Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-04-09


ment, which is neither dcputcd from, nor ap- |
portioned by any established rulo among the
states, but proceeding from self created body,
unknown, TO the constitutional body which ac-
knowicdgcs no law founded upon common and
equal rights, knows superior, and which
reaches, and is Systematically combined with
affiliated bodies mt the seats of government of
the great states-a body that already constitutes
| q power, greater than the power of the provisi-
| ons of the constitution, and assuming the right
to nominate the President ofthc United States,
expects, by the assistance and Increase of their
distant associates, and the discipline and popu-
larity of thcirlcaders, to elect the President in
violation of the manner prescribed and establish
cd by the constitution.
The central fower at the seat Of government
Is at present composed of select number of the
members of Congress who, from their official
station, have access to, and intercourse with,
the foreign ambassadors, us, likewise with the
great officers of the government, and, by aid of
| the Post Office, and the public Press, comnu
nicatc with their associates throughout the coun-
TRY. Such body arc sapable of having, and
actually do possess, great influence in every.
part of the Union. They arc under no rcstric-
tons as to the number and condition or resi-
dence Of their members; the Judges of the Su-
prcme Court, should they consent, may be adj
ded to this central iurto, an addition which
would increase their responsibility and inhu-
cnce; they might proceed further, and the Heads
OF the Executive Departments might be request
cd TO become members of the central junto;
should they also unite with them, their influence
would be still further increased. Should peri
lous times occur, and men of mchastencd am
bltion become the President and Vice President
OF the United States, they would employ this
central power to fill the two Houses of Con-
Igrcss with their favoritcs and, by their coope-
ration with the governors and popular clubs at
the seats OF the state governments, be able to
| eject III our own free country changes which
might ,'terly subrert orr beautiful scheme of
government. Should this central power, cx-
tending to all portions Of the Union, be able. BY
the cooperation of its associates, to discredit
ana superscde the separate powers of the states
IN the choice OF President, it would afterwards
lind less difficulty in eGecting the consolidation
ofthe Executive power of the United States,
winch, by the constitution, proceeds FROM rests
upon, and Is bound to defend, the separate ar-
thorlty of the respective states. This done, the
reform will not stop at the consolidation of the
Executive power of the United States ruincus
rs that measure may prove; but will extend to
the legislative department, and, difficult as the
attempt may seem, cndeavor to abolish the equal
ity OF the states III the Senate. This alteration
may, III the commencement, be mere recon-
mendation, like the congo d'eire or nomination
OF the PRESIDENT by the central power at the seat
| OF government; but, recommendations often re-
| pcatei, will, in time, become imperative COM
Inands, and TO this end it will be urged that by
| these means, our plan of government will be-
come more economica!, more simple, more mag
ni.icent. and less Liable TO chance from OCCASION
al popular excitement We may have one
Chief Magistrate, instead of 25-one I.egisla-
turc oil 3oo members, instead of % legislatures
oil three or four thousand memlers-one Judi
ciary, instead OF a thousand, supported by law
| ycrs, whose numbers would form an armv-and
instead ofan irregular choice of The President
by the present mode, We may have one unbro-
ken succession OF Presidents from q consistent
and perpetual body, whose plans of policy and
prctcnsions to po'vc: had bccn settled by unin-
tcUuptcd and secret deliberations.
These changes may not occur, aud our best
security that they Wilinos, depends upon the pa
tcnt, firm, and constant adherence to the pro
Visions of the constitution. The compact be-
| tween the states has already received the sane
| ton of one generation; the alteration which it
suffered, during this period, may, perhaps, by
common consent, hereafter be itself altered, and
the constitution restored to its primitive form ::
the changes which happened in the government
lof Holland, in the Italian Republics, and the
progressive steps by Which elective magistrates
have elsewhere become hereditary, should in
duce us to adhere with decision and fidelity to the
/ checks and securities which our constitution has
| A.
tive system of government, balanced as il is bv
| the division OF power between states uneaual
| in territory, numbers and wealth, and between
| them and the United States.
The successive attempts to alter the consttu
ton, originating i'll most instances in the belief
that the proposed amendments would be posi-;
tive improvements, although they have failed
have, nevertheless, not only disturbed tic re-
pose OF Congress, but weakened the stability of
the constitution.
While the subject was under debate in tho
general and state conventions, every article and
provision thereof was open to free examination
In those discussions different questions arose I'D
on The division Of the powers between the states
and between them and the United STATES: and
particularly IN determining the manner in which
the power of the last should he exercised On
tins subject the journals ofthc General Conyen-
ton show that the deputies from the great states
desired an influence proportionate to their great
or numbers and resources: while these fron, the
small states Showed an equal Or greater sol;c;
tudc TO preserve, Us far rs possible, The influence
OF equal soyercigns, which they enioycd under
the confederation, AMI in fact Possessed in The
formation OF the constitution itself. The-ccr.-
stitutien, therefore, otghi TO te regarded as 4
compact expressive OF the liberaiity aud prudent
policyoi the states, and IS apparent ineGuali
tics constitute peculiar system Of balances
derived from permanent natural differences a.
rnong the states which is believed to be s,loeri
or to any artificial establishment, or political
charter heretofore devised. The unceasinr
ST uggle between the natural superiority OF the
great states aud the self love and spirit of cn,tali
ty OF the small states, (which will indure so on
rs their freedom shall exiSll constitutes an eout
poisc of unccasing efficacy i'll the nraintainence
and the preservation of orr political sgstcrn.
This system is able to maintain and preserve
our envied freedom, if it fortunately has inau-