Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1833-09-24

its tav0r. Most OF them are liable 10 the same
constitutional objections for which the present
Bank has been condemned, aud perhaps to Az
there are strong ubjections on the score OF ex.
pediency. In Kidding the country Of an trIesPon'
sibe power which has attempted to control the
oyernment, care must be taken not TO unite the
same power with the Executive branch. 10 give
a President the control over the currency anu t'e
power over individuals nov possessed by the Bank
of the United States. even with the material dit.
ference thathe IS responsible to the people. would
be az objectionable and as dangerous as toleave II
az il is. Neither the one nor the other is neces.
sarv. and therefore ought not to be resorted TO.
90 the whole, the President considers II as
conciusively settled that the charter OF the Bank
of the United States will not be renewed, and he
has no reasonable ground TO believe that any sub
stitute will be established Being bound 10 reg
uate his course by the laws as they exist. aud
not TO anticipate the interference of the lesisla-
tive power, for the purpose OF framing new sys-
tens, it il proper for him seasonably to consider
the means bv which the services rendered BY the
Bank OF the United States are to be performed
after ITS charter shall expire.
The existing laws declare, that :" the depof
sites OF the money of the United States. in places
in which the said Bank and branches thereof may
be established. shall be made in said Bank or
branches thereof, unless the Secretary OF the
Treasury shall at any time otherwise order and
direct, in which case the Secretary OF the. Iiea-
sury shall Immediately lay before Congress, III
| session, and il not, Immediately after the com
mencement Of the next session, the reason of such
order or direction
The power of the Secretary Of the Treasury
over the deposi,es, is unqualified The provis.
ion that he shall report his reasons to Con-
gress, is no limitation. Had It not been In
serted, he would have been responsible 10 Con
I eress, had he made removal for any other than
poud reasons, and his responsibility, now ceases.
upon the rendition Of sufficient ones to Congress.
The only object OF the provision, is TO make his
reasons accessible to Congress. and enable that
body the more readily to judge Of their sound
ness and purity, and thereupon to make such
further provision by law as the Legislative power
may think proper in relation to the deposite ut
the public money. Those reasons may be very
diversified. 1t was asserted ny the Secretary OF
the Treasury without contradiction, as early as
l817, that he had power Z" to control the proc red
iDgs'' Of the Bank Of the United States at any
mnment, "by changing the deposies to the State
Banks" should il pursue an iiiiberal course TO-.
wards those institutions; that I" the Secretary OF
the Treasury will always be disposed to support
the credit of the State Banks, and will invariably
direct transfers from the deposites OF the public
money in aid OF Their legitimate exertions to main
tain their rrdf:'' and he asserted right to EN-.
/ pillow The State B INKS when the Bank OF the Uni-
! ted States should refuse to receive on depuslte
the nu,es Of such State Banks the public inter
est required, shuuid BIZ received in payment OF
the pubic dues. In several instances he did
transfer the pub,c dcpusites TO State B,nks. in
I L., ~ hrun hos Inrr sDTc
\ come, ted only with the safety OF those banks,
the public on, enience and the interestS OF the
I Treasury.
{. FIT was lawful for M Crawford. the S-creta.
~ of the Treasury, al ;hat time, to ACT OH these
t principles. il will be difficult to discover any
sound reason against the application of similar
principles in still stronger cases And II rs
matter of surprise that power which, IN the
infancy of the Bank. was freely asserted as one
of the ordinary and familiar duties of the Sec
retary Of the Treasury, should now be graVely
( questioned. aud attempts made to excite and
alarm the public mind as if some new and IN.
heard Of power Was about to be nsurped By the
Executive branch Of the Government
| It's but little more than two and halt
wears to the Termination OF the charter OF the
| present Bank II is considered as the decision
! of the country that it shall then cease to exist,
and no man, the President believes, has reasona.
bic ground for expec Iatlon that any other Bank
of the United States will be created bt Congress.
To the Treasury Department is entrusted the
safe keeping and faithful application of the pub
lie moneys. A plan of collection different from
the present, must therefore be introduced and
put in complete operation before the dissolution
of the present Bank. When shall it be com.
menceds Shall no step be taken IN this essen
tial concern until the charter expires, and the
Treasury finds itself without an agent, its &C.
counts in confusion, with no depository for its
funds, and the whole business Of the Government
derangedl or shall it be delayed until SIX months,
or a year, or two years before the expiration Of
the charterl II is obvious that any new system
which may be substituted in the place OF the
Bank of the United States, could not be sud-
denly carried into effect On the Termination Of its
existence without serious Inconvenience to the
Government and the people. Its vast amoont Of
| notes are then to be redeemed and Withdrawn
from circulation, and its immense debt coilec.
.d Vhase oner ations mnst he Gradual Othpr.