Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1817-12-23

It =.
| either the generality of the expression or the
coui sc OF Decentralization under it. with the idea
| ,a; Congress has not Il discretionary power O.
ver IT. expenditures limited by their apphca
tlOu 4" To The common defence aHd general
| welfare"
| 4 few of The very great variety OF instanc-
| eS, IN which The revenues at the Jnted States
have been applied 60 objects not iaihng Win
| III the SpccinCd puMcis 1T Congress, or those
| whichniay be regarded as incidental TO them,
| will best Illustrate this remark.
! thus, il can SCARCELY be conceived, tkat, if
construed with rIgor, the constitution has con
| ierred the power 10 purciia>e a library, efther
| specifically, a. necessary" incident to L.
| giSlaiiOn. sui less, perhaps, can the plous
| services Of chaplain, or the purchase OF eN-
| pensive paintings, FOR Ornamentn@ the hall OF
| session, or various other expenditures of simi-
| lar character. he considered as 4" necessary"
! incidents TO tue power OF making laws. Yet, To
! these and tosimiiar objects, have the funds of
| the United States been freely applied, at eve
\ ry successive session OF Congress, without 4
| question As to the constitutoUality OF the APP
| plicatiou.
| 1t would be yet more difficult TO reduce I'M
der the specific or accessory powers 0t Con-
| gress the liberal donation TO the wretched suf-
| ferers in Venezuela, or the employment of our
revenues in the useful and interesting enter
prize TO the Pacific.
The bountes allowed for the encourage
nent of the fisheries, form another expendi-
! turt, that does not tall under any OF the pow
erS granted by the constitution. Nor could it
| fairly be- considerable interable from the pow
ers granted upon the strict principles some
! times contended for. The same objections
would apply to actual bounties, paid to manu-
| tacturerS for their encouragement, and to the
indirect encouragement given TO them, and
! witch operates as a bounty to one class of the
! community, and as tar upon the rest. These
and variety OF other app. OPERATIONS can only
| he justified upon the principle, that the gene
| raj clause in question, has vested in Congress,
| discretionary powar to use for the" general
welfare, tac funds which they are authorized
! TO raise.
| Nor is there any danger that such power
| will be abused, while the vigor OF representa-
| tive responsibility, remains unnpaired. Ii is
! on tins principle that the trainers or the CON
| sututiOn mainly relied for the protection of
| the pubic purse. Ii was safe reliance 1t was
manifest that there was no other subject Oh
! which representative responsibility would he
! so great. On the other hand, while this priu-
| cipie was calculated TO prevent abuses in the
| appropriations of public money il was equal.
! ly necessary togive an extensive discretion TO
I tue legislative body III the tlisp position of the
| revenues since no human foresight conld dis
! Germ, nor human industry enumerate the inf.
nite variety OF purposes, to which the public
/ money might advantageously aud legtimately
| be applied. The attempt would have been to
| teSSidte, MOTTO frame a constitution to foresee
| aud provlde specifically for the wants OF ia.
| ture generations; not TO frame a rule of con
| duct tor the legislative body. Hence proceeds
the use Of this general phrase in relation 10 the
| purposes TO which the revenues may be appii-
! ed whilst the trainers of the instrument in
! the-clauSe which concludes the enumeration of
| pOicerS, scrnpulously avoid the use of SO com
/ PiehehSIVe an expression, and contiDe them
selves 10 the grant of such incidental power as
might be both :" necessary and proper" TO The
exercise of the specified powers
Nor IS 1t conceived that this construction of
| the constitution is calculated to give that un-
limited extent TO the powers of the federal 60
| vernment, which by some seems to have been
| 1DDlgilenGeU is y hat,.
| the powerto appropriate money for a purpose
| and power To do the act for which ii is appro-
| priated and, it so the authority 10 appropri-
| ate money for the general welfare" does not
! ny tar construction extend the specified or in.
| cidehtai powers OF government. Thus in the
| case under consideration ii the power 10
J make a road or dig canal is not given, the
| power of apprOpria;ing money cannot confer
| II. however generally il may be expressed. #
| there were no other limitation, the rights Of
| the respective states, over their soil and terri
! tory, would operate as restriction.
! Whilst this appears 10 be safe as well as
! fair construction of the constitution, is also
| tlIat which has been practically given to il
since the origin OF the government. Of this
| the instances already mentioned, furnish some
evidence, audit is apprehended that npon the
| rigid principles of constructions asserted both
! IN regard to The enumeration of powers and
| the appropriation OF revenue, the acts of the
! federal government, including aiiis branches
| Will exhibit a continued series OF violations OF
adoption, to the present day.
II would behoye us 10 turn over the statute
book and deliberately examine, how, upon
| these principles, the laws giving bounties 10
| fishermen, encouraging manufactures esta.
| biishing trading houses with the Indians, e.
| rectIng and constructing beacons piers and
| light houses, pun chasing libraries, adjoining
with paintings the chamber or Congress, giving
| charity TO suffering foreigners constructing
| roads through the different STAKES, and esta,
| biShing banks, can be recoDciied TO the pro-
| sioDS OF the constitutions. II, Dis las Deen re-
| marked Dyhigh authority, the constitutional
| question can be precluded by repeated re-
| cognitlons, under varied circumstances OF the
| validity OF the exercise OF power by Con
| gTess, - IN the acts of the legislative execu-
| tive, aud judicial branches of the government
1 accompanied by indications in different modes
| OF q concurrence OF the general will Of the na-
! ton" t:r advocates for these powers in the
/ general government can find little difficulty in
| Supporting the pretensiOn.
| ff'm All These considerations, your commit.
! tee submit 1t rs their opinion, that Congress
| has the constitutional power TO construct roads
and canals through the several states, rih the
assent NJ The states. on such terms as may be a.
greed on, Ie4cIRg The ju9sdtctiOnaI rights in the
| states respectively. To these aud other natio-
/ nal improvements, which may be found to be
within the constitutional powers of the govern
ment, they think it advisable that the interest
| OF tile government in The bank of the United
| States SlIould be Appropriated They forbear
! to give greater length 10 this report BY enlarg.
| ing on the important advantages to be deriV-
| ed from these national improvements. They
| also forbear at this time to offer tie details of
| any upon the subject, presuming ii most pro-
| per to obtain the sense of the House of Repre-
sentatiyes in the first instance ON the general
| proposition. For this purpose they respective
| ly submit the following resolution
| Resolrcd, That in order to promote and give
security TO the internal commerce among the
| several states to facilitate the safe and expe-
! ditions transportation of the mails, by the i'm.
| prOvemeut Of post roads, with the assent Of the
| respective states to render more easy and less
| expensive, the means and provisionsi necessary