Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1824-11-16
us now resume the examination Of the cd ar
ucie, sec. L. cl II, with which we commenced.
and let us SEE

ucie, sec. 1. CT. II, with which we commenced
and let us see--
"haher an election appointment of sieers Of Pres
deaf and Pie the direct, sho
made oy 'f"fe' Gun be righy exercised iegsa
f"e heTec or oy fhe executive, Judiciary of state or
any body ether bsan the people tAem,,ivs,.
Whence is the power to appoiot electors do
rived Is II - power which the people eyer.
cIsed M their highest sovereign capacity be-
fore the formation of the CONSTITUTIONS Of IN.
United States, or IS II power unknown be.
'oie mar peri"d, ana which those only are
entitled tn exercise, who are parties Ia that
compact, The states, or, wha, has t.en sheer
TO he the same thing, the people of the STATES.
IN their highest sovereign capacity, before the
an"p''on OF demonstration, were completely
sovereign and independent. sin that sens,
tue constitution was submitted TO them: in
'nat sense 1.-THE states" ratified il ; and in thar
sense OF the term Estates" they are cnnse
quen''y parties To the compact :" And what
ever powers the states claim tn exercise inthe
the lsdsr palss clearly
The states, previous TO their adoption OF The
constitution, were completely sovereign, yet
they made no appointment of electors, and
not until they adopted that instrument and
thereby became parties to that great league
ar pact could they claim to exercise the rish
Of appointing electors Of President and Vice
President BY this compact they pledged
themselves to each other, ampng other things,
that the states should elect or appoint electors
10 choose the President and Vice President.
The Constitution Of the United States is n
great arrangement, and distribution of powers
10 b" exercised by the different persons, de-
partnents, and Indies prescribed in the mstru-
inent to be exercised too, in the sense I'M
derstood ut the time it was framed and
adopted. Ii these Fundamental arrangements
of power can be disturbed, at the pleasure, and
upon the Interpretation, of any of the parties
to the compact or of any Of the bodies, de-
parimeDts or persons to whom power is dele
gated by the constitution; it varies from all
other compacts ever made among men. Such
AN Interpretation will destroy the very nature
of the government. If the election of electors
can be made by any other persons than those
upon whom II Is enjoned by the constitution
the whole structure of the government be-
comes ai once altered, not by two-thirds of
The states, hut u may become so by The plea
sure of one. IL a state can permit its Iegisla-
ture to make this appointment of electors, by
the same power, the election may be mad.
by the executive Or the Judiciary thereof, or
the state might authorize this appointment TO
be made by a foreign potenfate.
Having shewn the meaning of the words
1
lected from the clause itself; and having also
sbewn the sense in which these terms were
understood when the constitution was framed
and adopted let us now enQnire what con-
struc'ion Is best calculated to preserve the lib
critics OF the people. e
| Some OF The purest and most distinguished
| patriots of the revolution entertained seri,,,s
| appreheDsions of the interference of foreign
nauns 10 this important election.
| 10 the d'hates of the Virginia Convention
Mr.. Grdyson says, we know that there
scarcely ever was an election of such an Of
, lcer, without The lnterpostioD Of foreign
! powers Two causes prevail 10 make them
intermediate in such cases one is To preserve
The balance ~ power: the other 10 preserve
their trade. These Causes have produced
'mterirrenccs OF foreign powers in the election
! of The kiug of Poland George Mason saws.
That the powers Of Europe will interposr,
and we shall have civil war in the bowels
OF our country, and be subject to all the bor-'
'rors, and caiamltIes of an elective monarchy
These approximations too were felt, undsr the
thorough belief, that The people were 10 choose
The electors. This is admitted throughout all
The debates of this cow eni0n, aud this very
Circumstances was relied on, by those friendly
To the adoption Of he constitution in that con-
ventioD, as the ntans Of averling the evils ne
cessarlJ iDcideDtalt To TIE election of the FIRST
magistrate OF an extensive empire and il is
confidently believed, That this clause of the
constitution could have been successfully vim
dcated in Virginia, and throughout the Uuit
ed States, only upon that ground. IL the
pOwer OF appointing electors, given to the peo-
pie, can, by The legislature of state, be right
| fully transferred from them to any other body,
eau II bn believed that the day will never ar
rive, when we shall see the interference of
| fnrp IN t,; 1T
less this power be exercised by the people,
the ImProbabifty of such case is not very
remote. We have already seen a majority of
the members of a state legislature give them
selves mp to- the seducti0ns ofa great land spec
uiatOn; and surely it can be no great stretch
Ut creduliiy To suppose that the time will ar
rive, when a foreign nation will see its adj
vantage in uterine ddIing in this election of our
chief magistrate. Nor is il unreasonable To
suppose that such interference might be
rlfrctu4IIy exerted by largesses Of various
kinds. But allowing The iinprobabiIiiy of
any such interference for the present, because
| 10 one can pretend that aDy such Interference
has been attempted, yet such case becomes
quite practicable and almost certain, If This
| power IS exercised by any other, than the
people Themselves. Bot foreign interference
| for the present out OF the question, some Sc
| rIons Inconvenience force themselves on us
90 the present occasion. 'Aooiher, and no
less important desideratum is,tbat the execu-
tive should be independent for his election,
as well as his continuance in Office on all, but
the people themselves. He might otherwise
be tempted 10 sacrifice his duty 10 his CON-
/ pldIsaOce for those whose favour had bren
necessary to his election and TO the dura-
tion Of his official consequence" Add surely
II is desirable that even the OdIOus suspicion of
such possible sacrifice Of duty should be re.