Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1819-08-03

rate and argue with each other, fully,
freely and without control, or interruption,
from corruption or violence. AS TO in-
terEal connections, the constitution itself
provides remedy, by giving TO each
house power To punish and even To
expel. But DIS to external disturbances,
or interruption arising from persons not
members, The constitution says nothing.
| Now II seems TO have been, on a late oc-
casion agreed, and readily concede, that
II Is necessary, that congress should be
guarded from corruption and violence,
from whatever quarter they may proceed.
he clause under consideration, if resort
Ell to, at once affords the right 10 legis-
| late {: and law being necessary, con-
gress may pass an ACT defining aud pu-
| nlshinS offences against their peace or
| dignity, AT their discretion. | put this
case, not only with a view 10 further
! illustration of the real character and effect
oil The SECOND clause, hui will, vicv, 10
| express, IN passing, my humble opinion of
| what Is called the law OF privilege. That
law Is found III the constitutions oniy, and
| relates 10 the individual members of
congress only. The members ui congress
ihrieiorr, have privileges, because they
are expressly g'ueis To them: but congress
| collectively have NO privileges whatever,
| wv Shcu Uty nave pOutGS,
but no privileges: and one of their pow
ers, derived from tins very clause, is 10
| make law TO punish those who shall
disturb them i'll the performance of their
duty. This law ought 10 be made, and
offenders should be placed immctila,
underline control oil the Judicial authority.
his question do not mean to dis, Hiss
but 1t were called upon 10 state the DO
| liiicai proposition, ererrccOgnisedb v men
highly respected for Intelligence aud imse-
| s11t1, which contained The greatest mass
! of error, | should umquesl,omaby select
| that, which athrnis thai one b,dnch Of the
| Legislature may, under the vague and
| exotic notion OF privilege, order ID citizen
| OF The United States To be arrested, TO
| be brought before them, To be kept in
confinement, 10 be tried by the offended
party, and To be punished by law no,
| mot law, for law is rule OF action
| prescribed by the supreme power, and
one branch OF the legislature cannot be
| The supreme powcr,) by rule most en-.
| phaticallS eX pos, iacto, because moi ONLY
never promulgated, but never heard OF
| befcre.(3)
| VIII take the liberty TO present auuii,-
| er doubie-barrclied case, selected, like the
| former, on account of It's two fold appli
cation. Congress are moi expressly au-
th"rlsed, to appropriate money. Tins
power, whenever employ I'd, must be used
as an Incidental power In relation TO
appropriations, for The payment of the
"ebtS OF the United States, perhaps the
authority may be regarded, as specific
ana express. will not stop TO examine
that question. Ii Is enough Tor INV nur
pose, HAL llic RIGHT 10 appropriate, is ge-
nerally an Incidental power. Appropiia-
tlons are made where there Is 10 debt
| due. Money Is appropriated for The mr.
pose OF deiraylng the anticipated eA; pen
ces, OF foreign Intercourse. There IS no
debt due; 10 minister appointed. But
| The power 10 appoint foreign ministers
and 10 negotiate, Is vested IN ihe president
"nd senate aud To render this power a.
valuable, IL Is necessary 10 make law,
| placing III the hands of the Executive Il
| luna adequate 10 The object. II This rea-
soniHS be correct, the proposition adopted
by small majority of congress i'm the
session OF 1917 10, affirming their right
10 appropriate money at their discretion.
| ought 10 haN" experienced the fate of the.
| resolutions, with which il was associated
Laws have been passed BY congress. for
he purpose OF eitecilng The objects nd.
| called by the 2d section OF the 4th article
| III relation 10 fugiIlves from Justice.
| GIL" Iiuhh idohr- Al Is Dcileve0, TO be I'M
possible 10 shew, any authority for the
passage OF these laws, whose cons,i-
| tullona!iiy has never been Questioned
eNcepi that winch IS derived from tIIe
clause under considerations. And vet
II has been said, and repeated. by preat
men anu wise men, that this clause does
noI contain delegation of power; A
| clause :" essential, that without The SUBJ
stance oil Tins power as Mr.. Madison EN-.
| phallcally remarks, the Vs. hole constitution
would b. a dead ieller.(4)
| thlnh that tile several considerations
here presented, do most concjusiyelv
prove The truth of the proposition. which
aiiirns, thai III relation 10 The second class
OF powers maintained IN the ID clause
That Is w!iat are called The vested powers.
lie clause does enlarge The legislative
power o. congress. This part of the sub
lsct nigh therefore be now dismissed.
bnt an argument presents Itself az this
moment 10 my view, which | will take
leave 10 use, because II not only fits the
present case, but will furnish me with an
excuse iOr saying Il few words. on a
questioH HAT has been, as much agiiated
| as any question that has occurred since
| The establishment Of the present govern
ment; and is not yet completely settled.
| AhV treaty 'BdhIIlR power Is vested DV
Tie constitution, III The president and
senate. treaty IS made, aud duly ra-
! tined. But there Is stipulation IN tur
treaty, requiring an appropriation of mo
ney, which, Dui tor The treaty, congress
would not be authorised 10 make. Ii is
manifest, that the act passed 10 carry the
treaty into effect, being necessary. is di-
recily authorised by The claus in uues
ton.
All these 'lIiugs appear 20 nv simple
apprehension so clear, Thai shall not