Delaware journal. [volume] (Wilmington [Del.]) 1827-1832, 1827-09-07


a calculator by nature and by habit, Napoleon
was fond Of order, and friend to that moral con-
ouct IN WHICH order is best exemplified. The libes
OF the DAY have made some scandalous averments
I'd the contrary, but without adequate foundation.
Napoleon respected himself too much. and under
stood the vaee of public opinion too well, to have
plunged INTO general or vague debauchery.
The consequences of the revolution, however ia
tai to private families, were the means of filling the
camps OF the nation with armies of description
vhc! Europe had never seen before, and it is to be
'oped' Will never witness again. There neither
safety, honor. nor almost subsistence. in any other
profession, and, accordingly. it became the refuge
OF the best and bravest of the youth of France, I'M
I'll the army ceased to consist in most nations, of
the miserable and dsorderly class of the commune
ty. but levied in the body and bosom of the |
state and composed of the flower of France, wheth
err as regarded health, mural qualities. elevation
OF mind. With such men. the Generals of the Re-
pubic achieved many and great victories. but with
OUT Delng able to ensure corresponding advantages.
! his may have been, in great measure. occasoned
by the dependence in which the Generals were held
by the various administrators OF the Republic at
home-a dependence accounted for by the necess-
ty OF having recourse 10 the Government at Paris
Tor the means of paying and supporting their armies
From the time that Napoleon passed the Alps, he
| inverted this state of military Dependence and made
the newly conquered countries not only maintain the
army by means of contributions and coniiscations,
but even contribute to support the French Govern
ment Thus war which had hitherto been burtnen
to the Republic. became in his hands source of pub
lie revenue; whilst the youthful General contributing
TO the income OF the State, on which his predeces
sors had been dependent. enabled to assert the
independence at which ne speedily aimed and
respond with the Directory upon footing approach
ing to equality. His talents as soldier, situation
as victorious General, soon raised him from equality
0 pre- eminence.
These talents applied not less to the general ar
RI rangements OF the campaign, than TO the dispositions
Tor actual battle. In each of these great depart
mens Of war Napoleon was not merely pupil of
the most approved masters of the art-be an i'm
proven, innnvatOr. an inventor.
In strategic he applied upon gigantic scale those
f principles which Frederick of Prussia had acted.up
On, and gained a capital or Kingdom when Fred
erick would have won town or "A province. His
system was, of course. that Of assembling the grea-
t test possible force OF his own upon the vulnerable
point Of the enemy's position, paralyzing perhaps.
two parts OF their army. whilst he cut the third to
pieces, and then following up his position by destroy
v Ing the remainder IN detail For this purpose, he
!, taught Generals to divide their armies upon the
march, with view TO celebrity of movement, and
facility ofsuppy and to unite them at the moment
of contest where attack would be most feeby
h sisted, because least expected. For this. aso he
i first threw aside all species Of baggage which could
r possibly be dispensed with supplied the want OF
n magazines by the contributions eyactcd from the
# country, collected from individuals by regular
" system Of marauding discontinued the use oftents
and trusted to bivouackng with his soldiers where
Is hamcts could not be found and there time to
a erect huts. His system rulnous in point Of
lives for even the military hospitals were otter
10 dispensed with. But although Moreau termed Ma
n. poleon Conquerer at the rate of ten thousand
70 day, yet the sacrifice, for length of time, uni
70 lormy attained the object for which, designed
,s The enemy who had remained in their extensive
,e cantonments distracted by the reports of variou
Il, columns moving in different directions, were sur
ri priced and defeated by the United force of tn,
n French, which had formed junction where ant
70 when it was least expected. 1t not till theN
If had learned the of Withdrawing from his attaci
so soon as made that the allies learned to defea
y the efforts of his movable columns.
th Napoleon was not less orig FINAL as tactican thai
" as "A strategst His maneuvres on the field of bat
is tie had the promptness and decision of the thunder
en- bolt In the actual shock of conflict as in the pre-
Id parations which he had made for bringing il on, hi
" object was to amuse the enemy upon many points
he while he oppressed one by an unexpected force o
a numbers The breaking through the line. the turn
ey ing of flank, which had been his object from TIN
ITS commencement of the fight lay usually disguised
X under greater number of previous demonstrations
I'D and was not attempted until both the moral and ply
ed steal force of the enemy was impaired by the lengt
of the combat. 1t was at this period that he brough
40 up his Guards, who. impatient Of inactivity, ha'
he been held in readiness for hours and now, sprngn
of forward like wolf dogs from the LEASH had the gori
va rious task in which they rarely failed, of decdin
lin the long sustained contest. 1t may be added a
characteristic of his tactics, that he preferred EN-
blowing the order of the column to that of the line
perhaps on account of the faith which he might res
Nv in the extreme vaor of the French officers by whom
- the column was added.
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