Alabama state intelligencer., 1831-08-20

it does seem to me that the fear wlich would strip the States of their sovereignty and degrade them, in fact to dependent corporations lest they should abuse right indispensable 10 the reaceable protec- ton of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar guardianship, when they created the General Government, is unnatural and unIeason- able. If those who voluntarily treated the system, cannet be trusted to preserve ii, what power canf
 So far from extreme danger, hold, that there ne- was free state, in which this great conserva- tive principle, so indispensable in a was ever so safe ly lodged. In others, when the co-estates, repre- senting the dissimar aad connecting interests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was compromise, submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government, and State, come into conflict, we have higher remedy; the power which called the General Go, ernment into existence which gave it all of its authority, and can enlarge, contract abolish its powers us it pleasure, may be invoked The States themselves may be appealed to, three fourhs of which, in fact, foim a power, whose decrees inc Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence all discomfort. The utmost extent tben ofiLe power is, that State act ing in its sovereign capacity, of tbe parties to the Constitutional compact, may compelihe Goyeln- ment created by that compact, 10 subn,lt question touching its niraction, 10 tEe parties wlO created H. to avoid the supposed oangers of which, it is pro- posed to resort 10 tie novel, the hazaidous, and must add, fatal project of giving 10 the Genernl Co., velnment the sole and final right of interpreting the
 
 making that insrt nent the creature of ifs will, in stead of rule of aciion impressed on it at iis ton, and annihilapg in fact te autl oriy which im- posed it, and fem which tLe Goyel ntnt itself de- rives its existence.
 That such would be tte result wiele ire right in question vested in tle Legislative or Executive branch ofthe Government, IS toItettd l J all. No has been EaIdy as 10 asteit tLat Congress or the President out It 10 lave tie Ish, or 10 deny, that if vested finally and exclusively in eiher the consequences, which have stated would rot neces- sanly follow lu ifs advocates Lave hecn IecCnciled to he dochine, on he suIposon. Il att ele is tne Department of tEe General Goyerrment, which, from its peculiar organization, affords Tn in6eEen- dent tribunal through which the Government may exercise the high aulEoiity, which is inc subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all.
 1 yield trust to few in my attachment 10 the Judiciary Department l am fully sensible of its inn potance, and would maintain il to the fullest extent in its constitutional powels and independence; but it is impossible for 10 believe, flat it ever was in- tended by the Constitution that it should exerclse the power in question: or that it is competent 10 do so, and if were that it woudL Le safe depository of the power.
 Its powers are judicial and not Tocal, and are expressly confined by ihe Constitution 'to all fGses in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and the treaties made, der its authority; and which have high authority in asserting, excludes political questions, and oCmpre- hends those only, where these are parties amenable to the process of the Court" Nor is its lncompeten cy less clear than its want of Constitutional aufor y. There may be many and the most dangerous niractons on ihe part of Congress, of which it is conceded by all, the Court, Judicial tribunal, cannot fIom its nature take cognizaLoe. The Ta- riff itself is strong in point; ardthe reason ap- plies equally 10 al ohtrs uhere Congress perrers porcr from an object inttnded, 10 enc not nhndd, he most insidiouS and dangercus of all he inta0diCn; i; and uhich mag te eatended to aHcf its r6uers more especially to he aaing and dppropriating But, sup posing competent to take cognizance of all infrac tions of every description, the inseParabe objection still remains, that it would not be safe tribunal 10 exercise tfe power in question.
 It is an universal and fundamental political prin- cpe, that the power to protect can safely be confd- ed only to those interested in protecting, or their re- spopsble agents, a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The danger in our system is, that the General Goyerun ent, winch represents the
 interests of tEe whole, may eEcTOach on the States, which represent the peculiar and local interests, or ttat the latter may encioach on the former In ex- amIning this point, onght rot to forget that the Government through all its Departments, Judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and responsible agents: and that he rCwcr ukich rtaty controls mimdteiy 0H inc mCrtmtnts IS not in he C. gents tut those uho elect appoint htm. To under stand then its real character, and what would be ihe action ofihe system in any surposable case we must raise our view from tEe mere agents, to this high controlling power which frally mrels every move ment of the machine. By doing so, we shall find all under the control ofthe will oft majority, compound ed of inc will of majority of tie States, taken q. corporate bodies, and ihe majority of the people Of the States estimated in federal numbers. These unit ed constitute ihe real and final power, which impes and directs the movements of the General Govern ment. The majority of the States elect he majorl- ty ofthe Senate; of Ee people of ihe States that of the House of Representatives; the two united the D.a. .l. IL fGf fIa Senate appoint the Judges; majority ofwbcm, and
 majority oI tEe Senate and iLe House with he Pre- sident, really exercise all of epowersothe Govern ment. with the exception of the cases where the Constitution requires greater number than malo- rty. The Judges are, in fact as truly iEe Judicial Representatives of this united majority, as the majo- ry of Congress self the President, is its legs- lative executive representative and to confde the power 10 the Judiciary 10 determine finally and conclusvely, what powers are delegated, and what reserved, would be in leaty to confde il 10 te na- jorty, whose agents they ae and by whom they can be controlled i'll various ways and, of course 10 sub ect (aganst the fundamental principle of cur sys-
 tenn, and all sound Tolnica rcasoning,) ire reserved powers ofthe States, with all of the local and pecu-
 liar interests, they intended to protect, 10 the will Of the very majority, against which the proec- ton intended. Nor will tEe tenure by which the Judges hold their office, however valuable the provision in many otEer respects, materially vary ihe Its highest possible effect would be to re- fard and not finally 10 aesist the will of dominant majority.
 But it is useless to multiply arguments Were it possible, that reason could settle question where
 the passions and interests of men concerned this point would have been long since settled forever, by inc State of Virginia. The report of her Legisla-
 ure 10 which have already referred, has really in my opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speak
 ing in reference to this subject it says, 'it has been objected" to the right of State to nterpose for the protection of her reserved nghts) "that tie Judicial authority is 10 be regarded the sole expositor of inc Constitution m fhis ohiecfion if ,night ba ob