Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1832-10-02

iy restored, in the shape Of grant. This modiiica
ton of the right of self government tho par: OF
tho States is in fact, the pivot of the system. By
shilling its position tho prcpouderance is on the
ono side the other, to drop tho simile by in
crcasing, diminishing the enorgy OF tho repairing
power, effected by diminishing increasing the
number oil States necessary amend the Constitu
ton, the equilibrium between the reserved and the
delegated rights may be preserved, dcroycd at
pleasure.
L aware, it is objected, that according TO this
view, one-fourih of the States may in reality change
the Constitution and thus, take away powers which
have been unanimously granted by all the Statos.-
The objection is more spccous than solid The right
of State is not TO delegated powers but 10
prouenf the reserved from being assumed by tho Co.
vernment. 1t is, however, certain, the right may be
abused, and thereby, powers be resumed, which were
in fact delegated aud it is also true, if sustained by
one fourth OF the co-statos, such resumption may
he successfully and permanently made by tho State.
This is tho danger; and tho utmost extent of tho
danger, from the side of the reserved powers. 1t
would. acknowledge, be desirable to avoid, or less
en- ii but neither can DO effected, without increa.
sing greater and opposing danger
If the right be denied to the State to defend her
reserved powers for fear she might resume the dele
gated that denial would, lin effect yield to the Gen
oral Government the power, under the colour of
construction to assume, at pleasure all the reserved
powers III 49, IN fact, question between the dan
ger OF the States rcsuming the delegated powers on
/ one side, and the General Government assuming the
reserved on the other Passing the far greater
VI the latler, Than tho former, which
ehdcavored to illustrate in tho address of last
mer, shall confnc my remarks TO the striking diff
terence between them, viewed in connection with the
genius and theory of our Government.
Inc right OF u State, originally, TO complete self
government Is fundamental principle in our sys
.c IN virtue of which, the grant of ro,per required
"e consent Of all The Sfates, uhie to ,ciihhold
Potoer the dissent Of single State ,oas sufficient
rs true, that this original and absolute power of
seii-g government has been modified by the Consti
tuition, as already stated that three fourtbs of
inc states may now grant power, and conseauently
IL requires more than one iourth to withhold Tie
boundary between the reserved and the delegated
powers marks the limits of the Union. The States
arc united to he extent of the latter and
beyond that limit. 1t is, then clear that it was
not intended, that the States should he more unit
eo, than the Will of onc-fonrth of them, or rather
one more than fourth, would permit. 1t is wor
thy OF remark, that it was proposed i'm the Com
ventlon to increase the confederated powers as it
may be called, by vesting twothirds of the States
win tho right of amendment; as to require more
lnan third instead of fourth, withhold power
The proposition was reccted; and three fourtbs
unanimously adopted. 1t is, then, more hostile 20
the nature and genius of our system, to assume
Po'oerS not deteg0fed than to those that are;
and less hostile, that State, sustained by 0ue
fourth Of her cOstates, should recent the exercise
81 pO'oer really intended to be granted than that
me General Government should dsSume the exercise
~ potoers not Intended 20 be delegated. In the
latter case, tho usurpaon of power wonld he
against the Fundamental principle of our svs
TEN, the original rights OF the States TO self
government; while in the fermcr, f il be- usurp-
oton ut all, II would be, if so bold am expression
may be used, an usurpaton in the spirit OF the Com
sttution itset--ihe spirit Ordanng that the utmost
extent of our Union should he limited by the will of
any number of States exceeding fourth 81 that most
wisely In a country having great diversity of
geographical and political interest with vast ter
ritory, to be filled in short time with almost count
less miions,-a country, of which the parts will G.
quail Empires, union more intimate than that
damned IN the Constitution and intimate of course
that mig be permanently hostile to the feelings
OF more than a fourth of the States. instead of
strengthening, would have exposed the system to
certain destruction, There is deep and profound
philosophy, which he, who best knows our nature
Will tho most highly appreciate that would make the
intensity of the Union, if may so express myself
Inversely TO the extent of the Territory and the po
putaon OF country, and the diversity OF its inter
ests geographical and POLITICAL and which would
hold, in deeper dread, the ASSUMPTION of reserved
rights by the agent appointed to the dclega-
ted; than the resumption of the delegated by the
authority VIII ich granted the powers and ordained
The agent TO administer them. There appears in
deea' 10 be great and prevailing principle, that
lends TO place the delegated power in opposition to
the dsiegating the created TO the creating power
reaching lar beyond man and his works up 10 the
universal source of all power. The earliest pages
of sacred history record the rebellion of the Arch An
gels against the high authority of Heaven ITSELF and
ancient mythology, the war of the Titans against
Jupiter, which according 10 its narrative, menaced
the universe with destruction. This all pervading
principle is at work in our systematic created war
ring against the creating power and unless the Go
vernnent be boiled and chained down. with links of
adamant by the hand of the States which created l.
the creature will usurp the place of the creator and
universal political idolatry overspread the land.
If the views presented be correct, it follows that
on the interposition of State in favor of the re-
served rights, it would be the duty of the General
Government to abandon the contested power, or
to apply to the States themselves the source of all
political authority, for the power in of the
modes prescribed in the Constitution. If the case
be simple one, embracing a S ngle power, and that
IN lis nature, easily adjusted. the ready and APP
proprate mode, would he amendment in the ordi-
nary form, on proposition of two.thirds of both
houses of Congress, be ratified by threeourts of
the States; but, the contrary, should the deranpc
rnent OF the system be great embracing many points
diihcut to ADJUST the States ought be convened
general Convention the most august of all assem-
bles, representing the United Sovereignty of the
contederated States, and having power and authori-
W TO correct every error, and to repair every diapi
daton or injury, whether caused by time or accident
or the conflicting movement of the bodies which
compose the system. With institutions every way
so fortunate, possessed of means well calculated
TO prevent disorders, and so admirable to correct
them, when they cannot be prevented he who would
prescribe tor political disease diSuniOR on the
one slde or coercion of State in the assertion of its
rights on the other, w0utd deserUe and ,oM receiue
the erecrdtionS of this, and all future generations
| have now finished what lad 10 say on the sub
lect OF this communication, in its immediate connec
ton with the Constitution. In the discussion have
advanced nothing but on the authority of tho Con
stiiutOn ITSELF that Of recorded and unouestiona
bic facts, connected with the history of its origin
and formations and have made no deduction. but
such rested on principles, which / believe 10 be
unquestIonable but it would be idle TO expect II; the
present state of the public mind favorable recon
ton Of the conclusions, to which / have been car
ried. There are too many misconceptions to en-.
pTeIudICgS to d,I,, l.