Martinsburg gazette. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1833-1855, 1834-01-02
Congress of The United States
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10.
IN SENATE.

The resolution offered yesterday by
Mr.. Clay was taken up, when Mr.. Ben
ton moved to amend the resolution BY
adding the following:
"Also, That the Secretary commu.
nicate to the Senate the monthly state.
ments of the affairs of the Bank of the
United States for the current year,
which have not been heretofore CON-
municated.
Also, the entire correspondence be-
tween the Secretary of the Treasury
and the President of the Bank OF the
United States for the first half Of the
year 1870"
The amendment was agreed TO.
Mr.. CLAY said that he felt il his duty
to submit to the Senate some explana-
ton of the motives which had induced
him to ask il to adopt the resolution.
The Secretary, in his report concern
ing the Public Deposites, had laborcd
very hard, through two or three Of the
first pages Of it, 10 prove that he pos
sessed the erclusipe power to decide
when they should be removed. This
power, he commended, was not restrict
ed to any particular contingencies, but
twas absolute and unconditional, as
far as the interests Of the Bank were
involved" 'Itis not necessary" says
that officer, "that the depositcs should
be unsafe, in order to justify the re-
moval. The authority to remove is
not limited to such contingency. The
Bank may be perfectly solvent, and pre-
pared to meet promptly all demands
upon it: it may have been faithful in
the performance Of all its duties, and
yet the public interest may require the
deposites to be Withdrawals; and, as that
cannot be done lvithout the action of
this Department, the Secretary Of the
Treasury would betray the trust con-
fded to him, if he did not cause the de-
posites to be made elsewhere, when.
ever the change would advance the
public interests or the public convent.
ence. The safety Of the deposites--
the ability of the Bank to meet its en-
gagements-its fidelity in the perform
ance of its obligations, are only part
ofthe considerations by which his judg-
ment must be guided. The general
interest and convenience of the People
must regulate his conduct"
Here is the assumption of power
analogous to the old exploded doctrine
ofthe general welfare, in most odious
form. According to that doctrine, it
was claimed by certain Federolsts of
1889, that the Constitution vested in
Congress power to legislate on all SUBJ
jects for the general welfare. But ac-
cordng to the new version of the here.
sy, n Secretary Of the Treasury--a
subordinate officer Of the Government,
the creature Of Congress, arrogates to
himself power to administer the du.
ties of his Office, and to regulate the
currency Of the country, in conformity
with his sense Of the general interest
and convenience of the peoplei And
at the very moment of setting up this
enormous pretension, he denies any
such power to Congress!
But this is not all. This modern doc
trine assumes for the Secretary not on
ly a power equivalent to its ancient
prototype, but il demands that it be
respected as absolute and unconditional
and exclusive even to Congress. "For,
to quote the language ofthe Secretary,
"although Congress should be satisfied
''that the public money was not safe in
sthe care of the Bank, or should be
"conrinced that the interests of the
"people of the United States imperions-
ssiy demanded the removal; yet the pas
sssage of law directing it to be done,
"would be breach of the agreement
ssinto which they have entered"
Is this possibls' Can it be true that