Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-11-15
"A dollars per annuni

part The idle imputaeion of an intended encroa CHI
ment thus appears 20 be utterly nfound-d unless in
eeed the ethics of certain fashionable orasts should
De received, as orthodox always inpute bad mott e.
to good action in disrespect to the evangelical r ss
OF school, to regard the inrmes of our natures
WIN SO much Charity and tenderness as ALWAYS TO pre-
sumo good motive, for questionable action.
hitherto this subject has been examined upon the
prncpc OF analogy drawn from the proceedings of the
Wo houses II Congress. These without any constitute
a. provisions on the subject. are founded solely upon
uhtary arrangements between them for mutual coven~
ehce and have been found extremely beneficial in prac-
VICE. IL appears TO me, that some similar Course OF
PooeeaInss between the Executive and Senate upon all
P'ns o concurrent jurisdiction, our Others If
eoineo is at least recommended, from the intimate
connection between them by the constitution.
IN the I'd section OF the 3D. article of that instrument
ioiowlng power amongst othersis given the Execu-
1--WE He, (to w.t. the Presidency may REQUIRE the oDin.
ION IN writing OF the principal officer in each the ex-
uuve departments, UPON any subject relating the -
Hes V me respective cDfces Upon this authority il ia
SAID, the Executive has formed cabinet OF consuitat-
on and advice OF the heads of departments upon all points
or general policy and Echouf confirming each 10 his O.
ihon i 7oriftng uion any su6jec reaft 90 The duties
q MS harncuar c6ice This has been done by every
President believe, without any scrupes upon the prn
cpe OF want of coordination. do not mean t. oues.
ton the propTety of this proceeding NV object is To
Compare the connection established by this clarse of the
constitution, between the Executive and principal oi=
GERS OF departments, and that, by another clause be~
tween the Executive and the Senate.
BY the same section and article this power IS given
to the executive lie shall! have power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate 10 make treaties
provided two thirds OF the Senators present Concur ana
he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con-
sent OF the Senate SbaH appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consus judges of the supreme
court, and all other officers of the United States whose
appointments herein otherwise provided for and
which Shall be established by law" In these respects
the most emphatca terms are used to establ sh the
concurrent jurisdiction between the Executive and Sens
ate. The President sbau nominate, ard by and with
the adUcc and consent OF the Senate shall appoint Sc
&c-
The term advice" is as emphatca a; one as could
be used make the Senate the cynynfufiouei tribunal
OF adUlce to the Executive, upon all subjects which
II relates. Bat the Senate is only adUse the Ex-
ecutve IN these respects, its is to be given to
Certain Executive acts ConSent implies the exercise
OF VIII and the exercise 1T wI, involves conse-
quences of responsibility. The plain language OF the
constitution each Senator this oil are not only to
adlise the President, but you give your
Senf 10 his GctS and tbcTcre 10 be re5lonSie
for Them TO the u0tioH, himself The re,atons thus
established, are ought be, of the most intimate,
and confidential nature, and in MY Judgement. it would
conduce very much the due exercise Of al ers.
agree upon mode by VIII ch an interchange Of ~
pnoD between the Executive and Senate might be had
at some intermediate stage Of 1t, deliberations upon Ex-
ecutiVe propositions, and before its final desicons THIS
Senate devised the mode on its part If investing CONE
mittee of its own body with all its rowers after re-
guessing arespecJfa Conference with the Executive an~
thorisng it, It's EaTf tkaf confcTencc The
President 1as deemed it bis duty decline this over
tuTe, and thus u deny all intermediate ateichanee of
opinion with the Senate upon Executive proposition
and To receive IT'S advice, eDiy by its final aCt 1t is
scarcely possible TO AVOID attaching this an air Of
defiance, upiendly in It's tendency that reciprocal
confidence, and corporation between the two tribunals
which the public interests seem mperioGsly to require
The President as anfrdfendeHt department Of the POI
vernnenr, had an uque tonable right decline the
overture, ard having, verify believe with the pur-
est motives, laid down the rule Of lis conduct l. will
doub less, be cheefuy ind hope, with undated cons
hdence, and good will acquesced in by the Senate d
ring the remaining part of his administration PerbaDs
TOO 1t VIII become the perm neat rule Of proceeding
between the two tribunals in all future times Bur
have yet to learn the correctness of the prncles upor
which the refusal was founded, and have also yet t6
learn that the executive authority of the ration win be
improved by it.
WIN, D. GILES.
Wig7yar1, October 23d, 1913.