Constitutional Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1824-1832, 1824-03-02

F; instrument. NIr. i. SAID ne would call the at
tention of the gentleman from Delaware, to a
clause that had not been adverted to in debate,
and would appeal to his candor, whether it did
not present a serious difficulty to his construc-
tionof the Constitution. That gentleman de-
rives the right to make roads, from the right
to regulate the internal commerce between the
states, by land as well as by water; but a
clause in the 9th section of the LIST article, pro-
hibitits Congress from making any discrmina-
ton IN favor OF the ports of one state, over
those of another. And it is fair to presume,
that they might have given such preference,
but for the prohibition. Now, if the gentleman
from Delaware is right, that we have the right
of regulating internal commerce between the
states, it follows, that Congress may make I'M
lJust discrimination In the interior of the coun-
try, which they are restrained from making at
the ports. There can be no reason for this dis
tinction. The states meant 70 secure to them
selves perfect equality, on this delicate and in-
portant subject But, to what purpose forbid
determinations at the ports, if it could be made
on roads and canals The only answer that
can be given, is, that the commerce on the lat
ter was never contemplated, and the coasting
trade was all that was intended by the trade be-
tween the states. The gentleman from Della
ware also said, that if Congress, under its ex-
press power to regulate commerce among the
states, had not also the power to facilitate it, by
| making roads and canals, it would be in the
power of any state to obstruct the trade between
other states, which passed through it; but there
was sufficient protection against this mischief,
in that clause of the Constitution which secures
| to the citizens of one state, the privileges of
every other, taken along with that regard
which every state may be expected to have TO
its interests. The evil was too remote aud i'm
probable, to hive male the power commended
for, necessary, or to furnish any argument for
its existence.
| AS to the power of Congress to make war,
to raise and support armies, MIR. T. said, he
could not see how that could be made to give
the power to adopt system of Internal Inn
ploVement. 1t is true, it may be occasionally
necessary to make road canal to fort or
an arsenal, but in this case, the road or canal is
mere appendage to the military work. 1t is
in fact, a part of the work ITSELF Yet that Cir
oamstance can no more give power to make
roads or canals over the whole Union, than to
extend any other operation which the govern
rnent may find it COW enient to carry OH, within
| the limits of their exclusive jurisdiction. Such
| q power cannot be necessary to the exercise of
the military power, as we have raised and sup
ported armies IN two wars, without making
roads and canals; nor has any nation in Europe
found the direct exercise of this power, though
it's individually possessed, essential to its mill
been exercised here, during the temporary ext
gencies of war.
/ But, Mr.. Chairman, said Mr.. T. if we had
This power, there seem to be strong reasons why
1--we should not exercise it. And [ would ask
Vthe further patience of the Committee, while |
lofer some objections to the bill which seem to
me to deserve their serious consideration. 1t is
very clear, that if we engage in general sys-
ITEM of internal improvement, it will bring with
it an extensive exercise OF internal legislation.
] Large sums of money must be drawn from the
people, and be again expended in the construc-
tion of roads and canals. 1t must take good
deal, also to keep them in repair, as every rain
that falls, and every frost, does them more or
less of injury. The construction and superin-
tendence of these public works will require
long train of officcrs-fOr it is conceded that the
| United States are, themselves, to construct
roads and canals, and not by the agency of in
oorporated companies-and you can act only by
the means Of delegated power. There must
also be new tribunals erected to enforce the nu-
merous contracts which the system implies, and
to punish the injuries TO which the works will be
! exposed, as the State Courts refuse to exercise
jurisdiction under your laws. All this apparatus
must occasion predictions accession to the pow
er and influence of the General Government,
and especially to the Executive branch of il.
MIR. Chairman, our system Of government is adj
/ mirably adapted to circumstances. No
other could secure the blessings Of civil liberty
to so extensive territory, with such diversified
interests. But it is evident that its preserya-
ton depends upon some very delicate circum-
stances, which are necessary to maintain the
Just equilibrium between the power of the Gem
eral Government and that of the States. 1t is
problem yet to be solved, to which ofthe two
opposite Dangers of consolidation and disunion,
we are most exnOsed. I know that some of tho
most patriotic and far-siglIted men in the nation
have differed on this question In forming our
Il opinion on it, we can draw no lights from history
and have to rely solely on our own powers Of re
Election and sagacitY. But whatever may have
been the relative strength Of the two powers at
the adoption of the Constitution, there Is an OBJ
vious cause for the continual increase in the
power of the General Government to be found
in the multiplication of the states. As the
number of these increases, the relative weight
of each proportiona!ly di;aiEishcs. Thus Vir-
ginia, when the General Government first went
into operation, was about One-sIxth Of the Union,
now she is not more than e-tcntli. Virginia
and MARYLAND together have not more relative
weight than Virginia had alone. But it is
clear that the same power. divided between
two states, cannot act with the same effect as
j when it is united in one--and that they are not
likely to act as efficiently in opposing the Dea-
sures Of the General Government, either by
means of their Representatives, or by operating
| on public opinion. Even if VIC suppose them
actuated by the same views, and cooperating in
the same of opposition, still tic ieaIousies
and dissentions Of allies q. > proyeTbal, and are
founded in the strongest principles If our nature
And whether the object ofthe General Govern
ment be to pass a scdiIion law, to repeal a Judi
ciary law, to incorporate bank, or to adopt a