Southern planter., 1832-11-17

saief) shau riove that we have ose,sorna y y, 's pe
.nd nope q will, on account OF our own as van
~ we in iiy and happincfs nf our own race W
Ou' is, eNpernentn gogcfuinen, sas an ,he ali e,,,
W. - = sl,uPe e'nicdency, unmodiei and extending tbc
h'lle Of me eonenrrig m.oniy alike to the Coast.
uon lthe Articles Of the Unionl and 4, ~ f,, =.
winch II constituted. n failed and The r,c.er, .,,
was reared in ifs place. combining for N. a.,
ume ~ "a confederation, the absoule with 40 rtneo,
ens, y ""a .aas ting The justice OF the with the
The new Government was reared on The io,nJ,,on ~
le oa strengthened bot not changed Il stand. on thc
same solid basis Of die cuncurring rnaioy ncrf,ei H.
he sanction Of The pcople Of the State. IA er,l i
and not indirectly, through The State Covernmcnt ss,hc
TsWesenativrs, sW as IN The old confederation With that
umeronce, lhc authcniy which made the two Constitr
ons-yhch granted their powers and ordained and oro,n
iHed their respective Governments 10 execute tcs te
same But IN passing from the Constitution 10 the Gov.
rinmrnt' The law-makng and the now,
ersl he difference htween the two becomes radical ana
essential There, In the present. the coneuffnr aoritv
cropped. and the absolute substituted In determining
then' what powers ought to he granted and how The Gov,
enment appointed or their execution ought 10 be orran
@eu uc separate and oncurng voice ~ the States was
Ie9uHoa, he union being regarded, for this purpose in
reefnre 70 s various and distinct interests, but Ia the ex
ecuon Of these powers, CeegHed only because all the
states hai common interest in their exercise the In
on no longer regarded, IN reference to is parts but
forming TO te extent Of is delegated powers one gca
community, 10 be governed by common win iut a. he
States are IN reference to their separate Interests and hy
government orgahized on principles SIMILAR 10 theirs By
uls SIMPLE but fortunate arrangement. have engrafed
tlc absolute the concuuug Majority thereby giving 10
The administration Of the powers Of the Government
where they were required al the energy and prom
belonging 70 the former while have retained Ia the
power granting and organizing authority, (f may cx.
press mysel ti' principle Of the concuuing mai niy,
and with T. that Justice moderation and full and perfect
representation Of the interests Of the nifty which
belongs exclusively 10 H.
Such y the sodiy and beauty Of our admirable syslsn
but which, u perfectly obvious only preserved by
maintaining the ascendancy Of the eonsttuton-mang
hofy over the lawmaking-hc concufrng over the ab-
solu,e majority Nor Il less clear that this only be
eheeed by the right of State to annul the unconsiu-
onal acts Of the 0ovcrnmen-a tight coniounded with
the idea oi minority governing majority, but which.
so FAR from be ng the ease is indispensable to prevent the
more energetic hut imperfect majority which controls The
movements Of the Government. from usuping the place
Of that more perfect end just majority which formed The
Constitution and ordained Government to execute H. pow
| ers
Nor need we apprehend that this check as powerful
il is, win prove excessive. The distinction between the
constitution and the making powers ngy mark
ed IN our institutions may yet be considered as a and
untied experiment II scarcely be said to have exs
ted at all before system Of government We have
much to learn, 10 is practical opeTaton and, among
other things II do not mistake, are far om realizing
the many and great difficulties Of holding the latter sub
ordinate 70 the former. and without which (tis obvio)
the entire scheme Of Constitutional Government AZ least
n our sense must prove abortve short has been
experience, some Of these Of very mdable chaactsr,
have begun to disclose themselves particularly between
the Constitution and the Government Of the Union. The
two powers there, represent very different ntcressh the
one that Of all the Staes taken separately and the other
that Of majority Of the States forming confedeatcd
community Each acting under the impulse Of these res
pectve very different interests, must necessarily strongly
tend TO come into collision; aud in the conflict tie ad-
vantage will be found almost exclusively the side Of the
G've5nment, or law-making power few remarks viii
be sufficient to Illustrate these positions.
The Constitution, while il grants power TO the Gove-
ment at the same time imposes restrictions is ac,on,
with the intention Il eonhning within limited range
OF powers and Of the means Of executing them The oh.
icct Of the power h protect the rights. and promote
the interests Of ALL and Of the restrictions prevent the
majority, The dominant interests OF the Government
lfrOm ucrNertInH intended for the good
into the means Of expressing the minor interests Of tho
community Thus eiTcumstanced the dominant interest
in possession Of the powers OF the Government, and IN,
minor interest whom they exercised must regard
these restrictions In very different lght-the latter as
protection, and the former restraint, and, Of course
= accompanied with al the impatient feelings with which
restrictions cupidty and ambition ever regarded b,
those unruly passions. Under their influence the Con
sttution will be viewed by the majority not the
Of their authority Il should be, but as shaekes on thei
: power To them Il will have value, as the means o
. protection As a majority, they require none. ihei
number and Strength, ana not 1he Nonsu'uoh' @o Wy, m
protection; and. Of course, may so speak Their IN
snc III be, 10 weaken aud destroy the restrictions u
order 10 enlarge the power lie must have very mpet
feet knowledge of the human heart who does not see, u
this state Of hngs an ncessant conflict between the Go
vernnent the aw-makng power, and the Constitution
making power Nor is less certain that. IN the contest
p the advantage will be exclusively with the iorner
The aw-makng power organized and IN constant ae
u ton having the control Of th honors and emoluments
g the country and armed with the power 10 punish and re
q ward the othe the contrary, Is unorganzed, yin
dormant in the great inert oi the community, ul ch
ed into action extraordinary occasions and az distan
v intervals, and then besowng honos, eNefcsng u
patronage having neither the faculty TO reward nor
lr punish. endowed simpy with the attribute TO graz
p1,gers aud orain the authority execute them. Tie
" suit is ineva e With strong instinct the pa
~ Of the Government. TO throw cH the restrictions Of III
n Constitution and enlarge Us powers, and with sue
= powerful faculties gratiy this instructive impulse. h
law-makng necessarily eneroach the Constitution
VI making power unless restrained by the most cicieI
Y, check at least strong that for which contend
vi IS worthy Of remark that, al other circumstance beiI
~ edua the dssnilar the interests represented by
L two the more powerful will be this tendency TO enefoac
pnd il is from this, among Other causes thatt Is 20 m
~ stronger between the Government and the Constitution
making powers Of the Union, where the interests arc
very dissimar than between the two IN the several stat,
x That the trainers Of the Constitution aware OF
~ danger which have described have conclusive pro
in the provisions which have frequently alluded
M is mean that which provides for amendments to he Co
~ sttution.
~ have already remarked on that portion OF this prov
~ ion which, with the view Of strengthening the ooned
ated power conceded to three0uths OF the states rg
10 amend which otherwise could only have been exefcls
reg Nv the unanimous consent Of ALL II is remarkable,
while this provision thus strengthened the amending po
@ er as il regards the States itimposed impedmens on
re- so ar as the Government Is concerned The power OF
GU ting as general rile is invested In the majority o &c
u', grtss but instead OF permitting majority TO propose
nu mendments the provision requires, for that purpose, w
is thirds Of both Houses clearly with view OF merposl
"a b,rrief auanst this strong instructive appeutc OF