Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1834-04-19

hearing before conviction, and IN uidl, to
tribunal for deciding on the charge ~ h. lnparta
waged in vain. So nave been
II the resolution had been left in -,
form, II is not to be presumed that if con igna
nave received the assent of maioritv V quo ever
nate, for the acts therein specified y? oi these
OF the constitutions and laws We're c 90 collation.,
in the limits of the Executive autboritdaii viii
are the "dismissing the late Secretayy They
treasury, because he would not coy OF he
ms sense OF his own duty, remove tGbnauafyb
OF the United States in deposite with t ,I MONEY
"of the United States and its branch branch ue Bank
formlty with the Presidents opinion. IN Con,
pJn.th ms successor TO effect such re emu ap
cification has been substituted ana Iher spe
were the Executive PROCEEDINGS 'G u as these
"to the public revenue" principsIIv We relation
in the course of the discussion thay ,,e:@eFred 70
less be generally regarded as the act. VIII doubt
to be denounced as can assumnton ~ intended
"ty and power not conferred by the ~ VI author
cor laws, but in derogation of both ~ SlltutiOA
| fore due to the occasion that a condonS there
mary Of the views of the Executive in n sum
| them, should be here exhibited ieSpecth
| By the constitution, "the Execntiro
vested in President Of the United stpoN~eIB
Among the duties imposed upon him a ms5'eSa-
he is sworn to perform, is that of SIfs I,u Which
that the laws be faithfully execpteS JH5ng care
| thus made responsible for the entire .ne!ng
the Executive Department it was bn %I roo Of
able that the power of appointing, ovsr neaSOa
and controlling those who execute tbo isehg
power in its nature executive-sbouId u u1-a
in his hands, 1t is, therefore, not only bs V.d l
but the constitution makes it his duty 70 assal
inmate, and by and with the advice ana ~, no
iOft ha inf oil
| ed States whose appointments are not in ~ oH'
stitution otherwise provided for" with Nun .oa'
sion that the appointment of inferior o sfo'I-
| may be vested in the President alone ' ~
Courts Of Justice, or in the Heads of no,a We
ments. P"it
! The Executive power vested in the Senate :.
neither that of nominating" nor "appointno,,Ss
| 1t is merely check upon the Executive non
! Of appointment. Ifindividuals are pronodod g.
appointment by the President, by them deemos
incompetent or unworthy, they may witbboIi
their consent, and the appointment Cannot ~
made. They check the action of the Eypcnt;r.
but cannot in relation TO those very subiect,
act themselves, nor direct him. Selections ara
still made by the President and the negative
| given to the Senate, without diminishing his 70
sponsibility, furnishes an additional guarano
to the country that the subordinate executive q,
well as the judicial offices, shall be filled with
worthy and competent men.
The whole Executive power being vested
the President, who is responsible for its exercise
it is necessary consequence, that he shou3
have right to employ agents of his own choice
to aid him in the performance of his duties and
to discharge them when he is no longer Willing
to be responsible for their acts. In strict &C.
cordance with this principle, the power ofremo.
val, which, like that Of appointment, is an orig,
nal Executive power, is left unchecked BY tip
constitution in relation to all executive Officers
for whose conduct the President is responsible
while it is taken from him in relation 70 iudici,I
officers for whose acts he is not responsible, n
the Government from which many of the hn.
damental principles Of our system are derived
the Head of the Executive Department origi.
nally had power to appoint and remove at will
all officers, Executive and Judicial It was TO
take the Judges out Of this general power ofre.
moval, and thus make them Independent of the
Executive, that the tenure Of their Offices wa,
changed to good behaviour. Nor is it conceiy
able, why they are placed, in our constitution
upon tenure different from that of all Other
officers appointed by the Executive, unless the
for the same purpose.
But ifthere were any just ground for dOubtOn
the face Of the constitution, whether all execu-
tive officers are removable at the will of the
President it is obvated by the cotemporaneOU
construction of the instrument, and the uniform
practice under it.
The power of removal was topic Of solemn
debate in the Congress of 1889, while Organ2
ing the administrative departments OF the Go
vernment, and it was finally decided that the
President derived from the constitution, the pow
er Of removal, so far as it regards that depart
ment for whose acts he is responsible Although
the debate covered the whole ground, em0Iac'
ing the Treasury as well as all the other EXecu'
tive Departments, it arose on motion 10 stIlke
out Of the bill to establish Department OF 70,
reign Affairs, since called the Department Oh
! State, clause declaring the Secretary 10 De
removable from Office by the President oil lne
United States" After that motion had Deen Ge.
cided in the negative, it was perceived l!id.
these words did not convey the sense uIe
House of Representatives, in relation 10 tne uus
source OF the power of removal. WIN Wv
avowed object of preventing anyiuture iIeieh..
that this power was exercised by the Pfesluen.
in virtue of a grant from Congress, Wheh III oo'
that body considered it as derived from lheeon
stitution. the words which had been the suDJsotf
of debate were struck out and IN lieu 'Ilei ;a"
clause was inserted in provision concerns .7n ~
the Chief Clerk Of the Department Whlc Sac 90
clared that whenever the said principe JIM JIM
shall be remOred from office by the fiesio'n Of
{" of the United States or in any otnef 0@' anch
vacancy" the Chief Clerk should, during G s".,
vacancy, have charge of the papers OF the onoS
This change having been made Tor lne e1p that
purpose of declaring the sense OF Congle SG.om
| 4 i