Herald of the times. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1830-1846, 1830-06-09


tain objects within the State; and in leg
islating not exclusively, but concurrently
with the General Government on certain
other objects within the State. That
these State rights are limited to these
limits of Legislation to these objects
Of exclusive and concurrent legisla-
ton; that the right of State jurisdiction
is limited by these limits of legislation;
and that the power of the State Execu-
tive has the same limits. Ifths be cor
rect definition of the limits of the indie
pendent rights ofthc States, (and ifit be
not, let any one show any other State
right not included within those limits,
and | will abandon the inference which |
am going to deduce therefrom.
say il this be correct definition of
the limits of State rights, independent of
the General Government, it will follow
that all this clamor against the General
Government, on the subject of State
rights, is entirely without foundation.-
For no instance can be cited in which
the General Government has usurped
the power belonging TO the States; that is,
the power of legislating con subjects cX
clusively within the legislation of the
States; nor of legislating exclusively on
objects as to which the States have
q right of concurrent Legislation -
No; not one instance in the whole history
of the Government. Admitting, then, if
you please, that the States have right
of selt-defence as to their independent
rights; it will be time enough to deter
mine what is to be done when the
necessity Of such defence shall arise /;
that is, when the General Government
shall usurp the power of legislating upon
objects exclusively within the state legis-
lation, or the power of legislating excu-
sively upon objects as to which the States
have right Of concurrent Legislation. If
that time shall ever come, when the &C.
neral Government, in all its branches,
shall be so corrupt and abandoned as to
conspire to usurp this power, (and to
usurp it they must, all conspire,) and to
strip the States of these rights, and shall
attempt to establish the usurpation, then
let the States defend themselves; let them
resist the attempt, and to the death, for
then the compact will indeed be dissolv-
ed; then the question will be question
OF force, between the opprcssor on the
one side, and the oppressed on the other,
and the sword must decide it.
This right of self defence, by this ap-
peal to force, is the right of every people
in the last resort, under every form of GO
vernment, whether single or confederate.
In both there is a line where forbcarance
with the government ceases to be a duty :,
and where the right of resistance begins
in single governments, with the people,
and in confederate, with the States. In
single governments, this line may not be
distinctly marked, and made visible to
the eye; and then is to be determined
rather by feeling than the understanding
but in n confederate government it may
be distinctly marked, and made palpable
to the understanding. And in ours it is
so; in ours it is the line which has been
indicated; the line which separates the
independent rights ofthe States from the
powers Of the General Governments; and
which independent rights are obviously
those, and those only, which lie within
the limits which have been defined. For
all other rights, and which are called
State rights, are as obviously the COM
mon rights of the Nation, and not the
peculiar and independent rights of the
State.
If an act Of the General Government
shall exceed its authority under the con-
stitution, but which act does not infringe
any independent State right, that is the
concern of the nation, not of any state in
particular, any further than us it is part of
the nation; and to Judge of that act is no
more State right than it is an individu-
al right. For instance, suppose the Go
vernment exceeds, or is supposed to ex-
ceed its authority in the exercise of the
treaty-making power; and suppose the
purchase Of Louisiana to be that instance,
(and this was the opinion of some, sure
ly no State independent right was infring-
cd by this act. No State, therefore, as
State, had any more right to Judge and
determine upon the unconstitutionaIity of
the act, than any individual had. 1t was
the concern Of all, and of all equally. I'll
was the whole peoples business; and it
was the business Of their constituted au-
thoritics to determine it. The same may
be said Of the admission of Louisiana, as
a State, into the Union, which was also
deemed by some an unconstitutional act;
and so of other acts of the like kind.
Again: if an act of the General Gov
ernment exceeds its authority, but does
not infringe any State Independent right,
but does infringe the right or rights Of
individuals, that is an affair between the
individual and the General Government.
Surely it is not State right to adjudicatc
that affair, and redress that individual