Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-01-28

The general tenor of our Structures here
tofore, in relation to the probable success of
the French arms in Russia, will sanction the
idea that we have been of opinion that Ma
poleon would ultimately succeed in the main
object of his enterprise. There is nothing
in the late Bulletins that induces us to re-
lihqush that opinion.
But, what was Bonaparte's real object
We always supposedit to be the occupa-
ton of the chief ports of Russia on the Bal
tic, for the purpose ofAexSluding British
manufactures from the cpnttpent 1t was
chiefly because the empAroS Alexander,
would not exclude the hsfS 4pdize of En-
gland that the emperor oftbe French made
war upon him.
why Napoleon marched upon Moscow
before he moved upon St. Petersburgh is
a question which practical military men are
better qualified to answer than we are. 1t
was, in all probability, to prevent the Rus
sian monarch from having place of refuge
so magnificent as Moscow when he should
be driven from St. Pe:ersburgh and, per-
haPs, the better to secure to the French
troops the permanent possession of the Rus
sian coasts of the Baltic sea and its head wa
tiers. 1t is likely, when Bonaparte resolved
to seize Moscow, he also determined to
make it his winter quarters. The destruc-
IIOn OF city ny the fttSSldnS themselves
defeated this last intention; and on trial
the French gems. NAV have found that their
deposits Of provisions we're so far in their
rear as to endanger then supplies, unless
large army were kept in ACTIVITY during the
whole winter tn preserve communications.
Under these circumstances, the tenure of
Moscow would have been unwise and might
have been pernicous to the principal end in
view and the retreat from it, far from be
ing a measure brought on by the superior
| force of the Russians, must be viewed AS
step dictated by sound military Judgment
Indeed the battles and skirmishes that pre-
| coded and accompanied that event, were
| not Of a character to impress the mind with
| the belief that the French losses were so
| great as 20 compel the grand army TO fly
la truth all accounts concur, that the Rus
slams could not prevent the French from
moving in any direction they pleased.
| AS to the mere possession of Moscow, that
does not seem to us essentially important.
1t could never have entered the head OF
Bonaparte TO conquer the whole dominion
of Russia His design was, doubtless, TO
secure the principal posts and cities of that
empire, as auxiliary TO his main plan of cx
Guiding the English. Viewing the war in
this light, rctrogade movemtnt,upon solid
military principles, so far from being a
/ proof Of defeat and disaster, is in effect, the
best assurance Of ultimate triumph.
This, we believe, is the first time that Ma
| poleon ever retreated in form. His ability
is now as Conspicuous in that as in battle
The Cossacks, it is true, have harassed his
| wings and his rear; bat such petty obsta-
clcs, generally speaking. cannot impede his
main intention of setting himself down for
winter quarters ia more advantageous pc.
sition, and waiting the opening of the spring
The Poles, who have nothing to hope from
the Russians, and nothing to lose by the Fri