Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-02-28

IL answer! will venture to assert that in every
instance In which the District system has been
made to give way to the General Ticket, party
OBJECTS have constituted the ayowed motive of the
change.
Out, sir, on this subject of State rights let me
warn gentlemen to beware of running the national
oarque into the vortex of real danger, while at
tempting to escape from those which are purely
imaginary. They regard the State governments
as sentines standing the watch-towers of liber-
W ana yer place those governments in a relation
~ the general government that must destroy both
.heir hdeiity and vigilance. l have shown, sir,
,hat where the General Ticket exists, the State
legislatures, by nomination or other modes of in
oeaton, viii, In practice, control and decide the
vote OF the State, for President BY bringing the
S.ate Legislatures into the operation of choosing
Tue Fresident, you make it the duty of those to
SCUM the alarm OF approaching tyranny, who have
oeen themselves instrumental in making the tyrant
~ would be just as wise TO expect the disclosure
OF felony, by participant in the per peraton of
~ 1he true mode OF preserving the guardian
vigilance OF the State Legislatures is to keen them
entirely out OF the sphere of the Presidential can
vass. Let them stand by disinterested specta-
tors, While the People choose the President 1t is
thus only that they can be preserved in the attitude
of sentinels
ALLOW me now, sir, to go little farther on this
subject, and ask gentlemen if it has never occurred
H.
nicate an artificial energy, morbid action TO des-
potism inthe general government?
Upon what principle is it assumed that the State
legislatures will be always on the side of liberty?
Does our experience warrant the suppositon
beg that gentlemen will do me the favor to open
their eyes, and look around them, at political events
that are passing, almost at the very moment in
which am speaking Have not attempts been
made during the present session. by the resolutions
IN sln 4
stubborn temper, into celebrity and piiancy more
compatible with the views OF the Executive Gov
eminent! Such, sir, is the fral security of liberty
when we rely, exclusively, upon holding one
power in check by another, instead of subjectng all
TO the control OF the People. The experience Of
all nations that have made the experiment, demon
strates, that it will eventually result in neretri-
cious combination between the powers designed
to act as checks on each other. What was the re-
al power to which the fathers of the Republic look
ed with dread and apprehension Not the Legisla-
tvs power oil this House, but the power of Execu-
tive patronage. Upon whom is il that this power is
likely to exert the most dangerous influence! I'm
questionably. Sir, upon small, pre-exis,ng bodies,
ike the Slate Legislatures, and not upon the mass
OF the People. The People of single electoral
district, would be more difficult to move, by Elk
ecutive patronage, than the Legislature OF whole
State. And, will venture to assert, that there
Is not one OF those DISTRICTS, in the whole Union,
that could have been induced, without any infor-
nation the subject, to instruct ihei Representa-
uves here, 10 give their support in particular
measure of the Executive Government Sir, a
President. coming into power, by the aid and con-
currence of the State Legislatures, would be ire
sistibe. These bodies would lull the People into
false security, and, while protesting TO defend,
would actually betray their liberties. But the mos,
extraordinary objection that have vet heard urged
against the District SYSTEM is, its tendency pro-
dlce consolidation. What, lie, me ask, do gentle
men mean by the term consolidation? Do they
use il as synonymous with Union? If that be the
case, admi, that the tendency of the District Sys
tenn will be to" consolidate the Union" the very
thing which the Father of his country declared to
be the primary aim of the Federal Convention in
framing this Government. But, that consolidation
which is really dangerous TO liberty, and which
would destroy the fcderatve character of our go
vernment, is the concentration of power in the
government here In this sense of the term, | de-
prccats consolidation much as any man, and the
tendency Of my proposition is TO produce result
almost precisely the of this. Instead of
concentrating power IN the hands of the Govern
ment here, 1t diifuses the most important of all
powers among the great body of the Peonle, and
likes 1t there irrevocsbly.
1t seems 10 me that reading of State
Rights is now, for the first time, introduced. I
have always regarded State rights, as standing in
tIO
vernment. But now the rights of the States are
brought out in array against the rights of the Peo-
pie. How can IL be conceived that we imuair
the rights of Stale by vestins the highest prero-
gatve OF sovereignty in the People Of that State
Virginia, voting by Districts, is Virginia still d-
vested OF none Of her attributes, a separate men,
Der OF the Coniederacy. God forbid tina, should
propose any thing absurdas to break down the
barriers which separate her from the rest of the
Union, and let in any foreign influence TO control
her political operations do not propose 10 i'm
pair the federative character of the Government in
the slightest degree. Each state will give precisely
the number OF electoral votes for the President
that she is now entitled TO give, under the existing
provisions of the Constitution.
But the concluding argument which shall urge
in favor Of the District System, is this The small
States will never consent 10 gveup their eventual
quality in voting for the President in this House,
unless the large States will consent to break their
power Of concentration and combination, by the
establishment Of the District System. In reference
to this Indispensable compromise, all the arguments
which go 10 demonstrate the expedIency of depriv-
ing this House of the contingent power of voting
for the President, are so many arguments in favor
Of the District System.
This brings me to the consideration of the second
and incomparably the most important branch of
the amendment that which provides, that in The
event OF failure Of The primary electoral vote TO
decide the election, the two highest candidates
shall be referred back 10 the People instead of re-
ferrng the three highest to the House OF Represen-
tatives.
In entering into the investigation of this part of
the PLAN which illustrates the genius Of the whole
amendment, propose to develop what deem to
be the true principle Of liberty, in the organization
OF our system Of government. Tn all The free 60
vernments that have existed, it will be found upon
examining their structure phlosQpsc9lly, that