Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1835-03-10
MIR. ARClIER'S REMARK

MIR. ARCllER'S REMARKS.
Mr.. Archer, of Virginia, (formerly Chairman Of the
Committee of Foreign Afairs) in reply and after
adverng to his own situation old member Of the
House, and to the interest felt by the portion of the
Union which he represented in the question now under
discussion, promised, in brief manner possible
present his views and opinions in relation to it.
lie had thought, when he first read the resolutions
winch had been moved in the form ofamcndent by the
gentleman from Massachusetts, (Nlr Adams that they
were AN Improvement those of the gentleman from
New York, (Nlr. Canbrelcng1 lie regretted 20 dis
cover, however, from more attentive examination,
and the remarks which had Just fallen from that no.
norabie gentleman, that he had been mistaken. and
tat there was in reality, substantial diversity of
import between the plans they respectively recommend
cd The gentleman from Massachusetts, indeed in the
speech he had now addressed to the House, well
as IN MS second resolution, had dated much the
anxiety he felt, (and justly felt Mr. Archer houg
that negotiation with the French Government should
not be broken off as was proposed by the resolution
onered by the gentleman from New York. the
head of the Committee, (NIr. Cambrelcng) But why
was the gentleman thus anxious For the manifest
reason that If by resolution of Congress- all nepotia
non should be inhibited whatever disposition there
might be ON the part of the French u come
to terms, how could they ciiectt? Did all who heard
nm perfectly well know that, when negotiation had
been thus broken off, the principle of national pridc
would prevent that Government from making us any pro-
Posas eyenf were well disposed to do so, All
diplomatic intercourse being broken Off there would re-
nam no channel through which its good feelings if they
dld exist could be intimated to What Afler we
by formal concurrent act of all the members of Co
Vernent mad declared IT 10 be peremptory will that
negotiation should not be continued, did any one sup
pose that were every member of the French Executive
and OF the Chambers thoroughly convinced that
we were in the right, and they in the wrong France
would tender to us any offers of rcparaon' 1t would be
futile TO expect it.
declared against further negotiation. The first of the
gentleman from Massachusetts,, that would accept of
nothing short of the complete ful6lment of the treaty:
on winch basis, however, he is willing admit nav is
anxious to keep open the door of negotiation Now
where said Mr. Archer is the real difference of these
propositions that should held up as a substitute
lmp in i,. L.,
tween them The former indeed consistent with it.
self The latter admitting and invoking contnu-
ance OF negotiation We. peclues the sole ground and sub
lect OF IT, by preliminary and Perempory inhibition. AT
ter declaring that will have nothing but our full de-
mand without abatement of title, why talk of nego-
tatlom ASK the President TO continue IL Continue IT,
to what end? Negotiated what subject? Was there
any other in relation which our opinion was reoured
but That of the treaty and its stipulatons which were to
remain unaltcrablc by any negotiation? What Mr. A.
meant he sad to Illustrate was that those two schemes
OF proceeding, between which decision was invoked
as something different identcally the same re-
sult-were not similar merely, but the thing And
what was Tar more important that either very bad
tng; That was to say, preclusion would be- if adopted
the only TO the restoration Of harmonious rea
tons with this country and France
this, Mr. A said, not all. 1t couidnot be
signed to stop with the mere breaking off of diplomatic
relations and intercourse with France. This would be
absurd Something further must be doHc, the money
stipulated by the treaty Ohes subject Agreement and
rupture of rcations) would be lost 1t were well
by quiet acq1escence in the rejection of the treaty in
this mode! What, then, to be done: What was to
follow this inhibition ofnegotation? In what measure
or result was 1t to cVenuate? Unless the loss the
ney was to be submitted to in this mode there could be
put one OF two successive and supplemental results
and these interruption of peace or information of
trade between the countries Reprisals that is TO saw
war IN some FORM the introduction of commercial in
tercourse in some form extent Mr.. a.. said he would
take glance at the character of these alternatives and
the influence which the adoption of either likely to
exert on condition and affairs.
lie would take the worst irst-war: for a resort TO
repriaas every body knew would be war; and in the form
i'm VIII
could be commenced. What the state of our pre-
paredncss for war, he would inquire. If we were
prepared be would not boast If we not lis should
not be the hand TO draw away the VEIL and expose the
deficiency But matter what might be the amplitude
OF our preparedness, had gentlemen adequately
dered the character and resources of the Power with
winch we were to be engaged in conflict He had taken
some palms, his duty, since this matter had en-
gagged much ate non inform himself on this sub
Ject This he mad been enabled do from very rood
Sources and he would therefore take himself TO rive
the committee some views of the maritime and military
resources OF France. She Power with which war
war certainly not to be considered any light game
Three hundred vessels of various classes and coDpre
hendlng ec0y class, composed the military marine of
France. Forty Of the line if his information
accurate about forty frigaes and inferior vessels of
all kinds and denominations prodigious marine force
employed IN these vessels He had from various and
undoubted sources of information, that higher degree
OF attention had been paid since the last peace by the
Government Of France only the restoration and
enlargement OF its marine force but 10 the object of
dering 1t effective, than perhaps had been done by any
other Power lie had made it his business since room
had first been presented for apprehension of war to seek
information from every naval officer of eurs he had met
with ON the subject, and he had concurrent account
IRON ALL that the sOlictude of France TO improve her
system of naval discipline and to perfect by rigorous
practice had been most extraordinary These brave
never disposed to overrate any form of DANCER but
prompt to render justice, even to what might become
rival arms all concurred that the encounter OF no Power
could be more formidable than that Of France on the
ocean.
But what the land military force of France3 MOI
lever than 1O0OOO. The late war had passed away
so long, but that retained lively recollection of IL
haTassments Not our maritime cities only were expo
sedscarce pig poultry were sufc i'm the LARGO
region made accessible by the or our streans-
Great Britain had military force not amounting to a
third he believed, Of that Of France. This force had
demands on 1t for the maintenance of her settlements
extending widely the Globe. There was no zion
IN which II was not required that this force should he
distributed. If with this force so UNEQUAL from proper
amount and from dispersion Great Britain was able to
harass so much our maritime frontier what was the an.
noyance we might anticipate from the 300 vessels and
the 4OOUUO troops Of Frances lie did not speak of our
power TO rePe aggression III any FORM from any quarter
mat he would be the last person TO bring into
Vcrsy. But that was not the question We oualf to
aggression when apprehendcd however great
our capacity 20 rcpcl &C. But the question was on the
proPrety and policy Of mourning it, And in this vie w.
the magnitude OF the probable aggrcssing force formed
an essential element Of consideration. II might be n
necessity or duty, TO disregard this magnitude but il
was not less duty of sobcrmnded 10 consider it,
But another wtghty consideration was to be added.
when, now, was this war, If ii came to end France
could not subduc us-we could not subduc France
1cntcnen were disposed TO refuse all negotiation TO
prevent war but they must have negoation fore le
could put stop to IT, Would the two nations be better
prepared 10 negotiate when feelings had been cxacer-
Dated by conflicts and losses the ocean by esccgts
and desolaon the land When oceans Of blood had
9een shed, and millions Of money sacrificed, would the