Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1819-03-23

! essential TO all government. Put is this
case OF confidence! Would the people
OF any one state trust these OF another
with power 10 coniroul the most insig-
nihcant operations OF their state govern
meni We know they would not. Why
then should we suppose that the people of
any one state should be willing TO trust
those OF another with power TO coniroul
The operations OF u government 10 which
They have contided their most important
and most valuable interests! la the Le-
siSlaiure OF The Union alone, are all
represented. The Legislature of the
Union alone, therefore, can be trusted
by The people with the power of controul-
ing measures which concern all, in the
contdencc That Ii will not be abused-
! This, then, IS not case of confidence,
aud we must consider il as it really is.
IL we apply TIC principle for which the
slate oi Maryland contends, TO the consti-
, tuition generally, we shalt find il capable
Fol changing totally The character of that
instrument. We shall fluid il capable of
| arreslng all ihe measures of the govern
| neni. and OF prustla,lng il al the foot of
The siaies. The American people have
declared their Constitution, and The laws
MAIDEN pursuance thereof. TO be supreme;
but thus principle would transfer The SUI
premacy IN fact TO the states.
III lhe siates may iax one instrument
employed 10y the government III The exc
cnllon OF Ills powers, they may tax any
ana every other instrument. They NAV
'aS the mail, they may tax the mint, they
may IAN patent rights, they may lax The
papers OF the custom house, they may
lax Judicial process, they may tax all The
means employed by the government, TO
an excess which would defeat ;iil lie ends
OF government. This was mol intended
by The American people. They did not
design 10 make their government Deepen
deni on the states.
Genilemen say, they do not claim the
rghi 10 extend state taxations 10 these
objects. They limit their professions 10
property. But on what principle is this
distinction made Those who make it
have furnished no reason for ii, and the
principle Tor which they contend denies
IT.. They contend that the power Of tax
anon has no other limit than is found IN
The 10Th section of the Isl article OF The
constitution thai, with respect 10 eve-
~ thing else, the power OF the state is
supreme, aud admits of 10 control. II
this be true, The distinction between pro-
perry and other subjects TO which the
~ arbitrary, and can never be sustained.
This is moi all. II the controlling power
o! HE staIes be established, if their su-
premacy as tOtaNaiion be acknowledged,
whai is 10 restrain their exercising this
control III any shape they may please TO
give II Their sovereignty is not confined
TO taxation. That Is not the only mode
IN which If might be displayed. The
question Is, IN truth, question of supre-
macy; and II the right Of the states TO
tax The means employed by The general
government be conceded, the declaration
That The constitution, and tile laws made
III pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme
law of The land, is empty and unmeaning
defamation.
in The course of ihe argument, The Fee
deralist has been quoted; and the opin-
ions expressed by the authors of tina work
have been justly supposed to be entitled
10 great respect IN expoundImg the con-
sti,ution. No tribute can be paid TO
Their worth which exceeds their merit {:
but mapplying their opinions to the cases
waIeh may arise in the progress OF our
government, right TO Judge of their
correctness must he retained; aud, TO
understand the argument, we must exa-
mine the proposition il maintains and
The objections againS. wliic!Iii is directed.
The subject OF those numbers, from
which passages have been cited, is the
unlimited power Of taxation which is vest
ed in the general government.
The objection 10 this unlimited power.
which Tie argument seeks to remove, is
stated WITH fulnesS and clearuess. IL is.
" Chat an indefinite power OF taxation
IN the latter Che government o! Tie u
nlon) might and probably would, in
time, deprive the former Che govern
ment OF tie staies) of the means OF pro-
vidln9 tor then own necessities aEd
would subject them entirely TO The mer-
cy OF the national legislature. As the
iaws OF the Union are 10 become tie
supreme laws Of The land as il is 10
have power 10 pass all laws that may be
necessary for carrying into execution
the authorities with which ii is proposed
10 vest it; the national government
might a any time abolish the taxes inn
posed for state objects, upon The pre-
teucc OF an interference with It's own
Ii might allege a necessity for doing
this, i'll order TO give efficacy to the ma
ional revenues and thus all the re-
sources OF taxation might, by degrees.
become the subjects OF federal mono
poly, to The entire ex fusion and des-
ruciIon of The stale governments"
The objections 10 the constitution
which are noticed III these Numbers, were
TO the underlined power Of the govern
meut 10 lax, not 10 the incidental priyi-
lrge Of eXemptlng ITS own measures from
state taxation. The consequences appre-
hended from this underlined power, were.
that il would absorb all the objects of
taxation. (" to the exclusion and destruc-
ton of the state governments" The ar
guments Of the Federalist are iniendedto
prove the tallacy of these appreTiensions