Litchfield enquirer., 1834-02-20

OnoeE tucse geStrtCbtOnsS tne e9fabllShmeut of its offices. and the appointment of its off, cers, the amount of its discounts and every thing respecting those discounts, its purchases and sales of exchange, and all other concerns of the institution, are to be conducted and managed by the directors. There is nothing in the charter, giving the slightest authority to the Secretary to decide, as between the bank on the one hand, and the Government or the people on the other, whether the general management Ofthe directors is wise or unwise, or whether in regard to matters nOt connected with the depOsites, it has or has not violated tho conditions of it's charter. The statement which the bank is bound to make ;O the Sec retary, he may lay before Congress and he is, doubtless, bound by his official duty, tO communicate to Congress any other infOrma- ton in his possession, tending. in isjudgment. to show that the bank had disregarded ils charter, or failed to fulfil all or any of its du- ties. But here his authority, 80 far as it re- gards the general course and operations of the bank, ends. It is then for Congress to act, if it see occasion. and to adopt the regular. rem cdies, for any evils which it may suppose to exist. But it transctnds the power of Con- gress itself to pronounce the charter violated. without hearing, without trial, without iodg- ment, far less is any such power of prOnOun- cing final judgment confined to the Secreta- ry. His power simply is, that in regard to the deposifes of the puhlic money, he is to judge in the first instance, whether just cause has arisen for their removal.
 The Secretary seems to suppose, indeed the very basis of his argument assumes, that the law has conided 10 him general guardi- anship over the public welfare, so far as that welfare is in any way connected with the hank, or liable to he affected by it's proceed ings; and that he holds the power of the re- moving Ahe deposites as the means, or instru- me6t by which he is to enforce his own Opin- ions respecting that welfare. The commit tee do not adopt this opinion. They think that if such had been the design of the law, its provisions would have been different from those which it does actually contain.
 If such general guardianship had been in tended to be conferred on the Secretary. it is reasonable to believe that he would have been vested with powers more suitable tO such a high trust. If he had been made, or inIen- ded to be made general inspector or superin- tendent, other authority than merely that of removing the deposites, would have been giv- en him, for this plain reason, that the Gov ernment and the country have interests of much magnitude connected with the bauk, besides the deposites of the public moneys in its vaults, and to which interests, if endanger- ed, the removal of the deposites would bring no security.
 The Government is proprietor ofseven mill ions of the stock of the bank, and yet no au- thority is given to the Secretary to sell this stock under any circumstances whatever, or in any other way to interfere with it.
 The bill and notes of the bank, too, are made receivable in all payments to the Unit ed States, until Congress shah otherwise or- der; and no power is given to the Secretary to prevent their being so received, either du- ring the session of Congress, or in it's recess, however the credit of these bills and notes might become depreciated.
 How is it possible to conceive that, if Con. ; gress intended to give to the Secretary gen. eral right to judge of the operations and pro. ceedings of the bank, and a power, of course, to declare when it had violated its duty, and was no longer trustworthy. it should yet leave him under an absolute obligation to receive its bills and notes in all payments to the Treasu- ". though they might have lost all credit, and place no means in his hands to execute his high authority of superintendent, except the mere power of removal.
 Wherever it is clear that Congress has given the Secretary a power, it has given him the means of informing his judgment as to the propriety of exercising that power. He has power to remove the deposites, and ample means are afforded him by which he may learn, from time to time, whether those de- posites are safe. For this purpose, it is ex- pressly made the duty of the bank to furnish him. so often as he shall require, if not often. CT than once week, with statement 0f the amount of the capital stock of the corporation, of the debts due to it. of the m0neys deposit ed in it, of its notes in circulation, and specie on hand, and he has right to inspect the general accounts, in the books of the bank, relating to this statement. The abatement enables him to judge of the solvency and sta- bility of the bank, and of the safety of the public money deposited in it. Here, then, is power, and all appropriate means given for the just and enlightened exercise fthat pow CT. Confined to the deposites, the power is accompanied with all rational auxiIiarics and attendants.
 But for the depreciation Of the bills of the bank. should that happen, and for other cases of maladministratinn, Congress has provided just and appropriate remedies, -fn he applied tary. For redress Of these evils, no power Is given t0 him.
 For the security of the public interest, the law reserves right to either House of Con- gress, to inquire at alf times, into the proceed ings of the hank, and if. on sush inquiry. it appears in any respect to have violated its charter, Congress may bring it to trial and judgment. Power is given to the President, also. to institute judicial proceedings, h he shall have reason to believe that any such vio. lation has taken place. But no such power is given to the Secretary.