Edwardsville spectator. [volume] (Edwardsville, Ill.) 1819-1826, 1822-05-04

feeble resistance 10 a strong force in Ito
rear. 1--we had work at Mobile Poihe
only, the enemy might take Dauphipn
Island, which would afford him great
aid 10 attacking the point, and enable
him even if we should succsed IN res
pelling the attack, to render AS great
mischief there, and throughout tho
whole Gulf. In every view which. cav
be taken of the subject, it appears iudi'
pensiblc for us to command the cn-
trance into Mobile Bay; and that de-
cision being taken, | think The considers.
tons which favor the occupation OF Dau-
phine Island by strong work, are con.
elusive. 1t is proper to observe, that,
after the repulse before New Orleans, in
the late war, the British forces took pos
session of Dauphine Island, and held it
till the peace. Under neither OF the
reports of the Board of Engineers and
Naval Commissioners, could any but
sloops Of war enter the Bay, or tha
anchorage between Dauphine and PeH"
can Islands. Both reports give to that am
anchorage ID feet at low water, and goa
at high. The only difference between
them consists in this that, in the first u
bar, leading to the anchorage, reducing
the depth of water to IL feet at low
tide, was omitted. In neither case could
frigates enter, though sloops of war Of
larger size might. The whole scope,
however, of this reasoning turns on a
different principle-on the works neces.
sary to defend that Bay, and by means
thereof, New Orleans the Mississippi,
and all the surrounding country, against
powerful invasion, both by land and
sea, and not OH the precise depth Of
water in any of the approaches TO the
Bay, or to the Island.
The reasoning which is applicable to
the works near New-Orleans, and at
the Bay of Mobile, is equally so, in
certain respects, to those which are to
be erected for. the defence of all the
bays and rivers along the other parts OF
the coast. All those works are also
erected Oh greater scale than would
be necessary for the sole purpose Of
preventing the passage of our inlets by
large ships of war. They are in most
instances, formed for defence against
more powerful invasion, both by land
and sea. There are, however, some
difference between the works which arc
deemed necessary in the Gulf, and those
in other parts of our Union, founded on
the peculiar situation OF that part OF the
coast The vast extent OF the Missis-
sippi, the great outlet and channel OF
commerce for SO many states, all OF
which may be affected by the seizure OF
that city, or Of any part of the river, to
a great extent above it, is one OF those
striking peculiaritics which require par
|ticular provision. The thinness Of the
population near the city making it me-
cessary that the force requisite for its
defence should be called from distant
parts and states, is another. Tho
danger which the army assembled at
New-Orleans, would be exposed to,
of being cut off in case the enemy
should throw force on the river
above it, from the difficulty of ascending
the river TO attack it, and of making
retreat in any other direction, is third.
For an attack on the city OF New Orleans,
Mobile Bay, or any part of the interme-
diate coast, ships OF war would be neces-
sary only as a convoy to protect the
transports against naval force on their ,
passage, and on their approach to the
shore, for the landing of the men, and
on their return home, in ease they should
be repulsed.
Onthe important subject ofour defence
generally, think proper to observe that
The system was adopted Immediately af-
ter the late war, by Congress on great 3
consideration and thorough knowledge
of the effects of that war-by the enor,
nous expense attending it-by the waste
Of life, Of property, and by the general
distress of the country. The amount Of
dept incurred in that war, and due at its
conclusion, without taking into the esti-
mate other losses ha wing been heretofore
communicated, nee not now be repeat
ed. The interest ofthe deb; thus incurred,
is four times more than the sum neces.
sary, by annual appropriations, for the
completion of our whole system Of de-
fence, land and naval, to the extent pro-
vided for, and within the time specified.
When that system shall be completed the
expense of construction will cease, and
our expenditures be proportionably di-
minished. Should another war occur
before it is completed, the experience
of the last marks in characters too strong
to be mistaken, its inevitable consequent.
ces; and should SUCH war occur, and
lind US unprepared for it, what will be
our justification, TO the enlightened body
whom we represent, for no, having COM
pletcI these defences That this svs-