Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1831-09-15
SILAS E. BURROWS
Col. JAMES MoSRoR,
Late President Of the U. 5.
Letter from Mr.. Monroe.
New YoRK, January got


New Yoak, January Goth, 1851.
Dear Sir: The confidence | have placed IN
YOUR rectitude aud patriotism. VIII induce me 10
give an explicit answer TO the general 'nierrosa-
tories contained in your letter of the 9Th. though
fear that my continued weak state OF health
will make it less satisfactory than 1t otherwise
might be- especielly as have none Of the official
documents with me which are calculated to Illus
trate the subject
You ask me what is my opinion of the Ell.
feet which the U. S. Bank has on the national
currency, and as to the policy ct renewing its
charterf-what the situation Of the Government
without its aid during the last war?--wha,is se-
neral advantages IN regulating exchange. in facil-
,,,tinu remittunces TO Individuals and its general
Importance:
When the old U. S. Bank was first instituted,
was one of those WHO vnted against 1t IN the Sc
nate. doubted the power ct the Government
under the Constitution to make such an establish
ment. and was fearful that the influence which 1t
! would give to the Government over the noneled
concerns Of the Union, would have very impro-
per effect on our free system. The Bank was IN
| stituted soon after the Government WAS adopted,
and at a period when the question OF the relative
movers Of the two Governments excited great
| feeling, and divided the Congress and the Union
into very Jealous and violent parties. / was OF
that party which construed the powers OF the Ma
tonal Government strictly, and sought to impose
on it correspondent restraints. So tar as any
change has since taken place in ny opinion, it has
been the result of experience, and prompted by
belief that such change would give strength
to the system, and not weaken or endanger 1t.
Between such Bank, and any arrangement
which the Government can make, the alternative
must be between Bank Of the government itself,
and under its exclusive control, reliance on its
own resources and surplus funds. deposited IN a
| manner to produce the best effect, and DEEPEN
dence on the Banks Of the several States. have
no hesitation in declaring 1t as ay decided OPT
Mon that neither of these could accomplish the
great objects contemplated, and that each OF them
IS liable in other respects to the most serious OBJ
iections To bank of the Government, this re-
mark Is applicable IN both views, aud with pecu-
liar force in the latter. III confined to the m"tr0po'
lis, it could not extend its discounts beyond ve'
~ limited circle, nor its agency as deposit tor
the revenue received in the several Sates-nOr
for remittances to Northumberland for other 10.
| iects il would be equally limited. Such an in
sti,u,o requires an active supervision by those
for whose benefit it is intended. The regular Of
fetal duties of al! the Departments in the Execu-
tive render it impossible for that Branch to per-
| form that service without an interference with
those duties 10 the injury Of the public. II branch
es should be established, their position might ena'
! BILE them To remedy some of the defects ated,
! but they would accumulate others of much great
or force. The interference with the constitutions
al and regular duties Of the executive would, III
the same degree, be increased. But that is con-
parativeIy slight evil A Bank thus instituted
! being under the control of the Executive, by the
appnntment of its Directors, and in all its 0pe.
rations, might, in the hands Of cad admlnistia-
ton. be welded as an instrument 10 sap the toun-
dation of the Government itself. Appeals would
be made to the Government from every part Of
the Unlon, for IFS influence in obtaining discounts
and thus seduction might be practi,ed to great
extent for the worst purposes. The influence
would be reciprocal. Those connected by such
tie with the Government would be looked 10 Tor
sapport at ele, TONS who would not fail to render
il. thus the revenue of the nation, raised by
taxes on the proper objects TO support their Zee
Government, might be made an instrument to It's
overthrow.
The s:cpnd alternative suggested, a reliance
on the surplus funds. for the accomplishment OF
the biects contemplated, it must be obvious, must
fail in every instance. The revenue Of Govern
ment is generally limited to certain specified oo-
jects, according to All estimate Tor each, ana 10
which it is appropriated. The fond raised, some
times falls short Of the object II seldom exceeds
it in any considerable amount. For the want oil
surplus /. mast lie idle in the Treasury until
appropriated, and If appropriated as provision
Cor an emergency, for var for example, it must
still lie idle in the Treasury, until that event oc-
ours, or be loaned out. Il could not lie Idle
The whole nation would revolt against IT. and II
] 4 l.. h.. lc IN Nam 4
when called for, and might even be lost. In this
mode. the regulation Of the value of the currcn-
cy. Of exchange, & of rendering service, by faci-
tating reuttances. would be soortve The third
alternative which has been suggested. reliance
on the State.Banks, would be equally unprOduc-
tive. The Government would require No aud ex-
cept in time Of war, when immense, sums would
be necessary. which could be procured only By
loans, and when application should be made to
them, there is good cause to aPPrehend that each