The Virginian. [volume] (Lynchburg [Va.]) 1822-1829, 1823-05-23

was III ih. zenith ut his fame ard has pew
ga resistance wlli.l, imposed ties fist
hounds Ia tx. giani strides 10 UNIVERSAL no
ininion and aimed tho first s,1ccesst,a f'iow
At the uneNamplcd progress 81 flal l'-r'f''.
tons conquefiir. Ii tigoied and enslascd
Spain caiiis make such ucilc sseTfiohs III
bsnaIf Of "a fnouaiel WIN had no qualities
Ia secure her - een, anil had done no
thing Ia cliila her gratitude, what may we
not expect from Spain regenerated, when
honor and librriy are the stakes. The
aberfisc eli,trt OF Naples IN shake of her
ser, itudc. issirli even across the AilatltIe,
and IA calculating the chances OF tits CON
4csi, many arr I'D from her example, to
nppr,h.'.id similar termination IL the spa
1ish revolution. The Comparsion Is liasiy
aud MUST. The eileninaie, tickle, d'-iTo-
Burablc aud mercurh character Of the tia-
llans, is more strongly cs-ntrasled with Tire
strength, the majesty and tfr' consistency of
the Spanards, than theac,dy oiziicFreDeh Is
will IN. phlegm ol tt. English Thephysi-
cal advantages of Spain are rs superior AS
her moral and IN her penInsuiar 5tiuaiioh,
aud the lastl.Sses vt her numerous NOUN
tains, she is aIntest secure from INVASION,
and impregnahic 10 conquest. From the
character of her people, the Determined
spirit which apparently actuates her conn-
ciis, her local advantages, and her great cx-
ample Ia 1911, we tnsieye that Spain will
r, sst the unauthorized mM ryranncal de
nIanls Of France aud the Allies, and that
iiijs resistance will BIZ at last successtul
Our OF the events which We suppose
might by possibility present Ibis war, is
the Internal condition of Frapce--the 9th
er The armed interference Of England.-lt
is known that the public mind in France Is
much agitated--tllat the opposition TO the
war is general, aud that discomfort has
found its way into the racks of the invading
ariny.--The condition oi SPAN is viewed
with ~ mpathetic eye, because the good
old cause is still dear 10 the hearts of
Frnchmen. Their mcRoEyble rev oiutiuii,
The pinnacle of military power aud glory,
To which il conducted them, and the sad
den and disgraecfnl reaction OF 1915, by
which they were compelled 10 rellnqulsh
iheir government, their liberty and their
esesQn.sts together. are yet remembered
with regret aud solrow-Thcy can neither
approse of the hostile attitude which their
hated rulers have assumed towards Spain,
nor willingly cooperate in enforclag their
dcmands--Tn the cause Of Spain, they ae
knowledge the principles of their own re.
vontion, aud IN her enemies, they sta3 the
satie enemies Who strapped them Of ficir
cdnqu,sts and the falucrei their dceds---lf
these preihises be trne, the conjecture
which prcdiets that the war commenced IN
the Pyrenees, viii lerminate'inP Paris, seems
rational aud erdb;.ble--lt Is possible that
the apprehension 8, this consequence has
delayed the commencement OF hostili- |
lies, hat II dues not seem likely that it will
or can prevent the war. France is the in
strumert of the northern powers, and will
NOT be aslcwca 10 fecede--lier fears by
them will be dcrmcd grouudless, or
they will think il more grudcnt to meet
this revolutionary spirit st Once, wherever
il be found, whether in Spain OF France,
thar Ia s0ller il 10 increase by its innate !
tendency. by the discovery of their fears,
aud by the influence oi successful example.
Under any circumstances they noigt't be
glad Of u preteNt, To occupy the delicious
aud fertile provinces Of france--they will
eagerly embrace one which will promote
Ineit ufsilt ot vengeance, at the same iilnc
that il affords ah opportunity of glatiica- !
lion te their luxury.
However England might BE influenced !
by The occurrence fpartlcuareveuts, there |
Is no ground Ia believe thai she will in the
first instance, embrace the cause Of Spain.
This is the language of ministers, and this
assurance has no doubt been communica-
ted 10 the members Of the Alliance. If il
IS therefore, extremely probable, that she
may by events, and by the spirit OF the
people, be forced to take part ultimately
n the war, this will have no decisive infln-
,nec, operating only prospectiyeiy, upon
he designs of the enemies of Spain. Nor
S il likely they would be driven from their
,ourse, by the direct accession itself of
Enslaet, 10 the cause of the peninsula.