The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1827-01-04

| no pace Wncfc III Snoulu SoOucl Df our
care to establish body Of loyal and in-
dustrious Settlers, who, ceasing to % q
! burthen here, would there add strength to
our dominons, and in avery critical point.
Secondly. An object OF higher impnr-
tsnce is defensible line of Frontier To
establish an arcifiniGs boundary, between
the two countries IN this quarter was as
clearly the intention Of the treaty, "a is ia
dispensably necessary for our security
| II the present claims ofthe United States
arc conceded, and. they. pass the river ST,
Johns, or even if they reach or possess It's
western bank the whole province of New
Brunswick lies az her mercy. Occupying
| the upper part Of such a stream, the coug,~
| try below could never be protected, from
contraband trade, in time Of peace, nsy
! from invasion in time of war All tilp
difficulties of preparation and transport,
for attack, will then he overcome with s,s-
curity within their own territory, and
their descent into ours viii only offer ins-
creased facilities in proportion IA they adv
vance. The only line of division, which
can distinctly separate the two countriep,
and secure the weaker, as in this quarter
Great Britain must be considered To bss.
against the aggression Of tho other is tas
! divide the heads Of rivers, agreeably "a.
the principle Of the Treaty, by the high
lands from Mars Hill. Indeed. il is not
too much to affirm, that this is The only
! practicable frontier, which the relations 6f
the two Powers. and the geography of the
| country can admit. The boundary must
be either Mars Hill, or the Isthmus of
Cumberland. or the Penpbscot. A merle
dian line over such an extent Of territory,
! intcrsecting rivers in such manner, can
never exist. A division, full of inconycl-
renee for two parishes, and almost mprao-
ticable for counties in the same kingdos,
can hardly answer between two nations.
Between two NATIONS, having common
language, opposite maxims of govefD-
ment, incessant intercourse, conflicting IN.
terests, and mutual and undisgused jeal-
ousy and rivalry Of each other, surh
frontier can only produce continued colls-
ion and endless disputes, and must sooner
or later, end IN struggle, which, II there
| be no otherrecourse, Great Britaip had
better anticipate than defer.
at will be in VAN that tho possession ,
OF Grand Manun has confirmed TO ms the
control Of tho Bay Of ruudy, or that by
again seizing the mouth Of the Ponobscot.
that control may be secured, and extepd-
ed ainng the adjacent American coasls, if
the United States arc thus 10 acquire in
I our rear the COMMAND Of river which
flows through the midst Of New runs
4 wick, and whose various branches COM
inunicate, by an easy navigation, with al
most every quartor Of the province. Tho
| immediate consequence TO be apprchond-
ed must be the cnse Of n rupture with thas
Power, the attack and conquest of this
Colony, and it may not bo without use To
anticipate the rcmotcr, but nollcss impor-
tant, and no less probable consequences.
The ncighborng province Of Nova Scotia
becomes exposed tc almost every point of
attack from the mouth OF the same stream.
The ST. Johns, by one Of the greatest GU
riosties Of nature, presents difficulties ut
lts entrance, which might be easily so
strengthened that no force from rca could
penetrate il. Here then the enemy would
have every convenience md security foS
preparing their 6otiln, and would expect
IN safety their oppofi unity for crossing. by,
n few hours course, TO the opposite shore.
Nor could any naval superiority prevent
the occurrence. or repair the effects OF
such opportunities. The nature Of the
Bay Of Fundy renders the assistance Of
ships Of war uncertain in summer, and IN
winter their very presence impractlcable.
Thus the natural defences Of the lsthmus
Of Cumberland would be turned, taken in
the rear, or become useless, and instead
Of long, difficult, and circui'ous march to
the strongest, and perhaps an impegna-
BILE entrapce Of that province, the enemy
gain the choice, and access Of the weak
est and in five days an American army
from the mouth Of the st. Johns, might be
cannonading the forts and ships in Halifax
harbor. But IL is hardly necessary 10 in
auire h.y long Nova Scotia could be re-
tained, were New Brunswick lost, or how
long Halifax or any other place defended,
were Nova Scotia overrun, or how tho
American coast could be bloc kndcd, or
even superior fleet maintnined IN those
waters, with no harbor for shelter or re-
pair 10 the northward Of Bermuda and
westward Of ireland (though perhaps ono
might reasonably extend the consideration
Of these consequences so far as TO ques-
ton the safety of our West India com
merce, or oven the possession of those Is-
lands, and still more the security of New
foundland, and the fishery on lis bankss)
il is sufficient that, without any pTetenslon
in military science, il must be obvious 10
any ope, who either has any acquaintance
with the country, or even considers iis
situation on the map. that tho acquisition
Of such an advantage by an enemy, and its
loss on our part, must greatly increase
their chances Of conquest, and tho cost
and difficulty Of our defence.
Sd. The third consequences involved in
the settlement Of this boundary, is the con-
nection together of the British Colonies,
and their communication with each elhor.
That wedge Of territory which The, Uni-
ted STATE are erdeelcring to drive up bs-