Martinsburgh gazette. [volume] (Martinsburgh, Va. [W. Va.]) 1810-1825, 1814-08-25

&Saa VI
august, gen. Brock well knew that a cessation
OF arms below had taken place, is certain, be-
cause on that day he gave me information Of il,
and that the orders in council had been repealed,
and observed, he hoped it would be the founda-
ton OF a peace. It is likewise well known. this
measure was disapproved by the President, and
principally on account of the effect it would have
on my army. When gen. Dearborn was ordered
by the President, to make diversions on the ene-
my's posts below me, and ought to have been
cooperating with me with all his forces, he was
sitting at his ease at Greenbush, and making ar
ranSements which were one great cause of the
destruction of my army. And yet this same gen.
Dearborn, was appointed president of the court
martial which has condemned me for the missor-
ine which his own misconduct had been a great
cause IN producing. In sacrificing me he has un-
doubleday made some atonement for his own faults,
IN the opinion of the administration, and may be
| pernitte to remain in the possession of his noni-
nal rank, and in the enjoyment of his e~moluments,
in the degraded and disgracfeul situation, to
which he has submitted for more than a year.
Thus has gen. Dearborn. by adopting a mea-
sure which brought the principal part of the ene-
my's force against my army, exhibited his pro-
found skill in military operations, and his talents
and qualifications as commander in chief of the
American army.
l shall now proceed to consider that part of
the Presidents message, of the 4th November,
1912, which developes the objects of my unfor-
,unate campaign. 1t is in the following words
"Prenous to its declaration, (the war; 1t was
deemed proper, as a measure of precaution and
forecast, that a considerable force should be plac.
ed in tie Michigan territory, with a general view
to its security, and in the event of war, to such
operations in u. Canada, as would intercept the
hostile influence of G.. b. over the savages, obtain
the com rrand Of The lake, on zshich that par Of Cana
da borders, and maintain cooperating relations with
such forces as might be most conveniently EN-.
pioyed against other parts. Our expectation of
gaining the command of the lakes by the invasion
Of Canada from Detroit, having been disappointed,
measures were instantly taken, to provide on them,
a naval force superior to that of the enemy"
The object of the force intrusted to my COM
mand, are here particularly stated. They are
stated by the first magistrate to the legislature of
the nation. This is a document of the highest au-
thority, and must be considered as conclusive evil
dence, that these were the objects for which the
expedition was ordered. and which the President
expected would have been accomplished. If it
was the expectation of the President, that with
the few militia under my command, | should have
obtained possession of the lake, it is unaccountable,
THAI 1t never was communicated to me. All my
instructions from the department of war, were
laid before the court martial, and there was not
the least intinatlon OF the kind. Indeed / never
had the most distant idea, that this expectation
was entertained, until it was disclosed in this
message. Both in my repeated written commu-
nlcauons, and in frequent conversations with the
President and Secretary of the department of war,
| had urged the necessity ola navy on lake Erie,
superior TO the British, in the event of war with
6. Britain. l well knew at that time, they had
a strong naval force on the lake, named and pre-
pared in every respect for offensive or defensive
war. The United States had not a single vessel
or gun boat on those waters. All they had was
an old unarmed transport vessel, repairing on the
stocks, and which was not launched until near a
J yn0nfh alton tha Ia~lo pn nj ..nu
There were but two modes of taking possession
of the lake one, by taking or destroying the
enemys naval force; the other, by taking possess
sion of all their posts and harbors, both OH the
main land and islands, an extent of coast more
than 500 miles. l am confident no one will believe
it was possible for me, either to have taken or
destroyed the British feet then on the lake, with
the means ] possessed. The force under my COM
mand, was totally inadequate to have effected
it in the other way, especially after the fall of
MichiImackinac, and all the northern nations of
sayages in hostility against me. Although l still
entertain the same opinion ! gave to the govern
ment before the declaration of war, that a navy on
lake Erie was essentially necessary; yet l now be-
lieve, had an adequate force been sent to the
Michigan territory, and sufficient forces had been
ordered 10 have taken possession of forfs George
and Erie at the same time, and these armies had
co-operated, the whole of that part of the province
ofUpper Canada, which borders on lake Erie,
might HAVE DSeh III our possession III tne campaign
OF eighteen hundred and twelve, with ali the
enemy's harbors on the borders of the lake, by |
which means the naval force must have been des-
troyed, or must have surrendered at the approach
of winter.
This idea / suggested to the secretary Of war,
in my memoir of the 9th March eighteen hundred
and twelve, provided the object was the reduc- |
ton of the Canadas, and it was the intention of
the government, contrary to every opinion / had
given, not to build a navy on lake Erie, / suggest
ed it as the only possible mode. and at the same
time pointed out all the difficulties which would
attend it. On the 9th of March, at the time when
this memoir was presented, l had no command in
the army, and had uniformly declined to accept a
military appointment, although had been strong
ly solicited. Being then the governor of Michigan
territory, it was my duty to induce the govern |
ment to provide means for its safety.
About the 18th ofApril, after / had been APP
pointed to the command of the north western army,
unsolicited, and even undesired on my part
then presented to the President. through the me-