Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1834-09-02

but they elected by the State Legislatures which for
the most part assembled ia large commercial cities,
where that influence favorable psrpetua,ion Banking
aud Funding Systems, Is generally concentrated; aud how
greatly this influence is ie in all important elections
well known The consequence has be almost literal
tulhlnent OF what ssuggested, heaugly the first
Article OF this Section. The Senate which was Intended
to be the peculiar guardian OF State Rights, ire suny
failed 10 fulfil! the purpose OF s creation and become the
representative ofassocaIed wealth, OF corporate institutions
and privileged men, whose interests opposite and hos
tile TO that OF the great body OF the people.
Sec 3.-Ereeutipe Department.
l. The Executive pat OF Government, (says Black
stone has been wisely placed in single hand by the
British Constitution, for the sake of unsnmty strength
AMI Dispatch. Were II placed in hands il would be
subject TO many Wills Many Wills, II dsunited aud
lug different create weakness in Governments and
to unite those several Wills, and reduce them TO one is
work of more time aud del than the exigences OF state
viii afford shall not Il trust, says the same writer) be
considered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when lay
down principle, that, in the exerton OF lawful pre-
rogase the King IL, aud ought TO he absoute that
far absolute, that there 6 legal authority tina, can her
delay resist him. He may rejec, what bills may make
VIVA, treaties, may coin what money, may create what
peers. may pardon what offences he pleases.
Petogatve, which consists ia the mower
oil acting where positive laws silent belongs To no mart
of the American Constitution less to that branch of
H. which from The force OF its definition signifies
executing or carrying into eject laws previously enacted
10y another department, Nothing is left discretionary with
the Executive ohcerhe has power, privileges be-
yond tie law which creates his Office and pescrbcs its
duties Great and important Discretionary pow ers vested
ia Executive hands, will certainty violate tie spirit
Constitutions and lead to dangerous Ifgrea
and alarming emergencies require such deep alton of
power, IL should be for the shortest tine possible and with
the stricesplimitson From the weakne human la.
ure, unlimited and discretionary powers will be abused
by any body oil what's The ibert of
the people ore never sale under the gracious and
loroearance oil aGovernment whether of one few or
many; they can only be trusted TO the stricest Limitation
OF power
ed by the people for four The King Great Br.
tain Is perpetual and hereditary Prince The one is
amenabe topersonal punishment and disgrace: the per.
son OF the other is sacred aud invoabe. The one has
quahed negative upon the sets OF the legislative body:
the other, has an absolute negative. The has RICH,
10 command military aud naval forces OF the nation:
1.-THE olher in add ion 10 this right possesses that of decar
ING war, andot raising aud regulating fleets armies by
his authority. The one has concurrent power with
branch oil the Legislature in the formation OF treaie
the other is the sole possesso OF the power of making
treaties. The one has like concurrent authority in an
pointing TO Offices the other is the author OF all an
poln'mens The one can coR.er no privileges whatever
the other make denizens glens noblenen of com
lnoneTs can erect corporations with all the rights incl
dent TO corporate bottles The prescribe no rules
concerning the commerce currency OF the nation: the
other Is IN several respects the arbier of commerce. and
IN This capacity can establish markets and fares; can reg
ate weights and measures; canIsy embargoes for limit
ed ume; can cob money! can autborise prohibit the
circulation OF foreign The one has no particle Of sni
tJusdicon the other the supreme he al and 90
vernon oil the national church.
A From the fist section Of ahs DIVISION OII we learn
how inporant is Tor the preservation OF Liberty that
the three great apartments Of Government should be in.
dependent OF each oliershoud free will 10 act in
IT. own sphere according os of the
Constitution The propensity of the Legislative depar
mentto intrude upon the rights, absorb the
oil the other deparments, also pointed OUT ne.
ressiy therefore, obvious OF furnishing each with con-
siiiuonai arms Tor its defence. Without some cheek
on legislative encroacbmeni the Executive might be
dualy stripped of his authority by successive Trsoon
OF "hiihaed by single vote: aud thus Legislative and
Executive powers would peedily TO be blended in
The same hands To prevent these evils qualified ne.
gave ON all legislative acts has been given the Execu-
uve-a provision, wise in many cases. because il not only
protects an important branch OF government but
es soehmes' sa'utsFy check upon the legislative body
calculated 70 guard the community against the effects of
iacon Preciancy, Of any impulse unhiendIy to The
puoc good, whichnay happen TO Influence majority OF
ba oody The negative OF the President lar from be-
ing direct and positive consists merely in the suggestion
Of stgHnenatve objections to be approx or
by those TO whom they addressed Should anv hill on
Reconsideration IN connection with IIe Presideats oh
JectIons, be approved OF by lsof both Houses
shall become law So that important undertaking of
rue history aid Experience Of all ages show ia and
me po'o"ndesi observers OF mankind have told me a,
the Executive power is safely con6ded "a ono Ih
@lhg 'rcn responsibility greater; te attention
OF The peopleis directed a single oiieci: and I,, o
Is more easily confined. The Executive ta., r -
our constitutions was organized with a view 10 his 81.
insight Into the nature OF Csoyernmeo. ~ " nus wise
deth0f'ty skdH De Uesied in Present or me T1;,S
states But as proof Of The impoencv Of Lv,osn 49,
nom" ns executive @uhoriyihus vested in The President
IS sometimes efectuaiy taken. way bv associ,n ;,
him branch OF the Legislature With ,he siaJ VIZ"
hoh OF HE power 10 remove from office te,e - mo,
PT'ah' duy IN which IheSenaIe is not associated with
I h%ee"'lVe-hdkig complete union of L legislative
ana Executive power in the same hands T,c consa
quences oil this union, which nrnos, Of h
institutions really intended 10 avoid are sill in ha e.
iOpea 30 long they iuued to be actr.taJ 81, ~
WIZ ana operated on NY The same motives iinys
q" s'hoo'hy between them they were in ,oeujuuc
'"unaHy undermining the CONSTITUTIONS and lrviu
a. lo"ett2 Weinse'Vesas msy be plainly seen iu le
81 as'ing'oh's Administrations and in ,la If
Sohh Sudins Some check given 10 this acc,,,s
non OF power by Thomas Jefferson ~ mo did mo-, Loi
so wen WIN The Senate. Under more re rent
he senate and tie Executive have beeu ,,re eorc,,r
4" '"ei FIe"s anu Tie sane results have followed The
Isco'd u present existing 'betwes the head of se Fx
ecu we AoF e PRESIDENT Is i'm Tact no hing lnoeA and
as Executive council the Senate s likely 10 lead % CO.
a tai
D. power existing between The departments. mites Tho
P'e ny hmeIy interference, shall adjust the hosnro
]4'e senate Sf0H0s an position 10 Command s,5 Ia
C"Fo "a large portion Of The action of lOverpe,enf
"i can pass without It's concurrence, not az uty dis.
h"IgFu oy the Executive without is consent-jf we ar
'VP' "Hy "le PoweIo o. removal iom Office which die Sc
lae strongly claimed in the beginning and lii! cIa,r f
Add TO this the power of trying all peachoen,s
most formidable engine of Judicial cruell aud
ma you have completed the definition of q ,,rannv tIe
'non Of alpowerf Legislative, Executive ard Jucisrv
n the body = - '''J'
o. Tbs alarming and formidable combination of no,ve,
n ne same body, was clearly and lis conseoeoces
'Olh,ed out by many pahios the time tle.
i'" before lie people Tor consideration and aJopsion
axe the following examples f
l. 'in we new Constitution, the ,Presidspt anil 60
dte nave an Executive, and thirds el the eos
au'e anu some wegRy instances (as in skinp all Kinds
"eaueS "hl'h are The laws Of the and) theV ,,ye The
'"o.e Ltg,IshVe ana Executive powers. They i,inuy
ppoin Oh officers. civil and military and tbev (,bs g.
aie) Try al impeschments, either of their own me"r
o. we oucers appointed by themselves IL there moi
most formidable combination OF power thus created In
ahoc"n the most critical eye discOve spopeilfv
''is Po'e" corpf Either monarchy or stislocracy
~" ue RehsFs'ed perhaps the glievsgs system Of
o.eInmen may arise. II cannot be de ied vy tf1tb
L .uue ffffffaf =. 4