Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1819-01-16

reduction can be made with propriety by
changing the organization, or by reducing
the number OF officers OF tie line, or Inc
stafi, IN proportion 10 The meu. Ii is OBJ
vious, that, as the officers are much more
expensive III proportion 10 their nunbrrs,
than the soldiers, that the pay of the ar
my, In relation tOifs aggregate numbers,
must he increased or diminished, in the
Increase or diu,inuiion of the former. Ii
IL Impossible 10 Tx amy absolute proper
ton between ofsscers and men, which viii
suit every Couniry aud every service !;
and the organization of different coun-
tries and of differen! periods, in HE same
country. has, accordingly, Natied CON
snicraby. Oar present. organization, OF
which document marked A. contains All
exhibit, is probably as well, or better
adapted 10 Tie nature OF our cunriry and
service, than any other: as il seems TO be
the result of experience: for, by refer
enGe 10 document marked b. IL wilI-b
seen, that II is nearly similar, with the.
exception of tie generaf staff, in which.
The present IS niole extensive, io the or
gaDizalion of the military establishments
OF 1852 and 1862 Ii is believed that The
proportion OF officers of The line Ia the
men, will require no farther observations
The staff, as organised by the act oitlie
last session, combines simplcity with ef-
hcacy and is considered 10 BE- superior
10 that o! tie periods 10 which have re-
ference. In estimating The expenses of
The ARMY, and particularly That oi the
stall, the two most expensive branches al
III, the engineer and ordnance depart
ments, ought not fairly TO be included.
Ihrir duties are connected with the per-
manent preparations and defence of The
country, and lave so little reference 10
the existing establishment, that. ii The ar
my were reduced 10 a single egiment, no
reduction could safely be made in either
ct them. To form correct estimate of
the duties ~ The other branches of the
stall, and, consequently, the number Of
officers required, we must iake Into con-
-slderatlon not only the number Of troops,
but, what Is equal, essential, The number
oil posts ana extent of country which they
occupy. Were our military establish
,ymeDt reduced one hall, il IL Obvious, that,
1t the same posts continued 10 be occu-
pied. which cow are, The same number Of
Officers, IN the quarlermasters, commissa ,
rvs, pay masters, medica!, and adiuiamt
aud Inspector generals departments,
would he required
10 compare, then, as ~ sometimes
done, our staff with those Of European arr
MES, assembled III large bodies, is mani
iesily unfair. Theact .! the last sessiou, il
Is believed, has made all the reduction
winch oughito he ATTEMPTED ltlas render
ed the staff efficient without making i, ex.
pensive. Such staff is moi only indis-
pcnsible TO the efficienc, of The army,
but is also necessar, io'a proper econ
omy IN lis disbnrsr meilts and should
AN attempt be n'ade al retrenclImeni, by
reducing The present number, il would,
Ill lis consequences, probably prove
wasieiul and exiravagani.
In fact, no part of our military or
ganizaiIen requires more attention in
peace than The general staff. 1t is, in ev-
cry service, invariably Tie las, in attain
ing perfection and, if neglected in
peace, when there is leisure, il will he i'm
possible, in ilie midst Of iie hurry aud
hustle Of war, 10 l4ing it 10 perfection.
LII Is III peace thai IT should receive
perfect organization, and that the officers
should be trained 10 method and punctu-
atty, so that ai the commencement Of
IA war, instead OF creating anew, nothing
more should be necessary than TO give 10
II the necessary enlargement In this
country, particularly, The staff cannot be
neglected with impuDliy. As difficult rs
ITS operations are, III actual service, eve
~ where, II has here to encounter great
aud peculiar Imped'ments, from lie cx
tent OF tie country. The badness, and fre-
qucntly the want Oi roads, and tie sud
den and unexpected calls which are often
made on the militia. II il could be siown
that The staff. in lis present extent, was
not necessary in peace, ii would. viii,
The view taken, be unwise 20 lop oh any
o! its branches, which would be prresSa
ry IN actual service. With deiccii.e
siaf, we must carry ON our military opc-
rations under great disadvantages, and
be exposed, particularly al the commence
meni "fa war, 10 great losses, eI,bar-
easements and disasters.
As intimately connected with this part
OF Tie susJeti, Ills proppTiO observe, that
so many anal such distant snail posts a.
our service requires, moi only adds TO Tie
cNpeuce al the Amy, by rendering d
more numerous Stah necessary, nnt il
ene-spes the rrIce Of almost c,rry arii-
Gle OF supply and the dirncuiiy oi eD!orc-
lDg proper responsibility and economy
10 an army thus situated, the expenses
and losses iesuiiDg from TRANSFORMATIONS
alone constitutes a considerable sum.
Under He best management our aims
must be- more expensive, even wcrp our
supplies equally cheap, than Europeau
armies, collected IN large bodies, ~ lie
midst Of populous and wealthy comoa-
mites. These observations are not made
to jn~ilfy an improper management, or.
To divert the attention Of The house fon
SO important subject as tie expence Of
Our military establishment fir,. 10
fact oc4ht 10 have an opposite f,ci !;
lo'. Jhsi IN ibe same proportion Hal IT, II
liable TO be expensive, ought Tie attention
and eHOri OF ilc government 10 be TOus
ed 10 confirm llseknences NJ iillin lie n,n.i