The Massachusetts spy, and Worcester County advertiser. [volume] ([Worcester, Mass.]) 1825-1831, 1826-04-19


US 10 obvious hazard-tbat which is ;pparer
ana threatening, or, as the word annliner
ihphes, hanging over US. Was there the
, any such danger? The enemy had no troop
emDodleo near us-he had no ships in gu
waters, nor was il known that any force wa
uesuhed 10 be employed against us on tn,
contrary, his land and naval ornaments wer,
engaged in prosecuting, with unusual vigo
ana success, war in Europe. How, then
IL was said, could imminent danger of inys
sion exist 1t could not be inferred from an,
known fact, unless the beIligerent state of The
TWO nations, the mere fact that war existed
Is 10 be received as proof of imminent danger
81 invasion. This doctrine would be too
nroad, as 1t would lead to results both alarm
ing and dangerous.
~ ~. declaration of war alone should justify
calling
then would II be in the power of the United
States to convert the militia at once into a
standing army, and TO hold every man liable
10 do duty in the service during the continu-
ance OF war, if it were, like the late wars
IN Europe, protracted for twenty-five years.
power like this, exerting itself upon the
! population Of this country, would too much
resemble the Objectionable and arbitrary con-
| scriptive system of France. The trainers of
Inc Constitution, when they gave authori-
~ to the United States 10 employ the militia
| IN only three exigencies, and those of press
ing character, requiring immediate military
and TO sustain the government, could never
nave imagined that out of that authority a
constructive power could have been raised
and claimed, by which the whole militia
might be converted into a standine army. for
The general and ordinary purpose of prosecut-
| ing war.
1t was also commended, as appears by the
documentary proof, that the measures of this
government show that no imminent danger of
invasion existed; Tor on the 3lst of July,
1912, the Secretary of War addressed letter
10 the Executive of the State, in which,
among other things, he says, 81 am COM
nanded by the President to inform your FIX
ceilency, that this arrangement of the militia
was preparatory TO the march of the regular
troops to the northern frontier. The exigenc-
es OF the service have required, and orders
nave accordingly been given TO Mai. Gen
Dearborn, to move the regular troops to that
frontier, leaVlng cufficient number to man
the guns 10 the garrsons on the seahoard, -
ne troops were removed to the northern
frontier, not to repel invasion, or to meet
threatened INVASION, but TO carry on offensive
operations by making the territory of the enc
design to call in question the wisdom of this
measure, 1t may be inquired whether the
PRESIDENT, when he adopted it, could have
apprehended imminent danger of invasion at
any point or place where the militia of Mas.
sachusetts could have been empoyedo If So,
would he have ordered the regular troops from
the district, so threatened and exposed, to
mace not in isnnA rdy Z TIL nav
| of the Secretary.
Again: the Secretary of War, in letter
| addressed to the Senate Of the United States
| IN 1913, in speaking of the division Of the
United States into military districts, says,
when this arrangement was entered into, il
"lll be observed, that there were no naenaceS
OF immediate invasion, and few militia in the
held.-lt was intended as measure OF pre-
caution, to guard against possible, but, as was
hoped and presumed, distant dangers"
The history Of events comes also in aid Of
this view OF the subject; for, although the
regular troops were Withdrawn, except sufi-
| Gent to man the guns in some OF the forts, in
others not sufficient number FOR that purpose,
and in others none at all; yet the district, for
( the defence (which the militia were demand
( ed, remained nearly two years in almost as
perfect tranquility as if no war had existed.
This brings me to inquire what The Execu-
tive of the State did. in view OF this state Of
things. He declined executing the order of
| General Dearborn, because be considered he
had no power to do otherwise. He consider
ed his power as limited, by the Constitution,
to the existence OF some of the exigencesmen-
! toned in that Instrument; and, in the absence
OF all evidence Of the existence of any ofthem,
! he considered that he could not execute the
ORDER because, in this country, no authority
I but the laws is known or acknowledged All
| persons, of whatever rank or condition. must
bow to the. supremacy of the laws, and no one
can either hive or exercise any power not de-
rived from them. II, therefore, the Constitu-
ton gives limited power to the President to
call forth troops under the Act of Congress,
upon the happening OF certain events, that
power is contingent, and the events must hap
pen before the power can be exercised. Ii il
be no, so, and the power is not to be consider
ed as thus circumscribed, it would be general.
and not limited; for there would be no adyan-
tage in limiting it by the Constitution. il the
officer to whom it is entrusted can exercise IT
without regard to that limitation. This limi.
tation of constitutional power over the militia
was considered TO be for the benefit of those
liable to do duty and SO, that they had a
j right to take refuge under the Constitution.
when called upon, il the right to exercise the
power did not exist. Hence, it was thought
that the Executive could not execute the or.
der of Gen. Dearborn, as ii did not rest uron
constitutional power. and, therefore carried
with it no obligation Of obedience.
Having now explained at large the reason:
by which the Executive was influenced, as
have understood them, perhaps incorrectly
but not Intentionally so, shall, without fur.
,her comment, leave them TO the considera.
ton Of the Committee, and inquire how (al
( the United States were necessarily affected b,
his dc cisioi.
BY the law of 1875, which contains the gen.
) eral provisions for calling the militia into the
J service OF the United States, the President i