Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-11-11
"a dollars per annum

established between the u. States and any
one OF these minor powers. a political =.
gent at any one OK them therefore. would
have nothing 10 DO, and il generally found,
that one placed abroad with Doshing 10 do,
will hnd business for himself, by doing mis-
Sskt AZ least e furnishes him with an in
GttTnent % do so, as he will readily con-
cinc.e. thai bis place will not be Of long
continuance, without something to DO. r.
stead 4 general change in this point Of pc
hey, therefore, It's proprisry is sanctioned,
D. both experience and reflection
A. then the object was OF a temporary cha
raoter, AMI Consisted IN the policy OF solicit
ing the iuterposition Of Sweden, as auxiliary
to the mediation Of Russia, for the purpose
OF obtaining peace with g. Britain, IL be-
comes a question deeply Interesting to the
power and dignity Of Tie U. States to deter
mine, whether on the 9th day of July last,
that policy ought TO have been adopted bv
the y. States that Being the day on viii, b
the Senate resolved, That /, is inexpedient
at tins time to send a minister pleEipoteuti-
airy 10 Sweden
In examining this question 1 shall impose
great restraints upon nv self, es5I might ua@
! Intentionally be betrayed into EXPRESSIONS,
which might possibly be Construed into a
want u respect TO- the course Of policy attri~
buted to the President Of the u. States. Let
me then entreat you, fellow citizens, TO re-
hcct and determine for Yourselves, whether
under the circumstances existing on the 9th
Of July last, the solicitation Of Sweden TO in
terpose her good SLICES in co-opera-ion with
Russia, to obtain peace with Great Britain.
would have promoted the dignity, the honor.
or the Interest OF the L. States: Wouia x
have had any tendency to procure peace
On the other hand, might it not have had
some tendency 10 defeat lis own objectl II
should be recolIecsed, that whether the me
diation of Russia vas offered If her own vo-
lunt-ry motion, or not, Il was, BV thai Hqy
clearly ascertained, that it was not sought
far by Great Britain and i was then be-
iieved, that the overture was cody received
by her, AMI, il not Pr, mptly rejected. was
cerainiv not promptly accepte d.-Whac
benefit then, could BIZ nationally expected
oy soliciting the auxiliary Interpretation ce
sweden! Might It not produce INJURIOUS
consequences f. when @. Britain had man.
i,eSted 80 little respect for the mediation az
Russia, would the solicituds of the United
states 20 enlist another power Of compara>
lively subordinate influence, in the measure,
increase the respect OF Great Britain for the
United States What inference would ma
turally be drawn from such proceeding by
Great Britain and By every other power in
Europe Certainly an unbeconing so.icitude
Tor peace, and an astonishing instability in
carrying on a war, SO recently proclaimed
by the United States.-IVOuld impressions
ike these, be likely to produce in Great Bri.
tam disposition for peace? Would they net
rather induce her 10 conclude, that the Il. g
were tailoring under some unknown inc2-
pacIty to conduct the war, and thus encou-
ge her to proiong it for the purposes Of
developing their embaTrassments, and final.
~ 10 reduce them TO submission And would
not her mistaken views OF the state of pub
lie sentiment in this country upon the SUBJ
Jec. Of the war, enforce this conclusion?
Kecollect the taumting reply of Lord Castles
rcagh to the overture tor peace made BY
the President few days after the declara-
ton OF war, and no doubt will be left on the
uDect-Besides, what persuasives could
Sweden address to Great Britain, which
could possibly influence her to change her
own views of her own maratime righsS
What Impressions would such proceeding
be likely 10 make on the Cove fnment Of
France? Recollect her late and present re,
lauons with sweden, and the answer to the
Question is obvious - This part of the sub
lect, however, will not be further pressed
These general points are intended 70 show
the general course of reflections, which in
huenced my conduct ON tie occasion, and 10
suggest to others, al additional, and conse-
queutial considerations belonging to tits
peculiar delicacy forbils more particular
developement
II, then, the Senate did believe, that this
measure flowed from the auiable sohcitude.
Of the President to- obtain peace, and thac
under existing circumstances, it could not
have thattendancy, bus night have an on
pOsite one, and be a, the same time attcns
ded with Their hilarious couseQ ueuces. was
iS not bound by the highest Constitutional
inJunctioHs Co prevent its adopdous il.
however, he Senate, when left 10 coniec-
tufc, should have mistaken the real views
and objects Of the Presidcu, in this respect.
as ] sincerely hope it did, and IL the higher
Office should have been conferred ON Mr..
Ruts 3. for hts personal accommodation With
out any reference co eventual powers or O5.
iects, as WAS thc case with the Swedish
government and Mr.. karlzow, WHIST more
proper reply could the Senate have made
20 the President. than ii did mAkc} What
course could be aore respectful 70 him, or
less Injurious to toe feelings oil MIR. Russell,
90 wit that it is az ffig tine neSpedient 20
send a minister Hieuifcfevf'ary 90 Sweden.
Othces IN this country, are puUIic property,
and intended for public use and not lor per,
suual benefit; aud i No. Russcll could not
find Il convenient 90 accept the Office the
public Interests required, 10 my Judgment,
the Senate could not have been justified 10
adUisiNg the President TO make one for his