Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-03-14

between two Governments These balances and
equipoises are bard TO be sustained. They are
er ui termini, liable to disturbance. There is a
continual struggle in the different powers to destroy
it. The subordinate power will seek to withdraw
authority, and the paramount to absorb it. The
corrective of the first tendency is, to render the
General Government independent OF the State CO.
vernnents for its operation. This has been done by
the change FROM the Confederation. The General
Government was dependent on the States absolute
ly. This form of dependence has been destroyed,
aud the old system OF requisition has been given up
Here we have the correction of the second tenden-
cy, which is TO allow the subordinate check on
| the paramount power. This is done by the mode
OF organizing as functionaries. The State Go
vernments appoint the Senate. But this is not
sufficient. Why? Because the Senators are not all
appointed at tiue, and misrule may be sustained
by two thirds. The control Of the State Govern
ments over the election of the House of Represen-
taiives IS very slight. The effective control
which Is given, is that over the election of the
President. The President is not only the active
| power, but rs part of the Legislature. Nothing
can be done without him. His acts are part OF
The acts OF the Government. He is the neck in
| relation TO which you may realize the policy OF
Caligula, and strike with decisive effect Control
held over him is efficient the whole Gov ernInent
For this reason in consequence of this view, in
the first plan Of the Constitution, the convention
sislaturcs. Two propositions were aade TO ex-
punse this feature without success. /, was finally
surrendered Tor the present system, which was
Considered to be tnntamount. The Legislature has
now the appointment OF the m ode OF the choice OF
electors. The design was 10 give control by the
power TO consolidate the vote of the State a
district system would divest this control, and
suovert this material part Of the plan of the con-
| sitution.
Inc utility OF the State Legislatures as the rally
ing points OF public sentiment is admitted This is
what the oppressed have always stood in need of;
and the continuance of oppression is owing to the
want OF IT. What is the cause of despo,isn in all
paris OF the world! What causes millions to submit,
TO Inc control OF one man, frequently the mos, in
| sShihcant, worthless, or brutal, among them
Because, when misgoverned, they have no means
OIL combination to put down the usurpation OF pow
! or or us abuse. We have the remedy The State
legislatures are admirable for this purpose on ac-
count both OF the adequacy Of their expression of
puoiic sentiment, and their regular periods of as
semoiase But they require an instrument by
which to reach their object Remonst.ance is mo,
suilicientiy powerul; coercion would derange the
equIpoise OF the system. What has the Com
s''uuon provided! 1t has given this control
over the PRESIDENTIAL Election as the instrum emit
mere an disorder Is ed, and the system il
Kept subordinate 10 the federal principle and to
the general safety The State Legislatures are the
loci to collect rays Of public sentiment But what
is required ct these foci. The rays are not IN ha
scattered but some mode TO be provided for
'n.o"inS mem concentrated the object to be
Affected = prfsna,ic instrument which disp.rsed
them would Illustrate the design. The policy was
10 PROVIDE Tens to throw them in a concentrated
torn, or given point. The District system is The
pTasf'- the General Ticket system is the lens. II
..diAes me defensive contrivance, the burning
glasses OF Archmedes; by which, if rnis-goyern-
aa1n 10 r,N,.s l.
on the system, il in lis first efforts Ia
consolidate, and reduce it to ashes.
lie WIS asked, If this faculty of operating with
consolidated strength, and controlling The eiec 10,
OF President, was State rish' Let the words Of
the Constitution answer: " Each State shall an
point, IN such manner as the Legislature thereof
may Direct" its number Of electors Was this a
Ish' OF Inc States IN their political, and not OF the
People OF the States in their genel al, collective
capacity? Let the language Of the most aurborj-
tanVe commentary on the Constitution, the FEEDER
alist, reply; g The immediate election of the Pre-
s:dent Is to be made By the States in their political
Characters Nor was this mere barren right of
the ofaes. 1t was a most beneficial power:
not beneficial to the State only, but to the
ohioh' IL was not mere question of relative
power, among the States, as the gentleman
from South Carolina had supposed Each State
has an interest in ii belonging to the other States
Inc interest IS common that public opinion
should act efficiently. Would the diyes,i,nre of
thrs right tend TO give the form of consolida-
ton 10 the General Government The idea was
that this result could ensue because the mower
Invested, though taken from the Government womb
De gwen to the People ofhe State; and could not,
therefore, have an effect OF State divestilure Lei
all powers, then, be taken from the Stale Govern.
mentS and given TO the PeopleZthe State Govern-
ments be eHdced would that be consolidation
-No, u was SAID: for consolidation expressed
the concentration Of all political powers in tbs Co
veTnmeni, and this Government would still have
no more than It's former amount Of power, if the
powers dlvested from the State Governments were
oply feaosoroed In the general political capacity
OF the People. But how long would this amount
OF power, in the General Government. remain IN.
same! The functions and authority of The State
Governments displaced, how long must il be. be-
tore the functions and authority of both Goverp
men's must become vested in the General Govern
ment! all necessary powers must exist some
where. The political functions and authorize
required Tor the well-beipg of the Community were
MOTTO be RENTED. His friend from South CaroIna
knew, and had stated this truth with erea, force
Tor purpose OF his own. If there were but one
Government Ia community, all the poIticsI
powers, required by its well-being must be yeste1
in that Government Iflhs were not done h.
grant, il must be by assumption: for the objects NJ
evil association could not be allowed TO pe,isb
us functions must 60 on. If these powers were
not acquired by assumption, then they mus, be
obtained by grant. In one or the other mode thew
must vest, by necessity that was indefeasibe and
irresistible. II was the knowledge of this ruth
which furnished those who looked beneath the
surface Of political science, with the important
axiom, that one OF the modes Of giving to Govern
Inent the character Of despotism, under its wors,
form, was the denial of power really requisite. for
the attainment OF its designs. But he would furnish
the pollution, az 10 the mode in which Tho co,. -