Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1821-05-29

S1S'S, 10 III ana competent
Judge, neither can its Subordinate departments
be so that, III truth, the usurpa;ion may he
madcby he Judiciary Itself :(si) and that the
last resort by the judiciary, is not in relation
to the rights of the parties under the com
pact, under whichthat judiciary is tlerved.(kkJ
1t is stated in The Fcdcralist, az thai each
department of the government, and conse-
quentiy each OF tile two governments should
have will OF IFS own, and check each other;
that tins Is essential to liberty and that am
bltion must bemade TO counteract ambition
Again, IT Is said. (n,m) "that in single rep,ib-
lie all the power surrendered by the people,
| is cOmmittedto Il single government, and that
us,irpation is guarded against, by division
thereof between the different departments
but that {" in the compound republic of Anre-
| RIGA, the power is first divided between the
two governments, aud then the portion allot-
eel to each, is stbdiyided, between distinct
departments" and that hence arises a pou-
BILE SECURITY to the rights ~ the peoples
and " that The different governments UW con-
Tol each other, at the same time that each
will be controlled by ITSELF" The same
work states another case, which is entirely
analogous, and in point. II says, that, i'm a
free government, the security for civil rights
must be the same rs that for religious rights.
1t consists in the one case, in the multiplied
ton OF interests, and in the other, in the null
tiplcation of sects, and that the degree OF
security, in both cases, will depend upon the
number of interests and sects. (nn)EI will
here say, with a writer before quoted tool
that II the jurisdiction of the supreme court
is only limited by its own viii, it is unlimited,
and that power cannot be checked BY itself,
| or by its subordinate agents. 1t is further
said, IN the same work, (pp) that if this most
important power had been intended to have
been conferred OH the court, it would have
been expressly given, and that its omission is
fairly accounted for, on the principle of the
necessity of having checks and again, that
| collisions between the two governments
| must have been, undoubtedly, foreseep, but
were submitted to, as the lesser oi evils, and
on the ground that the people were the
only arbiters who were thought safe or ne
cessary(qq)
| close this long list of authorities BY one
| which cannot be heard by the sons offreedom,
with indifference. 1t is the authority of our
most distinguished sage and patriot, THOMAS
| JEFFERsoN.--m the resolutions adopted by
| the Legislature of Kentucky, in the year 1898,
| and admitted to have been written by him.
| 1t Is resolved, " that the several states COM
posing the United States of America, are
not united on the principle of unlimited
| submission to their general government
nut that, by that compact, they constituted
ageneraLgovemment for special purposes,
| delegated To that government certain def
me P0CeTS, reSerriag each state ~ Itself the
reS'duary mass Of right, to Hte;r otcn self
| government /; and that whcnsoever the ge-
neral government assumes unaeieguted
"powers, It's acts are unautlioritatye, roid,
and Of no force That to this compact each
state acceded as q state and is an integral
party, It's co-states forming, as to itself,
the other party: that the government ere
ated by tiiis compact was not made the ca
= clusire on final Judge If he eItent of the
| . Po'cers delegated TO 'tSej, since that would
have made Is discretion, and not The con-
stitutlon, the measure of its powers but
" mat, as III all other cases ofcompact, among
parties having no common Judge, each par
:" ty has an equal right to Judge for itself, as
" well ofinfractions as of the measure OF re-
" dress."nT)
| These authorities are more than conclusive
10 shew, that in Il contest for rights between
| the two parties to the federal compact, nci.
theirs competent to bind the other: both
because 1t would, in such case, Judge in its
own cause, and make the contract what it
| pleased, and because they both have an equal
right to interpret that contract, and neither is
| bound to yield the point to the other The
matter is to be referred to their common SUI
perior, the people, who will Justly settle the
dispute between them. We ought not,
lightly, to suppose, that either party will
usurp upon the other but that tendency
would rather be imputed to the stronger go
yernment and one too whose officers are
not bound, by oath, to respect the rights of
the other party. Collisions between them
are not to be, causelcssly, apprehendcd but
they are the lesser of evils, when compared to
the despotc power which is now claimed, for
the supreme court, and which would sweep
away the rights of the weaker party.-It is
SAID by the able writer before mentionedI ss)
that it is better to bear with clashing con
structlons of the constitution, than to Weld
up all our powers to the general government
Again 1t is said in The Federalist(H), that
concurrent power between the governments
on the subject of taxation, is better than alb
solute subordination.
1t IS said by the supreme court, that this
immense and unreasonable power, is given
10 them by the constitution.-By what arti-
| Gle, ana section OF that instrument, is it con-
ierred! III 1t be given, the article can be dis
tlncfiy pointed out. None such can be found,
and, as the lawyers say, this immense power
ought not to rest only in averment. If it
was intended to be given, in 50 important and
unreasonable case, would it not have been
expressly given /? When right is claimed by
one of the contracting parties, to bind the
other to the extent ofits pleas ure and dscre-
ton, ought we not to have chapter and verse
for it =? When the great principle is to be set
aside, which forbids aparty to decide his own
cause, ought that power TO rest, only, upon
remote and doubtful i'm plication?
fit be said that this power is carried, by
the general words, in the second section of
the third article ofthe constitution, extend
inS the judicial power to &" all cases arising