Alabama state intelligencer., 1831-08-20

which our Constitution rests
 il That such dissimarty of Interests may exist ii is impossible to doubt. They are to be found in every community, in greater, or less degrees, however small, or homogeneous; and they constitute, every where, the great difficulty of forming and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal ton of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and op- posing interests is, in fact, what mainly renders Constitution indspensble 10 overlook which, in reasoning Constitution would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its cha
 racter. Were there no contrariety of interests, mo- thiag would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone would be sufficient guaranty. It IS the con nict ofopposng interests which renders the most difficult work of man.
 Where the diversity of interests exist in separate and distinct classes of the community, is the in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free States of antiquity the rational constitutional provision is, that each should be represented in the Government, a separate tae with distinct voice, and negative the acts of lis co-esiaes, in order 10 check their encrOach ments. In England the Constitution has assum- Il ed expressly this form; while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was affected under different but not much less efficacous forms The perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the Constitution of these nowned states all oftheir celebrity which their
 liberties for so many centuries and raised them to so great height of power and posterity. Indeed, constitutional provision giving to the great and sepa- rate interests of the community the right of sefpro lection, must appear to those who will duly reflect the subject not less essential to the preservation ofl- berty, than the right of suffrage itself They in fact have common object to effect, which, the one is neeessayasthe other to secure responsibility that IS, hdt those ho moke and execute the td,cs should be dc- countatcotoSe on h0m idrs m reality Operate e only solid dnd durabie toumdation Ct liberty lfwh- out the right ofsuage, rulers would oppress US, ), so, without the wight of sefprotection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests ofthe munity. The absence of the former would make
 the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the lat
 ter the feebler interests, the victim of the stronger. l Happily for us, we have artificial and separate classes of society. We have wisely exploded all I such distinctions but we not, that account exempt from all conrarety of interests, as the pre- sent distracted and dangerous condition of our coun- try, unfortunately but too clearly proves With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate soil situation, in dusry and production, but not,s therefore, less necessary to be protected by adequate constitu
 onal provision than where the distinct interests ex- st in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth greater, such separate and dissmilar geographical
 interests, are more liable to come into conflict, and more dangerous when in that sate than those of any other description so much so, that IS the first instance 0n record uhere Mey hare not t0Ymod in eItensiue territory, separate and independent Commu mites, or suLected tie uhoie to despotic sray. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country.
 l So numerous and diversified are the interests of country that they could not be fairly represented in single government, organized so as to give to each great and leading interest, separate and dis tinct voice, as in the Governments to which have referred A plan was then adopted better suited to our situation but perfectlyTnovel in its cbaracter- | The powers of the Government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference 10 classes, but geograph | cally. One General Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all the powers SUD- posed to be necessary toreguate the interests common to all of the States leaving others subject to the | paraie control of the States being from their local and peculiar character such, that they could not be subject 10 the will ofthe majority ofthe whole Union without the certain hazard of injustice and oppres- sion. It thus, that the interests of the whole subjected, they ought to be, to the will ofthe whole while the peculiar and local interests were whose custody only, they could be safely confded. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact to which all ofthe States parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excel
 ence of our political system. It is truly and empha- tcally American uithout example or parallel
 To realize its perfection, we must view the Gene ral Government and the States a whole, each in its proper sphere sovereign and independent, each perfectly adapted to their respective objects; tie States acting separately representing and protecting the local and peculiar nterests acting jointly, thrO one General Government, with the weight respec- lively assigned to each by the Constitution, repre- senting and protecting the interest of the whole {; and thus perfecting by admirable, but simple ar rangemeut the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred distribution, originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb is the great and difficult problem, the solution of which, tie duration of Constitu ton, of Union, and. in all probability, our liberty de- bends. How is this to be affected?
 The question is new, when applied to our peculiar political organization where the separate and con- flicting interests of society are represented by dis tnct, but connected Governments; but is in reality an old question under a new form, long since rer- fectly solved Whenever separate and dissmilar in- erests have been separately represented in any Co., vernment; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode, by which such political organization be preserved; the mode adopted in England, and by all Governments, ancient and modern blessed with Constitutions deserving to be called iree to give to each coesate the right to | judge of its powers, with negative, or veto on the acts ofthe ohers in order to protect against encrOach ments the interest particularly represens prin- ciple which all of our Constitutions recognize in the distribution of power among their respective De- parments, as essential 10 maintain the lndepen- l dence of each but which 10 al who will duly reflect on the subject must appear, far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental dis tribution of powers between the States and the Ge- neral Government. So essential is the principle that to withhold the right from either, where ihe veregn power is divided is in fact 10 onnu Inc diri- sion itself, and to consolidate in the one left in the exclusive possession ofthe right al ofthe powers of the Governments; for is not possible to distinguish, | practically, between Government having all pow CT, and the one having the riet to take what power it pleases Nor does it in the least vary the prnci- pie, whether the distribution of power be between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly or