaneous
~ guarded pecauSe' 'shod"' VI ''e se.e"u l'o''.s "
attack the separate squaorohs or Vessels may NC ea
ed in detail although me naSa1 lotee oe' n .ne
gas ,a",p,e =, concentrate Under ,he idea ,ba
suen oec IF ,La adversary was Coreseen he
v nn T ~ nsb his forces upon the places thus left
;.hni o,ecI;an Tbis mode of defence is liable to
w. ..bnr nh;ac,;on Of heinz exposed to fatal disasters
nJonnndsr " assaults Of an enemy and of lcayinr
M '."a ~ oorA;c,s n bs determined sometimes bv
inc sO;,e of all the efforts Of courage and
Eli r. !, ,pere attemned TO improve up6n this
sA'i,' >. I;n;, .;,h :, ,a,n,oror, h,,,cr;as md
mId, uy u vnmd ,s fnund that besides beinu weak