Alexandria gazette & advertiser. [volume] (Alexandria [D.C.]) 1822-1824, 1824-09-09

At FIVE dollars per annum.
CAPTURE OF CORNW ALLlS.
We have heard il nten serted. says
the Norfolk Herald, that General Wash
ington, by web concerted plan OF hnesse
drew Cornw allis into the position at \ ork !.
the most favorable perhaps, that could
have been selected to prevent the retreat
ard insure the capture of the British army;
while Others, again, have contended, that
Washington had other views at the time,
that the movements OF CORVALLIS were
the result of necessity, and that his being
at York was rather the effect OF
accident than OF miscalculatIon. This
question may be considered as put at rest
Sy the following letter, published in the
American Museum tor Nav, 1871; which
is peculiarly Gpr0pos at the present time.
The Editor OF the Museum thus introduces
che letter.
set has been controverted whether the
capture OF Gen. CORVALLIS was the re-
suit ola plan preconcerted between Ge-
neral Washington and Count de GIasse;
or rather whether the arrival OF the
Count in the Chesapeake, was prede-
termined and expected by Gen w ash
ington, and consequently all prepara-
tons to attack New York, 3 mere hnesse
10 deceive the enemy; or whether the
real intention was against New YORK,
and the siege of York Town planned
uoon the unexpected arrival OF the
French feet in the bay, The following
Ietter will set the matter in its true
light
MouSr VERyoN, July 81, 1858.
S,a. | duly received your letter OF the
iatb instant. and can only answer you
briefly and GENERALLY from memory: that
combined operation of The land and naval
forces Of France in America, for the year
1881. was prsconcer,ed the year before;
that the point of attack was not absolutely
nyreed upon* because 1t could DOT be
forekpown where the enemy would be
mos, susceptible OF impressions; and De-
cause we (having command OF the water
with sufficient means of conveyance could
transport ourselves to any spot with the
greatest celerity; that II was Determined
by me, nearly twelve months before hand,
AT all hazards, 70 give out, and cause II
TO he believed by the highest military as
well as civil officers, that New York was
the destined place of attack, for the im-
portant purpose of inducing the eastern
and middle states 10 make greater eXer-
tions in furnishing specific supplies than
they otherwise would have done, as we'll
as tor the interesting purpose OF rendering
the enemy less prepared elsewhere; that
by these means, and these alone, artille-
~, boats, stores and provisions, were IN
seasonable preparation. TO move with Inc
utmost rspidity to any part OF the cont.
nent; for the difficulty consisted more IN
propIdiug. than knowing how to apply the
military apparatus; that before the arr val
ot the coun, de Grssse, II was the liked
determination to strike the enemy IN the
mos! vulnerable quarter, so as to insure
success with moral certainty, as our al
fairs were then i'm the most ruin0us tram
Imaginable; that New York was thought
10 be beyond ouI effort, and consequently
that the only hesitation that remained,
was between an attack upon the British
army 10 Virginia, and that 10 Charleston !:
aud finally, mat, by the Intervention OF
several communications, and some lnci-
dents which cannot be detailed in letter,
the hostile post in Virginia. from being
prouisional and strongly expected. became
the detfa;tiue and certain object OF the
campaign
only add, that il never was in contem-
plation to attack New York, unless the
garrison should first have been so tar de-
Farnished, to carry on the southern ope-
Tations, as TO render our success in the
siege of that place, as intalllble as
any future military event can ever be
made. For frepeat 1t and dwell upon 1t
again. some splendid advantage (whether
npon larger or smaller scale was almost
immaterial) was so essentially necessary,
10 revive the expiring hopes and languld
exertions OF the country, at the crisis 10
uuesiion, that never would have con-
scented to embark in any enterprise, where
nm, from the most rational plan and accu-
rate calculations, the favorable issue
should not have appeared to my view as
a ray of light. The failure OF an attempt
against the posts OF the enemy, could,
in no other possible situation during the
war, have been so fatal to our cause.
Il That much trouble was aiken and 6nesse
used, to misguide and bewilder Sir Henry
Clinton, in regard to the real object, by
Il titiOus communications as well as by
making deceptive provision of ovens,
forage, and boats, 10 his neighborhood, is
certain: nor were less pains taken to de-
ceive our own army; for bad always con.
ceived, when the imposition does not COM
pleteIy take place at home, it would me-
yer sufficiently succeed abroad.