Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1820-12-30

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| porlani objects, bur are by no means 90
essential as those which relate immedi
ateiy aud solely 10 d state of war and.
ihoug!i-nol To be neglected wholly, ought
not Ia have any decided influence i'm the
organization OF our peace esta blishu,ent
without, therefore, making any farther
remark on this point nj the inquiry, will
proceed TO consider the other class. on
winch, as IL comprises The great aud lead.
'nS inducements 10 maintain, in This
country, regular army in peace, tie pro.
Ihlneht features OF ITS organization ought
TO depend.
however remote our situation from the
great powers OF the world, and however
paciilc our policy, we are, notwi,bstapd-
ing, liable to be involved in war; and. to
resist with success It's ca!amiiies and dan
gers, standing army i'll peace, in the
present improved state of the military sci
snce, Is an Indispensable preparalion.-
iiie opposite opinion cannot be adopted,
without putting TO hazard the indepen,
uehee and safety OF the country. | am
aware that The militia is considered, and
I'D many respects justly, as The great Ma.
lionai force bat, 10 render them eff
'eG'iVe, every experienced officer must
acknowledges, that they require the aid
OF regular troops. Supported by suit
dDle corps of trained artillerists, and bv
small but well disciplined BODY of in.
ian,ry, they may be safely relied on 10
garrison our forts, aud 10 act in the field
as light troops. In these services their
zeal, courage, aud habit of using fire
arms, would be of great importance, and
| would have their full effect. To rely on
them beyond this : 10 suppose our militia
capable OF meeting in the open field the
regular troops OF Europe, would be 10
resist Tie most obvious truth, and the
%hoie oil our experience as a nation.
war Is an art, TO obtain perfection IN
"hict much time and experience, parii
cuiarly Tor the officers, are ne, essary. 1t
Is true, that men OF great military genius
occasionally appear, who, though with
out experience, may, when an army il I'll.
ready organized and disciplined, leadit 10
victory yel know of no INSTANCE. under
circumstances nearly equal, in which the
greatest talents have been able, with ,r.
regular aud uDdisclplined troops, TO meet
WIN success those that were regularly
framed. Genius, without MUCH expsri-
ence, may command, but ii cannot 20
much iuTtGrT. IL cannot at once organize
ana discipline an army, and give II that
military tone and habit which only, in the
midst ol Imminent danger, can enable il
10 perform tue most complex cvelutions
WIN precision and promptiiude. Those
qualities, which essentially distinguish
an army from an equal asse mblage Of an
framed individuals, can only be "A, uui.e,
by the instruction of experienced officers
IL they, particularly The company and re
glmeDtal officers, are inexperienced, tho
army must remain undisciplued,i in which
case The genius, and even The experience
OF the commander, will be OF little avail
Inc great and leading objects then of a
miiliary establishment la peace, ought ia
De 10 create and perpstuate military skill
ana exPerleuce so that al all times The
country may have al lis command body
OF othcers, sufficiently numerous, and
wen instructed IN every branch of duty,
9olh OF the line aud staff; and the or"ani
gallon OF the army ought TO be such as "a
enable the government, at The commence.
menf OF hostiIties, TO obtain a regular
force, adequate 10 the emergencies of The
couairy, properly organized and prepared
Tor actual service. II is thus only that Nc
can be III the condition to meet the frs
shocks OF hosiiliiies with uuyielding firm.
ness and to press on au enemy while oui
resources are yet unexlausted, But if, OF
me other hand, disregardibg the ooonC
ulciales OF reason and experience, wt
should IN peace neglect eur military esta
DhS nment, We must, with a powerful ant
sKiIiul enemy be exposed to The :aOsl d.s
PRESSING calamlties. Not all the zeal, cOn'
rage, aud patriotism of our EIiliiia, uEsuD
ported by regularly trained AMI disciplia
Ell troops, can avert them, Without sucI
troops, the two or three first campaign
would be worse than lost. The honor O
1 10 =
sources OF The country useIessly lavisied
Tor, IN proportion TO the want OF elhcieE
cy, and pTOPer organization, must, il
actual service, be our military expendi
lures. When taught by sad experience
we would he compelled TO make redou
bied efforts, with exhausted means, 20 re
gain those very advantages which wer
lost Tor the want of experience aud skill
In addition to The immense expendiiug
which would then be necessary, exceed
ing, manifold, what would have been suf
Gent 10 put our peace establishment OF
, respectable footing, crisis would bethu
= brought on OF the most dangerous cha
, racier. Ii our liberty should ever be eH
, danSeTed, by the military power gainin
Tie ascendancy, IL will be from The q,
eessIiy OF making those mighty and IRE
c gnl%T efforts, TO retrieve our affairs, aft
series Of disasters, caused by the val
D OF adequate military knowledge just a
c IN our physical system, STATE Of Il
. most dangerous excitement aud paroz
+ ysms follows that Of the greatest debil
g " and prosiralion. To avoid these dal
y gerOus consequences, and to prepare q
T. country to meet stale O. war, pafiic
e larry at its cOmmencement, with hon
II and safety, much must depend on the o
a ganizatiOn of our military peace esiablis
e ment and have, accordingly, in q
o plan about to be proposed, tor the r
e duciion OF the army, directed my aiie
e lioH maiuly to that point, believing il