Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1828-08-15

pact; and that, in case Of deliberate. psipable
and dangerous exercise OF other powers, not grant
ed by the said compact, the States who are parties
thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to
interpose, for arresting the progress Of the evil.
and TOR maintaining within their respective limits,
the authorities, rights and liberties appcrtaining TO
them"
tbs in the corollary drawn from this Resolu-
ton, that the Intelligencer is pleased 10 detect the
A" anti national doctrines" oil the Enquirer-and
the seeds Of dissolution and deaih.-But is James
Ma ison - virtual ttaiIor Do his doctrines 20 20
the dissolution oil the Union' Before the charge,
then, is brought against us, let higher criminal
be arragued at the bar OF public opinion.-Accuse
Of high treason all the Republicans OF '9s and 80,
along with the Members OF the Virginia Legisa
ture al that great" CRISIS" OF our hber,ies-and
with James NJ adison himseli-tor, he justilies, in
the following manner, his own resolutions:
"The resolution, having taken this view Of the
Federal compact, procee Is 10 infer, that in
Of deliberate, papable and dangerous exercise oil
other powers, not granted by the said compact the
States, who are parties thereto, have the right and
are in duty bound TO interpose Tor arresting the
progress OF the evil, and Tor maintaining within
their respective limits, the authorities rights and
liberties appertaining to them
1t appears TO your committee to be plain
principle, founded In common sense, illustrated by
common practice, and essential to the nature Of
compacts; that, where resort can b. had TO no tri
buna superior to the authority OF the parties, the
parties themselves must be the rightiul Judges in
the last resort whether the bargain made has been
| pursued or violated. The Constitution Of the u
| nited States was formed by the sanction Of the
States, given by each in it, sovereign capacity. 1t
adds TO the stability and dignity well 10 the
authority OF the Constitution, that it rests this
! Legitimate and solid foundation. The States then,
being the parties OF the constitutional compact, and
In their sovereign capacity il follows OF necessity
that there can be tribunal that u,horiiy,
TO decide in the last resort, whether the compact
made by them be violated; and, consequently,
that, as the parties to ii, they must themselves de-
eide, in the last resort, such questions may be
oil sufficient magnitude to require their intcrpos-
| ton.
| " Ii does not follow, however, that because the
States, as sovereign parties TO their Constitutional
| compact, must ultimately decide whether II has
been violated, that such Il decision ought TO be in
terposeu, either IN a,hasy manner, on doubtful
| and inferior occasons-Even in the case of ordi-
nary Conventions between different nations where,
~ the strict rule OF Interpretation breach of a
part may be deemed breach of the whole; every
part being deemed condition OF every other part
and OF the whole, IL is always laid down that the
breach must be both wul and material. to ia sfy
| an application OF the rule-But in the of an
intimate and Constitutional Union, like that OF the
United States, it is evident, that the interposition
me parties, In their sovereign capacity, can be
called for by occasions only, deeply and essenti
ally affecting the principles of their political sys
tenn.
The resolution has accordingly guarded a.
gainst any Misrepresentation OF its object, by ex
preSsiy requiring for such interpostion, the
case OF a Deliberate pdipabie & dangerous breach
oil the Constitution, by the exercise of po,CerS moi
| granted by II. 1t must be not OF a lgh
| and transient nature, but ora nature dnnger0u.
to the e-s"t for which the Constit, Itjos
vas established. 1t must lie a case, moreover
notobscure or doubtful in its cton but plain
i aud Pdtpd6ie. Lastly, il must he case not re
suiung from partial consideration, or hasty do
termination; but staInpt with a final coIisid
uSilNeTHfP adherence IL m
because the resolution dnos not require, that the
question SHOULD bo dIscussed how far the exercise
| OF any particular power ungranted by the COnsIi.
tutoi, would Justify the nterpoSitIon OF the parties
TO II. As cases might easily be stated which none
would contend ought 10 fall within that description:
cases on the other hand, might, with equal ease
be stated 80 fragrant and fat al, to unite every
opinion in placing them within the description.
| "Dut the resolution has done more than guard
against nisconstructon, by expressly referring TO
cases oil deliberate, pdLpd6e g. dangerous nature
ltsprcihes the object OF the interposion which i,
contenpiates TO be solely that OF arresng the pro-
gress OF the eU Of usurpaiion, and of maintain
the authorities, rights, and liberties apperainine
| 10 The States, as parties TO the Constitution.
"From this view OF the resolution, II would seem
nconceivaoie that 1t can incur any just dsapproba
uon from those, who, laying aside all rnomentary
Impressions, and recollecting the genuine source &
object OF the Federal Constitution shall candidjy
| and accurately interpret the meaning of the Cen
eral Assembly. the deliberate exercise of dan
gerous powers, palpably withheld by the Constitu-
ton, could not justify the parties to it, in interpos-
ing even so lar as to arrest the progress of the evil
and thereby TO preserve the Copstituton itself as
well as to provide for the safety of the parties
a ~ .."'o would be end 10 all relief from A.
surpea power, and direct subversion of the rpb,s
sPecihed or recognized under all the State Consti
uops, as well as plain denial of the fundamental
principles ON which our independence itself was
! declored.
"But 1t is objected, that the Judicial authority il
10 be regarded as the sole exposition of the Consti
tuition, in the last resort; and il NAV be asked for
what reason, the declaration by the Gen' Assem-
bly, surprising it to he theoretically true, could be
required at the present day, and in so solemn man
ner.
On this objection it might be observed, first.
mat there may be instances Of usurped power.
which the forms of the Constitution would meyer
raw within the control of the Judicial department.
secondty, that If the decision of the Judiciary be
raised above the authority Of the sovereign parties
to the Constitution, the decisions of the other de-
departments, not carried by the forms of the Con
su.uuon neiore the Judiciary, must be equally
authoritative and final with the decisions Of that
department But the proper answer TO the obiec
ton Is, that the resolution the General Assembly,
relates to those great and extraordinary cases in
which all the forms of the Constitution NAV prove
Intellectual against infractions dangerous TO the
essential rights OF the parties TO il. The resolution
supposes that dangerous powers, not Tolerated
may not only be usurped and executed bv The q.
ther departments, but that the Judicial Depart-
nent also may exercise or sanction danpero,e
powers beyond the grant of the Constitution: and
consequently, that the ultimate right Of the par
ties TO the Constitution, to Judge whether the
compact has been dangerously violated, must en-
tend TO violations by ohe delegated authority. as
well as by another; by the Judiciary as well a. b
the Executive, or The Legislature.
Ho"evcr true, therefore, il NAV be that Tie
Judicial department. is in all questions submitted
n firm nf Tho