The Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1822-1822, 1822-04-02
Official Document.
OFFICIAL PAPER.

the Forti6cations on Dauphine Island,
and Mobile Point. {.
To the Senate and Hosse Of Reprssent9.
siuss Of tie Un,tsd Sfases.
Congress having suspended the appro.
priation at The last session, Tor the lorti6s
cation at Dauphine Island in consequence
OF doubt which ~ as entertained OF the,
propriety OF that position, the further pro.
secution Of the work was suspended, and
an order given, as s,ntimated in the Mes
sage of the Sd Of Dec TO the Board OF
Engineers and naval Commissioners, to
re- examlne that part Of the coast, and par
ticuIarly that position. as also the POSITION
al Mobile Point, with which it Is connects
ed. and to report their opinion thereon,
which has been done, and which report IS
herewith communicated. I
By this report, it appears to be still the
opinion OF the Board, that the construction
Of works at both these positions is OF great
importance to the defence OF New Orleans
and of all that portion OF our Union which
is connected with, and dependent on, the
| Mississippi. and on the biherwate rs which
empty into the Gulf Of Mexico, between
that river and Cape Florida. hat the
SUBJECT may be tullv before Congress,
transmit, also, a c. Ply OF the former report
of the Board, being that on which tne
work was undertaken, and has been, N
part executed. Approving as J DO the o.
pinion of the Board.5i consider IT my duty
to state the reasons ol which adopted the
first report, especially AZ they were, ia
part, suggested by the occurrences OF The
late war.
The policy which induced Congress'to
decide on, and provide for, the defence OF
the coast. Immediately after the war, was
founded on the marked events OF that In.
teresting epoch. The vast body OF men
which it was found necessary to call into
the field, through the whole extent OF our
maritime frontier, and the number who PEI
rished by exposure, with theslmmense exe
penditure OF money and waste u proper.
~. which followed, were TO be raced, 70
an eminent degree, 10 the detenceiess con-
ditior of the coast. Ii was TO mitigate
these evils, in future wars, and even Tor
the higher purpose of preventing war ,its
self, that the decision was formed TO make
the coast. so tar as il might be practical.
ible. impregaabIe; and that the measures
necessary W tudb OCySSs 'S'S
pursued with so much zeal stree.
II i. known that no part Of our Union ID
more exposed 10 invasion, by the. hume
rous avenues leading TO i, or more oe-
fenceless by The thinness Ut the ne'ghD"r
ing population; ~ offers q greater temp
tation to invasion, either as per-
anentsacquisitiOr, or az prlzeNo Inc
cupidity of graspi6g invaders, from the
immense amount OF produce dePosllea
there. than the city OF New Orleans. e
j. known, also, that the seizure of1o part
of our Union, could affect so deeply and
vitality the immediate Interests OF so many
states, and of SO many OF our fellow cp
tizen., comprising all that extensive terri
tory and numerous population which are
connected with, and dependent on. the
Mississippi, as the seizure OF thatcIty.-s
Strong works, well posted, were, there
fore, deemed absolute y necessary for liz
protection.
tits not, however, by the Mississippi
only. or the waters which communicate
directly with, or approach nearest 10, New
Orleans, that the town is assallable. Is
will he recolIected- that in the late war,
the public solicitude was excited, not 90
much by the danger which menaced it, 10
those directions, as by be apprtbension
that. while feint might be made there,
the main force, landing either 10 the bay
of Mobile or other waters between that
bay and the Rigolets, would be thrown a.
bove the town in the rear of the army
which had been collected there TOR its de.
fence. Full confidence was entertained
that that gallant army, led BY the gallant
and able chief who commanded it, would
repel any attack which it mighthe ex-
posed in front. But haG such force been
thrown above the thrown, and Q position
taken on the banks of the river, the dis~
advantage to which oDr troops would have
been subjected, attacked in front and rear
az they might have been. may easily be
conceived As their supplies would have
been cut off, they could not have remains
ed IN the City, and, withdrawing tromeit.
It must have fallen Immediately into the
hands of the iurce below. In ascending
the river. to attack the force above, the
attack must have been made to great disc
advantage, since it must have been on
such ground and at such time as the ene--
nv preferred. These considerations show.
that defences other than such az are in-
mediately connected with the city, are
of great importance TO its safety.
An attemptto seize New Orleins and
the lower part OF Mississippi, will be-
made only by great power, p combs.
nation Of several power, with strong
naval and land force, the later Of wbich
must be brought in transports which may
sail 10 shallow water. lfhe detences a.,
round New Orleans are cell posted and
az, sufficient strenpth Ia, fepel any attack