Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1833-03-22

80 'hINNNiNht Y Nl n "A ieles
reader TO Peruse the history Of that event without being
iorcibly struck with the analogy IN the eau e. which led
to their separation, and those which now tb,esten rs " inn
a similar calamity. With the establishment Of he central
power in the King, commenced a s,s EN- OF taxation
which under King Solomon, was greatly increased TO de.
H"y me expense oil ieailng Ihe tetuplr, OF enla piug I'D
embelishing Jerusalem, the seat of The cruiraI Govern.
ment, and the other prpiuse expenditures Il his mag. III.
cent reign. Increased taNa'on was iollov ". d bv its r,-
turai consequences-discsnieni aud complain which
before his death began 10 exci'e resis ance. On the
succession OF his son, lchohoam, the ten Tribes, headed
by Jerohoau, demanded a reduction OF the faxes. The t.n.
pie being finished, and the embellshmeut OF Jerusalem
completed, aud the money which had been raised for that
purpose being no longer required; or, in other words, the
oebt being PAID, they demanded a reduction ofthe duties
a repeal OF the tariff The demand was taken under con.
siderauon, and after consulting the old men, the counsel
OTIS u W, VINO advised a reduction, he then took the opi-
mon OF the younger politicians, who had since grown nm
anu Knew not the doctrines Of their fathers; he harkened
unto their counsel, and refused TO make the reduction and
,ne secession OF the ten tribes, under ~JcrobOam, followed.
The tribes OF Judah and Benjamin, which had received
Tue disbursements, alone remained to the house Of David.
but, TO return TO the point Immediately under consiIrr,.
Oh. ~ knew mat II was not only the opinion OF a large
majority OF our country, but il might be said 10 he ia.
oPunlon oil the age, that the very beau IDEAL OF a perfect
Government was the government of a majority. acting
through a representative body, without check or Iimit.tion
mus power; yet, VI we may test this theory by experience
u reason, we viii Ind that so far from being perIect.
the necessary tendency OF all Governments based unor
the VIII OF an absolute majority, without constitutio,,l
check or limitation of power, is TO faction. corruption nm
archy and despotism; and this, whether the will of the ma
Joniy be expressed directly through an assembly of The
people themselves, or by their representatives. ! know,
N''- We ~ tHN IVA Nen'uflnS lnlS assertion 1 utter that
mn'ch IS uhpopn'or' both within and without these walls;
out, where truth and liberty are concerned, such consid..
rauons should not be regarded. He would place the dcci.
sloi oil This point on the iactthat no government of the kind
among the many attempts which had been made, had
ever endured for a single generation; but, on the contrary
mad invariably experienced he fac which he had ASST +.
&C 70 mem Let a single instance be pointed OUT, and he
would surrender his opinion. But, if We had not lie aid
o. eNperlet ce TO direci our Judgment, reason itself would
be a certain guide. The view which considers The cnu.
munity as a unit, and all its parts as la wing a similar inter.
o. Is rSulcahy erroncon'. However small te commune
W may be, and however homogeneous il. Interests. the ma.
men' 'n't government Is put into operation. as soon IS it
beglns TO collect taxes and TO make appropriations. he diff
iert portions OF community mus, of necessity. bear differ.
ehtahu opposing relations in reference TO The action of the
government. There must inevitably spring TN two inter.
esisi a direction aud a stakeholder interest; an interest,"
Fronting by the action OF the COVE nmcnt, and interested
III increasing It's powers and action; and another, at whose
expense the political machine is kept in motion. III
knew how difficult il was TO communicate distinct ideas ON
ssch a subject, through tie medium OF general proposi.
IONS without particular illustrations; and, in order tina, he
might be distinctly understood, ihough a; The hazard of he.
my euLous' ne would illustrate the important principle
winch he had ventured to advance, by examples.
Let us, then, suppose a small community OF five persons.
separa'eu from the rest OF the world; and, to make the ex-
ample strong, let us suppose them all to be engaged In tho
same pursuit, and 10 he of equal wealth. Lei ms G,rther
suppose, mat they determine to govern the community bv
'ne WIN o. a majority; and, to make the case as strong as
POSSIBLE lei us suppose that the majority, in order TO meet
inc expenses OF the governments, lay an equal tax. saw of
$lUo' ON each individual OF this little communitv.-ibeir
treasury would contain five hundred dollars. Three arc a
,nyorl'yi anu they, by sHPpoSiton, have contributed three
huhired as their portion, and the other two, Uhe minoriivl
W. hundred. The three have the right TO make the an.
preparations as they may think proper. The question is
now would the principle Of the absolute and unchecked
majority operate, under these circumstances. in this IiuIe
community lfthe three be governed by a sense oC ;us.
ucS-i ,hey should appropriate the money TO the objects
Tor which il was raised, the common and eonaI benc6, of
the nVe' then The object Of the association would be fairly
!" honestly effected, and each would have a common in.
.vnes' Ia me government. But, should The majority pur.
sue an opposite course; should they appropriate the money
:" a u u 10 peneht heir own particular interest, with
oul regard TO The interest oil the two, (and that they will
so act, unless there be some efficient check he Who hos,
Knows hnman nature will least doubt) who does not see
.hat inc tlreo and the two would have directly opposite
interests, in reference TO The action of the government,
The three, who contributed TO the common treasury I'm,
t.ne1 INJURED dollars could, in fact, be apprOpriating the
hundred 10 their own use, convert the action of tho
government into the means of making money. and of
consequence, would have a direct interest in Increasing
te taxes 1hey put in three hundred and take ont five:
.at - uhey take back TO Themselves all they had put i'm;
ana, IN addition, that which was put in by their associates
or IN other words, taking taxation aud appropriation to.
Sctner' they nave gained, and their associates have lost
TWO hundred dollars by the fiscal action of the govern
ment' ana opposite Interests, in reference 10 the action
oil the government, is thus created between tbep'. tmo
one having an interest In favour, and the other against
the taxes; the one to increase, and the other to decrease
te axes the one to retain the taxes when the money i.
no longer wanted, and the other TO repeal them, when he
objects for which they were levied have been executed
Letus now suppose this community of five to be raised
to twenty-four individuals, to be governed in like manner
by the Will OF majority; it is obvious that the same prin.
ciples would divide them into two interests-into a map;nri
ty and a minority, thirteen against eleven. or in sone othor
Proporuoh; anu that all the consequences, which he had
~ PPhN"bI 10 tc small community of FIVE
would be equally applicable to the greater-tbe cause NOT
depending upon the number, but resulting necess,rilv
ne AcIon oil the government itself, Let us now SIM.
Pose ,"'', 'nS'ehIo OF governing themselves directly in an as
semoIy OF Tue whole, without the Intervention of agents
tney shouId adopt the representative principle, and that
ls'ed OF oelhg governed by majority ofthemscIves. tbev
shou'd ne governed by a majority of their representatives.
1T Is OBVIOUS that the operation of the system youId moi he
aiiected ny the change, the representatives being respon.
siDIe 10 those who choose them, will confirm TO the vviu
OF lhelr constituents, and would act as lhey wouId do
ere 'hey present, and acting for themselves; and the
sdhe cohuict oil interest, which we have shown woulJ
eA,stIh one case, woHld equally exist in the other.-Ip
e'ne case me inevitable result would be, a system of
hosuie legislation ON the part OF the majority, or the stron.
ger interest, against the minority, or the weaker interest.
'he oDJfcto' winch, on the part of the former. wouId he IN
exact as much as possible from the latter. which would ne
S5ss',Hy Z 'esis ed ny all The means in their power. War.
iare' by iegisIalIon, would lhus be commenced b.tveep
me patues' win The same object, and not less hostile than
thai which ~ carried on between distinct and rival ne,ior.
the only distinction would be in lie Instruments "a h.
moue' hhdctnenis, IN the one case, would supplv what
cOuId only DC G iected by arms in The other. and Ihe in
eVlta0le operation would be to engender the nost bostLo
ieemugs between the parties, which would Inerse sverv
ics"nS o Pariousm-that feeling which embraces us
"no'e, ana substitute ~ lie place tie most violent marty ~.
."on"e".' anu' instead OF having one common centre of at
tachment, around which the affections of the ronnunitv
might rally, there would, in fact, be two-u,e Interests Of
the majority, TO which those who constitute that m,iori,v
"ould DC more attached than they would be TO the whole
ana mar OF the minority, TO which they i'm like manner
W9uiu also be more attached than to the interests oC the
"o'e ; ac'Ioh would thus take the place Of patriotism.
slu' WIN 'he loss OF patriotism, corruption must necessari-
y T,,"' st" 'n us HsIn, anarchy, and, finally, despoism,
or te establishment OF absolute power in a single indivi.
duaI, az a means Of arresing the conflict Of hostile inter.
ess, on me principle hat it is better TO submit 10 the will
OF a single individual, who, by being made lord and master