Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-03-11
0oMaR EssIoMAL.
IN SENATE or THE U. STATES.
MAkCH /, 1926.

- NH. AaCHER'S SPEECH &C oNrrNuEn
Most of the objections the arrangement of I'll e
Constitution, Mr.. A. thought like those sometimes
urged against the arrangements of higher wisdom,
only specous till the design of these arrangements
had been explained This was the case with re-
sPect TO this subject OF the primary election of Pre-
sldent, in relation 10 which his friend from South
Carolina had been able to discover NO design. and
had supposed that we were left without the guild
ance of any fixed principles of regulation ia mat
ter OF this Importance. Hecould not conceive that
any principle presided when the rule was variable
with the legislation OF every State. 1t was mat
ter OF no difficulty TO admonish him of his error,
and to develop to his view principle of the most
profound and salutary design, presiding in this ar
rangement. Our first form OF federatlve Govern
menr, Mr.. A. said, had exhibited condition of
complete dependence of the general on the State
Governments. Perhaps from the Jealousy of ma :
tional power which prevailed no other form of a
national system would have been tolerated, ill the
inconroyer,ible testimony OF experience had de-
monstrated i;sdefects and ineffciences The whole
mass Of the functions of the General Government
were administered by single class of agents, a
representative assembly. We had no other GENERAL
Government than Congress when this plan came
to be substituted by the present form of federation
ii WAS necessary TO keep the two systems of a
General and State Government, in connexion and
correspondence, as parts of a consistent though
complex adjustment Of machinery. What were
the means by which this arrangement was to be
effected? II could only he done by making the
concurrence OF one part of the system requisite 10
the action of the other part Phe General Govern
ment was 10 take its life from the State Govern
ments, which were aniecedent both in existence
and authority. The dependence, then, which was
necessary to the congenial and harmonious opera
ton OF the two systems, must proceed from the
States, and rest on the genera authority in what
manner were the links OF this dependence to be
contrived? There could be bat two modes of this
dependence; the one Of the General Government on
the State Governments, for its operstion the other
officers. No other modes Of The dependence aid
necessarily concurrent action OF two political sys-
tens, could be conceived The first oil these
modes, however, the dependence OF the general
system on the States for its operation, had been
condemned by an experience that was unequvocal-
ly instructive 1t was the Old system OF requsition
which had become VIGOROUSLY effete, alter the
excitement Of The Revolutionary struggle, by which
alone il had been sustained, bad been Withdrawn
No resources then remained but the dependence OF
the General Government on the State Govern
ments, for the appointment OF its functlonaries.
70 give this absolutely and without qualification,
would make the dependence extreme, and might
obstruct the salutary efficiency OF the General
Government. Then qualified dependence must
DC TfSOrteu fescTNiHS W INV Otdts n
controlling instead OF appointing power, as re-
spected the selection Of the depositares and fune-
lionaries Of the General Government. As respected
one branch of the Genera! Legislature, the Sena-
torial, the power Of appointment, was given sbso-
lutely. This was not sufficient guarantee for
control, however, because the whole body OF the
Senate, not falling under the powef of dispiace
meDt at one time (,his other considerations FORBADE
a sufficient number OF the body would remain, IN
defiance of the exercise Of this power, to sustain
and to prosecute system OF dsorganizlng admin
istration. a further influence over the selection
Of the general functonaries, therefore required
10 be given. Over the House OF Representative
direct emsnation from the popular sovereignty
the control was slight one, land that gusrdedj
extending 70 the time, place, and manner, only
Of the elections. Bot, as respected the Executive
Department, the control was made effective: 10
reserved discretion was given over the modes o
appointment Of the electors Of The President Wit
design 10 what effect? TIA, tsestates nigh, b