Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1823-12-27

eleciian;by the people; and we ask, lift can
really have any other?
We should suppose it would he difficult io
answer tins questluI afhrmaii,ely. when we
know that in every instance in which il has
been rtsurted Ia, such has been lis effect. Ii
members of Congress did not desire to pro-
dnce such result, they would not readily "a
dept an "xpedirnt, whicl experience has pro,
eel, almost necessarily leads To il: Certainly
IL the recommendation of the Caucus be- obey
eel and II il be- not, the will of the people is
unshackled, and may be exrrted with equal
force and Il fuller knowledge Of the hazard of
an election before the House of Representa-
tvas.
This consideration alone, is sufficient 70 test
the sincerity of its object If the people are
united, 81 that majority of their votes will
probably be given in favor uC any one indr du
a', the deliberations of caucus cannot dis
tnrb, but will conform TO such an unioo hut,
lion the contrary, the people are distracted
and confused among ,ariety of candidates,
andincapabie ofconcentratinga majority on any
one, the caucus system interposcs its concilia
Tory councils. and produces union out of dis
order. The members Of caucus being them
selves the agents of the people, do not profess
and would not dare TO nominate a candidate,
IN opposition Ia the declared or known sense
ot n majority of the nation, but acting in be-
nall OF the people, they adopt the means by
which that sense may br felt, where il would
otherwise be lost. They practise no undue
means for the attainment of This rud and If
they could harhor any sinister design, they "a
| dept the surrsi means TO defeat their own oh
lJeci. They dlspassonatcly survey the diff
cnltics which prevent an election by the peo-
| pie, and sincerely aim Ia surmnInt them
They behold sumo h4lf duz.n candidates sire
| nnously urging their claims tn the Executive
| chair, and each individual ubsiinatplY ciinging
ia some local partially in his f7vnr, resolved
! II he Cannot command immediate success, TO
found his hOn"s vt future promotion upon his
present prrtinacity. Amid this scene of dis
| 'rsciion they frankly avuw, not ouly lhpi
| oainivn as To the man, who would bp most like
| iy To unite majority of The people in. his
| favor, and best promote the public welfare,
hut their.own predictions founded upon 81
| 'nilar considerations. The people have thus An
opportunity of rxerting their own will and if
my disapprovr the nomination. OF counter
acting choice ny Congress, bv eIrctng some
other individual. Ii the people approve iho
! recommendation of the caucus. il IS their own
voluntary act, sureripducrd no doubt, by all
| those considerations of individual preference,
or public policy Ia which ~ prudent man
should he insensible. II they disregard it, their
| power is unimpaired and they then act fairly
| admonlshrd. that if they fail To eject differ
| ent candidate, the members ofthe caucus act
ing in the House of REPRESENTATIVES may then
do absolutely what they could previously on
Hly advise the people to do If after this the cleo
ton should come 10 the House of Represen-
tatves. stronger argument could not he urg-
ed at the wisdom of thr caucus nominations
In such an event the people would be he prin-
cipal sufferers, since by that means AN cleo
| non might he made 10y small majority of the
natIon--a calamity the people ought To de
precafe and which their representatives mag
unanimously endeavored to avoid We ask
| our readers to reflect, whether that man can
he friend of the People, who endeav0rs to
bring the election to the House Of Represen-
tatives or, If that member Of Congress can
he other than such friend, who generously
strives To prevent such an alternative ? This
idea presses upon our minds with irresistible
force, when we consider that in an election by
the House of Representatives. the constituent
loses all control over the conduct of his re-
preventative. In such An emergency the re-
preventative becomes ;he arbitpr for the nation
| Tie 10 constituted an umpire to settle diffirul-
ties which the peope have been unable to adj
Just, and he would pPrvert his trust by sub
mission To instructions from his immediate
district.
| Will any one he hold enough to hazard the
| opinion that the members Of Congress can px-
erclsp more power and influence in a caucus,
han in an election by the House of Rrpresen
tatives ? We should pronounce their power in
thr latter alternative, to be of fearful rharac-
ter-nnt IN the nation only, hut in the case of
a small state especially, 10 The representative
himself! Translate the Individual. capable Of
practising intrigue in a caucus to snbserve his
private ends if such an one could be found
into an election in the II ,usp, with the yot, nf
state in his hands, or with the weight and
influence with which superior talents NAV in
vest him. and what may hr not accomplish !?
Every one must be satisfied that il members
of Congress desired To acquire undue influ
eoce. or To accomplish corrupt purposes, in
stead Ut pxeriing themselves 10 collect the
streams Of public opinion into one channel
their true policy would he 10 srread them over
A wider surface: they should nnIfiply the
number of candidates, they should discourage
| every effort NJ concert and thus effeciuaIly
prevent an election bv The people.
Congressional Caucus then sincerely
aims to give the election to the people, nv
producing union and concert in their opera
flons, and The attainment Of ifs object depends
upon the wisdom and ingPnuousnPss Of il
deliberations. is II not more likely To atiain
this end, than any expedient which has been
or can he devised2
II must be apparent to every one, that as
the end proposed, is union Of sentiment A.
mong the people in every part Of the United
States, M expedient IN which they are not
fully represented viii answer the purpose. II
IS for THIS reason that state nominations.
whether by the people, or by y caucus Of
members of the local legislature. rather pre-
vent than promote concert among the whole
body Of the nafIos These local raucuses are
too frequently governed nv sectional cOnsi
aeraiions, and individual attachments which II
IS Che Ieahing object of q renernl cnlctis IN