The Rhode-Island Republican. [volume] (Newport, R.I.) 1809-1841, 1819-08-11
@isrelIanp.


treaty transferring the Florldas, negotlat-
ed under the full authority OF the Span
ish government, has nor been ratified.
Had this treaty been unlocked for and
unexpected had any events urged the
necessity Of an immediate surrender Of
that territory had Ferdinand the 7th
been taken by surprise, and at a loss how
to act, we should not be astonished at
this hesitation, and would find some ex-
cuse in the deplorablc situation of that
kingdom, and the total absence Of resour-
ces or independence but after protracted
negotiations of twenty years. duration;
after spoliations on our commerce, ma
tional insults, and state oil peace, a.
mounting very nearly to state of war;
after we had repeatedly urged our claims,
and almost exhausted negotiation, Spain
could not plead ignorance Of the actual
state OF our relations and when her min
lister, accredited in this country, had, af-
ter some years of deIiberation, entered
into formal treaty, ccding to us the
Floridas, as an indemnity for our claims,
with what faith or character can the Span-
ish King refuse to ratify the authorised
acts OF his agents ? In this negotiation,
which was neither hurried nor secret,
the utmost frankness and liberality were
evinced by the American cabinet. We
had showed more forbearance towards
Spain than could reasonably be expected
Of us, labouring, as we have been, under
prcssingand crying wrongs; and if Spain
possessed the strength and national char
acter which she did in the first tell years
ofthe reign of Charles the 9TH, we should
have been this day at war with her and
it is not to be denied, that her weakness,
and the struggle with the revolted colon
les, have excited some sympathy, which
has been injurious to our rights and in
tercst.
A new era, however, has commenced
and what is strictly just, and demanded
also by considerations Of safety, must be
vigorously pursued. The Fividas mast
be ours, the late Seminole war, and the
events also of the war with Great Britain,
unite to assure us, that the safety and
tranquility OF our frontiers is out of the
question without them. We have tried
TO obtain them peaceably," we must
try what force will do ; they are our pro.
pcrty, we have lien upon them which
cannot be evaded; and if Spain feels her.
self justified, and sufficiently powerful,
either to prevent our taking possession
Of them, or cjccting us when we have
them in our power, let her try tier best:
but without them, it will cost the United
States treble their value to maintain an
army of observation on our frontiers.
~ 1t is not, however, so certain that the
\ treaty may not be ultimately ratified the
obstacle is the British cabinet, and
I've believe that Lord Castlereagh has not,
4 nor could not pledge the cooperation OF
bis nation in the evel.t of hostilities grow
!. ing out Of non-r ratification Of the treaty,
sfor in that case the veil would be too
& tflimsy, and though not desirous of seeing
Ia war either with Spain or Great Britain,
4 yet this country will not permit Great
Britain to war with us under the Spanish
Rag. IL the British, by an unwarrant-
!. able interference in our concerns with
another nation protesting to he indepen-
dent, disturb the peace of the civilized
world, and cause another continental war,
ySlcImust be prepared to state her reasons
and justification TO that world, and stand
ssady to abide the consequences 1t
,argue nothing for her to say, that
possessing the Floridas might endan-
fg6f}the Spanish and British possessions
in the West Indies, for it is well known
that il is not our interest. our policy, or
our intention to acquire and hold any
(transmarinc possessions neither can it
be. possible for the United States and
Great Britain to be at war without ter.