Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1829-12-22

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piy the means of rendering them sol the induce
ments 10 maintain squadron upon our coast would
be so diinipst,dthe difficulties, Inconvenience,
and hazards would be so numerous and serious,
that an enemy, even physically and numerically
superior IN force of ships, would find il his inter-
est 70 avoid such an attempt.
The history oil our Revolutionary war, and or
experience during the last war with Great Britain,
indicate these two positions too clearly for them to
be mistaken
Our past sufferings adnonsh us, that the Chesa-
pclkc Bay, ind the waters Rhode Island, are
most vulnerable points, but while this is admitted,
there is geIt satisfaction III the reflection that they
are known 70 be susceptible of perfect defence
and from their relative positions TO each other-ther
accessibility ut all times TO ships of the greatest
draumht of water and their greater range Of anchor
ing grounds than are afforded by any other harbors
our whole line OF coast, they form, in the opinion
, of the Commissioners, the two most important and
desirable points for The general rend ezvous OF
Navy, IN peace as well as III var; and these, they
think, would, III every view, be the most judicous
locations for chief naval depots
The central position, the nlldneSs and salubrity or
the climate; the facilities OF ingress and eGress, and
the almost ncxaustblo supplies of ship timber af
tordcd by the Chesapeake and its tributary streams,
render il superior TO any other place whole
line Of coast for great naval station and depot; and
next in the order of Importance, for such PURPOSES
! is Newport: Rhode Island, other epotin Mar
! ra ansett Bay
! Aside Of ali the considerations which recommend
these as the most important positions for naval de-
pots and stations in reference TO the local advantages
ana lGSlcS tiiey aiorI Tor the rendezvous OF
there are other views which strike our minds with
increased force and interest and conduct similar
Conclusions.
/ Let us, Sir for moment, con cmpate 4 state OF
war ana suppose these TO be the general rendezvous
of our Gu.rda Costa consisting of line of'battle
ships, aided by steam batteries. These c,-operanr
with tie permanent toEtl!iculiuns, now IN progress
would place those Poiats in n state OF security and
enable Us to protect extensively, If etiectuaiy
our inland coat;ng radc, and render invasion dif-
tl:u!t and hazardous at any point ami probably i'm
! practicable It nost-w!!;le frIgates. elnops of
var, and Snlalc. vessels. sailing thence, thew
would DC able TO do at al times, ard returning, "a;
they might, in ali winds would annoy the commerce
OF the en- my III distant seas, his own coasts
and al the mouths oi his harbors-to protect which.
/ h would necessarily nc obliged - draw the larger
part u his force from Of stationed there
! We might thus compel him to ac on the Defensive
Wh" the chances oi our merchant and other vessels
5itely returning INTO port, wouil be greatly incrcas-
! ed The Importance OF Navy, does not depend so
much upon the number OF ships, as upon their size
ana efficiency, and judicious disposition of them il,
reference 10 our OWN protection and the annoyance
{ OF an enemy to tn greatest possible extent.
In time Of peace Ships, particularly those of the aud
gaes ought 10 be laid up in situations where they could
most easily united and their services readily commanded
II! defensive operations against enemy coming suddenly
Upon our coat and bringing with him ii might happen,
view oil the subject the two positions referred TO- again present
themselves being desirable than any Other the
devious OF Navybeween the Chesapeake and Newport
each being 81 accessible, of egress and ngcss that
junction OF i!ceS stationed at them, might generally if at
all times be effected in less 4U is an adval.
ae OF vast importance not possessed by any other ports
TT fo the rentezH of ships Of War whole
time frontier Between Boston and the Chesapeake form
such uctue under ordinary circumstances might take
ten days OF even longer time; bur with adverse Winds
one: causes not unAely to The detention would
incacu!abe for, long they should continue ship war
might not ne able to get out of the harbor OF Boston
! Yards, and what shat! be done with them?
Al Boston, the buildings and improvements are hiriy vaua
e and The dock now in at that yard makes
' de- Ia 'a ue retained as an auxiliary establishment
S IeH ana ctive popiatioi-!IS numerous arcers and
mechanics and other affords give it facilities in
contc,P.auon between Nassacfusets Bay and the
waters OF Rhode Island and should the completed
Batteries and Shops OF WAY would become highly important
as pesGnns the means OF aording additional protection
Whne e OF coast East OF Cape Cod and Nantucket South
1noa by direct saie' AID speedy communication
Boston and Newport while merchant vessels bound boston
would Often particularly numc Of war; avail themselves OF this
Channel to reach their destined port For ships rendez-
either during peace war i'
As has heretofore heen observed, Portsmouth, New Hap
SHIRE Is liable 10 particular objections AID its remote position
ana Boston Intervening deprive of any advantages il mich,
0neIwise possess, as an auxiliary establishment, New York
philadelphia, and Pensacola neither of them easily
es Two later Cannot be entered by ships great draugh,
The yatd at Washington has established al Great e.
pene Il possesses factories Of chain cables anchors cam
hVoses hochs, casting and laboratory generate: and
ayages a'"ch 30 these valuable factories beng conucte
ner tne immediate ego Of Govenmeut-and although like
'ephd II Goes nor afford sufficient depth of water 10
admit the passage OF ships OF heavy dsau ygh their Guns
stores Oh board yet still considering conueyon , ,Io
chesapeake BAY and the facility with which the huls of ships
OF the largest class, may be towed Hampton Roads or M
io'Nt common steam boats, be
tiute OF advantages building y4 If viewed in the
si OF an auxiliary larger and iuporan es.sIis
Iucnt, IN the lover wa'G:s OF the Chesapeake.
Upon the whole With respect tie number Of wards view
~ the Question III al It's aspects, the Commissioners of the
'"'y Wh great d'ccnce submit tine opinionlhai with III @
exception oi the yaT!s al Boston, Wdshs;ion and Norfolk
arr i'o'ncr Near tie Gulf OF MeXCo principally a. place Tor
le deP0s Of sores) all ufOIr other Yards ,oi IN tho
u 'e" Years, taiowmg time to the ships &c be
dispensed wih without injury ;he Naval sefvce-poyIcd
Fue$bOishnent Oe made near Newport. Rhode Island That
we pace OF general rendezvous peace III war SHOULD
"e NE %hesa2sAke Bay, and the near Newport
-'tt lrf.f chou.
u 'se "n"-anh that at Boston auxiliary 90 the oicr
..'u Wv opinion IS confidently entertained, that economy aud
tiHv would he greatly promoted by arrdnremrr,
~ 10 W. 'nos, a.Vi'aoo position near NcTPo, atisiaco
- Judgment cannot be formed until thorough and minute
e%anua ION shall have made 1t is tno,yn la tryr "
% preference. " ~''i~'
"ih regard to 'te preservation or ships in ordinarc from
we ln'Ie arising from climate" much has been said and
ritter ny men OF practical Information and many icr,cs
~ eHI.. upon ne sugect u belisycd hnwercr - L.