The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1814-02-16
lFio,n f-st Paee.l

ton. he may lose This hope, abandon Kings
ton. and concentrate his forces at Montreal.
Ibis event is, in my opinion, so probable,
as 10 render necessary communication OF
the views of the president, in relation to the
movements on your part, (Which shall be
subsequent to those now making) ON two
supp0sitions $500
1T. That the enemy will keep his ground
at Kingston /; and .
I'd. That he will abandon that ground and
withdraw from Montreal.
On the first superstition, there is no diff
Guilty in either selecting our object, or the
means of pursuing it. We ought to destroy
the communication between Kingston and
Montreal, by interposing competent force
between the two, and assatling the former
by joint operation Of military and naval
means.
:. Local circumstances favor this project
A few armed boats on lake St. Francis. stops
all intercourse by water; in which case,
cannon, military stores and articles of SUBJ
sistence in 6uN, cannot be conveyed between
Montreal and Kingston.
From lake Ontario TO Ogdensburg We COM
mand the navigation of the St. Lawrence by
our armed vessels, and under their protec-
tion, our army can be passed over and estab.
iished on the Canada side at he point deem
ed most proper for the attack.
On the other sapposition, that the British
garrison is Withdrawn from Kingston to
Montreal, the old question of approaching
him by lake Champlain. Or by the St. Law
renee, recurs, and ought now to be settled,
so that there should be no unnecessary pause
IN our operations at a later and more mo.
mentous period of the campaign.
The circumstances in favor of the St.
Lawrence route, are these:
LIST. Our force is now upon it.
IL f,,yo .cH.
whole distance.
Sd. The enemy 10 not fortified on the St.
Lawrence side, and has on it no strong out
posts, which must be forced, in order to Sc
cure our TANKS and reaA while engaged in
the main attack; and
9TH. BY approaching his .fGnk, Gas this
route enables you to dog instead of his front,
we compel him to change his position, in
which case, he must do one of four things I:
other he must occupy the north side of the
river and give up the south, or ne must oc-
cupy the south side and give up the north
or he must conine himself to the island and
give up DO h sides or lastly, he must &C gu
ply both sides, and in this case expose himself
to be beaten in detail
None OF these advantages are to be found
in approaching him by the other route. Our
troops are not upon it: we cannot move BY
water his out posts are fortified, and must
assailable point, and that is covered by the
St.'Lawrence our attack must be made
exactly where he wishes it to be made all
his arrangements aud defences are, of
course, in full operation, nor is he COMPEL
ed to disturb them in the smallest degree
In word, we must fight him on his previ-
Gus dispositions and plans, and not on any of
our ozvn.
These reasons are deemed conclusive for
preferring the route Of the ST. Lawrence
and your measures subsequent to your pre-.
sent expedtion) will. therefore, be conform.
edto this view of the subject.
am, sir. very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.
Major Gexeral Dearborn.
Ertraet of q letter from Major General
Dearbora TO The Secretary at War, d.
Ted
"Sackett's Harbor,
April %. 1918.
The troops embarked yesterday. Eve
ry vessel is crowded with as many men as
possible; the total number 1900, of the best
men. ] trust we shall sail within one or
two hours. If the sails for a new vessel
arrive within Gay or two, and small
sloop from Oewego, which ought to have
been her davs since S0 roora ~ -