The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1814-03-26


added the time necessary tor giving the order, for
| Masking the arrangements preliminary to sieii
movement for making also the subsequent rne from
Morrlsviiie to the mouth OF the Gsu, lanoqui river
ell OF which would probably protract the moment
OF junction till the sth OF Nov.
Admonishod ss by the storms which hsye
assaed u; FOE Ten days past, and which have rs.
yet ceased, cannot but think tdat a period so late
would ut itself be fatal to the project. t..
Other circumstances lead to the conclusion.
Beeinn ng our operations from the mouth Il the Gau-
nanoqu river, we shall have a march Of twenty
four miles to ngstou, and through u country co.
vered with woods, destitute of 5tants and per.
vious only by two rosds, which without any inter-
rupton from the enemy, are represented al nearly
impsss,ble at p,e eat. THIS mcveme nt (unke that
'ginsiiy projecteJ') cannot be made thoot the
ais of horses, and lels mum her ct these than SIX
hundred, (G) including the 81 regiment of dragons,
is, unde rs,and deemed insufficient Now these
must be fed and their provinder drawn from this
place, NJ the country between Graveliy Point and
Putneyvl'e, affords uons, and interposes n swanpy
desart which shuts US out from the supplies Of Res
Se and ltayTile, &c. An important question arises
here-can the necessary forage he obt aimed from
this neisbborhood the 9nsrtsr- says
II cannot, that II must be cxrted from Lowvie
40 niles distant and transported hence by wster"
These facts, on our plan, menace operations a.
g.ins Kings N with delay, which would probably
surrourf us with all the embSrras Of Csns-
dan winter. and extingnsh evey hope of grs.pins
the other. the sAter and the greater object below
call il the safer and greater object tcesu,e--
| At Montreal. you find the weaker plsee, and the
sIler force encounter at Mortreai Won meet
FRESH nnsxhanstsd, tcent rein crc- men. of four
Thousand men at Montreal, you approach your
own resources, aud establish between YOU a,S them
| an easy and expeditions intercourse: st Montreal
! You occupy point which must be gained IN rarry-
ing your attacks home to The purposes of the war
| snd which seized row, will save one campaign: al
Montresl, you hold position which completely se.
vcrs the ensmy's line OF opera IONS which shuts M
the O:tswa as well as the St Lawrence against him.
and which, while 1t Restraints all below witbers and
| per'shes all shove itself
| These general, the thoaghto which present
| themselves on your proposition, and which under.
stand as abandoning, Tor this Campo On, the propos
| ed attack an Montreal am entirely discussed to
listen 10 all that be said the other SIDE of tn
question, bat at present. the assigned !eay,.
me n" d"net OF the policy of pursuing, promptly and
| funny the p!sn already indicator, and which, be
sides the appreciation of the president has reserved
the sanction OF council OF war.Ta1
| an. very respectfully,
Sir, your mo otcdicnt serrent.
: JOHN ARMSTRONG.
| MOTOR general Wilkinson.
n descent at .HPhersoa's farm tvo e q hail
| miles bcloxp Kingston.
(al Forage TOR this number zuas required 5v the
general
-, his refers TO tie preceding plan, aso-ov.d BY
the pr eSiceni the Esd .Juiy ard eoms,,unicated
| TO general HHkin on on the 5fh IF august
! Cal This eli consisted # generals UTikin-
son. L,.uiss BroSgn, and ,suaytspoat, and eo,nsrs
3ore Chauneee TIE opinisn urrninious
=
Hdr6ov, ana While IL pas deemed broct, cadle and
| svds intended 10 carry our GttGck, against 6o.h
hitg tn an Montreal, ne had one or more con-
| re'sottons with commodore ChQuncer on the Re
Drral su6ject Of navGl co-operation- Yhesr had
particular ereneet to tzco points, tie place oGand-
rug ian case Kingston tvas the object AZ attach
ana ne dssree 81 protsenon syhich the fee. coua
be abe 70 render 20 the debGrkafios or.he army
fhe phfces Of descent indicated BY The secretary
! Spere three
II " Pserson's farm, tzvo miles and half below
I'd iHe mouth efthe Lit.ls cataya7ui, fur or
foe ns'le- ov- &tngs,o7; and
Sd The nron'h If the cianaao7a riper, txven.y,
Jour 'ntss og"~ RTngston.
The camnodore's answer qpas sub.tant;aHy nc
|oHows--tnot he zpouid not tate upon kin,seJ the
re-p9nsioiity efcoperirg The i!natre Of the army
az The st efthese psirts, bps fhg. hs spotd cover
as landing at either Of the other tspo.
Head Quarters, .Sacke,t's Ray6or,
Dear Sir. 80
VISA sbost TO embark for Grsnsdier Ia,,nS
when ireoeiyed your letter of this morning which
WIZ sndeavor 20 answer; my very feeble condition,
and the waa. OF time Ear reelection, di,quafy me
from doing tul justice 60 my opinions.
You will recolect that in my lett Of the 9Th Of
August, proposed TO take Kingston, as pre- nina
ry TO IN attack Montreal; on offered different
opinion In your letter of the S,h and on my srr "a
mere; submitted the alternative to rounoil Of wsr
whish decided in favor OF your plan, to leave Kings
ton untouched. and proceed directly sesinst Mou.
trea' bnt Interior nsderstions and Information
have induced me TO adhere TO my original pisn.
Permit me. previous TO the discussion of the
grounds of my opinion, to submit few incidental
/ remarks
II Is extremely doubtful what may be tte present
force OF the enemy Kingston, and very upcertain
| how much orr own force may have bseo dimi.ished
by disease, aud the casualties attending our move
/ ments.
| From the retreat Of Proetsr before general Har.
rlsDn, and the information received from colonel
Scott, think it probable that DE Rottenburg with
the electives OF his division, has gone to reinforce
Proctor, and that the troops winch have descended
to Kingston consisted only of the sick of hst diy.
| SION.
My idea Of recalling general Hampton to reinforce
ns, was pro uced b; an alarm with respect to the
'nsuNeieney "f our force, which found spreading
and the direction which suggested, was fou sded or,
Your own proposition (d) of the 18th nstsnt st
which time understood you to offer the q, iniop
| that the march from Hampton's eneamp snt TO
NC rsviiie might be accomplished IN SIX DAYS and
my o~n opinion s that By disembarrisng himself OF
his artillery and its sttrsii, perhaps be might be
able TO make the march is that time or q few DAYS
| more.
My reasons for preferring fine stack OF Kingston
| 20 that OF Montreal. ere these:
BJ the eduetIon OF chat place, We conquer pro-
vince, not only OF CREST importance to the enemy
but valuable acquisition to ourselves; we capture
| or destroy four th0use9d of his oest troops we
Put end to the Indian war; and by the des;ru eth.
on OF his naval force, establish command Of the
lake, and permit respectable part OF oar naval
force to be employed elsewhere.
On the contrary, leave Kingston, its gsrrison, and