Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1819-04-02
Il had been frequently asserted during

Ike debates on the constitution, and be-
fore its adoption, that this clause was
in reality no grant of power, that il con-
veyed nothing but what would have re-
suited 10 the government by unavoidable
implication. No axiom is more clearly
" established in law" says the Fedcralist,
No. A, than that wherever general
"power TO do "a thing is given, every par
" ticular power necessayE for doing ii is
pressed by the aniis,nt RS The En-
glish law. " Quando IA, lid aiicui con-
csdit, csaccdsre ridr;m. It Id, SINE Qpo res
ipsa esss nou potest." When The law grants
any thing ls. IA person, i, also sises ti,a,
uit&oat ,cAich The thing ITSELF Cannot
he. Or as Lord Coke inierrrets il,
when The law doth give any thing 10
one, il siveih implicitly Whatsoever tx
necessary for the taking and enjoying the
same" Thus " wl,rn lands are let by one
man 10 another at iss will Of the lessar
and th; lessee sows Tie land, and The
lessor after ii is so9n, and before The
corn is ripe, phi hin out, yet the lessee
shah have the corn, and shall base free
entry, cgreSs, and rig, ess TO CIT and carry
avay tie corn" lCoA- Lit. GO. This La
TT, maxim affords the best definition o!
what IL meant by necessary means.
they are those means rits0W rhich the
end could not he attained. The clause
then conveys no grant OF powers II was
ims eried from abundant caution, or per-
I,aps for the purpose of letting i'll The
power contained in tie latter part OF
the clause, and ofvesiipg i'll the leglsla
lure rather than the other departments
The power of making laws 10 carry into
effect the other powers vested in the
government, or IN any department or otf-
Ger thereof. Let us Thea suppose i''ai
this clause had not been inserted. Con-
gress then would have mad right 10 use
the means necessary 10 eifrctuaie their
gran,eepOwers, and no more; they could
only have used those means sine quo
(without which, their express powers
could not have been carried into execu-
lion. The Insertion of tue clause has
no greater effect II >cOnfers no new
power. When law is about to pass,
tile enquiry which oughtto be made hy
Congress Is, does the constitution ex-
pressly grant this power? il not, then, is
this law one pitioat (Which some power
cannot be executed. ifi,is not, then it
IS a power reserved 10 The states, or 10
The people, anu We may rot use the
means, nor pass The law.
The government of the y. s. is one Of
specified and s:mitedpowers. Alth0' liBii
ted, they are vt ample. they are vast.
Ii is entrusted with the regulation of all
our external concerns ii is empowered
10 protect us from foreign nations and
from internal disseniions. For this pur
pose il NAV lay taxes, borrow money,
raise armies, govern the militia, build
ships, and exercise every power which II
Is necessary should be exercised 10 at
tain those great and desirable objects.
The purse aud the sword are placed in
lis hands. The state governments have
all residuary power; every thug neces-
Sary for the protection of the lives llber-
Nv and property of individuals is lcn sub
ject to their control; the contracts OF
every class OF society, agricultural. mer-
cautile, or mechanical, are egulated by
their laws, except in those cases where
uniformity was desirable, in which cases
the stat 5 fully surrendered the power.
This residuary power was lefi In posses
sion of the States for wise purposes. IL
is necessary that The laws which regulate
the daily Transactions of men should have
regard to their interests, Their feelings,
even their prejudices. This can better
be done when the territory is o! mode
rate dimensions, than when II Is i'm
mense; il is more peculiarly proper TOO
In the situation of our society, where
we have been always accustomed 10 our
own laws, and our own legislatures, and
where the laws OF one state will not suit
the people of another; il is still more
important that this division Of legis-
.lative power into external and internal
should he rigidly adhered TO, and lis
proper distribution religiously observed,
when we reflect that the accumulation of
these powers into the hands OF one govern
ment would render il too siiong for the
liberty of the people, aud would inevita-
bly, erect "a throne upon the ruins of the
republic. Why then should the federal
government grasp al powers not neceS-
sary for carrying into effect their ac-
knowiedged powers why should they
trench upon those interior measures
which were reserved by The states for
their own regulation aud controul why
should they so eagerly, year after year,
and session after session, encroach upon
state rights, and make one encroacbmeni
a precedent for another or why should
they assume even doubtful powers, when
they are vested will, so many undoubt.
ed powers perfectly adequate for all their
legitimate purposes
1 think il clear that tie intention Of the
constitution was 10 confer OH Congress
the power OF resorting 10 such means as
are Incidental TO the express powers to
such means as directly aud necessarily
tend TO produce The desired effect. II the
chiefor principal object oIihe instrument
intended TO be used, be such as 10 pro
duce other effects, or TO couhuce 10 some
oiker end, II cannot b. considered as a
necessary insirumeniiore calculating the
desired end, although il may remotely
have tendency TO produce the desired
effect. Thus, bank is principally intend
ed 10 benefit Individual merchants and
traders II is said 10 increase their CAPT