Delaware journal. [volume] (Wilmington [Del.]) 1827-1832, 1829-04-10

the data necessary to form certain Judgement on
the first point We ought to possess, to enable US
to perform such a judgment, a knowledge first, of
the force, military and naval, which the republics
can apply to the operation; secondly, that which
Spain can exert in resistance; and. thirdly, what
portion of the inhabitants of the island would take
part on the one and on the other side of the beli-
gerents. Although we have not this information in
ample detail, we know that Spain is in actual pos
session, with very considerable military force;
that this force, recently much strengthened, cccu-
pies the Moro Castle, deemed almost impregnable,
and other strong holds in the island; that driven as
she has been from the continent OF America, all
her means and all her Efforts will now be con-
centrated on this most valuable of her remaining A.
mercan possessions; that to this end she will apply
attention, which has been hitherto much distracted
by the multitude of her belligerent exertions I'M
North and South America, exclusively to this most
important point; that to its succour she will gather
up from heiVast wreck, the residue OF her once pow
erful army in Europe and America; and there is rea
to believe, that If she should be openly assist
ed by any of the European powers she may receive
from them covert but irresponsible aid. With all these
resources and favorable circumstances combined, it
must be admitted that the conquest OF Cuba is very
difficult if not impracticable, without extensive and
powerful means, both naval and military. But, Sc
condly, do either Colombia or Mexico possess such
means? We doubt it. They have both to create
three four vessels of smaller grade, badly man
ned, compose the whole naval force OF the United
4 Mexican States. That of Colombia is not much
greater, better manned. But the means OF trans
porting and defending, during its voyage, the militia
ny force necessary to achieve the conquest, are alb
solutey indispensable Nay, more; it would be in
the last degree rash and imprudent to throw an ar
my into Cuba unless the two republics possessed and
could retain anava superiority at least in theGut
of Mexico to provide for those contingencies which
ought always to be anticipated in the vlcssitudes OF
war And, 10 the third place, it is well known that
the inhabitants of Cuba, far from being united in
favor of invasion, entertain great apprehensions as
to their future safety, in such an event, and that
| hey specially dread an invasion from Colombia. on
f account of the character of portion of the troops
of the republic.
d But fthe difficulties were surmounted, and the
conquest of the island once effected we should
not be without continual fears of the instability of its
!. future condition. The same want OF naval power,
i which would be felt in reducing, would be subse-
quently experienced in defending and preserving it.
# Neither Colombia nor Mexico is destined to be first
d rate naval power. They both, (Alexico still more
h than Columbia, want extent of sea coast, bays
e inlets, and harbours, the nurseries of seamen ii
If short, all the essential elements Of powerful ma
d rinc. England, France, the Netherlands Spair
e herself, when she SHALL as at some no very distant
day she must, recover from her present debility.
u will for long time to come if moi for ever as ma
ii val powers, outrank either Mexico OF Columbia. 4
ot war with any one OF those European nations, woult
st place Cuba in the hands of either of those two Re
" pubcs. at the most imminent hazard. 1t is impos
d. sible for the Government of the United states Il
III close their eyes to the fact that in the event OF
to military enterprise being prosecuted by the Repub
ne lies against Cuba the ships, the seamen, the cannon
and the other naval means necessary to conduct 1t
eP will have been principally obtained in the Unte'
q. States. Although, far from giving any countenanc
OF to the procurement OF those supplies, determines
at to maintain faithful neutrality, they have dlrecte
he strict enforcement of their laws the fact, never
OF heIess of their being collected within their ports
as subjects them to unirendy and injurious suspicion:
m And they would see, with much repugnance, II
Is sources drawn from themselves applied to the az
y, compshment of an object 10 which their policy an
IT, their interests are opposed.
on The President hopes that these consideration
enforced by such others as may present themselvs
a. to you ii they should not be deemed of suflcie
est weight to prevent altogether any invasion OF Gun
G will, at least dissuade from any rash or premau
au a enterprise with inadequate doubtful means. Al
It is required, by the frank and friendly relatio
A.. which we most anxously desire ever to cherish WI
the new Republics that you should, without reserv
explicitly state that the United States have too nut
,,a at stake in the fortunes Of Cuba. to allow them
w see with Indifference, a war Of invasion prosecn
and in desoatng manner, OF to see employed, IN II
H., purposes ofsuch war; one race of the inhabltan
,ct combating against another, upon principles al
with motives that most inevitably lead if not to II
'e.t determination of party the other, to Il
YES most shocking excuses. The humanity of the I'm
of ed States, in respect to the weaker, and which,
bey such terrible struggle would probably be the ST
jet ferlng po'uoh' "hu ',e'. "u.y =" ua's"' W" ~
of selves agalhst lie coh.aso" VI SUCH "e"i "o ~"
fec gerous examples, would c0nstrain them even at
on. hazard of losing the friendship, greatly as tn
heir value It, oil Mexico ana |o'omp'' ~ e"P'y al
,nts means necessary ~ '"c'i seco'"y'
e as If you should be unable to prevail on those
lght publics to renounce all designs Of the invasion