The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1814-05-28
NATIONAL VIEWS.

s'eiy gwen, OF what might be expected
from them IN the event OF a safe and salts
factory peace with France, we have thor
that there Could be no doubt that they
would interpose their good offices, and aid.
II necessary, IN support Of the rights TOR
winch we contend. Let US examine this
SUBJECT more critically. It's importance
merits it.
The contest in which we are engaged is
noS LOT ourselves alone. 1t is IN defence cs
the rights or all nations who have any IN
terest IN commerce, or III those higher ard
nob'er branches of policy which are conneIc-
ted with it. The nations of EuroDe ar,
DOW too enlightened not to know, the cons.
qVences that would resu, from perp;t,inV
the absolute dominion OF the ocean ,orr
nsurped ny any one OF them. We hazarou
notiing IN asserting THAI the power which
holds that ascendancy Will have gone F,.,
'hcc, 10 establishing universal dopjesa,,.
tnan 1t rs possible to establish On LAM b.,
eoAqdest. The monopoly of comne.re is !.
necessary consequence OF the dominion of
sae sea- The power holding the one can
regulate the other; 70 this nation dispense
'1'ois' on tna' impose restraints and penal.
ties. lie government comuapd;ie q, o
commerce of the world possesses IT'S wez,,h
and veal h is power. That C.. Britain
grasps at this high pre-emineuce, cannot he
oen'ed. That she has sought it. by sys
tematlc POLICY, which toak ADVANTAGES or
'he circumstances OF the times of the dan
gers, oistresses, weakne,s aod creduhtv M
other powers, is not less obvious. Nonc
OF the nations OF Europe are Interested IN
Permitting this state OF things to exist.
hey arc all interested in producing one
WITCH n, ay De compatible with the general
prosperity and independence of each
n 1,
lies OF Great Britain, in the cortest w,rh
France, received serious wrongs from thn
british government at different STAGES of
the war between Great Britain and Frs,cs
Several OF them were actually engaged. AZ
q ilereht periods, IN the war against Great
Britain, on the side of France Th;e n,o.
me case with Russia, Prussia. Denmart |
SPAN, and Holland, most of whom ac,ed
independently, under just sense OF their
wrongs These wrongs were inflicted ON |
tue h'sn seas, or by means # the mari
tlme superiority which Great Britain hao
gained. IL is well known fact. thai
81 Tue use OF ner power she has disregart.d |
the rights OF others, even those the best af- |
'soleo 10 her. Cannot be presumed that
Sne VIII cease to dot, should her ascenda, |
cy be better established, nor can il he h.
iieved that the other powers IF =,
rope viii submit to her usurnat;one -
De nsensible to their rights aud hcnor
when they fiud themselves in a si,uat,o,, -
assert them. ~
b. o form reasonable estimate of tho re-
suit OF the negotiation at q ottenburp or of
the supper: which we may expect in T.
from Russia aud The other powers Of the
continent, We must look With some minnie
ness to the situation in which pcaAg Win
rance "'li place ell the parties to it. This !
must IN CERTAIN degree depend on the !
nature OF the peace, and that on the party |
WIN Whom It IS made. lfpeace is made |
win b9naparte, we may form some idea.
from whstwe have ssen, as we'll IA f,o0' |
other circumstances of its cond;,;o,. -. /
OF tue state IN wnIcn It viii leave r.iro ann
Ii with the house Of Bourbon, more uocer. |
'aihty hangs override subject In The for |
Incr event. France will be party to l.. In |
the latter, the allies will dictate its cond,- |
',ohs. - prince VINO owes his elevation ex |
CiuslVely to foreign powers, who have en- /
lereo BIS Country with powe ful armies, |
anu In great measure subdueu it. ss must
be the Case it the house of Bourbon he res.o,
red. Can hardly be considered party to |
ny treaty they may frame with him. THE
Is no speculative reasoning. 1t is plain
matter OF tact TO which ell must assent. IL |
IS not necessary, tor our purpose, to pursue |
TINS SUBJECT further in this particular bra pch !
at this time. Let US suppose that such q |
peace is made with France, IS will hav.
secured the continent from danger from tina |
quarter, at least for the present & this NAV
Dc presumed, from the last accounts. wheth
ar u be made with Bonaparte or the Bour |
oons ouch peace would enable the EmDs |
ror OF Russia q his allies Of the Continent 70 !
look to the usurpatinns of England. aud to |
concert and adopt such measures as mic,,i |
De found most expedient TO prevent reno |
'ltIon OF them In pursui. of this great nb |
ect' their attention would naturally b. |
irawn to the negotiation at Gotterourg |
between the Uni ed States and Great Bri
.aiA sustained by the former, for the secu-
rity of those rights. from whose violation Inv |
he latter, those powers had so often emf !
ered. The attention Of the Emperor of
~ VIII be more particularly drawn e. |
tnis negotiation, from the circumstance |
mat gre" out Of the offer of his NJ diatioo !
"hicn Nreat Britain rejected. The same |
may De expected OF the Crown Prince of |
o"eden'"ho, 1t IS understood, has repeated
y expressed his willingness to promote an |
cconmod alton between the ". States & G.
britaih on just conditions, and in whose do
nlnlons the negotiation is held.
IT would nevertheless be highly imprudent
n the United States to repose with conf
fence on the favorable result Of the negori |
ions at GotJenburg. The frst effect Of |
peace between France and the allies will be. |
ne extraordinary eXulta ion Of the British |
government, which will srrogate to itself |
all the glory due to the late victories. and To |
a successfIl termination Of the war. should |
that be The result. lis pretensions. in re-