Wheeling compiler. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [i.e. W. Va.]) 1829-1831, 1830-05-05

ecutive will, as IN the other class. The
first class are assistants to the President,
and made removable at his pleasure by
law.
But this class of Federal Officers are
public property, and not removable at the
arbitrary will of Presidenl, If good and
faithful, the public arc interested in their
services; if bad an unlaithiul, the pubic
good requires their removal IN the mode OF
proceeding required by The respective ten
ures Of their Offices, as prescribed by the
known law. A dark and secret iuqnisl-
ton was never intended 10 be admitted ihtc
orr Institutions; nor was a refusal to tell
the cause of objection and condemnation
heretofore known TO the genius of our Re-
public; not even to the military, subject TO
orders; nor to the culprit arraigncd at the
bar.
We admit the legal right and duty ofthe
President to supercede, suspend the iunc-
tons, or, ifyou prefer the term, remove
District Attorneys, MarshalIs, Registers,
and Receivers of Public Moneys, aud
Custom House Officers, and more espe-
ciallY the whole class ofour money gather
inc Agents. and such others as are made
removable by him, for cause relating to
their official conduct. or fitness for their
stations; but such removal or suspension
IS suhjccl TO the restraining powers OF the
Senate, on cause shown. The public in
ttrest and safety require it should be so;
aid our institutions are conformed 10 their
eugency. This, like other powers, Is a
public trust, aud TO pervert It from It's orr
gnal purpose is an abuse, and not law
.flluse ofthe power. The cause of reno
val generates and gives life to the power
dremoval. as the OycIt act of treason gives
application and life to the power to hang
FIR treason. VIII any Senator here avow
the opiaion Il a. these officers and their
noluments, or the provisional removing
Lower Ofthe Presl dent, were designed as
ether the means of bribery or instruments
# punishment, in the hands Of a candi
cate for the Presidency, or Of a President
in Office, TO buy votes, or punish the OPP
rosiug voters in our Presidential con-
tests? Not oue man will avuw Ibis. That
would be grossly abusing power confer
red for the public good, and corruPIlng the
very sources Of republican, elective, and
representative govcrnment-lhc great cleo
tive franchise itself.
A removal ofthls class Of public officers
is. like a nomination for Office, only pro
yisional and nchoate, until It becomes abb
solute and definitve by the subsequent
sanction of the Senate, to be given in our
established and long Practised manner Of
proceeding upon Executive business.
As in nominating to Office, so also IN re-
moving, or displacing from Office, in this
class Of the public officers, the originating
act Is, and for the public convenience ought
TO be, with the President; and in ordinary
cases and times the act of the President
receives the undIsputed sanction Of the
Senate. All past experience shows this
TO be the fact. either because the Repre-
scntatiyes or Senators Of the person noml-
mated or removed know has sultableuess or
qualification for office, or the cause OF his
removal, or because Presidents are not or
dInarily disposed to abuse their powers;
but for the security Of the public, If there
be an allegation or suggestion OF the unfit
ness of the nominee, or Of the llegality of
the removal, it becomes the duty Ofthe Sen
ate to inquire into the matter, and act ac-
cordngly, by an active eXortion of Their
restraining power. One design Ofrepre-
seutation is to avail the public oftbe better
lights from the scene Of appointment or re.
moyal. than a President, pent up in the Me-
iropols, can have
But let me examine the true nature and
extent OF the despotism now proclaimed By
the majority; the arguments by which they
attempt to sustain themselves in their new
to all their arguments,
reports and votes heretofore; and, If posi-
bic the causes and practical consequences
of this astounding proclamation.
The founders of the Republic, and the
people of the United States, when they
adopted the Federal Constitution, we're es-
pecially Jealous of the powers of the Pres
ident; and the encroaching spirit oflhe Elk
ecutlve viii.
To that point all their principal fears
we're concentrated; and the history Of that
day shows that It was with some difficulty
the people ofthe United States could be in
duced to adopt the Union, lest the Presi
dent. with the powers then accorded to
him, should become the destroyer Of their
Liberties.
Their fears Of Executive encroachment
we're not idle chimeras Of the fancy; nor
were they effected from mere impotence
of regulated liberty and government Of
laws. To them they were devoted. The
histories ofall nations which had lost their