Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1831-09-22

pie, Il mus still lie lille ia the Treasury uutii that
event occurs, or be loaned out II could not lie
idle. The whole nation would revolt ag ainst il q,
II loaned out. II might be impossible 10 obtain IL
when called for, aud might even be lost. In
this mode the regulations OF the value of the
currency, OF exchange, aud OF rendering
service. by facilitating romiitances, would be
Hooriise. Tue third alternative which has
been suggested. a reliance ON the State
BANKS. would be equally unprnductive. The
Government would require no AID except in
TINE "l war, when immense snms would be
necessary, which could be procured only by
loans, aud ahen application should be made
10 them, there Is good cause to spprehend that
each would end arGur to obtain tae best term,
II Could there Is no PARTICULAR bond between
them aud the National Governmsut, aud. in.
PEELED by their interests and that OF The Stock.
h"liers, II is natural lht they should pursue
thet course. Should such an emergency
arise as menaced The overthrow of the Govern.
menf, the interest thereby excited might he
paramount, and torce The Banks, under the di-
fecion VI Tue Stockholders, 10 unite IN a con.
mon Effort 10 save Tue country. But the great
objec' Is TO prevent such crisis by a command
OF funds, which would enauie the Govern.
meni 10 arrest It la every other object the
State Banks would fail. There being no stan-
datd TO which all must adhere. no connection
e3,h
Ol inem with limited funds, aud IN embarrassed
circumstances, they would neither regulate The
value vi con-, OF eAchangc luor facilitate remit.
tauces.
National Bank occupies different ground.
Come oted WIN The q Dvrtn,nent bv IT'S charter
and AIS capita, which consists OF stock III which
the oovefnmeni participates i'll a certain de-
gree, there is no instance IN which, on ptinoi=
pie, there can be difference OF interest be
tween them, aud many powerful considerations
10y winch ihe interest of the Bank must Stun
late II 10 support the credit Of the Govern
mem IN any situation in which il may be pla-
ced. II the credit OF the stock should sink. the
Capital oil the Bank wonld de- cline in eqadl de
gree the effect oil which would he iril IN all ds
operations. Its paper would depreGinte, aud
check be given 10 II, circulation II not au en-
tie suspension. Standing at tho head of the
moneyed operations oil the Government, II is It's
intermediate agent Ia making remitiunCes To
banks aud individuals thTOug hpnt the Union,
aud likewise between individuals, from which
much credit aud inh renee are gained, if not
prahi. Ii has the meaos, and may be cOns,de-
'ed Us tue most powerful agent in raising aud
Sustaining the circulating medium ona par
y lih specie throughout the Union, aud of ele
vatIng the state Banks to that standard, by
sub ectlng them To the necessity OF reaching
and adheriogt to II, TO sustain their credit aud
even their existence. Let the credit Of the q ~
ernment SAX, aud all these advantages are
lost. HE Back therefore, from regard 10 III
terrs', Is bound 10 sustain il. The Directors,
except the tew appointed by the Government,
are elected by tho slockhoiIsrs, aud are anu
naDle TO them. Ii gives us Ipport. therefore,
10 the Governmeni, On principles OF hat,onal
policy, in the support OF which II is interes ed.
aud would disJaIn becoming an INSTRUMENT for
any other purfoSf.
The view above presented is supported by
experience, and particularly by the events Of
the la,e war. When the war commenced, the
Government had not the funds which were ne
cessary 10 support it, and was in consequence
forced TO resort TO loans, which we're wItO ditli-
cuty obtained from any qiarier. even in
llmlted degree, and on untavorable trms. |
have not the Official documents before mt, and
cannot 5 ate the sources from which any loans
were obtained, nor tue conditions, with the de-
chns vi the pubic credit as the war advanced.
, well renIttnhea, however, that when was
cal ed by the President 10 the department OF
War, ON the 3lst oil August, 1914, the Crrih.
Gates OF the Treasury were selling al $50 IN
the 500, by which 20 were losi. II was eyI-
d nj lhal ia reliance was placed ON the sale of
Ceruhcates only, thai II still iutther declIhe
would ensue, and that tue worst consequence
III phi be apprehenie led Tue country was III
yaued iArough the whole inland ond maritime
frontiers. aud powerful sqhadrons weic at tbe
mouth ol every bay and rIsor le"ding TO onf
principal clues, which were threatened WIN nj
tack aud ruin. Tue metropolis Vi oar Uhlon
had been forced, and It's puOhc buildings des-
troyed. Such was the state OF the country, aud
The funds, when | entered the Department oil
War. Uuder such CIRCUMSTANCES an appeal
was made 10 the PATRIOTISM ANA interest OF the
1 IA. h. Hon
meat OF War, with the sanction of The Presl-
dent, for loans OF money necessary Tor Their
own dc fence, for that Of the maflII,ne frontier,
and the UnIon For The first loan tnht was OH
tanned one mIliioa OF dulldis from the cry OF
NV York, which took place few days aliSr
entered the Department, no price was hEed.
As The Treasury Notes we're stliidg Tor $50 IN
the 4 100, thar was claimed, but nol acceded 10.
|, was left for subsea ,ent ahJusmeni, to be set.
lied on far principles ossefal millions oI
dollars were ODlained from the Disirltt oil / g
lambda aud principal cites thranghoutth the L
mon. and. according To my recollection, al pas.
rhis proves that until the Unon Is threatened
win ruin, no loans can b. obtained IN e'nergea-
cIes, without a National Bank, o herwtse than
Al great sacrifice. These CONSIDERATIONS led
toa change in my opinion, aud induced me 10
concur with tue President IN The pruptiety 9t
Instiuiing such Bank alter tue Conclusion oil
the war in 1915 As to the constitutional OBJ
lection, it formed no serious obstacle Ia yo.
ing against II in the FIST instance, was gov
erned essentially by policy lhe construction
eavs TO tue Constitution considered Il strict
ooe: In the later instance, II was more ib' :
raj, bi, according 10 my Judgment, JuSined by
lie po"eiS.
The above sketch contains my sentiments on
the subject of your several in'eirogatofies.
which | communicate TO you, not LOT Phol 'c
view, but in a splrit of confidence. since my
retirement have sought 10 avoid all political
controversies, Having conculred "IIh The
President ia the propIiety Of instItuung the lat
ter Bank my opinion was not wiinhelu' ana IS,
presume, kn0wn,as fhat IL remains unal'ered.
Should "A justification OF my conduct Tor the
change Of 5 ntlmrni m the interval between ihe
institution of the fist aud second Bank become
necessary, or any Q her apppea' Is made 10
make II a public duiy 10 explain the cause o
that cbange, shall not withhoidi. shdil ot
attentive 10 the course OF events, and not lal
to perform that duty, should either Call be
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