Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1831-08-16

life has passed in the service Of the Union, and
whatever public reputation have acquired, is in
identified with it. TO be too national
has, indeed, been considered by many, even OF
my friends, to be my greatest political fault
With these strong feelings Of attachment, have
examined with the utmost care, the bearing OF
the doctrine in question; and SO far from anar'
chicai, or revolutionary, soiemn!y believe 1t to
be, the ouy solid foundation OF our system, and
of the Union itself, and that the opposite doc
trine. which denies to the States the right Of pro.
:ecting their reserved powers, and which would
vest in the General Government, ut matters not
through what Department the right of determln.
ing exclusively and finally the powers delegated
to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty OF the
States, and Of the Constitution itself; considered
as the basis of Federal Union. As strong as
this language is il is not stronger, than that used
by the iTustrious Jefferson, who said, to give the
General Government the final and exclusive right
to Judge of its powers, is to make I" its discretion
and not the Constitution the measure Of its poU-
ers;" and that " in all cases of compact bsitceen
parties having no common Judge, each party has
an equal right to judge for itself, as weN Of the
operation, as Of the mode and measure Of redress"
Language cannot be more explicit; nor can high
er authority be adduced.
That different opinions are entertained on this
subject, consider, but as an additional evidence
of the great diversity of the human intellect
Had not able, experienced and patriotic individu-
ais, {, r whom have the highest respect, taken
different views. would have thought the right
too clear to admit of doubt; but am taught by
this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat
with Difference opinions differing from my own
The error may possibly be with me; but, II SO, |
can only say, that after the most mature and con-
scientious examination, have not been able to
detect it. But with all proper Difference, must
think, that theirs is the error, who deny, what
seems to be an essential attribute to the General
Governments right utterly incompatiblew with what
all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted
character; an error originating principally, as |
must think, in not duly rejecting on the nature
of our institutions, and on what constitutes the on
ly rational object of all political Constitutions.
1t has been well said by one of the most saga
cnus men of antiquity, that the object OF Con
stitution Is to restrain the Government, as thu NJ
la,os is to restrain individuals. The remark IS
correct, nor is it less true, where the Government
is vested in majority, than where 1t Is IN SIN
gle or few individuals; in republic. than mo-
narchy or aristocracy. No one can have higher
respect for maxim, that majority ought to go
vern, than have, taken in its proper sense, sub
tuition, and confined to subjects in which every
portion of the community have similar interests;
but it is great error to suppose as many do, that
the right OF majority to govern is natural ard
not a conventional right; and, Therefore absolute
and unlimited. by nature every individual has
the right to govern himself; and Governments,
whether founded on majorities or minorities, must
derive their right from the assent, expressed or
implied, Of the governed, and be subject to such
limitations, as they may impose. Where the in
terests are the same, that is where the laws that
may benefit one. will benefit all, or the reverse,
it is jnst and proper to place them under the con-
troll Of the majority; but where they are dissimi-
lar so that the law. that may benefit one portion
may be ruinous to another. it would be on the con-
trary unjust and absurd to subject them to its
will; and such, conceive to be the theory on
which our Constitution rests.
That such dissimilarity Of interests may exist,
it is impossible to doubt. They are to be found
in every community, in greater. or less degree.
however small, or homogeneous; and they consti.
tute, every where, the great difficulty OF forming,
and preserving free institutions. Toguard against
the unequal action Of the laws, when applied
to dissimlar aud opposing interests. is, in fact,
what mainly renders constitution indispensable;
to overlook which, in reasoning on our Constitu.
ton, would be to omit the principal element, by
which to determine its character. Were there no
contrariety of interests. nothing would be more
simple and easv than to form and preserve free
institutions. The right Of suffrage alone would
be sufficient guaranty. 1t is the conflict of OPP
posing interests which renders it the most diff
cult work of man.
Where the diversity Of interests exists in sep
arate and distinct classes Of the community, as is
the case in England, and was formerly the case
in Sparta, Rome, and most Of the free States Of
antiquity, the rational constitutional provision u.s.
that each should be represented in the government,
as separate estate, with distinct voice, and a
negative on the acts of its co-estates in order to
check their Entertainments. In England, the
constitution has assumed expressly this form;
while in the governments Of Sparta and Rome the
same thing was effected under different but not
much less eficacious forms. The perfection Of
their organization, in this particular, was that
which gave to the Constitution Of these renowned
States all of their celebrity, which secured their
liberties for SO many centuries and raised them to
so great height of power and prosperity. In.
deed constitutional provision giving To the oreat