Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1832-10-02

/ UcTeTnIDV, COnTTICt, Which
is the law; and that necessity compels it TO decide
that the rule prvscrb,l by tho inferior power, if
in its opinion, inconsistent 18th that of the higher,
| is void; be the conflict between the Constitution
and law, between u charter, aud the bylaws of
II corporation. The principle, and source of au-
| thority are the same in both cases. Being de-
rived from necessity, 1T is restricted within its linn
it's, and cannot pass an nI.h beyond its narrow con-
| fines Of deciding in before the court and of
COURSE, between parties amenable to its process, cx
Guiding thereby political questions, which of the
two is in reality, the law, the act of Congress-, or
| the Constitution, when, their face, they are in
cor. stent; and yet, from this resulting limited
power derived from necessity, and held in common
| with every court in the world, which by possibility
may take cogniZanco of case involving the in
| terprc,atio of our Constitution and laws il is at
| tempted to confer on the Supreme Court, a power
| which would work thorough and radical change
| in our system; and which power was positively
| fused by tho convention.
| The opinion, that the General Government has
the right cnforce its construction of its powers
| against State, in any mode whatever is in truth,
| founded on fundamental msconception of our
system. At the bottom of this aud in fact, almost
| every other misconcepton, to the relation be-
| tween the States and the General Government,
turks the radical error, that the latter Is national
and not as in reality 1T is, confederated Govern
mcnt; and that it derives its powers from higher
source, than the States. There are tn susauds, in
| iuenced by these impressions, without being con-
| scious of IT, and who, while they believe them
selves to be opposed to consolidation, have infused
| into their conception of our Constitution, almos,
all the ingredients, which enter into that form of
| Government. The striking difference between the
present Government, and that under the old confcd
Grafton q speak of governments, distinct from
constitutions has mainly contributed to this dam
gerouS impressions. But, however dissimilar their
| Governments, the present Consultation is as far
remoced from consolidation and rs as strictly, and
as purely confederation, the ,ohich IL super
sedcd.
| Like the old confederation, it was formed and
ratified by State authority. The only difference III
this particular is, that ratified by the pco-
pie OF the States, the other by the State Govern
lnents; one forming more strictly Union of the
state Governments, the other OF the States them
selves; one oil the agents exercising the powers of
sovereignty, and the other of the sovercigus them
selves; but both were union of political bodies, as
distinct from unions of the people individuality
They are indeed both confederations; but the pre-
sent in higher and purer sense, than that which
1T succeeded; just as the act of sovereign high
CIR and more perfect than that of his agent and it
was doubtless, III reference to this difference that
the preamble of the Constitution, and the address
OF the Convention, laying the Constitution before
congress, speak OF consolidating and perfectng
the Union; yet this difference, which while it ..e
waited the General Government, in relation to the
State Governments, placed it more Immediately in
the relation of the creature and agent of the States
themselves, by natural msconception, has been
the principal cause of the Impression so prevalent
of the futeriority of the States the General Co
vernment, and of the consequent right of the lat.
ter to coerce the former. Raised from below the
| State Governments 1T was conceived to be placed
| above the States themselves.
/ have now trust conclusiyely shewn that n
State, has right, in her sovereign capacity, in
Convention, to declare an unconstitutional act of
Congress to be null and void, and that such decla
ratlonS would be obligatory her citizens as
highly as the constitution itself, and conclusive
against the General Government which would have
no right to enforce its construction OF its powers
against thai of the State.
next propose to consider the practical effect of
the exercise of this high and important right,
which as the great conservative principle of our
system, is known under the various names of null
LITIGATION, interposition, and State Veto, in refer
ence to its operation viewed under different aspects
notification as annulng an unconstitutional act
| OF the General Government as far as the State is
concerned; interpcsition throwing the shield of
protection between the citizens of State and the
encroachments of the Goycrnment; and Veto as
arresting exhibiting its unauthorized acts within
the limits of the State.
| The practical effect could the right be consider
| cd as one fully recognized would be plain and
simple, and has already in great measure been an
| tcipatcd. If the State has right there must, of
necessity, be corresponding obligation on the
part of the General Government to acquiesce in its
| exercises and OF course, it would be its duty to
abandon the power, least, as far as the State is
concerned, and TO apply to the States themselves
according to the form prescribed in the Consu-
ton, to obtain 1T by grant. If granted, acqueis
cence, then; would be duty the part of the
State; and in that event, the would term-
nate in converting doubtful constructive power
into one positively granted; but, should it not be
| granted. nc alternative would remain for the &C.
neral Government, but it's permanent aban-
donment. In either event, the controversy
would be closed and the Constitution fixed; a re-
suit OF the utmost Importance to the steady opera
ton of the Government, and the stability of the
| system, and which can never be attained, under its
present operation, without the recognition of the
| right, as experience has shewn.
From the adoption of the Constitution we have
had but one continued agitation of constitutional
| questions embracing some of the most important
powers exercised by the Governments; and yet in
spite of all the ability and force of argument dis
| played in the various discussions, backed by the
high authority claimed for the Supreme Court, to
adjust such controversies; not single constitution
al question, of political character which has ever
been agitated, during this long period, has been
settled, in the public opinion, except that of the
unconstitutionaty of the Alien and Sediton Law;
and, what is remarkable, that was settled against
the decision Of the Supreme Court. The tendency
is to increase, and not 10 diminish this conflict for
power. New questions yearly added, without
diminishing the old, while the contest becomes
more obstinate as the list increases; and what is
mighty ominous, more sectional 1t is impossible
mat the Government can last under this increasing
diversity OF opinion, and growing uncertainty, as
To It's power IN relation to the most important sub
Jccts OF Legislation; and equally so, that this dan
gerous state can terminate, without power some
where to compel, in effect, the Government to
abandon doubtful constructive powers, or to con-
vert them into positive grants, by an amendment
OF the Constitution; in word, to substitute tho
positive grants of the parties themselves for the
constructive powers interpolated by the agents
Nothing short OF this, in a system constructed as
ours IS, with double set of agents. one for local
and the other for general purposes, can ever ter
inmate the conflict Tor power, or give uniformity
and stability to its action.
Such would be the practical and happy opera-
ration were the right recognized; but the case NAV