Martinsburg gazette and public advertiser. [volume] (Martinsburg, Va. [W. Va.]) 1826-1833, 1830-10-28

or indirectly elected by and responsible 10 Tue
| States and the f,Dctionafies Of the States "a
their appciatment sud responsibility wholly
independent OF the United states, no consul
Itatioaal control Of say sort Belonging TO Inc
United States ever the States Under snch
an srvanization, il IS evident that & would
be IN ,l,e pswer si the states, sRllsldaaiiy'
40 pass unauthorized laws, and 10 carry them
lnto complete effect, ANY thing IN the OoEsn-
tuition AID laws Of the United States to the
CONTRARY notwithstanding. This would be a
nslllfyiHg power IN is fleuary character and
whether il had is final effect, through the
Legislative. Executive or Jn siciary organ oil
the state, would he equally fatal u tee con
stituted ~rcldtisn bstween the two Cove n
Heuts.
Should the provisions Of The Constitution,
as reviewed. be fduad not to secure the Go
verument and rights of the States, against u
surpatiaBs and abuses on the part Of the u
nited States, che anal pssori, within the Pur-
view Of the Consttotion, hes liz AN amend
ment o fthe Constitution, according to a pro
cess applicable by the States.
Aud il the event Of a failure OF every cen
stifutionsl resort, and an accumulation Of
usurpations and abuses, rendering passive o
bedlence and non resistance q greater evil
than resistance api revolutios, there can re-
main bat cue resort, the last of alan APP
peal from fhe csnseiled obligations OF the
constitltlonaLcoEpact, to oliginalrights and
the law Of self preservation. TLis ~ tho nj
TINA ratio usder all Governments, whether
cons 5lldated, confederated, or a compound
OF both: and il cannot be doubted that a SIN
Gle member of The Union. in tue extremity
supposed rbnt IN that only, eoaldhave a right,
as IA extra and ultra-ccnstitutIopal ptght, to
make the appeal,
This brings us 10 the yery eEpedieet lately
advanced, which claims for a single State a
right 10 appeal against an exercise of power
bY ths Government of The United States, de
cided by tho State TO BE unconstitutional, to
me parties to the constitutional compact; the
decision eftlc State TO have the effect Of nul
iifring the act OF the Government of the y
ais1d States, unless The decision OF the State
be reversed by three foarths of the parties.
The distinguished names and high author.
tics which appear 10 have asserted and Civ
en- a practicalscope To- this d~setti1e, entitie il
to a respect which it might be difficult other
wise to feel for it.
Ii the [. etrine were to be understood as re
curing the three ~feurtis Of the States to sus-
tain, instead OF that proportion to reverse the
decision oil the appealing State, the decision
TO he without effect during tie appeal, IL
wsgld be sufficient to remark, that this extra
~consti. utional course might well give way to
that marked out BY tae constitution, which
authorizes two,thirds of tlle States to iGsti
tute and thrse-lourths TO eifectuate an amegd-
ment Of the constitution. establishing a per-
manent rule of the highest authority, in place
OF an regular precedent 81 construction osly.
But it is understood that the nullifyiag
Iin.f,tva in,x,,te TIT H. t,...1-, -ftla TO a..
Us TO be presumed valid, and that it oyerrVtes
Itse law of the 4 States, unless oyerrulea BY
tl.rGc lourtlls OF she states.
Gan more be necessary TO demonstrate the
inadUiissthility Of suck a doctrine, than that
it puts il IN the power Of the ,3~IDas!oat fraction
over ane fourth Of the bpitcd States, that is,
Of seven states cut eG twenty four, 10 give the
law and even the constitution to seventeen
states, each of the seventeen having, as par
ties 10 the constitution, al equal right with
each oil The seven, to eXpOund 1t, aNd To insist
on the exposition? That IT, seven might, in
particular distances, be right, and tho sew
entscn wrong, - more than possible. Bat 10
establish a positive and permanent rule, Civ
iuG such.a power, 10 such a minority, ever
such . saajoriiy, would s~verturn the. FIRST
principle OF free Government, and in prac-
lice, necessarily o~vertarh tae Government it.
self.
Its 10 be,reccllectcd that the Constitution
wa proposed to The People Of the States as
q ohoie, and unanimously adopted by The
States as d ,caets, it being a part Of the Con
stitution that net less than three fuurtls Of
the States Should be competent to make any
alteration in what had been unanimously
agreed TO. So great is the caution on this
point, that III two cases where peculiar inter
ests were at stake, a proportion aven Of
three fourths is distrusted. aud unanimity re.
9uired 10 make All alteration.
When the Constitution was adopted as q
whole II IS certain that there sTcre many
parts, which, ii separately proposed, would
have been promptly rejected. 1t is far irem
impossible, that every part Of a Constitution
might be rejected by a majority, aud get ia
ken together as whole, be unanimously ae-
ceptcd. Free Constitutions viii rarely, iG ev-
erg be formed, without eciprocalcencessions;
without articles conditioned Oil and talanc-
lug each other. Is there a Constitution Of a
single State Of the twenty. four, that would
bear the experiment Of having its component
parts submitted TO the People, and separate
~ decided on?
What the fate Of the Constitution OF the
United States would be, if SO small a pro
portion Of the States would expunge pats OF
1t particularly valued by a large majority,
can have but one answer.
The difficulty Is not renewed by limiting
the doctrine TO cases of construction. How
many eases of that SORT, involving cardinal
provisions of the Constitution, have occtrrsd2