Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1833-03-13

two would have directly opposite interests, in re.
ference to the action Of the government? The
three who contribute to the common treasury but |
three hundred dollars, could, in fact, by appro.
priating five hundred to their own use, convert
the action Of the government into the means Of
making money; and, Of consequence, would have
direct interest in increasing the taxes. They
put in three hundred and take out five; that
is, they take back to themselves all that they had
put in; and, in addition, that which was put IN
by their associates; or, in other words, taking
taxation and appropriation together, they have
gained, and their associates have lost, two hun.
dred dollars by the fiscal action OF the govern.
ment. An opposite interest, in reference to
the action Of the government, Is thus created
between them; the one having an interest IN Ia
yOr and the other against the taxes; the one to
increase, and the other to decrease, the taxes;
the one to retain the taxes when the money Is no
longer wanted. and the other to repeal them when
the objects for which they were ieVied nave oeen
executed.
Let 10 now suppose this community OF five to
be raised to twenty -four individuals. to be gov
erned in like manner by the will Of majority;
it is obvious that the same principle would divide
them into two interests-into majority and
minority. thirteen against eleven, or in some
other proportion; and that all the consequences,
which he had shown to be applicable to the small
community Of FIVE, would be equally applicable
to the greater-the cause not depending upon the
number, but resulting necessarily from the &C.
ton of the government ITSELF Let US now sup.
pose, that, instead Of governing themselves di-
rectly IN an assembly Of the whole, without the
intervention Of agents, they should adopt the re-
preventative principle and that. instead Of being
governed by majority Of themselves, they should
be governed by a majority OF their representa-
tves. 1t is obvious that the operation Of the
system would not be affected by the change, the
representatives being responsible to those who
choose them, will conform to the will Of their
constituents. and would act as they would do,
were they present. and acting for themselves;
aud the same conflict of interest which we have
shown would exist in one case, would equally
in the other. In sither case, the inevitable re-
suit would be system Of hostile legislation on
the part Of the majority the stronger interest,
against the minority, or the weaker interest; the
object Of which, on the part Of the former, would
be to exact as much as possible from the latter,
which would necessarily be resisted by all the
means in their power Warfare, by legislation,
would thus be commenced between the parties,
with the same object, and not less hostile than
that which is carried on between distinct and RI
val nations-the only distinction would be in the
instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the
one case. would supply what could only be ef-
fected by arms in the other; and the inevitable
operation would be TO engender the most hostile
feelings between the parties. which would merge
every feeling Of patriotism-that feeling which
embraces the whole, and substitute in its place
the most violent party attachment; and, instead
Of having one common centre Of attachment,
laro ,uht fha aft nf hQ fv
might rally, there would, in fact, be two-the
interests of the majority, to which those who
constitute that majority would be more attach.
ed. than they would be to the whole, and that of
the minority, to which they in like manner would
also be more attached than to the interests of the
whole. Faction would thus take the place of pa
triotlsm, and, with the loss Of patriotism. cor
ruption must necessarily follow; and. in its train,
anarchy; and, finally, despotism. ar the asta-
blisment Of absolute power in single individu.
al, as means of arresting the conflict Of hos
tile interests on the principle that it is better to
submit to the will Of single individual, who, by
being made lord and master OF the whole COM
munlty, would have an equal interest in the pro-
lection Of all the parts.
Let US next suppose that, in order to avert the
calamtous train of consequences. this little com.
muuity should adopt written constitution with
limitations restricting the will Of the majority, in
order to protect the minority against the oppres-
sOns which he had shown would necessarily re-
suit without such restrictions. Ii is obvious that
the case would not be in the slightest degre vari-
ed, If the ma ority be left in possession of the
right Of judging exclusively Of the exten, Of its
powers. without any right On the part Of the mi.
nority to enforce the restrictions imposed BY the
constitution on the will Of the majority. The
point IS almost toe clear for illustration. Nothing
can be more certain than that when constitution
grants power, and imposes Limitations on the ex-
ercise Of that power, whatever interests may OBJ.
tain possession Of the Government will be in ia
vor Of extending the power at the expense of the
Limitation; and that. unless those in whose be.
half the limitations were imposed, have, in some
form or mode, the right of enforcing them, the
power will ultimately supsrsede the Limitation.
and the Government must operate precisely in the
same manner as if the will Of the majority 60.
verned without constitution or limitation of pow.
er.
IL 4 Ill