Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1824-05-21

are almost independent Of the legislature who
elect them--A sadly corrupt subject truly
but we must dlssect il, in order to discover and
Improve the science Gifts organization.
But perhaps shall be told oa Que hand,
that the frnmers Of the constitution did not in
tend, by requiring these departments should
De separate aud distinct," that they should
also be tndeptndent Of one another. Perhaps
not perhaps the few states ia which the ezec-
''t're Is appoin'edby the Legislative department,
and the universal appointment of the .judicia
ry ny the legislative ar erecuiire or beth joint
", are innocent transfers aud not intentional
usurpat'ons, OF the sovereignty Of the people !;
mere copying sf the British policy mere
continuance VI the old colonial forms, withOu,
adverting TO the manifest iniustice aud disre-
gard to- The Sovereignty Of the lpeople, out of
which it originated.
Perhaps we shall he told. on another hand
that the people are incompetent to estimate
the qualifications of judges for surely we shall
not pc told that the people cannot Judge of the
qualifications suitable for the erecuiite depart
ment, since we see that Sc, enteen states
against Six elect their gov errors by the vote of
tue people, and all elect their legislators by the
vote OF the people.-And does it then require
SO much less sagacity to discover the qualili-
cations requisite to discharge all the conpli.
Gated and various duties of la,egiuer, all the
diversified labours Of chief magistrate, than to
desciy that little speck Of intellect which is
restricted to the narrow and almost unique
had like tn have said mechanical business of
expounding the sSriifen lao. Tit be SO in fact,
SO much the more depl0rable is that state Of
things which makes il so so much the more
deplorabie Is that state of our laws which re-
quires such transcendant talent TO expoupd
them, as scars above the comprehension Of
common-sense lift be so, I say most decid
eddy and fearlessly of contrad zion, that il ORR
CLIMATES from the abusive suing and latitude of
legislation, not from the rationale of the sub
jecf.
On the contrary,-if our la,cgirers were more
profound, our laws would be- more consistent.
more Perspicuous, less multitudinous; il is
these and thousand similar imp.riections in
our laws which require such inscrutable depth
OIL talent to penetrate their dark recess se.-it is
tins that perpleyes or prOfuundest Judges.
and involves their decisions in SD many neon.
ssfences, contradictions and reversions! Wei.
IL may require saSes to PROFOUND laws emana
ting from infancy and ignorance! Onnisci-
ence itself might he al IA loss, too frcqnen ,ly
even to make sense of them But il is not
here that meant to discuss the qualifications
proper for the due discharge of duties apper-
,ainiaS To these departments the pro, ince Of
ms part OF my subject is to appeal to the
comn0n-sense of every one, whether it be
not required by the fundamental principles of
our government, that as all power is nbe-
rent in the people," as !" the magistrates, are
trustees, and servants Of the people, and at all
times amenableto the people," they should al
SD be elected by the people; otherwise tn, Sc
principles are imperative and nugatory. TO
say more, would only b. latoring To pr owe a
self evident axiom. 1t may not be super Auous
to note by the way however, that the subordi-
nate officers IN each department, being minor
considerations, and amenable to the prime ipa
'ncumbents, are very properly subject to their
I appointment.
have said, that that arrangement which
makes one departSoent Of government DEEPEN
dant on aoolhrr, makes it independent, Of the
people reverse the proposition, and an e.
qually clear and indisputable truth results
that arrangement which makes any depaI {.
ment ofgovernmeDt dependant on the people
makes il independent Of any other. The in
dependence ofthe executive and judiciary oi
the election of the people, makes them de
pendant on the Legislature. Their election by
the people is the remedy for this dependence
at least in part, the remedy would be complies
were the control of their salaries also taken
out of the hands of the legislature, and xed by
the constitution.
As the idea oflegisIative despotism may be
sort of heterodOx in the opinions Of MANY
who have not duly weighed the subject, will
invite their attention to The authority of Mr..
Madison, Mr.. Jefferson, and the Pennsylvania
council Of censors, as exhibited by the fol
lowing passages Transcribed from our political
bible, the FederaIist.
"itsagTeed ON III Sides" says Mr.. Madison, thal
the powers property belonging 10 Of The depst-
ments ought not 10 be, directly and comp efeiy ad-
m nist Thy ther Of the other departments. I, Is
equally evident, that, in reference 10 each oihe,
neither OF them ought IN possess, directly, or ndi-
recily, an everything influence in The administration
OF their respective powers II will not be denied
tha power IS of an encroschng nature asd that IL
ought 10 he ehectuaily RESTRAINED iron, passing the
limits assigned TO il. After discriminating therefore
IN theory, the several classes Of power as they may
IN heir nature he Legislative, executive or iudicia.
ry The next and difficult task, is TO pGoyide
some practical security FOR each, agaps The invasion
o the Others. What this security ought to be- 10 the
> Eat problem to he solved.
l. VIII II he sufficient TO mark, with precision, the
nonh0aries OF these departments, 10 the constitution
OF Tue government, and 10 trust TO these parchmeu,
barriers against the encroncbing spirit Of power ?
ms ~ the security which appears to have Le en- prin-
cipay relied on by The coupiiers Of most D. tie
mer'can constitutions. But experience assures us,
I'D" me eihr"cy OF the provision has heen greatly
l"Ver-rated; ana that some adequate defence
rs ,nhspensabIy necessary for the more feeble a
gains' The more powerful members or The goyrrn-
meat. The fsgisfatre department is every where
exceeding The sphere Of lis activity, and drawing aI
power mo us mpetnons rorfer. 'sN' As the Iegis-
a'ive drparment alone has 10 the peck els Of
me people, AMI has IN jome constitutions full discrei-
ION, anu ~ MI prevailing influence over the pecu
mary rewards OF those who fll the other depar,.
mems dependence is thus created, in the later
whch gives SIN greater nciIiiy TO the eDcroach-
menis OF The former
=" have appeal ed TO oar own experience for the
Huib oi "h"t advance on this subject. Were il
necessary 10 verify Ills experience by particular
proofs, they might lie multiplied without end