Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-04-09

rous tendency ola central power, at the scat Of
the general government, combining to nominate
the President of the United States, eight months
before his election. Members of Congress be-
longing TO this central power, and, moreover,
possessing great talents, learning, and expert
ence, will obtain an influence with the exccu-
tive departments which must impair the lust
influence of others, not possessing the same
authority. With these determinations, such
members, received with distinction by foreign
ambassadors, and necessarily holding, under
circumstances of favor, intercourse with tue
chief officers of the government, will form con-
nexions, and establish regular intercourse with
persons of like talents and learning in the scvc-
raj states, and, III special manner, at the seats
of government of the principal states-thesc dis
tinguishcd men becoming the illuminate of our
country, and being regulated by sort of free
masonry, the sign and pass word of which WILL
at once, place the initiated in full confidence
and communion with each other, in all parts of
the Union. Such combinations secure TO the
members ofthe central power influence and adj
vantagcs in the making laws, as well as in the
procuring OF appointments of every sort, and,
above all III promoting the election of such cam
didate for the Presidency rs they may select
anu nominate. The members of the central
power VIII, under such circumstances devote
more oil their time, during the sessions imned-
ately preceding an election, in arranging. COM
blning, and extending the means To effect the
election of their candidate, than will Ike besto,y-
ell on the ordinary and regular business of Con
gress; and, instead of-doing the business that
they were deputed to perform, they will be en-
gagged In other duties which interfere with them
The course of events, during the last winter,
may have already led near observers to suspect a
conneSion existing between central power of
tins description, at the seat of the general Co-
vernment, and the Legislatures of Georgia, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Now York, and perhaps
Of other states.
1t Is surprising men to be blind to the influence
and results OF former examples of this nature
that have appeared in other times and countries
TO believe that individuals, distinguished by t;,-
tents and experience, aided by sil,lrl associates
especially at the seats of the state governmenis
viii be likely to fail i'll the Accomplishments of
their purpose.
| Rome, IN former times, was the seat Of n
great central power, which reached to hcrrcrno-
test provinces, and the life, liberty ana proper
ty OF, the citizens were every where held at the
mercy of this power. Paris in our own time,
has also been the scat OF great central power,
winch extended over all parts Of France, and,
acting upon The people in ali their towns and
villages, punished opposition TO its mandates,
and whatsoever were deemed errors in political
opinion, with conhscation of property, and loss
of life.
These rcnlalSs are not TO be answered by n ref
crence TO the practice OF the State legislatures
Conference and meetings among the members
OF those local bodies, to agree upon measures
IN reference TO state policy, arc not liable to the
same objections. Their influence is less power
full, and they operate withinmore limited spheres.
and the members are more responsible for their
political acts, well as by the greater frequcn-
cy OF state elections, as by the scene of their
political operations being nearer TO the super
vision and inspection oftheir constituents. Nei-
Their are there the same constitutional objections
arising from the Inequalities of the states and
| from our federative and balanced system OF eo-
vernmcnt.
| 1t was to protect the people of the state from
this great central power that, instead of con-
ccntrating power in one place, the constitution
has provided for the division and distribution OF
1T throughout and among the states. By adher-
/ ing to this division and distribution of power.
though we hns our government less Simple,
more expensive, aud less magnificent, we NAV
nationally hope to preserve our political intoe-
rity, and toperpctuate our liberties.
| There are apparent defects in our Constitution.
! We have, nevertheless, increased and prospercd
under it. If these defects we're cured. the very
means which should effect the cure may intro.
duce, as has happened, other and greater de-
ects, especially when these alterations are made
n the midst of political excitement, and without
opportunity of regarding all the evils connected
with the remedial amendments
All that is the work ofn1an IS lilehir,l, ilnpcr
feet. We probably enjoy greater portion Of
freedom and happiness than falls to the lot of o.
tier nations; and because we desire vet more,
we must be careful not to lose what we have,
by hasty and partial alterations In our plan Of
government. lie would, therefore, prefer 30
In
is, III hopes that adequate means may be de-
used TO suppress this great and alarming central
power, which is now expressing the constitution
self ny controlling and superceding its wise
and well considered provisions.