Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1831-08-15


thom IN order TO avoid the necessity of present
ing my views, with the reasons IN support OF theh
in detail.
| AS my object is simply to state my opinions,
might pause with this reference to documents, that
so fully and ably state all the points immediately
| connected with this deeply important subject, but
as there are many, who may not have the opportu-
nifty, leisure to refer to them, and it is posi-
blc however cloar they may be, that different per-
sons may place different interpretations on their
meaning, will, in order that my sentiments may
be fully known, and TO avoid all ambiguity, proceed
To state summarily the doctrines, which L conceive
they embrace.
Their great and leading principle is that the Gen
cral Government emanated from the people ofthc
several states, forming distinct political commun-
ties, * acting in their separate and sovereign capac
~, and not from all of the people forming az
grcgatc political community; that the Constitution
of the U. States in fact compact to which each
State is party in the character already described:
and that the several States parties. have n rht
to Judge ofits infracions, and in of dcliber-
ate, palpablc, and dangerous exercise of n power
not delegated they have the right in the last resort
to use the language of the Virginia resolutions, .f6
ihterPosc for drrcstfng the progress of the epH and
for maintaining rcithn their respectire limits the
authorities, rights and liberties, apsertaioiuG to
them" This right of interposition, thus soemnly
asserted by tho State of Virginia, be it called what
1t may, state right, veto, notification, or by any o.
Their name, conceive to be the Fundamental prin
ciplo of our system resting facts historically as
certain, our Revolution itself, and deductions as
simple and demonstrativc us that of any political,
| or moral truth whatever; and firmly believe that
on its recognition depends the stability and safety
of our political institutions.
L am not ignorant, that those opposed to the doc
trinc have always, now and formerly, regarded it
in very different light, anarchical and revolu-
tonary. Could believe such in fact to be its ten
dcncy, to me it would be recommendation.
yield to none, trust, in deep and sincere attach
ment TO political institutions, and tho Union of
these States. never brcathed opposite scnti-
ment; hut on the contrary, have considered
them the great instruments of preserving libcr-
~, and promoting tho happiness of ourselves and
our postcrity; and next tc these, have ever held
them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in
tho service of the Union and whatever public rep
utation have acquired, is ndissolubly identified
with it. To be too national has, indeed, been
sidercd by many ofmy friends, to be my great
est political fault. With these strong feelings of
attachment, have examined with the utmost caro-
the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far
from anarchical, or revolutionary, L solemnly be-
love it to be, the only solid foundation of sys
tem and ofthc Union itself, and that the opposite
doctrine, which denies to the States the right of
protecting their reserved powers and which would
vest in the General Government, lit matters not
through what DEPARTMENT. the right of detcrmn-
ing exclusively and finally the powers delegated to
1T, Is incompatible with the sovereignty of tho
States, and of the Constitution ITSELF considered as
| the basis of Federal Union. AS strong as this
language Is ii is not stronger than that used by the
llustrious Jefferson, who said, to give the General
Government the final and exclusive right to Judge
OF its powers, is to make tS discretion and the
Constitution the of its pouers;" and that
''in all Of compact bet,reen parties daring no
common Judge, each party has equal right to
judge for ITSELF ,oeH Of the operation, as of tde
made and measure Of redress" Language cannot he
more explicit; higher authority be ad
duced.
That different opinions entertained on this
subject, consider, but additional evidence of
the grca. diversity of the human intellect. Had
not able, experienced and patriotic individuals for
| ak ri
views, would have thought the right too clear TO
admit OF doubt; but L am taught by this, we'll as
| by many similar instances to treat with Difference
opinions differing from my The error NAV
possibly be with me; but, ifso can only saw that
alter the most mature and conscientious examina-
tion have not been able TO detect it. But with
all proper Difference must think that theirs is the
error, who deny, what seems to be an essential at
tribute of the conceded sovereignty of the States;
and who attribute to the General Government a
| right utterly incompatible with what all acknow
ledge to be Its limited and restricted character;
error Originating principally | must think, in
not duly rejecting the nature of our institutions
and on what constitutes the only rational object of
all political Constitutions.
| 1t has been well said by one of the most sa ga
cIous men OF antiquity, that the object of Consti
| tuition is to restrain the Gore, nn,ent as that of
taiCs Is to restrain individuals. The remark is cor
rect, nor is 1t less true, where the Government is
vested In majority, than where it is in single or
Il fe" individuals; IN republic, than Il monarchy
or aristocracy. No one can have a HIGHER resnect
for the maxim, that the majority onght to govern
IMAM have, taken in its proper sense, subject to
the restrictions imposed by the Constitutions and
confined to subjects, in which every portion of the
community have similar interests but it is n great
error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a
majority to govern is a natural and not convcn-
tlona right and, therefore absolute and unlimited
BY nature every individual has the right to govern
hiHlseli; and Governments, whether founded on
maJoriti"s or minoritios, must derive their right
| from the assent, expressed or implied of the gov
crncd, and be subject to such limitations as thew
| may impose Where the interests are the same
that is whcro the laws that may benefit one will
benefit all, or the reverse it is lust and proper to
place them under the control of the majority; but
where they are dissimar that the la W. that NAV
| ocncht one portion may be ruinous to another it
would be on the contrary unjust and absurd to sub.
Ject them to its will; and such, conceive to be the
| theory on which our Constitution rests.
| That such dissimary of interests may exist it
is impossible to doubt. They arc to be found in
| every community, in greater, or less degree, how
| ever small, or homogeneous; and they constitute
| every where, the great difficulty of forming and
preserving free institutions. To guard against the
unequal action of the laws when applied to dissIn
liar and opposing interests, is, in fact what mainly
renders constitution Indispensable; to overlook
which, in reasoning Constitutions would be
to omit tho principal element, by which to deter
mlnc its charactcr.-Wcre there no contrarietv of
interests, nothing would be more simple and easy
than TO form and preserve free institutions The
right OF suffrage alone would be sufficient guar
ranty. 1t is the conflict of opposing interests
which renders it the most difficult work of man.
Where the diversity ofinterests exists in separate