Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1824-01-10

tion that subject, so delicate in its chnrac-
Ter, had hitherto been commented upon in
| this House with so much freedom, aud yet
without tl,'. least asperty. Ii clearly showed,
| proof of that could be- necessary, that the
objects Of all were only such az, in their diff
ferent views of the matter, ought in justice to
be obtained. The great departments of the
GovrrnmeDt We're, the Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial. The latter is organized by the
two former and the Influence of the rrspec-
tive states, in -. organization, is of course the
same as IL is IN the other two. In the choice
at the Executive, and in the popular branch
of the Legislature. each state has rpIrcscn-
t,tion proportioned 10 lis representative num-
hers, with this exception, that, in the choice of
the Executive, an addition of two votes was
given tn each state, without regard 10 its
numbers, or the amount of IFS contribution 10
the public treasury. But in this branch oftbe
Legislature the case is widely different. Here,
In consequence of the popularity of our con-
di,ion, at the time of the adoption of the Con
stitution, the equitable principle of represen-
taiion, founded on population and contribution,
has been entirely disregarded. Here, each
state on the score of its sovereign character,
has equal weight and what, he asked, was the
relative importance of this branch in the go
vernmcnt? He would not say il was that by
which all the efficient power of the govern
ment was controlled, but he would say, that
hut slight consideration of the constitution
was necessary 10 show that this branch did
5" more than any other. With the single e&-
ception of originating revenue bills, its legisla-
tie powers were CO extensive with the po-
pular branch. No law could pass without the
assent of the Senate Almost all the inn
portant proceedings of the Executive, are sub
Ject TO lis revision. All appointments require
It's appropriations unless its assent is first obtain
ed 10 law pro, ding a different mode. The
consent of two-ihirds of this body is necessary
To The validity of all treaties and IL has The
sole power TO try lmpeachments of all the high
officers OF the government, as well Executive
as Judicial. In branch of the government
possessing such extensive powers, the small
but patriotic state of Ihinois, with pOpula-
ton ofGft.y.fce thousand, has representation
equal to that of Pennsylvania, with popu-
laiion of one million aud .Gfy Mousand.-
Inc hve largest states in the confederacy, viz.
ONO, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and New
York, with population of four millions eight
hundred thousand, have a representation but
equal tn the FIVE smallest states, with popu-
iatIon ofthree hundred and tJffy-L,ree thousand
weary one hall OF the nation, residing in the
five largest states, has representation but e.
quail TO the one twenty-seventh part, residing
In the five smallest states. About one-haIf the
whole people, residing IN FIVE states, are re-
presented here ny ten voices, whilst the 9th
fr hall are represented by thirty four voices.
The dfsproportion of the relative influence of
Inc several states, having reference TO their
population, as a just basis of representation,
cannot fail TO strike every mind The same
Inequality existed at the adoption of the con-
stitution, but in much less degree. SThen,
taking an average of the population of the
states, and considering those as small, who do
ttNt IN a.. H..
majority now, by the admission of new
states, with assent of the old, they are In
minority. There were, at that period, eight
large and five small states. Now, by the same
criterion, there would be found 10 be but ten
large, and fourteen small states. Still this
was all right u was according iu the compact
INTO which all the States had voluntarily en-
tered and he fervently hoped for the peace
and happiness of the peOpl.. of these states
that the day might be far distant, when even
a desire should be entertained to alter it.
but, when 1t IS proposed so to change the
Constitution, as to reduce still more the rea-
I'VE weight Of the large states, in the general
scale, II surely becomes proper 10 reflect on
the existing condition Of things And in view
OF that, he asked, whether il was reasonable
TO expect the large states will ever assent to
the proposition made by the gentleman from
missouri, reducing their political weight in
me confedfracy, without concession of any
kind, on the part of the other states? He
thought not. Still, as one of the Representa-
tIves of one of the large states he would give
MS assent to the measure proposed, of divid-
ing 'he states INTO districts for the choice of
Electors, provided it was done in the spirit
winch produced the Constitution, that is, a
siirlt OF mutual concession. He was willing
Tor one, to make concessions for the general
harmony; and all he asked was, that they
should be- reciprocal; and those, he thought,
could, with care and justice, be made. BY the
present Constitution, in the event of no one
person having majority, for the Office of
President, Of the votes Of the Electors, on the
first ballot, the chOice devolves on the House
OF Representatives and, in such choice. each
state has an equal vote. Ii is believed. that. AT
the time OF the adoption of the Constitution,
the contingency on which this result was
made to depend, was not Thought likely 10
happen. And, It Is supposed, that, from the
great number Of small states since admitted
into the c0nfederacy, and from other causes,
Its occurrence for the future may be- frequently
expected. Ii is reasonable 10 Suppose, thai
Indsmuch As 1t WAS evidently the leading de-
sign of the constitution. that in the choice of
! President and Vice President the states
should be represented, with the exception al
ready noticed, according tn their relative
numbers, and, as they deem IL but lust, that
| such should be the case, this feature i'm the
Constitution IL, by the large states, considered
InequtabIe. Bot, what is of greater impor-
lance, the provision bringing the election to
The House of Representatives is deemed oh
1cctionable by all the states, on the ground
That 1t jeOpardizes the purity Of the election.
and exposes the whole system TO danger, bs
hordIng facilities to The corruption of part
| 10 this wide spread apprehension was well
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