Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1826-05-12

may distinguish between the objects
plated by the Executive il the proposed negotiations
and adopt ana reject others. And this high deli
cate, and important trust, the gentleman detuccs SIM
piy from poser to withhold the minister's salaries
(hc process OF the gcncmans argument appears To- me
simguar lis conclusion. lie lounds himself on
the legal maxim, that ic who has the power 10 rive
may whatever condition qualification TO the
gtt he chooses. ihis maxim. sir would be applicable
I'd the present. case ii were the sovcreirns of the
country; II all power IN hands; if the public
money entirely own; if our appropriatiun OF
twere grace and favor; and if there were no res
traints upon MS, hut sovereign will and plea
But tue Argument totally forgets that we arc
ourselves hut public agents. that our power over the
Treasury is bur that of stewards trust fund; that
we have nothing 10 give aud therefore gifts To limit
qualify: that it is much duty 10 appropriate TO
proper objects, to withhold appropriations from such
as are imcoper; and that it is tnuch and clearly,
our duty 10 appropriate IN proper aud constitutional
manner 10 appropriate at all.
The same honorable member advanced another idea,
in which cannot concur. He does not admit that
confidence is be reposet IN the Executive on the
present oCcasion because confidence, he argues i'm
Plies only, that not knowing ourselves what will be done
IN given by others, 10 those who are 10
act IN IT, that they will act right and know the
course likely 10 be pursued regard TO this subject by
the Executive, confidence can have no place. This
seems singular notion of confidence; it certainly is
not notion of that confidence HCh the constitution
requires branch of the Government TO reposc in
another. The President is agent but like OUR
selves, the agent of the People They have trusted to
ms hands the proper duties of his Office and are not
10 take those duties o his hands from any op
ion of cur that should execute them better our
selves. The confidence which is due from us 10 the
Executive and from the Executive to us, is person.
al, but official and constitutional. II has nothing Ia do
with individual lilings or dskngs; but results from
that division OF power among Departments, and those
limitations on the authority of each, which belong to
the nature and frame Of our government.
Hwouid be unfortunate indeed il our line of consti-
1,.:In ihrntn hoo
according TO opinions OF persons, sreryr this way
to-day from undue attachment, and the other way TO-
Ihorrow, from dstrus. dislike. This NAV sometimes
happen from the weakness Of virtues or the excite
ment Of passions but trust it will not be c0oIIv
recommended 10 as the rightful course of public
conduct
1t is obvious 10 remark, Mr. Chairman, that The Sc
nate have not undertaken 20 give directions or nstrc
tons in this That body CLOSELY connected with
the President in Executive measures. Its consent TO
these very appointments is made absolutely necessary
by the constitution; yet, has fiji in this or
any other case, to take upon Itself the responsibility of
directing Tue mode in which the negotiations should be
conducted.
For these reasons, Mr.. Chairman am for giving no
INSTRUCTIONS advice directions in the case prcfer
leaving it where, in my Judgment the constitution has
LETT ito Executive discretion and Executive respon-
sibi!ity.
But sir, think there are ether objections to the
amendment. There parts Of it which could not
agree to, Il 1t were proper TO attach any such condition
10 cur vote. As TO all hat part &c the amendment that
asserts the neutral policy of the nited States and the
lneXpedlcncy OF forming alliances no m n assenfs 10
those sentiments readily more sincerely than
myself. On these points, arc all agreed. Such is
our opinions; such, the President assures u.s. i'm terms is
his opinion; snc knox 10 be the opinion of the coun
try. Hit be thought necessary to affirm opinions which
no one either dciIes bis, by resolution of the
House, | shall cheerfuly concur in il. Bat there is
one part OF the proposed amendment to which could
not agree IN any form. wish ask the gentleman
from 10 1tvelr. Inn 4, 4
look at 1t again, and to whether he means what il
eX.-esses or implies; for, this OCCASION should be
gratfcd by seeing that the honorable gentleman
himself had become sensible that he had fallen into
some error, in this respect than BY seeing the vote +
the House against him by any majority whatever
That part of the amendment 10 which now object
Is that which requires, d condition of the resolution
before that the ministers ''shal not be authorized 70
discuss, Consider, or consult upon measure which
shall conint the present future neutral rights or du
ties OF these United States either as NAV regard En-
roPean nations, between tine several States of Mex
leo and South America"
need hardly repeat, that this amounts to a precise
Instruction II being understood that tie minister sa
not be authorized to discuss particular subjects is =
mode OFspcech precisely equivalent to saving provided
the ministers be instructed, the ministers being in
structed not 10 discuss those subjects After all that has
been said, be said, about this amendment beino
no than general expression ofopnion or abstract
proposition, this part of ar. exact and definite in
structicB prescbes to public ministers the precise
manner in which they to conduct public negota
ton; duty maniestly and exclusively belonging in nv
judgment, TO the Executive, and not 10 us.
But If we possessed the power 10 give Instructions
this instruction would not be proper to be given Let
examine it. The ministers shall not discuss cong-
der, or consult ;" &c.
Now SIR, in the first place. it is to be observed, that
they are not only not TO agree to any such measure but
they arc not to discuss it, fpropoed TO them they are
not to give reasons for declining it. Indeed they can
not reject t they can only say they authorized
to consider it, Would not be better sir to leave those
agents at liberty 10 explain the policy of our govern
nent fully and clearly and 10 show the reasons which,
induce us TO abstain far possible from foreign con
nexions, and 70 act in all things with scrupuous re-
gard to the duties OF neutrality?
But again They to discuss no measure which may
commit our neutral rights duties. To commit IS
somewhat indefinite. May they not modify, nor in any
degree alter our neutral rights and duties3 II not
hardly Know whether a common treaty of commerce
could be negotiated because all such treaties affect or
modify more or less the neutral rights or duties of the
parties; especially all such treaties as our habnual poll
= leads us 10 form. Bot | suppose The author of the
amendment uses the word in larger and higher sense
Ic means that the ministers shall not discuss or consi