The Massachusetts spy, and Worcester County advertiser. [volume] ([Worcester, Mass.]) 1825-1831, 1827-09-12

IN total subsection the stern precepts o
military stoicism. 1t was a common and ex-
pressive phrase, that the heart of a politician
should be in his head, but his feelings
sometimes surprised him in a gentler mood
A calculator by nature and by habit, Ma
poleon was fond of order, and a friend to
that moral conduct in which order is best
exemplified. The libels of the day have
made some scandalous averments to The
contrary, but without adequate founda-
| ton. Napoleon respected himself too
much, and understood the value of public
opinion too well, to have plunged into gen
eral or vague debauchery.
Considering his natural disposition, then.
1t may be assumed that if Napoleon had
continued in the vale of private life, and no
strong temptation Of passion or revenge
crossed his path, he must have been gen
orally regarded as one whose friendship
was every way desirable, and whose enmi-
ty it was not safe to incur.
But the opportunity afforded by the times,
and the elasticity of his own great talents,
both military aud political, raised him with
uneXampled celebrity to sphere Of great
power, and at last equal temptation. Ere
we consider the use which he made of his
ascendancy, let us briefly review the caus-
es by which it was accomplished.
/ The consequences of the revolution
however fatal to private families, were the
means of filing the camp of the nation
with armies of a description which Europe
had never seen before, and it to be hoped,
VIII never witness again. There was nei-
Their safety, honor, nor almost subsistence,
in any other profession, and accordingly it
became the refuge of the best and bravest
of the youth of France, until the army
ceased to consist, as IN most nations, Of the
miserable and disorderly class Of the COM
munity, but was levied in the body and bo-
som of the state, and composed of the flow
er of France, whether as regarded health,
moral qualities, or elevation of mind
With such men, the generals of the Tcpub-
lie achieved many and great victories, but
without being able to ensure correspond
ing advantages. This may have been in
great measure occasioned by the depend
ence in which the generals were held by the
various administrators of the republic at
home dependence accounted for by the
necessity of having recourse to the governs
ment at Paris for the means of paying and
supporting their armies. From the time
that Napoleon passed the Alps, he inverted
this state of military dependence, and made
the newly conquered countries not only
maintain the army by means of contribu-
tons and cenfiscations, but even contribute
to support the French government. Thus
war, which had hitherto been burden TO
the republic, became in his hands source
I of public revenue whilst the youthful gen.
eral, contributing to the income of the
state, ON which his predecessors had been
dependent, was enabled to assert the indie
pendence at which he speedily aimed, and
correspond with the Directory upon foot
ing approaching to equality. His talents
as a soldier and situation as q victorious
general soon raised him from equality to
pre-eminencc.
These talents applied not less to the gen
eral arrangements Of the campaign, than
to the dispositions for actual battle. In
each of these great departments of war,
Napoleon was not merely pupil of the
most approved master of the art-he was
an improVer, an innovator, and an inventor.
! In strategic, he applied upon gigantic
scale these principles which Frederick of
/ Prussia had acted upon, and gained a cap
ltal or kingdom, when Frederick would
have won a town or a province. His sys-
tenn was, of course, that of assembling the
greatest possible force of his own upon the
vulnerable point of the enemy's position,
| paralyzing, perhaps, two parts of their ar
my, whilst he cut the third to pieces, and
! then following up his position by destroy
ing the remainder in detail. For this pur-
pose, he taught generals to divide their ar
mics npon the march, with q view to celeri-
ty of movement, and facility of supply, and
to unite them at the moment of contest,
where an attack would be more ieebly re-
sisted, because least expected. For this,
also, he first threw aside all species oil
/ baggage which could possibly be dispensed
With--supplied the want of magazines by
the contributions exacted from the country
or collected from individuals by regular
system of neutrality-suspicious. the
use of tents, and trusted to bivouacking
with his soldiers, where hamlets could not
] Lo found, AMI tI.ere tirI4s e sroa.
huts. His system was ruinouS in point Of
lives, for even the military hospitals were
often dispensed with But although Mo.
rcau termed Napoleon conqucror at the
rate of ten thousand men day, yet the
sacrifice for a length of time uniformly at
tanned the object for which it was design
cd The enemy who had remained il
their extensive cantoments, distracted by
the reports of various columns, moving il
different directions, were surprised ant
defeated by the united force of the French
which had formed junction where and
] when it was least expected. 1t was no
till they had learned the art of withdraw
ing from his attack so soon as made, tina
the allies learned to defeat the efforts o
his movable columns.
Napoleon was not less original as a tao
tician than as strategist. His manpuv
res on the field of battle had the prompt
ness and decision of the thunderbolt. il
the actual shock of conflict, as in the prep
arations which he had made for bringin!
it on, his object was to amuse the enem,
upon many points, while he oppressed on
10y an unexpected force of numbers. Th,
breaking through the line, the turning of
+ flank, which had been his object from tn