Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1827-08-27

complished
The consequence ofthe Revolution, novel, C,
fatal to private families, were the means =. ="
ling the camps Of the nation with arniiee y.
description which Europe had never seen oelc.
and ;t ;s TO be hoped, will never witness AGAIN
Flare was neither safety, honour, nor almost
s,I,s;s,ence. in any other profession. and accor
dinqIvi il became the refuge Of the best ana ora'
vest Of the youth of France, until the arm! cea'
cod TO consist, as in most nations, OF the :nisei
able d disorderly class ofthe community, w.
was levied in the body and bosom OF the s,a'e
and composed of the flower Of France, whetner
as regarded health, moral quaities,o eieNauoh
Of mind With such men, the generals u IN.
republic achieved many and great VICTORIES ou'
without being able to ensure corresponding az
vantages. This may have been IN great ma
sure oce asioned by the dependence IN winch inc
ore nerals were held byihe various admih's'ra-
tors ofthc republic at home,a dependence accouh
led for by the necessity OF having recourse 10 the
covprnmen, at Paris for the means ri paying
and sunporting their armies, From the time
that NAPOLEON passed the Alps, he lnvered 'hlS
stale of military dependence and MADE the new
" conquered countries not only MAINTAIN INC
,rmv by means Of contributors and cohhSea-
tions, bat even contribute to support tne .reh.n
| Government. Thus war, WHICH bad hithfr!o
been burden to the republic, became l" ms
hands a source of public revenue; Whlis' TIC
Youthful General, contributing to the income
of the state, on which his predecessors had oeeh
dependent, was enabled 10 assert the inuepehd
enee at which he sneedily aimed, and cores
pond with the Directory upon ioouhs APP
nroaching to equality. His TALENTS as SOL
der. and situation as victorious general, soon
raised him from equality to pre- eminencc.
These talents applied no less to the general
arrangements of the campaign, than to the dis
nositions for actual battle. In each OF these
GREAT departments of war, Napoleon was not
merely pupil Of the most approved masters
of the art-he was an inprover, an lnnovator,
and an inventor. :,
In strategic, he applied upon giganllc scare
those principles which Frederick OF Prussia
had acted upon, and gained CAPITAL or 4 king
dom. when Frederick would have Won town
or province. Hi, system was, of course, t at
of assembling the greatest possible force oil his
own upon the vulnerable point OF the enemy
position, paralyzing perhaps, two parts Il their
jprmy, whilst he cut the third to pieces, and
I then following UP his position by des roy1ne
the remainde: in detail For this purpose, he
taught generals to divide their armies upon
Il the march, with a view to celebrity OF move
ment, and facility Of supply. and to unite them
at the moment Of contest, where an attack
would be most feebly resisted, because least eX.
pected For this, also he first threw aside all
specics of baggage which could possibly be dis
nensed with--supplied the want of magazines
: b. the contributions exacted from the country
c....., n i; :. G---1----.---r>
tents, ana trusted to bivouackng with his sol
ders, where hamlets could no, be found, and
there was no time to erect huts. His system
was ruinous in point oflives, for even the mill
tary hospitals were often dispensed with But
although Moreau termed Napoleon conquer
or at the rate of ten thousand ren a.day, yet
the sacrifice for length Of time uniformly at
tanned the object for which it was designed.
The enemy who had remained in their extern
sive environments, distracted by the reports Of
various columns moving in different directions,
were surprized and defeated by the united
force of the French, which had formed Juno
ton, where and when it was least expected 1t
was not till they had learned the art of with
drawing from his attack so soon as made, that
the allies learned to defeat the efforts of his
movable columns
Napoleon was not less original as a tao
tieian than as a strategist. His manevres
on the field OF battle had the promEtness and
decision OF the thnnderbolt. In the actual
shock of conflict, as in the preparations which
he had made for bringing it on, his object was
to amuse the enemy upon many points, while
he oppressed one by an unexpected force of
numbers. The breaking through the line, the
turning of flank, which had been his object
from the commencement of the fight. lay usual
Iy disguised under greater number Of pre-.
yious demonstrations, and was not attempted
until both the moral and physical force of the
enemy was impairedby the length of the com.
bat 1t was at this period that he brought up
his guards, who, impatient of inactivity, had
been held in readiness for hours, and now,
ssprinsing forward like wolf dogs from the
leash, had the glorious task, in which they
rarely failed, of deciding the long sustained
contest II may be added, as characteristic of
ms tactics, that he preferred employing the
order OF the column to that of the line, perhaps
on account of the faith which he might rest in
the extreme yalor of the French officers, by |
whom the Column was headed.
The interest which Napoleon preserved in
The French soldiers affection by frequent dis
irioution OF prizes and distinctions, as we'll as
bv his familiar no,i-e of ,;,e;r ,,errope .n1 .,