Litchfield enquirer., 1834-02-20

power, to direct legal investigation into the conduct of the bank; how can it possibly be maintained that a general inspection and guardianship over the public welfare, so far as It IS connected with the bank, is cOnfided tO him, and that his authority to remove the de- posites, was given, not tO protect fhe depOs-l ties themselves. and secure their proper use, but to enable him to enforce upon the bank, under penalty of their removal, such course of management. as his sense of the public in- terest, and the convenience of the people may require Such a construction would give the law strange and uOdeserved character. It would convert the power of removal, intended for remedy and redress, into a mere instru-, ment of punishment and it would authorize the infIicfion of that punishment without hear ingy or tPialy in the very cases in which the law vet says, that if violation of duty be char ged, the charge shall be heard and tried be- fore Judgment Is pronounced. and the duty of preferring this charge, and Ofprosecuting it to judgment, is given, notdO the Secretary, but to Congress. and to the President.
 The contingent power given t0 the SPcre- tary to remove the deposites. evidently shows
 that Congress contemplated the possibility of the happening ofsome sudden evil, fur which,
 either no other remedy was provided, or none
 which could be applied with sufficient prompt itudle and for which evil removal would be just and appropriate remedy. The remedy, prescribed then, teaches us the nature of the evils which were apprehendcd. We can read ily understand that threatened danger tO the funds was one, and probably the chief of those evils ;. because change into other hands was the ready and appropriate measure, which would ratiOnaEly suggest itself to all minds, as the proper security against such danger; and change is the remedy actually prescribed. Neglect to transfer the deposites from one place to another, as the exigencies of Govern n,ent might require, and thereby to furnish those facilities of exchange, which the char ter demands of the bank. without commission and without charge, is another evil for which, should it happen. the remedy would naturally be the withdrawing of the funds, and the plac- ing of them in their former custody, SO, that they could be transferred or exchanged by the Treasury itself.
 But who can see any eOnnexl0n or relation, such as ordinarily exists between an evil ap- prehended. and remedy proposed-between such an evil as supposed over discount, for instance, by the bank, at one time. or an un- r der discount at another, and the abrupt rec | nsoval of the deposites? And ifno one can see the connexion, how can it be supposed that, in giving the power of removal as rem edy, Congress had in view any such evil! A question may arise between the Govern
 ment and the bank, respecting the right of the parties to the sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, as in the case of the Preach bilF.
 Nis question on which different opinions
 may be entertained. and which is, in its nature, fit for judicial decision. Does any man ina- zine that such a case as this was in the eye of Congress, when they granted the power of 1 withdrawing the whole public treasure from the Bank? Can it be fer one moment main-
 tained, that Congress intended that. in such a case. the Secretary should compel the bank to adopt his own opinion by the exercise 0fa power, the very exertion of which deranges
 the currency, interferes with the industry of
 the people, and,} under some circumstances.
 would hazard the safety of the whole revenue? Tho Committee think it cannot admit of a
 rational doubt, that if Congress had intended
 to give 10 the Secretary any power whatever,
 not directly touching the depostes themselves,
 not only would it have specially pointed out
 the cases, but it would also, most assuredly,
 have provided remedy more suitable for each case. The nature of the remedy, therefore, which is prescribed, clearly shows the evils in- tended to he provided against.
 To admit the Secretary's conduct is subject to no control but his own sense of the general interest and convenience of the people, is to acknowledge the existence, in his hands, of a discretion SO broad and unlimited. that its con- sequences can be no less than Co subject, not only all the operations of the bank and its Of- fees, but its powers and capabilities, perhaps it's very existence, to his individual wiR He is of opinion that the law creating it is in ma ny of its prOvisioss unconstitutional; he may not unnatHrally, therefore, esteem it to be his duty to restrain and Obstruct to the utmost of his power the operations of those provisions, thus deemed by him to be nconstitutional.- He is of opinion that the existence of such a powerful moneyed monopoly, is dangerous to the liberties of the people. It would result from this, that if in the discharge of his off, cial duty. he is to follow no gnide but his own sense of the interest ofthe people, he might feel bound to coMnteraet the operations ofthis dangerous monopoly. diminish its circulation, curtail its means. and prejudice its eredit.- To accomplish these very purposes. and these alone, he might withdraw the depOsites. The power given him kyA Congress- would thus be used to defeat the will of Congress in one of it's most important acts. by disereditiDg and
 otherwise injuriously affecting an insttUtion,
 which Congress has seen ft to establish. and
 which it. has declared shall continue with all | its powers to the expiration of its chasiey. | The power conferred on the Secretary is .
 trust power, and like other trust powers, in
 the absence of express terms. setting forth the
 occasions for it's exercise, it ia to be cOastraed
 according to the subject and object of the,
 trust. As in other cases of the depasite of
 monies in Banks, the primary object sought
 to be accomplished by Congress; by that Rsss.,