Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1821-12-06

force moveablc along the whole OF the by
| road expressly made for that purpose. The Eng
fish had besides great number of gun-boa,s i'm all
the ports opposite Boulognc. All small craft all pi-
iot and fishing heats, &c prepared for warfare
u necessary. They were numbered and classcd in
divisions, with officers ready direct, and troops to
man them. The guns and ammunition were so dis
posed IN the magazines that these vessels could be
| armed in moment Finally, besides the squadron
stationed oil Boulogne, there feet of olserya
uon IN the Downs, another nj Spithead, and u third
III the More In Il few minutes tho elcgraphic sig
mails could communicate betw cen all these points and
the Admiralty in London.
linus, which ever way the wind nigh, blow, il was
probable the English would arrive nj the point of es-
cent, ii not IN time To prevent the landing, least
soon enough To burn the otilll la that ease our ar
my would have been left without !, retreat without
support and without provision
That II would have performed prodigcs / am sem
sble' itwould have been less m;ignanimous than
the army of the east, after the naval battle of Abou
kir But those opposed il were not Turks and
| Arabs. II would have had to contend against a
people OF prodigious obstinacy-aganst n million of
men in arms, animated by the enthusiasm OF pairiot-
sm aud melted by the most mplacable hatred of the
! French name.
| nave implrtialy stated our means of attack and
ne English means of fence.
am still OF op'nion that 1T was impossible effect
| descent without the protection of fleet equal to
mat l''u wiicn we Then possessed, and which was de-
sry that tins cct should first have possession of the
channel, aud the captains who commanded it, in
consequence OF the inexpcriemce of MANY and the
|
cXcepuons,) we're such to render victory impos-
sbie As 10 success after the laning, leave il to
eminent military commanders To determine by their
skill and experience the chances of victory and de-
tcai coniinc myself To statistical view OF the mill
| tify and naval force OF Great Britain
Instead OF attacking the British empire in its centre
would have been advantageous 10 land ia Ire
land But II would have been necessary 60 have
| made tins attempt with great cxpediion.-Had
uen, bonaparte, instead of conquering Egypt, pro-
ceeded with his army of italy TO Ireland iba, conn
| Try would certainly have been lost to England and
British power would have sustained an irreparabIc
blow. by landing in the Bay of Galway, and proceed
afterwards along the banks of the Shannon, a fine
position would have been occupied Ireland would
nave been thrown into insurrecton, the natives arm
ca ana organized IN corps, and the English driven
| out oil that island. We fomented the revolt or Tho
i'si ny sending them triilinS Succours. They were
the victims oil their confidence and rghtful n;ssicrcs
followed the insure cton.
Al me Tune when our continental army had com
tpeceo MS glory by the campaign and victory of Aus
triitz, England, by destroying the combined naval
'orce VI rance and Spain, of Cape Trafalgar Sc
cured a long duration TO her maritime preponder-
'nicc. Being relieved from NIL fear of invasion, she
abandoned the defensive system, and gradually adj
Neninred an offensive She failed in her first
attempt against SPAN, under General Moore and
against Belgium, under Chatham Instructed nv
these reVerscs she learned TO connect more pcriecy
her military and naval operations E; to employ more
abundance and htncss in her means, more prudence
! IN her plans, ana more vigor in the execution The
| army which the naval force at Corunna saved from
destruction was soon after brought back by that same
iorce To the Peninsula where supplied and sunnor,
ed by The navy IL balanced durin. five wears Inc s,c
cess of the French troops in PORTUGAL and s;nn;n
which countries became the tomb of the armies III
| AusterliiZ and Jena
Merchan, vessels taken : by the English 1859
ana made good prize. . DO. Americans 900
Nevertheless, the English compelled TO conclude
pence because To the public 1859 Captures diyii-
e" between me ships OF war and prvateers, were far
from DeIng able To compensate the losses, the bank
ruptccs and the disorders caused TO society by the
seizure OF 2OO merchant vessels laden with the rich
rs OF national industry.
The late struggle, SUPPORTED with so much honour
ny Tie United States against England, is extremely
remarkable, considered with relation TO the arr Of
naval warfare. AT the moment when the war be-
tween The two powers began, the English were sa-
t'3ted with success over our navy In vain did some
admirable battles prove to them what French ships
wei armed and well directed were capable of per-
forming. They knew that in all circumstances Ma
poeon sacrificed his navy to his army-that he made
serve as sappers the workmcn engaged FOR the con-
sruction of vessels, and that he used as infantry the
marine Sunners and the crews of his ships Enplapp
trusted that he would lead them 90 their destruction
ny land, before they should be in a condition TO be
formidable by
.ertain OF almost never encountering any but
ships manned by recruits and inexperienced sailors
the English abandoned themselves 10 security They
relaxed more and more from that activity and that
frequency OF military exercise which had rendered
hcm so formidable. They looked upon themselves
rather on peace than footing in fact 700
English slips, cruising all seas scarcely in the
course ot whole year engaged in dozen Of single
ton Thus JGl0Ots of the British navy remained up-
on war footing without having once in a year an
opportunity OF measuring their strength with the ell
eniy
The time this vast developemcnt of naval
force, destined 10 blockade all coasts Obliged then,
10 nhX with the English sailors great body OF foreign
rienced sailors r.
Inc Americans on the contrary, having only
sHIaI! huiner OIL SHIPS OF var could employ in the COM
position OF their crews the greatest notwithstanding
Iui tl,p,rf, or.I,
ton TO the best English seamen and thus diminished
IN double ratio The relative merits of British crews
Besides, the Americans, English by descent paticut
energetic, aud coldy but deeply passionate ike the
citizens OF the mother country were like them bar
dened to the sea, and famliarized TO manmuvrcs bv
'c longest voyages and the most dangerous naviga-
ton. In these numerous points of view they conld
without disadvantage, sustain comparison with the
sailor oil the three Kingdoms. The Americans in
"hhS preparations Tor struggle against their nati-
RAJ rivals considerable time before, acted like men
who dIstrustcd their strength, aud who dreaded
the great reputation of their antagonists They en-
deayoured. therefore TO enlist or their side all tlie
chances which prudence could prepare and produce
lhcy lIad 20 create navy entirely new. Free from
prtJudices, and unrestrained by the obstacles which
are opposed to Improvement TO the perectiur Of an
cent institutions, they set out from the adyanc-
Ell points Of the art if they constructed vessels it
was on the best principles, aud according to the most
advantageous dimensions. For every rank Of sbius
they began by giving themselves physical suucrior
y IN the magnitude OF their principal dimensions, in
the number and cabrc of their guns in the number
ana choice OF their salors Then they Showed the |
greatest attention in exercising the sailors embarked
IA their vessels These men, naturally good scamen
became excellent gunncrs capable OF firing from n |
distance with much precision With the view oil
fcnuerng more sangHinary close action, they en-
parked Tie best shaipshoocr OF the Union where the
narksmen are all excellent Theyput into their hands
chrDihcs 10 ire downwards from the mass and from,
NC most elevated paints ihc vessel
10 alI these elements of success must be added
me enthusiasm of irecmen in defending their coun-
Try freedom, and the fury Of a mercantile pcople.
VINO hight Tor their interest and the safety Of their