Alexandria gazette, commercial and political. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1812-1817, 1814-02-19

q my people OF Italy,. ID en isttsf =,
the Duke OF Lodi, he dciiyers himself
more decisiysly. |" Mypcopls OF the
kingdom of Italy may be certain that ]
shall never under any circumstances a.
'bandon thcm." We doubt ars thu
accuracy of a statement published by
one OF our cetemporarics, which says,
that he was willing to give up the Iron
Crowuto Beauhanoi., cede Venice to
Austria, and Rome to the Pops. How
cyerrevr If the statement be correct, it
was such : enc as the Allies could not
consent to. Has there been any subse-
quent offer! He talks of new delays
which probably have arisen from the
new circumstances of Holland having
thrown of his yoke. Here is fresh
Power entered into the ranks of powers
negotiating against him.
We observe in the set Of Frankfort
papers we have received land from
which we have made in preceding page
some interesting extracts that Austria
has republished in a supplement- to the
Frankfurt Gazette of the 22d Nov. the
declara,i n she issued last August
The motives that have led to the repub
lication of this document, we are unable
to explain. We may be sure however
that 1t has been done de,ignedly. Sure.
iy Austria cannot mean tina, she repub-
fishes to shew that in Nov. her demands
and conditions remain the same as they
did in Aug. In that declaration it Is
stated, that if a general peace could not
be made, preliminary continental peace
might be negotiated. Is such a design
in contemplation new? Does Benaparte
wish to draw the Continental Powers in
10 sePerate peace, and is this the cause
OF Lord Casllereagh's visit to the Con-
linent We remark in the Speech bit
,terness against England, and we recol-
,lect that in previous Speech to the Sc.
nate, he had attempted to pique the con.
.tinental Sovereigns with saying, that
,heir opinions were directed by England.
There is no doubt that he will leave no
article unpractised to separate US and
our Allies. In this attempt we trust he
will fail; for the Allies feel that their
truest interests consist in the closest and
most intimate alliance with this country.
But the allies should guard against
their generous feeling; they should not
be hurried into conditions of peace less
than their situation and safety entltle
them to claim. BY peace France will
gain every thing. She will regain at
least, 100000 Of her best troops, one
bali of her best officers, and seamen sui.
ficient 10 man 50 sail of the line. The
obstinaCy and rashness Of Bonaparte
have thrown away the military means OF
France. Never egain can Europe ex-
pcct to find her SO stripped OF an army,
so exhausted in her finances; nsver a.
gain can Europe expect to see more
tormid ,ble and victorious force opposed
to france. The crisis is e. sat 1t is in
favour of the allies, not only beyond ex-
pectation, but beyond calculation, and il
they do not reap tie full advantage O.!
it, they may soon pay dearly for their
folly. 10 SIX months after the peace,
France may have 50 sail OF the line,
we'll manned, and al army OF hall mil.
lion of men, commanded by great mi
iilary genius. One victory may again
give him possession of Vienna, and Eu-
rope may again be re-plunged into ali
the miserles hich it is now in her pow
er TO erect an etiectual barrier sgainst.
This barrier is the ancient iilElts OF
france, As existing II 1909. Even those
limits have been found too powerful for
the balance of power in Europe, and
shall VIC increase them now We can re,
duce ths to state otIair preponde ance?
If Bonaparte refuses such conditions,
the Allies should occupy Paris, restore
the Bourbon tamIly, re.instate the royal
party, and effect their purpose by that
means The restoration Of the Bour--
bons might not indeed be made siDe
qua non at present, but We should never
forget that that measure alone can af-
ford well founded hopes of permanent
peace. Bot perhaps some of the allies
aould not ocncnr in insisting on condi.
tons 10 the ex;cAtof reducing France to
her ancient linus. In that case we must
take just as much as the alliance col
lectiyely will dgmand. We must take
conditions far short OF those which safe.
ty requires, and power enables us to die
tote, rather than allow the accession of
any material member from the alliance.
Should more than her ancient limits be
granted to France, ministers will of
course be prepared to shew that they
would have insisted on better terms
could they have prevailed on the alliance
collectively tokave concvrred withthem.
If they are undoDe, the country will ex-
ecrate them, and two thirds of the op-
position will arraign them. The oppo.
sition are now laying in weight in hopes
that insufficient terms Of peace will
bring them into power The country