Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1831-08-18
POLITICAL.
MIR. CALHoUN,s SENTIMENTS.
CONCJuDHD.

pays In tho first instance render, the pronos,ion
nore complex, and will require in order to under
stand wkcro the burden in reality ultimately falls
On that superstition, to consider the protective or
AZ It's fronds call 1T, the American System, under
tnroo.toid aspect of taxation, of protection and
oil distribution; or as performing at tho same time
the several functions of giving to tho
government, of affording protection to certain
branches of domestic industry, and furnishing the
means to Congress of distributing large sums
tnrough It's appropriations; all of which arc so
blended IN their effects, that is impossible 10 I'M
derstand It's true operation without taking tho whole
in:s tho estimate.
Admitting then, as supposed, that he who con-
'umes the article pays the in the increased price,
and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers
without affecting the producers class, (Which,
By the by, is far from being true except in the sim
sic case, II there be such one, where the produ-
cars have monopoly of an article, so indispcnsa-
bio 10 info, that the quantity consumed cannot be
anected by any increase of price, and that
eidcred IN the light of tax, merely, the impost
duties tall equally every section in proportion
10 its population, still when combined with it's 9TH
er effects, the burden it imposes a tax may be
traneierrcd from section to the other, take
II from onc and place il wholly or tho other Let
VIZ apply the remark first TO lis operation sys-
tom OF protection.
Tho tendency of the tax, or duty on the inipor-
ted article is not only raise it, price, but also
In the proportion that of the domestic article
If tho kind for which purpose, when intended
for protection, it is in fact laid; and Of course in
determining where the system ultimately places Che
burden III reality, this effect also, be taken in
20 tho estimate. If OF tho sections exclusive
II produces such domestic articles, ana the other
purchases them from it, then it is clear that the
amount of such increased prices, tho tax or duty,
on the consumption of the foreign articles, would
DO transferred from the section producing the do
nestle artics to tho that purchased and
cd thcn,, unless the latter in turn, be Unidentified
by the increased price of the objects of its indus
try, which will venture to assert to be the
with tho great staples of the country, which
form the basis of exports, the price of which is
regulated by the foreign and the domestic mar
kct. To those who grow them, the increased
price of the foreign and domestic articles both in
consequence of the duty on the former is in real
ity, and In tho strctest sense n tax, while it is
clear that tho increased price of the latter acts
bounty to the section producing them, and that
tho amount of such increased prices, on what it
sells TO the other section gcater or loss than the
duty 1t pays on the imported articles, the system
will in fact operate bounty tax; if greater
the difference would be bounty; if less, a tax.
Again, the operation may be equal in every other
respect and yet the pressure of the SYSTEM relative
ly, on tho two sections, be rendered very unequal
by the appropriations, distribution. If each
ton receives back what it paid into the treasury,
tho equality lift previously existed will continued
but if one receives back less, and the other pro-
portionally more than it paid then the difference in
relation to the sections will be to the former loss
and to the latter gain; and the system in this as
pect would operate to the amount of the difference
n contribution from ne ono receiving less than
1t paid, to the other that receives Such
would Do ncontestlbly its general effects, taken
all its different aspects the theory suppos-
ed to be most favourable to prove tho equal action
OF the system, that the consumer pays in tho first
instance the whole amount of the tax.
To shew how, this supposition, tho burden
and advantages of tho system would actually dis
tribute themselves between the sections, would
carry far into details; but feel assured af.
ter full and careful examination that they such
as to explain, what otherwise would seem inc xpli-
oable that section should consider its repeal
calamity and the other blessing; and that such
opposite views should be taken by them, place
them in state of determined conflict, in relation
to the great fiscal and commercial interests of the
country. Inded were there satisfactory expla-
nation, the opposite views that prevail, in the two
sections, to the effects of the system, ought to
satisfy all of its unequal action. There can be no
safer, more certain rule, than to suppose zach
portion of the country equally capable of under
standing their respective interests; and that each is
much better Judge of the effects of any system
measures on its peculiar interest, than the other
can possibly be.
But whether the opinion, of its unequal action,
be correct, or erroneous, nothing be GER
tain than that the impression is widely extending
itself, that the system, under all it's notifications
rs essentially unequal; and if to that be added, n
conviction still deeper, and more universal, that
every duty imposed for the purpose Of protection.
~ not only unequal but also unconstitutional, it
would be fatal error to suppose, that any remedy
short OF that which have stated, can heal our
political disorders.
in order to understand, more fully, the Difficult
ty Of adjusting this unhappy contest on any other
ground, tmay not be improper TO present gone
be clearly SEEM how hopeless it is to expect that It
can be yielded, by those who have embraced it.
They believe that all the powers vested by the
Constitution in Congress, not only restricted by
the limitations expressly imposed, bat also by the
nature and object of the powers themselves. Thus
though tho power to impose duties on imports be
granted IN general terms, without any other express
limitations, but that they shall be equal, and no
preference shall ho given to the ports of ono state
over those of another, yet being portion of
the taxing powor, given with the view of ra sin
revenue, is from it's restricted to that OBJ
Jeot, much as if the Convention had expressly
SO limited it; and that to it to effect any other
purpose, is an infraction of the instrument in it's
most dangerous form; nfracton by porversion
more easily made, and moro difficulLto resist than
any otheP. The view is believed to be appli-
cable to the power of regulating commerce, as
well as al tho other powers. To surrender this
important principle, it is conceived, would DO to
surrender all power, and to render government un.
limited qnd despotic and TO yield up, in relation
TO tho particular power in question wozld be in
tact to surrender tho control of the whole industry
ind capital of the country TO the General Govern
ment; and would end IN placing the weaker section
an a colonial relation with the stronger. For no.
thing more dissmiiar in theirn ature or may be
more unequally affected by the same laws than diff
fcrent descriptions of l1bour and property; and if
taxes, by increasing the amount and chang the
intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a syH-
tenn of penalties and rewards, it would givo all the
power that could be desired to subject the labour
and property Of the minority to the will of the ma
jOTity, to be regulated without regarding the inter
est ofthe former, in auhssrvienCY TO the of