Alexandria gazette, commercial and political. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1812-1817, 1813-07-01

Tertiary to Sweden
In examining this question ! shall
impose great restraints upon myself,
lest l might unintentionally be be-
trayed into expressions, which might
possibly be construed into a want of
respect to the course of policy at
tributed te the President of the u.
States. Let me then entreat you.
fellow.citizens, to reflect, and de-
termins for yourselves, whether I'M
der the circumstances existing on
the 9th of July last, the solicitation
of Sweden to ,interpose her good of
fees in cooperation with Russia, to-
obtain peace with Great Britain,
would have promoted the dignity, the
honor, or the interest O. the United
States7 Would it have had any ten
dency 10 procure peace On the Q.
etber hand. might it not have bad
some tendency to defeat ito own obs
iect I 1t should BIZ recoIleeted, that
whether INTERPRETATION Of Russia was
offered of her own voluntary motion,
or not, il was, by that day clearly
ascerLsined. that it was not sought
for by q. Britain and it was then
believed, that the overture was cool
ly received by her, and, if not
promptly rejected, was certainly not
promptly accepted. What benefit
then, could be nationally expectedby
soliciting the auxiliary intsrposition
Of Sweden : Might il not produce
injurious consequences? II wien
Great Britain, had manifested solit,
tie respect for the mediation Of Rus
sia, would the solicitudesof the Unit
ed States to enlist another power OF
com paratively subordinate influence,
in the measure. increase the reseect
Of Great Britain for the United
atates !? What Inference would IA
turalIy be drawn from such pro-
ceeding by Great Britain and by e.
very other power in Europe {! Ger
tainly an unhecoming solicitude for
peace, and an astonishing instability
in carrying on war. SO recently
proclaimed by the United states.--
Would impressions like these, be
likely to produce in Great Britain . .
disposition for pease9 Would they
not rather iadace her to conclude,
that the United States u~rv '"esrsng5 h
! .aas<ier salac@nsakn0ws ineapaolty to
conduct the war, and thus encourage,
her 10 prolongit for the purposes Ut
developing their embarrassments, &c
finally to reduce them to submission
Aud would not her mistaken views
Of the state Of public sentiment in
this country upon the subject OF the
war, enfnree this conclusion Re-
collect the haunting reply Of Lord
Castlereagh to the overture for peace,
made by the President few days
after the declaration of war, and no
doubt Will be left on the suhject.-
Besides, what persuasiyes could
Sweden address to Great Britain,
which could possibly influence her to
change her own yiows OF her own
maritime rights? What impress
sions would such proceeding be
likely to make on tho Government of
France Recolleet her late and
present relations with Sweden, and
the answer to the Question is obvious.
This part of the subject, however,
will not be further pressed.-Ihese
geReral points are intended to show
the general course of reflections,
which Influenced my condsct on the
occasion. and TO suggest TO others
all additional, and consequential con-
silerntions belonging % Tits pc
cuiiar dclieacy forbids more parti-
GUAR developement.
If, then. the Senate did believe,
that this measure flowed from the
uuIirbie spt;ni,ude Of the President
10 obtain peace, auu 7Cffat under ex.
listing circumstances, it could not
have that tendency, but might have
an opposite one, and be at the same
time attended with other. injurious
consequences, was it not bound by
the highest constitutional injunc.
tons to prevent its adoption 1t.
however, the Sena.s, when left to
conjecture, should BaS, mistaken the
real views and objects Of The Presi-
dent in this respect, as l sincerely
hope it did, ard il the higher Office
should have been conferred on Mr.,
Russell for his personal aceonmoda-
ton without any reference TO eventu- :
al powers or objects, as was tho case >
with the Swedish government and,
MIR. Kantzow, what more prop"