Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1828-05-21

the Court of Chancsry 10 he House D! LorGs,
~ Shirley, against fagg, who was one "a their,
members. was breach Of their privileges. In
another case, which was an appeal taken ny
Crispe against ValmahHy, who was member,
they imprisoned the sergean's and oarristers
who had plead, for Crispe contrary to an or
der OF the House, as for breach oil PrIvhege
In the case Of Admiral Griffith mcmner, GER
tain persons who had trrspassed on his hshe-
res, were found guilty OF Q breach Of pri'i>
lege, and " ere ordered 10 stand committed, and
were afterwards discharged, after being repri-
manded on their knees, paying the costs. Anh'
e en- as late as about the year 1911, Dir FRANCIS
Burde,t was committed TO the Tower OF Ions
don for breach of privilege, in writing, or
publishing libel, it was deemed by the
| House of Commons. In times more remote,
Judges were put in custody Of the Sergeant>at-
Arms, and, in one instance, Judge Berkly was
taken eff his bench in Westminster Hall, BY
the Usher Of III. Black Rod, to the great terror
of his brethren; hut the instances quoted oil
counsel being imprisoned Tor arguing cause,
and persons ordered 10 be committed for an all
legged ,respass, are strong Illustrations OF the
position Thai no man, or set OF men. can be
| safely uus:ed with the unresirained power OF
Judging and furnishing in their own case, II IS
no, So icirnt To say, that the House will no, fol-
low such absurd precedenis; once lei il be SET
tied, that il depends upon their discretion alone,
to decide whether there lisa contempt or breach
Of privilege, and IT, decide both the kind and
MEASURE Of punishment, without The power OF
any other tribunal TO relieve, then the citizens
claim to liberty, is not matter OF right but OF
suferance. Besides this view 81 theicase, upon
general principles, the minority Of the commits
lee are satisfied, that the House does not, pos
sess the power in question, by force OF various
provisions Of the Constitution, which they
will now refer. In the 9th seclon Of the Isl
Article the privileges of the members are pre-
cisely defined, and are made 10 consist in ex>
empgion from arrest, except in treason, sc. ana
from being questioned, elsewhere, for any
speech in the House. These are privileges in
the true meaning OF that term; they arc immu.
mites or exem ,,tions, and are personal to the
members, ahd, as has been justly remarked by
the author of the Manual, they were probably
| defined, with a view to arrest the encroaching
character of privilege, whose characteristic
feature has been, that claims have been advanc-
ed from tmetto time, and repeated, till some
example OF their admission enablc them 10 oulld
law on that example. 1t is believed, that no
one will contend, sincethis provision, that there
are any other privileges; when, therefore, the
question arises about the right of furnishing
for contempt, it is really a question. not Of pri.
uiiege, but of po,cey. IL will now be attempted
briefly 10 inquire into the powers of the House;
they are TO be found in several sections Of the
first Article; they are, lst. To choose their own
Speaker, and other officers, sdly. To originate
all bills for raising revenue; 3t:ly. The sole
power Of impeac hmen'; Ably. To determine
the rul. of its own nroce"dIngs, Furnishing its
members for disorderiy brhavioI, aud expeliing
a member, with the concurrence Of TWO thirds;
sthlv. The power 10 Judge Of the elections,
qualifications, and returns, Of its members. If
the proposition be true, that the enumt ration
Of two dis met personal pri' ieges 10 the men,
bers be evidence that the trainers Of the Consi-
tuition designed them 10 have no more, 1t would
! seem 10 follow, by parity Of reason, that the
enumeration Of certain powers, being given
10 the House, was evidence that the House
should have no more powers. is sometimes
con;ended, that, from the nature Of things, the
House must bave certain inherent powers, ard,
amongst others, the power of protect Ting itself
from insult: the provisions Of the Constitution
above referred TO, seem TO furnish an answer to
this argument: for, if we are to impule 10 the
House of Repr, senta,yes any inherent power,
what could more emphaucally fall within that
class than the following: power 10 choose its
own Speaker, without which it could not even
be organized; power TO determine the cleo
tons, qua6, ations, sc. o! its members, with
out which il could not know who were cons
stitu iobally elect, d, power to punish its
own members for disordeIly behavior, without
which There would be danger, at some period,
of an utter prostralion of all order. The guard
ed caution, which thought it necessary TO i'm.
part to the House, power to give itself organi.
zauon and action within itself, surely did no.
mean TO leave the same House al liberty to
range in The 6oundess field Of wild and CAPRI
cious precedent, in search Of power TO punish
their fellow citizens, whatsoever and howsoe.
yer it pleased, without any chart or compass
TO guide its course, or Limitation ito restrain il,
save only its own mere discretion, in acting on
maxims and modes of proceeding, locked up
in its own bosom, until applied in individus
cases The correctness Of this idea may be
strongly enforced by reference to the provision
as 10 punishment in cases OF impelch ment
thus il is declared, that punishment, in cases OF
impeachment shall not extend farther than 10