Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1830-10-15
SIR NADISON,S LETTER
z'o IL Gdl.or Of &c Nsrs1. .an,eric.n !eevic,,.

(.
hall of that doctrine; and you express wish for my
ideas these sobiccts.
am aware of the drlicncy of the task in res
poets, and the difficulty in every respect OF DONG 1u
Justice to it. But, having in moro than Ole ance
complied wtha like request from other friendly quar-
ters, do not decline sketch Of tho views which
have been led to take of tho doctrine IN question, as
well as some others connected with them; and OF the
grounds from which it appears, that the proceedings
of Virginia have been mIscenceived by those who
hive appealed to them la order to understand the
true character of the Constitution OF the United I
Sfates the error, not uncommon, must be avoided,
Of viewing it through the medium, either Of conso-
Gdated Governments, Of confederated Govern
rpent. whilst it is neither tho the other hut
mixture of both. And having in no Model, the ST. |
nliltudes and anaogies applicable other systems Of
Government, must, more than any ober be Its own
interpreter according to It's text and the facts Of the
cAse.
From these it will be seen that the Characteristic
pecnliarities of the Constitution are, L, the mode oil
its formations 2, the division of the supreme powers
of Government between the Suites in their united
capacity, and the States their individual capaci-
Ties.
I. II was formed, not by tue Guverumonts OF the
component States Us the Federal Government for
which it was substituted was formed. Nor was it
formed by majority of The people of the United
States, single community in tue manner OF
Consolidated Government.
II formed by the States, TINT is by the people
IN each of the States, acting in their highest
reign capacity; and formed consequently by the
same authority which formed the State constitu-
TONS.
Being thus derived from the same source as tho
Constitutions of the States IL has, Within each State,
the authority the constitution Of the State
and is much constitution. in the strict sense of
the term within lis prescribed sphere, the consti
tntions of the States are, within their respective
spheres; bat with tits obvious and essential difference
that being compact among the States in their high
est sovereign capacity, and constituting the people
thereof ono people for certain purposes it csunot be
altered o. annulied ut the will of the States indvi
dnally, the constitution Of State may be ct its in
Gividdal will
Q. And that it divides the supreme powers of Gov
ernnent, between the Government Of the United
States, and the Governments of the individual States,
IS stamped on the face of the instrument; the powers
or war and OF taxation, of and of treaties
and other enumerated powers vested in the Govern
ment of the Uuited States, being of as high and soye
reign character, any CT the powers reserved TO
the State Governments.
Nor is the Government of the United States crea-
ted by the constitution, less Government in the
strict of the term, within the sphere of It's
powers, than the Governments created by the consti
tQtions Ut the States are within their several spheres
1t IS Ike them organized into Legislative, Executive
aHd 3udciary Departments. 1t operates like them
directly persons and things. And, like them, II,
has at command physical force for executing the
powers committed to it. q'he concurrent operation
III certain cases, one of the features n,orkpu the
peculiarly Of the system.
Between these fcrent constitutional governments
the operating all tho states the others oners
ting separately ~ each. With the aggregate powers Of
government divided betwacn them. 1t could not es
cIpe attention, that controversies would arise con
ceTuIng the boundaries of jurisdictions and that some
provision ought to be made for such occurrences.
political system that does not provide for pcaceab,c
and authoritative termination OF occurring ntrover
s1us, would not DO more than the shadow of eov-
ernmont, the object and end of real government
nHtn inc substitution OF law aud order for unccrtun-
ty confusion and violence.
What to hhve left final decision, 10 such oasss to
gnch OF toe statS, then bhirteen, and already twenty
tcnr ccoia not fan to mako the constitution and Laws
Of the United States different IN different sta es was
obvious and not less obvoas that this diversity of
independent decisions, mast altogether distract the
government of the Uniou and speedily PAT an end to
the Union itself a uniform authority ofthe laws, is
IN itself vital principle. Some of the most in,por
aat laws could not be partially executed They mast
no executed ID all the states they could be dnlv
executed IN none. An impost, or an EXCISE for ey
simple, rot IN force IN some states, would hs defeat
ed liz others. 1t is well known that this was umoun
the lessons OF experience, which had primary infl-
ence in bringing abont the existing constitution. a
1os OF Its general authority would moreover revive
the exasperatin questions between the states holdr,u
ports fJr fofogu commerce. and the ADJOINING states
without them; to which added all the inland
saeS, necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce
through other states
lo have made the decisions under the authoritv of
the individual states co-ordinate in all cnses Win
DECISIONS under the authority of the United Ststes
you'd uDavodably produce collisions incompatible
with the psace OF society, and With that regular and
efficient administration which is of the essence of free
governments Scenes could not be avoided in which
ministerial officer ofehe United States and tho cor
respondent officer Of an individual state would have
rencontras in executing conflicting DEGREES; tho re-
silt OF which would depend the comparative force
OF the local posse attending them; and that, casu
ally depending on the political opinions md partv
feelings III different states.
To have referred evety cashing decision. under
tue Two authorities, for final decision to the stat es
as parties 10 the constitution. wonld be attended With
delays, With inconVeDeuocs. and with expenses
amounting TO prohibition Of The expcdient not TO
reaton us tendency TO impair tho snluary vepera
tfpn tor system requiring such frequent nterposi-
<ons nor the delicate questions which might present
themselves to the form of station the annea ami
as TO The quorum for deciding It.
10 have frosted to negotiation for adjusting dis |
pfEes between tue government Of the United States
aD1 lae safe governments, as between independent
and separate soveregntics, would have lost sight nj
Ipgsther ora constitution and government for the
Union; and opened direct road from a. failure