Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1831-04-07

fnrcseen. that the states mi hit inavertantiy pass
laws inconsistent with the Constitution OF Tue
limited States. or with acts of Congress: least
laws mirht BE- passed, which would DE C'aiseo
with such inconsistency. How snou'u u,ee.
questions be disposed Of? Where shall the power
Of Judging, in cases of alleged interierenee' NC
loigeds One suggestion, in the coh'eh,lon' va. .
to make it an executive power, anu 10 ~ tne
hands of the President, by reqniringal STATE Jaws
to he submitted to him, that he might negative
such as he thought appeared rcpushant 10 u'e
general constitution. lhis 'dea' perhaps may
have neen borrowed from che power exercised by
the crown. over the laws of the colonies. 1t would
evidently have been not only all announcement ana
troublesome proceeding, but dangerous, a!so' 10
tLe mowers of the States. 1t was not pressed
II was thought wiser and safer. on the whole, 10
require state legislatures and state judges to take
an oath to support the constitution OF the United
States and then leave the States at liberty TO pass
whatever laws they pleased, and 1t interference
in points of fact should arise, to refer the ques-
tion TO iadjcial decision. To this end, the judi.
cial power. under the Constitution oil the United
States. was made co.extensive with the legis!a-
five mower. 1t was extended to all cases arising
under the Constitution and the laws of Congress.
The Judiciary became thus possessed OF the ai-
thorty of deciding in the last resort, in all cases
of alledped interference, between State Laws and
the Constitution, and Laws OF Congress:
GeutIemen-ihis is the actual Constitution
This is the law of the land. There may he those,
who think 1t unnecessary, or who would prefer
di lferent mode Of deciding such questions. But
this is the established mode. and till 1t be alter
ed. the Courts can no more decline their duty,
on these occasions. But, Gentlemen, can any
reasonable man doubt the expediencyo this pro-
vision. or suggest Setter? Is 1t not ABSOLUTELY
ssential to the peace OF the country, that this
power should exist somewhere: Where can II
exist, better than where it now does exist: The
National Judiciary is the common tribunal of the
whole country. 1t is organized, by the common
authority, and its places filled by The common
agent. This is plain and practical provision:
1t was framed by no bungers, nor by any wild
theorists. And who can say, that it has failed.
Who car find substantial fault, with its operations
or its results? The great question is, whether,
we shall. provide for the peaceable decision OF
cases of collision. Shall they be decided by law,
or by force? Shall the decisions be decisions OF
peace, or decisions of war?
On the occasion referred to, the proposition con-
tended for, was, that every state, under certain
supposed exigencies, and in certain supposed cas-
es, might decide for ITSELF and oppose its own
force to the execution Of the laws. BY what ar
gument, do you imagine, gentlemen, it was, that
such proposition was maintained! should call
it metaphysical, and subtle; but these terms
would imply at least ingenuity, and some degree
of plausibility; whereas the argument appears to
me plain assumption, mere assumption, mere per-
verse construction Of plain language, in the body
of the Constitution itself. As | understand 1t,
when nut forth in it's revised and most authentic
shape, it is this: that the Constitution provides
that. any amendments may be made to 1t, which
shall he agreed to by three fourths OF the States;
there is. therefore nothing in the Constitution to
which three -ourths of the States have not agreed.
All this is true, but then comes this Inference,
viz: that when one State denies the constitution
atty of any law of Congress. she may Arrest ITS
execution as to herself aud keep 1t arrested, till
the States can all be consulted, by their cOnven-
tons, and three fourths Of them shall have de-
cided that the Law is Constitutional. Indeed
the inference is still stranger than this; for
State Conventions have no authority to construe
the Constitution, though they have authority to
amend it; therefore the argument must prove, lift
prove any thing, that when any one State denies
that any particular power is included in the Con-
stitution it is to be considered as not included,
cannot be found therel threefourths of the states
agree to insert it. In short, the result oil the whole
is, that though it requires 5-4ths hot the States
to insert any thing into the Constitution yet any
one State can strike any thing out of it. For
he power to strike out and the power of deciding,
without appeal, upon the construction of what is
already in. are substantially the same.
And. Gentlemen what a spectacle should we
have exhibited. under the actual operation
of notions like these: At the very moment when
our government was quoted, praised and com.
mended all over the world; when the friends OF
Republican Liberty. every where, were gazing
at it with delight, aud were in perfect admiration
at the harmony of its movements, one State steps
forth. and by the power of notification, breaks
up the whole system, and scatiers the bright
chain of the Union, into as many sundered links
as there are separate states.
Seeing the true grounds of the Constitution
thus attacked, | raised my voice in its favor,
must confess, with no preparation, OF previous in
tcntion. can hardly say that embarked in the
contest from sense Of duty. twas an instan-
tancous impulse of inclination, not acting against
duty, trust, but hardly waiting for its sugges
tons felt it to be contest for the integrity OF
the Constitution, and was ready to enter INTO
1t, no, thinking or caring, personally, how
,,rht ont