Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-12-20


the world without having any beneficial effect upon the
reasoning in the The varying opinions might
express at various periods of my life, could not in the
smallest degree increase lessen the rights of the Ge
neral Assembly but let turn the attention of the
General Assembly to the actual words used in the
preamble the instructions of that day and far
they relate the obligation of instructions then claimed
by the General Assembly. they will be found, in my
Judgment strictly consist with the opinions expressed
by in the character of Senator which words the
following: " The General Assembly of the Common
wealth of Virginia. though they entertain doubt of
Your punctual performance of your duty, of your
faithful adherence to the great principles of CONSTITUTE
ona law and national policy deem it Incumbent on them
TO communicate their ofitons, formed after the most
mature deliberaon. certain subjects essentially
ueced they soemny believe, with the dearest rights
and most important interests of the people"
Does this quotation look like the language of
mandf Does it show any Inconsistency in my opinions
at different periods and under different circumstancesi
Certainly not. 1t demonstrates great resemblance in
language and actual identity in principle The Gene
raj Assembly, on that occasion communicates lis ofni
ons to its Senator'S and relies upon the respect due
those opinions, the obligation for their observ
ance. expressed the same sentiment, in nearly the
same language, IN the character OF Senator. Where
then IS the inconsistency of my opinions for by the
General Assembly, 1t is from the " instruct"
the Senators and request the members of the House
of Representatives. used in the resolutions of INSTRUCT
1t is to be observed that have on any oc>
cason objected the instruct" applied BY the
state legislatures communicating their opnoa their
Senator'S respectively. have always Thought and still
think the term proper according my definition Of
its import. have only enqured into the real obligation
imposed the Senator by the use of that term and
have eontended that subject to qualifications and
conditions; that does not preclude his discretion
in tact is not mandatory. That this the Literal
ad precise understanding of the General Assembly at
the time and on the occasion referred to- is ebvious
because protested only to communicate its ofions to
ITS Senators and this mmuncatinn did Justify it. in
using the term instruct although could not be even
presumed that the term communicate their opinions
d amount to acommand. But the last General AS.
hat aud
the term command" are IN fact synonymous has en-
ueaVoreu TO come to that result by rocesS oJTe1Son
MS Is salo IN the preamble that to instruct is moi
merely TO recommend instruction to Senator in
Standardization to request to representative i'm
plies a command" This implication is here denied
ana certainly with conclusive force to the General
Assembly which used the instruct ;" because if
the General Assembly had intended that il should i'm
ply aecoInmard, 1t would have used the term "'com
mand and thus relieved thelast General Assembly rsm
proving by ratiocn2tion, that instruct" means com
mand, and all the world from the OF mpli.
cation where positive at command. 1t is de
MED that the word instruct can be made to mean the
word command, by any collocation or pocess of rea
sonng or play upon words because in ruth ard fdet
their meaning essentially different and however inge-
Nous the argument it cannot destroy the subbornness
OF fact But may be here observed that it is inn
pliedly admitted IN the resolution that the term in
struct does not vi termni, exclude all discretion
and impose positive obligation obey the instructions
And unless the term instruct" can be converted into
the term command " sll the benefit Of the argument
OF terni will be against the mandatory character
of Instructions. That the instruct" does not in
its true meaning, nor in its practical application i'm
pose necessary obligation obey cannot be denied.
Nothingis more common than for coupEof law to in
struct ures, both upon of law and evidence
and nothing is than for ju-ies dsobev
such instructions Boh rights far as understand
being uDquest nable. Other examples might be pro-
duced. Hence conclude that as "instruct" does not
mean " command" but notwithstanding the reasoning
in the preamble still in fact "instruc." and
the state legislatures choose the instruct" when
they were at liberty to have chosen the word com
mand," we'll knowing the meaning Of both lit never
was theirnention TO ipose commands instead of in~
structons upon their Senators in Congress Although
the last General Assembly, for the first time, did
claim the right to 90 command the Senator's Of the
state; in the rule proclaimed for the enforcement of
that right does in fact admit the discretionary right
Of the instructed Senator. This conclusion will be still
farther enforced by another striking and important
difference, bStween the principle contained in the
solution of the General Assembly and the opinion ex
pressed By me, respecting the true character and ob
cation of insructione to which now respectfully
cit the earnest attention Of the General Assembly.
The General Assembly, in the body Of its resolution,
asserts the indubable right of the state legislatures
instruct their Senators all points, constitutional
foic, &c and by consequence it is the bounden du.
ty of the Senator'S 20 obey such instructions :" but in
the provso it cxempts the Senators frem the bounden
duty Of obedience in two descriptions of cases. the
il is presumed is intended to relate to the term con-
sfifntioHa and the other to the term foisic, used
In the body Of the resolution the words Of the proviso
are, Provided the instructions TO be gwen require not
the Senator TO commit dUioiafion Of the constitution
of moral rurtitude :" and the Senator is
cessariy left judge of his exemption, under this
classification of The first classification enbra
ces Instructions upon all dubious constitutional ques
tons in which the Senator is TO judge, whether the
instruction calls him commit Uio1fion Of the
constitution not. and il in his judgment it does he
then becsmes invested with the night Of dso6edieHce
The other classification relates to all cases hoHc"
The words are, Provided the instructions, &c re-
qoire not the Senator to commit Of moral fyt-
tude" The term moral tsirpitude is vague and
indefinite aud certainly requires definition and prec-
sion, before il can be very imposing rule of conduct
For atanee I'D IS respectlnlly asked the General A.