Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1816-02-06

| compromise, nothing which points to the
| cooperation ct foreign power, nothing
| which designates treaty-making faculty.
1t IS connected with any of the necessa..
| ny accompaniment of that faculty 1t is
not furnished with any CT those means.
without which it is impossible to make the
smallest progress towards a treaty.
| Il Is self'evident, that a capacity to re-
| Sulate commerce by treaty, was intended
| by the constitution to be lodged some
| where. 1t Is just as evident, that the le-
| gisiative Capacity of Congress does not A.
/ mount TO it; and cannot be exerted TO pro-
duce treaty. 1t can produce only Sta
tute, with which a foreign state cannot e
made 70 concur, and which will not Weld
| TO any notifications which foreign state
may desire 20 impress upon it for suitable
| equivalents. There is no way in which
| Congress, as such, can mould its laws into
| treaties, il it respects the constitution. IL
! may lsgslatc and counter-legislate but
| 1t must forever be beyond its capacity TO
combine In law, emanating from its So
| p2rlte domestic authority, its own views
with those ct other governments, and 80
produce harmonious reconciliation ct
those Jaring purposes and discordant ele~
| ments which it is the business of negotiate
! on 60 adjust
l reason thus, then, upon this part of the
subject it is clear, that the power of
congress, rs to foreign commerce, is only
what 1t processes to be in the constitution.
legislative power, to be exerted munich
paly, without consultation or ag. G. ment.
with those with whom we have an inter
Course of trade it is undeniable that tie
constitution meant to provide for the ex-
ercisc OF another power relatively to CON-
merce, which should exert itself in concert
with the analogous power in other coun-
tries, and should bring about It's results.
not by statute enacted by itself, but by an
international compact called treaty that
It Is manifest, that this other power is vest
Ell by the constitution in the President and
Senate, the only department of the govern
meat winch 1t authorizes TO make any trea-
ty, AMI which it enables to make all trea-
ties that II 1t be so vested, its regular cx-
ercise must result in that which, as far asit
reaches, is law in itself, and consequently,
repeats sucn municipal regulations as stand
In its way, since tits expressly declared by
the constitution, that treaties regularly
made shall have, as they ought to have,
the force Of law In all this, perceive
nothing TO perplex or alarm US. II exhi--
bits . we'll d'gested & uniform plaa Of gov-
ernment. worthy of the excelel.c ren kI-
whom it was formed. The orr; airy pow. +
to regulate commerce by statutory enact
ments, Gould only be deyoived upon Con.
gress, possessing all the other legislative
powers of the government. The extraor-
binary power TO regulate it by treaty. could
not be devoved upon Congress, because
from its composition, and the absence of ali
those authorities and functions, which are
essential to the activity and effect of :,
treaty making power, il was not calculated
to be the depository of it. II was wise &c
consist ut TO place the extraordinary pow
err to regulate commerce by treaty, where
the residue OF the treaty-making power
was placed, where only the means Of nego-
citation could be und, and the skilful-and
beneficial Use of them could reasonably be
expected.
That Congress IegiSlates upon commerce.
subject to The treat making ho7oer, is a
position perfectly ineligible but the un-
Outstanding Is in some degree confounded
by the other proposition. that the legisla-
tive power Of Congress is an exec ton ont
of the treaty-making power. 1t introdu-
ces into the constitution strange anomaly
"A commercial state, with written CON
stitution, and no power in it to regulate i,s
trade, in conjunct on with ether states, in
the universal mode of convention. 1t will
be in vain to urge that this anomaly is
merely imaginary; for that the President
and Senate may make a treaty of COM
meTcs for the consideration of Congress-
The answer is, that the treaties which
the President and Senate are entitled 70
make, are snch, as when made, become
law, that it is no part of their functions
simply to initiate treaties. but ccnclusiyely
to make them, and that where they have
no power 10 make them, there is no provi-
sion il the constitution, how OK BY whom
they shall be made.
That there is nothing new in the idea OF
a separation of the legislative and conven-
tioHal powers upon commerci u subjects.
and of the necessary control Of the Former
by the latter, IS known to all vino are ac~
Quaintcd with the constitution # England.
The Parliament Of that Country enacts tie
statutes by which Is trade is regulate ua
nicip Ny. The Grown modif;cs them by
treaty, It has been imagined, indeed
that the Parliament is IN the practice OF
confirming such treaties but the facs IS
indoub edly otherwise. Commercial tres
ties are laid before Parliament, be cause tha,
kings ministers are responsible for their
advice in the making ofthem, and bee ose
the vast range and complication Of Che
English laws of trade ard revcrnp, repder
legislation unavoidable, not for the ratifcs
ticn, bIt the execution Of their commercial
treItcs.
Ii is suggested again, that the treaty-ma.
king power, (ualess we are tenants INC
mon OF it with the President ami Senate. q,
the extent az least of our LEG sistve riphts.N
fa recfilcf,r monster f,-c erra.t ,,,.t,