Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-04-09


power by which they can completely suppress
the voice OF the small states in the first trial, ON
PRESIDENTIAL election, the small states will SO
iar give up their control in the last resort as to
choose Presidentby joint vote of the two
Houses OF Congress, lii which they reserve the
extra power which the federatiye principle in
our National Legislature gives them. This boz
dy, the Joint meeting of the two Houses of Con
gres', would be prceiscly,,analogou to the who'd
body of electors, if assembled at Washington
the same number of the same political princi.
pies, with the same views and interests. eniov-
ing, IN an equal degree, the confidence of their
constituents, equally honest, patriotic, intclli.
gent, and trust wc.thy. But the gentleman from
south Carolina says, this would be TO choose the
rresdent by the National Legislature. which
would lead TO dissolution of the Union. And
Is 1t true, that the fate of the Union would he
less sale In the hands of both Houses of Con
gress than in those of one of its branches.
hope the President may always be chosen by
The electors. dread a resort to Congress on
tins subject, under any circumstances; but, il
such a resort must be had, it is surely more saf5
In the hands of both Houses of Congress, than
IN those Of either House singy.
Inc gentleman from South Carolina seems TO
think the proposition now offered, a perfectly
| mover one True, 1t has never before been pre-
sented as an amendment to the constitution; but
1t Is as old as the constitution ITSELF On the
lNh July, 1897, 1t was agreed unanimously. i'm
the federal convention that the President shoul e
be elected by the National Legislature; and for
long time this thought the safer mode.
even In the first instance of choosing a Presi-
dent, by this enlightened and patriotic assembly
OF statesmen, some of whom, at least, entertain
no hostility TO the power of the small states. It
was moi then discovered, that such an election
would endanger the existence of the Union
The gentleman from south Carolina thinks
there would be great danger from the influence
OF the Departments OF the Government and of
the Executive, upon the two Houses Of Congress-
IN their choice of a President But would not
thts influence operate as strongly, nay, much
more SO, upon the House Of Representatives.
voting as states upon that question, under the
present SYSTEM The gaining one member of
the Joint meeting, would be no more than gain
ing one vote out of two hundred and sixty-one.
while the gaining one member in the House of
Representatives might be gaining a twenty
fourth part of the whole. When state has
but one Representative, this would be obvious
" the case, as it would be,,when the Represen
tatiyes of state should be divided as that the
change of ono would give the vote of the state
10 one candidate or to the other-so that, by
possibility, the gaining of thirteen votes might
change the fate of a Presidential election: take
1t from one candidate, and give it to another. In
inc latter case, the danger would be truly for
hidaole; In the former, it would be no Greater
than resorting second time to the electors.
| Whilst the honorable gentleman charges me
with aiming deadly blow at the power of the
small states, how stands his own account with
those small states? Has he not aimed deadly
blow at their powers BY the constitution, If
no one of the Presidential candidates shall re-
ceive majority of the votes of all the electors
the House OF Representatives, voting by states
shall choose the President from the candidates
having the highest number of votes, not cxcee-
ding three. The moment, therefore, that it is
ascertained that no one of the candidates has re-
ceived the votes of a majority of the electors,
the right is complete in the small states to
control the election. 1t is guaranteed to them
by one ofthe great federal features of the consti-
tuition. lts right precious in the eyes of the
ambitious men of the small states; and shall
the friends of the small states endeayor to di-
vest them of this casual but highlyvalued right
The gentleman proposes that i'm case of no
election by electors in the first instance, the
case shall be sent back to those electors. He
wishes to provide, that the election of Presi-
dent shall in no event, devolve upon the House
of Representatives. He seems to have mother
object in view in his proposition, but to deprive
the small states of this power. He is for Civ
ing 1t up without a consideration. He does not
even ask any corresponding concession, on the
part of the great states. Instead of leaving the
election TO the House of Representatives, when
Delaware would have an equal vote with New
York, he sends it back to the college of cleo
tors, in which the vote Of n. York would be 10
that of Delaware as 10 to l..
Although esteem this casual power of the
small states, in electing President in the
| House OF Representatives, of no advantage to
them, for one, Iwould never consent to yield it,
without obtaining, at the same time, an equal
cession of power on the part of the great states
| The great federal features of the constitute
| on have become enormous cXCrescences, owing
their growth to circumstances not forcseen by
the members of lbc federal convention among
others, to the unparalleled increase of populate
on in some of the great states. These excres-
cences must be reduced equally and siinultane-
| susly. The balance must be more nicely adj
justed, or the equilibrium will be forever lost.
/ Although we cannot expect any final vote on
| the propositions now under considerations at this
session, we might have vote upon the amend
rnent of the gentleman from Missouri, proposing
TO dispense with the agency of electors. This
amendment has been very fully and ably argued
! on the part of that gentleman, and would now
attempt to answer him; but this would be al
unnecessary consumption time, provided the
Senate is now disposed TO postpone, indefinitely
| all the amendments offered. III the decision
should be against tho postponement, ! shall
still have the opportunity of making the obser-
yations which should now offer.
Mr.. Taylor, of Virginia, said he was opposed
to the district system, because it had a tendency
to deprive all the states, great and small, of I,
portion of their power, and because it inferfered
with the separate Characterof the states as indie
| pendent sovereignties. lie illustrated this view
of the subject by several remarks, and then pro-
cecded to state that he concurred in the opinion
that had been expressed in debate, that the dis
trict system was calculated to bring the election