The Massachusetts spy, and Worcester County advertiser. [volume] ([Worcester, Mass.]) 1825-1831, 1829-12-16
WHOLE NO. 2959.

'hae my immediate compliance with the appli-
cation Tor his recall, and the appointment OF a
successor, are not to be ascrbed to any evidence
that the imputation of an improper interference
cy him In the local politics of Mexico, was well
iouhueo nor to want of confidence in his
talents or integrity and to add chat the truth
Of that charge has never been affirmed by the
Federal Government of Mexico, In its coInmu-
nications with this
consider 1t one of the most urgent of NV
duties to bring to your attention the propriety
OF amending that part of our Constitution which
relates to the election Of President and Vice
PRESIDENT. Our system Of government was bv
JUS trainers, deemed an experiment and thew
therefore, constantly provided a mode of rem.
edyiDg its defects.
10 the People belongs the right of electinp
their Chief Magistrate; it was never designed
that their choice should, in any case, be defeat
| ed, either by the Intervention of electoral COLI
leges, or by the agency confded, under certain
contingencies, TO the House of Representatives
Experience proves, that, in proportion as agents
to execute the will of the People are mnltin}ied
there is danger of their wishes being frustrated.
| Some may be unfathful: all are liable to err,
so far, therefore, as the People can, with con.
venience, speak, it is safer for them to EXPRESS
their own will
The number of aspirants to the Presidency.
and the diversity of the interests which may in
tuence their claims leave little reason to ex-
pect choice in the first instance and in that
event, the election must devolve on tho House
OF Representatives, where, it is obvious, the
will of the People may not be always ascertain.
ed, or, if ascertained, may not be regarded.
From the mode of voting by States the choice
is to De made by twenty-four votes and il may
often occur, that one of these may be controlled
by an individual Representative Honors and
offices are at the disposal of the successful can
didate. Repeated balotings may make it APP
parent that single individual holds the cast in
his hand. May he not be tempted to name his
reward But even without orruption-suppos,
ing the probity of the Representative to be
proof against the powerful motives by which he
may be assaiied-the will Of the People is still
constantly liable to be misrepresented. One
may err from ignorance of the wishes of his
constituents another, from a conviction that it
is his duty to be governed by his own Judgment
otthe fitness ofthe candidates finally although
all were infexibly honest-all accurately IN
formed of the wishes oftheir consttuents.yet,
under the present mode of election, minority
may often elect the President; and when this
happens, 1T may reasonably be expected that ef-
forts VIII be made on the part of the majority to
rectliy this injurious operation of their institu-
tons. But. although no evil of this character
should result from such peryersion of the first
principle OF our system-tkat the majority IS to
g01ern-t must be very certain that Presi-
dent elected by minority cannot enjoy the
confidence necessary to the successful dis
charge of his duties
In this, as in all other matters of public con-
Germ, policy requires that as few impediments
as possible should exist TO the free operation of
the public will. Let us, then, endeavor SO to
amend our system that the office of Chief Mag
lstrate may not be conferred upon any citizen
but In pursuance off fair expression of the viii
oil the majority
lwould therefore recommend such an amend
ment OF tae Constitution as may remove all in
termedlate agency in the election of President
and Vice President. The mode may be so reg
ulated as TO preserve to each State its present
relative weight in the election; and failure in
the hrst attempt may be provided for, by con-
inning the second to choice between the two
highest candidates In connection with such
an amendment, it would seem advisable to limit
the service of the Chief Magistrate to single
term, of either four or six years. If, however,
1t should not be adopted, i is worthy of consld-
Grafton whether provision disqualifying for
office the Representatives in Congress of whom
such an election may have devolved, would not
be proper.
While members of Congress can be consti-
tutionally appointed to offices of trust and
profit, it will be the practice, even under the
most conscientious adherence to duty, to select
them for such stations as they are believed to
be better qualified to fill than other citizens;
but the purity of our Government would, doubt
less, be promoted by their exclusion from all
appointments in the gift Of the President in
whose election they may have been officially
concerned. The nature of the judicial office,
and The necessity of securing in the Cabinet,
aud in diplomatic stations of the highest rank,
the best talents and political experience should,
perhaps, except these from the exclusion.
There are perhaps few men who can, for any
great length of time, enjoy Office and power,
without being more or less under the influence
of feelings unfavorable TO faithful discharge of
their public duties. Their integrity may be
proof against improper considerations immedi-
ately addressed to themselves, but they are apt
to acquire habit of looking with Indifference
upon the public interests, and of tolerating con-
duet from which an unpractsed man would re-
volt. Office is considered as a species of props
efty and Government, rather as a means of
promoting individual interests, than as an in
strument created solely for the service Of the
People. Corruption in some cases, and, in 9TH
ers, ?erversion of correct feelings and princ-
pies, divert Government from its legitimate
ends, and make it an engine for the support of
the few at the expense OF the many. The du-
ties of all public officers are, or at least, admit
of being made, so plain and simple, that men of
intelligence may readily qualify themselves for
their performance and | cannot but believe
that more is lost by the long continuance of
men in Office than is generally to be gained by
their experience. l submit, therefore, TO your
consideration whether the efficiency ofthe Gov
eminent would not be promoted, and official in
dustry and integrity better secured, by a gem
eral extension of the law which limits appoint
ments to four years.
In a country where offices are created solely
Tor the benefit of the people, no one man has
any more intrinsic right to official stations than
another. Offices were not established to give
| support to particular men at the public expense.
No individual wrong is, therefore, done by re-
moval, since neither appointment to, nor con
tinuance in Office, is matter of right. The in
cumbent became an officer with view to pub
lie benefits; and when these require his remov-