The Arkansas advocate., 1832-05-30

in the Criminal Courts in the District of Columbia. The prsp,lege which the Constitution secured to hlm, extended no further than sSfor words spoken in debate;" and the settlement of this question in England, from whence this feature of our Constitution is borrowed, shows conclusiyely, the correctness of our position.
 From fhe Boston Centinel.
 The trial of Samuel Houston, for an assault on Mir. Stanberrv, member of Congress from Ohio, bids fair to become protracted business. It appears to US that that tho the mode of proceeding therein is almost as extraordinary, as the as- sault itself was unprincipied and vio- lent. The Constitution of the United States expressly declares that no mem Der of Congress shall be called to ac- count out of the House, for any thing said in debate. This is a wholesome provision to preserve the freedom of de bate. 1t is clear that this principle of the constitution has been violated in the most fragrant manner by Houston, who as past member of Congress, could not plead ignorance of the rule. That such an outrage has been committed is not denied by the offender. Instead of proceeding immediately 10 judgment, Congress appear to be sustaining an ex- animation into the proof of what was charged 'by Mir. Stanberry in his place. Whether what was stated by Mir. Stan berry should turn out to be true or not, 1t should not alter the case so far as regards this outrage. As. MT. s. spoke under the sanction ofhis oath of office, 1t ought to be taken for granted that lie had reason 10 believe it was true, when he charged fraud on certain indiyidu. als concerned. If the charge were not true, the proper course would have been for the party aggriered, to have furnished some other member of Con- gress with the proper evidence 10 repel the charge. Under no circumstances, has an individual right to take the case into his own hands, and to execute summary punishment upon member of Congress for words spoken in debate in discharge of his duties. By going into evidence ofthe truth of the original charges, Congress leaves it to be impIi. ed, that, if they are not proved as char ged, the offender may escape punish ment. But if the assault were copmit- ted, for any thing done in the official capacity of member, the offender ought not to escape under any circum- stances, even though if should appear that the member of Congress had acted indiscreetly, and without sufficient evi- dence. Under any other view of the case, itwould at all times be competent, for an individual to be the judge in his own case, 10 execute summary and personal punishment on member of Congress for any thing said in the heat of debate, and 10 rely.for his own im- punity on the proofthathc might trump up to disproye what had been said upon the floor ofCongress. We apprehend, therefore, that the constitution enioins lit upon Congress, to punishan individu- |al for any outrage committed on it's members for words spoken in debate. without going into the origin of such words. When the facts of the assault are admitted, as they appear to be in this case, the punishment should follow as matter of course. Without such a construction. peaceable menwould keep away from Congress, and others would have to go armedin selfdetence.