Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1820-11-24

,hich make them irretrievable, are, To-
getlier with the defence of the frontiers
he high duties of depar,ml ut OF war.
II they do not exist already. the national
institutions have vulnerable point. II
they DO exist, and are performed, and are
be discarded because like other bene-
;iis they are 10 be paid FOR, we are the
| victims OF Il most delusiye economy.
All that orr civil institutions permit, or
ought TO permit us To exact from The mi
li,ary is, that our means OF resistance be
apporiioued to the meaHs which other na-
tioms have of offence. The power of con-
cenirating warlike resources, of promptly
applying II, and of making the light of
the sciences to be reflected on that of war
belsng to larger states. F1Ifitication,
discipline and an effective system of de
fence give an adventurous independence
10 The smaller and restore the balance.
The nations, between which and ourselves
are The greatest likeliho0ds of collision,
are richest in these fearful Attributes l.
n safe 70 reject the cOunterpOlsc! With
the elements OF conquest III their hands,
Is II wisdom To imirench ourselves behind
our patriotism alone Ii has been our
misfortune 10 read The advantages of pre-,
para'Ion i'll the history 0i other uaiions,
and 10 know them for ourselves by the
reverse. The create part Ot The war oi
the revolution Was without concert, means
or preparation, aud vet the termination
ct II was successful. But who expects
recurrence. of The salient principle, that
raised the natiou from so frequent and
hopeless prustra,ion, aud vas IN itself ;he
cause aud earnest of sucCcss! The let
tiers OF General Washington are cOmncn-
tarics an the absence o, military nrganl-
sr.as,, IL, =.
lack oil means was scarcely greater evil
than that oi a proper distribution OF them
Until duties we're subdivided and respop.
sibiliiies established, until thought and
perseverance had given unity and stability
10 vaiOr, lie was al the head of mass of
ineri matter, which swvlied his numbers
without increasing his strength. The
steady operations Of Disciplined troops
were Ohsiructed only bya resistance al The
same sort, We can scarcely be thought
TO adhere to The principles OF the reVolu-
lion, II we are unmindtul of the experience
OF il.
The rrors OF the late war are nearer
al hand, aud there * no sanclity about
them, such as belongs 10 those of The
revolution, To forbid their dcvclopemeni
IL will be apparent IN every instance. that
they were occaSi0ned by deficiency ne-
bal, III The misappiicatian of them all
aud that this mlsappicailan arose, as an
inevitable consequence, from the absence
| oi Institutions organized during peace,
| and arranging intO separate accountable
| departments, The various necessities and
duties OF an army, givlngto each within
| lis own sphere, ilie power OF aScCrtaining
and administering 10 the one, aud pte.
| scribinS and enforcing The other. 4 par
! tIaI attempt al preparation was made in
| 1908, but III the absence OF elementary
| knowledge, and OF the atiempi to acquire
| II, the creation of d few regiments added
| To the physical force of the country as
far az their bayOneis exten.e ted, but did
DOT enlarge the sphere OF military ability.
| Had The number been doubled, W. scare
| ~ should have been stronger. II is not
the disconnected muscles that make the
| sentlent man. A certain number ut com
| panles conhti,uie regiment; bul on
their union The collective mass is endOw
ed with capacities unknnwn 10 il. detdch
ed state. 4 number of regiments may
III like manner form an army hut at
each new combination, the mechanism
of the subordinate par, is los, in higher
principles that con,roul The whole. To
move an army, 10 pay, cloihc, feed aud
shelter II, 10 ascertain resistance aud ap-
portion the mrans OF surrounding il, to
heal lis wounds and administer lis iuss
tlce, TO prNmugaie the orders which go
vern It, and watch their execution and
effect, are principles that do not enter into
the composition of he numerical strength
OF our army. They are the functions of
staff, and on the correct understanding
aud performance of them depend the
dlf' cti0n ana efficacy OF physical strength.
Usefulness OF this sort was moi part oil
he augmentation OF 1903, and we paid
dearly Tor the omission.
Al the very onset of the war, the alb
sence OF proper system OF transmitting
orders cost us MichlIimat kinac aud Chi
cagO, and removed The delcnces of the
very frontier we had selected for active
operations. Nrxt followed the miserabl,
| expedition OF General Hull, in which from
tie same and similar causes were Tie seeds
of defeat, even without The incompetent
Cy OF the commander. The military sur
veys and inspections, which have since
caused the erection of forts Howard and
GratlOi, and guarded even the remote ave-
nues 10 The sceae OF action, bad not ex'
tended 10 tie ground itself, until an army
oil heterogeneous materials, more exhaust
ed by dissention aud uncertainty, Than by
lis march OF thirty five days through Z
wilderness, arrived al an unknown land
ignorant of its own character, its duty OF
tue enemy. An end was 10 be accom-
pllsbed, aud the means were yet 10 bt
combined. Authority aud sccounta bllity
were underlined or misunderstood at tn,
moment when they should have been ap
piled. There were no subordinate iDtell
gences TO give unity aud impulse &c
strength. aud link the authority OF tn
chief to the performance OF the remOtes
, ACT. Operations became dependent OF
Tie desuliory efforts OF individuals, ano
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