Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1831-07-18
From the q. S. Gazette,
Letter Of Mr., Madison to c. j. IngeysoH of PHI
GdeLDhia


MONTPELIER, June %, 1881
Dear Sir: have received your friendly letter
of the 18th inst. The few lines which answered
your former one of the 2lst of Jan last were written
IN haste and III bad health but they expressed tho
without the attention i'll some respects due to the
occasion, dissent from the views of the President
as to Bank OF the United States and a substitute
tor 1t, to whioA cannot but adhere. The obiec
lions to the latter have appeared to me to prenon
derate greatly over the advantages expected from
1t, and the constitutionaty of the former I still
regard as sustained by the considerations to which
yielded In giving my assent to Che existing Bank
The charge Of inconsistency between nv .ohiec
ton to the constitutionaiiy ofsuch bank in i9l
and my assent in 1877 turns on the question how
ar Legislative precedents, expounding tho cons f1u
t1on' ought to guide succeeding legislatures, and
to override individual opinions.
Some obscurity has been thrown over the ouas
tlon, by contounding it with the respect due from
one Legislature to laws passed by preceding lceisla
lures. But the two cases are essentially different
"A constitution being derived from n superior au-
thorlty, is to be expounded and obeyed, not con-
trolled or varied by the subordinate authority of
legislature. law, on the other hand, resting on
no higher authority than that possessed by every
successive Legislature, its expcdency, well it's
meaning, is within the scope of the latter.
The case Ill question has lis true analogy in the
obligation arising from judicial expositons of the
law on succeeding Judges; the Constitution being
a law to the legislator as the law is n ruIe or doc
sion to the Judge,
And why are judicial preccdents, when formed
on due discussion and consideration, and deliberate
ly sanctioned by reviews and repctitions, regarded
as OF binding influence or rather Of authoritative
force, IN settling the meaning Of a law 1t must
he answered, LIST, because it is a reasonable and es-
tabished, axiom, that the good of society requires
that the rules of conduct Of its members should be
certain and known, which would not be- the case If
any Judge, disregarding the decisions of his prcdc
cessors, should vary the rule of law according to hi,
individual Interpretation of it. Msera est scrvitu,
u6i JUS est aut vagum aut incognitum. ID bccaus,
an exposition of the law publicly made and repcat
edly con flrmed by the constituted authority car
ries with itby fair inference the sanction Of those
who, having made the law through their Legislative
| organ, appear under such circumstances 10 have
determined its meaning through their judiciary or
1 gan.
| Can it be of less consequence that the mcani,-t
| Of a constitution should be fixed and known tbaI
that the meaning Of law should be so7 Can in
decd a law be fixed in its meaning and operation
unless the constitution be sol On the contrary i
particular legislature, differing in the construc
ton OF the constitution, from series Of precedin,
| constructions, proceed to act on that difference
they not only introduce uncertainty and instabilit,
IN the constitution, but in the laws themselves: in
| asmuch as all laws preceding the new coustruc
ton and inconsistent with it, are not only annulle
for the future, but virtually pronounced nullitie
from the beginning.
But it is said that the legislator having sworn Il
| support the Constitution, must support il in hi
own construction of it. however different fror
that put by his predecessors, or whatever be tn
consequences of the construction. And is not IN
Judge under the same oath TO support the law vr
has it ever been supposed that he was required q
at liberty TO disregard all precedents however G,
lennly repeated and regularly observed; and bv q
wing effect TO his abstract and individual opj,
ions, TO disturb the established course Of practlc