The enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1804-1815, 1813-12-18

insisted upon the res, alton Of the B urborn
family to the throne. the sine qua non
condition OF peace With Bonaparte. Subse-
quent 20 this, peace has been sought and SO
l'ciied on the part of France on the very
principle and terms which Great Britain
had iatimated or expressed rhe way il
which she eXtricated herself from this Iii
)eHma, vas that of consulting an Ally
! whom she secretly cntrcatcd-nut to ratfy
but TO reject. Under the evidence of
these facts and experience, may we nut re-
peat with particular emphasis and appli-
cation, the remark of Mr. Fox when he
said to the British Ministry, a." you have ia
ken up system calCuI ated to uncivize the
world--to destroy order-,o tranple on re
! hgion--to stiile in the heart, not merely
| the generosity Of noble senti,neat, but the
| affections of socia! nature and in the pro.
secutIon OF this system, you spread terror
ana detastation all around you ?" De,ermin-
! ed on war, it was her policy to unite with
RUSSIA and thereby destroy all the probabi
litles and hopes of peace. Similar motives
led her to the Peninsula to fight for peo-
! pie, against whom she had often tortured
her ingenuity tor an excuse in going to war,
ana committing rapaciiies upon her COM
meroe.t
In relation to the cause of war between
Russia and France, it is almost Impossible
to form conclusive and satisfactory opini
! on.
AS to manitestos, they are nst to be re-
gardcd with more respect and confidence
than the evidence OF party in his own be
halt. The remoteness of our stu alton from
the seat cf ali this devastation secures us
! from danger, aio il is matter of indiffsr
ence whether Alexander or Napoleon first
violated their secret or their known treaties
1t there was even a glmmcrng of hope
! a hp o nE h -,
come more happy and enlightened, it Ger
tanly would make strong and perhaps a
successful appeal IL our feelings ia Offering
our best wishes for their success But
when according to every data and every
circumstance upon which our best Cal
culatons can be formed, no change can be
expected which will alter their cundi
ton except from bitter to severe,' We
must give way TO the same principles VIII ch
guide other nations in wishing FIR those g.
vents which promise US most advantage
Now in regard 10 the existing contest in Eu
rope, there Cannot be more papahlc par
dox. more astonishing contradiction on
ourpart than to be fighting Crest Britaii
on the one continent and wishing he's success
on the other. 1T would seem as If she wert|
not match FOR US, and that We in the re-
dundance OF oar means and the vastness of
our strength wish for an accumulation If
treasure and power on her part that she may
,rt f,;sr s, rnT5bied to NEE rs IN the
those persons who wish for the success Il
the allies. And yet such is the plain ant
patural result from such zvished for s,a
Of things.
| We wish for peace, but finding that unat
tainabie, we are compelled togo to war, and
we wish to beat our enemies, but nctwith.
standing this we wish our enemies II be
Come able enough to beat ourselves. 1.-THE
contest were exclusively between the Pow
ers OF the Continent, it would give rise to =
very different question. and very probably
very different opinions would be entertaiae
But as q. Britain is pow carrying On war
against us OF y sanguinary, bai barous anG
DISCRIMINATING character in its operations
and IS infexiUiy determined .gainst peace,
and equally so upon our submission to cla;ns
which involve our national honor and rich,s.
we ought assuredly TO wish that he, D ,.wer'&
her means may be inadequate to her designs:
he wars OF Europe in which she is eneac
ed require diversion and diffusion of her
strength which otherwise might be collect
ed and united against US. To wish her sue.
cess there, is ultimately wishing success
here. II the Allies prove successful, they
VIII undoubtedly from principles of graft
| tude, Oh policy or according to soiee engage
ment to that effect give her all the aid in
their power for the purpose Of accomplish
| ing her views in America. With these re-
| sources and the immense accumulation she
would derive from them, we should be very
| apt TO give up the idea of conquering, for
that of being able to defend.
| II the Allies succeed, the main sdvanta
| ges which q. Britain will derive will BE-
those already stated independent of those
which she may contemplate from the de
teat and consequent weakness Of France.
| And these are the very advantages which
will enable her to multiply her wrongs and
| Injuries on us. There will be no CONSEQUENT
policy or duty on her part to retain her
Strength IN Europe for the purpo Of K. ep
ing IN subsection those she may have con
quered.
| Not so in regard to France. IF France
should be successful and the soyereigpt,es
Of Europe should fall PROSTATE before her, il
would require almost as much vigilance
aad power to keep them in the order and sn
0ordlnation he empei or m GIT wish as il did
indeed to reduce them to that condition.
Instead therefore Of entertaining ambitious
designs IN regard to nations Of another He
misphere, he would find himself obliged t.
do more, than We think he could do. in pre
venting those extensive regions from contin
ualiy risir5 in revolt, These considerations
IN addition to Others which must obviousIv
suggest themselves to every observer, lead
US 90 think that the fears EXPRESSED in regard
to BjDaParte in CAGE Of success are fe,Sned
and unreal. In regard to Greas Britain. we