Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1830-05-04
MR.. McpUFFIE'S REPORT.

be obvated Its loans would be confined to the
District of Columbia or, if extended 10 the various
parts of the union.-so say nothing Of the neon
rcniencc TO which it would expose those at dis
tance who obtained accornmodations--they would De
unavoidably granted without any knowledge Of the
circumstances of the persons upon whose credit
the Government would depend for repayment. II
would, in fact, be, for oil useful purposes, q mere
District Bank.
These views of the subject have brought the
committee to the conclusion that If a Government
Bank should be established it would have at least
as muy branches as the Bank OF the United States,
and probably much greater number. Few admins
trations would have the irmness to resist an ap.
plicaton to establish branch coming from any quar-
ter of. the Union. however niudc,ous the location
might be- upon correct principles of commerce and
banking
The Bank of the United States now employ FIVE
hundred agents, III various parts Of the Union where
It's offices established. From this fact some idea
may be formed of the very great addition which would
nc made to the patronage of the Executive Government
By the establishment Of such bank as the one under
consideration.
But the patronage resulting fromthe appointments
the annual superintendent these agents. great as it
would doubtless be, would be insignificant and HARM
less, when compared with that which would result
from the dlSpensaton of bank accommodations to the
standing amount Of at last fifty millions of dollars
The mind almost nstincGvely shrinks from the con-
temptation of an idea so omnous to the purity of the
Government and the liberties Of the people. No
Oh WHICH liP COTlmtSec nave know
ledge, except perhaps, the despotism Of Russia was
eyer invested with patronage ut once SO prodi-
eious in hs influence and dangerous In Its rbor
Rctcr. In the most desperate financial ex,remities
10 other European government has ever ventured
upon an experiment perous. IF the whole pat
ronage of the English monarchy werb concentrated
in the hands of the American Executive it may be
well doubted whether the public liberty would be
SO much endangered by it as it would by this vast
pecu,iiary machine, which would place in the hands
nF niminiSt ration ffv milli0uc If
fund for reward'ng political partizans.
Without assuming that corrupt use would bs
made OF this new species OF government patronage
very slight acquaintance with the practice ofull po
tical parties, whatever may be their professions will
be sufficient to satisfy any rejecting mind that all the
evil consequences of corruption would flow from its
exercise Have not our political contests too fire.
qnently degenerated into selfish scramble for the
Offices OF the country? Are there not those who sim
cerely and honestly believe that these Offices are le-
gitimate objects of political warfare, and the rshtfu
reward of the victorious party' And, dsiniereste
and patriotic the great body of every political party
IS admitted to be, the fact less true than it is la
mentabe, that the devoted and active parizans
are very often mere soldiers of fortune, who watch
the political signs, and enlist at the eleventh hour n
der the banners of the party most likely to prove
successful. Such being, or less the compost
ton of all political parties, what would be the proba
BILE use made of fifty millions of bank patronage by
political party which conscienously held the doc
rIne that all the offices in the gift of the Executive
should be divided among the partzans Of success
nl political leader? Would not the same principle be
even more applicable to bank loans9 and would not
the Treasury of the u. States under the sanctiyinu
influence OF party deluson and party nfatuation be
literally plundered, by mcrcenary retarers bankrups
IN fortune, and adventures in politics?
Even IT the administration should be ever so much
disposed to restrain the abuse of this patronage il
would be utterly impractceblo to exercise any Ell
Client control over the great number of bank directors
who would be scattered over the Union, and who,
upon all the known principles OF human nature il
may be confidently predicted, would principally con-
sist of busy and Cflicious political partizans.
Such would be the notwithstanding not under
the public eye, but under the protecting mystery of
sort of concealment and secrecy deemed indspensa-
bic in baukisg operations-to whom not only the
whole Treasury of the Union would be confided, to
be sQuandered, perhaps in progate favoritism, hut
the tremendous power of putting the whole property
OF the nation under mortgage, for the redemption of
the bills issued at their discretion To say nothing
of the utter insecurity Of the public revenues under
'sucha system, a new species of Legislative power
unknown to the Constitution, would be committed TO
these irresponsible bank directors, of which no hu-
man sag=city predict the consequences
just analysis OF the operation of granting loans
by this Government bank, in exchange for the notes
of will show, that it involves the
exercise, the part of the directors of the two
fold power of appropriating the public revenue in the
most dangerous Of all forms-dscretlonary loans
aud of pledgng the responsibility of the government
To an unlimited extent, for the payment of the debts
at the same time created against it. These are
among the highest functions ofegisative power, and
have been expressly exclusively vested in Congress
Unless, therefore, it be assumed, that Congress NAV
rightfuly transfer the powers with which it is nyes
ted to these bank directors, will be difficult to find
any warrant, either in the letter spirit OF the Con-
stuton, for the creation of this tremendous engine
of peeunary influence. 1t may, indeed, be doubled,
whether all the branches of the legislative authority
united, have any constitutional power to lend the pub
Tic revenue, either to individuals, corporations or
States, without reference to the objects to which it
shall be applied But, whatever may be the power
of Congress on this subject, it appears to the Com
nttee TO be inexpedent: in every view of the ques-
ton, that the government should be converted into
great money lender. There is no species of trade in
which it would be wise for the Government to en-
bark; but of all the variety of pursuits known to in
diydual enterprise that Of lending money by the
Government to the citizens of the country would be
traught with The most Pernie;eus copseqnences
In the first place, il is business to Which, in the
very nature Of things, government is adapted and
least of al. popular government There is no EN-.
pioymsnt of capital that requires more vigilant
and ckfu superintendent. Nothing but the ever