Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1825-09-16

ACT Oh 1913, either with post acto retrospect
tive law 1t has relation period anterior to its
passage; it does not refer to time that has already
e'apsed it affects rights vested or contingent; nor
does 1t demand tue discharge of duty never be-
fore exacted and performed In our examination of
this subject have for the sake of argument taken il
for granted that this Act did impose upon the Chancel
Tor ''new condition obgatioun which in point of
fact was groundicss assumption. when Chancellor
Taylor was elected Judge of the Richmond District the
law OF 1901, then IN force fixed his residence at the
Cityo Richmond. When that act was repealed by the
Aco 1913, the latter contained provision substan-
p'y the same with that in the former that he should
still remain there. This is new condition or obi
gatIon;" is only continuance of the terms of the old
coDdton and obligatjonn annexed to the Office at the
time he was elected and commissioned it is simply
reenactment of the former law relative to his location
Let us investigate little more closely, the consequent
resulting by fair inference and necessary implication
from the Chanceor's doctrine. The of 1901, be-
ing repealed BY that of 3l3 course prescribe to
him no obligation, terms conditions. The act of
.3l3 does prescribe to him the duty of residing ia the
City of Richmond he always had done under the for
mer law but being passed after his acceptance of his
commission is, in his opinion eek post facto," and
he peases; whether within without the limits of the
Chancery District The act of 1901 is rescindcd, and
no law, which can now be enacted by the Legislature,
can agreeaby to the singular and extraordinary notions
which he entertans OF the nature of sea post fucto"
laws, bind him. What is the consequence? He may
remove his MootCourt to any County in the State and
provided he attends regularly his Courts in Lynch
burg and Richmond in despite of Acts of Assembly, and
the interests OF tue community he may still retain his
office. The wisest and salutary measures which
the Legislature adopt for the promotion of the public
welfare and the general good, may by him be thwarted
and defeated. There many instances in which, if
the Court of Chancery do Immediately interfere the
remedy OF the party gone foreyer-the injury which
may be sustained by the slightest delay can
afterwards De adequately redressed rreparable damage
may be done Ina variety injunction cases. the inter-
position of the Court to be eectua be prompt and
instantaneous How these Inconvenience to be pre-
vented or guarded against?n short, how the very
objects for which Courts Of equitable jurisdiction are
established to be effected if the Legislature cannot con-
sttutionally direct public officer change his resi-
dence when the interest and convenience of the people
render it necessary?
But says the Chancellor the term ex post facto is
properly used to convey the idea that prior right can
net be controlled by posterior law unless with the
consent of the party to be affected" by it. This we
deny; and if the Chancellor means to assert that a
'pror right cannot be controlled by pose,ior law
we have hesitation in saying that the position is not
was it law; and we challenge the production
of any adudcated case either in England or America
support principle which our humble opinion is
utterly rreconclable with the ceares deductions of
81,
zion of country. The instances already enunera-
ted IN which real property takenfrom the citizen and
10 almost every without his CONSENT for roads mill
seats, canals, light houses Notifications and other pub
tic buildings, conclusiveIy prove that the Legislature
may rghtfuy and constitutionay exercise this power
The General Assembly of Virginia, in 1886 converted
all estates tail into eesimple and although this act de-
prIved many individuals, against their will of rights
already vested, yet member either of the Bar
the Bench has intiinated even doubt of its
sutonaldy.
But concede for moment that prior right can not
be disturbed by poscror law the Chancellor terms
IT. and what advantage does he derive from the adms-
sion What prior right of his does the Act of 1918 in
fringe! He obeys much of that law, requires him
to hold Court in Lynchburg while in the BREATH
he refuses to observe that portion oft which designates
Richmond as his ''pIace of residence" As the Chan
ceIIor bound by the Act of 1901 locate himself
IN this City and the Act of 1913 only exacts that he shall
still remain here, feel great difficulty in discovering
what right either vested contingent prior or poster-
or, is impaired by tie provision of the latter law. All
his rights Judge conferred him. not to crafty
his ambition subserve his interest but for the public
veal The independence of his tenure,-hodinr his
office during good behavior is not personal privilege;
1t is the privilege ofthe People. When it is attacked
the Liberties of the community arc endangered. But
TO say that the Independence of the Judiciary assaed
by law, which, for public convenience, insists upon
Judge residing at particular place. is too absurd 20
need serious refutation. We should not be able to
retain our gravity, when discussing question so rid
culous.
The term post facto, is, how ever, employed bv
Judge Fleming in Eiot Ex'or VS.. Lyel, Bird Call. in
the same sense 10 which he uses it. We aro =, ;r N