Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1820-02-15


STATES, asserts the correctness OF this
doctrine in the strongest terms. After
declaring that the question III that case
is one, which regards the conflicting
powers of the government of the Union
and of its members, II Is affirmed, that
on the supreme court of the u. States the
consultation has devolved the important
duty of deciding such a question. Waiv
ing for The present all inquiry into The
pIoprieiy or improperly OF The decision
made by the court OF the main question
discussed in that cause, aud yielding 10
that high tribunal the Difference Justly
due TO The intelligence and virtue of the
Judges now composing II, II may be ask
ed. what security Is possessed by The state
governments, that the authority OF this
precedent may not I've used III future iines
10 the total anuihilaiion of their sove
reigniy However upright and pure and
impartial the Judges OF that court may be
found 10 be al any one particular mo-
ment, receiving, as they do, their APP
pninim njs from that federal government,
receiving also compensation for their
services from that government, and look
ing 20 that government for any future
improvement III their condition, il ought
not 10 be expected, that they will remain
forever Tree from Tie influence of that
sense OF gratitude, which results lroni
The recollection of past tavors, and that
spirit OF concession, which too often
springs from The hope OF favours vet 10
be received. Give them the power 10
decide between these rival authorities.
and II one decision be right may not
another be wrong Ii one erroneous de-
cision be made under the influence lust
alluded to, an influence of which the
most virtuOus individual is often uncon-
scious. may not that decision lead TO
others still more erroneous and ultimately
fatal TO American liberty
ii may be said, that in political institu.
tons like those, which exist IN The United
STATES, liberty cannot be endangered by
the Jut,cial auihoriiy.-Ii is true, that
tile judicial authority is necessarily the
weakest. Ii neither holds the purse nor
wieids The sword, and therefore cannot
directly affect the political rights of the
natlon.-But II ought not TO be forgotten,
that the hat OF the court will have lis
weight with The legislative and executive
bodies, and their powers are formidable
Does The federal constitution give In tLe
federal government or any of lis DEPART
ments the exclusive right 10 draw the
line OF demaTkatlon between the powers
oil 'hat government and those reserved
10 The states! Such a right cannot be
pretended to be expressly granted bv the
constitution, nor is il believed 10 be fairly
a,Je'TGdie from any of the powers confer
red upon the federal governments
General Assembly are therefore con-
strained 10 believe, that this question
must be answered in the negative hy
those, who justly interpret the consti,u
ton itself; and especially by those. who
nave MOI yet forgotten the jealous fears
entertained by many at the time of lis
adoption, lest II should produce comsoli
datlon OF all power III The general govern
ment.-lf at that time tins question had
Deen answered III the Affirmative, il will
hot De hazardlng much 10 affirm, thai
these fears would have prevented the
constitution from ever becoming the su-
preme law Of This land. The General
Assembly must therefore be permitted
s0iemniy ioprotesi againstthc assumption
OF any such power by The general govern
ment or any of IFS departments. How
then II may be asked, are questions be-
tween These rival authorities 10 be sell
tied! Are they TO remain Constant
source OF dlscord between the federal
and the STATE governments 81 not. TO
what tribunal must the appeal be made
for their decision? If a tribunal be
established for their decision. bv whom
shall II be established, and i'm what man
ner shall il be- organized? These ARE
questions difticHli TO be solvcd.-The
answers 10 them involve momentous con
sequences. They ought not 10 be an
preached but with The most cautions cir
cumspeciIon.-Yet failure to answer
them may eventuatc in the dismember-
ment OF tins great republic.-The General
assembly with every disposition to re-
Spec' lie federal government, cannot
neiieVe 'Odt II would be safe 10 confide
NE power OF creating such tribunal To-
Nna' government That government is
one and entire. lis different deDariments
are necessarily associated with each other
experience has demonstrated. that the
high powers already conferred upon II.
VIII invite to their exercise the most COM
mandlng talents Of the patton In these
circumstances, possessing, as il does Dos
seSS' every opportunity TO unite its diff
lc'eU departments III the pursuit Of one
Co"non oblecf, possessing the highest
capacity 10 select the beS. means Of al
tdlhing that object, administered, as il
thuSt DE, by persons, who according TO
me constitution of human nature cannot
ne altogether exempt from the influence
VI mat love OF power, which the history
OF all nalions slIe@s TO be incident 10
man; the General Assembly cannot
avoid the conclusion, that TO confer upon
that government the power of creating
such a tribunal would increase the dan.
gers of consolidaiiou.-Would the gene-
raj government be endangered by deriy-
ing tins tribunal irom the staies2 The
General Assembly would deprecate such
consequence; but can it be Justly an.
Pr'hendedI The state governments are
dispersed over vast extent ni territory