Vandalia Whig and Illinois intelligencer. [volume] (Vandalia, Ill.) 1832-183?, 1833-10-23

| JuDeE STORY has published a work, enti-
tied "Commentaries on the Constitution Of
the United States" 1t is esteemed work
of great merit, by no means detracting from
the we'll earned reputation Of its author. Up
on the subject of the appointing power, he
ha- the following appropriate remarks:
"rhe power to nominate does not natural
ly, or necessarially include the power to re-
movej and if the power to appoint does in
cude it, then the latter belongs conformity to
the executive and the senate. In short, un.
lder such circumstances, the removal takes
lplace in virtue of the new appointment, by
mere operation of law. 1t results, and is no,
Iseparable from the law itself.
''Phis was the doctrine maintained with
great earnestness by the Federalisls; and i
had most material tendency 10 quiet the
just alarms of the overv helming influence
and arbitrary exercise of this prerogatlve 0
the Executive, which might prove fatal to the
personal independence and freedom of opin
ion ofpublic officers, as well as to the public
liberties of the country. Indeed, it is utter
|y impossible not to feel, that, if this unimi
tied power of removal does exist, it may be
made in the hands of bold and designing
man, of high ambition and feeble principles
ian instrument of the worst oppression, and
most vindictive engeance.-Even in mon
arches, while the councils of state are sub
IJect to perpetual fluctuations and changes.
the ordinary officers of government are per
United to remain in the silent possession OF
their offices, undisturbed by the policy or the
passions Of the favorites Of the court. But
IN republic, where freedom Of opinion and
action are guaranteed by the very first prin'
cip!es Of the government, if a successful par
Ity may first elevate their candidate to office
and then make him the instrument of theil
|resentments, or their mercenary bargains; II
men may be made spies upon the actions Of
their neighbors to dlsplace them from office
or, if fawning sycophants upon the popular
leader of the day may gain his patronage to
the exclusion of worthier and ADLER men, it is
most manifest, that elections will be corrup-
ted at the very source; and those who seek
office. will have every motive to delude and
deceive the people. 1t was not therefore
without reason, that it was urged, that the
power of removal was incident to the power
|of appointment. That it would be most
|unjustifable construction of the constitu-
ton, and of its implied powers to hold 9th
erwisc. That such a prerogative in the Ex-
ecutive was in its own nature monarchnl
and arbitrary, and emlnently dangerous to
the best interests, as well as liberties Of the
country. 1t would convert all the officers Of
the country into the mere tools and creatures
of the President. A dependence so seryile,
on one individual, would deter men Of high
and honorable minds from any agency in the
public service. And if, contrary to exPecta-
ton, such men should be brought into office,
they would be reduced to the necessity Of
sacrificing every principle of independence
to the will of the Chief Magistrate, or of ex-
posing themselves TO the disgrace Of being
removed from office, and that too at time
when it might no longer be in their power tt
engage in other pursuits"