The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1829-12-17

AmSng o.he. considers ATOMS elsiming atten.
ton, IL msy be observed, that, by reducing tho
number Of Navy Yards, many materials suita'
bic for the construction ofsmali vessels would,
in the building of large ships, be saved. In
the present state of things, such materials are
distributed among so many Yards, that tho
expense and difficulty ofcollecting them al a.
ny one point, frequently exceeds :heir value.
Viewing this question then in reference to
the expense, and to the efficiency OF our naval
establishment, the Commissioners are decld-
edly of the opinion, that the present pumber
OF Navy Yards is greater than is consistent
either with econony or the wants OF The ser.
vice"
The question here arises--what number of
Navy Yards does the Navy, viewed IN it's pre-.
sent and probable future state, require, TO Sc.
cure 10 ii all the advantages and facilities no.
cessary to render it in the highest degree ef'
hcient?
To form satisfactory opinion upon this i'm.
portant point, We must look to our ssahonrd
and consider well the localities Of our harbors
II will be found, that, although numerous,
there are brt few of them whieh cnn be sale
y entered by ships of the limo, or even large
irlgates; and surely il will be conceded, that
none other should be selected as general rem
dezvous for our Navy
Our maritime frontier presents two promi.
nent positions, or which a pkiful invading en-.
eHy would endeavor TO gain possession--ss
enabling him. more efectually than any other
to hOrrRss our coasting and foreign uadc, and
cut OF our Internal communication by water
while they would also enable him, with but
small military force, comparatively, TO com
pei MS TO maintain more than ten times his
number Of troops to protect points in the very
heart ofour country, which he might bs con
tinualy threatening, although he nigh, new.
er seriously design 10 attack. These positions
are precisely those which we should most vigil
antly preserve from his grasp. Tho very res.
sons which render them objects of great in
terest tn him, render them doubly important
to US l!he, possessing them, could thus SO.
rlou-ly annoy us, we, having them in posses.
sion, could thence most eifectually protect our
line of coast and assaii{im should he attempt
blockade. An enemy excluded from those
positions, can no where upon o,lr coast tind
more than temporary shelter for his shi ps-
1t Is indeed confidently believed, that, If we
had these two points well secured (and We
surely possess amply the means of rendering
them SOY the inducements to maintain sQua.
dron upon our coast would be 50 diminished
the difficulties, inconvcuiences, and hazards,
would be So numerous and so serious that an
enemy, even one physically and numerically
our superior in force Of ships, wouic find il his
interest TO avoid such an attempt.
The history of our Revolutionary wnr. and
our experience during the last war with Great
Britain, indicate these two positions too clear
ly FOR them to I've mistaken.
Our past suferings admonish us that tho
Chesapeake Bay, and iho waters near Rhode
Island, are our mo.t vulnerable points but
while this is admitted, there il great sGtisinc.
ton in he reflection tnat they are known to
bo susceptible nj perfect defence Nom
their relative positions 10 each uthcr--t air
accessibility, at oil times, to ships of the great.
est drnught oi water, aud lbeir greater range
of abchoring grounds than are afforded by a.
oy other harbDrs on our whole line Of coast,
they form. IL tae opinion of the Commission.
ers, The Two most important and desirable
points for tho general rendezvous Of 06r Ma.
w, IN peace as well as in war; and .hess they
think. would in every view. be the mos, judi.
cions locations for onr chief naval dcpots
Tho central position, the rhildncss and salu.
brhy Of tho climate, the facilities Of ings,.s
and cgress, md the nlmos, inexhaustible sup
plios of ship timber afforded by the Chesa-
peake and its tfhutaiy streams render il su.
perior to any other place on our whole line of
coast FOR great naval station and depot; and
next, in the order of Importance for such pur.
poses, is Newport, Rhode Island or some 9th
or spot IN Narrangnnsctt Day.
Aside of all considerations which re commend
these ms the most Important PORTIONS for na
val dspots aud stations. IN reference to the
local advantages and ineiluiss thoy aiInrd 70,
the rendezvous 81 ahips there ere other v;cWs
which strike our minds with increrEed force
and interest, and conduct us 20 similar CON.
illusions.
Let cs, for q moment. con,ernlsia q state
ot war, and suppose thcsc 30 - the genera
rendezvous Of our Guarta Costa consist oi
hne ot.battie ships, aided by slcsIn batteries
These cooperating wuh the pormunent form
i'catIons now IN progress, would place those
points Ia state OF security, and enable us ic
protect extensively, II not etiictnallv, our IN.
land cUostng trade, and To render invasi"u'
difficult and n1zai dnus ~ am point, and prob
ably ippraciiCaJle - most wh 10 our frigatcs
.iosps OF war, aud s,rallcr vessels. sailing
thence rs they would be ablo tD d. al al times
and returning, AZ they might, in all winds
would annoy The commerce of the ruomy in
distant seas. even on his own cousts, aud at
the mouths Of his hnr. rs 10 protect which.
he woald neccssbrll7 ~ Obliged 10 draw the
larger part Of his force irnm our coasts (ifsta-
toned there I'VE might thus compel him
To act on the defensive, while The chances Oi
our merchant and other vessels fa'cly return.
ing into port, would be greatly increased.
The Importance Of a Navy dogs not j"pend So
mnch upon the number of ships as upun their
size and efficiency, and judicious t'spos ton
ot them IN reference to our own protection a
the annoyance of an enemy to the greatest
possible extent.
Ia time Of peace, our ships, particularly
those Of the line and frgutes, ought to be laid
up in situations whore they could bo most ca.
silly united, and their services most readily
commanded, in defensive operations against
an eneiny coming suddenly upon our coast,
and bringing with him, as ii might happen tho
Grst intelligence Of his having declared war
against us. In this view of tho subject, the