Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1831-08-16

,ever WINS free State, in which this great con-
servative principle indispensable to ALL was ever
20 safely lodeed In others, when the coestates'
renresentins the dissimilar and connecting inter-
eats Of the community, came into contact, Tue
only alternative was compromise, su0miss!on' U,
fnrcs. Not so in ours. Should the Generai
Government and State come into conflict we
have higher remedy: the power which caiieo
the General Government into existence, wh'ch
pave II all of its authority, and can enlarge, con-
tract. or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may
he invoked. The States themselves may be ap-
nealed to, three-fourths OF which, IN tact, form
mower. whose DEGREES are the Constitution itself,
and whose votes would silence all dIscontent.-
The utmost extent, then, Of the power IS, that
State. acting in its sovereign capacity, as one oil
parties to the constitutional compact, may COM
mel the Government, created by that compact, to
submit question touching its infracton to the
parties who created it; to avoid the supposed
dangers of which, it Is proposed to resort to the
novel. the hazardous, and, | must add, fatal pro.
iect Of givingto the General Government the so'e
and final right of interpreting the Constitution.
thereby reversing the whole system, making that
instrument the creature Of IFS will, instead OF
rule Of action impressed on it its creation, and
annhiating, in fact, the authority which impos-
ed it, and from which the Government Itself de-
rives its existence.
That such would be the result. were the right
in question vested in the Legislative or Execu-
live branch Of tie Government, Is conceded by
all. No one has been so hardy as to assert, that
Congress or the President ought to have the right,
or to deny, that, ifvested finally and exclusively
in either, the consequences which have stated
would not necessarily follow; but its advocates
have been reconciied to the doctrine on the sup
position, that there is one department Of the Ge-
neral Government which, from IT'S peculiar organ.
ization. affords an independent tribunal through
which the Government may exercise the high au-
thority, which is the subject of consideration,
with perfect safety to all
yield, trust, to few, IN my attachment to
the Judiciary Department. | am fully sensible
Of its importance, and would maintain it to the
fullest extent in its constitutional powers and in
dependence: but it is impossible tor me to be-
leve, that it ever was intended by the COnstitu-
ton, that it should exercise the power in ques-
ton, or that it is competent to do so, and il it
were, that it would be safe depository Of the
power.
lis powers are Judicial aud not political, and
are expressly confined by the Constitution " to
all cases in law and equity arising under this Con.
stitution the laws Of the United States, and the
treaties made under its authorty;'' and which,
have high authority in asserting, excludes politi
cal questions, and comprehends those only where
these are parties amenable to the process of the
Court Nor is its incompetency less clear than
its want OF constitutional authority. There may
be many and the most dangerous infractions on
the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by
all, the Court, as a judicial tribunal, cannot,
from its nature, take cOngnizance. The Tariff
itself ir strong case in point; and the reason
applies equally 10 all Others, schere Congress per.
uerts a po,oer from an object intended TO one not
infended-the most iasidious and dangerous of
all the attractions; and vhich may be extended
to all fits po@ers, more especially to the taring
and approprsatmg But, surprising 1t competent
to take cosnizance of all infractons of every de-
scription. the inseparable objection still remains.
that it would not be a safe tribunal TO exercise
the power in question.
1t is an universal and Fundamental political
principle, that the power to protect, can safely
beconfded only to those interested in protecting,
or their responsible agents, a maxim not less
true in private than in public affairs. The danger
in our system. is, that the General Government,
which represents the interests Of the whole, may
encroach on the States, which represent the
peculiar and local interests, or that the latter may
ShSioaSh ou lux bVt"Ct' ~ SAdulliuS uto pOut3
we ought not to forget, that the government
through all its Departments. Judicial, as we'll as
others, is administered by delegated and respon-
sible agents; and that The poicer chich really
controls ultimately all the movements is mol in
the agents, but those Vho elect or appoint them.
To understand then its real character, and what
would be the action of the system in any suppos-
able case, we must raise our view from the mere
agents, to this high controlling power which f.
nally imrels every movement of the machine. BY
doing so, we shall find all under the control of
the will Of a majority, compounded of the will
of majority of the people ofthe states estimated
in federal numbers. These united constitute the
real and final power, which impeIs and directs
the movements of the General Government. The
majority Of the states elect the majority of the
Senate; of the people Of the states, that Of the
House of Representatives; the two united. the
President; and majority Of the Senate appoint
the Judges; majority of whom, and ma iority
Of the Senate and the House with the President,
really exercise all Of the powers of the GOVERN
ment, with the exception Of the cases where the
constitution requires greater number than