Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1821-06-12

| press and important limitations OH the soys-
reignty the states." They then pnt in the
claim of the Judiciary fora share IL this sn-
Pren;Gcy, and conclude with as,ing these
questions:-" When we consider the sitila-
ton OF the government of the Union and of
a state, in relation To each other, the nature
| of our constitution, the subor,linatioh of the
state governments to that constitution, the
| great purpose for which jurisdiction over all
cases arising under the constitution ana laws
ofthe United States, is confded TO the Judi
cial department, are we at liberty to insert
IN this general grant, an exception of those
cases IN which Il state may be party Will
the spirit oftle constitution justify this at
tempt, TO control its words? We think il
viii not. We think case arising under the
I constitution or laws of the United States, is
cogulzable in the courts of the Union, who
ever may be the parties to that case" This
| passage of the opinion has been quoted on
account of its multiiarious errors of principle
and reasoning.
IT, basis of the whole reasoning is, that
the general words of the judicial article, ne
cessarily include the states and having as
sumed this proposition, they throw upon
their opponents the burthen of proving that
the states are ercepied out of this grant of
power. AS | have fully investigated the first
thing to the discussion on that subject ;more
especially, as the court have not touched on
any of the topics which are there urged.
Nothing in the opinion has any tendency to
shake the principle for which have contend
| ed. What can it avail the court To say that
the constitution has created many express
and important limitations on the sovereignty
of the statcs,' if the limitation in question
be not one of those express limitations !?
And that it is not, has been already shewn in
the last number.
To make their argument at all effective,
the court ought to show that the words of
the constitution would not be satisfied, by
giving to the federal courts the ordinary u-
risdiction over individuals. 1t is not enough
to prove that the jurisdiction would be better
exercised over the states than over indiuidu-
ais; for the court have no choice of means
to carry their constitutional powers into eff
feet Ii the convention have provided mad
equate means TO execute their own plans,
the defect is only to be remedied by AN
| amendment to the constitution. But | can
| not conceive case in which the power over
individuals (which the federal courts certainly
possess,) will not he adequate to the execu-
ton of their constitutional powers. Let us
suppose this case-A state enacts some law
and let it be penal law,) which is inconsis-
tent with the constitution or laws of the u.
States. A citizen is tried and sentenced I'M
der that law. He wishes To obtain redress
from the courts of the u. States. This re-
dress can be obtained as well by suing the
officer who executes the Judgment ofthe state
court, as by suing the state itself. If the
state chooses TO protect its officer, the same
| consequences will follow that would have
taken place in the other mode of proceeding,
II the state had determined TO resist the
judgment of the federal court. In both ca
ses violent collision must ensue between
the state and federal authorities, which NAV
ultimately terminate in civil war. But unless
II can he shewn that this consequence would
be avoided by making the states parties, in
stead of the individual citizens, there is no
reason for preierring the construction given
by the court The next reason urged by
the court, is " the situation of the govern
ment of the Union and of a state, in relation
| to each other" and the " nature of our con-
| sttution." do not perceive what is dis
| tinctly meant by the nature of our con-
| stitution." The expression is so indefinite
that 1t conveys no precise meaning. If I'M
derstand it, it expresses nothing more than
was before implied in the relations of a state
and the Union. If this be the meaning of
the court, join issue with them without hest
tation; for nothing is more demonstrable
! than that the relations of the states and fed
eral government are wholly incompatible
with the idea of the STABILITY of the states,
unless it be expressly given by the constitu-
ton. The facts on which this opinion rests.
are so prominent, that they must command
assent, the moment they are stated The
| original independence of the states the par
tial delegation of some of the powers OF
| SOVEREIGNTY N fIa
entire possession of all powers not surren-
| dered; the silence Of the constitution as to
| any pre-eminencc of one government over
| another, in regard to their respective rights
all these form an irresistible body of evidence
! that the two goverpments stand on equal
| grounds as to their peculiar powers. The
| next circumstance from which they infer the
stability of the states, is I" the subordination
| OF the state governments to the constitution"
| This subofdination is nothing more than an
obligation imposed upon them TO respect and
| support the constitution of the u. States. Ii
is an obligation secured by compact and
! guaranteed by interest. But does it follow
| that the supreme court have the power of
coercing the states to fulfil their duty? If a
| compact is made between two Independent
governments, does the judiciary of one of
| them acquire right to decide without APP
peal upon the conditions of the compact,
and TO compel the other party to acquiesce
in their constructions | presume il viii
not be denied that the federal government is
bound by equally sacred ties, to respect the
rights of the states; or, in the words of the
| supreme court, they are subordinate to the
rights of the states. ! have never seen a
syllable in the constitution that makes the
states more subordinate to the federal gov
eminent than the latter is to the rights ofth
states. The truth is that both stand on the
same footing. The argument of the court,
then, may be easily turned against itself II
| the federal judiciary possess q direct poyypr