The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1831-1858, 1831-10-19
NO. 3O55.

toh, nave not been able to detect it. But with
-. P'Pet oeietence, must think that theirs is the
"no uehy, what seems to be essential at
tribute OF the conceded sovereignty of the States
and who attribute to the general coxernman.
e right utterly incompatible with what all acknowl
edge TO be its limited and restricted character an
error originating principally, as must think ;n'rot
duly rejecting on the nature of our institutions.
and on what constitutes the only rational oh;sct ~
all political constitutions. .aE
Il 1t mas been well said by one of the most sara
cious men OF antiquity, that the object of n consti
tuition is to restrain Government as that of la,, i
to restrain Individuals The remark is correct nor
is it less true where the Government is vested in
majority, than where it is in a single few ndivd-
uals; in republic, than monarchy or aristocra-
/ cy. No one can have a higher respect for the
maxim, that the minority ought to govern, than
have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the
strIctlons imposed by the constitution and confined
to subjects, in which every portion OF the community
have similar interest; but it is great 10 sup
| pose, as many do, that the right of majority 10
govern is a natural and not conventional right;
and, therefore, absolute and unlimited BY nature
every individual has a right to govern HIMSELF and
governments, whether founded on maiorities or
mnorities, must derive their right from the ascent
expressed or implied, of the governed and be sub
Iect to such limitations, they may impose
Where the interests the same, that is where
the laws that may benefit one, will benefit all or
the reverse, it is just and proper to place them
under the control of the majority; bat where they
are dssimilar, that the law that may benefit one
POItioh may De rulnOuS TO another, IL would be
the contrary unjust and absurd to subject them to
ITS will; and such conceive to be the theory on
which our constitution rests.
That such dssimilarity of interests may exist, it
is impossible to doubt. They are to be found in
every community in greater or less degree how
ever small or homogeneous but they constitute eve
ry where the great difficulty of forming and pre-
serving free institutions. To guard against the un
equal action OF the laws, when applied to dissmi-
lar and opposing interests, is, in fact what mainly
renders constitution indispensable to overlook
which, IN reasoning our constitution. would be
TO omit the principal element, by which to deter
mine its character Were there no contrariety of
interests, nothing would be mere simple and easy,
than to form and preserve free institutions. The
right OF suffrage alone would be 4 sufficient guaran-
y 1t the conflict of opposing interests which
renders it the most difficult work ofman
Where the diversity of interests exist in separate
and distinct classes of the community as is the
case IN England, and was formerly the ease in
Sparta Rome, and most of the free states of anti
quity the rational constitutional provision is that
each should be represented in the government, as
separate estate, with a distinct voice and mega
tive on the acts Of its co-estates in order to check
their encroachments. In England the constitution
has assumed expressly this FORM while in the
government of Sparta and Rome the same thing was
erected under different but not much less efica-
cous forms. The perfection of their organization,
IN this particular, that which gave to the con-
stltution of these renowned States all of their &C.
leorlty, which secured their liberties for so many
centuries and raised to great height of power
ana prosperity. Indeed constitutional provision
given to the great and separate interests of the
community the right offs lf-protection, must appear
10 tnose who Will duly reflect the subject, not
less essential to the preservation of liberty, than
the right of suffrage itself-they, in fact, have
common object, to effect which the one is as ne
cessary as the other; to secure that is that those
'rho make and execute the ld,cs shonld be
tdoLe 10 those on 1chon the dcs in reality operate
the only solid and durable foundation Of liberty.
II without the right of suffrage our rulers would
Cypress us So without the right of elf-protecton,
the major would equally Cypress the minor inter-
ests OF the community. The absence of the for
| mer would make the governed the slaves of the
rulers and of the latter the feeble interests the
victim oil the stronger.
Happily for us, we have no artificial and sepa-
rate classes of society. We have wisely exploded
all such distinctions; but we are not on that ac-
count, exempt from all contrarety of interests as
the present distracted and dangerous condition of
our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves
| with US they are almost exclusively geographical
resulting mainly from difference of climate soil sit
uatlon Industry and productions but are not there
fore less necessary to be protected by any ade-
quate constitutional provision than where the dis
tlnct interests exist In separate classes. The me-
cessty is in truth, greater, as such separate and
dssImlar geographical interests, more liable to
come into conflict, and more dangerous when in
that state than those of any other descriptions so
much so, that ours is The first instance on record
,chere they haze not formed an extensive terrific
! ry separate end independent communities, or sub
/ JeIteu
not be our unhappy fate also must be the sincere
| prayer OF every lover of his country.
So numerous and diversified are the interests of
our country, that they could not be fairly repre-
scented IN single government, organized so as to
give to each great leading interest separate and
| distinct voice, as in the governments to which
have referred plan then adopted better
suited to onr situation, but perfectly novel in its
character. The powers of the government were
divided. not as heretofore, in refer to classes
! put geographically. One general government was
| formed for the whole, to which was delegated all
the powers supposed to be necessary regulate the
interests common to all of the States leaving 9TH
ers subject to the separate control of the States,
being, from their local and peculiar character such.
that they could not be subject to the will of the
whole Union, without the certain hazard of inlus-
tice and oppression 1t thus that the interests
of the whole were subjected, as they ought to be-
tothe will OF the whole, while the peculiar and 10,
1 cal interests were left under the control of the
States separately, to whose custody only, they
could be safely confded. This distribution of pow
er, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact,
to which all the States parties constitutes tha
peculiar character and excellence of our political
system. 1t is truly and emphatically American,
trltiout example or parallel.
To realize its perfection, we must view the gen.
era government and the States as a whole each
IN Its proper sphere, sovereign and independent,
: each perfectly adapted to their respective objects
the State acting separately, representing and pro-
/ tectlng the local and peculiar interests, acting
l. Jointly through one general government with the
weight respectively assigned TO each by tine consti-
tuition, representing and protecting the interests of
IF the whole; and thus perfectng by an admirable,
but simple arrangement, the great principle OF re-
d presentation and responsibility, without which no
r government can be free just 10 preserve this
sacred distribution as originally settled, by coerc
d ing each to move in lis prescribed oro, is the
n great and difficult problem, on the solution of
!, which, the duration of our constitution, of Union
d and, in all probability, liberty depends How
i is this to be eifected2
The question is now, when applied to our pecu-
liar political organization, where the separate and
conflicting interests of society represented BY
-. distinct, but connected governments; but it is in
reality old question under u new FORM not since
f perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimi-
lar interests have been separately represented in
, any government; whenever the sovereign power
has been divided in its exercise the experience and
wisdom of ages have devised but one mode. by
which such political organization can be preserved
the mode adopted in England, and by all govern.
ments ancient and modern, blessed with consttu
tions deserving to be called free; to give to each
coestate the right to judge of its power; with
negative or veto on the acts of Others in order to
protect against entertainments the interest il mar
ticularly represents; principle which all of our
constitutions recognize in the distribution of power
among their respective departments as essential
M NHartA