Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-05-16

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the -, omp5n tlld much more ceritvit
invtFN kOnstqus lght TO all means NED dial
ry 10 enable the stiief slaiures 10 exercise Ill r
right TO cominand-tl would the state legish-
lures possess the pov II 10 burst open the doors
oil the Senate, expose Pc executive proceedings o
the world, for the purlbse of enabling them o
obtain the information NECESSARY in the execution
OF their right to commail; and impose on the Sc
majors the consequent obligation to obey such com-
mand III these monstroA results should lie deni-
ed, then is the denial still further demonstrators
that the mere RICH, to choose does not by coase-
quence involve the rigt, to instruction. any Of
the other consequence deiuced from il.
&c But if the General Assembly claim not tie
power of commanding the executive and ju-
dietary of the state, in the discharge OF Their
respective functions, whom it cOnstiutiorally
chooses, upon what ground is it that il
claims the right of commanding the Senators
OF the state in Congress, in the discharge OF
their executive and Judiciary functions: Ii the
principle of incompalibility should be presumed TO
operate IN one case, surely it would operate much
more strongly in the other-yet the resolution OF
the General Assembly makes no exception of is
con'io! over the Senators ia these Important res
poets. think may safely trust these observa-
tons 20 demonstrate, although the subject is sis-
ceptibie of other demonstrations, that, in puDhc
concerns, the right 10 instruct is not consequence
Oi right to choose: IL not being an uniform and
universal result from that cause, must OF course be
imputedto some other. Tbs demonstration wifi
be made still more complete, by recurrence u
the reason and nature OF things, applicable ID
private concerns. The error OF the contrary opin-
ion In The present case seems to have arisen ;li0>
Sether from overlooking the principle and opera
lion o!an intermediate agency III elections, which,
as Tar as know, are exclusively applied 10 our ow
political institutions. Take the following illustrat
ton: i authorizes Il to choose agent or repIel
sentative for a, 10 transact AS business. u, ID
virtue oil this authority, chooses L, not To transact
BIS business, but A's;-whose agent or represent
tative Is Z, when thus chosen by Is Not BIS suret
y; for he has nothing transact for B, nor for his
benefit, but AS whose business he is to transact.
Who would then have the consequent Iieh, To in
siruc, T.! Certainly =, who is alone interested in
the agency OF &. ID could not derive any conse-
quentla! power to instruct L, i'll what manner to
transact Az business, merely from the lower 10
choose G., which, when he had executed, his power
ceased. Thus, when the people OF Tie United
States authorised the state legislatures 10 choose
two Senators to protect their rights, and transact
their concerns, they became the beneficial cens,i-
tuenis OF the Senators, and not the state egIsla--
tunes their intermediate agents; and tie right Of in
s'ruc:lon devoved upon the beneficial constituents
the Peopie nor does the right 10 instruct retained
by the beneficial constituent, even where there is
no intermediate agency find its foundation in the
right 10 choose, elect The right TO choo.e OF
elect may serve 20 direct the notifications in exc
cutting The right 10 Instruct, but is not the true
foundation OF tla right; its foundation has much
higher sanction; ii depends upon the great ri, hts
and Interests OF the beneficial constituent, put IT.
charge OF his agent or representative; whose every
act, in the representative character affects the well
fare Of the beneficial constituent 1t is upon these
obvious grounds that conceive myself the repre-
sentative OF the people of the United States Ill their
individual capacities generally, and of the people
OF tile slate OF Virginia particularly, and not the
representative of tie legislature OF Virginia. in IT'S
corporate character. Whilst therefore, take great
pleasure IN acknowl Lodging myself d servant OF the
people, III common thmy fellow servants OF the
General Assembly, must protest against being the
servant OF my fellow servants; serving the people
III communion; although employed in different &C.
cupaiions: or in other words, the representative Of
me Gene-al Assembly in its corporate character
NOT because have any objection 10 the appea-
non, II The TACT were so; but because the fact is
not So do not in my senatorial character rem
der scribe TO the General Assembly in its cor
pc ale character; but in that character I render
Se'oce 10 he people OF the United States, III their
Individual capacities generally, o2As 81 ne peonle
9t t aeiEtat; ~ s,tsSs- tjdrifculoyly" The
very thing said and repeated the critic say sough,
me laws OF congress operate; not the legisla-
lures collectively. Rendering the people service,
therefore, AMP in that sense their servant From
all these considerations, conclude, that if the
claim OF The right to instruct be made 10 depend
upon The rghlto choose, such claim is demon
strated 10 be unfouDded; even if the constitution
had been silent upon The subject. But the consti-
luton with IFS usual logical precision has subsan-
TALLY declared trhat shat be the consequence OF
The '1Sht to choose, in the particular case under
consideration. The words arc, &" the Senators,
&c. shall be chosen by the legislatures, Sc and
each Senator StGH haze one rote; here is an al.
iiimative, logical distribution Of rights 10 the
legislature is given the right to choose: 10 the
Senator, when chosen, is given the right 10 rote
as a consequence Of being chosen byhe icgisla-
t0re' but directly against this constitutional dis
'Ilbution OF rights and consequences, the General
assembly infer, that each Senator bar cOuseGnence
shall have no vote; and each state legislature bv
consequences shall have two votes For il an
pears to me to he in vain for the Senator 10 claim,
the direction and command OF his own vote, if the
state legislature have hc direction aud command
over him. 1t then tile constitution has not in d.
rect, negative terms, excluded the stale legislatures
from the command and control Of the senatorial
votes in Congress; Uncertainty has in Affirmative
terms, by giving TO the Senator'S respectively the
right TO vote upon principle Of direct inconpa-
libiiily with such Legislative control and command.
1t should also be recoecied that another virtual
exclusion IS contained in tie first section of The
constitution, in the following words: " All csis!a-
tive powers herein granted, shall be vested n a
Congress ofthe United States, which shall consist
oi Senate and House Of Represensstives''
now beg you, my friends, 10 ask yourselves
what has become OF this eccentric formidable
charge, OF my denial, that was in MY senatorial
character, the representative Of The people Of Viz
gina, when you must have observed, that 10 prove
That Was Tho renrnaenlatiun cr lL,n 5000 ~ "