Alexandria gazette & daily advertiser. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1817-1822, 1818-09-18
pre.en, day, / shall fearlessly encounter

present day, / shall fearlessly encounter
every other authority. ~,
Were the construction, however, which
our opponents have put on this clause, cor
rect, il would leave yet ummpared the pow
er of appropriating the dividends OF the
stock held by the government IN the Bank
OF United States, and the proceeds OF the
sales of the public lands, neither OF which
fall within the description OF those sources
of revenue that are embraced by TINS Sec
ton and both Of which would consequent
ly remain subject TO the provision OF an9th,
er clause Of the constitution which shall
presently have occasion TO notice.
But whence, let me ask, do our opponents
derive their Limitation Of the power OF Con.
gress to appropriate the public revenue
Congress have power, I'VE have seen, TO
lay and collect taxes to pay the debts, and
provide for the common defence and gene
raj welfare :" under no other restrictions,
except "that all duties, excuses and customs
shall be uniform )" "that no duty shall be
laid on articles exported from any state,' -
nor any "direct tax imposed" but accord,
Ing to prescribed ratio among the several
states.
Why does this language extend beyond
the authority OF laying and collecting taxes
Not to provide for the payment OF the debts
of the nation. For that obligation OF good
faith, so far as respected existing debts, the
constitution, elsewhere, expressly provi-
ded: and from the subsequent power to
borrow money, that of returning it, when
due. would have been necessarily infer
red.
Why describe the objects TO which the
revenue may be applied, and impose an
obligation TO provide for them, unless the
power, Of appropriating, the public money
to those objects, was also designed 10 be
granted? Shall we render nugatory clause
of the constitution, from tar construction
of which, it is conceded, by almost all our
adversares, that much public benefit may
be derived
They are pre- pared, however, TO meet
this interrogatory with another. 1t is con-
fidentIy asked, "why should specific emu
meration Of any other powers OF Congress
Immediately follow this clause, when every
power would be embraced by an authority
to provide for the common defence & gene
raj welfare? My construction of the clause
affords an easy solution OF this enquiry;
The powers, delegated by it, are restricted
to the collection and application OF the pub
lie revenue. Many, indeed the far great
er part Of the powers subsequently enume-
rated, require, for their exercise, no apPro-
priation OF money whatever. The very
few which do require such auxiliary aid,
are the most important of them all, as ITO
raise and support armies )" "to provide and
maintain navy" and they involve the
necessary exercise OF many powers, which
the mere authority to appropriate the pub
lie money does not comprehend. The lat
ter furnishes but one mem Of attaining the
common end of all the powers of Congress,
the general welfare. 1t may be employed
for this purpose either singly, OF in con-
junction with other powers, alike necessa-
ry % this primary and ultimate end OF all
governments.
The defect of the argument which have
sought to answer arises from superstition,
that my construction of the clause in ques-
ton, which extends its import beyond the
power of !evying taxes, asserts title to
every power whatever, tending, in any de-
gree, to provide for the common defence
and general welfare Of the United States.
For myself, sir, | totally disavow any
such construction. ask for Congress but
the authority, expressly delegated by this
clause, to lay and collect taxes, and, when
thus collected, so to apply them, as to
provide for the safety and welfare OF the
union.
Far from being the un5ounded authority,
at which so much alarm has been express
ed, i. carries along with il several obvious
limitations. The end to be attained by it,
must be one Of common defence, or otgene-
raj welfare il must, also, be one which re-
uuires the appropriation Of money; and
Congress can, then, no farther participate
in its attainment, in virtue OF this power,
than by contributing, towards it, the public
money.
1t cannot be commended, that thi, power
is rendered unnecessary, by that contained
in the last clause OF this section, ito make |
all laws which are necessary and proper for
carrying into" effect the powers expressly
delegated 10 Congress. The former is a
primary and independent power the lat !
ter but secondary, or auxiliary. Had the
latter not been expressed, there can be no !
doubt, 10 use the language OF Publius, that
it would have resulted 10 the government
by an unavoidable implication" as il did,
under the articles of confederation. II was
inserted in the federal constitution to obVi.
ate, not 10 create doubts. But, If deemed
essential, this authority extends beyond that
in question, and comprehends the power to
pass other laws, as we'll as acts OF appro-
priation. 1t suffices for my present pur-
pose, while it also obviates an objection Of
one Of my colleagues, (Mr. Smyth) that,
among those acts, it expressly authorizes
all such, as are required for the exercise OF
the power contained in the clause which
have endeavored to expound. Both clauses
resemble each other in one quality, which
our adversaries seem to disregard they