Vandalia Whig and Illinois intelligencer. [volume] (Vandalia, Ill.) 1832-183?, 1834-05-08

Ii is only necessary to look al the condi
tion IN which the senate and the presiden
have been placed by tbs proceeding, t,
perceive IFS utter inconpatability will
the provisions and the spirit OF the consli
tuition, and with the plaiest dictates ofhu
mainly and justice.
Ii the house of representatives shall bt
'Iof opinion that there is INST ground for tht
censure pronounced UPON the president
then will it be the solemn duty ofthat house
to prefer the proper accusation, and to cause
him to be brought to trial by the constitu
tIonal tribunal. B 1in what condition
would he find that tribunal? A majority o
Its members have already considered III,
case, and have not only formed but expires
SEQ deliberate Judgment upon its merits
It's the policy of our benign systems o
Jurisprudence, to secure, in all crimina
proceedings, and even in the most trivial
lltigations, a fair unpreudiced, and impair.
tai trial. And surely it cannot be less i'm
portant that such trial should be secured
10 The highest officer in the government.
The constitution makes the house of rep
resentatlves the exclusive Judges, in the Isl
instance Of the question, whether the pres
ldent has committed an impeachable of
fence. A majority of the senate, whose
Interference with this preliminary question.
has, for the best Of all reasons, been studi-
ously excluded, anticipate the actionseflAe
house of representatives, assume not only
the function which belongs exclusively to
that body, but convert themselves into ac-
cusers, witnesses, counsel, and Judges, and
PREJUDICE ,he whole case. Thus presenting
The appalling spectacle, in free state, Of
Judges going through lnbored preparation
Tor an impartial hearing and decision, bv a
previous er parte investigation and SEN
tenee against the supposed offender.
There is no more settled axiom in that
government whence we derived the model
of this part of our constitution than, that
"the Lords cannot impeach any to them
selves, nor join in the accusation, because
they are judges" Independently of the
general reasons on which this rule is found
ed, lis proprieiy and importance are great
" increased by the nature Of the impeach-
hg power. The power of arraienine the
NH officers of government, before tribu
nafwhose sentence may expel them from
their sea's-and brand them as infamous. is
emInently popular remedy-a remedy
designed 10 be Employed for the protection
| OF private rlghIand public liberty, against
the abuses OF INJUSTICE aud the encroach-
nents, OF arbitnry power. Bat the fra
mers of the Constitution, were also un.
Idoubtedly awar, that this formidable in
strunlent had ben, and might be abused i
and that from itsvery nature, an impeach-
ment for high cimcs and misdemeanors.
whatever might e lis result would in mostl
cases be ACCOMPANIED by so much of dis
honor and reprach, solicltude and suffer
ing, as to make the power of preferinc it.
one OF the highet solemnty and import
ance. 1t was de to both these consiGera-
tons, that the imeaching power should he
lodged in the ha DIS of those who, from the
mode of their dection and the tenure of
their offices, woud most accurately express
the popular will. and at the same time be
most directly anespeedi!y amenabe to the
people. The thory of these wise and be-
nignant intentins is in the present case
eflectually defeaed by the proceedings of
he senate. The members of that body
represent not the people but the states /;
and though theyare undoubtedly response
BILE to the states, yet, from their extended
term of service, the effect of that RESPONSE
bility, during the whole period of that term
must very much depend upon their own
impressions Of Its obligatory force. When
a body thus constituted, expresses, before
hand, its opinion in a particular case, and
thus indirectly invites prosecution, it not
only assumes a power intended for wise
reasons to be confined to others, but il
shields the latter from that exclusive and
personal responsibility under which it was
intended to he exercised. and reverses the
whole scheme Of this part of the constitu
ton.
Such would be some Of the objections tc
this procedure, even if it were admitted
that there is just ground for impuring to til,
president the offences charged in the reso
luton. But if, on the other hand, tn
house of representatives shall be IF opin
ion that there is no reason for chargin.
them upon him, and shall therefore deem
it improper to prefer an impeachment, lhel
will the violation of privilege as it respect
that house, of justice asit regards the pres
iden,, and of the constitution, as it relate
to both. he only the more conspicuous an
Impressive.
t The constitutional mode of procedure O
an impeachment has moi only been who'll
,l,J hat Of h<,