Vandalia Whig and Illinois intelligencer. [volume] (Vandalia, Ill.) 1832-183?, 1833-02-13

10 nave trusted 10 negotiation for adjusting
disputes between the Government of The u.
s. and the State Governments, as between
independent and separate sovereignties, would
have lost sight altogether of Constitution
and Government for the Union; and opened
direct road from failure OF that resort, to the
ultima ration between nations wholly independ.
ent of and alien to each other. If the idea
had its origin 10 the process of adjustment, be-
tween separate branches Of the same Govern
ment, the analogy entirely fails. In the case
Of disputes between independent parts of the
same Governments, neither part being able to
consumate its will, nor the Government to pro-
coed without a concurrence Of the parts, neces-
sity brings asout an acconan,ed-s,~----Is l., dia.
8utes been State Government, and the Cow
erument Of the United States, the case ia prac-
.icallv, as well as theoretically, different; each
party possessing all the departments Of an
>. ganized government, legislative, executive,
judiciary; and having esoha physical force to
support its pretensions Although the issue Of
Negotiation might sometimes avoid this extrem
Iit,, how often would ithappen among so many
States, that an unaccommodating spirit IN some
would render that resourceu navailing? 4
contrary supposition would not accord with
knowledge of human nature, OF the evidence
IF our own political history.
| 'The Constitution, not relying on any of the
preceding notifications, for its safe and sue.
cessful operation, has expressly declared
N one hand. "that the Constitution, and
The laws made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made under the the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land; 2, that the Judges Of every State shall
re bound thereby. any thing in the Constitutions
and laws ofany State to the contrary notwith-
standing; 3, that the judicial power Of TIL
United States shall extend to all cases in law
nd equity arising under the Constitution, the
avs of the United States, and treaties made
under their authority, &c"
Goa the other hand as security Of tho
fightsand powers Of the States, in their indi-
vidual capacities, against an undue prepondcr~
ance of the powers granted to the Govern.
ment over them in their united capacity, the
Constitution has relied on.-i, the responsible.
Y of the Senators and Representatives in the
Legislature of the United States to the Legs
ia1ures and people Of the States; 2, the respoi.
.blity of the President to the people of tho
United States; and 3, the liability of the Ext
ecu:ive and Judicial fnnctionaries Of the ITni.
tied States to impeachment by the Representa-
ilFcS VI pco(uc vi t1c OidtCss III oiC b60uSI!
Of the Legislature of the United States, and
| trial bv the Representatives of the States, IL
the other branch: the State functionaries, Le
gislative, Executive, and Judicial, being, az
he same time, in their appointment and re-
sponsibilty, altogether independent of the
agency or authority Of the United States.
How far this structure Of the Government Of
The United States Is adequate and safe for its
objects, time alone can absolutely determine.
Experience seems to have shown, that, what
ever may grow out of future stages of our ma
tiona career, there is, as yet, a sufficient con-
troll, in the popular will over the Executive
and Legislative Departments Of the Govern
ment. When the Alien and Sedition Laws
were passed in contravention to the opinions
and feelings of the community, the first elec-
tons that ensued put an end to them. And
whatever may have been the character OF
other acts. in the judgment of many of us, it rs
but true, that they generally accorded with the
views of majority of the States and Of the
lpeope. At the present day, it seems we'll un-
derstood, that the laws which have created
most dissatisfaction, have had like sanction
without doors; and that, whether continued;
varied, or repealed, like proof will be given
of the sympathy and responsibility of tho
Representative body, to the constituent body.
Indeed, the great complaint now is, against tho
results of this sympathy and responsibility, in
the Legislative policy Of the nation.
with respect to the judicial power Of the
United States, and the authority of The SUI
preme Courts in relation to the boundary OF
jurisdiction of the Federal and the State Gov
ernments, may be permitted to refer to the
thirty >ninth number Of the "F'ederalist,"* for,
the light in which the subject was regarded
by its writer, at the period when the Consiitus
ton was depending aud it is believed, that the
same was the prevailing view then taken of it,
that the some view has continued to prevail,
and that it does so at this time, notwithstand-
ling the eminent exception TO it.
'But tits perfectly consistent with the con-
lcession of this power to the supreme Court, II,
cases falling within the course Of its functions,
to maintain that the power has not always been
rightly exercised. To say nothing of the Pc
rod, happily short one, when Judges in their
seats did not abstain from incorporate and
party haraasues, equally at variance with
heir dignity, there have been occasional de-
cisions from the bench, which have Incurred
serious and extensive disapprobation. Still it
Il e A. Nj