Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1826-03-14

,e repressed by increasing tie eish, Ct the re-,
acting bodies
II had been admitted by the gentleman from S.
Carolina, that the State Governments were the
sentinels of the General Government. Why not
give them ward as well as watch? When they
stood upon the ramparts, why not confde to them
the artillery, which would turn the public sent-
ment against the enemies who might beleaguer the
Constitution. He fears they will be corrupted by
the power in quesion--that they will conspire
with the general government, and communicate to
it morbid activity This cannot be. Who ever
heard of one Government being anxious to usurp,
not for itself. but for another! For this reason
they will not conspire with the general
AT any rate, double conspiracy will be requisite.
This is not TO be presumed. If they conspire, they
produce new evil, and make no addition 10 that
which would otherwise exist. II they cnunteract
each other, on the contrary, they exceedingly
beneficial. What harm has the stream of State
concurrence done for twenty-five years? What
good didrot the power of Legislative action do in
1893? If pressed by the suggestion in question, a
reference the results of this action in that period
was the reply.
The principles Of his friend from South Carolina
especially demanded concurrence in these views.
He has insisted much on the great source OF dam
ger 10 be apprehended in the Executive. The pa
tronage of our Executive is represented as greater
than that of England The peculiar construction
OF our society, fondness for Office, and aviity
to be sejuced, have all been urged. Yet his friend
from South Carolina endeavors to knock down the
only check. His argument is irreconcileable TO
his principles. Here is check by which the Tx
ecutve is kept in complete control to public SEN
iiment. His friends rejection OF this check, must
spring from his idea OF the inetficiency of checks
There is safety in political Institutions without
checks and balances. Organized power can only
be restrained by organized power. The want of
an organized check was the reason of the submits
sion of Rome to the Neros and Caligulas. Let
Us look at Roman history. A bad Emperor was
put down. Did any benefit result! None
Things Immediately relapsed into their former
state. This was no action of restraint which was
regular or steady. The evil was giavated, in
deed rather than alleviated: for fear was rendered
more unsparing, and tyranny more implacable
The only Institutions which can alleviate despo-
tism organized Powers. What is the alIeyia-
ton OF despotism in Turkey, Religion an organ
ized power. The press is this check in more en-
ghlened countries The historical evidence is in
iav OF checks, and not against them When
Rome was founded Romuus Instituted Senate
a popular Assembly, and King; here we have ba-
lanced powers Servus Tullius, the wisest of her
Kings added TO these the influence of property.
This was another check and balance. The design
of The trbunes was TO give greater effect 10 these
balances but they destroyed the balances, and
gave the ascendancy TO democracy. Then the
rabble introduced Cesar. The State would not
afterwards have a free government when some
Emperor wished to re-establish it, because it knew
that the monarch better than the anarch; that
any despo,ism more tolerabe than tha, of uD-
bridled multiludes and confusion.
All historical analogy exhibit ed the same results
The gentleman from South Carolina seemed to
mink that England has rot system of checks and
f'lances. He maintained, on the contrary, that
England iourished by her balanced Constitution.
10 that she owes her uncommon power. 1t was
SAID that the corruption of the House of Commons
had destroyed this balance. This corruption was
however, countervailed by another power. The
apparent disturbance of the balance is corr eced by
the Lress. Lord Coke said, Parliament was a
place where the people speak their mind England
Is represented fairly by her newspapers. These
are in effect, her Parliament, where the Peon,e
speak their mind. These keep the House of Com.
mons from entire subserviencc, and coun,eract the
evils oil the septennal system. This is the balance
system. Melancholy indeed would il be for the
human race, II there were no instance OF balanced
government. If he were to define despotsm. he
would call il unbalanced government We have
not only Legislative, Judiciary, and an Execu-
1--WE, bnt we adds second balance of two govern
msnts, and third, OF two principles in one General
Government federal and a national Webave
therefore, carried this excellent doctrine of balances
further than any other people.
lie put this discovery among the creates, which
the world ever saw. was next to those of Co
Pernicus, Newton and Columbus. Columbus
gained his immor'alii by the discovery of new
World; we have discovereda new method of 20
vernng this World, by making the seat of free
principles, The influence of which is felt 10 the
remoies' corners of the Universe. Yet this admi
rable system is sought 10 be DESTROYED for the sal.
OF political abstraction-Ihe abstraction which
required the reference of all power to popular
agency for its discharge But, allowing the ius
iice OF the abstract principle, it had no application
IN the present discussion, because the real mport
the principle required the reference of power TO the
co stiiuent body, whatever ii might be; and The
- ates the people contemplated, and acting not in
am aggregate capacity, but as members of political
Communities, were the constituent bodies conteu
plated By the Constitution in relation TO the cleo
ton of the President. This was not only apnareo,
from the terms OF the constitution, ia Tie clause
which it was sought by the present proposition of
amendment 10 reform, but it verified by the |
express authority OF the commentary of the Fede- |
raist, in which il was explicitly asserted that this |
election is 10 be made by the States in their noli
iicai character" But neither was this principIe |
Just in its application 10 ordinary representative
system OF the expedency OF referring every spe- /
cies OF political agency directly to the PeopIe II
conduced neither to the security, the dignity, or
the real efficiency OF the People, to have agency |
forced on them to this extent. The avowal oil
such doctrine might be unpopular, butbe had no |
objection to the avowal OF unpopular doctrine if
he knew it to he salutary and Just. He would not |
shrink from opposing stream of error, because il
approached him in broad and furious torrent The
effect OF this doctrine of the reference of perpe
tual and engrossDg political agency Of the people,
was TO make them tyranis first and slaves after
wards. What have we seen in The popular Co
OF Greece and Rome? The effect of