Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-03-09

great branches of the Federal Government, the
Executive, Legislative. and Judiciary, should DC
separate and distinct from each other, not only in
contemplation of law, but in point Of fact; and,
for this end that each should not only have its in
tlependent organization, but that the individuals
administering each, should be wholly free from the
control and influence of the individuals who ad-
minstered tue Others.
To secure this independence on the part OF the
President, and 10 prevent the legislative depart
ment from starving him into compliance win
their will, by Withholding his necessary support or
seducing him into aequiescence IN their views
BY tempting his avarice with augmented salary,
| (Fed No. 77,) it provided in the constitution
that he shall receive fired compensation tor his
services, which shall neither be increased nor
diminished during the term for which be was
elected.
To secure the independence OF the Legislative
| Department, and to prevent the Executive from
influencing its deliberations. by retaining set OF
dependents in the Senate and House OF Represen-
tatives, always ready, like the placement in the
British Parliament to support the measures OF adj
| mipistraton, il was provided IN the same consti-
tuition, that persons holding Offices under the au-
thorty of the United States, should be wholly
excluded from the floor of Congress
| The Committee believe that this provision Tor
the independence of the Senate and House OF Re-
preeentativcs, though wise and proper as far as it
| goes, does not go far enough to accomplish the
object il had in view. They admit that the pre-
ssuce of Office holders in the legislative department
would be the bane of honest and independent le-
gislation: and they believe that the presence OF
Office hunters would be equally fatal. The dam
ger to be apprehended from each, is. in effect. the
! same. The Office holder would support the inca
sures OF administration for the purpose of saving
the Office which he had in possession; the office
hunter would support the measures, for the pur-
pose Of securing the Office which he had in expects
tion. BY either party, the interest of the country
would be sacrificed to the views of the Executive;
and the appropriate means for preventing this mis-
chief was, first, TO exclude Office holders from seats
in Congress, and this the constitution has done
aud, secondly. TO prevent Senators and Repre-
scntatives from taking appointments from the Pre-
sident under whose administration they had served
and this il has omitted 10 dc. The omission was
too material TO escape the observation OF those
who were not blind 10 the defects Of the constitu
ton; and their animadversions were too loud and
vehement TO pass unnoticed by the great advo-
Gates for the ratification Of that instrument. The
authors Of the Feleralit in their No. So, felt II to
be their duty to meet the objection which grew Out
Of this omission. But even these great men, with
their superior Abilities aud ardent zeal in the best
| of causes, could attempt no more than 10 diminish
the qusntum of danger which coald not be denied
to exist, and to cover, with brilliant defamation
a part OF their beloved constitution which euult
1 nOt OeoctcuueN. 1ucJ baius
! Sometimes we are told, that this fund of cor
truption, Executive appointmcnts,) is to be ex-
hausted by the President in subiung the virtue o
the Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other HOUSE
Is to be the victim. The improbability of such
mercensry and per6dous combination of the sever
al members of the Government, standing ON a,
different foundations republican principles will
we'll admit, and at the same time accountable 10
the society over which they are placed, ought alone
10 quiet this apprehension. But, fortunately, tn,
constitution has provided still further safeguard
The members of the Congress are rendered neligi
bic to any civil Offices that may be created, O
which the ernoluments may be increased, during
the term of Their election. No Offices, therefore
can be dealt out TO the existing members but sucl
an may become vacant by ordinary casualties; ant
to supposc that these would be sufficient to pur-
chase the guardians of the people, selected by the
Ipeople themselves, is to renounce every rule by
which events ought to be calculated, and to SUBJ
}s,itute an indscrfminaie and unbounded jealous"
with which all reasoning mast Pf ,s answer, though
Inc Co0ml isssuaht, was insufficient at the time
I ShRssgvsn. and that subsequent events have en-
tirciy iovadase it. II was insufficient because il
turned upon the false position that one Office could
only influence one member, whereas, in the opinion
of the Committee it might influence many; for the
danger 70 be apprehended from this source lies in
the pnrsuit, and not in the enjoyment of the Office
and many member. might be pursuing the same one
at the same time, and all upon the principle oil
devotion to the will Of the President and neglect o.
the interests of their constituents But whether
i good or bad at the time il given, there can be
90 question about its insufiicency at the presen,
time The Jaet upon which it rested has ceased
10 exist. 1t is ne Longer true that the President
in dealing out offices TO members of Congress-. will
be limited, supposed in the Federalist to the in
| considerable number Of places which NAV become
vacant by the ordinary casualties of deaths ard
Iengnanons; on the contrary, he may now draw,
for that purpose, upon the entire fund of the Exc
i cu,ive patronage. Construction and legislation
have accomplished this change. In The very first
| year OF the constitution, construction was put
upon that instrument which ensbled the President
to crea'e many aCanoies as he pleased, and al
any moment that he thought proper. This was
effected by yielding TO him the kingly prerogaiiye
of dismissisg officers without stbe Formally of a
trial The authors of the Federaiist had not fore
seen this construction; far from il they had as
serted the contrary, and. arguing logically from the
premises, (" that tho Diminishing potoer ,oos op-
puyfena,lt to the appointing po,oer," they had
maintained, in No. ~ Of that standard work that.
az the consent of the Senate necessary 10 the
appointment Of officer, so the consent Of the
| same body would be equally necessary to his dis
mission from Office. But this construction wa,
oyerruled by the first Congress which was formed
| under the constitution; the power of dismissior
| from Office abandoned to the President alone
and, with the acquisition Of this prerogatiye, the
power and patronage of the Presidential Office was
Instantly increased TO indefinite extent, and the
argument Of the Federslis against the capacity OF
the President TO corrupt the members of Congress
founded upon the small number of places which he
could for that purpose, totally overthrow.
So much for construction. Now for the effects of
4 L.; - ;.,~