Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1816-01-27

nut. the d stfbution and notifications OF
those powers have no parallel. To the
Z eral government arc coEhded certain
powers, specially enumerated, and princi-
pal!y aft citing our foreign relations, and
the general interests of the nation. These
powers are limited, not only b. their spe-
cial enumeration, but by the positive de-
ciaration that, all powers not enumerated.
or not prohibited to the states, are reserved
to the states, or 70 the people. This de-
marcation of power is not vain ard in,ffec-
tual. The free exercise, by the states, of
the powers Reserved to them, is as much
sanctioned and guarded by the constitution
or the United States, as is the free exercise,
by the federal government, Of the powers
delegated to that government. If either
b. imp .ired, The system Is derangcd. The
two governments, therefore, possessing,
each, its portion of the divided sovereign
ty, although embracing the same territory,
and operating on the same persons and
frequently on the same subjects, are ne
vertheiess separate from, and independent
OF, each other. From this position, be-
lieved to be incentrovertble, it necessarily
results that each government must act by
as o1vn organs: troH no other ran ii ex-
poet, command or enforce obedience, even
as to objects coming Thin the range Of
its powers.
But whist, on the one hand. neither
government IS left dependent upon the o.
ther, tor the exercise of its proper powers,
so Oh the other hand. neither goveinment,
nor any OF It's departments, Can act com
fHlStrcty, on the ether or any of It's organs
m their political or official capacities; with
tle single exception. perhaps, OF tue case
where state may be sued.-In using the
term conhuiStUe action, do not mean to
restrain 1t to the idea of actual force, but
to extend It to any act on imposing an obi
CATION to obey. The present government
OF tie Y. States, grew out of the weakness
and ineiiiciency OF the confederation, and
was intended TO remedy it's evls.-instead
OF government of rc9uisitiou, we have
government OF ho1ver. But how does that
power operate, On individuals, in their
individual! capacities. No one presumes to
contend, that the state governments can
op rate ,mpuisively on the general gov
ernment or any of its departments, even in
cases OF unquestionabl- encroachment on
state authority; as, for example, if tue
Federal Court should entertain jnrisdicti-
on, III personal actions, between citizens of
the same state, not involving questions
concerning the construction of the cansti-
tuition OF the u. States, nor concerning the
validity or construction of any statute, trea-
ty, commission or authority of, or under,
the general government, nor concerning
the validity OF any statute, commission or
authority OF, or under. any state govern
ment; Such encroachment Of jurisdic-
ton could neither be prevented nor re-
dressed by the state government. or any of
Its departments, 6y any fyCceednYe getting
on the FcdcrQi Courts can perceive
nothing in the constitution which gives to
the Federal Courts any stronger claim to
prevent or redress, by any Procedure act-
ing on the state Courts, an equally obvi-
Gus encroachment on the federal iurisCic-
ton. The Constitution Of the u. States
consemplates the independence of both
governments, and regards the residltaTy
sovereignty OF the states, as not less invio-
liable than the delegated sovereignty of
the y. States. 1t must have been torescen
that controversies would sometimes arise
as to the boundaries of the two iurisdicti-
ons. Yet the constitution has provided no
umpire, has erected no tribunal by which
they shall be settled. The omission pro-
ceedei, probably, from the belief, that
such . tr bunal would produce evils great
Ell than those of the occasional collisions
which it would be designed to remedy. BE
this as 1t may, to give to the 6 neral gov
eminent or any of its departments, a di-
rccc and controlling operation upon the
sta-c departments, as such, wculd be to
change, at once, the whole character of
our system. The independence of the
state authorities would be extinguisbed,
and superiority, unknown to the consti-
tuition, would be Great d, which would,
sooner or later, terminate in an entire con-
soldation of the states into one complete
national sovereignty.
III these principles be correct; ifthe two
governments and their departments are
separate, distinct frcni, and dependent
OF each other, and neither can act directly
and compulsiveiy upon the other, there is an
end Of the question now before the Court
for the question is, in fact, whether the
Federal Court can act directly on this
Court, by obliging it to enter judgn. mt
not its own.
But THIS principle Of the separation and
independen of the departments Of the
two governments, deserves farther deve-
iopeUe0t.-The writer commonly called
the FederahSt. and who has ably ciucida-
ted many Of the principles os cur govern
meht, lays down tie position, that the
national anC state systems are 10 be. re
garded 40 one 7vhoie" Qettcr 50, .. 245-
24o) From this position, both he ard the
Counsel for the Appellee, have inferred
the right of appea! fro a the State, 20 the
Federal Courts. The pos ton itself, how
ever, is assumed without proof or illustra
ton, nor is the sense in which it Is to be
u1d rstood, distinctly unloldef.
There is only one sense in which II is