Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1818-10-02
POLITICAL.
vINpICATl0N OF I.uE U. S. RAM
rRoN ia FRANKLIN GAzrITL-No.s.

FROM ia FRANKLIN GAzEITE-No.3.
| Bat the WeetS oi the existing policy may
not be unworthy Of consideration. Ho,,
! is If viii The result Of lie cashiers cir
cuIar, aud Tie refusal by The bank and lis
branches, 10 grant bills OF exchange al
par, be prcjndicial to the interests of The
community, 10 greater extent than Was
felt
IWSi-Undcr the state of things which
existed prior 10 the creation Oiihe United
States Bank land
Second-During, the policy ofiIiai bank,
immediately preceding that which NOW eX-
isis?
This may be determined from the fol-
lowing view of the subject.
Ihai consequences, such as are ar.
he!eai IN a state 81 things involving an OBJ
sirucicd currency must he experienced,
cannot he doubted. and 4 iseQuaiiy plan
that such an distraction Involves both
troabie and capenSe. But both those neon
veuieuccs we're endured ioa most opptes-
sive extent before tie United States Bank
| came into being II my memory serves
me, as much as fweaiy per cart. MAS de-
! inanded by the brokers, between Wash
| iugton and BOston-pcrhaps II WAS more.
| in add;lioa. an 0rcI' pfop0rtioa al trouble
was eXacied, under the Chaf!rring and
| grinding policy which then prevailed
! Now, unit. the United States Bank Shall
keep pace with the cormOrant appetite III
| The brokers' or form league with them
or, IN other words, il the buitcd States
| Bank shall regulate this exchange so as 10
make II embrace 10 more than All eqUNa.
lent for The cost and expence OF specie
investments, between these and other
| plac :, 10 must follow that the creation OF
that bank is Promotive of consequences
lTj,U0uyGblc 10 the interests al the Commu
uity. And al! thai part Of the exchange
system in which trouble, aud veXaiion are
concerned i'll having TO DO with brokers,
and their uUceriair cXactIous, must re-
ducc itself TO so much as is employed in
walking or riding 10 the u. ). Bank, orits
branches or transmitting the amount
necessary TO beeNcItanged, by post-w hen
ii return viii be given al ii parrot exchange,
boiiomcd on the specie actWe.
| infer therefore, (thc exchange between
Washington and Boston being NOW per
cent? that lie u. 5. Bank, II II have moi
performed What the minimizing parts Of
our community supposed II would: aud
| which think has been sheysH il could NOT
perform, no. was il bound 10 ppriorm-li
| has brought about Ii system oi regularity
in relation 10 exchange, (aud exchange
must necessarily exist and oil fairness,
which never could have been brought "a
houitor wouldnoi have beeiD 10y any other
means. And to the regularity and fair
ness Of The system MAY he added the Gl-
ira,,taee which the difference between
twenty per cent. and i"o per cent. inn
plies.
Second-Bni whether is the existing
policy, or the pol.cy which preceded ii
| best?
This can be known, only, by an exami-
nation OF beth, which | shall attempt on
| ~ i'll cursory WAY. Bui enough will be
| advanced, perhaps, to satisfy those who
are disposed TO give Misrepresentation its
proper weight, winch 10 preferable.
Ii is well known, that The policy of The
| United States Bank, soon after its oYgani-
cation and the same policy continues,
| down 10 the late tbange--iended TO drive
an tie paper OF The private, or state banks (;
and The reason Why this eject was pro-
| duced, may be found in the general Cur
rency and extra-acceptableness of the
| u. $. Bank paper, over state bank pa
| per. All mercantile men sought after II,
and 10 get it, mosI generally Tie paper Of
other banks was deposited IN The y. S.
Bank, and its branches. This consolidate
ed debts against the state banks which
they were either compelled To redeem, or
| keep up weekly interest upon--wlIicl,
for the reasons assigned, was necessar. !
| against all the banks, Tearward oftlie point
where The currency tended.
The state banks perceiving this, saw
that IL was useless To continue 10 make
discountS-for the interest received in one
hand, waspaid away hy The Tic
routine Ui business by the state banks,
was really like
| Dropping buckets into empty urIis
r,IIs -
Indeed, il was worse than that--for in
addition 10 The necessity which they found
! had overtaken them To- make 40 discounts,
another necessity al last arose, which was
To- pay ZIP! And this produced cores
ponding necessity OH The part of tie stale
banks, TO use lie same language TO their
| debtors. The consequences arising oui of
| this universal demand for payment, need
| not lac detailed. Suffice ii 10 say, the
community felt the pressure of il--aDd
they must continue 10 ieCi If, sCith0m RENE
dg, until the state banks gel out of debt
To- the United States Bank and lis branch
| es.
| Now, If my opinion were called for on
| the prOpTiefv Of The aforesaid policy, how
ever much deprccaic ITS effects, should
be compelled to attribute the evils which
| Tie community have, and must for some
| time CONTINUE To- endure, To the undue mul-
| liplicaiion Of state banks, and ihe conse-
qucnt amount Of payer, with which the
| u. States has been oVcrTuu, iIap 10 any
exceptions against the policy oftbe United
States Hdnk. II isnevcrtheless true, that
many old, an solvent, aud valuable banks,
are 10 be made to suffer under Tie two
| fold state OF ihings-,iz. the muliplica-
| ton Of stale banks; aud the policy Of In
United States Bank, without having con-
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