Winchester gazette. [volume] (Winchester, Va.) 18??-1826, 1813-12-04

pointed TO confer with him that he did
not consider the authority given to the
committee BY the resolution, snch as
would authorize them to call ON him IN
their onscial character; but If they were
specially Instructed by the Senate, he
wonld freely receive them, aud appoint
a time for that purpose special IN
strnctioRs in that case were according
" given by the Senate TO the comni,tee.
A-hy this distinction between them
tcers appointed q a committee, and
speciaL Instructions under that appoint
r,ent, unless 1t was sPon the priciple
that the Senate possessed Che faenity of
Transporting its powers. to its commit
tees for certain purposes But whe-
Their this presumption he fairly drawn
in theory or Not. Tie true reply to this
course Of ressod;ng, conceive to be
that the practice of conducting bust
ness between th6two houses "f Con-
gross be MANAGES ofconferenccs upon
disagreeins vote, between them. is
founded aitose,'s.- upon principles OF
| utility and convenience. Its object is
! 10 facilitate thc public business, by har-
n,oniyine their srsesedjnss and &c the
I suppnsitians case cogld really exist and
mutual sonvcnience could be produced
| by It, fpresnfhe, whatever pSsumpi'on
might be drawn from itin theory. that
in practice. the want of coordination
or the part OF a committee then invest
ed with powers, would not long he
deemed a sufficient consideration, to de
| feat arrangements founded altogether
in mutual Convenience, and practical
utility.
The presp,nplinn therefore, drawn
from the Imaginary theoretical case,
seems 10 lie ssnre than questionable.
But there is smother defect, and u very
| material one as it appears 80 nee, in the
Presidents final conclusion:
1t consists in the essential difference
in the organization of the tribunals sup
posed to be analogous. Each house of
Congress consists OF numbers. The
Executive, Of 4 single individual. Ii
would be manifestly ireonvenient from
that circGwstauce Tor a committee to
confer with either house collectively :;
bat it would be entirely conveaiept for
it to confer with the executive consist
Ing Of a single individual. This differ
ence Is fally illustrated, in the exteRt
TO which The President carried this
principle Ofanalogy, in authorizing his
SECRETARY CT State, tn personify the
Executive in eenferrr;nS with a euRl-
nsittee of the Senate appointed 10 confer
with the Executive authority itself.
Whereas, seeerSils 20 the constitution
the Secretary does not possess one
atom oil Executive authority nor does
the President possess the power 10 in
vest him with one, the office wanting.
the coordination Nth the chief Exece-
Tive authority OF the nation, essential
10 such a purpose but q committee OF
the Senate does participate in the cha
raeter, and powers OF the Senate aad
tor certain iucohate purposes may be
invested With its whole powers, and Of
course would not be waiting III respect
to coordination with The Executive,
Nor do see, aOv the Executive from
It's indiYisihiiitF, ear make 4 commit
Zee Of Itself sHaiosous 10 the proceed
ings of either HoRse OF ccngress; and
it is evident that, from this dissimiIa-
rity IN lis organization, from its phiSi-
! cal ineapaeity, il cannot in this respec;
| conform 10 the proceedings Of either
The Secretary ofStatc Personifyins the
executive, Tor the purpose of conferr-
Ing, woE'd hs analogous to the Secre-
tary Of the Senate Prosouisyius that
body fer the same purpose; each being
in the contemplation OF the constifu-
lion, subordinate, the nsere scribe to
the tribunal, te which he beienss, and
incapable Of participating N its pow
ers. OF attribgtes. Til. exposition
show, thg uncertai,sty Of theoretical
results, VIXEN drawn from practical
! slissimilariiies. This also leads me to
consider the character Of the transac-
ton in relation TO is suggested en-
| eroacbmeht On the Executive asthori-
t,.
It should Nc recoiSeeSed. that the FIX
ecu,ive, in relation to the Senate, upon
the subjects of treaties, aud appoint
ments TO Office, IS ahe active original
ing power. The Senate, tke passive,
preventive power. The executive there
fore presents 10 TIE confederation Of
the Senate sIl original objects. The
Senate may give, or deny the activity,
But in thc case Of denial, the power Of
The Senate, is at az end. 1t has no OBJ
jeets. IL can originate no Substitute.
The obvisHs effect of & conference be-
tween them, therefore, would be, TO
give the Executive the advantage, Of