Litchfield enquirer., 1831-07-21
Fnnn, rha Amerfcan .SentineL.

'- MonfpeLier, June 25, 1881.
 near Sir-T have received your friendly latter of inc 18th inst. The few lines which .neyvered your formep one of the 21st of Jan nary Iast, were written in haste and in bad health but they expressed, though without the attention in some respects due 10 the Oc- casion, dissent from the views of the Presi- dent, as to a Bank of the United States and substitute for it; to which cannot but ad- here. The objections to the latter have aP- peared to me to prepOnderate greatly over the advantages expected from it, and the con stitutionality of the former I still regard as sustained by the considerations to which yielded in giving my assent to the existing Bank.
 The charge of inconsistency between my objection to the consttutionality of such bank in 1791, afSd my assent in 1877, turns on She question, how far legislative expounding the constitution, ought to guide succeeding le- gislaturss, and to overPule individual opinions.
 Some obscurity has been thrown over the question, by cenfounding it with the respect due from one legislature to laws passed by preceding legislatures, But the two cases are essentially different. constitution being de- rived from superior authority. is to be ex- pounded and obcye0, Rot controlled or varied by the subordinate authority Ofthe legislature. A law, on the other hand, resting on no higher authority than that possessed by every sue cessivs legislature. its expediency as well as it's meaning is within the scope of the latter.
 The case in question has its true analogy in the obligation arising from judicial exPosi- tions eff the law on succeeding Judges; the constitution heinz a law to the legislator, as the law is rule of decision to the Judge.
 And why are ;;:::daicial precedents, when for. rosd m d,,a d;scnssion and consideration, and deliberately sanctioned by reviews and repe- titions. regarded as of binding influence or rather of authoritative force, in settling the meaning of law? It must be answered, lst, because it is a reasonable and established ak iosn, that the good of society requires that the rules of conduct of its members should be certain and known. . hich ould not be the case if any judge. disregardins the decisions of his predecessors, should vary the rule or law according to his individual interpretation of it. Misera est servtus ubi jus est aut vagum aut incognitum. 2d, because an exposition of the law publicly made. and repeatedly confirmed by the constituted authority, car ries with it, by fair inference, the sanction of those who, having made the law through their legislative organ. appear under such cir cumstances to have determined lts meaning through their judiciary organ.
 Can it be of less consequence that the
 meaning of constitution should be fixed and B known, than that the meaning oEa-l law should be SO? Can indeed a law be fixed in its meaning and operation, unless the cOnstitu' ton be so On the contrary, if particular legislature, differing in the construction Of fthe constitution, from a series of the preceding c0nstructions. proceed tO act on that d'ftcr. ence,s they not only intrndlice uncertainty and -sugfaUiIity m Tne Constitution, but In the laws themselves inasmuch as all laws preceding the new construction and inconsistent with it, are not only annuled for the future, but vir- tualiy pronounced utilities from the beginning.
 But it IS said that the legislator having sworn to support the Constitution, must sup port it in his own construction oft however different from that put on it by his predecess- Ors, or whatever be the consequences of the construction. And is not the Judge under the same oath to support the law r! yet has it ever been supposed that he was required,or at liberty to disregard all precedents. howev- or solemnly repeated and regularly observed and by giving effect to his own abstract and individual opinions, to disturb the established course of practice in the business of the com munity Has the wisest and most consci- entious Judge ever scrupled to acquiesce in decisions in which he has been overraled by the matured opinions of the majority of his CUUcdSueUS Auu SuUScSiSSOnssy " S~"AOs .As "'sAA self thereto, as to authoritative expositions of the law? And is it not reasonable that the same view of the official oath should be taken by legislator, acting under the Constitution, which is his guide, as is taken by Judge, act ing under the law, which is his
 There is in fact apd in common understand ing, necessity of egarding course ofprac- tiee, as above characterized, in the light of legal rule of ofinterpreting law: and there is like necessity of considering it constitution. al rule of interpreting constitution.
 That there may be extraordinary and pc culiar circumstances controlling the rule in both cases, may be admitted; but with such exceptions, the rule will force itself on the practical judgment ofthe most ardent theo- rist. He will find it impossible to adhere to, aad act officially upon, his solitary opinionSas as to the meaning of the law or constitution, in opposition to construction reduced to prac- tice, during a reasonable period of time more especially where no prospect existed of a change of construction by the public or its agents. And if n reasonable period of time, marked with the usual sanctions, would not bar the individual prerogative, there could be no limitation to its exercise, although the danger of error must increase with the in crcasing oblivion of explanatory circumstan- ces, and with the continual changes in the im- uort of words and phrases.
 :A sLov, h, anHt fho Iarsesnn oe ovowv