Virginia advocate. [volume] (Charlottesville, Va.) 1827-1860, 1829-12-18

=" auu 'nat tne truth OF that change has
. never been affirmed by the Federal 90
sernment of Mexico, in its communca-
{ tons with this.
consider It one Of the mos. urgent or
t my duties to bring to your attention the
nfopsiety OF amending that part of ou.
a CONSTITUTION which relates to the election
OF President and Vice President. Our
: system OF government was, by its trainers
oeemed an experiment and they there
iois, consistently provide mode of ren.-
: edying its defects
10 the People belongs the right of
electing their Chief Magistrate i, wss
never designed that their choice should,
IN any case, he defeated, either by the
intervention of electoral colleges or by
the agency contided, under certain con-
tlngencies, in the House of REPRESENTA-
uves. Experience proves, that. in pro.
portion as agents TO execute the will of the
people are multiplied, there is danger of
their wishes being lrust, ated. Some nav
he unfathlnl all are liable to err. So
tar therefore, as the People can, with con-
venlence, speak it is safer for them to
express thir own will
The number of nspirants TO the Presidency
and :hc diversity of the interests which NAV in
fiuenco their claims, leaves little reason to ex-
Pect choice IN the first instance; and in that
event. the election must deyolye on the House
OF representatives, where, it is to be observed.
inc VIII OF the people may not be always ascer-
tanned, or, 1t ascertaincd, may no. be rewarded
From the mode of voting by States, the choice
is 10 DC twenty-tour votes and il may often oc.
cur that one of these NAV be confronted Inv IN
Individual Representative. IIonors and Offices
are under the controul Of the successful candid
ate. Repeated baottngs may make it apparent
that n single individual holds the cast in his
hand. May he not be tempted to name his re-
ward But even without rruption-suppos-
! ing the probity of the Representative 10 be
proof against the powerful motives by which
ne may be assailed, the will Of the people is still
liable TO be misrepresonted. One NAV err from
ignorance of the wishes of his constituents
another, from conviction that it Is his duty TO
: be governed by his own judgement of the fit
ness of the candidates; finally, although all were
inHeaibiy honest--all accurately informed of
the WISHES OF their constituents-yet under the
Prenent mode of election, minority may often
elect the President; and when this happens il
may reasonably be expected, that efforts will be
made oy the majority, to rectify this Injurious
operation OF their institutions. But although
no evil OF this character should result from such
peryersIon of the first principle of our system
fh1t the majority is to gOrcrn-it must DO very
, certain that President elected by minority
.
successful discharge of his duties
In tins, as IN all other matters of public con-
Germ, policy requires that few mpediments
as possible should exist to the free operation of
v the pubic Will Let us, then, endeavor so to
| amend that the office of Chief Maristraie ,,,y
: not be conferred upon any citizen but in pursu.
: ance OF fair expression of the will of the ma
ljority.
would, therefore recommend such an n
mendment OF the Constitution may remove
n Infa l,,,t.
Y ident and Vice President The mode NAV be
a SO regulated as to preserve to each State it's
present relative weight iii the election and n
iaiiure In the first attempt may be provided for,
by conhnnS the second to a choice between the
TWO h'shest candidates. In coDnexion with
Sucn an amendment, it would seem advisable to
limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to n
single term, of either four or SIX years IF how.
: ever, IL should not be adopted il is worthy of
g consideration whether a provision disqualifyine
. LOT oihce the Representatives in Congress on
y whom such election may have deyolyed.
S wonld not be proper
Y while members of Congress can be constitu.
tionaiiy appointed TO Offices of trust and profit
y IL VIII be practice, even under the most consci-
cht,ous adherence to duty to select them for
suci situations as they are believed To be better
d quaiihed TO I'LL than other citizens but the M.
q rty of our Government would doubtless he
4 promoted by their exclusion from all appoint.
= nents in the gilt of the President i'm whose @.
| iectioD they may have been officially concerned
e nc nature of the judicial Office and the neces.
d sity OF securing in the Cabinet and in dipo-
10 matlc stations of the highest rank the best tai
ents and political experience, should, perhaps
~ expect those from the exclusion
iheie are perhaps few men who can, for any
e great length OF time. enjoy office and power,
n without being more or less under the influence
. OF feelings unfavorable to faithful discharge
81 of their public duties. Their integrity NAV 5c
l. PROOF against improper considerations immedi-
N ately addressed to themselves, but they are TO
-, acquire habit of looking with indiffcTrrec I'D.
on the public interests, and of toleraii.,2 con.
v DUCT from winch an uDpractised man would
l. revolt Office Is considered as n species of prop
# erty and Government rather as n means of pro-
. :noting individual interests than as an instru
- ment created solely for the service of the Peo
+ pie. Corruption in some and, in Others per
version OF correct feelings and principles divert
10 Government from its legitimate ends and make
;. u an engine tor tho support of the few at the
% expence OF the many. The duties Of all public
le | ofHcers, or, at least, admit Of being made So
f. plain and simple, that men Of intelligence ma,
NJ readily qualify themselves for their performs
80 ance and cannot but believe that moio is los
u by the long continuance Of men i'm office tbon i
D. generally TO be gained by their experience.
CT submit, therefore, To your considerations wheth
To- er the efficiency of the Government would no
= only be promoted, and official industry, and in
~ icgrity better secured, by 4 general EXTENSION
ID OF the law which limits appointments 10 fou
y years.
20 Ina country where Offices are created solel,
for the People, no one man has any more in,riii
sac right to official station than another Of
D. fees were not established TO give support to par
; ticuIar men at the public expense. No indiyid
= uai wrong is therefore done by removal, since
J, neither appointment To-, nor continuance in of
.e nee, is matter Of right. The incumbent became
an officer with a view TO public benefits an,
when these reqnirs his removal. they are not I,