Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1829-06-19

character OF the present war will be entirely
changed. Hitherto, on the part OF the republics,
the contest has been Tor independence and self
government, and they have had, on their side, the
good wishes and the friendly sympathics OF large
portion OF the world; and those especially Of the
people Of the United States. But in the csent OF
military enterprise directed against Cuba, it will
.hecoine war Of conquest In such war, what
ever may he the result OF that enterprise the inter-
esls oil other powers, now neutral, may be serious
~ affected, and they MAJ be called upon TO per-
form important duties, which they may no,
be at liberty 10 neglect. The issue o; such war
may have great influence upon the balance and
istability OF power in the West Indies. Nations of
Europe may feel themselves required 10 nlerp0Se
Horribly TO arrest course OF events 10 which they
canoot be indifferent. II they should limit their
!inierposon merely TO the object of preYe ning any
change in the existing staie OF things in respect
10 the islands, the U. States, far from being under
any pledge, at present, TO oppose them, might
lind themselves contrary TO their inclination re-
iuctanily drawn by current of events 10 their
SIDE In considering such enterprise as hes
been supposed, il it he undertaken, there ought TO
be an anxious and deliberate examination first in
to the means Of Colombia and Mexico to accom-
psh the object; and secondly, their power to pre-
serve and defend the acquisition, ii made. We
have not the data necessary to form certain
Judgment or the first point. We ought 10 possess,
to enable US 10 form such Judgment, a knowledge
hrs, OF the force, military and naval, which the
ITepubllcs can apply 10 the operation; secondly,
that which Spain can exert in assistance; and,
thirdly, what portion OF the inhabitants of the ISL
anu would take part on the one ond on the other
side oithe beliigerents. Although we have not
this Information in ample detail, we know that
Spain is in actual possession, with very consi-
derable military force; that this force, recently
much strengthened, occupies the Moro Castle
deemed almost impreguable and other strong
holds in the island; that driven, "a she has been
from the continent Of America, ali ;cr means and
all her efforts will now be concentrated on this
most valuable OF her remaining American possess
sons; that TO this end she will apply her attention,
which has been hitherto too much distracted by
The multitude OF her belligerent eSertions in North
and South America, exclusively 10 this most i'm.
portan point; that 10 its she will gather up
from her vast wreck, the residue OF her once pow
teriul army in Europe and America; and that there
IS reason TO believe, that if she should not be
openly assisted by any OF the European powers,
she may receive from them covert but irrespons
Die all. W it'll all these resources and favorable
circumstance combined, it must be admitted that
the conquest OF Cuba is very difficult il not i'm
practicable, without extensive and powerful
means, both naval and military. But secondly
do either Colombia or Mexico possess such means:
We douh, 1t. They have both TO create q ma
rne. single ship Of the line, Two frigales, and
three or four vessels of smaller grade, badly
manned, compose the whole naval force OF The
United Mexican States. That of Colombia is not
much greater, nor better manned. But the means
OF transporting and defending during its voyage,
The military force necessary TO achieve the con-
quest, are absolutely INDISPENSABLE Nay, more;
10 throw army into Cuba, unless the two repub-
lies possessed and could retain naval superiority
at least i'll the Gull OF Mexico, to provide for those
contingencies which ought always TO be anticipa-
Ted IN the vcissitudes OF war. And, in the third
place, it is we'll known that the inhabitants OF Gu
ba, lar from being united IN favor OF INVASION en-
iertain great apprehensons TO their future safe
| ~, in such an event, and that they especially
dread an invasion from Colombia, on account
OF the character OF portion Of the troops OF that
! republic.
| But if all difficulties were surmounted, and the
conquest OF the island was once effected, we should
not be without continual fears OF the instability OF
lis future condition. The same want OF naval pow
or, which would be felt in reducing would be sub
sequently experienced in defending and preserv-
ling 1t, Neither Colombia nor Mexico is destined
| TO be first rate naval power. They both, Mex
| leo still more than Colombia,) want an extent OF
sea coast, bays, inlets, and harbors the nurseries
oil seamen; in short, all the essential elements OF
a powerful marine. England, France, the Meth
erands, Spain herself when she shall. as at some
no very distant day she must, recover from her
present debility, will, for long time 10 come, if
not for ever, naval powers, outrank either Mex
| leo or Colombia. a with any one OF those
| European nations would place Cuba in the hands
OF either OF those two Republics, az the most inn
ininent hazard. 1t is impossible for the Govern
ment of the United States 10 close their eyes to
the fact, that in the event OF military enterprise
being prosecuted by the Republics against Cuba,
the ships, Che seamen the cannon, and the other
naval necessary TO conduct it, will have
been principally obtained in the United States
| Although, far from giving any counenance 10 the
procurement OF those supplies, determined 10 main
tain faithful neutrality, they have directed
strict enforcement Of their laws; the fact, never
theless OF their being collected within their ports
subjects them TO unriendly and injurious suspi-
cions. And they would see, with much Iepug-
! nance, resources drawn from themselves applied
TO the accomplishment of an object to which their
! policy and their interests opposed.
| The President hopes that these considerations
enforced by such others may present themselves
10 you, if they should not be deemed OF sufficient
weight TO prevent altogether any invasion of Gu
bas will, al least, dissuade from any rash or pre-
mature enterprise with inadequate or doubtful
means. And it is required, by the frank and
friendly relations which most anxiously desire
ever TO cherish with the new Republics, that YOU
should, without reserve, explicitly state, that the
United States have too much at stake in the for
tunes OF Cuba, TO allow them to see, with inJir-
ference, war OF invasion prosecuted in desola.
/ ting manner, or TO see employed in the purposes
o; such war, one race of the inhabitants COM
/ batting against another upon principles and with
motives that must uevitably lead il not to the ex.
/ termination OF one party or the other, 10 the most
shocking excuses. The humanity of the United
States, in respect TO the weaker, and which in
such terrible struggle, would probably be the
suffering portion, and their duty to defend them
selves against the conagion Of such near and dam
| gerons examples, would Constrair~ hem, even al
the hazard of losing the friendship greatly as they
value it, of Mexico aud Colombiat to employ ali the
| means necessary TO their security
| II you should be unable 10 prevail on these Re-
| publics 10 renounce all designs of the invasion and
! conquest OF Cuba and Porto Rico, you will then
exert your eDdeayoTs 10 induce them 10 suspend
| The execution OF them until the result is known of
| the interpostion which we are authorized to be-
eve the late Emperor Of Russia, and his allies at
the Instance OF the United States, have made TO
put an end to the war, and that which has been
herein stated 10 have been recently made al the