Vandalia Whig and Illinois intelligencer. [volume] (Vandalia, Ill.) 1832-183?, 1834-01-22


PEE without being Immediately communica-
!ed TO The public servants, who were authors
ized TO apply the remedy And if the corpo-
fa'ion has so arranged its concerns, as to
conceal from the public directors some of its
o.ost Important operations, and has thereby
destroyed the safeguards which were design
led to secure the interests of the United States,
1T would seem TO be very clear that it has for
teited its claim to confidence, and is no Ions
Iger worthy of trust. In the ordinary concerns
OF lie, among individuals, no prudent man
would continue to place his fundsin the hands
lot an agent, after he discovered that he was
Istudiously concealing from him the manner
In which they were employed. The public
money ought not be guarded with less vigi-
lance than that of an Individual. And mea-
sures OF concealment, on the part Of his cor
Poration, are not only contrary to the duties
OF It's agency, but are also in direct violation
Iof the law, to which ii owes its corporate ex
Iislence. And the same misconduct which,
IN the case of private individuals, would in
duce prudent man to dismiss an agent from
his employment, would require a similar
course towards the fiscal agent Of The govern
ment, by the officer to whom the Law has en-
trusted the supervision Of his ccnduu.. and
given the power of removal
Tired by these principles, it viii be found
that the conduct Of the bank made it the du-
ty of the Secretary of the Treasury to with
draw from its care the public funds.
LIST. Instead Of board constituted of at
least seven directors, according to the char
ter, at which those appointed by the U. States
nave right TO be present, many of the most
important money transactions of the hank
have been, and still are placed under the
control OF a committee denomlnated the Ex-
change Committee, of which no one of the
public directors have been allowed to be a
member since the commencement of the pre-
sent year This committee is not even elect
led by the board, anu public directors have no
choice IN their appointment. Thew are cho-
sen by the President OF the bank: and the
business oil the insttutlo,. which ought to be
decided or by the board of directors, is in
many instances transacted ly this commit
tee, ana no one mas II right 10 be present ut
'ieir proceedings out the president and those
"p'm he shall please to name as members Of
THIS Committee. Thus loans are made, I'M
known at the time 10 a majority Of the board,
ana paper discounted which might probably
De rejected at regular meeting of the direc-
' tors; the most important operations of the
bahk are sometimes resolved on, and execu-
ted by this committee; and its measures are
1t appears, designedy, and by regular sys
tenn, so arranged as to conceal from the off.
GERS oil the government, transactions, in which
the pubic interests are deeply involved
And this fact alone furnishes evidence too
strong to be resisted, that the ronceamen,
OF certain important operations of the corpo
ration, from tho officers OF the government, is
one of the objects intended to be accomplish
ed by means Of this committee. The plain
words OF the charter are violated, in order tc
deprive the people of the Unied States oil
one OF the principal securities, which the law
had provided 10 guard their interests, and to
render more safe, the public money entrusted
to the care Of the bank. Would any indi-
vidual Of ordinary discretion, continue his
money III the hands OF an agent Who had VIC
lated his instructions for the purpose of hi
ding from him the manner in which he was
conducting tho business confded to his
charge? Would he continue his property in
his hands when he had not only ascertained
that concealment had been practsed towards
| him, but when the agent avowed his deter
mination 10 continue in the same course, and
to withhold from him, as far as he could, all
knowledge of the manner in which he was
employing his funds? If an individual would
not be expected to continue his confidence,
under such circumstances, updn what prn-
cipe could a different line of cdnduct be re-
CURED from the officers of the United States.
charged with the care OF the public interests
The public money is surely entitled to the
same care and protection as that of an ipdl-
vldual, and If the latter would be bound. in
Justice to himself, to withdraw his money
from the hands of an agent, thus regardless
! OF his duty, the same principle requires that
the money of the United States shulld. under
the like circumstances, be withdrawn from
the hands Of their fiscal agent. And as the
power OF withdrawal was confided to the Sc
cretary Of the Treasury, it was his duty to
remove it on this ground alone. if no other
cause of complaint had existed against the
bank. The conduct of the bank, in relation
to the three per cent. stock of the u States,
lis memorable instance of the power exer-
ised in secret by the Exchange Committee,
and the abuses 10 which it is incident. The
circumstances attending that transaction
have been so fully Land before Congress and
the public, that it is useless to -epcat them
here 1t was case in which this committee
not only managed in secret a moned transac-