Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1831-08-15

that state than those of any other descriptions so
much so, that is the first instance record,
,cherc then haze formed ercnsrc territory,
sc parate and Independent communities, su6jec-
ted the rhOlc to dcspotic s,cdy-That such may not
be our unhappy fate Also must DO the sincere pray
err of every lover of his country.
So numerous and diversified are tho interests of
our country, that they could not be fairly repro
scented in a single government, organized so, as to
give to each great and leading interest, separate
and distinct voice, i'll the governments to which
have referred. plan was then adopted better
suited to situation, but perfectly novel in it's
character. The powers of the Government were
divided. not heretofore, in reference to classes
but geogra phicaly. One General Government was
formed for the whole, to which was delegated all
the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate
the interests common to all of the States leaving
others subject to the separate control of the States
being from their local and peculiar character, SUCH
that they could not be subject to the will of the
whole Union, without the certain hazard of inius-
ticc and oppression. 1t thus that the interests
of the whole were subjected, they ought to be
to the will of the whole, whilo the peculiar and
local interests left under the control of the
States separately, to whose custody only, they
could be safely confided-This distribution of pow
or, settled solemnly by constitutional compact, to
which all of the States parties, constitutes the
peculiar character and excellence of our political
system. 1t is truly and cmphatically american,
Icithout example parallel.
To realize its perfection, must view the Gen
neral Government and the States whole; each
i'll its proper sphere, sovereign and independent,
each perfectly adapted to their respective objects;
the State acting separately, representing and pro-
tocng the local and peculiar interests acting Joint
ly through General Government, with the
weight respectively assigned tic each by the Const-
tuition, representing and protecting tho interest of
the whole; and thus perfecting by an admirable,
but, simple arrangement. the great principle of re-
presentation and responsibility, without which
government can be free or Just. To preserve this
sacred distribution, as originally settled by
cling each to move in its prescribed orb, is tho
great and difficult problem, on tho solution Of
which, the duration of our Constitution of Union,
and, in all probability, liberty, depends. How
is this to be effected?
The question is new, when applied to peculi-
ar political organization, where the separate and
conflicting interests of society are represented by
distinct, but connected Governments but is in real
ity an old question under new form, long since
perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimi-
lar interests have been separately represented in
any Government; whenever the sovereign power
has been divided IN its exercise, the experience and
wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by
which such political organization can be preservcd;
the mode adopted in England, and by all Govern
mcnts ancient and modern, blessed with Consttu.
tions deserving to be called ree to give to each CO.
estate the right to judge of its powers, with mega
tive, or veto on the acts of the Others in order to
protect against encroachments, the interest par
uculariy represents; principle which all of our
Constitutions recognize in the distribution of pow
er among their respective Departments as essential
to maintain the Independence of each, but which
to all, who will duly reflect the subject must
appear far more essential, for the same object in
that great and fundamental distribution of powers
between the State and the General Government
30 essential is the principle that to withhold the
right from either, where the sovereign power is di
Vlded IS IN tact TO dnnuL the diusion itself, and to
consolidate IN the one left in the exclusive possession
of the right, all of the powers of the Government:
tor 1t is not possible TO distinguish, practically be-
, wecn government having all power, and the one
having the right to take what power it peases.
Nor does 1t Ill the least vary the principle whether
the distribution of power be between co-estates MS
III England, or between distinctly organized, but
connected Governments, with us. The reason
is the same IN both cases, while the necessity is
greater In our case, as the danger of conflict is
greater, where the interests of society are divided
than in any other, as has already
been shcwn.
These truths do seem to me to be ncontroyeri
BILE; and am at loss to understand how any one
who has maturely reflected the nature of our
institutions, or who has read history or studied the
principles of free Governments to any purpose
can call them in questionable explanation must,
II appears TO me, be sought in the fact that in eve
ry free State, there those who look more to the
necessity of maintaining power, than guarding
against It's abuses. do not intend reproach, but
simply to state fact, apparently necessary to ex-
PLAIN the contrarlety of opinions among the ntei-
gent, where the abstract consideration of the sub
Iect would seem scarcely to admit of doubt If
such be the true cause, must think the fear of
the Government too much in this case
TO be In great measure unfounded or, at least that
the danger is much less from that than the oppo
site side. | do not deny that power, of so high
a nature may be abused by State; but, when re-
fleet that the States unanimously called the Gcner
al Government into existence with all of its pow
ers, which they freely surrendered on their part
under the conviction that their common pcace
safety and prosperity required it, chat they arc bound
by common origin, 81 the recollection of ,
common triumph in the great and splendid achieve
nent OF their independence; and that the STRONGEST
Feelings OF our nature, and among them, the love of
national power and distinction, are on tho side of
the Union; it does seem to me, that the fear which
would strip the states of their sovereignty and de-
grade them, in fact, to mere dependent corporo-
uons lest they should abuse right Indispensable
10 the Peaccable protection of those interests
winch they reserved under their own peculiar paur
dianshlp, when they created the General Govern
mcnt, is unnatural and unreasonable. Irthoso who
created the system, cannot be trusted
to preserve it, what power can?
30 lar from extreme danger, hold that tLerc
never was free State, in which this great conser
NauVc principle, Indispensable in ALL was ever so
sIoly iodged. In others. when the co-estates ron
reschtlng the dissmar and connecting interests of
the community, came into contact the only aItor
hatlve was compromise, submission or force Not |
so IN ours. Should the General Government and
q state come INTO conflict, have higher remedy.
the power which called the General Government
INTO existence, which gave it all of its authority
ana Can enlarge, contract abolish its powers at II
pleasure, may be invoked. The STATES Themselves !
may be appealed to, three fourths of which in fact
form power, whose DEGREES are the e;opst,tntir'
IselI, ana whose voice silence all discomfort |
ne utmost extent then of the power is that 4, |
state acting IN It's sovereign capacity ne opc 6