Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-09-27

Jesty's ministers, that which / consider to
be practicable, if the disposable force in the
| Mediterranean could be 81 appropriated by
! the state of Spain-of Lord Wellington 5
plans, whether the presence of the corps
! detached from hence to Aicant is dispen-
sable to enable him either TO resume often
sive operations, or to maintain the defence
of Portugal. OF all the circumstances in
! short, upon which such a question must i'm :
mediately depend, / am totally ignorant of
these and of the relative advantage of the ap
plication NJ our force, Lord Wellington must
be the best and only judge shall send to
his lordship c. py of this dispatch.
1t appears to me, that the state # Europe
affords well founded hope, that the dis
| truction OF Bonaparte may be accomplish
ed
Ii is at the same time clear, that the eff
| forts already made are not sufficient and
| cannot be SO. Russia has indeed been sue
cessiul, but her success has been of a mega
| tive kind. She has had the disadvantage in
ali her battles with the French, when fairly
met. B"napartc has been beat by the cold
AID fam.n not by the Russian arms. Had
Russia n the Contrary, defeated the French
IN her first engagements, and driven her
Dack to the Oder, as a Conquering enemy,
then the downfall might have been produc
ID by Russia, aud by the rest of Germany
that would nave joined her standard. But
| 1t strikes me that Russia has nearly come To
| the term at her advantages over Bouaparte.
She has not the means of carrying on AN of
tensivc war against Frauce-w ithout money
that great army must subNist upon the cOGn-
try, and with the new and poor composition
OF the officers, with the piuEOcring habits OF
The whole, their presence must be curse
70 the Country, and must create general dis
gust. Austria is III my opinion Tie only pow
or IN Europe that has science and experI-
enCe necessary to carry Oh offensive wai'
against France. 1t che won d now join Rus
sla, success might be considered as certain.
The great power of Russia, is in nay iudg
;nent defensive only.
HE brilliant successes of Spain no dub
nave operated as a most pow, rful diversion
tor Russia, ana Bonaparte appearing unwi
ing To abandon it tor the present, the occu-
patton OF so large a French force, must con
! tribute essentially to the great object il,
iew. But such must be the reduced state
| at oPaln, her country exhausted, her re
| sources unproductive. her government W.
manageable, that were it not tor the indi i'd
! uai presence of Lord Wellington, and tor
| the effect or his wonderful influence and a
o'hties, even her Liberation would be cons,
| dered as almost desperate and impossi.
| BILE.
Il Neems nece sary, there fore, hat great
| e. part OF the population o. Europe should
| be brought into the field against tins co.,
anon enemy. Italy is that instrument-Ita-
| ly is ripe for it--ltaly offers innumerable
| facilities for such an undertaking. 1t pos
sesseS most vigorous ,ystem of govern
! ment which IL would alone be seficient to
! Continue IN order o bring all the res mr.
css OF the country into operation. 1t is fer
| tile and rich, and had been untouched by
| war. Its own means would supply he wants
| OF the army without any additional aid in
| specie, the want of which contracts our o.
| perations ia Spain and elsewhere. Its peo
! PIE eDrave ana ma ag abe, and have been
well and long habituated to order and ODE
dience. There would be no embarrassment
| with any existing government, which has
| been one great cause the misfortunes OF
opain In Italy all political ARRANGEMENTS
might be managed as>CIIght seem best for
the common cause.
The south of Italy appears the most de
sirable point OF attack. The whole force
OF SICILY could be employed without danger
to the island Naples, possessed Of good
national army, is already formed to our
hand. Your force is at once nearly doubled
and it would he practicable to march i'm
! medi ately with an army OF between 80 and
10000 men to the north oft 4iy-yuur num-
bers your resources daily increasing.
1t always strucR me that there was this
great difference IN favor If an operation
from hence la Italy, in preference to Spain.
III the former We Can Al once act as prin.
! cipal. We arc from the beginning cqul To- the
| enemy, and with proper management could
fight hun with advantage. In the latter we
can o"li be auxiliaries l., SCI open 2 couu.
! try against so great superi. rity of caval
ry, we Cannot take the field unless protec
ted by British or Spanish army Lord
! Wellington IS too distant. The Spanish ar
my are at present good for nothing Tin
less, therefore, the former shall have such
success as will put him IN possession Of the
centre OF the Peninsula, or the force and
condition o. the former shall very much nm
prove, 1t seems to me difficult for onr corts
debarked irum hence to take the field with
effect. In fact this had been the result. II
has hitherto been confined to Al:caut. bv a
force very superior TO It's own number.
think, also, that IN such an undertaking
grea: advantage might be derived from, he
atch duke Francis, and the duke Of Orleans
Ii bonaparte's fortune began u fail, the pre-
sence OF French prince OF the blood. and o.
an able man, might have great elect ON tbe
French armies. The arch duke Franc. !,
admiralty calculated for a leader lie i
sensible aud manageable and surroundedb r.,
very able men.
| Austria would be probably friendly but i
the government was not. 1 sho id hone viii
| the b4sugSitfou of he ,reu,