Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1830-04-13
sPEECII OF MIR. CLAYTON.

III am right in my views of Tie constitutional now
crs OF the President and Senate, thus far presented
the former can never properly remove officer be-
tore the expiration of his term, but for counec
ted only with the public interest willie the latter can
investigate the cause, and ascertain by the facts how
Jar the constitution has been complied with; and il
tins authority has been abused, extended beyond
IT'S constltu ronal limits, the House may inlpeacf the
author of such abuses before the Senate, and the Srn
ate may remove him and all his mnions. An i'm
Peachment, however, requiring majority of the
House to prefer it and two thirds ofthe Senate to
sustain It, can rarely, perhaps, never, prevail against
the exercise of executive patronage directly OIL Con
gress and the influence of party spirit Then SIM
pose that President regardless of his duty and O.
the consequences either of exposure or impeachment
should remove oil our public servants who would not
assent to hs usurPation of tie sovereignty the peo
pie, and til their places with favourites and mar
sites who should seek to robe him with the in,neria
purple: We have been told that such case may &C.
cnr-that Aaron Burr was once the verge of this
High office; and it has been said that he would have
filled every office in this way do not say so n1vscf
nor do pretend to decide upon that. But the CUES
tton now arises-what checks have the pcoDIe uonn
usurner wh3 should do these thinrs for his own nd
valcemcnt, immediately after his accession to the
Presidency 1t IS certain that, until the expiration
OF hrs tour year term period long enough for the
Achievements OF revolution, the people have no check
upon him errept through The instrupcnkaliGY of NE
Senate and in such the question tptat control
hastse Senate upon this po1cer. becomes one ofin-
tense interest to the American people
We have seen that, by the terms of the Constitu-
tion the President IS authorized fill up oil vacan
c'as happening IN the recess of the Senate, by gran
ting commissions which shall expire al the end OF
the next session. When vacancy is created bv n
removal, the question arises, can the officer removed
be relnsated by the direct action of the Senate
there are many who maintain the affirmative of
this question. Some for whose judgments I feel
great Difference and with whom usually act here,
have so expressed themselves; and there are certain
iy strong opinions to support them. That Of Aexl-
ander Hamilton expressed in the nth number of the
Fcderalist IS urged with much force as being in &C
cordance with this construction. After cnumeratinp
there, as one of the advantages to be expected from
the cooperation OF the Senate in the business of ap-
pointEnents that it would contribute to the staliiv
of the administration he adds, the 'consen. of that
body will BIO necessary TO dispkace well as to ap-
P, 1t Is insisted that the displacing here referred
to- IS indicated by the Context to be- not temporary
removal by temporary appointment, amounting
only TO any attempt to change but that the power
denied by him to exist IN the President alone, was
such dlsplaclug power could defy the sdiscoun-
tcnance of the Senate-and that, therefore this
great statesman pressed upon his counryman
OF the highest recommendations of the Constitution
that change of the Chief Magistrate would not
occasion violent or so general revolution in the
officers of government might be expected, if he
were the sole disposer of Offices. Where man in
any station has given satisfactory evidence of his
fitness for It, a new President would be restrained
from attempting change in favor of person more
agreeable to him, by the apprehension that the dis
cnuutenance of the Senate might Illustrate the at
tempt. Those who can best estimate the value of
steady administration, will be most disposed to prize
aprovsion which connects the official existence of
public men with the appreciation of that body which
from the greater permanently of It's own compositions
will, in all probability, be less subject to inconsistent
cy than any other member of the government The
weight of Hamtons opinion is here set in full array
against the advocates of constructive power; and Il
Is true that his exposition Of the Constitution was
coeunporanesus with its ratification, that was then
given TO, and pressed upon. countryman for the
purpose of effecting that ratification; that it was
viewed at the time obviatipg all objections to the
extent OF Executive influence, aud that perhaps the
only censue which has been cast upon his poit
iCal writings, charges that he was too much DISPOSED
not TO curto but to extend and increase the powers
OF the Federal Government. Yet his doctrine Mt
least to the extent contended for was not rcconusod
by the House Of Representatives in 1850: and if the
decisions OF that day which have been referred 10
are 70 be regarded as obligatory upon US the Senate
s no direct action upon the removals of the Presi-
GENT, Inc question recurs then, by what constitu-
tohaI MODE can 1T maintain any check upon these
abuses of Executive power
take tue true difference, between the prcsent
advocates OF that power and myself TO consist in
this~they consider the Senate as standing in Tho 70
Patton OF quasi privy council the President ,bo
may or may not abide by their advice as IN him shall
SEEM most eXPed;ent They deny the docfri,n -
Hamilton, that the Constitution connects tho of;;i
existence Of public men with the appreciation or 90
appreciation of the Senate They deny it in ev
view which cen be taken of it. | consider the son
ate u possessing certain Executive powers TO be