The Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1822-1822, 1822-04-02

SumeC, De QSeUleU necessary W CufieCt d.
some pc int, other Than at n. Orleans, a
strong force, capable of moving in any di
rection, and Attending aidto any part which
may be attacked, and, III my Judgment,
no position presents so many advantages,
as port OF rendezvous, for such force, as
the mouth of lha, Bay. The ratification
at the Rigole.s will defend the entrance by
ole passage into Lake Ponchartrain, and
also into Pearl River, which empties into
the Cult, at that point. Between the Rig
Diets and Mobile Bay, there are but two
inleis, which deserve the name, those ct
ST. Louis and Pascagola, the entrance into
which. is 100 shallow, even for the smallest
vessels; and from the RigoIets to Mobile
Bay, the whole coast is equally shallow,
afording the depth of a lew feet Of water
only. Cat Island, which is snearest the
RigoletS, is about seven and halt miles
distant from the coast, and thirty from the
Rigole.s. Ship Island is distant abou, ten
miles from Cat Island, ana twelve from
the coast, Between these islands and the
coast, the water is very shallow. AS to
the precise depth OF water In approaching
those islands from the Cult, the report of
the Typographical engineers not having
yet been received, it is impossible to
speak with precision, but admitting 1t to
be such, as for trlgates, and even ships ot
the line TO enter, the anchorage at both is
unsafe, being much exposed to northwest
winds. Along the coast therefore, there is
no motive for such strong works on our
part; no town to guard, no inlet into the
country to defend; and II paced on the
Islands. and the entrance OF them is such,
as to admit large ships OF war, distant as
they are from the coast, 1t would be more
easy for the enemy to assall them with
effect.
The position. however, at Mobile Bay,
is essentially different That bay takes
its name from the Mobile river, which is
formed by the Junction OF the Alabama q
Tombigbee, which extend, each. about
800 miles into the interior, approaching
at their head waters, near the Tennessee
river. Ii the enemy possessed lis mouth
and fortified Mobile Point and Dauphne
Island, being superior at sea, II would be
difficult Tor US to dIspossess him OF either,
even Of Mobile Point; and ,ldlng that
position, Pensacola would soon fall, as
without incurrlng great expense IN the
construction of works there, it would pre-
&c st but a feeble resistance 10 strong
force in its rear. If we had work at
Mobile Point only, the enemy mig bit take
DauphIne Island, which would afford hun
great aid in attacking the point, and enable
him. even should we succee1 in repelIing
the attack, 10 renter US grea, mischief
there, and throughout the whole Guipi.--
In every view which can be taken on the
subject, it appears Indispensable tor US to
command the entrance into Mobile Bay ;
and that decision being taken, think
the considerations winch favor the occu-
patton of Dauphine Island by strong
work, are conclusive. 1t is proper to OBJ.
serve. that, alter The repu!se before New
Orleans, III the late war, the British for
ces took, possession OF Dauphine Island
and held it till the peace. Under neither
of the reports OF the board OF Engineers
and Naval Commissioners, could any but
sloops of war enter the Bay, or the an
chorage between Dauphine and Pelican
Islands. Both reports give to that anchor
age 10 feet at low water. and x0s at high.
The only difference between them con-
ssts in this: that, in the first, a bar, leading
10 the anCh rage, reducing The depth OF
water 10 twelve feet at low tide, wa, O.
mited. In neither case could lrigates en-.
ter, though sioops war OF larger size
might The whole scope, however, of
this reasoning, turns on different prin-
ciple--on the works necessary to defend
that Bay, and, by means thereof, New
Orleans, the Mississippi and all the sur
rounding country, against powerful in.
vasIon both by land and sea, and not on
the precise depth of water IN any of the
approaches to the Bay or to the Island.
The reasoning which is applicable to
the works near New Orleans and at The
Bay of Mobile, is equally so in certain re
spects 10 those which are to be erected for
the defence of all the bays and rivers along
the other parts Of the coast. All those
works are also erected on greater scale
than would be necessary for the sole pur-
pose of preventing the passage OF our in
lets by large ships Of war They are in
most instances, formed for defence against
a more powerful invasion both by land
and sea. There are however, some differ
ences between the works which are deem
ed necessary IN the Gulf. and those III o.
ther parts OF our Union, founded on the
peculiar situation Of that part OF the coast
The vast extent of the Mississippi-tbe
great outline and channel of commerce for
so many states, all of which may be affec-
ted by the seizure of that city or of any
part oil the river, to a grea extent above it.,
is one OF those striking petuliarities which
require particular provision. The thin
ness Of the population near the city, ma
king ii necessary that the force requisite
for its defence should be called from dis
faRt narts and states is another The