Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1821-01-30

with regard % ,hose collateral touse.
quences, voih :: tf", (says he) where
some collateral matter arises oui of the
general words, aud i,sppcBs 10 be uu--
reasonable, there The Judges arc, in de-
'ency, Ia conclude HAT tins CONSEQUENCE
~as MT foreseen Us the parliament, and
therefore they are AT hberiy tn cxponnd
the s'a'u by equity, and only quOad hoe.
disregard II" Ii, then, il can be she~ n
that any absurd consequences will re.
suit from such construction of The
- section Of The 3d article of The
consii'uiinn, as viii contite 10 the pre-.
seni Judiciary al The L. ). the authority
~ deciding claims 10 which slate and
me United States are, eilher directly or
l"dHett'y, the liiigating parties, i, will toll.
lo", according TO The rule just laid down,
| shdi ANY such construction would be uu.
lair. IL would, believe, be considered
as departure from The universal practice
and principles by which mankind sre
governed IN the formation Of compac,s
Tor one oi The parties to delegate TO the
other, the sole right OF constfuipe and de-
TRIMMING In the last resort, any of the
ls'ipniaiions IN the agreement, upon which
uihcrente al op,uion might rnsue =
more espe cially, when The parties 10 such
compact, had manifested no snslI degree
OF jealousy ana caution during The whole
progress OF the neYociaiiom. Ii is true.
tha' The federal government covld no, be
considered as having ans agency in the
proceedings. which fiually led 10 The as
ldopiion Of tn. Federal Constitution:
though that government bcca me from the
very momen, OF its adoption, very pro.
minent party 10 il. in all lis bearings.
Now, though the Judiciary OF The u S Is
III tact the mere creature Of the STATES
u cannot be denied that the pawcrs of
The general government (of which il is
coordinate branch,) were cautiously.
Jealously, and Reluctantly granted. II
such be the Fact, then, is IL reasonable 10
DeiieVe, That II could have becu The in
ten'ion OF the States, 10 coniide TO This
government. jndlcial power almost Gov
| extensive with cessiOn Of all those DOW
ers OF sovereignty. which were so high
" estimated by The staies-and for The
preservation (Which, so many annre
tensions were entertained and oppressed
But II may be asked, wherein consists
lie danger and the alIsnfdiiy of conf.
Ding 10 The supreme court of the u. s
those powers with winch (ss some con-
tend) u Is Invested b. The constitution
ana which n has heretofore exercised
WIN In" acqUirscence OF the states? Lei
us suppose that Congress should pass 4
Ia" evidently smbvcrsive of lie p!aiuest
aiid most fundamental principles of The
cohs'ltutlon--aud respecting the uncou-
sii'uiionslliy of which, there could moi
be the. shadow Of a doubt, with a great
majority OF the nation. The history of
Congressional proceedings, will warrant
me liz asserting, that This is by no means
sn extravaganza supposiiion. What tri-
buual, according 10 The doctrine con
tended for. aud the practice Of that court
Is 10 decide upon the consiiiuiionalitv of
such law Not The SIales BIN, co..
ordinate branch of this very government,
deriving lis existence, its power, and
emolumenis solely from the other branch
es-and dependent for an INCREASED com,
penSation upon ihe will of The Federal
Legislature. Questions OF this sort, vii
necessarily shew The absurd consequen
ees Of siipposing thai il could ever have
been The design OF the trainers of the
constitutions, 10 confIde 10 the Federal
Judiciary, latitude OF power SO enor
nous and SO alarming. II is reasonable
TO conclude, then, thai such could never
| have been their intention The c0use.
quences therefore which may grow, ani
have grown, cOlla'cralIy. OUT # allowing
| to that tribunal the authority above men-
Toned, being absnro-ConiraIy TO reason
and TO the probable intent Of the mar
lies TO the compact. il is fair 10 presume.
| acsordIng to the rule of construction al
| ready quoted, that such cops Quences
were not foreseeu by The States Who,
(oeing the only legitimate exposilors OF
me case ought 10 eSpound this part Of
the constitution by equity and disregard
any construction, the consequences Of
which would be unreasonable and alb
| surd.
Admitting. for the sake Of argument.
however, that the supreme court Of The
u ,. is consiilutioDally aud euni,ably
empowered 10 decide upon cases ipvolv
ing questions OF such magnitude, let us
enquire INTO the proprIeiy OF any longer
acqulescI0g III system so anomalous IN
IFS character, and so dangerous in IFS
consequences. Let us invesIioa ATE the de-
tects OF this system; and let us demon
strate how very i'll calculated is this tri-
bunal 10 decide with impartiaIiiv mon
the constl'Wiouality Of laws, passed bx
Congress, conflicting with thereal or sun
posed rights OF the individual states
! The reasoRableness Of the agency of
The national courts (says Mr.. Hanilton)
III cases IN which the state tribunals cam
not ne supposed 70 be impartial, speaks
for itself" II ibis rule be applicable 10
the state courts, il will surely apply with
equal force 10 cases in Which The nation.
al courts cannot be supposed 10 be i'm
partial For, says he. emo man ought
certainty 10 be Judge in his own cause,
or IN any cause IN respect TO Which he las
me teast interest or bias II will necessa-
TIIy follow then, that the intcrposilion Of
some oiber tribunal Than the national
courts (nnder their present organization
must be necessary in cases in which the
latter can be considered 10 have the
| 90 Lfnkf Intr,sst NJ Lin. . liz Ill.,. . 1