Virginia advocate. [volume] (Charlottesville, Va.) 1827-1860, 1830-05-07

strictly limited government, and tho r,s,rnl
'""'"" Win which spowcts were delegated
'o"s apparent upon the the face of Tie CON
N'u''on' II ought TO be strictly construed. To
'he ruin OF all this, wo most readily give our
hearty assent. Bat the question is not hon the
constitution shall 10 construed, bat ,cko shall
ronstrue 1T. That the judicial power of the H.
rtcd States have the power TO decide all oucs
lions in law and equity arising under the con.
s:i'ution is most certain : but that th,y al,vor.
decide these cases correctly, is by no means O.
qually certain. Ent tits equally certain that
when any case whatever isbrcught before them,
they must ofneccssity decide, (beforo they can
proceed to the merits of the question: whether
1t has arisen under the constitution, of the Uni
ted States or not OF, in other words, they must
decide upon the eSteut of their own jurisdiction.
II THIS DO an erroneohs principle inithc -constitu-
ton of Judicial system, il is certainly not new
or uncommon in the jnniclal systems of this
country and we have never heard of ansinitia-
tory tribunal, distinct from the court, TO decide
the previous question, tile court have jurisdc-
ton or not nor did the ira NETS of our constitu-
ton think it necessary to provide super-appel-
late tribunal to which apFeais m light be carried
from the decisions of the highest court of strictly
judicial power. In this ,iew Of the subject.
they had the example Of the British constitution
before their eyes, in which the court of the last
resort is composed ofthe judges and peers, who
when acting separately exercise, the one Judi
cial and tho other Legislative powers only and
that this view of the subject did not escape their
notice and reflections is sufficiently apparent
from cotemporaneous commentaries on the con.
stitution. e-aa, :sA 1855
Arguments against our conclusion are fro
puently drawn from tho consequences which. il
is apprehendca, will arise from its admission,
1t is said that if wa allow the constituted autho-
rites of the general government to decide upon
the extent of its powers all the important powers
reserved TO tho state governments will be taken
from them by construction, and will be swallow
ed up by eonsoli, ,tion of power in the general
government But are not representatives, our
senators, and our judges, with very few excep-
TONS born and educated in some state or other
OF this U hon. The president himself must
come from some state, and return to it again.
ut the termination of his Office if he ever leave
the poor District of Columbia, whose misfortune
1t is to have given rise to SO much discussion
and excitement of this question. But above all
these, where are the people ofthesstates VIII
they forget their Kentucky, their Pennsylvania,
their Connecticut ?-Yes and their Virginia
the Antient Dominion which however ready
her sons MAY be to leave her, and seek new
homes in distant regions, they ever,remember as
their birth place, with pride and triumph that
VIII never permit them TO forget that there are
such things as states and state rights And
what is to become of the omnipotent principle of
representation, of W hich we boast so much and
so justly, as the power which moves and regu-
lates, with wonderful harmony, our vast and
complex politician system When the people
forget that they free and moi till then, they
will cease to be so. And when this dark, and
we hope, distant day of oblivion shall come no
matter what the constitution, or its construction
may be, the people will be slaves
In our next and. last number, we will notice
some of the consequences that would probably
arise from construction different from that
which has heretofore been given to the consti-
luton IN relation to this subject, by the author-
ties OF the general government; and we will add
few plain observations on that part of the con-
stltutlon which extends the judicial power of
the United States to cases in which state NAV
be party
JUSTINIAN.