Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1832-10-02

applied to socossion--the throwing off the autkori
ty OF tie Union iiscJ. To niltiy the Consti,u-
non, IT may be pardoncd the solocism, would
Indeed be tantamount To dsunion; and as applied
to such act, it would DO true, that State could
no; DO in and out of the Union at the same time;
but til, act would he secession.
But To apply it publication, properly under.
stood, tho object OF which instead OF resisting or
diminishing tnc powers of Tho Union, is TO preserve
them as they are, neither increased, dim nsh-
cd and thereby, the Uuion itself uor the Union
may bo as etecually destroyed by increasing as hy
diminishing its powcrs--by consolidation, as by dis
union nscii,) would he, L would say, had 1 not
great respect for many, who do thus apply it, eyre
gious triing with n uravo and deeply mportu MT
constitutional subject.
might here finish the task, which your request
imposed; having, trust, demonstrated, beyond the
power OF retutaiion, that State has the right to
defend her reserved powers, against the oncroacl-
incnt oil the General Government; and, may add,
that the right is in it's nature peaceabe, consistent
with the federal relations of,he State, aud perfectly
efficient, whether contested before the courts, or
attempted 10 be resisted by force. But there is an.
other aspect OF the subject, not yet touched, with
out adverting to which, it is impossible to under.
stand Tho full effects of Notification, the real
character of our political institutions; aude to
the power, which the States, u confederated bo-
dy, have acquired directly over each other; and on
which will now proceed to make some remarks,
though fear at tho hazard of fatiguing you
rrcvions to the adoption of the present Constitu-
,on, no power could hc exercised over any State,
by amy other, all of the States, without it's own
CONSENT and we, accordingly, find that the old con-
federation and the present Constitution, were both
submitted Tor ratification to each of the States, and
that each ratified Tor itself, and bound only in
consequence of its own particular ratification, as
| has boen already stated. The present Constitution
mas made, In this particular, most important mo-
dihca'ion in their condition. allude to the pro-
vision, winch gives validity to amendments OF the
Constitution, when ratified by three fourths of the
States--a provision which has not attracted
huch attention as ITS Importance deserves With
outI, no change could have been made in the Con-
stuutioh unless with the unanimous consent OF all
! the States, in like manner, it was adopted: This
provision, then. contains highly important con-
cession, by each to all of the States, of portion
OF the original and Inherent right of sclf-go
'erhlnen', possessed, previously, by each
Paratey, In favour OF their general confedcrated
powers, giving thereby, mcroasdd energy TO the
| states In their united capacity, and weakening
them IN the same degree i'll their separate Its OBJ
Ject waste facilitate and strengthen the action of
| the amending, or Ito speak lt.lc more appropri-
atoly as it regards the point under consideration
! me requiring p0,ccr 1t forescen, thai expe.
rience would probably disclose errors i'll the Con-
stitutIon ITSELF that time would make great chan
III the condition of the country, which would re-
| quire corresponding changes in the Constitution,
that the irregular and conflicting of the
bodies, composing complex system, might
| cause arrangements requiring correction, and that
10 require the unanimous consent of all the States
| TO meet these various contingencies, would be
placing the whclc too much under the control of
|
power was given TO The amending, repairing
powcr--thls els medicatrir of the syterR.
| To understand correctly the naturc of this
cessIon, we must not confound ii with the dele
| gated powers, conferred on the General Govern
inent, and to be exercised by it, the joint agent
OF the States. They essentially different. The
former is in fact, but modification of the original
sovereign power; residing in the people of the
| veral Statcs-ot the creating Constitution
king pocer itself intended stated, to fdciLitate
and strengthen its action, and not change its cha
rdcter Though modified, it is not delegated. 1t
still resides iathe States md is still to be exercised
6y them, and not by the Government
proposes next to consider this important modi-
| iication of the sovereign powers of the States in
| connection with the right of Notification.
IL Is acknowledged, on all Sides that the dura-
lion and stability OF our system depends main
tanning the equilibrium between the States and
the General Goverument-lhe reserved and dclega-
Ted powers. We know, that the Convention,
"h'c!l formed the Consultation, and the various
state Conventions, which adopted it, far as we
are informed % tIoir proceedings, felt the deepest
soi.citGGe On :h:s point. They and felt there
woul! &c AN incasstrt conflict bc;w them which
would menace the existence OF the sy ten itsoif
unless properly guarded. The contest bctN cen
the States and General Govcrnment-thc re-
served and delegated rights-wil in truth, be a
conflict between the great predominant interests of
the Union, on one side, controlling and directing
| the movements Of the Government, and seeking to
enlarge the delegated powers, and thereby advance
their power and prosperity; and, the other, the
minor interests rallying the reserved powers as
the only means OF protecting themselves, against
The cncroachment and oppression of the other
In such contest, without the most eflcctual check
the stronger will absorb the weaker interests
while on the other hand, without adequate pro-
vision of description, or other, the efforts
OF the weaker TO guard against the encroachments
and oppression of the stronger might permanent
ly derange the system.
On the side OF the reserved powers, no check
more efectual can be found, desired, than multi.
icaton, the right of arresing wit hin the limits
of State, the exercise by the General Government
of any powers, but the delegated-a right which, if
the States be true to themselves and faithful to the
Constitution, viii prove, on the side Of the re-
served powers, an effcctual protection to both.
Nor is the check on the side of the delegated less
perfect. Tho less strong, it is ample to guard a.
gainst encroachments and is as strong as the ma
ture of the system would bear as viii appear in the
sequel 1t is to be found in the amending power
without the modification, which it cOptairs OF
the rights of self government, the part of the
States as already explained The consent of each
State would have been requisite to any addition.
al grant of power, other amendment Of the Con
sttution. While then, Notification would enable
State to arrest the exercise OF power not delegated
the right of self government, if unmodilied, would
enable her to prevent the grant of power not de-
legated and, thus, her conception of what power
ought to be granted, would be conclusive against
the co-states, as her construction of the powers
granted, is against TIE General Government. In
that case, the danger would he on the side of tho
States reserved powers The amending power
IN effect, eorrects this danger In virtue of the pro.
visions, which it contains, the resistance of State
TO power, cannot finally prevail, unless she be sus-
tanned by fourth Of the states and in tho same
degree, that her resistance il weakened the power
OF the General Government, the side of the delo-
gated powers is strengthened. 1t is true, that the
right of State to arrest an unconstitutional act is.
of ITSELF complete against the Government but it is
equally that the controversy may in effect he de-