The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1831-1858, 1831-10-19

the other departing nts but that the judicial depart
ment may also exercise, or sanction fangerous
powers beyond the grant Of the constitution, and
consequently that the ultimate right Of the parties
TO the constitution to Judge whether the compact
has been dangerously violated must extend TO vio-
latons BY one delegated authority, as well as by |
auother-by the judiciary, as well as by the execu-
tive or legislative"
Against these conclusive arguments rs they seem |
to me- il is objected, that if party has the right
to Judge of infractions of the constitution so has
the other and that conseque ntly in cases of con-
tested power between State and the general gov
eminent each would have right to maintain its
opinion, as in The case when sovereign powers diff
fer in the construction of tire zties or compacts and
that Of course it would come to be mere question
ofiorce. The error is in the assumption, that the
general government is part of the constitutional
compact The States, as has been shown formed
the compact, acting as sovereign and independent
communities. The general government is its cre-
ature and though in reality govcrnme Mt with all
the rights and authority which belong TO any other
government, with the orb Of its power it is, never
theless, government emanating from a compact
between sovcregns, and par aking in its nature and
object, OF the character of joint commission, APP
pointed to superinteBd and adminstrate the inter.
ests in which all Jointly concerned. but having,
beyond its proper sphere, more power than if it
did not exist To deny this would be to deny the
most incontestibe facts, and the clearest cnnclus
ions while to acknowledge its truth is To destroy
utterly the objection that the appeal would be to
force, in the case supposed For if each party has
a. right to Judge, then upon our system of govern
ment the final cognizauce of question OF contest
| ed power would be in the States, and not In the
| general government. II would be the duty ofthe
latter, as in all similar of a contest between
one or more Of the principals and joint commits
sion or agency, to refer the contests TO the primer
pals themselves. Such are the plain dictates OF
reason and analogy both. On no sound principle
can the agents have a right to find cognizance,
as against the principals much less to use force
against them, to maintain their construction OF
} their powers. Such right would be monstrous
and has never, heretofore, been claimed in similar
cases.
That the doctrine is applicable in the case ot a
contested power between the States and general
government. we have the authority not only oil rea'
son and analogy but Of the distinguished statesman
already refeared to. Mr.. Jefferson, at late period
Of his life, after long experience and mature re-
Election. says, with respect to our State and fed
eral governments do not think their relations are
correctly understood BY foreigners. They suppose
the former subordinate to the latter. This Is mol
the case. They are Coordinate departments of one
@ single and ntregal whole. But you may ask II the
: two departments should claim each the same sub
il Ject of power, where is the umpire to decide De-
tween them. In case of little urgency or impor'
tance the prudence Of both parties will keep them
e aloof from the questionable ground; but if 1t can
# neither be avoided compromised, convention
Il of the States must be called, to ascribe the doubt
full power that departmen which they may think
l, OeSI IL is tnuS tndL our oy
1t ing amendments, and by prescribing the authority
e and mode of making them, has by simple contrl'
i vance, with a characteristic wisdom, provided
t. power which, in the last resort, supersedes eitec
tually the necessity and even the pretextfo force
| 4 power to which none can fairly object; will
which the interests OF all safe; which can de
intely close all controversies in the only etectua
% mode, on freeing the compact Of every detect ana
" uncertainty, by an amendment the instrument it
=, self. 1t is impossible for human wisdom, in sys
tom Ito ot,Pc 70 dav :co m
be safe and eiiectua and at the same time consist
l. ent with what the relations and acknowledged
powers Of the two great departments ofou govern
I, ment. 1t gives beauty and security peculiar tc
system, which if duly appreciated, will trans
1t init its blessing to the remees generations but i
e not, our splendid anticipation Of the future will
prove but empty dream. Stripped of all its Gov
ering and the naked question is constitutional or
+ absolute one; government resting ultimately on
the solid basis Of the sovereignty of the States, or
;, the unrestrained will of majority; form oil
government in all other unlimited ones, in which
injustice and violence and force must finally prevail
Let it never be forgotten that where the majority
rules the minority is the subject: and if we should
absurdy attribute to the former the exclusive gf
, of constituting the constitution, there would be in
fact between the sovereign and subject under such
agovernment, no constitution, at least nothing
deserving the name, serving the legitimate OBJ
Ject oil so sacred an instrument.
How the States to exercise this high power
of interpositon which constitutes essential a
portion of their reserved rights that it cannot be DEL
egated without entire surrender the sovereign
ty, and converting system from federal into a
consolidated government, is question, that the
| States only are competent to determine. The ar
guments which prove that they possess the power.
| equally prove, that they in the language of
Jefferson, the rghtful judges Of the mode and
measure of redress" The spirit of forbearance,
we'll the nature of the right itself, forbids
course to it, except in of dangerous infrac-
tons of the constitution; and then only in the last
resort when all reasonable hope of relief, from the
ordinary action of government has failed; when if
the right to nterposc did exist, the alternative
would be submission and oppression side,
or resistance by force the other. That our sys-
TEN should afford, in such extreme cases, inter-
mediate point between these dire alternatives by
which the government may be brought to pause,
and thereby interval obtained to compromise
differences or if practicable, be compelled to sub
NIT the question to a constitutional adjustment
through an appeal 10 the States themselves, is
evidence of its high wisdom; an element not, as is
supposed by some of weakness, but of strength not
OF anarchy or revolution, but Of peace and safety
Its general recognition would of itself in great
measure, if not altogether supercede the necessity
of its exercise, by impressing the movements of
the government, that moderation and Justice SO es-
scntia to harmony and peace. in a country cf such
vast extent and diversity of interests ours; and
would if controversy should come turn the resent
ment of the aggreved from the system Of those who
had abused its powers, Ia point importantly and
them to seek redress, not in revolution or over
throw but in reformation. 1t is in fact, probably
understood, 4 substitute where the alternative
would be force, tending to prevent and that fails
! to correct peaceaby, the alterations to which all
! political systems are liable, and which, if permit
ted to accumulate, without correction, must finally
| end in general catastrophe.
! Concluded in our nert.)
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