Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-11-22
FOREIGN.
THE MANIFESTO
or 7'HE
EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA.
Concluded.

tive should be decidedly rejected, could not
certainly be foreseen. But the manner in
which they were received, and still more
the striking contrast between the sentiments
entertained by Austria and the whole con-
duct oftt1e Emperor Napoleon, tor the PERI
cd OF these unsuccessful endeavors for peace,
soon destroyed the best hopes that were en-.
tertaiHed. Instead OF endeavoring by mo
derate language to improve at least cur
view of.the future, and to lessen the gene
raj dependency, it was on every occasion
solemnly declared, before the highest autho-
rites III France, that the Emperor would
hear OF no proposition for peace that should
violate the integrity OF the French empire,
in the French sense of the word, or that
should make any pretension to the arbitrafi-
ly Incorporated provinces.
At the same time, eventual conditions,
with which this self>creeted Boundary did
not even appear to have any relation, were
spoken OF, at one time with menacing indig>
nation, at another with bitter contempt--as
u it had not been possible to declare suffci.
emily distinct, the resolution OF the Emperor
Napoleon, not TO make to the repuse of the
world even one single ncElil,al sacrifice
These hostile demonstrations we're attend
ed with this particular modification to Aus
tria, that they placed even the invitations to
peace which this cabinet with the knowledge
and apparent consent of France, made to
other Courts, in false and highly disad-
vantageous light. The sovereigns united "a
gainst France, instead OF any answer 20 AUS
tria's propositions for negotiation, and her
offers of mediation, laid before her the public
declarations of the French Emperor. And
when III the month of March his Majesty sent
minister to London, to invite England TO
share IN neSocation for peace, the Byitish
4 81. -.
Austria still entertained any hope of peace.
when the Emperor Napoleon had in the
mean time expressed sentiments which could
only tend to the perpetuation of war !" a
declaration which was The more painful to
his Majesty, the more it was just and well
founded.
Austria, however, did not upon this &C
count cease TO impress in more forcible and
distinct terms the Necessity of peace, upon
the mind of the Emperor of France direct
ed in all her measures by this principle. that,
as all order and balance Of power in Europe
had been destroyed by the boundless SUPERB
ority Of France, no real peace was 10 be ex-
pected, unless that superiority were dmi
nished. His Majesty in the mean time a
dopted every necessary measure to strength
en- and concentrate his armies; sensible that
Austria must be prepared for war if her
InGufesNlOh HGlS EOt W NC entirety nC3NalatnE.
Ills Imperial Majesty had moreover been
long since persuaded, that the probability Of
an Immediate share in tile war, would no
longer be excluded from his calculatioas.-
The actual state OF things could not,be con-
tiIrued OF this Tie Emperor was convinced:
this conviction was the1nainsprins OF his &C
tons, and was naturally strengthen ned by the
failure of every attemptto procure peace.
The result was apparent. BY one means or
the other, either by negotiation or force of
arms, new state of things must be effected.
The Emperor Napoleon was not only a..
ware OF the austrian preparations for war,
but even acknowledged them rs necessary.
and justified them IN more than one instance.
He had sufficient reason TO believe that his
Majesty the Emperor, at so decisvca peri
cd for the fate of the whole world, would Law
aside all personal and momentaiy feelings
would aloGe consult the lasting welfare of
Austria, and Of the countries by which She
Is surrounded, and would resolve nothing but
what this great motive should imDose as a
duty upon him. The Austrian cabinet had
never expressed itself in terms that would
warrant any other constructions and vet the
French did not only acknowledge that the
Austrian mediation could only be an armed
mediation, but declared, upon more than one
occasion, that Austria under existing cir
cumstances, ought no longer TO conGne her.
selfto act secondary part, but should an
pear in force upon the stage and decide as a
great and independent power Whatever
the French government could either hope
or fear from Austria, the acknowledgements
was Of itself previous justification of the
whole intended and hitherto adopted mea~
sures Of his Imperial Majesty.
Thus far were circumstances deveIoped
when the Emperor Napoleon left Paris, in
order to make head against the progress of
the Allied armes--Even their enemies have
done homage TO the valor of the Russian and
Prussan troops in the sangunary actions of
the month OF May. That however the re-
suit of this first period Of the campaign was
not more favorable to them, was owing part
ly TO the great numerical superiority Of the
French force, and to the universally &C
knowledged military talents of their leader.
and partly to the political combinations, by
which the allied Sovsreigus were guided in
ail their undertakings. They acted under
the just superstition, that 4 CAUSE ike the
one IN which they were engaged could not
possibly be confined to themselves, that 500
ner or later, whether successful or unfortu,
nate, every state which still preserved
shadow Of Independence must join their cons
federacy, every independent army must act
with them. They, therefore, did not allow
further scope to the bravery Of their troops.
than the moment required, aud preserved
considerable part Of their strength for
period, when, with more extended means.
they might look 60 The attainment of Qrca>