Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1815-09-27

foreign powers The moment a whole
nation esponses the particular interests of
family, II IS compelled to mingle in a
multitude OF transactions which it would
otherwise consider as perfectly Indifferent
We have been unable to establish the
republican system among us, although we
have attempted it under various forms
more o. less democratic but it should be
considered, that of all the constitutions
which have been successfully tried without
success, there is not one which was not
produced in the bosom of factions, and
which was not the work OF circumstances,
lmPerlous but fugitive this, then. is the
reason why they have all been vicous.-
But, since the 18th Brumaire.* there has
existed period. singular, perhaps, in the
annals oil the world, To mediate. shielded
lromthe storms, to found the edifice of IL
berty on solid basis. such as is Justified
by reason and experience. After the
peace OF Amiens, Bonapartc might have
choSen between the republican and the
monarchcal system-he might have done
VIVA ever he wiShed-he would not have
encountered the smallest oppoSition.-T
precious deposit Of liberty was confded
to HIM :he had sworn to defend it: nv
keeping inviolable this promise, he would
have fulfilled the expectations of, fine ma
ton, which had judged him alone capable
OF resolving the great problem of public IL
berty in an extensive cOuntry--he might
have covered himself with immortal glory
Instead OF which, what is now proposed TO
be done 1t is proposed to give him the
absolute and hereditary property of an au
th0rIty which he has received only in
trust. Is this for the true interest ui the
First Consul himself? 7 40 u9t 5elieue 1t.
Ii is very true, that before the 18th
brumaTe, the state was falling into ruins.
and that absolute power snatched IL from
the drink Of the abvss.-i}ut where is the
inference from this fact /? that which the
Whole world knows, that political bodies
are SUBJECT to diseases which cannot be
cured except b. violent remedies: that
temporary dictatorship is sometimes neces-
sary Tor the salvation Of liberty. The Rn-
mans, who were So Jealous Of their free
dom. recognised the necessity of some
tunes calling into action this supreme pow
er, But because a violent remedy has
saved z sick man, shall we every dav ai-
minister to INN the same violent remedy !?
Fablus, and Cincinnatus, and Camilus.
saved the liberty of Rome by absolute pow
er but it was by laying down that power
as soon as possible by retaining il they
would have destroyed what it was intend
ed they should have preserved Caesar
was the first who sought TO retain it f: he
was the victim of his criminal passion, but
liberty was destroyed forever. Thus.
every thing which has been said respecting
the necessity of absolute power, only prove
the necessity of absolute power, only
prove the necessity Of Temporary dicta-
tarship in certain critical moments. but
does not prove the utility of permanent
and interchangeable despotism.
1t is in the nature of their government
that we are to seek for the instability of
great republics tits because being hgsti
iy pat together in the midst of civil con-
VuIsiuns, enthusiasm always presides over
their establishment. One only has been
the work of philosophy organised i'm the
calm OF peace. this republic subsists full gf
wisdom and vlgor; the United States of
North America present this phenomenon,
and their prosperity constantly receives
acccssl0ns which excite The wonder and
admiration of other nations. Thus was it
reserved for the new word to teach the old
that nations may TRANQUILITY exist under
thedominion Of liberty and equality. Yes \
l dare to layit down as a principle, that
when new order Of things is To- be estab-
ed without fear OF factions, as il was ia fhe
power Of the first consult to have done. es-
peciaily after the peace of Amiens. and as
1t IS st,l IN his power TO do. it j. easier tn
form a republic without anarchy than
monarchy without despotism. For how
can We conceive limited power which
will not be illusory in a government where
a Chief has the whole executive authority
in his hands, and every Office in his Gift :?
We have heard something Of institutions
adapted to produce this effect.
But previous TO proposing the creation
Of a monarch, ought we not to be assured
that such institutions are among the num-
Der Of possibilities that they are not
among those metaphysical distractions
with which the contrary system its go con-
stantly reprOached Nothing has been
hitherto invented to moderate supreme
power, unless it be those intermediate bo-
dies called the PRIVILEGED orders. Is II.
then.a new nobility which is spoken of
under the name Of institutions? But is
not dis remedy worse than tbe disease
los absolute power dcpriyes us of nothing
but liberty, whilst the institution Of privi-
lprp1 ord nr. ,Iprri,,.s ,,s o.. o,,..e ~. nj, 90.