The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1831-1858, 1832-10-03
From the National Infelligeucer.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.-No, 7.
When the ma, liner has been tossed for manu- dam,
IN htck 'cedthtr, and on iuakno,cn sea he
naturally auails himself of the first pause in the
storm, the earliest glance Of The sun, to take his
latitude and ascertain hotc far TIE elements haze
artcen him from has true course. Let us initiate
thus prudence and, before zoe float f1rthe, refer
10 the point from tchich zee departed that tce
may be at least able TO conjecture ,chere ,ce
nop are"
The power which the Constitution gives to the
President, to negative bills which have passed
both Houses OF Congress, has been abused, under
the present Administration, to such an extent as
10 constitute an usurpation of the rights of the
PEOPLE, and of the States, through their agents
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
We do not speak Of the case of the Bank bill par
tlculary but of the Veto principle as acted upon by
the present Executive. Under the same construc-
lion, which we cannot doubt in the event of Gen.
Jacksons reelection, will continue to be given to
that provision of the Constitution, we shall have
Chlef Magistrate exercising, for nearly FIVE years
to come, more than monarchicdl authority. The
power which Gen. Jackson has exercised seuer
tunes within two years has not been reserted to by
any Of the KINGS of England for the last century,
though undeniably part of the British Constitu-
tion. So onward, indeed, has been the march Of
free principles that at this day the King of Great
Britain who should put his negative on well-con-
sidered bill which had passed both Houses of Par
it. For much less exercise of authority than the
stoppage by the Veto of bills approved BY MAORI
ty of the People, Charles X was lately expelled
from the throne of France, and Louis Philippe
would soon be made to follow him. were he in the
some manner to fly in the face Of the Representa-
tives of the People.
With the light we now have, we cannot but re-
gard the Veto power anomaly in our system,
1t is that part of it, we discover, which was most
weakly defended by the trainers of the Constitu-
ton, when it came to be discussed before the Peo-
pie; and we cannot now conceive why it was not
more disputed than it appears to have been.
The main reason assigned for it by Alexander
Hamilton, the able defender of the Constitution
was, to guard against d" the propensity of the Leg.
islative Department to intrude upon the rights,
and absorb the powers, of the other departments
Of the government" &c Without this power % said
MI H., 1.-THE President might be gradually strip
ped of his authority by successive resolutions or
anhihilated by a single vote" This is the ground
on which the Veto power was mainly sustained.
We have seen, in the result how completely, by
means of this very power the President has turned
the tables on the Legislative Department. By
successive acts of arbitrary authority he has "grad
ually stripped" CONGRESS of almost half Of it's
powers, and the SENATE Of more than half It is
the Executive, we know now which has the pro-
pensty, and a very strongly developed propensity
too to intrude upon the Legislative Department,
and not the Legislative upon the Executive. Pow
er steals from the many to the few" and not
from the few to the many
1t is not a little remarkable that the only other
argument produced by the generally sagacious as.
sociate of Mr.. Madison in defending The Constitn.
ton to support this feature of it, has also proved
in practice to be an argument against it, instead of
being in favor of it at establishes" said he
"a salutary check upon the Legislative body. cal.
culated to guard the community against the effect.
offaction preciptancy, or of any impulse unfriend
ly to the public good" It is very clear that these
influences likely to operate upon an indiv;d,.
al as upon he3es composed of number Of indiyidu.
ais; that it is, in truth much more probable that
one man in the government should be under such
influences than that majority oftwo hundred and
thirteen, or of any other number, should be. Such
is the fact, unquestonably in reference to the sub
ject now before us. If the influence of factions
counsels has not been felt in the rejection of the
Bank Bill we do not know how to account for II
We have the authority Of the financial Ministe,
directly in favor of the measure; and we have tbs
President rejecting it because he was not called
upon to furnish the project Of it, As to precipi
fancy, that could not be pretended in regard 10
measure which the President had at three conse
cutve sessions, earnestly invited Congress 10 ac
upon. And that impulse is certainly unfriendly I,
the puolic good which is exerted 10 derappe In,
national currency, and to put the value of ever,
description OF property into state Of fuctuatoI
and uncertainty. Such have been tho effects q
the Bank Veto in many parts Of the country , Of
iecis not felt by merchants and traders only, bu
equally and even more sensibly by the planter and
the farmer.
Inconsistency and mutablity in the laws" said
Hamilton, " form the greatest blemish in the char
acter and genius Of our government . and this
" blemsh' was to be cured by the Veto This
very evil has been introduced by the Veto The
laws have been changed by il. The national poll.
ey has become unsettled. The Inconsistency Of the