Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-03-09

have plain and obvious relation to the mower,
expressly granted, and which, single state go.
vernment cannot regulate, naturally belong to
the General Government, unless il can be shewn.
that the regulation of those subjects by Congress
impairs the power Of the State Legislatures to
regulate their own internal police. In LAYING
down tins rule, have been governed by the
nVmg principle which Pervades and sustains
the whole fabric Of our complex system of 90
vernment, political responsibility. This should,
IN all cases, be co-extensve with political now.
er and wherever the power ola government o.
Perates upon the interests of those to whom it is
not responsible, there is precisely SO much des-
Potlsm. This idea cannot be better illustrated,
than by the very subject under consideration.
Roads and canals for the transportation of the
mail, and for bringing into efficient operation
the military power of the nation, are intimately
connected with the prosperity, the defence, and
the very existence of the Union. The whole
people of the United States are, therefore. in
terested In the execution of works of this des-
cription. Let us suppose, then, that the gene
raj government commences a road or a canal
Tor these general and essential purposes, through
the state of Delaware, and thai the government
OF that stateshould interrupt its progress.-What
would be the political anomaly presented The
government of Delaware emanated from, and
responsible to, forty thousand people only.
would be seen controlling the interests of the
whole people of the United States, amounting TO
nearly ten millions The people of the United
States have no representative in the Leesla-
ture OF Delaware, and, consequently, no means
OF controlling its operations upon their interests
but by the supremacy of the laws of this eo-
vernment, In the case supposed, therefore. the
great interests of this republic would be subject
ed to the action of a power having every charac-
terlstic of dcspotism. 1t is true, it would be a
petty despotism, but it would not, on that ac-
count, be less despotic in principle. Iii would
not directly endanger the liberties of the coun-
try, 1T would weaken its energies and embar-
rass the essential operations of the government.
For, Sir, show me, in any of the subdivisions OF
this comprehensive scheme of representative
governments, power operating be oni as res
possibility, and l will snow you a power I'M
known to the system-a comet, let loose from
the power OF gravitation, winch must inevitably
destroy the planetary har .tony by which that
system is SO admirably characterized.
Let us now reverse this picture, ADD contem-
plate the operations of the general government
upon the states, in fulfilling the great ends of its
creation. What are the principles which lead
gentlemen to presume that therights of the states
will be mfringed Is Congress, in its leeisla-
tive action upon the states, like the state legis-
latures In their action upon the United States.
irresponsible to those upon whom its power ooe
rates Are not the people of the states repre-
sented on this floor, the governments of the
states IN coordinate branch of the national
legislature, and both, In chief executive maois-
tracy And when the concurrence ofall these.
or OF two thirds of both branches Of Congress, is
necessary to the passage of any law affecting the
rights of people, or thu powers of the states,
have we not all the Safeguards which human
wisdom can provide against the abusive exer-
else OF power Sir, in the vast. field of leeisla-
ton over which our jurisdiction extends, we cam
not touch with rudeness a single chord of the
body polite whose vibration will not reach eve
ry department of this government. l conf
IDENTIFY assert, that this government is as popular
In ITS organization, and as safe depository of
power, as state government
With the aid of these general principles. I
shall proceed to inquire what powers have been
actually delegated to Congress, in reference to
the subjects embraced in the bill on your table.
am clearly of the opinion that, under the
general power to raise and appropriate money
to 6 promote the common defence and general
welfare" Congress has the power to appropri-
ate money for making roads and canals, with
the consent of the states in which these works
may be executed, without reference to any of
the other specific grants of power. As the no.
norable Speaker has distinctly dIsclaimed all
power over internal Improvements derived from
this source, Unjust beg the particular attention
OF the committee while attempt to explain nv
views on the subject, and remove the misap-
prehensIons which | believe to exist, as to the
eTtent OF the power which is claimed under this
clause. When l lay it down, that the power Of
raising and apPropriating revenue, like all the
other sovereign powers of this government. is
unlimited, unless where expressly restricted. |
beg gentlemen not to be alarmed at the promo
sitIoD, for will give it such an explanation as
VIII, think, render it perfectly harmless. The
powers to declare war, and TO raise and support
armies, are certainly as dangerous as any YES
ted In tins government, and yet, it will not be
pretended that they are sub ject to any other Ii
imitation than what will be found in the wisdom
and discretion of Congress. We have the same
power to raise an army of a hundred thousand
men IN time ofpeace, when we have occasion for
their services, that we have to raise a single re-
Slment In the greatest emergency. And though
every one will agree, that such freak of power
would be wanton and wicked i'm the extreme,
no one, presume, would venture to pronounce
it unconstitutional. In like manner, | main
tam that we have as clear constitutional power
to raise one hundred millions of revenue, with
out any reference to the other express grants of
power, that we have to raise a single million for
Tue urect purpose OF carrying these grants into
effect. The failacy ofthe arguments of gentle
men on this subject consists in surprising the
constitution leaves nothing to the discretion of
Congress; which, in fact, construe the consti-
tuition as you will, our principal security must
depend upon that discretion. In determining
what sovereign powers belong to Congress, no
discretion, admit, is gwen to us. The consti-
tuition is our in6exibe landmark. But, in de-
terTnlning in what manner, under what cirCurn-
stances, and for what purposes, these powers