The Massachusetts spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1821-1823, 1823-07-30


both armies had marched from Madrid
TO La Mancha, and a column also of
both, was organizing 10 La Carolina, to
act in that country. At Almaden, a
building was terrifying. In Los podro-
ches de Cordoba, movable column of
infantry and cavalry has been formed,
which is intended TO keep up the COM
munication with Almdden, and to recon-
noitre the country to the north of Ser
ia Moreno.
In CaZella there will be another col
umn for similar purposes in that part of
the country. In Estremadura, Badajos.
is terrifying, and the best spirit pre-
walls. This is also the case in the PROV
ince of Salamanca and Cindad Rodrigo.
General Morillo, commanding the 4th
army, had his headquarters at Astorga
on the 10th, and the forces under him
were rapidly increasing. Brigadiers
Palarea Jauregui are in Asturias with
between and 5000 men. Gen. Nina,
as stated before, was at Castelfollit on
the Cd, and being in the enemy's pres
ence, had concentrated his forces.
Gen. Espinoa slept on the 18th in AL
bacete--he has 5000 foot, 400 horse,
and two pieces of ordnance under him.
The guerilla leader Locho had his
headquarters in Almagro, where he is
terrifying himself--They have made
General of him but the people a.
bout him must sign the orders he issues,
as His Exoellency cannot write. Val
depends has been momentarily occupi-
ed by body of malecontents who levi
ed contribution of $4,000 IS. va, &c.
SEVILLE, JUNE 9.
Dispatches from the Marquis Castell-
dosrius, dated Fl. @. May OF, state, that
on the same morning, at 7 O'Clock,
whilst with his vanguard at Talayera, his
advanced posts which were at the
bridge of Alberche, sent a report that
the enemy were in sight-that the
troops were Immediately ordered 10
form in the Prado until the number
of the enemy could be ascertain
ed--that two battalions of Quad
alajara were posted on the wooden
bridge, to cover the passage and retreat
of the baggage to the left of the Ia
gus; whilst the cavalry, with the two
grenadier companies of Cuenda and
Guadalajara, and the light-infantry of
the latter, and two feld-pieces were
ordered to advance that at eight o.
clock, the FIRE began on the part of the
gueIillas; and that, although the French
lancers charged the regiment of caval-
ry, the fire Of grape-shot from the artil-
lery, and the serenity with which they
were received, obliged them to retire
that. shortly after, it was discovered, by
The dust, that the enemy were going TO
attack their left on perceiving which.
Gen. Castelldosrius ordered Gen. Zayas.
who was with the guerllIas and cavalry,
10 fall back-that Gen. Zayas did retire
in admiral order, insomuch that, though
the enemy pursued them at first, he
charged them with the squadron of Gu
rassieurs, and obliged them to retreat
that, about mile from Talavera, Gen
Zayas halted with the cavalry, and a.
lighted but that the enemy did not
continue their movement-that,i in the
mean time, Gen. Espeleta, who arrived
in the preceding evening, with the gar
rison of Madrid, was retreatng with the
two battalions which passed to the left
OF the Tagus over the wooden bridge
that the nature of the ground and the
quantity of dust raised by the columns.
did not permit the forces of the enemy
to be calculated, which, however, they
state to have been far greater than
their own, particularly in cavalry -
that, nevertheless, the composure Of
the Spanish troops inspired them with
respect, for which reason Gen. CasteIl-
dosrius felt the greatest satisfaction in
reporting, that all the troops preserved
the utmost order and discipline, and be-
haved with valour but that the knewl-
edge, discipline and example of Gen.
Zayas, in particular, contributed more
than any thing else TO the executing of
that movement in such a manner as to
reflect as much honour on the troops as
victory itself The dispatches further
state, that the loss on the part of the
Spaniards is ten or twelve wounded :;
but that it was not possible to ascertain
what that of the French amounted to.
though the former presume it must
have been more considerable, by reason
Of the good direction of the Spanish ar
tillery-that the latter troops were en-
camped on the left bank of the Tagus,
beyond the bridge; and that, whereas
the projected plan would no longer be
pursued, which was TO keep vanguard
ON lis right hank In ordor 10 cannna ~,