Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-03-14

who. Instead OF confning himself On his farna 10
the exercise OF supervising authority, should UNI
dertake to perform all the offices HIMSELF! The
true principles Popular efficiency are to vote by
large masses, and to act by representation. Let
not the whole body of the People be distracted by
vices and local interests, but let their political ac
ton be depurated by representation.
Applying these principles TO the present sub
Ject, he wished to retain every part of the Const-
tuition in its present form, but that which refers the
election to the Ho sc of Representatives His
plan is to retain the primary election and the cleo
tors, and to send back the election, in any mode.
III we agree on the principle, can find the mode
We must have form of general government.
None could be safe but the Federative form; asd
the State power which this position for district
system aimed to sacrifice, an essential conser-
vative principle, and safeguard of that system.
Wehave reason to regard ourselves as the most
fortunate and blest of People. All the population
of every other quarter of the world have suffered
nom rnisrule; while we, with all the elements of
misrule in our general government. have such pow
erful guards, that before they be brought into
| efficient operation, the People themselves must
| conspire for their own destruction. They must
conspire in double capacity, and in two-fold
mode: by their direct representation in this House,
In their aggregate capacity, and in their political
character, as States, through their action on the
Senate and on the House of Representatives.
He could only consent to change the Consitu-
ton where experience and time, the great masters
have taught il is deective and that is in the re-
ference of the election to the House of Represen-
tatives.
But it is said we must adopt the district system,
on the necessity OF compromise with the small
States. Compare the terms OF compromise. The
small States asked 10 give up what threatens
the general good, the large States, what is essential
to tie general good. Was a principle Of maleyo-
ience to be imputed to the small States? If the
small States desire sacrifice from the large States
yet they ask no sacrifice from the People. The
value of the vote to the small States is none. 1t
does not come until after the contingency which
they would avert. 1t is not then general choice.
but only choice out of three persons. Suppose
small State votes as the majority would do; then
the vote is superarogaory. Suppose small State
votes against the majority, then the responsibility
Is TO be deprecated But the small States have a
direct interest in the preservation of the power of
The great States to consolidate Their first inter-
est Is not in the election of individual but in
the preservation OF the federation. The small
States will, and ought to, surrender any rights for
the public good They held power NOT for the
small States, but for the whole Union. What is
The highest interest? self preservation. How is
the Federation to be preserved? How is the life
oil the small States to be preserved? If danger
threatens the Federation, oaly the great States are
adequate TO give it protection. The Teucers
must hight under the SHIELD of the Aiaxes in the
day Of battle, for the rights or existence of fedora
ton, If that day should ever come. 1t would be
an act OF madness in the small States, by stripping
OH ITS folds, or reducing its verge. 10 bring the
shield to the weight oftheir own arms. They will,
II wise night In the armor of Achilles. He hoped
no willy effort would be made 10 obtain this armor
He trusted that willy influence and persuasion NAV
mol prevail as OF old, to the destruction of of
the buiwarks OF the national government, and of
freedom 1t they should, i, would still be his
consolation TO have given his honest, though feeble
counseIs, to avert such an event
but few words more. We must have some
form oil general government. We can have no
security Tor our freedom, but in the principle of
States acting on the General Government. in a
federal capacity. 1t is impossible 10 separate this
federal principle from institutions, without
opening the door to evils of the most fatal charac
ter. But the diyestiture of the House of Repre-
sehtaives OF the power of election he regarded as
essential TO the conservation of the Union He
believed the election, of Chief Magistrate TO be
me Vulnerable point in the Constitution. II ia
there that the stability of the Government is mos,
doubtful. This election il the Roman Gulf. into
which we should throw whatever is most precious
to us, II 1t can only be closed by such sacrifice
ne oeeved the whole human race in;e ested in the
experiment OF free government we were conduct
ing. We must not then permit this source of dan
ger to remain. Take this power from the House
oil Representatives. Such was his object: this he
would do at all events. The interests OF freedom.
IN all countrie' and ages, tied up, bound, and
incorporated in cur experiment No less, then.
as philosopher, than patriot, he was pre-
pared Tor every sacrifice. And as the act af Cur
tius. supposing him to have saved his country
exered an influence all other countries and tmes
= SO would our act rebound, in effects incompara-
oily more extensive, and imposing, and bene6cent,
II we should be successful, by auspicous councils.
IN closing this chasm, which yawned in the Con-
stitutIon, from the perious Jurisdiction of the
douse OF Representatives over the election of the
Chief Magistrate OF the Union.
Mr.. Archer then concluded by expressing hope
thai the first resolution would prevail, and the
second be rejected
virtue Of deed Of 10 me nv Abraham II
~ Chdress, aud Of record the cIe ks office tbe