Virginia Argus. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1796-1816, 1813-11-11
Prom the National Jnteltgeneer.
THE SEAT OF WAR.

kVerN eve ~ now attentlVelr,Urected TO the one
ratohs ~ our army on the frontier, IN which quar-
| ter the Campaign must soon close for already has
| the ground in that quarter been covered by fall
of snow more than a foot deep. We are left in
tai uncertainty, from the movements OF the army.
which appear to have been made with n direct view
to battle the enemy ad if they laiI in that object,
have at leas, the effect of creating aud keeping
live very various coniectures among ourselves as
| to its ultimate destination.
Ii is very seldom that presume to obtrude on
the attention o. our readers our specuations mil
itary matters, with which we profess TO have very
little acquaintance hut we cannot refrain from Of
fering a few observations the prospects at the
seat OF war.
dent always cxccp ed, to which the enemy is equal
~ liable with ourselves, army will, by the 18th
OF this month, be concentered at Montreal AID
will before the lst day of July be in possession
of Quebec.
Ii our Northern Army is inferior in point Of num-
hers and equipment To the extent of our wishes the
British garrison ut Kingston ought to- be captured
as well as the naval force on Lake Ontario, before
General Wilkinson descends the st. Lawrence
Otherwise, this part of the enemy's forces rs we'll
as that at Montreal may possibly escape by forced
marches To Quebec, where they woula materially
add to the main army of the enemy. II, however,
we arc sufficiently strong 10 meet, with Decided ad.
vantage, the utmost force of the enemy when uni
ted OF which we can form 90 inIgeme I. being
neither informed to the amount OF our force or
that oil the enemy III this the garrison OF
time ago. * it may not be necessary for militia
ry commander to street is attention TO that post.
The only annoyance to be apprehcnded from ii is
by water, and this will soon be interrupted by the
season. The chances of escape Of the garrison
Quebec !essened, whilst such escape f Effected,
is readercd Hnmportant to for, the greater tie
number OF troops in Quebec, so long their force
is inferior to ours the greater will be the difficulty
| to the enemy to subsist them, during the seven
months suspension of intercourse which the cold
season always occasions.
| An impression seems 20 prevail generally that
! the fortress OF Quebec is mpregnabe to any assai-
| Liant but, from al the mforma ion we can collect,
J THIS is an erroneous idea as RESPECTS the Uni ed
States. The great strength of this fortress is cal
culate fora defence against attack from the sea OF
by water; yetit was once surrender cd to the arms
St Great britain, when held by France. But We
are induced 10 believe il is uutenabie against
| perior force by land from the United States. This
belief is founded on attentive enquiry into the to-
Biography of the country, into the strength OF the
Qualifications ON the land side, and by facts which
well Informed correspondents have placed within
our reach. These shall cons isely STATE, prem-
sing, that we feel no scruples at publishing them ;
/ because the enemy CLEAN from them. ii correct,
| no information which he has not already. He has
been longer engaged b. prac .icaly studying the to-
| biography Of Canaia. IL is 40 secret to them that
| we use m,isk-ts aud cannon that there is a river
| called he St Lawrence, aud Lakes champaign, On
| tario aud Eiic If they learn that we snow our
! strength so much the better They cannot alter
| what is retreat from Canada is impossible.
The present force OF the enemy there laust fall
| into our hands: MI Earope eoald mot save it, ANY
| future establishment there by Great Britain must
be Withdrawn before winter ann ually, OF share the
| same fate.
/, We proceed, then, to state our views of the sub
jet
| There arc no natural impedments to prevent or
materially retarTi the march of nm army from the
! Three Runs to the Plains of Abraham, which are
| as high as any part the upper town, the citadel
perhaps excepted. Here au attack may be made
| by bombaiiment. which could scarcely be endured
long by population of not more than fifteen thou
! sand, contained within walled town conpactly
built
! Without approaching nearer than mile the walls
Of Quebec, beseeinS army would lntefc ept a sup
plies M fuel provisions, and all other succor, FOR the
seven winter months. In this time would be re-
| CURED for the support of the place, including the
inhabitants, refugees aud the army, upwards of five
millions OF ratious aud twenty fve thousand cords
of wood. Ii these supplies should be materially de-
hcient, equalization must be made, CT the enemy
must come nut and give us batc, OF the result oil
| which no reasonable doubt can BE enjertained.--
The mere opening OF the gates to receive sueeors
would give us the command OF the main batteries,
| and of course Of The whsrves and river
Another mode of siege, We are informed may be
adopted If the place hold out It'll May and that IS,
by land and ioating batteries in WOii's Cove,
yered by Others on the heights and by batteries on
the oppositdF rqpeA From those on the Cove, the
wI'arves mayl4 rakki. except at the lower corner
wv " - Thlp"i6 "pu'u bS puht rum
| the Oppdt iel3lCso Thus all succor may be com
pleiely excluded until a knd force decidedly supe-
rior TO oars shall arrive, which in all probability
| cannot reach Quebec before July, If then There
IS no reasonable ground TO believe, least such is
| the opinion of well informed men, in which an
cline TO concur, that Quebec stand close siege
| ill that time against superior force
| Suppose the whole British force ia both the Ca
nadas, the 18th or 25th OF November TO be pla-
ced in this fortress, as in all human probability il
will be, except what shall capture orcut ofirom
rctreGt--whieh is the same thing in cifect--wlatc-
yer u may be on that day, it cannot be augmented
before July because none but avery large reinforce
| ment could eyade besieging army, and the place
cannot be approached by water before that time
! We, on the other had it neccss ~, can send re-
Inducements by Lake CsR.lngi;in ali wiuter--Jnd
with great CELEBRITY IN May & Juhe wa could forward
\ troops, which would be before hand with any that
the enemy conld send-Satllat, itappears 10 us, in
any event, The siege might be conveniently cODnu-
! Cd all summer, 10 fortune 10 the enemy Or accident
to ourselves should delay its fall beyond the month
| OF June.
These are in brief our views Of the subject, and
our reasons for believing that, before July next
! ~ soldier OF the enemy IL both Cauadas will DC
| captive or slain, and the territory completely In
! our possession.
The yslie and consequences of this acquisition III
| two provinces Of the enemy, surprising it 10 be
/ made, rs we doubt not it will, shall for
/ consideration IN future paper
NEW JERSEY.