Lynchburg Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1829-185?, 1830-04-19

4 ~ urged win much force ~ beng ~ accord.
ance with this construction. Alter enumers.
ting there. as one ofthe advantages, 10 be 81.
, pected from the cooperation of the Senate Ia
the business of appointments. that If would
contribute 10 the stability of his administration
he adds, the consent of that body will be ne.
cessary TO disptdcs rs well as to appoint II
Is insisted that the dispacing here referred TO
Is indicated by the context 10 be, not a tenn
porary removal by atemporary appointment
amounting only Ia any attempt To change.
hui than the power denied by him TO exist in
the President alone, WINS such dlsplaeing
power ms could defy the disenunteEancc OF the
Senate Aud that. therefore. this great states
man pressed it upon his countrymon as ono of
the highest recommendations If the Consttu
tlon, that "A change of tho Chief Magistrate
would not occasion So violent az erneraia
rev 'lnnon IN the officers Of government as
might be expected, fhe wafe the solo diVaser
OF Offices. VIII re man IN any station has
given satisfactory evidence OF his fitness for
II, "A new President would br restrained from
attempting chnagf Va favor ola person more
agreeable 10 him, by tie apprehension thai the
dlscountenancc the Senate might Illustrate
thu attempt Those who can best estimate the
value u steady administration, will he most
disposed TO prl2e II provision which connects
the official existence OF public men with the
appreciation oil thai body, which, from The goa.
ter permanency III It's own composition, Will,
Ia all probability, he loss subject 10 inconss-
iency Than my Other member of the govern
ment' The weight of liamlltons opinion is
here st IL full array against the advocates Of
constructive power, aud II is true that his
exposition Of the Constitution was cotempora-
neous with ils ratification, that II was hen CIV
en- 70, aud pressed upon, our countrymen ior
the purpose ofe1ccing that ratification that
II was viewed at The time NJ obyiaing all oh
lection 10 the cxtcn, OF Executive inhurneo,
and that, perhaps, the ouly ccnsure which has
aver been cast upon his political writings, char
ges that he was TOO mach disposed mol to cur
tail but 10 extend aud increase tho powers OF
the Federal Government. Yet his dociflne,
al least TO the extent eoniended for, was not
recognized by the House OF Representatives in
l55V. aud If the decisions of that day which
have bren referred TO- are 10 be regarded az
obligatory upon US, the Senate has no direct nc
ton upon the removals oil the President The
question recurs then, by what constitutional
mode can II mtntaln any check upon these a
buses OF Executive poVeri
| take the true difference between the pres
eat advocates Of thai power aud myself 10
consist il his they consider the Senate ns
standing in the relation of quasi privy conn-
Gil 10 the President, who may or may not abide
~ their advice as 10 him shall seem most rx-
pfhFHi- lhtf hfhf ubh'fiHf W
ton, that the Constitution con Rects the Official
existence OF public men with tho appreciation
or dsapprobBton Of the Senate They deny
IL 10 avery view which can he taken Of IL !
| CONSIDER the Senate rs possessing certain Ekr-
cutIye powers, 10 be KeTcIsed IN co operation
with the Pfesldrnt when they approve OF the
| Administration of his coordinate powers, or IN
| opposition to, aud ns salulary check upon him
when he has abused such powers and 'rat, a,
officers ola cgrlain grad cannot b. appointed
without their advice aud consent, So II these
officer be re uoved 10 reward patIzans or for
any other unjusdabe purpose, the Senate eau
reject nominations 10 supply the vacancies
thus occasoned, aud thus either compel the
President, 10 renstate those removed, o. leave
vecanGies which he cannot supply after the eX
piraton Of Tho session. lfihs view b. sound,
the SENATE by its egitimate though indirect
action upon every removal, has checl, upon
tho abuse of pownr, which, II exercised. when
the public interest really demands II, will DIES
troy the moives for that abuse. and may here
after save the Republic IN her hour of greatest
perl The objects 10 be attained by M amDi-
tons and Designing President, through the IN.
| strumentalny OF these removals will be to
dlsplace the real irienda of The people, aud 10
ill up the vacancies with his own creatures,
suhservien, 10 his Will, aud independent ofalI
other controul, aud lthe senate have the
virtue te reject his proposition. Ia effect those
ends he may he compelled To retfacl bis reno.
walls o. TO leave the place vacant.
Tins right Of rejecting appointments, with
the express dcsign OF acting upon the removals
should be exercised whenever the removing
mower has been abnsrd--brOanse every such
abuse is an act Of tyranny, aud the first ap.
proaches Of usurpation, or oppressive aud ar
bi.raty power should be repulsed by those who
ghi to stand as the most vgilant aud intro
pd among the sentinels of liberty. Ordinarily,
he who accepts an appoiui ncni 10 I'LL a vncan.
cy occasiUued by such an abuse OF power, ~
| cognisani % the facts, and cobseniing 10 lie
abuse Moreover, this check should be inter
+ posed whenever the public interest demands
the restoration Of u meriiorions officer, whe
) iher removed through Inadverlcnt error OF n.
territorial injustice. The Senate thought II iml-
poriant to exercise this right in the cases of the
military nominations in lS22, but the privilege
becomes nestimaby valuable whenever the re.
moving power OF President is exerted for the
7 purposes Of personal ambition and in utter con.
tempt Of the public interest. II Is infinitely
better TO go without an officer than TO submit
TO IAN acl Of TYRANNY IN any shape. We
Z have no right TO originate bills for raising rev
, enue--we cannot nominate OF propose III The
first inst ance the sums TO be levied the peo'
e ole but when the other House sends here such
bills we can amend or reject them. Now,
2 whenever we believe that the sum 10 be fniSod
: is destined for any purpose which is tyrannical
) or oppressive, or mol really necessary tor
e the public interest, we are bound TO negative
fihe whole bill. tive are not allowed to ~
{ mend il to suit that interest. We should doubt
e les refuse amy appropriation oil public money
il we believed il destined to advance the inter
5 est. OF an usurper although satisfied at TIN
d same time that real evil might grow OH, oil
1 the want Of funds to dsburse the ordinary ex
! penses of government. Ia these and all simi
Il ar cases the question must be weighed ant
o decided. whether the object TO be achieved |,
: worthy of the sacrifice il may occasion /; an'
e so long rs thp spirit Of our ancestors dwell
! WITHIN these walls, we shall rarely think an!
E. sacrifice too great, II made in successful re
e ss,ance to the oppressive exercise Of arbitrar.
- power