Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1832-10-05

80
and by government organized principles similar TO il
theirs BY this simple, but fortunate arrangement we
have engraed the absolute the concurring majority
thereby giving the administration OF the powers Of the
Government where they required, all the energy
and prompness belonging TO the former while have
retained in the power granting and organizing authority
(f may cSPress nysc) the principle OF the
ring majority, aud with it, that justice, moderation and
full perfect OF all the interests
community which belongs exclusively toit
Such is the soliiy aud beauty Of admirable system,
but which, IL !, perfectly obvious only be preserved
by maintaining the ascendency OF the Contribution
MAKING AUTHORITY OVER THE LAw-MAKING--rHE
coNcvRRrNG OVER THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. Nor
is il less clear this only be effected by the
of State to annul the unconstitutional OF the Co.
vcrnme la right centounded with the idea of minori
~ governing majority, but which, Gar from being the
il indispensable prevent the energetic, but
imperfect majority, which controls the OF the
Government, from usurpng the place of that per-
feet and just majority, which formed the Constitution, aud
ordained Government TO execute its powers.
Nornesd apprehcnd that this check, powerful as
il is will prove excessive. This distinction between the
Constitution aud the law-makng powers, so strongly
marked in institutions, may yet be considered
and uned experiment 1t can scarcely be said TO have
existed, at all, before our system OF Government. We
have yet much learn, to its practical operation and
among other things II do not mistake, far from
realizing the many and great difficulties OF holding the lat
ter subordinate 10 the former, and without which, ii is OBJ
vious the entire scheme OF Constitutional Government at
least sense, prove abortve. Short has been
experience OF these, of formidable char
accr have begun to disclose themselves; particularly be-
tween the Constitution and the Government the Union.
The two powers there, represent very different interests
tho one that of all the States, taken separately; and the
federated community. Each acting under the impulse
of these respective aud very different interests must
cessary strongly tend 10 come into collson and in the
conflict the advantage will be found, almost excusiy ely
on the side of the Government or law making power
few remarks will be sufficient illustrate these positions
The Constitution, while il grants powers TO the Govern
ment at the me imposes restrictions its action,
with the intention OF confirming it within limited range of
powers and Of the OF executing them. The object
of the powers is, to protect the rights and promote the in
teress of ALL and of the restrictions, the MAORI
ty, the dominant interests Of hS Government from per-
verng powers intended for the common good into the
means OF expressing the minor interests Of the community
Thus dominant interest in posse sson
of the powers Of the Government and tie minor nts
on whom they exercised, regard these restric-
lions in very different light-the latter as a protection
and the former restraint, and of course ACCOMPANIED
with all the impatient feelings with which, restrictions on
cupdiiy and ambition regarded by those unruly
passions Under their influence, the Constitution will be
viewed by the majority, the of their authority
as should be, but shaekles their power. To them
il will have value, the OF protection As
majority they require Their number and strength
and the Constitution, their protection and
course; II may speak, their instinct will be, TO weak
and destroy the restrictions, in order TO enlarge the
powers He must have a very imperfect knowledge Of
the human heart who does not in this state OF things
ncessant conflict between the Government the law
making power and the Constitution making power Nor
rs 1t less certain that in the contest the advantage will be
o exclusively with the former.
The lawmaking power is organized, and in constant
action, having the control Of the honors emolume
Of the country, and armed with power TO punish
reward; the other the contrary, unorganzed lying
dormant in the great inert OF the community, till call
ed into action on extraordinary occasions and at distant
intervals, and then, hestowing honors, exercising
patronage having neither the faculty to reward to
punish but endowed, simply with the attribute grant
= powers and ordan the authority TO execute them
The result is inevitable With strong instinct the
part OF the Government TO throw off the restrictions of
the Constitution, and TO enlarge its powers and with such
powerful faculties 10 crafty this instructive impulse
making must necessarily encroach the Constu-
making power unless restrained by the efficient
check; least strong, that for which contend
IL is worthy OF remark that all other being
equal the dmar the interests represented by the
two the powerful will he this tendency encroach
and is from this among other causes that it much
l. stronger between the Government and the Constitution
making powers of the Unon where the interests are
sae. "''''' tina" O''"ee" the two i" the
That the trainers of the Constitution were aware OF the
!. prool in the nave SsGes Tor amendments to the
have already remarked on that portion of this provi
winch with the view the
power conceded TO three fourhs Of the States right 10
amend which otherwise could only have been exercised
oy inc unanimous consent Of all. 1t is remarkable that
whe this provision thus the
as 1t regards the states, imposed impedimen on it. IA
lar as the Government concerned. The power OF
acting general rule invested in the majority, oC Con
Il grcs but instead permitting majority TO nronose
menus the provision requires for that purpose two thirds
e of both houses clearly with view ofinternoeion - ~
against this strong instructive appetite the Governne Mt
for the acquisition OF power But would have been fol-
~ in the extreme, thus carefully guard the passage to
inc drec acquisition, had the wide door of construction
been leit TO lis Indirect; hence in the same sp
rt IN which two-irds of both houses required TO
propose amendments, the Convention, that framed the
rejected 'he many propositions, which
moved IN that body, with the intention of divesfng the
S,aes VI he Tgh oil nteposng, and thereby of the only
eheca means preventing the enlargement Of the pow
ers OF The Government by construction
It's thus, that the Constitution making power has forth
eu tseH against the aw-makng; and that effectually
mat however strong the disposition capacity of the lal
Ter TO encrodcb, the of resistance on The mart o
the FORMER, Is not less powerful IT, indeed encroacb.
mems nave been made the fault i'm the system but
IN he hatenton and neglect Of those whose and
duty 1t was, to inerpose the ample means of proecton
afforded by the Constitution
10 sum up in few words in conclusion what anpears II,
me- 10 ne the entire philosophy of government i'm refer
ehce TO The subject OF this communication.
wo powers are necessary the existence and preser
'"oh vi rec states; power the part the ruled 10
prevent rulers from abusing their authority by compel
ing mem 10 be faithful TO their constituents and which
eHeced through the right of suffrage and a pow er
! 10 COMPEL THE PARTS OF SOCIETY TO DE JUST TO
oESE ANorHER BY COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT
THE INTEREST OF EACH OTHER which can only no e.
eced whatever may be the device for the burmese nv
requiring the concurring of all the great and die.
hct interests OF the community to the measures of the
government This result is the sum total of ali The con
rlVances adopted by free States preserve their bert
by preventing the conflicts between the several classes mr.
parts oil the community Both powers are ipdspensabe
ne one as much so the other. The rulers are no,
more disposed to encroach the ruled than the different
interests OF the community another nor would
hey more certainly convert their power from the lust
ana Iegilnae objects, for which Governments are instu
en INTO an instrument Of aggsndzemen al the EXPENSE
on ne ruIed unless made responsible their
an would the stronger interests theirs al the exoense
oil the weaker. unless compelled to consult them in tbe
measures oil the Government, by taking their separate and
assent The same operates in both case
Inc constitution OF our nature, which would imneI Tho
rulers 10 Cypress the ruled, unless prevented woui In III