Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1816-02-08

Nay, the whole treaty-makng power
will be blotted frem the constitution, and
new one, alien to its theory and practice,
be made to supplant it. If sanction & scope
be given to the principles Of this bill
This bill may indeed be considered as the
first OF many assaults. not now intended
perhaps, but not therefore the less likely TO
happen, by which the treaty-making pow
err, as created and logged by the constitu-
ti,n, will be pushed from its place, and
compelled 70 abide with the power of or
binary legislation. The example of this
bill is beyond its ostens;b'e limits The
pernIcious principle, Of which it is at once
the child and the apostle, Tust work on
ward and to the right and the left until it
has exhausted itself; and il never can ex-
haust itstl 1t until it has gathered into the
vortex otthe legislative powers of Congress
the whole treaty making capacity of the
government. For if, notwith standing the
direNtnsss and precision with which the
constitution has marked out the depart
ment of the gov rnment by which it wills
that treaties shall be made. and has de-
clared that treaties so made shall have the
force and dignity of law, the House Of
Representatives can insist upon some par
ticipation in that high faculty upon the
simple suggestion that they are sharers in
leg slative power upon the subjects en-
braoed by any given treaty, what remains
to DE done for the transfer to Congress of
the entire treaty making faculty, as it APP
pears III the constitution, but to show that
Congress have legislative power direct or
indirect upon every matter which treaty
can touch? And what are the matters
within the practicable range of treaty
which your laws cannot either mould or
qualify or Influence I'm sginatinn has been
tasked for examples by which this question
might be answered. 1t is admitted that
they must be few, and we have been told,
as think, of no more than one. 1t is the
case of contraJand Of zvar. The case has,
it seems, the. double Recommendation of
being what is called an international case.
and a case beyond the utmost grasp of
Congressional legislation. I remark upon
1T, that It is no more an international case
than any matter of collision, incident to the
tr'de ct two nations with each other. /
remark further, that a treaty upon the
point of a contrs'>and of war, may inter
tere as we'll as any other treaty with an act
OF Congress-. A law encouraging, by a
bounty or otherwise, the expectation of
certain commodities, would be countcrac-
ted by an insertion into the list of contra
band of war, in treaty with England or
Il
treaty would look oc way and the law a.
mother. And various modes might readiy
be suggested in which Congress might So
legislate as to lay the foundation of repug-
nancy between its laws and the treaties of
the President and Senate with reference
to contraband.-I deceive myself greatly
II subject can be named upon which a
Ike repugnancy might not occur. But e.
ven If should be practicable to furnish,
after laborious enquiry and meditation, a
meagre and scanty inventory of some half
dozen topics to which domestic legislation
cannot be made to extend, will it be pre-
tended that such was the insignificant and
narrow domain, designed by the constitute
on for the treaty-making power 1t would
appear that there is with some gentlemen
Willingness to distinguish between the Ie-
gslative power expressly granted to Con-
gress and that which is merely implicit, &
to admit that treaty may control the re-
suits of the latter. I reply to those gentle
men, that one legislative power is exactly
equivalent to another, and that, moreover,
the whole legislative power of Congress
may justly be said to be expressly granted
by the constitution, although the Jnstitu-
ton does not enHme-ate every variety of
its exercise, or indicate all the ramifica-
tons into which it may diverge to suit the
eXigencies OF the times. I reply, besides,
that even with the qualification of this
vague distinction, whatever may be It's
value or effect, the principle of the DILL
leaves no adequate sphere for the treaty
making power. reply finally, that the &C
knowiedged operation of treaty of peace
in repeating laws of similar strength and
blending character, enacted in virtue of
powers communicated IN Terminus to Con-
gress, gives the distinction to the winds.
And nov that / have again adverted to
the example of a treaty of peace, let me
call upon you to reflect on the answer which
that example affords TO all the warnings
We have received in this debate against the
mighty danger Of entrusting+o the only de-
partment of the government, which the
constitution suppoSes can make a treaty,
the Incidental prer0gative of a repeating
legislation. 1t is inconsistent, we arc desi-
red tobelieve, with the genius of the consti-
tuition, and must be fatal to all that is dear
to treemen, that an executive magistrate
and Senate, who are not Immediately G.
lected by the people, should possess this
authority. We hear from one quarter that
il Il be 81, the public liberty is already in
the grave, and from another that the pub
lie interest and honor are upon the verge of
1t. But do you not perceive that this pic
ture of calamity and shame is the inere fig !
ment of excited fancy, disavowed by the |
constitution as hysterical and erroneous in |
the case OF treaty of peace Do You not |
see that il there be any thing in this high |
coiored peril, it is treaty of peace that |
must realize It? Can we in this view COM |
pare with the power to make such treaty !
that pf ma king q f.eafv Of rom pnarca3 ~. |