The Portland gazette. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1818-1824, 1824-04-27

iectoFx, a majority Of whom are appointed by
the large Shies-Iience il : happened.
from year 10 year. that attempts have been
made BY certain States 10 alter the Consti-
tuition on the subject Of the Presidential =
lection, notwithstanding this election j. matter
ofcompromise 4 compact between the States,
without which, 90 Constitution or union
could have been formed. Hitherto these at
tempts have all failed, and, since the addition
Of 30 many new States, the probability of any
alteration 81 the Constitution j much dimin-
ished bot, while the chance Of any regular
alteration is lessened, the dangers Of the Con-
sttution are much increased. The formidable
central power, which has appeared At the seat
ofG5vernment, which Is ne.ihcr deputed from.
nor app,rtioncI by any established rule among
tie States, but proceeding from a self-created
body, unknown 20 the Constitution--a body
which acknowledges no law founded upon
common and equal rights knows ~ superior,
and which reaches, and il systematically com
bined with affiliated bodies al the seats Of
Government ofthe great States--a body that
already constitutes power, greater than the
power Of the provisions Of the Constitution,
and assuming the right TO Illuminate the Pres
ident Of tie United States expects, by the
assistance and increase ofthelT distant asso-
ciates, and the discipline and popularity Of
their leaders, 10 elect the President la violation
Of the manner prescribed and established hy
the Constitution.
The central poscer AZ the scat Of Govern
ment is al present composed Of select num-
Der Of the members Of Congress who, from
their Official station, have access TO. and inter
course with, the foreign Ambassadors, a.
likewise with the great officers ofthe Govern
ment, and By aid Of the Post Office, and the
public Press. Communicate with their associ.
aies throngl out The country. Such a body
are capable Of having, and actually DO pos
sess great influence 10 every part Of the I'm
ion.-They are under 20 restrictions as 20 the
number and condition or residence of their
members; the Judges of the Supreme Court,
should they consent, may be added 10 this CEN
ira unto, an addition which would increase
their responsibility and influence; they might
proceed further, and the Heads Of the Execu-
tive Departments might be requested 10 be-
come members Of the central unto; should
they also unite with them, their influence
would be III further increased. Should per-
ilous times occur. and men 81 unchastened
ambition become the President and Nice-Pres-
iient Of the United States, they would employ
this central power 10 I'LL the two Houses OF
Congress with their fayourites. and, by their
cooperation with the Governors and popu-
lar clubs al the seats ofthe S ate Governments,
be able to effect in our own free country chan
ges which might utterly subvert our beautiful
scheme Of government.-Should this central
power, extending TO all portions Of the Union,
be able, BY the cooperation Of its associates,
10 discredit and supersede the separate powers
Of the States in the choice of President, il
would afterwards iHd less difficulty in effect
ing the consolidation Of the Executive power
Of the United States, which, BY the Constitu-
ton, proceeds from, rests upon, and Is bound
70 defend, the separate authority of the re-
spective States. This done, the reform viii
not stop at the consolidation of the Executive
power Of the United States. TuinOus as that
measure may prove but viii extend to the
legislative department, and, difficult as the
attempt NAV seem, eudeavour to abolish the
e ualty OF the States in the Senate. This al
terafion NAV, in the commencement, be a
mere recommendation, like the Gorge d'etire
or nomination Of tue President By the central
power az the seat Of government; but, rec
concentrations often repeated, will, in time,
become imperative commands, and 20 this end
Of government will become more economical,
more simple, more magnificent, aud less La
bic 10 change from occasional popular excite
ment. We may have one Chief Magistrate,
instead Of 25--one Legislature Of 800 men,
bers, instead Of 25 Legislatures OF three or
-four thousand members,--one Judiciary, in
seal Of thousand, supported by lawyers,
whose uuInbeTs would form an army-and
r e -
President BY the present mode, we may have
one unbroken succession of Presidents, from
consistent and perpetual body, whose plans
Of policy and pretensions TO power had been
settled BY uninterrupted aud secret delibera-
tons.
These changes may not occur. and our best
security that they viii not, depends upon the
patient, firm, and constant adherence 10 the
provisions Of the Constitution. The compact
between the States has already received the
sanction Of one generation; the alteration
which il suffered. during this period. NAV,
perhaps, by com non consent. hereafter be IL
self altered. and the Constitution restored 70
ats primitive form the changes which happen
ed IN the Government Of Holland, in the ltal-
ian Republics, and the progressive sters BY
which elective magistrates have elsewhere
become hereditary. should il5uce Us TO ad-
here with decision assd fidelity TO the checks
ssd SECURITIES which our Constitution has
provided for the preservation Of our represen-
tative system Of Government, balanced as il
is By the division Of power between States,
unequal in territory, numbers, and wealth,
and between them and the United States
The successive attempts 10 alter the Con-
slitution, originating in most instances 10 the
belief that tie proposed amendments would BE-
positive improvements, although they have
failed. have, nevertheless, not only disturbed
the repose Of Congress, but weakened the
stability Of the Constitution.
While the subject was under debate in the
general and state conventions. every article
AMI provision thereof was spen to free exam
ination. 10 those discussions difficult ques
tions arose upon the division Of the powers
between the states. and between them and the
y .H-.~f 90. l4-Fas