Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1816-02-01


ty's favor----who however, on some other *
Ordinary ground, was estopped from sue
ceeding in the cause. Thc construction Of
the act, however, does not depend merely
upon the last member of the section. By
the exception or proviso therein also COLI
tanned, no other error is to be assigned or
regarded than suca as appears on the
face of the record, and Immediately res
hecss the construction of the treaty relied
on. This provisn or exception, especially
when taken in connexion with principle
which pervades all appellate Courts,
namely, that party shalt not assign for
error, that which is beneficial, or not inju-
rions to him, confines the appeal to cases
in which. as il appears from the face of the
record, the treaty both came in question,
and was decided against, tot injury Of
him who relied on il. In other words, the
exception of the clause, restricts the pre-
ceding words Of it, which might have o.
therwise, been considered more extensive.
and produces symmetry between all
the members of the section.
This view of the subject would produce
| correspondent right to the party gricved
by the construction of the Court below. to
| make the point of the decision upon the
treaty, p ;rt of the record, that is OF the
Judgment, as well to give jurisdiction to
| the appellate Court, as TO afford founda-
ton, on which the errors permitted by the
act to be ASSIGNED, are TO he erected. But
| TO suppose that Court having only ju'is-
| dictioo in single car, is not to show that
that case has actually occurred, would be
| as novel, in the history of judicial proceed
ings. as it might be fatal to the ordinary
( grounds of jurisdiction of the several
States-grounds, on no pretence, rcquir ng
81, I 4
and as to which, the State Courts possess
the uadoubted privilege even TO err, with
out remedy.
In the case before us, while it is admit
| ted that the appellont was a British alien,
and set up the treaty of peace, as ground
| or defence against the appel.ee's claim, it
was far from being the only ground Of that
defence, or on which, only, the decision of
| this Court. or that Of the District Court,
could have turned.-The case agreed in
| the cause, consists of fourteen different
| findings, most of which are of mere or
ldinary character. For example, as this
suit respected land lying in the territory
| granted by the English Crown, to Lord
| Fairfax, and also granted to the appellant
| by this Commonwealth. since bis death, one
ct those findings drew in question the point,
(IosSibiy never before soleNnly settled by
this Court,) whether Lord Fairfax had an
| ailodlal, or only mere seignioral right To
! the land. Under the last idea of his title,
judgment in favor of the appellee, ought
| not, f'erhafts, to have been rendered, aitho'
| in other respects, the treaty, should have
been in his favor. That would have been
| a mere ordinary ground Of jurisdiction,
| no how within the meaning or purview of
| the 25th section and many other points
of the same character, may be found to
exist in the case agrced.--Whatever the
| fact may have been, the most the Supreme
| Court OF the u. 5. is permitted to know,
IS to be collected from this courts Judgment
OF reversal; and thar Judgment is general,
and only takes the ground, that the law,
| on the case agreed, is, OH saTne point, in
favor of the appellant. 1t may we'll have
been. for aught, appearing, of record, to
| the contrary, that the judgment was rem
dered upon the before mentioned question
| respecting the nature OF Lord F ;rsax's ii
| lie, or on some of the other ordinary,
| grounds of enquiry submitted by the case
| agreed: or it may be taken to have been
rendered Gas the fact really was) upon the
| act OF compromise of 1926, which, although
| 1t was posterior to, and formed no part of
| the case agreed, was considered by the
Court. as a letter addressed to them, by
the appellee, authorizing it to render the
| Judgment, pursuant to the provisions of that
! act. But if, in truth, the judgment of this
| Court 7ras rendered upon the construction
Of the treaty, it is the appellee's misfortune,
| that he did not manifest it to the appel
late Court, by spreading it upon the re-
cord.
Thus stands the case upon the record,
by which alone the Sup: Court of the u. s.
should have been governed, in assuming a
| jurisdiction in the case. But if that Court
had held itself at liberty, to go out of the
| record, and re sort to those reports, which
| are deemed authentic evidences of the de-
cisions therein contained, it's jurisdiction, in
1 this case, would have been cut up by the
roots altogether. The report of the case
| ~ would have shewn, that if the treaty
| OF peace was at all decided on, by
| the District Court, its decision thereutlon
was in the appellee's favor, and that that
decision was, in effect, affirmed, as to that
point, by the equal suffragcs of the Judges
of this Court upon it. That report does not
| merely omit to state, as the record does,
whether the treaty was decided upon, or
not, by this Court, and how it goes fur
| ther and shews, that the actual decision OF
this Court was rendered upon another, &
ordinary ground of jurisdicton--the act Of
compromise aforesaid such a ground, as
no error can be assigned on, under the pro-
| viso Of the judicial act, as aforesaid, and as
must forever bar the Supreme Court of the
U. 5. from acting upon the case, unless we
! go beyond the actual provision of the sec
ton III question, let in the power of that