Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-04-09

yves may control the other six-seventils unon
the election of President. And this is the O.
Their great federal feature ofthe Constitution, to
which some gentlemen of late appear To he
much attached. Under one of these great fedc-
raj features ofthe Constitution, the power of the
small states may be completely merged in the
| election by Electors. Under the other. the
power OF the great states may be as completely
merged, In the election of u President, in the
llouse OF Representatives. Can any thing be
more homogeneous, more preposterous, more
monstrous! The venerable gentleman from
'irginia, who fears the national, but is charmed
with the great federal features of our Constitu.
ton, compares the operations of our government,
TO those ofth steam engine-and he informs us
OF variety of safety valves, by which the steam
| may pass of, without danger to the machine.
| do not perceive the efficacy of those safety
valves, In the dangerous operation of choosine
President of the United States. If we cont.
nue. those two great federal features of our Con
sttution, without modification, the engine will
not bear the force to be applied; the steam will
become irresistible; we shall increase the pres
sure, till we burst the boiler.
The gentleman from New York, (Mr. King !
VINO was lately In favor of the resolutions repor-
ted by the committee, has become reconciled TO
the great federal feature of our Constitution. bv
which the small states may completely control
the large, in the election of a President-at
which L marvel much. If that gentleman will
agree that bare majority of the Representa-
tives of thirteen small states, consisting of tbirtv
one members, less than the number of Repre-
sentatlycs from his own state, shall have power
to choose President, against the will of hun.
dred and eighty-twO Representatives, will he
not give them the power to support the Prcsi-
dent they may thus choosea The power that
can create and appoint, should be the power TO
uphold and defend. Otherwise, there can. be
government. Will that gentleman agree, that
the supplies necessary for the support of the go
vernment and the administration, shall be gran
ted by the House of Representatives voting by
states? VIII he consent to = rrle, that i'm case
the two Houses of Congress disagree as to the
SUBJECTS from which our revenues shall be raised.
the objects upon which our treasures shall be
expended, the case shall be decided by the 1T.
OF Representatives. voting by states? This
might be. highly gratifying to the states, could
1t be permanent. But, it is evident that such
state OF things could not exist for single year.
And yet, some gentlemen arc recoucilcd TO
system by which a minority of the House of Re-
representatives., as small, by possibility, as about
thirty-siX, out of two hundred and thirteen
while not dollar can be appropriated for the
support of such a President, without the concur
ring votes of majorities in both Houses of Con-
gress. President elected by minority, must
be overwhelmed by opposition.
:
The small states, in the House of Representa-
tlves, can choose President against the voice
OF the large, and attempt to alter the relative
power OF the states, in this particular, even with
their own consent, for it cannot be otherwise is
considered as deadly blow at the power of the
small states-a power necessary to their exis-
tencc- Is it necessary to the existence of the
small states, that they should possess power,
under any circumstances, to impose President
upon the United States, against the voice of six
sevenths, or even against the voice n majority of
the people? Is it necessary to their existence
that they should have more weight in such an
election than their federal numbers would give
them? The exercise of this extraordinary pow
er ofchoosing President, in the House of Re-
personalities, has occurred but once in six and
thirty years, and even that afforded no peculiar
advantages to the small states. On the contra
ry,git put in jeopardy their very existence. A
combination amongsix of the large states can
completely control the residue of the states up
on the election of President by the electors, and
this power may be called into operation every
four years, and may be continued without in
tcrruphon, as long as those states can agree as
to their dividends, while the small states can only
come IN for casual exercise of their extraordi.
nary power, when the great states disagree a
mong themselves, and which has happened but
once since the establishment of our government
This power, however, which may be casually
exercised by the small states must and will lead
to combinations among the large states, to pre-
vent resort to the House of Representatives
regard to their own interests imposes upon
them the necessity of such combinations; an an
omaious case OF necessity on the part of the
strong to combine against the weak.
vi what advantage is the power to the small
states, which has been exercised but once since
the establishment of our government, and was
then considered as great calamity? What adj
vantage can there be in retaining powerwhich
1T will be dangerous to exercise None. Am
bilious individuals i'll the small states may casu-
ally derive an Importance from their situation,
in tue exercise of this power, but this can be of
no importance to the people of the states to
which such individuals may belong.
There is power, however, vested in the small
states, beyond their numerical strength upon
which their existence depends-thcir ear,al vote
in the Senate of the United States. But this
is power, not to give the small states an undue
influence in the choice of President, not to
enable them to impose lawsupon the large states,
but preventive power-a power to arrest the
progress of laws which might infringe their
rights or intercSts-lt is species Of yCto by
which the Senators of twelve states, however
SIM i the population Of those states, can cGcc-
tualiy prevent the passing of any law which
they may think against their interests. With
out this power, the small states mist Immediate
" fall prey to the large. Whether this prin
| ciple of veto should have been carried further
| by the constitution, it is unnecessary now TO
inquire. Fortunately, there is one point on
which this principle of veto rests in single
statcitis for the preservation ofthnt sacred part
of our COnstitution-the equal voteof the State
the only part which is put beyond the reach Of
alteration. BY the 9Th article of the constitu-
ton, no state, without its consent, shall be de-