Phenix gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1825-1833, 1826-03-06

,o,t the measures of administration for the pur-
nose of saving the Office which he had in pos
session; the office hunter would support the same
measures, for the purpose of securing the office
which he had in expectation BY either party,th
interest of the country would be sacrificed to the
views of the Executive; and the appropriate
means for preventing this mischief, was, first,
toexclude Office holders from seats in Congress,
and this the constitution has done; and, second
", to prevent Senator'S and Representatives from
taking appointments from the President under
whose administration they had served and this
it has omitted to do. The omission was too
material to escape the observation OF those who
were not blind to the defects of the constitutions
and their animadversions were too loud and We
hement to pass unnoticed by the great advo-
Gates for the ratification of that instrument
The authors of the Federalist, IN their no. 50,
felt it to be their duty to meet the objection
which grew out of this omission. But even
these great men, with their superior abilities,
and ardent zeal in the best OF causes, could at
temnt no more than to diminish the quantum OF
a DANCER which could not be denied to exist, and
to cover. with brilliant defamation, part OF
their beloved constitution which could not be
defended They said:
sSometimes we are told, that this fund of cor
ruption, Executive appointments) is to be ex-
hansted by the President il subduing the virtue
of the Senate. Now, the fidelity OF the other
House is to be the victim, The improbability
of such mercenary and perfidious combination
of the several members of the Government,
standing on as different foundations as republic
can principles will well admit, and at the same
time accountable to the society over which they
are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehen-
sion. But, fortunately, the constitution has pro-
yided still further safeguard The members
of the Congress are rendered Ineligible to any
civil offices that may be created, or OF which the
emoluments may be increased, during the term
of their election. No Offices, therefore, can be
dealt out to the existing members but such as
NAV become vacant by ordinary casualties; and
to suppose that these would be sufficient to pur-
chase the guardians of the people, selected by
the people themselves, is TO renounce every rule
bv which events ought to be calculated, and to
substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded Jea-
lousy, with which all reasoning must be vain
The Committee believe that this answer, tho
specious and confident, was insufficient at the
time it was given, and that subsequent events
have entirely invalidated it. 1t was insufficient,
because it turned upon the false position that
one Office could only influence one member,
whereas, in the opinion of the Committee, it
might influence many; for the danger to be APP
pretended from this source, lies in the pursuit,
and not in the enjoyment of the Office, and many
members might be pursuing the same one, at
the same time, and all upon the same prlncl-
pie, of devotion to the will of the President and
neglect of the interests of their constituents
But whether good or bad at the time 1t was CIV
en-, there can be no question about Its INSULT
cheney at the present time. The Jacf upon
which it rested has ceased to exist. 1t Is no
longer true that the President in dealing out OF
fees to members Of Congress, will be limited
as supposed in the Federalist, to the inconsde-
rabie number of places which may become va
cant by the ordinary casualties Of deaths and
designations; on the contrary, he may now draw,
for that purpose, upon the entire fund OF the
Executive patronage. Construction and legis-
lation have accomplished this change. In the
very first year Of the constitution, construc-
ton was put upon that instrument which ena-
bled the President to create as many vacancies
as he pleased, and at any moment that he tho,t
proper This was effected by yielding to him
the kingly prerogative of dismissing officers
without the formality of trial. The authors
of the Federalist had not foreseen this construc-
ton; so far from it, they had asserted the con-
trary, and arguing logically from the preml-
ses, "ihat The dismissing po,cer arGs aPpnrfennnt
TO The appointing po,cer, they had maintained, in
No. II of that standard work, that, as the con-
sent of the Senate was necessary to the appoint
ment of an officer, SO the consent OF the same
body would be equally necessary to his dismiss
sion from office. But this construction was o.
verruled by the first Congress which was form
ed under the constitution; the power OF dismiss
sion from office was abandoned to the Presl-
dent alone, and, with the acquisition OF this
prerogative, the power and patronage OF the
Presidential office was instantly increased to an
indefinite extent, and the argument OF the re-
deralist against the capacity Of the President to
corrupt the members of Congress, founded up
on the small number Of places which he could
use for that purpose, was totally overthrown'
So much for construction. Now for the effects
of legislation; and without going into an emu
meration of statutes which necessarily increase
the Executive patronage, the four years APP
pointment law will alone be mentioned; tor.
this single act, by vacating almost entirely the
civil list once in every period OF Presidential
term Of service, places more Offices at the COM
mand of the President than were known to the
constitution at the time of its adoption, and IS
of Itself, again sufficient to overthrow the whole
| of the argument which was used in the FEEDER
alist. SO completely is this the fact, and Sc
entirely has that argument vanished, that nc
L