Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-02-06

all who examine it," The gentleman thir5ks
that the designation of postroad withdrawsitthl-
trely, SO far it is used for that purpose. from
the power of the whole state; whilst the Prem,
Ident thinks it absurd to assert that a mere
county court may not defeat the execution 81
law OF the United States! The President thinks
mat under the power of appropriatng the np-
ney % the Y nned States, Congress may applylit
10 any object OF internal Improvement, provided
II does not assume any territorial jurisdiction;
and IN this respect, he claims forthe general COW
ernment more power than the gentleman sfrorr,
virginia assigns to it. And he fMr. ca must
own that he 80 far conceded with the gentleman
from Virginia. Ifthc power can be traced to
no more legitimate source than to that of an
propnating the public treasure, he Welded the
question.
Inc truth is, that there is no specific grant,
IN sss constitution, of the power of appropria-
tion; nor was any slich requisite. LISA result
ing power. The constitution vests in Congress
the power of taxation, with but few limitations.
to raise public revenue. 1t then enumerates
the powers of Congress. And it follows, of ne
cessity, that Congress has the right to apply the
money so raised to the execution of the powers
so granted. The clause which concludes the
! enumeration OF the granted powers, by authoriz-
ing the passage of all laws 6 necessary and nro-
4
OF appropriation. And the trainers of the con-
shtution recognize it by the restriction that no
money shall be drawn from the Trca sury but in
virtue of a previous appropriation bv law. II
was to him wonderful how the President sbould
have brought his mind to the conclusion. that nm.
der the power of appropriation, thus incidental
ly existing, right could be set up, in its nature
almost without limitation, to employ the public
money He combats with great success and
much ability, any deduction of power from the
clause relating to the general welfare. He
shews that the effect of it would be to overtu1n.
or render useless and nugatory, the careful en-.
uIneration ofour powers; and that it would con-
vert cautiously limited government into ON
without initiation. The same process of reason.
ing by which his mind was brought to this ms
conclusion, one would have thought. sbouIj
nave warned him against his claiming, under
the power OF appropriation, such a vast latitud
OF authority. He reasons strongly against the
power, claimed by us, harmless and benef
cent and limited, as 1t must be admitted to b
and yet he sets up power boundless in its OK
tent, unrestrained to the object ofinternal iU-
provements, and comprehending the whole.
scope OF human affairs. For, if the power exis
as he asserts it, what human restraint is the
upon 1t! He does, indeed, say, that it cannot
be exerted so as to interfere with the territorial
jurisdiction of the states. But this is a restric
tlon altogether gratuitous, flowing from the
bounty OF the President, and not found in the
prescriptions OF the Constitution, FIVE have =
right, indefinitely, to apply the money of the
government to internal improvements, or TO any
other object, what is to prevent the application
OF 1t to the purchase of the sovereignty itself ;f
state were mean enough to sell its sovereign
ty-to the purchase of kingdoms, empires. the
giooe ltsef! With an almost unlimited power
OF taxation; and after the revenue is raised. with
right TO apply it under no other Limitations
than those which the Presidents caution has
suggested, he could not see what other human
power was needed. 1t had been said, by Caesar
or Bonaparte, no doubt thought by both, that.
with soldiers enough, they could get money e.
nough; and with money enough, they could
command soldiers enough. According to the
Presldents's Interpretation of the Constitution.
one OF these great levers of public force and
power Is possessed by this government. The
PRESIDENT seems to contemplate, as fraueht with
much danger, the power humbly as it is claimed.
to effect the internal Improvement of the coun-
try. And, In his attempt TO overthrow it. sets up
one OF infinitely greater magnitude The guam
tum OF power which we claim over the subject
OF internal lmproven ent is it is true of greater
amount and force thin that which results from
the Presidents view of the Constitution but
then 1T is limited to the object of internal improve
ments whist the power set up by the Presi-
dent has no such limitation, and, in effect. as
Mr.. G. conceived, has no Limitation whatever
but that of the anility of the people to bear tax
alton.
(! With the most profound respect for the Presi-
dent, and after the most deliberate consideration
ofhis argument, Mr.. G.. could not agree with
| him. He could not think that any political
| power accrued to this governments from the
mere authority which it possessed to appropriate
the public revenue. The power to make inter
nal Improvements drew after it, most certainlv
the right to appropriate money to consuniate the
object. But he could not conceive that this
right of appropriation drew after it the power of
internal improvements. The appropriation of
! money was consequence, not cause. 1t follows:
1T does not precede. According to the order of
nature, VIC first determine upon the object to be
accomplished, and then appropriate the money
necessary to its contamination. Accordinp to
the order of the Constitution, the power is defin-
ed, and the application, chat is, the appropria-
ton of the money requisite to its effcctuation,
follows as a necessary and proper means. The
practice of Congressional Legislation was con-
! forInable to both. We first inquire what we
may do, and provide by law for its being done ::
and we then appropriate, by another act of le-
! gislation, the money necessary to accomplish
the specified object.-Tbe error of the arru
ment lies in its beginning too soon. II suppo-
ses the money to be in the Treasury, and then
seeks to disburse it. But how came it there ?
Congress cannot impose taxes without an OBJ
| Ject. Their imposition must be in reference to
the whole mass of our powers, to the general
purposes of government, or with the view to the
fulhlment of some one Of those powers, or to the
attainment of some one Of those purposes.-
In either case, we consult the Constitution and