Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1821-06-08

the leuerai courts, as TO claims by other
states, for the purpose of fair and equal an
bitation Of them, the anxiety of the states
To obtain the eleventh amendment TO the
constitution is ascribed by the court to mo-
tives entirely sordid. They have said, that
the jurisdiction was denied, thereby, TO the
citizens of other states, because Mey might
be extensive creditors of the states, whereas
other states, or foreign states, might not be
SO. This imputaiion is equally unsupported
and ungencrous. A good reason existed for
the inhibition of the former class of cases,
which did not exist as to the latter. A iu-
ristsiction as to the latter, was permitted, not
only because it was, in itself, Just and fair,
but would avoid broils and wars with other
powers. foreign state may Justly COM
PLAN OF the Judgments of rival state, rem
dered against her but the interests OF her
subjects will be concluded thereby, and no
cause of war afforded, unless, at least, the in
justice be glaring. No nation, especially,
can justly complain that the states do not
give a preference TO foreigners, over their
own citizens, in their courts, as none of them
give ii similar preference to our citizens, SUI
Ing in their respective kingdoms.
The court goes on to say, that they are led
by the causes, to which they have been pleas
ed to ascrbe the amendment in question,
and which have endeavourcd to shew, are
not Justly TO be imputed to the states,) TO
consider that amendment, as only Intended
| for those cases, in which {" some demand is
made against state, by an individual
Whatever may have been intended, the
words themselves of the amendment, cannot
be so restricted. They are as comprehensive
words, as could be used, to interdict all suits
whatsoever, commenced or prosecuted in a
federal IIrf ic
from the sovereignty or dignity OF the states,
which does not apply, rs well to cases in
which the state is exhibited as plaintiff, as
defendant :: and every reason which allows
the state courts to have Just cogniZance of
/ the cause, permits that cognzance 10 be f.
nal The state as defendant TO writ of
error, sued out against her, and there is but
little difference between the summons, by
which an original suit is commenced, and
the citation, which is consequent or writ of
error. The object of both is, to give notice
of the existence of the suit, and both are, or
ought to be, conceived In the least objection
able form.
The court still imputing to the states, I'M
worthy motives, for wishing for the eleventh
amendment TO the constitution, and on which
1t seeks to nGrro,O the construction Of that
amendment, say that Z" Il general interest
=" might well be felt, in leaving TO n state the
full power of consulting ats convenience, in
the payment of ats debts, or of other
claims upon it, but no interest could be
g felt, in so changing the relations between
the whole and lis parts as To strip the
government of the means of protecting, by
" the fundamentally of its courts, the con
" stitntion and laws, from active yiolation"-
That general interest could not be felt, I'M
wac ,lah l. 81.
states, which is not shewn, believed, or adj
mitted to be the fact. This, therefore, was
not the real motive for the amendment in
question, but the laudable and honorable
ones | have already stated.
The court has entered into string of
technical quotations, and subtiItics, to show
that the eleventh amendment only applies TO
" demands" existing in favour of individuals,
In the first instance, and suits commenced
therefor, Ill exclusion OF demands, arising
subsequently, TO be relieved from what are
supposed TO he erroneous judgments, in the
state tribunals and they say that the words
of that amendment, justify and " require'
that construction. AS to these words, il the
object of the states extended to the last as
well as the first, what more comprehensive
terms could have been used "Commenc-
ed" and prosecuted, embrace every pos
sible case. Reterendo singulo Singulis, this
word "prosecuted" would reach case,
brought into the federal court, although not
originally " commenced" there. This natural
construction of this word, holds, to,tion,
as the objection to the federal jurisdiction,
on account of state dignity and sovereignty,
is, in both cases, the same. a technical and
verbal criticism, contrary to these great prin-
ciples, and Withholding a case from the final
pf flo fnta
equal degree, in derogation of the rights of
the states, is unworthy of the cause, and the
parties. The states who made the amend
ment, would not have been satisfied by the
inhibition, as now narrowed, and explained
They would never have conceded, that their
courts are not as impartial, in rendering a
Judgment III their favour, as in giving judg-
ment against them This is the ground OF
the distinction taken by the supreme court
Unless there be difference i'll this respect
against the impartiality of the state tribu-
mails, jurisdiction is Inhibited in the first
case, as well as iii the last The court has
here brought to its aid, and in extension of
IFS own jurisdiction, principles too nice for
common observation. They consist of fila
ments so slender, as only to be seen through
the magnifying glass invented by the court,
III favour of their own prcjudices and love of
power
join issue with the supreme court, in its
idea, that a suit against state is process
sued out against il, las the citation in the writ
OF error ISL and for the purpose of establish
ing some claim against it, by the judgment of
court. The object of the present writ of
error is to get a Judgment of exemption, as
to the hundred dollars now in controversy.
In substance, therefore, this writ of error IS,
entirely, a suit. 1t is also, undoubtedly suit,
technically speaking, and in point of law.
That is undoubtedly suit or action, which
can be relinquished by a release of all suits
and actions. This is the case of a writ of err