Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1832-10-05

kiNG-riE coNCURUING ABSOLUTE MAORI
~ Nor rs 1T less clear, that this only be cilec
edby the right of IA State To annu tho unconsttu-
tonai acts OF the Governments right conicundcd
WIN the idea of minority governing majority,
ont which, so FAR from being the case, indispcnsa
oIo To prevent the more energetic nut imperfect ma
Jority, which controls tho movements of the Gov
eminent, from uSuTping the Place OF that more per-
icct and Just majoriy, which formed the Nonst'tu'
ton, and ordained Government to execute ITS pow
ers.
Nor need we apprchcud that this check, as pow
ortul as it is, will prove excessive Tins distinction
between the Const,tut and the law.making pow
crS strongly marked in our institutions, may yet
be considered as a new and uniricd experiment. 1t
can scarcely be said TO have existed, at ALL before
our system of Government. We have yet much to
learn, to its practical opcration,and among other
things, if do not mistake arc far from realizing
the many and great difficulties oi holding the latter
subordinate tho former, and without which, 1t is
obvious the entire scheme oi Constitutional Gov
eminent, ut least in our SENSE must prove aborive
Short as has been experience, some of these of
worry Formidable character, have begun to disclose
themselves particularly between the Constitution
| and the Government Of the Unon. The two pow
there represent very different interests; the one,
that of all the States, taken separately and
tho other, that of majority at the States, form
ing coniederatcd community Each acting under
The impulse "a these respective and different in
tcrerts, must necessarily strongly teld to
INTO collisions and in the conflict, the advantage will
nc found, almost exclusively, the side of the
Government or llw-ma king power. A few
remarks will be sufficient to illustrate these posi-
tons.
Tie Constitution, while it grants powers to the
Govcrrtmcni at the time, imposes restrictions
on ITS action with the intention ot conhning II, with
in limited rapge of powers and of the of CT
ccuting them. The object of the powers is, to pro-
tect tie rights and promote the interests of all, and
OF the restrictions, To prevent the majority, the
dominant interests of the Government. from peryert
ing powers, intended for the good, into the
means OF Expressing tho minor interests OF the
Inunity. Thus circumstauced the dgminant interest
| #
the minor interest, whom they are exercised
must regard these restrictions in a very different
light-the latter, protection, and the former
restraint, and OF course, accompanied with all the
impatient feelings with which, restrictions on GU
pidty and ambition regarded, by those I'M
ruly passions. Under their influence, the Constiu
ton will be viewed by the majority, not the
source OF their authority, as it should be- but as
shackles, on their power. Totem, it will have no
value, as the means of protection. AS Il majority
they require Iinne. Their number and strength and
not the Constitution, their protection and, of
course, if may speak, their instinct will be, to
weaken and destroy the restrictions, In ordert en-
large the powers He must have very imperfect
knowledge of the human heart, who does not sec,
IN this state OF things, incessaat conflict between
the Government, or the law-making power, and the
Constitution making power Nor is it less certain
that i the contest, the advantage Will be exclusively
with the former.
The law making power is ORGANIZED and in con-
slant action having the control OF the hunours and
emoiuncnts OF the country, and armed with the
power 10 PUNISH and reward; the other, the
trary, is unorganizcd, lying dormant in the great in
er mase of the comurity, till called imto action on
extraordinary occasions, and at distant intervals
and, then, bcstowing no honours, exercising no pa
tronagc, having neither the faculty reward nor to
punish, but endowed, simply, with the attribute TO
grant powers and ordain the authority 10 execute
them. The result is inevitable. With so strong an
instinct on the part of the Govern.cent throw off
the restrictions of the Cons Iutionr and to enlarge
ITS powers and with such powerful faculties to gra-
THY tins instructive Impulse, the law-nakng must
necessarily encr0ach on the Constitution making
power, unless restrained by the efficient check;
IL is worthy OF remark, that all other circumstances
being equal the more diSsm;lar the interests repre-
scented by the two, the more powerful will be this
tendency to encroach and it is from this among
other causes, that ii is much stronger between the
Government and the Constitution making powers of
the Union, where the interests so very dissimi-
lar, than between the two in the several states.
That the trainers of the Constitution were aware
OF the danger which l. have described, we have con
elusive proof in the provision to which | have so
frequently alluded, mean that which provides for
amendments to the Constitutions
L have already remarked that portion of this
provision, which with the view OF sreng ,honng the
coniedcrated power, conceded three fourths of
the sta es right to amend, which otherwise could
only have been exercised by the unanimous consent
OF all III is remarkable that while this provision
tlus strengthcd he amending pow er, it regards
the states, 1t imposed inpcdnents it, as far as
the Government was concerned. The power of act
ing as general rue is invested in the majority of
congress, but instead of permitting majority to
propose amendments, the provision requires for
that purpose two thirds of both houses clearly with
view OF intcrposing barrier, against this strong
instructive appetite OF the Government for the ac-
QUESTION Of power. But it would have been foly in
the extreme ihus carefully guard the passage to
inc direct acquisition, hld the wide door of con-
structlon been left open to its indirect; and
hcncc, IN the same spirit, in which two thirds of
Doth houses were required to propose amendments
the Convention, that framed the Constitutions re.
Jccted TIE many propositions, which were moved i'm
the body, with the intention of divestng the states
OF tue right OF lnterposng, and thereby of the only
eitcctual means OF preventing the enlargement of
the powers OF tho Government by construction
IL Is thus that the Constitutions makinr power has
lor'ihed itscii against the law making and that so
oifectually, that however strong the disposition and
capacity of the latter 10 cncroach the means of re-
sstance, on the part Of the former is not less now
criul- II indeed cnCTOachmcnts have been made
the fault Is not in the system but in the nattention
and neglect OF those whose interests and duty it was
TO interpose the ample means Of protection afforded
by the Constitution.
TO up in few words in conclusion what an
pears TO me, to be the entire philosophy Of govern
hent, Ill reference to tho subject of this communi-
cation.
Two powers necessary to the existence and
preservation Of free States power on the part of
the rJIed t. prevent rulers from abusing their
rty, by compelling them to be faithful to their con
Stlluents, and which is effected, through the right Of
suffrage; and power coMPEL TIE PAE7s or so.
CIETY TO BE JUST TO ONE ANOTHER, BY COMPELLING
THEM TO CONSULT THE INTEREST OF EACH OTHER which
can only he effected, whatever may be the device for
the purpose by requiring the coucurring assent OF
ali the great and distinct interests of the con1nu-
2lty to the measures of the Government This re-
suit is TIE total of all the courivances adoped
by free States TO preserve their liberty, hy preventing
the conflicts between the several classes or parts.