Alexandria gazette, commercial and political. [volume] (Alexandria [Va.]) 1812-1817, 1813-03-11
From the Boston Cenfisel.
pra.pKs ON THE LAST cAMfAIGx IN

REMARKS ON THE LAST CAmfA
RUSSIA.
The friends of France in Europe, as
well as in this country, will undouetediy
deny the importance of the consciousness
which will follow from the defsa' "h.e"
the emperor has sustained. 10 juc9e
correctly of these consequences, II ID
Important, that we should settle 'hree
points.
First-What were the avowed & real
objects of the war.
Secondly Whether all The means
which Bonaparte could collect were
employed in the attainment OF those oo'
jects. -.
Thirdly-Whe,her he has entirely
failed in the accomplishment OF all the
objects for which the war was underta-
ken
After these questions have been dis;
cussea, there will still remain someve-
~ interesting topics, such as, whether
the failure of the emperor in accomplish
ing his views will be limited simply to
the restoration of the state OF things
which existed before the campaign -
Whether his ply steal power, and his
moral influence, OF that great and pow
eriul control he had over The minds OF
men will remain Observation-Disclosures
if the charms Of his invincibiiity be once
broken, the liberation Of many of the ma
tons vino have been as much restrain
ed by the terror OF his maine as by his
arms, will not be very probable con-
sequence land lastly, whether his
power over his own people is so firmly
established, that they will submit to be
the blind, passive, suffering instruments
of his ambition.
We propose to make some general
remarks under all these heads. We do
not aim to enlighten the wise, but to a
muse, and perhaps in some cases, to at.
ford information to that class Of readers
who have not had leisure or opportunity
10 inform themselves.
We shall found our arguments upon
facts proved by written documents, and
shall give no further credit to the Rus
sian accounts than as we think they are
supported by the French bullelins-by
the terror which appears to have Pervad-
cd every part Of France, and by facts
acknowledged by both parties, and which
cannot deceive us. For example, we
shall in all our reasoning take it for
granted, that Bouapaste did mean to make
Moscow his winter quarters in case A
lexander would not make peace. We
shall support this by French papers and
bulletin. alons. We shall assume ano-
Their fact, that being forced to leave
Moscow after having resolved to remain
there long after the city mas known to
be destroyed, he then determined to take
| up his winter quarters at Smolensk,
Witepsk, and along the Dwlna, but in
his 29th bulletin he AYERS he meant to
go back to Warsaw, and that he wason.
ly prevented from doing so by the DISC
bliging conduct OF one TchichagoH, who
refused him unciviily passage through
Minsk.
As to another material fact, we shall
assume, not on the authority of lord
Cathcart, who is our enemy, nor Of the
Cossac Platow, who seems to prefer
fighting to writing, nor of KutusoH, who
is though an old man very obstinate
enemy of France, but Oh the authority
of Beauharnois, cideyant son.in-law Of
Bonaparte, and now his vice monarch,
that the French artillery is destroyed
How great this loss is, We have only the
evidence of the Emperor, who declared
that at the great battle of Bo'odino,
nearly 1000 pieces of cannon poured
forth their thurtcrs on those heights.
We believe also, on the emperor's
declaration, this fact, that of $4,000 Ca
yalry which entered Russia, he could
only form four companies composed Of
officers, amounting to 600 men in all
give this merely as specimens ofthe
sort Of evidence upon which mean to
reason.
As to the importance Of these losses
to the French army, refer my readers
to the emperor's eloquent 29th bulletin,
for think it such, in which he will find,
that he considers that an army can nei-
Their stand, fight or fig, without artille-
~ or cavalry.
This is not exaggerated-l4aving thus
stated the nature of the evidence on
which rspose my reasoning, | shall
proceed to the execution of my plas
lst. Of the avowcd, apd real causes
of the present Russian war.
We have reason to fear that the !,
pretexts for the invasion of Russia by
France, are not sufficiently known to our
felIow-citizens. It's universally known
that France was the assailant; that she
invaded Russia with greater force
than has been collected in any one army
since the destruction of the Roman en-.
Dire hut II is not generally known what