Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1830-10-15

authur. OF the united States ShaH De the supreme
law If the land; 9, that the Judges OF every Suite
shall be bound thereby any thing the Constitution
and laws ofany State to the contrary notwths'and I
ing B. that the judicial power of the United States
shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising
under The Constitutions the laws of the United States,
and treaties made under their authority" &c
On the other hand, as security of the rights and
powers Of the States in their individual capacities
against undue preponderance OF the powers grant
ed to the government over them in their united
pacty the constitution has relied on, the respnn-
sibi,y of the senators and representatives in the
Legislature of the United States to the Legislatures
and the people of the States 2, he responsibility of
the President to the people of the United States;
and 3, the Liability Of the executive and judicial
fnnc!ionares oftLe United States to impeachment
by the representatives of the people of the States
in one braDcr C the J4egislat ure of United
States, and trial by the Representatives of the
States, IN the other branch the State functona RES
legislative, executive and judicial, being at the
same time, in their appointment and responsibility,
altogether independent of the agency authority
ofthe United States.
How fur this structure the Government of the
United States is adequate and safe for its objects.
time alone absolutely determine. Experience
seems to have shewn, that whatever may grow out
of future stages ofour national career there is,
yet, sufficient control in the popular will over the
Executive aud Legislative Departments ofthe Gov
ernHant When the Alien and Sedition Laws were
passed in conrarention to the opinions and feelings
OF the community, tho first elections that ensued put
an end TO them. And whatever may have been the
character of other acts, in the judgment of many
it s but true, that they have generally accorded
With the views OF majority of the States and the
people. at the present day it seems well under
stood, that the laws which have created most dissat-
sfcction have had like sanction without doors; and
that whether continued, varied, or repealed like
proof will be given the sympathy and responsibility
OF the representatives body To the constituent body
Indeed, the great complaint ncw is, agonst the re-
suits of this sympathy and responsibility In the egis
lativc policy of the nation.
With respect to the judicial power of he United
I! lie rf fha IN,
| relation To tue boundary of Jurisdiction between
| the Federal and the State Governments, | may be
dermitted to refer 10 the thirty ninth number of the
"EederalIst, - for the light In which the subject
was regarded by its writer, 1T he period when the
Constitution was depending and it is believed, that
the same was the prevailing view then taken of it,
hat the same view has continued to prevail, and
that it does at this time, notwithstanding the
eminent exceptions to it.
But II is perfectly consistent with the concession
of this power TO the Supreme Court. IN cases tall
ing within the course of It's functions, inaintaIn
| that the power has not always been right exef-
! ciscd- To say nothing of the period happily short
one when Judges i'll their seats did not abstain
| from Incorporate and party harangues equally at
variance with their duty and their dignity there have
been occasional decisions from The bench, which
have incurred serious and extensive dsapprnba ion
Still H. Wosld seem, hat. with but few exceptions,
the course OF the judiciary has been hitherto sis.
tanned by the predominant sense of the nation
| Those who have denied or doubted the suprenaa.
cry othe judicial power of the Uniled States and de-
| q
State, seem not to nave sufficiently advert ed t the
utter inettlceHcy OF supremacy D law ottae land
:. without supremacy in tl, exposition and execution
of the law nor TO the destruction OF all equpoise
! between the Ecderu Government and the ST. ate
governments, If, whilst he fnctionarics of the Fed
eral Governments are directly indirectly elect ed
by, and responsible to the States and the function
aries of the States are IN their ,poointn,ent and
responsibility wholly independent of the United
States, no constitutional control faDg sort BELONGED
! to the United States. Under such an orgunza ion
1t Is evident that 1T would be the power of the
States, individually, to pass unauthorized laws and
to carry them into complete effect any thing in
| the Constitution and laws of the United States 10
! the contrary notwithstanding This would be
multiplying power in Its penary character; and whett-
er 1t h7d its final effect, through the Lee ,iative
Executive, or Judiciary organ OF the State would
he equally fatal to the constituted relation between
the two GsverBments
Should the provisions of the Constitution as here
reviewed De found not to secure he government and
rights OF the States against usurpations and abuses
ON the part of the United States, the final resort
within the pnryIew of the Constitution lies in an
amendment of the Constitution, according to pro
cess applicable by the States.
And IN the even of the failure of every constitu-
tlonaI resort and accumulation of usurpations and
abuses, rendering passive obedience and non-resis-
tance greater evil than resistance and revolution
there can remain but resort the last of allan
appeal from the cancelled obligations OF the compact
to original rights and the law of self Dreseryation
Tins Is the ultima ratio under all government s,
whether consolidated, confederated, or a compound
of both; and it cannot be doubted that single mem,
Der OF the Union, III the extremity supposed, but In
that only, would have right, extra and Ill ra-
constitutional right, to make the appeal.
This brings Us to the expedient lately advanced,
Which claims for single State right to appeal
against an exercise OF power by the government off
the United States, decided by the State be uncon-
stnona to the parties to the constitutional conpact
the decision of the State have the effect of nufy-
ing the act of the Government of tue United States
unless the decision of the Stat be reversed BY three
fourths of the parties.
The distinguished and high authorities
winch appear to have asserted and given practical
scope TO this doctrine, entHle it TO respect which
1t might be difficult otherwise to feel for IT,
1t the, ioctrine were to be understood requiring
the three tourhs OF the States TO sustain instead Of
That proportion TO reverse the decision Of the appeal
ing State the decision to be without effect dnrinr
the appeal, lt would be sufficient remark that his
extra constitutional course might well give way 20
That rkel BIZ