Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1834-09-02

ofI IN
nfs Article where the legislative powers of Congress are
enumerated can, under preence whatsoever be exer-
esedby that body.
T. There are four and y env States hesidss sov.,t
ie'iorles, embraced in this Unon-sretchipg over an
immense surface from the icy gions the North 10 the
perpetual summer OF the South every variefv
S ehhae' soil aud territorial advantage. Some entire
Sates remote from the sea, covering rich alluvaI
soil, entirely devoted 10 those Agricultural
which are consumed at home. Others, extending along
Tue Atlantic aud FAR the Southern and t,onici
sns' are abundsn, IN those peculiar productions which
constitute The chief objects OF commerce. There are some
enilfe States, the other hand, whose cline
ana sterile SOIL drive them manufacturing pursuits or to
Tue navigation OF the Each distinct class of laborers
an" the capital they employ occupy their own sepaae
reg'on' The manufacturer is found in one State; the
mariner In auoher the sgricuituraist In third: and
Ia SneI occupies region sl more exclusively devo-
tea 10 MS own productions. Hence ANY law hai ,von
pe'"e oeneneiay to one class. must be detrimental TO
The other; which would be the case were they ain
on the confined territory as in England
or ROLAND IL would be ns reasonable to suppose that
'd", passed IN England for the benefit OF her ow MANN
lecturers would be equally beneficial all the States and
hlngdoms oil Europe, as 10 imagine that tariff law in
tended TO foster manufactures in New England will one
rate also TO the bene6, of the Southern planter We find
therefore, in the peculiar geographical situation of tbe
States and the hostile relations which ,eir
90 eaeh DINER another and conclusive evidence that the
trainers oil the Constitution intended TO vest in Con.
ssss Inc power OF legislang any local sub
Jec or OF passing any law regulation which must me-
cessaly operate unequay, The advantage of one seq
lion, and 10 she prejudice Of another.
o. II the doctrine laid down in The two piecedinp arG
% DC !rreand no candid enquirer deny their truth
men IL mus necessarily follow, that Congress has no
u'ioy 20 lay discriminating duties on articles of
'oeign commerce. Tor the purpose protecting
maneiaciureshas authority 10 make roads and canals
through the States and different the country
no se'hory 10 grant monopolies any exclusive and
corporate privileges whatsoever Because they are NOT
necessary 10 carry into operations any the power vested
oy TIE Constitution the Government They are NOT neces
ssry olay and coec duties &c for no,
cessary 10 regulate commerce with foreign naon NOT
cessary esiabii,h post. ces and ms, roa.' -
ey necessary TO regulate The value OF domestic coin and
CT oregn coin, Che only money ecognze bv The Conss;
are all and each otbe separate and dsnct
rs. aclaa
a. any po"e specified in the Constitution; each LEADING N
important consequences, and greatly modifying the rea
llen OF the States with each other If ii wcye Intended
na sUeh important powers should be vested in the Ge-
neral Government they would have been fpecisIv emu
nera'ed among the granted powers.2d, From their yery
nature, and from the peculiar situation of The ne states
as mentioned IN Article 7h Protecting Duties system, oi
Internal improvement aud all Banking and other como
rave institutions, must operate unequally unusty great
" TO Tie advantage OF States ruinous 10 others.
Hence they are unconstitutional because the people Of the
States in their sovereign capacity INFO mis- more
perfect Union in order "toesfa6iish iusfee iuse d.
nestle HGnqunhty and promote TIE general tcelCores
eSptnence oil orly years has taught ihat neither
OF ese oscs Tor which alone the States entered into the
Union can be accomplished long the sbove mention
ed powers are exercised by the Federal Government.
~ an powers necessary protect the domestic inter-
we eNsss' and promote their internal welfare, in
eiudlng TWO oil those mentioned aboveIhe power make
fespeerfVereyas es cornoate priivges
tore the antagonist or opposing of The Federal
Governments; Jhey constitute the balance or coun
ter weights IN this complex organization. Should the Fe
dera legislature (Which Is most probsble) transcend its
Just limits and destroy The balance Of the system, will
then become the duty and tile the State Iegs-
dtures to give The Alarm and to check tie encroacbment.
according 10 certain modes prescribed in IT, Constitution
Any other method of arreslng federal usupaon
constitutional and revolutionary.
10. The People of Virginia, in their original and sove-
reign capacity, after mature deliberations free from fear or
restraint did, by their delegates in Convention assembled
with solemn appeal to the Searche OF Hearts for he pu
rity OF their Intentions assent 10 and TGiy the present
Constellation end announced all whom might concern
tina: the said Constitution binding upon The said people
In like manner and with the Ike solemnty they assented
10 and rahted the stare constitution they hoh there
fore, the acts and deeds OF the People Vrgina-they
are both considered by the people of Virgnis
sary promote their general and domestic welfare;
both in an equal degree, allegiance and Tor the
protection OF both, good citizens, bound TO
pledge our lives, fortunes and sacred honor.
III GoVERNMENr.
Sec. Rehabilitation Of PoWer.
]. II the intention of the trainers OF the Constitu-
oD not only 10 limit the general of power granted
10 the Federal Governments but also 10 distribute that mass
OF granted power among its constituent parts in such way
as that they might be a mutual check each other;
keeping in view the great political maxim, that the Legi-
auge, Executive, aud Judiciary departments ought TO
be separate and distinct; holding cardinal rule, lying
atthe very foundation of all free institutions, thal the
maker OF law shall not supefinteDd lis executions snd
that he who executes The law shanot be the judge OF IFS
nlrsctioD.
o The accumulation Of ell power. Legislative, Exeeu-
i've and Judiciary in the same hands whether of one
few, many and whether hereditary selfappooted,
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition Of
tyranny when the Legislative and Executive powersare
united in the person. body there be bor-
tybecause Tie same Monarch or Senate may enact iy
rauuica laws 10 execute them in lyrsnnieal manner
Were the power OF Judging joined with the Legislative,
the life and liberty Of the people would be exposed 10
brary contribution, The Judge would then be the Iegsa-
tor Were il joined 10 the Executive power, the Judge
might behave with all The violence 81 oppressor Its
therefore essential TO The preservation Of liberty thai these
three departments shall only be separate and distinct.
but that they shall be- much possble independent OF
J each Ohar.
g. Powers OF eneroaching nature and tending
reach youd the limits assigned TO H. unless eectuai
iy restrained In order, therefore, preserve the indie
pendence OF each department., it il evident that neither
ght possess directly indirectly everything
influence IN tho administration Of Their respective pow
ers. Each department should have independent will
of its own; and should be furnished with the
cessary Constitutional means, and personal motives TO
sis encfOsehmients Of the Others. The Constitution
| intended "sAys SIR. Jefferson" that The three great
branches Of tie government should I've coordinate aud
indepet deaf Of each other AZ 10 acts therefore, which
are to he done by either, has given control
olsr branch Where the different branches have TO set
in their respective lines finally and without appeal, under
any law they may give 10 IL dle snt aud opposite
structons From these different constructions Of The
act BY different brsnchos, less mischief arises, hsn from
giving to any OF them eouironl over the ober'"
4. 10 government, where numerous and extensive
oreropaivcs are placed in the hands Of hereditary
/ march, the Execuliys department s very justly
elrded as the source Of danger, and watched with
an the Jealous which zeal Tor liberty ought 10 in.
spre. Bu in representative republic where the ExecU-
tive Maristracy IL carefully jiuted both in the extent
and duration powers, aud whore The legislative pow
or il exercised by assembly, which is inspired by
supposed Influence the people, with on intrepid
6denco in its own strength, which is sufficiently numer
Gus TO feel all The passions that actUate multitude, yet
not so numerous 10 be incapable Of pursuing ihe objects
Of its pessons by which pescribes, " Ia
against lie cncrpfsng ambition ~ this department that
Ia intu Of md