Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1832-07-03

Or, thus Is no picture OF the imagination; il
IS PLAIN analysis, strict business view of our
And l do not know any laDguag"
~ winch can tettor describe the aggregate
operation OF the protecting system upon the d'i-
erent sections OF this Union, than to say is an
,nnua' legislative draft upon the productive m
'"s'ry OF the planting States, in favour OF the
manufacturing States, for between ten aud fifteen
|, OF dollars. signed by the presiding OF
lcers OF the two Houses and countersiSned by the
PRESIDENT Of the United States.
Having now explained the agency Of money
IN the exchanges Of fnreign commerce., AMI its
tendency to disguise the actual operation Of the
protecting system, the committee will the more
readily perceive the force aud propriety of the
illustrations which have been adiuced, to PROVE
the great inequality and injustice of that sys-
tenn.
The reason is now apparent why import du-
ties have been erropeously Supposed TO operate
differently from excise duties, upon the produ.
GERS and consumers OF the articles sub ecied to
these respective duties.
IL, for example, discriminating excise du
~ were leived upon the producers of Que third
part only Of the cotton manufactures Of the Uni
ted States, every body would admit that almost
the whole burthen of this duty would fall upon
the producers Of the prescribed manufactures.
The exemption Of the other two-thrds from
taxation would render il obviously impossible
to throw tho burthen Of the duty on the conss.
mers.
Now, this is equally true Of import duties le
We'd upon foreign manufactures, while domes-
tic manufactures Of the same kind, au,i OF twice
the amount, are exempted from duties. And
the reason why it is not equally appdrenti that
as excise duties operate upon domestic exchan-
ges, there is nethDg in the transaction that brings
an Increased quantity of money into the mar
ket.
Every body sees, therefore, that, i'm the case sta
ted, the price of the duied article cannot he in
creased as much even as oue-thrd part of The
amount Of the duty, and the principal bur,hen
must consequently be borne by the produ-
GER.
III money were not admitted free Of duty
from foreign countries, aud IL the quantity Of it
IN the United States remained the same after
the imposition Of protecting duties as before, it
would be equally as apparent, as in tho case of
excise duties, that the producers must bear most
of the burthen. The very first effect of laying
on protecting duties, i'm such a state of things,
would be plain papable fall in the money
price OF the staples of exportaton in the United
States, almost exactly propor,ioned to the du-
ties, while the money price of the protected ar
tIcles would remain unchanged. The exchan-
geable value OF the staples of expectation would
he no more diminished than it is now, hut it
" Guild he moro obvious, from being indicated by
JdH 10 the money price Of these staples, in
stead OF rise IN the money price of protected
For the purpose of embodying these princi-
pies III practical illustration, and Of demon
strating that partial aud discriminating duties
upon portion only of the national consumption
must operate as taxes upon production, I will
suppose that one third part Of each and every
article consumed i'm the United States were pro-
duced south of the Potomac. and the other two
thirds north of that river. / will, moreover.
suppose that political economist were 10 rise
m IA pnrfh II
mount of the federal taxes should be levied by
excise duties upon that third of the various arti-
Giles OF our consumption which was produced
south of the Potomac. Tie would he Mt no
loss Tor arguments to sustain this proposition, as
a just and equal scheme Of taxation, If il he true
mat the whole burthen Of indirect taxes falls
upon the consumers. He could truly aIlege that
IL would be much more economical TO collect the
duties from one-third part Of the Union than
from The whole, lnasmuch as only one third of
the number OF revenue officers would be re-
quired. and if it would be an equal and lust
system, its economy should be decisive 10 its ia
voT.
Let us now dispnssionately examine its true
operation, assuming that the productions Of the
ou'h amounted to sixty millions. and those of
ne north to one hundred and twenty millions,
md that an excise duty of forty per cent. should
Ie levied on tho former, yielding an annual re-
venue OF twenty-four millions of dollars. Ia
KING the article Of shoes rs an example, and as
Stunning that twelve millions of pairs should he
consumed in the United States. avera-
ging the value of one dollar each, it would fol-
low, from tho suppostion. that the southern
States would produce four millions of these
pairs, and that the southern shoemakers would
pay excise duties 10 the amount Of one million
six hundred thousand dollars. Now, il is main
tanned, that all duties fall upon tho consumers,
and consequently that the southern producers
Of shoes would have no more cause TO compIan
Of these partial duties than any other class of
people, as all must be equally the wearers and
o. shoes. Ii is evident that the con-
sumers of the south would he subject to no grea-
Ter burtheD, as consumers, than those Of the
north, tor the price Of southern made shoes
coulS not be any higher than that Of the north.
ern made shoes in the same common market:
there could not he two prices for the same QUA
lity of shoes The whole result would conse-
quently be, that the consumers of the north and
of the south would pay the very same price for
shoes, and be subject to the very same burlhen
in consequence of this duty. But the southern
il is obvious, would paw taxes to
the amount OF one million six hundred thousand
dollars, while those the north would pay none
at all. Here, then, would he a specific tax of
one million six hundred thousand dollars levied
on the producers Of shoes in the south, diminish
ing the annual income Of that section of the u
Mon precisely TO that extent, as compared with
the income derived by the northern sec'ion from
the sane quantity of the same kind of labor. -
The course OF reasoning which have applied
to shoes, will equally apply to every other arti-
Gle; and, it will follow, that the grand aggre-
gate of this scheme Of partial and discrinna
ting excise duties, would be to throw The en-.
tire burthen of federal taxation upon the south
ern States, though tho consumers of both sec
lions would be equally affected by it. 1t would
be exclusively a tax upon tho producers, and
would be, in no respect, less unjust and oppres-